Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

Mavridis, Christos and Serena, Marco (2018) Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, 177 (1-2) . pp. 53-66. ISSN 0048-5829 (doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6)

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Abstract

We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0,1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 25614
Notes on copyright: © The Author(s) 2018. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made
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Depositing User: Christos Mavridis
Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2018 12:41
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2019 10:06
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/25614

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