Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits

Mavridis, Christos ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1146-958X and Serena, Marco (2020) Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits. European Journal of Political Economy . ISSN 0176-2680 [Article] (Accepted/In press)

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Abstract

We analyse a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the benefit of the favorite public policy to differ across groups and impose an intuitive refinement, namely that voting probabilities are continuous in the cost of voting to pin down a unique equilibrium. The unique continuous equilibrium depends on a key threshold that compares the sizes of the two groups.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 31002
Notes on copyright: © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Depositing User: Christos Mavridis
Date Deposited: 22 Sep 2020 12:14
Last Modified: 24 Sep 2020 05:00
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/31002

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