Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

Capraro, Valerio ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0579-0166, Schulz, Jonathan and Rand, David G. (2019) Time pressure and honesty in a deception game. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 79 . pp. 93-99. ISSN 2214-8043 [Article] (doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.01.007)

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Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 28838
Notes on copyright: © 2019. This author's accepted manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Depositing User: Valerio Capraro
Date Deposited: 22 Jan 2020 10:41
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2020 14:37
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/28838

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