Towards a theory of decision-making with paradoxes.
Belavkin, Roman V. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2356-1447
(2006)
Towards a theory of decision-making with paradoxes.
In: Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Cognitive Modelling, 2006, Trieste, Italy.
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Abstract
Human subjects often violate the rational decision-making theory, which is based on the notion of expected utility and axioms of choice (Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). The counterexamples, suggested by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961), deserve special attention because they point at our lack of understanding of how humans make decisions. The paradoxes of decision-making are particularly important for the ACT-R theory which currently relies on expected utility. The paper presents two alternative methods: a random prediction method that uses subsymbolic computations and a method that uses symbolic reasoning for qualitative decision-making. Both methods are tested on ACT-R models of the paradoxes, and the advantages of each method are discussed.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Research Areas: | A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence group |
| Item ID: | 5 |
| Useful Links: | |
| Depositing User: | Repository team |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Sep 2008 10:46 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Nov 2022 02:12 |
| URI: | https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/5 |
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