Pay for performance with motivated employees
Cerrone, Claudia 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1551-6723 and Manna, Ester
(2018)
Pay for performance with motivated employees.
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 18
(1)
, 20170190.
ISSN 1935-1682
[Article]
(doi:10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190)
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Abstract
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords (uncontrolled): | adverse selection, intrinsic motivation, individual and team incentives, D03, D82, D86 |
| Research Areas: | A. > Business School > Economics |
| Item ID: | 30774 |
| Notes on copyright: | © 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com - https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190 The published article is made available in this repository in accordance with the publisher's policy - https://www.degruyter.com/page/repository-policy |
| Useful Links: | |
| Depositing User: | Claudia Cerrone |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Aug 2020 08:35 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Feb 2022 10:38 |
| URI: | https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/30774 |
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