Labour market enforcement in the 21st century: should whistleblowers have a greater role?

Lewis, David B. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8059-0773 (2019) Labour market enforcement in the 21st century: should whistleblowers have a greater role? Industrial Relations Journal, 50 (3) . pp. 256-276. ISSN 0019-8692 [Article] (doi:10.1111/irj.12251)

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Abstract

Labour market enforcement can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms. On the basis that inspectorates in the UK have been under‐resourced historically and that reliance on self‐regulation is particularly objectionable in sectors that have a record of providing low pay and poor working conditions, this article explores the potential for using whistleblowing by both workers and non‐workers as a method of enforcing labour standards. The author believes that, in principle, policing by inspectors working in conjunction with unions is particularly important in industries where small firms are prevalent and individuals may feel particularly vulnerable to retaliation if they speak up. Nevertheless, given the low likelihood of government inspections and low levels of unionisation in the private sector, it is suggested that enhancing the protection given to whistleblowers who report suspected wrongdoing might deter employer non‐compliance and prove cost effective.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > School of Law
Item ID: 26568
Notes on copyright: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Lewis, D. ( 2019) Labour market enforcement in the 21st century: should whistleblowers have a greater role?, Industrial Relations Journal, 50, 256– 276, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12251. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
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Depositing User: Jisc Publications Router
Date Deposited: 10 May 2019 09:43
Last Modified: 14 Jul 2021 11:20
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/26568

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