Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits

Mavridis, Christos ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1146-958X and Serena, Marco (2021) Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits. European Journal of Political Economy, 67 , 101961. pp. 1-19. ISSN 0176-2680 [Article] (doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101961)

[img]
Preview
PDF - Final accepted version (with author's formatting)
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0.

Download (581kB) | Preview

Abstract

We analyse a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the benefit of the favorite public policy to differ across groups and impose an intuitive refinement, namely that voting probabilities are continuous in the cost of voting to pin down a unique equilibrium. The unique continuous equilibrium depends on a key threshold that compares the sizes of the two groups.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 31002
Notes on copyright: © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Christos Mavridis
Date Deposited: 22 Sep 2020 12:14
Last Modified: 29 Nov 2022 17:59
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/31002

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Statistics

Activity Overview
6 month trend
2Downloads
6 month trend
42Hits

Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.