Attack trees in Isabelle

Kammueller, Florian ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5839-5488 (2018) Attack trees in Isabelle. Information and Communications Security: 20th International Conference, ICICS 2018, Lille, France, October 29-31, 2018, Proceedings. In: 20th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2018, 29-31 Oct 2018, Lille, France. ISBN 9783030019495. ISSN 0302-9743 [Conference or Workshop Item] (doi:10.1007/978-3-030-01950-1_36)

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a proof theory for attack trees. Attack trees are a well established and useful model for the construction of attacks on systems since they allow a stepwise exploration of high level attacks in application scenarios. Using the expressiveness of Higher Order Logic in Isabelle, we succeed in developing a generic theory of attack trees with a state-based semantics based on Kripke structures and CTL. The resulting framework allows mechanically supported logic analysis of the meta-theory of the proof calculus of attack trees and at the same time the developed proof theory enables application to case studies. A central correctness and completeness result proved in Isabelle establishes a connection between the notion of attack tree validity and CTL. The application is illustrated on the example of a healthcare IoT system and GDPR compliance verification.

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