The spillover effect of enforcement actions on bank risk-taking

Caiazza, Stefano, Cotugno, Matteo, Fiordelisi, Franco and Stefanelli, Valeria (2018) The spillover effect of enforcement actions on bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 91 . pp. 146-159. ISSN 0378-4266 [Article] (doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.04.008)

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Abstract

Enforcement actions (sanctions) aim to penalize guilty companies and provide examples to other com- panies that bad behavior will be penalized. A handful of papers analyze the consequences of sanctions in banking for sanctioned companies, while no papers have investigated the spillover effects on non- sanctioned banks. Focusing on credit-related sanctions, we show the existence of a spillover effect: non- sanctioned banks behave similar to sanctioned banks, depending on their degree of similarity, offloading problematic loans and reducing their lending activity

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Accounting and Finance
Item ID: 24860
Notes on copyright: © 2018. This author's accepted manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Depositing User: Franco Fiordelisi
Date Deposited: 30 Aug 2018 11:56
Last Modified: 14 Jun 2021 05:37
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/24860

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