Stock co-movement and governance bundles: does the quality of national governance moderate this relationship?

Egwuonwu, Ambrose, Lodh, Suman ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4513-1480 and Nandy, Monomita (2021) Stock co-movement and governance bundles: does the quality of national governance moderate this relationship? International Journal of Finance and Economics . ISSN 1099-1158 [Article] (Published online first) (doi:10.1002/ijfe.2548)

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Abstract

In this study we examine if corporate governance, as a bundle, can better explain stock co-movement. To test the implication of governance bundles on stock co-movement, we consider a monitoring and incentive alignment bundle. Using 2659 firm–year observations from 321 firms listed on the S&P 500 from 2009-2017, we find that the governance mechanism bundle can enhance the ability of stock prices to integrate better firm-specific information, which reflects on stock co-movement. In addition, we find the existence of a complementary relationship between National Governance Quality and a firm’s board monitoring. This also helps in explaining the puzzle of stock co-movement. The findings will extend the understanding about the co-movement related literature mentioned in the corporate governance and corporate finance research. The findings are also helpful for decision makers and policy makers involved in the efficient controlling of stock co-movement.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Accounting and Finance
Item ID: 31854
Notes on copyright: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Egwuonwu, A, Lodh, S, Nandy, M. Stock co‐movement and governance bundles: Does the quality of national governance moderate this relationship? Int J Fin Econ. 2021; 1– 19, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2548. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
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Depositing User: Suman Lodh
Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2021 16:43
Last Modified: 21 Feb 2021 19:59
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/31854

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