Ecological psychology, radical enactivism and behavior: an evolutionary perspective

Dickins, Thomas E. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5788-0948 (2021) Ecological psychology, radical enactivism and behavior: an evolutionary perspective. Behavior and Philosophy, 49 . pp. 1-23. ISSN 1053-8348 [Article]

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Abstract

Ecological psychology and enactivism are close relatives in that they share an interest in positioning the behaving organism as an active agent and in interpreting this with reference to ecological and evolutionary ideas. But they also differ in their uses of biology and the concept of information. I review these uses, relate them to ideas in behaviorism, and conclude that a version of enactivism, championed by Daniel Hutto and colleagues, is the more viable hypothesis. I extend this radical enactivist effort into evolutionary enactivism as an exercise in parsimonious theory building that aims to avoid essentialism.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > School of Science and Technology > Psychology > Behavioural Biology group
Item ID: 30948
Notes on copyright: Behavior and Philosophy, 49, 1-23 (2021). © 2021 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies.
Reprinted /reproduced with the permission of the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies.
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Depositing User: Tom Dickins
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2020 15:00
Last Modified: 20 Apr 2022 05:21
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/30948

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