A union default: a policy to raise union membership, promote the freedom to associate, protect the freedom not to associate and progress union representation

Harcourt, Mark, Gall, Gregor, Kumar, Rinu Vimal and Croucher, Richard ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9617-734X (2019) A union default: a policy to raise union membership, promote the freedom to associate, protect the freedom not to associate and progress union representation. Industrial Law Journal, 48 (1) . pp. 66-97. ISSN 0305-9332 [Article] (doi:10.1093/indlaw/dwy005)

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Abstract

Workers are defaulted to being non-union in employment relationships across the world. A non-union default likely has substantial negative effects, consistent with the empirical literature reviewed, on union membership levels, because of switching costs, inertia, social norms, and loss aversion. A union default would likely have positive effects on union membership, and has the additional virtues of partially internalising the public goods externalities of unions, improving the freedom to associate (the right to join a union), and preserving the freedom not to associate (the right not to join a union). A union default would also strengthen the extent and effectiveness of union representation.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Leadership, Work and Organisations > Diversity and Gender group
Item ID: 24017
Notes on copyright: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The version of record Mark Harcourt, Gregor Gall, Rinu Vimal Kumar, Richard Croucher; A Union Default: A Policy to Raise Union Membership, Promote the Freedom to Associate, Protect the Freedom not to Associate and Progress Union Representation, Industrial Law Journal, Volume 48, Issue 1, March 2019, Pages 66–97, is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/ilj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/indlaw/dwy005/5040332 and https://doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dwy005.
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Depositing User: Mark Houssart
Date Deposited: 28 Mar 2018 13:27
Last Modified: 22 Jun 2020 09:47
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/24017

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