Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size
Mavridis, Christos and Serena, Marco (2018) Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, 177 (1-2) . pp. 53-66. ISSN 0048-5829 (doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6)
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Abstract
We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0,1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Research Areas: | A. > Business School > Economics |
| Item ID: | 25614 |
| Notes on copyright: | © The Author(s) 2018. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made |
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| Depositing User: | Christos Mavridis |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Nov 2018 12:41 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2019 10:06 |
| URI: | https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/25614 |
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