Hierarchical invasion of cooperation in complex networks

Vilone, Daniele, Capraro, Valerio and Ramasco, José J. (2018) Hierarchical invasion of cooperation in complex networks. Journal of Physics Communications, 2 (2). ISSN 2399-6528 (doi:10.1088/2399-6528/aaab2e)

[img]
Preview
PDF - Published version (with publisher's formatting)
Download (862kB) | Preview
[img] PDF - Draft pre-submission version (with author's formatting)
Restricted to Repository staff and depositor only

Download (499kB)

Abstract

The emergence and survival of cooperation is one of the hardest problems still open in science. Several factors such as the existence of punishment, repeated interactions, topological effects and the formation of prestige may all contribute to explain the counter-intuitive prevalence of cooperation in natural and social systems. The characteristics of the interaction networks have been also signaled as an element favoring the persistence of cooperators. Here we consider the invasion dynamics of cooperative behaviors in complex topologies. The invasion of a heterogeneous network fully occupied by defectors is performed starting from nodes with a given number of connections (degree) k0. The system is then evolved within a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the outcome is analyzed as a function of k0 and the degree k of the nodes adopting cooperation. Carried out using both numerical and analytical approaches, our results show that the invasion proceeds following preferentially a hierarchical order in the nodes from those with higher degree to those with lower degree. However, the invasion of cooperation will succeed only when the initial cooperators are numerous enough to form a cluster from which cooperation can spread. This implies that the initial condition has to be a suitable equilibrium between high degree and high numerosity. These findings have potential applications to the problem of promoting pro-social behaviors in complex networks.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Article number = 025019
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 25708
Notes on copyright: Copyright information: © 2018 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd.

Original content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Valerio Capraro
Date Deposited: 26 Nov 2018 12:26
Last Modified: 29 Nov 2019 21:59
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/25708

Actions (login required)

Edit Item Edit Item

Full text downloads (NB count will be zero if no full text documents are attached to the record)

Downloads per month over the past year