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‘Dharma and the Enjoined Subject:

Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the Study of Ritual’

OCMS, Ph.D

July 2018

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an enquiry into the conception of dharma by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras with the aim of arguing for its contemporary relevance, particularly for the scholarship on ritual. It seeks to do this by offering a hermeneutical re-reading of the text, primarily by investigating the theme of the relationship between subjectivity and tradition in the discussion about dharma, and bringing it into conversation with contemporary discourses on ritual.

The central argument that is proposed in this thesis, based on this re-reading, is that Jaimini’s conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice that is centred on the enjoinment of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. This argument, which places subjectivity and tradition at the heart of the explanation of Vedic practice, is then discussed with the scholarship on ritual in order to indicate its contemporary relevance.

Therefore, the explication of the central argument, which is based upon the insights gleaned from this hermeneutical re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras, will be broken down into two main aims. The first aim will attempt to demonstrate that the significance of Jaiminian enquiry lies in its conception of dharma as an embodied traditionary practice that possesses the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. The second aim will attempt to demonstrate that this re-reading of Jaimini’s enquiry can offer both substantive and methodological insights to the contentions within the contemporary study of ritual. Jaimini’s conception of dharma enables me to introduce the notion of subjectivity at the heart of the explanation of ritual and allows the possibility of re-imagining a way beyond the reductionist explanations of ritual in contemporary scholarship.
‘Dharma and the Enjoined Subject:

Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the Study of Ritual’

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

July 2018

Oxford Centre for Mission Studies
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed

Date

27th July 2018

STATEMENT ONE

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote.

Other sources are acknowledged by midnotes or footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Signed

Date

27th July 2018

STATEMENT TWO

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27th July 2018
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

MAPPING THE JOURNEY

PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā,¹ which is based on Jaimini’s seminal text known as the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, is a school of thought in Indian philosophy whose stature and nature of enquiry, particularly in light of its close connection with the elaborate practice of sacrifice in late Vedic times, has been a point of contention. The Mīmāṃsā has been generally observed in modern scholarship as a system of thought or a body of doctrines that is a ‘reasoned investigation of the earliest portions of the Veda’,² a ‘science of interpreting sentences’³ and a ‘scholastic tradition’ that is ‘dedicated to the study of the language of the veda’⁴; however, it has also been simultaneously dismissed as an ‘orthodox’ tradition that is contemporarily irrelevant,⁵ and its credibility as one of the sad-darśanas⁶ in Indian philosophy has often been treated with suspicion. As Biderman poignantly noted:

Mīmāṃsā has suffered many contemptuous attacks both in India and the West. It has been condemned by “spiritualists” as a sterile, mechanistic, dogmatic ritualism. It has often been

¹ The Pūrvamīmāṃsā is known as ‘prior enquiry’ as opposed to Uttaramīmāṃsā which is known as ‘posterior enquiry’. The general term commonly used by scholars for the former is Mīmāṃsā and the latter is Vedānta. See G Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, ed. S Radhakrishnan, Banaras Hindu University Press, Varanasi, 1942, pp. 4-5. Henceforth in this thesis, the term Mīmāṃsā will be used to refer to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. However, one must take note that the nature of the relation between the two is still a point of contention. The nature of this contention is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.
³ See GV Devasthali, Mīmāṃsā: The Vakya-śāstra of Ancient India, Bookseller’s Publishing, Bombay, 1959. See also U Panse, A Reconstruction of the Third School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Sri Satguru, Delhi, 1989, p. 4.
⁶ Sad-darśana is generally known as the six-systems or six-schools of Indian philosophy namely Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. These six-systems are generally known as the āstika schools that regard the Veda as authoritative as opposed to the nāstika schools that disregard this claim, such as the Buddhists, Ājīvikas and Jains.
condemned by philosophers, both Western and Indian, as a rigid, narrow-minded school, whose contribution to Indian thought is at best marginal.\textsuperscript{7}

The ‘marginal’ interests that have shaped the works of modern scholars, both Eastern and Western, which I classify here into two general groups, are particularly noteworthy for their lack of clarity about the purpose of Jaimini’s \textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtras} and the paucity of investigation on the understanding and intelligibility of the Vedic world of sacrifice propounded by him. On the one hand, there are those who accept the Mīmāṃsā as a philosophical tradition even as they advance an anti-intellectual reading of its main theme of ‘ritual’,\textsuperscript{8} and on the other hand, there are those who take the Mīmāṃsā as an exegetical tradition that advances a science of language whose principles can be interposed across contexts.

As a school of Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā system has attracted very little attention in comparison to the other schools of thought. Garge argues that modern scholars on Indian philosophy have largely neglected the Mīmāṃsā system, and maintains that the number of scholars engaged in the field indicates that the Mīmāṃsā is one of the ‘less favoured \textit{darśanas}’ within Indian philosophy.\textsuperscript{9} According to him, those who do study the Mīmāṃsā system seek to introduce new themes while disregarding the ritual concerns as orthodox and redundant.\textsuperscript{10} Keith writes:

\textsuperscript{7} See S Biderman, \textit{Scripture and Knowledge: An Essay on Religious Epistemology}, Brill, Leiden, 1995, p. 183. Wilhelm Halbfass, Karl Potter, Surendranath Dasgupta and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan are scholars whose works are typical of the general philosophical attitude towards Mīmāṃsā i.e. an attitude that takes the doctrine to be predominantly mechanistic and ritualistic and therefore unworthy of serious philosophical discussion.

\textsuperscript{8} Arnold suggests that the Mīmāṃsā is discussed under the rubric of Indian ‘philosophy’ only because it is generally taken as ‘one of the six “orthodox” schools’ of Indian thought, but it has never been taken as a system of thought that has seriously contributed any ‘philosophical’ relevance. See D Arnold, ‘Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā’, \textit{Philosophy East and West}, vol. 51, no. 1, 2001, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{9} DV Garge, \textit{Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study}, Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute, Poona, 1952, p. v.

\textsuperscript{10} Garge argues that this is a tendency that is recognizable even amongst early commentators such as Kumārila and Prabhākara, who in their engagements with Śabara’s \textit{Bhāṣya}, dwelled at great lengths on topics such as the idea of ‘god’, the ‘reality of the external world’, ‘mokṣa’, even as they sought to establish the Mīmāṃsā as a \textit{darśana} in light of the new Nyāya and Vedāntic insights, which often
The details of the discussions have necessarily little value; they deal with incidents of sacrifices, which flourished only in the early days of the history of Mīmāṃsā, and in many cases the labor devoted to their investigation cannot but seem to us mis-spent.\textsuperscript{11}

Kane best captures the sense of this prevailing general attitude towards the Mīmāṃsā:

The doctrines of the early and principal writers on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā are rather quaint and startling. Their arguments about the eternality and self-existence of the Veda are fallacious and were not accepted even by other ancient Indian systems. Both Prabhākara and Kumārla have in their scheme no place for God as the dispenser of rewards or as the ruler of man’s destiny as being pleased with men’s prayers. They do not expressly deny the existence of God, but they assign to god or the deities mentioned in the Vedic texts a secondary role or rather practically no role at all. They raise yajña to the position of God and their dogmas about yajña seem to be based upon a sort of commercial or business-like system, viz. one should do so many acts, dispense gifts to priests, offer certain offerings, observe certain ethical rules and other rules of conduct (such as not eating flesh, subsisting on milk) and then the reward would follow without the intervention of God. There is hardly any appeal to religious emotions, there is no omniscient being, no Creator and no creation of the world.\textsuperscript{12}

The little that has been written about Mīmāṃsā in Radhakrishnan’s \textit{Indian Philosophy} (Vol 2) deals chiefly with the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the system, without any discussion about Jaimini’s reflection on Vedic practice:

It is unnecessary to say much about the unsatisfactory character of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as a system of philosophy. As a philosophical view of the universe it is strikingly incomplete. It did not concern itself with the problems of ultimate reality and its relation to the world of souls and matter. Its ethics was purely mechanical and its religion was unsound.\textsuperscript{13}

Dasgupta mentions that the Mīmāṃsā cannot be properly spoken of as a system of philosophy and only gave it cursory attention in his \textit{History of Indian Philosophy},\textsuperscript{14} and D’Sa argues that ‘the Mīmāṃsā is no more a living system and its name does not command much respect even among scholars, some of whom have gone to the extent of making it a sort of ancilla of the Uttarā Mīmāṃsā.’\textsuperscript{15} Dasgupta has stated that the Mīmāṃsā school no longer holds any interest even for the student of Indian

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{11} AB Keith, \textit{The Karma-Mīmāṃsā}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn, The Heritage of India Series, Delhi, 1978, p. 79.
\bibitem{12} PV Kane, \textit{History of Dharmaśāstra}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1968, p. 1217.
\bibitem{13} Radhakrishnan, \textit{Indian Philosophy}, vol 2, pp. 428-429.
\bibitem{14} The Mīmāṃsā receives a much shorter discussion (about one-third) as compared to the discussions accorded to the other philosophical schools such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta. See S Dasgupta, \textit{A History of Indian Philosophy}, vol 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 68-69.
\bibitem{15} FX D’Sa, R Mesquita & G Oberhammer, \textit{Hermeneutics of Encounter}, vol XX, De Nobili Research Library, Vienna, 1994, p. 75.
\end{thebibliography}
philosophy,\textsuperscript{16} and while the accusation might be far-fetched, the Mīmāṃsā school, particularly in contrast to the ‘more popular and influential Vedānta school’,\textsuperscript{17} continues to remain a school that is under-studied and under-appreciated, especially as ancient ‘Vedic sacrifices began to fall into disuse’.\textsuperscript{18} Ninian Smart’s assertion promptly captures the sense in which the Mīmāṃsā is often dismissed when he states that it is ‘the most archaic of the orthodoxies of India’.\textsuperscript{19}

As an exegetical tradition, the Mīmāṃsā discussions concerning the theory of sound and language, in light of the resurgence of the problem of hermeneutics and language have been explored to a considerable extent. These scholars turned to Śabara’s Bhāṣya (commentary) and the works of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on the tarka-pāda (sections on reasoning/philosophy) in particular, and sought to uncover a theory of language to establish the Mīmāṃsā as an exegetical system. The works of Gachter, Bhat, and Taber are a few examples.\textsuperscript{20} These topics then become the central focus of study, which while significant in their own terms, have largely taken the theme of ‘language’ and the ‘principles of interpretation’ out from their sacrificial context, and developed them independently as the major contributions of the system. McCrea observes that the ‘standard practice in general surveys of Mīmāṃsā…has been to draw a sharp distinction between “philosophical topics” (i.e. topics dealt with in the tarka-pāda) and “Mīmāṃsā topics proper” (i.e. the interpretative questions dealt with in the fifty-nine pādas of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra)’ where the latter topics are taken as having ‘minor

\textsuperscript{16} Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol 1, p. 406.
\textsuperscript{18} G Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Motilal Banarsidass, Allahabad, 1911, p. 8.
importance’ or are being ignored altogether as unconnected from the rest of the sūtras.\textsuperscript{21}

The rules and principles found in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras have been emphasized at the expense of the study of the system as a whole, and the ritual context within which these rules are made intelligible and effective have been sidelined. Within contemporary Mīmāṃsā scholarship, the contribution of the Mīmāṃsā understanding on ‘sound’, ‘word’, ‘grammar’, ‘semiology’, ‘linguistic analysis’ and ‘law’ have each become a central focus of study on their own. For example, the 25 essays collected in the momentous volume Studies in Mīmāṃsā edited by Dwivedi, have sought to take the Mīmāṃsā out of its ritualistic interpretations to make it a part of the ‘global’ philosophy of language and religion by classifying it under topics such as ‘epistemology’, ‘philosophy’, ‘grammar’, ‘meaning’ and ‘language’.\textsuperscript{22}

The concerns of these two ways of representing the Mīmāṃsā enquiry differ, in that the former consigns the Mīmāṃsā as a redundant system because of its perceived ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘ritualism’, and the latter tries to make the system relevant to the contemporary resurgence of interest in the problem of the philosophy of language. However, the nature of investigation that prevails in these groups reveal that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras have largely been taken as a corpus that is already constituted and closed, and ostensibly dead. This ‘objectivist’ reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras combined with the discarding of the structures of understanding that constituted the enactment of Vedic practice, remained distant to the ritualistic conception of dharma that was central for Jaimini’s constitution of the Mīmāṃsā. In both these accounts, there seems to be an underlying assumption that the nature of Mīmāṃsā enquiry can be discussed apart from Jaimini’s central concern of dharma and its ritual context, and that it is only by


distancing the discussion from the context of Vedic Brahmanical ritual that the Mīmāṃsā can be productively developed as a *darśana*.

Therefore, despite the importance and vitality of their work in light of the topics they had chosen to study, the selected interests that have contributed to the development of modern scholarship on Mīmāṃsā have not been able to provide insights about the nature of Jaimini’s enquiry. His reflections on the challenges of the Vedic world that confronted him and his defence of the practice of sacrifice as a tradition that demanded continued enactment was entirely disregarded. Despite their importance, these studies have also resulted in fragmenting the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, thereby relegating it to a collection of topics that are not discerned to have a common concern or purpose. Clooney, who has written an insightful monograph on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* of Jaimini, goes to the extent of claiming that the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* have not been understood in the ‘spirit’ in which they were written, neither by the commentators, nor by modern scholarship on Mīmāṃsā. He maintains that the text of Jaimini has remained unexplored as a whole, and thus makes his task a ‘rediscovering’ of and a ‘return’ to the *Sūtras* themselves. ²³ Although a few translations of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* in English by a handful of scholars can be found, namely by Jha, Sandal and Thadani, ²⁴ no comprehensive research has been done on the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā beyond these few translations, especially not in light of Jaimini’s central theme of ritual and dharma.

The aforementioned selective studies, while momentous and significant in their own right, have not sought to raise the question of ritual and tradition and, therefore, have

not been able to offer much with regard to the central theme that is propounded in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* - the enquiry into the nature of *dharma*. The rationale for the intelligibility of Vedic practice that Jaimini sets out to argue and develop in his *Sūtras* is consequently missed out. These studies contain certain presuppositions of their own which must be interrogated if one is to consider the Mīmāṃsā system more seriously, and its contribution as a philosophy of Vedic practice (ritual action) is to be recognized and put forward.

In providing this critical overview of Mīmāṃsā scholarship as an introductory background to the thesis, I highlight my interest in seeking to investigate the question of ritual and tradition in light of the central theme of *dharma* in Jaimini’s enquiry in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*. The overarching claim that I wish to propose and develop is that the Mīmāṃsā tradition, when read primarily through Jaimini’s concern for ritual and *dharma* in his *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, is best understood as a hermeneutical tradition that offers a philosophy of Vedic practice. It is a school of reflection in which *practice* is taken as the fundamental reality and, therefore, central in shaping and organizing the Vedic world. While the Vedic experience can be taken to be mediated significantly through language, the world, including the highest good in the Mīmāṃsā, is revealed and understood only through correct and responsible activity. Furthermore, understanding the Vedic world as ordered and organized around the practice of sacrificial ritual also allows me to account for the emergence of a ritual subjectivity, which in this thesis, is discussed as the mode through which the relevance of ritual as a traditionary practice is responsibly maintained and continued. Therefore, I wish to show that the type of intelligibility that is expressed in Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* through a study of his unique conception of *dharma* also calls for a revision of our very
understanding of what the Sūtras, as well as the Mīmāṃsā as a darśana, are primarily about.

**CENTRAL ARGUMENT AND TWO AIDS**

This thesis, then, is an enquiry into the conception of dharma by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras with the aim of arguing for its contemporary relevance, particularly for the scholarship on ritual. It seeks to do this by offering a hermeneutical re-reading of the text, primarily by investigating the theme of the relationship between subjectivity and tradition in the discussion about dharma, and bringing it into conversation with contemporary discourses on ritual.

The central argument that is proposed in this thesis, based on this re-reading, is that Jaimini’s conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice centred on the enjoinment of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. This argument, which places subjectivity and tradition at the heart of the explanation of Vedic practice, is then brought into conversation with the scholarship on ritual in order to indicate its contemporary relevance.

The explication of the central argument, which is based upon the insights gleaned from this hermeneutical re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras, will be broken down into two main aims. The first aim will seek to demonstrate that the significance of Jaiminian enquiry lies in its conception of dharma as an enjoined traditionary practice that possesses the structure of a hermeneutic tradition.

The specificity of this claim is that Jaimini’s conception of dharma, read through the theme of the enjoinment of the subject, enables me to account for the emergence and
transformation of a particular mode of being in the Vedic sacrificial world. The enjoinment of the subject is taken here as the responsible appropriation and enactment of a tradition’s practical rationality by the ritual subject. More precisely, the structure of transformation - which includes the three stages of desiring, appropriating and enacting - that gave rise to the subject of ritual injunction can be seen to be akin to the three-fold structure that constitutes a hermeneutic tradition.

Therefore, to give an account of Jaimini’s conception of dharma in light of the enjoinment and transformation of the subject is also to give an account of the nature of Jaiminian enquiry and his understanding of tradition. The explication of the structure through which this ritual subjectivity emerges in the Mīmāṁsāsūtras, thereby enables me to explicate the traditionary hermeneutical structure of Jaimini’s enquiry.

The second aim will seek to demonstrate that this re-reading can offer insights to the debates within the contemporary study of ritual. Jaimini’s conception of dharma enables me to introduce the notion of subjectivity at the heart of the explanation of ritual. Therefore, the insights gleaned from the discussion of the enjoinment of the subject i.e. the subject of ritual injunction who embodies and enacts the practical rationality of a tradition, allows the possibility of re-imagining a way beyond the symbolic and formalist reductionist explanations of ritual in contemporary scholarship. This, I argue, is a hermeneutical re-reading of the Mīmāṁsāsūtras.

**Dialoguing Traditions of Enquiry: Mīmāṁsā and Ritual**

As mentioned above, the main concern of the thesis is to explicate the unique ritualistic conception of dharma by Jaimini and critically engage that with contemporary discussions on the problematic of ‘ritual’ within the study of ritual. The rationale for choosing to dialogue these two traditions of enquiry is based on the following:
First, though the main project of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is concerned with the intelligibility of elaborate Vedic ritual in light of the over-arching theme of dharma, the Śūtras have been scantily studied as a source for understanding ritual either by the scholarship on Mīmāṃsā or the scholarship on ritual. The credibility of the Mīmāṃsā tradition has largely been treated with suspicion particularly because of its perceived ‘orthodoxy’ whose vast material on elaborate ritual details are claimed to be a redundant discussion that is irrelevant for contemporary discourse. This thesis may be seen as a fresh reading in that, it seeks to understand the nature of Jaimini’s enquiry by focussing primarily on the theme of dharma in the ‘historical and doctrinal’ context of Vedic ritual and tradition even as it seeks to present a ‘constructive reading’ of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras.25

Second, the choice to study the Mīmāṃsāsūtras through the parameters set by the scholarship on ritual will gain further relevancy due to correlations that can be argued to exist between Jaimini’s work and the issues raised by contemporary discussions on ritual. Jaimini’s conception of dharma as an enjoined traditionary Vedic practice therefore, will be able to critically engage with the contemporary understanding of ritual and contribute new insights to the contentions that exist within the study of ritual.

Third, the academic study of ritual, which is growing in its efforts to be an independent field of study known as ritual studies, is largely resourced and governed by the discourse predominant within the Western intellectual tradition. This thesis will seek to contribute critically to the understanding of ritual by introducing the discussions taken from an Indian intellectual tradition as its main resource, even as it seeks to dialogically participate in the debates within the Western academia.26

26 While it would be presumptious to assume that the study of ritual in the Western academia has not engaged with Indian materials, as the works of Staal, Heesterman, Humphrey and Laidlaw, to name a
Therefore, the two themes around which the investigation into Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and his conception of *dharma* is pursued can be stated as: (a) the nature of Jaimini’s enquiry into *dharma* and ritual, (b) and its contemporary relevance, particularly for the scholarship on ritual. Thus, this reading of Jaimini’s text brings together two traditions of thought - Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsā* tradition represented by his text, and the study of ritual represented by the Western scholarship on ritual. In other words, the reading of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the attempt to establish its contemporary relevance is conditioned by the contentions that arise from the study of ritual.

I have mentioned that the first main aim of this thesis is to argue that Jaimini’s conception of *dharma* can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice centred on the enjoinder of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess the structures of a hermeneutic tradition, and the second inter-related aim is to investigate the substantive and methodological contributions that may be explicaded from Jaimini’s enquiry in an attempt to offer insights for discussion in the scholarship on ritual. While Jaimini’s enquiry and the scholarship on ritual are two distant traditions of discourse, in that the former is more closely associated with Indology and the latter with the emerging multi-disciplinary ritual studies, the aim of this thesis is to bring them together in a form of dialogue. Therefore, the re-reading of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* in this thesis is both constrained and guided by the specific questions that I bring to it -

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few, have all gathered their substantive insights from Indian materials, these studies have often treated these materials as primarily ‘data’ against which they engage their theories. The contributions of traditionary reflexive discourses on rituals by practitioners such as Jaimini have not been engaged seriously as dialogue-partners in their enquiries. Michaels’s *Homo Ritualis* (2016) based on extensive textual studies and field-work in Nepal and India, is an exception in that it has attempted to present a ‘Hindu’ theory of ritual by drawing particularly on the *Mīmāṃsā* literature. The works of the authors mentioned above are the following: F Staal, *Rules Without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences*, Peter Lang, New York, 1989; JC Heesterman, *The Broken World of Sacrifice: An Essay in Ancient Indian Ritual*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993; C Humphrey & JA Laidlaw, *The Archetypal Actions of Ritual: A Theory of Ritual Illustrated by the Jain Rite of Worship*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994; A Michaels, *Homo Ritualis: Hindu Rituals and Its Significance to Ritual Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016.
questions drawn particularly from the contentions within the contemporary scholarship on ritual.

According to Bakhtin, ‘even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all), they will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent development of the dialogue.’

Flood develops this sense of ‘renewal of past meanings’ into a method of dialogical enquiry which shifts from a ‘plain sense’ of reading to one that goes beyond it to establish the ‘interpreted sense’ to seek for its contemporary relevance. He argues that while ‘the plain sense is the foundation upon which the interpreted sense is built’, the ‘plain sense is never enough for a particular situation’ and maintains that the ‘interpreted senses are always necessary to bring some meaning to life for some particular community of readers’.

Therefore, for Flood, ‘a dialogical reading’ is one ‘that stands outside of the texts while partially entering into them in an act of imagination’ and allowing their ‘reconstruction and reconfiguring in a new mode’.

Following Flood, I argue that as important as it is ‘to maintain discourses within the boundaries of tradition in order for them to retain meaning and relevance for particular communities of readers’, it is equally ‘germane, enriching and challenging to engage theologically and philosophically with thought systems outside of those discourses’.

This renewal of past meanings is enabled by hermeneutical traditions of enquiry, where such an enquiry entails not ‘a discovery of the past’ but a ‘construction of the past’ from ‘a particular perspective or standpoint’.

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29 Ibid., p. 17.
30 Ibid., p. 6.
31 Ibid., p. 15.
sense of the ‘encyclopaedist’ or universalist understanding of neutrality as a singular and unbiased claim to truth and knowledge, but rather seeks to be dialogical. Following MacIntyre’s thesis on tradition and enquiry, I will argue for the importance of recovering the ‘conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition’, which enables the past to be continually reconfigured in light of new readings, beyond just discovery and description.

Building upon the works of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics, this thesis is informed by ‘phenomenological hermeneutics’ and will build on the dialogical method of research as espoused by Flood in his major works as the conceptual lens and framework. Phenomenological hermeneutics is succinctly described by Flood as the turn from the ‘philosophy of consciousness (that developed from Descartes through Kant up to Husserl) to the philosophy of the signs and languages’ where the subject of knowledge, instead of being a detached observer, is situated in a particular historical and social context, in which ‘understanding’ is negotiated in a dialogical relationship of intersubjectivity. The enquiry is phenomenological in that it allows the structures of tradition to show themselves through the interplay of the text and the subject in the stages of enjoinment, and it is hermeneutical in that it recognizes the historical nature of

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35 The term ‘phenomenological hermeneutics’, which I have borrowed from Paul Ricoeur, is used here to acknowledge that this thesis accepts the Ricoeurian critique of the Husserlian phenomenology. For Ricoeur’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology, see P Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, trans. K Blamey & JB Thompson, Continuum, London, 2008, pp. 23-50.
enquiry and the importance of the situatedness of an understanding of ritual as located within a tradition.

THE PATH AHEAD

The central argument will be developed through the following four main chapters with each chapter contributing to the elaboration of the two aims that guide the thesis. The hermeneutical re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is constrained by the questions that I bring to the text, particularly through a detour of the problematic on ritual, and the insights that it offers dialogically.

Chapter Two offers an introduction to the three strands of enquiry that make up the conceptual framework guiding the development and explication of the central argument in the following chapters. I will begin with a brief introduction on Jaimini and his text – the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. I will then explicate the tripartite conditions of understanding which constitute the structure of a hermeneutical tradition of enquiry as: (a) the notion of a shared telos, (b) the authority of an internal rationality, and (c) the institution of an answerable practising community. Each of these themes will form the conceptual lens through which I re-read the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, and will also inversely enable me to argue that Jaimini’s vision and approach in his conception of dharma and explication of the enjoinement of the subject can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. I will also map the debates in the contemporary discourses on ritual with an attempt to highlight that it is constituted by three interrelated contentions about representation, rationality and articulation, each of which is concerned with the larger problem of a reductionist form of enquiry. My reading of Jaimini’s text and the explication of the stages of enjoinement of the subject in his conception of dharma in the following chapters will enable me to seek insights to address these debates stemming from
contemporary discourses on ritual. Finally, I will end the chapter with a brief overview of how the notion of ritual and tradition can be conceptually related to one another to claim that an investigation of these two themes is not so distant as to inhibit conversation.

In Chapter Three, I will investigate Jaimini’s introduction of dharma as the pursuit of his enquiry primarily by looking at the theme of sacrifice and subjectivity. I focus on the invisibility of dharma and the emergence of the Mīmāṁsā subject in light of the problem of meaning within the study of ritual. I claim that the debate concerning the question of meaning in the scholarship on ritual is limited because the ritual actant and his impulse towards meaning in the practice of sacrifice is not taken into consideration. I use this claim to argue, through a detour on the problem of the invisible and Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion, that the tradition-constituted subjectivity becomes the mode through which the invisible - the invisibility of meaning and the telos of tradition - is revealed. With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I seek to argue that Jaimini’s engagement with the notion of the invisible dharma within the context of the phala-governed Vedic sacrifice, introduces the birth of the Mīmāṁsā subject who desires the telos of tradition. The nature of this desire, in turn allows me to account for the interplay between Jaimini’s concern for the unbroken tradition of Vedic sacrifice and the pursuit of dharma. With regard to the second aim of the thesis, the understanding of the invisible as a human ‘existentiell’ allows me to account for the notion of sacrifice as a traditionary practice that is intrinsically meaningful, and which is

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38 To discuss the noun ‘Existence’ (‘that something is’), Heidegger uses two related words, Existentiell and Existentielle, as descriptive characteristics of Dasein’s being. An ‘existentiell’ is a categorical or ontical characteristic (an understanding of all that which relates to one’s existence) while an ‘Existentielle’ is an ontological characteristic (the structure of existence). While ‘existentiell’ is taken to pertain to Dasein as an entity, ‘Existentielle’ is taken to pertain to the essential feature of Dasein, i.e., an element of the being of Dasein. For a detailed elaboration and analysis of these terminologies, see S Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 16, 32, 37-38, 70-74, 116-117.
accessible primarily through the ritual subjectivity (desiring subject) upon which it is ultimately grounded.

In Chapter Four, I will develop Jaimini’s explication of the authority of the Veda in light of the discussion on ritual and rationality, particularly by looking at the limitations of reductionist approaches within the study of ritual. I claim that a reductionist enquiry in the human sciences, which includes the modern invention of ‘ritual’, is propelled by a Western universal rationality whose presuppositions are often uncritically borrowed from the scientific methods of enquiry. I use this claim to argue the importance of identifying tradition-constituted rationalities. With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I seek to demonstrate that Jaimini’s development of an intelligible internal rationality, through his unique conception of the authority of the Veda as an infallible injunction oriented towards enactment, allows me to identify the structure of a revelation-appropriation mechanism which constitutes the sacredness of the text and tradition. This demonstration of the authority of the Veda can then be seen as both an example of a tradition-constituted rationality and also a rejection of any notions of a universal rationality. With regard to the second aim of the thesis, Jaimini’s development of an internal rationality and his dialogical constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and critique of foundationalist epistemologies will be offered as an example of a way forward beyond reductionism to an appreciation of the complexity of an internal rationality governing a particular tradition.

In Chapter Five, I will explicate Jaimini’s development of the realization of dharma in light of the discussion on the question of praxis and the articulation of ritual, primarily by looking at his elaboration of the nature of Vedic practice and its intrinsic relationship with dharma. With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I argue that Jaimini’s discussion of the event of sacrifice through the lens of ‘enjoinment’ and ‘answerability’ allows the
reconceptualization of ritual as a narratively structured traditionary practice that is both answerable and repeatable. This reconceptualization of ritual showcases both the textuality of Vedic practice and the agency of the enjoined subject and discloses Jaimini’s unique ritualistic conception of dharma. With regard to the second aim of the thesis, I provide a brief genealogical sketch of the larger action-theory dichotomy that pervades the enquiry into ritual to highlight that the articulation of ritual through the lens of this dichotomy is problematic because the answerability of an embodied inhabitation or ‘the life of practice’ is not given due consideration. I claim that Jaimini’s notion of practice is able to contribute an understanding of ritual that is not entangled in the theory-action dichotomy but one that is historically situated and answerably appropriated and maintained.

Finally, in Chapter Six, I will draw my conclusions together particularly in light of the central argument of the thesis and its two main aims that have been introduced. I will bring the contributions of each of the chapters together in light of the significance of Jaimini’s enquiry and his conception of dharma, and the implications of this study for the contemporary discourse on ritual. The conclusion of the thesis will be followed by an Appendix, which lists all the cited Sanskrit transliterated sūtras from Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras.

**SUMMARY**

I began this introductory chapter with a brief overview of the nature of scholarship concerning the Mīmāṃsā tradition, particularly in light of the negligence with which the central theme of dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras has been received both in India and the West. I highlighted that the marginal scholarship that studied the tradition generally sought to distance itself from what it perceives as the ‘orthodoxy’ of Vedic Brahmaṇical
‘ritualism’ that Jaimini discussed in elaborate detail in his text. I claimed that this sideling of the ritual concerns, which makes up the majority of the discussions in the Sūtras, limited the significance of their studies primarily in that they were unable to explore the central concern of Jaimini’s enquiry – the conception of dharma that sought to validate the intelligibility of the Vedic practice of sacrifice.

It is within the context of this background that I then proposed a hermeneutical re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras as the primary investigation of this thesis, whose two overarching aims include: (a) to demonstrate the significance of Jaiminian enquiry by explicating the unique conception of dharma in light of the internal concern of ritual and tradition, and (b) to offer insights to the scholarship on ritual by introducing the theme of ritual subjectivity at the heart of the discussion, as a way of indicating the contemporary relevance of Jaimini’s enquiry.

I then introduced the manner in which I seek to discuss the two traditions of enquiry by highlighting the dialogical method that builds upon the works of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics, and I concluded the chapter by providing a brief outline of how each of the following main chapters will be discussed, especially in light of the two aims of the thesis.
CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
JAIMINI, HERMENEUTICS AND RITUAL

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I seek to lay out the conceptual framework necessary for this thesis. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, the central argument advanced is that Jaimini’s conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice centred on the enjoinment of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. The explication of the enjoined subject in light of Jaimini’s concern for dharma then allows me to develop an account of a ritual subjectivity which becomes the embodiment of an unbroken tradition. It is this notion of subjectivity which is excavated from Jaimini’s enquiry that allows me to propose the re-imagining of ritual as a traditionary practice.

The discussion of this central argument is broken down into two aims that seek to demonstrate firstly, that the significance of Jaiminian enquiry lies in its conception of dharma as an enjoined traditionary practice that possesses the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, and secondly, that this can offer both substantive and methodological insights to the contentions within the contemporary scholarship on ritual, particularly through the introduction of the idea of the enjoined subject as an explanation of ritual subjectivity.

With regard to the first aim, I will read key themes concerning subjectivity, text, and action from Jaimini’s discussion of dharma in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras, with the aim of arguing that the interconnectedness and interplay between them in the stages of enjoinment can be seen to disclose the structures of a hermeneutic tradition. However, before I delve into the enquiry into dharma, I have to develop a preliminary background
understanding of Jaimini and his text. This preliminary discussion will not be an attempt to provide a historical or intellectual biography of Jaimini, although a brief sketch is included, but rather, to locate the Mīmāṁsāsūtras by sketching the background of the text to help inform my mapping of Jaimini’s epistemological position, and to argue that his approach towards an understanding of dharma is already implicitly hermeneutic in orientation.

I will begin with a brief description of the Mīmāṁsāsūtras, followed by an overview of the Mīmāṁsā corpus. I will briefly highlight the readings of the Mīmāṁsāsūtras by the commentarial tradition, with the intention of highlighting the argument that the Mīmāṁsāsūtras have generally been studied apart from the context of their ritualistic concern, and that Jaimini’s concern for the sanctity of Vedic practice, the performance and transmission of which is seen as vital for the maintenance of tradition and the actualization of dharma, have largely been sidelined.

In order to argue that Jaimini’s vision and approach in his conception of dharma can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, I will need to highlight the tradition from where this understanding of ‘hermeneutic’ is borrowed and, therefore, I will briefly introduce Western hermeneutical traditions of enquiry, particularly post-Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics.¹ This introduction will lay out the structure of a hermeneutic tradition of enquiry, which will also serve as the conceptual lens through which I re-read the Mīmāṁsāsūtras. This hermeneutic lens will not only enable me to argue that Jaimini’s enquiry and conception of dharma possessess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, but also enable me to discuss the disclosing of this

¹ By ‘post-Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics’ I am referring here specifically to the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre and Mikhail Bakhtin, and particularly their discussions on the theme of text, action and tradition respectively.
structure in the enjoined subject as providing substantive and methodological insights to the contentions that are raised in the contemporary scholarship on ritual.

With regard to the second concern, I will seek to draw insights from Jaimini’s conception of dharma that can offer contributions to the ongoing discussions within the academic study of ritual. I will primarily discuss the problematic with regard to the study of ritual by mapping the contemporary debates on ritual with a view to show that it is constitutive of three contentious discussions about representation, rationality and articulation. Each of these contentions is briefly presented in each of the three core chapters as a way of setting the parameters for the questions that are pursued in the respective chapters. Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras are read with a view to seek for ‘insights’ to the ‘queries’ that arise from the contemporary study on ritual. Jaimini’s account of the centrality of practice and the importance of the ritual actant in his enquiry into the nature of dharma offers an explanation of ritual subjectivity in a way that contemporary scholarship on ritual has yet to seriously consider.

It is here that the hermeneutic tradition, and particularly the dialogical approach that stems from it, will be used to serve as a guide towards effectively engaging both the Mīmāṃsāsūtras as well as the theories of ritual in conversation to provide an attempt at the possibility of developing ‘mutual answerability’. The intention is to see if a hermeneutical re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras is able to offer insights and contribute to each of these contentions discussed within the academic study of ritual.

2 Using the lens of post-Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics, I will primarily build on the dialogical method as espoused by Gavin Flood in the field of religious studies for the conceptual tools necessary to dialogue a traditionary reflexive discourse on ancient Vedic practice with contemporary scholarship on ritual.

3 Bakhtin develops the notion of ‘mutual answerability’ in the sense of an ‘inner interpenetration’ between ‘life’ and ‘art’, and it is the possibility of this sense of interpenetration that I wish to explore for bringing Jaimini’s enquiry and the academic study of ritual into conversation. See MM Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, M Holquist & V Laipunov (eds), trans. and notes V Liapunov, Texas University Press, Austin, 1990, p. 1.
Therefore, the tasks for this framework are: (a) to locate the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, (b) to present a brief overview of the Mīmāṃsā corpus with the intention of highlighting the paucity of discussions concerning ritual and tradition within Mīmāṃsā scholarship, (c) to give an overview of the hermeneutic tradition with the intention of highlighting its conceptual structure, (d) to identify the key components of the contemporary discussions on ritual, and (e) to establish the conceptual ties between ritual, tradition and subjectivity.

**LOCATING THE MĪMĀṂSĀŚŪTRAS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW**

Both the Mīmāṃsākas and Mīmāṃsā scholars took the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini as the foundational text upon which the Pūrvamīmāṃsā as a darśana was formulated. The text consists of twelve adhyāyas (chapters), which are divided into sixty pādas (sections), and which are further divided into several adhikaraṇas (topics). They comprise approximately 2745 short statements or aphorisms, referred to individually as a sūtra. The term sūtra, which literally means ‘thread’, and is often translated as

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4 Mīmāṃsākas are the adherents of the Mīmāṃsā school of thought.

5 The Pūrvamīmāṃsā, which is taken to be one of the six darśanas in Hindu philosophy within the āstika tradition, is taken by some scholars to be concerned primarily with the investigation of the ‘antecedent portions of the Veda’. The tradition of the Mīmāṃsā darśana in ancient India is believed to be the ‘first’ and ‘only rigorous philosophical interpretation of the Vedic sacrificial ritual’. See Bhatt, ‘Mīmāṃsā as a Philosophical System: A Survey’, in RC Dwivedi (ed.), *Studies in Mīmāṃsā*, p. 3. Keith also mentions that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are most possibly the earliest of the six darśanas preserved today. See Keith, *The Karma-Mīmāṃsā*, p. 5.

6 According to Halffass, in classical Indian philosophical literature darśana means simply ‘philosophical view’ or ‘opinion’ or ‘belief system’. He proposes this against the interpretation of the word taken to mean ‘insight’, ‘intuition’, or ‘vision’ which is employed by modern Indian thinkers, and particularly Neo-Hinduism, to suggest that Indian philosophy (darśana) is grounded in experience in a way that Western philosophy is not. Halffass reminds us to be cautious against the employment of the word which is used as a vehicle for cultural self-assertion. For a detailed discussion on the concept of darśana, see W Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1988, pp. 263-286. According to Renou, the word translated literally means ‘view’ and is used to suggest the different points of view assumed by philosophical schools. See Renou, *Indian Literature*, p. 39.

7 While each adhyāya of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras generally consist of four pādas each, the third, the sixth and the tenth adhyāyas have eight pādas each as opposed to the normal four.

8 Each of these topics takes up one doubtful point, and by a series of reasoning and discussion, arrives at what can be considered as the best (most acceptable) conclusion. See Jaimini, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini: Chapter I-III*, trans. G Jha, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1916, p. i.

9 As Garge has highlighted, ‘In Mādhava’s reckoning there are 2745 sūtras grouped into 915 adhikaraṇas.’ See Garge, *Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study*, p. 5.
aphorism’, is applicable to describe both the whole work, in which case an ‘s’ is added at the end (viz. sūtras), or to its individual sentences or paragraphs, in which case the addition of an ‘s’ is not required. It is taken from the image of weaving and of woven material made out of threads. Sūtra works\(^\text{10}\) are intended to present the essence of a doctrine systematically in compact form, and they are generally precise and succinct.\(^\text{11}\)

While the nature of Sūtra works is such that it is difficult to read them without a commentary, scholars such as Modi and Clooney have pointed out that they can also be read on their own. Modi, who has worked extensively on the Brahmasūtras, sets forth eleven principles as guidelines for approaching the Sūtras independently, and has stressed the importance of reading the texts ‘intensively’ and ‘internally’ to get the sense of the Sūtras from its context, before consulting the commentary and other texts.\(^\text{12}\) Clooney sought to ‘fix the sense of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras as a whole’ through a reading of ‘the Sūtras as distinguishable from the Bhāṣya’ and elaborated the importance of ‘working from a knowledge of parts of the texts to a sense of the whole’.\(^\text{13}\) Garge lays out a critical evaluation of the ‘principles of textual interpretation’ that he argues are employed by both Jaimini and Śabara in their respective works.\(^\text{14}\) As Clooney has pointed out, any given sūtra generally resolves into three component parts which consists of a statement (usually represented by the nominative), made in reference to a certain situation (represented by the locative), for a certain reason (represented by the ablative).\(^\text{15}\) These kārakas (case-relationships) are particularly important in that they indicate the structure of a particular sūtra statement (argument). For instance, while the

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\(^\text{11}\) See H. Scharfe, Grammatical Literature, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977, p. 87.


\(^\text{13}\) Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, pp. 19-20, 40-41.

\(^\text{14}\) Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, pp. 252-265.

\(^\text{15}\) Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 43.
ablative allows one to understand the reason for which a statement is made (which may be a positive or a negative reason), the locative indicates the context or situation to which the statement refers, or in which an argument is based. Clooney points out that ‘locative references are usually of two kinds’: (a) those that ‘offer a general or conceptual condition which can be understood on an abstract basis without reference to a particular ritual place or text’ and (b) those that refer to ‘a particular text or ritual situation’. The presence of particles such as *ca, vā, tu, iti cet, na* which occur regularly in the *Sūtras* are also helpful indicators of the general arrangement and ordering of the skeletal structures of the *sūtras*. They allow one to see what can be placed as primary and what as secondary, which is a helpful guide when one attempts to excavate the meaning (or main line of argument) of the *sūtras*.17

In this thesis, while I acknowledge the importance of seeking to ‘attain a more specific and accurate understanding of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* on its own terms’, I remain committed to the position that *Sūtras* cannot be read without a commentary. This is particularly pertinent in the case of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* because not only is the *Bhāṣya* of Šabara-svāmin (c. 400 CE) the earliest extant commentary available on the *Sūtras* but more importantly, it is one that is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas as the most authoritative. Therefore, even as I remain cautious of the probability that there may be possible divergences or distinctions in the interpretation of individual *sūtras* in Šabara’s commentary, in this thesis I nonetheless rely on Šabara’s *Bhāṣya* to help me

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 44.
18 This is unlinke the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa which has two *Bhāṣyas*, with each *Bhāṣya* claiming to represent correctly the meaning of the *Sūtras*.
19 It is my understanding that Šabara has sought to stay as close to Jaimini’s concern for the intelligibility of the Vedic sacrificial tradition as possible and have not intentionally brought in assumptions or attributed meanings from outside Jaimini’s concern and context. Even Clooney, who has claimed that Šabara has on occasion attempted a shift in perspective (particularly concerning the theme of *apūrva*), nonetheless states categorically that ‘there is no point in ignoring Šabara’ and that there is no doubt on the ‘general accuracy’ of the *Bhāṣya*. Clooney, *Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini*, p. 46.
understand the context more comprehensively. I seek to acquire an intelligible sense of the Sūtras by employing: (a) a close and intensive reading of the text ‘for its own sake’ with the intention of seeking to develop an intelligible translation, which is followed by (b) a re-reading (and re-translating) that is assisted by Śabara’s commentary, and which is then (c) critically interrogated (compared and re-evaluated) in light of the available [English] translations of the Sūtras, particularly of Jha, Sandal, Thadani, and more recently Clooney. Therefore, the final translations of each of the sūtras mentioned in this thesis are a result of this hermeneutical circle where, more than a direct translation of each of the specific sūtras, I have sought to present the overall sense of the sūtras and have often resorted to presenting a gloss, which is assisted by the commentary and the translations already available.

The primary concern of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras as a whole, as declared in the introductory first sūtra, is to enquire into the nature of dharma. While Jaimini elaborates his notion of dharma and the means of knowledge that enable its pursuit in the first adhyāya, from the second to the twelfth adhyāya he enters into an elaborate discussion of the world of sacrifice which centers around his concern for its enactment. It is these discussions, which deal extensively with the corpus of sacrifices and its complicated details of performance, that often obstruct scholars from seeking to investigate the nature of Jaimini’s enquiry beyond his introduction of dharma and his discussion about the nature of śabda. As laborious and tedious as the task of surveying these details is, Jaimini’s discussions can be tied together under several themes that disclose the nature of his concern for the practice of sacrifice and the structure and method which entails enjoinder and enactment. Jaimini introduces his notion of action and the principles

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which lay down the nature of different actions in the second and third *adhyāya* respectively. In his fourth and fifth *adhyāya*, he talks about the motives that direct these actions along with the order in which they are then organized, and in the sixth *adhyāya*, he takes up the theme of the one who is entitled to the sacrificial enactment. From the seventh to the twelfth *adhyāya*, Jaimini discusses the nature of the enacted sacrifice, and the way in which the details of the sacrificial components (accessories) are negotiated through a structure that allows modification, transference and repetition even as the originality of each enactment is sought to be maintained.

In the process of seeking to resolve complications pertaining to the interpretation and enactment of enjoined sacrifices, Jaimini engaged in lengthy discussions and negotiations with interlocutors, presumably both from within and outside the Mīmāṃsā tradition. 21 These discussions were often followed by a reflection about the presuppositions and overall purpose of enacting sacrifices, many of which were stated in response to objections (*pūrvapakṣas*) from their interlocutors (*pūrvapakṣins* – holders of the *pūrvapakṣa* positions). While concern for rules governing the sacrificial world to ensure its enactment was an important focus of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* from the outset, its underlying concern had to do with the *why* of sacrifice – a *why* that entails the question of its intelligibility and significance for the Vedic world.

The personal history, date and place of birth of Jaimini is uncertain, which is usually the case with ancient *sūtrakāras*. Regarding the period to which he belongs, there is little information apart from contested speculation amongst scholars who place him as far apart as the seventh, fourth and second century BCE. Shastri has noted that while Radhakrishnan assigns the fourth century BCE and Dasgupta the second century BCE

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21 The nature and form of these ‘discussions’ and ‘negotiations’ will be elaborated in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis where I present the dialogical constitution of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*. 32
as the period in which Jaimini flourished, the structure of the Sūtras and the style of composition imply that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras belong to a period which saw the growth of sūtra literatures, i.e. from the seventh century to the second century BCE. Other scholars like Jacobi are of the opinion that the Sūtras date no later than second century BCE while Keith has assigned the period not later or earlier than 200 BCE as a plausible conclusion. Clooney claims that the Mīmāṃsā appears ‘as a definite school of thought, with its own texts…some time after the time of the Buddha (500 BCE).’

The Mīmāṃsāsūtras are a text from a cultural setting that is unfamiliar to our own and, therefore, it is important to investigate in more detail how it contributes to Jaimini’s immediate society. To do this, I will attempt to place the text as close to its social and intellectual context as possible and remain ‘sensitive to the wider textual field’ within which it may be located.

The Beginnings of Mīmāṃsā: Between Codification and Speculation

The primary designation of the term mīmāṃsā or mīmāṃsāte can be traced back to usages in the Veda, and particularly the Brāhmaṇas, where the term is used to denote a form of enquiry which allows a discussion of doubts and problems with regard to contentions over ritual details. According to Clooney, the oldest use of the derivative verb-form mīmāṃsānte which is translated as ‘investigating a doubtful point and arriving at a conclusion thereon’, occurs in the Yajurveda Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas

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22 For more details, see Garge, Citations in Šabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, pp. 13-17.
23 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 19.
24 Flood argues that while a ‘philological’ reading of a text, which he points out is ‘indispensable in establishing the plain sense of the texts’ is necessary, one must move from a plain reading to a ‘dialogical’ reading of a text, which goes ‘beyond philology to establish interpreted senses.’ See Flood, The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion, IB Tauris, London, 2006, p. 16.

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in the discussion on rituals.26 Garge claims that the earliest ‘traces or rudiments’ of the Mīmāṃsā can be traced as far back as the RgVeda where ‘doubts are raised and inquiries started regarding the ultimate truth on a religious as well as philosophical plane.’27

While it is difficult to trace the chronology of ancient texts in terms of dates,28 it is often possible to trace them in terms of the development of their linguistic usage and, based on that argument, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras may be located as a text which was composed ‘towards the close of the Vedic age’ when the ‘new literary genre’ called the ‘sūtra literature’ came into prominence.29 The sūtra period was a period that witnessed the beginning of the development of the ṣaḍ-darśanas,30 and the foundational texts of each of these schools were all written in the sūtra form.31 Garge has mentioned that Jaimini’s work, on account of its form and nature deserves to be compared with the Śrauta-

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26 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 21.
28 The texts themselves do not give chronological indications. Gonda has remarked that many of the ‘definite dates’ suggested in modern scholarship are little more than guesses unsupported by cogent arguments but based on ‘disputable deductions or unconvincing considerations.’ J Gonda, The Ritual Sūtras, Otto Harrasowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977, p. 476.
29 The rise of this style of literature was largely a consequence of the need to reduce the growing mass of details preserved by specialists in different branches of knowledge. It is not disconnected from a method of teaching designed to enable the student to memorize vast and varied amounts of rules, facts and other relevant information. Ibid., pp. 465-466.
30 According to Renou, ‘The darshanas appeared in the early centuries of the Christian Era, in the form of Sūtras, “aphorisms”: these aphorisms immediately became the subject of commentaries, oral at first, later written down, which were sometimes developed into semi-independent works or, as more frequently happened, gave rise to further commentaries; and so the process has gone on, even into contemporary times.’ See Renou, Indian Literature, pp. 39-40. Flood mentions that the classification of these six specific schools comes only post-twelfth century and warns that the loose classification is problematic not only in that it excludes important traditions such as the ‘Śaiva systems’ but also more importantly in that it does not account for ‘dynamic exchange’ and ‘common style of discourse’ that was shared amongst all of these traditions. He also pointed out that a Jain author named Haribhadra Sūri (eighth century) seems to have been the earliest to use these six systems, although the six were quite different from what was later consolidated as the six darśanas. See G Flood, The Truth Within: A History of Inwardness in Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, p. 140. See also KS Murty, Śaḍ-darśana Samuccya: A Compendium of Six Philosophies, 2nd edn, Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi, 1986, pp. 98-100. Jha also mentions that ‘till so late as the fourteenth century the name “Ṣaḍ-darśana”, “six systems of philosophy” had not become stereotyped as standing definitely and specifically for the six systems now known as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The old division was into the two broad lines mentioned by Yājñavalkya in his Smṛti, under the names Nyāya (Reasoning, argumentation) and Mīmāṃsā (Investigation, Deliberation). It is not easy to find proper justification for the later division into the “Six Systems”.’ See G Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, ed. S Radhakrishnan, Banaras Hindu University Press, Varanasi, 1942, pp. 2-3.
śūtras, and it is this close comparability that in turn discloses the uniqueness of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras.

The Śrauta-sūtras are manuals, also known as ‘rules of sacrifice’, compiled for the purpose of giving directions for the performance of several solemn sacrificial rites in Vedic times. Sharma notes that the ‘Śrauta-sūtras were formulated to describe the procedure of the performance of sacrifice[s]’, and along with the Grhya-sūtras and the Dharma-sūtras they form an important link between the Vedic literature and the classical literature. According to Gonda, these works are closely connected with the older Vedic literature and are also related to and based on the Brāhmaṇas, which they often quote or refer to in their ‘vocabulary’ and ‘phraseology’. These treatises i.e. the Śrauta, Grhya and Dharma sūtras are together commonly known as the Kalpa-sūtras.

According to Ramgopal:

There is a fundamental difference between the Brāhmaṇas and the Kalpasūtras in regard to their aim and scope. The principal aim of the Brāhmaṇas is to explain the significance of various acts in Vedic sacrifices and to settle ritualistic doctrines, while the Kalpasūtras are chiefly connected with a succinct and systematic account of all the Vedic sacrifices and customs prevalent at the time of their composition. The Kalpasūtras simply record the rituals and traditions current in their respective schools and do not concern themselves with their explanation and rationale.

They were understood to be the outcome of the efforts of the Aryans’ attempt to preserve and systematize the religious practices that were gradually multiplying. They aim at the systematic description of the Śrauta rituals in their respective schools and seldom make any attempt to interpret them. The Śrauta-sūtras therefore, present a detailed and systematic treatment of the Vedic sacrifices, and they were composed mainly to deal with the Vedic sacrifices in a nutshell. They are commonly known for

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35. The word ‘Kalpa’ is often translated as ‘ritual’ and the word ‘śūtra’, as mentioned already, is commonly understood to mean an ‘aphorism’.
37. Ibid., p. 4.
the preservation of the *codification* of ritual practices in a completely systematized form.\(^{38}\)

Clooney, while following the same observation that the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Śrautasūtras* are comparable, locates the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* particularly midway between the ‘sacrificial’ *Śrauta-sūtras* and the ‘philosophical’ *Darśana-sūtras* on account of its nature of enquiry. According to him, while Jaimini’s text is more speculative in its reflection on the nature of the Vedic practice than the *Śrauta-sūtras* (ritual-manuals) and therefore, is closer to the *Darśana-sūtras*, it is a speculative reflection that is grounded primarily on the intelligibility of the sacrificial ritual.\(^{39}\) While one finds, in both the works of the *Śrauta-sūtras* and the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, a very systematic treatment of a large number of Vedic passages with an attempt to arrive at definite conclusions regarding the details of Vedic rituals, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* of Jaimini and the *Śrauta-sūtras* undertake their approach in very distinct ways. Pandurangi lays out the distinct approaches of both the *Sūtras*:

> The *śrauta-sūtras*’ approach is descriptive. These describe the details of the sacrifice step by step following the procedure of the performance. However, these do not discuss the rationale underlying the introduction of certain items or procedures. These are just a diary of performance...However, a full discussion and the interpretation of the statements in the Brāhmaṇas connected with sacrifice is not found in *śrauta-sūtras*. The Jaimini *sūtras* of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* are formulated to play this role.\(^{40}\)

He continues:

> A large number of sacrifices and rituals and their auxiliaries are stated in Brāhmaṇa literature. These are codified in *Śrauta Sūtras*. However the rationale behind the arrangement of these is not stated in these works. This is worked out by Jaimini in *Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras*.\(^{41}\)

According to Garge, ‘the *Śrauta-sūtras* deal with the complicated procedure of the sacrificial rites while the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* attempts at a judicial interpretation of the texts

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\(^{38}\) Ibid., p. 8.

\(^{39}\) Clooney, *Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini*, p. 82.

\(^{40}\) Pandurangi (ed.), *Pūrvamīmāṃsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View*, p. 176.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., p. 17.
Clooney claims that the Śrauta-sūtras came to be juxtaposed with and eventually replaced by the assertion that ‘ritual is itself its own meaning’ whose arrangements constitute the significance of its components, and is supplanted by the appeal to the coherence of logic and language which is understood to have a life of its own. While the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are also developed in the context of ‘repetitive’ performance of the sacrificial prescriptions, they are concerned with the why of sacrifice that enables one to reimagine the how of responsible performance and to enquire into the nature of the reference of Vedic practice i.e. dharma. Das asserts that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras can be taken as ‘the first intellectualized interpretation of sacrifice’ and suggests that this system is a ‘partner’ in our attempt to understand sacrifice rationally, and not merely as a pre-reflective portion of the data we study.

In line with Clooney, I wish to highlight that Jaimini’s defence of the intelligibility and sanctity of Vedic practice in a period which saw, on the one hand, the rigorous production of methodical codification of systematic ritual manuals and, on the other, a growing intrusion and influence of Buddhist idealism and abstract speculation, places him in a ‘hermeneutical’ position where he seeks to move beyond the rigid systems and structures of the Śrauta-sūtras without tending towards the ‘idealist’ and ‘spiritualist’ positions that were emerging, and grounding his enquiry firmly in the notion of the ‘truth’ and authority of the Veda. It is this ‘hermeneutical’ orientation that enables him to seek out a rationale and a vision for Vedic practice by establishing its interconnectedness with dharma that is both ‘realist’ and ‘immanent’ and, therefore,

42 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 50.
43 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pārva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 82.
46 The Mīmāṃsā’s ‘realist’ position can be taken to be the outcome of its conception of dharma. The Mīmāṃsā finds that the investigation of dharma involves metaphysical and epistemological issues about the nature of the self, nature of karma and its result; it is therefore committed to a form of realism. See GP Bhatt, The Basic Ways of Knowing: An In-Depth Study of Kumārila’s Contribution to Indian Epistemology, 2nd edn, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, p. viii.
able to reflect a harmonizing view of dharma while reflexively locating his project firmly within the Vedic sacrificial world. To reiterate, Jaimini’s primary concern in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras can be argued to be the sanctity and intelligibility of Vedic practice, the performance and transmission of which is seen as vital for the maintenance and continuation of tradition and the actualization of dharma.

The Mīmāṃsā Corpus

The Mīmāṃsā tradition, throughout its long history, has continued to be a commentarial tradition, with each Mīmāṃsāka developing their own contributions based upon earlier commentators, all of which are eventually related to Śabara’s Bhāṣya (commentary) on the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. Though Jaimini in his Sūtras refers to a few predecessors,47 he is generally taken as the founding teacher and inspiration behind the development of the Mīmāṃsā darśana in so far as clear ‘literary evidence of such development’48 is available, and more importantly in light of the fact that his Sūtras are the only extant work available today.49 As Garge notes, after Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras, no other ‘independent work’ was written on the system, and all the great scholars of Mīmāṃsā after him have all based their contributions on Jaimini’s Sūtras through a commentarial form of scholarship.50

47 Jaimini, in more than one occasion in his Sūtras, makes reference to earlier Mīmāṃsākas preceding him namely Bādarāyaṇa (see Mīmāṃsāsūtras [henceforth MS] 1.1.5; 5.2.19; 6.1.8; 10.8.44; 11.1.65), Bādarī (MS 9.2.33; 6.1.27), Aṭiśāyana (MS 6.1.6; 3.2.43; 3.4.24), Kṛṣṇājini (MS 4.3.17; 6.7.35), Lāvukāyana (MS 6.7.37), Kāṃkāyana (MS 11.1.58; 11.1.63), Åtreya (MS 4.3.18; 5.2.18; 5.1.26) and Ālekhaṇa (MS 6.5.17).
48 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. v.
49 As Clooney has pointed out, the Sūtras themselves are most likely to be the work of a school produced through an oral tradition extending over centuries rather than a ‘personal creation’. See Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 51. Therefore, although I use Jaimini to indicate authorship by referring to the Sūtras as the work of his effort, I use Jaimini cautiously and primarily for the sake of convenience, even as I remain sensitive to the possibility that it may be inappropriate to speak of them as the work of one man, and could even be misleading as the name Jaimini could well have been a gotra name.
50 See Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 7. Much of the literature, in the long history of scholarship-through-commentary of the Sūtras by adherents of the system, are assumed to be either
Although Jha mentions that the Sūtras of Jaimini have had several commentators such as Upavarṣa and Bhartrḥmitra, who are ‘known to us only in name’, the Bhāṣya of Śabara-svāmin is the earliest extant commentary available on the Sūtras and is, therefore, taken as the most authoritative. Śabara’s Bhāṣya was followed by two important commentaries that laid the groundwork for the development of the Mīmāṃsā tradition which was led, on the one hand, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. 620-680 CE) who commented on the Bhāṣya in three parts namely – Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika, and Tuptīkā, and on the other, by Prabhākara Miśra (c. 700 CE) who wrote his commentary on the Bhāṣya known as the Bṛhatī. Kawal notes that while the ‘relation between these two scholars is not clear’, it ‘seems likely that they were close contemporaries’. See Mahādeva Vedāntin, Mīmāṃsānyāyasamgraha: A Compendium of the Principles of Mīmāṃsā, p. 13, fn 7.


untraceable or unpublished, such as the two commentaries by Upavarṣa and Bodhāyana known as Vṛtīs, and it is not the scope of this paper to comment on those. For a detailed overview of each of the authors mentioned by Jaimini as well as those that follow him, refer Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, pp. 5-8.

52 Benson notes that while the ‘relation between these two scholars is not clear’, it ‘seems likely that they were close contemporaries’. See Mahādeva Vedāntin, Mīmāṃsānyāyasamgraha: A Compendium of the Principles of Mīmāṃsā, p. 13, fn 7.
While there were elaborated agreements on the style and methods of interpretation prevalent in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, there emerged against this background, a set of disputed and contentious issues, in which problems of disagreement within the text commented upon multiplied between different commentators in the continuing commentarial-tradition after Śabara-svāmin. The Mīmāṃsā as a school persisted over the centuries precisely through these intra-Mīmāṃsā disagreements and debates. The formation of the three schools of Mīmāṃsā, namely the Bhaṭṭa, Prabhākara and Murāri schools, were a consequence of these disagreements and debates.

A survey of the intellectual history of the Mīmāṃsā, including the important introductory treatises on the system, highlights that most commentators and interpreters differ on what they introduce and consider the main thematic of the system. For example, the three relatively well-known treatises on Mīmāṃsā that have been published, all with accompanying English translations, are Laugākṣi Bhāskara’s *Arthasaṅgraha*, Āpadeva’s *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, and Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitā’s *Mānameyodaya*. While they were all written as introductory texts to the Mīmāṃsā system, they do not discuss the same set of topics. The first two deal directly with the analytic principles of Vedic exegesis, and the third deals exclusively with the philosophical positions, particularly as developed in the works of Kumārila, without any discussion on exegesis.55

While we are fortunate to have a single *Bhāṣya* on the text which is considered to be authoritative,56 the very nature of Jaiminian enquiry and what he enquires into and why,
viz., what the Śūtras as a text are primarily about, is often only discussed and understood fragmentarily. Similar to other branches of Sanskrit literature, a large number of the Mīmāṃsā works were written between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century.\(^{57}\) These range from introductory treatises, which presupposed no prior study of the subject, to commentaries on the major works of earlier writers, to the development of the ‘New School’ of Mīmāṃsā in the texts by Khaṇḍadeva (c. 1575-1665 CE) based on the ‘New Logic (Navya-Nyāya)’.\(^{58}\) Although there have been a few studies on the commentary of Šabara-svāmin, and the study of two of the schools of Mīmāṃsā, namely the Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara schools, have continued at least till the eighteenth century, not unlike the modern scholarship on Mīmāṃsā, these studies have been largely thematic, with scholars looking to elaborate particular pādas (sections) and therefore confining themselves to limited themes.\(^{59}\)

However, as disparate as these disagreements were, they all shared the same telos in that they were Mīmāṃsākas trying to establish the Mīmāṃsā as a darśana and argue for its credibility and significance in light of the criticisms of its central tenets from other systems of thought, particularly the Buddhist system, which was understood to be dominant in the early periods of the formation and development of the Mīmāṃsā tradition.\(^{60}\)

My intention in briefly mapping the Mīmāṃsā corpus is to highlight that even as scholarship-through-commentary proliferated and continued up to the eighteenth

\(^{57}\) For a comprehensive list of the bibliography of the Purva-mīmāṃsā tradition, refer Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, pp. 11-25; also see the Appendix (1-74) in the same text where Umesh Mishra lists another important ‘Critical Bibliography’.

\(^{58}\) See Mahādeva Vedāntin, Mīmāṃsānyāyasamgraha: A Compendium of the Principles of Mīmāṃsā, pp. 13-14.

\(^{59}\) Mīmāṃsā authors occasionally disagree in their recognition of topic boundaries. See the introduction to Mahādeva Vedāntin, Mīmāṃsānyāyasamgraha: A Compendium of the Principles of Mīmāṃsā, pp. 20-21.

\(^{60}\) The period in which Šabara-svāmin, the commentator of the Śūtras, flourished was taken to be a period when Buddhist philosophers openly critiqued and challenged the Hindu orthodox schools of philosophy. The period of Kumārila and Prabhākara, who were both believed to be writing in and around the 7\(^{th}\) century CE, was certainly a period of critical engagement and debate with Buddhist thinkers.
century, these commentaries often distanced themselves from the main concern of the the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*; as a consequence, have only served to sideline the particularity of the Vedic ritual context that Jaimini sought to vehemently defend. They have been unable to contribute to the discussions on the understanding of the nature of Vedic practice, which is the central concern for Jaimini in his investigation into *dharma* and his constitution of the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition.

**THE HERMENEUTIC TRADITION**

One of the most prominent and extensive debates within the humanistic enquiry is the debate on the nature of human rationality, and the terms on which this debate was conducted was in the standard opposition between ‘objectivism’ and ‘relativism’. This opposition continued to pervade the study of culture, religion and society, and within the study of religion, in light of the growing recognition of the plurality of religious traditions and the multiplicity of their voices, the question of rationality became a central contention.61

On the one hand, as MacIntyre has pointed out, according to post-Kantian Enlightenment thought, there ‘was an unargued belief that in all enquiry; religious, moral or otherwise, the adequate identification, characterization, and classification of the relevant data does not require, and indeed may preclude any prior commitment to

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61 The edited volumes of Brian Wilson (1970), and Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (1982) were important in introducing the issue concerning rationality within contemporary discourse. These discussions were followed a year later by the important work of Richard Bernstein (1983) and nine years later by the pivotal work of MacIntyre (1991), both of whom have sought to excavate not only the underlying tensions and presuppositions but introduce proposals for a way forward. Refer B Wilson (ed.), *Rationality*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1970; M Hollis & S Lukes (eds), *Rationality and Relativism*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982; RJ Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1983; A MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1991.
some particular theoretical or doctrinal standpoint’. This encyclopaedist mind-set inspired an ‘objectivist’ enquiry which claims that ‘the data, so to speak, present themselves and speak for themselves’, and whose approach involves a detached and ‘neutral’ observer who does not acknowledge but seeks to ‘bracket’ his prejudice, and who overlooks cultural and historical particularity in his quest for universal and accurate representation of data. MacIntyre argues that these theorists held a ‘unitary conception of rationality and of the rational mind’ by which ‘they took for granted not only that all rational persons conceptualize data in one and the same way’ but also that the ‘attentive and honest observer, unblinded and undistracted by the prejudices of prior commitment to belief’ will ‘report the same data, the same facts’. This was understood to be applicable for all forms of enquiry. On the other hand, the reaction to the encyclopaedic position in the works of post-critical scholars, influenced by Nietzsche’s genealogical approach and perspectivalism argues for the importance of promoting the ‘multiplicity of perspectives’ from which they believed ‘reality’ could be viewed, to the extent that these multiple perspectives have no commonalities or shared conceptions of ‘truth’. Nietzsche, in his ‘psychological, epistemological, historical and literary’ explorations of the question of ‘truth’, argues, according to MacIntyre, ‘that all claims to truth are and can only be made from the standpoint afforded by some particular perspective. There is then no such thing as truth-as-such, but only truth-from-one-or-other-point-of-view’. Therefore, the ‘encyclopaedists’ and ‘genealogists’ can be seen to hold two divergent and even antagonistic rival viewpoints. While the post-Kantian Enlightenment position proposed the notion of a standard and fixed rationality that is universal in its adoption, the Nietzschean-influenced counter-Enlightenment position challenged that privilege and sought to deconstruct its fixed foundations.

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63 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
64 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
The search for a coherent alternative that is able to engage these two untenable positions seriously while seeking to surpass it, has been emerging from different perspectives associated with different philosophers across disciplines such as Kuhn and Feyerabend in the philosophy of science, Winch and Geertz in the social science, and Habermas in critical theory and pragmatism. It is within the same concern for identifying and formulating a coherent alternative beyond these extreme binaries that the task of hermeneutics was proposed as a way forward. Bernstein, having extensively examined the nature of this debate in his book *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, sought to interrogate this standard opposition and move beyond incommensurability by introducing a new conception of rationality that is grounded on the practical task of hermeneutical discourse as founded in ‘dialogical communities’. He argued that it is the incommensurability of theories, traditions and practices that makes hermeneutics necessary for understanding. He also pointed out that while we, in the modern world, can no longer assume that there is shared acceptance of norms and principles and the preconditions for *phronesis* no longer necessarily exist, it does not mean that the preconditions for hermeneutics are absent. Bernstein argues that it is precisely when shared preunderstandings are absent that hermeneutics and the practical possibility of dialogue becomes crucial. Bernstein picks up on Gadamer’s discussion of hermeneutics, which he claimed is not only concerned with the interpretation of texts, but whose insights are extended to ‘all that no longer expresses itself in and through its own world’ and argues that ‘philosophical hermeneutics contributes to the movement beyond objectivism and relativism’. Henceforth, the hermeneutic approach, particularly the post-Heideggerian philosophical hermeneutics, has been developed as a way forward from what was commonly known as ‘objectivism’ and ‘relativism’.

66 Ibid., p. 157.
67 Ibid., p. 112.
Ricoeur argued that the recent history of hermeneutics has generally been dominated by a preoccupation to enlarge the aim of hermeneutics in terms of a ‘mode of knowing’. The interpretation of texts, particularly in the works of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, sought to establish hermeneutics as a viable method for the human sciences. The use of the term ‘hermeneutics’ as ‘a science of understanding that can offer a hermeneutical methodology for the human sciences’ was first developed in the nineteenth century through the works of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, primarily for the interpretation of texts. For Schleiermacher, the development of a ‘general hermeneutics’ is primarily dependent on the challenge of grasping the author’s intention, and along with the hermeneutic task of ‘grammatical interpretation’, a ‘fuller grasp of the author’s intention’ is acquired through ‘a psychological immersion’ in the period in which the text was written. Ricoeur notes that for Schleiermacher, while ‘the first interpretation is called “objective”,’ in that ‘it is concerned with linguistic characteristics distinct from the author’, it is also ‘negative’ in that ‘it merely indicates the limits of understanding.’ Therefore, it is only in the second interpretation that the proper task of hermeneutics is fulfilled, where the subjectivity of the one who speaks is reached. Dilthey expands Schleiermacher’s analysis of hermeneutical methodology to the ‘problem of the intelligibility of the historical’ where the text to be interpreted is reality itself and its historical interconnection. Dilthey, writing in an epoch characterized by a ‘total rejection of Hegelianism and an apology for experimental knowledge’, sought to

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68 Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, p. 52.
69 Sherma and Sharma point out that the ‘term hermeneutics is related to the name of the Greek god Hermes’, who is also known as ‘the messenger of the gods’, tasked with the role of transmitting, translating and interpreting messages ‘from the celestial realm to the human world’, and thus ‘hermeneutics was broadly seen as the art of interpreting texts’, and particularly ‘scriptures’. See RD Sherma & A Sharma (eds), *Hermeneutics and Hindu Thought: Towards a Fusion of Horizons*, Springer, New York, 2008, p. 2.
70 Sherma & Sharma (eds), *Hermeneutics and Hindu Thought: Towards a Fusion of Horizons*, p. 3.
71 Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, p. 55.
72 Ibid., p. 56.
respond to the positivism predominant in that period by claiming the scientificity of historical knowledge as comparable to the natural sciences. To do this, he maintained a strict ‘opposition between the explanation of nature’ and the ‘understanding of history’, where understanding presupposes the ‘primordial capacity to transpose oneself into the mental life of others.’ For Dilthey, understanding is ‘foundational to the interpretative process at the heart of the human sciences’, and while the ‘natural sciences are based on the experience of externalities, the human sciences relate to inner experience’. 

After Dilthey, Heidegger took hermeneutics through what Ricoeur termed a ‘Copernican inversion’ by subsuming the question of ‘method’ to the reign of ‘primordial ontology’. For Heidegger, verstehen (understanding) is no longer an entering into the minds of authors or an immersion into the context of the author through intuition or empathy (Schleiermacher) or by historicality (Dilthey), and the decisive step in hermeneutics was not an attempt ‘to perfect the epistemology of the human sciences’, but rather to question the ‘fundamental postulate’ itself i.e. the very presupposition of hermeneutics construed as an epistemology. For Heidegger, understanding is ‘essential to our being’ and is more than just a ‘cognitive process’. As Sherma and Sharma point out, ‘it is less a theoretical comprehension than a practical knowledge that relates to our being-in-the-world or existence (Dasein). His important categories for understanding in his magnum opus Being and Time include ‘Dasein’, ‘facticity’ and ‘thrownness’, which refers to our arbitrary givenness and ‘care’ and ‘being-towards-death’ that touches the acceptance of our finitude and the striving towards genuineness and responsibility. Therefore, for Heidegger, understanding is necessarily interpretative. Thereafter, there was a significant shift from a ‘mode of

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73 Ibid., p. 57.
74 Sherma & Sharma, Hermeneutics and Hindu Thought: Towards a Fusion of Horizons, p. 4.
75 Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, p. 61.
76 Ibid.
77 Sherma & Sharma, Hermeneutics and Hindu Thought: Towards a Fusion of Horizons, p. 4.
knowing’ to a ‘way of being’, which is seen as ‘an attempt to dig beneath the epistemological enterprise itself, in order to uncover its properly ontological conditions’. The question of ‘how do we know?’ was replaced by the question of ‘what is the mode of being of that being who exists only in understanding?’ With Heidegger, the ‘forgotten question of being’ and ‘the question of the meaning of being’ were now central to the enquiry.

It is precisely in light of this shift that Gadamer takes up the debate about the human sciences in terms of Heideggerian ontology, and introduces the concepts of ‘prejudice’, ‘authority’ and ‘tradition’ by claiming that ‘we are always situated in history’ and communicating at a distance is made possible only by means of a ‘fusion of horizons’. Gadamer takes Heidegger’s perception of understanding as his point of departure and, borrowing his analysis of ‘fore-structures’ as foundational to understanding, argues that ‘prejudice’ is inevitable and that all understanding is both limited and constrained by history and ‘tradition’. While the works initiated by Heidegger and Gadamer were developed for a discussion of human understanding in a more general sense, it is in the works of Ricoeur that hermeneutics was primarily applied to the study of human action. Ricoeur focussed on Gadamer’s ‘communication at a distance’ by drawing on the ‘universal linguality of human experience’ that enables our belonging to a tradition, and sought to interpret it in light of the problematic of the ‘matter of the text’. Therefore, for Ricoeur, hermeneutics is ‘the theory of the operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts’. Ricoeur argues that ‘hermeneutics is not a reflection on the human sciences, but an explication of the ontological ground upon

78 Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, p. 52.
79 Ibid., p. 61.
80 Ibid., p. 62.
82 Ibid., pp. 273, 337-358.
83 Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, p. 71.
which these sciences can be constructed’, and sought to shift the function of ‘understanding’ from the concern of grasping a fact to the apprehension of a possibility of being.\(^\text{84}\) He further claims: ‘To understand a text, we shall say, is not to find a lifeless sense that is contained therein, but to unfold the possibility of being indicated by the text.’\(^\text{85}\) Ricoeur states at this point that while philosophical hermeneutics move with assurance along the \textit{ascending} pathway from epistemology to ontology, it is along the \textit{descending} pathway that the most significant question for hermeneutics is encountered.\(^\text{86}\) Hermeneutics in this sense is an ontological hermeneutics, a \textit{projection} within a prior \textit{being-thrown}, a way of being in the world that touches upon the acceptance of our historicality and finitude and our effort towards authenticity and responsibility. It is a way of abiding and living reflexively in the world, where one understands one’s particularity and location in history and temporality, and how the dialectic of ‘belonging’ and ‘distancing’ informs both our knowing and our acting in the world - our being.

Building on ‘Heideggerian ontology’, Gadamer revisited the concept of \textit{tradition} and introduced it as the site (historical location) where the ‘alienating distanciation and the experience of belonging’ for \textit{Dasein} is negotiated.\(^\text{87}\) It is this historical location, which is not ‘historically neutral’ in the ‘Encyclopaedist’ sense,\(^\text{88}\) that allows me to seek if rational enquiries are indeed enquiries that can only be enabled by traditions of enquiry. Within the scholarship in the human sciences, in the last few decades, the concept of tradition has seen a resurgence of interest both as a ‘category’ as well as a ‘method of research’ particularly concerning the question of ‘whether and to what extent’ one can

\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 63.  
\(^{85}\) Ibid., p. 64.  
\(^{87}\) Ricoeur, \textit{From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II}, p. 68.  
\(^{88}\) The ‘Encyclopaedist mind-set of Enlightenment modernity’ understands ‘neutrality as a single framework within which knowledge is presented.’ See Flood, \textit{The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion}, p. 15.
accept the ‘tradition-bound nature of rationality’ and enquiry without conceding to the relativistic thesis that disagreements between varied and competing traditions are rationally unresolvable.\(^{89}\)

**Tradition as a Hermeneutic Form of Enquiry**

The word ‘tradition’ is taken to have come from the ‘Latin noun *traditio* (“handing over”) which derives from the verb *tradere* (“hand over”, “deliver”). This sense of ‘handing over’ (*traditio*) is closely related to the Greek *paradosis*, which also comes from a verb meaning “hand over”.*, but with a focus on the ‘content’ on what is being handed over. Both terms (*traditio* and *paradosis*) are often used in a literal and figurative sense, and when used in the latter sense, can also be taken to suggest a sense of ‘teaching’ and ‘instruction’. It is primarily in this sense that both terms were used and developed by the ‘Latin and Greek Christian theologians’ to designate ‘the body of teachings preserved and handed down by the church as the “Catholic faith”.’\(^{90}\) The English usage of the word *tradition* with the meaning of ‘hand over’ is argued to have been derived from both the ‘Latin verb *tradere*’ and the ‘French *tradicion*’ around the fourteenth century, referring to the process of ‘passing on’ and carrying the same sense of ‘handing over’ or transmitting ‘something’ from the past.\(^{91}\) As Morris would put it, ‘each generation has handed on something to the next and that something is – Tradition.’\(^{92}\) Flood threads together various conceptions of tradition to argue that while there are different ways of approaching the complex nature of tradition, the central concept of any tradition is primarily the notion of ‘memory’, and tradition is closely

associated with the passing down of ‘collective memory’ ‘through the generations’. He presents the performance of asceticism by the religious self as an example of the form that a transmission of the memory of a tradition can take, and he argues that the ‘past’ is not an object that is ‘simply waiting to be discovered’ but is a ‘memory’ that has to be ‘continually reconfigured in light of new evidences and new readings’. Therefore, for Flood, the notion of tradition is not something that is ‘passively received’ but instead it is ‘actively reconstructed in a shared imagination and reconstituted in the present as memory’. Following this understanding of tradition as a ‘content’ from the past that is reconstructed and handed down to succeeding generations in this thesis, I would later argue that it is the internal rationality of a particular tradition that is transmitted and passed on by each generation, primarily through their texts and practices. It is particularly within the hermeneutical tradition that the concept of tradition has been developed and proposed, both as a method of enquiry and a mode of understanding, particularly through the works of Gadamer, Ricoeur and MacIntyre in the twentieth century, and it is primarily based on their insights that I highlight the structure of a [hermeneutic] tradition below. In the following chapters, I will argue that this same structure can be uncovered from Jaimini’s enquiry.

**Structure of a Hermeneutic Tradition**

One of the charges that Gadamer makes against the Enlightenment tradition in his *Truth and Method* is their confusion and failure to perceive the three interrelated conditions of understanding: ‘prejudice’, ‘authority’ and ‘tradition’. He claims: ‘there is one prejudice

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93 Flood notes that the nature of tradition is complex and can be taken to simply to mean, as Shils does, ‘that which is handed down from the past’, a traditum, or, as Pelikan does, the ‘social glue that brings cohesiveness to a clan or tribe’, or we can distinguish different aspects of tradition such as ‘the hermeneutic’, ‘the normative’, ‘the legitimation’ and ‘the identity’ in the way that John Thompson has done. See Flood, *The Ascetic Self: Subjectivity, Memory and Tradition*, p. 8.


of the Enlightenment that defines its essence: the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power’, arguing that they have succeeded in distorting prejudice to mean ‘unfounded judgement’ that has ‘no foundation in the things themselves’; authority is taken to be ‘blind obedience’, and tradition is taken to be ‘something that is historically given’ that is the ‘abstract opposite of free self-determination.’ Gadamer differentiates his understanding of tradition from this misunderstanding that he calls ‘traditionalism’ and shows that not only are prejudice, authority and tradition inescapable, but they are also necessary and positive conditions for understanding. For Gadamer, we, as essentially historical beings, are always situated within specific traditions, which enable us to understand one another. Therefore, according to him, tradition is not ‘the inertia of what once existed’ but is something that is continually ‘affirmed, embraced, and cultivated’ as an act of reason and a freely chosen action. We are ‘always already affected by history. It determines in advance both what seems to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation’. ‘Understanding’, therefore, is ‘to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated’.

Ricoeur, in his third volume of *Time and Narrative*, discusses the possibility of understanding tradition as a multi-faceted concept and claims that contemporary thinking about tradition has become entangled in unnecessary confusions because contemporary philosophy has viewed tradition as a monolithic concept. For Ricoeur, the term ‘tradition’ does not denote a single phenomenon, but a cluster of interrelated ones.

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97 Ibid., p. 271.
98 Ibid., p. 281.
99 Ibid., pp. 281-282.
100 Ibid., p. 300.
101 Ibid., p. 290.
He argues that the notion of tradition can be best understood under three inter-related themes which include the discussion about: (a) how we are connected to the past, (b) what we are connected to when we stand in relation to the past, and (c) the legitimacy of the past’s hold on us today. Ricoeur categorizes these three themes using the concept of ‘traditionality’, ‘traditions’ and ‘tradition’.  

It is this explication of the vitality of tradition and historical consciousness and situatedness by Gadamer and Ricoeur that MacIntyre picks up and develops in his own work. In his three major works, there is a sustained development of the validity and significance of tradition as an enquiry, and as an alternative to both Enlightenment universalism and post-modern perspectivalism, where he stressed and illustrated the importance of recovering the conception of rational enquiry as bounded within a tradition, and proposed the significance of tradition as a mode of understanding and a method of enquiry.

The three senses with which Ricoeur unpacks the complexity of the notion of tradition are significant in that they enable a further explication of the three important conditions of understanding that can be taken as constituting the three inter-related structures of a hermeneutic tradition, which includes: (a) the condition that locates and connects us to our past - a sense of shared telos, (b) the condition that allows us to identify what we are connected to when we stand in relation to the past - the authority of an internal rationality that is unique to that tradition, and (c) the condition that legitimizes the past’s claim on us today - the institution of the answerable practising community.

Therefore, to say that enquiry is bound to tradition necessitates the explication of these three conditions, and it is in the post-Heideggerian hermeneutical tradition, and particularly in the works of Gadamer, Ricoeur and MacIntyre, that I find contributions to the development of these various aspects of tradition as a form of enquiry. The three constitutive structures of telos, internal rationality and practising community are discussed most comprehensively by Ricoeur and MacIntyre, as highlighted below.

**Telos**

In discussing ‘the unity of a human life and the concept of a tradition’ in his *After Virtue*, MacIntyre points out that ‘any contemporary attempt to envisage each human life as a whole, as a unity, whose character provides the virtues with an adequate telos’ is faced with ‘social obstacles’ whereby ‘modernity partitions each human life into a variety of segments, each with its own norms and modes of behaviour’. He argues that ‘these separations’ have led to the privileging of ‘the distinctiveness of each’ as opposed to ‘the unity of the life of the individual’ as a whole. These ‘social obstacles’ are then followed by what MacIntyre calls ‘philosophical obstacles’ which are characterized by ‘the tendency to think atomistically about human action and to analyze complex actions and transactions in terms of simple components.’ This has led to the dominant orientation that ‘particular actions’ no longer ‘derive their character as parts of larger wholes’, and ‘life comes to appear as nothing but a series of unconnected episodes – a liquidation of the self’ where the self is fragmented ‘into a set of demarcated areas of role-playing’. All of these developments have in turn contributed to the invisibility of ‘the unity of a human life’. MacIntyre attributes this growth of modern individualism and ‘individualist conceptions’ to the reality that modern society today is constituted by

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106 Ibid., pp. 204-205.
'a collection of strangers, each pursuing his or her own interests under minimal constraints.' He adds that such modern individualistic societies where there are no institutions that ‘express or represent the moral community of the citizens’ become governed by ‘a set of institutional arrangements’ that seek to impose a ‘bureaucratized unity which lacks genuine moral consensus.’ MacIntyre claims that this lack of moral consensus or common goal is a consequence of the denial or neglect of its own narrative history by society and the fragmentation of individuals from their historical location and narrative due to the influential modern notion of individualism.

It is in light of this that MacIntyre explicates the impossibility of giving an account of human action that is individuated and intelligible outside the framework of a particular narrative. In the absence of ‘an overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as a unity’, any conception of virtues ‘remain[s] partial and incomplete’, and any conception of justice within this ‘collection of strangers’ remains untenable as there are no common goals or grounds upon which rival versions of what is considered good can be negotiated. He notes that there can be no independent or objective study of an ‘agent’s intentions’ apart from the ‘causal and temporal order’ within which they are historically situated and the ‘history of the setting to which they belong’ and concludes by arguing that ‘narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions.’ The narrative form, MacIntyre argues, is not a method of understanding that is then imposed onto the enquiry into the nature of action but it is a form that is intrinsic to the very nature of human action. Further, the notion of being connected and located firmly in history is important for understanding actions, for every action is deemed intelligible only within a particular

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107 Ibid., pp. 250-251.
108 Ibid., p. 254.
110 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
history. According to him, ‘an action is a moment in a possible or actual history or in a number of such histories. The notion of a history is as fundamental a notion as the notion of an action. Each requires the other.’

MacIntyre points out that modernity fails to appreciate this interrelation between the concept of history and action and points to Sartre who, in his ‘whole theory of the self’ in particular, argued that ‘human life is composed of discrete actions which lead nowhere, which have no order; the story-teller imposes on human events retrospectively an order which they did not have while they were lived’ so that ‘to present human life in the form of a narrative is always to falsify it.’ Stating that Sartre never sought to provide the answer to ‘what human actions deprived of any falsifying narrative order’ would look like, and claiming also that Sartre himself had to write a narrative to ‘show that there are no true narratives’, MacIntyre argues that ‘all lived narratives’ are characterized by ‘a certain teleological character’ where ‘we live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future.’

Within MacIntyre’s argument, one of the key aspects of the narrative form or teleological nature of human life is that they are guided by a goal - an end or a telos - towards which the actions are oriented. He states: ‘There is no present which is not informed by some image of some future and an image of the future which always presents itself in the form of a telos – or of a variety of ends or goals – towards which we are either moving or failing to move in the present.’ It is in this sense that ‘man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to

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111 Ibid., p. 214.
112 Ibid., p. 214.
113 Ibid., pp. 214-215.
114 Ibid., pp. 215-216.
MacIntyre proposes the Aristotelian tradition as one such tradition in which the goods (virtue in this case) that a tradition offers are available only within ‘the narrative unity of a human life’, particularly in practices that derive from ‘shared activity’ with a community whose members find their purpose in the unity fostered by a *shared vision* of the good. Therefore, for MacIntyre, it is the teleological unity of a tradition, and for him the Aristotelian tradition, that can provide the necessary alternative to liberal individualism. In other words, it is the notion of a shared *telos* that allows the conglomeration of actions to be narratively structured and the idea of a tradition cultivated, actualized and validated.

*Telos*, for MacIntyre, can be understood in light of the notion of ‘practice’ in reference to teleological virtue. Virtue requires embodiment in practice, and MacIntyre defines a virtue as ‘an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.’ Every practice, for MacIntyre, embodies ‘goods internal to the practice’ whose realization ‘requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it’ according to the shared *telos* of the community. Therefore, practice is carried out in reference to one’s relationship with other practitioners according to shared common standards. In this sense, living out shared virtues in relationship within a community is a dynamic process that is ongoing and never fully completed.

*Internal Rationality*

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115 Ibid., p. 216.
116 Ibid., p. 258.
117 Ibid., p. 191.
In his book *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* MacIntyre provides a sustained development of the notion of rationality as bound within a particular tradition. MacIntyre was seeking to find an alternative to the two predominant views on rationality which was characterized by the Enlightenment view of a universal and standard rationality, as proposed by Kant and Bentham on the one hand, and the post-Enlightenment perspectival view of a multiplicity of rationalities developed from the works of Nietzsche on the other hand.

MacIntyre claims the indispensability of tradition in any form of enquiry by asserting that ‘all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought, transcending through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition’.\textsuperscript{118} He further writes: ‘What I am therefore, is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition.’\textsuperscript{119} For him, a tradition is:

\textit{an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.}\textsuperscript{120}

MacIntyre stresses that these internal discussions within a living tradition are ‘historically extended, socially embodied argument[s]…about the goods which constitute that tradition’\textsuperscript{121} and it is these internal dynamics which ushers one to the specific sense in which MacIntyre takes the notion of ‘tradition-constituted enquiry’. He states:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 222.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 221.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, p. 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
There is no other way to engage in the formulation, elaboration, rational justification, and criticism of accounts of practical rationality and justice except from within some particular tradition in conversation, cooperation, and conflict with those who inhabit the same tradition. There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some particular tradition or other.\textsuperscript{122}

Ricoeur uses the term ‘traditionality’ to talk about the way in which we are connected to the past. He argues that we are always embedded and located within the ‘chain of interpretations and reinterpretations’ transmitted to us from the past.\textsuperscript{123} Regardless of what traditions we inhabit, regardless of what is transmitted to us from the past, we always think in the mode of tradition. To say that enquiry is bound to tradition is to begin enquiry by taking up problems and preoccupations from the past. The importance of tradition is not only what is handed down to us in particular contexts, but also the sense that there is some particular tradition, to which we must belong if we are to engage in a discussion, an activity, a deliberation.

\textit{Practising Community}

It is in light of the necessity of these ‘exemplifications’ as discussed above that one can argue, following Ricoeur, that tradition is not just a set of transmitted contents that governs our thought and practices but one that legitimately does so. This is to claim that not only are we connected to our particular past because of ‘the unavoidable finitude of all understanding’, but also because the transmitted contents from the past are endorsed and accepted as legitimate by us today. For Ricoeur, the question of the legitimacy of our situatedness and location within traditions is an important one because traditions are ‘proposals of meaning’\textsuperscript{124} which are at the same time ‘a claim to truth’.\textsuperscript{125} Each tradition presents itself to us not as one tradition amongst many others, but as \textit{the} tradition.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 350.
\textsuperscript{123} Ricoeur, \textit{Time and Narrative}, vol 3, p. 220.
\textsuperscript{124} Ricoeur, \textit{Time and Narrative}, vol 3, p. 227.
According to MacIntyre, a ‘living tradition’ is a ‘historically extended, socially embodied argument’ which not only manifests in a grasp of those ‘future possibilities which the past has made available to the present’ but also ‘continue a not-yet-completed narrative’ and ‘confront a future whose determinate and determinable character…derives from the past.’\textsuperscript{126} It is this continuation of the narrative, which according to Ricoeur, is to ‘enlarge the sphere of communication’\textsuperscript{127} that necessitates the practising community, where the enquiry is continued and the tradition embodied. He writes:

> Tradition means transmission, transmission of things said, of beliefs professed, of norms accepted, etc. Now such a transmission is a living one only if tradition continues to form a partnership with innovation. Tradition represents the aspect of debt which concerns the past and reminds us that nothing comes from nothing. A tradition remains living, however, only if it continues to be held in an unbroken process of reinterpretation.\textsuperscript{128}

It is one of Ricoeur’s central claims that tradition is something that \textit{happens}; it is an \textit{activity} of transmission - a normatively structured activity.

**PROBLEMATIC IN THE STUDY OF RITUAL**

In a previous section, I have stated that Jaimini’s conception of \textit{dharma} in his \textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtras} can be re-read as a hermeneutical enquiry into Vedic practice which can offer insights into the discussions within the contemporary scholarship on ritual. In this section, I will primarily discuss the problematic with regard to the study of ritual by mapping the contemporary debates on ritual with a view to show that it is constitutive of three contentious discussions about representation, rationality and articulation. These debates are highlighted with the intention of showing that they will be brought together

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 222.
\textsuperscript{126} MacIntyre, \textit{After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory}, pp. 222-223.
in conversation with a re-reading of Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* in an attempt to develop ‘mutual answerability’ in the succeeding core chapters.

While there is a multiplicity of interdisciplinary theories and perspectives adopted in the study and interpretation of rituals, the contemporary debate within the study of ritual is identified in this thesis by two main fundamental attitudes that are adopted with regard to ritual. These two attitudes are summed up here by two phrases viz., ‘ritual as representation’ (thought-centered) and ‘ritual as phenomenon’ (act-centered), adopted by two theoretical tendencies that may be categorized as the semiotic-symbolists and the formalist-structuralists. The origins of this debate, however, can be traced back to the classical theorists of the late nineteenth century.

**Historical Beginnings of the Thought-Action Dichotomy**

Bell argues that the formal study of ritual began after a drawn-out debate by classical theorists on the question of the ‘origins of religion’ from the late nineteenth century onwards, at the heart of which was the controversy over whether the roots of religion were to be found in the rites and practices or in the myths and beliefs of a community. On the one hand, beginning with the work of Smith, who was closely following the evolutionary schema of the anthropologist Tylor, religion was taken as constituted by ‘a series of acts and observances’ that existed primarily ‘for the preservation and welfare of society’, shifting the focus away from speculative myths about the nature of things to the series of acts performed by the community. He believed

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129 According to Bell, even though the ‘theoretical positions’ taken up by different scholars tend to be ‘more diverse and more nuanced’, their orientation and emphasis along these two lines is nonetheless clear and decisive. See Bell, *Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions*, p. 3.

130 Taylor propounded an evolutionary view of social development where humans ‘progressed’ from being ‘savages’ to becoming a ‘civilized person’ and where primitive practices were reduced to an explanation about archaic ‘survivals’ in the new modern religious practices. See EB Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Harper, New York, 1958 (1871).

that religion originated in activities that cemented the bonds of the community. His student Frazer, who followed this line of thinking, was equally interested in propounding the activities of communities and their collective experiences as the site from which religions originate.  

Bell mentions that Frazer’s most famous work, *The Golden Bough*, developed the argument that in order to understand myth, one must first understand ritual activity, as ritual is the most expressive form of cultural life. Therefore, the importance of ‘ritual’ as acts that precede myths and beliefs was stressed. Smith and Frazer became important figures for the school known as *The Myth and Ritual Schools*, which maintained the primacy of ritual as acts in their enquiry into the roots of religion.

On the other hand, following the early influential pioneering work of Müller on the presumed Indo-European roots of Greek mythology, the phenomenologists of religion who had aligned themselves with Müller’s emphasis on myths, accorded a greater primacy to cultural myths, beliefs and symbols as opposed to ritual, which was understood as the practical reworking or performance of those myths. ‘Ritual’, as the phenomenologist of religion Eliade noted, is completely distinguishable from symbols and myths: ‘A symbol and a rite…are on such different levels that the rite can never reveal what the symbol reveals.’

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133 Bell, *Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions*, p. 5.
134 The *Myth and Ritual Schools* continued to influence in turn the Cambridge School of Classicists, such as Jane Ellen Harrison, who expanded and developed the theory of the primacy of ritual (ancient rites) to argue that ritual is the source of all myths, and that even classical folklore and literature derived from ‘ritual’ activities. See JE Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 3rd edn, Meridian, New York, 1955. Also see WM Calder (ed.), *The Cambridge Ritualists Reconsidered*, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1991. For a further discussion of *The Myth and Ritual Schools*, see WG Doty, *Mythography: The Study of Myths and Rituals*, University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1986, pp. 73-78.
136 *Religionswissenschaft* or ‘the science of religion’ was a term used by Müller to designate what he perceived as a non-theological and non-philosophical approach to religion, and it was also generally translated as the ‘phenomenology of religion’. See, C Bell, *Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions*, p. 8.
'living’ myths from rituals, still tended ‘to place ritual on a secondary level, reserving a primary place for myth by virtue of its closer relationship to the underlying structures of all religious experience’. 138

While the ritualists of *The Myth and Ritual Schools* were theorizing in terms of a universal evolutionary pattern that they argue had historically ‘diffused to become the underlying basis for all ritual[s]’ everywhere, the mythologists and phenomenologists of religion on the other hand, were seeking to locate ahistorical universals and identify trans-historical similarities and commonalities across cultures through their applications of the methods of ‘systematic comparison’. This enabled them to move away from the evolutionary framework adopted by *The Myth and Ritual Schools*, but at the cost of a meticulous historical framework. 139

However, in spite of their seemingly divergent methodological approaches, both schools were working under an Enlightenment ‘universalist’ rationality 140 that was inclined to argue for ‘a coherent and meaningful unity to the diversity of religions, cultures and histories’ 141 across continents. Therefore, underlying the emergence of ‘ritual’ as a formal category separated distinctly from myths and beliefs was an attempt to understand and negotiate cross-cultural diversities and similarities and to locate *difference* primarily according to the positions of the scholars of that period who were convinced that the ‘scientific’ pursuit of knowledge accorded them a more privileged

139 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
140 I am using ‘Enlightenment universalist rationality’ here in the sense of the encyclopaedist (Enlightenment) understanding of rationality as neutrality that proposes a universal and unbiased claim to truth and knowledge. See MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition*, pp. 149-151.
position. Therefore, as Bell noted, ritual ‘as a constructed category’ was a ‘rather liberal and enlightened one’.\textsuperscript{142}

While there was no dearth of critics to challenge these early theories and call attention to their inconsistencies,\textsuperscript{143} nonetheless these classical theoretical models and debates were significant in that they were influential in positing an essential dichotomy between myth and ritual. Segal has pointed out that this dichotomy resulted in growing contentions between notions of practice and belief, phenomenon and representation, and ritual began to be ‘readily cast as action in opposition to thought and theory’,\textsuperscript{144} stimulating a clear distinction between behaviour and beliefs, action and thoughts, and practice and text in the enquiry into the nature of religion. As a result, ‘ritual’ as a category, was not only distinguished and disconnected from the notion of religion, but also came to be understood as particularly \textit{thoughtless} action in itself - habitual, routinized, prescriptive, traditional, and unreflective - which are the ‘purely formal, secondary, and mere physical expression of logical ideas’\textsuperscript{145}. Smith, in his book \textit{The Meaning and End of Religion}, argues that the understanding of the category ‘religion’ shifted, as a result of the gradual process of reification of the term \textit{religio} from an adjective to a noun, from denoting an ‘attribute of persons’ to a ‘separate thing in itself’. He claims that this process accelerated particularly during the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment period, as the doctrinal content of religion slowly came to be regarded as more central than religious practices, until finally religion was conceived as a set of beliefs that can and should be evaluated in terms of their internal consistency.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{143} Bell has pointed out that even scholars like Stanley Tambiah and Victor Turner, who seek to bridge this dichotomy, still maintain the presupposition that the dichotomy is distinct and clear. See Bell, \textit{Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice}, pp. 20-21.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p. xv.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 19.
Following this separation of religious beliefs and practices, the tendency to interpret ritual either in terms of what it ‘symbolizes’ or in terms of its underlying structure was further strengthened. The outcome of these processes is the modern representational theory\textsuperscript{147} of ritual, which tended to present external accounts of ritual that are often distanced from the complexity of the ‘act’ and the ends towards which it conduces - ends as conceived by the practitioners.

The Debate in the Contemporary Study of Ritual

While Buc traces the history of the development of the study of rituals, which he claims is specific to ‘Western societies’, back to the sixteenth century,\textsuperscript{148} Bell argues that the ‘formal’ study of ritual as a distinct category in academia, which sought to be differentiated from the study of religion, is a relatively recent phenomenon that first emerged as a formal term of analysis in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{149} Grimes, highlighting that the phrase ‘ritual studies’\textsuperscript{150} was not in use until 1977, inaugurated the \textit{Journal of Ritual Studies} ten years later, and claimed that this journal can be taken as supporting evidence that the distinctiveness of the study of ritual has come of age.\textsuperscript{151} The concern for the distinctiveness of ritual, particularly with the perceived demise of religion as an


\textsuperscript{150} It is only in the late 1970s that the academic study of ritual has come of age as a branch of the academy called ritual studies. The publication of the \textit{Journal of Ritual Studies} (1987-) with the initiative of Ronald Grimes paved the way for this development. The new ritual studies, according to Grimes, emerged within religious studies at the interface between liturgical studies in faculties of theology and liturgics, anthropology of ritual in the social sciences, and performance studies in departments of drama. See RL Grimes, \textit{Beginnings in Ritual Studies}, University Press of America, Washington DC, 1982. Also, RL Grimes, \textit{Research in Ritual Studies: A Programmatic Essay and Bibliography}, American Theological Library Association, Chicago, 1985.

analytical category, led to a re-exploration of the checkered conceptual relationship between ritual and religion, and the emergence of ‘ritual studies’ came to be linked with the earlier dichotomy of myths and ritual in relation to the study of religion. As contemporary theories on ritual continue to draw from this un-problematized dichotomy, the effects of this assumption has led to the continuing study of ritual as an ‘object’ or a ‘datum’ investigated through a method that already presupposes the notion of ritual as action opposed to beliefs and symbols, which are more closely associated with the notion of religion.

This distinction between beliefs and ritual, then in turn, influenced the way contemporary discourses on ritual diverged, and they tended to diverge in two main directions, with both sides uncritically assuming ritual as a kind of action alone. The contemporary debate, as already mentioned, can be identified by two main fundamental attitudes adopted with regard to the study of ritual.

The first group, which I categorize here as the semiotic-symbolists, were those group of theorists who focussed on the meaning(s) of religious symbols as their frame of reference in their approach to the study of rituals and, therefore, emphasized ritual as a symbolic site of meaning and as a universal medium of symbolic expressions. Durkheim was one of the most important pioneers in arguing the instrumentality of ritual as serving a social function in society. Durkheim in his The Elementary Forms of the

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152 For example, Fitzgerald argues that there is no basis upon which ritual activities could be separately categorized as either religious or secular. According to him, there is no distinction between the ‘Sharia Laws’ or ‘the Laws of Manu’ that ‘prescribe customary ritual practices and obedience’ and ‘voting at an election, attending a committee meeting...or wearing the colours of the football team one supports.’ According to Fitzgerald, there is no religious meaning in ritual activities, precisely because he believes there is no distinction between religious and secular activities; every activity must be subsumed under secular activities. Therefore in proposing the secular study of religion, he also sought to replace the category ‘religion’ with ‘ritual’, ‘politics’ and ‘soteriology’. See T Fitzgerald, ‘Playing Language Games and Performing Rituals: Religious Studies as Ideological State Apparatus’, Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, vol. 15, no. 3, 2003, pp. 221-241.

153 Bell argues that the emergence of ritual studies was fuelled by the prominence of ‘ritual’ in the works of cultural anthropologists such as Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, Edmund Leach, Marshall Sahlins. See Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, p. 15.
Religious Life analysed religion pragmatically as comprising both primary beliefs and secondary rites, and argued that the ‘collective consciousness’ of individuals was fostered through the *medium* of these rites and rituals, thus providing cohesion and integration in society. Following this Durkheimian reading of ritual as serving a social function or as communicating a larger meaning for society, later theorists became primarily interested in how ritual as a medium of religious expression facilitates the surrounding social and cultural life. This was a period in which theories concerning the effect of ritual on social cohesion and equilibrium coincided with the introduction of ‘*culture* as a category’ of investigation. Therefore, ritual came to be interpreted in terms such as ‘symbolization’ and ‘social communication’. It was a model of ritual theory that was still in search of a way to represent the universal essence of religious experience and was accompanied by cross-cultural methods of comparison premised upon a universal rationality. This approach then resulted in the elucidation of ritual as a *tool* for understanding and substantiating larger entities such as religious symbols and beliefs and society and culture. Thus, ritual was understood to be a *storehouse* of religion, culture and society that was taken to represent the same.

155 Durkheim’s position was supplemented by the important works of both Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, as well as the *Annales* theoreticians. Mauss and Hubert sought to demonstrate how ideas about religion were not only closely interrelated but emanated from social activities, and thereby reinforced the centrality of ritual as a sociological category. See H Hubert & M Mauss, *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function*, trans. WD Hall, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981 (1898).
On the other hand, influenced by the works of Lévi-Strauss and particularly his assertion that rituals are completely distinct from myths, by the late twentieth century, there were scholars who emphasized the necessity for the study of ritual ‘in itself and for itself…to determine its specific characteristics’ and emphasized the need to study ‘ritual in its own right’. They were interested exclusively in how the phenomenon of ritual works on its own, without signifying any meaning with regard to religion or society. For them, ‘religious symbols and the symbolic activity of ritual’ are too complicated in themselves to be taken as ‘mere reflections of the social order’.

The study of ritual as representation is crucially missing the importance of the act and its ‘interior organization’ and ‘self-referentiality’ in their approach. Seeking to navigate these ‘unchartered waters’ by focussing particularly on the syntactical elements of ritual, they proposed a new approach called ‘Ritology’ or the ‘science of ritual’ that would become the study of the phenomenon of ritual in and for itself and to promote the development of a computer-based research platform for the analysis of ritual by means of an ‘ontology of rituals’. This, they argued, would introduce ritual studies as a distinct ‘science’ of study that can stand in its own right. To study rituals in this manner

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158 Lévi-Strauss took the dichotomy of myth and ritual the furthest by eventuating the initial distinction to a distinction between living and thinking itself. He was worried that ritual is all too often mistakenly conflated with myth and becomes a mere repository for the beliefs and representations of a cultural world outside ritual. See, C Lévi-Strauss, *The Naked Man: Introduction to a Science of Mythology*, vol 4, trans. J Weightman & D Weightman, Harper and Row, New York, 1981, pp. 679-684.


160 ‘Ritual in its own right’ was a phrase first used by Filip de Boeck and René Devisch as a critique of the reduction of the ‘dynamics of ritual transformation’ to a text or script in studies of the ‘divinatory ritual’ in central Africa, particularly those of Victor Turner, which have sidelined the explication and understanding of ‘the ritual moment’. See, F de Boeck & R Devisch, ‘Ndembu, Luunda and Yaka Divination Compared: From Representation and Social Engineering to Embodiment and Worldmaking’, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 24, no. 2, 1994, pp. 98-133.


163 An international conference held in Heidelberg, from 29th September to 2nd October 2008, was a collaboration between several ritual theorists, working with the aim of developing ritual studies as a ‘science’ of its own. The conference was called ‘Ritual Dynamics and the Science of Ritual’. ‘Ritual Dynamics’ is a research programme established in the year 2002 by the German Research Council for the goal of evolving an acceptable meta-framework for identifying a kind of universal grammar of rituals in the study of ritual structures.

would then mean, to study them as particular and singular events, independent of their contexts and socio-surround and of any underlying meanings that may be attributed to them. Therefore, they are primarily interested in looking at rituals parsimoniously as an independent and autonomous locus of enquiry. Rituals are seen as mechanical and rule-governed activities not necessarily concerned with thinking or meaning-making and hence, they attended primarily to the formal and practical elements in their study. Smith talked about the importance of seeing ritual as work as opposed to seeing ritual in terms of symbolic and idealized expressions. Staal vehemently argued that rituals must be investigated and understood for their own sakes, as they are meaningless and pure activities where the performers’ only concern is the proper execution of the rules. Bateson also emphasized the importance of situating the locus of enquiry on rituals themselves by taking them as autonomous from the larger social order. This has resulted in the implication that ritual, rather than being subsumed under the study of religion, or even society or culture, is a distinct field that can be studied on its own terms and not as a continuation of the study of these larger fields.

The first position, which can be claimed to be a continuation of the Enlightenment approach adopted by the classical theorists, in their attempt to identify what they

168 Staal, who has studied Vedic sacrificial rituals, argues that rituals must be studied for their own sake in terms of their actual performances. According to him, rituals are not symbolic acts which refer to something beyond the rules of performance. Ritual performers are only concerned with one thing when they engage in a performance, and that is the proper execution of rules. He defines ritual as ‘pure activity’ where the only thing that matters for the practitioners is the faultless execution of its prescribed rules. Staal therefore contends that ritual action is ‘without function, aim or goal’, thereby implying that it is without meaning. See, F Staal, ‘The Meaninglessness of Ritual’, Numen, vol. 26, 1979, pp. 3-9. See also M Bloch, Symbols, Songs, Dance and Features of Articulation: Is Religion an Extreme Form of Traditional Authority?’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, vol. 15, no.1, 1974, p. 55.
believed to be a universal category of human behaviour, worked with essentialist and realist pre-suppositions that were derived from their own rationalities. They sought to ‘discover’ ritual by finding some ‘deep-structure’ social sense and function often only known to the researcher and not the participants whose own traditionary constitutions they were not interested in investigating.  

Ritual, for them, was a ‘treasure house of culture and society, epiphenomenally shaped…to reflect or radiate how values, ideals, and relationships should be shaped and resolved, symbolically and functionally.’

The second position criticised the former for their ‘claims to the value of any universal, overarching definition or conception of ritual’, and thereby, sought to recover the *phenomenality* of ritual through attempts to exhaust the significance of its formation by adopting a ‘grammar’ and a ‘science of ritual’ approach. In their attempts to stress the autonomous and complicated nature of ritual as a distinct phenomenon, they tended to cast ritual as an independent autonomous entity in itself with no connection with religion and society, and as an activity whose primary concern is the execution of a system of rules. Ritual, for them, is a self-organizing and self-referential phenomenon without any credal core or symbolic content and whose forms are characterized by an interior complexity and irreducibility to either its agent(s) or its environment. Their position resulted in the widening of the belief-practice dichotomy to its extreme, and subsequently to the widening of the relationship between religion and ritual.

In their efforts to propose ritual as a phenomenon that can be distinguished from other encompassing categories such as religion and society, the formalist-structuralist ritual theorists have a tendency to under-determine the role of meaning, beliefs and texts as

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172 Handelman & Lindquist (eds), Ritual in Its Own Right: Exploring the Dynamics of Transformation, p. 3.
they sought to foreground ritual as an act in and for itself without any symbolic content. The semiotic-symbolist ritual theories showed a tendency to over-determine the role of meaning, beliefs and texts as they sidelined the enactment aspect of ritual. These two prevalent attitudes in contemporary debates were influenced by the unchallenged dichotomy between myth and ritual in classical scholarship. This dichotomy was founded upon a particular notion of ‘myth as beliefs’ and ‘ritual as action’, where beliefs and action were understood to correspond to activities of the mind (thought-centred) and the body (behaviour-centred) respectively. This ‘objectivist’ representation of ritual as an epiphenomenon and the ‘formalist’ abstraction of ritual in terms exclusively of its forms and structure, only seek to support the supposition that ritual is an unreflective and thoughtless action. The notion of ritual-as-action (as opposed to religion-as-beliefs), and thereby, empty action was not problematized by contemporary debates on ritual. Therefore, they reduced ritual to either a secondary representation of larger religious, social or cultural entities, or to an event that is abstracted from its concrete enactment in material reality. Ritual as a way of acting which expresses the construction and negotiation of human meaning within a particular cosmology, and therefore, as a form of praxis taken to be a mode of thinking and reflection, was completely left out of their imaginaire.

Although much is known from these interdisciplinary studies about various kinds of ritual in light of the roles they play in social and cultural processes, the question of what ‘ritual’ is, what it is constitutive of, and how it can be comprehensively understood, has

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174 See Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. Also see Grimes, Ritual Criticism: Case Studies in its Practice, Essays on its Theory, p. 1.
175 For example, according to Jean-Pierre Wils, rituals, as ‘conditioned reflexes’, are performative in nature and therefore as soon as we talk about them and they no longer exert their unquestioned objectivity over us, they become objects of reflection and lose their performative validity. Therefore as a set of standardized and prescriptive sets of behaviours, when ritual is beset by reflection, it takes on something of the nature that is akin to a theatrical performance. See, J-P Wils, ‘From Ritual to Hermeneutics’, in Discourse in Ritual Studies, H Schilderman (ed.), Brill, Leiden, 2007, pp. 257-261. See also M Bloch, ‘Symbols, Songs, Dance and Features of Articulation: Is Religion an Extreme Form of Traditional Authority?’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, vol. 15, no. 1, 1974, p. 55.
not yet been posed in a helpful manner. Schilbrack argued that the reason for this is the lack of philosophical interest in ritual. He highlighted that while the study of rituals is an interdisciplinary investigation and includes varied disciplines ranging from sociology and anthropology to performance studies and gender studies, philosophical interest in ritual is lacking and ‘philosophy has so far contributed almost not at all to the study of rituals’. Guided by this over-arching problematic of seeking to understand what ‘ritual’ is at the heart of my questioning, and following from the opposing positions highlighted above, I seek to elucidate the contentions in contemporary debates in the form of three main problematic about ritual. Therefore, I will reformulate the debate on ritual as a contention about (a) the articulation of the thematic of ‘ritual’ and its representation, in order (b) to explore its rationality and the historical conditions that gave rise to its study, with a view (c) to reclaim the importance of the agency of the subject in ritual practice and the tradition within which the practice is made intelligible.

It is in view of these three main contentions within the contemporary debates in ritual that this research seeks to draw insights from Jaimini’s conception of dharma as an explanation of ritual subjectivity, and develop and argue that this hermeneutical re-reading and reclaiming of the ritual actant is vital for understanding and paving a way forward from the imbalance that is presented in this section. Therefore, this thesis will seek to contribute a traditionary perspective to a general analysis of the phenomenon of ritual. In light of the contentions highlighted above, I will discuss ritual primarily as a traditionary practice viz. a culture-specific technē that entails the enjoinderment and formation of subjectivities and results in an embodiment of the rationality of a tradition. This definition assumes the body as the locus of experience and transformation and the ‘text’ as the authority that stipulates enjoinderment. It is this enjoinderment which may be

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177 Here technē is taken in the sense of a skill that possesses practical rationality. This notion of technē, which is borrowed from Macintyre’s reading, is elaborated in the next section.
characterized as ‘the expression of a certain kind of textuality’ and allows an identification of the self-expression of a particular tradition.

There are two interrelated things that are important in my attempt to reimagine ritual primarily as traditionary practice, and particularly through the lens of ritual subjectivity: first, it must be noted that while ritual is a term also utilized to categorize actions often termed ‘secular’ and its study has ventured into other disciplines (particularly anthropology and sociology) aside from its beginnings in the study of religion, my conception of ritual as a traditionary practice is one that is set within scriptural traditions where the notion of ‘cosmology’ and the authority of a ‘sacred’ text are not yet lost. To suggest this is to see ritual primarily as a religious act. There are analogues of ritual in the ‘contemporary, secularised world’ but these are not discussed as rituals in my usage because they are not obligations enjoined by a ‘sacred’ text that seek to enact the ‘memory of a tradition’. The interrelation between religion, understood primarily in terms of socially sanctioned praxis and training of the body, and ritual, understood as a way of acting in the world that expresses imagination rather than propositions, allows me to claim the centrality of practice without making it an autonomous and meaningless activity. Ritual practices can be taken as ‘somatic responses to human need in real space and time’, and far from being irrational or self-sufficient, serves as the locus within which the construction and negotiation of human meaning within a particular cosmology is fully realized. Second, while these practices function on a broader scale of collective representations of values and narratives of a community, resulting in the preservation, continuation and transformation of histories,

179 Ibid., p. 65. My understanding and use of the term ‘religion’ is borrowed from Flood’s discussion of religions as ‘not primarily abstract systems but lived realities experienced within subjectivity, within the body, within community, and in the messy cut and thrust of history and human life…Religions are ways of life, ways of living in the body, which encounter and respond to the raw fact of being, to the human condition…’ Ibid., p. 15.
180 Ibid., p. 58.
181 Ibid., p. 6.
they impact upon individual lives and are appropriated primarily through desire, language and enactment within individual subjectivities.

**RITUAL, TRADITION AND SUBJECTIVITY**

Stausberg mentioned that the ‘term “ritual” and the related term “rite” go back to Latin, which has the noun *ritus* and the adjective *ritualis* (“relating to rites”). While he points out that this ‘does not imply semantic and pragmatic continuity’ in that the ‘meaning of these Latin terms does not correspond to the modern way of employing them’, he also notes that once ‘ritual’ became an important and useful term in the humanities, it came to replace ‘alternative (and partly synonymous) terms such as “ceremony”, “observance”, “celebration”, “custom”, “service” and “tradition” gradually’.\(^{182}\) Scheid, in his *An Introduction to Roman Religion*, mentions that the term *ritus*, whose Greek equivalent is *nomos*, is taken to designate a particular mode of action adopted in a specific form of practice, such as the celebration of religious festivals, as opposed to the content of those festivals. The term employed by the Romans to designate those contents, which are known more generally today as ‘rites’, is the term *sacra* or *caerimoniae*.\(^ {183}\) According to Ernout and Meillet, ‘the term *ritus* depends on the root *er*- (ar-), enlarged by *-ei-* and the suffix –*tu-*.’ They claim that the word is ‘an example of the concordances between the Indo-Iranian and the Italo-Celtic religious vocabulary’, and further argue that ‘*ritus*’ corresponds to the ‘Vedic *ṛtam*’, which is generally taken to designate ‘correct order’.\(^ {184}\) The word is also related to the Indo-European root *re(i)-* which is taken to mean ‘to reason’, ‘to count’.\(^ {185}\)

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Quoting the ‘first edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, published in Edinburgh 1771’, Asad points out that ritual was defined as ‘a book directing the order and manner to be observed in celebrating religious ceremonies, and performing divine service in a particular church, diocese, order, or the like.’ He goes on to claim that by 1910 (in the eleventh edition of the book) the notion of ritual as ‘a *script* for regulating practice’ was shifted to ‘a type of practice that is interpretable as standing for some further *verbally definable*, but tacit, event’. He claims that this modern understanding of ritual was disinterested in taking this shift from the sense of ‘a script (a text to be read and performed) to an action (an apt performance of what is prescribed)’ into account, and therefore, is unable to appreciate the intellectual and practical disciplines acquired for the full development of the self, such as the constitution of the ‘monastic self’. While the distinction of ritual either as a ‘script’ or an ‘action’ exclusively is limiting, this distinction, when pursued to explore their interrelation, serves to introduce the possibility of understanding ritual as a particular way of acting, and a specific form or method of practice and skill in action, which is oriented towards the realization of the *telos* of what is considered to be the *good*. This understanding of ritual action is very similar in its structure to MacIntyre’s envisioning of traditionary enquiry as a *techné*.

In discussing philosophical enquiry, and particularly the enquiry into the knowledge about the truth of the good for the enquirer and the human good, MacIntyre talks about conceiving such enquiry as a craft, a *techné*, which he conflates with a *skill* that possesses practical rationality. He draws from Aristotle’s statement - ‘every good is the


*ergon of a techné*¹⁸⁸ - and connects it to the journey of transformation for the enquirer. For MacIntyre, to be an enquirer into the nature of the good is to learn to make himself or herself become a particular kind of person, ‘making oneself into an apprentice to a craft’.¹⁸⁹ He then goes on to discuss some salient characteristics which the structure of a *techné* (here philosophical enquiry) shares with other crafts: firstly, he talks about the significance of the apprentice learning from his teacher for two purposes – one, to identify mistakes in the process of his recognition of the best available standards and two, to learn to distinguish his own ‘excellence here and now’ and the ‘ultimate excellence’ which furnishes him and his master with their *telos*. Secondly, he talks about the practical embodiment of virtues along with a ‘desire guided by reason’ to realize and actualize the ‘potentiality’ which, along with the authority and guidance of the teacher, will enable the enquirer to move towards the shared *telos* of a fully perfected craft. Thirdly, he talks about the ‘rationality of a craft’ that the enquirer can share in, by understanding and participating in the tradition through which it was achieved, and thereby, learning how to go further as well as learning how to direct others towards that shared *telos* of fully perfected work.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, for MacIntyre, if one seeks to enquire into the nature of virtue, one has to submit to a disciplined apprenticeship where the lack of important ‘qualities of mind, body and character’ required for the ‘excellent performance’ and an ‘informed and accurate judgement about excellence in performance’ can be acquired and learned from ‘those competent to transform us into the kind of people who will be able both to perform well and to judge well.’¹⁹¹ Thus, the relationship of master-apprentice can be seen as providing the necessary groundwork for practices to be passed on as tradition. Action as *techné* becomes a carrier of tradition and the mode through which tradition may be transmitted.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 61-62.
¹⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 61-66.
It is with this sense of action, understood as traditionary practice entailing the formation of a subjectivity that ritual finds conceptual similarity and allows me to establish a link between the notion of ritual and the notion of tradition highlighted previously. Shils describes ‘tradition’ as ‘mechanisms of persistence’ operating through the beliefs and practices of a community,¹⁹² and Hammer, based on his important work on Oakeshott and Gadamer’s use of ‘tradition’, claims that ‘the origin of tradition lies in human activity’.¹⁹³ Valliere argues that the noun form of ‘tradition’ i.e. traditio (‘handing over’), which is closely related to the Greek term paradosis, is best understood to designate the ‘content’ of what is being handed over.¹⁹⁴ Pieper argues that the Latin preposition trans, hidden in the use of ‘tradition’ is closely related to the ‘act of tradition’ which is described in French as transmettre, suggesting the notion of tradition as an act of transmission.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, traditio as a generic ‘something’ transmitted in time can be seen to have a unique relationship with ritual. This relationship is particularly pertinent when ritual, as I have highlighted, is taken as a religio practice. The Latin term religio, which was taken by Cicero to have originated from relegere, referring to the ‘lore of the rituals’ of one’s ancestors that is being ‘reread’ or ‘retraced’, is similar to the Latin term traditio in the noun form, which equally refers to the ‘content’ of what is being delivered or transmitted. King points out that this understanding of the term religio ‘seems to have gained provenance in the “pagan” Roman Empire’ where religio was ‘virtually synonymous with traditio.’¹⁹⁶

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Balagangadhara also claims that ‘religio is what traditio is all about’ and points out that religion as tradition is ‘a set of practices transmitted over generations’. 197

It is in light of this that I claim ritual, re-understood as a traditionary practice, can be taken as a meaningful religio practice, which responsibly embodies (internalizes and inscribes) the practical rationality of a tradition, and actualizes it in enactment. This conception of ritual allows me to develop the centrality of the notion of ritual subjectivity in an attempt to investigate and understand the phenomenon of ritual.

**SUMMARY**

In this chapter, I have provided the conceptual framework for the two aims of the central argument that I seek to pursue in this thesis. With regard to the first aim, the groundwork for the claim that Jaimini’s conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice centred on the subject, and whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, began by locating of Jaimini’s text between the codification-driven Śrauta-sūtras and the speculation-driven Darśana-sūtras where, following Clooney’s observation, I argue that Jaimini’s vision and approach can already be seen to be hermeneutical in orientation. In providing an overview of the Mīmāṃsā corpus through the commentarial tradition, I argued that Jaimini’s predominant concern, in his quest to understand dharma, was the intelligibility of ritual practice and I showed that the continuing scholarship-through-commentary had largely sidelined the concern for the centrality of practice. These commentaries have taken the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā system viz. the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, out of its ritual context and have only scantily studied it as a source for understanding the nature of ‘ritual’ that Jaimini makes intelligible and consistently.

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defends. Therefore, these studies were not able to account for Jaimini’s conception of dharma and his concern for the sanctity and continuation of the practice of ritual in the Vedic world. I then provided a historical background to the hermeneutic tradition as I sought to explicate its constitutive structure as telos, internal rationality and practising community. The hermeneutic tradition of enquiry was developed on this groundwork in light of the claim that Jaimini’s ritualistic understanding of dharma, when pursued through the theme of subjectivity and tradition, also possessed a structure that can be argued to be akin to that of the hermeneutic tradition.

With regard to the second aim, the groundwork for the claim that Jaimini’s enquiry can offer insights to the contentions within the academic study of ritual began by developing a historical background to the scholarship on ritual, particularly in light of the myth-ritual and thought-action dichotomy, to argue that these fundamental attitudes to ritual gave rise to an understanding of ritual as an empty and thoughtless action. This claim is divided into three contentions which are stated as the representation of ritual as meaningful practice, the challenges of a universal rationality and the articulation of ritual through the agency of the ritual actant. The aim, in the following chapters, is to show that these contentious discussions are unable to move forward because the notion of ritual subjectivity formed within a practising tradition has not been seriously considered. I then briefly highlighted the conceptual ties identifiable between ritual, tradition and subjectivity and ended the chapter with a preliminary sketch of how the theme of ritual, tradition and subjectivity may be conceptually tied together.

Having introduced the conceptual framework for this thesis, I now move on to the three core chapters that will focus primarily on explicating the significance of Jaimini’s enquiry by approaching the Mīmāṃsāsūtras through the lens of the transformation of the subject and the stages of enjoinment, as I continue to be guided by the attempt to
understand Jaimini’s conception of dharma. These stages of enjoinment that include the mode of desire, appropriation and answerable enactment will allow me to account for the pursuit of dharma, the authority of the Veda and the realization of dharma. This will in turn help me to argue that Jaimini’s conception of dharma is closely intertwined with his concern for the preservation and continuation of an unbroken tradition.

Each of these three core chapters will be guided by a hermeneutical re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras even as it engages with questions that are raised in the scholarship on ritual, questions whose underlying issues can also be seen to be related to hermeneutical traditions in general. The next chapter begins with an investigation on the theme of the pursuit of dharma. It will be read in light of the discussions on the problem of meaning and reductionism in the study of ritual, particularly with a focus on the notion of sacrifice and the end towards which the practice is directed and made meaningful.
CHAPTER THREE: PURSUIT OF DHARMA
TELOS, DESIRE AND SUBJECTIVITY

INTRODUCTION

The debate concerning the question of ‘ritual’, in light of the two fundamental attitudes that I have mentioned in the previous chapter, can be discussed in terms of the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of ritual. The issues that concern both of these queries can be discussed as two forms of reductionist enquiry; the former ontological and the latter epistemological. While these two queries can be discussed as two separate and distinct debates in their own right, they are nonetheless conceptually inseparable. The question of the ‘thing’ or ‘phenomenon’ that constitutes or identifies ritual is closely interrelated with the question of how one may investigate and talk about ‘ritual’. Ricoeur argued and demonstrated that these two forms of enquiry are two overlapping domains that can and must be investigated together. According to him, a discussion ‘begins as the simple analysis of our manner of thinking and talking about things’, and the process of discussion and analysis eventually shifts to an investigation or enquiry about ‘the things themselves and the requirements they place on our conceptions about them.’ In this chapter and the last (Chapter Five), I will engage with the question of the ontology of ritual by looking at the problem of representation and articulation as it relates to the phenomenon of ritual, even as I discuss the question of the epistemology of ritual in the next chapter (Chapter Four) as it relates to its formal study.

If the focus in the enquiry into ritual is an attempt to understand the thing-in-itself, then what thing-in-itself or phenomenon does ritual actually represent? As I discuss below, this underlying question forms the debate on the problem of meaning in the study of ritual, with the formalist-structuralists reducing ritual to a meaningless activity that is

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1 Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, p. 121.
solely constituted by the formality of its rules, and the semiotic-symbolists reducing ritual to an epiphenomenon that derives its meaning only externally i.e. outside its situated enactment or practice.

**Ritual and the Question of Meaning**

Claiming that the chief characteristic of rituals is orthopraxis and not orthodoxy, Staal, an influential proponent who based his study on the Vedic fire ritual (agnicayana), critiques the general supposition that ritual is an act oriented towards goals and purpose, and not with itself. He argues that ritual is an autonomous practice where the performers of rituals are concerned only with the correct execution of specified acts: ‘their primary concern, if not obsession, is with rules. There are no symbolic meanings going through their minds when they are engaged in performing ritual.’ While Staal does not dispute the value of ritual in society, he defines ritual ‘as an activity governed by explicit rules. With the importance of the act being what you do, not what you think, believe, or say.’

He describes rituals as forms of actions that are basically context-independent and self-referential, and therefore, are ‘primary’ and ‘pure activity’ that is ‘without function, aim or goal’ necessitating an investigation for their own sake. He goes on to claim that ‘the chief provider of meaning is religion’ and ritual became meaningful only through its association with religion - with the imposition of meaning onto such primordial utterances as *mantras* and other meaningless practices. Therefore, Staal argues that while religion is best understood as the coming together of ritual and meaning; rituals in and of themselves; are meaningless activities and more importantly, are anti-religion.

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Staal’s idea of the meaninglessness of ritual seems far-fetched given the continuing scholarship on ritual that demonstrates the social, communicative, or performative meaning of such activities, he is reacting precisely against the predominant position that reduces the practice of ritual as *mediums* or *tools* for understanding ‘larger’ and more encompassing social phenomena, particularly the over-elaborate ‘meaning-under-every-rock symbolic analysis’ of much of the early theorists of ritual and culture such as Turner and Geertz. Kreinath also argued that ‘as long as texts and discourse are taken as the major source or primary model for inquiring into religious traditions’, and as long as the practice of ritual is unaccounted for except as the by-product of religious beliefs, the study of religion and culture ‘will be limited to such issues as representation and meaning’. Geertz’s two programmatic articles entitled *Thick Description: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture* and *Religion as a Cultural System*, where he outlines a theoretical perspective that emphasizes the meaningfulness of ritual based on his semiotic theory of culture, are often taken as an example of the textualizing of culture and practices that both Staal and Kreinath protest against.

Geertz identifies ritual and religion as concepts that are interrelated and defines religion ‘as a system of symbols’ where the the essence of religion, the notion of the ‘really real’ is understood to originate in ritual because ‘the world as lived, and the world as imagined, [are] fused under the agency of a set of symbolic forms.’ Kreinath elaborates Geertz’s position by arguing that ritual is what generates religion for Geertz because ‘it is capable of combining the “model of” and the “model for” reality in a way that acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by

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formulating conceptions of a general order of existence.’\textsuperscript{10} For Kreinath, while Geertz’s approach is important for ‘the study of religion’, it is problematic for the study of ritual because ‘it presupposes a concept of symbol that he believes misconceives the analysis of ritual performance - as long as it is grasped as a category that can only determine the type of unit that “serves as a vehicle for a conception”.’\textsuperscript{11} He argues that a serious engagement with Geertz’s approach will result in the analysis of ‘the conceptions or models of reality as embodied in, or exemplified by, rituals’ and would lead to the sidelining of the analysis of ‘the rituals themselves’.\textsuperscript{12} While Geertz’s approach is significant, particularly for the study of culture and religion, and also introduced useful notions such as the ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ perspectives, Kreinath contends that ‘he is unable to analyze rituals on their own terms,’ and his approach ‘systematically relates the rituals back to religious conceptions that he takes to be the representation or meaning of ritual symbols’. Kreinath argues that Geertz’s understanding of ritual therefore, is reduced to ‘a mode of communicative behaviour that functions to ascertain religious moods and motivations, rather than a form of human action that establishes and transforms relations’.\textsuperscript{13} In a similar manner, the accounts of the ‘functionalist’, ‘ethologist’, and ‘confessionalist’ also tend to reduce ritual practices to an epiphenomenon that points outward towards some external meaning, rather than towards the activity or the performed act itself.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{10} Ibid., p. 4.
\bibitem{12} Ibid.
\bibitem{13} Ibid.
\bibitem{14} Michaels in his chapter ‘R ritual and Meaning’ in the edited volume of \textit{Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts} (2006) highlights that the ethological-psychological, socio-biological and socio-ecological theories regard ritual as a ‘mechanism of biological selection (survival of the fittest) or social regulation’.
\end{thebibliography}
It is this lack of interest in accounting for the complexity of the ritual act that provoked Staal and the formalist-structuralists to suggest that the ‘study of ritual’ must be a separate ‘field of its own’ rather than an extension of the larger study of religion, or society and culture, and it should be studied ‘in terms of the syntactic rules they follow’ rather than through the dimension of any external myths or beliefs. For these theorists, the subsuming of the analysis of ritual within other studies such as the study of culture and religion, and the attempt to distil religious meanings from rituals without analyzing the ritual practices themselves is inadequate for a comprehensive analysis and understanding of the phenomenon.

One may not agree with Staal’s thesis in its entirety, however, his provocative idea of the ‘meaninglessness’ of the ‘pure activity’ of ritual is significant in pointing to the self-justifying dimensions of ritual practice and in advancing the possibility of looking at rituals as essentially self-referential. It is precisely this concern for, as well as lack of, the self-justification of ritual that encouraged contemporary scholars to seek a ‘science of ritual’ that would make the study of ritual a distinct science which can stand in its own right - independent of their contexts and from any underlying meanings that may be attributed to them. However, Staal’s total rejection of meaning (and the relationship between ritual and religion) and his privileging of (abstract) rules in his attempt to highlight the independence of ritual and the primacy of the act of ritual, does not accord him the space to explore the particularity that exhibits meaning that is generated from within - the particularity and uniqueness of ritual understood as a traditionary practice. Staal’s select insistence on the rules of performance prevented him from pursuing the complexity that constitutes traditionary practice, and thereby, also the attendant notion

more-or-less on formal aspects, such as language and codification, symbols, communication, or performance and dramaturgy. See Kreinath, Snoek & Stausberg (eds), Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts, p. 248.

of the subject who ushers meaning to the act. Therefore, while Staal opposes the reductionism implied in functionalist and symbolic theories, he is himself a reductionist, and his account of ‘pure activity’ remains limited insofar as he neglects all meaningful aspects that people, and particularly ritual actants, attribute to their own practices.\textsuperscript{17}

While Geertz, in his attempt to privilege the conception of religion, does not accord primacy to the discussion of the performed act, Staal, in his attempt to act as a corrective does not accord any space for the discussion of the theme of religion, which he argues entails the borrowing and imposition of meanings from outside the performed act. Therefore, the ‘objectivist’ representation of ritual as an epiphenomenon and the ‘formalist’ abstraction of ritual in terms of its forms and structure (rules), are both unable to account for the \textit{act} of ritual thereby, only serving to repudiate the supposition that ritual in itself is an unreflective and thoughtless action. Even contemporary scholars, such as Michaels, who sought to ‘solve the conundrum’ by proposing a ‘middle way’, nonetheless maintain that ‘rituals are indeed without meaning’. Michaels supports this claim by developing three points whose overarching argument revolves around the notion that rituals are ‘mimetic’ actions that are ultimately ‘changeless’ and ‘invariable’. According to him, ‘rituals are staged productions of timelessness, the effort to oppose change, which implies finality (and, ultimately, death).’\textsuperscript{18}

Stuck between Geertz’s objective analysis of ritual as ‘datum’ that is seen as a \textit{window} for understanding larger social phenomena, and Staal’s deconstructionist analysis of ritual as meaningless activities that nonetheless sought universal features, how does one account for the notion of ritual as a meaningful practice without falling into either of these reductionist positions? I would like to argue that it is when ritual is re-imagined


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 260.
and posited in the language of a traditionary practice that its intrinsic relationship with religion and meaning can be acknowledged without sidelining the specificity and integrity of the practice of ritual. It is then that ritual can be discussed in the sense of a specific religious practice and the agency of the subject of that practice who pursues meaning taken into consideration.

It is in light of this tension that I turn to Jaimini’s philosophy, and look at his discussion on the practice of Vedic sacrifice, to seek a way forward from these contending positions. The problem of meaning,19 understood particularly as a separate and external entity that is then imposed onto ritual activity, is an impasse that Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras not only grappled with but sought to propose a way forward from. It is this structure and process of negotiating a way forward, without the devaluation of the event of enactment or the sidelining of the tradition within which the enactment is situated, that I will seek to develop in this chapter. I will discuss Jaimini’s notion of sacrifice as a meaningful practice primarily through an excavation of the ritual subjectivity that emerges within the interplay of his introduction of dharma as the telos of tradition and his defence of the intelligibility and vitality of the continuation of sacrifice.

To that end, this chapter will be discussed under three main themes, with each theme seeking to build on the previous one. I will begin by giving a brief historical overview of the Vedic world of sacrifice, within which the Mīmāṃsā was formulated, to help

19 The question of ‘meaning’ is of course not exclusive to the study of ritual or religion. The category ‘meaning’ is applicable to a range of expressions, such as ‘linguistic meaning’, ‘aesthetic meaning’, ‘political and cultural meaning’, and ‘scientific meaning’ and so on. The attempt here at an investigation into the notion of meaning as it relates to ritual is to claim that the event of sacrifice can be discussed as a meaningful-practice in so far as it can be argued to address the existential dimensions of human concern which involves questions that relates to the meaningful order of existence. It is precisely this notion of meaningful traditionary practice that Jaimini’s discussion of sacrifice offers. For an elaborate discussion on the meaning of religious action, see Flood, The Importance of Religion: Meaning and Action in our Strange World, pp. 53-60.
enquire into Jaimini’s rationale for his introduction of and concern for *dharma* as the central theme in his enquiry. I will argue that Jaimini’s sideling of an important alternative that offers itself as a viable rationale for claiming sacrifice as a meaningful practice, when taken together with his insistence on the pursuit of *dharma*, discloses his concern for the continuity and vitality of tradition. To help me develop the conceptual lens with which the pursuit of the invisible *dharma* may be investigated, I will take a detour through Heidegger’s phenomenology to explore the possibility of relating the invisible with the formation of subjectivity. I will end the discussion with an explication of the emergence of the Mīmāṃsā subject, who as a sacrificial agent desiring the *telos* of *dharma*, ushers the identification of sacrificial activity as an intrinsically meaningful event. This disclosing of invisibility as firmly grounded in ritual subjectivity in turn enables me to explicate the practice of Vedic sacrifice as a meaningful event, and one that can also be validated as one of the constitutive structures of a hermeneutic tradition - *telos*. The reduction of ritual as empty action, this chapter seeks to argue, is because the question of the ritual practitioner and his impulse towards meaning have not been seriously taken into consideration.

**THE DEMYSTIFICATION OF SACRIFICE IN MĪMĀ_MSBĀ**

Many of the early prominent theories about sacrifice, particularly in anthropology, have largely centred on the predominant theme of a human-divine communication or relationship. This relationship is primarily based on the presumed assumption of a polarity between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’, where the human sacrificial agent, who is known to be polluted, sinful and guilt-ridden, is looking to transform and redeem or purify himself through the propitiation of a deity or a higher extra-temporal power in
the performance of the specified sacrifice. Sacrifice, which according to Tylor, ‘evolved from the idea of giving a gift to a deity as if he were a man’, was minimally defined by Smith and Doniger as ‘the act of giving up something in order to receive something of greater worth.’

Sacrifice was generally understood as a ‘transaction’, an ‘offering’ or a ‘substitution’ undertaken for the mutual benefit of the deity and the human sacrificer, where the sacrificial agent brings an offering of sacrifice to the deity who in turn rewards them with blessings. Hubert and Mauss claim ‘in every sacrifice an object passes from the common into the religious domain; it is consecrated’. Beattie, taking the case of the ‘Nuer’ and ‘the ancient Hebrews’, adds that a sacrifice is made ‘to a High God, variously conceived’ and sometimes also to ‘lesser divinities and spirits believed to be able to affect man’s condition’. Evans-Pritchard, who conducted an extensive anthropological survey of the Nuer religious symbolism, also regards sacrifices as invocations to a transcendent God. According to him, if one had to ‘sum up the Nuer sacrifice in a single word or idea’, it would be best categorized as ‘a substitution, vita pro vita.

While Stroumsa claimed that this fundamental pattern of offering-and-blessing centred around the notion of a transcendent being (taken both in the theological and

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21 Bourdillon & Fortes (eds), Sacrifice, p. 17.
23 See Bourdillon & Fortes (eds), Sacrifice, pp. 30-33.
26 Bourdillon & Fortes (eds), Sacrifice, p. 31.
metaphysical sense) is found throughout the history of religions.28 Das challenged that assumption by pointing out that these presupposed universal features in the discourse about the sacrificial processes are drawn heavily from ‘assumptions about man, society and God in Semitic traditions’29 and, therefore, failed to recognize and appreciate different sacrificial systems within the context of their own cosmologies and traditions. 

Das suggested that the general theory of ritual as elaborated by ‘anthropological discourse on sacrifice’ was inadequate because it fails to recognize that in other contexts such as the Vedic sacrifice, the gods are not identified as the central focus around which the sacrificial performance is oriented.30 According to her, sacrifice in the Vedic practice, is not an activity in which the objects are simply transferred from men to gods but one in which ‘sacrifice to god is complemented by sacrifice of god’, suggesting a different conception of the nature and role of both ‘god’ and sacrifice.31 This observation opens the path for a re-imagining of the possibility of enriching the discourse about the nature of sacrifice and its presumed connection with the transcendent or the invisible.

As Beattie has pointed out, even the understanding of what one means when one says something is made ‘holy’ or ‘sacred’ and how one changes something into that condition is unclear,32 and in an increasingly secularized post-modern world,33 the question of ‘God’, of transcendence, of the invisible, of the irreducible, is often burdened with the question of relevance, particularly in the academy.34 Flood observes

30 Ibid., pp. 445-446.
31 Ibid., p. 445.
32 Bourdillon & Fortes (eds), Sacrifice, p. 29.
33 For a discussion on the secularization thesis that has developed particulary in the sociology of religion, see P Heelas & L Woodhead, Religion in Modern Times: An Interpretative Anthology, Blackwell, Oxford, 2000, pp. 307-308.
that we are now living in a ‘secular age where belief in a transcendent reality, or rather
the experience of a transcendent reality as a fact in our lives’, has been seriously
challenged and even replaced by ‘skepticism towards transcendence as the default
position.’ Clooney points out that ‘traditional religious discourse’ has come under
sustained scrutiny and analysis in the ‘post-modern West’ whereby ‘the most important
works in theology and the study of religion’ no longer center on ‘questions about the
nature of God, the revelatory capacity of scriptures, or the explanation of religious
experience in ways satisfying to the contemporary mind’ but ‘the discussion of religion
has been systematically detached from the sure unifying foci - God, Scripture, and the
meaning of life - that have traditionally afforded at least minimal coherence within even
the most acrimonious discussions’.

He believes that this ‘unsettling development’ poses ‘a challenge of the first order to traditional religious discourse and to those who have articulated their faith and understanding of religions in terms of that discourse’.

Although this concern seems to be presented as a more recent modern development, one finds that in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, which precede us by thousands of years, notions such as ‘God’ or ‘gods’ or ‘authors’ of [sacred] texts were already subjected to critical discussions and their centrality challenged and sidelined. It is this curious sidelining of the importance of gods by Jaimini, while simultaneously forefronting the centrality of the practice of sacrifice in his pursuit of dharma that enables me to suggest the event of sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful activity. I lay the groundwork for that suggestion by first offering a brief overview of the historical background within which the Mīmāṃsā as a school was formulated.

37 Ibid., p. 659.
38 Charles Taylor, for example, claims that while it was impossible in 1500 not to believe in God in the West, in 2000 unbelief is not only an easy option but even inescapable. He also argues that the concern with meaning is a particularly modern phenomenon. See C Taylor, A Secular Age, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 25, 308.
Background: Centrality of Yajña in the Vedic World

The significance and centrality of sacrificial activity for the Vedic world throughout the Vedic period cannot be overemphasized. Staal asserts that Vedic ritual is not only the ‘oldest surviving ritual of mankind’ but also that it ‘provides the best source material for a theory of ritual’. According to him, it is the ‘largest’, ‘most elaborate’ and ‘best documented’ among the ‘rituals of man’. Gonda also remarked that ‘no other nation of antiquity has left us so detailed, considered, and systematic descriptions of their ritual and ceremonial as the Vedic specialists.’ Sacrifice, according to Phillips, is the soul of the Veda: ‘It is older than the hymns, for they were composed for its celebration…Viṣṇu and Indra made the spacious world for the sake of sacrifice.’ Clayton also notes that ‘even before the hymns in the Ṛg-veda were collected the idea of sacrifice had so fully laid hold of the mind of the Aryans that all the thousand hymns in the Ṛg-veda refer directly or indirectly to sacrifice.’ Panikkar, while certainly aware that the conception of sacrifice and the connotation of the term itself varied through the ages in Vedic history, makes the claim that ‘if one had to choose a single word to express the quintessence of the Vedic Revelation, the word yajña (to sacrifice), would perhaps be the most adequate.’

Clooney observes that the Brāhmaṇas, which are texts ‘composed earlier than the Mīmāṃsāśūtras’, are ‘closely connected with the actual prescriptions and prayers’ and are more commonly understood to be concerned with the exegesis of sacrifice. Renou

39 Staal notes that while all sacrifices may be taken as ritual, however all rituals may not be taken as sacrifice. He confines sacrifice as a type of ritual in which an animal is ritually killed. See F Staal, Rules Without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences, p. 69.
40 Ibid.
41 Gonda, The Ritual Śūtras, p. 470.
notes that they presuppose a thorough acquaintance with the course and details of sacrifice, and from the period of the Brāhmaṇas, the act of sacrifice significantly became the central activity around which the Vedic world was organized.46 According to Gonda, ‘the contents of the Brāhmaṇas may be classified under the heads of sacrificial directions, explanations and exegetical, “mythological”, polemical or “philosophical” speculations on the great rites and their “connections”, and the advantages to be gained by means of the rites.’47

These descriptions of sacrifices in the Brāhmaṇas were followed by two diverging perspective on the Vedic practice of sacrifice. On the one hand, according to Clooney, ‘at the “end” of the Brāhmaṇical period’, and with the introduction of the Upaniṣads, ‘speculation on the sacrifice incorporated a new attitude regarding the essential or higher aspects of the sacrifice’ that is beyond its performed act. He highlights that this period witnessed ‘the sacrificer’s construction of his own spiritual self in the elaborate actions he performs’ and culminated with the development of the Upaniṣadic notion of a brahman and an ātman which while independent of the sacrifice as ‘higher realities’ are nonetheless made manifest by its performance.48 According to Mus, in the Upaniṣadic speculation, sacrifice was taken to be significant only in so far as it relates and points towards these notions of ātman and brahman and to the extent to which they are made manifest by them.49 On the other hand, the Brāhmaṇas were also followed by the sūtra literature, and works such as the Śrauta-sūtras, which are concerned primarily with the systematic exposition of the ‘rules of sacrifice’, prescribe the manner and employment of rules for the various ceremonies. The Śrauta-sūtras sought to record in detail the actions to be undertaken in a specific order and according to strict instructions, such as

46 Renou, Indian Literature, pp. 4-7.
47 Gonda, The Ritual Sūtras, p. 341.
in the *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice. Their main concern is to facilitate the correct performance of rituals, and to ensure that these performances are executed exactly as prescribed by the Vedic texts. They presuppose that rituals are to be performed because they have been laid down by the Veda directly and therefore, do not concern their investigations with attempts to elucidate the significance or meaning of those performances.\(^{50}\) Therefore, in comparison and contrast to the Upaniṣadic speculations that rationalize and locate sacrifice in light of the higher realities of *brahman* and the self, the descriptions of the Śrauta-sūtras are unconcerned about issues of meaning and significance. Clooney suggests that ‘the intellectual ancestry of the Mīmāṃsā’ may have been constituted by these prior ‘reflections’ and set of instructions.\(^ {51}\)

**Mīmāṃsā and the Empty World of Yajña**

The Mīmāṃsā as a school of thought was generally taken to originate at a time when the whole religious and sacrificial system of the Brahmins was, as Thibaut puts it, in a ‘comparatively floating and unsettled condition’.\(^ {52}\) He argued that this was a time when, owing to differences in tradition, beliefs and ritual practices, the various Vedic Śākhās began to form themselves.\(^ {53}\) Gonda claims that in the post-RgVedic period when the

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\(^{51}\) Clooney, ‘Jaimini’s Contribution to the Theory of Sacrifice as the Experience of Transcendence’, p. 201.


\(^{53}\) The question of how the Vedas should be interpreted, particularly concerning the question of the enactment of rituals, is believed to have led to several attempts to formulate rules and interpretative techniques which gave rise to the development of several systems. Garge offers a description of the origins of Mīmāṃsā that is suggestive of several stages of development, and argues that ‘discussion and cogitation concerning the true nature of things, material or spiritual’ was what formed the very backbone of the Mīmāṃsā, which was primarily a process that sought to examine the ‘pros and cons of a problem with a view to arrive at the right conclusion’. See Garge, *Citations in Sabara-Bhāṣya: A Study*, p. 1. Jha.
rituals came to develop considerably, the separation of groups of followers formed not only divergent views received as śruti but also generated different interpretations. Thibaut notes that the growth of ritual activities and its diffusion over a wide extent of territory in turn led to the growth of different usages in connection with the sacrifice. As a result, multiple centres of the study of rituals began to develop. According to him, there was a shift from the full and circumstantial oral tradition where the sacrifices were performed based on the negotiation of the double ground of the (sacred) texts and the community (priestly schools and customs) that preserved those oral traditions, to a critical period where the oral tradition became obscure and the performance of the sacrifices was sought to be preserved solely by the formulation of rules and interpretative techniques founded on an implicit faith in the authority and infallibility of the (sacred) texts. The great mass of śruti materials handed down by memorial tradition orally from generation to generation was gradually assembled into a collection of treatises, accomplished by the aid of writing.

The changing circumstantial milieu and the way in which the Vedic tradition itself was evolving and diversifying meant that the world of sacrifice brought new and unique challenges. Thibaut mentions that the earlier ‘creative period of Brahmanical religious thought’ was a period in which doubts raised concerning sacrifice were discussed and

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55 Keith mentions that the accounts of the sacrifices mentioned in these texts would not have been sufficient for the priests to perform the details of the sacrifice, and argues that ‘a full and precise oral tradition’ would have assisted the priests to ensure the enactment of each of the sacrifices prescribed. Keith, *The Karma Mīmāṃsā*, p. 1. The oral explanations of the teachers, though they were not rigidly recorded like the texts themselves, were nonetheless an important factor in the performance of sacrifices.
56 G Thibaut, ‘Introductory Remarks’, in Bhāskara, *The Arthasaṁgraha: An Elementary Treatise on Mīmāṃsā*, p. ii. This may be one of the reasons why the Mīmāṃsā continues to be understood as an ancient exegetical system by modern scholars. Clooney mentions that the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* has ‘its roots in late Vedic times, when the corpus of sacrificial texts and rituals was being collected, and organized in a “final” form.’ Clooney, *Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini*, p. 19.
57 The śruti materials mentioned here are the RG-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the Yajur-Veda and the Atharva-Veda. See VR Roth, *Der Atharvaveda in Kaschmir*, Gedruckt Bei Heinrich Laupp, Tubingen, 1875, pp. 9-10. This, according to Roth, was taken to be entirely consistent with the fact that the tradition was oral, and was preserved primarily by memory.
reasoned about collectively in a spirit of free enquiry. However, the altered circumstances of the time in which Mīmāṃsā was formulated, even in the Brahmins concern to preserve the tradition of performing sacrifices based on the authority of the Veda, presented several difficulties which demanded attention:

Firstly, the attempt to systematize and codify all the knowledge and understanding about the soundness and validity of sacrifice in treatises as pregnant and concise as the sūtra form, without careful consideration of the immediate (oral) practising community, meant that the sacrificial performances were transformed into a doctrine based increasingly on the nature of the sacred texts. The ‘fixation’ that writing enabled was taken as a guarantor for the persistence of practice and more importantly as its conservation. This necessitated the sacrifice to be placed on an incontrovertible foundation for its continued dutiful performance, which in turn gradually changed it into a rule-governed mechanistic practice.58 However, the peculiar nature of the Vedic texts, and the character of the Brāhmaṇas and the nature of the prescriptions contained in them were such that the understanding and performance of them were ‘assailed by numerous doubts and misgivings’ as to whether they were a ‘faithful representation of what the sacred texts intimate’.59 According to Thibaut:

The description of the sacrifices contained in the Brāhmaṇas is so incomplete and obscure, in the best cases so disjointed and unsystematic, so frequently interrupted by remarks and comments on the mystical signification of the sacrifice and its constituent acts that it would appear almost impossible for the sacrificer to feel assured of having done exactly what he ought to have done unless he had some other help to guide him.60

Chakrabarti claims that the growing communities found the task of understanding the correct procedures of the Vedic performances increasingly complicated and

59 Ibid., p. iii.
60 Ibid.
unfavourable. This problem of interpretation was also the beginning of the Brahmans’ preoccupation with the task of finding a method - an elaborate procedure and rules - for the performance of sacrifice. The event of sacrifice was no longer characterized by collective negotiation amongst the practising community but by an impersonal imperative that demanded dutiful compliance. There was an emerging gap between the world of the authoritative text and the world of the receivers of that text.

Secondly, the growing focus on rules and the complicated process through which a sacrifice is interpreted and performed brought in the question of attainment of the result of sacrifice and particularly the issue of where the fruits would originate from, at the centre of the sacrifice. This was not helped by the lack of clarity concerning the conception of ‘gods’ in Vedic thought. As Clooney highlighted, ‘the authors of the Brāhmaṇas generally refuse to subordinate the sacrifice, as homage or propitiation, to the gods to whom the sacrifices are offered’. This uncertainty concerning the place of the gods, combined with the growing cynicism over the fruits of the sacrifices allowed skeptics, came to be known later as the materialists (Lokāyatas), to charge that the sacrifices cannot ensure their results and that they were ultimately futile.

The claim that sacrifice was primarily a reciprocal relation between the gods and men gained prominence, and the absence of this reciprocity and exchange was in turn used to challenge the very purpose and efficacy of sacrifice itself.

64 Clooney, ‘Jaimini’s Contribution to the Theory of Sacrifice as the Experience of Transcendence’, p. 201.
65 Skeptics are most commonly known by the name Cārvākas or Lokāyatas and they are known to be ‘materialists’ who do not believe in supernatural entities or the notion of a sacred scripture; however there are also skeptics within the Brahmanical fold who question the capability of the sacrifices to produce results and rewards, and they are not necessarily materialists in the prior sense. See Mādhava, The Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha: or, Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, 4th edn, K Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1914, p. 7.
Thirdly, the complicated nature of the sacrifices and the growing scepticism over its fruit allowed room for criticisms from the other schools which were developing during that period, particularly on the question of the efficacy of sacrificial performance and its relation with dharma. For the sceptics, in particular the Cārvākas, dharma as a telos was understood as a concept that the Brahmin priests merely paid lip service to, in order to maintain their superiority and dominance; and as something that was taken to be transcendental in nature and invisible to sense perception, it could not have had any real significance for the immediate society. It also led to the heightening of criticisms from the Buddhists and the Jains who were intent on disputing the authority of the Veda in the tenets of their own system, and the ‘world-renouncers within the Vedic fold’ who sought to mythologize the idea of sacrifice and its relation to performance.

Therefore, owing to the shift from the full and circumstantial oral tradition to the critical period of the codifying of culture, the period around which the Mīmāṁsāsūtras, first as a form of engagement and later as a redaction, took shape can be taken as a period when the rational plausibility of the ritual of sacrifice and its necessity for the preservation of the Vedic tradition was no longer accepted as original and significant. There was confusion about the intelligibility of the traditional sacrifices from the inside i.e. from within the Brahmanical world, as well as criticism about the validity of the Veda as means of enquiring into dharma from the outside, particularly from the Buddhists, and

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66 Ibid.
67 While there are no direct references to Buddhist doctrine and philosophy in the Sūtras of Jaimini, Pandurangi notes Kumārila’s claim that Jaimini was writing at a time when Buddhist philosophy was emerging as an important teaching. The period in which Śābara-svāmin, the commentator of the Sūtras, flourished was taken to be the period when the Buddhist idealist schools of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda came forward and vehemently attacked the āstika schools of philosophy; and these Buddhist schools were understood to particularly criticize the validity of the Vedas as an authority on the concept of dharma and the efficacy of the yajñas. See Pandurangi (ed.), Pārvamīmāṁśā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, p. 119. Also see Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in Mīmāṁsā, p. 5.
69 Matilal has mentioned that the Vedas and their relation to sacrifices were seriously attacked by the Śramaṇas (mendicant Brāhmaṇic philosophers) around 500 BCE and as a result, its authority was devastated by the criticisms, and the Mīmāṁsā as a school was founded by the Vedic priests to re-establish the authority of both the scriptures and the sacrifices they enjoin. See M Eliade (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Religion, vol 9, MacMillan, New York, 1987, p. 537.
later the Jains. Not only was it a period when ‘the traditional Vedic orthodoxy had lost its power to convince [gradually] and the question of the intelligibility of sacrifice demanded attention’ but it was also a period that saw the individuation of society that no longer had a ground upon which it may be firmly rooted.

In these circumstances, the impending danger of Vedic sacrifice being reduced to a claim of mere ritualism without meaning was a real one. The continuance of a practice that made the formation and transmission of a heritage possible and its relationship with the community’s own construction of a collective identity plausible was under threat of being dismissed in the absence of a ground upon which the foundation of sacrifice could be laid. Once the validity of sacrifice, within the context of this changing circumstantial milieu, was premised primarily on the production of tangible results or visible phalas i.e. an exchange and reciprocation between the sacrificer and gods, the question of how and where these results originated from had to be addressed.

On the one hand, there was the Vedic orthodoxy whose response was to simply put aside the question of meaning and purpose and assert that the complex system of sacrifices and ceremonies had to be performed regardless of beliefs and results. On the other, there was the alternative of directing the question of results and phalas towards external referents such as the devatās (deities) as the endowers and rewarders of the sacrificial efforts. The nature and role of the devatās as guarantors of the

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70 In developing their defence of the Veda, the Mīmāṃśā philosophers had before them the possible alternative, adopted by the Buddhists and Jains, that scripture consists of the vision of human beings endowed with supernormal insight (seers), or even an omniscient being as adopted by the Nyāya school. Mīmāṃśā, however, fundamentally rejects the ability of humans to know any transcendent matters through introspective insight. See J Taber, ‘What did Kumārila mean by Svataḥ Prāmāṇya?’, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 112, no. 2, 1992, p. 205.

71 Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃśā and Post-modern Theology’, p. 663.

72 K Burns, *Eastern Philosophy*, Arcturus, London, 2006, p. 40. Burns mentions that Jaimini attacked the view of an earlier Mīmāṃśāka named Badarī, who held that the injunctions of the Vedic texts were to be carried out regardless of the results.
meaningfulness and purposefulness of the practice of sacrifice was an important contention.

It is in light of this ‘empty’ world of sacrifice and Jaimini’s engagement with these alternatives, that I seek to highlight his unique hermeneutical concern for the intelligibility of traditionary practice as well as the emergence of a Mīmāṃsā subjectivity in his efforts to claim the intrinsic validity of the practice of sacrifice. It is to Jaimini’s discussion on the theological issue of devatās that I now turn, in order to explicate the depth of his vision to restore the high status of sacrifice in the Vedic world.

**Beyond Devatās: The Quest for Intrinsic Meaning**

While yajña is a central category for the understanding of both the Vedic and Mīmāṃsā world, the question of how the category may be understood, particularly in existential terms, as the affirmation of practice in the face of nothingness or in the collapse of foundations, has not been developed. Much of Vedic and later Hindu sacrifices have also been understood primarily in terms of a relationship between those who seek phalas (fruits, results) from powerful deities through offerings in sacrifices and those deities themselves. Sacrifice was then seen in terms of its function within the framework of a gift-exchange and communication between men and deities. According to Renou, sacrifice as ‘the center of the Vedic religion’ comprised ‘a succession of oblations and prayers, fixed according to strict liturgy, in which the culmination was reached when the offering was placed in the fire.’ He claims that ‘the objective of the

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73 Sacrifice, according to Śabara, is the highest form of ritual. See Šabara-bhāṣya (henceforth ŠBh) 1.7.15 in Sabarasvāmi, Šabara-bhāṣya, 3 vols., trans. G Jha, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1933-36, p. 125.

ritual was to enter into communication with the divine world and thence to acquire certain advantages which profane initiative could not enjoy.\textsuperscript{75}

This notion of sacrifice as a practice that resulted in the yielding of fruits is not an uncommon theme in the \textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtras}. In \textit{sūtra} 11.1.20, Jaimini states:

\begin{quote}
[In the case of] sacrifice, there should be results (fruits) that follow from [each] performance, as in the case of common experiences such as agricultural tasks, because they are brought about by actual performance. [Each time an action is performed, therefore, a result occurs].\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

Jaimini further suggests in \textit{sūtra} 1.2.17 that the outcome of the fruits of these performances were taken to be dependent on the kind and magnitude of the actions that were performed. He writes: ‘Results are accomplished by means of actions, [and] as in ordinary experience, [the] results are measured by the extent of actions accomplished.'\textsuperscript{77}

People are primarily connected with the sacrifice (particularly the optional sacrifices) because its performance leads to material effects i.e. fruits (\textit{phala}), and it is this \textit{phala} that expresses the \textit{puruṣārtha} (that which is for the purpose of man) of the sacrifice for the performer.\textsuperscript{78} As Jha notes, one may claim that it is through this \textit{puruṣārtha} that the sacrificial agent’s inclination to sacrifice and introduction to the sacrificial event first takes shape.\textsuperscript{79}

While sacrifice is taken in its most basic sense as a \textit{phala}-oriented performance and pursuit, for Jaimini this performance is not governed by or centred on the notion of a gift-giving deity (\textit{devatā}) or deities (\textit{devatās}). In his efforts to find an economic and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{76} MS 11.1.20: \textit{Karmanyārambhābhāvyatvāt kṛṣivat prayārambhāni phalānī syuh} \\
\textsuperscript{77} MS 1.2.17: \textit{Phalasya karmanispatteśaṁ lokavat parimāṇataḥ phalaviśeṣayāḥ syāt} \\
\textsuperscript{78} MS 3.7.6: \textit{Phalasamīyogāti tu svāmiyuktam pradhānasya.} \\
\textsuperscript{79} Similarly for the master of sacrifice, [there can be no substitute] because the results accrue to him, and the result follow the act. \\
\textsuperscript{79} Jha, \textit{The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā}, pp. 48, 196-199.
\end{flushleft}
coherent arrangement for the plurality of devatās which necessitated both (a) the inverting of their distinct names (MS 2.2.9-12) and (b) the inevitable substitutions of one or several devatās in place of others in the ‘modified rites’ (MS 6.3.17-18), Jaimini in his engagement with the pūrvapakṣin (holder of the prima facie view in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras) also discussed the important theological issue of the nature of the gods, and particularly their functions in relation to sacrifice. This engagement is best exemplified in sūtras 9.1.6-10 where the argument with regard to devatās is posited in terms of who fulfils the sacrificial ritual and brings it to fruition - Is it the devatās or is it the sacrificial act itself, which brings about the fruition of the results? How are sacrificial results generated from the actions performed?

Discussing the theme of prayojana in the context of the fulfilment of sacrificial action in sūtras 9.1.1-5, Jaimini presents the position of the siddhāntin (holder of the established or conclusive view in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras) that the sacrificial action (yajñakarma) itself is the main motivation (principal or primary factor) for each of the enacted sacrifice.

9.1.1: That which is the yajñakarma is the principal factor [primary in relation to all else], as that is what is enjoined (created through injunction); hence the preparation (embellishment) of the materials must be regarded as motivated (prompted) by that primary purpose.80

As a viable competing position, the pūrvapakṣin, in sūtras 9.1.6-8, puts forward the argument that the devatā should be taken as the one who fulfils the sacrificial ritual and brings it to fruition and, therefore, be regarded as the principal motivating factor around

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80 MS 9.1.1: Yajñakarma pradhānaṁ taddhi codanābhūtaṁ tasya dravyeṣu sanskārastatprayaktastadarthatvāt
MS 9.1.4: Phaladevatayoṣca.
The fruit [of the sacrifice] and the deity [to whom the sacrifice is offered] also [have the character of being the motivator (prompter) of details].
MS 9.1.5: Na codanāto hi tādguṇyam.
Not so; they are enjoined as subordinate to the primary action [by reason of injunction].
which the sacrifice is organized and performed. The pūrvapakṣin uses the analogy of a meal prepared for the honour and pleasing of a guest, to claim that the sacrificial offering similarly serves as a meal for the deities as the guest, and is not prepared for its own sake. In sūtras 9.1.6-8 the pūrvapakṣin states:

The deity should be taken as primary [and as prompting the details of the sacrifice], because he is like a guest for whom a meal is prepared, and is the “lord (owner) of wealth” [who is the one to] grant the wealth and fulfil the purpose desired.

The deities, as the explicitly intended recipient of the offerings, can be claimed to be the motivating factor for the performance of sacrifices. Sacrifice for the pūrvapakṣin was understood primarily as the act of giving an offering to the deities as propitiation, and the deities were taken to be the centre of the conceptual rationalization of sacrifice, the telos towards which sacrifice was oriented.

In the subsequent sūtras in 9.1.9-10, Jaimini responds by arguing that sacrifices are not aimed at the propitiation of devatās, but the various materials, including the devatās, are needed for their contribution to the fulfilment of the sacrificial activity. He argues that the sacrificial action (yajñakarma) is what must be primary, because it is the act that is prompted by the force and authority of the injunctive statement:

9.1.9: It is the yajñakarma that should be regarded as the principal factor, because the act is brought about only by the Vedic word; and the Deity is [spoken of only as] a subordinate factor.
9.1.10: In the case of the guest, he is primary, as his pleasure (happiness) is primary; [but] it is not so in [the case of] the sacrificial act.

In his treatment of the particular cases of ‘extended sacrifices’ or ‘transferences’ in sūtra 8.1.34, Jaimini mentions that ‘the deity is spoken of only as a subsidiary factor’

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81 MS 9.1.6-10 forms what is known as the devatādhikarana which discusses the nature of the Vedic deities, and the issue raised here is concerning the form of the deities, that is, whether they have material bodies or whether their graphic descriptions in the Vedic literatures are to be seen as allegories.
82 MS 9.1.6: Devatā vā prayojya đatithivad bhojanasya tadarthatvā
devatās
devatās
MS 9.1.7: Arthapatyācca
MS 9.1.8: Tataśca tena sambandhaḥ
83 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā, p. 250.
84 MS 9.1.9: Api vā śabdapūrvatvādyajñakarma pradhānāṁ syād gunatve devatāsṛutil
MS 9.1.10: Atithau tatpradhānatvam abhāvah karmāṇi syātasya prītipradhānatvāt
to suggest that they are not the primary motivating factor but merely one of the constituting factors (guna) that helps fulfil (complete) the sacrificial activity. Śabara, in his commentary on sūtra 9.1.9, elaborates the nature of this subordinate position of the deity by arguing the following:

The substance and the deity are both accomplished entities; and while what is denoted by the root “to sacrifice” is something that has to be accomplished, whenever an accomplished entity and a thing to be accomplished are spoken of together, the former is mentioned only for the purposes of the latter.\footnote{MS 8.1.34; Guṇatvena devatāsruthi}

Does this mean that the deities cannot be defined as the recipients of offerings made in the sacrifice, and therefore, cannot accrue results? What role do they play in the sacrifice? Mādhavācārya (c. 14th CE), in his commentary on sūtras 9.1.6-10 mentions the following:

…Nor are the gods givers of the results due to a real capacity to do so, for the mantras and arthavādas which describe their five attributes – having bodies, etc. – do not have that [i.e., establishment of divine capacity] as their intent. Otherwise we would have to conclude that gods mentioned in mantras such as “Hail to vanaspatis, hail to the mūlas” would have bodies, and this would contradict perception [for no one thinks of these as “real” deities]. Therefore [there is no evidence in such texts that] the gods do function like kings who give rewards.\footnote{Ś Bh 9.1.9 in Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, p. 1454. Quoted also in Clooney, ‘Devatādhikaraṇa: A Theological Debate in the Mīmāṁsā-Vedānta Tradition’, p. 281.}

In his Tantraratnam commentary on the same passage, Pārthasārathi (c. 11th CE) emphasizes that the sacrificial action is the primary factor and points out that the dravya and devatā are materials that serve the primary action. Focussing on the argument over whether the devatā is primary as the one that accrues and ensures the results, he first presents the pūrvapakṣin argument that claims that the devatā must be considered as the object of reference as he is the recipient of the sacrificial action. He then presents the siddhāntin position that argues that even if the sacrificial act may be argued to be subservient to the result, the devatā cannot be taken as the object of reference because it is still subordinate to the act in that it contributes to its accomplishment. He maintains\footnote{Mādhavācārya, Jaiminīyanyāyamālā, 3 vols., Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, No. 24, Anandasrama Press, Pune, 1892. Quote and translation taken from FX Clooney, ‘Devatāadhikaraṇa: A Theological Debate in the Mīmāṁsā-Vedānta Tradition’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 3, 1988, p. 282.}
that while the notion of a recipient devatā is an important element of the architecture of sacrifice, it does not mean that the sacrifice is subordinate to the devatā, but on the contrary, the devatā participates as a subordinate element to ensure the fulfilment of the sacrificial act.  

Drawing from the sixth adhyāya, Jha mentions that there are three important sacrificial actions that constitute the ‘subject-matter’ of Mīmāṁsā particularly as forms of offerings to deities, namely yāga, dāna and homa. He notes that an offering becomes a yāga when the ‘proprietary right’ is relinquished by means of utterance in favour of a deity; and when that same offering is transferred to another person who is near at hand, the offering becomes a dāna, a giving; and it is called a homa when the thing offered is thrown into the ‘fire’ or ‘water’.  

Jha goes on to claim that the deity to whom the offerings are made is ‘a purely hypothetical entity’ posited and uttered primarily ‘for the sake of accomplishment of the sacrifice’. Drawing from Śabara’s Bhāṣya, he argues that the deities cannot be regarded as the principal factor primarily because ‘the Deity has no body, it does not eat anything, it cannot be either pleased or displeased; nor can it award prizes or punishments’. Highlighting that there are three sources of information which identify the nature of the ‘deity of sacrifices’, which he mentions as (a) the nominal affixes, (b) the dative termination, and (c) mantras, Jha argues that the deity is ‘not necessarily a person or being’ but a linguistic requirement that is spoken of by ‘injunctive sentences as one to whom the offering is to be made.’ Biardeau also goes to the extent of claiming that devatās in the Mīmāṁsā are nothing more than names

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89 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, pp. 248-252. Śabara in his Bhāṣya, while acknowledging that the relinquishing of one’s proprietary right is the common factor, explains the differences between the three in the following way – ‘in Yāga, there is mere verbal relinquishment (the thing offered is not actually taken away by the recepient), - in Dāna, the thing is actually made over (to the recipient), - and in Homa, the thing offered has got to be thrown into some receptacle (water or fire).’ Refer Śabaravāmi, Šabara-bhāṣya, pp. 780-786.
90 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, p. 250.
91 Ibid., pp. 250-251.
mentioned in Vedic texts. While Jaimini does indeed suggest in *sūtra* 10.4.23 that the deities, indicated by the *mantras*, may only have a verbal reality however, he also mentions, as can be gleaned from *sūtra* 6.3.18, that ‘the *devatās*’, along with the ‘sacrificial fire, the *mantras* and the distinctive enactment (rite)’ are all intrinsically essential to the constitution of the sacrifice and that they are ‘non-substitutable’. For Jaimini and Śabara and the ensuing Mīmāṃsākas that follow, in the focus on bringing about the invisible referent (what has yet to exist) in sacrificial practice, the *devatās*, along with other accessories such as the sacrificial fire, the firewood, the chanting, and so on, are taken primarily as instruments that ensure the fulfilment of the enactment of sacrifice, and therefore, regardless of whether they are real embodied beings or not, *devatās* are neither the principal motivation nor end-results or even the issuer of fruits themselves. As Kumārila has pointed out: ‘the sacrifice is enjoined with regard to the result. It requires its fulfillment [in the result] and this is not possible without the material and the *devatā*. They are both needed because they contribute to the action but are not the object of accomplishment.’ Clooney notes that for the Mīmāṃsākas, the ‘truth’ of ‘what lies behind the divine name is not a relevant issue’ and the ‘possibilities of extra-verbal reality do not bind the interpretation’ of the name of the deity. Quoting Śabara’s *Bhasya* 10.4.23, he exclaims: ‘It ultimately does not matter if the deities exist

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93 MS 6.3.18: *Na devatāgniśabādakriyamanvārthasamīyogāt* [The] deity, [the] fire, [the] mantra and [the] action (act) are non-substitutable, because they are related to a [totally] different purpose (object).

94 The subordinate role of the *devatās* is one topic where the Mīmāṃsākas, from Kumārila and Prabhākara to the followers of these two commentators, and the subsequent proponents of the schools that they developed, mostly agreed on. However, even if the reality of the existence of gods is not their primary concern, this does not mean that the Mīmāṃsā tradition is necessarily atheistic, as some scholars would claim.


apart from the Veda, their “linguistic reality”...they are “part of the mantra,” not part of the kriyā.\textsuperscript{97}

In sūtra 4.2.27, Jaimini mentions that sacrifice, which is denoted by the root word yaj, should be understood as that act which brings about a connection between the various factors that are involved and, therefore, is an activity in which the sacrificial agent, the materials for the sacrificial performance, as well as the invoked deities are brought together and integrated within the wholeness of the sacrificial event so that the verb ‘to sacrifice’ may be actualized.\textsuperscript{98} According to Clooney, Jaimini is seeking ‘a meaningful understanding of devatā’ that is characterized by its harmony ‘with the logic of the performance of the sacrifice’ and its ‘coherent overall understanding of the texts related to it’\textsuperscript{99} According to him, ‘devatā, as relevant to the ritual, exists only within the verbal formulation of the distinctive characteristics of that ritual’ and the ‘ritual’ is not ‘distinct from the devatā’ but they are both ‘interdependent realities, not independent entities merely connected by assertion.’\textsuperscript{100}

Jaimini’s development of the intrinsic purpose of sacrifice and his concern for the primacy of sacrificial action necessarily entails the devaluation of the other elements of sacrifice, such as the gods and other external referents that seek to provide meaning and purpose. The possibility of gods as an external authority upon which the purpose of sacrifice is dependent is sidelined, and the gods are limited to the role of a verbal necessity that is invoked in the sacrifices. In the absence of the gods and in the denial of their ability to accrue the fruits desired by the sacrificer, the general question which

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 284.
\textsuperscript{98} MS 4.2.27: Yajaticodanā dravyadevatākriyaṁ samudāye kṛtārthavāt
What is denoted by the root ‘yaj’, should be understood as that act which brings about the connection between substance and deity; as this is the sense applicable to the whole [of primary actions].
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 347.
arises is concerning the mechanism that ensures the efficacy of the practice of sacrifice and the nature of its intrinsic purposefulness. Jaimini goes on to claim in śūtra 9.1.13 that it is ‘the (transcendental) purpose [that] should be regarded as the prompter of these details as the others have not been enjoined, and as they are subservient to the said purpose’, it is the purpose (artha) that should be regarded as the prompter and the reason for the fulfilment of the details of sacrifice.\textsuperscript{101}

Jaimini’s view of yajña, though not entirely disconnected from the older Vedic view,\textsuperscript{102} is unique in that he is careful not to allow the traditionary practice of sacrifice, which for him is the constituent core of dharma, be dependent on external referents or values. It is this concern that made him develop a demystified ‘non-covenantal’ model of sacrifice. For Jaimini, deities are not conceived of as above or apart from the sacrificial system and he is unwilling to establish the transcendental nature of the sacrifice through extrinsic reference. Therefore, his subordination of the gods can be taken as merely one aspect of his attempt to elevate the sacrifice to the status of an unquestionable practice intrinsically worthwhile on its own terms. In presenting his conception of sacrifice where the core act of practice is accorded a privileged centrality, he seemed to be shifting the focus back on tradition. Moreover, in dismissing all possible external referents such as deities, he is forefronting traditionary practice.

Jaimini’s refusal to found the intelligibility of sacrifice on the ground that the deities can provide, however, gives rise to new challenges concerning the validity and efficacy of sacrificial activity. If the devatās do not have the responsibility of bringing about the

\textsuperscript{101} MS 9.1.13: Ārtho vā syāt prayojanamitāresāmacodanāt tasya ca guṇabhūtāt \v{\i}vāt
The purpose should be regarded as the motivator (prompter) of these [details], as others have not been enjoined; they are subservient to the said purpose.

\textsuperscript{102} Clooney mentions that while Jaimini’s view of yajña is unique, it is not without precedent, and argues that we can note several aspects of the older Vedic view taken into account by Jaimini. For a detailed elaboration of these aspects that Clooney has pointed out, refer FX Clooney, ‘Sacrifice and Its Spiritualizations in the Christian and Hindu Traditions: A Study in Comparative Theology’, The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 78, no. 3/4, 1985, pp. 367-368.
fruition of the results and fulfilling the sacrifice, how then does Jaimini seek to account for the intelligibility and purposefulness of the sacrificial act? What is the principal motivation for sacrifice, and more importantly, how does that ensure fulfilment? Or does Jaimini offer a different understanding of fruit (results); one that is not related to material rewards as more commonly understood?

The general question at issue then is, what will ensure the validity and efficacy of a sacrifice in the absence of those external referents that can be taken to be the rewarder of the good efforts made causally? How could one talk about the intelligibility of sacrifice in the absence of those referents that can provide meaning to it?

It is against the historical background of this ‘empty’ world of sacrifice and the absence of a ground upon which to found the traditionary practice of sacrifice that Jaimini’s insistence on the pursuit of dharma demands further elaboration. The concern for Jaimini in his Śūtras was to go beyond providing an explanation of the rules and structures of the sacrifice to an understanding of the telos that makes the Vedic practice intelligible and its relation with tradition purposeful and meaningful. I would like to argue that it is precisely within this concern for the vitality of Vedic practice and its purposefulness that one is able to cull out the interrelation between the pursuit of dharma, the telos of tradition and the ritual subject seeking to affirm the practice of sacrifice. In the rejection of the intelligibility and ground that deities can provide, Jaimini’s account of sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful practice had to be developed through a disclosing of the subject that emerges from the dialogical structure of call and response vis-à-vis tradition.
Dharma and the Telos of Tradition

Hitherto, I have mentioned that Jaimini’s refusal to establish meaning as originating from outside the event and enactment of sacrifice can be read as a commitment to seek an intrinsic evaluation of the meaning and purpose of sacrifice. Jaimini takes up a position where he dismisses external impositions of meaning, particularly the notion of devatās as the reciprocator of acts that are performed. This position raises an important question regarding the connection between the practice of sacrifice and the outcome of that sacrifice. If in sacrificial traditions the notion of a ‘God’ or ‘gods’ is generally taken to represent the transcendent or invisible element towards which all religious acts are oriented and if in the Mīmāṃsā system the gods are not accorded that privileged status, how then does Jaimini seek to validate his primary concern for the continuing practice of sacrifice and how does he defend the idea that the performed act is not an end in itself - a meaningless pursuit? It is in light of this rejection of external meaning and the continuing affirmation of the practice of sacrifice that I seek to locate Jaimini’s introduction of dharma as a pursuit for the telos of tradition.

Dharma, despite being one of the most important and fundamental features of Indian civilization and intellectual history, the nature and concept of dharma has never been a theme that incurred sustained Indological scrutiny. Olivelle, who charted the Brahmanical concept of social order through the notion of dharma explores the ways in which the term was largely developed out of ideas linked to the sovereignty of the deity Varuṇa, into a concept of good rule in the edicts of the Buddhist king Aśoka. This was then subsequently adopted as a Vedic concept of sovereign socio-moral order. Hiltebeitel, while agreeing that the concept has changed greatly over the centuries, claims that dharma, as a derivative from the Sanskrit root word धर्म which means ‘to

hold, to support, to sustain’, has never lost the sense of holding entirely, even when, for example, one meaning of dharma came to exclusively mean ‘the Buddha’s teachings’. He argues that the precursor to the classical term dharma can be found in older Vedic Sanskrit, where one finds the mention of the term dharman. Dharman, for Hiltebeitel, can also be translated as ‘foundation’, in the sense of depicting something which ‘holds’. Horsch, in his account of the progression of the meanings of rta and dharma, shows that ‘dharma’ as a polysemous concept can be attributed to a range of things that includes society, rituals and even the foundations of the world. According to Doniger, dharma, which is often understood simply as ‘duty’ or ‘correct activity’, is a ‘context sensitive’ concept in that even the notion of correct action for different people will be different.

_Dharma_ has been variously discussed as a concept associated with kingship, order, and duties, and has pervaded all sections of Hindu society today. However, the _Sūtras_ of Jaimini have been concerned more explicitly with the traditionary practice of Vedic sacrifice and the accompanying enjoinderment and obligations of the _Vaidika_ sacrificial agent. Although the majority of Jaimini’s _Sūtras_ are a discussion about the complicated details of enacting the Vedic traditionary practice of sacrifice, Jaimini introduces his project as an enquiry into dharma, as a ‘dharmajijñāsā’, where he also elaborates dharma as an ‘artha’ which possessess the characteristics of a ‘codanā’. The question of dharma in light of Jaimini’s commitment towards the affirmation of sacrifice, and the life of Vedic practice, posed interpretive challenges for those seeking to understand this unique conception of dharma and of the nature of the invisible. While the interpretation

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107 MS 1.1.1: _Athāto dharmajijñāsā_
108 MS 1.1.2: _Codanālokapo ’rtho dharmabh_
of dharma as ritualistic i.e. as pertaining to the performance of sacrifices is generally accepted, the structure of this relationship between the invisible and the material has largely remained under-explored. Dharma has often been loosely assumed and defined under various categories which include: (a) an overarching principle of cosmic ‘significance’ that is sought in the performance of sacrifice,\(^{109}\) (b) prescribed duty or moral actions of the Brahmanical tradition,\(^{110}\) (c) injunctions or prescriptions that impels one to sacrifice,\(^{111}\) and (d) even the sacrifice itself.\(^{112}\)

In his study of the Mīmāṃsā experience of language, D’Sa cites several discussions from modern scholarship on the Mīmāṃsā notion of dharma and points out that the general consensus is that the concept of dharma is best understood as duty, including the dutiful compliance to the right performance of the Vedic rituals. Critiquing what he deems an essentializing of the nature of dharma to ‘duty’ alone, he goes on to develop a

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110 Müller remarks: ‘There is little room for Philosophy in all this, but there are questions such as that of Dharma or duty, including sacrificial duties, which offer an opportunity for discussing the origin of duty and the nature of its rewards…Dharma here translated by duty, refers to acts of prescriptive observance, chiefly sacrifices…this dharma or duty is enjoined in the Brāhmaṇas, and these together with the Mantras are held to constitute the whole of the Veda, so that whatever is not mantra is brāhmaṇa, whatever is not brāhmaṇa is mantra.’ FM Müller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1973 (1912), pp. 186-187. Thibaut writes: ‘The entire Veda, excluding the Upanishads is said to deal with dharma or acts of duty, of which the chief are sacrifices’. See Thibaut, ‘Introductory Remarks’, in Bhāskara, The Arthasaṁgraha: An Elementary Treatise on Mīmāṃsā, p. vii. Swami Madhavananda also claims that the ‘(Mīmāṃsā) is an inquiry into righteous action (dharma); it believes in a real objective universe as well as in a plurality of selves, although these are admitted as eternal and omnipresent; and it glorifies heaven, to which the performance of rituals is held to be the way…the whole emphasis of the Mīmāṃsā is on the mechanical performance of rites, and it has no use for god as the author of the periodical manifestation and dissolution (sṛṣṭi and pralaya) of the world, nor does it believe in them’. S Madhavananda, Mīmāṃsā-paribhāṣā of Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, 2nd edn, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1987, p. iv. Biardeau also notes: ‘Dharma according to the context is the assemblage of the Vedic rites prescribed in order to reach “heaven” after death and welfare in this world or the conduct that is considered to be meritorious because it is recommended by the orthodox traditions and it assures good rebirths.’ Biardeau, Théorie de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole dans le Brahmanisme Classique, p. 466.

111 According to Sharma: ‘Jaimini defines Dharma as a command or injunction which impels men to action…Dharma is supra-sensible and consists in the commands of the Veda…The earlier Mīmāṃsākās believed only in Dharma (and not in mokṣa) and their ideal was the attainment of heaven (svargā).’ C Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973, pp. 236-237.

112 This is clearly stated in the Arthasaṁgraha where it is asked ‘What is dharma? What are its characteristics?’, and the reply is ‘Only sacrifices.’ Bhāskara, The Arthasaṁgraha: An Elementary Treatise on Mīmāṃsā, p. 1. Pandurangi notes that ‘without giving up this multi-dimensional import of the term dharma, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā uses it in the area of Śrāuta religion in the sense of Yāga, i.e sacrifices enjoined by Vedic injunctions’. Pandurangi (ed.), Pūrvaṁīmāṁsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, p. 176.
three-pronged meaning of dharma based on his reading of Jaimini’s śūtra 1.1.2. He states: ‘The primary meaning of dharma refers to something supersensible, the secondary to the means through which the primary purpose is achieved and the third meaning is extrinsically attributed to the one who makes use of this means.’

Claiming that his analysis is motivated by the desire to see the ‘metaphysical depth in the Mīmāṃsā’, D’Sa provides a systematic account of the principal doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā’s philosophy of language. He argues against the common view that the Mīmāṃsā is primarily a manual of Vedic exegesis, or meta-exegesis, which lays down principles for interpreting Vedic sacrificial texts unambiguously, where all philosophical discussion is strictly secondary. He presents the Mīmāṃsā as a ‘worldview which rests on a certain concept of ultimate reality and offers a truly spiritual kind of salvation’. The key to his effort is his interpretation of dharma, which according to him ‘is that Significance which puts one in touch with [one’s] final fulfillment’.

He states: ‘Dharma is [that] Significance (artha-) whose characteristic is a vedavacanam. Whereas the former is an eschatological statement about dharma, the latter is a phenomenological one.’ He supports this definition by building from the definition of dharma as declared in the Sūtras as an object that is not amenable to the senses. He remarks:

If we keep before our eyes the actual assumption of the Mīmāṃsāka-s that Dharma is not amenable to the senses, then there should be no difficulty in conceding that yāgadi cannot be the primary meaning of dharma. If the yāga-ritual were the chief meaning of dharma, then the chief assumption (that dharma is not amenable to the senses) will be rendered both senseless and superfluous. And this, for the simple reason that the yāgadī-ritual is obviously amenable to the senses. On the other hand, if the assumption that dharma is not amenable to the senses is given

113 D’Sa, Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śabara and Kumārila: Towards a Study of the Mīmāṃsā Experience of Language, p. 44.
114 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 150.
115 D’Sa, Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śabara and Kumārila: Towards a Study of the Mīmāṃsā Experience of Language, p. 51.
its due (which means that dharma is beyond the ken of the senses) then the primary purpose and meaning of dharma cannot be reduced to the yāgadi-ritual.\textsuperscript{116}

While D’Sa’s backreading of the theme of ‘a spiritual kind of salvation’ to Jaimini’s Sūtras is certainly open to critique and further discussion, his development of the primary and secondary meaning of dharma which is then connected to ‘the one who performs the yāgadi-ritual’, whom he refers to as the ‘dharmika’, is important in introducing the vitality of the ritual actant as the means through which the telos of dharma is actualized.

How then, is one to pursue this invisible telos of tradition and how is this pursuit related to the ritual actant? While Jaimini does immediately point to śabda as the only means through which the invisible dharma may be pursued or accessed,\textsuperscript{117} I wish to show that this quest for the invisible telos also gave rise to the emergence of the Mīmāṃsā subject - a ritual subjectivity constituted by a desire for purpose and meaning. I argue that this preliminary excavation of the theme of subjectivity in our quest to understand the nature of Jaimini’s dharma helps in laying the groundwork for understanding the purport of Jaimini’s definition of dharma in sūtra 1.1.2 – ‘an artha whose characteristic feature is a codanā’ – which implicitly presupposes an enjoinment and enactment by an obligated sacrificial agent.

Therefore, to aid me in developing a path that can conceptually connect the theme of subjectivity (and particularly the religious subject) with the theme of invisibility, I take a brief detour via Heidegger’s phenomenological method to seek for insights from his notion of the ontology of a religious life and his retrieval of the ‘historical life’. I turn to Heidegger’s early lectures and writings on ‘phenomenology’, ‘religious life’, and the

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{117} MS 1.1.5: Autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ, tasya jīvānām upadeśo ‘vyatirekaḥ cārthe’nupalabdhe tat pramāṇāṁ bādāraṇaṁyāsūnapeksatvāt.
I will address this topic more elaborately in the next chapter.
‘hermeneutics of facticity’, and particularly the discussion on the ‘formal indication’ (die formale Anzeige), which is a key concept for his phenomenological method.

**Heidegger and the Phenomenological Retrieval of the Historical ‘Life’**

In his lectures on the phenomenology of religious life, Heidegger discusses ‘the historical’ (das Historische) as the ‘core phenomenon of the phenomenology of religion’. For Heidegger, any phenomenon is intimately bound up with history; and phenomenological enquiry must begin from the ‘factual life experience’ that is able to designate both the experiencing and that which is experienced. It is what allows the phenomenon in question to show itself in accordance with its manner of being or existing. Factual life experience i.e. ‘the originality of the absolute-historical in its absolute unrepeatability’ is, for Heidegger, the point of departure as well as the place within which philosophy and its goal can be pursued. If the factual life and situation is the phenomenon, then the task is to grasp the conditions of its possibility and Heidegger’s ‘formal indication’ is the attempt to find the right mode of access to this phenomenon, such that it can be explicated and analyzed hermeneutically.

For Heidegger, the ‘formal indication’ is therefore, a way of entering into a genuine interpretation of the factual situation in the mode of its unfolding and expressing as historical existence. To formally indicate is to primarily bind oneself to investigate and to move as close to the concrete life in its mode or manner of being as possible. It is a

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118 These early writings are based on lectures he delivered at the University of Freiburg between the years 1919 and 1923 prior to the publication of his magnum opus Being and Time (1962).
121 According to Heidegger, the ‘factual life experience’ is ‘the whole active and passive pose of the human being toward the world.’ It is the concreteness of life being ‘there’ for us in its various expressions. His concept of the world, which is both a communal and self-world emerges in the context of factual experience. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, pp. 8-9.
122 Ibid.
general orientation that seeks to engage with the phenomenon by appropriating it as our own and interpreting it from the standpoint of our own concrete historical situation, even as we do so in a way which seeks to touch on something essential in that situation. Flood, in discussing the relationship between ‘the formal indication’ and Husserl’s phenomenological method, argues that the formal indication is ‘not so much a method, as bracketing might be understood, but rather a general orientation to “phenomena” that seeks to move from an account of contingency to essential features of what is being enquired into’, and for him, this means that Heidegger’s formal indication is seeking to indicate, or point to, ‘a primordial sense of being’ and its mode of unfolding as life i.e. as a concrete way of being or existing temporally.\textsuperscript{123} This indicating or pointing to is a mode of \textit{formalization} which is beyond simple \textit{generalization} in the sense that it looks in the direction not of typologies but of the manner in which something is related to as a thing - the \textit{how} in which it is experienced in the concreteness of life. A formal indicator is thus, grounded in the structure of \textit{Dasein} and one of the primary features of \textit{Dasein} is self-disclosure i.e. it lets itself be seen as it is in itself. As Flood writes: ‘In contrast to the Husserlian model of intentionality in which a subject intends an object, here both subjectivity and objectivity are modes of self-revealing - of being-there.’\textsuperscript{124} Flood suggests that it is in this sense that all phenomenological enquiries in Heidegger’s discussions can be taken to be simply formal indications of the historical beings or entities of humans.\textsuperscript{125}

The implication, then, is that religious life has an \textit{ontological} sense and one that is disclosed only through its being existentially carried forward in further interpretative unfolding. For Heidegger, the religious life in its most basic sense fundamentally is the decisive moment wherein the possibility of being a self is actualized. Factual life is the

\textsuperscript{123} Flood, \textit{The Truth Within: A History of Inwardness in Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism}, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 230.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 16.
manner in which it rises into expressiveness according to its own mode of being. Heidegger brings to light his own view of the modes of being of factical life and the manner of approach appropriate to grasp these modes in their structural coherence. He names the three basic modes or senses of the being or intentionality of life as the content-sense (Gehaltssinn), relational-sense (Bezugssinn) and actualization-sense (Vollzugssinn). The first sense concerns the meaning of the ‘what’ of experience, i.e. life in its manner of being a ‘this’. The second addresses life in its manner or in the ‘how’ of its being directed or oriented as the actualization of its possibilities. The third sense concerns the fundamental manner in which the directedness of life is fulfilled or in which life is pulled in its particular direction.126

In presenting a phenomenological explication of the Letters of Paul as an example of a distinct religious phenomenon, Heidegger talks about a form of empathy that he calls ‘something like an I’ (Ichlichkeit) that allows one to understand Paul’s communal world through the factical life experience, and shift from the position of reading it as an object-history to its enactment situation. There are two kinds of invisibility that Heidegger is dealing with: (a) the invisibility of the historical past that is opaque due to the passage of time, and (b) the invisibility of the focus of religious practice, such as, in the case of Paul, the invisibility of the coming of the spirit, the parousia.127

Flood notes that in contrast to Husserl’s phenomenology as a first reduction or bracketing, Heidegger’s formal indication ‘does not claim to suspend judgement about being but rather assumes human being and our location in time as a precondition for understanding’.128 Therefore, the formal indication does not point to a suspension of judgement concerning the being behind appearances but rather to an enquiry that can

127 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
raise ontological questions. Flood points out that it is in this sense that Heidegger claims the understanding of the religious life (views and practices) as the understanding of the historical.\textsuperscript{129} It is in the understanding of history that one is able to appreciate the narratives and actions of religious appearances which are given life within specific cultures and traditions and which have been handed down from the past and are in their own way invisible today.

Drawing from Heidegger, one can suggest that the invisible nature of the historical past and the invisible nature of religious practices share conceptual similarities, particularly in that these practices have been handed down from a past which are now distant from our own location. It is only through the recognition of structures of being in its temporality and self-disclosure that one can enquire into the invisible.

\textit{The Invisible and the Religious Subject}

As Flood extensively points out in the majority of his works, practices and forms of religious manifestations are cultural forms whose significance lies primarily in the nature of the person revealed i.e. the way in which the person comes to appropriate and inhabit these practices within the recognized tradition.\textsuperscript{130} For the religious practitioner, the invisible comes to exert a force, a power, on his or her life through the memory and repetition of religious practices that have been handed down from the past. Flood argues that it is precisely through this process that the ‘practitioner’s identity’ is ‘subsumed’ and ‘overwhelmed’ by the ‘implied self of tradition’. Through repeated acts of ritual,

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
and through acting in the world in conformity to tradition, the practitioner seeks to realize the invisible ideals and goals of the particular religious tradition.¹³¹

It is in these repeated acts of conforming to and preserving the memory of a tradition that the religious subject, in the process, ushers the revelation of the ‘truth’ behind the appearances of practices. The spiritual practices developed over long periods of time by practitioners are intended to diminish the ‘egocentric’ view of the self and to cultivate a habitus that is oriented towards the telos of a tradition and towards the world. The orientating of the person to the transcendent goals of tradition thereby, simultaneously discloses the tradition that was once invisible. It is this almost paradoxical claim of finding oneself while letting one’s self go that Flood identifies as an important marker for the understanding and situating of the invisible. In the growing invisibility of the religious subject, one can find an appearance and disclosing of what was once invisible - transcendence, the telos of tradition.¹³²

This revealing of the invisible in the life of the practitioner is our entry into the invisible and is the window through which one can glimpse the ‘spirit’ of the invisible. Every revelation occurs with respect to Dasein, a consciousness of a thing in which it is meaningful in a particular meaningful world, which has a history. So, the question that can be posed going forward is: What is the mode of being of the religious subject and how does it relate with the invisible in a way that allows the uncovering of the telos of a tradition? It is in light of this question that I seek to claim that the practice of sacrifice, now read through the lens of the emergence of a ritual subjectivity, can be re-elevated to the status of a traditionary practice, which is a practice that entails a quest guided by the pursuit of meaning. The validity of this traditionary practice can then be related to the

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¹³² Ibid., pp. 6-15.
emergence of responsible subjects who have immersed themselves in tradition. Who, then, are these responsible subjects and how may they be located?

It is with this question in mind that I now look at Jaimini’s enquiry into the nature of the invisible and the tradition-constituted transformation of the Mīmāṃsā subject, and argue that the subject constituted by the desire for meaning is the being through which the telos of dharma is made visible. In the remaining sections, I discuss Jaimini’s notion of desire in light of the theme of the eligibility to perform sacrifices in an attempt to discuss the specific modes in which the subject, in his pursuit for dharma in light of its invisibility, bears witness to the transmission of meaning and finds himself initiated into the dynamic process of an unbroken tradition.

**Desire and the Emergence of Subjectivity**

In the history of Indic religious traditions, discussions concerning conceptions about the person (the self, the subject) have varied greatly. The notion of the self and its relationship with the quest for ‘truth’ has been one of the fundamental characteristics of Hindu traditions. From speculations about ‘mystical possibilities’ (ways of being and awareness) of the spiritual self (ātman) that transcends and elevates ordinary consciousness through layers of self-experience in the Upaniṣadic thought, where ātman seeks to realize the true nature of reality as oneness with Brahman, to the rejection of the multiple forms of self-awareness and personalities that identify the self (puruṣā) with the mind and body in Sāṅkhya, where the goal is to return to the native state of self-absorption and bliss, one is introduced to a diverse range of views and conceptions. The concern with the nature of the self in the philosophy of the Vedānta was expressed through a range of positions that viewed the self in the end as ‘the only true reality and

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[is] the same in all of us’, to ones that posited that there are ‘innumerable distinct selves embodied in a real world’, to those that claim that the ‘true self is distinct from matter and the goal of life is to free our self from its bonds’. Flood notes that ‘along with the philosophy of the hidden self, a social institution developed devoted, at least theoretically, to this realization, namely the institution of renunciation’.

Other accounts, such as those derived from Yoga and Buddhist thought, advocate the disciplines of yogic-practice and moral-action as the means through which one’s true-self or no-self is discovered. The true self, in their accounts, is conceived differently and apart from the self that performs action. The highest good is understood to be achieved by practices that disentangle the self from the world, culminating, in the case of Buddhism, in the notion of an awakening or enlightenment as the extinguishing of the concept of the self (anātman) and desire. The goal of the self, according to the Yogasūtras, is the development of an, ‘intense sense of inwardness through concentration on a single point that transforms consciousness’ for the ‘final liberation’ conceptualized as ‘inner solitude (kaivalya)’. The Yogasūtras develop the idea of the realization of the inner self that transcends the outer self that is associated with the body.

The understanding of the self, and the body, in each of these accounts tend towards the idea that ‘being human implies a unique capability for final liberation, a rare or exclusive soteriological privilege’, and this theme continued to be quite familiar for


136 Ibid., p. 114.

137 Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought, p. 271.
both the early and later Vedic texts as well as texts of later classical Hinduism. As Halbfass puts it: ‘Human existence may be full of misery; yet it is the only gateway to liberation, the only opportunity to choose one’s future instead of simply living in accordance with the karma accumulated in the past.’\textsuperscript{138} Mauss claims that the concept of the ‘individual’ never developed in India due to the influence of the world-renouncing traditions, particularly Buddhism, Vedānta and Sāṅkhya.\textsuperscript{139} Ram-Prasad also claims that ‘classical Indian theories of consciousness generally evolved within a soteriological context in which the ultimate goal was some transcendental spiritual state’.\textsuperscript{140}

However, in contrast to these common preoccupations with soteriology, with liberation from worldly, temporal existence in Indian thought, where the idea of self-negation in the quest for freedom from the limiting conditions of temporality and the humanness of life is pervasive, Halbfass mentioned that there is a more worldly, earthly, temporal atmosphere in older Vedic texts than in later Indian thought. He writes: ‘Words like ātman and puruṣa which in later thought are commonly associated with the absolute self’, are closer in their Vedic usage ‘to the embodied person, to man in his concrete individuality’.\textsuperscript{141} Within the Vedic ritualistic contexts, ‘man is distinguished and preeminent because he is the only one among the animals who perform rituals or sacrifices’.\textsuperscript{142} Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāśūtras, which deal primarily with dharma and ritual, uphold the notion of the subject as the affirmer of practice, of sacrifice, of empirical life - not as a seeker of liberation but I wish to argue, as a carrier of tradition.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p. 268. Taken from Satapatha Brāhmaṇa 7.5.2.23.
Flood mentions that the question of desire, particularly in the debate concerning the relation between the ‘body and desire’, has generally revolved around a ‘dichotomy between the rational control of the passions concerned with bodily disciplines’ on the one hand, and ‘the body’s uncontrolled impulses associated with irrationality and freedom’ on the other. This, he shows, is an old debate where Western thinkers such as Freud and Weber have gone to the extent of claiming that the ‘control of the body through various “technologies” and the renunciation of desire’ through dedicated disciplines has ‘allowed for the development of culture and civilization’ as we know it today. While the ‘rationalized control of body and desire’ has also been often discussed as ‘one of the major concerns of the orthodox Brāhmaṇical tradition’, the religiosity proposed in the Sūtras, where desire is affirmed as the main motive of ritual practice, offers a unique understanding of both desire and the significance of sacrifice.

In the following sections, I wish to show that Jaimini’s introduction of the pursuit of dharma is primarily a concern for developing and affirming the intelligibility of tradition and particularly the intrinsic meaning of the practice of sacrifice. This concern is centred on his notion of the subject who, in the context of the changing world of Vedic sacrifice that I have highlighted in the first section above, seeks to affirm its practice and discover his place within tradition. This process of learning to conform to the patterns of tradition not only introduces the mechanisms through which the meaning and content of tradition is pursued and transmitted but also discloses the transformation of the subject whose self-enhancing and self-transforming potentiality is centred on his desire for meaning and purpose. In this ritual transformation, the subject is initiated into tradition through a journey of seeking to become one with the ones who have gone before him - his ancestors; with the past. This subjectivity, immersed in tradition, ceases

to be the individuated subject, instead, becoming the artistic impulse of tradition. It is through this desiring subject that the affirmation for the viability of pursuing the telos of dharma is revealed.

**Jijñāsā and the Guru-Śiṣya Paramparā**

In the very beginning of the sūtras where Jaimini introduces the nature and field of his enquiry in the tarka-pāda, he declares: ‘Now, therefore, the desire to know [enquire into the nature of] dharma.’ The first two words atha (now, or next) and atah (therefore) are pregnant introductions offering a first glimpse into the Mīmāṃsā notion of the subject. Biderman argues that these two sūtras relate to two closely interwoven themes which constitute the whole of Mīmāṃsā’s religious and philosophical endeavour.

They immediately throw open the question regarding the import and meaning of the term ‘now/next’, and while its usage can be taken to suggest a sequence, the question of a ‘sequence to what?’ must still be posed.

Jha, in his translations of Jaimini’s Sūtras that includes his ‘original commentary’, mentions that there are two Mīmāṃsā positions on the usage of the term atha, based on two different implied injunctions. According to him, these two positions are in accordance with the interpretations of Kumārila and Prabhākara, who are later commentators of Śabara’s Bhāṣya. On the one hand, the position of Kumārila mentions that the term atha is used in the context of a discussion over the scope and method of the injunction svādhyāyo’dhyetavyah (the Veda should be studied). According to this, the term atha is taken to imply a moment ‘after the text of the Veda has been learnt [by the student] during residence with the teacher’. It expresses an immediate succession to the study of the Veda where the result of knowing the sense of the Veda has already

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145 MS 1.1.1: Athāto dharmajijñāsā.

Desire (jijñāsā) here is taken in the sense of an enquiry, an investigation.

been achieved. Taken together with the term *atah*, it then has the implication that this knowledge of the sense of the Veda has to be followed by the enquiry into its meaning through an investigation of *dharma*.\(^{147}\)

The position of Prabhākara on the other hand, mentions that the term *atha* is used in the context of a discussion over the scope and method of the injunction *aṣṭavāraṁ brāhmaṇam upanayīta tam adhyāpayīta* (one should initiate the eight year-old Brāhmaṇa boy and should teach him). Prabhākara takes this injunction together with a text from the *Smṛtis* that states - *upanīya tu yaḥ śiśyaṁ vedam adhyāpayed dvijaḥ sakalpam sarahsyañchaṭam āchāryam prachakṣaṭe* (that Brāhmaṇ who, having initiated the pupil, teaches him the Veda along with the ritualistic rules and esoteric explanations, him they call the *teacher*).\(^{148}\) According to this position, the term *atha* is taken to imply a moment where the Brāhmaṇ, who is desirous of acquiring for himself the title of *ācārya* (teacher) is contemplating the initiation and teaching of the student as his duty. The student, having learnt the skills of expositing the meaning of the Veda by developing the skills of the sciences of grammar, prosody, lexicography and the like, is understood to be engaged in the next stage of seeking the true meaning of *dharma* with the help of his teacher.\(^{149}\)

Both of these positions, even if based on the interpretations of two separate injunctions, are important indicators suggesting that Jaimini’s introduction of a desire to know *dharma*, and his use of *jijñāsā* already point towards the notion of a quest for an *artha* (purpose and/or meaning) that entails the transformation and production of a certain kind of subjectivity, be it the teacher or the pupil or both. For example, in the injunction stated by Prabhākara above (*aṣṭavāraṁ brāhmaṇam upanayīta tam adhyāpayīta*), the


\(^{148}\) Jha, *The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā*, p. 105.

two injunctive words ‘upanayīta’ and ‘adhyāpayīta’ both have the ātmanepada ending, which indicates that the action is enjoined towards the nominative agent who will accrue the result by responsible submission to the injunction. Jaimini’s introduction of the desire to know dharma reveals an unveiling of a subject who is on the threshold of seeking to expand the limits of what it means to be a subject appropriating a tradition, and engaging with the preliminary task to overcome the split between the acquiring of knowledge and its realization and appropriation with responsibility. Understanding, for Jaimini and, therefore, for the Mīmāṃsā subject, based on this introduction suggests a fusion of both knowledge and action and presupposes a form of embodied traditionary practice where the acting is never independent of the knowledge of the Veda. It is within this intricate interplay between the pursuit of dharma and the submission to the teachings of the Veda that one is able to locate the mode of being (existing) of the Mīmāṃsā subject and is offered a glimpse of the notion of dharma as a meaningful pursuit that is constitutive of Vedic existence. This interplay is not only a submission or an initiation into tradition but a submission in a particular way in which the possibility of the intimate connection between remembrance and the re-enactment of a traditionary practice is negotiated and realized.

**Desire and the Mīmāṃsā Subject**

In the introduction to the fourth adhyāya where Jaimini sought to discuss the two kinds of motivation organizing the sacrifice, he mentions that ‘humans desire to get what pleases them (what brings them happiness), and this [obtaining of pleasure and/or happiness] is not separate from [that which defines] their purpose (or goal).’ In the first and second pāda of the sixth adhyāya, amongst the several adhikāras that are

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150 Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, p. 169.
151 MS 4.1.2: Yasmin prīthiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsā’rthalakṣaṇāvibhaktavāt
discussed to identify the one who can and who ought to sacrifice, ‘desire’ is mentioned as one of the most fundamental markers (*laksana*) for identifying the sacrificial agent:

6.1.3: In as much as the act [of sacrifice] is related [to something], it should be taken as related to the *desired* thing; hence the text should be seen as enjoining the act [of sacrifice, as a means to the attainment of the desired purpose].

6.1.13: But the *desire* for results [arising] from sacrifices is equally present [in the woman also].

6.1.20: It is by virtue of her *desiring* the fruits [of sacrifice] that the wife is regarded as endowed with ownership.  

6.2.1: As the *desired* end (goal) is accomplished only in individuals, so each individual is authorized to sacrifice and accomplish that goal.

6.2.6: The man should be taken as mentioned only for the sake of the performance [of the act], his relationship [to the act] being indicated by the mention of the ‘*desire*’…[all emphasis are mine].

The existence of purpose and meaning in any activity is vital for Jaimini and it is desire that ensures the presence and pursuit of that purpose and makes the action intentional and directed towards an object. It is desire that distinctly individuates the subject and determines his participation in the event of sacrifice as a sacrificial agent. The subject emerges as a sacrificial agent (*yajamana*) primarily because of his desire for something that motivates his acting, and it is this motivation that enables him to ‘carry out the entire details of the act’ to completion. Observing that the ‘inseparable bond of subject and desire’ in the *Mīmāṃsā* contradicts the ‘common view that liberation is attained through the extinction of desires’, Freschi emphasizes that ‘desire is the key factor for the identification of the subject and for every single person’s understanding of herself as an “I”’. Desire is the motive of ritual action that enables his pursuit and

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152 MS 6.1.3: *Pratyaarthān cābhisaṁyogā karmato hy abhisambandhah tasmāt karmopadesah syāt*

MS 6.1.13: *Phalotsāhā viśeṣāt*

MS 6.1.20: *Phalārthitvāt svāmitvenā bhisambandhah*

MS 6.2.1: *Puruṣārthaikasiddhitvāt tasya tasyadhikārah syāt*

MS 6.2.6: *Api vā kāmasanīyoge sambandhāt prayogāyopadiśyeta pratyarthā hi vidhiśrutvi viśāaāvat*

153 MS 6.1.5: *Karturvā śrutisaṁyogād vidhiḥ kāṣṭhyenagamya*

The injunctions [of an act] pertain to only such an agent (potential performers) as may be able to carry out the entire details [of the act], as such is the sense given in the Vedic texts.

154 E Freschi, ‘Desidero Ergo Sum: The Subject as the Desirous One in Mīmāṃsā’, *Rivista Degli Studi Orientali*, vol. 80, no. 1/4, 2007, p. 51.
without desire the agent is not only purposeless, but cannot be identified as a sacrificial agent. His existence as a subject is dependent on his desire to act.\textsuperscript{155}

\textit{The Nature of Desire: From Phala to Svargaḥ}

Jaimini makes a distinction between various kinds of sacrifices which may be more generally classified under these three main categories: (a) optional (kāmya), (b) occasional (naimittika) and (c) necessary or fixed (nitya) sacrifices. The Śūtras mention a number of optional (kāmya) sacrifices performed purely because of the desire for a tangible result, such as the kārīrī sacrifice, which is performed for the obtaining of rainfall. The kind of desire that is mentioned here is closer to a worldly passion (rāga) arising out of specific wants or needs. In sūtras 11.1.26-27, Jaimini writes: ‘In ordinary experience, the action is determined by the need for perceptible goals (fruits)…[and] the action is taken to be complete when the goals are perceived to have been received.’\textsuperscript{156} These sacrifices are performed as often as one desires the result proceeding from them and are repeated as often as necessary for the accomplishment of the result. It is the fulfilment of the sacrificer’s satisfaction that is sought in pursuing these wants and needs. They issue from and are initiated by the subject out of an ordinary and everyday engagement with the material world.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 54.
\textsuperscript{156} MS 11.1.26: \textit{Loke karmā’rthalakṣaṇam}
In ordinary experience, the action is determined by the need [for perceptible goals (fruits)].
MS 11.1.27: \textit{Kriyānāmarthāṇeyavat pratyakṣo laśtanūvṛtyā pavargaḥ syāt}
The actions are subservient to the purpose, [and the purpose is perceptible]; hence the action is taken to be complete when the goals are perceived to have been received.
\textsuperscript{157} MS 11.1.20: \textit{Karmanyārambahāvyayatvāt kṛṣiva pratyārambahaiḥ phalaiḥ syuḥ}
‘The results of action occur only upon actual performance, and are proportionate (one performance, one result, etc.), as in the case of common areas of experience, e.g., agriculture (there is a proportion between the work done and the fruit).’
MS 11.1.21: \textit{Adhikāraḥ ca sarveśāṁ kāaryavatād upapadyate viśeṣaḥ}
‘The repetition of sacrifices duplicates the result, and the performances re-occur whenever someone desires the the result.’
MS 11.1.22: \textit{Sakṛtta syāt kṛtyarthavādaṅgavat}
MS 11.1.23: \textit{Śabdārthaśca tathā loke}
MS 11.1.24: \textit{Api vā samprayogo yathākāmi samprajjeyatāśrutīvādvidhiṣu vacanāṁ syuḥ}
The occasional and fixed sacrifices are usually described as mandatory and are not directly connected with a specific need for something in the sense of being worldly. The jyotis sacrifices, which are performed on the advent of spring, or the jātakarman performed at the birth of a son, are examples of necessary sacrifices performed only on specified occasions. Some examples of the fixed sacrifice are the agnihotra, which is performed throughout the course of one’s life, and the performance of the daily sandhyā. The sacrificial agent of the occasional and fixed sacrifices performs independently of a need for something and reflects a responsibility and a desire that one may claim is more originary than the one that has arisen out of worldly wants and needs. In the absence of a tangible result as suggested in the case of the optional sacrifices, the rationale for a desire to perform sacrifices and to submit oneself to the order of sacrifice has to be investigated beyond the worldly passions to a more existential longing and submission. In Jaimini’s system, there is no room for actions that are purely duty undertaken without any consideration for results. When the pūrvapakṣin suggests this notion of a purposeless action (action in and for itself) in sūtra 4.3.10, the siddhāntin replies in the following sūtra 4.3.11 by stating that the purpose that renders the act purposeful will still be implied even in such cases.¹⁵⁸ The discussion of karma and phala in sūtras 11.1.20-28 also suggests that actions are primarily phalavat, with the only exception being actions already subordinated to actions-with-results, so that

¹⁵⁸ MS 4.3.10: Codanāyāṁ phalāśruteḥ karmamātraṁ vidhiyate na hyaśabaṁ praṭīyate
In as much as the result is not mentioned in the injunction, only the act [without any result] should be taken as enjoined, as what is not actually enjoined [by the text] cannot be recognized.

MS 4.3.11: Api vāmnānasāmarthyaṁ codanārthena gamyate arthāṁ añhyarāva vacanāṁ praṭīyante arthato hyasamarthāṁāṁāntaryyaṁ 'pyasambandhaṁ tasāṁśrutekeśaṁ
‘Not so; the binding force (command) is inferred from the authority of the Vedic text; the texts are recognized to be for some object by reason of their having rewards. Those that do not contain any reward and have no connection with any (sentence) in the proximity, (their connection should be sought in a remote passage) because it is a portion of the Vedic text.’ The translation of this particular sūtra is borrowed from Sandal. See Jaimini, Mīmāṁsā Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. ML Sandal, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993, p. 67.
their own results are not independently considered. The distinction between the three sacrifices primarily pertains to time/duration as the person is presumed to be always desirous and always interested in the outcome.\(^{159}\)

I argue that it is this dimension of desire as existential longing and pursuit, predominant in the case of occasional and fixed sacrifices, which best articulates the primary contours of subjectivity in Jaimini’s Mimāṃsāsūtras. This is not to claim that the dimension of needs is not related to the dimension of desire. The Mimāṃsā subject is in the first instance absorbed in the quest to satisfy a need. So, subjectivity is primarily made up of ‘needs’ and the mode of immediately satisfying those needs. This concept of need can grow into the concept of desire where need forms an important component of this more originary desire. While need, as the first instance of desire, knows precisely what it seeks to accomplish, desire is characterized by a non-comprehension. It is precisely because of this that fixed sacrifices i.e. sacrifices for which no specific results are mentioned in the Sūtras are commonly associated with the desire for ‘heaven’ - svargakāmo yajeta (the one who desires svarga must sacrifice).\(^{160}\)

The question concerning the nature of svarga, and whether it should be understood as a ‘substance’ or as a ‘quality’, was a point of contention that continued to be investigated by many of the later Mimāṃsakas. The use of svarga, literally translated as ‘heaven’, suggests a longing and desire for what is not ‘given’ before, of which there is no idea -

\(^{159}\) MS 11.1.20: Karmanyārambhābhāvyatvāt kṣīvate prayārambhaṁ phalāṇi syuḥ
MS 11.1.21: Adhikāraś ca sarveśāṁ kāryatvād upapadyate viśeṣāṁ
MS 11.1.22: Śaकṛtṛu syāṁ kṛtṛathvādaṅgavat
MS 11.1.23: Śabdārthaścā tathā loke
MS 11.1.24: Api vā samprayogye yathākāmi sampraśītāśrutītvādvidhiṣu vacanāni syuḥ
MS 11.1.25: Aikāṣābhyāṁ tathāṅgesu
MS 11.1.26: Lokē karmā̀ ’ṛthalakṣanāṁ
MS 11.1.27: Kriyānamarthasaśeṣatvāt prayatko ’lastannirvṛttyā pavargah syāt
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātre tvadārṣanāc chadbārthēnāpavargah syāt
For these sūtras, refer to the translations provided in previous footnotes.

\(^{160}\) MS 4.3.14: Ekaṁ vā codanaikatvāt
Only one result should be assumed, as the injunction instigates only one action.
MS 4.3.15: Sa svargaḥ syāt, sarvān prayaviṣīṣṭatvāt
That one result assumed is ‘heaven’, as that is equally desirable for all.

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the transcendent invisible - and which is not perceivably available as some specified purpose or object at the moment one desires it. It is also at the same time taken by Śabara in the sense of denoting ‘a state of happiness’ or contentment (prīthih) that accrues upon the realization or fulfilment of the ‘highest good’. According to Jaimini and Śabara, ‘heaven is the outcome of an action whose result is not explicitly specified.’ This is not a desire for objects (in the way the visible or material objects are understood); this desire does not know the object of its satisfaction, and in and of itself, it is not endowed primarily with anticipation but clings more closely to the prior affirmation of the present.

Studying the three components of the Vedic statement ‘svargakāmo yajeta’ which include (a) the desirous sacrificial agent, (b) heaven as the object of desire, and (c) the verb ‘to sacrifice’, Das argues that the use of the ‘imperative optative mood’ rather than the ‘indicative present’ in the verb yajeta implies three things when viewed in its usage within the context of sacrifice: (a) the sacrificial agent acting as a free agent, (b) the action to be performed as not contrary to the desire of the agent, and (c) the action as not contrary to the larger welfare of the agent. The use of the imperative optative is important in pointing out that the command to sacrifice, even when its purpose is not tangibly perceived, is a responsible and free act that ultimately seeks to bring the concern and welfare of the agent to fruition. In the absence of a ‘corporeal reality’ granted to the deities or gods, and the Mīmāṃsakas’ unwillingness to grant a ‘spatial reality to heaven’, the desire for svarga and how that may be understood is to be sought in the type of action that is performed and the mode through which the

161 Traditionally, the Vedic ritualists are represented (for example in the Mahābhārata) as holding svarga to be the highest goal. Śabara describes svarga not as an actual place but as a state of being – of contentment or happiness (prīthih). See Śabaravāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, p. 807.
162 MS 4.3.15: Sa svargakṣyā, sarvān pratyāhāriṣṭvāt
ŚBh 4.3.16 in Śabaravāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, p. 807.
164 Ibid., p. 448.
performance is fulfilled. It is in this sense that svarga is often related to prīthi, understood as a state of being.\textsuperscript{165} Śabara insists in his commentary on sūtra 6.1.2, that heaven is a state of pure bliss/happiness, and that the desire for happiness is ever-present.\textsuperscript{166} When the sacrificial agent is impelled to perform a sacrifice that arises out of his needs and wants, the indicative present is used, mostly to suggest that the agent is willing to submit to the correct procedures for the accomplishment of his specific desires and purposes. On the contrary, when the sacrificial agent performs a sacrifice out of his desire for happiness, the implementation of correct procedures is no longer a submission to an injunction but an appropriation of an imperative that the agent knows is not only good for him, but also desires it fully to become a part of him, to allow it to constitute him. This desire contrasts with the wants and needs of the optional sacrifices in the sense that this desire originates from outside of the subject and is thus a pull outwards that is better understood as a yearning, a longing to transcend, without immediately knowing or anticipating towards what or where.

The desiring subject seeks in the sacrifice something that goes beyond the confines of anything that can be presented as a phenomenon, yet the subject (sacrificer) does not know what that something is, and it is this unknown that calls forth responsibility. In this sense, the practice of sacrifice, in its telos is transcendental and resembles a kind of ‘metaphysical desire’. The elusiveness of the object of sacrifice, which so far is only mentioned as dharma, is what generates the very pathos of the world of sacrifice but it is this same elusiveness that ultimately constitutes the subject as a responsible agent - of a certain kind that can be firmly distinguished from the worldly (laukika).

\textsuperscript{165} Jha claims that the word ‘svarga’ or ‘heaven’ is applied to that ‘happiness which is totally free from all touch of pain, and which as such is desired by all men.’ Jha, \textit{The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā}, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{166} Śabaravāmi, Šabara-bhāṣya, pp. 964-965.
There is a shift from a worldly desire for objects, inherent in human beings to a desire for the invisible, for heaven, which can only be brought about through the understanding of the Vedic word and the tradition within which it is intelligible. As Das succinctly remarked: ‘Desire freed from its slavery to objects, becomes desire created by the Logos itself’. The features of this desire then may be expanded as the following: (a) desire is a mode of questing, a mode of seeking the invisible; (b) desire does not proceed only from the subject out of a vacuum but is prompted from outside, from the word (of tradition) or the memory of the past; (c) desire is a living for the other, a continuation of what was already started, a realization of inter-connectedness, and a transformation that entails narrative. It is within the context of this more originary desire for the invisible that one is able to appreciate Jaimini’s concern for the emergence of a responsible subject who not only seeks to participate in the traditionary practice of sacrifice but also serves as the mode through which it is continually transmitted.

**Adhikaraṇa: Desire and the Responsibility of Fulfilment**

As we have seen in the previous section, the general principle that presents itself in the case of sacrifices that entail material results is that any person who is desirous of attaining a certain result is entitled to the performance for the accomplishment of that end. The *pūrvapākṣin* uses this principle to argue, in the first *pāda* of the sixth *adhyāya*, that all beings therefore, should then be entitled to perform the acts prescribed in the Veda. This argument proposed by the *pūrvapākṣin* generates a lengthy discussion in the sixth *adhyāya* over who really is entitled and who ought to perform the sacrifices. In considering cases that includes the entitlements of women, the four-

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168 Jha, *The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, p. 205.
169 MS 6.1.4: *Phalārthatvāt karmaṇaḥ śāstrāṁ sarvādhikāraṁ syāt*  
In as much as an act is performed for the purpose of obtaining results, all beings should be entitled to perform the acts [prescribed in the Vedic texts].
castes, the gods and rṣis and even animals, the pūrvapakṣin’s argument, starting with sūtra 6.1.6, seeks to draw certain boundaries regarding the eligibility of women, while also arguing for the inclusion of all the four castes in the performance of sacrifices.

Jaimini makes the claim in the beginning of the conversation, by way of a siddhānta, that the injunction to perform actions prescribed by the Veda is addressed primarily to an agent who is able to carry out the entire details of the sacrifice: ‘In reality, the injunction of an act should be taken to apply to only such an agent as may be able to carry out the entire details of the sacrifice; because such is the sense given in the Vedic texts.’

The question of the entitlement of a person to perform the sacrifice is taken together with the question of the ability of the person to perform the sacrifices consistently until its fulfilment. This responsibility includes not only the material and physical ability to perform the details of the sacrifices, but also the ability to understand and ensure the completion of the process. Therefore, the concern for Jaimini is primarily the fulfilment of the act of sacrifice in accordance with the injunctions prescribed by the Veda.

170 MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyam avīšeṣāt
All the four castes [are entitled to the performance of sacrifices], there being no distinction.
171 MS 6.1.4: Phalārthatvāt karmaṇāḥ śāstraṁ sarvādhiḥkāraṁ syāt
It being impossible for him (the Śūdra) to acquire the knowledge, he is [therefore deemed] incapable of performing sacrifices.
172 MS 6.1.6: Lingaviśeṣānirdeshāt tu punyakttamaitiśāyanāḥ
‘On account of the use of a particular gender (masculin), only men are entitled,’ says Aitiśāyana.
173 MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyam avīšeṣāt
All the four castes [are entitled for the performance of sacrifices], there being no distinction.
174 MS 6.1.5: Karturvā śrutisamyoγād vidhiḥ kārtyeṣānāṁ gamyate
With regard to the question of the eligibility of women, in sūtra 6.1.8 Jaimini clearly states that ‘it is the whole genus i.e. the whole human community, that is enjoined to perform sacrifices; there is no ground for distinction between male and female, and that women are equally entitled to perform sacrifices.’ The pūrvapakṣin’s argument against the right of women to perform sacrifices is that women do not possess any wealth as they belong to their husbands and as their husband’s properties, whatever they earn from their work also belong to the husbands. Jaimini, after pointing out that women, in Vedic texts, can be clearly indicated to possess property and wealth, reiterates once again that it is primarily the presence of a desire to sacrifice and the desire for the fruits that accrue from it that identifies women as eligible for its performance. Jaimini argues that the possession of wealth is a variable factor and the possession of wealth can be brought about as the need arises. Regarding the scope of the functions of the wife in a sacrificial performance, Jaimini concludes by clarifying that in the performance, there are some details distinctly performed by the man alone, such as the shaving of the head, and there are others that are distinctly performed by the wife alone, such as the wearing of the gold ring. It is only in the sense of their
respective roles that they are ‘unequal’. However, Jaimini also clearly states in sūtra 6.1.17 that there are some sacrifices which the man and his wife must perform jointly, such as, for instance, the darśapūrṇamāṣa and the jyotistoma where the clarified butter that has been laid down as oblation has to be examined by both of them together.

It is in light of this absence of distinction between men and women, husband and wife, that the pūrvapaksin goes on to then suggest that there should be no distinction amongst the four castes and that they should all be entitled to the performance of sacrifices. The siddhānta view on this suggestion is that the agnihotra and such sacrifices can only be performed by the three higher castes because in connection with the primary rite of fire installation, only three castes have been mentioned in the Veda. The main premise upon which the Śūdra is omitted from the performance of sacrifice is primarily due to the impossibility for him to acquire the knowledge to do so. However, Jaimini does make mention of the ‘Rathakāra’ who can participate in the fire-installation. He also mentions the chief who is a Niśāda and, therefore, does not belong to the three higher castes, but who can perform the raudrā sacrifice, thereby, showing that the performance is not entirely exclusive as long as the sacrificial agent possesses the knowledge and know-how to execute his role. In sūtra 6.1.44 Jaimini mentions that as laid down by the Vedic injunction, the fire-installation has to be accomplished

181 MS 6.1.24: Tasyā yāvaduktamāśīrbrahmacaryyamatulyatvat
Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, pp. 983-986.
182 MS 6.1.17: Svavatostu vacanādaikakarmyaṁsyat
Husband and wife possessing wealth are entitled to perform a joint (one and the same) sacrificial act.
183 MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyam avīšeṣat
All the four castes [are entitled to the performance of sacrifices], there being no distinction.
184 MS 6.1.26: Nirdeśādvā trayāṇāṁ syādagnyāḥdeheye hy asambandhaḥ kratuṣu brāhmaṇaṁśrutītyātreyaḥ
The acts [in question] can be performed by the three [higher] castes, as in connection with the installation of fire only these three have been mentioned; [therefore] the Śūdra can have no connection with sacrifices, the veda being applicable only to the Brāhmaṇa, so says Ātreya.
185 MS 6.1.37: Avaidyatvādabhāvaḥ karmaṁ syat
It being impossible for him (the Śūdra) to acquire the knowledge, he is [therefore deemed] incapable of performing sacrifices.
186 MS 6.1.44: Vacanād rathakārayādhāne ‘syā sarvaśeṣatvat
The text in question speaks of the installation to be done by the Rathakāra, because such is the direct declaration, which must refer to one not already mentioned.
187 MS 6.1.51: Sthapatirṇiśādaḥ syat śabdasāmarthyat
The chief (sthapati) should be taken to be a Niśāda because such is the sense in the word.
specifically by the *Rathakāra*. While the *pūrva-paśīn* in *sūtra* 6.1.45 claims that the use of the term *Rathakāra* indicates a profession taken to mean the profession of chariot-making, the *siddhāntin*’s position in *sūtra* 6.1.50 is that the word refers to a *Saudhanvana* (mixed caste), which is a caste slightly inferior to the three higher castes\(^{188}\) and refers to one whose mother is a *Śūdra*.\(^{189}\) Similarly, with regard to the *Niṣāda* who performs the *raudrā* sacrifice as mentioned in *sūtra* 6.1.51, Šabara mentions that he belonged to a mixed caste and is technically devoid of Vedic learning, and therefore, should be incapable of participation, but in light of the injunction that is addressed specifically to him, he is taken to have learned (been taught) the texts needed for the performance of that particular sacrifice.\(^{190}\)

Between *sūtras* 6.1.39-42, Jaimini also discussed two important disqualifiers that were brought up: (a) lack of necessary wealth, and (b) physical disability. Jaimini, stating that it is not right that the man without wealth should not be entitled to perform sacrifice, argues that the possession of wealth is not a prerequisite as wealth is a variable factor and that possession of wealth could always be brought about as the need arises. With regard to the question of physical and bodily defect, Jaimini concludes by arguing that a person with such a defect need not necessarily be excluded from sacrifices, as it is always possible that people may be cured or healed from the defect that prevents them from performing an act.\(^{191}\) While Jaimini is aware that not all who desire will possess

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\(^{189}\) Jha, *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā in its Sources*, p. 315.

\(^{190}\) Šabarasvāmi, *Šabara-bhāṣya*, p. 1012.

\(^{191}\) MS 6.1.39: *Trayāṇāṁ dravyasampannāḥ karmano dravyasiddhitvāt*

Among the three castes, only a person possessing wealth [is entitled to perform sacrifices], because the performance of sacrifices can be accomplished only by means of wealth.

MS 6.1.40: *Anityatvātva naivaṁ syādarthāḥdhi dravyasāṁyogah*

It cannot be so, because it is a variable factor (not permanent); and [the possession of] wealth can be brought about as the need arises.

MS 6.1.41: *Aigahīnāśca taddharmā*

The case of a man suffering from a bodily defect is like that of the man dealt with [in the preceding discussion].

MS 6.1.42: *Uppattau nityasāṁyogāt*
the ability to perform the sacrifice to its fulfilment, in sūtra 6.2.1, he claims that as long as every participant helps in the accomplishment of the desired end and the fulfilment of the act of sacrifice, each of their respective roles is taken to be entitled and is, therefore, significant. 192

**JAIMINI AND RITUAL SUBJECTIVITY**

I have argued so far that while dharma as the telos of Vedic practice of sacrifice is invisible, its invisibility can be pursued and disclosed through the life of the ritual practitioner. I have also discussed that the Mīmāṃsā ritual practitioner is unique in that he is constituted by a desire to seek the meaning and purpose of sacrifice, a desire that entailed the responsibility of submission to tradition to fully pursue its telos. Therefore, it is the notion of the desirious ritual practitioner that allows me to discuss the practice of sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful activity. I have demonstrated that not only is the sacrificial agent distinguished by a desire for fruits but also by a desire that moves him to appropriate the call of an imperative as that which is good for him. It is this longing that sets him on a quest to pursue and seek to understand dharma, the first initiation of which is to understand the nature of knowledge as necessarily entailing and resulting in embodiment and responsible enactment.

This initiation, which is best understood within the context of the guru-śisya paramparā, allows the sacrificial agent to acknowledge the chain of memories preceeding him and is now connecting him with others through the call of the Veda. It is this process of learning to intentionally conform to the patterns of tradition that allows the desirous Mīmāṃsā subject to undergo a transformation of the ego cogito or

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192 MS 6.2.1: *Puruṣārthaikasiddhitvāt tasya tasyādhiśkaḥ syāt*

As the desired end (goal) is accomplished only in individuals, so each individual is authorized to sacrifice and accomplish that goal.

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personality and make room to allow the gradual development of a ‘narrative space of tradition’. This process of conforming to the patterns of tradition and the transformation which the subject undergoes whereby the *ego cogito* is subsumed by a sense of identification with a ‘collectivity greater than the individual’ through an understanding of the import of the Veda is similar in its structure with what Flood develops as ‘inwardness’ and ‘shared subjectivity’ formed through ‘the cultivation of text-informed spiritual practices’. Such spiritual practices, argues Flood, offer ‘resistence to the exteriorization of religion that sees religion purely in terms of law and injunction’ and helps one in advancing ‘an existential understanding of religions’ whereby traditionary practices such as sacrifices in the Vedic world can be discussed as meaningful practices inseparable from the religious imagination and tradition within which they are locatable.

It is this cultivation of practices in the quest to pursue *dharma* which discloses a ritual subjectivity - a tradition-specific text-informed subjectivity that will be developed as the enjoined subject in subsequent chapters. The pattern of enjoinment, for which desire for a meaningful *telos* is the first stage, and followed by appropriation and enactment of the rationality of tradition as the second and third stage, is discussed in the following chapters. These three inter-related stages can be more simply summed up as the pursuit, appropriation and enactment of the practical rationality of a tradition by a desiring subject, and it is this pattern that I discuss as constituting traditionary practice. This traditionary practice, disclosed through a mode of being that serves as a carrier and validator of the rationality of tradition, is what is identified as ritual in this thesis.

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194 Ibid., p. 9.
In line with Flood, I suggest that the argument for the centrality of subjectivity in the enquiry into ritual is an attempt to reintroduce a sense of subjectivity that is not cut off from its ‘cosmological roots’ but rather, is formed and intensified in text-specific ways in their quest to appropriate a telos greater than their egocentric individualist pursuits.\(^{195}\) Jaimini’s introduction of dharma as the telos of sacrifice, in his concern to preserve and maintain the continuity of the Vedic tradition of sacrifice is, therefore, closely connected with the notion of the subject who cumulatively realizes the possibilities of his own being within this traditionary practice and pursuit. From the very outset, there is, to borrow Sloterdijk’s phrase, a ‘vertical tension’ or a ‘self-surpassing tendency’\(^ {196}\) inherent in the subject’s existence that help him affirm virtues, particularly in the absence of absolute external foundations. The cultivation of this trait of affirming life and the desire to go beyond oneself, when introduced in light of Jaimini’s larger concern for the intelligibility of Vedic sacrifice and the justification for dharma, gives rise to the emergence of the desirous sacrificial agent enjoined by the Veda, by tradition. It is through this formation of a tradition specific subjectivity that one can reimagine sacrifice, not as a reciprocal relationship of gift-exchange but as a process of becoming - an intensification of a subjectivity transformed in its willing submission to tradition. Sacrifice, as a form of traditionary practice, then becomes the realm through which the existence of the Vaidika is made meaningful with every new ritual act taken as a participation in this realm of meaning and the reinvigoration of the significance of

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\(^{195}\) Ibid., pp. 13-14.

\(^{196}\) Sloterdijk, drawing from the ‘Platonic Socrates’ who claims that ‘man is the being who is potentially superior to himself’, argues that there is a self-surpassing tendency, a perfectionist aspiration, present in all humans and all cultures. He claims that all cultures and subcultures rely on distinctions by which the field of human possibilities gets subdivided into polarized classes: religious cultures are founded on the distinction between the sacred and the profane; aristocratic cultures based themselves on the distinction between the noble and the common; military cultures establish a distinction between the heroic and the cowardly; athletic cultures have the distinction between excellence and mediocrity; cognitive cultures rely on a distinction between knowledge and ignorance; and so on; and thus in all humans there is an upward-tending trait. See P Sloterdijk, *The Art of Philosophy: Wisdom as Practice*, trans. K Margolis, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012, p. 7. Sloterdijk’s claim that human beings are all subject to ‘vertical tensions’ is important for understanding the nature of the formation and techniques that constitute the self, even if one does not necessarily agree with his proposal of ‘anthropotechnics’ and his reduction of the idea of religion to self-forming exercises.
practice in their world affirmed. This sense of subjectivity allows me to take the pursuit of dharma as a pursuit for the meaning and purpose of sacrificial action, and a pursuit for understanding the telos of tradition.

**SUMMARY**

Starting with the goal of seeking to enquire into the nature of the phenomenon of ritual, in this chapter, I introduced the problematic of meaning in the study of ritual and discussed Jaimini’s pursuit of dharma through the theme of desire and subjectivity as it relates to the practice of sacrifice. I have argued that Jaimini’s insistence on the quest for the telos of tradition and his introduction of dharma, particularly in light of the disintegration of the foundations of the Vedic world of sacrifice in the period within which the Mīmāṃsāsūtras was formulated, allowed a closer look at his concern for developing the significance of the practice of sacrifice even as he sought to reimagine and affirm it as a traditionary practice. This in turn enabled the explication of the emergence of the Mīmāṃsā subject who not only desires the telos of meaning, but also opens the narrative space of tradition and is constituted by it. I have also shown that it is this emergence of a ritual subjectivity that allows an enquiry into the elusive nature of the realm of the invisible and validates Jaimini’s introduction of dharma as one of the constitutive structures of a hermeneutic tradition – telos.

I have limited my focus in this chapter primarily to the introduction of the Mīmāṃsā subject through his mode of being and the process of his initiation into tradition. In the next chapter I will look at the development of the internal rationality of the Mīmāṃsā tradition primarily through the theme of the constitution of the authority of the Veda and discuss the mechanisms that entail its dependency on the responsible subject who must take up the task of embodying that rationality through the process of enjoinment.
CHAPTER FOUR: AUTHORITY OF VEDA
RATIONALITY, REDUCTIONISM AND TRADITION

INTRODUCTION

The discussion in the previous chapter on the pursuit of dharma was directed by the question of reductionism and the ontology of ritual, and in this chapter, I focus primarily on Jaimini’s epistemology in light of the prevailing problem of reductionist methodological presuppositions in the study of ritual. I claim that reductionist enquiry in the human sciences, which includes the modern invention of ‘ritual’ and its study, is propelled by a ‘Western’ rationality whose universalizing presuppositions are uncritically borrowed from the scientific methods of enquiry emanating from the natural sciences. I present this claim to argue for the importance of identifying tradition-constituted rationalities and validating their enquiries. It is primarily in light of this framework that I develop Jaimini’s understanding of the authority of the Veda.

With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I seek to argue that Jaimini’s demonstration of the authority of the Veda as an infallible revelation that necessitates (enjoins) enactment not only discloses his concern for the continuation of tradition but also serves as an example of a tradition-constituted rationality. The intelligibility of this internal rationality, in light of Jaimini’s concern for the realization of dharma, is demonstrated in his elucidation of the dialogic constitution of the sacredness of the Veda that ensures its appropriation in practice.

With regard to the second aim of the thesis, the reductionist tendencies in the study of ritual that sought to offer explanations and critiques which are externalist in their approach, are unable to provide accounts of internal concerns and forms of reasoning that are specific to a tradition. The intelligibility of Jaimini’s demonstration of the
authority of the Veda is discussed with the goal of highlighting the need for developing an appreciation of internal rationalities governing traditions in the study of ritual. The argument suggested is that the study of ritual needs to seriously take into account ‘tradition-internal reasoning’ and its ‘ways of forming tradition-specific subjectivities’ in order to have a clearer understanding of the internal mechanisms that uniquely make up traditionary practice taken here as ritual.

To that end, since the issue of rationality in humanistic enquiry is the point of departure in this chapter, I will begin the first section by presenting a brief genealogical sketch of the adoption of a standard universal rationality that has influenced the enquiries of both the natural and human sciences, including the modern invention of ritual and its study. I will then present an explication of the intelligibility of Jaimini’s enquiry as an example of a tradition-constituted rationality in the second section, even as I point out the importance of taking tradition-constituted rationalities and their forms of reasoning into account in the study of ritual. I will argue that while Jaimini’s enquiry can be said to be guided by a tradition-constituted rationality, it does not lend itself to simplistic categorizations of being a relativistic enquiry bounded within its own tradition. This is because Jaimini’s own position can be seen to be an outcome of a dialogical encounter and engagement with other contending positions.

THE QUESTION CONCERNING RATIONALITY

The classical humanist tradition in the West, which tended to locate its origins in ancient Greece, attributes this era with the ‘invention’ of logic and the establishment of a set of principles for the existence of ‘pure rationality’. According to King, modern

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academic philosophers in Western academia have displayed a tendency to locate the
origins of ‘modern Western civilization’ in the Greek differentiation between *mythos*
and *logos*. Consequently, a distinction is drawn between ‘mythology (denoting the
sacred stories that give meaning to particular communities) and history (what actually
happens in an objective sense)’ , where the latter is privileged over the former.\(^3\) He
further adds that this principle of rationality primarily influenced by the idea of *logos*,
has often been understood as a ‘culturally independent and neutral faculty capable of
promoting a new kind of thinking (free thought)’, which is thereby, firmly distinguished
from a ‘dogmatic adherence to tradition’.\(^4\) Flood mentions that the idea of rationality in
the Western academia, beginning with Aristotle’s distinction between *theoria*
(theoretical rationality) and *phronesis* (practical rationality), has been understood in two
ways: firstly, as ‘knowledge of truth through inference from valid premises’, and
secondly, as ‘the development of logic from Aristotle and the two rules of logic’, the
‘law of non-contradiction’ and the ‘law of the excluded middle’.\(^5\) Therefore, the notion
of rationality which had predominated in the modern West, particularly since the
Enlightenment, was not only ambiguously secular in form but also strongly aligned with
the natural sciences as the basis for a universal and objective foundation of knowledge.

The extensive debates on the nature of human rationality predominating throughout the
twentieth century were closely connected with the question of whether the nature of
enquiry in the human sciences is essentially of the same nature as that of the natural
sciences (and the rationality that was dominant in that particular method of enquiry).

From the works of Kant and his influence on Enlightenment thinking, to the post-

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\(^3\) King, *Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought*, p. 10.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 13.
\(^5\) As Flood has highlighted, ‘the law of non-contradiction’ states that ‘a statement \((p)\) cannot be
simultaneously true and false’, and ‘the law of the excluded middle’ states that ‘for any statement \(p\), it is
the case that ‘either \(p\) or not \(p\)’ is true’ where ‘\(p\)’ is understood exactly in the same way in both
modern, post-secular affirmation of pluralities, the debate has primarily revolved around attempts to establish ‘standards’ of rationality to validate ‘scientific’ enquiry where the natural sciences are often taken as the paradigm of rationality in action.  

The Rationality of ‘Sciences’

The beginning of contemporary ‘scientific methodology’ is often traced back to the mid-seventeenth century, to the dawn of the ‘modern age’, whose two influential protagonists were Galileo in physics and astronomy and Descartes in mathematics and epistemology.  

7 The narrative of modernity, particularly as evident in the ‘foundationalism’ of Descartes, was governed by a striving for the possibility of achieving ‘absolute certainty’ in knowledge and thereby, the end of all doubt.  

8 Cartesian foundationalism was influential as a framework for modernity’s scientific enquiry and with the works of Hobbes and the later empiricists, the identification of atomistic objectivist matter as the ontological ‘real’ was gradually established. Science came to be understood as the quest for the ahistorical ‘universal laws of nature’ valid across history and across traditions.  

9 Kant was significant in giving rise to the development of Enlightenment thinking wherein the idea of man freed from the shackles of location and tradition was vehemently advanced. Kant defined the meaning of the Enlightenment with the Horatian motto, sapere aude (dare to know), which he renders as ‘Have courage to use your own understanding’. As he puts it:

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the

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8 Ibid., p. 42.

Fay argues that the introduction of neopositivism (or logical empiricism) as an approach to ‘explain’ the practices of the natural sciences had in turn influenced the development of a human science that pursued quantitative and causal generalizations in their investigations. Social-scientific research, for example, was primarily based on a methodology developed from Comtean positivism and laid great stress on the methods of empirical research designs such as the generation of data, sampling, and the location of causes based on ‘prediction’ and ‘measurement’. The human sciences were concerned with the scientific tasks of identifying ‘empirical generalizations’ which can explain human activities and behaviour across historical and cultural contexts, independent of time and place. The fundamental positivist principle of Newtonian science and Cartesian dualism which worked with ‘the assumption that there is a fundamental distinction between nature and humans, between matter and mind, between the physical and the social/spiritual world’, had also increasingly promoted the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’, and ultimately between the researcher and the researched in the human sciences.

In the attempt to organize social order on a solid base, the foundation of modern social-scientific research in the first half of the nineteenth century turned to

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11 B Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1976.
12 Somekh & Lewin (eds), Research Methods in the Social Sciences, p. 23.
‘Newtonian physics as a model to imitate.’ According to this principle, the scientificity of a research enquiry was grounded on the adoption of a ‘value-neutral’ orientation towards the investigation of empirical and ‘factual’ phenomena. As Smith remarked: ‘Positivism provided a powerful statement for the unity of all the sciences and thus for the acceptability and necessity of employing the methods of the natural sciences in the study of social affairs.’

Classical social theorists, from Weber and Durkheim in the discipline of sociology, to Menger and Walras in economics, to Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in social anthropology, and Freud in psychoanalysis, were all concerned with justifying their varied approaches in terms of their scientificity. As Somekh and Lewin pointed out, many of the ‘early twentieth-century social scientists struggled to extricate themselves from the accusations made by logical positivism that research which lacked the solid foundation of measurement was no better than fancy and invention’ and therefore, they attempted to develop methods that were able to conform to the methodological standards adopted in the natural sciences, whereby researchers ‘focused on seeking generalizable laws governing the behaviour of human groups’. Wagner mentions that one of the unintended consequences of those strivings for ‘scientificity’ during the constitutive era of the human sciences was the relative closure of the understanding of what the human science really was about, and what it means to be human.

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Human Science and the Problem of Rationalities

In the nineteenth century, there was also a reorientation of the natural sciences away from the realist-representation towards a more relativist-pragmatic understanding of science which was characterized by Mach’s withdrawal from the ‘explanatory ambition’, Dilthey’s separation of the models of the natural and the human sciences, and Nietzsche’s radical critique of science.\textsuperscript{20} Kuhn had also mentioned that these practitioners (scientists) were influenced by a variety of contextual factors and had stressed the importance of understanding their enquiries as the relative product of research processes where opinions and findings were primarily organized around their specific ‘internal power structures, interests and status claims’.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, the recognition of scientific enquiry as a social practice that is ‘falsifiable’ started to gain prominence.\textsuperscript{22} This opened up the debate about the nature of rationality, especially in light of the relation between the natural and the human sciences, whose underlying issue was best exemplified by the position taken by Winch, on the one hand and Taylor, on the other.

Winch, in his book, \textit{The Idea of Social Science}, strongly challenged the accepted parallels between the natural and the human sciences and denied the role of anything parallel to a law of nature in explaining human behaviour. According to him, ‘social relations really exist only in and through the ideas that are current in a society; ...
social relations fall into the same category as relations between ideas’. Winch, following Wittgenstein, emphasizes the social nature of human action and underlined the importance of rules and norms of behaviour. Social rules, according to Winch, do not cause the act, but they rather constitute the act by giving it its specific meaning. For Winch, to understand human behaviour, one requires more than just abstract knowledge of the rules of a society; one needs to know what counts as following a rule in a particular case. He writes: ‘All meaningful behaviour must be social, since it can be meaningful only if governed by rules, and rules presuppose a social setting.’ To elucidate this, he says that one must somehow learn to share the viewpoints, attitudes and feelings of the actors, and one must understand the meaning and deliberation of human action from ‘the inside’ if one is to understand it as human action; it is not just a matter of observing it from the outside as in the natural sciences. He discusses this idea in Understanding a Primitive Society where he highlights the Azande notions of witchcraft as a coherent and meaningful practice within the world inhabited by the Azande. For Winch and many post-Second World War anthropologists and philosophers, cultures are taken as closed-systems with their own standards of rationality bounded within their own cultures and, therefore, had to be understood within their own contexts and in their own terms.

Taylor, who also offered a theory demarcating the human sciences and the natural sciences based on the central role that interpretation plays in the human sciences, agrees with Winch’s claim that there are no universal standards of rationality that can be applied across cultures. He argues against the reduction of other cultures as simply engaging in a ‘different language game’ unrelated with other cultures. Taylor argues

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24 Ibid., p. 116.
that while every culture’s rationality may be linked to coherence and the ability to follow a rule as proposed by Winch, they must also possess the ability to account or give reasons for the coherence of their own practices and beliefs. For Taylor, it is this ability to articulate and formulate a coherent theoretical understanding that not only differentiates between cultures, without claiming one or the other as ‘irrational’, but also allows communicability across cultures.26

Under what conditions then, can one categorize the worldviews and cosmologies of other traditions as ‘rationally’ adequate or inadequate? Are cultures and traditions exclusively relative and radically independent to such an extent that their rationalities and modes of intelligibility are incommensurable and therefore, inhibit the discussion of rationalities that can be judged across cultures?

The Modern Invention of Ritual

The notion of a ‘common rationality’ applicable to all forms of enquiry was particularly problematic in the study of ritual. The study of ritual was introduced and developed within the framework of the social sciences whose presuppositions were borrowed from the natural sciences. The ‘scientific’ models of enquiry that these social sciences adopted distanced themselves from notions of ‘traditions’ and were unable to access the implicit mechanisms through which social communities construct their own understandings of realities or discuss the truth claims implicit within the ‘objects’ of their enquiries. The social scientific approach to religion and ritual where ‘any theory or method of investigation in any of the human or social sciences is or

may be applied to the study of specific sets of religious data. Theorizing that exacerbated the division between what can be categorized as the positions of the ‘idealists’ and the ‘critical-realists’. The reductionist form of enquiry influenced by the natural sciences was adopted in the human sciences with an attempt to investigate the kind of ‘object’ ritual is and the way it can be analyzed and explained.

According to Bell, the ‘emergence of the concept of “ritual” as a universal phenomenon that is substantively manifest in human nature, biology, or culture’ is the consequence of a ‘successive layering of scholarly and popular attitudes’. She notes that ‘the whole issue of ritual’ historically began as the identification of a ‘discrete phenomenon to the eyes of social observers in that period in which “reason”. The scientific pursuit of knowledge were defining a particular hegemony in Western intellectual life’, and the category ‘ritual’ exposed ‘the beginnings of a major shift in the way European culture compared itself to other cultures and religions’.

Ever since the mid-nineteenth century, the general view is that ritual as well as religion declined in relative proportion to modernization and the secularization that accompanied it. Bell identifies the British philosopher Spencer as one of the ‘first to formulate an evolutionary opposition’ between the ‘industrialization of modern culture’ and the

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28 According to Waardenburg, the debate between the ‘idealists’ and the ‘critical-realists’, within the emerging academic study of religion, was primarily due to differences in motivations that guided their enquiries. He claims that while the former had a ‘positive appreciation of religion’ and sought to discover, and thereby construct, the ‘truths, norms and values’ of other religions, the latter were ‘suspicious’ of promoting religion either as a category or as a phenomenon and did not allow the possibility of truth claims by either the religious traditions or the idealist scholars. See JJ Waardenburg, Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion: Aims, Methods and Theories of Research, Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1999.
29 Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions, p. 254.
30 Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, p. 6.
‘rituals of tribal or feudal cultures’. Weber, who followed a generation later, contrasted ‘ritual and magic’ with ‘the rationalization and disenchchantment of modern life’. 33 Bell notes that the ‘emerging fields of study focused on ritual as an ideal representation of what was different from reason, what reason needed to explain and, ultimately, enlighten and transform’. 34 Lukes pointed out that the scholar identifies ritual whenever cultural actions and beliefs present themselves to him as ‘non-rational’, or as certain actions in which the means seem to be disproportionate to the ends. 35 Sax argues that many of the post-Enlightenment theories label ritual as ‘certain activities that seem to be nonrational’, without taking into account how the performers of those activities understand them within their own cosmologies and narrative frameworks. He cites an example: ‘According to our meteorological theories, dancing cannot really make it rain, and so when someone performs a rain dance, we call it “ritual”’. 36 He laments that scholarly endeavour gives rise to the ‘sin of reification’ where scholars ‘conduct research on the rituals, they teach and write about them, and after some time they begin to think that “ritual” is something out there in the world, whose characteristics can be classified, enumerated, and analyzed.’ 37

Bell notes that the ‘twists and turns’ of the ‘repudiating’, ‘returning’ and even ‘romanticizing’ of ritual are ‘closely intertwined with the emergence of the very concept of “ritual” as a universal phenomenon’ which is then ‘accessible to formal identification and analysis’. The formal analysis discloses ‘concerted intellectual efforts’ which sought to ‘deal with the “other” in the various religious and cultural guises in which this

33 Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions, p. 254.
34 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 3.
“other” has been perceived.’\(^{38}\) These efforts not only showed the manner in which studies, particularly of other cultures, were carried out, but the concept of ritual became a useful scholarly tool to differentiate ‘the magical’ and ‘the religious’ from ‘the rational’. While on the one hand, ‘a focus on ritual has enabled scholars to determine basic similarities among very different ritual practices and traditions’, on the other hand, the ‘deployment of “ritual” as a universal’ category has also led to the establishing of ‘new distinctions and borderlands’, particularly between ‘those who wield such universal categories and thereby transcend their culture and, those who, locked in their cultural perspectives, are the recipients of categorizations that may seem meaningless or threatening’.\(^{39}\) As a result, the perspectives on ritual in contemporary scholarship tend to undermine forms of traditionary rationalities and authorities and tradition specific ways of living and acting.

‘Ritual’, whose concept was the outcome of a ‘drawn-out, complex and intrinsically political process of negotiating differences and similarities’ between cultures, came to be conceived as a ‘panhuman phenomenon’. Its study resulted in the emergence of a dichotomy between the ‘scholars of ritual practices’ and the ‘practitioners of ritual’ i.e. the people that the scholars studied.\(^{40}\) Bell argues that ‘the study of ritual has gone through historical perspectives’ which have ‘less to do with how people ritualize and more with how Western culture’ sought to figure out the relation between ‘science and religion’, and between ‘tradition and modernity’, and it therefore reflected the nature of Western scholarly involvement with the ‘other’.\(^{41}\) Ritual as a formal category and a phenomenon was invented, identified and understood primarily through the lens of a Western ‘universal’ rationality.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., pp. 261-262.
\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 259.
\(^{41}\) Ibid., p. 253.
While there are various ways through which the study of ritual was approached, all of these approaches generally understood ritual as a universal and representational medium of symbolic expressions based on a model of ritual theory looking for a universal expression of religious experiences, and which mapped religious phenomena in terms of morphological categories, guided by cross-cultural methods of comparison. Each of these approaches worked under an Enlightenment-influenced universalist framework, and tend to argue for ‘a coherent and meaningful unity to the diversities of religions, cultures and histories.’ These accounts, however, did not seek to enquire into the nature of theological accounts that as Anselm’s ‘faith seeking understanding’ suggests, are accounts working strictly within the presuppositions of theological beliefs. In their objective generalization and sidelining of cultural specificities, they were unable to excavate the rationalities and theologies of these traditionary practices and the tradition specific ways in which they meaningfully organize their world and affirm it.

**MĪMĀ_MSBĀ AND THE RATIONALITY OF TRADITIONS**

It is problematic to ascertain a central constituting idea that distinguishes rationality because the term ‘rational’ is a polysemous term suggesting a wide variety of meanings whose standards of interpretation vary amongst different theorists. Flood points out that the ‘range of rationality’ cannot be restricted to ‘logical rules’ and emphasized the need to understand rationality ‘in terms of human practices that have been developed over millennia that involve making judgements in particular situations that are the best means to achieve a particular end.’ He points out that the debate about rationality has not only been about ‘the application of logical rules to statements’ but more broadly

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42 Ibid., p. 9.
43 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
about ‘coherence and the degree to which statements correspond to reality’. He further argues that one could claim ‘minimally, that rationality entails coherence and intelligibility’ which can be articulated to others, if not across traditions, certainly within traditions. For Flood, it is in this sense that a ‘culture’s schema involves a narrative dimension’ and it is what enables religion to be understood as a ‘story’, the explanation of which is precisely the function of rationality.

Arguing that conflicting views on an issue generally arise as a result of ‘fundamental disagreements about the character of rationality’, MacIntyre seeks to develop the idea of ‘rationality of traditions’ as an alternative to both the universalist and relativist rationalities that he argues predominated the debate about rationality. For MacIntyre, as opposed to the notion of standard ‘laws of logic’ that are generally identified as the universal premise of rationality, there are different ‘laws of logic’ that do not necessarily identify with the Aristotelian laws of logic. He further notes that these ‘laws of logic’ have to be supplemented by other criteria such as the ‘modes of enquiry’ and the ‘justifications of belief’, all of which shape the internal structures of a rationality.

MacIntyre, whoformulates Thomism as one example of an essentially tradition-constituted enquiry, points out that rationality is always ‘tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive’ and consists of a teleological ‘progress’ made through ‘a number of well-defined types of stage’ particular to a tradition. MacIntyre lists three stages for the initial development of a tradition-constituted rationality, which encompasses the understanding of rationality as an articulation that is not only coherent but theoretical in the Taylorian sense. According to MacIntyre, the first stage of enquiry ‘begins from some condition of pure historical contingency, from the beliefs, institutions, and

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46 Ibid., p. 132.
47 Ibid.
practices’ which can be taken as a given for a particular community and from which a ‘community authority’ is accepted and conferred, particularly ‘upon certain texts and certain voices’. In this stage, a given community, and often ones that are ‘to greater or lesser degree, in a state of change’, take certain ‘beliefs, utterances, texts, and persons’ to be ‘authoritative’ unquestioningly, or at least without ‘systematic questioning’.

In the second stage, the inadequacies of these previously unquestioned authority structures are ‘shown to be susceptible to…alternative and incompatible interpretations’ which then give rise to ‘incompatible courses of action’. This stage can be identified by the growing evidence of ‘incoherences in the established system of belief’, ‘confrontation by new situations’ or the ‘coming together of two previously separate communities’, thereby, resulting in the opening up of ‘new alternative possibilities’ that ‘the existing means of evaluation’ are unable to provide. In this stage, while the ‘inadequacies of various types have been identified’, they have ‘not yet’ been ‘remedied’. In the third stage, the ‘inhabitants of a particular community’ respond to these challenges and inadequacies by not only taking ‘stock of reasons and of questioning and reasoning abilities they already possess’ but also by developing new ‘inventiveness’. This response results in ‘a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and evaluations, designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations’. According to MacIntyre, it is at this stage - where the possibility of developing a ‘theory of truth’ and ‘judgement’ which are accepted as necessary for the continued relevance of the authority structures - that the tradition itself has reached a point of development where it becomes ‘a form of enquiry’ with its own rationality that can then be institutionalised and regulated as a method of enquiry.

49 Ibid., p. 354.
50 Ibid., p. 355.
51 Ibid., pp. 356-358.
It is in light of Flood’s emphasis on ‘coherence and intelligibility’ and the framework of a ‘tradition-constituted rationality’ propounded by MacIntyre that I now seek to present Jaimini’s enquiry not only as possessing structures that are akin to what constitutes a tradition-constituted rationality à la MacIntyre but one that also introduces the mechanisms of what is entailed in the transmission of the Vedic practice of sacrifice as a living unbroken tradition.

The Authority of the Veda and the Unbroken Tradition

I have mentioned in the previous chapter that yajña is the central activity governing the Vaidika way of life. The very first two sūtras of the first adhyāya already indicate that the concept of dharma, the understanding of the Veda and the practice of yajña are closely interwoven together.\(^52\) For Jaimini, the enquiry into dharma as a seeking for truth beyond the phenomenological and transitory reality of the world is taken to be accessible only through the medium of śabda, and particularly the codanās of the Veda. It is through the Veda that the desiring subject then actualizes dharma. This relentless commitment to affirm the vitality of the authority of the Veda as the only means through which the invisible realm is accessible and the practice of sacrifice is made intelligible,\(^53\) allows me to enquire into and explicate the internal rationality governing Jaimini’s enquiry.

This commitment to justify the authority of the Veda involves three tasks that are developed here as stages of enquiry akin to the stages that make up a tradition-constituted rationality in the hermeneutical sense as developed by MacIntyre. These three stages highlight the relationship between the constitution of the Veda as verbal

\(^{52}\) MS 1.1.1: Athāto dharmajjñāsā
Now (next) therefore, the desire to know dharma.
MS 1.1.2: Codanālakṣaṇo ’ṛtho dharmaḥ
Dharma is that ‘artha’ whose characteristic feature is that of a ‘codanā’.

testimony and the traditionary practice of sacrifice, and validate this relationship by establishing the authority of the Veda as a pramāṇa that is infallible for the goal of actualizing dharma through practice. The first stage involves a presentation of Jaimini’s unquestioning acceptance of the authority of the Veda through his proposal of śabda- pramāṇa as the only valid means of accessing dharma. This places Jaimini firmly as a Vaidika who locates himself within a particular tradition that recognizes and accepts the authority of the Veda. The second stage involves his awareness of the challenges and criticisms, and the potential incoherencies or inadequacies, evident through his engagements with opponents to his system whose objections are presented in the form of several pūrvapakṣas. This stage of negotiating and engaging closely with the pūrvapakṣins then lead to the third stage that involves Jaimini’s reconceptualization of authoritativeness as infallibility that presents an intelligible position accepted as intrinsically valid by the Mīmāṃsakas. This reconceptualization also discloses the mechanism that maintains the Vedic tradition of sacrificial practice as a living hermeneutic tradition. This involves an understanding of sacredness as necessarily entailing enactment that allows the Veda to be received and performed as an unbroken tradition.

In the sections below, I will begin by discussing the first and the third stage through the theme of śabda-pramāṇam and the intrinsic infallibility of śabda respectively. I will then discuss the second stage of the dialogical constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras as a way of re-engaging the question of whether MacIntyre’s proposal of a tradition-constituted rationality is a universalist or a relativist position, or whether there is a third way of understanding his proposal that is beyond these two extreme positions.
Śabda-Pramāṇa: Verbal Testimony and Valid Knowledge

Jha mentions that ‘from the earliest time, man has made the distinction between Matter - regarded, roughly, as what is tangible, - and Spirit - what is not tangible’. He states that ancient Vedic speculation was based on the matter (visible) and spirit (non-visible) dichotomy; and while Sāṅkhya acknowledges and maintains this dichotomy, and Nyāya provides the rationale for this distinction, neither school provide the means of knowing (pramāṇa) or accessing the suprasensible spirit world. Jha writes:

In the group known as the Nyāya, we find expounded in detail the means and methods for ascertaining of the real nature of things, both material and spiritual; this is done on the basis of common sense and the aid of supernatural means of knowledge is not emphasized. Mīmāṃsā deals entirely with spiritual truths, which are not amenable to any ordinary means of knowledge - being cognisable only through the Reliable Word, Revelation.

Mīmāṃsā, in its quest for the highest truth that is not amenable to the senses, argues that śabda is that very means of knowing the invisible and accessing the realm of the unknowable, of which dharma is its main focus of enquiry. The Mīmāṃsā understanding of reality is divided along the dimensions of the visible (drṣṭa) and the invisible (adrṣṭa). Visible reality is taken as the reality accessible through pratyakṣa and the invisible as that which can only be accessed through śabda. For Jaïmini, śabda is infallible with regard to all that concerns the invisible (imperceptible) and it is never erroneous in matters invisible. After introducing the telos of Mīmāṃsā investigation as dharma and defining it as a purpose whose characteristic is injunctive in nature, 

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54 Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, p. 3.
55 Ibid.
56 This distinction of the ‘visible’ and the ‘invisible’, which is often referenced to Śabara-Bhāṣya, is fully elaborated by both Biardeau and Gachter in their respective works. See Biardeau, Théorie de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole dans le Brahmanisme Classique; also see Gachter, Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrvamīmāṃsā: A Study in Śabara Bhāṣya.
57 MS 1.1.5: Autpattikastu śabdasyārthaḥ sambandhah, tasya jñānam upadeśo vyatirekāś cātṛte’ñupaladbhe tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānayeśaṁ paryantavāt
The relationship between the word and what they express (denote) is inborn (originary). Instruction (teaching) is the only means of knowing it, [as it is] infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; [it is a valid means of knowledge] as it is independent, according to Bādarāyaṇa.
58 MS 1.1.2: Codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmaḥ
Dharma is that ‘artha’ whose characteristic feature is that of a ‘cadanā’.
Jaimini goes on to argue that the other accepted pramāṇas cannot validate dharma because sense-perception (pratyakṣa), which is the main pramāṇa upon which all other pramāṇas are dependent upon except śabda, is only capable of denoting tangible material objects.59

The recognition of the authority of the Veda is one of the most important criteria of Hindu ‘orthodoxy’; it is what eventually gave rise to one way of separating the āstika from the nāstika traditions.60 According to Pandurangi, ‘of all the schools of Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā is the most powerful champion of Vedic authority’ and therefore, its most important proponent.61 It is this commitment to Vedic testimony or revelation that has also often resulted in the charge, particularly by modern scholars, that the system is no longer a living or relevant one.62 As Arnold has pointed out, Mīmāṃsā’s concern with establishing the authority of the Veda has prompted many modern scholars ‘to characterize this tradition as virtually antithetical to truly philosophical inquiry’.63 He notes that even those who advance a more nuanced understanding and are sensitive observers of the Mīmāṃsā, such as Matilal and Clooney, have tended to dismiss its ‘scriptural way of knowing’ as ‘a sort of fundamentalism’ and a ‘non-philosophical’ description that is then taken as the ‘true

59 MS 1.1.4: Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyānāṁ buddhijanam tat pratyakṣam animittaṁ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt
[That] cognition by a person which occurs when there is contact (connection) of the sense-organs (human senses) [with an existent object] is sense-perception; it is not a means [of knowing dharma] since it apprehends only what is present [existing at the present time].

60 The highest authority that is recognized for all the āstika schools of Indian philosophy is the revelation of the Veda (Vedic testimony). This is not to say that within the ‘orthodox’ domain of acceptance of the Vedic revelation, there are variations of that acceptance. Pandurangi maintains that ‘even the so-called nāstika schools have developed in opposition to the Vedic view’ and ‘they also owe their allegiance to the Veda in some way or the other’. Pandurangi (ed.), Pūrvamīmāṃsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, p. 235.

61 Ibid., p. 235.


predecessor to Advaita." However, in the following discussions I seek to argue that the nature of Jaimini’s commitment to Vedic revelation, and his proposal of śabda as the only pramāṇa to enquire into dharma, when understood in light of the vitality of yajña in the Vedic world, discloses his unique concern for the preservation and continuation of Vedic practice as an unbroken tradition that pushes one to reimagine the very notion of both ‘authority’ and ‘orthodoxy’.

Having mentioned in sūtra 1.1.4 that the enquiry into dharma is not amenable to such means of cognition as sense-perception and inference, Jaimini, in the following sūtra 1.1.5 claims that śabda is the only means of cognizing all that is beyond the limits of possible sensory experience, and particularly dharma:

1.1.4: [That] cognition by a person which occurs when there is contact (connection) of the sense-organs (human senses) [with an existent object] is sense-perception; it is not a means [of knowing dharma] since it apprehends only what is present [existing at the present time].

1.1.5: The relationship between the word and what they express (denote) is inborn (originary). Instruction (teaching) is the only means of knowing it, [as it is] infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; [it is a valid means of knowledge] as it is independent, according to Bādarāyana.  

Although dharma is accepted as an object of knowledge, it is an object that has no given external or tangible form or features through which it can be visibly identified and distinctively defined. Therefore, dharma is not amenable to sense-perception because sense-perception is taken to be able to apprehend only those objects which are in visible existence at the time of perception. Moreover, since all the other means of knowledge are also dependent on and have their foundation primarily in sense-perception, they cannot be taken as valid means for knowing dharma. It is within this attempt to grasp the invisibility of dharma that śabda is introduced as the only means of knowledge that

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65 MS 1.1.4: Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyānāṁ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittaṁ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt.
MS 1.1.5: Autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhāḥ, tasya jñānāṁ upadeśo vyayate kāthē nupalabdhe tat pramāṇāṁ bādarāyaṇasyānapeksatvāt
66 Jaimini mentions only three pramāṇas – perception, inference and śabda – and Śabara has not added any other pramānas to it. However Prabhākara adds upamāna (comparison) and arthāpatti (implication) while Kumārila adds anupalabdhi (non-comprehension) to the five that Prabhākara lists. See B Shastri, Mīmāṁsā Philosophy and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi, p. 26.
can access and actualize *dharma*. It is precisely within this concern to bring *dharma* into existence in a world that is oriented around *yajña*, that Jaimini is interested in the validity of *śabda* as a *pramāṇa*.

To understand the significance and contours of Jaimini’s epistemology through a discussion of his proposal of *śabda* as the only *pramāṇa* for matters pertaining to *dharma*, one has to acquire a preliminary understanding of the nature of *pramāṇa* and its role in the context of the *darśana*-based culture.67

**Pramāṇa**

*Pramāṇa*, in the Indian philosophical tradition, is generally understood as a means of cognition or a medium of accessing valid cognition. Mohanty, however, considers it in the sense of a ‘philosophical theory’ which seeks to discuss the nature of things with a rationale and justification that is coherent and intelligible within a particular *darśana*.68

According to Bilimoria, *pramāṇa* seeks to deal with the question of ‘the possibility and grounds of the valid means of knowing’.69 For him, it includes such questions as ‘how do we know?, how do we know what we know?, how do we know, or establish, the truth or falsity of what we claim to know?, how many ways of knowing are there? and do they all lead to the same truth?’70 *Pramāṇa* for him, is defined ‘in terms of the instruments (*karaṇa-karaṇa*) and the concatenation of conditions and factors (*sāmagrī*)

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67 It is significant to note that at some point in the course of their development, each of the *darśanas* came up with their own theories of *pramāṇas*. See JN Mohanty, ‘Indian Philosophical Tradition: The Theory of *Pramāṇa*’ in S Biderman & B-A Scharfstein (eds), *Rationality in Question: On Eastern and Western Views of Rationality*, Brill, Leiden, 1989, p. 219.
68 Ibid., p. 219. In the matter of recognizing different *pramāṇas*, the various *darśanas* may be referred to as follows – the Cārvākas or the materialists recognize only perception (*pratyakṣa*); the Vaiśeṣikas and the Baudhāyas add inference (*anumāṇa*) to perception; the Sāṅkhya philosophers accept verbal testimony (*śabda*) along with the other two; and some of the Nyāyayikas add comparison (*upamāṇa*) to the earlier three and the Vedāntins add non apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and postulation (*arthāpatti*); the Paurāṇikas add two more to the six above namely, conclusion (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*). See RN Sarma, *The Mīmāṃsā Theory of Meaning: Based on the Vākyārthamārtkā*, Sri Satguru, Delhi, 1988, p. 5.
70 Ibid.
that are capable of bringing about a desired result, in this instance, a genuine piece of knowledge.’ The criteria for determining the truth or otherwise of this ‘knowledge’, i.e. *pramāṇyaniścaya*, are also given alongside the definition.\textsuperscript{71}

*Pramāṇa*, writes Mohanty, is understood as ‘the specific cause of an irreducible type of *pramāṇa* [true cognition]’, which for him amounts to three claims that together constitute his ‘*pramāṇa* theory’ - one, ‘some cognitions are true, i.e. *pramāṇa*’; two, ‘some of these true cognitions belong to a type that is irreducible to any other type’; and three, ‘true cognitions belonging to an irreducible type are caused by a unique aggregate of causal conditions’.\textsuperscript{72} Mohanty notes that while knowledge in the Western tradition ‘arises from reason or from experience’ which, not until recently, was the point of contention between the ‘rationalists’ and the ‘empiricists’, in the Indian context, knowledge or ‘true cognition’ is negotiated through the means of varied *pramāṇa* which are not easily reducible to the distinction between reason and experience. Indian epistemology generally involves four basic accepted factors, which includes: (a) *pramātā* - the knower or cogniser of knowledge, (b) *prameya* – the knowable i.e. the object of knowledge, (c) *pramāṇa* – the chief means of knowing, and (d) *pramāṇa* or *pramiti* – the valid knowledge of the subject.\textsuperscript{73}

According to Hiriyanna, there are three overall functions of *pramāṇa* that are basic to philosophy. Firstly, as ‘*karana*’, the ‘source or sources of knowledge’, i.e. the means or ‘instruments of knowing’. Secondly, as a means for ‘scrutinising, criticising and evaluating through the process of reasoning the knowledge derived through the “source/s”.’ Thirdly, as ‘*pramāṇya*’, the ‘measurement for the criterion of determining the validity of knowledge either as true or false’. Together these constitute the grounds

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Mohanty, ‘Indian Philosophical Tradition: The Theory of Prāmāṇa’, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{73} Sarma, The Mīmāṃsā Theory of Meaning: Based on the Vākyārthamātrkā, p. 4.
for the possibility of knowing: *pramāṇavada*. What then, are the conditions that a *pramāṇyam* has to qualify to be accepted as valid?

In seeking to engage this question as it relates particularly to the Mīmāṁsā tradition, Arnold writes that there is a ‘systematic ambiguity’ in the Indian philosophical tradition concerning *pramāṇa*, with its definition ‘alternately refering to a reliable *means* of knowing, and to an episode of *veridical awareness.*’ He critiques the approach adopted by modern scholars such as Matilal and Mohanty as effectively ‘capturing the foundationalist tenor of the Indic discourse on ways of knowing’. For him, the former’s observation that ‘a *pramāṇa* in the Sanskrit tradition is conceived as a combination of evidence and causal factor’ and the latter’s ‘causal approach’ which is influenced by the ‘later Indic tradition of the Navya-Nyāya’ are both too committed to the ‘foundationalist presupposition’ to see that their position is precisely what the Mīmāṁsākās sought to call into question. Arnold points to Śabara’s development of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* (which he translates as ‘intrinsic validity’) as the cornerstone of Mīmāṁsā epistemology. He suggests that *prāmāṇya* ‘refers to that abstract quality in virtue of which a *prāmāṇa* has whatever status it has.’ Kataoka argues that for the Mīmāṁsā tradition, besides the ‘epistemological’ correspondence with an object, one of the most important characteristics of a *pramāṇa* is being a source of new information. For him, it is precisely this characteristic of ‘not having a preceding element’ (*apūrva*) that makes *śabda* an important *pramāṇa* for the Mīmāṁsā. In comparison with *pramāṇas* such as perception which can only communicate an object that is perceived, the independent status (*anapekṣatva*) of a Vedic injunction allows it to be a reliable source of knowledge about *dharma*. Therefore, for Kataoka, though the notion of ‘novelty’ is understood

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74 Bilimoria, Šabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge, pp. 7-8.
primarily from a ‘ritualistically pragmatic viewpoint’ in the Mīmāṃsā tradition, it is also ‘closely connected with the independence of the Veda’. Šabara, in his commentary on sūtra 1.1.2, where he responded to a pūrvapakṣin who claims that ‘there are many cases where people speak falsely’, argues what is important is not the demonstration of absolute certainty but the ability to falsify claims that are presented. Šabara goes on to state that if a claim is not susceptible to any criteria of falsification, it is then accepted to stand as true until otherwise proven. D’Sa notes that in the Mīmāṃsā, every pramāṇa has to satisfy two conditions: (a) every cognition has to be free of doubt (asamśaya), and (b) it should not be contradicted (abādhita) by another source of knowledge. Jha also notes that both commentators of Šabara’s Bhāṣya, namely Kumārila and Prabhākara, are agreed on the claim that valid cognitions are cognitions that consist in being an apprehension, by which they mean cognitions that bears directly upon their object until they are contradicted otherwise through the illumination of the real state of things of that which is cognized. Therefore, while sense-perception is readily accepted by all the darśanas as a vital pramāṇa for objects within the visible realm, śabda as a pramāṇa is more complicated and contentious in that its validity and authority is solely dependent on its manner of establishing intelligibility and the nature of what is established. In the case of directly non-perceptible objects, this can be taken to mean that the truth of valid cognition is dependent on the manner in which the cognized object and the cognizer affirm one another and are made intelligible.

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77 Ibid.
78 Šabaravāmi, Šabara-bhāṣya, pp. 7-8.
80 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Māṃsā, pp. 19-22. 
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Seeking to understand verbal cognition\textsuperscript{81} and its ‘manner’ of making a meaning or object intelligible necessitates a brief discussion of the tradition of Veda-transmission to look for insights that may help connect Jaimini’s concern for dharma and its actualization in practice. To understand Veda-transmission, I briefly present a preliminary discussion on how śabda is equated to the Veda taken as śruti, particularly in the context of the Mīmāṃsā.

\textit{Śabda}

\textit{Śabda} is a term that has wide currency in Indian philosophical and linguistic speculations and is used to mean different things in different contexts. \textit{Śabda}, translated in the literal sense, can be taken primarily as ‘sound’ - a verbal sound that is uttered and heard. However as Deshpande notes, the term śabda is ‘elastic enough to range from individual sounds to sentential sequences and from pronounced words to the communicative aspects of language’\textsuperscript{82}. Therefore, śabda as a term can denote the spoken word that is heard and also the written word as a token of the spoken or heard word. ‘\textit{Śabda}’, within the study of linguistics, while often loosely translatable as ‘word’ or ‘language’, is more commonly understood in the wider sense of ‘speech’, which covers a wide range of linguistic behaviour, such as making utterances, forming linguistic units, constructing grammatical complexes, conveying thoughts and ideas, as well as linguistic items such as \textit{vākya} (sentence), \textit{pāda} (morpheme), \textit{sphoṭa} (word-whole), \textit{vāc} (sacred word), \textit{dhvani} (sound-syllable), \textit{varṇa} (letter), pronunciation,

\textsuperscript{81} Verbal cognition is taken here as the cognition of something not amenable to perception but is produced by the knowledge of śabda.

mystic syllables (such as Oṃ), and any speech-act. As a generic term śabda can also stand for the whole field of speech and language.83

In Jaimini’s discussions in his Sūtras, śabda is taken in the sense of the Veda – an authoritative sound that is all-pervasive, infallible and everlasting but which is made up of an implicit sound-element that manifests itself in a more ostensive form that can be broken up in speech, into aggregates of sound-sequences, or letters (varnas). Jaimini’s arrangement of the Veda, as I will discuss in the next chapter, is essentially injunctive in nature.84

Śruti and Āgama

Bilimoria mentions that one of the major source of knowledge accepted in traditional times, apart from the various pramāṇas, was āgama or the ‘word of tradition’, where ‘word’ is largely identified with inherited wisdom enshrined in the scriptures that are traditionally revered and sanctioned. He argues that ‘tradition, whether in a culture or in a structure, functions as an important source of knowledge’ for determining what is authoritative and worth preserving from what is not. He makes it clear that it is not ‘tradition as such that becomes a distinct source of knowledge, but rather a tradition that has been systematised as a result of reasoned enquiry, and which has specified a set of epistemological criteria’.85 He adds that the functions of a pramāṇa such as examination, interpretation, and evaluation are equally brought to bear on tradition as a viable source of knowledge. Bilimoria states all this to make his claim that the ‘theoretical underpinning of śabdapramāṇa - as the more precise articulation of āgama

83 Bilimoria, Śabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge, pp. 61-62.
84 Ibid., p. 62.
85 Ibid., p. 9.
or “tradition” came to be known - has its roots in the very early attempt to systematise and justify tradition as one but a legitimate and significant means of knowing.\textsuperscript{86}

It is this sense of \textit{āgama} as closely related to the development of \textit{sabdapramāṇa} that is important to take into account to understand the \textit{mechanisms} through which \textit{śruti}, as revealed word, constitutes the Veda. \textit{Śruti}, which is literally translated as ‘heard sound’, is traditionally identified as revealed sounds that embody ‘truths of ultimate value’ \textit{(paramārtha)}. These revealed sounds ‘seen’ by seers are then understood to have passed on as the Veda.\textsuperscript{87} The revelation, which is constituted by both authority and sanctity, is taken in the sense of possessing eternal value and whose authority is characterized as being \textit{apauruṣeyā} i.e. without personal origin (non-human).

Mohanty, in stressing that the ‘Indian scriptures’ have their primary ‘existence not in writing but in aural form’, mentions that ‘\textit{śabda}, as a \textit{pramāṇa}, is not a mere word, but a sentence, and not a written, but a spoken sentence.’\textsuperscript{88} Jha, in his discussion on the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, maintains that \textit{śabda} is ‘verbal cognition’ which is ‘the cognition of something not present before the eyes, and which is produced by the knowledge of words’, and he connects ‘words’ with ‘letters’ which are heard as ‘sounds’.\textsuperscript{89} Biderman, in stressing the importance of the ‘memory’ of an ‘authoritative recaller’ in carrying and transmitting ‘sacred material’, claims that revelation in the Indian context has to be understood as ‘revelation in the form of sound, which is transmitted orally, through recitation.’ According to him, this process of the formation

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Veda, which is taken from the root word \textit{̣vid}, meaning ‘to know’ or ‘what is known’, is a cognate with the Greek \textit{oida}, Latin \textit{vidi} and the English ‘wisdom’.
\textsuperscript{88} Mohanty, ‘Indian Philosophical Tradition: The Theory of Prāmāṇa’, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{89} According to Jha, for both Prabhākara and Kumārila, the comprehension of the denotation of the word is not obtained through the sense organs because the organs only perceive letters, and the letters themselves possess a certain potency which brings about the comprehension of the object or meaning denoted by word. Therefore, verbal cognition is directly caused by the letters and is not directly cognized by perception or inference. See Jha, \textit{The Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā}, p. 52.
of Vedic ‘scripture’ where it is transmitted from teacher to pupil introduces śabda as ‘ontologically prior to the written text.’ Halbfass takes this understanding of śabda as that which constitutes the ‘language of the Veda’ and referencing Bharṭṛhari, recollects the claim that ‘the Veda is the “organizing principle” (vidhātr) of the world, that is, not only its “teacher” or principle of instruction (upadestr), but also its underlying cause and essence (prakṛti).’ Halbfass goes on to claim that ‘the Veda is the foundation of language’ and that the ‘recitation, memorization and exegesis of the Vedic texts, just as the correct usage of the Sanskrit language in general, has ritual implications.’ He also adds that the Veda ‘precedes or transcends the entire semantic dimension’, and claims that it is in this sense that the Veda is equated with ‘word’ (śabdapradhāna).

Taking all these together, śabda can best be understood as speech, primarily heard as or revealed in the form of sounds (utterances), and which thereby constitutes the language of the Veda, and serves as the organizing principle of the Vedic world. It is against this background of the verbal constitution of the Veda as authoritative testimony or revelation that śabda is best understood as a pramāṇa. In the context of the oral formation and constitution of Vedic ‘scripture’, the aspects of śabda may be broken down as: (a) sounds that are heard i.e. śruti; (b) sounds that are received in the form of lettered words, transmitted through the mechanism of teacher-pupil relationships; (c) lettered words whose primary concern is imperative i.e. whose artha is produced and validated by the knowledge of letters and sentences and not by the senses; and (d) words whose domain is the realm of the invisible, beyond the material.

Once śabda is understood in this manner, the task of validating the authority of Veda for Jaimini entails that both the Veda as śabda and the tradition (āgama) of its transmission are made intelligible as being self-evident and self-sustaining respectively.

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91 Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought, p. 5.
He proceeds by taking up a two-fold task: one, to ensure that the content of what is transmitted i.e. śabda endures through time, and two, to ensure that the mechanisms through which these transmissions are rendered possible are both justifiable, and more importantly for the Mīmāṃsā, repeatable.

It is this relentless commitment to adhere to the unquestioned authority of the Veda that firmly locates Jaimini as a Vaidika. His creative endeavour to make the Veda intelligible in light of the practices of yajña makes him one of the most important proponents of the validity and authority of the Veda.

**Intrinsic Infallibility and the Features of Śabda**

Having claimed in *sūtra* 1.1.5 that śabda is the only means of understanding and realizing that which is invisible i.e. dharma, Jaimini developed this position in his engagement with the pūrvapakṣin in the subsequent *sūtras* where he sought to reconceptualize the very notion of the authority of the Veda by introducing the theme of infallibility. For the Veda to be infallible for Jaimini it had to be both self-evident and self-sustaining i.e. independent of any external source from which a fault could arise. It is this insistence on the vitality of intrinsic validity or independence, as evidenced in his discussion on the originary and authorless nature of the Veda, that I discuss below with an attempt to disclose how this also relates to Jaimini’s concern for the unbroken tradition of Vedic practice.

**Śabda as Originary**

In *sūtra* 1.1.5, Jaimini cites Bādarāyaṇa to claim that śabda is the only valid means of knowing dharma because it is independent and infallible in its authority. This independence, he argues, is based on the inborn or eternal (ever-present) relationship
between word and its intended meaning or purpose (object-referent). Instruction or teaching, as word or utterance that is communicated, serves as the means of knowing objects (or realizing meanings) that are not perceptible to the senses. He claims that there is an originary, primordial (autpattika) relation (sambandha) between word and purpose (meaning), which is not established by human convention (i.e. it is prior to the action of any speaker).  

The opponents of Jaimini sought to bring him to task by arguing that word is the product of human convention and is not eternal (the connection of the word and its intended meaning or object referent is not eternal) but transitory in nature. This particular understanding of word as a human product is presented in the following pūrvapākasas from sūtras 1.1.6-11:

1.1.6: Words are impermanent (non-eternal) because they are made [they follow after effort];
1.1.7: Because it does not persist, [because they lack stability (i.e., they quickly cease to exist)];
1.1.8: [Also] because of expressions like ‘he makes’ (karoti) [which are conjugated], being used in connection with words;
1.1.9: [Also] because they are used simultaneously in diverse places [and denote diverse existent things];
1.1.10: [Also] because they have original forms and modifications (derivative forms);
1.1.11: Further, because they multiply due to the plurality (multiplicity) of its producers (speakers).

According to the pūrvapāksīn, words cannot be eternal because they are the results of the efforts of the person using or uttering them and they can only exist when they are spoken, and disappear (are destroyed, cease to exist) after they are pronounced. The opponent also adds that words cannot be eternal because multiple speakers can produce

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92 MS 1.1.5: Autpattikaśabdasāyṛthena sambandhaḥ, tasya jñānam upadeśo yvyatirekaś cārtiḥ'napalābdhe tat pramāṇam bādārāyāṣyāṇaṃ apekṣatvāt
93 MS 1.1.6: Karmāke tatra daśanāt
MS 1.1.7: Asthānāt
MS 1.1.8: Karotiśabdāt
MS 1.1.9: Sattvāntare ca yaugapadāt
MS 1.1.10: Prakrtivikṛtyośca
MS 1.1.11: Vṛddhiśca kartṛbhūmnāsyāt
94 MS 1.1.6: Karmāke tatra daśanāt
MS 1.1.7: Asthānāt
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a word in different places simultaneously. The word that is produced is not the same word but a word that is created anew, to be destroyed after it is pronounced. This is the suggestion that śabda is transitory. In the last three pūrvapakṣas, the opponent argues against the claim that words are manifested rather than produced, by claiming that the forms and sound-magnitude of words are modifiable. This insistence on the transitory nature of words based on the argument that its production is a human convention can be seen as the attempt to forefront (a) the agency of the subjective individual consciousness as the creator and inventor of words and (b) the multiplicity of contexts (within which words can be invented and produced).

This concern to account for the usage of language by any given individual at any given moment in time makes the pūrvapakṣin challenge what can be perceived as an ‘objective’ or ‘generalized’ reading of language by Jaimini. How does Jaimini respond to this claim? Is Jaimini’s understanding of śabda a linguistic form that is always stable and is not changeable or adaptable? How does he understand śabda in light of this claim for individual production?

In response to the claim that words are transitory because they exist only when they are spoken and disappear immediately after utterance, in sūtras 1.1.13-14, Jaimini stressed that words, as already in existence, are only made manifest or rendered perceptible through human utterance. He states: ‘(They do not lack stability,) but they are distant from near-at-hand existent objects and so do not become objects of knowledge. Conjugations, etc. pertain to the utterance or usage of words, not to their creation.’

Utterance, as making manifest, is mentioned in sūtra 1.1.14 to argue against the claim

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95 MS 1.1.10: Praktivikṛtyoṣṭa
MS 1.1.11: Vṛddhiṣṭa kartṛbhūmnāsa
96 MS 1.1.13: Sataḥ paramadarśanaṃ viṣayānāgamāt
MS 1.1.14: Prayogasya param
The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 63.
that words are *produced* by the speaker. He contends that the role of utterance is to make the already existing word perceptible, not to create it.

For Jaimini, the whole notion of the transient character of words which takes the moment of utterance as the moment of the creation of a (new) word is problematic because it forbids words from becoming and performing precisely their main role, which, as he mentions in *śūtra* 1.1.18 is to communicate. For him, utterance is not the production or creation of the word, but for the primary purpose of expressing the designation or meaning of the word; the word for Jaimini is always directed towards an addressee and towards meaning (object referent). In *śūtra* 1.1.18, he argues that ‘the word must be eternal as (its) utterance is for the purpose of another’\(^97\) i.e. primarily for the purpose of making the meaning known to another.\(^98\) If the words ceased as soon as they are uttered, no meaning could be comprehended and there would be no communication. For the speaker, the linguistic form exists only in the context of specific utterances. This is not to claim that the meaning of the word is not determined by its context, for even for Jaimini, the meaning of the word is understood specifically within the context of Vedic practice. Bakhtin, claiming that ‘any utterance is a line in a very complex organized chain of utterances’,\(^99\) elaborates this interrelation in his theory of heteroglossic utterance, albeit in a different context:

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97 Śabaravāmi, Šakara-bhāṣya, p. 37.
98 MS 1.1.18: *Nityastu syād darśanaasya parārthatvāt* [The word] must be eternal, as [its] utterance is for the purpose of another.
Jaimini was not as concerned about the origin of the word as he is about the relation between the word and its purpose. Bilimoria remarks that while the standard practice by modern scholars has been to render autpatti\(\text{ka}\) as ‘eternal’, he highlights several related meanings of the term listed by Monier-Williams,\(^{101}\) and argues that autpatti\(\text{ka}\) as a construction from ‘utpattih + dhak’ can be taken to mean ‘originating or arising simultaneously, or without interruption’. He argues that the relation between the ‘word’ and its ‘meaning’ is best understood as ‘originary’, ‘in the sense that the presentment of the word and its meaning is simultaneous’, in that they are inseparable from one another; ‘The relation is sui generis, natural and with a sense of permanency about it’.\(^{102}\) He relates this sense of originary with Heidegger’s definition of origin (\textit{Ursprung}) as ‘that from which and by which something is what it is as it is.’ Building from Heidegger’s point that our quest should not be for an original language, nor discursive primordiality but for an ontologico-existential immediacy, i.e. for the roots and basic \textit{a priori} structure which makes discourse or speaking possible, and in which signification is ultimately embedded.\(^{103}\) Bilimoria contends that the autpatti\(\text{ka}\) principle, read as originary without having an origin, defines the ‘relational structure (sambandhena) that belongs to the very nature of śabda and artha. The emphatic stress is on the constancy of the relation: “śabda is never outside of or apart from the autpatti\(\text{ka}\) relation”.’\(^{104}\)

D’Sa looks at sūtra 1.1.18\(^{105}\) and argues that the eternal aspect of language is not for itself but for the sake or purpose of something else (\textit{parārtha}), which according to him

\(^{101}\) Monier-Williams distinguishes between several related meanings of the term autpatti\(\text{ka}\): ‘relating to origin, inborn, original, natural, inherent, eternal.’ See Dwivedi (ed.), \textit{Studies in Mīmāṃsā}, p. 190.

\(^{102}\) P Bilimoria, ‘\textit{Autpatti\(\text{ka}\): The “Originary” Signifier-Signified Relation in Mīmāṃsā and Deconstructive Semiology}’ in Dwivedi (ed.), \textit{Studies in Mīmāṃsā}, p. 190.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p. 191.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., p. 199.

\(^{105}\) Śabarasvāmi, śabara-bhāṣya, p. 37. ‘[The word] must be eternal; as [its] utterance is for the purpose of another.’
is, ‘the sake of the historical aspect of language’. He elaborates that when we utter phonemes (varṇas) coherently, language makes itself available to us in our situatedness and meaning is revealed in and through the sequences of phonemes. Space and time ensure that only an aspect of language is manifested at a time but in a manner that when a word is formed by a definite phoneme-sequence a polysemous meaning emerges. The eternal aspect of language reveals itself in the form of phonemes in a particular context to anyone who utters them in an appropriate sequence and this is possible due to the intrinsic and natural or inborn relationship (autpattikah sambandhah) of word and meaning (sabdārthah). A gathering together of words and their specific meanings gives birth to a sentence and sentence meaning and it is the sentence-meaning that has a specific reference to the world of sacrificial action for Jaimini. A sentence meaning has specific reference to our being in the world. Our being-in-the-world is not a statement about one’s situation nor about one’s dwelling place but it is a statement of how one’s being is, of how one ‘ek-sists’. The world and I are intrinsically related and it is here where historical language is grounded. In the same way, Jaimini also seems to suggest that while there is a word that is united as a single entity originally or eternally, that same word is not broken apart into as many separate words as there are contexts of its usage. It is in this sense that the word, which is taken to be indeclinable in sūtra 1.1.16 can also be understood.

Jaimini’s point about autpattika can be seen to argue that whenever we participate by speaking or communicating, we are always already in śabda and this is the eternality,
the given aspect of śabda. Everyone speaks and communicates but no one invents śabda. It can only be manifested and put in motion or used the moment one begins to utter or speak. To begin to speak, therefore, is to assume the totality of language as that which precedes us and is authorizing us to speak. Language should be understood not only as rules that preside over the constitution of the phonological, syntactic and lexical or stylistic systems but also as the accumulation of things said before and their continuation in participation. To participate in speech is to appear in a situation where things have already been said before us.\footnote{This understanding of language is very similar to the philosophy of language that Ricoeur, Voloshinov and Bakhtin developed in their works. See P Ricoeur, \textit{From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II}, trans. K Blamey & JB Thompson, Continuum, London, 2008; VN Voloshinov, \textit{Marxism and the Philosophy of Language}, Seminar Press, New York, 1973; MM Bakhtin, \textit{Towards a Philosophy of the Act}, M Holquist and V Liapunov (eds), trans. and notes V Liapunov, Texas University Press, Austin, 1993.} Therefore, both D’Sa and Clooney argue that for Jaimini śabda is not merely an ‘instrument’ or a ‘tool of communication’\footnote{FX D’Sa, ‘The Happening of Tradition: The Mīmāṃsā’s Vedapramāṇam’, in D’Sa, Mesquita & Oberhammer, \textit{Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday}, p. 80.} or a ‘book to be read’,\footnote{Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern Theology’, p. 660.} but a living dialogue that both precedes and forms its users through its usage.

However, while śabda is unchangeably eternal, at the same time it has to be historically available and useful for the performance of sacrifice in a particular time and place.\footnote{MS 4.2.23: \textit{Karṇḍeśaṅkalāṅmacodanaṁ prayoge nityasamavāyāṁ} There is no injunction for the agent, place and time as these are necessary factors in every performance (essentially connected with every performance).} This is the sense in which Jaimini puts forth his argument that the eternity of the Veda is connected with the dependence of its ‘meaning’ being realized in the performance in sacrifice. The Veda is ‘ahistorical’ only in the sense that it depends on the successive repetitions of the performers who preserve and embody it as tradition. In this sense, the relation between the word and its purpose remains in some cases to be realized. For Jaimini, the eternal nature of the Veda is important in that it allows him to establish the
actualization of dharma in a realm beyond the perceptible (visible) i.e. in the realm of language. More importantly, it also allows him to provide a rationale for the ‘beginningless process of Veda-learning’,\footnote{FX D’Sa, ‘The Happening of Tradition: The Mīmāṃsā’s Vedapramāṇam’, in D’Sa, Mesquita & Oberhammer, Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, p. 77.} which is the foundation upon which the authorlessness of the Veda can be made intelligible.

**Veda as Authorless**

Jaimini establishes that śabda is not the production or invention of human convention but an ongoing *given* which enables the engagement and communication of humans from within their own context of usage. The pūrvapakṣin now shifts the discussion towards a challenge against the trustworthiness and efficacy of śabda for expressing the primary subject matter of the Sūtras i.e. dharma, particularly in light of Vedic injunctions. In *sūtra* 1.1.24, the pūrvapakṣin states: ‘Even though they [the word, its meaning and the relationship between the two] are eternal, they do not express the subject-matter (dharma) because they are not efficient for that purpose.’\footnote{MS 1.1.24: Utpattau vā’vacanāḥ syur arthasyāt annimittatvāt}

The challenge, regarding the nature of the trustworthiness and efficacy of Vedic injunctions as a source for realizing dharma, brought about the question of the location and source of where the authority of the Veda is ultimately derived from. In *sūtra* 1.1.27, the authorship of learned men or seers is made mention as a candidate: ‘According to some people, the Vedas are the work of human authors; being as they were, named after men.’\footnote{MS 1.1.27: Vedāṁś caīke sannikarṣaṇī puruṣākhyāḥ} The pūrvapakṣin argues that the Veda must be composed by human authors because one finds various sections of the Veda named after men, such as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item MS 1.1.24: Utpattau vā’vacanāḥ syur arthasyāt annimittatvāt
\item MS 1.1.27: Vedāṁś caīke sannikarṣaṇī puruṣākhyāḥ
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
‘Kāṭhaka’ (named after Kāṭha), ‘Kālāpaka’ (named after Kālāpa) and so forth, who were understood to be seers.\footnote{117 These are names Śabara provides in his commentary on MS 1.1.27 as examples. See Śabarāsvāmi, Šabarābhāṣya, pp. 48-49.}

In concluding the first pāda, Jaimini, in his response to the above pūrva-pākṣa regarding the authorship of the Veda, briefly states in sūtra 1.1.29 the following: ‘It has been explained that the word is prior (to its usage by speakers)’.\footnote{118 MS 1.1.29: Uktantu śabdapūrvatvaṁ This translation is borrowed from Jha. See G Jha, The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. G Jha, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1916.} This sūtra in Śabara’s commentary has been interpreted to mean that ‘there is an unbroken tradition (continuity) of the texts among the students of the Veda’ suggesting that traditional wisdom is passed on orally from the old to the young through countless generations.

The Veda is prior to, and independent in terms of composition from those who have taught it over the centuries.\footnote{119 Translation from Śabarāsvāmi, Šabarābhāṣya, p. 49.} Śabara argues that the names Kāṭhaka and others are due to the sages being especially efficient teachers and expounders of that section of the Veda.\footnote{120 Translation from Śabarāsvāmi, Šabarābhāṣya, pp. 49-50.} The Veda has speakers (or articulators) but not authors.\footnote{121 See Clooney’s interpretation in Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṁsā and Post-Modern Theology’, p. 673.} This assertion came to be known as the doctrine of apauruṣeyatva (authorlessness) of the Veda.\footnote{122 In ancient India, the concept of authorlessness can be understood through a variety of analysis and perspectives. Clooney talks about the grammar of classical Sanskrit itself, as well as the mystical understanding of the general orthodox Brahmanical tradition of seers, which are both taken to be closely related to the idea of authorlessness. Ibid., p. 673.}

The usage here seem to suggest that rṣis, while they form part of an unbroken tradition of transmission, cannot claim an authorial function regarding the content of their transmission of the living text.

In sūtra 1.1.30 and 1.1.31 Jaimini further mentions the presence of ‘special study’ by persons of different names regarded as ‘specialists’ or ‘teachers’. He also discusses that the names mentioned in the Veda should be taken in the sense of ‘excellent carriers’...
rather than as authors. ‘We have already explained that words always precede those who use them. The so-called authors are merely the expositors, while the temporal references are only apparent.’

In his response, Jaimini shifts the discussion concerning the question of authority from the theme of authorship to the mechanisms of interaction facilitating the reception and transmission of a traditionary practice. While the position concerning the authorlessness of the Veda is discussed briefly without subsequent elaborations, these concluding sūtras are vital in providing a window for understanding Jaimini’s concern for tradition, and his efforts to establish the interplay between yajña, dharma and the oral transmission of the Veda as an intrinsically valid and intelligible one.

The doctrine of authorlessness of the Veda was significant for Jaimini in the following ways: Firstly, Jaimini’s concern and task had always been to establish the independent status of the Veda as a faultless source of knowledge in order to validate it as the only means of knowing dharma. For the Veda to be faultless, it had to be independent of any external source from which a fault may arise. This was important because the positing of an author, either human or divine, to the Veda will make it susceptible to the subjective intentionalities and defects of the authors, which can then reduce the validity of the relation between the word and its purpose (meaning) to one of interpretations rather than enacted validation.

The theme of authorlessness within the general Brahmanical orthodoxy is not entirely new in that the notion of the seers (ṛṣis) hearing the Veda is generally accepted.

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123 MS 1.1.30: Ākhyāḥ pravacanāḥ
MS 1.1.31: Parantu śrutisāmāṇḍyātāram

124 Garge, Citations in Šabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 221.
Clooney, however points out that some ‘logicians of the Nyāya school sought to refute the notion of authorlessness on the grounds that it made no sense to say that there are texts no one has composed’.\textsuperscript{125} Given the possibility of fallible human authors, the notion of God as the perfect author is presented as an option that could be uncontroversially taken up as the source of authority and eternal wisdom. As Biderman has stressed, what is crucial to emphasize for Jaimini is that the signifying capacity of utterances is not at the level of \textit{enunciation} (the intentional communication of a self-willed agent) but at the level of its \textit{reception}. The authorlessness of the Veda makes it impossible to be interpreted solely by reference to the intentions of the author(s).\textsuperscript{126} Jaimini’s concern is primarily not with the attempt to discover the origin of a ‘creator’ or to recover the intentionality of an ‘author’ at some concrete point in history but to find a way to ensure the continuation and transmission of tradition.

Secondly, in order to ensure the transmission of tradition, Jaimini sought to forefront the orality of the Veda by positing it as a ‘living dialogue’\textsuperscript{127} whose authority, or sacredness, was one that can only be continually affirmed and activated \textit{in enactment}. If I bring the \textit{orality} of the constitution and transmission of the Veda, together with the understanding that while words possess inherent signifying power for Jaimini, meaning is not an automatic causally conditioned product of an aggregate of words, then it becomes evident that the way in which meaning is produced in Jaimini’s \textit{Mīmāṃsā} necessitates enactment. Biderman, in highlighting the oral tradition predominant in the Indian context, makes an important observation about the sacredness of the Veda:

\textsuperscript{125} Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-modern Theology’, p. 678.
In the Indian context, it is not the inability to write that has resulted in the supremacy of the oral form of religious texts, but the conscious choice of oral transmission as the only appropriate vehicle for holy utterance. The “scriptural” quality of sacredness is established within the relationship between persons as part of a continuous tradition.\textsuperscript{128}

The Veda is a living dialogue for Jaimini precisely because it is inseparable from his concern for sacrifice and this event of sacrifice can only be performed together in the presence and participation of the other. While it is probable to assume that the teacher, who has memorized the Veda by heart, is the one whose interpretation is the reliable guarantor of the sacred truth, it is in the matrix of the performative-relationship that meaning is realized. The role of the teacher is not to impose his meaning onto the text, but as Biderman has proposed, it is to ‘confer the status of authority’\textsuperscript{129} upon it. This authority then enables both the student and the pupil to submit themselves to the wholeness of the sacrifice within which they are both participants. The expounder and reciter of the Veda and the desiring sacrificial agent are brought together by the sacrifice where their primary role is to accomplish and fulfil the sacrifice. It is within this living dialogue and interaction in enactment that meanings are realized. The source of authority, therefore, is inherent not only in the eternality of words but also in the relationship between the words and their usage in student-teacher relationships within a specified sacrificial setting. As Clooney writes: ‘The Veda has no author, no meaning beyond the words and the sacrificial actions themselves…People do not invent their rituals, nor author their sacred texts.’\textsuperscript{130}

Therefore, any meaning that may be found in the Veda is the result of its having been pronounced and heard, and received in enactment. The dependence of meaning on enactment makes it impossible for the meaning of the Veda to be understood from its words alone. The source of authority is not inherent in the words alone but rather in the

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., p. 93.
\textsuperscript{130} Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern Theology’, pp. 660, 672.
interplay between the words and the teacher-pupil relationship that enact them. Therefore, the intention and authority of the Veda cannot be realized without the intention of hearers - the pupils, the believers - without whom the authority of the text cannot be established or maintained. The intelligibility of the Veda alone does not entail authority; it is the performance that confers it. Performances of the texts, together with adherence to the ritualistic injunctions and prohibitions that may be found in them, constitute the texts as authoritative, infallible and absolute.

Thirdly, the performative model of validation introduced by Jaimini can also be read as a re-orientation of the understanding of history through the lens of an ongoing tradition. Jaimini, in establishing the independence and performativity of the Veda, sought to highlight a sense of ‘ahistoricity’ which entailed the affirmation of the present and enabled successive repetitions as a way of preserving and maintaining the continuity of tradition. This concept of authorlessness is often misunderstood as a denial of history, or is accused of playing a power game with the intention of reifying the foundational doctrines of the ‘elite’ orthodox Brahmanical ritual tradition, but to do so would be to oversimplify the concern and import of Jaimini.

Therefore, Jaimini’s concept of authorlessness, and the discussion of utterance-as-manifestation, is best read in light of his conception of tradition and his concern for the continuity of the practice of sacrifice. His fundamental insistence that the Veda is apauruṣeya i.e. it transcends the realm of human discourse, can be best understood in

132 Ibid., p. 93.
133 Ibid., p. 92.
135 This was the accusation made by the Cārvākas particularly. See Mādhava, The Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha: or, Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, 4th edn, K Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1914.
terms of a ‘finitude’ and a ‘belonging-to’\textsuperscript{136} (to borrow Ricoeurian terminology) in an ongoing and living tradition. It is to claim that we are always limited by our historicality and can \textit{belong} only as creative participants in an ongoing tradition. We have no role in its composition or its creation.

\textbf{MacIntyre and the Dialogical Constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras}

The problem of rationality that I have alluded to, in light of the growing acceptance of cultural variations in traditions, poses a challenge over ‘whether, and to what extent’, one can accept ‘the tradition-bound nature of rationality’ without falling into ‘the relativistic thesis that no contention between competing traditions is rationally resolvable’. \textsuperscript{137} MacIntyre’s proposal of a ‘tradition-dependent rationality’ has particularly received criticism in light of the perceived ambiguity in relation to its position i.e. whether it should be understood as a relativist or a universalist position. As Seipel points out, most critics of MacIntyre generally ‘maintain that his claims about the possibility of rational evaluation across traditions are irreconcilable with his conception of the tradition-dependent nature of rationality’. They argue that ‘his theory of the rationality of traditions has a tradition-independent basis, in which case his conception of rationality is false, or the theory is merely justified within and for the members of a particular tradition, and in which case it fails to refute relativism.’\textsuperscript{138} Kuna, for example calls MacIntyre a ‘consistent universalist’,\textsuperscript{139} and Jones points out that ‘MacIntyre’s formal claim about the narrative quality of human life \textit{qua} human life is at odds with his claim about tradition/community’.\textsuperscript{140} He argues that while MacIntyre ‘wants to claim that epistemology is tradition-specific’, his own ‘claim...(at least in its explicit

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
formulation) is not specific to any tradition.\footnote{Ibid.} Gunnemann claims that MacIntyre is proposing a ‘meta-narrative’ which is seeking to encompass all other narrative traditions but without a systematic exposition of how this meta-narrative is integrated within his privileged tradition.\footnote{JP Gunnemann, ‘Habermas and MacIntyre on Moral Learning’, Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics, vol. 14, 1994, p. 93.} Therefore, the question about whether MacIntyre’s proposal is able to provide a way forward from the dichotomy of objectivism and relativism it claims to go beyond continues to be a point of contention.\footnote{For a more detailed discussion on this contention, refer JA Herdt, ‘Alasdair MacIntyre’s “Rationality of Traditions” and Tradition-Transcendental Standards of Justification’, The Journal of Religion, vol. 78, no. 4, 1998, pp. 524-546.}

I would like to argue, however, that when MacIntyre’s thesis is located and read through the two orders of enquiry he alludes to in framing his project, one can see that the criticisms are misguided. While MacIntyre’s development of a first order points to his proposal of tradition as a form of rational enquiry, in anticipation of the question of cultural variations and pluralities, he goes on to problematize this proposal through a second-order enquiry by locating it within a wider context that assumes the plurality of traditions. As I discussed above, MacIntyre develops three interrelated stages in his account of traditionary rationality he referred to as ‘the very earliest stages in the development of anything worth calling a tradition of enquiry’.\footnote{MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 355-356.} Although MacIntyre mentions these three stages as the ‘initial’ and ‘earliest’ stages, he also states that ‘a tradition which reaches this point of development will have become to greater or lesser degree a form of enquiry.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 358.} Upon drawing this aspect of his discussion to a close, MacIntyre proceeds to propose a new stage in the development of rationality, which while continuing to be internal and specific to tradition, is now discussed in the wider context of a plurality of traditions. He concedes that ‘at some point it may be discovered within some developing tradition that some of the same problems and issues -
recognized as the same in the light of the standards internal to this particular tradition - are being debated within some other tradition’ which results in the development of ‘defined areas of agreement and disagreement’. According to MacIntyre, this order is not primarily about what is internal or specific to traditions, but it is about negotiating the particularity and differences between different traditions that are in contention and, even in conflict.

It is at this juncture that I return to Jaimini, firstly, to present the pūrwapakṣa-siddhānta dialectic as the second stage of tradition-constituted rationality that I have delayed till now, and secondly, to also argue that the dialogic manner and imagination with which his Mīmāṃsāsūtras was constituted challenges the very presupposition upon which the objectivist-relativist bifurcation debate is generally presented, that is, that the rationality of a tradition is necessarily relativistic. I argue that the dialogical constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras challenges this simplistic reduction of traditionary enquiry as necessarily a ‘relativistic’ or a ‘closed’ enquiry intelligible only for the participants of a specified or particular community. Jaimini’s text discloses the structures of a dialogical engagement and negotiation between two or more traditions that can be identified as dialogical hermeneutics.

The Dialogic Constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras

The term mīmāṃsa, drawn primarily from its etymological roots, has generally been taken to denote a sense of discussion and deliberation over matters of doubts and confusion concerning ritual activities. However, the nature and form of this discussion and the style of engagement between competing traditions of enquiry has not

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146 Ibid.
147 Ibid., p. 359.
186
yet been properly theorized. Apart from general mentions that the term *mīmāṃsā* is a derivative of the Sanskrit verb ‘*man*’ in introductory passages,\(^{149}\) no work has been done on a sustained excavation of the concept of *mīmāṃsā*, particularly for the methodological insights that it can offer as a form of inter-tradition and intra-tradition engagement and dialogue.

I have already mentioned in the first section of the third chapter that prior to the formulation of the *Sūtras* by Jaimini, discussion and debates concerning matters relating to sacrifice were a regular occurrence. I have also mentioned that in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, Jaimini himself makes reference to a number of predecessors such as Bādarāyaṇa, Bādarī, Atiśāyana, Kṛṣṇājī, Lāvukāyana, Kāmukāyana, Ātreya and Ālekhana. Keith points out that it will not be entirely wrong to assume that the *Sūtras* themselves are a redaction of the compilation of the discussions and clarifications amongst these hosts of seers.\(^{150}\) However, according to Verpoorten, even before these teachers and thinkers, occasional discussions of the *Mīmāṃsā* type are found in the *Brāhmaṇas* and later in the *Śrauta-sūtras* as well. He argues that the beginnings of the *Mīmāṃsā* and the very use of the term *mīmāṃsate* can therefore, be traced to the Veda where the term is used to denote doubts and discussions with regard to contentious points of doctrine and ritual.\(^{151}\)

According to Garge, it is only the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition that raised and discussed the problem of the rising differences in teachings among the various Vedic schools (*śākhās*).\(^{152}\) The question of differences arises particularly over the question of whether specific sacrifices, such as the *darśapūrṇamāsa* and the *jyotiṣṭoma*, differ from school

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\(^{149}\) See for example, GP Bhatt, ‘*Mīmāṃsā* as a Philosophical System: A Survey’, in Dwivedi (ed.), *Studies in Mīmāṃsā*, p. 4.

\(^{150}\) Keith, *The Karma-Mīmāṃsā*, p. 3.


\(^{152}\) Garge, *Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study*, pp. 56-64.
to school, or whether it is the case that regardless of the differences in name or form that are distinctive to each school, the sacrifices themselves are not affected by these variations and, are therefore, unchanged in their enactment from setting to setting.

In allowing these differences to be highlighted and discussed, with the intention of developing a way forward to ensure the continuity of the practice of sacrifice, Jaimini is risking the possibility of being dismissed as lacking an established position. Indeed, as Clooney has pointed out, this was precisely the charge with which the Buddhists critiques the āstika traditions, particularly the Mīmāṃsā: How could truth (valid cognition) be found in the Vedic system if its own proponents cannot agree amongst themselves?\textsuperscript{153}

Concerning the question of the nature of sacrifices, Jaimini in sūtra 2.2.1 cites six means of differentiation by which one can ascertain the difference or non-difference among various acts (rites). Garge elaborates these differentiations with the following examples:\textsuperscript{154}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(i)] Differentiation by \textit{different words}: When there is a different word enjoining an Act, it should be treated as a different Act, because of its special equipment. There are such texts as: (a) one should sacrifice with Soma, (b) One should pour the libation into Fire, and (c) Give gold to Ātreyā. Here we have three sentences containing three different verbs, denoting Acts. Unless there be reasons to the contrary, these three Acts must be different since each has its own equipment of accessories.
  \item[(ii)] Differentiation by \textit{Repetition}: In a case where the same verb is used several times, the Repetition of one and the same word should indicate difference among Acts, - because if one and the same Act were meant to be enjoined, then there would be no point in repeating the verb a number of times. For example, - in the texts - ‘\textit{samidho yajati}’, ‘\textit{tamānapātāṃ yajati}’, ‘\textit{idō yajati}’, ‘\textit{barhīr yajati}’, ‘\textit{svāhākaraṃ yajati}’…where the verb ‘\textit{yajati}’ has been repeated five times. Hence the texts should be taken as laying down five different sacrifices.
  \item[(iii)] Differentiation by \textit{Number}: The text ‘one sacrifices seventeen animals dedicated to \textit{Prajāpati}’ - lays down seventeen distinct acts constituting one main sacrifice.
  \item[(iv)] Differentiation by \textit{Accessory details}: such as the Deity, the substance (\textit{dravya}) to be offered and so on. When a substance is prescribed to be offered to a Deity other than the one gone before, it becomes a differentiator of the Acts. E.g. the text ‘when curd is put into hot milk, the milk becomes turned into curdled solids, called ‘\textit{āmikṣā}’ which is offered to Viśvedevas - and the liquid, the skimmed milk, is offered to the Vājins’ - is taken as laying down two distinct offerings.
\end{itemize}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[153] Clooney, \textit{Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini}, p. 169.
\end{footnotes}
(v) Differentiation by the \textit{Name}: The Name - the slightest change in the Name, also differentiates Acts, as it occurs in the very passage enjoining that Act, e.g. the text, \textit{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft \textit{Atha i\textit{\textasciitilde{s}}a jyoti\textit{\textasciitilde{h}}, vi\textit{\textasciitilde{s}}vajyoti\textit{\textasciitilde{h}}, atha i\textit{\textasciitilde{s}}a sarvajyoti\textit{\textasciitilde{h}}\textquoteleft\textquoteight} - is taken as mentioning three different acts of those different names.

(vi) Differentiation by \textit{Context}: We have the injunction of the compulsory daily Agnihotra in the text \textquoteleft\textquoteight one should offer the Agnihotra\textquoteight, and in a different section of the Veda we have another text enjoining the performance of the Agnihotra \textquoteleft\textquoteight for a month\textquoteight. In this case Jaimini concludes that since the context is different, the purpose must be different. So the monthly Agnihotra laid down in the second context must be different from the daily Agnihotra laid down in the former text.

While distinctions and differences as they relate to different \textit{sākhās} are acknowledged, in \textit{sūtra} 2.4.9 Jaimini defends the unity of the ritual while allowing for the many differences accruing in various schools over time.\textsuperscript{155} His conception of sacrifice as an event is one in which these differences are incorporated and guided towards the final goal of ensuring the enactment and fulfilment of the act.\textsuperscript{156} In so far as each sacrifice commits to the overall \textit{yajñārtha} underlying the Vedic texts, the enactments of each school, although distinctive in their own styles, are taken as practices oriented towards the same purpose.\textsuperscript{157}

The attempt in this section is to propose that the constitutive structures of the \textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtras} can be taken as grounded in a form of reflection, discussion and debate prevalent between competing strands of intellectual traditions prior to their formulation. The intention is to highlight that the redacted \textit{Sūtras}, in the form that is available today, reveal a structure of both intra-tradition and inter-tradition debates, particularly between

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{155} MS 2.4.9: \textit{Ekaṁ vā saṁyogarūpacodanākhyāviśeṣāt}\textsuperscript{\textendash} [In reality,] the act is one because there are no [significant] differences in relation to connection, form, injunction and name.
  \item MS 2.4.9: \textit{Ekaṁ vā saṁyogarūpacodanākhyāviśeṣāt}\textsuperscript{\textendash} [In reality,] the act is one because there are no [significant] differences in relation to connection, form, injunction and name.
  \item MS 3.1.2: \textit{Saṁsaṁ parārthatvāt}\textsuperscript{\textendash} An element is an auxiliary (subordinate) because it serves the purposes of another.
  \item MS 11.1.1: \textit{Praya motionbhisambandhat prthak satāṁ tataḥ syādaikakarmayamekaśabdaḥbhisaṁyogāt}\textsuperscript{\textendash} The acts, though separate, should be regarded as one act, because they are related to a [single] purpose, and because they are named by a single term (sentence).
  \item MS 11.1.6: \textit{Arthabhedastu tatrārthehāikārthvādāikakarmyān}\textsuperscript{\textendash} In this case, on the other hand, as the purpose served is one and the same, all should be regarded as one act.
  \item For a fuller discussion on the differences between the Vedic \textit{sākhās} as it relates to the \textit{Mīmāṃsā}, see Clooney, \textit{Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini}, pp. 168-175.
\end{itemize}
the Mīmāṃsākas and the Naiyāyikas that can be claimed as dialogic, one in which the ‘other’ is neither imagined, invisible or diplomatically tolerated, but is actively presented in their own terms and through their own voice.

As Jha highlights in detail in his translations of Jaimini’s text, each of the twelve adhyāyas (chapters) of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is made up of various adhikaraṇas (topics), and each of these topics take up one doubtful point which is then contested through a series of discussions with the goal of establishing a valid conclusion. Jha notes that for every adhikaraṇa, there is the following: (1) viṣayavākya, a Vedic sentence, which is followed by (2) a saṃśaya, doubt as to its correct meaning, which is then followed by (3) a pūrvapakṣa which is the prima facie view put forward, after which is presented (4) an uttarapakṣa or clarifying refutation, which then finally results in (5) the siddhānta, the final or conclusive view. These are also known as the five limbs of every adhikaraṇa. For topics that are particularly complex and need longer and more elaborated discussions, most of these points, particularly points three to five as above, are repeated as often as necessary.

For every adhikāra, the pūrvapakṣa is usually the first position that is put forth, which is the view of the opponent. In much of the discussions in the Sūtras, the pūrvapakṣa is usually presented first, though there are a few instances where the pūrvapakṣa follows an initial statement of the siddhānta. The siddhānta is the finally accepted view that is presented after a thorough engagement with the pūrvapakṣa position. As Clooney notes, Jaimini’s text is almost entirely constituted by this debate and discussion between the pūrvapakṣin and the siddhāntin, with Śabara’s Bhāṣya serving to provide additional back-and-forth arguments and elaboration of the context in more details. To borrow

MacIntyre’s phrase, the nature of dialogue in Jaimini’s text and its conclusion is ‘…no more than, the best answer reached so far.’

There are four crucial points one may derive from this pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta dialectic in our attempt to excavate a style of dialogical engagement: First, both the pūrvapakṣin and the siddhāntin are participants in a shared discourse where the preliminary knowledge about a topic or a theme are presented and contested together. Second, while the pūrvapakṣa position is gradually rejected over a course or stages of discussions, the preliminary rejections give birth to new stages of disagreements that enhance and enrich the understanding of the topic itself. Third, the siddhāntin comes to a conclusion not only after hearing the pūrvapakṣin’s position and engaging with his disagreements but often after accepting and incorporating most of the pūrvapakṣin’s more salient points. The siddhānta, therefore, is not an imposition of an already set viewpoint but a negotiated conclusion. Fourth, the goal of the discussion or debate is not always the achievement of consensus, but more importantly the clarification of difference, which at the same time, opens a window for further engagement. It is this clarification and respect of differences between contending and dialoguing traditions that was pointed out by Clayton as the hallmark of the vāda-tradition prevalent throughout the course of the Vedic period. Therefore, the contextual milieu within which the Mīmāṃsāsūtras were formulated as a text was a place of a hermeneutic encounter between competing traditions of enquiry where the nuances of that encounter form the very constitution of the text itself.

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160 This phrase, although borrowed from MacIntyre, best exemplifies the nature of the Mīmāṃsā position. See MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition, p. 124.

Jaimini’s position on the infallibility of the Veda based on its characteristics of being both autpattika and apauruseyā can be taken as the attempt to elaborate a precautionary strategy to ensure the continuation of the practice of Vedic sacrifice. According to Taber and Arnold, Jaimini’s formulation of this position, and the ways in which Śabara and later Mīmāṃsākas in the course of the development of the Mīmāṃsā tradition developed it, can be read as an important ‘formulation of a sophisticated critique of foundationalism’. Taber and Arnold, in their respective essays on svataḥ prāmāṇya, claim that this doctrine is a relevant ‘philosophical insight,’ which can be read ‘as a compelling critique of foundationalist epistemologies’.162 Arnold points out that the insights on this doctrine can be read as ‘an important Mīmāṃsā contribution to a discussion in which foundationalist options (those of the Naiyāyikas, and particularly those of Indian Buddhists in the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) predominated’.163 Although he carefully mentions that he does not fully subscribe to the Mīmāṃsā position, he sees it as a relevant insight which can contribute to ‘contemporary Western discussions in the philosophy of religion’.164 Summing up what came to be characterized as the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of svataḥ prāmāṇya, Pollock writes:

163 Arnold, ‘Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā’, p. 27.
164 Ibid.
As I have pointed out in the previous section, even as Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā is dialogically constituted out of their direct engagement and negotiation amongst themselves and with the Naiyāyikas, his project, which was elaborated by Śabara and the following commentators, was also partly motivated by the threat of the rise of Buddhist thought and their criticism on the orthodoxy of the Mīmāṃsā.166 Concerning the question of validity (prāmāṇya), Vaidyanātha Śāstri (c. 17th CE) laid out four different positions held by different schools of thought:

The Sāṅkhyaśas say it is ascertained that the validity and invalidity of awareness is intrinsic; the Logicians (i.e., Naiyāyikas) say that both (validity and invalidity) are (determined) by cause, quality, deficiency, and so forth (i.e. are determined extrinsically); the Buddhists say (there is) intrinsic-ness of invalidity, and external-dependence of validity; but the Mīmāṃśakas say (that) validity is intrinsic, and invalidity is dependent.167

Clooney claims that Jaimini’s discussion and affirmation of action in his Sūtras is much closer to Buddhist thought than it is to Upaniṣadic thought.168 However, on the question of prāmāṇya, it is with Buddhist thought that they had the most conflicting position. As can be seen from the view attributed to the Buddhist in the quote presented above, validity for them was established by prāmāṇyas such as perception (pratyakṣa) and the like and anything else is necessarily taken as erroneous. According to them, perception is the only prāmāṇa with which the ‘undistorted knowledge of the world’ can be known. While the Mīmāṃśakas maintain the position that one is prima facie justified in taking as valid any prāmāṇa that can provide ‘intelligible conception’, the Buddhists posit that until one can eliminate the distortion that comes from the activity of thinking and conceptualizing, one should maintain the assumption that all beliefs prior to that realization are false. Arnold argues that it is this position, of qualifying ‘a valid instance of awareness (jñāna)’ as such by its simply ‘being coherent (lack of ambiguity) or

168 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, pp. 206-208.
determinate (*niścita*), as opposed to “essentially ambiguous” (*saṃśayātma*) which allows critics to question whether the Mīmāṃsākas can really talk about ‘truth’.  

In engaging this criticism one can begin to see, as Taber and Arnold suggest, the Mīmāṃsā critique of the foundationalist project, particularly the one proposed by the Naiyāyikas. For Śabara, the task of enquiry is not to attempt foundationalist demonstrations of once-and-for-all certainty which, as Kumārila points out, only leads to infinite regress but rather to consider and maintain as justified all beliefs that have not been falsified. In his Šlokavārttika, where Kumārila develops the doctrine of intrinsic validity more comprehensively than any other Mīmāṃsākas, he discusses the criticism that the character of validity (*prāmāṇya*) is not applicable to Vedic injunctions, by claiming that infinite regress would follow if one were to take the criteria (*pramāṇa*) as also requiring the criteria of validity. He states: ‘The validity of all valid criteria must be intrinsic, for a validity that is not intrinsic cannot be produced by anything else.’

Arnold highlights that ‘the Mīmāṃsākas experienced Buddhist epistemologists as representing a serious challenge to the worthiness of their enterprise’. Later commentators such as Kumārila were particularly preoccupied with responding to the arguments laid out by the Buddhist Diṅnāga. While the nature of engagement between these traditions of thought is not always explicit in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, the Buddhist, Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsākas are understood to be close interlocutors of one another. The Mīmāṃsā is taken to represent one of the voices that constitute these inter-traditionary conversations which eventually led to the development and growth of various schools that took up the task of defending, negotiating and reworking their positions in light of the criticisms from other thinkers and schools.

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171 Arnold, ‘Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā’, p. 44.
For Jaimini, pramāṇas and knowledge (jñāna) are considered to be valid only in relation to their pragmatic efficacy. This is primarily because his concern is guided by a quest to find the means that most effectively usher in the understanding and realization of dharma. As alluded to by Arnold towards the end of his essay and as I have elaborated previously in the sections above, the Veda is authoritative, as far as the Mīmāṃsākas are concerned, because its appropriation and affirmation of ‘sacredness’ in enactment where the text is received in enjoinder and embodiment is ‘a socially validated practice’. 172 ‘This is what has always been done’, as far as anyone can remember, and continuing and maintaining that practice is their initiation and submission into tradition as historical beings who desire to responsibly carry that traditionary practice forward. 173

In the early nineties, Clayton, writing on the philosophy of religion, had discussed the importance of the Indian vāda tradition as a model of dialogical enquiry in a pluralist context. Clayton observes that in opposition to Jefferson’s Enlightenment ideals and his views on the study of religion ‘with its basis in universal reason’, 174 in the vāda tradition ‘religious claims are made and contested in a variety of contexts’. 175 He lists three different contexts: intra-traditional, inter-religious and extra-religious contexts. 176 While Clayton’s intra-traditional context resonates with the pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta form of dialogical enquiry I have discussed above, the challenge of dealing with two or more traditions falling under dialogical hermeneutics can also be seen to resonate with Mīmāṃsā’s engagement with both the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. One can see clear resemblances between the vāda tradition and the dialogical form of engagement adopted

172 Ibid., p. 32.
175 Ibid., p. 4.
176 Ibid., p. 21.
by the Mīmāṃsākas in their efforts to clarify their differences as well as hold on to the integrity of their traditionary practice.

In light of the second concern of this thesis, I presented an example of the intelligibility of traditionary practice to argue that the study of ritual must be taken not just as ‘the social scientific study’ of ritual but as an enquiry that can offer ‘legitimacy to traditions’ self-enquiry, albeit ‘within a framework of rational discourse’. This argument for the legitimacy of the self-enquiries of traditions such as the Mīmāṃsā is developed to highlight the possibility of rethinking ritual studies as a field of enquiry that can accommodate and accord ‘hospitality to traditions and their self-representations’¹⁷⁷ and that can take into account the internal rationalities that shape such practices that are identified here as ‘rituals’. However, the claim for the need to recognize the legitimacy of self-representation of tradition as can be found in Jaimini’s enquiry is not proposed to simply suggest an uncritical hospitality where the study of ritual is thrown open to the relativistic tendencies of differing traditionary particularities without seeing windows of communicability together. What is proposed is not the conglomeration of a plurality of theologies studied for their own sake which are unable to offer insights to one another. The commitment to claiming the legitimacy of traditions’ self-understanding and self-representation is to accept a historicism that traditions, in the hermeneutical sense, are not static but changing through time. Traditions are in the process of continuously reinventing their rationalities in new settings and contexts, and are seeking to continually provide a defence of their intelligibility in light of new ‘external critique’.

Therefore, this thesis is sympathetic to the self-descriptions and conceptions of varied traditions, and presents the Mīmāṃsā tradition as but one important example of a living tradition sustained with its own internal rationality. However, it does not present it

without opening it to the possibility of critique from other perspectives, such as the ‘text-historical’ or socio-political perspectives. While the suggestion for the study of ritual is ‘deeply sympathetic to tradition-internal concerns’, it is a suggestion that seeks to propose a dialogical model in that it allows ritual studies to ‘offer corrective readings to traditions’ and vice-versa.\textsuperscript{178} It is in this sense that originary texts such as the \textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtras} are argued to be relevant for our contemporary world, where forgotten traditionary meanings and insights are recalled and reinvigorated in a renewed form to guide our interrogations and understandings of contemporary contentions today. Ritual studies can establish itself as a field of enquiry that promotes the self-representation of traditions’ rationalities or theologies ‘alongside [the] social scientific, hermeneutical, historical and philological accounts’.\textsuperscript{179} In the dialogical relationship and engagement between a traditions’ internal rationality and its formal investigation, a fresh perspective may be imagined anew.

**SUMMARY**

In this chapter, I focussed primarily on Jaimini’s epistemology in light of the problem of rationality and the study of ritual. Discussing the nature of reductionist enquiry that an unchallenged notion of universal rationality, uncritically borrowed from the natural sciences, engenders, I discussed the invention and study of ritual as closely related to contentions about rationalities that informs enquiry in the social sciences. I then introduced Jaimini to argue that while he does not explicitly articulate a concept of traditionary rationality, his insistence on the intelligibility of the Vedic practice of sacrifice through a re-formulation of the authority of the Veda as intrinsically infallible disclosed structures akin to a ‘tradition-internal reasoning’ or a rationality of tradition.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 54.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 55.
I then argued that Jaimini’s demonstration of the authority of the Veda is significant not only in disclosing the mechanisms that constitute the unbroken tradition of Vedic practice but also for presenting a form of tradition-constituted rationality which challenges the universalist-relativist presuppositions upon which the contentions concerning rationalities are often premised. This opens the pathway for a dialogical approach whose form of enquiry is able to accommodate discussions that concern tradition-internal reasoning and tradition-constituted subjectivities.

Following the introduction of the desiring subject in Chapter Three and the excavation of the internal rationality of tradition in this chapter, in the next chapter I will discuss the nature of Vedic practice and the agency of the ritual subject in light of the problematic ways in which both ‘action’ and ‘ritual’ have often been theorized and understood.
CHAPTER FIVE: REALIZATION OF DHARMA
KARMAN, CODANĀ AND ANSWERABILITY

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter Three, I discussed the mode of desire of the Mīmāṃsa subject as the medium through which the invisible telos of dharma is pursued and in Chapter Four, I discussed the infallible Veda which enjoins responsible enactment as the only means of accessing dharma. Building on these preceding discussions, in this chapter I will discuss Jaimini’s elaboration of the nature of Vedic practice (yajñakarma) and its relationship with the realization of dharma primarily by looking at the event of yajña through the lens of the ‘enjoinment’ and ‘answerability’ of the yajamāna (sacrificial agent). I argue that this elaboration showcases both the textuality of Vedic practice and the agency of the enjoined subject which points towards the conceptualization of dharma as a narratively-structured traditionary practice. This conception of traditionary practice will contribute to the discussion on the articulation of ritual which, in its contemporary study, is deeply influenced by the larger theory-action dichotomy that pervades the enquiries in the human sciences. This has often resulted in the reduction of ritual to an empty action characterized by imitation-governed formality and non-intentionality.

The previous two chapters focussed on excavating the relationship between subjectivity, text and tradition in the discussion on Jaimini’s enquiry into dharma. In this chapter I will outline the internal structure of Jaimini’s institution of yajña by bringing the themes of karman, codanā and yajamāna conceptually together. I will seek to claim that these themes constitute the heart of his discussion on the realization of the fullness of dharma in sacrifice. The discussion of the interrelation between these three themes will also enable me to pursue the theme of enjoinment and answerability of the subject, which, I
will argue, is the foundation upon which the intelligibility of the unbroken tradition for Jaimini is ultimately constituted. It is the enjoined subject who holds the unique particularity and answerability of the sacrifice together and upon whom the fulfilment of the sacrifice is ultimately contingent.

I will begin this chapter by discussing the question of *praxis* and the theory-action dichotomy as genealogically traced by both Sloterdijk and Tull for the Western intellectual tradition and the Vedic tradition respectively. I will highlight that both their accounts, while drawn from completely different contexts, share a conceptual similarity in that they both suggest the need to retrieve a conception of practice akin to a traditionary practice. I will follow this brief sketch by introducing Bakhtin’s notion of ‘answerability’ and his discussion on the ‘integrity’ of the ‘act’ and use that as the lens through which the traditionary practice of sacrifice is accounted for and the tradition-specific subjectivity that it entails given more prominence. This will be followed by a discussion on the *eventness* and *textuality* of Vedic sacrifice where the enjoinment of the subject is discussed through the theme of answerable enactment. The discussion will conclude with an elaboration on Jaimini’s ritualistic conception of *dharma* followed by a discussion on the articulation of ritual and the insights that Jaimini’s notion of *dharma* and traditionary practice offers towards its understanding.

**THE QUESTION CONCERNING PRAXIS**

The last century is described to have made the ‘linguistic turn’ wherein consciousness or experience is understood to have always already been mediated by language.¹ This century is taken by some scholars to be making a similar turn to ‘practice’ i.e. the contention that practice or action can be seen as fundamental for understanding the

¹ The early nineties also witnessed what was called the ‘iconic turn’, particularly in the humanities, where an intense discussion about performativity was being engaged in Germany. See C Wulf, ‘Praxis’, in J Kreinath, J Snoek & J Stausberg (eds), *Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts*, Brill, Leiden, 2006, p. 398.
human condition and disclosing the complexity and mystery of our world.\(^2\) While this turn to practice is seen as opening up new vistas for understanding,\(^3\) it has also served to revive the dichotomy that has plagued modern thought and life - the dichotomy between what is more generally known as ‘action’ and ‘theory’. The ambiguous nature of what we consider ‘action’ and its relationship with ‘theory’ as a separate category continues to be a point of contention and confusion. Bernstein reminds us that these categories are not just ‘artificial distinctions introduced by philosophers’ but are concerns that ‘pervade and shape’ our daily lives.\(^4\) Sloterdijk effectively maps this distinction out as a central problem in the humanities, originating particularly within the Western intellectual tradition.

Seeking to explicate the conditions that created the *bios theoretikos* or the theoretical life in the West, Sloterdijk, in his book *The Art of Philosophy*, traces the problem of the relationship between theory and *polis* by looking at the origins of the theoretical person among the Greeks of the classical and post-classical age. He argues that ‘theory’ as a distinct category was developed primarily as a consequence of an estrangement from the *polis*. Sloterdijk begins his argument by going back to the founding of Plato’s academy in 387 BC, outside the city gates of Athens, at a time when life in the Athenian *polis* was facing a difficult period, particularly with the trial of Socrates, the Rule of the Thirty, and also the thirty years war against Sparta. Sloterdijk argues that it was against this background of the end of the ‘polis culture’ and as ‘a reaction to the collapse of the

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3 For a comprehensive survey and discussion of the various philosophical resources that could possibly guide the study of rituals as a mode of thinking through practice, refer Schilbrack (ed.), *Thinking Through Rituals: Philosophical Perspectives*.

Athenian polis model’ that Plato founded his Academy, with the conviction that ‘politics, as a shared concern for the community, had ceased to be the highest need for the intellect.’\(^5\) Democracy had failed and academia *qua ars moriendi* was born. It is here that Sloterdijk traces the transformation of the active citizen into a contemplative cosmopolitan with a strong dissociative propensity. He argues that the philosophy which orginated in the aftermath of this period in Greek history ‘is a child of defeat that simultaneously compensates for this defeat by ingeniously attacking it as the best form of defense’. This gave rise to ‘the idea that the thinking person has to be a kind of dead person on holiday’. He therefore, is a dispassionate theoretical person who takes the position of a ‘superior’ ‘spectator’ and whose ‘life of observation’ as ‘citizens of the universe’ is founded on the ‘exile ability’ of their soul and their *époché* from the local affairs of the *polis*.\(^6\) Sloterdijk claims that ‘there is a connection to be made between an important aspect of the production of persons fit for *époché* and the original institutions for educating boys.’\(^7\)

Sloterdijk’s deconstruction of the theoretical person is significant in that it highlights the limitations of a philosophy that champions the modalities of contemplation (*homo theoreticus, bios theretikos*) right from the founding of the Western intellectual tradition until the contemporary period. Sloterdijk points out that this privileging and championing of the theoretical served to push the category of human practice aside. Claiming that his concern is to ‘restore the high status of practice’ in his *You Must Change Your Life*, he comprehensively develops how the traditional approach of classifying human action through the distinction between the *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* served to make the dimension of practice as such invisible, if not actually inconceivable. He argues that the acceptance of this distinction as total and exclusive

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\(^6\) Ibid., p. 3.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 53.
makes us lose sight of a substantial complex of human behaviour that is neither merely active nor merely contemplative. It is this ‘complex of human behaviour’ that he discusses as ‘the life of practice’.

While Sloterdijk maps this distinction as a problem originating particularly within Western intellectual tradition, the distinction between theory and action, or knowledge and action, is a general concern that has also been a long-debated issue in the Indic tradition, particularly in discussions concerning the nature of relationship between the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā tradition. As I have mentioned in the second chapter, it is also an issue that concerns the understanding and study of the category ‘ritual’.

**MĪMĀṂSĀ AND THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION POLEMIC**

The nature of the relationship between the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā has been a long-standing contention, particularly amongst a number of Vedānta schools. As Pollock has remarked, the problematic relationship between the two is ‘embodied in the very nomenclature that links them, in the differentiation itself of a “posterior” from a “prior” *darśana*’. On the one hand, there are those who claim that there are no justifications for separating the two forms of enquiry. For instance, Jha claims that ‘as regards the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta*, there has never been any justification for regarding them as two distinct ‘systems of Philosophy’. They have always been and

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8 Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life: On Anthropotechnics, pp. 6-8.
continue to be known as ‘Pūrva’ (Preliminary) Mīmāṃsā and ‘Uttara’ (Final) Mīmāṃsā.\textsuperscript{11} He further states:

We are alive to the fact that later on differences cropped up between the two ‘Mīmāṃsās’; but they always appertained to minor details; on the main issues, there has not arisen any serious controversy. *Vedānta* proper finds its ultimate sanction in the *Vedic texts*; in fact for all practical purposes, the *Vedānta* accepts the tenets of the Mīmāṃsā, hence the statement by the Vedāntin – ‘Vyavahāre Bhajānayati’.\textsuperscript{12}

The interdependence and interrelation of the two Mīmāṃsās is indeed indicated by the fact that one of the main purposes of both the Mīmāṃsās was to defend the *Vaidika* notion of *dharma* from the criticisms of other schools such as the Buddhists. Both systems also firmly presuppose the authority of the Veda and engage a number of similar principles in their exegesis of the Vedic corpuses. However, controversies did arise later, particularly in light of the growing popularity of the notion that the attainment of *jñāna* (right knowledge) is the path to final liberation.\textsuperscript{13} According to Pandurangi, it was Śaṅkarā’s demarcation of areas concerning the two Mīmāṃsās that was particularly significant. According to Śaṅkarā: (a) the object of enquiry for the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and for the Vedānta is completely different in that ‘*dharma*’ and ‘*brahman*’ constitute the primary objects of their enquiries respectively. For Śaṅkarā, ‘these are not even related as main and subordinate’ objects (goals) ‘so as to warrant a consideration of one after the other’ but they are exclusively opposed to one another; (b) the fruits of the two enquiries are different in that *dharma* is meant for fulfilment ‘within the field of avidyā while brahmajñāna is intended to cross over avidyā’; and (c) ‘the nature of *dharma* is such that it has to be performed, while that of *brahman* is to be realized’ through knowledge.\textsuperscript{14} Pandurangi adds that most scholars have often uncritically taken ‘Śaṅkarā’s polemic against certain Mīmāṃsākas as a basis for

\textsuperscript{11} Jha, *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources*, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{14} See the elaboration of these three points by Pandurangi in KT Pandurangi, ‘Śrī Śaṅkara and Purva-mīmāṃsā’, in Dwivedi (ed.), *Studies in Mīmāṃsā*, p. 416.
ignoring the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as a ritualistic precursor to the wisdom and thought of the Uttarā Mīmāṃsā.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, there are scholars who generally assume that the two Mīmāṃsās are radically incommensurable. This assumption is affirmed to a large extent by Western scholars of Vedānta such as Deussen and Hacker who claim that the Vedānta has very little in common with what was often known as the Karma-Mīmāṃsā i.e. the Mīmāṃsā that deals specifically with action.\textsuperscript{16}

In modern scholarship the general term commonly used for Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is Mīmāṃsā as opposed to Vedānta for Uttarā-mīmāṃsā, with the former taken to focus its enquiry exclusively on \textit{karma} and the latter on \textit{jñāna}.\textsuperscript{17} This distinction between \textit{karma} and \textit{jñāna} not only created a polemic between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta but also led to the re-interpretation of \textit{karma}, especially by the nineteenth century Indologists, as an Upaniṣadic ‘doctrine’ which is seen in opposition to the ‘priestly rubbish’ of the \textit{Brāhmaṇas}. Henceforth, even those who treat the subject of action and knowledge as interrelated treat it as geared towards the \textit{telos} of liberation.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Karman and the Upaniṣads}

I have suggested in Chapter Three that early Vedic society revolved around religious insights that came by way of revelation (\textit{śruti}) and presupposed a ritual context. Talbott

\textsuperscript{16} Y Sawai, ‘Ramanuja’s Theory of Karman’, \textit{Journal of Indian Philosophy}, vol. 21, no. 1, 1993, pp. 11-21.
\textsuperscript{17} While the mention of Jaimini and Bādārāyaṇa in both the \textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtras} and the \textit{Vedāntasūtras} allows the possibility that the two works could have been redacted simultaneously, this assumption is an inconclusive one and the Mīmāṃsā is taken to be earlier than the Vedānta only because it is concerned with Vedic sacrifices. One can assume that the Mīmāṃsā as a school developed prior to the Vedānta, as the former is related primarily to the sacrificical ritual that was predominant and the latter is influenced by the growth of a more ‘philosophical’ spirit, which sets itself the task of seeking to comprehend the speculations which were drawn primarily from the \textit{Āranyakas} and \textit{Upaniṣads}. Refer Keith, \textit{The Karma-Mimamsā}, p. 6.
stressed that ‘at the heart of all Vedic literature lies the matter of ritual thought’ and argues that ‘in the early texts everything religious was a matter of acting’. *Karma(n)*, which etymologically translates as ‘to do, to make’, in Vedic texts predominantly denotes a religious sacrifice. *Yajña* was, therefore, considered to be the heart of the Veda and *karman* was taken to be the most distinctively significant feature of Indian thought about action.\(^{19}\) According to Tull, this emphasis upon the sacred act in Vedic religion shows up in the Sanskrit word *karman* which initially denoted ritual activity: ‘At the most basic level, the Vedic tradition employed the term *karman*, from the Sanskrit root *kṛ* (to do), to describe the “doing” of the sacrificial ritual.’\(^{20}\)

However, Tull further notes that with the gradual development and transformation of the Vedic *yajña* from a ‘matter of simple action’ to ‘an entity of astounding complexity’ over the centuries, the ‘doing of the sacrifice’ became slowly disaffiliated from the emerging ‘doctrine’ of *karma* and retribution.\(^{21}\) The notion of *karma* came to be closely related with the idea of rebirth (attainments of the afterlife) and this emerging doctrine continued to be reflected in Indological scholarship to the extent that the twelve essays compiled in the edited book entitled *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* gathered a general consensus that the definition of *karma* was founded upon ‘a theory of rebirth based on the moral quality of previous lives’. The theory of *karma* came to be constituted by three essential constituents which include: (a) ‘causality (ethical or non-ethical, involving one life or several lives)’; (b) ‘ethicization (the belief that good and

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bad acts lead to certain results in one life or several lives’; (c) ‘rebirth’ and liberation. *Yajña* was not even included in the index of the book.\(^22\)

Observing that the textual point of this emergence of *karma* as a ‘doctrine’ specifically concerned with the idea of rebirth is generally taken to be the early *Upaniṣads*, Tull sought to uncover the ‘Vedic origins’\(^23\) of *karma* ‘to see where scholarship made a wrong turn and so obfuscated *karma*’s early history.’\(^24\) Tull attributes the problem of ascertaining *karma* doctrine’s pre-*Upaniṣadic* history particularly to the view held by the nineteenth and early twentieth century Indologists regarding the relationship of the *Upaniṣads* to the preceding *Brāhmaṇic* period, ‘namely that the *Upaniṣads* rejected entirely the viewpoints expressed in the *Brāhmaṇas* and so expressed views unprecedented in ancient Indian thought’.\(^25\) Tull claims that ‘these scholars remained curiously silent about the doctrine’s attachment here to the paradigmatic event of the Vedic ritual’.\(^26\) He argues that this perspective arises from ‘a larger tendency among these scholars to disparage priestcraft’. This Enlightenment-influenced perspective resulted in their categorization of ‘the *Brāhmaṇas*, ritual texts par excellence and the exclusive possession of the Vedic sacerdotalists’, as distinctly separate from ‘the *Upaniṣads*, discursive texts that seek to express the nature of reality’. Consequently, *karma* was seen as a doctrine that was first elaborated in the *Upaniṣads* and addressed ‘issues not germane to the Vedic ritual tradition’.\(^27\)

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23 Tull developed the argument that ‘the earliest statements of *karma* in the *Upaniṣads* look back to structures, patterns, and paradigms already contained in both ideology and practice in Vedic rite’. Tull, *The Vedic Origins of Karma: Cosmos as Man in Ancient Indian Myth and Ritual*, p. 7.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 2.
27 Ibid., p. 3.
According to Tull, there was a marked tendency in these scholars’ interpretations to emphasize that the Upaniṣadic *karma* doctrine was characterized by concerns about ethical behaviours and their consequences. The supposed range of the Upaniṣadic *karma* doctrine’s ethical concern contrasts sharply with the sphere of Brāhmaṇic ethics, which values behaviour in terms of ritual performance. Yet, rather than turn to the *Brāhmaṇas*’ ritual orientation, scholars preferred to interpret this doctrine through imposing upon it a broad notion of ethics. He argues that as a result, ‘scholars often failed to acknowledge or simply ignored that the Upaniṣadic contexts in which the doctrine first appears exhibit themes clearly drawn from the Brāhmaṇas’.  

**Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and Classical Indology**

Müller, in the 1860s, more than a decade before critical editions of a significant number of *Brāhmaṇas* became available to scholars in the West, declared that the ‘general character of these works is marked by shallow and insipid grandiloquence, by priestly conceit, and antiquarian pedantry.’ He goes on to remark that ‘no person who is not acquainted beforehand with the place which the Brāhmaṇas fill in the history of the Indian corpus, could read more than ten pages without being disgusted.’ From the mid-nineteenth century to the first decades of the twentieth century, Indologists repeatedly expressed similar sentiments. In the early history of Vedic studies, even before the range of the Vedic literature had been thoroughly collected and investigated, Schopenhauer expressed that ‘the Upaniṣads were the only portion of the Veda which deserved our study and that all the rest was priestly rubbish (*Priesterwirtschaft*).’

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28 Ibid., p. 13. Tull does maintain that although many of the views expressed by scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding the relationship of Upaniṣadic and Brāhmaṇic thought and the role of *karma* doctrine in that relationship are no longer considered to be authoritative, the work of these scholars represents the foundation of modern Indological studies (and also a large part of the foundation of the modern study of history of religions).


According to Tull, when scholars did turn their attention to the study of the early Vedic texts, they found this preconceived notion of ‘priestly rubbish’ disproved by the tenor of the earliest of these texts, the Ṛgveda. Noting the Ṛgveda as a case of Vedic religion before the rise of Indian sacerdotalism, the history of Hinduism following the Ṛgvedic period was then seen as a period of complete degeneration, until the emergence of the Upaniṣads. According to von Roth and other nineteenth century Indologists, the initial stages of this decline occurred within the Vedic period itself, being clearly visible in the texts that immediately followed the hymns, the Brāhmaṇas. As von Roth noted: ‘[India] has, indeed, carefully treasured up and at all times regarded as sacred, the production of its earliest period [i.e., the Ṛgveda]; but it has attached the main importance to a worthless supplement [i.e., the Brāhmaṇas], and lost from sight and from knowledge the truly valuable portion.’

Although the composition of the Upaniṣads followed immediately that of the Brāhmaṇas, scholars tended to posit a line of development that aligned Upaniṣadic thought with that of the Ṛgveda, a milieu they perceived to be in opposition to the intervening Brāhmaṇic period. This position, according to Tull, is most evident in the view scholars took of the Upaniṣadic doctrine of karma and rebirth, particularly in regard to the doctrine’s problematic origin. The notion that the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine emerged together with the intent of much earlier Ṛgvedic beliefs while it opposed that of the Brāhmaṇas was partly due to what scholars perceived to be a general pattern in the ‘evolution’ of a religious tradition. Referring to such an evolutionary model, Whitney noted that the later introduction of the doctrine ‘is equally in accordance with the general course of religious history; it is a part of the prevailing shift from the basis of nature to that of morality.’ In the case of the karma doctrine, this

pattern of evolution was given impetus by what was perceived to be the degenerate state of the religion of the Brāhmaṇas. This shift to morality found in the Upaniṣadic doctrine was interpreted as being ‘anti-sacrificial’, to oppose the ‘corrupt’ sacerdotalism systematically promoted in the Brāhmaṇas.32

For Tull, this tendency to separate the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads from the Brāhmaṇas, and to place them in opposition, may be attributed to the general view that nineteenth century Indologists held of the role of priestcraft in the decline of a religious tradition.33 The Brāhmaṇas, which were compiled over several centuries, record the growth of the sacrificial ritual and its subsequent dominance in ancient Indian religion. The growth of the sacrifice (in both complexity and stature) during this period naturally coincided with the growth of a specialized sacerdotal class. In the view of many nineteenth century Indologists, the religion of the early Veda became devitalized in the hands of these sacerdotalists.34

Every aspect of the Brahmānic ritual was interpreted in light of this supposed ‘debauchery’. Scholars also asserted that the priests maintained their interest in the sacrifice because it provided them with a pretence to sanctity and thus, an exalted position in society.35 Nineteenth century scholars, with their deprecatory view of sacerdotalism, had little patience for the intricacies of Brāhmaṇic thought. Bloomfield, for example, remarked of the Brāhmaṇas that: ‘Both the performances and their explanations are treated in such a way, and spun out to such lengths, as to render these

34 Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 199.
works on the whole monuments of tediousness and intrinsic stupidity.’

Hence, scholars agreed that these texts did not merit even the most cursory examination.

These same preconceived notions about sacrificial ritual hamper any serious discussions about the Mīmāṃsā contributions to ritual today. Clooney claims that the lack of attention given to the Mīmāṃsā is a consequence of a general back-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras through a Vedāntic lens. He mentions that ‘as a school of philosophy, the attention given to the Mīmāṃsā has often been filtered through Vedānta’s evaluation of ritual action, [and] in particular Śaṅkara’s bifurcation of knowledge and ritual’ and this caricature ‘confuses performance of rituals with the Mīmāṃsā explanation of why rituals are performed’. They are therefore, taken to be a lower ‘work-oriented foil to the higher path of knowledge’. Mülller made the claim that ‘the object of the Upanishads was to show the utter uselessness, nay the mischievousness of all ritual performances; to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its motive a desire or hope or reward.’ Mīmāṃsā darśana is also generally referred to as the Karma-Mīmāṃsā to suggest that it is a purely ritualistic and action oriented darśana that is yet to reach the true path to salvation, that is the path of correct knowledge (jñāna).

While notions of ‘action’ and ‘knowledge’ differ in many ways in the Western and Indian intellectual traditions, the genealogy of the bifurcation between action and knowledge highlighted in the Greek and Indian [Vedic] tradition respectively by both Sloterdijk and Tull point towards a similar concern for the retrieval of a conception of what can best be described as a traditionary practice. They both suggest the existence of

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36 M Bloomfield, Religion of the Veda, GP Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1908, p. 44.
37 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pûrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 25.
39 Verpoorten, Mīmāṃsā Literature, p. 1.
a notion of praxis or karman that not only precedes this bifurcation but more importantly is oriented towards the constitution of a certain kind of subjectivity locatable firmly within a tradition.

This notion of traditionary practice finds itself increasingly sidelined in contemporary discussions of praxis and ritual. Traditionary practices such as [Vedic] sacrifices have generally been dismissed as actions that are purely habitual, imitative and repetitive particularly in the study of ritual and are largely distinguished from moral actions that are taken to be intuitive, intentional and instrumental. I wish to demonstrate that Jaimini’s notion of karma, when explicated in the context of the Vedic event of sacrifice, discloses not only the textuality of Vedic practice but also the ‘answerability’ of the enjoined ritual subject of injunction. To help me demonstrate this notion of ‘answerability’, I will draw insights from Bakhtin’s philosophy of the ‘act’ and his proposal of the notion of the ‘once-occurrent’ ‘unique’ ‘event’ of action and the answerability of the actant. Jaimini’s event of Vedic yajña read through the lens of Bakhtin’s answerability will not only allow me to account for the eventness of sacrifice and the agency of the yajamāna but will also help me develop insights to reimagine ritual as an intentional act that is nonetheless traditionary.

**Bakhtin and the Integrity of the Answerable Act**

Holquist, in his foreword to *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, points out that Bakhtin sets for himself the mammoth task of seeking to describe the undivided wholeness of the performed act in its ‘answerability’ viz. the unitary act. Bakhtin sought to bridge the gap between the theorizing and representations of acts or experience and those acts as they

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were actually performed or immediately experienced. Bakhtin claims that the integrity of the once-occurrent event is realized only in the relationship of understanding that constitutes and ensures the obligation of acting from the position of a particular perspective. For Bakhtin, the truth or the integrity of an act is not accessible outside the act but in the very act itself where the unique self (actor) plays a crucial part. He states: ‘Once-occurrent uniqueness or singularity cannot be thought of, it can only be participatively experienced or lived through…This Being cannot be determined in the categories of non-participant theoretical consciousness - it can be determined only in the categories of actual communion, i.e., of an actually performed act.’ This answerable deed, whereby the answerable unity of thinking and performed act is acquired, is termed by Bakhtin postupok, which etymologically means ‘a step taken’ or ‘the taking of a step’.

Going beyond the existential solipsism and the rejection of the objective world (and theory and thought) by those he termed the ‘so-called life philosophers’, Bakhtin introduced categories such as ‘action-performing thinking’ [posupaiushchee myshlenie] and ‘participative thinking’ [uchastnoe myshlenie] to talk about the participative thinker whose performed act does not detach from its product. In attempting to ‘detranscendentalize Kant’ and to ‘think beyond Kant’s formulation of the ethical imperative’, Bakhtin argues:

The unity of an act and its account, a deed and its meaning, is something that is never a priori, but which must always and everywhere be achieved. The act is a deed, and not a mere happening (as in “one damned thing after another”), only if the subject of such a postupok, from within his

42 Ibid., p. 13.
43 Ibid., p. xix.
44 Ibid., pp. 8, 44-45, 49.
own radical uniqueness, weaves a relation to it in his accounting for it. Responsibility, then, is the ground of moral action.\textsuperscript{46}

While Bakhtin focuses his attention on the unique locations of individuals and their acts, this attention is not meant to lead to the notion that the self is complete or even possible as a construction outside concrete relations with other people. In other words, his responsible self is not the Cartesian \textit{ego cogito}; Bakhtin does not view a world apart from the specific, responsible relationships that constitute it.\textsuperscript{47} As Bender has noted, Bakhtin developed the notion of ‘answerability’ to invoke the ‘necessity of dialogue between two people who come into an event with specific horizons of meaning and who then act to answer others’ actions’\textsuperscript{48}. The act, the unrepeatable deed, as Bakhtin has shown, cannot be abstracted from its concrete materiality and separated from its immediate context or from its author. Nevertheless, it takes shape in a particular historical moment and social environment as a \textit{participant} in the complexly organized chain of events. There is no ideal or abstract act that arises out of nowhere because an act in all its unique singularity is already an \textit{interaction} that is inherently dialogical. The \textit{doing} or \textit{done} of action (the content of action) possesses not only an ‘addressee’ but also a ‘super-addressee’ i.e. it is not without reference.\textsuperscript{49}

Bakhtin’s perspective of the answerability of the act provides fresh insight not only into the gap between the act and its theorizing, but also between the macro-societal world and the finite micro-societal specificity of individual life. It provides a window to see how the subject and the tradition (community) within which he is located are both constituted in the act. This notion of responsible participative thinking and Being-as-

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. xii.
\textsuperscript{49} Bakhtin’s concept of ‘addressivity’ in his discussion of ‘the problem of speech genres’ is particularly important in helping one argue that both utterance and acts have ‘the quality of being addressed to someone’ as their essential constitutive markers. Refer Bakhtin, \textit{Speech Genres & Other Late Essays}, pp. 95-97.
event allows me to account for the agency and the answerability of ritual acts, which hitherto have been reduced to non-intentional formalized behaviour.

In light of these discussions concerning the understanding of ‘action’, I wish to stress the importance of re-investigating Jaimini’s concern for the intelligibility of sacrifice and highlight the vitality of his unique ritualistic conception of dharma as the mechanism through which the Vedic tradition is both defended and carried forward. Jaimini’s conception of dharma in light of subjectivity, tradition and ritual, presents a move beyond the knowledge-action dichotomy and introduces an understanding of karma that discloses the agency of the ritual subject upon whom the responsibility of fulfilling the entire event of sacrifice is accorded.

**The Textuality of Practice: Yajña, Codanā and Enjoinment**

In dealing with the question of what distinguishes and constitutes the ‘sacredness’ of a given text, Flood maintains that sacred texts (scriptures) are distinct from other texts in that they possess the quality of ‘semantic density’, that is, ‘the propensity to be read and re-read repeatedly without semantic exhaustion’, which is combined with a ‘liturgical reception’ by a practising community. Flood’s definition of the sacredness of a text as the coming together of ‘semantic density’ and ‘liturgical reception’ is significant in its suggestion that ‘sacredness’ is not something that is given or ascribed beforehand but it is something that has to be received and actualized through enactment by a community of practitioners (believers).

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50 Flood notes that the term is first coined by Nelson Goodman in relation to aesthetics but is now more generally used in theology. See Flood, *The Importance of Religion: Meaning and Action in our Strange World*, p. 106.

The relationship between text and tradition can be further understood through the mechanism of what Ricoeur calls the ‘chain of interpretations’. Ricoeur claims that we, as historical beings, are in our situated ‘present’ always ‘in the situation of being heirs’ and not ‘in a position of being absolute innovators’. According to him, we are introduced to the past through the ‘texts’ (both oral and written) that have been passed down through generations. Ricoeur argues that if discourse is always addressed ‘to someone about something’, then it is only in the act of ‘reading’ that the text as ‘an archive available for individual and collective memory’ becomes a discourse involved in the act of interpretation. Therefore, the nature of the text is such that it not only possesses a ‘world’ of its own that is available to any reader or interpretant but also has the potentiality and openness to re-enter living discourse and the world of action through the act of reading and appropriation by an interpretant (reader). The fusion of the world of action and the act of reading is acquired through the mechanism of ‘appropriation’ and ‘revelation’. Ricoeur suggests that it is this ‘link between appropriation and revelation’ that is the ‘cornerstone’ of hermeneutics.

In discussing the rationality of Mīmāṁsā’s internal-reasoning, I have pointed out that the Veda is characterized by both self-sufficiency (independence) and infallibility in a way that presupposes enactment. In elaborating these characteristics, I have only stopped short of elaborating how the ‘revelation-appropriation’ mechanism is made effective, particularly for the goal of fulfilling the practice of sacrifice and ensuring the realization of dharma. Therefore, it is here that I seek to address the question - What is the core constituent feature of the Veda that ensures its pragmatic efficacy, particularly in matters concerning ritual and dharma?

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52 Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3, p. 221.  
54 Ibid., pp. 182-183, 191.
CODANĀ, THE UNIFYING PRINCIPLE OF THE VEDA

One of the main challenges following Jaimini’s claim that śabda is originary and authorless is the question of the nature of Vedic injunctions, particularly its efficacy in relation to the realization of dharma. The Mīmāṃsā has suffered contemptuous attacks and has been ‘condemned for being a sterile, or mechanistic, or dogmatic, or fundamentalistic ritualism’ precisely because of the correlation of the authority of the Veda with injunctions.55 Jaimini’s identification of his enquiry into dharma with injunctions made explicitly in sūtra 1.1.2 is often taken as ‘advocating the demand for unconditional observance of inexplicable commands.’56 While the nature of ‘injunction’ and ‘obligation’ might seem to convey a mechanistic and rule-governed habitual performance with little room for expression and agency, Jaimini’s work suggests an understanding of injunction that is not only desired by the subject but also willingly and responsibly appropriated, internalized and enacted.

In sūtra 1.1.24 Jaimini was confronted with the question of the relationship between word and act and its possible discrepancy in relation to its purpose. The interrogation was concerning the efficacy of injunctions in bringing about the primary purpose of the word, the invisible dharma.57 In seeking to address this discrepancy, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, Jaimini sought to first establish the Veda as an authorless living dialogue whose sacredness can only be conferred in relationships and actualized in enactment. It is only within this re-conceptualization of the Veda, from a purely historical corpus that is read (heard) to a living text that is liturgically received and

56 Ibid.
57 MS 1.1.24: Utpattau vā vacanāḥ syur arthasyāt annimittavāt
Even though they [the word, its meaning, and the relationship between the two] are eternal, they do not express the subject-matter (dharma) because they are not efficient for that purpose.
enacted, that the injunctive character of the Veda can be more comprehensively understood.

In light of the absence of authorship, the questions concerning the authority of injunctions, from whence they arose, to whom they are addressed and how they can be received are difficult queries. It is here that the dynamic process through which Jaimini sought to account for these questions and his insistence on reducing the entire Veda to a single unifying principle is illuminating. For Jaimini, the manner of his establishing the nature and authority of the Veda enables him to argue that the words of the Veda are fundamentally pragmatic in their orientation and, therefore, the essential character of the Veda is not denotation or description but injunction. In sūtra 1.4.1, Jaimini states: ‘It has already been explained that the Veda is primarily oriented towards the performance of sacrifices, and hence the whole of it should be accepted as serving that purpose.’

Jaimini’s argument suggests that the Veda informs one not what there is, but what needs to be done; it is concerned primarily with ‘prescriptions’ and not ‘descriptions’. Keith argues that the Veda lays down ‘injunctions for the performance of actions’, from which arise ‘an invisible potency’ that enables the arrangement and realization of the ‘desirable end’. This potency arises only in the context of actions that are enjoined i.e actions that prompt the subject and call forth responsibility. In other words, the Veda communicates only in terms of injunctions because its primary sense is realized only through enactment.

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58 MS 1.4.1: Uktam sāmānāyaidamarthya tasmāt sarvaṁ tadartham syāt
59 As Elisa Freschi has remarked in her footnote, which is reproduced here, the distinction between ‘prescription’ and ‘description’ is a crucial one. ‘Both schools of Mīmāṃsā agree that the Veda is an instrument of knowledge insofar as it conveys something sādhya “to be realized” and not something siddha “already established.” In this terminology, the choice of gerundive (sādhya) is revealing. The point is not that the Veda conveys something not yet established, as would have been expressed by a future particle, but, rather, something that could be done or should be done. In other words, the Veda is not a fortune teller. It does not tell one day what will happen tomorrow (or in any other moment of the future).’ See E Freschi, ‘Freedom Because of Duty: The Problem of Agency in Mīmāṃsā’, in MR Dasti & EF Bryant (ed.), Free Will, Agency and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p. 139, fn 3.
60 Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, pp. 36-37.
To enable him to substantiate this claim, Jaimini had to rearrange the Veda in such a way as to gear everything towards purposeful action and this necessitated the re-classification of the contents that make up the Veda. Following the first pāda of the first adhyāya (which is an elaboration of his introduction of the theme of dharma), Jaimini’s discussion is guided by his task to lay down principles and guidelines with which people can perform and bring sacrifices enjoined by the Veda to fulfilment. While the classification of the corpus collected as the Veda is an enormous and complicated one, in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras they are divided more simply into five categories, namely, Brāhmaṇas, Mantras, Namādheya, Niṣedha and Arthavāda. Jaimini considers injunctions (prescriptions) to be the core of the Brāhmaṇas and places all the other categories as subsidiary to injunctions whose authority is derived from their being a eulogy for specific injunctions:

1.2.7: These statements form single statements with injunctions, and [encourage the performance of what is enjoined and] is authoritative as eulogising the particular injunctions.
2.1.32: The name mantra applies to those of which the purpose is denotation.
2.1.33: The name brāhmaṇa is applied to the rest.
2.1.34: The character of mantras does not belong to that which is actually mentioned in the Veda, as it is only with reference to the sentences actually mentioned in the Veda that we have the above distinction.61

The Brāhmaṇas, which contain both positive and negative injunctions, are taken as the essential portions of the Veda, and the other passages that do not constitute either of these two injunctions, are classified as explanatory matter, arthāvada,62 and name,

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61 MS 1.2.7: Vidhīnā tv evakāvyatvāḥ stutī arthena vidhīnā syah
MS 2.1.32: Taccodakeṣu mantrākhyā
MS 2.1.33: Śeṣe brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ
MS 2.1.34: Anāṃmāteṣvamantratvamāmānāteṣu hi vibhāgah syāt
62 MS 1.2.23: Vidhiścāṅkarathakah kvacī tasmātstutih pratīyet tatsāmānāśitaśreṣu tathātvam
In some cases, such injunctions would be useless [without any purpose]; hence they must be taken as expressing praise [eulogy]; and the same may be said with regard to all other passages similar to these.
MS 1.2.27: Statīstu sabdāpūrīvatvā dīcodaṇā ca tasya
It is [a] praise; because it presupposes [is preceded by] injunction [verbal authority]; it is not authoritative in itself.
MS 1.2.28: Arthe stutirānyaḥtyai cet
Any praise which is useless is not allowed.
MS 1.2.29: Arthastu vidhiśeṣatvāt yathā loke
But there is use for it; in as much as it forms part of the injunction, as in the ordinary world.
Arthavāda statements are taken to be participating in the larger purpose by supporting injunctive statements, and even the mantras, although they are not injunctive statements, are likewise defended as supporting statements. These mantras are further categorized under various divisions such as Rc, Sāman and Yajus, according to which they are sung and recited or uttered usually in a low tone. According to Keith: ‘Mantras do not lay down injunctions but they serve to denote something of value in connection with injunctions, especially the deity to whom offering is to be made.’ Mantras are usually composed of prayers to deities but also contain suggestions as to the performance of sacrifices. Jaimini also devoted a section of his Śūtras to the consideration of the authoritative character of the ‘smṛti’. He takes the position that the smṛtis can be regarded as authoritative whenever they do not directly contradict the Veda, and only in so far as they are based upon and derive their authority from the Veda. Between sūtras 1.3.1-7 Jaimini argues the following:

Even though dharma (i.e. correct sacrificial performance) is based on scripture, practices without scriptural basis can still be known to be authoritative inferentially, because performed by the mantras -dayam syät yaduptatavapūrvamavidhāyakatvāt
That [word] must be a name; it is new in origin because it cannot lay down [the material] i.e. [it is not injunctive]. See Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, pp. 79-80.

MS 2.1.30: Vidhiṇamtrayor aikārthiṣyam aikāśabdāyāt
The vidhi and the mantra serve the same purpose, in as much as they contain the same words.

MS 2.1.31: Api vā prayogāsāmarthṛtyāt mantra bhiḥdhānavaçcī syāt
But because of the force of application [power of usage], the mantra conveys denotation [meaning].

MS 2.1.32: Taccodakesu mantrābhīṣya
The name mantra applies to those of which the purpose is denotation.

MS 5.1.16: Mantratastu virodhe syāt prayogarūpasāmarthṛtyāt tasmāduttatīdeśāh saḥ
When there is conflict, the order of the mantra-text should be followed because the capacity to be used as it stands is inherent in the mantra; the brāhmaṇa-text is taken as the originaive injunction [of acts].

MS 2.1.35: Teśāṃrg yatrārthaḥavāṣena pādavyavasthā
[Among the mantras,] the name rg is given to those wherein there is a metrical arrangement (division) by sense.

MS 2.1.36: Gūtiṣu sāṃbhīṣya
The name sāṃ is given to songs.

MS 2.1.37: Śeṣe yajuhśabdhah
To the rest, the name yajuḥ is given.

Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, p. 81.

While Śābara’s Bhāṣya does not state explicitly what works are included under the name ‘smṛti’, Kumārila places under the category the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, and the Manusmṛti only. See Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Tantravārttika: A Commentary on Śābara’s Bhāṣya on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śūtras of Jaimini, 2 vols., trans. G Jha, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1924, p. 244.
same people who perform the scripturally authorized actions. However, this inference is valid only when there is no contradiction with what is scriptural, and no ulterior motive involved.68

The privileging of the Brāhmaṇas and the intent of the re-classification of the Veda around injunctions point towards Jaimini’s concern for the actualization of the authority (sacredness) of the Veda, particularly through the performance of what is to be done (kārya). Thibaut, in his introduction to the translations of the Arthasaṁgraha, argues that Jaimini is keen to show that every part of the sacrifice, every word and gesture, are of use and that they can each contribute their share towards the proper accomplishment of the sacrifice. He claims that Jaimini is devising a comprehensive framework within which he is able to describe action as the foundation of meaning and order and is seeking to reflect a harmonizing view of the Veda that is centred primarily on the sacrificial action.69

**Characteristics of Codanā**

The first introduction to the notion of codanā is found in the introductory pāda in sūtra 1.1.2 where Jaimini defines ‘dharma’ as ‘that artha whose characteristic feature is that of a codanā.’70 In the discussions in the previous chapter, I have suggested that the Veda, as the only valid means of knowing and accessing the invisible, is oriented towards purposive action. In light of the definition above, one can see that the realization of dharma through purposive action is not only intrinsically connected to codanā but more importantly, an understanding of codanā serves as a gateway to

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68 MS 1.3.1: Dharmasya śabdānapi tvat āśābhdayānapekṣyaṁ syāt
MS 1.3.2: Api vā kartṛśaṁyāt pramāṇaṁyānīṁ syāt
MS 1.3.3: Virodhe tvaṁapekṣyaṁ syāt asati hyamanāṁ
MS 1.3.4: Hetudārśanācca
MS 1.3.5: Śiśtyākope viruddhamitī cet
MS 1.3.6: Na śastraparimāṇavatāt
MS 1.3.7: Api vā karaṇāgrahaṇe prayuktānuprāṇeran

The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 66.


70 MS 1.1.2: Codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmāṁ

Dharma is that ‘artha’ whose characteristic feature is that of a ‘codanā’.
understanding the nature of dharma. What then is codanā according to Jaimini and how is it related to ‘act’ and ‘purpose’ (fulfilment of the event of sacrifice)?

Jaimini, responding to the question posed in sūtra 2.1.2 regarding the relation between bhāvanā (that which comes into being) and words,71 proceeded by introducing a three-fold distinction of words between sūtras 2.1.3-5. This three-fold distinction include: (a) nouns - such words, on the utterance whereof the forms of the objects denoted are directly cognised, and as such do not stand in need of anything else, on account of their being self-sufficient in regard to their denotation, (b) verbs - such words, on whose utterances the objects denoted are yet to exist, and by means of which what has not existed is cognized, and (c) codanā - that which brings into existence something which did not exist - something new, something not known before.72 This distinction of words shows that for Jaimini, while the noun as a self-sufficient word is related to the denotation of objects that are directly cognisable, the verbs which cognize objects which are not yet in existence are not self-sufficient in that they have to be taken together with codanā to ensure that the invisible objects are brought into existence. In that sense, every verb, as indicative of bhāvanā,73 is necessarily related to codanā. Codanā is what allows the meanings or purposes (objects) of verbs to be actualized. Therefore, in the first instance, codanā can be taken as the force or potency that impels and prompts one towards a certain course of action and causes something that is previously invisible, to be.

71 MS 2.1.1: Bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdāḥ tebyah kriyā praśyetaisahyartho vidhiyate
‘Words expressive of action are creative of something new and from them in particular [and not from all the words of the sentence] we understand the activity to be performed.’ This translation is borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pārva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 69.
MS 2.1.2: Sarvesām bhāvo ’rtha iti cet
But bhāva forms the meaning of all words?
72 MS 2.1.3: Yeśāmutpattau sve prayoge rūpopaladbhistāni nāmāni tasmāt tebyah parākānksā bhūtatvāt sve prayoge
MS 2.1.4: Yeśām tātpattāvarthe sve prayogo na vidyate tānyākhyātāni tasmāt tebyah praśyey akṣaravitvāt prayogasya
MS 2.1.5: Codanā punarārmbhāh
73 MS 2.1.1: Bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdāḥ tebyah kriyā praśyetaisahyartho vidhiyate
However, *codanā* is not only a force that just prompts a certain course of action but also prompts the action in a certain way. The notion of *codanā* as the laying down of something that is not known before, as opposed to the description of what already exists, is also very closely related to another term that Jaimini uses in a similar way - *vidhi*. In *sūtra* 1.2.7 and 1.2.19 for instance, *vidhi* designates an injunctive passage that lays down something not existing before, *apūrva*:

1.2.7: But they are taken along with the injunctive passages; and as such could be authoritative as eulogising the particular injunctions.
1.2.19: It would be an injunction, as laying down something not known before, because a mere description would be useless. 74

What then, is the relationship between *vidhi* and *codanā*? Taking *sūtra* 7.1.7 along with *sūtra* 7.4.10 where the words *vidhi* and *codanā* are used in the same sentences together,75 Clooney argues that there is an ‘enjoined arrangement found in any ritual setting’ which tells us about the ‘concrete organization’ of a particular enactment (rite), within which the content of enjoinment may change from action to action.76 This content of what is enjoined in a certain arrangement for a particular enactment is what Clooney categorizes in the *Sūtras as vidhi*. Clooney claims that while ‘the *codanā* is the injunctive force’ which ‘impinges on the hearer and makes him begin action’, ‘the *vidhi* is the particular content of any injunction’.77 A detailed look at the first *adhyāya* where one is first introduced to the concept of *vidhi* will also suggest that, as Clooney has remarked, *vidhi* is an injunction related to the organization and enjoinment of every accessory and specification that makes up a particular sacrifice. Therefore, in the second instance, *codanā* can also be taken as the content of enjoinment (*vidhi*) balancing and

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74 MS 1.2.7: Vidyhinā tv evakāvyatvā stuty arthena vidhihinā syuh
MS 1.2.19: Vidhirvās yād aipūrvvatvād vādāmātrānā hy anarthakaṁ
75 MS 7.1.7: Utpattau vidhyabhāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvaṁ codaṇāyāṁ pravṛttiḥ syāt tataśca karmabhedah syāt
MS 7.4.10: Vidhyanto vā prakṛtivaccodaṇāyāṁ pravarteta tathā hi līṅgadārsanaṁ
76 Clooney, *Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā of Jaimini*, p. 137.
77 Ibid., p. 138.
organizing the structures of the sacrificial event and ensures the correct enactment of specified injunctions.

Both codanā and vidhi are also intrinsically related to the laying down of something not already known or the coming into being of something that has not existed prior - an apūrva. For Jaimini, an utterance or a sentence can be taken as an injunction only by virtue of it denoting an apūrva, when it brings about something that has not existed before:

3.4.3: It should be taken as an injunction, as it lays down something not already known.
3.5.21: The texts are direct injunctions, as they speak of what is not already known; hence the ‘eating’ would be in accordance with direct injunctions.
6.5.5: There is injunction, as it is something new. 78

The notion of apūrva as something new, something independent or original, is also extended to a range of other accessories used in a sacrifice for the first time in a novel way, as well as to certain types of sacrifices. In sūtra 8.1.5 and 9.3.20 for example, apūrva is taken in the sense of an independent sacrifice, such as the soma sacrifice, because it does not require ‘extended application’ or ‘transference’. 79 Therefore, by way of an extension, what is newly introduced can be spoken of as apūrva, be it names (MS 1.4.2), actions (MS 5.1.29) or substitutes (MS 9.2.43):

1.4.2: That [word] must be a name, which at first appears new; because it cannot lay down [the material].
5.1.29: Similarly, [also] that which has no antecedent [should not be anticipated].
9.2.43: The name also would apply to the substitute by reason of the coming in of the details, especially as they are something new. 80

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78 MS 3.4.3: Vidhis tv apūrvatvāḥ syāt
MS 3.5.21: Vacanāni tv apūrvatvāḥ tasmād yathopadeśaṁ syuḥ
MS 6.5.5: Apūrvatvādvidhānaṁ syāt
79 MS 8.1.5: Kṛṣṇavidhānādavā pūrvatvaṁ
The Soma-sacrifice should be regarded as an independent sacrifice, because it has its entire procedure laid down.
MS 9.3.20: Apūrve tavākāra'pradeśāt pratīyeta
At a sacrifice which has no precedent, there should be no modification, as in this case no transference is possible.
80 MS 1.4.2: Api vā nāmadheyain syāt yadutpattāv apūrvam avidhāyakatvāt
MS 5.1.29: Tathā pūrvaṁ
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For Jaimini, *apūrva* can also refer to a sense of time in that it is something new, and is used to describe that which occurs due to the instigation of the Vedic text. Therefore, in the third instance, *codanā* can also be taken as the realization (bringing forth) of fulfilment that introduces something new; the force that enables something to be complete in itself in a new way.

The three senses in which *codanā* can be summarized includes: (a) a force that prompts one towards a certain course of action towards something new, (b) a content that balances and organizes the structures of a particular sacrificial event, and (c) a force that ensures the realization of something new or the realization of completeness. It is the combination of these three senses that in turn identifies, prompts and obligates the desiring subject towards purposeful action and gives rise to the processes of the enjoinment of the subject. Therefore, *codanā* is the mechanism through which the Veda, as obligation, is appropriated by the responsible subject who is already initiated into the tradition. It is the coming together of the desiring subject and *codanā* that engenders the enjoinment of the subject.

With regard to the question concerning the subject of injunctions as it relates to sacrificial enactment, Jaimini discusses this in terms of *adhikāra*. *Adhikāra*, while generally understood as the criteria or conditions that identify the eligibility of the sacrificial actant, can also be discussed in light of the responsibility it entails towards fulfilment.

MS 9.2.43: Ākhyā caivaṁ tadāvesād viṃḥtau syād pūrvavāt
The Enjoined Adhikārin: Desire and Obligation

In the fourth chapter, I elaborated the complicated internal rationality and textuality of the Vedic tradition as a tradition that ultimately relies on the responsible subject to understand the nature of the obligation to act and to ensure the enactment of the injunctions of the Veda. Dwivedi notes that the ‘truth value’ and ‘authority’ of the Veda in Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras are not in the propositional knowledge they appear to convey but in the pragmatic coherence they produce by orienting a practitioner of Vedic sacrifice towards efficacious practice. The dependence of meaning on enactment makes it impossible for the meaning of the Veda to be understood from its words alone and that is why the enjoinement of the ritual subject is a necessary constitutive factor in Jaimini’s revelation-appropriation governed sacrifice.81

Once the centrality of the codanā, understood as the unifying principle of the Veda, is established, Jaimini goes on to discuss its necessary complements, primary amongst which is the prompted person. Within the Mīmāṃsā framework, as I have highlighted in Chapter Three, a subject becomes a sacrificial agent primarily based on the desire to commit to the practice of sacrifice. Therefore, desire and obligation, taken respectively as the sense of being called and the sense of submission to the narrative of the tradition, are not opposed to each other but intertwined in their telos of seeking to fulfil the enactment of sacrifice and realizing dharma.

In the beginning of the sixth adhyāya between sūtras 6.1.1-5, the discussion highlights that the injunctive sentences denote something to be done (kārya). By virtue of being related to the kārya denoted by the sentence, the agent as the desirous one who is in a position to responsibly appropriate the obligation and carry it out until its fulfilment is

taken to be denoted by the same injunctive sentence. The kārya, by its very nature is something that has to be brought about by a kṛti (an exertion or effort). This effort in the Mīmāṃsā sacrificial world is taken to be none other than the effort that comes from the sacrificial agent. I have mentioned previously that no such effort is possible independently of a desire to act.\textsuperscript{82} For example, whenever the Veda states that ‘the one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full-and-New-Moon Sacrifices’, the sentence is taken to imply that everyone who desires the fruit of heaven is directly addressed by the injunction. Therefore, it results in the identification of oneself as the one who is enjoined by the injunction and is entitled to carry out the enactment of the sacrifice. In the Mīmāṃsā context the word adhikārin, which is usually translated as ‘eligible’ subject, designates not only the eligibility to perform a ritual, but as Freschi has elaborated, also the understanding that the eligible person is bound to perform it.\textsuperscript{83} According to David, the concept of adhikārin, which he translates as the ‘person in charge [of a certain act]’, is the primary concept adopted by scholars to identify the ‘subjective response’ to an injunctive statement. He mentions that the ‘status of being an adhikārin has three correlates’ which are: (a) ‘knowledge (vidyā)’ – understanding of the Vedic text and its meaning, (b) ‘the possession of fires (agnimattva) having undergone proper installation rites’ and, (c) ‘the capacity (sāmarthya) to perform the rite along with its auxiliaries’. He argues that the central issue in the understanding of injunctions is ‘to determine the relation between a certain prescription and the listener’s “qualification” (adhikāra) to perform the corresponding act’.\textsuperscript{84} Eligibility entails both obligation and responsibility; the Veda presupposes and requires a doer for its authority

\textsuperscript{82} This kārya has been called apūrva by the Bhāṣya by reason of its being something new to all other means of knowledge, apart from the injunctive sentence; but the name given to it by Prabhākara is niyoga or prompting, because it acts as an incentive to the prompted person and makes him initiate an exertion for the goal of accomplishing the action. This kārya or niyoga is expressed neither by the verbal root, nor by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence, but it is denoted by the sentence as a whole. See Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, pp. 161-166.

\textsuperscript{83} E Freschi, Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā, Brill, Leiden, 2012, p. 118.

to be realized and being a doer means understanding and identifying oneself as being prompted and called to responsibly carry out the act.

For Jaimini, there is always an underlying human motive for action even when an injunction ultimately is taken as the main reason for doing something. As I have already discussed in the third chapter, the question of the *entitlement* of a person to the performance of sacrifice is taken together with the question of the *ability* of the person to perform the sacrifice consistently until its fulfilment. This responsibility includes not only the material and physical ability to perform the details of the sacrifice but also the ability to understand and ensure the completion of the process. Therefore, the concern for Jaimini is primarily the *fulfilment* of the act of sacrifice in accordance with the injunctions from the Veda.\(^\text{85}\) However, what is it about injunctions that make them prescriptive? What ensures prompting, response and enjoinder?

David points out the Māṁśā position that *vidhi* is best understood as the ‘content’ of an injunction or a ‘certain knowledge-event (*jñāna*)’ i.e. ‘something that can be cognized’. He draws insights from the treatise on the *Vidhiviveka* by Maṇḍana Miśra (c. 660-700 CE), which demonstrates that ‘the most common description of an action found in Māṁśā texts’, can be illustrated as comprising three stages: ‘*vidhi* (cause of an activity)’ \(\rightarrow\) ‘*pravṛtti* (activity/effort)’ \(\rightarrow\) ‘*karman* (movement (physical))’.\(^\text{86}\) In this schematization, ‘free will’ or ‘intention’ is generally presupposed to play no role in the process that leads from *vidhi* to *pravṛtti*. However, the role of desire in the appropriation of injunctions as a responsibility that must be embodied, suggests that there is space to trace the agency of the ritual subject both at the level of reflection (deliberation) on the injunction and also at the level of activity/effort (appropriation) and eventual movement.

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\(^{85}\) MS 6.1.5: *Karturvā śratisaṁyogād vidhīḥ kāṭsṛnyena gāmyate* 
In reality, the injunction of an act should be taken to apply to only such an agent as may be able to carry out the entire details of the sacrifice; because such is the sense given in the Vedic texts.

(enactment). It is specifically in this relationship between injunction and desire that Maṇḍana Miśra has offered some of his most important insights concerning the nature of *vidhi* and action. In *Vidhiviveka* 2 he states:

If speech was independent [as a cause of human activity], the activity would take place with necessity (*niyogataḥ*); thus there would be no point in saying [as Manu does] that “When a man fails to carry out prescribed acts [(…) he is subject to a penance]”, for then, even desire (*icchā*) would not be central to man (*purusasya tantram*), [who would behave] as if [he was] pushed by a strong wind or by the flow of water.\(^{87}\)

As David has pointed out, Maṇḍana’s ‘anthropological (rather than purely linguistic) reflection on the omnipresence of desire’, is in accordance with the ‘absolute priority conferred on desire in human psychology: if external rules of *dharma* should have any authority over human beings, this can only be because they teach (*upa-vātiš*) the means (*sādhana/upāya/abhyupāya*) to obtaining something desired (*iṣṭa*).’\(^{88}\) Maṇḍana, in seeking to point out the close relationship between the presence of desire and the means of pursuing an end, claims that even such practices performed by the ascetics are not the cessation or rejection of desires but are the dedicated concentration of all their activities (*pravṛtti*) as a means towards a desired goal or end. Therefore, the previous illustration or schematization can be revised as thus: Desire → *vidhi* (cause of an activity) → *pravṛtti* (activity/effort) → *karman* (movement) → fruit. Therefore, it is the vital presence of desire that prompts the ritual subject to appropriate the obligation of an injunction and integrate the enjoined acts to his embodiment and enactment.\(^{89}\) Maṇḍana sums up this viewpoint in his *Vidhiviveka* 28:

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\(^{88}\) David, *Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism (600-1000): Activity, Speech and Desire*, pp. 585-586.

\(^{89}\) Ibid., p. 586.
For a human being, there is no other incitement towards action (*kriyā*) than [there] being a means for realizing what he desires (*iṣṭābhyaṕāya*), and what [people] call ‘impelling’ (*pravartana*) is [nothing but this same] property [of an action], which is the cause of [their] activity.\(^90\)

It is through this appropriation of injunctions that the subject becomes fully enjoined, becoming the *niyojya* (to borrow Prabhakāra’s terminology) who is tasked not only with the performance of the sacrifice but also embodying the rationality of the Vedic tradition. In taking the practice of sacrifice as the enactment of the living dialogue that is the Veda, Jaimini is positing the claim that action, particularly ritual action, is textually infused and mediated. The meaning of the Veda is completely intertwined with the meaning of the action. The sacred text is mapped onto the body and the text and the act are fused together to become a carrier of tradition - the body thus becoming the locus through which the living dialogue and revelation is affirmed and appropriated. In Jaimini’s discussion, the Veda is not presented as a sacred text that provides historical, cosmological, psychological or moral percepts. It is not a text that tells the practitioner something is the case or offers a description about something but obliges him/her to act in a certain way to make something the case.\(^91\) It is this acting in a certain way that transforms the subject into a ritual subjectivity. Sacred texts therefore, need to be understood as primarily dependent on enactment and their reception as a bodily act that shares in the gestures, postures, and expressions within a community. Following Flood, one might say that the voice of the sacred text, the community’s revelation, is received by a community of reception and brought to life in the ritual act. The reception of the sacred text is not restricted to reading but entails an appropriation that brings forth activity.\(^92\)

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Discussing the theme of ‘agency’, ‘action’ and ‘selfhood’, Dasti and Bryant point out that classical Indian philosophers have largely perceived and argued that ‘a person’s karmic inheritance’ determines the ‘range of options’ one has in the present life and articulate ‘the role of the human effort in light of both the causal weight of the past and the complicated sense of current relationships that impinge upon individual agency’.¹³ They argue that despite varied differences in their philosophical outlook, ‘Buddhism, Jainism, and the Upaniṣadic tradition’ agree that ‘one’s decisions and actions’ can cause a cycle that continues after death and into the next lifetime and have ‘consequences that unfold over the course of multiple embodiments’.¹⁴

The Nyāya philosophers argue that the ‘enduring individual self must be the locus of agency and moral responsibility’, and correspondingly disagree with the Buddhist theory of the ‘no-self’ by arguing that the absence of an enduring self makes it impossible to explain moral responsibility over time. The Mādhyamaka Buddhists argue that ‘moral responsibility is not to be found in an enduring self, but in the network of relationships, states and interconnections that constitute our rich identities’.¹⁵ Other traditions that pursue contemplative practice such as the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta and Kashmir Śaivism appeal to both meditational and philosophical analysis. They seek to ‘deconstruct the empirical ego into various components and tie such components to more fundamental metaphysical realities and causal processes’.¹⁶

Dasti and Bryant claim that for each of these schools, the notion of agency, by which they mean ‘the notion that we are in control, that we are beings who act’, is a mistake

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¹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁵ Ibid., p. 6.
¹⁶ Ibid.
that can be attributed to ‘cognitive and affective disorders collectively called avidyā, existential ignorance’, which thereby, also constitutes ‘a fundamental part of spiritual ignorance’. Though the distinctiveness of each of these positions is developed in different ways, ‘the ultimate and final goal of life’, which is freeing oneself from the cycle of re-birth and re-death and from ‘the pain of ordinary embodied existence’, in most of these traditions is more commonly taken as ‘liberation’. In light of these deconstructive notions of the self, how does one move forward in an attempt to introduce the notion of agency and responsibility within traditions such as the Mīmāṃśā?

Although there is no reference to the ideas of rebirth and liberation in the work of Jaimini in his Sūtras, he is nonetheless concerned with the question of karman and its effects because of its close links to ritual practice, and the question of the motive and purpose of sacrifice - why deeds are performed and how they bring about the fruits of those labours - is one that persistently confronted him in his discussions. As Halbfass observes:

[The Mīmāṃśā] disregards or rejects ideas or doctrines which have become basic premises for the other systems. Final liberation (mokṣa), commonly accepted as a leading theme or even as the basic concern of philosophical thought, does not play any role in the older literature of the system; Mīmāṃśā deals with dharma, not with mokṣa. Familiar ideas like the cyclical destruction of the world (mahāpralaya), ‘yogic perception’ (yogipratyakṣa), the ‘Lord’ (īśvara), and so forth, remain excluded even in its later literature…the Mīmāṃśā carries the heritage of the ‘pre-karmic’ past of the Indian tradition into an epoch for which karma and samsāra have become basic premises.

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., p. 7.
99 Indeed, Śabara’s commentator Prabhākara still has no place for the idea of liberation in the seventh century CE, although his other commentator Kumārila opens up to the idea at around the same time.
Out of all the classical traditions, the Mīmāṃsā school is the most devoted to the preservation of ancient Vedic ritual culture. Its concern with agency stems from concerns with ritual motivations, obligations and its outcome.\textsuperscript{101}

\textbf{The Event of Yajña: Prayoga and Integration}

Starting from the position that there can be no action where there is no useful purpose served,\textsuperscript{102} Jaimini, as in the case of the re-organization of the Veda around the centrality of \textit{codanā} that I have elaborated in the previous section, assembles the number of sacrificial accessories and arranges and allocates them for their purposeful actualization (\textit{kriyā}) to ensure the fulfilment of what is at the centre of the Vedic tradition - the sacrifice that realizes \textit{dharma}. Jaimini is committed to show that every part of the sacrifice, every word, gesture and accessories are of visible use and that they contribute their respective parts towards the fulfilment of the primary sacrifice.\textsuperscript{103}

In the discussion in \textit{sūtras} 9.1.1-10, Jaimini mentions that the event of sacrifice is organized around its central sacrificial action. Every detail related to the sacrifice is rendered purposeful to the extent that it contributes to the fulfilment of the central action of sacrifice. He poses the \textit{siddhānta} position in \textit{sūtras} 9.1.1-3 that the sacrificial action (\textit{yajñakarma}) serves as the motivation (\textit{prayojana}) for each of the sacrifices: ‘The sacrificial action itself, created through the injunction, is primary in relation to all else; preparatory actions and the material prepared are motivated by that primary purpose.’\textsuperscript{104}

\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{101} MR Dasti, ‘Introduction’, in Dasti & Bryant (ed.), \textit{Free Will, Agency and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy}, pp. 6-7.
\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{102} MS 3.1.9: \textit{Arthalopādakarma syāt}
\hspace{1cm} Where there is no useful purpose [to be served], there should be no action.
\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{103} Bhāskara, \textit{The Arthasaśāstra}: An Elementary Treatise on Mīmāṃsā, p. xi.
\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{104} MS 9.1.1: \textit{Yajñakarma pradhānaṁ taddhi codanābhūtaṁ tasya dravyeṣu saṁskārastatprayuktastadarthatvāt}
\hspace{1cm} MS 9.1.2: \textit{Saṁskāre yuyamānānāṁ ādārthyaśamprayuktāṁ syāt}
\hspace{1cm} MS 9.1.3: \textit{Tena tvarthena yajñasya saṁyogād dharmasambandhastasmādyajnaprayuktāṁ syāt saṁkārasya tadarthatvāt}
According to Jaimini, the sacrificial action (yajñakarma) is of central importance because it is action brought into being by the injunctions of the Veda (codanā-bhūtam).\textsuperscript{105} As I will elaborate below, Jaimini insists on staying firmly grounded on the centrality of the primary action as he carefully weaves and integrates each of the components comprising the event of sacrifice together towards the fulfilment of the yajñakarma. In the same way as he understands the Veda and Vedic tradition, Jamini’s general position regarding sacrificial activity is to maintain that the validity and efficacy of practice is intrinsic in such a way that it brings about its own result independent of any external referent outside of tradition. In sūtras 6.2.13-18, Jaimini stresses the importance of carrying the sacrifice to its completion even when visible results that are desired such as cattle and rain are accomplished in the course of the performance. He maintains that the Veda denounces all unfinished acts and learned men decry those who begin a certain act without committing to it until the end:

Once a sacrifice is begun, the performer is constrained to finish it, precisely because he has begun it. By contrast, ordinary activities may be stopped whenever the performer wishes (even if incomplete), and there is no reason to postulate texts requiring that such acts be completed. Scripture pertains only to what cannot be known by reasoning.\textsuperscript{106}

The privileged centrality of the yajñakarma in Jaimini’s discussion of sacrifice is primarily guided by the dual theme of the correct integration of accessories and

\textsuperscript{105} MS 9.1.1: Yajñakarma pradhānaṁ taddhi codanābhūtaṁ tasya dravyeṣu sanskāraṣṭratprayuktastadarthavat
That which is the yajñakarma is the principal factor [primary in relation to all else], as that is what is enjoined [created through injunction]; hence the preparation (embellishment) of the materials must be regarded as motivated (prompted) by that primary purpose.

\textsuperscript{106} MS 6.2.13: Prakramā tu niyametyāsambhavasya kriyānimittatavā
MS 6.2.14: Phalārthitvādā niyamo yathānupakṛnte
MS 6.2.15: Niyamo vā tannimitattavā kartuṣṭatkāraṇāṁ syāt
MS 6.2.16: Lokam karmāni vedavattato dhīpuruṣajñānam
MS 6.2.17: Aparādhe’pi ca taīh sāstraṁ
MS 6.2.18: Aśāstraṁ tūpasaṃprāptiḥ sāstraṁ syānna prakalpakain tasmādarthena gamyetaśprpte sāstraṁarthavat
The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃśā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 85.
responsible fulfilment. This assembling and integrating of details towards the realization of a purpose points one towards Jaimini’s notion of sacrifice as an event.

Clooney, drawing from a pūrvapakṣa position in sūtra 4.2.23 that the siddhānta accepts, proposes prayoga as the term that best encapsulates ‘the overall pattern of a sacrifice, the relationships of various parts and aspects in right order.’ The combination of general propositions and specific cases illustrated in the seventh adhyāya suggests that Jaimini was not looking to describe an abstract model of sacrifice or develop generalized methods of performing it. Rather, he was looking to negotiate the situated and responsible fulfilment of every enactment. Sacrifices, for Jaimini, are not essences but events constructed and re-constructed based on the particularity of each context. Therefore, it is prayoga that best denotes the sacrifice as a ‘once-occurent event’ i.e. ‘a particular happening in a particular time and place, done by a particular person’. There is no abstract prayoga because prayoga is by definition an occurrence in historical time. As Clooney elaborates, the intersection of prayoga with the notion of motivation (prayojana) in the adjective prayukta also suggests the value and integrity of any particular sacrifice as a whole. Each sacrifice, ‘as a particular event, in a specific time and place’, ‘becomes a kind of “world”, valuable in itself, into which things, and people and actions enter for specific purposes’ and come into being. Prayoga allows one to claim that while the structures of sacrifices are strictly laid out to guide the performance, the event of enactment itself is a continuous re-negotiation and appropriation of those same structures to allow the specificity of that particular sacrifice to flourish and be accomplished. This notion of prayoga that Clooney propounds can

107 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 118.
108 Ibid., p. 117.
109 Ibid., p. 118.
110 Ibid.
be seen in Jaimini’s analysis of actions, particularly concerning their arrangement and integration.

**Main Division of Actions: Primary and Subsidiary**

In *sūtras* 2.1.6-9, Jaimini introduces two kinds of actions which he classifies as *pradhāna* (primary) and *guṇa* (subsidiary) actions - that which rests upon itself and is performed for the purpose of its own fulfilment is a primary action and that which turns upon itself and imparts an aid to the materials for sacrifice is a subsidiary action:

2.1.6: Actions are of two kinds – the primary and the subsidiary.
2.1.7: Those that do not seek to make (prepare) a material are primary actions, because the material is a secondary factor.
2.1.8: Those that are meant to make (prepare) a material are recognized as subsidiary, because with regard to them, the material is the predominant factor.
2.1.9: In the case of dharmic actions, every action would be primary because of the non-fulfilment [of anything visible] – as in the case of prayāja.111

The chief basis of this distinction is based on the following rationale: every act is related to some material substance and this substance has been regarded as serving the visible purpose of accomplishing the act. In certain cases, the act mentioned turns upon itself and imparts an aid to the material substance, for instance, in the case of the act of threshing, which serves to clean the corn. However, in some cases, the act rests upon itself entirely, where its sole purpose is its own fulfilment, for example, a sacrificial performance. Some actions are regarded as ‘primary’ actions because they are actions not used as materials or accessories for sacrifice. Other actions are regarded as ‘subsidiary’ actions because they are actions which constitute the preparation and production of material substances, such as the consecrating of the sacrificial fire, the appointment of priests at a sacrifice, the threshing and grinding of the corn and contribute towards the accomplishment of the primary actions.

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111 MS 2.1.6: Tāni dvaidhaṁ guṇapradhānabhūtānī
MS 2.1.7: Yairdravyaṁ na cikṣṛṣyate tāni pradhānabhūtānī dravyasya guṇabhūtātvāt
MS 2.1.8: Yaistu dravyaṁ cikṣṛṣyate īnastatra pratīyeta tasya dravyapradhānātvāt
MS 2.1.9: Dharmamātre tu karma syādaniyṛttech prayājavat
It may be noted here that the distinction of actions into ‘primary’ and ‘subsidiary’ is distinct from the subject of aṅgin (principal) and aṅga (auxiliary) in that the former distinction refers to actions alone, while the latter refers to a relationship that subsists between actions on the one hand and substances, qualities and purifications on the other. The latter distinction is important because once the differences between the two kinds of actions are established, the question about whether every enacted act is an independent act in itself or whether there are some acts that may be considered subordinate and therefore, auxiliary i.e. serving the purposes of some others actions, is immediately posited. It is the theme of the ‘auxiliary character’ of the acts and its concern with the motive of actions that is discussed at length between the fourth and twelfth adhyāya in the Sūtras.

In sūtra 3.1.2, the character of the ‘auxiliary’ is defined as ‘that which subserves the purposes of something else, of another’, suggesting that they exist entirely for the purposes of helping others. The case of sprinkling of water on the corn in connection with a sacrifice or the prayājas in connection with the darśapūrṇamāsa, are such examples. While Jaimini mentions in sūtras 3.1.3-6 that the character of an ‘auxiliary’ belongs to ‘substances’, ‘properties or accessories’, ‘embellishments’, ‘acts’, ‘result, and even the ‘agent’, Kumārila, quoting Bādari, argues that the character of

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112 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, p. 169.
113 MS 3.1.2: Śesah parārthatvāt
The auxiliary is an auxiliary because it serves the purposes of another.
114 Sabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, p. 337.
115 Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, p. 272.
116 MS 3.1.3: Dravyagunaṃsānāṃkāreṣu bādariḥ
[The character of auxiliary] belongs to substances (materials used), properties [of materials, performers, actions, etc.] and preparations (preparatory actions), says Bādari.
MS 3.1.4: Karmāṇyapi jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt
Actions are also [auxiliary], because they serve the purpose of the result, says Jaimini.
MS 3.1.5: Phalāṇ ca puruṣārthatvāt
The result is also [an auxiliary], as he is for the purpose of agent.
MS 3.1.6: Puruṣaṣaṃ karmārthatvāt
The agent is also [an auxiliary], as he is for the purpose of action.
auxiliary can only belong to the first three. He claims that the ‘act’, the ‘result’ and the ‘agent’ can serve both as ‘principal’ and ‘auxiliary’ in relation to one another.\textsuperscript{117}

\textit{Classification of Acts}

Before proceeding with the subject of the difference among actions, it is necessary to explain the various divisions and classifications made among acts. The first division is between what Jaimini classifies as the \textit{laukika} (worldly) act and the \textit{vaidika} (Vedic) act in \textit{sūtras} 11.1.26-28.\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Laukika} and \textit{vaidika} actions are similar in that they are both governed by an \textit{artha} (purpose), they can also be distinguished in that \textit{vaidika} action is further governed by a \textit{sabdārtha}, which is the purpose accessible only through the Veda:

11.1.20-25: The results of action occur only upon actual performance, and are proportionate (one performance, one result, etc.), as is the case in common areas of experience, e.g., agriculture (there is a proportion between the work done and the fruit). Each time the action is performed, therefore, the result occurs. The repetition of the sacrifice duplicates the results, and performances re-occur whenever someone desires the result. Since this (arising of desire which prompts performance) is a matter of perception, the performances can be undertaken as one wishes; there is no scriptural prescription in this regard. Subsidiary sacrificial actions are governed by texts, however, and cannot be repeated as one might wish. (Thus, undertaking a sacrifice at all is a matter of personal decision; but within the sacrifice, performance of the actions is strictly governed by scripture).

11.1.26-28: In ordinary experience, action is defined by (perceptible) goals, and the action is complete when the goal is perceived to have been attained. By contrast, in matters related to \textit{dharma} and not governed by perception (i.e. pertaining to the purpose and result of the sacrifice), action is begun and completed only as scripture prescribes.\textsuperscript{119}
The vaidika actions are further classified under two heads: (a) Positive or action proper, the performance of an act, and (b) negative or avoidance of an act. Of positive actions the three main divisions are: (a) ‘yāga’ – ‘sacrifice proper, the offering of a certain substance to a deity’, (b) ‘homa’ – ‘offering of the substance into fire or water’, and (c) ‘dāna’ – ‘waiving of one’s own proprietary right over a thing in favour of another person’. Another important division among the vaidika acts is in terms of (a) kratvartha, an act which helps in the fulfilment of the sacrifice and under which fall all subsidiary acts, and (b) puruṣārtha, an act accomplishing the desires of the sacrificial agent, under which fall all primary acts, as directly consequential for bringing about a result, both visible and invisible, that accrue to the agent. The classification of the vaidika acts into nitya (compulsory), naimittika (occasional), and kāmya (optional, performed for a particular purpose) is considered to be the most important.

Artha and the Agency of the Yajamāna

Artha, considered as ‘one of the driving forces of human life for more than two thousand years’ in India, is more commonly recognized as one of the ‘four ends of human life’ (puruṣārthas), which include kāma, dharma and mokṣa. Within this perspective, artha as ‘wealth’ is understood to be interrelated with kāma as

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MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā’rthalakṣanam
MS 11.1.27: Kriyānāmarthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣo ‘tastannirvrtyā ‘pavargah syāt
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātē tvadarśanāc chabdārthēnāpavargah syāt
The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 97.

120 Of the negative acts there are two kinds - in the kratvartha there is the not-holding of the šodashin vessels, and in the puruṣārtha, there is the not-killing of animals.
121 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā, pp. 171-172.
122 MS 4.1.1: Athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthayorjijñāsā
Next then, an enquiry into kratvartha (what subserves the purposes of action) and puruṣārtha (what subserves the purposes of man).
'enjoyment', *dharma* as ‘rules of life’ and *mokṣa* as ‘spirituality’,\(^{124}\) together known as the *caturāśrama*.\(^{125}\) Klostermaier points out that while this ‘sequence of stages’ is not necessarily followed by Hindus in their lives, the ‘*caturāśrama*’ structure have certainly ‘influenced the personal and social history of Hindus and Hinduism.’\(^{126}\) Scharfe traced the historical development of the term and its shift in meaning that ranges from ‘goal’ to ‘worldly objective’ to ‘wealth’. According to him, the usage of the term in the *Ṛg Veda* is closer to denoting the sense of ‘a goal, especially the goal of a journey (“going to the same *artha*”) but also of an enterprise (“the matter at hand”).’ Towards the end of the Vedic period the term began to acquire ‘meanings of substantial and material content’ and ‘assumed a major role in the ethics and religion of the Hindu people’. Scharfe notes that ‘as an object of commerce and agriculture, *artha* came to denote wealth and worldly possessions, and as the object of statecraft, it denoted a wide range of political duties and objectives.’ He also mentioned that the transition from ‘a seminomadic society’ to ‘a society of sedentary peasants’ in the late Vedic period resulted in the denotation of *artha* as ‘material well being of the society’.\(^{127}\) Scharfe also pointed out that ‘it was only about the third century BCE onward’ that *artha* came to be ‘incorporated under the heading of the “goals of man”’.\(^{128}\) Therefore, historically, these shifts in the meaning of *artha* ‘reflected different phases in the religious development in India’, and the term came to express a variety of meanings. Krishnamoorthy points out that ‘many modern writers’ are unfortunately ‘misled by the technical terms used by

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\(^{124}\) Malamoud has pointed out that each of the three concepts that make up the *trivarga* i.e. *artha*, *kāma*, *dharma* constitutes a ‘revolving hierarchy’ that provides a framework for understanding their interrelationship. He argues that each of these three values can be viewed in turn as governing principles that encompass the other values depending on the perspective that is adopted. See C Malamoud, ‘On the Rhetoric and Semantics of Puruṣārtha’, *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 1981, vol. 15(1-2), pp. 33-48.


\(^{126}\) Ibid., p. 291.


\(^{128}\) Ibid., p. 250. According to Scharfe, the earliest reference of the *trivarga* (*artha*, *kāma*, *dharma*) can be found in the annotations of the grammarian Kātyāyana (c. 250 BCE) to Pāṇini’s Sanskrit grammar (Rule 2.2.34). These three goals (values) of man were expanded into four goals (*caturvarga*) by the addition of *mokṣa* (liberation), which is first attested in the epic Mahābhārata (12.59.85).
ancient writers’ and have not been able to appreciate the ‘polysemous’ nature of terminologies adopted by them. For him, ‘artha’ can be taken to mean a ‘thing’, a ‘meaning’ or an ‘end-value.’

The term *artha* in the definition of *dharma* in *sūtra* 1.1.2 can be taken in the sense of ‘[that] human good’ or ‘[that] purpose’ (and it is in a similar sense that *artha* has been discussed so far in this thesis). However, the range of meanings adopted throughout the *Sūtras* and in Śabara’s *Bhāṣya* also includes meanings such as ‘object or thing’, ‘aim or purpose’, and ‘sense or meaning’. *Artha* is consistently taken as ‘meaning’ when it is used to refer to the meaning derived from words (*śabdārtha*) and it is taken as ‘the purpose of action’ (*kriyārtha*) when a group of words and a set of accessories set apart for a particular enactment of sacrifice are brought together. The notion of *artha* assumes particular significance in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* precisely because Jaimini claims that there is an underlying (intrinsic) relationship between each word and their meanings and also between action and its purpose. The ‘purpose or aim’ towards which this word-act interplay is directed brings about two related forms of purpose - the purpose of the sacrificer (*puruṣārtha*) and the purpose of the sacrifice (*yajñārtha*). These further determinations of ‘purpose’ guide both the reading of the Veda (texts) and the performance of actions.

In the preceding sections, I discussed the event of *yajña* primarily by looking at the way in which the task of the correct integration of accessories and the task of ensuring responsible fulfilment saw the orientation of the system cohere and centralize towards the integration of what actually happens in the enactment of sacrifice. In the midst of

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132 Ibid., p. 251.
this grand rearrangement (organizing) of the details of the sacrifice, and particularly in light of the two-fold classification of actions into primary and secondary, further distinguished along ‘principal’ and ‘auxiliary’ acts, where does one situate the agent of sacrifice, the *yajamāna* (*svāmin*), the one who enters the world of sacrifice with a desire for a *phala*, with a goal or purpose in mind? The location of the *yajamāna*, not only in light of his relationship with the hired *ṛtvik* (priests) but also in light of the centrality of the sacrificial act itself, is an important one, particularly because the efficacy of the practice of sacrifice continues to be seen through the lens of its *phala*, and to whom it accrues.

Building on the interpretation of *tyāga* as ‘renunciation (of the fruits of the ritual acts)’ by Staal et al. in the well-known work on Vedic ritual, *AGNI*, Krishna claims that the ‘distinction’ between the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvik* in the context of retribution is significant because Staal’s interpretation (even if he agrees that it is misplaced and that what Staal is referring to is closer to a *dravya*) pushes one to consider the non-agency of the *yajamāna* as essentially in conflict with the active notion of *karman*. For him, the crucial features of the Vedic *yajña* from the viewpoint of the theory of action are the following: 134

1. It is an action done by a group of persons for someone else who has engaged them for performing that action by paying the prescribed fee.
2. It is a collective action which can only be undertaken jointly by each person performing the part assigned to him in the total activity.
3. The action, though performed by many persons with each contributing separately to it, is still supposed to be one action.
4. The action, though done by many persons, is not regarded as their action, either singly or jointly, in the sense that the fruit of this action does not accrue to them.
5. The fruit of action accrues not to those who actually perform it, but to the one who has paid them to perform it.
6. The action is always undertaken for the achievement of a desired end, whether in this world or the next. It other words, it is a *sakāma karma*.

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133 Jaimini designates the title of *svāmin* to the *yajamāna* in most of his discussions.
Krishna then quotes the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* 3.7.36, which states that ‘the *ṛtvik* is one who is given the sacrificial fee as mentioned in the *dakṣināvākyā*’, as a justification for his claim that there is a clear distinction between the *yajamāna* (the person for whom the sacrifice is performed) and the *ṛtviks* (the priests who perform the sacrifice) in the context of Vedic sacrifice. He takes the relationship between the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtviks* to be limited to the ‘hiring’ of the latter by the former for the performance of a sacrifice whose fruits he desires to obtain. As he remarks:

> As far as Vedic yajña is concerned...the problem there relates not to the formulation of the principle according to which the fruit is to be distributed amongst those who have collectively participated in the action, but of the accrual of fruit to a person who has done practically nothing except hiring others to perform the yajña for him.¹³⁶

This ‘theory of the yajña’, that ‘one can reap the fruit of somebody else’s action’, is then posited against the ‘hard core of the theory of karma’ which ‘denies the very possibility of such a situation ever arising in a universe that is essentially moral in nature.’¹³⁷ Krishna writes that the ‘theory of karma as elaborated in the Indian tradition, therefore, has to be seen not as a description of facts relating to human action, but as an attempt to render them intelligible in moral terms’.¹³⁸ He further elaborates: ‘If “moral intelligibility” requires that each human being should reap only the fruit of his own actions, then no human being can really affect anyone else however much the appearances may seem to justify the contrary.’¹³⁹

It is in the context of this interpretation of *karman* and its problematic relationship with *yajña* that I revisit Jaimini’s discussion and usage of *artha* to develop a more elaborate understanding of ritual as narratively-structured traditionary practice. If the event of sacrifice revolves around the *yajñakarma*, which is guided by a *prayoga*, the

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¹³⁵ MS 3.7.36: *Niyamastu dakṣinābhīḥ śrutisaṁyogāt*
¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 175.
¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 177.
¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 178.
answerability of sacrifice can be sought in the yajamāna - the one who ensures the fulfilment of the sacrifice. The question that concerns me here is whether the yajamāna is a non-participant in the sense that Krishna portrays and therefore, is just another accessory that make up the sacrifice entailing no agency in the enactment of the sacrifice or whether he can be conceptualized as a ‘participative thinker’ who, in light of his desire for purpose and meaning and willful submission to tradition, understands the nature and significance of traditionary practice and his place and role within it.

**Motive for Acting: Puruṣārtha, Kratvartha and Phalas**

After a discussion on the question of the two forms of actions and their classification, Jaimini addresses the question of ‘prayukti’, which can be translated as ‘motivation’. The term ‘motivation’ is posited in light of an enquiry to understand what it is that inspires the occasion of a certain act. I mentioned the role of ‘desire’ in the third chapter and the nature of ‘obligation’ in the fourth chapter; in this section I introduce the discussion of motivation as it relates to the ritual subject and the practice of sacrifice. Following the distinction between the principal and the auxiliary acts where the principal act is taken to motivate, incite and provide the occasion for the auxiliary, the question of the motive of an act necessarily turns upon the question as to whether the act by itself fulfils the purpose (or object) desired by the agent, or whether the act fulfils something related to another act. In these two instances, the former where the act subserves the purposes of man is termed as the puruṣārtha and the latter where the act subserves the purposes of another act is termed as the kratvartha. This distinction best clarifies the question of motive for practice.

In sūtra 4.1.2 Jaimini claims that ‘what subserves the purposes of man (puruṣārtha) is that which follows the happiness of man, as the undertaking is due to his desire to
obtain happiness, and this is inseparable from his purpose (or goal). Based on this sūtra, Clooney argues that puruṣārtha denotes a sacrifice which is done out of self-interest and the nature of this enactment is closer to one that is pursued only for the satisfaction of visible human needs. He contrasts this with a kratu, which according to him, denotes a particular sacrifice in ‘the integral unity of all its parts: the foresacrifices, accessories, subsidiaries etc.’ He claims that when the term kratu is used in the compound kratvartha, the compound can be translated to mean ‘that which is for the purpose of sacrifice’, where the word kratu takes on the general meaning of sacrifice. The kratvartha is then interpreted as the ‘driving force of inner coherence or purpose’, which holds the whole together, the ‘causal architectonic’ of the sacrifice requiring it to fit together smoothly and in proper hierarchy. Therefore, for Clooney, in this particular form, kratvartha is strictly contrasted with puruṣārtha, that which is for the sake of the person. Clooney quotes the fourth and the eleventh adhyāya and particularly sūtras 4.1.1-6 and 11.1.28 to highlight his claim that within the category of the action performed, in the case of puruṣārtha, the desire for visible phalas by the agent is taken to be primary and in the case of kratvartha, the fulfilment of the act is primary:

4.1.2: Humans desire to have what gives them pleasure, and this is inseparable from their purpose (or goal).
4.1.3-6: The surrender of what pleases the performer can also be for his sake, since scripture, which is indubitable, asserts this, and since such actions have no material object; however, they need not lead directly to the desired result.
11.1.28: By contrast, in matters related to dharma and not governed by perception (i.e., pertaining to the purpose and result of the sacrifice), action is begun and completed only as scripture prescribes.

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140 MS 4.1.2: Yasmin pritih puruṣasya tasya lipsā’rthalakṣanāvibhaktatvāt
141 Clooney, Thinking Ritualy: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 145.
142 MS 4.1.2: Yasmin pritih puruṣasya tasya lipsā’rthalakṣanāvibhaktatvāt
MS 4.1.3: Tadutsarge karmāni puruṣārthahāya śāstrasāntaisāṃkhyatvānna ca drayāṃ cikīryate tenārthenābhisambandhat kriyāyāṃ puruṣāsāraṇāh
MS 4.1.5: Api vā kāraṇā’grahāne tadarthamarthasyā’nabhisambandhat
MS 4.1.6: Tathā ca lokahūṭeṣu
The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 78.
143 MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātre tvadarśanāc chadbārthenāpavargaḥ syāt
It is this inter-relation between the two *arthas* which allow scholars such as Clooney and Das to claim that the relation between *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* is of a ‘hierarchical encompassment’.\(^{144}\) This is shown by the fact that the performance of *kratvartha* necessarily entails the performance of certain activities described as *puruṣārthas*. They claim that stressing the second notion of *dharma* realized when an act is performed for the sake of sacrifice places the individual perspective in a subordinate role to the overall *dharma* realized in the total sacrificial system. This subordination enables the importance of the human *dharma* without reducing that *dharma* to a particular individualized meaning. According to Clooney, once a sacrificial agent (*yajamāna*) enters the event of a sacrifice as an obligated and desirous self, he realizes that he is participating in a ‘larger whole’ where the sacrificial act is no longer governed by his desires alone. He is required to meticulously perform according to the rules that are prescribed.\(^{145}\) He further adds that while the human person may approach the sacrifice as he wishes and according to his desire for certain results, once he has committed himself to undertake the enactment of a particular sacrifice, ‘the action is no longer governed by his viewpoint and desires. He himself is now a part of a larger event not totally dependent on him.’ He claims that this ‘relocation of human perspective - from center stage to a supporting role - is an intellectually useful position that enables the Mīmāṃsākas to affirm human significance without reducing it to an expression of this or that human meaning’.\(^{146}\) To sum up Clooney’s claim, it is ‘anthropocentrism’

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\(^{144}\) The term is taken directly from Veena Das in Das, ‘Language of Sacrifice’, p. 446.

\(^{145}\) It is probable that this was one of the main reasons that Frits Staal argues about the importance of seeing ritual as the performance of rules, and therefore as a ‘meaningless’ sacrifice that has no external reference and need not have. See Staal, ‘The Meaninglessness of Ritual’, p. 3. See also Bloch, ‘Symbols, Songs, Dance and Features of Articulation: Is Religion an Extreme Form of Traditional Authority?’, pp. 54-81.

\(^{146}\) Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-modern Theology’, p. 665.
that is ultimately transcended to make way for the larger fulfilment of the sacrifice and the realization of dharma.\textsuperscript{147}

However, discussing the same \textit{sūtra} (4.1.2), Jha argues that while the \textit{puruṣārtha} is discussed in light of an action undertaken by man for the purposes of obtaining a reward in the form of happiness, he takes \textit{kratvartha} as entailing an act which helps in the accomplishment of another act and more specifically the \textit{puruṣārtha} act that does not itself bring any reward to the performer. Under the \textit{puruṣārtha}, Jha includes all the principal sacrifices like the \textit{darśapūrṇamāsa}, as these lead to results desired by the agent, while to the category of \textit{kratvartha} he relegates all the auxiliary acts having their sole purpose in fulfilling the principal act itself, such as the \textit{prayajas} which are auxiliary to the \textit{darśapūrṇamāsa} for example. Jaimini’s discussion of \textit{sūtras} 4.3.1-7 also suggests that all material substances, along with their ‘embellishments’ and ‘sanctifications’, are regarded as \textit{kratvartha} and even in cases where the texts mention some special results accruing from these, the results are regarded as only commendatory.\textsuperscript{148} There are also certain things that can be regarded as both \textit{puruṣārtha} and \textit{kratvartha}, such as the mention of the curd, either as an offering in sacrifice or as a substance offered for obtaining efficient sense-organs. In the \textit{Rijuvimalā}, Śālikanātha makes the following observation:

\begin{quote}
The \textit{puruṣārtha} should be defined as that which subserves the principal sacrifice and also the purposes of the agent, by itself, and not through being employed in another act – helping the principal act…those of this latter kind being regarded as \textit{kratvartha}.\textsuperscript{149}
\end{quote}

The question of \textit{puruṣārtha} and \textit{kratvartha} is important because it bears directly on the question of motive. In \textit{sūtras} 4.1.22-24 it is mentioned that \textit{puruṣārtha} viz. ‘what

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 672.
\textsuperscript{148} MS 4.3.1: Dravyasāṁskārakarmasu parārthatvāt phalaśrutirarthavādaḥ syāt
The mention of results in connection with substances, embellishments, and acts should be regarded as commendatory, because they subserve the purposes of another [action].
\textsuperscript{149} Quoted in Jha, \textit{Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources}, pp. 293-294.
\end{footnotes}
subserves the purposes of man’ contains its own motive within itself, however, what is 
kratvartha viz. ‘what subserves the purposes of the sacrificial act’ is taken to have its 
motive primarily in that particular act towards whose fulfilment it would assist, or 
whose procedure it would form part. 150 Although there are some acts which can be 
categorized neither as puruṣārtha nor kratvartha, such as fire installation or Vedic 
study, these acts are considered to be needed for bringing about the performance of acts 
and the results desired by man. Such acts are therefore usually taken as a puruṣārtha. 
There are other acts that do not help produce any sacrifice or bring about any desired 
results, such as the making of the juhū used at the sacrifice. In the same category belong 
the embellishments and sanctificatory acts whose main role is to sanctify certain 
materials used at sacrifices and render them fit for use. To the same category also 
belong the viśvajit sacrifice. Although an enjoined sacrifice, it is neither a part of 
another sacrifice nor brings about a desirable result by itself. The general conclusion 
regarding such acts is that they should be considered as bringing about the desired 
result, in the shape of heaven and, therefore, be considered as a puruṣārtha. 151

150 MS 4.1.22: Ekanispatteh sarvain samaṁ syāt
When several things are brought about by the same act, they should all equally be regarded as the motive 
of that act.
MS 4.1.23: Saṁsargaranispattehāmikṣā vā pradhānaṁ syāt
[In reality,] the curdled milk should be regarded as the principal motive, because it is in that that the 
mixed taste is perceived.
MS 4.1.24: Mukhyaśabdābhisamstavācca
Also because it is the principal thing (the curdled milk) that is eulogized.
151 MS 4.3.10: Codanāyāṁ phalāsruteh karmamātraṁ vidhiyate na hyaśabdaṁ pratīyate
In as much as the result is not mentioned in the injunction, only the act [without any result] should be 
taken as enjoined, as what is not actually enjoined [by the text] cannot be recognized.
MS 4.3.11: Api vā mnānasāmarthāyic codanārthena gamyate arthānāṁ hyarthavattvena vacanāṁ 
pratīyante arhato hyasamarthānāṁānantaryye ‘pyasambandhaṁ tasmācśrutayeśāṁ
‘Not so; the binding force (command) is inferred from the authority of the Vedic text; the texts are 
recognized to be for some object by reason of their having rewards. Those that do not contain any reward 
and have no connection with any (sentence) in the proximity, (their connection should be sought in a 
remote passage) because it is a portion of the Vedic text.’ The translation of this particular sūtra is 
borrowed from Sandal. See Jaimini, Mīmāṁsā Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. ML Sandal, Motilal Banarsidass, 
Delhi, 1993, p. 67.
MS 4.3.14: Ekāṁ vā codanākathāvāt
Only one result should be assumed, as the injunction instigates only one action.
MS 4.3.15: Sa svargeḥ syāt, sarvān pratayāśīṣtatvāt
That one result assumed is ‘heaven’, as that is equally desirable for all.
MS 4.3.16: Pratyayācca

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I mentioned in the third chapter that the Mīmāṃsā subject does indeed overcome his egocentric and individualist view to understand the vastness of the traditionary practice within which he is located. I also mentioned that for Jaimini, the intelligibility and purpose of the sacrifice is located in the totality of the sacrificial event and not in the human sacrificial agent or the deities separately. While this thesis is sympathetic to the transcending of ‘anthropocentrism’ that Clooney espouses in his reading of the Mīmāṃsā event of sacrifice, Jaimini’s privileging of the act in his event of sacrifice, when taken together with the performability of the Veda and the centrality of injunctions, entails that his notion of sacrifice is one that is necessarily oriented towards a telos that is meaningful for the subject. Therefore, within the framework of Jaimini’s project, neither of these arthas is subordinate to the other in the definitive sense that Clooney claims, and both contribute to the fulfilment of the whole of the ritual performance. In Jaimini’s system, every artha seeks to integrate and harmonize with the other arthas in a way that allows their dharmic existence to be realized (carried out). Jaimini’s sacrifice contains a myriad of meaningful elements and relationships and the artha of the sacrifice is not measured by any one of them in isolation but only when they are integrated together in a harmonious whole.

Under the telos of realizing dharma, all the components of what makes up a sacrificial event (prayoga) are ultimately taken as having the character of a subsidiary. These components include substances, accessories (mantra and deity), purifications, actions and even human agents:

Also because such is the common notion [of people].

152 MS 3.1.2: Šeṣah parārthatvāt
MS 3.1.3: Dravyagūnasāṃskāreṣu bādariḥ
MS 3.1.4: Karmānyapi jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt
MS 3.1.5: Palaṁ ca puruṣārthatvāt
MS 3.1.6: Puraṣāśca karmārhatvāt
MS 3.1.7: Teṣāmarthena sambandhaḥ
3.1.2: An element is an auxiliary (subordinate) because it serves the purposes of another.
3.1.3: [The character of auxiliary] belongs to substances (materials used), properties [of materials, performers, actions, etc.] and preparations (preparatory actions), says Bādari.
3.1.4: Actions are also [auxiliary], because they serve the purpose of the result, says Jaimini.
3.1.5: The result is also [an auxiliary], as he is for the purpose of agent.
3.1.6: The agent is also [an auxiliary], as he is for the purpose of action.
3.1.7: [All these subordinate elements] are connected to one another in terms of purpose.

All actions are also taken to be ‘subservient’ to their arthas as it is for the sake of the purpose that they are carried out. The centrality of action for Jaimini is captured by Clooney when he argues that ‘actions take priority over every element used in them, and the sacrifice is a single overall action comprised of many component actions (along with all their component elements). The multiple actions are integrated in terms of their purposes, leading to the constitution of the single overall purpose’. 153

**Shared Subjectivity: Yajamāna, Ṛtviks and Sattras**

In sūtra 3.7.18, an issue is raised regarding whether all sacrifices for the sake of heaven should be performed entirely by the ‘sacrificer’ himself, or whether he need perform only the ‘act of dedication’ i.e. utsarga and the rest may be done by himself or others or only by those who have been hired for the purpose. 154 Clooney summarizes the discussion between sūtras 3.7.18-24 in the following manner:

Even though the result accrues to the performer of the sacrifice, he himself need perform only those subordinate elements related to the primary act, the act of sacrifice. The rest may be done...

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154 MS 3.7.18: Sāstraphalam prayoktari tallakṣaṇatvāt tasmāt svayaṁ prayoge syāt
The fruit [mentioned in the scriptures] accrues to the actual performer; therefore the sacrificer himself should carry on the entire performance.
MS 3.7.19: Utsargē tu pradhānatvācchesakārī pradhānasya, tasmādanyah svayaṁ vā syāt
In as much as dedication is the principal act, it must be done by the sacrificer himself, [he being the principal person concerned]; as for the other acts, they may be done either by the sacrificer himself or by another person.
MS 3.7.20: Pradhānātvāt śesakārī pradhānasya, tasmād anyah svayaṁ vā syāt
[In reality,] another person should [perform the details] because the securing of hired priests (paid agents) has been actually enjoined, and that is not possible in the case of the sacrificer himself.
by someone else, as is indicated by the mention of “payment” – he could not very well pay himself. But the number of other, paid performers is regulated by scripture.\textsuperscript{155}

In connection with the subsidiaries, the \textit{pūrvapakṣa} also raises the question as to whether the sacrificer himself is to perform the subsidiaries or whether it is necessary for him to perform the primary sacrifice only, the subsidiaries being performed for him by priests appointed by him. The \textit{siddhānta} position is that he may have the subsidiaries performed by others yet, being the \textit{prime mover} in these actions, the result of all actions - primary as well as subsidiary - will accrue to him.\textsuperscript{156} The agency of the \textit{yajamāna}, according to the \textit{pūrvapakṣa}, is understood in terms of his overarching centrality i.e. he does all the work. However, according to Jaimini, the agency of the \textit{yajamāna} is understood in terms of his ability to appropriate specific enjoinments towards the goal of fulfilment and towards realizing the \textit{telos} of \textit{dharma}. Just as the basic fruitfulness of sacrificial action still allows for the distinction of primary and subsidiary actions, the fact of human participation in sacrifice allows for various distinctions such as that between the \textit{yajamāna} and the priests. It is this precise ability that allows the shared cultivation of meaning and purpose in the practice of sacrifice.

It is impossible for the person who undertakes a sacrifice to enact every enjoined act by himself. In the context of an enjoined practice where the task is to understand your specific role and to appreciate the role of others, the necessity of interaction is part of the duties of a \textit{yajamāna}. It is this presence of the role of others that is often mistaken as outside assistance. Even though the \textit{yajamāna} appoints and pays for the services rendered by these assistants, he is the prime mover of all the acts done by these persons.

The results and benefits of these acts accrue to the sacrificial agent who arranges the fee


\textsuperscript{156} MS 3.7.20: \textit{Pradhānatvāt śeṣakārī pradhānasya, tasmād anyah svayaṁ vā syāt}

[In reality,] another person should [perform the details] because the securing of hired priests (paid agents) has been actually enjoined, and that is not possible in the case of the sacrificer himself.

See Jha, \textit{The Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā}, p. 195.
prescribed in connection with each act. Jaimini goes on to claim that the number of priests to be engaged could be as many as the duties enjoined to be performed by the several performers in the Veda.\textsuperscript{157}

Jaimini has also devoted some sūtras to the consideration of various questions regarding the performance of sattras. Sattras are ‘communistic sacrificial performances’ i.e. done by several persons together. Since each of these persons help in the accomplishment of the desired ‘phala’ each of them is considered a ‘sacrificer’ and as such the ‘phala’ of the sattras accrues to each of the sacrificers. Even though the performance of sattras is undertaken by a number of persons collectively, the phala accrues to each of them individually. The sattras differ from other forms of Vedic sacrifices in that; (a) they cannot be performed by one man and (b) there is no distinction between the priest and the sacrificer (yajamāna):

\textsuperscript{157} Some of the names of such performers that have been listed are the following: (a) the adhvaryu, who does the distribution (b) the pratiprasthātṛ, who offers the manthin (c) the nesṭṛ, who brings up the sacrificer’s wife (d) the unnetṛ, who fills the cup (e) the prastotṛ, who introduces the chant (f) the udgātṛ, who sings the chant (g) the pratiḥātṛ, who sings the pratiḥāra chant (h) the subrahmanyā, who recites the subrahmanyā (i) the hotṛ, who recites the prātaraṇavāka hymn (j) the maitrāvaruṇa, who gives directions and recites the puruṇavākā (k) the acchāvākā, who recites the yajyā (l) the grāvastut, who recites the grāvastotṛīya mantra. The exact number of priests at the soma sacrifice and also at the dārśapūrṇamāśa is seventeen. The functions of priests are restricted by their names, that is on the basis of particular titles given to the particular priests, and that the duties of the priests are regulated by the names of the acts and the priests is the general rule but there are practical exceptions. Refer Garge, \textit{Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya}: A Study, p. 289.

\textsuperscript{158} MS 10.6.45: Satramekaḥ prakṛtivat
MS 10.6.46: Vacanat tu bahunāṁ syāt
MS 10.6.50: Bahunāmītī ca itṣitaṁ viśeṣa-vacanaṁ vyartham
MS 10.6.59: Dvādaśāhasya satratvam āsanopāyicodanena yajamānabahuvena ca sutraśabābhishāṃbyogāt
MS 10.6.60: Yajaticodanādahāṇatvam svāmināṁ cā sthitaparimāṇavatāt

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For this reason, there is no appointment of the priests nor are their services exchanged for any promised gift. In the case of the *sattras*, there are seventeen sacrificers and all the sacrificers take part in the performance not only as ‘sacrificers’ but also as ‘priests’. 159

In my introduction to this section on the answerability of *yajña*, I have mentioned that Krishna claims a distinction between the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtviks*, where the former is taken as just an observer and the latter is taken as a hired hand. In Jaimini’s conception of sacrifice, no role towards its fulfilment is just a role but is always one that is enjoined. The distinction between the *yajamāna*, that is, the person for whom the sacrifice is performed and the *ṛtviks*, that is, the priests who performs the sacrifice, is not clear-cut in the case of all the sacrifices, as discussed above. In the context of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, for example, the *yajamāna* himself is technically regarded as a *ṛtvik* in order to complete the number of *ṛtviks*, which is mentioned as seventeen. In *sūtra* 3.7.38, Jaimini seeks to justify this on the basis of ‘*karmasāṁañyāti*’, that is, the similarity of functions between the *ṛtviks* and the *yajamāna*. 160

Krishna sees this shared cultivation and negotiation of purpose as the non-agency and therefore, non-answerability of the *yajamāna*. When one takes this shared co-authoring in light of the centrality of the correct performance of the once-occurent event of sacrifice in Jaimini’s project, one can start to appreciate the transformation and intensification that the *yajamāna* allows himself to go through. According to Jaimini, each of the different elements of the sacrificial event (*prayoga*) including the smallest details possesses their own *dharm*. The *yajamāna* is compelled to keep his attention focussed through the course of the performance to ensure that each enactment is a

160 MS 3.7.38: *Śvāmīśaptadaśāḥ karmasāṁañyāti*

The master of the house is to be regarded as the seventeenth priest, on the basis of the similarity of function.
When the dharma of all the components of the sacrificial event is correctly understood and performed efficaciously and all the elements fit correctly into the myriad of meanings constituting the act, it is then that, as Clooney claims, the ‘dharma of sacrifice’ is known and realized. When the yajamāna knows and understands his own dharma, he is then able to channel his own desires to participate in the larger sacrificial arrangement. In the process he learns to appreciate the dharma of each of the enjoined acts that serves the fulfilment of the sacrificial event (prayoga) and contributes to the realization of the yajñārtha. This channeling is best observable in Jaimini’s discussion of the interplay of the two arthas that realize ‘the dharma of sacrifice’, and it is to that I finally turn.

**Dharma and the Harmonized Yajña**

So far I have discussed that the yajamāna, as the agent of sacrifice can be taken to be the prime mover of traditionary practice who not only understands his role within the community but is committed to enacting his specific enjoinments while seeking to ensure the fulfilment of all enactments in harmony. In this process, he has come to understand the nature of the tradition within which he is located, its historicality, and the responsibility of appropriating it and carrying the weight of its continuation through his action. Without the agent of sacrifice, there is no enactment and without enactment, there is no authoritativeness that can be derived from the living dialogue that is Veda, upon which all things Vedic are ultimately founded and renewed.

Now I turn to the question of how Jaimini’s conception of dharma is intrinsically related to the sacrificial agent and the enactment of the traditionary practice of sacrifice. In short, I want to come to a clearer understanding of how dharma, subjectivity and

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traditionary practice are conceptually tied together in a way that can inform me about Jaimini’s fundamental concern and the nature of his enquiry.

Jaimini introduces his enquiry into dharma as unamenable to common sense-perceptions and the telos of realizing dharma is characterized by its nature of invisibility. Moreover, the event of sacrifice is posited to belong to the deontological realm of the obligatory act, which thereby can be read as reinforcing the radical split between what is amenable and what remains invisible. Jaimini’s concern is to bring these two together in a way that enables him to ground the invisible in the realm of the immediacy of lived experience. Therefore, his insistence that dharma could be realized only through the correct performance of rituals paves the way for understanding dharma as primarily constitutive of the human existentiale and of society.

Jaimini’s inquiry into dharma, which he declared in the first sūtra 1.1.1 in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras, begins with the definition ‘đoṇālakṣaṇārtho dharmaḥ’ that Jha translates as the following: ‘Dharma is that artha (purpose, meaning) which, being desirable, is distinguished by or possesses the characteristics of a codanā.’ Flood, in his overview of Hindu rituals in his Introduction to Hinduism, also takes Jaimini’s definition of dharma ‘as that of which the characteristic is an injunction (vidhi)…an obligation that is declared by the Veda, to perform ritual action (karma).’ This suggestion of a deep correlation between the complexity of the enactment of sacrifice and the notion of dharma allows Heesterman to claim that dharma is best understood as ‘the ritualistic order of Vedic sacrifice’. That Jaimini’s Sūtras are about dharma and his concern to understand it is primarily through an explication of the event of sacrifice.

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162 MS 1.1.1: Athāto dharmajijnāsā
163 Jha, The Purva-Mimamsa-Sutras of Jaimini, p. 3.
164 Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, p. 53.
(yajña) is generally not doubted in scholarship. It is the nature of this relationship that I seek to establish even as I remain committed to the notion that dharma, in Jaimini’s definition, is primarily an artha that possesses the characteristics of a codanā.

The discussion of the uses of the term dharma in sūtras 1.1.1-2 and 1.3.1 are comparatively more prominent and more comprehensively studied. In my investigation of dharma as the telos of tradition in the third chapter, this introductory definition has been the guiding framework. However, dharma has also been variously conceived by Jaimini in subsequent adhikāras particularly as it relates to the organization and integration of the details of Vedic sacrifice. Dharma is discussed in unique ways in different chapters in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and in turning to the other discussions one can find a more comprehensive elaboration of Jaimini’s dharma whose characteristic, as already mentioned, is similar to that of the codanā.

First, dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is discussed, in the sūtras that follow pāda 1.3, as a concept strictly embedded in the details of sacrifice and concerns the question of the harmonization of injunctions with their appropriation in practice. While dharma is closely related to the details that make up a sacrifice, it is also clearly distinguished from the guṇas in a way that suggests guṇas to have a peculiar mode of existing in the sacrificial context that could be considered as their dharmonic existence. In sūtra 3.3.35-36 for example, the grinding of the rice for the ektypal sacrifice is taken as the dharma of rice, as though the act of being ground is the very mode of being and purpose of rice in the sacrifice. Similarly, in sūtra 9.4.41, one finds that it is the dharma of milk to be boiled at the abhyudayeṣṭi and each of the accessories, such as the sacrificial post, the gold offered, the ghee or grain-offering, is taken to possess its own dharmonic existence

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166 MS 3.3.35: Tatsarvārthamaviśeṣāt
The grinding is to be done to all offering materials; as there is no distinction among them.
MS 3.3.36: Carau vā, arhoktaṁ purodāse 'rthavipratisedhātpaśau syāt
[In reality,] the grinding should be done to the rice only; in the case of the cake, it is implied by its very nature; [and] in the case of animal-flesh, it could not be done to it, as its very purpose would be defeated.
specific to the sacrifice that is performed.\textsuperscript{167} Jaimini goes on to mention that texts and words also have their specified dharmas, as do sacrificial agents and sacrificial actions.\textsuperscript{168} Based on the sacrifice to be enacted, these dharmas label the accessories, the persons and the actions and constitute the role they play in the specified event of sacrifice. This role entails what the element (accessory) in question does, what it is related to, when it is introduced in the sacrifice and when its role is over, so it can be taken as a description of the properties of an element in its sacrificial existence. Therefore, all guṇas pertaining to the presence of an element in their ordinary laukika existence possess the qualities of a dharma based on certain Vedic directives accorded in a given sacrificial setting. While the properties of a thing in its laukika existence can

\textsuperscript{167} MS 9.4.41: Abhyudaye dohāpanayāḥ sadharmā syāt pravṛttatvāt
At the rise of the moon, when there is transference of milking, its own procedure (details) applies, because it is already in operation (has already commenced).

MS 11.3.6: Tatkalāstum yūpakarmavātasya dharmavidhānāt sarvārthānāṁ ca vacanādanyakālātvaṁ
On the other hand, they have their own time, as they have the post for their objective; and they have been enjoined for the post; [in the case of all things,] another time is adopted only when there is a declaration to that effect.

MS 8.1.35: Hiranyamājyadharma, tejastvāt
The gold should be taken in the details of the clarified butter, as both are of the nature of ‘tejas’ (essence).

MS 8.1.36: Dharmānugrahācca
[Also] because many of the details can be adopted.

MS 8.1.37: Ausadham vā visadatvāt
[In reality,] it is the procedure of the grain offering that should be adopted, because of solidity.

MS 9.4.39: Vratadharmāc ca lepavat
It may be treated as an observance, as in the case of the ‘smearing’.

\textsuperscript{168} MS 2.1.41: Vacanāddharmaviśesah
On account of the special text, there is special (peculiar) quality (qualification).

MS 10.5.11: Ekasyāṁ vā stomaśāyāvrttadharmatvāt
It should be done over one [verse] only; because the song [has the character of being] repeated.

MS 2.3.23: Tatāmyogāt kṛatustadākhyah syāt tena dharmavidhānāṁ
On account of the fact of the connection of Agni with all sacrifices, any sacrifice may be named ‘Agni’, but that name would only serve to lay down the details of the sacrifice.

MS 2.4.2: Kratuvā śrutiśamyogetā
[In reality,] the property is of the agent, because of the direct signification of the agent.

MS 2.4.8: Nāmarūpādharme viśesapunaraktinindā ‘saktisamāptivacanapraśyaścittāntāvadhānānāt śāhāntareṣu karmabhedaḥ syāt
If an act is mentioned in different recensional texts, it should be regarded as different, [because of differences in] name, form, peculiar details (qualities), repetition, censure, incapacity, declaration of completion, explanatory rites, perception of distinct purposes (objects).

MS 3.4.1: Nivātimiḥ manuṣyadharmāḥ śabdasya tatpradhānātvāt
The Nivīta should be regarded [as enjoined] as an attribute of man, because the text speaks of man as the predominant factor.

MS 3.4.20: Aprakaraṇe tu taddharmas tato viśeṣāt
That which does not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice should appertain to man in general, because it differs on that point from those others [that occur in particular contexts].
be known through perception, its dharma can only be known through the Vedic text and their enjoinments. The dharma of every sacrificial accessory, which as I have pointed out, can also include the sacrificial agents and the gods, is how each of them is treated, acted upon, related to, during the sacrifice and in relation to the sacrifice. These dharmas thereby, label the person and clarify and constitute the role one plays in the sacrificial ritual.  

As Clooney pointed out: ‘Dharma is most often discussed and argued, and therefore understood in the negotiation of sacrificial details’.  

In this sense dharma reflects the functional description and practicality (value) of a sacrificial element (accessory) in a given sacrificial setting.

As I have pointed out in the previous sections, the sacrificial event comprises a conglomerate of texts (Vedic statements), acts (of various kinds), material substances and accessories. All of these derive their meaning and purpose only in the interrelationship and negotiation as factors that establish the main enactment. The dharmas of each of these factors are realized (brought forth) when they are organized properly in a harmonious relation to one another and the enactment generated and fulfilled according to the specified injunctions. Therefore, the event of sacrifice is also the constitution and negotiation of the interaction of each of the respective dharmas even as they are employed for the purpose of fulfilling the enactment in the correct manner as prescribed by the injunctions. To judge and validate how and when one can ascertain whether the integration of each of these sacrificial factors and elements are in harmony, Clooney highlights that Jaimini develops the notion of ‘inherent cohesion’.

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173 MS 4.1.2: *Yasmin prīthiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsā’rthalakṣaṇāvibhaktatvāt*
and the notion of ‘purposefulness’. This is to ensure that the organization and integration is directed towards the realization of the satisfaction of human desires and the overall purpose. According to Jaimini, each of the different elements of the sacrificial event including the smallest details possesses its own dharma:

9.1.26: Being an accessory of the fire, it should be repeated with each brick, because it is a collection, like the Paunāmāśī.
9.1.27: [In reality,] it should be done to the fire altar, because it is one substance; the others only subserve the purposes of that substance.
9.4.39: It may be treated as an observance, as in the case of the smearing.
8.1.35: The gold should be taken in the details of the clarified butter, as both are of the nature of tejas (essence).
8.1.36: [Also] because many of the details can be adopted.
8.1.37: [In reality,] it is the procedure of the grain offering that should be adopted, because of solidity.
1.3.23: But this is too similar to the qualification of the agent.
2.1.41: It is on account (of the fact of the Nigada) being employed in indicating to others that the peculiar qualification of the Nigada is mentioned.
2.3.23: On account of the fact of the connection of Agni with all sacrifices, any sacrifice may be named Agni, but that name would only serve to lay down the details of the sacrifice.
2.4.2: [In reality,] the property is of the agent, because of the direct signification of the text.
2.4.8: If an act is mentioned in different recensional texts, it should be regarded as different, because of differences in name, in form, in particular details, and because of repetition, deprecation, incapacity, declaration of completion, explanatory rites, perception of distinct purposes.
3.7.51: The assignation of subordinate elements because of their names is based on perception, whereas assignation because of the general rule that the ektypes are similar to their archetypes is based on inference. Usually, perception is more authoritative than inference, but because here the latter is based on scriptural evidence while names are secular in origin, the inference is more authoritative than perception.
6.7.14: The same would be done in connection with the Viśvajit performed in the course of Āhargana as all are (Viśvajit) alike.

When each of the dharmas of all the components constituting the unique sacrificial event is correctly understood and performed efficaciously and when all the elements fit

\[174\] MS 4.3.4: Naimititike vikāratvāt kratupradhānāmānyat syāt
\[175\] Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-modern Theology’, pp. 665-666.
\[176\] MS 9.1.26: Agnidharmaḥ pratiṣṭakam saṅghātāpaunāmāśīvat
MS 9.1.27: Agrnvāḥ syāt dvavyakatvāditarāsāṁ tadarthatvāt
MS 9.4.39: Vratadharmāc ca lepavat
MS 8.1.35: Hiryanāmāyadharmaḥ, tejustvāt
MS 8.1.36: Dhrmāngrahācca
MS 8.1.37: Ausadham vā visadatvāt
MS 1.3.23: Tulyaṃ tu kārtadharmaneṣaḥ
MS 2.1.41: Vacanādadharmaviśeṣāḥ
MS 2.3.23: Tatsamyogotāt kṛutastadākhyāḥ syāt tena dharmavidhānāni
MS 2.4.2: Kṛaturvā śrutisamāyogot
MS 2.4.8: Nāmarupadharmaḥ viṣeṣapunāraktindāṃ saktisamāptivacanaprāyaścittānyārthadārṣanāt śākhāntareṣu karmabhedaḥ syāt
MS 3.7.51: Tadganḍāvā svadharmāḥ syād adhikārasāmārthyaḥ sahāngairavyaktaḥ śeṣe
MS 6.7.14: Āhargane ca taddharmā syāt sarvesāmāviveṣāḥ
correctly into the myriad of meanings that constitute the enjoined enactment, then the ‘dharma of sacrifice’ (to borrow Clooney’s phrase)\textsuperscript{177} i.e. the force that brings each of the elements of sacrifice into a harmonious order, is realized. Therefore, Jaimini’s use of dharma, in the first instance, suggests that the various elements that make up the event of sacrifice has its own specified meaning and functional identity within the event of the particular sacrifice. These are then organized and harmoniously brought together in the act of sacrifice. Not unlike the vidhi that I have highlighted in the previous chapter, dharma is both the cause of order (cohesion) and the force that brings forth harmony. It is also the outcome and fruit of that harmonious arrangement and fulfilment.

Second, dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is also explored as an invisible reality that arises when ‘practice and the language of practice are properly ordered’. Clooney identifies several adhikaraṇas whose discussions concerning ‘the nature of sacrifice and its verbal dimensions’, are both ‘practical and conceptual, intelligible and to be enacted’.\textsuperscript{178} He argues that in such adhikaraṇas the discussion shifts from a consideration of dharmas as the functional details of a particular sacrifice to an understanding of dharma as the ‘larger reality’ of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy of Vedic practice that encompasses each of these functional details. One example of this discussion is found in sūtras 2.1.9-12, where Jaimini discusses what he calls dharmamātra karma i.e. ‘dharmic actions’ or ‘action that is uniquely dharmic’:\textsuperscript{179}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2.1.9-12}: Sentences denote actions of three varieties: a. secondary actions, preparatory of materials; b. primary actions, which do not prepare any materials; c. so-called dharmic or relational actions involving a material, without their own results, but not strictly preparatory - these are nevertheless primary and not subordinate to the materials used in the actions.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{177} Clooney, \textit{Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini}, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{178} Clooney, ‘Pragmatism and Anti-Essentialism in the Construction of Dharma in Mīmāṃsāsūtras’, pp. 751-752.
\textsuperscript{179} MS 2.1.9: \textit{Dharmamātre tu karma syādanirvṛtteḥ prayājavat}

\begin{itemize}
\item MS 2.1.10: \textit{Tulyāśrutivātād vā itaraḥ sadharmaḥ syāt}
\item MS 2.1.11: \textit{Dravyopadeśā iti cet?}
\item MS 2.1.12: \textit{Na tadarthatvāt lokavat, tasva ca ēṣeḥbhūtatvāt}
\end{itemize}

The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, \textit{Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā}, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 69.
Dharmamātra karma is defined as an action that is significant and complete in itself, primarily because it does not constitute a secondary action such as those that entail preparing materials to be used in the sacrifice. However, it contributes directly to ushering in the completion of a particular sacrifice. Such an act is considered dharmic in that it is ‘effective in itself’, without reliance on the mediation of visible fruits. Jaimini, again in sūtras 11.1.26-28, talks about actions that are purely dharmic where the performed act does not result in anything else apart from fulfilment i.e. enactment according to the Veda. These dharmic actions, while closely similar to primary actions (pradhāna), are actions that do not fit into the category of primary actions because they do not affect any visible preparation or result (phala) apart from ensuring a harmonized interaction between the elements involved in a sacrifice. Therefore, there is a sense in which even primary actions pursued and enacted out of desire also become actions performed because they are enjoined. It is here that the concept of desire and obligation come together to form the dharmamātra, which as Śabara glosses, can also be understood as karmamātra, ‘pure action’, action for its own sake. Therefore, Jaimini’s notion of dharmic action introduces an action, a sacrifice that is not subservient to a result or a purpose but one that is primary and complete in itself.

Third, inseparable from action, dharma is not presented as something ‘already there’ as the given object of some particular word or injunction. Words grouped and handed down in the tradition instigate particular actions. Dharma is known in the ‘event’ which only occurs due to the correct harmonization of word, its enjoinement and enactment.

180 Clooney, ‘Pragmatism and Anti-Essentialism in the Construction of Dharma in Mīmāṃsāsūtras’, pp. 751-768.
181 MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā ‘rthalaṣṭanaṁ
In ordinary experience, the action is determined by the need [for perceptible goals (fruits)].
MS 11.1.27: Kriyāṁmaṁarthasaṅvatvā pratyakṣo ‘astamunirṛtyyā pavargaḥ syāt
The actions are subservient to the purpose, and the purpose is perceptible; hence the action is taken to be complete when the goals are perceived to have been received.
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātra tvadoraśanāc chababrāthenāpyavargaḥ syāt
[On the other hand.] in the case of dharma, where there is no visible effect, the accomplishment is complete by doing exactly as enjoined by the word (text).
Therefore, *dharma* is intelligible only in the context of a sacrificial event and involves an enquiry into the interplay of an authorless Veda and the performance of the Vedic injunctions in that particular event. The Mīmāṃsā understanding of *dharma* as the completely harmonized, understood and appropriated set of words, actions, persons and events constituting Vedic sacrifice is closely connected to ‘the novelty, the *apūrva*, of a sacrifice’. Clooney notes that ‘the appeal to the notion of *apūrva* gives priority to sacrifice as a process and act over any reification of it and hearkens to the energy and vitality of the injunctive verbal force over against conceptual, essentialist extensions of one sacrifice to others’.\(^{182}\)

*Dharma* is then identified with the *yajñārtha* that comes from the fulfilled performance of the Vedic text, the *artha* which undergirds every element of the sacrifice as purposeful and includes every perspective, even that of the performer. While Jaimini introduces *dharma* as transcendent in the sense that it belongs to the invisible realm, the knowledge of *dharma* through the word and the realization of it in the Vedic ritual pave the way for the understanding of *dharma* as significant for ‘this’ life and for ‘this’ society. As Clooney observes, Jaimini ‘sought to replace the “laws of the cosmos” with the “laws of language and ritual”, and reliance on gods and humans…with an appreciation for the harmony of text and action’ that underlies the event of sacrifice and the world of Vedic practice.\(^{183}\)

The Mīmāṃsā argument developed in this section is that *dharma* is not an essential entity out there (that can be posited like a ‘God’) but is something that comes into being (*bhāvanā*) every time an act is perfected. It is that force whose ‘spirit’ pervades the enactment of sacrifice and ensures that the practice becomes a perfected craft that fully appropriates and validates the obligations and injunctions of the Veda. Sacrifice, for Jaimini, is an activity in which the sacrificial agent, the ingredients for the sacrificial

\(^{182}\) Clooney, ‘Pragmatism and Anti-Essentialism in the Construction of Dharma in Mīmāṃsāsūtras’, p. 760.

\(^{183}\) Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern Theology’, p. 663.
enactment, as well as the invoked deities are brought together and integrated within the sacrificial event and guided towards the realization of meaning and purpose that only a correct and responsible enactment can provide. When a sacrifice is correctly ordered and enacted, with the words uttered in the right manner and the materials utilized at the right places, by agents with a desire and ability to appropriate and embody the values of the community, then the enactment becomes an enjoined enactment. This enjoined enactment brings together the *dharmic*-existence of each of the components of sacrifice and their harmonious assemblage results in the disclosing of the overarching *dharma*, the ultimate value that is the fruit of fulfilment. The idea of *dharma* is articulated and understood through the injunctions of the Veda embodied in the figure of the sacrificial agent and manifested in the social world through the negotiated rules of interpersonal interaction and ritual injunctions. Jaimini locates the enjoined subject in a world that is organized and ordered around the practice of sacrifice. This world and ordering is closely related with his concept of *dharma* – an *artha* that is realized in correct activity. Therefore, the perfected sacrifice itself is the fullness of *dharma* and the realization of *dharma* is the affirmation of the traditionary practice of sacrifice. This perfected traditionary practice of sacrifice involves the interplay between the ritual subject in all its transformative stages, the rationality of the text, particularly injunctions, and the participation of others (both people and things) in the ‘once-occurrent’ event where *dharma* is sought and realized and the sacrifice is fulfilled in its entirety.

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184 MS 4.2.27: Yajaticodanā dravyadevatākriyain samudāye kṛtārthatvāt
What is denoted by the root ‘yaj’, should be understood as that act which brings about the connection between ‘substance’ and ‘deity’; as this is the sense applicable to the whole [of primary actions].
RITUAL AND THE ENJOINED SUBJECT

There are scholars who are wary at the task of proposing universally acceptable definitions\textsuperscript{185} and for good reason, since it is impossible for a theoretical discussion on ritual to avoid the tedious question of the definition of ritual. In most cases, a certain notion if not an outright definition, of ritual is presupposed. At the beginning of any theoretical focus on rituals, two interrelated questions about the distinctiveness of ritual and the nature of its relation to other forms of [social] action tend to dominate discussions concerning definitions.\textsuperscript{186} Bell pointed out that most influential theories of ritual have ‘a tendency to define ritual either as a distinct and autonomous set of activities’, or an ‘aspect of all human activity’.\textsuperscript{187} While some scholars ‘stress the distinctiveness of ritual’ and ‘how it is clearly different from all other kinds of activity’, ‘others stress the congruity of ritual with other forms of human action’, by reducing ritual to ‘the formal aspect’ of action in general.\textsuperscript{188} In both of these accounts, the notion of ritual as a form of action or behaviour opposed to intentionality, to sincerity, and to thinking can largely be identified.

With regard to the first group, ‘most attempts to define ritual proceed by formulating the universal qualities of an autonomous phenomenon’.\textsuperscript{189} They maintain the premise that what are categorized as ‘rituals’ can be found in particular societies and cultures and possess ‘distinctive characteristics’.\textsuperscript{190} These definitions then lead to the development of ‘a set of criteria’ that decides which activities constitute ritual actions and which constitute non-ritual ones. Bell points out that this has led to the separate classification of what was defined as ‘ritual or magical activity’ and what was taken as ‘technical or

\textsuperscript{187} Bell, \textit{Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice}, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., pp. 70-71.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 69.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
utilitarian activity’. The relationship between means and ends in ritual-activity is described as rule-governed, routinized, habitual and non-instrumental. However, the nature of non-ritual technical activity is described as pragmatic, spontaneous, and instrumentally effective. This distinction between the habitual and the instrumental in turn collapses into a distinction between the ‘rational and the irrational’ and the ‘logical and the emotional’.

Ritual was therefore, understood as a ‘kind of action that is ineffective, superficial and/or purely formal’ based on the unexamined and unchallenged premise that the scholar ‘know[s] it when he see[s] it’.

As ‘ritual’ continued to be ‘discovered’ and as the development of a plethora of what Grimes called ‘ritual types’ ensued, the difficulty in ‘identifying’ ‘ritual’s center or boundaries’ through categorization became evident. Snoek has remarked that ‘looking at the wide range of phenomena, that scholars have become inclined to call “rituals” over the last few decades, it seems highly unlikely to me that…there is any characteristic that really occurs in all of them. And those that do are surely not specific to “rituals” alone.’ As ‘ritual types’ proliferate, and the acceptance that there can be no single essential quality or set of characteristics found in all uses of a concept grew, the confusion over the phenomenon also grew and nearly all actions came to be associated with the term ritual.

This inability to clarify the distinctiveness of ritual as a category and the difficulty of managing the plethora of ritual types that continue to be suggested gave rise to a second group of theorists in recent years who sought to define ‘ritual as an aspect of all activity’. It was Erving Goffman who extended the notion of ‘ritual’ to the description of everyday interactions. This extension of ritual in a narrow

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191 Ibid., p. 70.
sense to ritual-like activity or ritualization made the term applicable to many activities and events to such an extent that it became an almost empty term, denoting everything from animal behaviour to greeting gestures, to birthday parties, and coronation ceremonies.\textsuperscript{195} Goody also claims that ‘routinisation’, ‘regularisation’ and ‘repetition’ lie at the basis of social life itself.\textsuperscript{196}

These accounts, in their efforts to establish the notion of ritual as a universal or transcultural category, sought to impose either universal characteristic (as in the first instance) onto activities across contexts or sought to assume the \textit{rituality} of all forms of actions (as in the second instance). The distinctiveness of ritual as a form of action - first taken as irrational and magical practice, later identified with all forms of everyday routine behaviors - is reduced to an empty action that is (a) rule-governed, non-instrumental behaviour and (b) that is ultimately transcultural i.e. beyond contexts and cultures.

In their book \textit{Ritual and Its Consequences}, Adam Seligman et al. differentiate the ‘antiritualistic’ ‘sincere’ mode of thought and practice from the ‘mere convention’ ritual that depicts ‘action without intent’ and ‘performance without belief’.\textsuperscript{197} Arguing that ‘sincerity grows out of a reaction against ritual’, they seek to emphasize the need to replace ritual with a sincere mode of behavior characterized by ‘a genuine and thoughtful state of internal conviction’ that brings out authenticity and responsibility. However, they also point out and demonstrate that while this aspect of the sincere mode of behaviour has characterized human action at all times, the exclusive privileging of it by the modernist or Enlightenment project influenced by ‘Cartesian orientations of modern science’, has in turn resulted in the sidelining and segregation of ritual forms of

\textsuperscript{195} Bell, \textit{Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice}. pp. 69-70.
action from moral and instrumental acts. Tambiah claims that rituals, understood as ‘conventionalized behaviour’ are not ‘designed or meant to express the intentions, emotions, and states of mind of individuals in a direct, spontaneous and “natural” way’ but ‘the formalization of rituals’ in turn ‘psychically distances the participants from the ritual enactment.’

Schilbrack claims that the central obstacle to an understanding of ritual as ‘actions or practices in which people engage’ is the supposition that ‘ritual activities are thoughtless’. He argues that this supposition is characteristic of ‘a set of modern views about what knowledge is’, which according to him involves the accurate representation of the external world. Ritual therefore, is treated as a ‘vehicle for thought’ and not as a ‘mode of thinking itself.’ As Bell points out, the problem with ‘the ritual-instrumental distinction’ is not only that the distinction is completely ‘alien’ ‘to many societies’ but also that ‘this distinction collapses into a problematic dichotomy of rational and irrational behavior’ and tend to cast ritual ‘as an object’ that is ‘dead’. This tendency, in both accounts, to cast off ritual activity as formalized, mimetic and non-instrumental, in their efforts to claim its universality is problematic because they are unable to accord space for the discussion of actions as narratively-structured practices, where the telos of the particular tradition, the agency of the subject and the answerability of the performed act is at the centre of ritualization. Therefore, in continuation to the notion of ritual as traditionary practice that I have highlighted in the second chapter, in this chapter, I have sought, both to retrieve the notion of traditionary practice that I have been introducing and highlight the answerability and the

198 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
202 Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, p. 72.
intentionality that constitutes it by drawing from Vedic practice of sacrifice as elaborated by Jaimini.

While the Vedic traditions and their rituals may be frowned upon for their ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘ritualism’ and their practices may have largely been discontinued (even if not entirely)\(^{203}\) in contemporary modern India, the notion of practice in Hindu cultures has always been one of the most important expressions of their worldviews and their theoretical underpinnings. Although the distinction between doctrine on the one hand, and practice on the other, has predominantly been the framework within which even scriptural traditions have generally been understood and accepted, however, the notion of practice has been so pervasive in Hindu cultures that scholars, starting with Staal, have often claimed that ‘Hindu-ism’ (taken in a general sense) is more closely identifiable as an ‘orthoprax rather than orthodox’ tradition, arguing that what matters is not what one believes but how one behaves.\(^{204}\) As Frazier has remarked, in ‘many respects the *lived* text of religious practice is a more robust manifestation of Hinduism than its written text’. This is because in Hinduism, rituals are reliably passed down through time and create ‘a point of reference across both cultural and theological shifts in contradistinction to a changing and often politically unstable political and economic history.’\(^{205}\) As Flood reminds us, the concept of *dharma*, even if variedly perceived, is precisely the central ideology of orthoprax Hinduism that derives from the revelation of the Veda (as well as the secondary revelation of the *smṛti dharma* literature) and is believed to be eternal.\(^{206}\)

\(^{203}\) For a detailed account of Vedic rituals that have survived into the modern period, see CG Kashikar & A Parpola, ‘Srauta Traditions in Recent Times’, in F Staal et al., *AGNI: The Vedic Ritual of Fire Altar*, pp. 199-251.


\(^{206}\) Flood, *An Introduction to Hinduism*, pp. 52-53.
Ritual, as highlighted above, has often been taken as a constrictive practice that favours ‘repetition’ and ‘orthodoxy’. However, the perspective from the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the conception of both authority and tradition in light of the practice of sacrifice reveals the creative dimension of ritual practice. In contrast to theories that see ritual as a form of social constraint, Jaimini emphasizes the elements of creativity and self-determination where, in the constitution and transformation of ritual subjectivity, one can identify a participatory, innovative and expressive dimension within the institution of sacrifice. Smith, in his extensive studies on Vedic rituals also emphasizes a similar creative aspect of ritual: ‘Reality, according to Vedic savants, is not given but made…sacrifice for them was not…regarded as a symbolic representation of an already concretised reality…the ritual was the workshop in which reality was forged.’

Ritual, for Jaimini, is never merely an imitation or repetition of the past but a practice where every new enactment in the ‘once-occurent’ event of sacrifice is a point at which the past and the present intersect in a fresh creation. Therefore, Vedic practices are never just thoughtless actions but are much more closer to what Bakhtin refers to as ‘participative thinking’ by the subject who takes the form of a Being-as-event answerable agent. The prescribed injunctions appropriated in every ritual practice become *participatory patterns* through which the basic human capacity to create new actions is elevated as a way of contributing to the broader structure of the Vedic tradition. As Frazier remarks, ‘practitioners are put in the role of an engineer or artist of the universe’, and in this respect one can claim that the enacted rituals are traditionary practices engaging humans in the construction of their world.

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The idea of the enjoined subject as a practice where the body (and mind) is trained to develop virtues, techniques and disciplines rather than representation is a process that unsettles the simplified bifurcation between belief and practice, myth and ritual, text and action. The introduction of the enjoined subject allows me to identify tradition as a continuity; as the ‘narrative of tradition’ that shapes the individual’s life. In following tradition, the ritual subjectivity subordinates and renounces the sense of self ‘to tradition, to a master’ in order to achieve intensification and transformation. In order to achieve this, the enjoined subject appropriates the rationality of a tradition and shapes the narrative of his life to the narrative of tradition. While this is often taken to mean the eradication of physical desires, minimizing worldly interaction, renouncing pleasures and developing the discipline of self-effacement and detachment, the Mīmāṃsā enjoined subject seeks to affirm desire by acknowledging and submitting to it, while still yet going beyond it. Therefore, it is a going beyond through appropriation and not through negation. Through acts of the will (desire) and bodily disciplines, the enjoined subject takes on the form prescribed for it by tradition and cultivates long-term patterns of behaviour. The subject, as a historically situated being, inhabits a culture, appropriates the relevant elements that makes up the rationality of the tradition, whose remembrance and affirmation of that rationality are enacted through the body in practice. In the public domain, this enactment is carried out within the institution (of sacrifice) validated by the community. In this subjective appropriation of traditions and in the enactment or re-enactment of its rationality one finds the relationship between ritual and dharma in Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras.

209 Flood, The Ascetic Self: Subjectivity, Memory and Tradition, pp. 2-3.
In this chapter, in light of the question of ritual and praxis, I discussed the nature of Vedic practice by looking at the event of sacrifice through the lens of ‘textuality’ and ‘answerability’ as its constituting factors. I argued that Jaimini’s notion of [yajña]karma as explicated in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras provides an example of a traditionary practice that goes beyond the general bifurcation of action and knowledge that was prevalent both in the Pūrva-Uttarā Mīmāṃsā debate as well as in the Western intellectual tradition. I argued that while the enactment of Vedic sacrifice is often understood to be built on a structure that necessitates predictability and formality, Jaimini’s introduction of the idea of sacrifice as an event that is unrepeatable, in the sense that every enactment is understood to be ever new (apūrva), is premised upon the answerability of the practising agent and his negotiation and construction of meaning and purpose together with others through enactment. It is in this sense that the agent can be taken to embody the traditionary telos of dharma whose characteristic is that of a codanā.

This allows me to claim that the Vedic tradition, far from being a determined and closed narrative, is a historically constituted and ongoing narrative, which not only appropriates the past but also possesses a telos that is continuously pursued and negotiated through the desirous and responsible agent in enactment. Thus, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are taken, in this thesis, as a philosophy of Vedic practice. In light of this historicality or historical situatedness, the shared cultivation and construction of the unbrokenness of tradition is brought about and maintained. This enactment, understood as the enactment of the rationality of a tradition by a desirous and answerable agent, fully constitutes the enjoined subject and ensures the realization of dharma in the event of Vedic sacrifice.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
A FINAL SUMMATION

INTRODUCTION

As noted in the introductory chapter, there is a general paucity of scholarship on Jaimini’s text, particularly as it relates to ritual, subjectivity and tradition. The attempt here at a hermeneutical re-reading of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* with the aim of seeking to establish its contemporary relevance, by excavating the insights that it can offer to the study of ritual, is but one reading amongst others. There are other readings of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, including one that sought to apply the ‘principles’ of the *Sūtras* in the contemporary field of Hindu legal law.¹ For example, Kane, a distinguished lawyer of contemporary India claims that the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation still possess practical importance for the interpretation of Hindu law and argues that they ought to be recognized by Indian courts. Kane states that although the commentaries of Śabara and Kumārila on Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* are primarily meant for expounding Vedic texts and interpreting sacrificial matters, yet, whatever fresh light they throw in the domains of jurisprudence, linguistics, geography and medicines is important even from the point of view of modern scholars.² While this example serves to suggest that the ‘contemporary relevance’ of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* can be proposed in a number of ways, this thesis has sought to do that specifically through an enquiry grounded in Jaimini’s primary concern for *dharma* and the traditionary practice of sacrifice.

¹ KL Sarkar, Gharapure and PV Kane, amongst other scholars, have highlighted the importance of Mīmāṃsā in the field of legal law in India. Justice M Rama Jois is understood to have published a volume on the legal and constitutional history of India, and Justice Markandeya Katfu is known to have borrowed from the principles of the *Mīmāṃsā-nyāyas* in his legal practice. For a detailed discussion on this, see Pandurangi, ‘General Introduction’, in KT Pandurangi (ed.), *Purvamīmāṃsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View*, p. xxviii; Āpadeva, *Mīmāṃsānyayaprakāsa: A Treatise on the Mīmāṃsā System*, p. iv.
The central argument put forward in this thesis can be more simply stated as a claim that Jaimini’s unique conception of *dharma* in his *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, when read as a philosophy of Vedic practice possessing the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, can offer substantive and methodological insights to the contemporary scholarship on ritual. This claim presupposes the following questions: What is the significance of Jaimini’s enquiry? In what way does this have any bearing on the contemporary scholarship on ritual? These two main questions were used as the guiding framework to discuss the two interrelated themes of (a) the nature of Jaiminian enquiry and (b) its contemporary relevance.

In this final conclusion, I will present a brief review of the contributions of the thesis in light of the two aims presented in the introductory chapter: (a) significance of Jaiminian enquiry and (b) its contemporary relevance for the study of ritual. I will end this concluding chapter by highlighting potential areas for further research as it relates both to Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsā* and to the study of ritual.

**JAiminian Enquiry and Ritual Studies**

The first aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that the significance of Jaimini’s vision and approach in his *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* lies in his unique conception of *dharma*. This conception is a reading of *dharma* as a philosophy of Vedic practice that possesses the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. I pursued this argument in stages throughout the three core chapters. In these chapters, I discussed the conditions that gave rise to the emergence and transformation of the enjoined subject that entailed the three modes of (a) desiring the *telos* of *dharma*, (b) appropriating the internal rationality of the Veda, and (c) enacting the practice of sacrifice within the institution validated by the community of practitioners.
I showed that Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras could be taken as a form of enquiry that is inherently dialogical in its approach. Therefore, they already possess, even if implicitly, the structure of a hermeneutic tradition whose excavation has been the preliminary task developed in this thesis. This inherent dialogism of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras derive also from (a) its location between the sacrificial Śrauta-sūtras (ritual-manuals) and the philosophical Darśana-sūtras and (b) its close interrogation and engagement within its own tradition and with other traditions of enquiry. Although this study of Jaimini’s enquiry as a philosophy of Vedic practice that possesses the structures of a hermeneutic tradition has not been previously acknowledged, this is not entirely surprising, as its ‘excavation’ was made possible only through the questions that were brought to the text. These questions arise primarily out of contentions that are specific to contemporary discourses and are located within the human sciences, particularly the interrelated study of ritual and religion.

The second aim of this thesis was to get ‘insights’ from the discussions on Jaimini’s conception of dharma for the ‘questions’ raised by contemporary debates in the study of ritual. In my efforts to maintain the claim that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are contemporarily relevant, the questions that were brought to the text from the contentions in the scholarship on ritual necessitated a hermeneutical re-reading that altered the way the Mīmāṃsāsūtras were approached and read. This hermeneutical re-reading, while it sought to maintain the internal concerns and boundaries of the tradition by engaging Jaimini’s primary concern of dharma and the intelligibility of Vedic practice, was nonetheless re-constructed in light of the questions raised from outside the Mīmāṃsā tradition. Therefore, there was an attempt at a ‘renewal’ of ‘past meanings’ in a subsequent dialogue.
In this dialogical engagement between the study of ritual and the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, I have highlighted that the main theme of the enjoinder of the subject i.e. the subject of ritual injunction introduced the possibility of critically discussing the notion of a ritual subjectivity. It is this subjectivity formed within a particular tradition that I emphasized in light of the problematic of ritual and the growing assertion for the development of ritual studies as a distinct discipline in itself.

As I have elaborated in the conceptual chapter, while there is a multiplicity of interdisciplinary theories and perspectives that have been adopted in the study and interpretation of rituals, the contemporary debate within the scholarship on ritual can be identified by two main fundamental attitudes adopted with regard to ritual. These two attitudes may be summed up by the two phrases ‘ritual as representation of’ and ‘ritual as abstracted phenomenon’, adopted by two theoretical models that may be categorized as the semiotic-symbolists and the formalist-structuralists. These two prevalent attitudes in contemporary debates were influenced by the unchallenged dichotomy between myth and ritual in classical scholarship. This dichotomy was founded upon a particular notion of ‘myth as beliefs’ and ‘ritual as action’, where beliefs and ritual were understood to correspond to activities of the mind (thought-centred) and the body (behaviour-centred) respectively. The notion of ritual-as-action, and thereby, *empty* action was not problematized by contemporary debates on ritual. Therefore, they reduced ritual to either a secondary re-presentation of larger religious, social or cultural entities or to an event that is abstracted from its concrete enactment in material reality. This ‘symbolic’ representation of ritual as an epiphenomenon and the ‘formalist’ abstraction of ritual in terms of its forms and structure outside of its context only seek to strengthen the supposition that ritual is an unreflective and thoughtless action. In an age of continuous

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reflection, ritual practices are carelessly taken to be increasingly redundant and ritual-centred traditions are largely taken to be unthinking traditions that are no longer relevant and are therefore, ‘dead’.

I have also highlighted that the Enlightenment-influenced study of ritual was guided predominantly by the adoption of a ‘universal rationality’ whose approach involved a ‘neutral’ observer who brackets his own bias and does not allow the space to acknowledge his own prejudice. In the process, he tends to overlook the cultural and historical particularity in his quest for universal and accurate representation of data. The growing scholarship on ritual in the early twentieth century saw a ‘reaction’ to this position in the works of post-critical scholars who argued for the importance of identifying the uniqueness of ritual as an act in itself. Nonetheless, they sought to locate universal features or ‘grammars’ of ritual. Both of these accounts, while they seem to be in contention, were implicitly based on the presupposition that the scholars, as observers, were distinct from the object of enquiry they wished to represent and describe. Between the modern objective analysis of ritual as ‘data’ that is seen as a window to understanding larger social phenomena and the post-modern critical analysis of ritual as an ahistorical rule-governed meaningless activity, an imbalance was created in the scholarship on ritual. These two accounts tended to present reductionist explanations of ritual that can be categorized as cultural reductionism on the one hand and structural reductionism on the other. Both these forms of reductionism offered explanations and critiques that are predominantly externalist in their respective accounts. In their hesitancy to account for the validity of traditionary truth claims as located within particular traditions, these theories were both unable to provide a conceptual space to account for the vitality of subjectivity and interiority formed by traditions that necessarily entail narratively-structured traditionary practices. As a
consequence, as Flood pointed out, such ‘externalist accounts’ tend to ‘bypass tradition-
internal concerns and forms of reasoning’ that are intelligible and can ‘make claims
upon the world and human experience’. One of the main endeavours of this thesis has
been to highlight that the study of ritual needs to take these forms of tradition-
internal rationalities and ways of forming tradition-specific subjectivities more seriously.

Unlike the reductionist accounts whose explanation of the phenomenon of ritual are
usually ‘antithetical to the internal claims of the traditions’ within which those practices
are rendered meaningful, a dialogical study of ritual, such as the one developed in this
thesis, is introduced as an exposition of traditionary-rationalities where the task is ‘to
demonstrate or translate a tradition’s semantic density into a language which is
implicitly comparative’ and therefore dialogical. This kind of account, similar to what
Flood proposed and developed for the academic study of religious traditions in his
major works, is ‘descriptive’ and phenomenological in that it wishes to offer a ‘thick
description’ in the anthropological sense. However, and more importantly, it is also
‘interpretative’ and hermeneutical in that it wishes to enquire beyond description to
interrogating the internal concerns of the tradition in the philosophical sense. This
framework of investigation entails the acceptance of the validity and ‘legitimacy of
tradition and tradition-internal concerns’, which is then argued to provide a way forward
from the problematic of having to choose between the inadequate universalism and
area-specific relativism.

In this thesis, I presented an example of the intelligibility of traditionary practice to
argue that ritual studies can be taken not just as ‘the social scientific study’ of ritual but
also as an enquiry that can give validity and legitimacy to traditions’ self-enquiry. I also

\footnote{Flood, ‘Reflections on Tradition and Inquiry in the Study of Religions’, pp. 49-50.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 50.}
\footnote{For a detailed discussion of Flood’s argument for the importance of allowing the study of religion to
become an ‘arena that gives hospitality to traditions’ self-inquiry within a framework of rational
discourse’, refer Flood, ‘Reflections on Tradition and Inquiry in the Study of Religions’, pp. 49-51.}
highlighted the need to promote the study of ritual as a field of enquiry that ‘gives hospitality to traditions and their self-representations’ and claimed that such a study is inherently dialogical whereby the concern is to engage and explore the rationalities that can be gauged from the textuality of the narratives of traditions. To claim the legitimacy of traditions’ accounts of themselves is not to establish a ‘reification’ of ritual but to establish a ‘pluralistic field of inquiry’ within which ‘the theological expression’ of particular ‘traditions are accorded a space alongside the social scientific study’ of rituals. 

Drawing from the post-Heideggerian hermeneutical tradition and borrowing insights primarily from the works of Gadamer, Ricoeur and MacIntyre, I proposed in Chapter Two that if the hermeneutical tradition can be taken to possess a structure of traditionary enquiry, it would be constituted by three conditions of understanding, which were identified as (a) a sense of shared telos, (b) the authority of an internal rationality, and (c) the institution of the practising community. Each of these conditions advanced the tradition in temporality through enquiry. In light of this structure, the question raised was - In what sense could Jaimini’s enquiry be termed as truly possessing the structure of a hermeneutic tradition?

I have argued that it is ritual subjectivity in Jaimini’s enquiry, which, through the pursuit of the telos of dharma and the appropriation and enactment of the rationality of tradition, disclosed a structure of transformation and enjoinderment that can be taken to be akin to the structures of the hermeneutical tradition. This conception of the ritual subject was then identified as the contribution that could take the discussion on the scholarship of ritual forward.

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7 Ibid., p. 54.
In Chapter Three, in light of the problem of meaning in the study of ritual, I argued that Jaimini’s proposal of sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful-practice is a way forward from the bifurcation asserting that ritual is either a meaningless activity or an activity that is meaningful only as an epiphenomenon. Towards developing this argument, I provided a brief historical overview of the world of Vedic sacrifice within which the Mīmāṃsā as a school was first begun, to help me investigate Jaimini’s rationale for his concern and unique conception of dharma as the central theme of his enquiry. I specifically discussed Jaimini’s rejection of devatās as a viable rationale for claiming the intelligibility and significance of Vedic sacrifice as a meaningful-practice and argued that Jaimini’s insistence on the pursuit of the invisible dharma even in the midst of a foundationless Vedic world point towards his concern for the continuance of the practice of sacrifice as an unbroken tradition. The quest to understand the nature of this tradition, then allowed me to introduce the Mīmāṃsā subject, who, in the first instance is a subject constituted by desire and willingly submits himself to the practice of sacrifice in his pursuit of prīth (happiness, heaven). This desirous subject is then taken as the mode through which the invisible telos of the Mīmāṃsā tradition is ultimately revealed. This mode of desire, guided by a concern for the intelligibility and meaningfulness of traditionary practice, then allowed me to discuss the first stage of enjoinderment - a stage in which the subject responds to the call of tradition, a call that emanates from a remembrance of the memory of the past.

In Chapter Four, in light of the question of ritual and rationality, I argued that although Jaimini does not explicitly articulate a concept of the rationality of traditions, his understanding and demonstration of the authority of the Veda as an infallible revelation presupposed a ‘tradition-internal reasoning’ or a rationality of tradition. Jaimini’s discussion of the originary and authorless nature of the Veda not only supported his claim that the Veda is the only means of knowing and accessing the invisible dharma
but also discloses a revelation-appropriation mechanism that constitutes the Veda as a sacred living text. This mechanism then presupposes the vitality of the enjoinment of the ritual subject. This chapter discloses that it is the internal rationality of a tradition that enjoins and constitutes the ritual subject and which the ritual subject of injunction ultimately embodies and enacts.

In Chapter Five, in light of the problem of the articulation of ritual, I discussed the nature of Vedic practice by looking at the event of sacrifice through the lens of ‘enjoinment’ and ‘answerability’ as important constitutive factors. I argued that Jaimini’s notion of yajñakarma in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras provides a way beyond the general bifurcation of action and knowledge that is prevalent both in the Mīmāṃsā as well as in the Western intellectual tradition that informs the study of ritual. I elaborated that while ritual activity is generally understood to be built on a structure that necessitates predictability and formality, Jaimini’s introduction of the idea of sacrifice as an event that is unrepeatable, in the sense that it is ever new (apūrva), is premised upon the answerability of the practising agent and his negotiation and construction of meaning together with others through enactment. In this sense, the agent is taken to be closely interrelated with dharma - the dharma whose primary characteristic is similar to that of a codanā. This allowed me to present the claim that the Vedic tradition, far from being a determined and closed narrative, is a historically-constituted and ongoing narrative. Not only does it appropriate the past but it also possesses a telos that is continuously pursued and negotiated through the desirous responsible agent in enactment. In this sense, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are taken as a philosophy of Vedic practice that is hermeneutic in orientation and it is in light of this historicality or historical situatedness that the shared cultivation and construction of the unbroken character of tradition is brought about and maintained. This enactment in the event of sacrifice is
understood as the enactment of the rationality of a tradition by a desirous and answerable agent that fully constitutes the enjoined subject, ensures the realization of dharma and also affirms the continuation of tradition.

Therefore, Jaimini, in his ritualistic conception of dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras centuries before the formal academic study of ritual is developed, provides an account of the intelligibility and vitality of traditionary practice that enables one to excavate the hermeneutical structure constituting what is discussed in contemporary scholarship as ‘ritual’. Jaimini’s notion of a traditionary practice is neither a given phenomenon nor an object that is dead but a continuity that is pursued and constructed through dedicated practice within a specific tradition in the matrix of the relationship between the living text (memory) of the particular tradition and the responsible subject that seeks to appropriate its rationality. Ritual, taken as a traditionary practice, is the event through which the meaningful pursuit and the enjoinment and embodiment of the practical rationality of a tradition is realized in enactment. This form of traditionary practice occurs in traditions that find their significance in continuity with the past and in cultures that are not yet de-cosmologized. A culture that consciously obliterates its past is unable to produce responsible practices that are identified here as rituals.

In my re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, I pointed out that the implicit mechanisms and conceptual schemas that can be excavated reflect an enquiry that is hermeneutical in orientation and can also be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice. Taking the theme of ritual subjectivity and tradition from the main chapters together, I claimed that Jaimini’s enquiry is significant not only in that it possesses the structure of a hermeneutic tradition but more importantly because those structures are disclosed through our excavation and explication of the enjoined subject - the subject who embodies the
practical rationality of the Mīmāṃsā tradition and ensures its continuation by presenting itself as a carrier and validator of tradition.

**Areas for Further Research**

Regarding the question of areas for further research, I discuss this in line with the two strands of enquiry that I have followed in this thesis. Within the scholarship on Mīmāṃsā, the excavation and recovering of the earliest Mīmāṃsā system as available through Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* remains to be explored seriously. There is a lack of critical analysis on the texts of both Jaimini and Śabara and also a need to dispel the generalized presumption that the ritual concerns of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* are irrelevant to contemporary discourses. The translations of the *Sūtras* themselves are still limited to only a handful. There have been very few attempts to clarify the true import and significance of the text as a whole, particularly in a way that assists and allows readers to reimagine ways in which the insights may be of contemporary relevance. Besides the paucity of textual studies on the Mīmāṃsā tradition, there is also a dearth of empirical researches on the Mīmāṃsā tradition as practiced today, as can still be found in certain parts of Kerala as well as the influence of the tradition on Indian culture and ways of living through the years. Investigating these areas will undoubtedly provide significant insights on the historical embodiment of the ideas of the *Sūtras* within living communities today.

Within the study of ritual, there is both a need to clarify the distinctiveness of ritual studies as a discipline and also imagine new ways to give legitimacy and respectfully account the self-understandings and self-articulations of traditions, even if they are introduced to critically engage with the social scientific study of ritual. The claim of the multi-disciplinary nature of the enquiries conducted by ritual studies remains to be truly
multi-disciplinary in that it has not sought to negotiate pluralities in their distinctive differences. A genuinely hospitable and multi-voiced discursive practice has yet to be initiated.
APPENDIX

SANSKRIT SŪTRAS CITED IN THE TEXT

All individual references to those sūtras which are fully translated anywhere in the texts are listed below:

MS 1.1.1: Athāto dharmajijñāsā.
MS 1.1.2: Codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmāḥ
MS 1.1.4: Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyānāṁ buddhijanaṁ tat pratyakṣam animittāṁ vidyamānapalambhanatvāt
MS 1.1.5: Autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhāḥ, tasya jñānam upadeśo ’vyatirekaś cārthe' nupalabdhe tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapakṣatvāt
MS 1.1.6: Karmāike tatra darśanāt
MS 1.1.7: Āsthānāt
MS 1.1.8: Karotiśabdāt
MS 1.1.9: Sattvāntare ca yaugapadyāt
MS 1.1.10: Praktirvikṛtyośca
MS 1.1.11: Vṛddhiśca kartārbhūmnāsyā
MS 1.1.13: Sātāṁ paramadarśanāṁ visāyānāgamāt
MS 1.1.14: Prayogasya param
MS 1.1.16: Vāṃśāntarām avikārah
MS 1.1.18: Nityastu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt
MS 1.1.24: ĚUpatvau va ’vacanāḥ syur arthasyāt annimitattvāt
MS 1.1.26: Loke sanniyyamanāt prayogasannikarṣaṁ syāt
MS 1.1.27: Vedāṁś caike sannikarṣaṁ puruṣākhyāḥ
MS 1.1.29: Uktantu śabdapūrvatvaṁ
MS 1.1.30: Ākhyāḥ pravacanāt
MS 1.1.31: Parantu śrutisāmānyamātṝam

MS 1.2.1: Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvādānārthakhyaamatadarthānāṁ tasmādaṇityamucyate
MS 1.2.7: Vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stuty arthena vidhinā syuḥ
MS 1.2.17: Phalasya karmanispattes tesaṁ lokavat parimāṇaṁ phalaviśesaḥ syāt
MS 1.2.19: Vidhīrvā syād apūrvatvād vādamātraṁ hy anarthakam
MS 1.2.23: Vidhīścānarthakaḥ kvacit tasmātstutis tṛtīyam tattāmānyāditaresu tathātvam
MS 1.2.24: Prakarāṇe sambhavam apakarṣo na kalpyeta vidhyānarthakyaṁ hi tam prati
MS 1.2.25: Vidyau ca vākyabhedaḥ syāt
MS 1.2.26: Heturvā syādarthavatvopapattibhyām
MS 1.2.27: Stutistu śabdapūrvatvāt acodanā ca tasyā
MS 1.2.28: Ārthe stutiranyāyeyeti cet
MS 1.2.29: Arthastu vidihiśeṇaḥ syāt yathā loke
MS 1.2.31: Tadarthaśaṅstrāt
MS 1.2.32: Vākyaniyamāt
MS 1.2.33: Bhuddhāśaṅstrāt
MS 1.2.34: Avidyāmānavacanāt
MS 1.2.35: Acetane ’rthabandhanāt

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MS 1.2.36: Arthavipratiśedhāt
MS 1.2.37: Svādhyāyavad vacanāt
MS 1.2.38: Avijñeyāt
MS 1.2.39: Anityasamyojānamantrānarthakāyān
MS 1.2.40: Avijñiṣṭāstuvākyārthaḥ
MS 1.2.41: Guṇārthena punaḥ śrutiḥ
MS 1.2.42: Parīśāṅkhya
MS 1.2.43: Arthavādo vā
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MS 1.2.44: Aviruddhaṁ param
MS 1.2.45: Sampraiṣe karmagarhānapalambhaḥ saṁskāratvāt
MS 1.2.46: Abhidhānena ʼṛthaṁvāḥ
cn
MS 1.2.47: Guṇādapratiṣedhāḥ syāt
cn
MS 1.2.48: Vidyāvacanamasamyojāt
MS 1.2.49: Satah paramaviṣṇānāṃ
cn
MS 1.2.50: Uktasāntyojānayogāḥ
cn
MS 1.2.51: Śīngopadeśaśca tadarthatvāt
cn
MS 1.2.52: Ūhaḥ
cn
MS 1.2.53: Vidhiśabdāśca
cn
MS 1.3.1.1: Dharmasya śabdamaṁvatāt aśabdamanapekṣyaṁ syāt
cn
MS 1.3.2.1: Api vā kartṛsāṃdyāt pramāṇamanumānāṃ syāt
cn
MS 1.3.3.1: Virodhe tvaṇapekṣyaṁ syāt asati hyanumānāṃ
cn
MS 1.3.4.1: Hetudarśānāccca
cn
MS 1.3.5.1: Śiṣṭākope viruddhamiti cet
cn
MS 1.3.6.1: Na śastraparimāntvāt
cn
MS 1.3.7.1: Api vā karaṇāgrahe prayuktānipratīyeran
cn
MS 1.3.23.1: Tulyāni tu kartṛdharmena
cn
MS 1.3.33.1: Akṛtistu kriyārthatvāt
cn
MS 1.4.1.1: Uktāṁ sāmāṇṇyadamarthya tasmāt sarvaṁ tadartham syāt
cn
MS 1.4.2.1: Api vā nāmadheyaṁ syāt yadutpatīvā apūrvvaṁ avidhāyakatvāt
cn
MS 1.4.6.1: Nāmadheya guṇaṅkṣuteḥ syād vidhānamiti cet
cn
MS 2.1.1.1: Bhāvārthaḥ karnaśabdābh tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyetaiśahyartho vidhiyate
cn
MS 2.1.2.1: Sarveśāṁ bhāvo 'ṛtha iti cet
cn
MS 2.1.3.1: Yeṣāṁputtātve sve prayogye rūpopalabalbhistāṁ nāmāṁ tasmāt tebhyaḥ
cn
MS 2.1.4.1: Yeṣāṁ tātputtāvarthe sve prayoge na vidyate tāṁyākhyātāṁ tasmāt tebhyaḥ
cn
MS 2.1.5.1: Codanā punarārāmbhaḥ
cn
MS 2.1.6.1: Tāṁ āvādham guṇapradhānabhūtāṇi
cn
MS 2.1.7.1: Yairdravyam na cikīryate tāṁ pradhānabhūtāṇi dravyasya varnaṁ tātvaratvāt
cn
MS 2.1.8.1: Yāstu dravyam cikīryate gūṇastra pratiyeta tasya dravyapradhānātvar
cn
MS 2.1.9.1: Dharmamārte tu karma syādaṁ ni vṛttatvāt prayogasya
cn
MS 2.1.10.1: Tulyasṛutitvādvā itaraiḥ sadharmaḥ syāt
cn
MS 2.1.11.1: Dravyopadeśa iti cet
cn
MS 2.1.12.1: Na tadarthatvat lokavat, tasya ca śesabhūtatvat
cn
MS 2.1.30.1: Vidhiṁantaror aiṁrthiḥ am aiṣaṣabdyāt
cn
MS 2.1.31.1: Api vā prayogasāmarthyaḥ mantro 'bhidhānavacśi syāt
cn
MS 2.1.32.1: Taccodakeśu mantrākhyā
cn
MS 2.1.33.1: Šeṣe brāhmaṇaṁsabdaḥ
cn
MS 2.1.34.1: Anāmnāteṣvamantratvamāmnāteṣu hi vibhāgaḥ syāt
MS 2.1.35: Teṣāmṛg yatrārthavaśena pādavyavasthā
MS 2.1.36: Gītisu sāmākyā
g
MS 2.1.37: Šeṣe yajuhśabdaḥ
g
MS 2.1.41: Vacanādharmaviśeṣaḥ

MS 2.3.23: Tatsaṃyogat kratustadāḥkhyāḥ syāt tena dharmavidhānāni

MS 2.4.2: Kraturvā śrutisaṃyogat
MS 2.4.3: Lingadarśanācaka karmadharme hi prakrameṇa niyameta
tatrānārthakarmanavat syāt
MS 2.4.4: Vyapavargaṁ ca darśayati kālaścet karmabhedaḥ syāt
MS 2.4.5: Aṇītyatvāt tu naivaḥ syāt
MS 2.4.6: Virodhaścāpi pūrvavat
MS 2.4.7: Kartustu dharmaniyamāt kālaśastraṁ nimittāṁ syāt
MS 2.4.8: Nāmārūpadharma
visēṣapunaruktaṁindā'saktisamāptivacanaprāyaścittāṁyārthadarśanāt śākhāntareasu
karmabhedaḥ syāt
MS 2.4.9: Ekam vā samyo-garūpacodonākhyāviśeṣaḥ

MS 3.1.2: Šeṣaḥ parārthavatar
MS 3.1.3: Dravya-guṇasaṁskāreṣu bādariḥ
g
MS 3.1.4: Karmāṇyapi jaimiṁih phalārthāvat
MS 3.1.5: Phalam ca puruṣārthavat
MS 3.1.6: Puruṣāśca karmāḥḥhatvāt
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MS 3.1.7: Teṣāmarthena sambandhaḥ
g
MS 3.1.9: Arthalo-pādakarma syāt

MS 3.2.22: Anarthakaṣcopadesaḥ syādaṁsambandhāḥ phala-vatāna hyupasthānām
phalavat
MS 3.2.23: Sarveṣāṁ copadiṣṭatvat

MS 3.3.35 Tatsarvārthhamaviśeṣaḥ
MS 3.3.36 Carau vā, arthoktaṁ puroḍāśē’rthavipratiṣedhātpaśau syāt
MS 3.3.40: Dharmavipratiṣedhācca

MS 3.4.1: Nīvatimiti manuṣya-dharmaḥ śabdasya tatpradhānāvah
MS 3.4.3: Vidhis tv apūrvavatvāt syāt
MS 3.4.20: Aprakaranve tu taddharmas tato viṣeṣāḥ

MS 3.5.21: Vacanāṁ tv apūrvavatvāt tasmād yathopadesaṁ syuḥ

MS 3.7.6: Phalasaṃyogat tu svāmiyuktāṁ pradhānāsyā
MS 3.7.18: Śāstraphalāṁ prayoktāṁ tallakṣaṇatvat tasmāt svayaṁ prayoge syāt
MS 3.7.19: Utsarge tu pradhānāvatvācchēsakārī pradhānāsyā, tasmādanyah svayaṁ vā syāt
MS 3.7.20: Pradhānāvatvāt śeṣa-kārī pradhānāsyā, tasmād anyah svayaṁ vā syāt
MS 3.7.36: Nīyamastu dākṣiṇābhīḥ śrutisaṃyogā
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MS 3.7.38: Svāmisaptadaśāḥ karmasāmānyāḥ
MS 3.7.51: Tadgūṇādhvā svadharmaḥ syād adhikārasāmarmthyāt sahāṅgairavyaktaḥ śeṣe

MS 4.1.1: Athātaḥ kratvartha-purūṣārthāhayorjijñāsā
MS 4.1.2: Yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya līpāḥ 'rhalakṣaṇāvibhaktatvāt
MS 4.1.3: Tadutsarge karmāṇi puruṣārthāya śāstrainātisānkyatvāṇa ca drayāṁ
cikīryate tenārthenābhisambandhaḥ kriyaṁ puruṣāsrutīḥ
MS 4.1.5: Api vā kārāṇaḥ 'grahane tadarathamthasyāḥ 'nabhisambandhāt
MS 4.1.6: Tathā ca lokabhūtesu
MS 4.1.22: Ekānispatteḥ sarvāṁ sāṁśyaḥ syāt
MS 4.1.23: Saṁsargarasaṇispatteṁ kāśikāṁ vā pradhānāṁ syāt
MS 4.1.24: Mukhyaśabdābhīṣaṁstvaścānca
MS 4.2.11: Pratipattirvā śābdaśya tatpradhānāvatvāt
MS 4.2.23: Kārtūrdeśakālāñmaṇacodanāṁ prayoge niyāsamavāyāt
MS 4.2.27: Yajātīcādanyā śrayādevatākriyaṁ samudāye kṛtaṁ kṛthaṁ syāt

MS 4.3.1: Dravyasāṁśakārakasam parārthatvāt phalaśrutirarthavādaḥ syāt
MS 4.3.4: Nāmānttreṇa vikāratvāt kratuḥpradhānāmamanyat syāt
MS 4.3.5: Ekasya tūbhayatve sāmyogapṛthaktaṁ
MS 4.3.7: Nāṁśrutīkāravatvāt
MS 4.3.10: Codanāmyāṁ phalaśrutē karmamārtraiṇi vidhiyate na hysaṁbdaṁ pratīyate
MS 4.3.11: Api vā māṁśasāmārthāyāc codanārthena ganyate arthāṁ hyarthavattvena
vacanāṁ pratiyante arthato hyasamarthānāmānāntaryyā 'pyasambandhaḥ
tasmācṛutiyakadesaḥ
MS 4.3.14: Ekāṁ vā codanaikatvāt
MS 4.3.15: Sa svargāṁ syāt, sarvāṁ prayaviṣṭaṁtyatṭvāt
MS 4.3.16: Prayāyācāna

MS 5.1.16: Mantratastu virodhe syāt prayogarūpasāmārthāyāt tasmādutpattideśaḥ saḥ
MS 5.1.29: Tathā pūrvaṁ

MS 6.1.3: Pratyaṁthāṁ cā 'bhisamioṇoṣṭa karmato hy abhisambandhaḥ tasmāt
carmopadeśaḥ syāt
MS 6.1.4: Phalaśrutihatvāt karmāṇaḥ śāstrair sarvādhikāraṁ syāt
MS 6.1.5: Kartuvāḥ śrutisāmyogāḥ vidhiḥ kārtryena ganyate
MS 6.1.6: Liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśātāntu puṇyākttamaiśārayanaḥ
MS 6.1.7: Taduktātīvāca dosaśrutiravijñāte
MS 6.1.8: Jātiṁ tu bādaraṇyaṇo 'viśeṣat tasmāt strayaṁ pratiyeta jātyarthaśyāviṣṭaṁtyatvāt
MS 6.1.10: Dravyavāttvātu puṁsāṁ syāt dravyasamyoṁkartaṁ krayavikrayābhāyāṁ
dravyatvātvarāṁ strīṇām dravyāṁ samānayogītvāt
MS 6.1.12: Tādarthyāṁ karmatādarthyaṁ
MS 6.1.13: Phalotsāhā 'viśeṣāt
MS 6.1.14: Arthena ca samavetatvāt
MS 6.1.15: Krayasya dharmanātratvaṁ
MS 6.1.16: Svavattāmapi darśayati
MS 6.1.17: Svavatoṣu vacanādaiṇkakarmayāṁ syāt
MS 6.1.20: Phalaśrutihatvāt svāmītempā 'bhisambandhaḥ
MS 6.1.24: Tasyāḥ yāvaduktaṁśirbrahmacyamatiḥsūkratvatvāt
MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyaṁ aviṣeṣāt
MS 6.1.26: Nīrdeśāvāt trayāṇāṁ syādagnyādheye hyasambandhaḥ kratuṣu
brāhmaṇaśrutirūtryārayaḥ
MS 6.1.27: Nīmittrathena bādariḥ tasmāt sarvādhikāraḥ syāt
MS 6.1.28: Api vā 'nyārthhadarśanat yathāsrutim pratiyeta
MS 6.1.35: Saṁśkāraṁyā tambhāgaḥ puruṣāsrutīḥ
MS 6.1.37: Avaidyavādabhāvāḥ karmāṇi syāt
MS 6.3.32: Trayāṇāṁ dravyasampannah karmāṇo dravyasiddhītvāt
MS 6.3.40: Anityavātu naivaṁ syādārthādīhi dravyasanyogaḥ
MS 6.3.41: Āṅgahīnaśca taddharmā
MS 6.3.42: Utpattau nityasanyogāt
MS 6.3.44: Vacanād rathakārasyādīhāne ’syā sarvaśeṣatvāt
MS 6.3.51: Sthapatirmiśādaḥ syāt śabdāsāmarthyāt

MS 6.2.1: Purusārthaiṣadvīdhitvāt tasya tasyādīhikārah syāt
MS 6.2.2: Api cotpattisanyogyo yathā syāt sattvadarsanam, tathā bhāvo vibhāge syāt
MS 6.2.6: Api vā kāmasanyoge sambandhāt prayaṅgyopadiṣyeta prayārtha hi vidhiśruti viśāyava

MS 6.2.9: Phalākāmā nimittamiti cet
MS 6.2.13: Prakramāt tu niyanyetāsambhavasya kriyānimittatvāt
MS 6.2.14: Phalārthiḥvādāv’ niyamo yathānupakānte
MS 6.2.15: Niyamo vā tanniṃittatvāt kartustatkāraṇam syāt
MS 6.2.16: Ṛoke karmāṇi vedavattato ‘dhipuruṣajñānam
MS 6.2.17: Aparādhe’pi ca taḥ sāstraṃ
MS 6.3.18: Na devatāgniśabdakṛtyamanyārthasanyogat
MS 6.3.21: Tathā svāminah phalasamavāyāt phalasya karyadgītāt

MS 6.5.5: Apūrvatadvādhiḥanam syāt

MS 6.7.14: Ahargaṇe ca taddharmā syāt sarvesāmaviśeṣat
MS 7.1.1: Sṛutipramāṇatvācchesāṇāṁ mukhyabhede yathādhikārah bhāvaḥ syāt
MS 7.1.2: Utpattyarthāvibhāgādvā sattvavadāikadhamyāṁ syāt
MS 7.1.3: Codanāśeṣabhadvādvā tadbhedādvayaṭiṣṭheran utpatteṛguṇabhūtattvāt
MS 7.1.4: Sattve laksanāsanyogat sārvatrīkāṃ pratīyeta
MS 7.1.5: Avibhāgattvā naivaṁ syāt
MS 7.1.6: Dvyarathavāṁ ca vipraṭiṣṭhiddham
MS 7.1.7: Utpattau vidhyabhāvādvā codanāyāṁ pravṛttiḥ syāt, tataḥcā karmabhedaḥ syāt
MS 7.1.8: Yadi vā pyabhidhānavat sāmāṇyāt sarvadharmaḥ syāt
MS 7.1.9: Arthasya tvāvibhakatatyathā syādabhidhāneṣu pūrvavatvāt prayogasya, karmāṇaḥ śabdabhāvyavatvādvibhāgācchesāṇāmapravṛttiḥ syāt
MS 7.1.10: Smṛtiḥi cet
MS 7.1.11: Na pūrvavatvāt
MS 7.1.12: Arthasya śabdabhāvyavatvāt prakaraṇanibandhanācchabdādevānyaatra bhāva’ syāt

MS 7.4.10: Vidhyanto vā prakṛtvaccodanāyāṁ pravarteta tathā hi liṅgadarśanaṃ
MS 8.1.1: Atha viśeṣalakṣanaṃ
MS 8.1.5: Kṛṣṇaṇidhānādvā’pūrvatvaṃ
MS 8.1.34: Gūṇataṃṇa devatāśrutiḥ
MS 8.1.35: Hiranyamājyadharmā, tejavaṭvāt
MS 8.1.36: Dharmaṇugrahaḥca
MS 8.1.37: Aśadhaṁ vā viśadtvāt
MS 8.3.32: Drṣṭaḥ prayogā iti cet
MS 9.1.1: Yajñakarma pradhānaṁ taddhi codanāḥūtaṁ tasya dravyeṣu sanākārastatprayuktastadarthatvāt
MS 9.1.2: Sanākāre yujyamānāṁ tādarthyātatprayuktāṁ syāt
MS 9.1.3: Tena tvarhena yajñasya saṁyogād dharmasambandhastasmādyājnaprayuktāṁ syāt sanākāsya tadarthatvāt
MS 9.1.4: Phaladevatayōśca
MS 9.1.5: Na codanāto hi tādguṇyām
MS 9.1.6: Devatā vā prayojayetithivad bhojanasya tadarthatvāt
MS 9.1.7: Ārāhapatyācca
MS 9.1.8: Tataśca tena sambandhah
MS 9.1.9: Api vā śabdapūrvatvādyājnakarma pradhānaṁ syād guṇatve devatāśrutīḥ
MS 9.1.10: Atithau tatpradhānaṁ abhāvah karmanī syāttasya prātipradhānaṁtāt
MS 9.1.13: Artho vā syat prayojanamit cascadeCodanāṁtasya ca guṇabhūtavāt
MS 9.1.26: Agnidharmah pratiṣṭakāṁ sanghātātpaurnamāsīvat
MS 9.1.27: Agnervā syād dravyākātvāditarāśāṁ tadarthatvāt

MS 9.2.43: Ākhya caivaṁ tadāvesād vikṛtau syād pūrvatvāt

MS 9.3.20: Apūrve tvavikāro ’pradeśāt prātiṣṭheta

MS 9.4.1: Saḍaviṁśatāśatrabhyāṣena paṣugaṇe tatprākṛtitvād gunasya pravibhaktatvādvikārō hi tāsāmakārtrsnyenābhisambandho vikārāṁnaḥ samāsāḥ syādāsāmyogācchā sarvābhiḥ
MS 9.4.39: Vratadharmanā ca lepavit
MS 9.4.41: Abhyudaye dohāpanayaḥ sadhānā syāt pravṛttatvāt

MS 10.2.22: Rtvigānāṁ dharāmāṭrārthaṁ syāddadātisāmarthyāt
MS 10.2.23: Parikrāyathāṁ vā karmasāmyogāllokaṁvā
dharmamatratvāt
MS 10.2.37: Syādvā prāśārpikasya dharāmāṭravāt
MS 10.2.38: Na daśaṁśaśabdaṁ tasmānityāṇvādaḥ syāt
MS 10.2.39: Udavasānīyaḥ satradharmā syāt taḍāṅgatvātata dānam dharāmāṭraṁ syāt
MS 10.2.40: Na tvatprākṛtitvādvibhaktacoditavācchā
MS 10.2.69: Naṁmittike tu kāryatvāḥ prakṛteḥ syāt tadāpateḥ

MS 10.4.23: Vidhiśabdasya mantratvaṁ bhāvah syāt tena codanā

MS 10.5.11: Ekasyāṁ vā stomasyāvṛttidharmatvāt
MS 10.5.24: Dhuryesvapāti cet

MS 10.6.45: Satramekaḥ prakṛtvāt
MS 10.6.46: Vacanāḥ tu bahūṁnaṁ syāt
MS 10.6.47: Apadeśaḥ syāditi cet
MS 10.6.48: Na ekavyapadeśaḥ
MS 10.6.49: Sannivāpaṇca darśayati
MS 10.6.50: Bahūṁnaṁci caikasmīn viśeṣavacanāṁ vyarthāṁ
MS 10.6.59: Dwādāsāḥyaḥ ṛtravem ṛṇāpāyicodanena yaṁjanānaḥahutvena ca satsraśabdhābhisajyogāt
MS 10.6.60: Yajaticodanādahinatvāṁ svāmināṁ cāḥṣhitaparimāṇatvāt

MS 11.1.1: Prayahojanābhisambandhāḥ prathak satāṁ tataḥ syādaikakarmayamekasabdābhisajyogāt
MS 11.1.6: Arthabhedastu tatrārthehāikārthyaādaikakarmyaṁ
MS 11.1.20: Karmanyārmbhabhāvyatvāt kṛṣivat pratyārmbham phalānī syuḥ
MS 11.1.21: Adhikāraś ca sarveśāṁ kāryatvād upapadyate viśeṣaḥ
MS 11.1.22: Sakṛttu syāt kṛṭarthatvādaṅgavat
MS 11.1.23: Śabdārthaśca tathā loke
MS 11.1.24: Api vā samprayoge yathākāmī samprafiṣyetāśrutivyādvidhiṣu vacanāṁ syuḥ
MS 11.1.25: Aikaśabdyāt tathāṅgeṣu
MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā ṛthalakṣanaṁ
MS 11.1.27: Kriyānāmarthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣo ‘tastannirvṛttyā ‘pavargaḥ syāt
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātre tvadarśanāc chadbārthenāpavargaḥ syāt
MS 11.1.39: Drṣṭaḥ prayoga iti cet

MS 11.3.6: Tatkālastu yāpakarmatvāttasya dharmavidhānāṁ sarvārthānāṁ ca vacanādanyakālātvaṁ
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