The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2005) The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. Economics Letters, 90 (1) . pp. 116-121. ISSN 0165-1765 [Article] (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014)
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014
Abstract
We investigate, within a Cournot supergame, whether optimal punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible. We show that, for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale, the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to optimal penal codes.
Item Type: | Article |
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Research Areas: | A. > Business School > Economics |
ISI Impact: | 1 |
Item ID: | 549 |
Depositing User: | Repository team |
Date Deposited: | 27 Nov 2008 12:08 |
Last Modified: | 13 Oct 2016 14:11 |
URI: | https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/549 |
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