Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation

Charness, Gary, Blanco-Jimenez, Celia, Ezquerra, Lara and Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael (2019) Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation. Experimental Economics, 22 (1). pp. 155-177. ISSN 1386-4157 (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9584-1)

[img]
Preview
PDF - Final accepted version (with author's formatting)
Download (3MB) | Preview

Abstract

We use different incentive schemes to study truth-telling in a die-roll task when people are asked to reveal the number rolled privately. We find no significant evidence of cheating when there are no financial incentives associated with the reports, but do find evidence of such when the reports determine financial gains or losses (in different treatments). We find no evidence of loss aversion in the standard case in which subjects receive their earnings in a sealed envelope at the end of the session. When subjects manipulate the possible earnings, we find evidence of less cheating, particularly in the loss setting; in fact, there is no significant difference in behavior between the non-incentivized case and the loss setting with money manipulation. We interpret our findings in terms of the moral cost of cheating and differences in the perceived trust and beliefs in the gain and the loss frames.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 24513
Notes on copyright: This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Experimental Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9584-1
Depositing User: Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2018 14:26
Last Modified: 05 Jul 2019 17:17
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/24513

Actions (login required)

Edit Item Edit Item

Full text downloads (NB count will be zero if no full text documents are attached to the record)

Downloads per month over the past year