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INTERTEXTUAL CHAOS?
INVESTIGATING PAUL’S USE OF HOSEA IN ROMANS 9:25-26 IN LIGHT
OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

A Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Middlesex University
Supervised at London School of Theology
November 2017
ABSTRACT

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University of Middlesex / London School of Theology
2017

In Romans, Paul quotes OT texts to argue for the covenant inclusion of the Gentiles. Two important quotations, from a hermeneutical standpoint, are Hos 2:23 (2:25 LXX) and 1:10 (2:1 LXX) in Rom 9:25-26, which are presented here as a case study for testing the relevance of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic for biblical studies. Paul’s quotations are thought-provoking because there seem to be difficulties reconciling the quoted texts’ original agenda with his own at the time of writing. The oracles were originally used to argue for the inclusion of rebellious Israel, not Gentiles as Paul argues. Thus, the issue of competing agendas becomes quickly apparent. Past scholarship has addressed this issue in various ways with little consensus being reached. This thesis utilizes Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as a clarifying way forward. Despite the significance and relevance of his work, Gadamer has not influenced biblical scholarship as deeply as one might have expected. The most significant contribution this thesis makes, therefore, is to bring Gadamer’s hermeneutic to bear upon the issue of biblical intertextuality as evidenced in the use of Hosea in Romans.

Part One introduces the issues and surveys the ways some scholars have sought to understand them (chapter 1). A Gadamerian approach is proposed as a way forward (chapter 2). Part Two outlines Gadamer’s philosophy, which includes a sketch of his scholarly context (chapters 3-4). Part Three revisits the intertextual intricacies in key parts of Romans through the lens of a Gadamerian hermeneutic. Relevant motifs that shape Paul’s and Hosea’s horizons are identified and traced, lending insight to Rom 9:25-26. This is aided by an examination of key texts from the CD and Pesharim (chapters 5-6). Conclusions are then synthesized, bringing clarity to Rom 9:25-26 (chapter 7). Finally, a summary is given, and areas for future enquiry are proposed (chapter 8).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of many people. I would like to thank Dr. Thorsten Moritz, mein Doktorvater. His critical eye and supervision throughout my project has been constructive and encouraging. Indeed, I would not have given much attention to Gadamer’s hermeneutic at all had it not been for his direction. I am appreciative also to Dr. Graham Twelftree whose willingness to read over several portions of my thesis was most helpful. I would also like to thank Drs. Steve Walton and Jean-Marc Heimerdinger, who served on my initial M.Phil. transfer committee, as well as Drs. Conrad Gempf and Mark Beaumont, who comprised my Ph.D. upgrade committee. Each of these scholars’ advice and guidance was encouraging to me throughout the entire process.

I remain indebted to Drs. Delio Delrio and Preston Sprinkle, whose invaluable feedback on conference papers helped give shape to my research below. I am thankful to Drs. William Elkins, Heath Thomas, Rudy González, and Darlene Gautsch, all of whom have been a major source of encouragement to me personally and academically. I was very encouraged by the brief (though very meaningful) conversations I was privileged to have had with Gadamer scholar, the late Dr. Richard Palmer. I will always remember his helpful and kind spirit. I remain thankful to the faculty, staff, and students at Eternity Bible College, where I am privileged to serve as adjunct professor. A note of thanks, especially, goes to Joshua Walker, my academic dean, who graciously allows me to teach students each semester. I am also thankful to Andrew Hollingsworth, a fellow scholar, with whom I have had many stimulating conversations.

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Much acknowledgement is due to my family. My parents and grandparents were most encouraging with both their words and financial support. Most of all, my wife, Tosha, has been an anchor. It is simply impossible to count how many times she has had to pull double duty while I was secluded in my office working on this project. Her continued support, like her beauty, has left me in humbling awe. I am thankful that I can finally tell my children – Isaac, Gracie, and Hannah – that, “Daddy is finally finished with his paper.” I am convinced that it was their smiles and bedtimes prayers that have made it possible to get to this point. (We await in anticipation, too, for the newest addition to our family – coming in just a few short months!)

Finally, the Lord’s kindness and grace has been abundant throughout this entire process. My prayer is that the Holy Spirit would use this thesis to bring the Father glory, honor, and praise, fostering unity in the church catholic under the name of Jesus Christ.

M.L.H.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Anchor Bible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCBS</td>
<td>A Compendium of Contemporary Biblical Scholarship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AARTTS</td>
<td>American Academy of Religion Texts and Translation Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBR</td>
<td>Bulletin for Biblical Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BECNT</td>
<td>Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNTC</td>
<td>Black's New Testament Commentaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSac</td>
<td>Bibliotheca sacra</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJHP</td>
<td>British Journal for the History of Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZNW</td>
<td>Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neuestamentliche Wissenschaft</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBQ</td>
<td>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Contemporary Continental Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Continental European Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRBS</td>
<td>Currents in Research: Biblical Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRINT</td>
<td>Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQS</td>
<td>Companion to the Qumran Scrolls</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTP</td>
<td>Dictionary of the Old Testament Prophets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSD</td>
<td>Dead Sea Discoveries</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Encyclopedia of Aesthetics</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>Encyclopedia of Phenomenology</td>
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<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Fides et Historia</td>
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<td>FPIJP</td>
<td>Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy</td>
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<td>GQ</td>
<td>German Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>HBT</td>
<td>Horizons in Biblical Theology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hermeneia</td>
<td>Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNT</td>
<td>Handbuch zum Neuen Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUT</td>
<td>Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Critical Commentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Int</td>
<td>Interpretation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJPS</td>
<td>International Journal of Philosophical Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJP</td>
<td>Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBL</td>
<td>Journal of Biblical Literature</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBQ</td>
<td>Jewish Bible Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>JETS</td>
<td>Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society</td>
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<td>JSNT</td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</td>
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<td>JSOT</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOTSsup</td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSSSup</td>
<td>Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTI</td>
<td>Journal of Theological Interpretation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTS</td>
<td>Journal of Theological Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNTS</td>
<td>Library of New Testament Studies</td>
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MNTC  Moffatt New Testament Commentary
NAC   New American Commentary
Neot  Neotestamentica
NIB   The New Interpreter’s Bible
NICNT New International Commentary on the New Testament
NICOT New International Commentary on the Old Testament
NSBT  New Studies in Biblical Theology
NTS   New Testament Studies
NUSPEP Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
PBM   Paternoster Biblical Monographs
PL    Philosophy and Literature
PNTC  The Pillar New Testament Commentary
RP    Research in Phenomenology
RQ    Restoration Quarterly
SAHS  Scripture and Hermeneutics Series
SCJ   Stone-Campbell Journal
SCT   Studies in Continental Thought
SDSSRL Studies in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Related Literature
SJP   Southern Journal of Philosophy
SP    Studia Phaenomenologica
SPEP  Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
ST    Scriptural Traces: Critical Perspectives on the Reception and Influence of the Bible
TBI   Theologische Blätter
TCPC  The Church and Postmodern Culture
TECC  Theological Explorations for the Church Catholic
THP   Topics in Historical Philosophy
TNCI  The New Critical Idiom
TNTC  Tyndale New Testament Commentaries
TZ    Theologische Zeitschrift
WBC   Word Biblical Commentary
WTJ   Westminster Theological Journal
WPS   Wadsworth Philosophers Series
YSH   Yale Studies in Hermeneutics
ZAW   Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: The Conundrum of Paul’s Use of Hosea 1:10; 2:23 in Romans 9:25-26

1.1 Introduction

In Romans, Paul quotes Jewish texts to make the case for the full covenant inclusion of the Gentiles. Upon close inspection, there seem to be difficulties reconciling the quoted texts’ original agenda with that of Paul’s present one. One such example is the use of Hos 2:23 (2:25 LXX, MT) and 1:10 (2:1 LXX, MT) in Rom 9:25-26, where Paul argues for the inclusion of Gentiles into the covenant family of God. The problem is that the quoted passages were originally used by Hosea to argue for the inclusion of rebellious Israel, not Gentiles.¹ The present concern, then, is to understand the nature of Paul’s use of Hosea since it appears to go against Hosea’s original context.² Consequently, questions abound. For example, can Paul’s use of the oracle be seen strictly as “interpreting” the text (i.e., restating it), re-authoring the text (i.e., revising it), or something else altogether?³ What hermeneutical components were at work that served to bring fusion between the original text and Paul’s latter reading of it? Considering these quotations were integral to Paul’s overall argument,⁴ it is necessary to pay detailed attention to the hermeneutical parameters at work. Pauline scholarship has pursued this in various ways. It will be argued that, while some of the past proposals are


² See also Steve Moyise, Paul and Scripture: Studying the New Testament Use of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 78.

³ Our conclusion will be that the best description is “dialogical re-authoring.” See Section 7.2 below.

⁴ For a study on Paul’s rhetorical use of quotations, see Christopher D. Stanley, Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), esp. 155-160 (on the importance of the citation within the argument, see 156).
helpful, by utilizing philosophical hermeneutics, some of these proposals could be aided in demonstrating sufficient fusion between Hosea’s oracle and Paul’s latter use of it.

Using Paul’s quotations of Hosea in Romans as a test case, it will be argued that the hermeneutic theory espoused by Hans-Georg Gadamer offers relevant insights into (Paul’s) otherwise enigmatic interpretive practices. Gadamer’s theory is conceivably useful here as it brings conceptual clarification, providing terminology and language conducive to making sense of the intertextual phenomenon observed. Gadamer’s approach might not be the only means to this end. That said, his theory remains helpful, indeed most advantageous, to be seriously considered as a hermeneutical tool to be utilized by scholars working in this field. Thus, the contribution of this research is that it brings to bear a (Gadamerian) philosophical-hermeneutical approach upon biblical intertextuality. It is further proposed that, assuming Gadamer’s theory, what one sees in Paul’s creative use of the oracle is exactly what one might expect. Highlighting Paul’s use of Hosea as a test case is helpful because there the hermeneutical dilemma (and tension) is so pronounced, not least in regard to issues of historical distance, horizons, prejudgments, and application—all of which are key elements that comprise Gadamer’s theory (see below). Moreover, as will be seen, our aim is not so much to dissolve the tension inherent in Paul’s use of Hosea as much as it is to offer an adequate hermeneutical account of it. To this end we employ Gadamer’s theory.

1.2 Hermeneutical Issues in Romans 9:25-26

Paul’s quotations of Hos 2:25b-d (LXX, MT) in Rom 9:25 and Hos 2:1b (LXX, MT) in Rom 9:26 bring to the forefront a variety of issues. First, there is the matter of how he alters the text to conform to his present purposes, allowing himself a considerable amount of freedom in the way in which he arranges the quotation. This is

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6 See Moo, Romans, 611–612; C.K. Barrett, The Epistle to the Romans, 2nd ed. (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1991), 178; Leon Morris, The Epistle to the Romans (PNTC; Grand Rapids:
observed clearly when Hos 2:25 and 2:1 (LXX, MT) are compared with their reconstrual in Rom 9:25-26:

Rom 9:25: 
καλέσω τὸν οὐ λαὸν μου λαὸν μου και τὴν οὐκ ἡγαπημένην ἡγαπημένην. 7

Hos 2:25b-c (LXX): 
καὶ ἔλεησω τὴν Οὐκ-ἠλεημένην καὶ ἐρῶ τῷ Οὐ-λαῷ-μου Λαός μου εἰ σύ.

Hos 2:25b-c (MT): 

Hos 9:26: 
καὶ έσται ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὗ ἔρρεθη αὐτοῖς. Οὐ λαός μου ύμεῖς, ἐκεῖ κληθήσοntαι υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος.

Hos 2:1b-c (LXX): 
καὶ έσται ἐν τῷ τόπῳ, οὗ ἔρρεθη αὐτοῖς Οὐ λαός μου ύμεῖς, ἐκεῖ κληθήσοntαι υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος.

Hos 2:1b-c (MT): 

First, it is to be noted that Hos 2:25b-c LXX and the MT do not diverge from one another. Second, Paul substitutes καλέσω for ἐρῶ in Rom 9:25 in order to continue his flow of thought, giving primacy to God’s “call.” 8 Doing this, he turns Hos 2:25 (LXX)

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8 James D. G. Dunn, Romans 9-16, vol. 38b (WBC; Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 571; See also: Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 46; Moo, Romans, 612ff; Morris, Romans, 370, fn. 116; Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary, (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 600; Starling, Not My People, 112; Ernst Käsemann, An Die Römer (HZNT; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1980), 264, says, “…ersetzt im ersten Wort ἐρῶ durch das
around, bringing καλέσω to the front.⁹ Third, along with the insertion of καλέσω, Paul does not use ἐλεέω, substituting in its place the inflected form of ἀγαπάω.¹⁰ Scholars have commented on this, attempting to make sense of this move.¹¹ Fourth, Paul’s Hos 2:1 quotation in v. 26 is very close to the MT and it matches the LXX, having no variation.¹² Since κληθήσονται occurs at the end of the Hosea quotations, and καλέσω was added at the beginning, the entire catena of quotations from the Hosea prophecy can be said to underscore the significance “calling” has to Paul’s theology of Gentile inclusion.¹³

One of the pressing questions being asked by intertextual scholars concerns the issue of “respect.” Steve Moyise is right to point out that, speaking strictly from a modern standpoint, Paul does not “respect” scriptural texts, for in some cases (e.g. Hosea in Rom 9), he does not merely repeat them word for word (as clearly seen above).¹⁴ Thus, Moyise’s call to offer an account of what it means to “respect” a text is warranted.¹⁵ As will be seen, Gadamer’s hermeneutic can provide a working scenario for shaping a definition of “respect,” a scenario that leaves room not in the least for the horizon of a past text but also the past text’s ability to speak into the present—the latter of which arguably remains a necessary hermeneutical criterion for a definition to what it

---

⁹ Moo, Romans, 612.

¹⁰ Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571.

¹¹ See eg., Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571; Starling, Not My People, 112. (Cf. Thomas Schreiner, Romans, [BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998], 527; Moo, Romans, 612, fn. 9; Jewett, Romans, 599, fn. 135; Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 46).

¹² See also Schreiner, Romans, 527. Although, cf. Starling, Not My People, 112–114, who notes an alternative reading found in Ψ⁴⁶ and other MSS. In those, he observes how ἐρρέθη is changed to ἐάν κληθήσονται (as well as how ἀυτοῖς and ὑμεῖς are left out). If these reflect Paul’s original quotations (as Starling thinks is possible), then he surmises that, first, the change to κληθήσονται is for the same reason as his change in v. 25. Second, and much more provocatively, Paul’s insertion of ἐάν before κληθήσονται serves to betray his desire to expand covenant inclusion to Gentiles, that is, “wherever” people are called the “not my people.” On this and issues surrounding ἐκεῖ, see Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 46-47.

¹³ Moo, Romans, 612-613. See also Jewett, Romans, 601.


means to respect a text. Indeed, Gadamer’s theory provides conceptual space in
delineating such a criterion, for any notion of “respect” must allow for the otherness of
a text to speak on its own terms, though not in a way that would exclude the
interpreter’s own situational otherness. In fact, to exclude the interpreter’s horizon
would be to prevent the text from speaking to their situation, an instance of
unquestionable hermeneutical textual disrespect. In this vein, arguably, Gadamer’s
dialogical hermeneutics can contribute to the current discussion by allowing one to
discard notions of interpretation as repetition in favor of a more creative version that
allows for the otherness of text and interpreter.\footnote{In this vein, arguably, Gadamer’s
dialogical hermeneutics can contribute to the current discussion by allowing one to
discard notions of interpretation as repetition in favor of a more creative version that
allows for the otherness of text and interpreter.} Therefore, as a critique of
enlightenment assumptions about objective interpretation in particular, Gadamer’s
theory proves helpful and clarifying (see below).

In addition to these (inter)textual features above, the hermeneutical issue runs
deeper. This becomes clear when one considers the change that occurs in the text’s
freshly-applied meaning. Moo observes that,

\footnote{On letting the text speak, see Demetrius Teigas (“Gadamer, Hans-Georg,” in A Dictionary
of Cultural and Critical Theory, 2nd ed., eds. Michael Payne and Jessica Rae Barbera [Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010], 293), who says Gadamer’s concept of fusion of horizons allows for a
“higher common ground” which can “sustain” the horizons of both text and interpreter. In this way,
the text can speak.}

\footnote{Moo, Romans, 613. That Paul is using the Hosea quotations with Gentiles (and not Israel)
in mind is clear from v. 24. Additionally, Moo (Romans, 613) is correct to say that, because Paul
names Israel as the referent in v. 27 to the Isaiah quotations that follow, the fact that the Hosea
quotations are meant, then, to refer to Gentiles is clear. Cf. Stanley, Arguing with Scripture, 158, fn.
47.}

Thus, one might say that Paul is not using the Hosea texts with the same agenda as the
prophet. That is, Paul applied these prophecies to the Gentiles and not to physical Israel.
And yet the original Hosea text, problematically, makes no mention of any inclusion of
the Gentiles, but rather speaks of a future inclusion of rebellious Israel, namely the
northern tribes. What factors, therefore, governed Paul’s hermeneutical decisions? A survey of previous scholarship is in order.

1.3 Previous Scholarship

We have selected those scholars who, in addressing the issue as they do, highlight the specific problems and questions that are particularly relevant for our study. That is, these scholars’ proposals and observations show precisely where Gadamer’s hermeneutic can be brought to bear upon the issue. In a survey of commentaries, it is interesting to note the amount of space dedicated to addressing the dilemma. For example, Schreiner devotes three paragraphs to 9:25-26, with much of his discussion reserved for the grammatical features. He does, however, offer pointed remarks on the hermeneutical situation itself (about ten sentences). Similarly, Moo provides three paragraphs of comments for vv. 25-26, leaving a disproportionate amount to address the dilemma. Dunn, likewise, allocates five paragraphs of explanation concerning vv. 25-26, with approximately three sentences that explicitly discuss the historical-distance between Hosea’s original agenda and Paul’s, as well as the hermeneutical dilemma that surrounds it. Cranfield devotes a mere four sentences to the same. Other commentaries are similar.

18 Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1989), 66. Although, the southern tribes might have been in view as well. See Section 5.1.2 below.

19 Schreiner, *Romans*, 527-528.

20 See Moo, *Romans*, 611-614. In fact, much of the space Moo devotes is for expounding on the range of views other scholars have held, leaving approximately five sentences of either rebuttals or views of his own.

21 See Dunn, *Romans*, 38b, 571–572.


One quickly notices the range of views on the issue. Käsemann, for example, believes Paul was not at all reflecting on the original sense. His view is that the provoking nature of the quotation has an eschatological emphasis, saying, “Der Reihenfolge in 24 chiastrisch entgegengestellt, sind die Heidenchristen die Empfänger der Verheißung, welche sie aus dem Chaos herausgeholt und zu Geliebten, also zu Kindern und zum eschatologischen Gottesvolk gemacht hat.” For Käsemann, the original meaning has been ignored because it has been superseded. C.H. Dodd is frank when he describes Paul’s use of Hosea as “ill chosen,” saying,

It is rather strange that Paul has not observed that this prophecy referred to Israel, rejected for its sins, but destined to be restored: strange because it would have fitted so admirably the doctrine of the restoration of Israel which he is to expound in chapter xi. But, if the particular prophecy is ill-chosen, it is certainly true that the prophets did declare the calling of the Gentiles.

Considering that the original intention of the oracle seems to be at odds with the way in which Paul later employs it (something Käsemann and Dodd both observe), one can find Dunn’s alternate reading understandable, preferred even. Taking exception with Dodd, Dunn says he “misses the point” because “Hosea’s allegorical case study and the promise to the Northern Kingdom of Israel enshrine a principle (that those once rejected can be taken back again).” That is, what God promised to do for Israel can be applied to the Gentiles. He adds that while this “principle…can be referred to rejected Ishmael, Esau, and Pharaoh,” it can just “as much [be applied] to hardened Israel,” which Dunn believes might have been part of Paul’s intention anyway. Similarly, Barrett believes Paul’s use of Hosea “refers mainly to the call of Gentiles,” though

24 Käsemann, Römer, 264, says, “Wie üblich versteht der Apostel die Sprüche als eschatologisch ausgerichtete Orakel, ohne über ihren ursprünglichen Sinn zu reflektieren.”
25 Ibid.
26 Käsemann’s views are better understood when one takes into account his thoughts on the preceding argument in Rom 9 (see Käsemann, Romans, 260-272).
27 C.H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (MNTC; London and Glasgow: Collins Press, 1959), 172. Though his conclusion is that Paul still sees the oracle as possibly still referring to Israel remains a stretch, see Starling, Not My People, 119-120, for a helpful critique of those who argue Paul is not talking about Gentiles in vv. 25-26.
28 Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571; See also Starling, Not My People, 123-124, concerning the various terminological descriptions.
29 Ibid. Dunn reaches this conclusion because the Hosea citation occurs after the discussion in 9:6-23.
quickly adding that, “it is, however, possible that [Paul] is also thinking (as Hosea did) of the temporary lapse of Israel and their subsequent return, that is, of the possibility that ‘vessels of wrath’ might become vessels of mercy.”30 The point emphasized by Dunn is that, on the one hand, while the Hosea prophecy itself pointed to a return of Israel in its original context, Paul merely used it as a “principle” for the inclusion of the Gentiles, and since Paul might have had in mind physical Israel anyway, Paul’s use of this text is not at odds with its original context.31 By going this route, one might argue that at least some of the hermeneutical tension has been eased on Paul’s use of the prophet.

Moo takes exception with Dunn’s construal, arguing that, “Paul requires more than an analogy to establish from Scripture justification for God’s calling of Gentiles to be his people.”32 Schreiner is in basic agreement, though conceding that a “principle” is, on some level, at play.33 He sums up his view by saying that Paul understood the prophecy as “fulfilled in the calling of the Gentiles.”34 Moreover, Jewett has argued that one should not read Paul’s use of Hosea so “narrowly” in that only Gentile Christians are in view, but rather as referring to the “mixed community of the church.”35

Two noteworthy treatments come from David Starling and J. Paul Tanner.36 First, Starling understands the “narrative and salvation-historical dimensions” as giving legitimacy to the thesis of a typological relationship between God’s past redemptive work for Israel and in the present work of Christ.37 His typological approach is not reduced to “illustrative tropes,” for it recognizes that Paul’s “correspondences… between Israel’s history and the gospel of Christ are understood as correspondences

30 Barrett, Romans, 178; See also Starling, Not My People, 164.
33 Schreiner, Romans, 528.
34 Ibid. Emphasis original.
35 Jewett, Romans, 600.
36 Broadly speaking, these two scholars take somewhat opposite positions on the issue and are therefore helpful sparring partners for our present study; see e.g., Starling, Not My People, 121, fn. 50.
37 Starling, Not My People, 123, fn. 62.
between the actions of the one God, whose ways (even when they are surprising) are
grounded in a consistency of character and purpose within the one grand narrative.”
Moreover, Starling claims to find some warrant for a typological reading because of
how, in the verses leading up to the Hosea quotation (i.e., vv. 6-23), “the dominant
mode of argumentation is by analogy and example,” not least in regard to scriptural
references. Paul’s aim in 9:25-26, then, was to refer back to the Hosea oracle as an
analogical reality for what God was doing in the first century. Thus, the typological
appropriation of the Hosea texts in vv. 25-26 finds collusion with other instances of
correspondence between Israel’s story and other motifs in the whole of Romans itself.
According to Starling’s view, in citing the Hosea texts Paul has not “forgotten” or
“overlooked” the oracle’s original context and would possibly still affirm its
“continuing relevance to the Israel of his day.”

Turning to Tanner’s article “The New Covenant and Paul’s Quotations from
Hosea in Romans 9:25-26,” one reads that it was Paul’s “New Covenant awareness”—
manifested in various New Covenant “events”—which “set the stage for [his] fresh
understanding” of the Hosea oracle. Tanner acknowledges the New Covenant “was not
overtly promised” to the Gentiles in Hosea. Nevertheless, their inclusion was a “direct
fulfillment” since they “participated in the New Covenant.” He readily admits that,
“Nothing in the context of these passages makes reference to Gentiles, nor did Hosea

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38 Ibid., 123-124, fn. 62.
39 Ibid., 125. Starling (125) goes so far to argue that it is “far from certain” that vv.27-29 are
prophetic predictions fulfilled in his own time.”
40 Ibid., 126.
41 Ibid., 163-164; specifically, Starling notes how Paul depicts typological correspondence
between the story of Israel and that of Adam, the church, the gentiles, individual Jews and believers,
and even himself (163). See his larger discussion on 139-162.
42 Ibid., 120. (See also 164.)
43 J. Paul Tanner, “The New Covenant and Paul’s Quotations from Hosea in Romans 9:25-
44 Ibid., 106. (See 103-110; Tanner speaks of “events” such as the revelation Paul received
concerning Gentile inclusion, Jesus’ announcement of the New Covenant at the Last Supper, and the
coming of the Spirit—not least upon Gentiles. Cf. Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 78, 85.)
46 Ibid., 102, 108.
imply that the fulfillment of the promises would be with Gentiles.” 47 What is more, he notes the hermeneutical dilemma when he recognizes that Paul used Hosea in order to “prove” that Gentiles were now included in the covenant. 48 The essence of Tanner’s argument is that Paul never rejected the original meaning of Hosea but simply sought “to affirm a fulfillment also with Gentiles.” 49 Moreover, Tanner takes exception with the

47 Ibid., 100.

48 Ibid., 98. Tanner says (101) that “Hosea 1:10 and 2:23 clearly refer to Israel. And yet in Romans 9:25-26 Paul quoted those verses and applied them to Gentile believers of the church.”

49 Ibid., 101. Emphasis original. Cf. Mitchell Kim, “Respect for Context and Authorial Intention: Setting the Epistemological Bar,” in Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation, ed. Christopher D. Stanley (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 124-125, and his positing of a “latent sense” (based upon Michael Polanyi’s theory) to the text. Citing Hays (Echoes, 67), Kim’s specific thoughts on Rom 9:25, bringing the issue of authorial intention to the fore, touches on related ideas found in Tanner (cf. fn. 50 below), though with a wider philosophical flavor (125-126). Kim’s proposal appears helpful, at times even congruent with ours—not least in terms of how he has a place for christological presuppositions in Paul’s interpretation, as we will show below (125-126). One wonders, however, if his theory of “latent knowledge” puts too much hermeneutical weight upon authorial intentionality. Kim says (115) “latent knowledge” helps to “define authorial intention more precisely,” and how this concept “reminds us that ‘we know more than we can tell.’” This, he says, allows “authorial communicative intention” not to be limited to the “conscious and focused attention of the author at the time of writing but rather encompasses a whole body of assumed knowledge” (115). He says further, “To reduce authorial intention to conscious authorial intention is unnecessarily reductionistic. We always intend more than the focus of our attention” (121-122).

Though it would take use too far afield to engage fully with Polanyi’s theory, a couple of responses are in order. First, one wonders how hermeneutically fruitful it is to distinguish a text’s “latent sense” from its “explicit sense,” not least when the former is somehow endowed by the author as his or her unconscious intentionality (115-116, 123). Not denying latent knowledge per se in readers or authors or all people in general, one wonders how it is even possible for a text qua text to be endowed with such a “sense” anyway. One might speak of a text’s horizon (as we do below), but this seems to be different from Kim’s idea. Under Gadamerian hermeneutics, the horizons of a text and its interpreter are able to dialogue in an act of genuine fusion. But to root such dialogue within the confines of a hidden authorial intention is not unlike psychologism (addressed below), and as such seems unattainable. It seems that endowing a text with a “latent sense” by a removed author does not, in the end, accomplish what Kim rightly seeks to do, namely, leave room for fresh application in “new settings” (116) in light of an author’s presuppositions (125-126). Second, in terms of applying this idea to Paul’s use of Hosea in Rom 9:25-26, Kim produces mixed results. He is correct that Paul’s christological presuppositions were integral for Paul’s reading, shedding light on the text (125). But that is the point of issue: Paul was reading a text, not an author—much less an author’s subconscious intentions. Would this even be possible to discern? Kim aims for genuine fusion between Paul and the text, though only by dividing the text into “explicit” and “latent” senses (with the latter being grounded in the subconscious of the author); the cost of doing this overshadows the benefits (as tempting as it might be). See also Steve Moyise, “Latency and Respect for Context: A Response to Mitchell Kim,” in Paul and Scripture, 131-139, esp. 134-135, who rightly questions Kim’s author-centered view as, in all reality, not as author-centered as it claims to be (see also his note on the lack of criteria provided by Kim on 137-138). This observation aligns with our critique about questioning a distinction between “latent” and “explicit” meanings as that hermeneutically fruitful. Our reply is that one does not need to focus so exclusively upon the author, especially to the point of grounding intention in the subconscious, as Kim seems to think.
idea that Paul is using the Hosea prophecy only to convey a principle. His ultimate solution to the hermeneutical conundrum is to say that the apostles—not least Paul—had gained a “New Covenant awareness” which would have helped shed light upon passages like Hosea. Tanner’s idea of an apostolic “New Covenant awareness” was made possible due to certain experiences and events, such as what was experienced at Pentecost—namely, that it was not only believing Jews who were receiving the Spirit, but also the uncircumcised, believing Gentiles. Thus,

The apostolic understanding that Gentiles were participants in the New Covenant helped the apostles see that the promise in Hosea of status change pertained not only to Jews in the New Covenant but to all who participated in the New Covenant—and hence also to Gentiles. If the New Covenant passages like Jeremiah 31:31-34 included Gentiles (though seemingly promised only to Israel), then the same hermeneutic applied to the Hosea promises. Gentiles would be included in the fulfillment of the New Covenant, even though it was not overtly promised to them. What Hosea was clear about was that the fulfillment would come with those participating in the New Covenant. The passing of time clarified that the Gentiles also would participate in the New Covenant and hence in the promises given through Hosea!

Having noted the variety of ways some have sought to make sense of this issue, it is necessary to reflect on some of their strengths and weaknesses before proceeding toward a Gadamerian description of interpretation, which, as we will show, remains conducive to bringing clarification to this intertextual phenomenon.

1.4 Advancing the Discussion

The basic issue concerning this instance of intertextuality is the fact of historical-distance, the contextual-time gap, between Hosea’s original agenda and

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50 Ibid, 109-110. Tanner says, “Paul's treatment of the Hosea passages must not be seen as a mere utilization for purposes of analogy or application of principle. The inclusion of the Gentiles was a legitimate phase of fulfillment for the Hosea passages, as 1 Peter 2:4-10 confirms. Believing Gentiles had now become ‘the people of God,’ full and equal participants in the New Covenant. The unfolding events of the New Testament (coupled with the Holy Spirit’s revelation of the mystery of the church) allowed the Hosea passages to be seen in their fullest perspective” (109-110). Cf. Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571.

51 Ibid, 106.

52 Ibid, 103-106. Cf. Wright, PFG, 758-760.


54 For an overview of intertextuality and some of the issues relevant for this study, see Craig G. Bartholomew, Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Framework for Hearing
Paul’s. Specifically, this is in terms of explicit competing agendas as Paul utilizes the prophecy in a way that is different than Hosea originally intended, i.e., the objects of the prophecy are different (the Jews for Hosea and Gentiles for Paul). The stakes are raised even higher when one recognizes how integral the quotations are to Paul’s central argument in Romans, an argument that will be outlined below. It is clear that Paul cites Hosea for the purpose of making the case for Gentile inclusion. Thus, if how he argued with the quotations are to be considered suspect, then it is not unreasonable to then question the validity of his conclusion. That said, it is important to consider the fact that Paul seemed quite confident with his use of the quotations. In what follows, areas where further advances can be made will be noted, building upon some of the scholarly views expounded upon above. It will be seen that these areas essentially center around the issue of historical-distance and the role preunderstandings and application play in all interpretive events.

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55 So Hays, Echoes, 182: “There is no possibility of accepting Paul’s message while simultaneously rejecting the legitimacy of the scriptural interpretation that sustains it. If Paul’s way of reading the testimony of the Law and the Prophets is wrong, then his gospel does constitute a betrayal of Israel and Israel’s God, and his hermeneutic can only lead us astray. If, on the other hand, his material claims are in any sense true, then we must go back and learn from him how to read Scripture.”
It was observed that both Käsemann and Dodd believed Paul disregarded the original sense of the prophecy in its OT context. There are, however, differences between the two scholars’ positions. On the one hand, Käsemann viewed the quotation as being “eschatologically-focused oracles,” while Dodd dismissed the legitimacy of Paul’s use of the quotation altogether. Beginning with Dodd, points where clarity is needed with respect to each view will be noted. Wanting to alleviate the hermeneutical tension, Dodd, in terming the quotation as “rather strange” and “ill-chosen,” assumes Paul to be a less-than-careful reader. This may very well be the case, but in the end, it seems difficult to substantiate. For example, Dodd states that the preceding argument in Rom 9 laid the groundwork for what is to come in vv. 25-26. Paul, he argues, has defended God’s right to choose who can be in the covenant as being his own sovereign right, which “[constituted] a new ‘Israel’ of Jews and Gentiles.” Dodd adds by saying that this “constituting…is in accordance with what the prophets said regarding God’s designs.” Specifically, he says that the inclusion of Gentiles into this new people was “established” by the Hosea oracle. When Dodd declares that Gentile inclusion was “established” by the Hosea prophecy, he should not be understood as meaning it was satisfactorily proved by the oracle (recall that he believed the oracle was “ill-chosen”). This must be seen, rather, as a reference to the way the oracle functioned rhetorically within Paul’s argument, that is, the implied author of Romans understood it as being established. Thus, what compelled Dodd to understand the Hosea citation as “ill-chosen” was his recognition of how the oracle functioned rhetorically.

It is possible that Paul might not have noticed his own blunder nor anticipated objections from his Jewish contemporaries—objections like Dodd’s. But this seems unlikely. First, Dodd’s argument assumes that Paul was ignorant (or at least forgetful) of other prophetic texts that spoke more explicitly of Gentiles—such texts of which

56 See Section 1.3 above.
57 Käsemann, Römer, 264.
58 Dodd, Romans, 172.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
even Dodd claims to be aware.\textsuperscript{63} Second, out of all the Jewish texts Paul could have chosen, Hosea’s oracle seems to have been \textit{purposefully} placed where it was. This claim is supported by the fact of its rhetorical place and function, namely, its specific position to persuade the reader that Gentiles were now included (something Dodd, it seems, also recognized about the implied author). Third, when Dodd says the Hosea oracle would have been utilized better by Paul in ch. 11, the glaring fact that it is \textit{not} used there only strengthens the point that its position in ch. 9 is deliberate.\textsuperscript{64}

The absence of any hint that Paul anticipates objections is interesting. Of course, that such an objection would have registered for Paul in the first place assumes that he was committed to similar hermeneutical assumptions that prevail among modern interpreters. The absence is nonetheless telling as Paul is quite capable of foreseeing rejoinders, anticipating objections, and then offering pre-emptive responses.\textsuperscript{65} Given how integral the oracle is to Paul’s argument, as well as the fact he never anticipates any objection to it, it is perhaps more likely to posit that something more intuitive is at play hermeneutically. Instead of imposing upon Paul modern hermeneutical criteria (and thus concluding that he was misapplying texts), it might prove beneficial to explore other hermeneutical elements possibly at play in his use of the Jewish texts.\textsuperscript{66}

Moreover, Käsemann’s “eschatologically-focused” view appears helpful since it provides an alternative way of dealing with some of the problems of context—that is, the problem of Paul’s placing the Hosea text within his own context, thus giving it different meaning. However, while it is reasonable to bring eschatology into this discussion, a further hermeneutic account of what is happening is needed. After all, while there should be no question that Paul’s use of Hosea has taken on a fresh and new eschatological meaning, further elucidation is required to show how he did so without ignoring the horizon of the Hosea text itself (after all, the oracle is employed to

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} See the critique of Longenecker and Gardener in Hays, \textit{Echoes}, 180–181. Steve Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context of His Quotations?” \textit{Paul and Scripture}, 98, is correct to warn of
contribute to Paul’s argument; see below). Käsemann, like other commentators, does well to describe what Paul is doing, but offering a philosophical-hermeneutic approach will fill in the gaps mentioned above. In this way, consistent with Käsemann, Paul’s eschatological approach can be preserved and highlighted but, perhaps beyond Käsemann, a total overcoming of the original horizon of the oracle is not necessary.67 A thorough critique of his overall thought is beyond the scope of this study. Yet, one wonders if the particular problem with Käsemann’s approach to the intertextual situation is not due to his other hermeneutical commitments which, as has been pointed out, remains problematic since it does not account for a deeper Jewish narrative that runs throughout Paul’s thought.68 Indeed, the present study acknowledges the insights gleaned from Käsemann’s work, though it attempts to integrate what might be friendly to his efforts with a more clarified account of Paul’s narrative approach, not least to the application of the Hosea oracle itself.69 This allows one to move, arguably, beyond talk of Paul’s disregard for the oracle’s horizon in favor of Paul’s, but rather to reframe the phenomenon into the more helpful Gadamerian language of Horizontverschmelzung.70

This leads us to the following questions: How does one make sense of an eschatological emphasis in Rom 9:25-26 textually and conceptually? Textually, how

anachronism when evaluating Paul’s rather free play with texts under modern criteria.

67 For all the noteworthy things about Käsemann’s work— not least his commentary on Romans—there remains hesitancy to adopt his apocalyptic framework. Our reservations are that, at times, Käsemann appears to emphasize a somewhat radical newness of Paul’s thought at the expense, arguably, of the underlying narrative features that are, in our view at least, present within the Pauline writings themselves. For example, Käsemann, Romans, 273, beginning his comments on vv. 24-29, says, “The promise which has been given to Israel and the goal of God’s saving counsel which is perceptible at present diverge. Hence Paul has to show that the divine promise is neither calculable nor a human privilege. Salvation history is not a process of continuous development. It is the history of the word which constantly goes forth afresh and accomplishes election and rejection. In this way the Jewish belief in election is transcended…”


69 If one were to place the present intertextual study within the framework of the so-called “apocalyptic” and “salvation-historical” debate, see Michael F. Bird, An Anomalous Jew: Paul among Jews, Greeks, and Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 114, who notes those scholars who have sought to account for an “apocalyptic” reading of Paul all the while still being sensitive to the “storied nature of Paul’s theology” (see also 114-123). This remains the general spirit behind the present work.

70 See Section 4.6 below.
does one account for the way the text functions rhetorically in the argument’s context? Should this rhetorical feature not be allowed to have full force and in a way that allows for Paul’s revisionary meaning? It seems that, taking into account the text’s function, the oracle’s own horizon cannot be disregarded so easily (as Käsemann suggests). Conceptually—given the historical context and agenda of Hosea—at what point can Paul alter, or at the very least add to, the oracle from being an exclusive one about the return of rebellious Israel of Hosea’s time and upon the Gentiles of his time? Does Paul on some level bring his own paradigm to the text of Scripture, imposing upon it the details he sees fit? If so, what hermeneutic can adequately account for this?\textsuperscript{71} One wonders, moreover, if the choice between these two differing horizons are indeed mutually exclusive or if the relationship between the two is much more intuitive and closer than one might think. In summary, Käsemann’s way forward does not ultimately absolve Paul from the charge of misguided exegesis nor does it answer (with full clarity) the question about the relationship between the horizons of the original oracle and its latter interpreter.\textsuperscript{72}

Dunn, moreover, does not see the original context and agenda of Hosea as worrisome, since Paul’s point was only to employ it as a “principle.”\textsuperscript{73} This appears to be a way around the problem of opposing contexts. An initial problem with this, however, is that it does not give due weight to the rhetorical nature of the quotations. That is, this would cause Paul’s argument to rest upon the assumption that, just because God\textit{ can} in principle do something that he\textit{ is} therefore doing it, and (in light of Paul’s argument via the oracle) his readers\textit{ should} simply get on board with the program. While this has the appearance of a viable solution, it seems to fall short. In the end, analogical arguments can only go so far, and because of this, it is unlikely that Paul would have argued in this, or in any similar, manner given how much is at stake for him in the context.\textsuperscript{74} In Moo’s words, “[W]e must conclude that this text reflects a

\textsuperscript{71} See Starling’s comments below concerning Tanner’s work.

\textsuperscript{72} At the very least, our study provides conceptual and textual clarity to what is otherwise overlooked in Käsemann’s comments.

\textsuperscript{73} Dunn, \textit{Romans}, 38b, 571.

\textsuperscript{74} Moo, \textit{Romans}, 613.
hermeneutical supposition for which we find evidence elsewhere in Paul and in the NT: that OT predictions of a renewed Israel find their fulfillment in the church. Moo goes on to describe Paul’s “hermeneutical key by which [he can] interpret and apply the OT” as being brought about by “God’s final revelation in Christ.” The point put forward by Moo, it seems, is that Christology and ecclesiology remain significant in understanding Paul’s hermeneutical practices. But if so, at what level? While it remains to be seen if this is even the case, one is left wondering how—that is the question—Christology can be the deciding interpretive factor. Hermeneutically, how can Paul’s present christological experiences and commitments shed light upon Hosea’s past prophecy? Perhaps it would be helpful, then, to put forward an interpretive paradigm which is able to take into account the idea of fusion between past and present, between an original text and its subsequent reading. This paradigm, as will be seen below, will also need to be capable of accounting for the roles experience and history both have as an effective phenomenon upon the interpreter—not least as they relate to the idea of prejudgments. Before these can be addressed, however, preliminary items need to be elucidated and clarified below.

Tanner’s work on this issue is commendable as it accounts for Paul’s new horizon of understanding. However, his overall solution to the dilemma leaves other questions. First, one is left wondering how Paul’s “New Covenant awareness,” inspired by certain “events,” can rightly be said to serve as the interpretive tool for Paul’s use of Hosea, when in fact this seems contrary to the rhetorical place and function of the Hosea quotation itself. Tanner rightly, as we will see in our discussion on Gadamer below, places emphasis on the fact that Paul had certain experiences that helped him come to see that Gentiles were now included into covenant blessings and that also illuminated their understanding of certain OT texts. Though lending hermeneutical


76 Ibid.

77 Tanner, “The New Covenant.” 104-106, 110. Cf. Starling, Not My People, 121-122 (see fn. 50), who likewise notices the weakness of this and similar positions.

78 Ibid. Tanner states (105): “…following the Day of Pentecost it was undoubtedly apparent to the apostles that the New Covenant promised in Jeremiah and Ezekiel was underway, and at least these aspects of the New Covenant were now being realized by the ‘believing remnant’ of Israel (which at the beginning is all that they expected the church to be). The events of Acts 10-11 would
weight to this phenomenon is helpful, there is more to the interpretive situation than just this, as the place and function of the quotations suggest. After all, Paul does not set forth the idea of “New Covenant awareness” in order to shed light upon the prophecy in Hosea, but rather the opposite, for the Hosea prophecy functions as a proof for New Covenant awareness. Starling comes to the same conclusion, and it is helpful to quote him at length:

But Paul's use of Scripture suggests at a number of points (particularly when, as is the case here, his citations are in the context of an argument from Scripture) that for him the inclusion of Gentiles is not simply and solely an eschatologically revealed novelty that he brings to Scripture ab extra, but an expansion of the circle of God's mercies that he claims to find taught or foreshadowed or promised or in some other way supported by Scripture itself. Otherwise, the appeal to Scripture is an entirely circular argument in which the point to be proved (Gentile inclusion) is nothing more than one of the interpretive presuppositions that Paul brings to Scripture and in no sense one of the warrants for his argument that Paul derives from Scripture. Whilst Paul is capable of adducing other kinds of proof than the testimony of Scripture for his case that Gentile believers are included among the eschatological people of God, the principal mode of argument that he is employing in this context is clearly an argument from Scripture, and our attempts to follow his train of thought should be guided by at least the prima facie assumption that he intends his Scripture citations to make some material contribution to the force of the argument.79

Moreover, if one were to proceed with Tanner’s view, a further inquiry into what role hermeneutically-formative power experiences have over interpreters would need to be clarified, as we have said already above.80 There needs to be explanation, in other words, about Paul’s interpretive horizons, his own horizon development, and from there, the place of prejudgments in the interpretive act. This brings us to a critique of Starling’s view.

Starling’s observations are equally insightful. However, further clarification should be sought to present a more complete account of the hermeneutical situation. For example, at the heart of his comments above, it must be cautioned that the rhetorical nature of the Hosea citation cannot bear the hermeneutical weight alone, for in some sense, Paul’s argument from Scripture was, as we will show, itself informed by other

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79 Starling, Not My People, 122. Emphasis original. See our reply to these comments below.

80 The reader is encouraged to keep this in mind when Gadamer’s use of Erfahrung, experience, is discussed below in Section 4.3.1.
realities. Furthermore, while Starling’s overall narrative approach is commendable, not least his keen eye for typological construals that relate the story of Israel with other themes in Romans itself, there are still questions which need answered and gaps yet to be filled. An example of this is found in Starling’s rebuttal to Terence Donaldson’s understanding of Rom 9:25-26 (and texts like them). Donaldson states that “the texts establish what Paul wants them to establish only if one shares his convictions at the outset.” Starling thinks Donaldson’s claim here rests upon the assumption that scriptural texts “must either do all the work or none of the work in establishing the point to be proved.” In contrast, Starling believes that original texts and the assumptions from their latter interpreter are more intimately related such that while the former “would scarcely have suggested the inclusion of Gentiles apart from the ‘mystery’ revealed to Paul,” they would still “provide partial, retrospective confirmation of that revelation in the way that they describe the dealings of God with Israel.”

This is surely correct. However, a hermeneutic that is capable of shedding light on how exactly this happens would serve to clarify the issue. Though it is not Starling’s intentions to address the specific (philosophical-hermeneutical) issues we are, it is perhaps helpful to note that, when he does touch on issues related to them, there remains room for more precision and lucidity. For example, he seems to imply that granting hermeneutical weight (regarding the Hosea citation in Rom 9:25-26) to Paul’s reception of the “mystery” and his christological convictions is tantamount to a “circular argument.” Starling suggests that, for those who hold this view, the original context of Hosea would have been “supplanted in Paul’s mind by the new application that he sees them having to Gentile believers in Christ.”

81 See Section 1.3 above.
82 Starling, Not My People, 122, fn. 54, citing Terence L. Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles: Remapping the Apostle’s Convictional World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 101.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., 121-122. See also 121, fn. 50, where he places Tanner, broadly speaking, into this group.
86 Ibid., 121. Starling subsequently references Käsemann, Romans, 274, and Hays, Echoes, 67, saying the latter “flirts with this approach, without actually embracing it” (121, fn. 49). Starling does seem to suggest that a circle of some sort is in play (122).
In response, first, this may very well be the case in the view of some modern interpreters. All the same, one must do justice to the fundamental phenomenon inherit to all interpretive activity, namely, the fact of the hermeneutical circle. That said, Starling’s caution about circularity is not altogether clear and, perhaps if clarified, could serve to advance his own arguments. Second, it is odd that Starling seemingly dismisses Paul’s christological horizon as a potential clue to the Hosea citations in Rom 9:25-26 on the grounds that this cannot, at the same time, account for how Paul argues from Scripture in those verses. Why must the latter be a necessary denial of the former? Third, in answering this intertextual dilemma, one must be prepared to address the fundamental question of application and its relationship to interpretive prejudices. When he glosses the views that give weight to Paul’s receiving the mystery as having “supplanted” the original meaning of Hosea in favor of a “new application” to those “Gentile believers in Christ,” one must ask, Why is it the case that a different application of Hosea is, de facto, unwelcome even if it were, at the same time, an argument from Scripture? Could it not be the case that Paul’s fresh application of the oracle in light of both his christological convictions and his present ecclesial concerns, is at the same time his argument from it? Perhaps there is a way to address these questions while avoiding some of the pitfalls of which Starling is so understandably cautious.

The basic problem is the subject-object tension between texts and their interpreters, that is, not being able to account for how historical texts can speak into one’s new present situation, as well as how one’s present situation does influence the meaning(fulness) of historical texts. Indeed, one sees this clearly in what was discussed above (e.g., Käsemann who, in order to account for the interpreter’s horizon, had to surrender the text’s horizon; recall Dodd, too). Even among the better treatments (e.g., Tanner and Starling), issues remain, as seen in our critique above. There is, therefore, the need to move beyond such strict constraints inspired by enlightenment ideas (see

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87 Again, it is readily recognized that this sort of enquiry is not part of his study.
88 Starling, Not My People, 122.
89 Perhaps Starling unintentionally inflates a genuine concern to an unnecessary level.
below) and into Gadamer’s more intuitive, aesthetic-inspired hermeneutic. In this way, we can take what is best of some of the positions mentioned above and build upon them.

1.5 Questions for Consideration

In light of all that has been said, advancements can be made by attending to the central matters of interpretive horizons, prejudgments, and application, as well as by seeing these as integral to the interpretive process.

One wonders, moreover, if there has been a lack of attention (and development) given to issues on the intersection of hermeneutics and epistemology? For example, Francis Watson’s seminal work, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, has offered invaluable insights into Paul’s use of the Old Testament, though his own approach is not without concern. Douglas Campbell essentially faults Watson for not dealing adequately with what one might describe as the problem of historical-textual distance between the writings of the OT and Paul’s subsequent use of them. Campbell argues that “it is difficult to see how [Watson’s canonical-Pentateuchal hermeneutic] could ultimately attest to the Christ event in any case, which lies, Watson asserts, beyond its textual horizon.” It is worth quoting Campbell at length:

Those locked within the world of the text and reading it responsibly—that is, respecting the purview of its canonical authors—will almost certainly fail to recognize Christ as the arrival of God’s definitive salvation, not to mention as God incarnate, as the majority of Paul’s Jewish contemporaries seem to have done. Indeed, Watson’s own parallel readings really endorse this possibility! In Watson's account Paul is now entitled to call these obstinate contemporaries stupid readers—as are we (although of course he calls them “blind”, and Christologically so!: cf. 2 Cor. 4.4, 6). The basic problem here is that this text does not supply any independent information that would allow the recognition of this event precisely because it is being read independently of it. (Strictly speaking Watson will struggle to get anything eschatological from the Pentateuch at all.) Moreover, *it is only a text*! Hence, in pursuing a ruthlessly non-Christological and prior hermeneutic of the Pentateuch as an independent epistemological moment, Watson has in effect *eliminated the possibility of any attestation to the Christ event and to Christianity on both descriptive and*

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Thus, it seems hermeneutical clarity remains allusive in Watson’s thesis because, by virtue of how a canonical-Pentateuchal hermeneutic works, Scripture must, as Campbell observes, be read independently of the Christ event entirely—not least including the eschatological events entailed in the New Covenant. Is it necessary, one wonders, that such disparity exist between texts and events?

Our study will seek to answer this question, as well as a related question of how can one meaningfully consider both horizons, that of the text and that of the interpreter, as well as for their respective agendas? The difficulty, perhaps, in understanding this instance of Pauline intertextuality is that there has been a great temptation on the part of commentators to cover up horizons—either Paul’s or Hosea’s. That is, there has been an inclination to observe in Paul’s interpretive activity what Gadamer called “naïve assimilation.” On this, he says, “Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness involves the experience of a tension between the text and the present. The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naïve assimilation of the two but in consciously bringing it out.”

The above observations serve as a springboard for the specific questions that need to be asked, questions that pave the way for Gadamer’s theory. First, how might a modern reader come to see how pre-modern Paul understood fusion to have been reached? Second, can it be demonstrated whether Paul saw his use of Hosea as, strictly speaking, interpretive? If Gadamer is right on the role of prejudgments and fusions of differing horizons (explained in Part Two), one should entertain the possibility that the kind of fusion envisioned by Paul was both broader and more intuitive than what might be expected on the basis of (his) mere interpretation and application as separate hermeneutical events. The need for such hermeneutical clarity cannot be overstated. Third, what prejudgments are brought by Paul to the table when using the Hosea texts,

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92 Ibid. Emphasis original.
and how might these be compared to other interpreters contemporaneous to him? Fourth, is it conceivable that what looks like Paul’s interpretation of Hosea is actually the result of fusing application with interpretation into a single hermeneutical event?94 Fifth, if this is the case, how might it be demonstrated, especially in ways that reflect appropriately the conventions of how Paul’s argument in Rom 9:25-26 works in its literary context?95 In what follows, a methodological footing will be laid that will provide the foundation upon which answers to these questions can be constructed.

94 Though it has not been given the attention it deserves, this observation about fusion is not out of step with mainstream Pauline scholarship (cf. Anthony C. Thiselton, *Hermeneutics: An Introduction* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009], 89).

Chapter 2: Method and Procedure

2.1 Introduction

This study, first, will remain committed to contextual awareness. This includes Hosea’s prophetic agenda and Paul’s new covenant agenda, both of which will be taken into account. Second, the need to analyze and evaluate various interpretive traditions in a comparative way to Paul is recognized. Adequate space for evaluating other interpretive uses of the Twelve Prophets among some of Paul’s contemporaries will be given. Third, philosophical hermeneutics will be employed, specifically the hermeneutic of H-G. Gadamer. This, it is argued, allows for a full contextual awareness, a necessity for clarifying the interpretive features of Paul’s use of Hosea.

2.2 Contextual Awareness

Contextual awareness entails the following. First, one way to help explain the process of understanding is to consider the hermeneutical circle, i.e., the relationship between the whole and the parts. In order to reach an understanding of individual words, terms, and locutions, the grammatical place, i.e., the whole, in which they reside must be taken into account. Thus, a broad awareness of the setting is necessary. Significantly, context cannot be reduced merely to the realm of grammar and syntax, but must also be expanded so as to include possible “implicit context[s]” and the “story or implicit story” which may lie beneath that which is most explicit. That is, awareness must be granted to the broader, more underlying narrative features of each respective text’s context (e.g., Hosea, Romans). Going beyond the mere syntactical level, it is agreeable that, “Every human community shares and cherishes certain assumptions,


98 Wright, NTPG, 115-116. See the discussion on the “vexed question of ‘meaning’” (115f). See also Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 125f, on the value of Wright’s work for intertextuality.
traditions, expectations, anxieties, and so forth, which encourage its members to construe reality in particular ways, and which create contexts within which certain kinds of statements are perceived as making sense." Thus, by examining contexts in this sense, sufficient clarity will be achieved. This means that a good account for the quotations in Rom 9 can be given if, and only if, a narrative substructure of the key motifs which occur within the context of the letter itself, as well as those within Hosea, has been developed (see below). This allows one to follow Paul’s line of reasoning, creating a condition in which one can evaluate the specific claims made with the Hosea quotations, as well as bringing lucidity to Paul’s broader theological purposes and agenda.

Second, in addition to the whole, the parts of the text will be given consideration. Such details include things like the rhetorical place and function of the Hosea quotations. Indeed, the rhetorical purpose behind Paul’s use of the oracle plays a part in the whole context. This sheds light upon the question of motive, addressing the logic of why the quotations were used in the first place. This is integral, for one notices that, in offering scriptural support for the inclusion of Gentiles, there is an implied assumption at work for Paul, namely, that the quotations will be persuasive. This reveals an important hermeneutical feature in their use, namely, that Paul was basing a certain claim upon them, i.e., the inclusion of Gentiles. These observations serve to highlight the distance between the contexts and the perceived problem this brings (in contrast to Hosea’s own use). This allows one to entertain the notion that, perhaps, Paul recognized something more inherent at work with his use, his application, of the oracle itself such that he believed that would convince his Roman audience. Thus, only by recognizing these parts, such questions are even able to be asked. By identifying these detailed assumptions as significant, one can be assisted in

99 Ibid., 36.
100 This “part” among the “whole” proves to play a very important role, for as was already mentioned, this was one of the problems with Tanner’s thesis (see above).
101 Cf. again Wright, NTPG, 115-116. As will be shown, the concept of “context” will be expanded to accommodate notions of historicality, tradition, horizons, the hermeneutical circle, etc., (see below).
102 That the significance of this assumption deserves the full attention of the modern interpreter cannot be overstated.
understanding how the part comes to terms with the whole (and vice versa) and subsequently with the hermeneutical event itself.

Third, when analysis is given to each respective context—the text of Hosea and Paul’s subsequent use—one thing emerges, namely, the fact of historical-distance between the Hosea text and Paul’s latter reading of it. A legitimate contextual awareness is nothing short of a true awareness of the otherness of each context. Thus, contextual awareness necessarily brings out more fully the two seemingly-opposed contexts (Hosea’s and Paul’s). Any analysis must address this issue, for it cannot be ignored. Contextual awareness thus takes seriously the fact of historical distance, and so this methodological component remains paramount—not least because this is precisely what is at issue in Paul’s use of Hosea (to which the scholars mentioned above can easily attest). But it is not enough to recognize and analyze each respective context and observe the fact of historical distance; one must seek to bring them into reasonable dialogue. This is not sought because the modern scholar demands it be so, rather because Paul seems to have supposed this already given the rhetorical nature of the citation. The argument proposed in the present study is that one way to do this is by coming to see understanding itself in new light.

Therefore, contextual awareness, by alerting the interpreter to the reality of historical-distance, culminates in the anticipated end: a fusion between the two contexts—Hosea and Paul’s. A hermeneutical approach to this passage would need to be able to account for how the historical-distance gap between Hosea and Paul, as well as their respective agendas, be bridged. This remains an important effort. After all, one might well ask how, among a second temple audience, it could ever have been the case that Paul felt he could convincingly employ a decidedly Jewish text—originally meant for a specific Jewish audience (i.e., unfaithful Jews)—in order to argue for the inclusion of a Gentile people? Since these quotations would indeed have been “highly


103 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 52.
104 E.g., see Starling, Not My People, 129, who calls attention to Jub 1:23-25. Here the phrase “sons of the living God” occurs and ought to be seen as an echo of Hos 1:10 (2:1 LXX). The phrase is employed in v. 25 from within the greater context (vv.19-25) as part of a divine promise to bring back wayward Israel, not Gentiles, who, as is well known, are portrayed rather negatively in Jubilees (see e.g. Jub 1:19).
controversial” to unbelieving Jews, what could have deemed its rhetorical use as persuasive?\textsuperscript{105} If understanding is to be seen as a “fusion of horizons,” then how might this shed light upon Paul’s reading of Hosea? Were there other hermeneutical components at play in Paul’s interpretive method which served, in his opinion, to account for this “fusion”—a bridging of the gap between past and present, between writer and reader, between two different agendas, Hosea’s oracle and Paul’s reading of it? Along with these questions, two more provocative questions surface. Might it be possible that what looks like competing agendas (which haunts modern interpreters) actually turns out to be merely an instance of historical-distance? And could it further be possible that the issue of historical-distance does not, in and of itself, entail a hermeneutical problem?\textsuperscript{106} It would appear that modern scholarship could be assisted in answering these questions if it was afforded a hermeneutical framework and conceptual vocabulary that could meet these challenges, which, it is argued, Gadamer’s theory provides.

2.3 Interpretive Traditions

The second part of this methodology will be to utilize select contemporaneous Jewish texts, specifically the Pesharim and the Damascus Document.\textsuperscript{107} The pesher

\textsuperscript{105} Wright, PFG, 1185. Cf. Stanley, Arguing with Scripture, 157-160, whose rhetorical approach seems to minimize the controversy, especially in the case of an “informed audience” (157) who would have run back to the original context of Hosea and simply found Paul to be referring to Israel (see esp. 158, fn. 46). This, however, ignores the clear designation the oracle has upon the Gentiles in 9:24 (cf. 158, fn. 47 [about his comments on 9:27], as well as 159, fn. 50 [about whether the “informed audience” would actually end up second guessing their conclusions once they arrived at 9:30-33]). Thus, Wright is correct to see this as having been controversial.

\textsuperscript{106} If this claim can be substantiated, then the tension inherent in Paul’s use of Hosea can be accounted for. For a further discussion on this, see the discussion on Lebech below.

\textsuperscript{107} The Damascus Document is analyzed here because they exhibit “pesher-type interpretations” (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 86). Additionally, in the Damascus Document (CD), there is extant just under a dozen citations from the book of the Twelve (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed., 88). Furthermore, the CD, unlike the Rule of the Community, was probably used for those sectarian who did not desire to live in such a stringent communal setting, having less regulated lives as those who lived under the Rule of the Community (John Joseph Collins, “Beyond the Qumran Community: Social Organization in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” DSD 16, no. 3 [January 1, 2009]: 351-369, citing 358). Arguably, this could bring justification to the notion that the interpretations given in the CD characterize the standard hermeneutical activity of the time (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed., 85. Watson adds [86], “The Damascus Document is the most comprehensive extant example of the sect’s scriptural exegesis, presenting pesher-type interpretations of a wide range of texts in the course of the reflections on the sect’s history and significance that fill its first
texts singled out in this study show awareness to either Hosea or the Twelve prophets. Out of these texts, moreover, the ones that interact with the motifs of law-keeping, righteousness language, or the Gentile question—all of which were so central to Paul in Romans (see below)—will prove to be especially insightful when juxtaposed to the text of Romans itself. The analysis of the sectarian texts will not, however, be exhaustive as the primary aim for their inclusion is for comparative purposes only.

It is important to investigate the *Pesharim* because these texts “are primarily and foremost hermeneutical compositions,” exhibiting well-known sectarian—specifically, eschatological—interpretive activity. Charlesworth notes that the “two foci” of the *Pesharim* are the “sacred text of the Torah” and also “the commentary


109 See Timothy H. Lim, *Pesharim* (CQS; New York: Sheffield, 2002), 13-22, for a general overview (see esp. 14-15, 46, on differences between “continuous pesher” and “thematic pesher”).


(pesher) that both follows the *lemma* (scriptural citation) and is adumbrated in the
*lemma*."\(^{112}\) These scriptural references, moreover, are taken by the sect to refer
specifically to their own historical situation, not least “their own special place in the
economy of salvation.”\(^ {113}\) Specifically, the *Pesharim* exhibit a type of “fulfillment
hermeneutics,”\(^ {114}\) in that, through their inspired Teacher, the sect could come to
understand how God was bringing to fruition his plans for Israel.\(^ {114}\) As will be argued in
the forthcoming analysis, the *Pesharim* reveal a decidedly *sectarian* hermeneutic.
Moreover, as “hermeneutically focused” texts, the *Pesharim*,

…reveal primarily the way the Qumranites viewed their recent past by finding meaning
for their own lives and special history by pouring over the words from God preserved
by the prophets, his servants. They read Habakkuk, Nahum, and other prophets and
biblical books by focusing on divine promises, predictions, and prophecies, and then
affirming that they had been fulfilled in the life and history of their own special
Community.\(^ {115}\)

Because of this, the *Pesharim* remain fertile soil for a comparison to Paul’s own use of
Hosea as a means by which his own community might be legitimated *and* expanded.

There is not a prolific amount of reference to the prophets themselves or detailed
discussion on the office of prophet in the Qumran texts.\(^ {116}\) That said, as James Bowley
cautions, one should not be tempted to think that prophecy or prophets were not

\(^{112}\) Charlesworth, *Pesharim*, 2. Emphasis original. On the origin of the pesher method, as
well as a brief overview of its characteristics, see Charlesworth, *Pesharim*, 12, 39 and 14-16, 68-70,
526-527; Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 268. Our interest here concerns not so much the
historical, but rather the hermeneutical, details of the sectarian texts (though of course the two are
not easily separated). On the former, see John J. Collins, “Reading for History in the Dead Sea

\(^{113}\) Ibid. See also Snyder, “Naughts and Crosses,” 27-28.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 16.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., 5-6.

important or that that they held little significance to the Qumran community. Thus, our focus on selected texts will prove helpful to our study.

Part of this analysis will be to establish how these texts were read and interpreted, even at times when those readings were seemingly at odds with their original context. In fact, real gain can be made by examining these specific hermeneutical peculiarities because they will display both similarities and dissimilarities with Paul’s own interpretive activity. The purpose for interacting with these interpretive traditions will be to allow these investigations to serve as patterns to which Paul’s own interpretive practices can be compared. Furthermore, this approach will become especially fruitful when the hermeneutical activity of both Paul and his contemporaries are analyzed by way of Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory. Some of Gadamer’s key hermeneutical concepts will help categorize—indeed, give language to—the interpretive phenomena occurring in these Jewish texts. For example, observations will be made regarding how prejudgments were at work in them. Accordingly, given Gadamer’s theory, we will take note of the manner in which these Jewish writers applied the aforementioned themes and texts for their own ends and purposes. We will observe, therefore, the assumed fusion that takes place in them, i.e., between the horizon of the original text and its later Jewish interpreter. By examining those texts, one will be in a better position to compare and contrast with them Paul’s own hermeneutical endeavors. This allows for a more complete hermeneutical comparison between the two, which will prove helpful and instructive.

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117 Ibid. Discussing the significance the prophets had for the Qumran community, Bowley’s observations are insightful (see Ibid, 361-362). Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 92, who remarks that, taking all the pesharim into account, it is “striking” to see what “prominence” the Twelve had for the sect.

118 On reaching conclusions despite “the poor state of preservation” of the texts, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 93.

119 Gadamer’s theory could offer positive contributions to the hermeneutical issues surrounding the Qumran texts. Cf. George J. Brooke, “Reading the Plain Meaning of Scripture in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, ed. George J. Brooke. JSSS 11 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 89-90, and his call for a “new model.”

120 For example, there is much to glean from the pesharim that specifically deal with the theme of Gentiles (among other themes like covenant inclusion, Torah observation, etc), as well as provide invaluable glimpses into the interpretive practices of Paul’s contemporaries. For example, Anselm C. Hagedorn and Shani Tzoref, “Attitudes to Gentiles in the Minor Prophets and in Corresponding Pesharim,” DSD 20 (2013): 472–509, citing 489, say, “The pesharim present
Paul’s use of Scripture, “it is important to ask both ‘inner-biblical’ and ‘extra-biblical’ questions.”

With reference to non-canonical literature, it has been said that serious examination of second temple Judaism has “reframed evangelical biblical theology.” This is because NT writers were not direct recipients of OT theologies and themes, but were recipients of the same only after being “mediated by Second Temple Judaism and enriched by the ‘new wine (Mark 2:22 pars.) and ‘new treasure’ (Matt 13:52) of the revelation of God in Christ.” This fact is accommodating to our justification for using the literature itself. The significance of second temple beliefs, expectations, etc., as a hermeneutical backdrop for a study of the NT cannot be overstated. This becomes all the more true when one is investigating a NT writer’s interpretive practices. One of the benefits of engaging non-canonical Jewish literature is that factors which govern the inherent differences and similarities between decidedly Christian interpretations from that of their Jewish, non-Christian counterparts will come to the forefront.

Excursus: Hosea’s Place and Function Among “The Twelve”

When discussing the significance of context, one must attend to the NT writer’s own Sitz im Leben. This would entail taking into account the way in which the Jewish texts were received by Paul, particularly his reception and use of Hosea. The general scholarly consensus is that the Book of the Twelve, of which Hosea was part, should be considered as one literary unit. According to James Nogalski, this idea of the Twelve

Gentiles as the paradigmatic Other, and they view foreign nations as both agents and objects of divine retribution. In some cases, they apply biblical prophecies against foreign enemies to contemporary Jewish antagonists.” Thus, in terms of our specific hermeneutical investigation, these contemporaneous texts are invaluable.


123 Ibid, 601.

being treated as a whole literary unit can be traced as far back as 200 B.C.E to Sirach. Craig Bowman cites Ben Sira’s understanding of the Twelve as proof of not just the Twelve as a single literary unit, but also as “a single, rhetorically intended message of comfort and hope.” Bowman argues that what brings the Twelve together are (1) “central themes”; (2) “discernible patterns of arrangement”; and (3) “important reading prompts placed in the opening chapters of Hosea.” The last of these is important to his overall argument, since he sees Hos 1-3 as “[setting] a tone and a rhythm for the whole BT,…[which was] strategically ordered with respect to a few key terms in Hosea.” One significant observation made by Bowman was on the work of Odil Steck, specifically in what the former describes as “orientational pointers.” Bowman states, “These orientational pointers for the reader create an organic logic for joining the parts to the overall purpose for the whole, and all of this can be discerned from the opening chapters in the act of reading alone. Thus, the front matter of the text matters!” To illustrate this, Bowman uses the example of Psalm 1 as having an


125 James Nogalski, “Reading the Book of The Twelve Theologically: The Twelve as Corpus: Interpreting Unity and Discord,” Int 61, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 115–22, citing 115; See also Dearman, Hosea, 7. Nogalski (115) admits, though, that there are competing themes within The Twelve that might hinder one from thinking the corpus is all that unified. The way forward, according to Nogalski, is to read The Twelve theologically. He states (116) a way to read The Twelve with “theological sensitivity” is to understand both the “chronological structure” as well as “the presence of catchwords, allusions, and recurring themes.” See also James Nogalski, “Recurring Themes in the Book of the Twelve: Creating Points of Contact for a Theological Reading,” Interpretation 61, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 125–36.

126 Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One,” 42. See also: Redditt, “Recent Research,” 49.

127 Ibid, 43.

128 Ibid. See also Dearman, Hosea, 7–8. Bowman’s thesis is reinforced by the fact that Hosea occupies first position among the ordering of The Twelve in the MT, LXX, and 4QXII* (see Ibid, 43, fn. 8). On views as to how Hos 1-3 is significant to The Twelve, especially as it serves as a bookend with Malachi, see Redditt, “Recent Research,” 54.


130 Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One,” 49.

131 Ibid.
“orientational function” in that it sets the stage for the rest of the Psalter. So also, Bowman concludes that Hosea, being placed at the beginning of the Twelve, serves to set the tone for how one ought to read the entire Book of the Twelve. In essence, then, the front matter of the Twelve is Hosea itself, and as such, the message of Hosea matters. Of course, with this as the basic assumption, then the unity of the Twelve becomes all the more evident.

Bowman’s second observation is that “the central message of the BT is the reciprocal use of שׁוב introduced by the universally attested placement of Hosea 1-3.” Bowman, after summing up Steck’s work—namely, that “most biblical texts have some sort of opening piece that sets direction for the whole”—proceeds to ask the question, “If there is an editorial intention behind the whole, shouldn’t it be found in the opening chapters of Hosea?” Bowman sees the implications of what is said in Hos 1:1, as well as the fact that שׁוב occurs twenty-two times in Hosea, as clues to the overall direction the Twelve is proceeding. Along with the fact that Bowman observes in all the prophets a certain theme, he posits that this theme was launched in Hos 1-3 and as such, the front matter of the Twelve is Hosea itself, and as such, the message of Hosea matters.

132 Ibid, 50.
134 Interestingly, Nogalski, “Reading the Book of The Twelve,” 117, in his endeavor to read The Twelve “theologically,” states that out of the twelve writings, ten of them assume the story of God’s people, Israel and Judah. These, he argues, fall into two chronological categories, the first of which is further subdivided into two groups, namely, a “pre-exilic group of four (Hosea, Amos, Micah, and Zephaniah)” and a “post-exilic group of two (Haggai and Zech 1-8).” Furthermore, Hosea is said to be given prime position in the first group (though Nogalski sees Amos coming before Hosea by at least 15 years). The reason for Hosea’s prime position was for “theological reasons.” The point being, when reading The Twelve “theologically” in a decidedly “chronological” manner, Hosea is seen as occupying the first position. Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 80. (For a good overview on the various understandings as to how The Twelve gradually took shape, see Redditt, “Recent Research,” 50-52.)
135 Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One,” 54; See also Schart, “The Book of the Twelve Prophets,” 141. (On the importance of “catchwords” in developing themes, cf. Nogalski, “Reading the Book of the Twelve,” 119ff; see also Redditt [“Recent Research,” 52ff] for an overview of past scholarship on this issue.)
136 Ibid, 50.
137 Ibid, 54.
the entire Book of the Twelve toward a certain path; this theme is the call for Israel to return to Yahweh.\footnote{Ibid, 58. Bowman says (58), “Yahweh’s recurring summons through these prophets is for Israel to return to him. This is set forth dramatically in the opening three chapters of Hosea as well as announced as an open condition in the last verse of the last book. Israel’s complete return and reconciliation to Yahweh was not resolved in Malachi’s day, nor in the day of the BT’s final redactor. The contingent nature of this repentance and allegiance was more than even the postexilic community could effect despite the prophetic warnings that filled Israel’s heritage.” (Cf. with Nogalski [“Reading the Book of The Twelve,” 118], who observes the “Day of YHWH” theme, occurring heavily in Joel and Obadiah. Nogalski says this is a “unifying element,” which, specifically for instances occurring in Joel, “will play out across the Book of the Twelve.”)} If this observation is correct, then this adds to our awareness concerning the overall context of Hosea, the Book of the Twelve, and not least to the texts Paul quotes in Rom 9. There seems to be ample warrant, then, to consider the Twelve as a whole unit, with Hosea playing, arguably, a prime role. Concerning this latter point, a comparative analysis of Paul’s use of Hosea in particular with that of his contemporaries’ use of the Twelve in general becomes all the more well-founded. Given the abundance of research, and the overwhelming consensus that the Twelve be considered as one literary piece, the unity of the Twelve will be assumed in the present methodology.

2.4 Philosophical Hermeneutics

The third component of our methodology is philosophical hermeneutics. The benefits are significant: “The task of philosophical hermeneutics...is ontological rather than methodological.”\footnote{David E. Linge, introduction to Hans-Georg Gadamer, \textit{Philosophical Hermeneutics}, ed. and trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), xi. All subsequent citations from Gadamer are hereafter \textit{PH}.} On first glance, this might appear ironic. However, as will be seen below, the appearance of irony is superficial. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutic neither negates nor contradicts method \textit{per se}. True, his theory seeks to pose a challenge to the claim that scientific methodology is the only means to truth; in this sense, method \textit{qua} method is specifically challenged. Moreover, his approach gets beneath the question of method and into the more fundamental question of the interpreter’s being. Thus, this particular way of engaging hermeneutical questions is by starting not with guidelines, rules, or methods, but by addressing the more pertinent
question of one’s place in the world. Therefore, our use of Gadamer’s theory as a component of our own methodology functions more along the lines as a component of assessment rather than, strictly speaking, a “methodology.”

As will be seen, this will prove useful for a study on biblical literature (especially regarding issues that concern the New Testament’s use of the Old). This point is accentuated by J.B. Torrance, who, in his foreword to Thiselton’s *The Two Horizons*, observed that, “One of the central concerns in contemporary theology and biblical studies has been the interest in linguistics and hermeneutics.” He continues,

> It is impossible to do genuine scientific biblical study today without raising questions of hermeneutics—the science of interpretation—and we cannot raise the question of interpretation without raising questions about the nature of knowledge, the use of language, and the scientific and ontological presuppositions operative in the mind of the exegete.

Thiselton, moreover, addresses those who would express concern for the intermingling of philosophy with biblical studies. He states rightly that “concepts drawn from philosophy” can serve to “facilitate the description and critical appraisal of the hermeneutical task.”

Indeed, one of the great benefits that philosophy affords the interpreter is that it provides helpful categories which allow otherwise vague hermeneutical phenomena to be spoken of more coherently. In fact, “certain perspectives and conceptual schemes which have been drawn from philosophy may serve in certain circumstances to illuminate the text of the New Testament itself.” It is beneficial to use philosophical categories, particularly the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, for an intertextual study such as this because the ontological presuppositions (mentioned above) of both

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141 These thoughts will be explained further in Section 4.2 below.
142 J. B. Torrance, foreword to Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, xi.
146 Ibid., 40. Thiselton refers to theological categories, though the point about the benefit of philosophy is clear (cf. pp. 47, 415-427).
the original writer (e.g., Hosea) and his subsequent readers (e.g., Paul) are allowed to be addressed. Rightly, Lebech says that “one of the key concepts” of Gadamer’s entire hermeneutical project was the “finitude of human life and understanding,” meaning each person is bound to his or her own place within “culture, history, and tradition.” Indeed, it is precisely the issue of Paul’s and Hosea’s differing life-situations – resulting in their differing understandings of, and agendas for, the oracle itself – that epitomize the task at hand. The benefit, specifically, of using Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory therefore is that it “does not consider this to be an epistemological problem.” Thus Lebech says,

While every individual subject is fundamentally conditioned through their cultural and historical background, Gadamer rejects entirely the presupposition of absolute, objective knowledge. On the other hand, he considers such embeddedness to be a necessary condition for judging, acting, and understanding. In the absence of pre-understanding, one would be unable to engage appropriately in concrete situations, or adequately comprehend subject matter. One’s embeddedness creates a horizon beyond which one cannot see. However it simultaneously provides the means by which one may critically examine one’s pre-understanding, expanding its horizons and broadening one’s knowledge of the matter at hand. If the idea that one’s “embeddedness” within “culture, history, and tradition” can be substantiated as a plausible epistemological component from which knowledge and understanding is achieved, then it is clearly beneficial to employ such concepts in the study on Paul’s use of Hosea. Given this, one would be obligated not only to address the question of the Hosea quotations in terms of its grammar, syntax, and lexical arrangements, but also expound upon the underlying features implicit within the text of Rom 9:25-26 itself—features such as Paul’s own “tradition” (in the way Gadamer means it), as well as his pre-understandings. It was said that part of the problem with past scholarly endeavors in examining Paul’s use of Hosea has been the lack of attention to how exegesis intersects with the much more vital question of epistemology. This being the case, philosophical hermeneutics provides a clear way forward by giving the modern reader the opportunity to look not just at the explicit

\[147\text{Flemming Lebech, “The Concept of the Subject in the Philosophical Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer,” } IJPS \text{ 14, no. 2 (June 2006), 222.} \]
\[148\text{Ibid.} \]
\[149\text{Ibid, 222. Emphasis ours. Cf. Wright, } PFG, \text{ 67.} \]
\[150\text{See Section 1.4 “Unresolved Issues” above.} \]
features which entailed Paul’s use of Hosea, but rather into the more fruitful area of Paul’s thought-world, i.e., his “embeddedness” within his own socio-theological “culture, history, and tradition.” Enquiry into these and related areas could shed light on the riddles regarding Paul’s interpretive activity.

If hermeneutics is only preoccupied with the investigation of just texts in their originality, then how does that give way to meaningfulness in respect to its later interpreter? “From the standpoint of hermeneutics, traditional approaches to language usually carry with them an inbuilt limitation, namely that they concentrate attention on the language of the ancient text, and do not attempt to bring about a fusion of horizons between the world of the text and that of the interpreter.” Should not the hermeneutical process account for the world of the interpreter as well? If so, then it remains evident that an examination into just the “world of the text,” while necessary, remains far from sufficient. Any description of what it means to understand, therefore, will need to take into consideration both the thing understood and the one who understands—the very issue which concerns Hosea’s oracle and Paul’s later reading of it, respectively. As we will see, this is precisely the benefit of using Gadamer’s theory, specifically his concepts of prejudice, horizon, and tradition.

Thus, the present research, with its philosophical-hermeneutical approach, is truly committed to a more complete contextual awareness. Having defined context to include broader considerations, one can see the benefits of philosophical hermeneutics

151 Lebech, “Concept of the Subject,” 222. Cf. Wright, PFG, 24-27. Watson, Hermeneutics, 3-4, recognizes the role of “presuppositions and commitments” when interpreting texts, though with some caution: “We cannot assess the contrasting readings of Habakkuk 2:4 by Paul and the Qumran pesherist without some sense of what this text might mean within Habakkuk and the Book of the Twelve as a whole, quite apart from what its early readers do with it. It is true that the differences between such readings expose the crucial part played by the presuppositions and commitments that individual readers bring to a text. Yet it is wrong to imagine that the text itself is no more than a blank screen onto which readers project their various concerns: it is normally possible to show that the text itself is implicated in the readings it occasions. To interpret is always to interact with a text, and it is also to be constrained by the text” (emphasis original). The benefit of utilizing Gadamer’s hermeneutic is that, as we shall see, both the horizon of the interpreter and the text is respected and held in tension. On the notion of contextual “respect,” see again Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context?” Paul and Scripture, 97-114, who observes that term “respect” can be ambiguous.

152 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 117. See also his discussion on Sawyer, et al, on 117-124, esp. 120.

153 Ibid.
more clearly since its task is *descriptive* in nature, addressing ontological questions rather than methodological ones.\(^{154}\) This approach is especially useful for the present task—a task which seeks to describe how fusion was attained between the text of Hosea and Paul’s latter reading of it. One issue, again, is that of historical distance. One wonders if the lack of attention given to the issue of historical-distance (see Section 1.3 above) is due to the lack of significance it is perceived to have in the overall hermeneutical task. That is, should *historical distance* be seen as a liability to overcome? Could it be that part of the problem thus far with some studies on Paul's use of Hosea—not to mention the use of the OT in the NT period—is the assumption that historical distance is always a hindrance to interpretation? Given the Enlightenment’s influence in answering these questions, Gadamer’s hermeneutic (which calls into question some of the Enlightenment’s most central tenets) is conducive to this study, for Paul himself interpreted Scripture apart from enlightenment influence and assumptions. Paul does not, in other words, share the modern commentator’s own enlightenment suppositions—ones which, to be sure, inform his or her own *modern* critique of Paul’s *pre*-modern hermeneutic. In this vein, a Gadamerian approach has the unique advantage of bringing insight to the question at hand.

\(^{154}\) See above.
PART TWO: GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS

Chapter 3: Gadamer and His Scholarly Context

3.1 Introduction

Hans-Georg Gadamer has been called a “most important theoretician,”\(^\text{155}\) and E.D. Hirsch, Jr., his most-ardent critic, called *Truth and Method* “the most substantial treatise on hermeneutic theory that has come from Germany in this century.”\(^\text{156}\) Likewise, Bartholomew says it is “the central text in hermeneutical theory.”\(^\text{157}\) Malpas and Zabala consider Gadamer, along with Heidegger, as one of the “two key figures in the development of modern hermeneutics.”\(^\text{158}\) It is unfortunate, therefore, that Gadamer’s influence, while being widely acknowledged, has not in fact impacted biblical scholarship as deeply as it might have.\(^\text{159}\) By bringing his philosophical

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\(^{158}\) Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala, “Introduction,” in *Consequences of Hermeneutics: Fifty Years After Gadamer’s “Truth and Method,”* ed. Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), xi. They continue, saying, “...while Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is certainly a key text in the history of hermeneutics in the twentieth century, it was the publication of Gadamer’s *Truth and Method* in 1960 that was the watershed event in the development of philosophical hermeneutics, and that established the hermeneutical as a distinctive mode of philosophical inquiry and engagement. While hermeneutics did not begin with Gadamer, it was Gadamer who first articulated a conception of hermeneutics in its universality, and who enabled the expansion of hermeneutics into the wider framework of contemporary philosophical debate. The implications and significance of the hermeneutical approach—its consequences for philosophy—can thus be viewed as largely deriving from the ideas laid out in *Truth and Method* and their elaboration, including the responses to them, over the last half-century” (xi-xii; emphasis original).

hermeneutic into dialogue with established exegetical practices, our understanding of Paul’s construal of the Hosea texts should be enhanced significantly. His philosophical hermeneutics grants the modern interpreter categories which help describe what may first appear as a hermeneutical dilemma and render it into something more coherent. It has even been said that Gadamer’s theory offers “an integrity to the whole discipline of biblical studies.”\textsuperscript{160} It is conceivable that this is especially true for biblical-intertextual issues. As stated, the value of Gadamer’s hermeneutic is that it is not normative but descriptive, an account of what happens in the act of interpreting;\textsuperscript{161} it is not therefore methodological, but ontological.\textsuperscript{162} To understand the details of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, a survey of his scholarly setting is necessary. He builds upon previous thought, finding both common agreement, as well as disagreement, with those scholars who came before him.\textsuperscript{163}

3.2 Scholarly Context and Influences

3.2.1 Friedrich Schleiermacher

Friedrich Schleiermacher operated within the sphere of so-called “romantic hermeneutics.”\textsuperscript{164} Merold Westphal notes several key characteristics of this school of thought. First, there is the notion of “deregionalization.”\textsuperscript{165} Schleiermacher sought to

\textsuperscript{160} Evans, \textit{Reception History}, 2.
\textsuperscript{161} Gadamer, \textit{TM}, 512-513.
\textsuperscript{162} Gadamer, \textit{PH}, xi.
\textsuperscript{164} Merold Westphal, \textit{Whose Community? Which Interpretation? Philosophical Hermeneutics for the Church} (TCPC; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 27; See also B.H. McLean, \textit{Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 35; John H. Smith (“Living Religion as Vanishing Mediator: Schleiermacher, Early Romanticism, and Idealism,” \textit{GQ} 84, no. 2 [Spring 2011]: 138–139) says that most of those thinkers who would be considered central to “Early Romanticism” (e.g., Schleiermacher) sought to utilize “religion” and its “conceptions” that would serve to “bridge piety and Enlightenment rationality, science and faith.” Cf. Thiselton, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 150, who cautions those who want to group Schleiermacher completely in with romanticism. On the contrary, Thiselton argues that Schleiermacher had “strong reservations about ‘pure’ Romanticism,” saying his “Romanticism was strong but not decisive.”
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 28; McLean, \textit{Biblical Interpretation}, 37. The term itself, as Westphal (28) acknowledges, comes from Paul Ricoeur.
draw hermeneutics away from being pigeon-holed into just any one discipline. He envisioned hermeneutics as a broad enterprise such that he sought to find what was “common to rather than distinctive of the various disciplines.”

Hence, it was “nondisciplinary.” His hermeneutic was to be a “hermeneutica generalis: a theory of the conditions of possibility for understanding as such.” This proved revolutionary. Schleiermacher’s project would be to deregionalize hermeneutics in such a way that the question would no longer be, “How shall we understand the biblical text?” but rather, “How do we understand any text at all?” Schleiermacher states that, “Da Kunst zu reden und zu verstehen einander gegenüberstehen, reden aber nur die äußere Seite des Denkens ist so ist die Hermeneutik im Zusammenhange mit der Kunst zu denken und also philosophisch.”

Second, the concept of a hermeneutical circle was characteristic of Romanticism. Schleiermacher himself calls this a “principle” that is “incontestable.” He says,

…daß wie freilich das Ganze aus dem Einzelnen verstanden wird, so doch auch das Einzelne nur aus dem Ganzen verstanden werden könne, ist von solchem Umfang für diese Kunst und so unbestreitbar, daß schon die ersten Operationen nicht ohne Anwendung desselben zu Stande gebracht werden können, ja, daß eine große Menge hermeneutischer Regeln mehr oder weniger auf ihm beruhen.

Understanding, then, does not happen outside the circle, for one must understand the parts before one can understand the whole and vice versa. The interpreter cannot

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166 Ibid. Emphasis original.
167 Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, 40 (see also 94).
169 However, Gjesdal, (Ibid., 136, fn. 9) takes exception with Schleiermacher’s claim that he was the first to develop a universal hermeneutics.
understand a whole sentence until he or she has first taken into account each word of the sentence; yet, the words themselves cannot be properly understood until the entire sentence has been grasped. Thus, “the part and the whole interact to make sense.”

This necessitates, therefore, the idea of “provisional and preliminary understanding.” Understanding must be seen, therefore, as circular, since it is “a basically referential operation.” But the hermeneutical circle is not debilitating. In fact, because of the circle itself, understanding remains possible since it provides the means by which revision, and hence “knowledge,” can be achieved.

The relation between whole and part is circular in that each is interpreted in light of the other; interpretation is a reciprocal interaction in which neither variable is independent of the other. The interpretation of the parts is guided by and revised in light of the whole, but my view of the whole is guided by and revised in light of my own reading of the parts.

For Schleiermacher, the hermeneutical circle was all the more intriguing, as there were two circles in play: (1) a grammatical-linguistic circle and (2) a psychological circle. For him, these circles both “form a hermeneutically circular whole.” In his view, one ought to focus on the philological features of a text (i.e., the grammatical details), for as we have seen above, sentences make little sense if we ignore the individual words (and vice versa). But he also sees the need to understand, along with the grammatical side, the psychology of the text—or more appropriately, the psychology of the author of the text. He says, “Gewiß aber wird auch die

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182 Ibid. See Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 150–151. Westphal (29) provides the helpful illustration of reading *Gulliver’s Travels*. Whereas one navigates the textual parts in light of the textual whole (and vice versa), there is also the necessity of working through the socio-historical situation of the author, so as to come to see this as “political satire in the guise of kiddy lit.” Westphal observes: “Now the parts begin to make more sense but only to the degree that I know
grammatische Seite nicht können der divinatorischen Methode entrathen.”

But Schleiermacher is quick to point out that the opposite is true as well, namely, that this “psychological aspect” (“psychologischen Seite”) must be informed by the grammatical, specifically in terms of a “comparative operation” (“comparativen Verfahrens”) by which words are located and understood in terms of other words. This leads to another characteristic of romantic hermeneutics: *psychologism.*

Psychologism, thirdly, is in search of the author’s “inner psychic life,” from which language itself springs forth. Romanticism’s project operated from the assumption that meaning lay not on the surface of the text (i.e., the grammatical, lexical), but rather “beyond the text itself [and] in the inner motivations of its original, historical author.” Indeed, this was Schleiermacher’s “tendency,” namely, “to make the real focus of interpretation the author’s thoughts and experience that lie behind the something about the author and his sociopolitical context. This move from the purely textual to the biographical-historical indicates that the two major circles described by Schleiermacher together form a hermeneutically circular whole. We interpret the text in light of the person, though much of what we know about the person we learn only from the text” (emphasis original).


184 Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 192; Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik*, 138-139. His argument is detailed at this point, e.g., see *Hermeneutics*, 190-195; *Hermeneutik*, 137-141. (See also Bartholomew, *Hermeneutics*, 307-308.)


186 Westphal, *Whose Community*, 29. Westphal (29) notes that this is why this specific hermeneutical approach has been called “romantic,” since it “shares this expressivism with the wider cultural traditions called romanticism.” (Cf. Palmer [*Hermeneutics*, 89], who cautions us not to equate “psychologism” with “psychoanalysis.”) The former is just another way of saying that “understanding is an art of reconstructing the thinking of another person. In other words, the objective is not to assign motives or causes for the author’s feelings [psychoanalysis] but to reconstruct the thought itself of another person through interpretation of his utterance.”) See also Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 106.

text rather than in the text itself.”\footnote{Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 307. It should be noted, however, that there is a dispute as to how much emphasis the psychological aspects really had for Schleiermacher. In the translator’s introduction to Kimmerle’s edition of Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics, James Duke discusses this issue and comments on Lücke’s influential “one-side picture” of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics which had as its focus the psychological aspect, namely his latter thought (10). Duke comments that Kimmerle’s edition, by including more of Schleiermacher’s earlier writings, sought to introduce a more well-rounded portrayal, thus smoothing out the so-called latter psychological emphasis with that of the earlier grammatical and linguistic ones (10). Space does not permit a full treatment on the details of this debate, though it suffices to say at present that it is perhaps the case that one should not fail to see, as Duke encourages, that the psychological aspects occur even in the earlier Schleiermacher and the grammatical ones in the latter, thus lending to our view that Kimmerle’s case is, seemingly, overstated (11). (See the entire discussion in Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 9-12.)}

Gadamer calls “psychological interpretation” Schleiermacher’s “most distinctive contribution.”\footnote{Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” Gadamer Reader, 259.}

Moreover, psychologistic hermeneutics aims to “reverse the process of writing, to work back from the outer expression to the inner experience, to reconstruct, re-create, re-feel, re-experience, relive that inner experience.”\footnote{Westphal, Whose Community, 29–30. See also: McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 42; David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle: Literature, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 11.} Schleiermacher says, “Eine Hauptsache beim Interpretiren ist daß man im Stande sein muß aus seiner eignen Gesinnung herauszugehen in die des Schriftstellers.”\footnote{Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, 32; Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 42.}

Thus:

...the interpreter must put himself both objectively and subjectively in the position of the author. On the objective side, this requires knowing the language as the author knew it. But this is a more specific task than putting oneself in the position of the original readers, for they, too, had to identify with the author. On the subjective side this requires knowing the inner and outer aspects of the author’s life (Auf der subject[tive]n in der Kenntniß seines inneren und äußeren Lebens).\footnote{Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, 32; Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 42.}

The reason for his commitment to psychologism was because he had come to see a division between thought and expression.\footnote{Palmer, Hermeneutics, 92–93. Cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 105-106.} Psychologism sought to move the interpreter outside of his or her own realm and into the realm of the author, entering the latter’s psyche. Thus,
For Schleiermacher, understanding as an art is the reexperiencing of the mental process of the text’s author. It is the reverse of composition, for it starts with the fixed and finished expression and goes back to the mental life from which it arose. The speaker or author constructed a sentence; the hearer penetrates into the structures of the sentence and the thought. 194

Another characteristic of romanticism was, fourthly, objectivism. 195 Westphal notes that Schleiermacher sought after objectivity, though in a nuanced manner, that is, for Schleiermacher, the goal of objectivity would be mediated via subjectivity. 196 He began with a subjectivist approach—namely, a “painstaking, methodical labor in which the interpreter (1) works back and forth from smaller parts to a larger whole within the grammatical-linguistic circle, (2) does the same within the psychological-historical circle, and (3) works back and forth with the circle formed by these two in relation to each other.” 197 The point here is that the driving emphasis in Schleiermacher’s interpretive theory lay in the subjective aspects. 198 Westphal describes this precursor stage to understanding as “always provisional and subject to revision.” 199 In essence, at this level nothing is certain, but everything is always up for re-evaluation, and of course revision and re-evaluation is possible because one is in constant movement between the whole and the parts. This process entails what Schleiermacher called “uncertainties.” 200 At this stage, understanding is on its way to being achieved because false assumptions are being eliminated during the process of movement between the whole and parts (and vice versa). The goal is objectivity, however. Westphal offers a helpful illustration:

> Just as the intuitions of racial bias are mediated by socialization into a world that is itself mediated by a variety of historical and psychological developments, so too are hermeneutical intuitions mediated by scholarly work under the guidance of a method.

196 Ibid., 32–33. Westphal comments that Dilthey, too, wanted to raise the *Geisteswissenschaften* to the same level of supremacy as that of the natural sciences (31). In order to do this, Dilthey thought, the *Geisteswissenschaften* needed to avoid destructive relativism, and because of this, his solution to this would be to propose a method (31-32). This, he thought, would help objectify the human sciences. See below.
197 Ibid, 32-33.
The former mediation is by means of a particular and contingent social formation, while the latter is supposed to filter out precisely such subjective factors.\textsuperscript{201}

Though the goal is objectivity, for Schleiermacher, it is only by means of subjective method—but method nonetheless.\textsuperscript{202}

3.2.2 Wilhelm Dilthey

Though considered to be Schleiermacher’s successor, Dilthey’s own contributions to hermeneutical theory remain significant (not least in regard to Gadamer’s scholarly context).\textsuperscript{203} Thiselton notes three big contributions: (1) he broadened the scope of hermeneutics so as to include the social sciences; (2) he placed hermeneutical emphasis on the notion of historicality; and (3) he underscored the importance of interpretive sympathy on behalf of the interpreter, which would be important for getting outside one’s self and into the other.\textsuperscript{204} The idea of \textit{historicality} was central to Dilthey. In fact, “historical consciousness” was the very heartbeat of his interpretive theory.\textsuperscript{205} Dilthey’s hermeneutic began to take shape when he “began to see in hermeneutics the foundation for the \textit{Geisteswissenschaften}—that is, all the humanities and social sciences, all those disciplines which interpret expressions of man’s inner life, whether the expressions be gestures, historical actions, codified law, art works, or literature.”\textsuperscript{206} In order to do this, according to Dilthey, certain methods would need to be devised.\textsuperscript{207} However, the natural sciences, properly defined, could not

\textsuperscript{201} Westphal, \textit{Whose Community}, 33.

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. This does not mean, however, we should understand Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics in the traditional sense, i.e., a “mechanical process,” but rather as an “art” (Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 301).

\textsuperscript{203} Thiselton, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 163.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. See also: Owen, “Hermeneutic Phenomenology,” 6. One can easily see Dilthey’s indebtedness to Schleiermacher, especially on this last point. For an interesting discussion on Dilthey’s idea of “sympathy” in relation to an Augustinian-influenced Christian epistemology, see Theodore Plantinga, “Commitment and Historical Understanding: A Critique of Dilthey,” \textit{FH} 14, no. 2 (March 1, 1982): 29–36.


\textsuperscript{207} Ibid. His aim was to discover how “objectively valid knowledge in the human sciences
be transposed into the realm of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. That being said, Dilthey understood that hermeneutics, the foundation for the *Geisteswissenschaften*, could be scientific, though in a way different from the natural sciences. The difference lay in the dissimilarities between the propositions that both the natural sciences and the human sciences make, respectively. Thiselton comments that,

Dilthey had great ambition. He recognized that Bacon had done much to found the natural sciences. But what Bacon had done for physical sciences, and what Kant and Hegel had done for philosophy, he hoped to do for the “human sciences.” “Science” is simply a coherent complex of propositions, whose propositions are well grounded. But propositions about human life, he insisted, are distinctive over against propositions about the natural world. Human self-consciousness includes a moral, historical, and spiritual dimension that must be recognized.

Thus, the point of inquiry on which both the natural sciences and the human sciences were focused was different: the natural sciences studied objects that could be seen, touched, tasted, but the human sciences inquired into the *Geist*.

Dilthey reasons that since the humanities’ object of study is different—the human “spirit”—its goal must also be different. The real goal is “understanding,” not scientific “explanation.” Thus, Dilthey made the important distinction between “explanation” (*Erklärung*) and “understanding” (*Verstehung*) as two contrasting approaches to the acquisition of knowledge...while the natural sciences are concerned with the explanation of general laws and ascribing causal effects in the world, the goal of the “sciences of the human spirit” (Geisteswissenschaften) is concerned with understanding.

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[was] possible” (Crowell, “The Early Decades,” 674).

Ibid.

Thiselton, *Hermeneutics*, 162. On this, it is worth quoting at length Eric S. Nelson (“Impure Phenomenology: Dilthey, Epistemology, and Interpretive Psychology,” *SP* 10 [October 2010]: 28), who says, “The natural sciences are oriented toward achieving a mathematically modeled explanatory construction of nature. As such, they are separate from and indirectly related to the nexus of historical life that is the basis of their practice and enactment. The difference between the natural and human sciences consists therefore in how they justify their respective claims. Epistemology emerges from this context with the issue of clarifying and differentiating the multiple modes of justification and validity in the various sciences. Epistemology is the systematic and historical description and analysis of conceptual knowledge, specifically how it occurs in the sciences. Dilthey’s transformation of epistemology occurred through situating scientific and conceptual knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) in contextual understanding.” See also Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, 103-106; Nelson, “Impure Phenomenology,” 29, esp. 33-34.


Ibid., 69. Emphasis original.
Crowell points out that “Dilthey...turned first to the concept of consciousness and then to the concept of life as the basis for grasping historical reality.”\(^{212}\) Dilthey discusses the “context of life,” specifically how, “Die Geisteswissenschaften sind so fundiert in diesem Zusammenhang von Leben, Ausdruck und Verstehen.”\(^{213}\) He continues by saying, “Eine Wissenschaft gehört nur dann den Geisteswissenschaften an, wenn ihr Gegenstand uns durch das Verhalten zugänglich wird, das im Zusammenhang von Leben, Ausdruck und Verstehen fundiert ist.”\(^{214}\) Dilthey’s answer, more properly, was “lived experience.”\(^{215}\)

Though the details of Dilthey’s thought need not be elaborated, a few aspects of his concept of lived experiences need to be pointed out. After all, Dilthey’s lived experiences have direct bearing on his emphasis upon historicality, that is, the two went hand-in-hand.\(^{216}\) Expounding on Dilthey’s use of “lived experience” (Erlebnis), Palmer observes that the implication of such use is none other than historicality, saying, “Experience is intrinsically temporal (and this means historical in the deepest sense of the word), and therefore understanding of experience must also be in commensurately temporal (historical) categories of thought.”\(^{217}\) Therefore, Dilthey found historical consciousness, fleshed out in lived experience, as a place for the foundation of the

\(^{212}\) Crowell, “The Early Decades,” 673.


\(^{214}\) Ibid., 87.

\(^{215}\) Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 162. Emphasis original. See also Palmer, Hermeneutics, 106–115, esp. 107-11 on the etymology of Erlebnis and the concept of “lived experiences.” McLean (Biblical Interpretation, 74-75) states that Dilthey’s conception of “lived experience” was due in part to his being influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology.

\(^{216}\) Palmer, Hermeneutics, 100, 111, 116–118. Emphasis original.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., 111. Emphasis original. Palmer adds (111): “Dilthey has, then, with the insistence on the temporality of experience asserted the foundation of all subsequent efforts to affirm the “historicality” of human being-in-the-world. Historicality does not mean being focused on the past, or some kind of tradition-mindedness that enslaves one to dead ideas; historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) is essentially the affirmation of the temporality of human experience as we have just described it. It means we understand the present really only in the horizon of past and future; this is not a matter of conscious effort but is built into the structure of experience itself. But to bring this historicality to light does have hermeneutical consequences, for the nonhistoricality of interpretation can no longer be assumed and leave us satisfied with analysis that remains firmly in scientific categories fundamentally alien to the historicality of human experience. It makes brutally plain that experience is not to be understood in scientific categories. The task is clear: to work out the ‘historical’ categories appropriate to the character of lived experience.” See also Crowell, “The Early Decades,” 674.
Thus, there exists commonality between both Gadamer and Dilthey on the issue of historical situatedness. In his effort to develop an expansive hermeneutic, Dilthey understood the importance of paying attention to both the interpreter’s historical situation, as well as that of the object being interpreted. He says, “Der Mensch erkennt sich nur in der Geschichte, nie durch Introspektion.” And so, “Gadamer applaud[ed] Dilthey’s efforts to move away from introspection and self-consciousness to seeing humankind as historically situated within the flow of human life.”

3.2.3 Martin Heidegger

There was perhaps no greater influence upon Gadamer’s philosophy than Heidegger. While a complete account is unnecessary, it is helpful to keep in mind the key areas of influence. In many ways, Heidegger remained the rightful heir to post-Schleiermacher scholarship, though not without having his own distinctions. Heidegger gleaned from his study of the ancient Greeks, from whom he came to understand his notion of “Being” in both “[primordial] and in temporal terms.” In this

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219 It should be noted, too, that within Dilthey’s hermeneutic of lived experiences is the recognition of the hermeneutical circle. This, of course, is significant to understanding Gadamer, for, as we shall see, the hermeneutical circle entails the issue of Vorurteil, which is central to Gadamer’s hermeneutic. See Palmer, Hermeneutics, 118-121.

220 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 162.


222 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 163.


225 See Palmer, Hermeneutics, 130, who gives a general placement of Heidegger's thought among Schleiermacher's and Dilthey's.

226 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 208; See also Franco Volpi, “Phenomenology as Possibility: The ‘Phenomenological’ Appropriation of the History of Philosophy in the Young Heidegger,” RP 30 (September 2000): 120–145, esp. 132-134. Cf. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, 26-28; Gadamer,
way, by utilizing the phenomenological work of Husserl, Heidegger was able to offer a hermeneutic that was neither romantic nor philological, but rather ontological.\(^\text{227}\) "The thing to which philosophy had to find its way back and which was the origin of all meaning, was, for Heidegger, not transcendental consciousness \([a \ la \ Husserl]\) but life in its originality."\(^\text{228}\) Fehér states further that Heidegger’s project could not have been what it was (i.e., his emphasis upon historicity) "without Dilthey’s influence."\(^\text{229}\) This is not to say that Heidegger agreed with the totality of Dilthey’s notion of historicality, for even though “Heidegger appreciated very much indeed Dilthey’s attempt to approach historical life,” his project fell short since he sought to “attain possibly objective historical knowledge,” taking “history to the rank of science.”\(^\text{230}\) This method, of course, proved contrary to Heidegger’s ontological emphasis.\(^\text{231}\) What he sought to do was merge the ontological with the phenomenological, or as Palmer put it: “Ontology must become phenomenology.”\(^\text{232}\) That is, “Being” was to be critiqued and delineated “by an analysis of how appearing occurs.”\(^\text{233}\) This was an important hermeneutical project.\(^\text{234}\)

Because his central idea was ontology, it is easy to see how Heidegger’s definition of understanding came to be what it was. What is understanding according to Heidegger? Palmer offers an excellent comparison between the English word “understanding” and how Heidegger conceived of it quite differently. He notes that in English, “understanding” often implies a type of sympathy, where one can be said to relate to the thoughts and mind of the other: “We speak of an ‘understanding look’ and

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\(^\text{228}\) Fehér, “Religion, Theology, and Philosophy,” 110. (See also: Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, 125.)

\(^\text{229}\) Ibid., 110–111.

\(^\text{230}\) Ibid., 120–121.

\(^\text{231}\) On some facets of Heidegger’s “critique” of both Husserl and Dilthey, see Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege*, 50-52; Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Ways*, 55-57.

\(^\text{232}\) Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, 129.

\(^\text{233}\) Ibid.

suggest by this more than mere objective knowledge; it is something like participation in the thing understood.”

In distinction to this, and to that of Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s definition, for Heidegger, understanding had less to do with attaining or gaining something (e.g., sympathy) and more to do with Being, or as Palmer aptly puts it:

Understanding is conceived not as something to be possessed but rather as a mode or constituent element of being-in-the-world. It is not an entity in the world but rather the structure in being which makes possible the actual exercise of understanding on an empirical level. Understanding is the basis for all interpretation; it is co-original with one’s existing and is present in every act of interpretation.

Heidegger’s emphasis on Being ultimately brings one to the breakdown of any subject-object distinction. That is, Heidegger’s emphasis is not upon the notion of the subject dominating the object in question (in the sense of wanting to understand it). Rather, the way to understanding is via embeddedness in the world. “Everything, in Heidegger’s view, is seen and understood from within a particular horizon. Meaning is that from which something is understandable as the thing it is.”

Heidegger’s idea of Da-sein conveys the idea that a person is “‘thrown into [his/her] own world (Welt).” That is, “Da-sein always finds itself already in a certain social, cultural, linguistic historical, and religious environment, which is not of its own choosing.” And so

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Hermeneutics, 128-130.

235 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 130.

236 Ibid., 131. Palmer (131) reminds us that Schleiermacher’s definition was more psychologistic and Dilthey’s more centered upon life. On Heidegger’s scholarly background and its relationship to his criticism of psychologism, see Fehér, “Religion, Theology, and Philosophy on the Way to Being and Time,” 102–103.

237 Ibid., 131. Emphasis original. Thiselton (Two Horizons, 165), says that, for Heidegger, “[M]eaning is not something which we ‘stick’ onto some naked object which is present-at-hand. It is not a property attached to objects, but is grounded in human life and attitudes.”


239 Ibid., 135. See also 132-34.

240 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 149. Emphasis original.

241 McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 104. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 174ff; 219-224. See also Thiselton, Two Horizons, 148, on “Dasein.”

242 Ibid. Emphasis original. On the concept of “world,” as well as how it’s always presupposed, see the introductory section in Heidegger, Being and Time, 91-95. See also Palmer, Hermeneutics, 132-134.
Heidegger says, “In-Sein ist demnach der formale existenziale Ausdruck des Seins des Daseins, das die wesenhafte Verfassung des In-der-Welt-seins hat.”\(^{243}\) Da-sein implies both “time” and “place,” with “Da” meaning a place or situation and “sein” as pointing to one’s temporal existence.\(^{244}\) With his concept of Da-sein, Heidegger doesn’t have to concern himself with the traditional subject-object schema.\(^{245}\) Bartholomew comments,

Heidegger’s philosophy is strongly ontological, and his epistemology is rooted in his ontology of Dasein. Sein can only be investigated if one begins with Dasein, which does not have a viewpoint outside history. In this sense “the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic” [M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 62]. This approach allowed Heidegger to rethink the subject-object relationship in knowing along historical lines, and it is here that his most significant hermeneutical contribution lies. "Worldhood" refers to that whole in which the human person finds himself or herself immersed. It is ontological and a priori, given along with Dasein and prior to all conceptualizing. To conceive of objects as merely “present-at-hand” involves secondary conceptualization. The primary relationship of humans to objects is a “ready-to-hand.” This contrasts with the Cartesian scientific orientation, which makes secondary conceptualization primary.\(^{246}\)

Because Being and understanding are taken together as “co-original,” Heidegger sees understanding as being something that takes place “prior to the subject-object dichotomy.”\(^{247}\) He says, “Erkennen ist ein im In-der-Welt-sein fundierter Modus des Daseins. Daher verlangt das In-der-Welt-sein als Grundverfassung eine vorgängige Interpretation.”\(^{248}\) Thus Gadamer can say, “Heidegger’s temporal analytics of Dasein has, I think, shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but the mode of being of Dasein itself.”\(^{249}\)

One resulting influence upon Gadamer was Heidegger’s thought concerning the hermeneutical circle, which, he argued, was inherent to understanding.\(^{250}\) The circle was


\(^{245}\) Ibid., 104. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 86-87.


\(^{249}\) Gadamer, *TM*, xxvii.

not a “vicious” one, but rather an “expression of the existential fore-structure [Vor-Struktur] of Dasein itself,” for “[i]n the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial type of knowing.”²⁵¹ In this way, understanding itself is always “provisional, historical, and temporal, resting on pre-understanding unavoidably.”²⁵² Heidegger describes pre-understanding as “fore-structure,” which is a type of “interpretive framework that we employ when we interpret events in daily life as meaningful. By implication, our experience of the world as meaningful is rooted in an ontological structure with Da-sein, which ‘exists’ before the act of interpretation, which is why Heidegger terms it a fore-structure.”²⁵³ Thus, for Heidegger understanding is not presuppositionless: “Die Auslegung von Etwas als Etwas wird wesenhaft durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff fundiert. Auslegung ist nie ein voraussetzungloses Erfassen eines Vorgegebenen.”²⁵⁴ And again, “Alle Auslegung bewegt sich ferner in der gekennzeichneten Vor-Struktur. Alle Auslegung, die Verständnis beistellen soll, muß schon das Auszulegende verstanden haben.”²⁵⁵ Thus Palmer can conclude:

The hope of interpreting “without prejudice and presupposition” ultimately flies in the face of the way understanding operates…It is naive to assume that what is “really there” is “self-evident.” The very definition of what is presumed to be self-evident rests on a

²⁵¹ Heidegger, Being and Time, 195 (Sein und Zeit, 203). Emphasis original. (For what he says more fully about the circle, see Being and Time, 194-195 [Sein und Zeit, 202-204].)


²⁵³ McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 113. McLean (113) notes that within Heidegger’s concept of fore-structure there is a three-fold division, which are all correlated to one another: “[1]‘fore-having’ (Vorhabe), [2]‘fore-sight’ (Vorsicht), and [3]‘fore-conception’ (Vorgriff).” Moreover, Mclean says (114) that Heidegger understands “all interpretation [to be] guided by this tripartite fore-structure.” This structure is as follows: (1) Fore-having has to do with a type of pre-understanding that must be in place before any object can be understood. For example, “a hammer is connected to the totality of construction tools and equipment, such as saws, screwdrivers, measuring tapes, nails, and screws” (114). This is what McLean calls a “broader referential context” (114). (2) Fore-sight concerns prior need. That is to say, before a hammer is needed (and hence valuable for use), I will have had already in place a specific need for which the hammer will prove useful. “For example, prior to a hammer being meaningful to me as ready-at-hand, I have the need to repair or build something, or I am able to anticipate such a need in my future” (114). (3) Fore-conception describes the process of bringing one’s fore-having and fore-sight together. That is, “fore-conception allows you to make a connection between the tool and the project” (114). See Heidegger, Being and Time, 191-192. See also Thiselton, Two Horizons, 165-166; and Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 309.

²⁵⁴ Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 200. (See the translation note in Heidegger, Being and Time, 192, fn. 1.)

²⁵⁵ Ibid, 202 (Being and Time, 194). See also Palmer, Hermeneutics, 135-136.
body of unnoticed presuppositions, which are present in every interpretive construction by the “objective” and “presuppositionless” interpreter. This body of already given and granted presuppositions is what Heidegger uncovers in his analysis of understanding.256

Some of these ontological features of hermeneutics will remain prominent for Gadamer, though with deviation and nuance.257 Concepts like historicality—specifically, one’s own tradition and Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein—will occupy central place for him as well.258 Moreover, the idea of prejudgment (Vorurteil) will take the place of the Cartesian view that unmediated individual reflection is an adequate means to understanding.

### 3.3 Summary

It was necessary to consider Gadamer’s influences to establish his scholarly context. For example, Schleiermacher’s program of deregionalization reverberates in Gadamer’s own conception of hermeneutics, which centers around understanding as such. Second, reference to the hermeneutical circle will be made, as Gadamer seeks to show that there is no starting point to understanding that is neither neutral nor free of prejudice (Vorurteil). Third, the idea of historicality will be brought to light, as Gadamer revives the central place of tradition and Wirkungsgeschichte in hermeneutics. Fourth, Gadamer’s philosophy is most basically not methodological, but rather ontological, though in a way distinct from that of Heidegger’s. Thus, the stage is now set to outline Gadamer’s theory so that it can be employed in our analysis of Rom 9:25-26.

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256 Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, 136. (See also 137.)

257 For example, see Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 201–202. Thiselton (101) points out that Heidegger’s philosophy is too “individualistic.” He says that this “contrasts unfavorably with Gadamer’s starting-point in life and tradition...” And elsewhere, he writes (293) “that although [Gadamer] shared some of Heidegger’s perspectives, [his] approach is not identical with Heidegger’s, and he is also more systematic and less elusive than the later thought of Heidegger.”

Chapter 4: A Gadamerian Description of Understanding and Interpretation

4.1 Introduction

Gadamer’s thought is both complex and intertwined. The ensuing outline follows his own sequence of thought, as given in his magnum opus, Truth and Method.

4.2 Truth Beyond Methodology

Gadamer begins Truth and Method by saying that his aim is to address “the problem of hermeneutics.” That “problem” transcends the issue of methodology:

So drängt das Problem der Hermeneutik schon von seinem geschichtlichen Ursprung her über die Grenzen hinaus, die durch den Methodenbegriff der modernen Wissenschaft gesetzt sind. Verstehen und Auslegen von Texten ist nicht nur ein Anliegen der Wissenschaft, sondern gehört offenbar zur menschlichen Welterfahrung insgesamt. Das hermeneutische Phänomen ist ursprünglich überhaupt kein Methodenproblem.

Thus, Gadamer sees hermeneutics as existing beyond the realm of science and in the realm of “human world-experience” (menschlichen Welterfahrung). The concept of “experience” (Erfahrung) will prove important to his overall trajectory in his explanation of “tradition” (see below).

Before the concept of tradition is explained,

259 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 166.

260 Cf. Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 211–224, who does this as well. Due to space constraints, it is regretful that more explicit attention could not be given to Gadamer’s exposition on language which occurs in the third section of Truth and Method. This is not to say that his ideas on language remain insignificant or inconsequential but that the “distinctive” qualities of the first two sections of Truth and Method have been recognized, not least in regard to influence (Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 222), and will therefore be afforded primary attention. Concerning how language factors into Gadamer’s overall theory, see Joel Weinsheimer, “Meaningless Hermeneutics?” in Gadamer’s Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. Bruce Krajewski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 162, and the surrounding discussion. See also Patricia Altenbernd Johnson, On Gadamer (WPS; Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000), 39-53.

261 Gadamer, TM, xx.

262 Gadamer, WM, 1.

263 For a helpful overview on the way Gadamer uses Erfahrung in comparison to Erlebnis, see the translators’ preface in Gadamer, TM, xiii–xiv.
his aim will be to establish the primacy of experience, that is, the experience of truth. Gadamer wants to “seek [out] the experience of truth that transcends the domain of the scientific method wherever that experience is to be found, and to inquire into its legitimacy.” Therefore, his intention is not just to expound upon experience for its own sake, but rather those experiences of truth that lie outside, and indeed beyond the limits of, scientific methodological capabilities. On this, Gadamer says “the human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science.”

First, he turns to aesthetic experience. Gadamer discusses how the “experience [Erlebnis] of art” cannot be supplanted by the rigid scrutiny of scientific methodology. Science is deeply restricted in what it can do. Science simply cannot discover truth from a methodological approach to art like the experience of art can. Because of this fact, Gadamer offers his own analysis of the aesthetic experience and from there seeks to pull aesthetic experience into the realm of each and every hermeneutical event. What this means, then, is that, with affinity to Schleiermacher’s program of deregionalization, Gadamer, too, wants to conceptualize hermeneutics as the “menschlichen Welterschaffung insgesamt.” Gadamer wishes to take the notions of tradition and art as the proper starting place so as to offer a description of the “hermeneutical phenomenon in its full extent.” After all, “in [the human sciences] our historical tradition in all its forms is certainly made the object of investigation, but at the same time truth comes to speech in it.”

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264 Gadamer, TM, xxi.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid. WM, 2.
267 Ibid., xi.
268 Ibid., xxii, xxvii.
269 Gadamer, WM, 1; see also Westphal, Whose Community, 69.
270 Gadamer, TM, xxii.
271 Ibid. Emphasis original.
Not wanting to consign the question of understanding and interpretation to the province of scientific methodology, Gadamer moves his enquiries beyond that sphere.\textsuperscript{272} There should be therefore no confusion about Gadamer’s intentions concerning his investigations. He is not out to propose a method, saying that, “The hermeneutics developed here is not, therefore, a methodology of the human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the humans sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of world.”\textsuperscript{273} Elsewhere he states, “My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing.”\textsuperscript{274}

Although he was not intent on developing a “method,” neither was he attempting to discard “methodical work.”\textsuperscript{275} He does not seek to “confine or limit modern science” as much as he wants to address the very question that goes to “precede it and make it possible.”\textsuperscript{276} Gadamer wants to ask something more fundamental. His question, primarily, is: “how is understanding possible?”\textsuperscript{277} Through his analysis of the experience of a work of art, a whole new “realm” begins to emerge, which itself “transcends” scientific methodology in its pursuit of truth.\textsuperscript{278} The central point of Gadamer’s work is the attention he gives to the interpreter’s historical situation.\textsuperscript{279}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{272} See again ibid., xx-xxi.
\item \textsuperscript{273} Ibid., xxii.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Ibid., xxv–xxvi. In the preface to the Second Edition (xxv), Gadamer expounds more on his intentions: “I did not intend to produce a manual for guiding understanding in the manner of the earlier hermeneutics. I did not wish to elaborate a system of rules to describe, let alone direct, the methodical procedure of the human sciences. Nor was it my aim to investigate the theoretical foundation of work in these fields in order to put my findings to practical ends.” (Cf. Palmer, “Heideggerian Elements,” \textit{Consequences of Hermeneutics}, 122.) Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 293, calls it ironic that Gadamer would include the word “method” in the title of his work on hermeneutics; Hirsch, \textit{Validity}, 245, also calls it “somewhat ironic.” On this, cf. Joel Weinsheimer, \textit{Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), xi-xii.
\item \textsuperscript{275} Ibid., xxvi.
\item \textsuperscript{276} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{277} Ibid., xxvii; Cf. James Risser, “Gadamer’s Hidden Doctrine: The Simplicity and Humility of Philosophy,” in \textit{Consequences of Hermeneutics}, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{278} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 294.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Cf. Hirsch, \textit{Validity}, 245–246. Hirsch does not see the novelty of Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory as being his assessment of the historical situation, but rather “his mode of presentation,” specifically as he “introduces new concepts and gives old words new meaning.” Hirsch lists things like \textit{Vorurteil}, \textit{Horizontverschmelzung}, \textit{Wirkungsgeschichte}, and art as \textit{Spiel}, all of which are covered below.
\end{itemize}
speaks of how “history does not belong to us; we belong to it.”  

What has served to shape one’s understanding has been one’s tradition, i.e., things like “family, society, and the state in which we live.”  

Before developing these ideas, he first examines aesthetic consciousness, attempting to establish the idea that one’s experience of art is a means by which truth can be attained—and that apart from method. Anticipating this analysis, Gadamer offers preliminary observations that will lend to his aesthetic critique, which will in turn tie into his theses of experience and tradition (mentioned above).

4.2.1 The Problem of Method and Bildung as Solution

The first section in Wahrheit und Methode is titled, “Das Methodenproblem.” He begins by observing that, “Die logische Selbstbesinnung der Geisteswissenschaften, die im 19. Jahrhundert ihre tatsächliche Ausbildung begleitet, ist ganz von dem Vorbild der Naturwissenschaften beherrscht.”  

The problem is that the Naturwissenschaften have been the model by which the Geisteswissenschaften have been studied. Gadamer faults Mill for giving preferred status to the methodology of natural sciences. Droysen, too, is criticized for wanting a scientific approach to the human sciences in the spirit of Kant.  

Gadamer even takes issue with Dilthey. The latter, it is remembered, pursued a methodology which took its cues from the natural sciences, though he did, admittedly, attempt to grant independence to the human sciences. But attempts and intentions are not that beneficial if results are not produced, and Gadamer was quick to recognize this in Dilthey. But if science did not please Gadamer’s criteria, what was his own alternative? At this point, Gadamer recognized the profound influence of Herder’s concept of Bildung. It is worth quoting Gadamer at length:


280 Gadamer, TM, 278.
281 Ibid.
282 Gadamer, WM, 9.
283 Gadamer, TM, 3.
284 Ibid., 5–6.
285 Ibid., 6–7.

*Bildung* remained an important concept for Gadamer because he saw in it the very principle from which the *Geisteswissenschaften* could be based. What science could not do for the human sciences, *Bildung* could.287 Thus, *Bildung* became part of the solution to the problem of method. *Bildung*, broadly, entails the idea of one encountering the “other,” that is, “keeping oneself open to what is other—to other, more universal points of view.”288 Specifically, *Bildung* concerns the idea of formation, namely, that the thing that forms oneself is not lost, but rather “absorbed” into it.289 Thus, the “other” has been “preserved,” and because of this very fact, *Bildung* itself ought to be seen as a “genuine historical idea.”290 This connection with historicality proves to be an important link in Gadamer’s conception of understanding. Gadamer views *Bildung* as chained to the idea of “a universal and common sense.”291 Like every other “sense,” *Bildung* implies openness to its surroundings.292 Again, one must not forget that his concept of *Bildung* remains the alternative to the scientific method in being the model for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Thus, his idea of *Bildung* as “universal and common sense,”293 and fundamentally as a “genuine historical idea,”294 is his way of saying that truth, as attained in the *Geisteswissenschaften*, is found in a way other than

287 See Thiselton, *Hermeneutics*, 212, who remarks, “What is the role of ‘method,’ Gadamer asks, for the *Geisteswissenschaften*, or humanities, literature, and social science? It is all very well, perhaps, for the sciences, as Droysen, Mill, or even Dilthey conceived of ‘science.’ The humanities, or Geisteswissenschaften, however are based on *Bildung*, or formative culture.”
289 Ibid., 10.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid., 15–16.
292 Ibid., 16. This is what I take Gadamer to mean when he uses the example of sight, saying, “Thus the cultivated consciousness has in fact more the character of a sense. For every sense—e.g., the sense of sight—is already universal in that it embraces its sphere, remains open to a particular field, and grasps the distinctions within what is opened to it in this way. In that such distinctions are confined to one particular sphere at a time, whereas cultivated consciousness [*gebildete Bewußtsein*] is active in all directions, such consciousness surpasses all of the natural sciences. It is a *universal sense*” (*TM*, 16; *WM*, 23). Emphasis original.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid., 10.
scientific methodology. In other words, truth can be discovered via historical cultivation and formation, i.e., Bildung, and all that the term itself implies. Gadamer states,

Ein allgemeiner und gemeinschaftlicher Sinn—das ist in der Tat eine Formulierung für das Wesen der Bildung, die einen weiten geschichtlichen Zusammenhang anklingen läßt. Die Besinnung auf den Begriff der Bildung, wie er den Überlegungen Helmholtzens sachlich zugrunde liegt, führt uns weit in die Geschichte dieses Begriffes zurück. Wir müssen diesem Zusammenhang ein paar Schritte folgen, wenn wir das Problem, das die Geisteswissenschaften für die Philosophie darstellen, aus der künstlichen Enge befreien wollen, in der die Methodenlehre des 19. Jahrhunderts befangen war. Der moderne Wissenschaftsbegriff und der ihm zugeordnete Methodenbegriff können nicht ausreichen.²⁹⁵

The idea of historicality that Gadamer says is inherent to the concept of Bildung will be further established when he proceeds to investigate the “humanistische Tradition” (“humanistic tradition”), which will lead him to the idea of the sensus communis, and from there, his critique of aesthetic consciousness.²⁹⁶

### 4.2.2 Sensus Communis

Gadamer begins his discussion about the Roman concept of the sensus communis with Vico.²⁹⁷ Before he elaborates on the sensus communis, Gadamer is quick to recognize that Vico is working from a “humanistic tradition that stems from antiquity.”²⁹⁸ He traces this tradition back to the ancient Greeks—to the disputes between the primacy of “philosophy” over and against “rhetoric” (and vice versa).²⁹⁹ A point of major contention between the Greeks was “the contrast between the scholar and the wise man on whom the scholar depends.”³⁰⁰ He adds that this is “a contrast that is drawn for the first time in the Cynics’ conception of Socrates—and its content is based on the distinction between the ideas of sophia and phronesis.”³⁰¹ The former is concerned more with the theoretical aspect of knowledge, whereas the latter concerns

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²⁹⁶ Ibid., 23–24 (*TM*, 16-17). Emphasis original.
²⁹⁸ Ibid., 18.
²⁹⁹ Ibid.
³⁰⁰ Ibid.
³⁰¹ Ibid.
itself with practical knowledge. Gadamer notes that this same conception had been carried down to the time of the latter Roman period, where ideas were aimed more toward “the practical ideal of phronesis than to the theoretical ideal of sophia.” What remained helpful in Vico, says Gadamer, is that his conception of the sensus communis is focused away from the theoretical and more toward the practical, or more precisely, not on the “abstract” but on the “concrete” aspects of human existence.

One can appreciate Gadamer’s focus upon Vico’s insights when his (Gadamer’s) overall aims and intentions are remembered—namely, finding a legitimate alternative to the scientific approach for the Geisteswissenschaften. Vico provides Gadamer with the sensus communis, which “obviously does not mean only that general faculty in all men but the sense that founds community.” Of course, “community” is the point of study in the Geisteswissenschaften. Gadamer remarks that,

Es hat etwas sofort Einleuchtendes, die philologisch-historischen Studien und die Arbeitsweise der Geisteswissenschaften auf diesen Begriff des Sensus communis zu gründen. Denn ihr Gegenstand, die moralische und geschichtliche Existenz des Menschen, wie sie in seinen Taten und Werken Gestalt gewinnt, ist selbst durch den Sensus communis entscheidend bestimmt. So kann der Schluß aus dem Allgemeinen und der Beweis aus Gründen nicht ausreichen, weil es auf die Umstände entscheiden ankommt.

By speaking about the primacy of “circumstances” (Umstände) as opposed to “universals” (Allgemeinen), the connection with the ancient Greek distinction between sophia and phronesis, the theoretical and the practical, becomes clear. Thus the significance of “circumstances” and phronesis (practical knowledge) remains central. Gadamer will suggest that this is so because humans are situated within tradition, being historically-effect by it. Gadamer is concerned with Vico to show that, contrary to

303 Gadamer, TM, 18.
304 Ibid., 19–21. See also Thiselton, Two Horizons, 294-295.
305 Ibid., 19.
306 Gadamer, WM, 28.
308 On the connection between tradition (specifically in regard to the Classics) and phronesis, see Camille E. Atkinson, “Is Gadamer’s Hermeneutics Inherently Conservative?,” FPIJP 14, no. 2 (September 2009): 285-306, esp. 286-287. Atkinson’s essay offers a balanced approach to
popular opinion of the time, the *Geisteswissenschaften* need only to look within to find its own basis, for “[t]he sense of the community mediates its own positive knowledge.”309 The *Geisteswissenschaften* do not need to be “measured by a standard foreign to it—namely the methodical thinking of modern science.”310 Simply put, the *Geisteswissenschaften* have their own built-in way of knowing. What Gadamer is hinting at is the notion that one’s “knowing” and one’s “understanding” are heavily facilitated by the *sensus communis*.311 That being established, Gadamer moves toward a discussion of aesthetic consciousness, which will allow him to further establish the primacy of historicality, and from there, tradition. But first, a few further preliminary items need to be addressed.

4.2.3 “Judgment” and “Taste” as Being a Means to Truth Beyond Method

Gadamer’s discussions on “judgment” (*Urteilskraft*) and “taste” (*Geschmack*)312 are necessary because they will provide the basis for his important appraisal of aesthetic consciousness (below). Gadamer says that “judgment” is similar to the *sensus communis* discussed above.313 It is quite synonymous with the concept of common

the question and role of “tradition” in Gadamer’s hermeneutic. Specifically, she argues against those who say that tradition played a mere passive role and that it leave no room for any substantive critique (see esp. 289-292). Additionally, Atkinson takes exception with those who see Gadamer’s tradition-centered hermeneutic as a form of “Aristotelian elitism,” where those who blindly go along with society’s traditions are deemed as “good” and those who do not follow tradition as “bad.” Atkinson asks if this is what Gadamer is doing with his concept of “tradition.” She says, “My short answer to this [question] is, no. Rather, Gadamer is merely defending Aristotle’s claims regarding the nature of moral deliberation and *phronesis*. More specifically, he is proceeding from the premise that one must already be good or, at least, have been brought up with some concern for the good in order to become good. In other words, if someone is nurtured in an environment where no sense of right and wrong is inculcated or cultivated, then he cannot be expected to demonstrate any interest in ethical issues, nor is it likely that he will ask or even understand moral questions” (287). Atkinson goes on to say that the classical theorists remain central to Gadamer because of their insight into the fact that “tradition” plays an integral role in the formation of virtue, because, for them, “one must be good in order to become good... [and it is true that] Traditions may be political, religious, cultural, historical or some intersection or network of these various strains but no human person exists in a moral or value-free vacuum” (287-289).

310 Ibid., 21.
311 Ibid., 25. See also his helpful discussion on Oetinger on 25-27, which are integral.
312 Ibid., 27–31, 31–37, respectively; Gadamer, *WM*, 36–40, 40–47, respectively.
313 Gadamer, *TM*, 27.
He notes that, historically speaking, the concept of “judgment” was deemed to be a “basic intellectual virtue,” and that this idea was in line with English thinkers who believed “judgment” (moral and aesthetic) was not at all based upon “reason” but was more similar to the concept of “sentiment (or taste).” Thus, the concept of judgment “cannot be taught in the abstract but only practiced from case to case, and is therefore more an ability like the senses. It is something that cannot be learned, because no demonstration from concepts can guide the application of rules.” (Of course, this changed with Kant, who saw little need to let things like sentiment linger around discussions concerning these judgments—hence, perhaps, the outcome of his famous duty-based ethics).

Next, Gadamer addresses the concept of taste. “Taste is defined precisely by the fact that it is offended by what is tasteless and thus avoids it, like anything else that threatens injury.” Simply, taste is similar to “sense.” It is like a “sense,” Gadamer says, because it is not governed by “reasons,” for when “taste registers a negative reaction to something, it is not able to say why.” Gadamer acknowledges the communal element of taste, saying that it “operates in a community,” though quickly adding that it “is not subservient to it.” The reason is because of the aforementioned concept of “judgment.” In order to glimpse the context from which the concept of “taste” is found, it is worth quoting Gadamer at length:

Part of the concept of taste, then, is that one observes measure even in fashion, not blindly following its changing dictates but using one’s own judgment. One maintains one’s own “style”—i.e., one relates the demands of fashion to a whole that one’s own taste keeps in view and accepts only what harmonizes with this whole and fits together as it does. Thus taste not only recognizes this or that as beautiful, but has an eye to the

\[^{314}\text{Ibid. Thiselton (Two Horizons, 295) observes that “in the earlier German philosophical tradition, what was known in the English and French traditions as ‘common sense’ appeared in an altered form as ‘power of judgment’ (Urteilskraft).”}\]
\[^{315}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{316}\text{Ibid., 27–28.}\]
\[^{317}\text{Ibid., 29; See also Thiselton, Two Horizons, 295–296; Cf. Kant, Judgment, 169–173.}\]
\[^{318}\text{Gadamer, TM, 33.}\]
\[^{319}\text{Ibid., 32.}\]
\[^{320}\text{Ibid., 32.}\]
\[^{321}\text{Ibid., 33.}\]
whole, with which everything that is beautiful must harmonize. Thus taste is not a social sense—that is, dependent on an empirical universality, the complete unanimity of the judgment of others. It does not say that everyone will agree with our judgment, but that they should agree with it (as Kant says). Against the tyranny exercised by fashion, sure taste preserves a specific freedom and superiority. This is its special normative power, peculiar to it alone: the knowledge that it is certain of the agreement of an ideal community. In contrast to taste’s being governed by fashion, we see here the ideality of good taste.  

Gadamer concludes that taste and judgment are ways of knowing truth. The way in which this happens “cannot be demonstrated,” Gadamer says, because one simply “must have a sense for it.” Whatever taste and judgment may be specifically addressing in some “concrete” situation, it is doing so under the umbrella of a universal whole, though it is not to be seen strictly as the mere “application” of the universal.

As odd as this may sound, there is seeming validation for such an idea. Even though this way of knowing cannot be systematized in a rule book and reduplicated, nevertheless taste and judgment can be illustrated. Though he reserves more substantive discussions for later, Gadamer brings attention to moral judgments. Even when one makes moral judgments, he says, one does not merely apply universal truths to specific situations in the sense of cutting and pasting them to some specific moral dilemma. In his view, rather, it is more like what happens in “jurisprudence, where the supplementary function of ‘hermeneutics’ consists of concretizing the law.” That is, laws, which have been codified (i.e., into a universal or whole) only exist in order to be applied (i.e., into a concrete circumstance or part). Interpretation, then, is always something more than the correct application of general principles. Our knowledge of law and morality too is always supplemented by the individual case, even productively determined by it. The judge not only applies the law in concreto, but contributes through his very judgment to developing the law (“judge-made law”).

Furthermore, the relationship between universal laws and its concrete application is said to be such that the latter is active in “co-determining, supplementing, and correcting”

322 Ibid., 33–34 (emphasis ours); See Kant, Judgment, 94.
323 Gadamer, TM, 34.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
those universals. What is important here is to remember that Gadamer is subverting Kant’s idea that aesthetic judgments are outside the realm of knowledge of truth. For Gadamer, concepts like taste are important, for “all moral decisions require taste.” Because “taste” functions within a community setting, both critiquing and affirming it, the concretizing of universal morals to specific situations require special judgments. But these judgments are not theoretical. On the contrary, by virtue of the act of application (i.e., “concretization”) itself, this is not grounded in pure, abstract reason. It is not grounded in logic but in the sensus communis, that is, common understanding. And this, ultimately, is an aesthetic process. Gadamer decries Kant, who taught that the aesthetic was not to be considered a player in his own ethics. All of this, Gadamer states, was detrimental to the human sciences in general, since aesthetics (judgment and taste) was “the element in which philological and historical studies lived,” and it followed that, once Kant discarded the aesthetic component from the human sciences, the only method available to it was that of the natural sciences.

For Gadamer, one must remember that the concepts of “judgment” and “taste” were utilized for more than just an evaluation of how communities (and individuals within them) function. His aims are higher: Matters of “taste,” “judgment,” and matters of “universal laws” and “concretizing of the law,” inherent within the living, functioning relationship between individuals and communities are, at the end of the day, hermeneutical. Indeed, for Gadamer, all of life is hermeneutical. His discussions on judgment and taste, not least his exposition on Bildung and the sensus communis, bring the reader to that point. Before this is completely developed, however, the question at hand needs to be answered: Contrary to Kant, can truth be found in the aesthetic

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327 Ibid.
328 Ibid., 35.
329 See the discussion on Ibid., 34–37.
330 Ibid., 35. Gadamer continues (35) by saying, though this is true that taste is “required,” this is not to say “that this most individual balancing of decision is the only thing that governs [moral decisions], but [rather] it is an indispensable element.”
331 Ibid., 36.
component? Gadamer asks, “Must we not also acknowledge that the work of art possess truth?”

Kant’s understanding of “taste” is such that he won’t allow it “any significance as knowledge.” Gadamer goes on to say that Kant “reduces sensus communis to a subjective principle. In taste nothing is known of the objects judged to be beautiful, but it is stated only that there is a feeling of pleasure connected with them a priori in the subjective consciousness.”

4.2.4 The Concept of Erlebnis

Since Kant’s “main concern” was to ground aesthetics upon the “subjective a priori... feeling of life” (as opposed to, as Gadamer put it, “[raising] the question of truth in the sphere of art”), in Gadamer’s eyes, the Kantian program of Lebensgefühl (“feeling of life”) demanded a response. Here, Gadamer moves to expound upon the concept Erlebnis (“experience”). He traces the word etymologically, looking first at the older word Erleben. Erleben implies the “immediacy” of one’s experience, i.e., “to be still alive when something happens.” This type of knowing has nothing to do with logical conclusions or inferences, but rather one’s own direct experience. Next, he observes a second meaning, this time behind another cognate of the word Erlebnis, namely, das Erlebte. This refers to the “permanent content of what is experienced.” Thus, this word deals not with the immediacy of one’s experience, but rather the “lasting result” of the experience itself. Gadamer says that both of these meanings—the “immediacy” and “lasting result”—provide the foundation for Erlebnis. But why is this word important, and what does it have to do with understanding truth in art?

333 Ibid., 37.
334 Ibid., 38. Emphasis original.
335 Ibid. See Kant, Judgment, 92–93, 188-196. See also Gadamer, TM, 38, 47–52.
336 Gadamer, TM, 52; WM, 65.
337 Ibid., 53.
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid.
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
Gadamer remarks that *Erlebnis* first began to appear in biographical literature.\(^{342}\) Within this genre, writers would use the word in such a way that both meanings (given above) would be understood.\(^{343}\) Experience, then, was something that spoke of both the immediacy of experience and the “lasting importance” (*bleibende Bedeutung*) of “its being experienced” (*sein Erlebtsein*).\(^{344}\) Gadamer traces the use of the word, as well as influences upon it, from Dilthey to Rousseau to Schleiermacher, Schilling, and Hegel.\(^{345}\) He notes that, for Dilthey, *Erlebnis* is primarily “epistemological,” in that it is the “basis for all knowledge of the objective.”\(^{346}\) The fact “[t]hat life (Leben) manifests itself in experience (Erlebnis) means simply that life is the ultimate foundation.”\(^{347}\)

### 4.2.5 Aesthetic Consciousness and Gadamer’s Critique

But there remained a problem. The problem for Gadamer was that “abstraction remains part of aesthetic consciousness.”\(^{348}\) “What we call a work of art and experience (erleben) aesthetically depends on a process of abstraction.”\(^{349}\) Gadamer laments the fact that, in order to come to see a work of art as a “pure work of art,” the process itself has pushed aside everything that has grounded the work of art itself (e.g., he mentions “its original context of life, and the religious or secular function that gave it significance”).\(^{350}\) He credits this to the fact that, for so long, the methodology of the natural sciences has been the mechanism by which the human sciences had been analyzed, which led “to discrediting all the possibilities of knowing that lie outside” scientific methodology.\(^{351}\) Art had been divorced from “its original context of life.”\(^{352}\) Gadamer says further,

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\(^{342}\) Ibid.

\(^{343}\) Ibid.


\(^{346}\) Ibid., 57; Thiselton, *Hermeneutics*, 213.

\(^{347}\) Gadamer, *TM*, 57.

\(^{348}\) Thiselton, *Hermeneutics*, 213.

\(^{349}\) Gadamer, *TM*, 74.

\(^{350}\) Ibid.

\(^{351}\) Ibid., 73. He also faults Schiller (73) for leading to what he has coined the problem of “aesthetic differentiation.”
...aesthetic differentiation is an abstraction that selects only on the basis of aesthetic quality as such. It is performed in the self-consciousness of ‘aesthetic experiences.’ Aesthetic experience (Erlebnis) is directed towards what is supposed to be the work proper—what it ignores are the extra-aesthetic elements that cling to it, such as purpose, function, the significance of its content. These elements may be significant enough inasmuch as they situate the work in its world and thus determine the whole meaningfulness that it originally possessed. But as art the work must be distinguished from all that. It practically defines aesthetic consciousness to say that it differentiates what is aesthetically intended from everything that is outside the aesthetic sphere. It abstracts from all the conditions of a work’s accessibility. Thus this is a specifically aesthetic kind of differentiation. It distinguishes the aesthetic quality of a work from all the elements of content that induce us to take up a moral or religious stance towards it, and presents it solely by itself in its aesthetic being.

Thus, aesthetic consciousness works toward abstracting art from its context, aiming for the bare form, the pure form, of the art itself.

But Gadamer sees this as nonsensical: “Abstracting down to the ‘purely aesthetic’ obviously eliminates it.” The reason is that to observe and “recognize” something (say, a picture) is at the same time to “read” it. “In fact, that is what ultimately makes a picture.” Gadamer will even claim this for listening to music, saying, “Even in listening to absolute music we must ‘understand’ it.” After all, “only when we understand it, when it is ‘clear’ to us, does it exist as an artistic creation for us.” All proposals, therefore, to see, read, or observe art in its pure form—as aesthetic consciousness under the authority of the natural sciences seems to have dictated—is, at the end of the day, an Enlightenment fiction. “Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially reduce phenomenon. Perception always includes meaning.” What, then, is the answer to the aesthetic problem, which scientific methodology has brought upon the human sciences? “In order to do justice to art,

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352 Ibid., 74.
354 Ibid., 77. See also Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 296.
355 Ibid., 79.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid., 80.
aesthetics must go beyond itself and surrender the ‘purity’ of the aesthetic. But how does one accomplish this? It was mentioned above that to perceive a work of art is at the same time to understand it (this was the heart of Gadamer’s critique of the so-called “aesthetic differentiation”). What is hinted at here is the concept of co-creation, that is, a work of art (say, music or literature) is not to be reduced to bareness, for the very essence of art suggests that there is something to be perceived.

In reply to Paul Valéry’s position that works of art are “not completable” (and therefore “endlessly interpretable”), Gadamer proceeds to ask, “If it is true that a work of art is not, in itself, completable, what is the criterion for appropriate reception and understanding?” Does the meaning behind a work of art lie in the genius of the observer? Gadamer answers this in the negative:

A creative process randomly and arbitrarily broken off cannot imply anything obligatory. From this it follows that it must be left to the recipient to make something of the work. One way of understanding a work, then, is no legitimate than another. There is no criterion of appropriate reaction. Not only does the artist himself possess none—the aesthetics of genius would agree here; every encounter with the work has the rank and rights of a new production. This seems to me an untenable hermeneutic nihilism... genius in understanding is, in fact, of no more help than genius in creation.

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360 Ibid.
361 Ibid., 79.
362 Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 96.
363 Gadamer, TM, 82. This is in the context of discussing Kant’s concept of artistic “genius” and how this allowed for “inexhaustible... interpretation” (81), as well as how this became problematically unaccounted for when Kant’s idea of genius was pushed aside and hence needs to be solved (see TM, 80-82). For background on this, see Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 94-100; on the unaccounted problem, see fn. 364 below.
364 Ibid. Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 95-96, says, “For Kant, genius differentiates the artist from the craftsman in that the products of the artist are complete in themselves, not by reference to a purpose; thus they are inexhaustibly interpretable because their interpretation does not stop when they have fulfilled some purpose. But whereas the use of the concept of genius declined as a credible way of explaining the distinctive character of the artist and the completeness of the artwork, the inexhaustibility of interpretation remained as a problem to be explained—by Gadamer as well as his predecessors. Valéry suggests that art is endlessly interpretable because, if it serves no purpose by means of which its completion can be determined, is itself essentially incomplete. It is as if Valéry conceives all works of literature as fragments, which require the reader to finish them. If the reader can in fact complete a poem, however, that implies he is in possession of precisely the power, the authority, and indeed the genius that the author lacked. But it seems clear that if we want to deny genius to the author, it will not do to transfer it to the reader.”
If aesthetics cannot be based upon a criterion of genius—either that of the creator or interpreter—then what about the criterion of Erlebnis, which was discussed above? Gadamer dismisses that as well. To say that some “work of art is only an empty form, a mere nodal point in the possible variety of aesthetic experiences (Erlebnisse), and [that] the aesthetic object exists in these experiences alone” results in “absolute discontinuity.”

He says,

Following Lukács’ ideas, Oskar Becker has stated outright that “in terms of time the work exists only in a moment (i.e., now); it is ‘now’ this work and now it is this work no longer!” Actually, that is logical. Basing aesthetics on experience [Erlebnis] leads to an absolute series of points, which annihilates the unity of the work of art, the identity of the artist with himself, and the identity of the person understanding or enjoying the work of art.

Erlebnis, therefore, cannot be the foundation for the aesthetic experience. But if not genius or experience (Erlebnis), then what? What remains a suitable answer to the aesthetic problem? Considering the above observation that the aesthetic problem itself had to do with aesthetic consciousness and differentiation, and further that this was the result of the domineering of scientific methodology, is it possible that the overarching problem (as Gadamer himself believed) is none other than the false idea that truth can only come via scientific methodology? If it is true that scientific methodology is the only route to truth, then, at least preliminarily, Gadamer has shown that its conclusion of aesthetic differentiation (see above) has rendered troubling results. That said, Gadamer leads one to initially conclude that truth can, and in fact does, transcend methodology. But how so? It will be observed below how Gadamer turned not to scientific methodology for the answer, but to the concept of historicality.

4.3 Preliminary Discussion on Historicality and Tradition

Gadamer insists on the primacy of historicality. “The pantheon of art is not a timeless present that presents itself to a pure aesthetic consciousness, but the act of a

365 Ibid.
367 On “historicality” and “historicity” (not least in relation to “historicism”), see Lawn and
mind and spirit that has collected and gathered itself historically.” What he means by being “collected and gathered” in a historical fashion is self-understanding. He says that having an “experience of the aesthetic” is a “mode of self-understanding.” Moreover, despite his scathing critique of aesthetic experience (Erlebnis), Gadamer’s goal was not to dismiss experience per se and its role in the process of understanding. Rather, his aim was to bring out the fact that Erlebnis, as normally conceived, reduced self-understanding, indeed experience itself, to the precarious point of discontinuity (see above). Gadamer wanted to move beyond this. His question was, “how can one do justice to the truth of aesthetic experience (Erfahrung) and [still] overcome the radical subjectivization of the aesthetic that began with Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”? In short, Gadamer wanted to acknowledge the prime role of experience (i.e., Erfahrung) in the process of understanding, but not fall into the trap of relegating the process itself to the level of subjectivism. Art, he thinks, has more to do with truth, knowledge, and understanding than previously thought. Gadamer asks,

Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly is not inferior to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to ground the fact that the experience (Erfahrung) of art is a mode of knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from that sensory knowledge which provides science with the ultimate data from which it constructs the knowledge of nature, and certainly different from all moral rational


Gadamer, TM, 83.

Gadamer, TM, 83.

Ibid. Gadamer continues: “Self-understanding always occurs through understanding something other than the self, and includes the unity and integrity of the other. Since we meet the artwork in the world and encounter a world in the individual artwork, the work of art is not some alien universe into which we are magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to understand ourselves in and through it, and this means that we sublate (aufheben) the discontinuity and atomism of isolated experiences in the continuity of our own existence. For this reason, we must adopt a standpoint in relation to art and the beautiful that does not pretend to immediacy but corresponds to the historical nature of the human condition. The appeal to immediacy, to the instantaneous flash of genius, to the significance of ‘experiences’ (Erlebnisse), cannot withstand the claim of human existence to continuity and unity of self-understanding. The binding quality of the experience (Erfahrung) of art must not be disintegrated by aesthetic consciousness” (83-84). See again Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 on the Concept of Erlebnis an Aesthetic Consciousness, respectively.

Ibid., 84.

It should be noted that, with respect to our investigation into Paul’s use of Hosea, Gadamer’s notion of historicality allows attention to be given to the past without precluding an emphasis upon newness. That is, Paul’s reconstrual of Hosea is not an exercise of detachment from his Jewish heritage. Therefore, a focus on continuity with OT Jewish motifs in Paul’s thought is as crucial as a focus on what is new in the same. We develop this below.
knowledge, and indeed from all conceptual knowledge—but still knowledge, i.e.,
conveying truth?  

The end to which Gadamer is working is to bring validation to the idea that truth can
come from the “experience of art itself.”

4.3.1. Reflections on Play

This leads to Gadamer’s “concept of play.” Here he seeks to illustrate “the
mode of being of the work of art itself.” What this means is that art, exhibited in
Gadamer’s conception of “play,” is not to be seen in reference to some subject
approaching the object (say, art); that is, an ultimate subject-object distinction ought not
to be seen. Of course, a distinction can be made in the sense that “play” and the
“behavior of the player” can be detected. However, these penultimate distinctions are
not what define the essence of play itself. Never mind the player’s cognitive
inclinations, says Gadamer. What matters most is not what, or how, or why the player
is purposing and aiming to do with the game (e.g., for “recreation”) but rather the
built-in “seriousness” the game provides itself. Thus, what really happens is not that
the player is being distinguished from the game via the player’s own purposes in

Hermeneutics*, 126–127.

373 Ibid. Thus, Bartholomew, *Hermeneutics*, 310, can say, “Gadamer argues that experience
and not abstraction is the key to understanding art.”

374 Ibid., 102; See also Philippe Eberhard (*The Middle Voice in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A
Basic Interpretation with Some Theological Implications* [HUZT; Chicago: Mohr Siebeck, 2004],
65), who says, “Gadamer’s notion of play is indebted to the Heideggerian critique of modernity’s
subjectivism and of the concept of scientific objectivity. It is a continuation of Heidegger’s thought
but in a more accessible and concrete form. It helps bring to the fore the inadequacy of the
dichotomy between subject and object.” See also Dostal, “Gadamer,” in *EP*, 258-259; Wright,

375 Ibid.

376 Ibid., 102–103; Cf. Eberhard, *The Middle Voice*, 63–64; Robert T. Valgenti, “The
Tradition of Tradition in Philosophical Hermeneutics,” in *Consequences of Hermeneutics*, 71.

377 Ibid., 102.

378 Specifically, he discusses the “seriousness” the player lacks in the act of playing a game
since, presumably, “play” is for relaxation (*TM*, 102–103).

379 Ibid., 102, citing Aristotle's *Politics*, VIII, 3, 1337 b 39 and passim.

Robert Bernasconi, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 123-
playing the game, but that the “[p]lay fulfills its own purpose only if the player loses himself in play.” Therefore, when one looks to unpack the concept of play, one needs to look beyond the cognitive happenings within the player. From this, it is easy to see where Gadamer is headed. Remembering the above discussion on the “genius of the creator” (as well as that of the reader), one is better positioned to see how Gadamer comes to find it implausible to ground the experience of art merely upon the subject’s own feelings toward it. He, of course, is using the concept of play to illustrate this fact. Gadamer states explicitly concerning the correlation between the experience of art and play:

When we speak of play in reference to the experience of art, this means neither the orientation nor even the state of mind of the creator or of those enjoying the work of art, nor the freedom of a subjectivity engaged in play, but the mode of being of the work of art itself. In analyzing aesthetic consciousness we recognized that conceiving aesthetic consciousness as something that confronts an object does not do justice to the real situation. This is why the concept of play is important in my exposition.

What mattered most to Gadamer is that, when it comes to art, it is not an aesthetic consciousness which entails the disastrous result of aesthetic differentiation, but rather “the experience (Erfahrung) of art and thus the question of the mode of being of the work of art that must be the object of our examination.” And so,

Gadamer uses Spiel to counter the modern emphasis of subjectivity in general and aesthetic consciousness in particular. He moves against Kant’s legacy and the subjectivation of art. Art is not the object of the so-called aesthetic consciousness; this consciousness is more than it thinks it is because art involves it in its play.

130, esp. 130.

Ibid., 103.


Ibid., 102. See also Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 28.

Ibid., 103. Gadamer further says (103), “The ‘subject’ of the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself. This is the point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. For play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those who play. Play—indeed, play proper—also exists when the thematic horizon is not limited by any being-for-itself of subjectivity, and where there are no subjects who are behaving ‘playfully.’”

Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 66; See also Palmer, “Heideggerian Elements,” Consequences of Hermeneutics, 127.
On the one hand, Gadamer remained largely critical of experience (Erlebnis), wanting to dismiss it altogether as a proper ground for aesthetics in general. Yet, on the other hand, he says that the “object of our examination” is to be “the experience (Erfahrung) of art.” The confusion can be eliminated when one understands the differences between both Erlebnis and Erfahrung, despite the appearances of similarity in its English rendering, as both are translated as “experience.” The former, to which Gadamer remained largely “critical,” deals with experience in the sense of “immediacy,” such that Erlebnis was associated with the critique of aesthetic consciousness and differentiation. The latter, Erfahrung, is different. That is, “Erlebnis is something you have, and thus is connected with a subject and with the subjectivization of aesthetics. Erfahrung is something you undergo, so that subjectivity is overcome and drawn into an ‘event’ (Geschehen) of meaning.” With this, Gadamer mounts his case for concepts like historically-effected consciousness and tradition as the basis for which the process of understanding might be grounded. But first, what does the concept of play have to do with art?

4.3.2 Further Reflections on Play: Presentation

Gadamer takes the concept of play, as he has conceived it, and applies it to art. First, Gadamer says that the “mode of being” of play is “self-presentation.” The idea of presentation serves as that which is common (a type of link) between play and art.

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386 See Section 4.2.4 above.
387 Gadamer, TM, 103.
388 Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, “Translators’ Preface,” in TM, xiii. See Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 above.
390 Though her comments are in regard to moral understanding specifically, see Atkinson, “Hermeneutic,” 288, who offers invaluable insight into the differences between Gadamer’s approach to understanding (via tradition and prejudgments) as opposed to those who operate under the sway of Modernism. These insights are important for what follows.
391 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 213.
392 Gadamer, TM, 108; He says, "Das Spiel ist wirklich darauf beschränkt, sich darzustellen. Seine Seinsweise ist also Selbstdarstellung" (Gadamer, WM, 113). For his detailed exposition of the concepts of presentation and imitation, what they are not and what they are, see TM, 110-114, esp. 113.
“Gadamer shows from the examples of music and drama that the work of art consists of the performance itself.”³⁹³ For example, he talks about a “religious act” and a “drama” in the context of his discussion on play, where the former is a “genuine representation [Darstellung] for the community” and the latter is “a kind of playing that, by its nature, calls for an audience.”³⁹⁴ He says,

In being played the play speaks to the spectator through its presentation; and it does so in such a way that, despite the distance between it and himself, the spectator belongs to play. This is seen most clearly in one type of representation, a religious rite. Here the relation to the community is obvious. An aesthetic consciousness, however reflective, can no longer suppose that only aesthetic differentiation, which views the aesthetic object in its own right, discovers the true meaning of the religious image or play. No one will be able to suppose that for religious truth the performance of the ritual is inessential. The same is true for drama generally, even considered as literature. The performance of a play, like that of a ritual, cannot simply be detached from the play itself, as if it were something that is not part of its essential being, but is as subjective and fluid as the aesthetic experiences in which it is experienced. Rather, it is in the performance and only in it—as we see most clearly in the case of music—that we encounter the work itself, as the divine is encountered in the religious rite. Here it becomes clear why starting from the concept of play is methodologically advantageous.

In saying this, Gadamer comes against the idea of aesthetic differentiation, which he considers wrong precisely on the grounds that one cannot describe an experience of a work of art in terms of the work’s supposed true form, or bare arrangement.³⁹⁶ And so, “truth is not to be reduced to a mere matter of concepts, but relates to experiences in

³⁹³ Thiselton, Two Horizons, 298.
³⁹⁴ Gadamer, TM, 109; Gadamer, WM, 114. See also Weinsheimer, “Gadamer and Aesthetics,” in EA, 265.
³⁹⁵ Ibid., 115. See also what he says about the “festival” in Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Über Die Festlichkeit des Theaters,” in Kleine Schriften: Interpretationen, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1979), 171; Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 59: “Ja, Begehung ist die Seinsweise des Festes…” Thiselton, Two Horizons, 298, says, “A drama exists only when it is played. Music is experienced not simply in reading the composer’s score privately, but in the actual event of the concert. Moreover, each performance is an event in its own right. It is not merely a ‘copy’ of what went on in the consciousness of the composer. Indeed, we might say: it is not ‘merely’ an interpretation; it is a creative event in its own right.” See also Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 71, who says, “Darstellung is the culmination of play. Representation is central because it is the way of being of play. The actual purposes of the game is not the content of game, that which the rules specify. This is only Scheinzweck, ‘illusory purpose.’… The presentation of play is most acute in theater play. When Spiel becomes Schauspiel play does not leak, so to speak, because of the openness toward the spectators. On the contrary, the spectators are part of the play’s space or volume and fulfill the way of being of play.”
³⁹⁶ See Section 4.2.5 above.
broader terms. Thus, this means by which one comes to understand art is in the experience of it—and this happens in its own presentation, which, again, is its mode of being. Thus, Thiselton rightly comments that, for Gadamer, one cannot divorce the play or the art from its being presented. Gadamer says, “A drama really exists only when it is played, and ultimately music must resound.”

This detail is important to Gadamer, for if one’s experience of art is more than just an experience of it in its bare arrangement, and is therefore an experience principally in its presentation, then the role of the interpreter cannot be seen as insignificant. The point here is that all experiences of the real world are not to be understood in Cartesian terms—that is, by means of autonomous individuality—but rather by understanding that the person, far from being an autonomous subject, is in constant dialogue with the reality itself and, in fact, has been shaped by it.

Palmer notes the significance of the concept of play, pointing out a few accomplishments of Gadamer’s exposition of it. He says that the work of art itself is no longer to be seen as “static,” but rather a “dynamic thing.” That is, the experience of a work of art cannot be divorced from the work of art. The experience of the Mona Lisa,

397 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 298.

398 See also Valgenti, “The Tradition of Tradition,” Consequences of Hermeneutics, 71.

399 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 213; See also Gadamer (TM, 125), who says, “The fact that aesthetic being depends on being presented, then, does not imply some deficiency, some lack of autonomous meaning. Rather, it belongs to its very essence. The spectator is an essential element in the kind of play we call aesthetic.” To illustrate this last claim, Gadamer expounds upon Aristotle’s Poetics in order to discuss the concept of tragedy, for it is “[t]here the spectator’s frame of mind figures expressly in the definition of tragedy’s essential nature.” Gadamer goes on to describe the effect (Wirkung) that the tragedy has upon the reader, which he argues displays the fact that “the spectator belongs essentially to the playing of the play” (126). (On this discussion, see 125-130.) More will be said on how this works into our present concerns in the section on Wirkungsgeschichte below.

400 Gadamer, TM, 115. Here he states explicitly (115) that his “thesis, then, is that the being of art cannot be defined as an object of an aesthetic consciousness because, on the contrary, the aesthetic attitude is more than it knows itself. It is a part of the event of being that occurs in presentation, and belongs essentially to play as play” (emphasis original).


402 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 214; see also Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 66. More will be said with Wirkungsgeschichte below.

403 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 174.
for example, is not reduced to an object of unintelligible jots and strokes. Much like a play or drama, its presentation belongs to its essence.\textsuperscript{404} The essence of the picture is its being presented, being seen and understood. Its essence is to draw the viewer into a form of play. It is in this sense that Palmer sees a work of art as “dynamic.” Thus, Palmer understands Gadamer as moving beyond the traditional hermeneutical distinction between subject and object, calling the distinction full of “inadequacy,” saying, “It is precisely the experience of art which shows that the work of art is no mere object that stands over against a self-sufficient subject. The work of art has its authentic being in the fact that, in becoming experience, it transforms the experiencer; the work of art works.”\textsuperscript{405}

But how does the above discussion work into his (and our) overall project? It was noted above that art, like plays and dramas, is presentational. Its essence is performative, in that it is operative through the experience itself. The experience of art in terms of aesthetic differentiation—i.e., in what has been described as bare arrangement—ought to be, according to Gadamer, discarded. What counts is not that one experiences a work of art in terms of seeing it as it is in its basic form, but rather in the experience of being caught up in it.\textsuperscript{406} That is, one’s experience of it is such that the interpreter (e.g., audience) is an integral part to which the essential nature of the work of art itself (i.e., its presentation) is aiming. It is recalled that Gadamer, like Schleiermacher, saw hermeneutics as being a deregionalized discipline, in that it concerned all of life, not just philology, for example.\textsuperscript{407} Hence, a line of continuity can be traced from Gadamer’s discussions on the aesthetic experience, art, and play to that of the historicality of understanding in general. Palmer’s way of describing Gadamer’s idea of historicality is helpful:

\textsuperscript{404} See Gadamer, \textit{TM}, 126. On the ontology of picture (in comparison to the performance arts such as dramas), see Gadamer, \textit{TM}, 130-138.

\textsuperscript{405} Palmer, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 174.

\textsuperscript{406} See again \textit{Erlebnis} and \textit{Erfahrung} in Section 4.2.4 above.

\textsuperscript{407} See Section 4.2 above. Cf. B.H. McLean, \textit{Biblical Interpretation}, 176-177. McLean says (177) that Gadamer “argued that the humanities and the natural sciences are both a subspecies of a universal practice of hermeneutics.”
Gadamer’s hermeneutics and his critique of historical consciousness assert that the past is not like a pile of facts which can be made an object of consciousness, but rather is a stream in which we move and participate, in every act of understanding. Tradition, then, is not over against us but something in which we stand and through which we exist; for the most part it is so transparent a medium that it is invisible to us—as invisible as water to a fish.\(^{408}\)

It is important to avoid confusion on the connection between Gadamer’s discussion on the aesthetic and aesthetic consciousness and his concepts of historicality and tradition. What does historicality have to do with aesthetic consciousness? Palmer is quite correct in connecting the two with one another.\(^{409}\) He laments that some evaluate works of art (specifically literary works of art) under the influence of aesthetic differentiation—that is, in the bareness of the work itself (i.e., the “formal aspects”), denying the temporal place and historicality of the same.\(^{410}\) “To discuss the meaning of the work for the present day would seem to have no justifiable place in their philosophy of a literary work; indeed the tension between the past and present is often swallowed up in the timeless ahistoricality of formal analyses of poetry.”\(^{411}\) The point, therefore, is that, since aesthetic consciousness and experience cannot be reduced down to a mere evaluation of a work of art’s bareness, but in its presentation, then according to Gadamer, this necessitates a hermeneutical doctrine of historicality. The work of art, although being rooted in the past, is constantly being experienced in the present. Hence, one can see the resulting effect this has on the nature of interpretation. Thus,

Gadamer insists that in the case of a work of art its actual being cannot be detached from its representation (\textit{Darstellung}). Hence the reality of something written or presented in the past is not recaptured by mere subjective recollection. Gadamer explicitly cites the Lutheran emphasis on preaching or the Catholic view of the mass as examples in which reality is disclosed \textit{afresh}. Interpretation is not a mechanical reproduction of the past in the present, but a creative event in its own right.\(^{412}\)

\(^{408}\) Palmer, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 176–177.

\(^{409}\) Ibid., 162–180. Palmer discusses the issue of aesthetics on 162-176, then he immediately segues into a discussion on Gadamer’s critical concept of historicality.

\(^{410}\) Ibid., 175–176.

\(^{411}\) Ibid.

\(^{412}\) Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 298–299 (emphasis original); Cf. Valgenti, “The Tradition of Tradition,” \textit{Consequences of Hermeneutics}, 71, who says, “The work of art is an exemplar of tradition because any artistic creation is at once an appropriation of a history of artistic effects and the handing-over of a new work to the ongoing history of art.” Thus, there is a conceptual link between Gadamer’s discussion of aesthetics and his upcoming one on tradition (see below).
For Gadamer, contemporaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit) is central to interpretive activity.\textsuperscript{413} Gadamer’s project, therefore, is concerned with how the pastness of a work of art (e.g., literature) is opened up into the present experience of the same.\textsuperscript{414} His hermeneutic, again, is not concerned with what methodology needs to be developed to make this dialogue happen; rather he is concerned more with developing an account as to how this happens with each and every encounter with a work of art—whether that be a picture, drama, or literature.\textsuperscript{415}

The above discussion on aesthetics must be bridged to what follows, namely, to the problem of historical distance and from there, textual considerations. Thus, it is helpful to note that for Gadamer, art is to be seen as an exemplar for the question of hermeneutics because “art is never simply past but is able to overcome temporal distance by virtue of its own meaningful presence,” and “[e]ven though it is no mere object of historical consciousness, understanding art always includes historical mediation.”\textsuperscript{416} Indeed, historical mediation is key to the phenomenon of understanding, and it remains integral to Gadamerian hermeneutics (see below).


\textsuperscript{415} See Gadamer, \textit{TM}, 512.

\textsuperscript{416} Ibid., 158. At this point, Gadamer compares the two approaches of Schleiermacher and Hegel. Schleiermacher was pre-occupied with reconstruction; that is, he thought hermeneutics ought to be concerned with reconstructing the original place in which the object under consideration once stood, its “original occasion and circumstances” (Gadamer, \textit{TM}, 158-159). Gadamer calls this “nonsensical” (159). Instead of reconstructing the past “nodal point [which originally existed] in the artist’s mind” (159), Gadamer opts for a more Hegelian conception of hermeneutics (160-161). Hegel, he says, understood that “the essential nature of the historical spirit consists not in the restoration of the past but in thoughtful mediation with contemporary life...In this way his idea of hermeneutics is fundamentally superior to Schleiermacher’s” (161).
4.4 Tradition, Temporal Distance, and Historicality

Gadamer credits Heidegger (contra the Romantics and Schleiermacher) for bringing a “decisive impetus” to hermeneutic theory.417 Schleiermacher and the romanticism of which he was part were both committed to psychologism (see above). Because of Heidegger, Gadamer argues, the task of hermeneutics cannot be reduced to the reconstruction of the author’s mind.418 That is to say, “the meaning of a text goes beyond its author.”419 Gadamer is hesitant to pick up on the same language used by others who say that the task is always to understand a text better than the author; on the contrary, he says, “Understanding is not, in fact, understanding better, either in the sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of fundamental superiority of conscious over unconscious production. It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.”420 This happens due to the fact of temporal distance, that is, the time-difference of the original location of the text and its later interpreter. This temporal distance should not be seen as problematic, “not something that must be overcome.”421 On the contrary, the temporal distance between, e.g., the text in its originality and its interpreter, actually proves to be the foundation for interpretation in general.422 Gadamer calls it a “positive and productive condition enabling understanding.”423 But how could something as seemingly problematic as temporal distance be a positive thing? One reason is because temporal distance itself is “filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which

417 Ibid., 296.
418 Ibid.
420 Ibid., 296; against this, see Hirsch, Validity, 252–254. Cf. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 112.
421 Ibid., 297. Gadamer says (297) that the desire to “overcome” the temporal distance was nothing more than “the naïve assumption of historicism, namely that we must transpose ourselves into the spirit of the age, think with its ideas and thoughts, not with our own, and thus advance toward historical objectivity.”
422 Ibid.
423 Ibid.
everything handed down presents itself to us." This is a significant feature of
Gadamer’s hermeneutic. One notices Heidegger’s influence. In the section on
Heidegger (Section 3.2.3 above), it was said that, integral to his own thought, was the
idea that understanding was not about a subject approaching, critiquing, or possessing
anything. The situation was more intuitive. Therefore,

Understanding is conceived not as something to be possessed but rather as a mode or
constituent element of being-in-the-world. It is not an entity in the world but rather the
structure in which makes possible the actual exercise of understanding on an
empirical level. Understanding is the basis for all interpretation; it is co-original with
one’s existing and is present in every act of interpretation. It becomes easy to see how Gadamer’s project of ontological hermeneutics
would remain indebted to Heidegger, for tradition and historicality, in the case of
Gadamer, remain central. Emphatically, he states that “history does not belong to us;
we belong to it.” Thus we are historical beings, having been enveloped, even formed,
by our traditions. This remains hermeneutically significant, for,

Every age has to understand transmitted text in its own way, for the text belongs to the
whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks to understand
itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on the
contingencies of the author and his original audience. It certainly is not identical with
them, for it is always co-determined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and
hence by the totality of the objective course of history.

Ibid.
Significant as tradition may be to Gadamer’s hermeneutic, it is not without detractors.
See Atkinson, “Hermeneutics,” 285–286. Atkinson notes that there have been two main objections
to Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory. It is interesting to note that, at least according to her, these
objections are somewhat ironic, since “they seem to contradict one another” (285). That is to say,
she says some critics (Caputo and Warnke) see Gadamer as giving unwarranted authority to
tradition, and hence being too conservative. On the opposite end of the spectrum, she notes (286)
that others (e.g., Hirsch) deem Gadamer too relativistic, and hence too liberal (though she herself
does not use the word).

Valgenti, “The Tradition of Tradition,” Consequences of Hermeneutics, 71. Valgenti
says, “...Gadamer’s recovery of prejudice, authority, and tradition takes up, and in so doing
transforms, the critical legacy handed down from Heidegger’s analysis of historicality.” He goes on
to say (71) that Gadamer has contributed to this legacy with his introduction to it the concept of play.
Cf. Hirsch, Validity, 256-257. See also Hoy, The Critical Circle, 43-44.

Gadamer, TM, 278.


Gadamer, TM, 296. For opposing views on textual meaning being “identical” to the
author and his/her first audience as well as the co-determined nature of meaning, see Hirsch,
By giving prime place to tradition, Gadamer sought to travel a route different than psychologism, which maintained that what ultimately mattered was the author’s state of mind in its originality (à la Schleiermacher). On the contrary, the hermeneutical process for Gadamer was not about the mental states of the author, but rather the co-determined development of both the text and the interpreter’s historicality. It is in this vein, moreover, that, by giving prime place to tradition, Gadamer counters enlightenment dogma in that he “refuses to set reason in opposition to tradition.”

Gadamer rejects the Enlightenment outlook which suspects all tradition and authority merely because it is tradition and authority. The acceptance of authority, he argues, is not necessarily blind or irrational obedience. It may be based on the thoroughly rational insight that as an individual of a particular historical generation I have my own built-in limitations, and may stand in need of learning from a source which has a better understanding of something than I do.

Gadamer mentions other positive facets that temporal distance brings to light. When one is removed from the historical situation from which an object originated, and discovers that he/she is found to be situated in a subsequent historical situation, then the essence of the object can be more clearly discerned. This is easier to see when one compares their observation of a piece of art that is contemporaneous with them. Gadamer says that we come to these familiar artworks “with unverifiable prejudices [Vorurteile], presuppositions that have too great an influence over us for us to know about them; these can give contemporary creations an extra resonance that does not correspond to their true content and significance.” Of course, it is relatively clear what Gadamer means. Temporal distance removes the interpreter from the object in such a way that, far from being unhelpful, serves to accomplish the hermeneutical task. “Only when all their relations to the present time have faded away can their real nature be more clearly discerned.”

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Validity, 251-252, 253-254, respectively.

431 Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 310.
433 Gadamer, TM, 297–299.
appear, so that the understanding of what is said in them can claim to be authoritative and universal."\textsuperscript{436} The point Gadamer moves to make is not that temporal distance allows one to read the text in such a way that he/she can know it as a purely historical text;\textsuperscript{437} his point, rather, is that temporal distance actually allows something to be done to the interpreter such that, if it were not there, one could not come to understand the text at all. Moreover, Gadamer understands temporal distance as a sort of "filtering process," which can weed out the unhelpful prejudices mentioned above.\textsuperscript{438} "Often temporal distance can solve question of critique in hermeneutics, namely how to distinguish the true prejudices \[Vorurteile\], by which we understand, from the false ones, by which we misunderstand."\textsuperscript{439} But how is this the case? How does temporal distance, packed with historicity and tradition, go about this filtering process?

For Gadamer, when the interpreter “encounters” some “traditionary text,” there is “provocation.”\textsuperscript{440} The interpreter’s prejudices—whether helpful or unhelpful—meet \textit{the other}, that is, the text, the object, etc. “In fact [the interpreter’s] own prejudice is properly brought into play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able to experience the other’s claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play

\textsuperscript{436} Ibid. See also Palmer, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 185.

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid., admits, “It is true that what a thing has to say, its intrinsic content, first appears only after it is divorced from the fleeting circumstances that gave rise to it.” But one must remember that Gadamer maintained that there is more to temporal distance than just this. After all, Gadamer is not content with offering yet another version of “historical consciousness,” such that the interpreter seeks to know the thing in itself. One must not forget how Gadamer labored against the idea of (aesthetic) differentiation and how that discussion applies to this one. Gadamer (297) found the “implicit presupposition of [the] historical method” problematic because it operates from the wrong footing which claims “the permanent significance of something can first be known objectively only when it belongs to a closed context—in other words, when it is dead enough to have only historical interest.” This is aesthetic differentiation all over again, only in the guise of historical studies. Contrary to this, Gadamer believes there is more to what temporal distance does than saying it simply means “the extinction of our interest in the object” (298). More will be said below.

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid., 298. See also Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 306.

\textsuperscript{439} Ibid. (\textit{WM}, 304). Emphasis original. Gadamer (\textit{TM}, 298) prefaces this with: “Not only are fresh sources of error constantly excluded, so that all kinds of things are filtered out that obscure the true meaning; but new sources of understanding are continually emerging that reveal unsuspected elements of meaning...And along with the negative side of the filtering process brought about by temporal distance there is also the positive side, namely the value it has for understanding. It not only lets local and limited prejudices die away, but allows those that bring about genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such.” See also Grondin, \textit{Philosophical Hermeneutics}, 113.

\textsuperscript{440} Ibid., 298.
himself.” Temporal distance provides the space in which provocation is possible, since the gap between the text and the interpreter is profound. But what brings about this profundity? The answer is one’s own historical situation. Gadamer says this was precisely the problem with previous thinking on the subject:

Real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity. Only then will it cease to chase the phantom of a historical object that is the object of progressive research, and learn to view the object as the counterpart of itself and hence understand both. The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding.

The problem was such that the historical studies focused exclusively on the object and failed to consider the historicity of the modern interpreter. Gadamer’s conception of the hermeneutical task is that the subject-object schema gives way to a harmony between both. This was what historical scholars failed to see. The interpreter’s historicity and the effect of tradition play a highly significant facilitating role in the interpretive process.

“We are *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*...My consciousness is not a transparent, self-grounding vehicle that puts me in immediate contact with its ‘object’ but is rather a grounded opacity (or at best a translucency) that enables a richly mediate contact with its ‘object.’”

Thus tradition is not a passive item we can choose to ignore, but rather an active and formative part which we cannot.

When a reader reads a text, he or she is engaging it, not objectively and freely seeing it in its pure form. Rather, the reader is engaging the text via the efficacious media called tradition:

441 Ibid., 299.
442 Ibid.
443 Westphal, *Whose Community*, 74. See also Valgenti, “The Tradition of Tradition,” *Consequences of Hermeneutics*, 72. Valgenti notes how Gadamer differs with Heidegger on this point, saying, “...Gadamer’s notion of the historically effected consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*) marks a turn away from the ‘existential’ thread in hermeneutics and toward ‘historical effect’ as a structural possibility for human understanding, an ‘a priori’ that bridges the differential gap when horizons are fused.” According to Palmer, “Heideggerian Elements,” *Consequences of Hermeneutics*, 123, Gadamer did not like the word “Bewusstsein” because “[t]he term suggested that Gadamer was falling back into thinking about the human subject within a world of objects.” According to Palmer, the use of the word was too problematic for Heidegger, and Gadamer himself conceded, acknowledging that he simply “could not find a better term” to use. See also Wright, “Gadamer,” in *EA*, 263.
By historically effected, [Gadamer] means that human consciousness is always shaped by history, culture, tradition, and language, in such a way that every act of interpretation is always “effected” by these factors. Our sense of belonging to a history, culture, tradition, and language always effects our horizon of meaning, how we think, what questions we ask, how we relate to the past, and what we hope for in the future.\textsuperscript{445}

Thus Atkinson can say, “Neither the Romantic ideal of interpretation as divination nor the Enlightenment’s faith in the apriority of reason is acceptable to Gadamer or to anyone who acknowledges that human beings are historically situated.”\textsuperscript{446} But how does this \textit{wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein} play out in the process of interpretation itself?

\subsection*{4.5 Vorurteil}

For Gadamer, “there is no presuppositionless interpretation.”\textsuperscript{447} The interpreter’s own prejudgments must be brought to light, for they “must inevitably come to the text with ‘anticipatory ideas.’”\textsuperscript{448} Heidegger’s idea of the fore-structure of understanding is to be recalled at this point. Gadamer takes this idea and sees in the concept an integral part of the hermeneutical process. The Cartesian notion that one can assess or interpret things in a presuppositionless manner, knowing the thing itself in an unmediated and direct way, is a myth. (Recall the discussion on aesthetic differentiation above.) Part of the human condition—i.e., one’s embeddedness within tradition, culture, and social environment—entails this fact.\textsuperscript{449} Therefore, the idea of prejudice (\textit{Vorurteil}) remains a

\textsuperscript{445} Ibid., 180–181 (emphasis original). McLean explains further (182) Gadamer’s ideas of historically-effected consciousness and tradition, saying, “According to Gadamer, one’s historically effected consciousness is also formed by the religious and intellectual tradition in which one finds oneself. By ‘tradition’ Gadamer means the ongoing ‘effective history’ (\textit{Wirkungsgeschichte}) of the past upon the present.” McLean also notes that this idea of tradition, i.e., it’s “happening,” has significance for biblical interpretation (see 183). See also the discussion in Gadamer, \textit{Heideggers Wege}, 52-52 (\textit{Heidegger’s Ways}, 58). Cf. Eberhard, \textit{The Middle Voice}, 90-91, 94, 144-145; Grondin, \textit{Philosophical Hermeneutics}, 113-115. See also Evans, \textit{Reception History}, 7-8, 14-16, on the translation of \textit{wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein} as well as avoiding the temptation to view it as functioning either in only "passive" or "active" ways.

\textsuperscript{446} Atkinson, “Hermeneutics,” 290.

\textsuperscript{447} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 304.

\textsuperscript{448} Ibid., 305.

\textsuperscript{449} The relationship between tradition and prejudice for Gadamer cannot be overemphasized. Palmer, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 183, is clear on this when he writes: “If there can be no presuppositionless understanding, if, in other words, what we call ‘reason’ is a philosophical construction and no final court of appeal, then we must reexamine our relationship to our heritage...Tradition furnishes the stream of conceptions within which we stand, and we must be prepared to distinguish between
central feature within Gadamer’s hermeneutic. It is true that one of the duties of a text is to encounter and adjust, if needed, the interpreter’s own prejudgments; the text must be able “to speak what is new,” and when it does, it can serve to “revise” the prejudgments that the interpreter brings to the reading. But the interpretive process is not a one-sided monologue, where the text is given primacy over the interpreter and his or her prejudgments; rather, it is a dialogue of question and answer—between the text and the interpreter. In the process of understanding a text, the fore-structure of the process itself (recall Heidegger) is just as important to the overall hermeneutical task.

For Gadamer, then, Vorurteile should not be seen as adverse. Rather, over against the Enlightenment’s demands, Gadamer wants to give “positive value” to the concept of prejudice. Of course, the Enlightenment taught that supreme authority was to be handed over to reason itself, and as a result, remained critical toward the idea of prejudice, as if it were something to be abandoned. Though prejudice, in the sense of racial or gender prejudice, is by definition both negative and harmful, it seems that the enlightenment thinkers may have overstated their case. Gadamer says that it was only after the Enlightenment came along that prejudice began to be taken negatively. Thiselton writes,

fruitful presuppositions and those that imprison and prevent us from thinking and seeing...
Ultimately, Gadamer asserts, the consequences of recognizing that there can be no presuppositionless understanding are that we reject Enlightenment interpretation of reason, and both authority and tradition win back a status they have not enjoyed since before the Enlightenment.” Cf. Hirsch, Validity, 250-261.

Thiselton, Two Horizons, 304.

Gadamer discusses the “hermeneutical priority of the question” when he speaks about the interpreter’s experiences with things in general, “We cannot have experiences without having questions. Recognizing that an object is different, and not as we first thought, obviously presupposes the question whether it was this or that” (TM, 356). He says further (360) that “the negativity of experience implies a question. In fact we have experiences when we are shocked by things that do not accord with our expectations.” Specifically, the question-and-answer schema as dialogue is relevant for hermeneutics precisely because it characterizes the task of hermeneutics itself. In fact, he says (363) when the interpreter encounters an “historical text,” the text itself “puts a question to the interpreter.” Cf. Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 106; see also Gadamer, “Classical and Philosophical Hermeneutics,” Gadamer Reader, 70; McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 185-188.

Gadamer, TM, 279.

Ibid. This is precisely Gadamer’s trouble with Descartes (see 280).

Ibid., 273.
In German legal terminology the term signifies a provisional legal verdict before the final verdict is reached. It was only the rationalism of the Enlightenment, with its maxim, borrowed from Descartes, that nothing could be accepted which might in any way be doubted, that established the purely negative aspect of the term as the decisive one. Gadamer, by contrast, insists that prejudgments are more far-reaching and fundamental for hermeneutics than conscious cognitive acts.\(^{455}\)

Thus, “Gadamer…reverses much of the sting of Enlightenment rationalism and idealism in his call for prejudice to be appropriated positively as part of the hermeneutic process,”\(^{456}\) as he argues that there are such things as “legitimate prejudices.”\(^{457}\) Prejudices are in fact necessary for knowing anything at all: “Far from arguing that we must leave our prejudices behind, Gadamer claims that our prejudices are indispensable, for, without them, we cannot interpret anything.”\(^{458}\) Gadamer says,

> In Wahrheit liegt es in der Geschichtlichkeit unserer Existenz, daß die Vorurteile im wörtlichen Sinne des Wortes die vorgängige Gerichtetheit all unseres Erfahren-Könnens ausmachen. Sie sind Voreingenommenheiten unserer Weltoffenheit, die geradezu Bedingungen dafür sind, daß wir etwas erfahren, daß uns das, was uns begegnet, etwas sagt.\(^{459}\)

Thus, as a “contrast to Enlightenment attitudes, Gadamer sees all interpretation as always guided by its own prejudice.”\(^{460}\) On this, Gadamer took his cues from Heidegger’s concept of the fore-structure of understanding.

> In the face of the sciences’ emphasis on the acquisition of objective, universally valid knowledge, Gadamer developed an alternate model that emphasized the importance of appreciating one’s own phenomenological fore-understanding (or preunderstanding), which both precedes interpretation and makes interpretation possible.\(^{461}\)

> Since prejudices enable understanding, one cannot ignore one’s own prejudices.\(^{462}\) They are the result of one’s embeddedness within their own world.\(^{463}\)

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\(^{455}\) Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 305. See also Gadamer, \textit{TM}, 273.

\(^{456}\) Bartholomew, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 325.


\(^{460}\) Bartholomew, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 310.


Thus, prejudices are significant to interpretation simply because they are a very real and effective presence. They are part of the interpreter, due to his or her situatedness within tradition. In fact, he says, “daß nicht so sehr unsere Urteile als unsere Vorurteile unser Sein ausmachen.” Therefore, one cannot know anything about the world without them. For Gadamer, in fact, “understanding takes place as an event within a tradition.” This is so true, says Gadamer, that not even Enlightenment thinkers are immune to the presence of prejudice: “And there is one prejudice of the Enlightenment that defines its essence: the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself…” That being the case, the interpreter—indeed, every interpreter—must be mindful of his or her own bias. This is necessary, he states, “so the text can present itself in all its otherness,” which remains significant to the hermeneutical task as a whole, since it is a dialogue. Thus, it would be a misconstrual of Gadamer’s theory to posit that prejudices hinder the text from speaking; on the contrary, prejudices are (indeed, ought to be) taken into account so that the text can truly speak. Since it is the case that “all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice,” it must be accounted for in any description or theory of understanding—whether of a theatrical play, a musical score, or even how an ancient text such as Hosea can be meaningful for Paul.

464 Ibid., 306. Thiselton remarks (306): “Tradition does not stand over against thinking as an object of thought, but is the horizon within which we do our thinking.” See again Palmer, Hermeneutics, 176-177; and Evans, Reception History, 239.
466 Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 310.
468 Ibid., 271. So McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 184, who says that for Gadamer, “the goal of hermeneutics is not to eliminate prejudices but rather to bring them fully to the level of consciousness.”
469 Ibid., 271–272.
470 On this, see the careful delineation in Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 112.
471 Gadamer, TM, 272.
4.6 Horizontverschmelzung

Integral to Gadamer’s hermeneutic is the concept of “horizon.”\textsuperscript{472} Moreover, he defines understanding itself as the “fusion of horizons” (\textit{Horizontverschmelzung}).\textsuperscript{473} The idea is that every person operates from a specific “vantage point,” which Gadamer labels a “horizon.”\textsuperscript{474} He grounds his idea of horizons upon the concept of “situation”—defined as that which “represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision.”\textsuperscript{475} Thus, when understanding is discussed in Gadamerian terms, it is described as the fusion of horizons—both of, e.g., the text and its reader.\textsuperscript{476} His concept of \textit{Horizontverschmelzung} is linked, moreover, to his exploration of \textit{Vorurteil}.

“Gadamer...employed the term horizon itself to explain the role of one’s preunderstanding in all interpretation.”\textsuperscript{477} In fact, “hermeneutics aims at prejudgments that will foster a fusion of the past with the present, thus facilitating the miracle of understanding, the sharing of a common meaning by temporally distant consciousnesses.”\textsuperscript{478} If \textit{Vorurteile} are a necessary component in the process of understanding, then a definition of understanding itself will need to account for it. This is the heart of Gadamer’s thesis.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{472} Ibid., 301.
\item \textsuperscript{473} Eberhard, \textit{The Middle Voice}, 78–79, discusses the “ambiguity” in Gadamer’s term \textit{Horizontverschmelzung}. He says (79), “\textit{Horizont} is singular, yet \textit{Verschmelzung} denotes a melting into one another of more than one element.” The fact that these two words are combined the way they are is important, Eberhard argues, because of the “apparent hesitation in Gadamer’s description of the event of this fusion. [That is,] Gadamer appears to oscillate between accounts where there seems to be only one horizon and accounts where he assumes more than one” (79). Eberhard states that the ambiguity in the combination of the singular \textit{Horizont} with the word \textit{Verschmelzung} is not a “weakness” but it is, rather, “a way of saying that there is one and many horizon(s) at the same time” (79). See also Wright, “Gadamer,” in \textit{EA}, 263.
\item \textsuperscript{475} Ibid. On the subtle differences between “horizon” and “situation,” see Eberhard, \textit{The Middle Voice}, 91–92. See also Vessey, “Gadamer and the Fusion of Horizons,” 530.
\item \textsuperscript{476} Gadamer, “Classical and Philosophical Hermeneutics,” \textit{Gadamer Reader}, 62.
\item \textsuperscript{478} Bartholomew, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 311.
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It is important to remember that it is not only the interpreter who has a horizon, but also the text. Thus,

[the horizons of the text] constitute the virtual “unsaid” of every text. As such, the founding sense-event of a biblical text does not reside solely in its semantic content, in its words, phrases, and sentences: its “sense” is also structured by these phenomenological horizons, within which the texts have been suspended. Therefore, whenever we translate, read, or interpret a biblical text, we always encounter as implied its phenomenological horizons, which are often, of course, strikingly different from our own contemporary horizons of meaning.

While maintaining that there exists the “otherness” of each of these horizons—of the text and interpreter—understanding nonetheless occurs when a fusion takes place between the two. For Gadamer, this does not mean that each horizon loses itself in the other and that “otherness” is lost; rather, both are respected and affirmed. Moreover, understanding, which is the fusion of horizons, occurs not when “tension” between the two horizons is overcome (something Gadamer calls “naive assimilation”), but in the act of “bringing it out.” The idea here is that of a conversation. Each dialogue partner, in seeking to understand the viewpoint (i.e., “horizon”) of the other, does not “lose” his or herself in the other’s horizon; hence, dialogue does not entail that full agreement be reached.

As we will see, this dialogical description helps give clarity in what is observed in Rom 9:25-26. Indeed, this describes all reading of texts. The goal is not for the

479 McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 191.
480 Ibid. A true contextual awareness will account for this fact.
481 Gadamer, TM, 305. Contra Hirsch, Validity, 254-255, who sees the concept of Horizonverschmelzung as problematic, calling it an “inner contradiction,” as it attempts “to fuse together the past and the present while still acknowledging their incompatible separateness.” See also Hoy, The Critical Circle, 14.
482 Ibid., 304. See Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 87. Eberhard says, “Fusion of horizon(s) is not the subject’s putting him or herself at a distance by catapulting him or herself into another horizon while attempting to leave him or herself behind. It is a process that situates him or her within itself. Fusion of horizon(s) is not engulfing and leveling but encompassing and involving.” See also Weinsheimer, “Meaningless Hermeneutics,” Repercussions, 159-160.
483 Ibid., 305. See also Thiselton, Two Horizons, 307-308.
484 For the relevance this idea has for intertextual issues, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 20-21.
486 See ch. 7 below.
reader to assimilate his or herself into the horizon (i.e., context, viewpoint, etc.,) of the text itself. Again, the “otherness” of the reader and the text are to be respected.\(^\text{487}\) “In simple terms, the fusion of horizons creates the possibility for the interpreter to see her phenomenological horizon and the phenomenological horizon of the text at one and the same time.”\(^\text{488}\) Citing Gadamer, Valgenti comments on the more general nature of the fusion of horizons, that is, its conceptual connection with tradition and interpreter: “Through ‘the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter,’ the problematic gap between the object of tradition and its audience becomes the site for his famed ‘fusion of horizons.’”\(^\text{489}\) Thus, everything comes full circle. Gadamer led up to the primacy of tradition through an extensive study of how truth is beyond methodology, which became clear with a treatment on the aesthetic. That, too, was made possible by examples of play and presentation. This, clearly, is how concepts like tradition, horizons, and prejudgments help make up Gadamer’s notion of Horizontverschmelzung, which happens on location—that is, where, as Valgenti has said, “the object of tradition and its audience” meet.\(^\text{490}\)

4.7 Anwendung

For Gadamer application, Anwendung, is not something which follows interpretation; on the contrary, it is part of it.\(^\text{491}\) That is, one should see “not only understanding and interpretation, but also application as comprising one unified process.”\(^\text{492}\) Bringing Gadamer’s thought into broad scope, Eberhard comments on the link between the discussion on play and application: “Just as play culminates in

\(^{487}\) On what Horizontverschmelzung is not, see Evans, Reception History, 240.


\(^{490}\) Ibid.


\(^{492}\) Ibid., 307. See also Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 89–90; Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 115.
*Darstellung* as play’s involving way of being, so fusion of horizon(s) culminates in *Anwendung* as the involving way of being of understanding history."  

Helpfully, Gadamer illustrates the primacy of application in the interpretation from both legal and theological examples.

In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is an essential tension between the fixed text—the law or the gospel—on the one hand and, on the other, the sense arrived at by applying it the concrete moment of interpretation, either in judgment or in preaching. A law does not exist in order to be understood historically, but to be concretized in its legal validity by being interpreted. Similarly, the gospel does not exist in order to be understood as a merely historical document, but to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving effect. This implies that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is to be understood properly—i.e., according to the claim it makes—must be understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way. Understanding here is always application (Verstehen ist hier immer schon Anwenden).

Gadamer’s discussion on the essential role application plays in the hermeneutical process is detailed. He laments the fact that application has been relegated outside the bounds of interpretive activity, saying, “The edifying application of Scripture in Christian preaching, for example, now seemed very different from the historical and theological understanding of it.” It is easy to see why he says this, given his detailed analysis of historical consciousness and tradition. When it comes to interpretation, says Gadamer, the goal is not to take the text, for example, and simply “repeat” what it says and call that understanding. On the contrary, the interpreter is to “express what is said [or written] in the way that seems most appropriate to him.” For Gadamer, understanding is situational, that is, from the standpoint of the particular questions that exist in one’s place and time. Hermeneutics, then, is dialogical (see


495 See Ibid., 321-336.

496 Ibid., 306.

497 Ibid., 307.


above). As Georgia Warnke observes, “For Gadamer… all understanding is situated, not only in the sense that we always understand from a particular perspective, but also in the sense that we always understand for a particular situation.”\(^{500}\) This was the point Gadamer brought in his examples from both theological and legal hermeneutics (see above).

The following questions are therefore relevant. First, how might Gadamer’s concept of *application* shed light upon Rom 9:25-26? Since Gadamer’s insistence that application plays a vital role in the complexity of the “hermeneutical process,” is it conceivable that what looks to be Paul’s interpretation of Hosea is in fact an act of fusing application and interpretation into a single hermeneutical event?\(^{501}\) Second, having already noted the importance of considering the rhetorical place and function of the Hosea quotations in Rom 9:25-26, how does this fact cohere with Gadamer’s thesis that application remains fundamental to interpretation itself? The striking thing about Paul’s use of Hosea is that it, too, is being applied as (and in) a rhetorical event, namely, as an argument for the new covenant’s full inclusion of the Gentiles.\(^{502}\)

Furthermore, for Gadamer, “what is truly common to all forms of hermeneutics” is that, “the meaning to be understood is concretized and fully realized only in interpretation, but the interpretive activity considers itself wholly bound by the meaning of the text. Neither jurist nor theologian regards the work of application as making free with the text.”\(^{503}\) One cannot twist the text to his or her own fancy.\(^{504}\) Thus, radical subjectivism is *not* within Gadamer’s purview.\(^{505}\) Yet, this does not mean application to specific situations is any less part of the hermeneutical process either. Rather, it is

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\(^{502}\) In the introduction to Gadamer’s 1978 essay *Hermeneutik als theoretische und praktische Aufgabe* (“Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” *Gadamer Reader*, 247), Palmer says, “Like rhetoric, Gadamer’s hermeneutics thinks in terms of reception, of application.” In the same article, Gadamer says, “What kind of art hermeneutics is, then, we can learn from rhetoric” (251). See Section 7.3 below. See also Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed., 20.

\(^{503}\) Gadamer, *TM*, 328. See also Gadamer, *PH*, 208-211.

\(^{504}\) See again Grondin, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, 112.

\(^{505}\) See Evans, *Reception History*, 230-233, and his comments on Gadamer’s dialectical approach to understanding (and hence not objective or subjective). See again Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding,” 42-44. See also Weinsheimer, “Meaningless Hermeneutics,” *Repercussions*, 159-160.
central to it. “Understanding is not a theoretical activity, in which man scrutinizes the material before him as [a] passive object. Indeed, in both legal and theological hermeneutics, Gadamer points out, the interpreter aims not at dominating the text, but at submitting to the will of the law or to the will of God.”

And meaning—not least for biblical texts—proceeds beyond the horizon of the author. Gadamer illustrates this with the example of an order. “To understand the order means to apply it to the specific situation to which it pertains.” Simply repeating the order word-for-word is not what it means to understand, though repeating it back to the one who gave the order might prove beneficial for purposes of clarity.

How is repetition not understanding? Because “real meaning” is found only when the order is “carried out and concretized.” Gadamer thinks the order’s meaning is realized when the situation to which it concerns is comprehended and in the actual obedience of the person carrying it out—both of which necessarily involves a level of creativity on behalf of the order’s recipient.

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506 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 308.
508 Gadamer, TM, 329.
509 Ibid.
511 See ibid., 330: “The criterion of understanding is clearly not in the order’s actual words, nor in the mind of the person giving the order, but solely in the understanding of the situation and in the responsible behavior of the person who obeys. Even when an order is written down so one can be sure it will be correctly understood and executed, no one assumes that it makes everything explicit. The comic situation in which orders are carried out literally but not according to their meaning is well known. Thus there is no doubt that the recipient of an order must perform a definite creative act.
Thus, application is not just an ancillary part of hermeneutics, but rather central to it. The implications here will prove significant for an evaluation of all interpretive acts, not least Paul’s.

4.8 Summary

Part Two explored Gadamer’s influence and scholarly context. Philosophers such as Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Heidegger were thus surveyed. Gadamer’s similarities and dissimilarities with each respective thinker have been noted. It was observed how Gadamer’s hermeneutic sought to challenge the natural science’s methodological approach, especially in regard to how it had been adopted and utilized by thinkers within the human sciences. Gadamer’s argument was that hermeneutics did not need to adopt the prevailing view, i.e., scientific methodology, in order to discover truth and meaning. Rather, truth could be attained apart from a scientific approach. He argued for this by way of his critique of aesthetic consciousness, particularly aesthetic differentiation and abstraction. Using this critique as a spring board, Gadamer could dispel the myth that methodology was the only viable means to truth. Furthermore, Gadamer argued that rationalism, which had begun under Descartes with his commitment to unmediated knowledge of truth, ought to be discarded in favor of something more real to the human situation. The human situation, he argued, was one of embeddedness and being thrown into certain unique traditions—whether cultural or religious, or a mixture of both. Thus, Gadamer sought to recast the human situation in terms of historicality. Furthermore, tradition for Gadamer was efficacious; it impacts the way one interprets, not just texts, but all of life.

Through his reflections on play, Gadamer was able to illustrate the concept of presentation as the primary mode of being of art. A drama exists in being performed, a song in being sung, and a text in being read—each in individual, concrete moments and situations, however unlike the original situation in which they were founded. Moreover, one of the perceived problems of hermeneutics, i.e., historical/temporal distance, turns in understanding its meaning.” See also Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” Gadamer Reader, 256-257.

512 Cf. Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 148-149.
out to be for him an enabling feature of interpretation itself. Because of his concepts of tradition and Wirkungsgeschichtliches, Gadamer argued that every interpreter brings with him or her prejudices, Vorurteile. These prejudgments, far from being inherently bad or debilitating, pave the way to understanding. The interpreter’s situation, their horizon, is formed by these prejudgments and, when the interpreter interprets, say, a text, he or she is confronted by the prejudgments and traditions, which form the horizon, of the text. Thus the opportunity for dialogue is possible. Understanding happens when a fusion of horizons takes place—a fusion between the horizons of the text and its interpreter.

Having laid out Gadamer’s hermeneutic, with discussions on those concepts conducive to the hermeneutical task itself—among them items such as Erfahrung, Spiel, Darstellung, Vorurteil, Horizontverschmelzung, and Anwendung—we will allow our deliberations to come to bear upon the present matter, namely, Rom 9:25-26. How might, therefore, Gadamer’s idea of prejudgments be used to understand Paul’s revisionary reading of the Hosea prophecy? What role is played by factors that shaped Paul’s pre-understanding that may not immediately be explicitly evident from his text? Could taking into account Paul’s own prejudices—whatever they might have been—help resolve the hermeneutical dilemma in Rom 9:25-26? If Gadamer is right on the fundamental nature that Vorurteile play in the interpretive event, then an examination of Paul’s prior-commitments, in dialogue with some of his contemporaries, will be indispensable to the task at hand. One is now left with pivotal questions, for if the task of “hermeneutics aims at prejudgments that will foster a fusion of the past with the present,” how can this Gadamerian concept of understanding offer insight into how Paul’s horizon and the horizon of the prophetic text came together? Specifically, how can Paul’s quotations, and reconstrual, of Hosea gain clarity in light of their different addressees? While maintaining the otherness of both Hosea and Paul, as well as their respective agendas, what are the key hermeneutical fore-structures of understanding that help show genuine fusion between the two?

513 That this is valuable, cf. Evans, Reception History, 74, who analyzes Murray’s and Swartley’s interpretations in light of their prejudgments. Here, we do so explicitly in terms of biblical intertextuality, of Paul’s interpretation of Hosea.
Moreover, Anwendung, Gadamer argued, was not a subsequent event after interpretation, but rather inherent to the interpretive process itself. To understand a text is to apply the text. If application is interwoven into the entire hermeneutical process, and not relegated outside of it, how might this influence the way one understands Paul’s use of Hosea? For example, could it be the case that, in light of the rhetorical role the Hosea quotations play within the overall argument, Paul’s use of the Hosea texts were what they were by virtue of their application (in the Gadamerian sense), that is, by their application within a new concrete situation—a situation different than what existed within the horizon of Hosea’s own understanding? And if Gadamer is correct in seeing application as central to hermeneutics, and as a result, as a fresh creative act in the present of a past text, then could it be the case that Paul’s use of Hosea is not as problematic as it first seems to be? On these last two questions, the answer is a resounding yes.

514 Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 311.
PART THREE: A GADAMERIAN REAPPRAISAL OF PAUL’S USE OF HOSEA IN ROMANS 9:25-26

Chapter 5: Texts and Contexts, Part 1

5.1 Hosea 1:10; 2:23 in its Old Testament Context

Keeping in mind that Hosea was part of a much larger collection of the so-called “minor prophets,” or simply, “the Twelve,” the overall narrative of Hos 1-3 will be outlined below to provide a better contextual awareness for Hos 1:10; 2:23. This will allow us, first, to gain a glimpse into Hosea’s “Horizont,” that is, “der Gesichtskreis, der all das umfaßt und umschließt, was von einem Punkt aus sichtbar ist.” Second, we will emphasize the differences between Hosea’s intentions with the oracle and with Paul’s latter use of it. Similarities (if any) that exist between Hosea’s horizon of understanding and that of Paul’s will be noted. Third, by doing these two things, fusion between the respective horizons can, hopefully, be observed. Thus, while space will not permit a full account of the oracle, certain recurring themes within it will be noted, specifically in chs. 1-3 from which Paul’s citations are taken.

5.1.1 Dominant Motifs

The book of Hosea can be divided into two parts—chs. 1-3 and chs. 4-14. The first concerns Hosea’s family, specifically his marriage and children, which serves “as the metaphorical means to understand the relationship between YHWH and Israel.”

515 The reader is encouraged to keep in mind all that has been said in the excursus above on Hosea’s place and function in the twelve prophets.

516 Gadamer, WM, 307; TM, 301. See again Section 4.6 above.


519 Dearman, Hosea, 16. See also Joshua Moon, “Honor and Shame in Hosea’s Marriages,” JSOT 39, no. 3 (2015): 335-351. On the metaphor of marriage, see Tom C. Parker, “Marriage and...
Furthermore, metaphor in Hosea is intensely purposeful and is more than “clever literary devices,” for the prophet is intent on “making connections between phenomena in order to instruct an audience.” In fact, one of the driving motifs for Hosea is the metaphor of “household,” specifically with God as its divine head. But metaphor in Hosea, not least in regard to household, is utilized in service to the motif of new covenant. Tanner, attending to the context of Hos 2:23 specifically and connecting that to the new covenant language of Ezekiel and Jeremiah, has convincingly shown that the context of Hosea does entail a new covenant theme. Along with Hosea’s tendency to use metaphor, another significant observation to note is his use of “allusion to prior national history.” This is not insignificant with regard to Paul’s use of the oracle in Rom 9:25-26 (see below).

Dearman is correct to state that the book of Hosea is an “occasional document,” and cannot, therefore, be said to “present theological views in systematic form, but addresses the particulars that occasioned prophetic responses.” As Brueggemann observes, the way Hosea characterizes God is in “concrete” terms, not in “abstract” or “theological” rhetoric. Dearman says further that, Hosea, like an epistle writer, does not present his theology abstractly, but responds from his theological convictions to the issues of his day. He does have a matrix that formed him and from which he developed a worldview and a corresponding set of convictions about theological integrity in common life. In literary and conceptual terms, we might describe Hosea’s matrix and resulting worldview as a narrative, a story-shaped ethos that he absorbed and that subsequently shaped his approach to the prophetic task. Working backward from his occasioned responses, we can reconstruct at least some of the narrative substructure of his theology.

Divorce,” DOTP, 535-537.


521 Ibid., 11; 44–50.


524 Ibid., 29.


Thus, documenting some of these motifs that emerge from the narrative will help shed light upon Hosea’s horizon. These include exodus and wilderness, divine love and election, covenant, and a re-unified people of God.\textsuperscript{527} Indeed, the compassion of God and the status of Israel as God’s people is front and center.\textsuperscript{528} Of course, these motifs are orated in terms of the “household” and covenant-marriage metaphor.\textsuperscript{529} The focus of chs. 1-3 is upon the marriage of Hosea.\textsuperscript{530} This, moreover, is arranged as a repetition of judgment and restoration.\textsuperscript{531} It is important to note that, in regard to both the judgments and reversals of judgments given in the oracle, the former are seen as having swift and immediate concern, while the latter are eschatological.\textsuperscript{532} Of course, the two passages, which Paul cites in Rom 9:25-26, are part of the more eschatological portions of the oracle that depict future blessings.\textsuperscript{533} Because Paul quotes from passages occurring within this first part (Hos 1-3) and due to the relevant motifs which occur within chs. 1-3, our analysis will focus there.

\textit{5.1.2 Hosea 1-3}

One cannot overestimate the exodus and wilderness motifs for Hosea, for God’s rescue of Israel from Egypt was “the supreme act of Yahweh’s grace” toward his people.\textsuperscript{534} The household metaphor, too, is utilized in chs. 1-3 (and elsewhere) as the “lens through which Hosea interprets the grand narrative of YHWH’s acquisition of Israel in Egypt and preservation of them in the wilderness.”\textsuperscript{535} Thus, Hos 1:10 (2:1) and 2:23 (2:25), where the people are said to be restored after having been wooed by

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\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{528} Tanner, “The New Covenant,” 99.
\item\textsuperscript{529} Dearman, \textit{Hosea}, 32. See again Tom C. Parker, “Marriage and Divorce,” \textit{DOTP}, 535-537. See also Brueggemann, “‘Hosea,’” 13, and the observation that God is depicted as part of the “social institutions” of the “community.”
\item\textsuperscript{530} Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 183.
\item\textsuperscript{531} Ibid., 183-184. See Section 5.1.2 below.
\item\textsuperscript{532} Stuart, \textit{Hosea}, 7.
\item\textsuperscript{533} Ibid., 8.
\item\textsuperscript{535} Dearman, \textit{Hosea}, 45.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
YHWH in the metaphorical wilderness mentioned in 2:14, are both part of that household metaphor, specifically “a household restored.” It is in this wilderness where God reveals himself and knows Israel, much like he did in previous times when the nation was rescued from Egypt.537

Within this first section, chs. 1-3, there is a clear schema of “judgment and renewal”: Hos 1:2-9, with the depiction of Hosea’s marriage and family, speaks of God’s judgment and disavowal; 1:10-2:1 (2:1-3) speaks of the reversal of judgment and disavowal; 2:2-13 (2:4-15) again speaks of judgment, with 2:14-23 (2:16-25) speaking of renewal and restoration. Chapter 3 follows the reversal in 2:14-23 (2:16-25), offering yet further account of what such a renewal and restoration will look like. From this schema of judgment and reversal, the original context of Paul’s citations can be constructed.

Following the superscription (1:1), the text begins with Hosea who is commanded to take a “wife of harlotry” and to have “children of harlotry” (2a), phrases that are distinctive to Hosea. The reason for this is because “the land commits great harlotry by forsaking YHWH” (2b). Taking Gomer as his wife (3), the marriage picture between these two is reflective of the backslidden condition of Israel. The command itself could imply the taking of a wife who is going to be unfaithful or who has been, though it is perhaps better to take this as neither “retrospective” or “predictive” but rather simply as a call to embrace a wife who had “social status” of shame.

536 Ibid., 49–50.
537 Macintosh, Hosea, xciv.
539 Dearman, Hosea, 17.
544 Ibid., 341-342. Cf. Tom C. Parker, “Marriage and Divorce,” DOTP, 536-537;
so, Hosea too would “act in a way that would bring public shame, and so demonstrate Yahweh’s status of disgrace in being bound to Israel.”

Verses 3b-9 record the birth of three children, the first child, a son, was named Jezreel (4). The second child, a daughter, was named Ṭrahmā, i.e., “No Compassion” (6). And the third child, a son, was named Ṭūmhā, i.e., “Not My People” (9). The children were so named to be a witness to Israel concerning judgment and the loss of covenant relationship with God. These names declared that the people were being “disinherited” and the compassion of God “was being removed from the northern kingdom of Israel in Hosea’s day.” The reason for the naming of the third child, Ṭūmhā, is explained in v. 9b, “for you are not my people, and I am not for you.” Here there is a word play where Ḥadhā recalls the divine name of YHWH given to Israel during the time of Moses. With an echo back to the exodus, this serves for Israel as a judgment that covenant status is revoked. “As a result of Israel’s disobedience God was no longer ‘I AM’ for them.” This includes discontinuing his “supporting, defending and sustaining” them.

The reversal of these judgments upon Israel is foretold in 1:10-2:1 (2:1-3). Verse 10 recalls the announcement that Abraham would have numerous descendants, and according to the oracle, this is still going to be realized. This promise to the patriarchs will include not just Israel but also Judah such that they will be given the title “children

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545 Ibid., 342 (see also 344).


547 So Dearman, Hosea, 92, 96, 98–99; On the literary, as opposed to the literal and day-to-day use, of these names, see Macintosh, Hosea, 15. See also Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 188-189.


549 On the use of כי to convey symbol, see Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 187.


553 Macintosh, Hosea, 28.

of the living God” (1:10; 2:1), a title depicting a “corporate reversal of the name Not
My People.” The phrase “children of Israel” in 1:10 (2:1) comprises all of Abraham’s
descendants, thus including both the northern and southern tribes. Moreover, the
covenant with Abraham is recalled as the springboard for covenant renewal. As Silva
observes: “Hosea was particularly adept at incorporating Israel’s earlier traditions to
reinforce his prophetic oracles.” Here, “[t]he essential point is that the promise will
prevail even over the horrific judgment.” Furthermore, the reversal is said to include
the appointment of “one head,” i.e., a national leader (1:11; 2:2). This reference can be
coupled with the reference to “David their king” in 3:5, denoting “that the future hope
of the people of God was with a descendant of David. Such a conviction was part of a
widespread prophetic hope about the future.” More so, both Israel and Judah are here
depicted as being unified together under this leader. With the reversal of the fortunes
of Jezreel mentioned in 1:11 (2:2), the reversal is again explicated in the command to
speak to one another as “My People” and “Mercy” in 2:1 (2:3). More on this below.

Chapter 2:2-13 (4-15) brings another charge against Israel, followed by another
depiction of covenant renewal in 2:14-23 (16-25). However, this should not be
viewed as an additional charge, but rather a “rehearsal of 1:2-2:1 (MT 3).” Hosea 2:2-
23, is where the prophet “offers his most compelling characterization of YHWH,”
namely, that he is “presented as a surprising and unsettled mix of indignation and
pathos.” This is seen in light of the couplet of judgment and subsequent reversal. This
reversal, moreover, in 2:14-23 (16-25) draws upon the exodus and wilderness motifs.
Thus:

555 Ibid. Cf. Macintosh, Hosea, 36, who says, “The complete expression “sons of the living
God” constitutes an instructive, carefully contrived antithesis to “Not-my-people...”.”
556 Stuart, Hosea, 38.
557 Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 190, fn. 38.
558 Macintosh, Hosea, 35.
559 Dearman, Hosea, 105. See also Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 190; Garrett, Hosea, 72.
560 Macintosh, Hosea, 36.
561 See Dearman, Hosea, 106, for the possible textual issue here.
563 Dearman, Hosea, 106.
In addition to continuing the family/household metaphor established in 1:2-2:13, the second half of the chapter also draws upon a grand typology whereby the significance of Israel’s earlier history, namely the exodus from Egypt, wilderness wandering, and settlement in the land of promise, gives structure to the depiction of betrothal and (re)marriage between YHWH and Israel. The link between metaphor and typology in these verses is the equation between marriage and covenant. Metaphor and typology are not just literary devices, but reveal a synthetic conceptual framework to Hosea’s way of connecting Israel’s history and identity with their divine Lord. Not only is it a grand typological schema, employing the events of saving history to portray a people once again redeemed and joined to YHWH; the expanse of the renewal is grand, whereby the land and nonhuman inhabitants are part of the transformation to come.  

Two things should be noted. First, in 2:14-15 (16-17), one ought to see divine agency at work, being anthropomorphized in the marriage metaphor. “In the metaphor of remarriage and renewed covenant, God will woo Israel and speak to her heart.” This clearly speaks of divine “initiative.” Macintosh calls this language “striking,” as it is a “coercion through love.” This part of the oracle conveys the message of genuine love on the part of God to his people. Furthermore, the wooing is back to the wilderness, “the origins of the Israelite nations, the place where, following the exodus, she found her beginnings and her initial marriage with Yahweh in the days of her youth… still uncorrupted by the idolatry of Canaan.” Second, it would be a mistake to forget that it is just God’s wayward people who are in view for the gracious benefits, as again the covenant renewal is such that it includes even the animals (v.18 [20]). Thus, the prophecy is imbedded with “overtones” of the “creation account.” The “ordering of nature” is intrinsic to this covenant renewal made with Israel.

The last part of chapter 2, particularly 2:22-23 [24-25], marks the epitome of the restoration. The three children of Hosea, Jezreel, “No Mercy,” and “Not My People,”

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566 Ibid., 121. Emphasis original. See also Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 194, fn. 59.  
568 Macintosh, Hosea, 69.  
569 Ibid.  
570 Macintosh, Hosea, 70. See also Garrett, Hosea, 87-91; Yee, “Hosea,” 225-226.  
571 Dearman, Hosea, 126. Dearman observes overtones from the Flood account, too.  
572 Macintosh, Hosea, 82. See also Dearman, Hosea, 126.
are depicted as refreshed and renewed. First, God will “sow” (זרע) Israel back into the land (vv. 22-23 [24-25]). This, again, is a play on the name Jezreel, אלון יזרעאל. Moreover, it is brought about by divine “initiative.” Mercy will be extended to “No Mercy” and God will say to “Not My People” that “you are my people” (v. 23 [25]). All of this is a product of divine agency, a response to the divine call, for “Israel, YHWH’s household, is set in a cosmic arena that also has responded to YHWH’s restorative word. And none of this is predicated initially on Israel coming to its collective sense, but on God’s resolve to overcome their failures and to transform them.”

Given the shame that would have been inherent to the children, God’s gift of a “new name” was such that it “flies in the face of the social norm.” As Moon says, the position of shame is overcome “by Yahweh’s refusal to allow the normal cultural expectation (giving disgrace to the disgraceful) to be the final word.” In light of this, it is necessary to note that the Hosea text never mentions Gentiles as recipients of re-inclusion, “nor did Hosea imply that the fulfillment of these promises would be with Gentiles.” And yet, this new naming recorded in Hos 1:10 (2:1) and 2:23 (25) is utilized by Paul to make the case for Gentile inclusion in Rom 9. Therefore, not unlike the renaming of Hosea’s children in the original context, Paul’s application of the oracle to Gentiles would have been equally scandalous and perhaps just as socially subversive as it was in its original setting.

Another important insight into the new covenant for Hosea is found in chapter 3. The chapter begins with Hosea going again after a “woman,” taking her back as a sign of God’s love for Israel. After a time of upheaval (3:4), there is a mention of “David

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573 Dearman, *Hosea*, 131, notes that “[t]his is a reversal of the negative sowing of historical judgment in 1:4-5.” Emphasis original. See also McConville, “Hosea,” in *DOTP*, 342.
577 Ibid.
579 See again Wright, *PFG*, 1185.
580 See Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 196, fn. 63, concerning the identity of the woman in 3:1. We understand the woman to be the same as previously in the narrative. Cf. Yosef Green, “Hosea and Gomer Revisited,” *JBQ* 31, no. 2 (2003): 84-89, esp. 86-89; Parker, “Marriage and Divorce,”
their king,” who will be sought by Israel.\textsuperscript{581} It is this king, furthermore, who seems to be the culmination of the renewal “in the end days” (5). The Jewish hope was that a future king would reign, a king from David’s line.\textsuperscript{582} Furthermore, it is not unfounded to think that, in this period, there “was an expectation of the healing of the tribal rift under a future Davidic ruler.”\textsuperscript{583} This will prove insightful when Paul’s horizon is outlined below.

5.1.3 Summary: Similarities, Dissimilarities, and Hermeneutical Horizons

In terms of horizons, there are notable similarities between the Hosea text and Paul’s text. First, there is for Hosea a primacy given to the Abrahamic promise over and against the failure of Israel to live up to the demands of the covenant implemented at Sinai. In Hos 1:10 (2:1) the “sand of the sea” metaphor drawn from the Abrahamic promise is depicted as being still in force, despite divine judgment and covenant disavowal.\textsuperscript{584} The promise will come to fruition despite the sins of Israel due to God's own initiative. This is similar to Paul’s emphasis on the primacy of the Abrahamic promise in Rom 4 (see below). Second, divine agency was seen in the wooing of Israel back to the wilderness (which recalled an earlier redemptive narrative) where the covenant will be renewed, as outlined in Hos 2:14-15 (16-17). This is not unlike Paul’s emphasis on the primacy of the divine call found in Rom 9 (see below). Thus, these narrative assumptions are marks of similarity. Third, there is for Hosea a hope for the


\textsuperscript{582} Dearman, \textit{Hosea}, 142–143. Dearman says, “The expectations about a David figure underwent development over time and became one of the building blocks of what became known in Second Temple Judaism as the messianic hope” (See also 143, fn. 29). On the issues surrounding the possibility that this was a later Judean editorial insertion, see Dearman, \textit{Hosea}, 144-145. Cf. Green, “Hosea,” 88; Garrett, \textit{Hosea}, 104; Yee, “Hosea,” 232.

\textsuperscript{583} Ibid., 143. He notes further that “Isaiah too regarded the division of the kingdom after Solomon’s death as a tragedy to overcome (7:17; 9:1-7 [MT 8:23-9:6]) through the exalting of Zion and future ruler from David’s line (2:2-4; 11:1-9)” (143, fn. 32). On the issue that v. 5 was inserted by a later Judean redactor, and what (if any) this possible editorial insertion had in similarity with Hosea’s original intent and theology, see Macintosh, \textit{Hosea}, 108–112. Cf. McConville, “Hosea,” in \textit{DOTP}, 348.

\textsuperscript{584} Again, see Ibid., 104.
re-unification of God’s people in light of (especially) the Abrahamic promise. The subject of Rom 9:25-26 is that Paul includes Gentiles into this scheme. This covenant renewal, fourth, was seen for Hosea as being in reference to both the New Covenant and a Davidic King. It is argued below that there exists similarly for Paul a New Covenant and christological element to his interpretive activity in regard to Gentile inclusion.

That said, there remains one glaring dissimilarity: Hosea’s failure to mention Gentiles as objects of inclusion and Paul’s radical claim in doing so. But as we have already noted above, even in this dissimilarity, there is remarkable similarity. After all, the use of oracle in both the original context and in Paul’s subsequent context would have been subversive to the prevailing expectations.

More will be said below on how Gadamer’s theory can provide language for this hermeneutical phenomenon. Before this can be done, however, attention must be given to the purpose and narrative substructure of Rom 9:25-26. In what follows, the text’s purpose will be briefly highlighted, followed by an in-depth analysis of the said narrative substructure (with comparisons to Jewish contemporaries). This is essential, for it provides the framework for drawing conclusions in light of Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory.

### 5.2 The Purpose and Narrative Substructure of Romans 9:25-26

It is clear that Paul quotes the oracle in order to convey a “new covenant awareness” for Gentile inclusion.\(^{585}\) Specifically, “the purpose of [citing Hos 2:25, 1 in Rom 9:25-26] is to trace the origin of the Christian community back to the double-edged electing act of God, as announced by God himself in scripture.”\(^{586}\) Verses 24-29, with 25-26 playing an integral role, emphasize that the divine call is the defining apparatus by which the people of God are established.\(^{587}\) It is true that what is at issue

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\(^{585}\) On this, refer to our discussion over Tanner at the beginning of this thesis.  
\(^{587}\) Moo, *Romans*, 610.
for Paul is the universality of God’s call, which is not restricted by one’s Jewish ancestry, but is now open to even non-Jews:

While vv. 24-29 pick up the theme of vv. 6b-13, they also move beyond what Paul has said in vv. 6b-13. For Paul now explicitly includes Gentiles among those whom God is sovereignly calling to be part of his people. God’s people are constituted by his call and not by natural descent. Paul now takes this point to its logical and (from the perspective of first-century Judaism) radical conclusion: physical descent from Abraham not only does not guarantee inclusion in the true people of God; it is not even necessary. Verses 14-23, despite their somewhat parenthetical nature, have prepared the way for this conclusion by highlighting so intensely God’s absolute freedom to bestow his mercy on whomever he chooses. Verses 24-29, therefore, bring Paul’s defense of God’s faithfulness to his word to its climax.

One sees from the Hosea quotations in vv. 25-26 that Gentiles, like Isaac (vv. 7-9) and Jacob (vv. 10-13) before them, are now part of God’s family. One can frame the specific question concerning Rom 9:25-26 in the following manner: How can Paul see the Gentiles as being part of the “people of God”? The answer is because they are “called.” This question is similar to, and is presupposed by, another: Who are the people of God, and how are the lines between “God’s people” and “not God’s people” determined? Considering the immediate context (vv. 6-23), Paul’s emphasis upon “the call” is instructive here, providing an answer to the question. How are God’s people established? By the divine, free call of God. Thus, it is agreeable with Moo to take vv. 24-29—perhaps not least vv. 25-26—as a theological “climax.” This is especially clear when one remembers how Paul substitutes καλέσω for ἐρῶ in v. 25 to emphasize God’s calling. The purpose, therefore, for Paul’s quotations from Hosea is to bring the thread of scriptural argument in vv. 6-23 to its desired end, which entails the inclusion of Gentiles into the covenant family of God.

But does the answer of “God’s call” offer a complete account of what is going on? The answer is no. It does not solve all the complex hermeneutical riddles of Paul’s quotations from Hosea, for that oracle mentions nothing about the inclusion of Gentiles, nor anything about their calling. It seems rather odd that Paul would interrupt the otherwise easy flowing argument in vv. 6-23 with quotations from Hosea. This is

588 Ibid. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 527; Cranfield, Romans, 2:500.
589 Moo, Romans, 610.
590 See Section 1.2.
obvious when one comes to see how a substantial amount of rhetorical weight rests upon them (see below). While the immediate context of vv. 6-23 helps to explain the purpose behind the quotations, it falls short in providing a detailed explanation for the way in which the quotations function—namely, as a scriptural basis for Gentile inclusion. In other words, it is perhaps easy to utilize the immediate context (vv. 6-23) to explain what Paul is doing with the quotations, but not how Paul is doing what he is doing. Thus, on this latter question, one must address relevant portions of the greater narrative substructure of the argument leading up to Rom 9:25-26 and not merely the immediate passage in which it resides. This allows for a glimpse behind Paul’s judgment that Gentiles are now called “my people” and into his pre-judgments. Recalling Gadamer’s idea of Vorurteile, pre-judgments are, hermeneutically, more fundamental than judgments; in fact, the former undergird and enable the latter. What, then, are the pre-judgments that enable Paul’s judgments? What pre-understandings are at work that enable the understanding that Gentiles are, in fact, in view?

By going this route, we will encounter the location of Paul’s own interpretive horizon. This will become evident once Paul’s horizon is compared with not only Hosea’s, but also his contemporaries’. Once Paul’s interpretive setting has been established, one can engage Rom 9:25-26 and evaluate the rhetorical function of the quotations—which, as will be argued below, operate in a way similar to Gadamer’s idea of Anwendung. Next, one can begin to reconstruct not only what Paul was doing with the Hosea quotations, but also shed light upon how he was doing it.

5.2.1 Three Motifs: Law, Righteousness, and the Gentiles

To establish Paul’s interpretive horizon, one must enter his narrative framework, revealing the Vorurteile that ground his exegesis and understanding of Hosea’s oracle. Three motifs will emerge from the text itself as we do this, namely, the motifs of law-keep- ing, righteousness, and the Gentile question. In what follows, Paul’s train of thought will be charted through the text as these motifs are highlighted along the way. Attention will be given to chs. 1-4 and 9-10:4, as these three motifs are prevalent there. Of course, these motifs will, if allowed, open a can of worms (not least in light of post-

While the discussion below on Romans will interact with the relevant scholars, we must exercise restraint and choose our sparring partners carefully. It must be remembered that this project is philosophical-hermeneutical. While this research surely has ramifications for wider questions and issues, it is impossible to analyze every textual or conceptual nook, as tempting as that might be. In what follows, then, clues will emerge about the Pauline fore-structure of understanding which grounds his judgment that Gentiles, via a citation of the Hosea oracle, are welcome into the covenant.

5.3 Gentiles and Covenant

In Rom 1:1-7, Paul discloses his credentials concerning his apostolic role in advancing the “gospel of God” (v. 1). Regarding the Gospel, Paul makes known his apostolic calling to “all those in Rome who are loved by God and called to be saints” (v. 7). Both “grace and apostleship” were given to Paul “to bring about the obedience of faith, εἰς υπακοὴν πίστεως, for the sake of his name among all the Gentiles, ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν” (v. 5). Much debate has surrounded εἰς υπακοὴν πίστεως, particularly on how πίστεως functions as a genitive. It could be understood as either (1) a subjective genitive or (2) an appositional genitive. The first would place emphasis on υπακοὴν

592 For a broad overview of the current debate about Paul’s views on the Law, see e.g., James P. Ware, “Law, Christ, and Covenant: Paul’s Theology of the Law in Romans 3:19-20,” JTS 62, no. 2 (October 1, 2011): 513-540, esp. 514-521. Some of these issues will be brought to light as the study progresses.

593 In terms of this debate, we cannot comment on every issue.


595 Schreiner, Romans, 35. See also: Don Garlington, The Obedience of Faith: A Pauline Phrase in Historical Context (Eugene: Wipf and Stock), 2009; Don Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance: Aspects of Paul’s Letter to the Romans (2nd ed; Eugene: Wipf and Stock), 2009, esp. 10-31; Moo, Romans, 51-53; Mounce, Romans, 62-63; Fitzmyer, Romans, 235-236.

596 Ibid. It is helpful to restrict discussion on the function of the genitive to that of the subjective genitive and the genitive of apposition, as Garlington (Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 14) says, “It should be noted that the [grammatical] terminology varies among individual writers…In fact, it will be seen that some of the grammatical options differ in name only.”
(“obedience”), rather than on faith. That is, “[The subjective genitive] sense would be the obedience that springs from or flows from faith.”\textsuperscript{597} If so, “obedience” and not necessarily “faith” is what he wanted “to bring about among all the Gentiles.” On the other hand, one could translate πίστεως “epexegetically, i.e., ‘obedience which consists in faith.’”\textsuperscript{598} That is, the “obedience,” which Paul was so adamant about producing, is simply “faith” itself. Garlington’s question is appropriate: “Is the significance of ὑπακοὴ πίστεως exhausted by treating it as a genitive of apposition?”\textsuperscript{599} One might even dare ask if any strict and exclusive understanding of ὑπακοὴν πίστεως exhausts the significance it was meant to convey. Accordingly, it has been suggested Paul might have meant “both ideas.”\textsuperscript{600}

Grammatically, there lacks warrant to think Paul implied one at the expense of the other (i.e., a subjective genitive or genitive of apposition). Nothing in the immediate context (1:1-7) or the greater literary context (chs. 12-15) contradicts such a conclusion.\textsuperscript{601} The same can be said about the context of Rom 1-4 and 9-10:4, our present focus. Understanding ὑπακοὴν πίστεως as a reference to initial saving faith seems to preserve Paul’s emphasis on faith itself,\textsuperscript{602} thus keeping in line with his quite negative response to Israel’s unbelief in their Messiah in Romans 9:30–10:1-4. Conversely, v. 6 reveals Paul’s eagerness to “bring about the obedience of faith” (v. 5) to his own recipients, i.e., “those in Rome” (v. 7), lending to the idea that the phrase itself is more nuanced.\textsuperscript{603} Thus, two things can be said about ὑπακοὴν πίστεως: (1) Paul states his apostolic mission, saying this entails bringing about initial, justifying faith in

\textsuperscript{597} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{599} Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 16.


\textsuperscript{601} This point is highlighted in the shift of thought that takes place at Rom 12. After his lengthy exposition of God’s plan of redemption (Rom. 1-11:32) followed by a doxology (11:33-36), Paul begins his exhortation to obedience in Rom. 12:1.

\textsuperscript{602} E.g. Rom 3:21-28.

Christ among all the nations, and (2) that this “bringing-about-the-obedience-of-faith” mission includes believers, in that he is called to keep “those in Rome” (v. 7) faithful to the Christ, in whom they profess. It could be said, then, that the first exhibits the genitive of apposition, while the second the subjective genitive. Thus, ὑπακοὴν πίστεως ought to be understood as both/and.\textsuperscript{604} The temptation to argue for one interpretation at the detriment of the other must be resisted. That this should be the case is further realized when Garlington notes the following “interesting analogy” from Przybylski’s own observation:

...Przybylski discusses the possible translations of the title moreh sedeq in CD. He notes that the Hebrew could be rendered either “teacher of righteousness” (objective genitive) or “righteous or right teacher” (explicative genitive). He opts for the former yet concedes that “The problem with which we have been dealing may in actual fact be a pseudo-problem arising solely out of difficulties inherent in the process of translating Hebrew into English.” Thus, “It should not be taken for granted that those two ideas are mutually exclusive” (p. 20). This is suggestive because it reminds us that Paul’s Semitic background could easily account for a flexibility in his Greek usage, permitting more than one meaning to reside in his genitival phrases. Perhaps the most famous of such phrases is δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.\textsuperscript{605} Garlington rightly states that “Paul has chosen to coin an ambiguous phrase expressive of two ideas: the obedience which consists in faith, and the obedience which is the product of faith...[and that] the ‘genitive of apposition’ and ‘genitive of source,’ while not inappropriate in themselves, are to be rejected as too restrictive.”\textsuperscript{606} Moreover, ὑπακοὴν πίστεως becomes less obscure when the discussion moves beyond lexical denotations (e.g., the subjective or appositional elements) and onto the important storied connotations (e.g., the implications and assumptions that exist behind the text).

\textsuperscript{604} Cf. Michael J. Gorman, Apostle of the Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul and His Letters (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 347.

\textsuperscript{605} Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 30, fn. 86, citing B. Przybylski, Righteousness in Matthew and His World of Thought (SNTSMS 41; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 17-20.

\textsuperscript{606} Ibid, 30. Emphasis original. See also Moo, Romans, 52-53; and Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 30, summarizes that, “On the level of the grammatical, although tags can be applied to πίστεως only with some reservation, the category which best conveys his intentions is ‘adjectival genitive’; that is, πίστεως is descriptive of ὑπακοὴν in a manner to be defined by the larger context and in keeping with the most pertinent exegetical data.”
What might Paul have been assuming in the phrase “obedience of faith,” and what is the significance of bringing “all the Gentiles” (ἔθνος in v. 5) into it? Paul, arguably, uses this phrase (and its immediate context) as part of a much larger working narrative and utilizes it “to encapsulate a world of thought.” It is true that in his introduction (specifically v. 7), Paul “draws upon concepts evocative of Israel’s relationship to Yahweh and applies them to all the Romans, the κλητοί of Jesus Christ.” Paul’s employment of beliefs and hopes which were once entirely exclusive to the Jews is now, mysteriously at this point, given to those who come in by “the obedience of faith.” Garlington comments further:

The letter’s opening paragraph is paralleled by 1:16-17, which is normally perceived to be the letter’s thematic statement. However, in distinction to many traditional approaches to Romans, I take the theme to be the revelation of the righteousness of God in the gospel to all who believe – the Jew first but also the Greek. As such, 1:16-17 is the functional equivalent of 1:5, “the obedience of faith among all the nations.”

Moreover, agreement with Garlington that Paul is expanding the rights exclusive to covenanted Israel to “the nations” is supported, perhaps, when one observes the connection between ὑπακοή (occurring in v. 5) with שמע. The Shema, as a prayer with its strict focus upon monotheism, was foundational for God’s covenant people Israel. The lexical association between the two, therefore, cannot go unnoticed. The idea that

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607 See Matthew V. Novenson, “The Jewish Messiahs, the Pauline Christ, and the Gentile Question,” JBL 128, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 357-373, esp. 369–372, who convincingly argues that Paul’s mission to the Gentiles was grounded upon his christological convictions.

608 Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 14. Cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 420, who observes “overtones…in this dense phrase.” See also Schreiner, Romans, 34, who, though no adherent to many of Garlington’s conclusions, observes both important and upcoming narrative themes at work in Rom 1:5. Furthermore, Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 11-13, makes several observations from the Old Testament about the significance of “obedience.” He also (12) brings to light the fact that “obedience” has much to do with the theme of covenant. It will be important, then, to link the thought-world of Rom 1:5 with Rom 2, not least when attention is given to our aforementioned motifs (see below).

609 Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 45 (emphasis original). See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 238-242.

610 Ibid (see also 46-47).

611 N.T. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 420. (Cf. Dunn [Romans, 38a, 17], who has discussed the link between υπακοή and שמע.)

612 Moo, Romans, 251.

613 “The frequent use of υπακούειν for שמע in the LXX shows how strongly the idea of hearing is still present for the translator in the Gk υπακούειν. Hence υπακούειν and υπακοή as terms
obedience and hearing are closely connected is important, as the latter motif is obviously used in a covenant context for ancient Israel. The question, then, needs to be asked: Is Paul’s use of “the obedience of faith” drawing upon a larger covenant narrative? An affirmative answer to this question becomes clear when Paul refers to the Shema in the context of covenant (un)faithfulness later on which, interestingly, is also part of a discussion concerning Gentile inclusion (e.g., Rom 3:1-3, 29-31; cf. Rom 1:5). Therefore, seeing ὑπακοὴ in Rom 1:5 as being linked to the Shema, which is itself utilized by Paul in the context of covenant faithfulness, one can conclude that when Paul uses ὑπακοὴ, he has in mind a specific covenant obedience. Or, in light of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, it is accurate to say that Paul’s use of ὑπακοὴν πίστεως is best understood within a Jewish horizon. To be sure, though, the motif of covenant here must be seen for Paul as christologically modified. Clues that this thesis is correct will be substantiated when Rom 2:12-29 is examined below.

It is important to remember that Paul’s grand focus is on the question of faithfulness—both human and divine. Wright keenly observes that,

[Roman 1:18 – 3:20] though, is not simply about “the human plight.” It is about God’s own problem and gives a preliminary statement of God’s way of dealing with it. God created humans to bear the divine image within the creation and called Israel to shine the divine light into the dark world. Faced with human rebellion and Jewish faithlessness, will God abandon these projects?

Specifically, the discussion on human and Jewish unfaithfulness (1:18–2:10) provides fertile ground for a debate about who will be identified as the people of God (2:11-29). Paul will climax his argument in the idea that “all, both Jews and Greeks, are under sin” (3:9). Paul has within his target particularly (though not exclusively) the unfaithfulness of the Jews, namely, that “Israel, too, has behaved in a pagan manner and will receive

for religious activity are always to be thought of within the sphere of a religion which receives the divine Word by hearing and then translates it into action” (Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 1 [electronic ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964], 224). See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 11.

614 It is even more intriguing when Paul contrasts the two in Rom 2 (see below).
615 E.g. Deut 6:4.
616 As in e.g. Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 247.
617 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 420. See also 482.
618 Ibid.
the appropriate reward.”

Despite it being clear that Paul is bringing the non-covenant Gentiles in on this indictment, he wants to show in 2:12-16 that there exists a scenario where Gentiles will be “justified…on that day” (2:13, 16) and not Jews who are “under the law” (2:12) and mere “hearers of the law” (2:13). Before he can get to that stage of the argument, however, Paul must point out the fact of human and Jewish unfaithfulness to their God. But even before this, he must point out God’s sure faithfulness to his people.

5.4 The Question of Faithfulness and Righteousness

The topic of divine faithfulness begins in Rom 1:16-17:

Οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστιν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι· δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται· Ο δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.

Several observations emerge. First, Paul’s not being ashamed is not to be interpreted in psychological terms. Second, it is correct to see a contrasting link here with the “shameful acts” of sinful humanity depicted in 1:27. Third, “salvation” is to include both Jew and Gentile, with the line of demarcation being drawn around those who believe, παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι. Fourth, in the gospel, “the righteousness of God is revealed,” δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ

619 Moo, *Romans*, 429.

620 Rom 1:16-17. Cf. the translations in Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed., 38, and Wright, *PFG*, 1466. Concerning δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, the latter understands this as “covenant justice,” which rightly emphasizes the covenantal dimension of this highly technical phrase. While taking exception with Watson’s understanding of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as one’s status before God (1466), Wright admits that the original context of Habakkuk suggests that “God’s righteousness” and “human righteousness” are not things to be played off against each other, but rather “belong firmly together” (1469; cf. Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed., 43). More will be said below.


ἀποκαλύπτεται. Righteousness language is to be equated, all things considered, with God’s own faithfulness (see below). The “revelation” of God’s righteousness here in v. 17 finds its conceptual equivalent in Rom 3:21, where God’s righteousness is said to have been “manifested”: δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ φανερώταται. It is there, moreover, where one learns that this righteousness is “through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ, to all who believe,” διὰ πίστεως Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας (v.22; see below).

Coming to a highly relevant (and more debatable) matter, fifth, is how to translate ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν and how to make sense of the citation from Hab 2:4 in Rom 1:17. On the first, it is probably best to understand the phrase as denoting “from faithfulness to faithfulness.” That is, in at least the first instance of πίστις, God’s own faithfulness is in view. This can be established by distinguishing πιστεύοντι in v. 16 (where human faith is obviously in view) from the other two occurrences of πίστις in v. 17a. The former is a description of how one receives the benefits of the saving power of God, which is inherent specifically to the gospel itself; the latter, by contrast, is a description of what the gospel is in its broad essence, namely, the revelation of the “righteousness of God,” and this, moreover, is the quintessence of the faithfulness of God. That is, the Gospel itself is a revelation of God’s own righteousness, a display of God’s faithfulness.

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625 Though agreeing with Wright, PFG, 943, fn. 472, in seeing the link between 1:17 and 3:21, it is not necessary to see much distinction between ἀποκαλύπτω and φανερόω. The two denote the same thing.


627 Hab 2:4 is a significant citation in Romans and Galatians and “it has had an enormous influence on the interpretation of Paul” (Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 73).

628 Contra Fitzmyer, Romans, 263, who suggests either a progression of faith or else something like “faith and nothing but faith” (our words).

629 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 71-72, who sees human, not divine, faith as the focus. See also Moo, Romans, 76. Wright, PFG, 1466, sees the first as a reference to God’s faithfulness and the second as a reference to human faithfulness. Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 350; Young, “Romans 1.1-5,” 281. See also Moyise, “Quotations,” As It Is Written, 20-21.
There are two reasons to prefer this interpretation. First, it accords with the equation of righteousness language with faithfulness in Rom 3 (see below). Second, this interpretation serves to make sense of the subsequent Habakkuk citation, as demonstrated below.

In v. 17, Paul follows ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν with καθὼς γέγραπται. Ο δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. The introduction to the citation, καθὼς γέγραπται, suggests to the reader that the prepositional phrase finds warrant from Scripture itself, namely, Hab 2:4. The original text (LXX) says, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως μου ζήσεται, “but the righteous will live by my faithfulness.” Therefore, Paul, in distinction to the LXX, does not include μου in his quotation. Moreover, the MT says, וְיִחְיֶה בְּאמוֹנָתוֹ יִצְדָּק. Thus, Paul follows the MT closer and is therefore much closer to its own meaning. One wonders, however, if this conclusion needs to be so definitive. For as Moo himself admits, Paul remains “unique in omitting any personal pronoun,” and it should not be assumed therefore that, just because there is an omission, one should automatically take Paul’s text here as being nearer the MT. (Could not the same be said about the LXX, after all?) It could be that Paul did not think it was necessary to include the LXX’s μου, just as he also did with the MT’s third person pronoun.

Belaboring the point is beyond our scope, but it must be pointed out that part of the issue is that some opt for the idea that human faith is in view precisely because of

630 See Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 38-45. Though Watson’s understanding of the citation itself is not to be preferred, his insights into the dependence between the citation and its antecedent are. See also Campbell, “The Faithfulness of Jesus Christ,” The Faith of Jesus Christ, 58.

631 Cf. Moo, Romans, 77-78, and Schreiner, Romans, 73, on the two different ways one can translate ἐκ πίστεως μου from Hab 2:4 LXX so as to modify either δίκαιος or ζήσεται. Cf. Young, “Romans 1.1-5,” 280, who takes ζήσεται a reference to Christ’s resurrection.

632 See Joseph Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 606, fn. 15, who notes differences in the LXX MSS on this.

the way the connection between v. 16 and v. 17 is viewed. For instance, Schreiner dismisses the thesis that divine faithfulness (whether God’s or Christ’s) is in view because of how he understands v. 16, that is, how it—speaking solely of human faith as a response for salvation—is seen as the definitive way to interpret v. 17. It is undoubtedly true that v. 16 concerns human faith, but it is not necessary to assume from this that v. 17 does so as well. For it is syntactically possible that Paul switches his emphasis from human faith as a response to the Gospel in v. 16 to God’s own faithfulness in v. 17.

Moreover, Francis Watson thinks the structure of Paul’s wording will not allow for the idea of a divine faithfulness view. Though admitting ἐκ πίστεως can denote faithfulness, he is not content with such a view due to the fact Paul says nothing explicit in that regard. He says “a reference here to divine faithfulness would require other indications in the context and it is just these that Paul fails to provide in his interpretive gloss.” Watson asserts that the lack of explicit use of phrases like “the faithfulness of God” make it “unlikely that this is intended in 1:17.” Maintaining the divine faithfulness view, he says, would “require a reader who is hypersensitive to what is only implicit in the citation – that the ‘faithfulness’ in question is God’s or Christ’s – while ignoring the explicit contextual interdependence of citation and antecedent. A reading is to be preferred that can make sense of that interdependence.” It is hard to see how this is convincing. Watson seems to make a sweeping assumption, namely, that only explicit features of a text are allowed to convey genuine meaning, or, at the very least, these features are to be preferred over the implicit ones. Either way, such claims are hard to defend (see below). It is necessary to maintain the integrity of the essential link

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634 Ibid. Moo compares this with Hebrews 10:38 as well.
635 Schreiner, Romans, 74.
636 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 46.
637 Ibid.
638 Ibid.
639 Ibid.
640 Though seeing this as a reference to Christ’s faithfulness is, as Wright, PFG, 1470, has said “probably a bridge too far.” Cf. Campbell, “The Faithfulness of Jesus Christ,” The Faith of Jesus Christ, esp. 64-66; Young, “Romans 1.1-5.” Gorman, Crucified Lord, 350.
and interdependence between citation and antecedent. It seems, though, that Watson thinks this link cannot be maintained by any view but his own precisely because he already assumes what the antecedent (in his view) needs to say based upon his views concerning the citation.\textsuperscript{641}

Furthermore, Schreiner is mistaken to suggest that, just because Paul failed to include \( \mu\sigma\nu \) that Paul therefore “intended to eliminate [the] possibility” that God’s faithfulness would be in view.\textsuperscript{642} One wonders if it is too strong to speak of the impossibility of the view in question. Could it not have been the case that God’s faithfulness was implied? Is it not possible that the implied portions of the text remain integral? These questions should be answered positively for reasons given below.

The original context of Habakkuk suggests that what is in view is about trusting in God’s promise and covenant faithfulness.\textsuperscript{643} The context of Habakkuk does suggest that, even if human faith/faithfulness were in view (per the MT), the implied (and underlying) contextual emphasis is indeed a trust upon God’s own faithfulness.\textsuperscript{644}

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\textsuperscript{641} See Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 45-46, esp. fn. 54, where his particular translation of the quoted Hab text is integral to his views. He opts for, “‘The one who is righteous by faith will live’ rather than, ‘The righteous one will live by faith.’” He then sees “by faith,” \( \epsilon\kappa\pi\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma \), in 1:17a as “scriptural” (45). He translates this antecedent as “by faith” because he is not comfortable with understanding the citation’s “by faith,” \( \epsilon\kappa\pi\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma \), as referring to divine faithfulness. The reasons are because of his comments about his preferences concerning empirical and implied features in the antecedent (45-46; see above). Watson is correct to highlight the interdependent relationship of text and antecedent (46), but his way of going about it is problematic, as the Hab text highlights God’s own faithfulness—however implicitly (see below).

\textsuperscript{642} Schreiner, \textit{Romans}, 74.

\textsuperscript{643} See Wright, \textit{PFG}, 1468-1471. See also Hays, \textit{Echoes}, 40, who sees the original context of Hab 2:4 as being a “response to the problem of theodicy, an implicit assertion of God’s righteousness. The faithful community is enjoined to wait with patience for what they do not see: the appearing of God’s justice. This hope God will not disappoint.”

\textsuperscript{644} Even Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 148, says, “Whether they think in terms of ‘faithfulness’ or ‘faith’, the prophet and the apostle are at one in their assumption that \textit{emunah} and \textit{\pi\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma} refers to the human response to the divine promise of definitive, eschatological saving action.” This, arguably, demands to be pressed further so that the emphasis is upon God’s faithfulness (our thesis). Wright, \textit{PFG}, 1467, is correct in his critique when he says that Watson fails to see how this saving action of God has to do with God’s own covenant faithfulness. This is precisely our own present point. (Cf. Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 148-149.) See also Hays, \textit{Echoes}, 40-41, who insightfully posits that Paul perhaps draws on both traditions (MT and LXX) in order to render the question of “whose faithfulness?” as ambiguous to say, in effect, that “in the gospel \textit{God’s own righteousness} is revealed; and the gospel is the power of God for salvation \textit{to everyone who believes}” (emphasis original). Cf. Moyise, \textit{Paul and Scripture}, 88.
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the faithfulness of God gives foundation to any subsequent call for human faith/faithfulness to God. It is not without reason, then, to suggest this is what Paul intended to convey as well. One wonders if strict attention to the text’s denotations have concealed its connotations. Thus, even if one were to follow the MT’s rendering and argue that human faith/faithfulness was in view, one must not fail to see this as a response to an already-implied and an even more paramount emphasis regarding divine faithfulness. Arguably, this emphasis was operative in Paul’s own rhetorical use of the quotation. It could be argued that the LXX emphasizes the divine foundation for a subsequent human response of faith/faithfulness, while the MT emphasizes the later (though without neglecting the former emphasis). In fact, this seems evident given how אמונה functions textually. Divine and human faithfulness, therefore, should not be played off against each other. Coupling all of this, secondly, with the fact that, within Romans, there is precedence for the parallel of righteousness language with that divine faithfulness in Rom 3:3 and 5 is instructive (more will be said on this below). This parallel is essential for understanding the link between δικαιοσύνη and πίστις in v. 17.

In conclusion, Paul must be seen as emphasizing the faithfulness of God, even if human faith/faithfulness were in view on some level with the Habakkuk quotation. This emphasis on divine faithfulness, particularly in regard to righteousness language and its link to the Gentile question, remain pertinent for the make up of the narrative.

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645 See Wright, PFG, 1469. This idea fits quite well in Rom 1:16-17.
646 See again Hays, Echoes, 40-41, for a similar view. Wright, PFG, 1468, thinks it is possible the LXX’s addition of µου reflects either the original Hebrew text (the change, he says, was perhaps due to “an easy orthographic slippage”), or because the LXX translator understood µου as a gloss of “the more natural reading.” Cf. Moo, Romans, 78-79.
647 Moo, Romans, 78, fn. 69, observes the verbal cognate of אמונה “is used more often to depict a person’s acceptance of God’s words and promises and trust in and reliance upon him (Gen. 15:6; Ex. 14:31; Num 20:12; 2 Chron. 20:20; Ps. 116:10; etc.).” This lends to our view that, regarding Habakkuk in Rom 1:17, what is in view is ultimately God’s own faithfulness. Thus, an argument that says this is “misguided” (e.g. Schreiner, Romans, 74) is without warrant.
648 Again, see Wright, PFG, 1469. Cf. Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 10-11.
649 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 68-69.
substructure, a narrative that, as will be seen, provides the hermeneutical background for Paul’s citation of Hosea in Rom 9:25-26.  

5.5 Human Unrighteousness and Unfaithfulness

While many views on 1:18-32 are well known, our attention will be focused primarily on those issues that are relevant for our investigation. Verses 16-17 are followed by a discussion on “the wrath of God,” which is “against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men” (18a). Despite the temptation, one should not see an ultimate distinction between “ungodliness” (ἀσέβειαν) and “unrighteousness” (ἀδικίαν) in v. 18 because even if one were to observe what Cranfield has already noted—namely, that some understand ἀσέβεια as a violation of “the first four Ten Commandments” and ἀδικία as disobedience to “the last six [commandments]”—both ἀσέβειαν and ἀδικίαν, though perhaps expressing varying nuances, have something much more inherent in common. There are at least two reasons for coming to this conclusion, both noted by Cranfield, saying,

…in view of the fact that the single πᾶσαν embraces both ἀσέβειαν and ἀδικίαν, and the fact that in the participial clause ἀδικίᾳ by itself is apparently meant to represent the double expression, it is more probable that they are here used as two names for the same thing combined in order to afford a more rounded description of it than either gives by itself (ἀσέβεια focusing attention on the fact that all sin is an attack on the majesty of God, ἀδικία on the fact that it is a violation of God’s just order).


653 Schreiner, Romans, 88. Fitzmyer, Romans, 278. Contra Jewett, Romans, 152.


655 Ibid.
Cranfield rightly observes first the presence of πᾶσαν as an aid in the understanding Paul’s use of ἀσέβειαν and ἀδικίαν, though for reasons given below it is his second observation that is significant, namely, “the fact that in the participial clause ἀδικία by itself is apparently meant to represent the double expression.”\(^{656}\) Cranfield is referring to the use of ἐν ἀδικίᾳ in v. 18b: “who by their unrighteousness suppress [ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων] the truth.” Knowing that “ἐν is the workhorse of prepositions” in the New Testament writings, it is understood that anytime ἐν is paired with a dative, there is a list of syntactical categories at the interpreter’s disposal—one of which is the instrumental use.\(^{657}\) How do the unrighteous and ungodly “suppress the truth” (18b)? Paul states it is “by their unrighteousness, ἐν ἀδικίᾳ.”\(^{658}\) This is telling, for it assumes that there exists for Paul a conceptual distinction between both “truth” and “unrighteousness.” However one defines “unrighteousness,” it cannot be understood to be “the truth”; after all, the former is what is suppressing the latter.\(^{659}\) Furthermore, verses 19a–20c serve largely as the reason for the final indictment of 20d: “They are without excuse.” It is clear Paul wants his readers to know that “the truth” of God (18b) and “what can be known about God” (19a) is evident, “plain to them” (19b), because “God has made it known” (19b). And it is this “truth” that is suppressed by “unrighteousness” (18b).

But what is meant by “truth” in v. 18? Schreiner sees vv. 21-23 as describing what he calls “the root sin,” saying, “the root sin that dominates human beings and unleashes God’s wrath is specified in verses 21-23. These verses describe the same reality in various ways, but the fundamental sin is the failure to glorify God and give him thanks (οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ἠυχαρίστησαν…).”\(^{660}\) The problem with saying “the failure to glorify God and give thanks” is at the same time “the fundamental sin” is that it runs contrary to the text, for the true “fundamental sin” is what Paul seems to call

\(^{656}\) Ibid.


\(^{658}\) Cf. the comment on v. 19 in Stuhlmacher, *Romans*, 36.

\(^{659}\) This proves to be important later; see below.

\(^{660}\) Schreiner, *Romans*, 87.
“ungodliness and unrighteousness” (v. 18) and not a failure to give God glory. Schreiner essentially takes “unrighteousness” mentioned in v. 18 and conflates it with the act of exchanging “the glory of the immortal God” in v. 23. But a careful reading will not allow for this. This is best seen when looking at v. 23 in conjunction with v. 25, which explains how humanity has gone about not honoring and thanking God. It is best to understand these two verses in comparison to one another. Verse 23a states: “[They] exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things.” Likewise, v. 25: “They exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator.” Thus, it is “the truth about God” and “the glory of the immortal God” which are set in parallel to one another. Paul’s discussion, then, of “exchanging the glory of God” in v. 23 and exchanging “the truth about God” in v. 25 come into focus: The “truth” and “glory,” both having been exchanged, mean to convey the same idea for Paul, that is, they are best seen as synonymous. Furthermore, the “truth” (ἀλήθεια) of v. 25 is to be understood as the “truth” (ἀλήθεια) that is “suppressed” in v. 18. Schreiner rightly observes: “But what truth (ἀλήθεια) have people suppressed unrighteously? The reference to ἀλήθεια in verse 25 provides a clue as does the subsequent context in verses 21-23. The truth that people have unrighteously suppressed and rejected is that the one true God should be honored and worshipped and esteemed as God.”

He is correct to say that the “truth” being suppressed in v. 18 is the truth that God is worthy of worship and glory. However, it is better to see v. 21 as an explanation of what is meant by “suppress the truth” at the end of v. 18 as opposed to a definition of what is meant by “unrighteousness” at the beginning of v. 18. The problem is how

661 Moo, Romans, 112; Cf. Jewett, Romans, 169–170.
662 Emphasis ours.
663 Emphasis ours.
664 See Jewett, Romans, 170, and his comments on v. 18.
Schreiner defines “sin” and how he subsequently colors (and defines) “unrighteousness.” He says,

We need to reflect further on the main thesis that Paul advances. Failing to glorify God is the root sin. Indeed, glorifying God is virtually equivalent with rendering him proper worship since Paul describes (v.25) the same reality as surrendering the truth of God for worship of the creature...We saw in 1:17 that the righteousness of God is rooted in his desire for the glory and honor of his name. He saves his people because it will bring glory to his name. It is hardly surprising to see, then, that the essence of sin is a rejection of God’s glory and honor. Sin does not consist first and foremost in acts that transgress God’s law, although verses 24-32 indicate that sin is the transgression of the law. These particular acts are all rooted in a rejection of God as God, a failure to give him honor and glory.666

Schreiner follows this with an intriguing summary of his understanding of what the “righteousness of God” is in its most basic form:

Paul uses the word “unrighteousness” (ἀδικία) twice in verse 18 to describe the sin of human beings...Human unrighteousness most fundamentally consists in a refusal to worship God and a desire to worship that which is in the created order. Unrighteousness involves the refusal to give God his proper sovereignty in one’s life. Since refusal to honor and glorify God is described in terms of ἀδικία, we have a clue here that both the saving and judging righteousness of God are rooted in a desire to see his name glorified. His wrath is inflicted upon the world because he is not prized, esteemed, and glorified.667

It is true that, in the strictest sense of the word, unrighteousness “consists” in failing to worship God and it is perhaps truer still (generally speaking) that a “refusal to honor and glorify God is described in terms of ἀδικία.”668 One should be cautious, however, to understand ἀδικία as being reduced to these things.669 Schreiner seems to suggest this. For example, he says: (1) “Failing to glorify God is the root sin” and (2) that, “Paul uses the word “unrighteousness” (ἀδικία) twice in verse 18 to describe the sin of human beings.”670 Depending on what Schreiner means by “consists” and how he takes ἀδικία as a description of failing to ascribe God glory, it seems that he is on some level

666 Ibid. Emphasis ours.
667 Ibid, 88-89.
668 Ibid, 88. Emphasis ours.
669 He is, however, much closer to Paul when he says, “Unrighteousness involves the refusal to give God his proper sovereignty in one’s life” (Schreiner, Romans, 88). The problem with Schreiner’s view is the seeming overemphasis on the glory motif at the expense of seeing unrighteousness as, fundamentally, disloyalty. See below.
670 Schreiner, Romans, 88.
equating unrighteousness here with his own understanding of sin. It is perfectly agreeable, of course, to equate sin and unrighteousness. But the problem is that Schreiner arguably reads into his definition of sin the glory motif precisely because he does not trace carefully the way righteousness language works. Schreiner is not as clear on this issue as he might have been.

Perhaps it is not helpful in the long term to say that, for Paul, the “refusal to honor and glorify God is described in terms of ἁδικία.” It seems that “unrighteousness” should not be conflated to mean (or worse, equated with) not glorifying God, but rather to say that it simply results in such failure. This might, on first appearance, seem like splitting hairs, but the ramifications of not making such distinctions will prove problematic in the end as it will only serve to blur Paul’s covenant-based narrative. The basic problem with Schreiner’s exegesis is that it does not seem to consider that it is the “unrighteousness of humanity” in v. 18 that acts as the instrument by which “the truth” (i.e., that God should be glorified) is suppressed. Indeed, “the truth” that God deserves to be glorified and worshipped, which humanity has suppressed, has been done so “by their unrighteousness” (v.18). It is exegetically unsatisfying to suggest, therefore, that the instrument by which the truth is suppressed is also, at the same, the truth that is suppressed. Thus, whatever “unrighteousness” means in this passage, it cannot be said to be in itself the “failure to glorify God” (i.e., “the truth” of v. 18).

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672 Schreiner, Romans, 88. Cf. the debate between N.T. Wright (Justification: God’s Plan & Paul’s Vision [Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009], esp. 64-65) and John Piper (The Future of Justification: A Response to N.T. Wright [Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2007], esp. 63-67). Cf. Schreiner (Romans, 198) and his critique of Piper’s definition of the “righteousness of God” with what he (Schreiner) says elsewhere about righteousness language in the context of human failure to ascribe God glory being a “root sin” (Romans, 88). In the end, Wright’s basis of Jewish covenant is to be preferred.

673 Contra Piper, Justification, 66.

674 Wright, Justification, 65, observes the same thing regarding God’s own righteousness.

675 Emphasis ours. See above on the instrumental use of the preposition.

676 The above observations on δικαιοσύνη in Rom 1:16-17 is something to keep in mind.

677 Contra Piper, Justification, 66.
What, then, can be said about Paul’s use of (un)righteousness language? It has been argued that, within Rom 1:19-23 (namely, vv. 22-23), Paul is “deliberately, though covertly, retelling the story of Genesis 3.” Argaullly, there is plenty of room within the text itself for such a view. Wright offers comments on the nature of the first and “primal sin”:

The primal sin was a matter of obeying instructions, or at least suggestions, not from the creator in whose image humans were made, but from an agent within creation itself. Instead of recognizing wisdom as an attribute of the creator, to be gained by worshipping and serving that God, humans boasted in a wisdom that consisted in supposed independence. But this wisdom consisted in the greatest folly possible—namely giving allegiance instead to images of humans and also of birds, animals, and reptiles.

The “primal sin” (cf. with Schreiner’s “fundamental sin”) therefore concerns notions of allegiance, obedience, and faithfulness to God, not the glory of God (at least not specifically so). This view coheres with Paul’s stated mission of bringing Gentiles into “obedience,” namely, the ὑπακοὴ πίστεως (1:5). Thus, 1:5 acts as the answer to the fundamental problem of humanity – the failure to remain in allegiance to God, which has served to bring about the suppression of God’s glory and honor. Wright’s narrative view thus makes better sense exegetically as the text states that the “truth” is “suppressed” by “unrighteousness” (1:18; see above). When unrighteousness language is observed in this light, Paul’s argument gains some clarity. Further insight will be achieved, moreover, when one comes to see how Paul’s understanding of righteousness (faithfulness) has been reconstructed due to his christological pre-understandings (see below). This will be no minor detail in terms of working pre-judgments.

In summary, “unrighteousness” should not be understood as the failure to glorify God, but is rather a failure of loyalty to God – resulting in a failure to glorify him. The important observation gleaned for our present purposes is that “unrighteousness” carries with it the idea of failing to stay faithful to the Creator, remaining obedient and allegiant to him. The issue concerns obedience. This conclusion was further reinforced when

678 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 432. Wright also understands Israel’s wilderness experience to also have been in view. Cf. Jewett, Romans, 170.
679 Cf. Moo, Romans, 109-110.
Paul’s use of ὑπακοὴν πίστεως was considered. That is, “obedience,” in some way or another, was the answer to the plight of humanity mentioned in ch. 1:18ff. After this, Paul moves to his implied Jewish audience (ch. 2). There Paul will address what righteousness looks like, how it can be gained, and who can have it.

5.6 Righteousness: By Hearing or Doing the Law?

In ch. 2, Jewish righteousness is questioned. By starting with “therefore” (διὸ), a link is provided back to 1:32 as,

[Paul’s] rhetorical tactic is to gain Jewish approval in 1.18-32 by reiterating an established line of Jewish critique of the immoral Gentiles, and then to turn the tables on his implied Jewish critics in 2.1 by pronouncing that they are just as guilty, aiming to achieve a rhetorical effect similar to that of Nathan’s charge against David in 2 Sam. 12.7. 681

In fact, Paul presents a scenario where Gentiles are deemed more righteous than their Jewish counterparts. 682 Rom 2:1-5 mark out the hypocrisy of Jewish judgmentalism, placing Jewish sin on the same level as the rest of humanity. 683 Space does not permit a full accentuation into all the difficulties surrounding vv. 6-10 regarding what role works play in the final judgment. 684 All the same, there seems to be in vv. 6-10 a stated emphasis upon the universality of God’s righteous judgment—whether in the giving of eternal life to those who in “patient good-working” pursue “glory and honor and immortality” (v.7) or wrath to those who do not (v.8). 685 The principle point here is that


682 This is not to mention a potentially controversial scenario, not unlike that of Habakkuk’s complaint in Hab 1:13.


685 See Jewett, Romans, 194; Commenting on vv. 7-11, Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 440, says, “[T]he great emphasis here, which colors the reading of the whole chapter, is on the universality of the judgment.” Cf. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 68, who glosses ὑπομονὴ ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ in v. 7 as “nothing but the work of faith.”
the judgment of God is not in any way, shape, or form subject to one’s racial or ethnic identity. 686 This is evidenced from the use of πᾶς in vv. 9-10, as well as the well-known phrase “the Jew first and also the Greek” occurring in the same verses. Thus, whatever may be said about works and final judgment, it is universality and non-partiality that is front-and-center, as v. 11 says, “For there is no partiality with God.” This is a telling sign that the objective for Paul is to turn upside down the ethnic barriers and distinctions which served to separate Jews from Gentiles. Paul is not explicit about all that he is doing here, though things become clearer in what immediately follows in vv. 12-29 and in what follows even beyond that. 687

The fact that ethnic concerns between Jews and Gentiles are in view for Paul is explicit in v. 12. Here, the motif of law-keeping is observed, and Paul’s remarks about those who have “sinned without the law” and those who have “sinned under the law” certainly serves to “[correspond] to the distinction between Jews and Gentiles.” 688 Commenting on what is meant by “the law” in v. 12, Moo observes that, “for Paul the unconverted Jew, ‘law’ refers, unless other qualifications are present, to this specific, historical, body of commandments that functioned, more than anything else, to give Israel its particular identity as a ‘people apart.’” 689 Thus, Paul’s discussion is in pointed reference to that which distinguishes “the Jews” from others. The subject centers, therefore, on the question of identity. Specifically, Paul will argue that ethnic identity does not ultimately matter in being justified. Indeed, Jewish—i.e. physical lineage—is irrelevant insofar as justification is concerned. This is because “it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the law who will be justified”

686 See Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 52.
687 So Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 440: “For the moment, like a rich but unresolved musical sequence, Paul’s argument makes its striking point, that God has no favorites, and passes on.”
688 Rom 2:12. Emphasis ours.
689 Moo, Romans, 145. See also Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 58. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 307-308.
690 Ibid. Moo adds: “Therefore, Paul is not here accusing the Gentiles of being ‘lawless’ (that is, notorious criminals or outlaws) but of being ‘law-less’—by definition, as Gentiles, they do not possess the law of Moses. They are ‘alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, strangers to covenants of promise’ (Eph. 2:12). In contrast, then, Jews live ‘in the sphere of,’ within the boundaries defined by, the law. From the Jewish point of view, of course, this difference in
Thus, law-keeping is the foundation for justification (more on this below). Paul’s goal, of course, in the greater context is to set aside “Jewish superiority.” But his argument proceeds beyond this. Garlington notes rightly that 2:12-16 serves to argue “that the possession of the law is in itself no guarantee against the wrath in the day of judgment; what is required is obedience to the law, which Romans as a whole clarifies to be the ‘obedience of faith’” (Rom 1:5). Of course, “obedience” was the very thing that humanity was not in 1:18-32; there humanity was ἀδικία, which connoted disloyalty (see above).

Returning to the puzzling phrase of Rom 1:5, εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως, “the obedience of faith,” light begins to shine upon Paul’s overall thought. His intentions behind that phrase become sharper once the false—not to mention tediously distracting—dichotomy of either a subjective genitive understanding or an appositional one is avoided and a focus is given to the broader implications of Gentile inclusion into the covenant. Support for this stems from the context of 2:12-29. Here it is the “doers [and not necessarily the possessors] of the law who will be justified [δικαιώθησον]” before God (2:13). Again, one must remember 1:18, namely, that ἀδικία was set in terms of unfaithfulness, non-allegiance, and disobedience. The substance of 2:12-15, then, must not be viewed as an entirely new discourse or argument. One reads in 2:13 that, despite humanity’s ἀδικία, some of humanity (the Gentiles), by becoming “doers of the law,” will become “righteous” (δικαιωθήσονται). But what is meant by “doers of the law”?

The “doers of the law” in Rom 2:13 is more than a “hypothetical category.” Rather, since “the Judaism of Paul’s day knew of a future vindication based on present possession of God’s law is absolutely basic” (145-146). More will be said on “law” below.

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692 Garlington, Faith, Obedience, Perseverance, 51.


fidelity to the covenant,” Paul wanted to reshape what, exactly, it meant to be faithful to the covenant, i.e., keeping the law, since the Messiah had now come.\footnote{Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 60.} Paul’s “concern is seen to be that of calling into question the prevailing understanding of who ‘the righteous’ are and the grounds on which they may expect to be justified.”\footnote{Ibid.} And to him, being “justified” meant becoming a “doer of the law.” The specific identity of those who are the “doers of the law” in 2:13 is understood when one notes the γὰρ in 2:14.\footnote{For an opposing view to how the γὰρ is functioning here, see Schreiner, Romans, 121. (Cf. Moo, Romans, 148.)} From this, we understand the “doers of the law” in v. 13 as “the Gentiles” mentioned in vv. 14-15. Gathercole notes that the scholarly consensus concerning the identity of “the Gentiles” in vv. 14-15 could be summed up as falling into one or two categories: the “non-Christian” and “Christian understandings.”\footnote{Simon J. Gathercole, “A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2.14-15 Revisited.” JSNT 85 (March 2002): 27-49, citing 29.} The former would see vv. 14-15 as some sort of reference to “natural law,”\footnote{Ibid, 38.} in that Paul had imported into his soteriology a sort of “Hellenistic philosophy,”\footnote{Ibid, 37.} whereas the latter would see the same passage as referring to Gentiles who believe in Christ, and so “carry out the Torah as Christian believers.”\footnote{Ibid, 29. Emphasis ours.} Although the “believing-Gentile” reading of Rom 2:14-15 remains perhaps “a minority position,”\footnote{Ibid. Gathercole states additionally that within the “the most common taxonomy of interpretations,” i.e., the Gentiles-as-believers and Gentiles-as-non-believers views, the latter “can be further subdivided into those scholars who see the purpose of these verses as establishing the responsibility of these Gentiles such that their condemnation is deserved [he calls this, ‘By far the majority position’ (fn. 10)], and those who see a positive portrayal of these Gentiles, whereby some unregenerate Gentiles have a better chance of vindication at the day of judgment than many Jews” (29; emphasis original). See also Mark A. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness: Paul’s Theology of Justification [NSBT 9; Downers Grove: IVP, 2000], 53-54; cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 441-442.} there are notable scholars who have rightly argued for this type of reading.\footnote{See Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 215. See also the catalogue of scholars mentioned in Gathercole, “Law,” 29-30.} More will be said on this question below.

\footnote{695 Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 60.} \footnote{696 Ibid.} \footnote{697 For an opposing view to how the γὰρ is functioning here, see Schreiner, Romans, 121. (Cf. Moo, Romans, 148.)} \footnote{698 Simon J. Gathercole, “A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2.14-15 Revisited.” JSNT 85 (March 2002): 27-49, citing 29.} \footnote{699 Ibid, 38.} \footnote{700 Ibid, 37.} \footnote{701 Ibid, 29. Emphasis ours.} \footnote{702 Ibid. Gathercole states additionally that within the “the most common taxonomy of interpretations,” i.e., the Gentiles-as-believers and Gentiles-as-non-believers views, the latter “can be further subdivided into those scholars who see the purpose of these verses as establishing the responsibility of these Gentiles such that their condemnation is deserved [he calls this, ‘By far the majority position’ (fn. 10)], and those who see a positive portrayal of these Gentiles, whereby some unregenerate Gentiles have a better chance of vindication at the day of judgment than many Jews” (29; emphasis original). See also Mark A. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness: Paul’s Theology of Justification [NSBT 9; Downers Grove: IVP, 2000], 53-54; cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 441-442.} \footnote{703 See Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 215. See also the catalogue of scholars mentioned in Gathercole, “Law,” 29-30.}
It should be noted that justification in Rom 2:12-16 “is not present justification,” but rather “future.” Wright cautions, however, that the two differences in timing cannot “be played off against one another,” saying further that, “they belong together: present justification, as Romans makes clear, is the true anticipation of future justification.” The issue of timing in vv. 12-16 is beside the point for our purposes. That these Gentile “doers of the law” will be justified in the manner Paul describes is what remains paramount (more below).

Michael Bird understands “the law in question as the Mosaic law.” This seems clear from v. 14: “For when the Gentiles, who do not have the law by nature, do the things of the law, though they do not have the law, they are a law to themselves,” ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος. The fact that Gentiles are said to “not have the law,” τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα, should shed some light on what is meant by “the law” in 2:13—namely, that it is precisely that law which typified the Jews as distinct from the other nations (ἔθνη). A further clue is provided by φύσει, which follows the phrase. Opinions abound on how φύσει functions within this verse. Both Gathercole and Bird argue for a reading of 2:14 as, “For when the Gentiles, who do not have the law by nature [φύσει], do the things of the law…” thus not allowing φύσει to modify ποιῶσιν but ἔχοντα. Bird comments,

704 Wright, “The Law in Romans 2 (1996),” Perspectives, 146. Emphasis original. See also Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 59; Fitzmyer, Romans, 309.

705 Ibid.


707 See Ibid., 170, fn. 36; see also Gathercole, “Law,” 35, fns. 45, 47. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 121, 123.

708 Gathercole, “Law,” 35-37. He states, “The majority view, however, is that φύσει goes with what follows (thus, ‘doing by nature the things of the Law’), but even among some commentators who take that view, the uncertainty is acknowledged” (35).


710 Contra Moo who argues that joining “‘by nature’ with the verb ‘do’ makes better sense” (Moo, Romans, 149). See also Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 53, who prefers this reading as well.
The Gentiles are not persons who by nature do the law, instead the Gentiles are simply those who do not have access to the law as intrinsic to their ethnic identity. This is supported further by the use of φύσει again in Rom. 2:27 ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία (“by nature uncircumcised”) and denotes those who are outside of the covenant by birth.\footnote{Bird, The Saving Righteousness, 170. Emphasis original.}

A potential problem with saying φύσει is used to modify ἐχοντα is due to the fact that the word φύσει itself is outside of the phrase that contains ἐχοντα, and thus, arguably, should not be seen as its modifier.\footnote{Gathercole, “Law,” 35.} Gathercole argues against this objection (namely, against Dunn and Fitzmyer), saying that just because φύσει occurs outside of the phrase ὅταν γὰρ ἐθνὴ τὰ μὴ νόμον ἐχοντα, it does not necessarily imply the word in question (i.e., φύσει) does not modify another word found within the phrase (i.e., ἐχοντα).\footnote{Ibid. Eg. cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 310.} Moreover, Gathercole comments that “one of the strongest arguments is that of Achtemeier and Maertens,” who both argue that “‘in every other instance in Paul’s letters’ φύσει is not used to ‘describe an action’, but rather argue ‘to characterize further some group.’”\footnote{Ibid., 36. Cf. Moo, Romans, 149. See also Seifrid, “Unrighteous by Faith,” Justification and Variegated Nomism, 129-130; and Schreiner, Romans, 123.} Therefore, it is best to see Rom 2:14 as referring to “gentiles who [even though they do not] by nature have the law,” are able to “do the things of the law.”\footnote{P. Achtemeier, Romans (Interpretation; Atlanta: John Knox, 1985), 45 as cited in Gathercole, “Law,” 36. Gathercole also quotes Maertens (P. Maertens, ‘Une étude de Rm 2.12-16’, NTS 46.4 [2000], pp. 504-19 [510]): “in the majority of cases where Paul employs the term, it is a question of a demarcation of Jewish over against non-Jewish identity, as in Gal. 2.15, for example… See also Rom. 2.27; 11.21, 24; Gal. 4:8 and Eph. 2.4, where the issue is identity in general’ (as cited in Gathercole, “Law,” 36).} This being so, understanding v. 14 as such illuminates further the fact that what is at stake is ethnic and boundary, and thus identity, distinctions.\footnote{Contra Fitzmyer, Romans, 309-310, esp. 310.}

Returning to the phrase “doers of the law,” clarity is gained by allowing it to be illumined by Rom 2:25-29.\footnote{See Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” Perspectives, 147, who points to the fact that in 2:27, the next instance of φύσει, Paul uses the word to highlight the Gentile’s non-circumcised status. Therefore, the same sense should be taken in v. 14.} Though more will be said on this link below, we note

\footnote{Cf. Wright, Justification, 245. See also Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance,}
presently that in v. 26, for example, the one who “keeps the precepts of the law” will “be regarded as circumcision,” though they are physically uncircumcised. And the one who “keeps the precepts of the law” (v. 26) – an expression reminiscent of earlier phrases about those who are “doers of the law” and who “do the things of the law” (vv. 13-14) – are participating in a “comprehensive, not partial, fulfillment of Torah.” But how can they be seen as law-keepers? More will be said on this in the next chapter, but the way in which the uncircumcised are incorporated into the community of the circumcised, and hence fulfill the Torah, is for Paul through faith. Commenting on Rom 4:12, Wright emphasizes this well when he says that it is not only true “that [the] uncircumcised believers are welcome into Abraham’s family but that the circumcised are welcome too if they too believe.” Being a “doer of the law” is rooted in faith in Christ. Of course, at this point in Paul’s argument, this is conjecture, for nothing explicit has been stated yet. That said, considering the context of 2:1-24, Paul is here only concerned with a preliminary stage of his much larger argument—namely, that ethnic distinctions are breaking down in regard to identifying those who will be justified at all. Paul’s main concern presently is the fact that there is a situation where law-possessing Jews will not be justified and non-law-possessing Gentiles will. Although, the point about a christological role at the final judgment should be given full weight (2:16). After all, Paul states that Gentiles “show that the work of the law is written on their hearts…on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus” (Rom 2:15-16). Just as the emphasis in vv. 6-11 is on perseverance, as well as the universality and impartiality of God’s judgment (see above), one must not

54; Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” Perspectives, 146-150.
719 Gathercole, “Law,” 46. More will be said about the link between v. 15 and v. 29 below.
720 Wright, Justification, 221. Emphasis original. (See also fn. 43 where he says that this helps in “developing 2:25-29.”)
723 Stuhlmacher, Romans, 43, rightly rejects this as being a latter insertion.
724 The point is still concerned with identification. Who will “show” or “demonstrate” (Gk: ἐνδείκνυνται) that the “work of the law” has been written on their hearts? It is those (Gentiles) who do more than merely “possess” the law, but do what it requires.
miss that, for Paul, the judgment itself has been realigned around the person of Christ. There would perhaps have been no major controversy about these details, as Paul’s real polemical thrust, indeed his fundamental hermeneutical move, is that the Jewish idea of future judgment takes upon itself a christological focus. Thus, Paul’s point in this section is that Torah-keeping, which leads to divine acquittal, has now been revised.

More will be said on this below.

Some scholars, however, propose a different construal. Schreiner, for example, does not see the obedience in question as a “saving obedience,” and Preston Sprinkle concurs, saying that the “emphasis in Rom 2:15-16 [is] on the condemnation, not salvation” concerning the people in question. Moreover, Dunn states that the phrase “doing (the things of) the law” is something Paul can,

express…with some vagueness, simply because he need not be specific yet. It is enough for his present argument to adduce the example of Gentiles who show a moral sensibility such as the law looks for and greater than that shown by many Jews. He does not actually say that this “work of the law” will guarantee their acquittal on the day of judgment; if anything his language is designed rather to explain how it is that Gentiles who sin without the law can yet be held responsible (vv 12, 15bc).

Wright’s narrative framework, however, is to be preferred. First, Paul must be seen as alluding back to the new covenant promises of Jer. 31:33. Second, the phrase “the
work of the law written on their hearts” (2:15) corresponds to the phrase “circumcision is a matter of the heart” (2:29). Moreover, the new covenant theme and allusion in 2:29 to Deut 30:6 is noticeable. The one with a circumcised heart is one whose “praise is not from man but from God” (2:29). Thus, those who are “doers of the

cf. Schreiner, Romans, 122, who says something similar.

732 Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 119-126, who does not see doing the law in vv. 14-15 as a reference to Gentile Christians, though he does see them being referenced in vv. 26-29 (139-145). Interestingly, he does link the phrase in v. 13b, “the doers of the law…will be justified,” with the vv. 25-29, saying it is not necessary to take v. 13b as a “hypothetical” (119). Moreover, he dismisses any supposed allusion to Jer. 31 in v. 15 (122), though he does say a connection can be made to the OT prophet when Paul discusses “circumcision of the heart” in v. 29 (142-143). Regarding his views about vv.14-15, Schreiner states that Paul’s point is that, since the Jews boasted in their possessing the law, Paul wanted to counter such a boast on the basis of the fact that the Gentiles, too, have heard of the law; therefore, the Jews should not boast in hearing the law when, for all practical purposes, so had the Gentiles. The two groups, then, are rendered to be no different in their standing before God. Schreiner acknowledges his view is “controversial” (see 116-117). In the end, Schreiner’s view in seeing a distinction between Rom 2:14-15 and Rom 2:25-29 is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the whole of v. 13 should be linked to v. 14—that is, “the doers of the law” in v. 13 must be seen as connected to doing the law in v. 14 (contra Schreiner, Romans, 121, who sees v. 14 as only being linked to v. 13a, thus bypassing the phrase “the doers of the law” in v. 13b). By going this route, one can more easily come to see the connection between doing the law and circumcision language in vv. 25-29 simply because the law itself, being grounded in the covenant God made with his people, had become the foundational expression for Jewish covenant faithfulness (see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 119ff, and Moo, Romans, 166-167). It is hard, therefore, to see how “the doers of the law” in v. 13 could not also be seen as those who had become part of the “circumcision” by “keeping the precepts of the law” in vv. 25-29, since “law” and “circumcision” were so linked, at least covenantally. Second, when Paul speaks of “doers of the law” in v. 13, he understands this in terms with what is said in v. 15, namely, that “the law is written on their hearts” (see Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism, 190, who acknowledges the syntactical link between the two here). Moreover, what is at stake in vv. 12-16 is that which has to do with the heart, “the secrets of men” (v.16), all of which makes sense to view as the conceptual equivalent of being a Jew “inwardly” and “circumcision being a “matter of the heart” in v. 29. Cf. Stuhlmacher, Romans, 48.

733 See also the discussion in Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 440-442, 448-450, who, when commenting on vv. 14-15 (and vv. 12-13), says Paul will provide more clarity when he gets to vv. 25-29 (441). Wright even says that the discourse on “circumcision” in vv. 25-29 is “parallel with the point about Torah” (448) mentioned earlier. (Cf. Dunn, Romans, 38a, 127-128, on the redefining of even the term “Jew.”)

734 Wright, “Romans 2.17-3.9: A Hidden Clue to the Meaning of Romans? (2012),” Perspectives, 502-503. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 322-323. See Jub 1:23, where the allusion to Deut 30:6 is observed. When this part of Jubilees is compared to Rom 2:25-29, a striking difference is noticed between the two competing uses of the Deuteronomic promises. Starling, Not My People, 129, rightly observes that, “Whilst the Deuteronomic language of the circumcision heart has obvious Pauline parallels (most notably Rom. 2:25-29) there is no hint in Jubilees that this motif is employed to narrow the scope of true Israel (as is the case in Rom.2:26-27); for the writer of Jubilees, the hope of restoration is a hope for all Israel, and to return to God is (emphatically and explicitly) to return to his commandments. Nor is Israel’s return ’from amongst the Gentiles’ (Jub. 1:14; cf. 1:8, 12) at any point explicitly or implicitly presented as a paradigm for the repentance of the Gentiles” (emphasis original).
law” are those who “have the law written on their hearts,” acquiring true “circumcision.” It is that group of people who are “righteous,” those who are “justified,” those who are “obedient” and “allegiant.” This group is the opposite of those who are “not in the right” (ἀδικία) in 1:18, those who are found to be disobedient and disloyal. Wright sees the entire issues as being about “status,” saying,…without needing either to have a previously existing Jewish category of ‘keeping the law’ in some attenuated or limited sense to draw upon, or to have worked out the implications of what he is saying in more than rudimentary detail, he is able to assert as a matter of theological logic (compare logisthēsetai in 2.26) that (c) uncircumcised gentile Christians do in fact ‘keep the statutes of the law’, as Ezekiel said. The prophecies of covenant renewal and blessing upon the gentiles have come true. The beneficiaries must be ‘fulfilling the law’ by their very existence. The question of an ethical ‘fulfilment’ such as that of 13.8 (corresponding very broadly to Luther’s tertius usus legis) is not yet in view. The fulfilment of which Paul speaks is, I think, first and foremost a matter of status. 735

Wright concludes by saying that the notion of “keeping the law” is best “seen as a new sort of theological category, derived from the ‘new covenant’ theme, ranged polemically against the failed Jewish ‘lawkeeping’, but yet to be worked out fully. It is a matter, not of achievement, nor yet of ethics, but of status.” 736 One might very well wonder if such a “theological category” for Paul, like the theological categories utilized by the sectarians at Qumran, should also be understood hermeneutically? 737 If “doers of the law” is truly about status and is at the same time a hint toward a “righteousness by faith in Christ” (which is to come shortly in Paul’s argument), then based on the continuing narrative substructure, we suggest that Paul’s “doing the law” is a concept that has been revised and reformulated due to factors existing within his own particular horizon of understanding. 738

735 Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” Perspectives, 141. Emphasis original.

736 Ibid. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 140; Moo, Romans, 171. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” Perspectives, 139-140, questioning what Paul might have meant by law-keeping and completing the law in vv. 26-27, says that he cannot be referring to the decision of those Gentiles who have decided to become “law-observant Jews,” for they are, after all, not even circumcised. He further describes (140) Rom 2:26-29, 3:27, 8:4-9, and 10:4-11 as a “sequence” and a “crescendo of passages in which Paul says…that Christians do in fact fulfill the law, even though…they have not done what to a Jew was one of its most basic commands.”

737 See Section 6.1 below.

738 This becomes clear by the time Rom 3-4 comes along. See below.
This is not to deny that more is in play insofar as the final judgment is concerned—namely, Spirit-wrought works (Rom 2:6-11; cf. 29). And to be sure, this issue is important and continues to be debated. But the problem which often snags real progress toward a proper understanding of Rom 2:12-16 is that debate has been too focused upon details surrounding how, and in what way, works plays in the final judgment. Garlington, then, is correct to point out that the critical issue was that Christ, not Torah, is now the focus of such perseverance:

Of course, the idea of perseverance is hardly unique to Paul. Even a passing acquaintance with pre-Christian Jewish literature is sufficient to inform one that the issue before many of its authors was precisely loyalty to the Mosaic standards in the face of widespread apostasy. But what is new in Paul is that perseverance has changed its focus: no longer are the people of God to obey the Torah but rather the “form of teaching,” i.e., the Pauline gospel concerning God’s Son, to which they have been committed (Rom 6:17 in connection with 1:1-3a; 2:16). For him perseverance is bound up with one’s inclusion in Christ: only in Christ is there no condemnation (Rom 8:1); it is Christ who insures the perseverance of his people (Rom 5:12-19).

As will be seen, though being important to highlight presently, the point is that everything now centers upon faith in Christ as the all-encompassing requirement of the law, i.e., “the obedience of faith” (Rom 1:5). If Paul’s understanding—i.e., his judgment—is that Gentiles can be included in the covenant and can therefore be “doers of the law” (though they do not possess the law), then Paul’s christological horizon of understanding must be seen as making this understanding intelligible. The rhetorical emphasis, then, in Rom 2:12-16 should not be understood primarily about the relationship between works and the final judgment as much as it is about the fact that all believing uncircumcised Gentiles are now considered part of “the circumcision” and, as


741 Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 69. Emphasis original. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 437, commenting on Rom 2:1-16, says, “[The typical] Jewish depiction of the last great assize is now transposed into a Christian key: The judgment will be ‘through the Messiah, Jesus’ (2:16).”

such, are considered full covenant members because they are in Christ. For Paul, there is now an obvious difference between saying, “The Gentiles do not have the law” and “the Gentiles are outside of the covenant.” That is, the former no longer implies the latter. Mere possession of the law is not sufficient for justification, thus placing Jews on equal ground with the Gentiles (2:12-29). And the Gentiles, who do not “have the law” yet end up doing “what the law requires” (v. 14), show “that the work of the law is written on their hearts” (v. 15), hence identifying the believing Gentile as a covenant member (as “justified”) and the disobedient Jew as a covenant breaker (cf. vv. 14, 17-24). Therefore, Gentiles who find themselves “outside of the covenant” are not so because they are Gentiles (i.e., not because they are that group of people who “by nature do not possess the law”; v. 14). Rather, they are outside because they simply do not join the covenant (i.e., become that group of people who “do what the law requires”; v. 14). This is to observe negatively what Paul observes positively. But of course, some Gentiles do in fact “show that [i.e., ‘identify themselves as ones in whom’] the work of the law [has been] written on their hearts” (v. 15). This happens when they become “doers of the law,” irrespective of the fact that they never “by nature” possessed the law. Negatively, the point here is that the condition for Gentile inclusion is not natural possession (and hearing) of the law. The condition for Gentile inclusion is something other than being born into it by nature. This justification is a reversal of humanity’s status quo in 1:18 (recall ἀδικία), the focus of his apostolic calling in 1:5, and therefore in line with his greater argument.

5.6.1 Summary

There will be in the final judgment (vv. 6-11) Gentiles who fulfill the law by doing it (vv. 12-16) and who will “condemn” those who, unlike them, “have the written code and circumcision but break the law” (v. 27). Circumcision, after all, “is a matter of the heart, by the Spirit, not by the letter” (v. 29). These uncircumcised and non-covenanted Gentiles nevertheless will be justified (v. 13), i.e., included in the covenant. Though much more remains to be seen, it must be pointed out that, significantly, this is the exact issue found in Rom 9:25-26 with the Hosea quotation: How could a Jewish

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743 This emphasis remains highly important for the enquiry into 9:25-26 (see below).

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promise of covenant inclusion ever find its fulfillment in Gentiles, who, by nature, were not the intended recipients? In Paul’s specific use of the oracle in Rom 9, then, it must be entertained that a specific fore-structure of understanding—something not unlike Gadamer’s concept of Vorurteil—was at work which served to establish his new, and revisionist, understanding of the oracle, something very much like his new understanding of law keeping in Rom 2.744 It stands to reason, then, that the perceived hermeneutical problem of Rom 9:25-26 that has worried modern interpreters could be accounted for if Paul’s Vorurteile were brought to light.

Gadamer says, “Es bedarf einer grundsätzlichen Rehabilitierung des Begriffes des Vorurteils und einer Anerkennung dessen, daß es legitime Vorurteile gibt, wenn man der endlich-geschichtlichen Seinsweise des Menschen gerecht werden will.”745 In light of Gadamer’s efforts to this end, therefore, one must ask, what prejudgments informed (and formed) Paul’s understanding of what it meant to be “doers of the law,” by which Gentiles can be said to have been included? In ch. 2, Paul was not explicit, except for what is mentioned in v. 16, about the christological basis for justification and covenant inclusion for the Gentiles.746 But he does not have to be forthright; after all, pre-judgments, being components of one’s interpretive fore-structure of understanding, exist behind explicit judgments. As we will see as his argument progresses, what it means to be a doer of the law in Rom 2 is for Paul re-oriented around his christological convictions.747 The judgment Paul makes concerning believing Gentiles being covenant members is what it is because of this hermeneutical pre-judgment, Vorurteil, concerning

744 That Paul’s understanding of carrying out the requirements of the law in Rom 2 is revisionist will become clearer when we see Rom 3-4 below.
745 Gadamer, WM, 281; TM, 278. See again Sections 4.4 and 4.5 above.
746 Cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 441, who says, “Throughout this section so far Paul has been saying things that cry out for further explanation, which he will provide as the letter moves forward. He is at this point sketching a scene, not filling in the details... Paul’s view, to anticipate the later argument, is that those who are in Christ, who are indwelt by the Spirit, do in fact ‘do the law,’ even though, in the case of Gentiles, they have never heard it.” (Emphasis ours.)
747 This view is, again, not without warrant among biblical scholars. E.g. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 70-71, comments, “With [the] necessary christological qualifications, ‘doing the law,’ in Rom 2:13, is no different in kind than the OT’s classic statement of ‘covenantal nomism,’ Lev 18:5: one continues to live within the covenant relationship by compliance with its terms, i.e., perseverance. Otherwise put, in Christ one becomes, according to 2 Cor 5:21, ‘the righteousness of God’” (emphasis original).
the reality of the Christ-event in relation to the manifestation of the righteousness of God. This will be clarified in subsequent discussions below.

For comparative purposes, it is helpful first to attend to the reading practices of Paul’s contemporaries. Portions from the CD and Pesharim remain particularly helpful to this end since, like Paul’s writings, they actively engage Scripture (specifically the twelve prophets), as well as with motifs that are relevant for this study (e.g., Torah-keeping, the Gentile question, and covenant fidelity). What will be shown below is how prejudgments in general are at play for the sect in reading the scriptural texts, not least in regard to the above motifs. Much like Paul, it will be seen that the sect’s interpretive judgments about Scripture have the meanings they do because of the essential pre-judgments that lie behind them. What will be discovered is that both Paul and pesherist interpret texts according to their respective community’s fore-structure of understanding. In this vein, clear similarities and dissimilarities will emerge.
Chapter 6: Texts and Contexts, Part 2

6.1 Pesharim and CD

In what follows, a comparative analysis of the interpretive practices in the Pesharim and CD will allow us to evaluate better Paul’s own reading of similar prophetic texts – not least Hosea in Rom 9:25-26. Specifically, this section enhances our broader study by making several observations. First, it will be seen that the sect often interprets texts creatively. This section allows us, then, to demonstrate that interpretive creativity was not a practice exclusive to Paul but something common to all interpreters due to the prejudices they have (as Gadamer says).

Second, while it will be observed that Paul and the sect are often similar in their creative use of Scripture, clear differences will still be evident. For example, when we compare below what it means to do the law for the pesherist with Paul’s understanding of the same in Romans, noticeable differences emerge due to the distinct prejudices that each one brings with them to the text. This section is significant for our entire study, therefore, because it will demonstrate, among other things, the role interpretive prejudices played in the creative reading of texts – a creative reading that was so integral to confirming and validating each interpreter’s respective communities.

(a) Joel 2:12, 13 in 4Q266 fxi 5

The quotations from Joel 2:12, 13 follow a string of two others from Lev 4:27 and 26:31. The quoted portion from Joel reads: “And in another place it is written: ‘Turn to God in weeping and fasting’” (4Q266 fxi 4-5; v. 12). This is followed by: “And in another place it is written, ‘Tear your hearts and not your garments’” (4Q266 fxi 5; v. 13). The quotation that occurs before the one from Joel, namely, Lev 4:27 (lines 2-3), states that those who sin “in unintentional error” are to offer a “sin-offering.” Following this is Lev 26:31 (lines 3-4), which states that God will not “smell the

748 In what follows, the reader is encouraged to keep in mind the observations gathered in Section 2.3 above.

749 This becomes clear by the end of chapter 6.
soothing aroma” of the sacrifice. In other words, even though there is the divine call to make such sacrifices, these have been rejected by YHWH. The point of the passage, and the quotations which support it, is to denounce those sacrifices presently happening in the Temple.\textsuperscript{750} Immediately following the Joel 2:13 quotation one reads: “And everyone who despises in these ordinances [משפט] according to the mouth of all the statutes [חק] which are found in the Torah of Moses will not be considered among all the sons of his truth” (lines 5-7). Those who perform sacrifices in the temple, the non-sectarians, are despising the ordinances of the Law and are not considered “sons of his truth.” A sectarian bent is obvious here.

Furthermore, in line 10, there is a brief discussion about the “peoples” (עמים). This should be understood as “the Gentiles” because the עמים are further described as being divided in terms of “languages” (line 10). Moreover, these “peoples” are those who have been caused to “err/go astray in a pathless chaos” (חגר ולבבות תבון; lines 10-11). In distinction to these people, it is read that: “You chose our fathers and gave their descendants your truthful statutes [חק] and your holy ordinances [משפט], so that man could carry them out and live” (lines 11-12). When understood in light of the Joel citations and the comments about them in lines 5-7 (see above), it is easy to see that the “statutes” (חק) and “ordinances” (משפט) (which have not been carried out by Jewish non-sectarians nor have they been given to the nations) have nonetheless found their fulfillment in the sect itself. Lines 12-19 reinforce this conclusion. For example, the sect sees YHWH as the agent who has set up their “boundaries” and those who “transgress” them will be cursed (lines 12-13). The transgressors are in distinction to the sect, who remain the “people of your redemption,” the “sheep of your pasture” (line 13). According to the sect, it is they who have been “caused to be raised up,” contrary to those who are under the “curse” (line 14). Lines 15-16 speak of the person who has been expelled from the sect, and “those who dwell in the camps” are those who “will curse” those who swerve from the Torah (line 17). Lastly, it is read that “this is the explanation/interpretation of the ordinances (משפט) which they are to do in the entire age of visitation...” (lines 17-18).”

\textsuperscript{750} Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 88.
Unlike the non-sectarians, the sect follows the “statues” [חק] and “ordinances” [משפט] of God (cf. lines 5-7 and 11-12). Sectarianism, then, seems to be much more than a mere sociological category, but also a sort of hermeneutical lens through and from which Scripture is read. That is, these scriptural texts find the meaning they do because of a sectarian Vorstruktur des Verstehens. After all, the assumption in the implied author is that the texts cited speak to the sect’s own contemporary situation, their dispute with the temple leaders; thus, the texts were meant for them. Indeed, “contemporizing tendencies” are distinctive to pesher in general. Steven DiMattei is therefore right to observe that, “[O]ne of the central characteristics of pesher exegesis, that which best defines its hermeneutical presupposition, is its contemporizing eschatological interpretation of prophetic texts, sometimes referred to as an ‘actualization’ of the text or as ‘fulfillment’ interpretation.”

He continues,

The hermeneutical principles or assumptions at work in Qumran pesharim are thus often recognized as a conviction that (1) biblical prophecies refer to end times, and (2) the end time is now. In other words, Israel’s historical past is to be interpreted in light of the contemporary circumstances or history of the sect, with the added belief that the community is currently living in the end times.

Both our observations and DiMattei’s here will prove significant as further pesher texts are examined below.

Furthermore, with a comparison between the sect and the “peoples,” that is, the Gentiles, one sees how the latter have gone astray but the former remain privileged,

751 On the sociological aspects of the Qumranites (not least in regard to their hermeneutical activity), see Charlesworth, Pesharim, 6-14. Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 3-4.
753 Lim, Pesharim, 52. See also Lim, Holy Scripture, 120.
755 Ibid., 77-78. Regarding our continued observations on Paul’s interpretations below, DiMattei rightly asks, “Are these not the same hermeneutical principles that govern Paul’s approach to biblical narrative…?” See also p. 88, where DiMattei—in line with what we have said at the beginning of this thesis about “contextual awareness”—observes how definitions about “meaning” and “context” should be understood to include the “contemporary” and “eschatological” place and “situation to which the text is applied” (i.e., for Paul and pesherist).
those who are in line with the covenant purposes of God. Using Scripture as the foundation, the sect’s chosen status is reinforced; they are the beneficiaries of God’s covenant favor, as opposed to those who are “cursed”—those who swerve from the Torah (line 17). It is the sect who has kept the “statutes” and “ordinances.”

Sectarianism, as a type of theological-sociological category is explicit (e.g. see lines 5-7). “The Qumranites’ interpretation of Scripture defined and shaped their ideology and categorized their Community.” But, arguably, one must take notice that the Qumranites’ ideology and Community served to shape their interpretation of Scripture as well. In this way, then, the sect’s sectarianism is operating at some level hermeneutically. For example, generally speaking, non-sectarian Jews—those being denounced by the sect—would have seen themselves as also carrying out the prescribed statues and ordinances, thus faithfully interpreting the Law. What gives the sect’s particular quotations its rhetorical voice is the fundamental prejudgement, Vorurteil, that the Torah, with its “ordinances and statues,” must be carried out according to a sectarian interpretation of the Law.

Our observations are congruent with DSS specialists. For example, looking at the use of Micah in the Community Rule, Tzoref has observed certain “exegetical modifications” in the citation of Micah that “[emphasize] community.” Tzoref says further, “The author of 1QS combines biblical allusion with self-referential linguistic modifications in order to recontextualize the verses from a specific historical setting concerning Israel as a whole, to a more general ongoing situation pertaining to his community.”

756 Charlesworth, Pesharim, 41.
757 See Bilhan Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 150-151, especially fn. 19.
758 Cf. the discussion in Ibid., 149-151.
760 Ibid., 222. Tzoref says, however, that such recontextualizations are not flippant, unchained from the original context (see e.g. 207, fn. 15; and 212). Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 41-42, on the work of F.F. Bruce and O. Betz; Lim, Holy Scripture, 95-111.
(b) Micah 2:6 in CD iv 20

That this is the case is seen, for example, in CD iv 20. This text utilizes Mic 2:6 in order to provide scriptural foundation for the identification of the sect’s enemy, Zaw. With the witness of other scriptural texts (Is 24:17; Gen 1:27), the greater context of this passage concerns judgment upon Israel. Belial, it is said, will be released against those in Israel as a judgment against their “fornication,” “wealth,” and “defilement of the Temple.” Moreover, the “builders of the wall walk after Zaw,” who is described as “the one who preaches” (line 19). In line 20, the scriptural text is introduced with אמרasher, “of whom he said.” The Mic 2:6 citation immediately follows: “They will surely preach.” Zaw might have been a “leader in the priestly establishment” or perhaps even the Man of Mockery. The exact identification is irrelevant, though it is important to observe in this case that “it is clear that the sect’s opponents are all identified in advance in the prophetic scriptures.” Indeed this is a recurring prejudgment, a hermeneutical Vorurteil, in the sectarian texts. What remains clear, then, is the sect has from the outset already assumed certain hermeneutical parameters from which they will read the prophetic texts—parameters including a pre-commitment to the idea that the prophetic text has specific contemporary relevance.

This prior notion of contemporaneity, inherent to their sectarianism, acts as an interpretive forestructure for their way of reading the texts. That sectarianism is in the background is perhaps evident from the way the text, “they will surely preach” (line 20; Mic 2:6), is applied. The plural construction “is actually a reference to a single preacher, Zaw,” an enemy of the sect who, arguably, held a prime position within the temple establishment. This unique application suggests a helpful insight: finding Zaw as the

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761 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89.
763 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89.
764 Ibid.
765 That this has a contemporary focus, see Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 30.
767 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89.
focal point of the application of the text is possible if and only if there exists some concrete and situational frame of reference from which it can emerge, namely, an already-in-place sectarian horizon of understanding.\textsuperscript{768}

\textit{(c) Malachi 1:10 in CD vi 13-14}

Line 13 cites Mal 1:10 to provide scriptural justification for not participating in the events occurring at the temple.\textsuperscript{769} Column vi begins by noting that some have falsely prophesied over Israel in order to lead them astray, but God raised other men up to help Israel regain their spiritual footing (lines 1-3). Citing a passage from the Torah, a metaphor is given about how these men “dug the well,” saying, “The well the princes dug, with a staff the nobles of the people dug” (Num 21:18; lines 3-4).\textsuperscript{770} The interpretation is given: the well is the Torah, those who dug it out are those of Israel who turned and repented (שָׁבוּ) and thus left the land of Judah and began to dwell in the land of Damascus (lines 4-5).\textsuperscript{771} With a citation from Is 54:16, the staff is said to be “the interpreter of the Torah” (line 7).\textsuperscript{772} The nobles, too, are those who have dug the well (lines 8-9).

The issue is about the sect’s exodus from the temple life and to a true keeping and interpretation of Torah.\textsuperscript{773} Thus, lines 11-14: “But all of those who have been brought into the covenant shall not enter into the temple in order to cause to light his altar in vain.” This is followed by: “They are those who cause to shut the door, of which God said, ‘Whoever among you would shut my door [...] and will not cause to light my

\textsuperscript{768} Cf. Tzoref, “Community Rule,” in Companion, 230, who says, “The author of the Community Rule rereads his biblical source texts to accommodate his own message, but he does not wreak havoc on the original sense of the text in its biblical context. He recontextualizes the scriptural terms and concepts within his own sectarian system, reworking inherited conceptions and interpretations within his interpretive framework.”

\textsuperscript{769} Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed., 90. Watson acknowledges the trouble with this understanding of the sect’s interpretation, though he rightly proceeds with it (see 90, fn. 60).


\textsuperscript{771} Cf. Ibid., 57-60.

\textsuperscript{772} See Collins, “Reading for History,” 302-303, on why the “interpreter of the Torah” here should be understood as the Teacher of Righteousness. Cf. Hempel, \textit{The Damascus Texts}, 64; Lim, \textit{Pesharim}, 75.

\textsuperscript{773} Cf. Hempel, \textit{The Damascus Texts}, 31. See Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,”
altar in vain” (Mal 1:10; lines 13-14). Those who “cause to shut the door” finds its Scriptural basis upon the “of which God said” introductory phrase. The point, it seems, is that participation in the temple is strictly prohibited for those who have left Judah—those “who have been brought into the covenant.”  

The original context of Mal 1:10, is a denouncement of those who offer poor offerings to God (Mal 1:6-14). Verse 10 specifically calls for a person to arise in order to close the doors so that sacrifices would not be offered in vain anymore. It is therefore easy to see why the sect utilized this text as support for separating themselves from the temple establishment and their works. The context of Mal 1:10 does indeed support, in terms of theological principle, a certain denouncement upon those who offer improper sacrifices which are not in strict accordance with the law. However, the citation itself, for the sect, contains little rhetorical weight in its own denouncing of the temple establishment unless a sectarian fore-structure of understanding is already at work. Once again, one can be certain that the temple establishment most certainly would have understood their teachings and practices in the temple to be in accordance with the Torah. What is assumed—and that is the key word—for the sect is that (1) the original text prophetically spoke directly to their contemporary situation and (2) that their sectarian approach to Torah is the only means by which correct interpretation is achieved.  

The passage from Mal 1:10 is not utilized merely to argue for a sectarian understanding of the Torah, but is also read from a decidedly sectarian pre-understanding. That is to say, the Mal 1:10 citation makes little sense, having no rhetorical force or weight, unless one reads it through the lens of an already-established

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The Dead Sea Scrolls, 159-160, esp. fn. 47, on observations concerning the sect’s temple theology.

774 Furthermore, the following practices, among others, are commanded as well: stay separate from “the sons of perdition” (lines 14-15); stay away from “unclean wicked wealth” (line 15); and “from the wealth of the temple” (line 16). By separating oneself from these things, one is walking in line with “the new covenant in the land of Damascus” (line 19). The fact that the “wealth of the temple” is mentioned serves to reinforce the idea of the moral opposition between the sect and its temple counterparts. Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. 90.

775 See above. Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 41-42, on F.F. Bruce and O. Betz.
sectarian commitment. Thus, one might suggest that the sect’s sectarianism operates hermeneutically.

(d) Amos 5:26-27; 9:11 in CD vii 14-15; CD vii 16

In CD vii 14-15 and 16, passages of Amos are cited in such a way to validate the sect’s departure from Jerusalem and into Damascus. The texts cited read: “As he said, ‘I will cause to remove the Sikkut of your king and the Kiyyun of your images from my tent to Damascus’ [CD vii 14-15; Amos 5:26-27].” This is followed by the “books of the Torah [ספרי התורה] are the Sukkat of the king” (lines 15b-16a). Then a scriptural citation from Am 9:11 is given: “For which is said, ‘I will cause to rise the fallen Sukkat of David’” (line 16). “A reference to the ‘star of your god’ is omitted from the quotation but included in the interpretation, in conjunction with a text from Numbers,” which according to the CD, reads: “A star travels from Jacob and a scepter rises from Israel” (Num 24:17; lines 19-20). Interpretations are then given: the king is associated with the assembly, the Kiyyune of the images are the prophetic writings, and the star is “the Interpreter of the Torah” (see lines 16-19).

776 One wonders how this might compare with Berrin’s observation regarding motive in the pesharim: “Although ‘motive’ is rarely viewed as a ‘generic factor,’ it may be the key to the most informative description of peshar. After all, the identifying form of peshar, its sectarian contemporizing eschatological content, and the conception of inspired exegesis inherent in its production are all means to a particular end. Each of these factors is essential for the maximal achievement of authorial motive: the communication of the theologically significant truth latent in the selected biblical base text” (Berrin, “Pesharim,” in Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 133; emphasis original). See also Lim, Pesharim, 52, as well as cf. comments in Lim, Holy Scripture, 111.

777 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89. See also CD vi 1-19.

778 See Florentino García Martínez and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, eds., The Dead Sea Scrolls: Study Edition, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 561 and 577, (CD vii 10-21 and CD xix 7-12, respectively), for how the oracles quoted differ between the A and B texts. (See also Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 90.)

779 See Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306.

780 On the link between the Amos 9:11 and 5:27, see Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306-307.

781 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89. The reference to “star god” is in Am 5:26.

782 See Knibb, “Eschatology and Messianism,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 387-389, on the textual and interpretive issues surrounding this text. See again Collins, “Reading for History,” 302-303, on the identity of the Interpreter as the Teacher (cf. CD vi 7). See also Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 307; Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 64, 75.
The sectarian pre-understandings are particularly evident here. For example, it seems that, in the original text, Amos 5:26-27 prescribes judgment (hence “exile” in v. 27). Those going into exile “beyond Damascus” are being sent due to sin and judgment (see Am 5:11ff). The CD, however, understands the passage as referring to them, the sect, who is sent to Damascus. The textual changes which occur between the CD and MT perhaps suggest this. 783 The conclusion reached from the sect’s reading of the text is that they are the ones who, on prophetic grounds, are “sent out” from Jerusalem into the region of Damascus. The “star”—the Interpreter of the Torah—will be sent to them as well. 784 Nothing in the original context suggests this particular reading. 785 But what does become clear is that these resultant interpretations are such because the sect, once again, reads them from a sectarian horizon of understanding. 786 Regardless as to whether these particular pre-commitments are (or are not) conducive to a proper reading of Amos, our only point is to say that pre-understandings are at work.

With the quotation of Am 9:11 (line 16), the introductory statement “as he said” (האמר אםל) serves as a scriptural support of the sect’s interpretation that the “books of

783 The CD reads “I will cause to remove the Sikkut of your king and the Kiyyun of your images from my tent to Damascus” (CD vii 14-15),” while the MT has, “And you will lift up Sikkut your king, and your images, your star god, which you have made for yourselves; and I will exile you beyond Damascus” (Am 5:26-27). The somewhat major textual differences occur between the first and last clauses of each passage. The first is that, in the CD, the first person Hifil perfect is used: “I will cause to remove” (והגליתי); in the MT, the second person Qal perfect is used: “you will lift up” (ונשאתם). Secondly, in the CD it is read that the Sikkut will be removed “from my tent to Damascus” (נ(Texture)ץאלה למקס); line 15. Cf. translation given by Martínez and Tigchelaar, 1:561), but the MT reads “beyond Damascus” (למדאכש; Am 5:27). That “Damascus” might have been a referent to Qumran, see Hempel, The Damascus Texts, (58-59) 60. See also Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 88, fn. 55; cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306.

784 See Knibb, “Eschatology and Messianism,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 387, on the grammatical ambiguity.

785 This is not to deny, however, that certain exegetical techniques might have been at work such that the sect was able to ascertain from (or give?) the biblical text certain meanings (e.g., see Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306). Putting the question of exegetical method aside, we are asking the question of hermeneutics (a distinction that is even made by Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 283). Whatever techniques and rules the pesherist might have employed, we wish to enquire into the horizon of understanding that gave rise to the pesherist’s technical approach to the biblical text. The pesherist’s decision to employ a particular method over some other one (whatever options he might have had) was in Gadamerian terms determined by his specific questions for the text at the time of reading. This is all the more true when one considers that the employment of a particular exegetical method was not always consistent (Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 354-355).

786 See again Sections 4.4 and 4.5 above.
the Torah [ספרי תורה] are the Sukkat of the king” (lines 15a-16b). These “books of the Torah” are among those things which will be carried away “to Damascus.” It is interesting that the context of Amos 9:11-15 itself, as the final portion of the entire prophetic text, concerns the promised eschatological restoration of “the captivity of my people Israel” (v.14 MT). Furthermore, the prophet speaks of this renewal as permanent, never again to be uprooted (v.15). Thus, by citing Amos 9:11, it is likely that the sect saw themselves as living in the middle (or perhaps the beginning?) of this renewal. At any rate, the sect conceived themselves as playing an integral part in the time of the renewal and restoration. And it is important to point out that Torah and Torah’s proper interpretation are no longer, according to the sect, to be found in Jerusalem but from within the sect. When compared to Paul’s discussion of Torah in Rom 2, this becomes intriguing.

\[ (e) Zechariah 13:7 in CD xix 7-9 \]

The passage from Zechariah is employed to denounce those who are unfaithful to the statutes (חק) of the covenant (lines 13-14). Leading up to the citation, CD xix 1-5 discusses (aided by a citation from the Torah) how the favor of God rests upon those who keep covenant with him (lines 1-2). Some sectarians can live in the scattered camps if they do so “according to the rule of the land” (מሲר אפרים) and thus be living “in accordance with the law” (התורה; lines 2-3 and 4, respectively). The point in this section concerns familial affairs, namely, marriage and having children—all in step with the teaching of the law (see line 3). This appears to be what the subject of covenant faithfulness to the statutes (חק) and the resulting favor of God in lines 1-2 concern. Line 5, with its citation from Num 30:17, seems to reinforce this idea. Immediately following this, a warning is given about those who “despise the commandments (מש atoi) and statutes (חק),” who will be punished as the wicked are punished (lines 5-6). This will happen “when God comes to the earth” (הארץ את אל; line 6), a fulfillment of the prophetic word: “When there comes the word which was written by the hand of

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788 Cf. lines 1-6 of this B text with CD vii 1-9 (A text).
Zechariah the prophet” (line 7). That is, punishment for covenant unfaithfulness finds its scriptural basis and assurance in what the prophet has prophesied. The prophecy says, “Wake up, sword, against my shepherd and against the man who is my associate—the utterance of God—strike the shepherd and the flock shall scatter, and I will cause to turn my hand against the insignificant ones” (lines 7-9).  

It is important to remember that the impending doom predicted in CD xix 7-9 is set in the context of those who first entered the covenant (of the sect), but who subsequently fell away from it. This is where a citation from Hos 5:10 comes into play (see below). Line 14 states that these people did not continue following the “statutes” (חק), having left the sect. Thus, the assumption is that those in the sect are, in fact, the ones who truly keep the statutes of the law. Perhaps the sect sees a correlation between those who were being denounced in the original context of Zech 13:7 (wayward, idolatrous prophets) and those who have abandoned the sect, those who “despise the commandments (מצוה) and statutes (חק) of the law (lines 5-6). Implicit, of course, in this is that the sect (i.e., the implied author) does not despise the commandments and statutes. Thus, to leave the sect is equivalent to despising the law; to remain faithful to the sect is not to despise it. Without this assumption, there exists little rhetorical force.

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789 The citation is virtually similar to the MT (see Martinus J. Menken, “Striking the Shepherd: Early Christian Versions and Interpretations of Zechariah 13,7.” Biblica 92, no. 1 (2011), 41). On the relationship between this alternate “B” text with the “A” text, as well as the hermeneutical significance it implies, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 90. See also Cook, “The Damascus Document,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 57-58.

790 The promised punishment for falling away will be the destruction that comes at Belial’s hand (line 14). Cf. the discussion of CD iv 20 above, where Belial comes as punishment because of “fornication,” which is to be seen in line with the denouncements given here in CD xix 7-9 concerning proper marriage “in accordance to the law.”

791 In the B text (CD xix 15-16) Hosea 5:10 is a “quotation”; in the A text (CD viii 3) it is an “allusion” (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 88).

792 On the difficulties surrounding the original meaning of v. 7, see George L. Klein, Zechariah, vol. 21b (NAC; Nashville: B&H, 2008), 385-391.

793 Hence the reason Zech 13:7 is quoted (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed, 90).

Two important things are noted. First, the meaning of walking “in accordance to the law” (lines 2-4) is realigned around the sect. Second, the prophecy is used in the way that it is because of this sectarian prejudgment, a necessary hermeneutical component by which the text is read and applied. The words to “strike the shepherd,” for example, can be applied to the non-sectarian because sectarianism as a prejudgment is already at play. Though, of course, the rhetorical function of the citation suggests that an argument is being made for sectarianism—namely, by the warning of impending doom. However, the prediction of scattering sheep and striking the shepherd can only have the rhetorical force it does because, from the outset, it has already been assumed that sectarianism is the proper category from which the prophetic text will be read. Thus, it can be concluded that a sectarian hermeneutic is, once again, present; this recognition allows the citation to have the rhetorical force and contemporary applicability that it does.

(f) Hosea 4:16 in CD i 13-14

The first section (col. i) of the CD concerns the judgment of God upon his people Israel, who have acted “in treachery” (במועלם) by “forsaking” their God (lines 1-3). Because of their sins, God turned his face from them and “gave them up to the sword” (line 4). One reads next that God remembered the covenant he had made with the forefathers, and so “caused to set aside a remnant for Israel and did not deliver them up to complete destruction” (lines 4-5). After acknowledging their guilt, this “remnant” is described as those who were “like blind people and as those who grope for a path” (line 9). Because of this, God “considered their deeds” and “raised up for them a Teacher of Righteousness to cause to guide them in the path of his heart” (lines 10-11). In line 12, there is the mention of “the congregation of traitors,” which line 13

795 See again Tzoref’s observations on this above.
796 Menken, “Striking the Shepherd,” 41, notes the term “shepherd” can be understood as being applied by the sect to either a “positive figure” or a “negative figure.” It is best, however, to opt for the latter. This becomes clear when the parallel passage occurring in the A text is considered, i.e., CD vii 10-21, especially line 13, where the “renegades were delivered up to the sword” (as translated in Martinez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:561). Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 86.
797 On the lack of article in “a Teacher of Righteousness,” see Lim, Pesharim, 75 (on CD i 1-11, see 75-76).
defines as, “Those who turn aside from the path.” A quotation is then given from Hos 4:16: “This is the time of which it is has been written: As a straying [שרר] heifer, so has Israel strayed [שרר]” (lines 13-14).\textsuperscript{798} This quotation was employed in connection at the time “when the Man of Mockery arose” and subsequently “caused them [Israel] to wander in chaos without path” (דָּרוֹם; lines 14-15).\textsuperscript{799} The key word דָּרוֹם in line 15 is to be connected with the same word which occurs in lines 9, 11, and 13. Here, it is recalled that Israel was described as “blind” and were those who “grope for a path (דָּרוֹם)” (line 9). Israel was subsequently given the Teacher of Righteousness “to cause to guide them in the path (דָּרוֹם) of his heart” (lines 10-11). But the “traitors” have turned “from the path (דָּרוֹם)” (line 13). And this, as was seen, was due to the Man of Mockery who led Israel “in chaos without path” (דָּרוֹם).

The following observations are relevant. First, since “the Teacher of Righteousness” was given specifically to the sect, and since Hos 4:16 was cited as the scriptural warrant for why there were those who fell away from the Teacher, following the Man of Mockery, one can sense that the hermeneutic employed in this particular reading of Hos 4:16 entailed a horizon of sectarianism.\textsuperscript{800} This is further evidenced by the assumption that to turn away from the Teacher of Righteousness (and his direction, line 11) is to remain in a state of covenant violation (lines 16-20).\textsuperscript{801} After all, not to follow the sect’s Teacher was not to be on the right path. And moreover, not to be in the sect was to be part of “wayward Israel,” as the prophetic text which was cited has spoken. This text, therefore, was cited and interpreted in the way that it was due to sectarian horizon of understanding, epitomized by the assumption of the Teacher’s own teaching authority. As already mentioned, sectarianism was not for the sect a mere theological position, but also a hermeneutical presupposition.


\textsuperscript{799} On the Man of Mockery, see Collins, “Reading for History,” 301-302; Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 65.

\textsuperscript{800} To validate this point, see Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 150-151, fn. 19. That the “congregation of traitors” is a rival group, see Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 27.
Second, this passage is cited from the assumption that it has contemporary significance to the sect in its present time. This assumption is disclosed in the introductory phrase immediately prior to the citation itself in CD i 13 that “This is the time of which it has been written...” Thus, the assumption of contemporaneity is made explicit from the outset, as the sect sees themselves as a living witness to the waywardness of non-sectarians. What, exactly, the significance of the prophetic text was for the sectarians is illumined when it is recognized that the Hosea text, originally for the purpose of addressing wayward Israel, was for the sect interpreted as being applicable to present-day Jews. Thus, a Hosea text originally meant for wayward Jews in the past was still being utilized for wayward (though non-sectarian) Jews in the present. Conversely, Paul in Rom 9:25-26 uses a Hosea text originally meant for Jews in the past as a warrant for the inclusion of Gentiles in the present. What this means of course is that there are here interpretive characteristics of both similarity and dissimilarity in each respective use, but the question—indeed, the ultimate question—is how such characteristics can even be constructed (see below).

(g) Hosea 5:10 in CD xix 15-16

This citation occurs in the same context as the one from Zechariah (above). Here it is read (lines 13-14) that “judgment” is coming “to all of those who come into his covenant, who do not cause to hold fast in these statutes (חק).” It is further read that the coming judgment is put forward in terms of “destruction at the hand of Belial” (line 14). To support this assertion, the CD cites Hos 5:10, saying that, “This [destruction at the hand of Belial] is the day when God will make a visitation, as he said, ‘The Princes of Judah will be as those who cause to change the boundary; he will pour out against

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802 That this is a “contemporary rival group,” (emphasis ours), see Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 27.
803 Recall the role of contemporaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit) in Gadamer’s thought (see above). On this, see again DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 77-78.
804 See DiMattei’s comments above (6.1a), as well as our critique of his otherwise helpful views in ch. 7 below.
805 That is, in the B text. Cf. e.g., CD vii 10-21 with CD xix 7-12 (see Martinez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:561 and 1:577, respectively).
them fury as water’” (lines 15-16). The promise of “destruction” finds warrant in the prophetic text; the introductory phrase to the citation (“as he said”) evidences this fact.

Appealing to this Scripture is useful for the sect since the context concerns how the “Princes of Judah” have committed a transgression of changing the “boundary”—preumably speaking of the Law’s “statutes” (חק) as mentioned above. This is focused exclusively upon those who, having entered into the covenant, did not subsequently remain true to its tenets: “For they entered into the covenant of repentance, but they did not depart from the path of the treacherous and have polluted themselves with the path of fornication and wealth of wickedness” (lines 16-17). This is followed by further accusations of taking vengeance in their own hands, showing resentment and hate toward brothers, and doing only what was right in their own eyes (lines 17-20). The transgressions, then, have been set in terms of moral impurity. But another facet of the accusations is the fact that, in committing the above sins, and in failing to live in moral purity, “they did not separate from the people and from their sins” (lines 20-21). This is the fullest description of the problem—that is, a failure to separate. This is described as both an act of neglect and as a “walk in the path of wicked ones” (lines 21). These acts of neglect and walking in the ways of wicked people, furthermore, find prophetic support in Deut 32:33, where it is said that, “Their wine is serpents’ venom and cruel poison of adders” (line 22). This is thus interpreted: the serpents are the kings of the peoples, the wine is said to be the paths of the kings, and the poison of the asps is said to be “the head of the kings of Greece,” who have been brought up to bring about judgment (lines 22-24). Lines 33-35 conclude col. xix by saying that “all the people who entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus

806 In the A text this is merely an “allusion,” whereas in the B text, this is an “explicit quotation” (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 88).
808 The introductory formula “against whom God has said” (אישר אמר אל עליים) evidences that the CD saw this as a prophetic insight into the problem of contemporary sectarian unfaithfulness.
and who turned and betrayed and turned aside from the well of waters of life, they shall not be counted among the assembly of the people... "

The Hosea passage is understood as a scriptural foundation for coming wrath upon those in Judah who have swerved from the covenant’s statutes. This transgression of the Law, as was shown above, was set in terms of moral impurity. And this, moreover, was set in terms of walking in the paths—in the “poison”—of the kings of the surrounding nations. The “changing” of the “boundary” is relevant to the sect as its interpretation centers upon those unfaithful Jews who have walked in the path of Gentiles. This is not against the original context per se of Hos 5. Moral purity was a major theme for the oracle. Having said that, what is involved here is more than just a correlation between the original context of adherence to the Law’s moral codes and the sects’ contemporary context which consisted of the same problem. There is, arguably, more at play, for the entire column is set in terms of a sectarian view of the Law. Lines 2-3 speak of adherence to the “rule of the land” and the “custom of the Torah,” but as was shown in the section above on the Zechariah citation, as well as the discussion in this section in lines 33-35, this particular understanding of the Torah arises only through a sectarian-centered hermeneutic—or more appropriately, a sectarian horizon of understanding. Thus, when Hos 5:10 is quoted about those who “change” the “boundary,” the underlying assumption is that this transgression is a transgression insofar as one reads it from a sectarian horizon—from the standpoint of those “who entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus” and have not “turned and betrayed and turned aside from the well of waters of life” (unlike those who did turn from it; see lines 33-34). Otherwise—and this is important—the use of Hos 5:10 would be rhetorically empty. Thus, observing the prior commitment to sectarianism in the citation helps account for the rhetorical force that is obviously present with the use of the citation itself.

811 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 61: “[The] strong scriptural influence on the community’s self-consciousness can be explained partly by their belief that they constituted the true
(h) Hosea 3:4 in CD xx 16-17

Working toward the Hosea 3:4 quotation in lines 16-17, it is first read that, those who enter the covenant, yet fail to remain steadfast, will be judged and forced out of the congregation (lines 1-3). Lines 4-12 further discuss the eviction of the unfaithful, whose deeds are shown “according to the explanation of the law (מדרש התורה) in which the men of perfect holiness walked” (lines 6-7). The unfaithful person is an outcast and the community is not to have anything to do with him, for they are cursed, being full of stubbornness and idolatry, and these have “no portion in the house of the law (בית התורה)” (lines 7-10). This judgment will be like the judgment given to those “who spoke wrongly against the righteous statutes (חק) and despised the covenant [...] and the agreement that arose in the land of Damascus—the new covenant” (lines 11-12). Again, there is no place for them in the house of the Torah (line 13). It is then read that, during the interim period of “gathering in of the unique teacher” (i.e., the death of the Teacher of Righteousness) and the end of those people who fell away, following the Man of Lies, will be a time of about forty years (lines 13-15). It is during this time that the anger of God will come upon Israel (line 16). This is followed with the phrase “as he said,” which provides the introduction for the Hos 3:4 citation: “There is not king, and there is not prince, and there is not judge, [nobod]y causes to reprove in righteousness” (lines 16-17).

This judgment contrasts with what is given in the Malachi citation (below) which states that there awaits restoration for those who repent (lines 17-21). In lines 21-25, there is a discussion about both the faithful and unfaithful. In lines 25-26, it is said that those who “have entered the covenant” and yet “break through the boundary of the law,” shall be cut off from the camp. This is contrasted with lines 27-43 and its discussion about “all those who cause to be steadfast in these ordinances” (במשפטים Israel.

812 Cf. Ibid., 32.
813 Cf. Ibid., 33 (on “Damascus,” see also 58-60; on “new covenant,” see 79-80).
These steadfast people will be rewarded with rejoicing and strength of heart, “and they will prevail over the sons of the world. And God will atone for them, and they shall see his salvation, for they took refuge in his holy name” (lines 33-34). The phrase, “All those who cause to be steadfast in these ordinances” (line 27) is linked with the infinitive-construct that immediately follows:

“All those who cause to be steadfast in these ordinances” (line 27) is linked with the infinitive-construct that immediately follows:

“to go and to come (לְבָא וְלִבְאֵל) in accordance with the law, and listen to the Teacher’s voice, and confess before God: ‘We have surely sinned, both we and also our fathers, to walk in hostility to the statutes of the covenant. Righteous and true are your judgments against us’; and do not cause to raise their hands against his holy statutes and his righteous ordinances and true testimonies; and they are left over to the first ordinances, with which the men of the Unique One were judged; and they caused to listen to the voice of the Teacher of Righteousness; and do not reject the righteous statutes when they hear them” (lines 27-33).815

Significantly, Torah observance for the sect is described in many ways, not least in adherence to the voice of the Teacher of Righteousness. The infinitive-constructs לְבָא וְלִבְאֵל are to be seen as descriptive of, and a result and consequence to, what it means to be “steadfast.”816 Moreover, what follows the infinitive-constructs (and the phrase they introduce) is a further description of what it means to be “steadfast”—namely, “and listen to the Teacher’s voice (line 28; cf. line 32).”817 Thus, the test for faithfulness to the covenant is not simply “to go and to come in accordance with the Law” but it is also measured by one’s adherence to the “Teacher’s voice.” In other words, true steadfastness to the ordinances is, among other things,818 a coupling of Torah observance with falling under the Teacher’s interpretive authority.819 Here, it is

815 See Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 33, on the MS issue here.

816 Ronald J. Williams, Hebrew Syntax: An Outline, 2nd ed. (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 36. Williams notes that, with the לְ, infinitive-constructs can be translated with a “thus... -ing”; this would better bring out the sense of “consequence,” as is to be seen here in line 27. Cf. the translation, “But all those who remain steadfast in these regulations, [co]ming and going in accordance with the law...”given by Martínez and Tignelara, DSS, 1:580–581. Cf. also how the infinitive-construct functions in line 29, where the CD says, “We have surely sinned, both we and also our fathers, to walk (벌כתנו) in hostility to the statutes of the covenant.” Here, the infinitive-construct serves to elaborate on the phrase “we have surely sinned.” It serves an explanatory role, such that what counts as “sin” is the resultant “walking in hostility to the statutes of the covenant.”

817 “Further description” because of the conjunction ו which serves to connect the infinitive-constructs with what follows.

818 E.g., confession of sin in lines 28-30.

explicit that, *faithfulness* to Torah and covenant is understood through the pre-understanding of a sectarian was of life.\textsuperscript{820} The text of Hos 3:4 in lines 16-17 demonstrates this thesis. First, when looking at the original context, Hosea 3:4 concerns judgment and 3:5 speaks of eschatological hope.\textsuperscript{821} Though it is not quoted, it is not unreasonable to assume that the context of v. 5 would also have had been in view with the quotation of v. 4. There is warrant for this idea, since lines 33-34 do have an eschatological ring to them.\textsuperscript{822} The quotation in line 16 of Hos 3:4 is a time of “interim wrath”—a time between “the gathering in of the unique teacher” and a time of “the end of all the men of war who turned back with the man of lies.” Thus, the sect utilizes the original context of v. 4, namely, that there will be political chaos, until the designated end. While finding common ground with the text of Hosea in that eschatology is in view in both places, the sect is interpreting it—in a way that includes both explanation and application—from a decidedly *sectarian* horizon of understanding. For example, who will see the coming “salvation” of God (line 34)? Who will reap the eschatological benefits (Hos 3:5)? For the sect, the interim judgment spoken about in the quotation of Hos 3:4 is seen to be “against Israel” (line 16), but those who will see salvation are the “steadfast,” which as we described in detail above, are those who adhere to the voice of the sect’s interpretive authority, the Teacher (line 28)—in other words, those who are members of the sect. The interpretation of Hos 3:4 proceeds from a sectarian vantage point. Hos 3:4, and the key themes involving that text, are informed by a sectarian fore-structure of understanding.

Second, at some level, it could be surmised that the sect saw a correlation between the unfaithfulness of Israel and Gomer in Hosea’s time and Israel with the


\textsuperscript{821} See Dearman, *Hosea*, 136–139. Dearman says, “In the typology of representation [i.e., Hosea’s wayward wife in 3:1 represents the wayward nation of Israel], Israel is separated from God as a result of its sinfulness and will be restored after a period of judgment and purification. As a consequence, it will exist for a time without the political status of a sovereign people. This is a form of self-incurred punishment that functions also as a period of purification. \textit{Afterward}, a return to the Lord is anticipated, at a time described as \textit{the latter days} (‘aḥārit hayyāmim). Whatever the phrase indicated about Hosea’s concept of eschatology, the quality of life depicted in 3:5 is similar to that expressed in Deut. 4:29-30, where the failure of Israel and its subsequent exile are anticipated as a painful prelude to a future return to the Lord” (139).

\textsuperscript{822} E.g., “salvation” is coming to the faithful; cf. also line 1.
temple-establishment of their own time. Thus, the objects of the sect’s judgment find their conceptual continuity, comprised of the theme of unfaithfulness, with wayward Israel/Gomer of Hosea’s context. But this does not answer the fundamental hermeneutical question; it merely pushes it back one step further. One must ask what gives rhetorical force to this conceptual continuity and what, for the writer of the CD, constituted unfaithfulness? It has already been shown above that unfaithfulness to the statutes and the Law was set in terms of non-sectarianism. That is, to be unloyal to the Teacher was to be unfaithful to the ordinances of the Law (e.g., see the discussion on Hosea 5:10 in CD xix 15-16 above). Thus, the most basic pre-understanding at work is that non-sectarians, in not heeding the authoritative, interpretive voice of the Teacher, are unfaithful like Gomer, and like the Israel of Hosea’s time, there will be an interim time of political upheaval for the Israel of their time before the end. In this way, the historical-distanced gap between Hosea’s text and the sect’s reading of it is bridged. Thus, the dialogue between both horizons—of text and interpreter—is on some level mediated by a received tradition of a sectarian way of life and therefore meaning, for them, is achieved. These interpretations serve to validate the sect’s sectarian way of life, which served to provide footing for their interpretations. When compared to how Paul understands Torah observance and covenant fulfillment in Rom 2, key similarities (and dissimilarities) emerge: Paul, likewise, understands Torah observance and fulfillment, though in his own unique way and from his own unique horizon.

(i) Mal 3:16, 18 in CD xx 17, 20

The Malachi quotations appear within the same section as the Hos 3:4 quotation above. In lines 15-16, an interim time of judgment was noted. Immediately following the Hos 3:4 citation, lines 16-17 states, “But those who turn from the transgression of

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823 Perhaps this is evident by the mention of fornication, et al., in previously analyzed passages (e.g., CD iv 17; xix 17).
824 So Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 278, who likewise speaks of the sect’s and the NT’s similar “creative” use of Scripture to “legitimate the novel beliefs of a community.” We would, however, caution those who would want to say that, for the sect and (not least!) Paul, what typified their interpretive activity was a mere one-sided endeavor. We prefer to speak of interpretation as dialogical given the assumption of prejudgments in the interpretive acts (see ch. 7 below).
Jacob have kept the covenant of God” (line 17). There are small references to Mal 3:16 sprinkled throughout, which mention how, upon turning from the sin of Jacob,

*They shall then speak,* each man to his friend, causing himself to act righteously with his brother in order to support their steps in the way of God, and God will cause to attend to their words. And he will listen. And it will be written in the scroll of remembrance [before him], to those who fear God and take into account his name, until salvation and judgment is revealed to those who fear God (lines 17-20).  

Immediately following this is the quotation from Mal 3:18: “And he shall again distinguish between [lit., “restore sight between’”] the righteous and the wicked, between he who honors God and he who does not honor him.”  

This citation should be seen as the eschatological reversal of the Hos 3:4 quotation. Whereas the latter spoke of judgment in causing the political forces to cease to be able to discern justice, the former promises that, for those who fear God, the political upheaval will be overturned.

Hence, the Malachi quotations concern a restoration. The original context of the prophetic text speaks about the coming “refiner” who would help bring about a restoration of the sacrificial system (Mal 3:1-4). This is followed by promised judgments upon those who commit various injustices (3:5). The subsequent divine charge against the “sons of Jacob,” who have robbed God” is then given (3:6-12) along with a lament at the prosperity of the wicked (3:13-15). Verses 16-18 record that the people of God came together, to whom God is said to have given them his attention, and promises to make those who fear him his “treasured possession,” his sons.

Thus, given the original context of Mal 3-4, it is not surprising why the sect would have desired to use this particular oracle. But what was the point of the sect’s use of it? It was argued that, in light of our investigations into this section of CD xx (see above), the answer to that question concerned covenant faithfulness. And this faithfulness was interpreted in light of (among other things) loyalty to the Teacher of Righteousness—in other words, sectarianism. It should be assumed that, in light of all that has been observed in the Hos 3:4 citations above, the promised restoration

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825 Italicized portions indicate the phrases incorporated from Mal 3:16. The phrases from the CD are virtually similar to that of what is recorded in the MT. See also Hempel, *The Damascus Texts*, 33.

826 This, again, is virtually similar to what is given in the MT.
described here via Mal 3:16, 18 is in terms of an implied sectarian covenant faithfulness as well. Moreover, this leads one to see for the sect a link between righteousness and faithfulness language, not least in terms of covenant. Moreover, if the Hos 3:4 citation was used to argue for judgment against those who refused the sectarian teachings, then the Mal 3:16, 18 citations are to be seen as arguing for the restoration of those who have accepted them. It is, after all, the sect—those who live by “going and coming in accordance with the law, and listen to the Teacher’s voice, and confess before God” (lines 27-28)—who will rejoice and see the salvation of God (lines 33-34). These texts are utilized precisely the way they are because it has already been assumed that they speak of the sect’s own contemporary situation. Thus, the verses from Malachi, contextually linked with the Hosea quotation, is also interpreted and applied in light of a sectarian pre-understanding.

(j) Micah Pesher – 1Q14

This pesher draws out a polemic against the adversary of the “Teacher of Righteousness” (רמא המורה; 1Q14 f.viii-x 6). The references to “Judah” and “Jerusalem” (both found in Mic 1:5) are directly interpreted by the pesherist as “the Teacher of Righteousness” (רמא המורה) (1Q14 f.viii-x 5-6). The Teacher is the one who “[teaches the law to] his [council] and to all those who freely join the chosen of [God, doing the law] in the council of the community,” and it is read further that it is this community who will be saved from the judgment (1Q14 f.viii-x 7-9).

830 Ibid., 94.
831 Cf. Horgan, *Pesharim*, 57, 61, and Abegg, Jr., *QSM*, 1Q14 f.viii-x 7-9, on the reconstruction (Horgan has lines 5-7); Lim, *Pesharim*, 30-31. See also Martinez and Tigchelaar,
By glossing “Judah” and “Jerusalem” as the Teacher of Righteousness, the pesherist reveals his own sectarian prejudgments as coming to bear upon the text. Moreover, those who “join” this “chosen” group are the beneficiaries of the Teacher’s instruction concerning the Law, and what characterizes this community is that its members practice “doing the law.” Thus, law-keeping and communal membership are linked. As a polemic to the Teacher’s adversary, this pesher regards its own community as the true community and therefore safe from judgment (1Q14 f.viii-x 7-9). For the pesherist, as opposed to physical Jerusalem, the true “Jerusalem” spoken about in the Micah text is centralized upon the sect’s Teacher. This is because the Teacher offers to the community a true teaching of the Torah. It is therefore the sect who does the law, which is to be seen as the opposite result of what the “preacher of lies” has taught, for he is the one “[who has caused the] simple [to err]” (1Q14 f.viii-x 5). For the pesherist, observing law is in the specific context of the Teacher’s own community. The original text has been interpreted in light of its sectarian convictions in order to proclaim the community’s legitimacy.832

Here in the Micah pesher, the interpretation of Judah and Jerusalem as being the Teacher of Righteousness, the sectarian leader, ought to be understood as the result of sectarian prejudice.833 The pesherist’s own sectarian horizon, in dialogue with the original text, guides his own understanding of Micah, thus consequently finding the verse’s application in his own concrete situation and time.834 In Gadamerian language, the judgment that “Judah and Jerusalem” refer to the “Teacher” is what it was because of certain sectarian prejudices brought to the text, which were shaped and formed by the pesherist’s own horizon—a horizon comprised of, broadly speaking, a dispute with the Temple establishment. “Doing the law” is, therefore, in the context of these prejudgments. This is not unlike Paul’s own use of the phrase, albeit under the guide of

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832 Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 275-276, has observed the same thing regarding the “function” of the pesher texts.
833 Cf. again Tzoref’s comments above.
834 See Collins, “Reading for History,” 306.
differing prejudgments. For him, “doing the law” is also interpreted from within the specific context of a certain community: the Christ-believing community.\textsuperscript{835}

\textit{(k) Habakkuk Pesher – 1QpHab}\textsuperscript{836}

In 1QpHab i 16, there is a quotation of Hab 1:5: “[Look, traitors, and behold; ראו בונים והбитו .]”\textsuperscript{837} This quotation diverges from the MT, which reads: “Look among the nations and see.” One can be certain that the textual issue is not with the reconstruction of the Habakkuk pesher.\textsuperscript{838} The textual concern might be solved by seeing the commentator’s quotation as being the result of a necessary reliance upon the LXX’s Hebrew \textit{Vorlage} (LXX: ἰδεῖτε, οἱ καταφρονηταί, καὶ ἐπιβλέψατε), though there is evidence to suggest that this reliance was not compulsory since the \textit{Vorlage} was not the only text he had available to him.\textsuperscript{839} Therefore, the pesherist’s failure to use the phrase “among the nations” appears to have been deliberate.\textsuperscript{840} Watson is convinced that what is in view here is the “suppression of the universal dimension of the prophet’s message.”\textsuperscript{841} This particular quotation will be revisited below in further detail, but suffice it to say presently that this, arguably, is yet another example of a sectarian hermeneutic on the part of the commentator.\textsuperscript{842} Indeed, for the pesherist, this prior commitment remains integral, for in addition to being a theological and sociological category, sectarianism functions \textit{hermeneutically}.\textsuperscript{843} This thesis is further

\begin{footnotes}
\item[836] Lim, \textit{Pesharim}, 33-35, offers a helpful outline of the structure of this pesher.
\item[837] This is the text and translation given by Martínez and Tigchelaar, \textit{DSS}, 1:10–11.
\item[838] Horgan, \textit{Pesharim}, 23.
\item[839] Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 113. Watson says, “the proto-Masoretic reading may also have been available to him, since it is present in the Minor Prophets manuscript from Wadi Maraba ’at (Minor Prophets [Mur 88] xviii.3). Elsewhere, the commentator reveals the influence of a proto-Masoretic reading even where his own \textit{Vorlage} diverges from it (cf. 1QpHab xi.8-14%).”
\item[840] Ibid. Watson continues, “It may therefore be more than an accident of textual transmission that neither his text nor his comment refers to a work of God ‘among the nations.’”
\item[841] Ibid.
\item[842] Cf. Brooke, “Reading the Plain Meaning,” \textit{Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible}, 87-88. See also Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273-274.
\item[843] Cf. Berrin, “Pesharim,” \textit{Biblical Interpretation at Qumran}, 122: “A theologically distinctive, historical, and specifically eschatological \textit{application of the base text} is certainly [an]
evidenced by 1QpHab xii 2-6, where an interpretation is given of Hab 2:17. Here, the prophet bemoans “the violence done to Lebanon,” as well as the “devastation of the beasts/animals.” The pesherist interprets “Lebanon” as “the council of the Community” and reads “animals” as “the simple people of Judah, those who do the law” (1QpHab xii 3-5).

Overall, the pesharim differs from a straightforward understanding of the prophetic text, which states that the victims of violence are the surrounding nations/Gentiles (כל-הגוים, “all nations/all peoples,” Hab 2:5; רבים גוים “many nations,” 2:8a).

Thus, the passage is given a sectarian spin by the pesherist. In this instance, the pesherist excludes the Gentiles from being understood as victims—substituting themselves as the group to be pitied. Moreover, the commentator’s hermeneutical move is such that the ones doing violence are not a surrounding pagan nation (such as Babylon for Habakuk), but rather the Wicked Priest, “the main object of the denunciations” (1QpHab xii 2). Along with this, the pesherist understands the reference in Hab 2:17c-d (where “from blood of the city and violence to the land” is mentioned [1QpHab xii 6-7]) as a reference to Jerusalem, the place where “the ^Wicked^ Priest did acts of abomination” (1QpHab xii 7-8).

These are examples of how, instead of the polemic being centered on a pagan nation (as in the original context), the interpretation renders the non-sectarian Jew, i.e., the Wicked Priest, guilty and responsible for the coming judgments. Whatever this might mean, the important thing to recognize is that these substitutions of Babylon for the Wicked Priest reveal a hermeneutic of sectarianism. That is, the Habakkuk text is read from a sectarian horizon of understanding. The prophetic text is interpreted in light of the contemporary concerns of the community, finding its meaning in the precise

essential [feature of pesharim].” Emphasis original. On Berrin’s thoughts on the “eschatological content of pesher... reflecting basic sectarian tenents” (117), see below.


Ibid.

Ibid.

application within the concrete situation of the pesherist. Thus, an attempt at fusion was attained when the horizon of the text encountered the horizon of the reader.

This thesis gains additional warrant when the commentary on Hab 2:14 is considered. Here it is cited that “the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the glory of YHWH like the waters cover the sea” and is taken by the pesherist to mean that the “knowledge” in question will be abundant for the sect themselves and is not interpreted as having a global dimension in the literal sense, as the original oracle foretold. For the commentator, the knowledge in question has more to do with the volume of knowledge given to the sect, not the scope of such knowledge given to non-sectarian outsiders (1QpHab x 14 – xi 2). Since this has been interpreted “in terms of the knowledge attained by the sect... the universal scope of the prophetic text is again eliminated from the interpretation.” These interpretive glosses are telling, for, as Watson has observed, the pesherist does not shy away from understanding the universal scope of judgment upon the Gentiles in the commentaries given in 1QpHab xii 12-14 and 1QpHab xii 17 – xiii 4. Here the judgment pronounced was a promised destruction upon every idolater, and they will be destroyed “from the earth” (1QpHab xiii 3-4). Building upon these observations, one can conclude that the inconsistency of limiting the universal scope of God’s knowledge to the nations, and filling up “the earth” with it (and everything that entails), yet all the while allowing a universal scope of God’s judgment upon the nations, driving them from “the earth,”

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849 Cf. Edward Cook, “A Commentary on Habakkuk (1QpHab)” in The Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation, 115. See also Section 4.7 above.

850 Does this mean legitimate fusion occurred? The answer to that question is inconsequential, for we are only wanting to describe the hermeneutical situation. However, the answer can only be found not in interrogating the particular resultant judgments, but rather in the pre-judgments. At any rate, sectarianism remains a clear hermeneutical approach.


852 This occurs in the context of denouncement of non-sectarians (see Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 151, fn. 20.)


854 Ibid., 113-114.
seems to have been due to deliberate exegetical decisions on the part of the pesherist. Part of the reason for these interpretive moves is due to a hermeneutical pre-commitment to sectarianism, as we have argued throughout.\textsuperscript{855}

At the beginning of this discussion on the Habakkuk pesher, i.e., 1QpHab i 16, the textual substitution of “the traitors” in place of “among the nations” was discussed. Revisiting this, it was remarked that the commentator was interpreting the quotation from a sectarian prior commitment. The pesherist does not leave the reader in the dark as to who these “traitors” are. He says they are those who became “traitors with the Man of Lies” (המשיח עם איש המבול; 1QpHab ii 1-2). The conjunction כי, which serves to link this phrase to what follows it, functions in a causal way.\textsuperscript{856} Thus, specifically they are “traitors with the Man of Lies, because [וכ] [they did] not [believe in the words of] ^the^ Teacher of Righteousness from the mouth of God” (1QpHab ii 2-3).\textsuperscript{857} Therefore, unbelief in the Teacher makes up the first reason why they are deemed “traitors.” They are traitors, secondly, because they failed to believe in the new covenant and failed to honor God’s name: “and it concerns the traito[rs of the] new [covenant] b[e]c[a]us[e [וכ] they did not believe in the covenant of God [and began to profane] his holy name” (1QpHab ii 3-4). Belief in the Teacher and in the New Covenant seem, then, to be intertwined. Furthermore, the traitors are described as “violator[s of the coven]ant, who will not believe when they hear everything that will com[e to pass t]o […] the last generation from the mouth of the Priest whom God has placed with[in the commun]ity”

\textsuperscript{855} Cf. Watson, who says, “The association between faith, the Torah and the elect community makes the Pauline emphasis on faith’s universal scope quite inconceivable for the Qumran commentator” (\textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 114). One might very well add that the same “association” between these three things also makes the universal scope of Paul’s concept of faith possible, given that the essence of his own “elect community” is redefined around Christ. Hence, prejudices are operative in both the pesherist and Paul. (Cf. what Watson says about the similarity of “eschatological interpretation” being focused for both pesherist and Paul around a “singular figure,” as well as his comments about an “oppositional ethos” in \textit{Hermeneutics}, 114.)

\textsuperscript{856} See Williams, \textit{Hebrew Syntax}, 72, 89.

\textsuperscript{857} See Horgan, \textit{Pesharim}, 24, who argues briefly, though convincingly, for this reconstruction. Cf. Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 110-111. Like Watson, we have included “in” in the above translation (110; cf. Horgan, \textit{Pesharim}, 13, 24). See Lim, \textit{Pesharim}, 76, on the Teacher’s assumption of a “prophetic tradition” via his prime “hermeneutical role.”
The Priest, we are told, is the interpretive agent for the prophetic words (1QpHab ii 8-10). Thus,

If the traitors will not believe God’s work when it is told, this suggests that God’s work is announced in advance. Although that announcement initially takes place through the prophets, the prophets require an interpreter: and God has provided such an interpreter, in the figure of the “Priest” who is also the Teacher of Righteousness.

For the moment, the point to be taken from this passage is that the pesherist has labeled a certain group of people “traitors” for colluding with the “Man of Lies.” This colluding is set in terms of covenant violations, which itself is linked with failure to have faith in what was spoken on behalf of God through the Teacher of Righteousness. Since the Teacher/Priest is the interpretive agent of the prophetic words, and since violators of the covenant are such because they have failed to believe in him, they will not believe that which is to come to pass on the “last generation” (1QpHab ii 6-8). What is evident is that a sectarian hermeneutic is at play. Indeed, Collins is right to observe that the interpretive activity in the pesharim “presuppose a body of information about the figures mentioned that is correlated with the prophetic text but not derived from it.” Commenting on this pesher, he continues:

...the interpretation cannot be derived from the text. The interpretation presupposes that the Man of the Lie and Teacher are known figures and that the designation “traitors” can be plausibly referred to the Man of the Lie and his followers. The pêšer correlates the prophetic text with the otherwise known history of the community, using the words “traitors” and “believe” as catchwords.

Thus, the pesherist’s presupposition was the interpretive authority of the Teacher. This sectarian precommitment was integral. The repeated emphasis upon the idea of “traitors” and covenant violations brings to the forefront a rather important feature of the pesherist’s hermeneutical activity: The commentator interprets the texts from a

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858 See Ibid., 25-26, regarding the reconstruction. Though it does not effect this study one way or the other, we have chosen to follow the reconstruction given in Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:12-13; See also Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 108.
861 Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273. It is to be cautioned, however, to suggest that the text plays no role; though Collins’ point stands.
862 Ibid., 274. Emphasis original.
863 Cf. Lim, Pesharim, 52.
sectarian pre-commitment and Vorstruktur des Verstehens. Significantly for our purposes, moreover, this is set in terms of keeping covenant. That is, the covenant is not violated when the Teacher’s interpretive authority is realized. The central hermeneutical issue revolves around Torah-keeping from a particular sectarian angle. This fact is brought to light when 1QpHab vii 1-2 is examined presently.

1QpHab vii 1-2 is eschatologically oriented, and lines 3-4 signal that the prophetic writings were for a latter interpreter, namely, the sect’s own Teacher of Righteousness. Moreover, it is read that the pesherist interprets the Habakkuk prophecy/vision as meaning “the final age will be prolonged and go beyond everything that which the prophets speak” (1QpHab vii 7-8). The prophetic encouragement to “wait” for the culmination of the final age (Hab 2:3b) is interpreted by the pesherist as referring to “the men of truth” (משרדי לאחר האמת; 1QpHab vii 10). Specifically, these “men of truth,” i.e., those who are patiently waiting for the end, are such because they are “those who do the Torah” (ﬠוושי התורה; line 11). Furthermore, the pesherist sees “those who do the Torah” as “the men of truth” because, as those who patiently “do the Torah,” they are those “whose hands do not falter from the service of the truth when the final age is stretched out beyond them” (lines 11-12). Indeed, “Torah” is for the pesherist kept only through a sectarian way of life. After all, in the original Habakkuk prophecy, Torah keeping is not mentioned in the immediate context as a characteristic of what it meant to wait for the fulfillment of the vision. This insertion, then, ought to be seen as a sort of interpretive gloss. It sheds light on what it means to “believe in the covenant” and in the Teacher (see 1QpHab ii 2-4). Law keeping for the pesherist is understood in light of a sectarian horizon of understanding, being centered around the Teacher of Righteousness. This becomes clear in the following.

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864 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 104-105. See also Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 268; Lim, Pesharim, 52.
865 Ibid., 112, observes this insertion too. Our emphasis, though, is that the reference to law-keeping here is interpreted in a sectarian manner (see below).
866 This is potentially significant when this fact is compared to Rom 2, as Paul understood “doers of the law” in his own unique way. Paul, too, understood law-keeping in light of a specific horizon.
The quotation of Hab 2:4b in 1QpHab vii 17 and its subsequent interpretation in viii 1-3a is most intriguing, especially so because Paul quotes this passage in Rom 1:17. For the pesherist, Hab 2:4b, “The righteous one, by his faithfulness, will live,” is interpreted as:

“Everyone who does the Torah [תורה עושי כולם] in the house of Judah, whom God will cause to free from the house of judgment because of their labor [عملם] and faithfulness [אמנתם] to the Teacher of Righteousness [הצדק במורה]” (1QpHab viii 1-3a).

Here righteousness language is clearly set in terms of doing the Torah. Again, however, nothing in the prophetic text itself (i.e., within the immediate context) mentions explicitly “doing the law.” The commentator seeks, however, to insert into his interpretation a Torah-centeredness. The pesherist, moreover, says that “the righteous one will live” in not just “doing the law” but also by remaining faithful to the Teacher of Righteousness (lines 2-3). Watson sees this interpretation as being a “fundamental soteriological statement”:

Here, the “righteous one” [צדיק] of the text is identified not with the Teacher himself (as in the comments on Habakkuk 1.4, 13) but with “all who observe the law in the house of Judah”. The “life” that is promised to the righteous consists in the divine deliverance “from the house of judgment”, and the faith which secures this outcome is oriented towards the Teacher of Righteousness. The order in which the three elements of the lemma are treated has the effect of placing still greater emphasis on “by his faith,” understood soteriologically as the means of escape from “the house of judgment” into “life”. For the pesherist as for Paul, Habakkuk 2.4b represents a fundamental soteriological statement in which the entire basis of a particular form of communal existence is summed up.

There is little doubt that soteriology is in view for both Paul and the pesherist. However, there is more to say, especially in comparison to Paul. First, on this issue and

867 See again Section 5.4 above.
870 Though “law” is mentioned in Hab 1:4 (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 112).
871 See again the similar observations by Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 112.
872 For a helpful caution on how to understand “faith in” the Teacher of Righteousness, see Charlesworth, Pesharim, 89. See also Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 605-606. (Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 110-111; Horgan, Pesharim, 17, 40.) See also Lim, Pesharim, 76 (and 85, where he likewise notices the significance of the Teacher’s hermeneutical authority).
in distinction to Watson, Fitzmyer is correct to note one helpful distinction between Paul and the pesherist’s understanding of Hab 2:4, namely, that “‘life’ for Paul means not just deliverance from the oppression of invaders (as in Habakkuk) or a rescue ‘from the house of judgment’ (as in the Qumran commentary), but ‘life in Christ Jesus,’ a share in the risen life of Christ (see Rom 6:4b).”874 Secondly, in highlighting the soteriological features of the commentary, one is also obliged to highlight the communal, i.e., sectarian, features. Watson of course does this, though, as seen so far in this study on the Pesharim, there is a strong sectarian fore-structure of understanding at play in those texts that undergird the interpretive activity—not least the interpretations of soteriologically-charged texts such as the one above. As will be seen in our investigation into Paul (see below), this is also largely true of him. One might say, then, that the soteriological features appear dependent, at least hermeneutically, upon the sectarian ones. After all, the interpretation of “the righteous one, by his faithfulness, will live” for the pesherist “concerns everyone who does the Torah in the house of Judah,” and it is that group who will be delivered by God from judgment (1QpHab viii 1-2).

The fact is that this text for the pesherist is not universalized, as was observed above, and expanded to the Gentiles, but is restricted only for “the house of Judah,”875 and the “righteous one” is not righteous only in “doing the law” but also in his faithfulness to the Teacher of Righteousness” (lines 1-3)—a sectarian claim if there ever was one. “Doing the law” and “righteousness” are mutually defining not just in terms of soteriological claims, but also in terms of how sectarian prejudices have come to bear upon them.876 In this manner righteousness language and law-keeping are intertwined.

873 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 110.
874 Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 606 (see also fn. 14).
876 Watson, Ibid., acknowledges that the pesherist understands the “righteous” in the Hab 2:4 text as referring only to “the minority within Israel who observe the law and believe in the Teacher,” and as a result, "minimizes every indication of universal concern in the Scriptural text." Watson comes very close to understanding sectarianism at play hermeneutically, yet one should bring it to a higher prominence. The issue is that Watson sees that “for Paul, the divine saving action is the comprehensive context both of ‘christology’ and of ‘ecclesiology.’ Christology and ecclesiology speak of different aspects of the many-sided and comprehensive saving event in which
It must be said that, in relation to Paul, there is similarity and disimilarity. On the former, both the pesherist and Paul understand law-keeping and righteousness as linked (e.g. Rom 2:13-15). On the latter, Paul’s reading is christological (Rom 2:16), that is, centered around the revelation of Jesus (see Section 6.2 below). On this, Moyise’s comments are helpful. It is true in one sense that the pesherist’s focus on law in his exegesis of Hab 2:4 is “precisely what Paul is intending to eliminate” in his own reading. And it is also certainly true, as Moyise points out as well, that this is due to differing "prior convictions." While both of these observations are somewhat true, it is perhaps not accurate to speak of Paul’s prior conviction as the negation of law as the basic prior conviction itself. Moyise comments that “it is difficult to imagine any circumstances where Paul would have interpreted the verse as applying to ‘those who observe the law in the house of Judah.’ It must therefore be due to their very different prior convictions.” If our exegesis of Rom 2:13-15 above is correct (as well as the exegesis of chs. 3-4 below), then Paul, like the pesherist, also understands righteousness as being intertwined with law-keeping, howbeit in a different sense. The point is that what constitutes hermeneutical differences between Paul and the pesherist is not the prior conviction of the insertion or absence of law, but rather the prior conviction of the manner in which law is fulfilled—for Paul, it is through Christ. Thus, Paul does not in one sense see law and the revelation of Christ as compatible (e.g. Rom 3:21a), yet in another sense this is not to be taken as a negation of the law’s being fulfilled and completed through Christ (e.g. Rom 2:13-16, 25-29; 10:4). Paul’s radical claim, then, is

the cosmos finds itself ‘invaded’ by God (J.L. Martyn). In that sense, Paul’s exegesis is determined by his soteriology” (17; emphasis original). One possible reason why Watson does not bring to the forefront the significance of a sectarian hermeneutic in his analysis of the pesharim is because, perhaps, he has chosen from the outset to subsume ecclesiology under God’s saving action. This is not to say that Watson has no room for ecclesiology; he does. But it is not as hermeneutically significant for him as perhaps it could be. For him, the assumption is that ecclesiology and Christology are subsumed under soteriology—that is, God’s saving activity is prior to each: “If, for Paul, the church is ‘the community of people who confess that Jesus Christ is Lord’ [Hays, Echoes, 86], it is also the community created by the exaltation of Jesus Christ as Lord. This exaltation occurs by way of Jesus’ death and resurrection, the culmination of a life that embodies God’s reconciling action on behalf of the entire world” (17; emphasis original).

878 Ibid.
879 Ibid.
really the fact of Christology.\textsuperscript{880} What this means, though, is that his hermeneutic is just as sectarian.

Furthermore, in terms of righteousness for the pesherist, faithfulness to the Teacher is paramount because he is the hermeneutical authority concerning the prophetic texts, placing them a level lower in status to the Teacher (hermeneutically speaking). It is worth quoting at length Watson’s remarks on 1QpHab vii 1-5:

Under divine inspiration, the prophet writes of the end-time, but he does not understand what he writes. This leads directly into the following comment on v.2b: the prophet is told to ‘write the vision...so that its reader may run,’ and the pesherist explains that the latter phrase ‘concerns the Teacher of righteousness, to whom God has made known all the mysteries of the words of his servants the prophets (1QpHab vii.3-5). The two comments on Habakkuk 2.2 exploit the contrast in the text between the writer and the reader, and the implication that what is written is written for the sake of the reader. Thus the contrast between the writer (Habakkuk) and the reader (the Teacher of Righteousness) is also a contrast between one to whom God did not make known the appointed end and one to whom God did make known all the secrets of that end. The Teacher knows more than the prophet because the Teacher has been given full understanding of the prophet’s divinely inspired words, whereas the prophet himself has not. When Habakkuk writes of the \textit{Kasdim} (the Babylonians), he is unaware that he is really writing about the \textit{Kittim} (the Romans). Only the Teacher knows that, for, in inspiring the prophet, God had the Teacher in mind as its primary addressee. The same is true, indeed, of all the prophetic texts. Habakkuk’s subordination to his divinely authorized reader establishes the model for all other prophetic writers, for God has made known to this reader ‘all the mysteries of the words of his servants the prophets’ (vii. 4-5)...\textit{Habakkuk’s commission to write for the reader’s sake serves to validate the sect’s most fundamental hermeneutical decision}.

Thus, the eschatological ministry of the Teacher serves to play a hermeneutical role in the subsequent use and application of the prophetic texts.\textsuperscript{882} The interpretive authority afforded to the Teacher (1QpHab vii 3-5) serves to be the key to unlocking the interpretive decisions that are made with the text itself. In this way, the meaning of

\textsuperscript{880} How this works out in terms of Paul’s reading of Scripture, see the conclusions in ch. 7 below. Cf. the last paragraph in Moyise, \textit{Evoking Scripture}, 62.


scriptural texts, as well as the motifs within them (e.g. “doing the law”), become what they are for the sect because of their sectarian horizon of understanding.

The pesharim given in 1QpHab xi is also intriguing. First, the prophetic text begins by interpreting Hab 2:15, where the prophet denounces the Chaldeans, saying, “Woe to him who causes his companions to drink. Indeed, causing to pour out his wrath, making drunk in order to look into their festivals!” (lines 2-3). This is interpreted by the pesherist as a reference to when the Wicked Priest “pursued after the Teacher of Righteousness to swallow him up with the heat of his anger in the house of exile,” and this was “at the time of the festival, at the rest of the day of the atonement, he caused himself to appear to them in order to destroy them and to cause them to stumble in the day of fasting, the Sabbath of their rest” (1QpHab xi 4-8). Citing Hab 2:16, the Wicked Priest is again taken as the object of God’s wrath by the pesherist in lines 8b-17. The reason given for the Wicked Priest’s judgment is “because he did not circumcise the foreskin of his heart and has proceeded to walk in ways of abundance in order to take away the thirsty” (lines 13-14a).

What is of immediate interest is how the Wicked Priest did not “circumcise the foreskin of his heart.” This could be an allusion to Deuteronomy, and is pertinent to our discussion because Paul himself makes a similar reference in Rom 2:25-29. In the original context, the prophet was speaking to the Chaldeans, the Gentiles. Yet, the pesherist applies this to the Wicked Priest, a Jew. Two things are noted. First, hermeneutically, this is the opposite what Paul does with the quotations from Hosea in Rom 9:25-26—he applies Jewish-oriented texts to sectarian (Christian) Gentiles. The pesherist, on the other hand, applies a Gentile-oriented text to a non-sectarian (Jewish) Priest. Second, by interpreting the prophetic text the way he did, the pesherist’s sectarianism is again highlighted when it was said that the Wicked Priest did not “circumcise the foreskin of his heart” (lines 13-14a). The assumption is that the sect, following the Teacher, is the community of the spiritually circumcised, while the Wicked Priest and his followers are not; they are uncircumcised. The latter caused

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883 Similar to the Nahum and Hosea pesharim (see below).
884 On this pesher, see Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273-274, whose work lends to
others to “stumble” in their fasting and Sabbath-keeping. The entire issue is one of law-keeping in a sectarian manner. Interestingly, for the sect, the Jewish establishment’s circumcision was counted as uncircumcision. Both Paul and the Jewish sectarians are, interestingly, understanding the Jewish rite of circumcision in a similar vein.

(I) Nahum Pesher - 4Q169

The first part of the Nahum pesher is a commentary concerning judgment upon “the Kittim.” Concerning Nah 1:4, the commentator remarks that when the prophet says, “He roar[s] at the sea and caus[es it to be dried up],” its interpretation is, “the sea is all the K[ittim]” (4Q169f-i 3). The “Kittim” should be seen as a reference to the Romans. The judgment is further detailed in the following line: “to bri[ng] against them judgment and to destroy them from the face of [the earth]” (4Q169f-ii 4). When the prophet speaks of God drying up all the rivers (Nah 1:4), this is applied to the Kittim, specifically their rulers: “with [their rule]rs, whose dominion will end” (4Q169f-ii 5a).

The pesher is focused not only with judgment upon the Gentiles, i.e., “the Kittim,” but also on those who compromise with the Gentiles. For example, in Nah 2:11-13 the prophet describes Ninevah as a “lion’s den.” The words “Where the lion went to enter” (Nah 2:11b) is taken as a reference to “[Dem]etrius, king of Yavan, who

our observations. See again his comments in the discussion on 1QpHab i 16 above.

886 Lim, Pesharim, 31, observes that the Nahum pesher is often deemed “the historical pesher” as it is not shy in naming certain historical figures (see below; see also 43, 64).
887 That the Kittim are in view in light of the poorly preserved nature of the fragment, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95, fn. 70; Horgan, Pesharim, 167-168. (For a different view, see Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 505-506.)
888 Evans, Ancient Texts, 87; Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 498, 505-506. See also Charlesworth, Pesharim, 73, 109-112; Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 96, fn. 74; Collins, “Reading for History,” 306-307; Lim, Pesharim, 32.
889 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95. For the textual issue on f1-2 4a, see Horgan, Pesharim, 168.
890 Watson, Ibid., has, “with [all their l]eaders, whose rule will end.” Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:337 have, “with [all their chi]efs, whose rule will end.” Cf. Abegg, Jr., QSM, 4Q169 f1-2:5a (the text used here).
891 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95.
sought to go into Jerusalem upon the council of the Interpreters of Smooth Things” (4Q169/iii-iv 1:2). They “The main focus of the pericope, however, is the Jerusalem establishment.” The “false interpreters” are the Pharisees. One reads that these interpreters “walk in treachery and lie[s],” and as a result, will be judged harshly (4Q169/iii-iv II:2-6). The point here is that prophetic word is interpreted in light of the sect’s own present concerns with the non-sectarian Jewish establishment being taken up as the focus of wrath. Watson explains,

When he wrote as he did, the prophet Nahum was attacking the Pharisees of the commentator’s time, as well as foreseeing an incident in which their final doom would be anticipated. The polemic is no doubt to be understood against the background of the Pharisees’ return to political power after the death of Alexander Jannaeus.

Moreover, this interpretive move where the original adversary, Assyria (to whom the original prophecy was given), is taken up by the pesherist in one instance to be the present enemy—i.e., his own Jewish contemporaries—is “particularly clear” in 4Q169/iii-iv 2:1-2. Here, the woe is ascribed to the “city Ephraim, the Interpreters-of-Smooth-Things.” Moreover, even though “lion” is taken by the pesherist to refer to Demetrius, it also finds a referent in Alexander Jannaeus (4Q169/iii-iv 1:4-7). Of

892 Cf. the translations given in Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95, and Edward Cook, “A Commentary on Nahum (4Q169)” in The Dead Sea Scrolls, 217. On the identity of Demetrius, see Charlesworth, Pesharim, 112-115. See also Collins, “Reading for History,” 306-307; Lim, Pesharim, 31; see also 32-33, where Lim notes that “lion” has dual referents in this pesher.

893 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 506.

894 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95 (esp. fn. 71-72 for textual and historical detail). See also Charlesworth, Pesharim, 97; Vanderkam, “Identity and History of the Community,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 530; Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 608; Collins, “Reading for History,” 307; Lim, Pesharim, 31.


896 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 506.


898 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 507 (note: in the original cited article, the authors have “Frgs. 3-4 iii 1-2”). See also Lim, Pesharim, 31.

899 See also Ibid., where Hagedorn and Tzoref observe the same interpretive move in 4Q169/iii-iv 3:8–4:8, where Ephraim has taken the place of the original Nineveh.

900 Lim, Pesharim, 32.
course, the “lion” motif was originally a referent to “the strength of Assyria,” but now finds its focus on a non-sectarian Jew.\footnote{Ibid.}

A few conclusions emerge. First, the actions of “the Interpreters of Smooth Things,” namely, compromising with the nations, was, for the Qumran sect, wicked and worthy of judgment. These “interpreters” were those who “walk in treachery and lie[s]” (4Q169fiii-iv 2:2-6). This, of course, is in the context of capitulation and compromise with outsiders—those outside of the covenant of YHWH. To engage in agreements with other nations was, in this case, treacherous. This leads up to, second, the observation that the interpretation of the Nahum pesher is, again, the opposite of how Paul uses Hosea in Rom 9:25-26. For example, the “lion” (originally Assyria) is applied to Jannaeus (4Q169fiii-iv 1:4-7). Moreover, in the 4Q169fiii-iv 2:1-2, the non-covenant Gentiles are substituted for rebellious Jews as objects of wrath; in Rom 9:25-26, rebellious Jews are substituted for non-covenant Gentiles as objects of mercy. The issue is about covenant membership in both cases (as will be seen in due course regarding Paul). Moreover, the Nahum pesher is not the only instance of applying the biblical text to a contemporary rival (or, in light of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, what one may call application by concretization); it also occurs in the Hosea and Habakkuk pesharim.\footnote{Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 490. See Section 4.7 above.}

That said, the sect’s way of reading the Twelve ought to be taken as insightful. Their reading occurs from the standpoint of a decidedly sectarian, eschatological horizon.\footnote{For a good overview as to how eschatology plays a roll in Qumran interpretive practices in regard to application, see Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 114–117.} Thus, what grounded the pesherist’s interpretive activity were the underlying judgments inherent to their eschatology, sectarianism, and to some extent, their own national hopes.\footnote{See and cf. Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 491. On how eschatology for the sect functioned in terms of past, present, and future, see Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 117.} In this way, the horizon of the pesherist encounters the horizon of the biblical text.\footnote{Regarding such historical/horizon “contact,” it is perhaps helpful to consider Charlesworth, Pesharim, 115, who describes the pesharim as “pneumatic commentaries” and “historicizing allegories of Scripture.” Specifically, he says, pesher is “fulfillment exegesis,” distinct}
experiences and circumstances. Thus the question: what prejudgments enabled Paul’s own reading of similar Jewish texts and traditions?

(m) Zephaniah Pesher - 1Q15 & 4Q170

The original text discusses how “all the earth will be consumed” (כל־הארץ), and how he will bring to an end “all the inhabitants of the earth” (הארץ כל־ישב). The commentator then mentions “[all the inhabitants of] the land of Judah” (1Q15f 5). Watson thinks that the prophetic phrase, “all the earth will be consumed” (1:18), found its interpretation in “[all the inhabitants of] the land of Judah.” Hence, the pesher should be understood as focused upon non-sectarian Jews as opposed to exclusively the nations in general. The pesherist puts a sectarian spin on the text. This idea is not without precedence among scholars, for the “eschatological content of pesher” in general does indeed “[reflect] basic sectarian tenets,” one of which is “the election of the Community.” Thus, a pre-commitment to sectarianism (i.e., the election of the community) allows the pesherist to interpret Zephaniah as a proof for their own particular understanding of what covenant loyalty (or law-keeping) looked like. What remains interesting is that this pesher, as the Nahum pesher above, appears to have been interpreted quite distinctly when compared to Paul’s treatment of Hosea in Rom 9. This pesher utilizes a text originally meant, seemingly, for the entire world and narrows its focus upon rebellious non-sectarians. Paul, on the other hand, reads the Hosea text that

from “historical works,” though “some of them mirror history by refracting the facts pneumatically and eschatologically for an in-group cut from the mainstream” (116; emphasis original).

906 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 99. Watson comments further that, “it is characteristic of Zephaniah that the universal ‘day of wrath of YHWH’ (2.1) is directed primarily against YHWH’s own people. This was no doubt also the main theme of the commentary.... The book of Zephaniah as a whole lends itself to an interpretation in terms of the forthcoming divine judgment that will befall the whole world, but especially the ungodly majority in Judea and Jerusalem. That is likely to have been the main theme of the Zephaniah commentary (or commentaries)” (99). This is not to deny our present thesis, however, for even in light of Watson’s observations that this pesher might be in line with the spirit of Zephaniah’s overall intent, it does not follow that a sectarian prejudgment is not in play, for the Zephaniah text is used by the sect to speak to their present concerns (see below).

907 Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 117. Emphasis original. Here, she also notes “dualism” and “historical determinism.” On some level, therefore, sectarianism is more than a social or theological category; it is part of their hermeneutic.

was originally focused upon rebellious Jews and widens the focus to include any believing Gentile. Both read from a sectarian horizon, howbeit from somewhat different horizons.

Sectarianism as a hermeneutic for the pesherist becomes clear again when one looks to the fragment from cave 4. This is a pesher on Zeph 1:12-13 and is a polemic against “those who say in their hearts, ‘YHWH will not cause to do good, nor will he cause to do evil” (1:12). This results in the rendering, “[they] will not eat” (4Q170fi-ii 2). Watson concludes that, “The commentator no doubt exploited the threatening scriptural reference to Jerusalem (‘At that time I will search Jerusalem with lamps’) [Zeph.1.12a] in order to denounce contemporary opponents in Jerusalem.” Thus, the text is interpreted in such a way that the non-sectarians are the focus of wrath. Once more, a sectarian hermeneutic is observed.

(n) Hosea Pesher – 4Q166 & 4Q167

The pesher in 4Q166 concerns Hos 2:8-14. The biblical context deals with Yahweh’s judgment on Israel through the metaphor of the marriage between Hosea and Gomer. Hos 2:7 records Gomer (Israel) saying that she has pursued her own “lovers” (LXX: ἐραστῶν μου; MT: ממאהב), specifically saying that these “lovers” have provided her with bread (LXX: τῶν δίδων μοι τοὺς ἄρτους μου; MT: נתני לך בשר), water (LXX: τὸ υδωρ μου; MT: מים), wool (LXX: τὰ ἴματα μου; MT: צמר), fine linens (LXX: τὰ ὀθόνια μου; MT: ושטיחי), and oil (LXX: τὸ ἔλαιον μου; MT: שמן). Most likely these “lovers” are the deities of the Canaanites. However, this is not to exclude the possibility that surrounding nations, specifically treaties with them, might also be in

909 On the textual issue surrounding f1-2:2, see Horgan, Pesharim, 192.
911 See Lim, Pesharim, 30, on the dating of the copies of 4Q166 and 4Q167.
912 Dearman, Hosea, 116.
913 Note the different endings between Hos 2:7 (MT): ושקויי; and Hos 2:7 (LXX): καὶ πάντα ὅσα μοι καθήκει.
914 Dearman, Hosea, 112.
By playing the “harlot” (LXX: ἐξεπόρνευσεν; MT: נזרה), Israel has the promise of Yahweh’s interference (8–9). Verse 9 seems to suggest that Israel will have a moment of realization and, because of Yahweh’s interference, she will begin to consider the idea of returning back to Yahweh, though it is unlikely that true repentance is in view.

Furthermore, concerning the items for which Israel has run after her “lovers”—that is, for the items mentioned above—she has failed to see that it was her God, Yahweh, who gave her these things and not the gods of the nations (10). In return, she has rendered worship to Baal (10). The result, according to Hosea’s oracle, is judgment, where Yahweh will “uncover her shame” (12; LXX: ἀποκαλύψω τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν αὐτῆς; MT: נבלתה אגלה). Specifically, the means by which Yahweh promises to uncover the shame of Israel is by taking away the things he had given her. Verse 12 states that Israel’s judgment cannot be stopped by anyone: “[N]o one can rescue the exposed Gomer from her fraught state. Israel is under the judgment of YHWH.” Moreover, God promises to do away with the festivals, Sabbaths, et al., of Israel (13). These celebrations are nationalistic festivals. Lastly, God promises to destroy the fruit that Israel believed Baal had given to her, which was displayed most emphatically when she worshipped the Baals (14–15). The great sin, it seems for Hosea, is that Israel has forgotten her God (15).

The pesherist sees Hos 2:8—where God blocks, or interferes in, the ways of Israel—as due to “the era of their disloyalty” (4Q166 i. 9). Like Hosea’s unfaithful wife, 4Q166 depicts “those who are led astray” as “the unfaithful ones.” This “disloyalty” (or “treachery”) ought to be seen as covenant disloyalty. Though it is

915 Ibid.
916 Ibid., 113–114.
917 Specifically, Hosea only mentions “corn,” “wine,” and “oil” in v. 10 (LXX), but bread, water, wool, and fine linens are no doubt also in view considering v. 11.
918 Dearman, Hosea, 116.
919 Though it is unsure if this is to be seen as exclusively referring to just Israel’s religious functions. See Ibid., 117.
920 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330–331.
921 Horgan, Pesharim, 139.
922 Abegg, Jr., has מון as “treachery.” See Abegg, Jr., QSM, מון.”
fragmentary, 4Q166 i. 11 suggests that this might very well be the case, since faithfulness to the covenant seems to be at least part of the subject of the text since it mentions “those who [upho]ld the [cov]enant.” Presumably, this is meant to refer to the sect itself. One might assume this, moreover, since the scroll speaks about “the generation of the visitation” (4Q166 i. 10), which, as part of the interpretation of Hosea in lines 7-8, most likely refers to those outside of the sect, being employed in order to link non-sectarians to the role of Gomer, who remains the epitome of covenant disloyalty. When Gomer (Israel) is pondering a return to her husband/God in the original text (2:9 MT; line 15), having recognized she was better off there than where she currently finds herself, line 16 makes a fragmented interpretation and reference to “the return of the captives” (שבי בשוב). If indeed the non-sectarian is already in view as unfaithful Gomer, then one wonders what “repent” here might have denoted for the sect—that is, whether repentance was a possibility for the non-sectarian. Of course, it is highly unlikely that this reference, whatever it might have meant for the pesherist, could ever have been taken as a reference to Gentiles. Since, firstly, the sect’s argument is a contextualized one. That is, the pesher is employed as (and within) a polemic against Jewish non-sectarians. Secondly, the subject is disloyalty on the part of God’s once-covenanted people, Israel, and it seems the “return” being pondered would not have been understood by the sect as referring to anyone other than Israel. After all, in the mind of the sect, the only one needing a return was wayward Israel herself. When compared to Paul’s interpretation of Hosea in Rom 9, this is revealing.

The scriptural citation mentioned in 4Q166 ii 1-2 is from Hos 2:10: “[She does not know that] it was I who gave her wheat, [wine] [and oil.] I increased [the silver] and the gold (which) they used [for Ba’al.]” The sect sees this as being an act of forgetting

923 Martinez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330–331. Horgan, Pesharim, 143, doubts this reconstruction.

924 On the link to Jewish non-sectarians, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 93.


926 On “repent,” cf. the discussion in Horgan, Pesharim, 143-144.

927 Reconstruction and translation as found in Martinez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330-331. Cf. with MT: “But she does not know that I gave to her the corn and the wine and the oil, and that I
God and forsaking his precepts (lit: “fling his commandments behind their backs”); which came through God’s prophets (lines 3-5). The sect laments that, “they listened to those who misdirected them and they acclaimed them” (line 5). Furthermore, concerning the quotations from Hos 2:11-12, that God will take back that which he had given them (the very things of which Israel credited to the Baals), the sect sees this as a judgment in order to bring about “sham[c] and disgrace in the eyes of the nations on whom they relied” (lines 12-13). Here, “the nations” are said to have been for Israel the focal point of reliance. Yet the nations will not be able to provide security from God’s judgment (line 14). Understanding what is meant by the idea of Israel relying upon the nations for security is better understood in the interpretation that comes from Hos 2:13 (lines 14-17). God will put an end to Israel’s “joy” (משושה), “her fea[st, her new] moon and her Sabbath and all her festivals” (lines 14-15). These “festivals” are described as being, somehow, in partnership with the surrounding nations: הגואים במועדי יוליכו עדות [in all the festivals, they walk in the festivals of the nations”; line 16). The phrase “they walk in the feasts/festivals of the nations” seems to reflect an established “exegetical tradition” taken from Jubilees. According to Hagedorn and Tzoref, there seems to be a consensus among scholars that the “insistence upon a 364-day year was a defining characteristic for the Qumran Community and related circles.” Moreover, this would have been a point of controversy between the sect and the Jewish establishment. In light of these facts, one essential feature of this interpretation is the fact of its increased the silver, but they used gold for Baal” (our translation).

928 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330-331.
931 Our translation. This translation differs from Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:331, though the reconstruction given by them (330) is followed here.
933 Ibid., 493 (see also 494-495). Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 81-82.
934 Horgan, Pesharim, 146 (see also 50).
contemporization to the present circumstances in which the sect itself was involved.\(^{935}\) So-called “sectarian adaptations” have been observed in the Hosea pesharim—this specific pesher being one of them.\(^ {936}\) It is telling, then, that covenant disloyalty—things like forgetting God, forsaking his commandments, and relying on the nations (line 13)—is established in terms of a decidedly sectarian horizon of understanding (perhaps not unlike Paul in Rom 2:12-29). With the Hos 2:13 pesher understood as a “sectarian polemic,”\(^ {937}\) the interpretations given by the sect only works if one assumes from the start a sort of sectarian pre-understanding.\(^ {938}\)

4Q167 contains a pesher on Hos 5:13-15. The pesher mentions a “raging lion” (4Q167 f ii 2). As Watson has observed, this is linked to Hos 5:13.\(^ {939}\) It is possible that the pesher has in mind Jannaeus, who relied upon Gentile help in order to push back a revolt.\(^ {940}\) Concerning Hos 5:14, the commentator says that, “[Its interpretation con]cerns the last priest who will stretch out his hand to strike Ephraim” (line 3).\(^ {941}\) Again, Watson sees this as quite possibly another reference to Jannaeus (who put to death six thousand people at a festival gathering), saying, “In the light of the lemma, in which the lion is YHWH himself, the commentator would understand this event as a divine judgment upon ‘Ephraim’ (the non-sectarian Jewish community).”\(^ {942}\) As was the case in 4Q166, there is judgment upon the non-sectarians for, presumably, breaking covenant with God by taking part, in some form or fashion with Gentiles—whether that be participating in the pagan festivals, adapting Jewish festivals to be in accord with Gentile festivals, or simply relying on them for help. The Qumran texts carry a significant amount of weight

\(^{935}\) Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 492. See also Lim, Pesharim, 52.

\(^{936}\) Ibid., 497.

\(^{937}\) Ibid., 493.

\(^{938}\) See Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 150-151, especially fns. 19-20, where 4QpHos\(^{2}\) 2.5 and 4QpHos\(^{2}\) 2.2-6, 15-16 are mentioned in the context of denouncement from the standpoint of sectarian interpretive authority.

\(^{939}\) Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 93-94. Here Watson notes that the חצר החרון is “known from the Nahum commentary and identifiable as Alexander Jannaeus (4QpHos\(^{2}\) 2.2; 4QpNah 3+4 i.5, 6).”

\(^{940}\) Ibid., 94. See also Lim, Pesharim, 30.

\(^{941}\) Martinez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:333.

concerning covenantal purity. Hence, one can easily discern, in relation to the use and application of the Hosea texts in regard to this covenantal purity, a rather negative focus upon the Gentiles.

Following this, there are fragments which comment on portions from Hos 6-7. First, 4Q167 ffv-vi 1-3 cites a small portion from Hos 6:4: “[What] shall I do with you, [Ephraim;] what [shall I do with you, Judah?…]”¹⁹⁴³ Though nothing remains of an exegesis of v. 4 in the sectarian text, it is possible that the citation given here is meant to lament, once again, the covenant unfaithfulness of the people to YHWH. This could be evidenced by the reference to Israel’s חסד in the original text being likened to a “morning cloud” and “the dew,” both of which vanishes out of sight quickly.⁹⁴⁴ That this is in view is perhaps clear in light of the pesher on Hos 6:7, which speaks of the explicit disloyalty on the part of the people: “[But they, like Adam,] broke the covenant.”¹⁹⁴⁵ Though fragmented, the application of this passage in 4Q167 fvi 1-2 is straightforward: “[…] they forsook God and [w]alked in the statutes of […]”⁹⁴⁶ It is difficult to tell in whose statutes the wayward people walked, though having investigated the discussion surrounding 4Q166 (see above) concerning Israel’s participation in the festivals of the nations, it is very possible—indeed, one ought not be surprised to discover—that the “statutes” mentioned above are the very rules and customs of the nations’ festivals and celebrations.⁹⁴⁷ If that is so, then at some level, the sect sees their non-sectarian counterparts as guilty of similar intermingling. Moreover, the pesher considers Hos 6:9-10, where Israel’s priests are condemned for “heinous

943 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:333. MT: “What am I to do with you, Ephraim? What am I to do with you, Judah? Your love (חסד) is like a morning cloud, and it is like the dew that rises early to go away” (our translation).

944 Dearman, Hosea, 195–196. Dearman says Hosea 6:4 is “God’s response to the people’s continuing faithlessness,” and the word hesed (Dearman translates this as “loyalty”) “appear here in a simile in the context of a charge of fickleness against the people…[the similes show] the fleeting commitment of Ephraim and Judah to YHWH (cf. 13:3).”

945 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:333. MT: “But they, like Adam, broke covenant; they dealt faithlessly with me” (our translation).

946 Our translation of 4Q167 f7-9:2.

947 See Bernstein, Qumran, 675, fn. 7, who suggests that the phrase from 4Q167fvi 2 (“They…[w]alked in the statutes…”) is based upon a similar phrase found in Lev 20:23 (and 2 Kgs 17:8): “And you shall not walk in the statutes of the nations…” Moreover, he says this latter passage serves as the basis for the idiom “They walk in the festivals of the nations” in 4Q166 fii 16.
activities”—such as, robbery and murder—their sins are described in terms of “harlotry.” Interestingly, when an interpretation is given, there is a mention, once more, of “the [w]icked nation[s]” [םָרֶשׁ נְגוֹיִם]; 4Q167 x 3). Because of the fragmentary nature of the passage, it is difficult to tell in what context “the wicked nations” is used in regard to the priestly sins. However, conclusions with some confidence can be drawn. Considering all that has been said above, one could expect that the evil which befalls Israel has to do, at some level, with involvement with non-Jewish people, that is, the Gentiles. This would make sense with the use of “harlotry” in this context (Hos 6:10; 4Q167 f1 1).

6.1.1 Vorurteile and Anwendung at Qumran

The prejudgments that undergird the sect’s interpretive activity have been noted. Given the necessary role prejudgments have on every interpretive act, one must see, therefore, the sectarian prejudgments as key. There is no question that sectarianism functions theologically and sociologically; but the observations given above point to the idea that these themes also function hermeneutically. It is worth quoting again Watson, who, seeking to drive a wedge between Paul’s use of Hab 2:4 and the pesherist’s own use, says,

For Paul, who uses Habakkuk 2.4 to advocate an antithetical understanding of the relation of faith and law, “faith” corresponds to the universal scope of God’s address in the gospel, directed as it is to Jews and Gentiles alike (cf. Rom. 3.29-30). For the Qumran commentator, the “righteous” of the prophetic text are identified with the

948 Dearman, Hosea, 198–199.
949 Outside of Hos 6:10, the word תָּש֖וֹנָה can be used metaphorically. For example, see Ezekiel 23:27, where the reference seems to be to idolatry, i.e., to unfaithfulness, due to some sort of participation with Gentiles; in this case, Egypt.
950 So Brooke, “Reading the Plain Meaning,” Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, 90: “There is really no neat dividing line between pure exegesis and applied exegesis, between the copying of biblical manuscripts and their interpretation and over-interpretation. All handling of scripture in the scrolls from Qumran shows not antiquarian interest but that certain authoritative traditions were understood to be continuously relevant. Of course the understanding of all the finds at Qumran is, like the finds themselves, still very fragmentary, but the rich range of materials now available from one place offers the modern scholar an unequalled opportunity to embark on a comprehensive analysis of the place of authoritative scriptures in a believing community. Any such analysis must give proper place to the texts of the scriptures themselves, which includes their plain sense, as well as outlining the broader exegetical assumptions of those who transmitted and interpreted them.” Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 283; Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 276.
minority within Israel who observe the law and believe in the teacher. The commentator therefore minimizes every indication of universal concern in the scriptural text.\textsuperscript{951}

Thus, one can make sense of such phenomenon by saying the texts as interpreted by the sect have the sectarian flavor they do precisely because they are read from a sectarian horizon of understanding.

Moreover, since the sect itself didn’t claim to have special “revelation” in the sense of visions, dreams, or the like, it is likely their re-reading of the original material was largely due to an “intellectual transformation of prophecy.”\textsuperscript{952} George Brooke comments that, “[T]his intellectual transformation is associated in the collective memory of the sectarian movement with the Teacher of Righteousness.”\textsuperscript{953} Extending Brooke’s thought, it seems that one could say the sect’s re-reading of the prophetic texts took the shape it did because of the horizon of the sect’s shared consciousness, with the Teacher as the central and essential gatekeeper.\textsuperscript{954} In determining and defining what exactly was essential to the pesharim (i.e., what makes the pesharim what it was), one must consider the outlook—and situatedness—the sect had toward the prophetic texts themselves. Specifically, Berrin cites the work of Dimant, who discusses “the sect’s own position in history” and their own “peculiar attitude to the base-text” in relation to their interpretive activity.\textsuperscript{955} Indeed, the sect’s interpretations are “in terms of the history, life, and beliefs of the Qumran community.”\textsuperscript{956} With respect to philosophical-

\textsuperscript{951} Watson, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 2nd ed., 113.


\textsuperscript{953} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{954} Cf. Lim, \textit{Holy Scripture}, 119-120.

\textsuperscript{955} Berrin, “Pesharim,” \textit{Biblical Interpretation at Qumran}, 122-123, fn. 48, citing Devorah Dimant, “Qumran Sectarian Literature,” in \textit{Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus}, ed. M. E. Stone, CRINT II.2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 507. It should be noted that Berrin takes a (slight) exception to Dimant’s definition of 

\textsuperscript{pesher} here (though this is somewhat inconsequential for our point here). See again Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273-274.

\textsuperscript{956} Horgan, \textit{Pesharim}, 259. (Horgan here is commenting specifically on the so-called “continuous pesharim.”)}
hermeneutics, this observation is significant, for one is immediately reminded of Gadamer’s vital concept of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*.\(^957\) This concept lends itself as a helpful tool in that it gives conceptual terminology and language to what has been observed in the *pesharim* texts above. Recalling Gadamer’s theory, one’s own tradition and historical place in the world enables all interpretive activity—not least for the pesherist.

Gadamer’s thesis ought to be recalled, namely, that “all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice”\(^958\) and Thiselton’s remarks that “there is no presuppositionless interpretation”\(^959\) and that an interpreter’s prejudices must be brought to light, for “he must inevitably come to the text with ‘anticipatory ideas’; [and] it is part of the hermeneutical task to make these conscious.”\(^960\) So in the quest to understand the sects’ use of those same texts which were also familiar to Paul, how might one describe such use? The interpretive practices of the sect can be described—or at the very least, helpfully clarified—in terms of the prejudices they brought to the text, that is, those *Vorurteile* which made the interpretations possible in the first place. Just as the sectarian could not physically see past the horizon of the desert landscape, neither could they hermeneutically see past the horizon of their own tradition. The sectarian’s horizon, like every interpreter before and after him—including Paul himself—was what it was because of the effect of their shared history, tradition, and theology out of which they lived and interpreted. For Gadamer, it is recalled, “Verstehen ist seinem Wesen nach ein wirkungsgeschichtlicher Vorgang.”\(^961\) For the sect, what brought fusion between the prophetic text and their own present reading of it was a prior commitment to an eschatologically-oriented sectarianism, centered upon the interpretive authority of the Teacher. In light of these *Vorurteile*, the texts themselves were applied in judgment toward non-sectarians, thus validating the sect’s own existence. It was from within these

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\(^957\) See Section 4.4 above.

\(^958\) Gadamer, *TM*, 272.

\(^959\) Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 304.

\(^960\) Ibid., 305.

\(^961\) Gadamer, *WM*, 305; *TM*, 299. See again Section 4.4 above.
concrete applications of the texts to the present circumstances that the text took on meaning for the sectarian.

Specific conclusions are as follows: (1) sectarianism operated hermeneutically at Qumran; (2) the motif of doing the law underwent a decidedly sectarian re-appropriation; 962 (3) the texts often found contemporized re-appropriation for the sect in that new focuses were contrived, e.g., texts originally speaking of Gentiles were reapplied to the present enemy of the sect; (4) covenant inclusion was, at times, understood in spiritual terms, i.e., a “circumcision of the heart”; (5) there is scant evidence—not least in the interpretations of Hosea texts—to suggest that the sect would have seen Gentiles qua Gentiles as objects of mercy as Paul does; and (6) the texts of Hosea which spoke of Jewish inclusion were still, for the sect, understood to speak of contemporary wayward Jews, not Gentiles. In this way, similarities and dissimilarities emerge.

6.2 Righteousness, Faith, and the Story of Abraham (Romans 3-4)

Chapter 3 has as its initial focus the faithfulness of God. Specifically, God’s faithfulness is questioned because of the covenant unfaithfulness and disloyalty on the part of some Jews (themes not unlike those found in the pesharim above). 963 Paul continues in Rom 3 with the same line of thought in 1:17-2:29. And so the question: “What, therefore, is the advantage of the Jew? Or what value is there for circumcision?” (3:1). This question is in response to what came before. 964 Paul answers the interlocutor’s question in the affirmative, saying, “they were entrusted [πιστεύω] with the oracles of God” (2). This is to be taken as reference to how the Jews were entrusted

962 See above. Cf. to Section 5.6.

963 Moo, Romans, 178–179. Moo notes “two broadly different approaches to the text” of 3:1-8. He calls the first view the “traditional model,” which sees the first part of vv. 1-8 as focusing upon the Jewish people, while the latter half is broadened to include all of humanity. The other way of viewing this text, according to Moo (and the one which he believes to be “nearer to the truth”), is that the entire passage (vv. 1-8) is focused on the Jewish people. Under this account, vv. 5-8 “do not take up a general objection to the fairness and consistency of God, but affirm the faithfulness of God to Israel or the ‘right’ of God to judge even his own covenant people” (179). It is this second approach that we believe to be the correct one. Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 356.

with the task of bearing witness to the world, i.e., to the Gentiles. The immediate follow up question is, “What if some were found unfaithful [ἀπιστέω]? Does not their unfaithfulness [ἀπιστία] bring to nothing the faithfulness [πίστις] of God?” (3). Observing the reoccurrence of the πίστ- word group here is instructive, for the cognates display the interconnectedness of the passage better than what a typical English translation can, as in v. 2, “entrusted” appears in English as an entirely different sort of word than “faithful” or “faithfulness.” That said, “faithfulness,” both Israel’s and God’s, is the center of Paul’s diatribe. While “unfaithfulness” can be seen as a reference specifically to not having faith in Jesus, it remains preferable to see “unfaithfulness” as the failure to carry out the divine mission of being “the light of the world,” the very thing they were entrusted to do. This, of course, was due to their own sinfulness, which undermines their “boast” in 2:17 and 23a, as they too are corrupt (vv. 21-24). Does, then, Jewish unfaithfulness render God’s faithfulness invalid, or put another way, does Jewish unfaithfulness “cause [God’s faithfulness] not to function”? If it is true that the covenantal promise was “to bless the world through Israel,” and if God decides to bless the world in a different way, i.e., “bypass Israel,” it would be true therefore, as Wright maintains, that “he [God] stands convicted of unfaithfulness: unfaithfulness…not in relation to his promise to Israel, but to his promises through Israel for the world; promises to bless the world by this means rather than some other.” Paul’s response is μὴ γένοιτο.


966 E.g. see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 131.


968 Jewett, Romans, 244; Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 327; Dunn, Romans, 38a, 131–132.


Quotations follow from the Psalms, the second of which is linked with God’s eschatological judgment spoken of in 2:12-16. Then comes an explanation of “faithfulness” in v. 5. “But if our unrighteousness demonstrates God’s righteousness, what shall we say?” Before moving into the rest of Paul’s line of thought, it is observed that in v. 5 “righteousness” is set in direct parallel to the “faithfulness” spoken about in v. 3, and furthermore, “unrighteousness” in v. 5 is linked with “unfaithfulness” mentioned in v. 3. Righteousness language, therefore, is tied to the concept of “faithfulness,” not least to covenant and obedience. Thus, a continuity of thought must be observed, flowing backward from “un/righteousness” (ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνη in 3:5a) to “un/faithfulness” (ἀπιστέω, ἀπιστία, and πίστις in 3:3) to “decrees of the law” (δικαιώματα in 2:26) to the “righteous” (δίκαιοι in 2:13). Moreover, “righteousness” was already observed in terms of human (and Jewish) unfaithfulness (1:18ff; see above). The present observations here serve to affirm those previous conclusions. Thus, the substance of ch. 2 is indeed a continual thought from 1:18-32. This reflection helps the reader not to lose Paul’s overall train of thought, which began in Rom 1 and into chs. 3-4 (see below). Finally, in response to the interlocutor’s accusation that Paul’s argument is self-contradictory, Paul finishes the rest of this diatribe defending the right of God to judge and inflict wrath (i.e., 5-8).

Verses 9-20, established by a catena of Scripture, provide a sweeping case for the guilt of all humanity. Verse 19a comes after the last citation, saying, “And we know that what the law says, it says to those within the law (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ).” When the preposition ἐν, being translated as “within,” is employed by Paul, it serves to mark out the precise role Jewish law played in separating the chosen people, Israel, from the

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973 On the “triple theme” at work here concerning continuity between Paul’s Gospel and God’s covenant with Israel, see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 132. On μὴ γένοιτο, see Fitzmyer, Romans, 327-328.

974 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 140.

975 Dunn observes this link as well (see Ibid., 134).


977 Jewett, Romans, 247–248; Dunn, Romans, 38a, 141.

978 See Gorman, Crucified Lord, 357-358. On possible literary similarities between Rom 3:10-18 and Qumran writings, see Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls,
Gentiles. The “law” serves to make sure that “every mouth may be stopped and the whole world may become accountable to God” (19b). This is followed by v. 20: “Because by works of the law (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου), no flesh will be justified in his sight, for through the law comes knowledge of sin.” As in 2:13, the topics of justification and law are again taken up in 3:20. The potential problem between these two passages is that it is difficult to reconcile them. On the one hand, in 2:13, justification is said to happen when people become “doers of the law.” In 3:20, though, it is read that “works of the law” will not bring justification. Having established that the phrase “doers of the law” cannot be a mere hypothetical but something actual, one must see “doers of the law” and “works of the law” as two separate ideas for Paul. The case has already been made for 2:12-13 as emphasizing identity—that is, those who will be justified. It is not within the scope of this research to address every complexity about “works of the law,” though we only wish to reaffirm the non-hypothetical possibility of the “doers of the law” in 2:13ff, while affirming the real impossibility of justification by “works of the law” in 3:20. Concerning the latter, it is contended that “works of the law” refers to those things that were argued against in ch. 2, namely, circumcision of the outward flesh, etc. Some scholars have argued that “works of the law” cannot refer merely to exclusive Jewish categories, for Paul says that οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ, “no flesh shall be justified” (3:20). Moo states that the reference to “all flesh” refers to both Jews and Gentiles, saying, “‘Works of the law’ cannot be, then, so interpreted as to restrict the principle to Jews only.” It must be observed, however, that πᾶσα σὰρξ is a Pauline insertion, from an allusion to Psalm 142 (LXX), where πᾶς ζῶν was used possibly as a “neutral expression for humans.” Presumably, then, Paul’s insertion of σὰρξ in place

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979 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 152; Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 168. Cf. Rom 3:19a with 2:12-14.
980 On Paul’s awareness regarding his use of ἔργα νόμου in relation to a “Palestinian Jewish tradition,” see Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 614.
981 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 153, 158–159; Against this, see Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism, 186–192.
982 Ibid., 158.
983 Moo, Romans, 208; See also Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism, 153–154.
984 Jewett, Romans, 266. On the allusion, see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 152–152. Cf. Ware, “Law, Christ, and Covenant,” 529-533, esp. in light of his overall project; Fitzmyer, Romans, 337.
of ζῶν had deliberate theological intent, namely, to point out “human finitude, weakness, and corruptibility.” Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Paul is arguing against Jewish ethno-religious pride and “fleshly distinctiveness,” which was symbolized in physical circumcision. This view can be further validated when it is recalled that Paul’s previous use of the word σὰρξ in 2:28 in reference to the issue of physical circumcision was cast in a negative light.

If “works of the law” (3:20) is the functional equivalent to circumcision of the flesh in 2:28 (σαρκὶ περιτομῆ), and when 3:21-22 follows in antithesis (“the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law...the righteousness of Jesus Christ for all who believe”), the following conclusions can be made. First, the revealing of “righteousness” (δικαιοσύνη) is linked to the discussion about justification (δικαιώμα) in 2:13. There, the details about justification were not explicated, only anticipated, but now a more coherent picture emerges. Second, the link between 3:21-22 and 2:11-29 is reinforced when we observe vv. 22b-23a: “For there is no distinction: for all have sinned” (οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν διαστολή, πάντες γὰρ ἤμαρτον). This clearly parallels 2:11, where the issue of partiality is discussed.

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985 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 155. Cf. Jewett, Romans, 266.
987 Jewett, Romans, 266.
988 So Ware, “Law, Christ, and Covenant,” 522, who describes the relationship between vv. 19-20 and 21-26 as “antithetical.”
990 See Dunn, Romans, 38a, 164–165, who says the phrase χωρὶς νόμου was “intended to be understood in contrast (νυνὶ δὲ) to the ἐν τῷ νόμῳ and ἐξ ἐργῶν νόμου of vv 19-20, implying that Paul thinks of the law in the same way in each of the phrases--the law as a boundary marker (‘those within the law’), where ‘works of the law’ is the distinctive pattern of religion and lifestyle demanded of those marked out by the law. ‘Without the law’ then means outside the national and religious parameters set by the law without reference to the normal Jewish hallmarks...”
991 See again Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 441.
Likewise, when Paul states in 3:21 that, “now the righteousness of God has been revealed apart from the law,” this should be seen as running parallel to 2:13-14, where Gentiles are given “justification” (δικαιωθήσονται, v. 13) even though they do not by nature possess the law (v. 14). Third, 3:21-22 fills in the details of 2:12-16 and, not least, 3:1-3. That is, the “righteousness of God” is said to be through Christ (v. 22) and all people are said to now be “justified” (δικαιόω) by grace (v. 24). At this point, Paul concludes by saying all “boasting” is null and void (v. 27), and justification “by faith” is set in contrast to justification by “works of the law” (v. 28). Remembering that fleshly, i.e., Jewish, “works” were those things Paul was arguing against in 2:25-29, one sees that those who have the “circumcision of the heart” (2:29)—those who are “doers of the law” (2:13), the ones who “show that the work of the law is written on their hearts” (2:15)—are those who have faith in Jesus Christ. Moreover, one must not miss that discussions about righteousness (3:21-22) and justification (3:24) are decidedly christological discussions. While Paul never mentions “justification by faith” in 2:13ff, and only subtly hints at the christological role in future judgment (2:16), looking back from 3:21-22, 24, the parallels thus far presented suggest they were very much implied. Thus, in the spirit of Gadamer, Paul had approached the subject of Gentile covenant inclusion in Rom 2 with “anticipatory ideas.”

Rom 3:29-31 offers additional insight:

Or is God a God of the Jews only? Is he not also the God of the Gentiles? Yes, and also of Gentiles, since God is one. He will justify [δικαιώσει] the circumcised by faith and the uncircumcised through faith. Do we then nullify the law through faith? By no means! Rather, we maintain the law.

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993 Note especially the parallel use of the δικ- word group.

994 See Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 503, where he discusses the faithfulness of Jesus Christ as “precisely his faithfulness to God’s Israel-shaped purpose,” thus connecting this back to the discussion of 3:1-3.

995 Ibid., 504, sees a plausible connection of the boasting in 3:27 to the boasting of 2:17-24, that is, to (in his mind) the idea of a Jewish boast of special “privilege of being God’s instrument in rescuing the world from the plight of 1.18-2.16.” This boast is obviously laced with national/ethnic overtones. Stuhlmacher, Romans, 65, says 3:27 links back to 2:17 with the catchword of boasting.

996 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 305.
Thus, the fact that the question as to whether God is also the God of the Gentiles (and the fact that the issue of Gentile justification is for Paul tied to that question) demonstrates, firstly, that the issue of ethnocentric concerns are still present issues, issues mentioned earlier in 2:11-29. Secondly, the fact that δικαιώσω is set in the future tense, and is not a mere “logical future,” is indicative of the link back to the argument in 2:12-16, specifically v. 13 (δικαιωθήσονται). Thirdly, the continued need for Paul to discuss circumcision serves to tether the line of thought back to 2:12-29. Fourthly, the matter of nullifying the law versus establishing it (3:31) ties once more back to the previous discussion in 2:25-29, where he says, “The one who is by nature uncircumcised but keeps (τελέω) the law will condemn you who has the written code and circumcision but breaks the law” (27). Thus, as will be seen, Paul sees those who have faith in Christ as the ones who “maintain the law,” i.e., those who “keep (τελέω) the law,” despite not being circumcised. These views are permissible for Paul, since God is the God of the Gentiles too (3:29). Though there is more to be said, the emergence of 3:21-22, 24 with 27-31 (in dialogue with 2:12-16, 25-29) suggest in Paul a christological horizon of understanding. The most significant part observed is the underlying, indeed hermeneutical, point—namely, the christological basis for the entire narrative’s re-construal of righteousness, law-keeping, and the Gentile question. The re-appraisal of the people of God (which itself was the result of his revisionary readings of key Jewish texts and themes) was what it was for Paul because of a decidedly christocentric emphasis. Thus, here Wright can speak of a “christologically redefined

998 Ibid., 189; Contra Moo, Romans, 252, fn. 33. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 206; Fitzmyer, Romans, 365.
999 See Ibid., who also makes this observation.
1000 Ibid., 191. Stuhlmacher, Romans, 67-68, sees v. 31 as Paul’s defense against those who charge him with antinomianism.
1001 Cf. Rom 10:4
1002 Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 206–208; Moo, Romans, 255.
1003 Fitzmyer, Romans, 367, says Paul “does not explain how the doctrine of justification by grace through faith upholds the law” (but will soon in the letter). It is also true, however, that even here Paul wants us to pick up on the hints and clues already outlined (e.g., 2:13-16, 25-29, 3:21-22; 3:27-31). That is, the Law is upheld in justification, even in the inclusion of Gentiles, and christologically so.
Paul’s reading of Scripture, and the theology which comes from it, was no doubt informed by his christological convictions, operating therefore as part of his Vorstruktur des Verstehens. This, of course, necessitates a discussion about his own Vorurteile. These concepts and terms provide helpful clarification.

Chapter four concerns the story of Abraham, where Paul puts into antithesis faith and works. “What, therefore, shall we say was found by Abraham, our forefather according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα)? For if Abraham was justified by works (ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη), he had something to boast about, but not before God” (4:1-2).

Unsurprisingly, σάρκα is understood negatively again. Moreover, the phrase “by works” (ἐξ ἔργων) is a shorter version of the phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόµου which occurred in 3:20. It is recalled that this phrase (ἐξ ἔργων νόµου in 3:20) pointed backward to the discussion about circumcision of the flesh in 2:28 (σαρκὶ περιτοµή), which is its functional equivalent. Thus, Paul is not speaking of “works” in a general sense, but in a specific, Jewish cultic sense. One cannot say, then, that “merit theology” is as inherent to the discussion as one might think, as Paul’s primary issue is “with the works of covenant loyalty… [and that] Paul’s opposition to Jewish covenantal nomism can be reduced to his insistence on Christ-fidelity vs. Torah-fidelity.” This claim is substantiated by the issue of circumcision in 4:9-12. In order to exploit the details of the Abraham story to his advantage, Paul states with scriptural citation that Abraham

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1004 Wright, PFG, 848.
1005 See the discussion on Seyoon Kim’s work below.
1006 See Sections 6.5 and 7 below.
1008 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 200; Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 218.
1009 Note that σαρκὶ περιτοµή in 2:28 is tied back to those who, by nature, “have the law” and those who are merely “hearers of the law” in 2:13-14. The progression of Paul’s working narrative, therefore, is clearly seen.
1010 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 217–218.
1012 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 218.
was “counted” righteous, not by works, but by believing God (vv. 3-5). This is buttressed by a quotation from the Psalms (vv. 7-8). Paul adds that Abraham’s righteous status was prior to his circumcision, not during or after it (vv. 9-10).

Paul’s argument is straightforward: the event of which Gen 15:6 speaks precedes the event described in Gen 17:23-27. Paul insists on separating into distinct phases what his fellow Jews, and no doubt he himself previously, had always taken as a whole...by narrowing the issue to circumcision as such, Paul takes up a strong position, and one difficult to contest. For the evidence of Scripture is that Abraham was reckoned righteous, accepted in covenant relationship by God, prior to his being circumcised and without reference to circumcision. That one fact is sufficient to establish the point that God’s righteousness was not dependent upon works of the law, or any cultic observance, in the case of Abraham. And if Abraham is the paradigm for God’s dealings with humankind, including his covenant dealings with the seed of Abraham, that also means that God’s acceptance in general is or at least can be “apart from works.”

Indeed, this is the content of Paul’s argument. However, as we will see, there is much more at play for Paul than merely the question of the timing of events. All the same, that circumcision is used by Paul as an example of a “work” of the law is instructive, as it connects the argument to Rom 2. The purpose was to show that Abraham would become “the father of all who would believe without being circumcised, so that righteousness would be counted to them also” (v.11b). The connection to Rom 2:13ff is clear: “Righteousness” is counted even to Gentiles, who “do not by nature have the law,” nevertheless, they “show that the work of the law is written on their hearts” (vv. 14-15). How so? Because the law did not bring about the promised inheritance of the world to “Abraham and his offspring”; rather, the promised inheritance came “through the righteousness of faith” (4:13), as the Abraham story shows plainly. Thus, the

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1013 See Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 131–160, for how the motif of the paternity of Abraham is consistent between the substance of Rom 4 and Gal 3. (Gen 15:6 is also cited in Gal 3:6.)

1014 On how significant, or perhaps insignificant, this citation is to Paul’s overall argument, see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 230. Concerning Paul’s use of ḫerēsh shawah with his citation, see: Fitzmyer, Romans, 375-376; Barrett, Romans, 85.

1015 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 231.

1016 See Mark Forman, “The Politics of Promise: Echoes of Isaiah 54 in Romans 4.19-21,” JSNT 31, no. 3 (March 1, 2009): 301–324, on the phrase “inherit the world.” Cf. Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 144–146. It is true that Paul fails to highlight a christological emphasis concerning “offspring” like he does in Gal 3:16, as the focus here is indeed “collective” (Moo, Romans, 274). However, it would be a mistake to think Christology is entirely absent (hermeneutically speaking; see below)—not least because the corporate and the individual, the ekklesia and the christos, cannot
persons who “share the faith of Abraham” are to be included in the covenant made with Abraham, and this includes Gentiles (vv. 16-17a).

What does “faith” mean with respect to Abraham’s faith? Dunn describes it (and the substance of vv. 17b-21) accurately and simply: “Abraham’s faith was nothing other than unquestioning trust in God’s power.”

Abraham’s “faith” was not lacking a proper object, as if it could be described as abstract wishful thinking. Rather, his faith was in God and in God’s ability to bring “life to the dead” and as the “one who calls [καλέω] the things that do not exist to have existence” (17b). Tellingly, Paul’s use of the Abraham story has been set in terms of God’s calling into existence “the things that do not exist.” This is not unlike his calling of the Gentiles, who were “the Not My People,” but who are now called “My People,” the “Not Loved, [but who are also now] Loved” in Rom 9:25 (more below). One should see Paul’s use of the Abraham story as a preview for ch. 9. Indeed, “[t]he identity of the people of God is clearly at the heart of Paul’s argument in Rom 4, and this is what comes to the fore in Rom 9-11, the ‘climax’ and ‘heart’ of the whole epistle.”

Moreover, Rom 4 is connected to Paul’s previous discussion in Rom 1. Adams, who has documented thematic links between the Abraham story and the status Gentiles have in Rom 1:18-32, says, “As ἄσεβῆς, Abraham’s initial status before God, prior to his being reckoned as righteous, was exactly that of the ungodly Gentiles portrayed in 1.18-32...But as justified, Abraham’s new status and orientation toward God through faith is the very antithesis of that of the disobedient Gentiles of 1.18-32.”

Abraham be played against each other as if the two are not, in Pauline thought, closely intertwined (see e.g. 1 Cor 12:12-13, 27).

1017 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 236.
1018 Moo, Romans, 282–283; See also Dunn, Romans, 38a, 239.
1020 Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 146.
here is “opposite” of the person in ch. 1. The central character in Paul’s narrative, Abraham, goes from a status of “ungodly Gentile” to become the Jewish patriarch.

Furthermore, despite the deadness of his own body and the impossibility of Sarah to carry a child, Abraham believed God could fulfill the promise with full hope and expectation (vv. 18-21). This faith in God grounds Abraham’s being counted “righteous” (v.22). Interestingly, Paul says that the words, “It was counted to him” was not written for him only, but also for us” (vv. 23-24). Paul’s hermeneutical assumption is that the text of Gen 15:6 (indeed the story itself) is written for the present. Paul narrows down this assumption—by which he had been operating all along—to a specific group, namely, the believers in Jesus the Messiah: “To those whom it will be counted, to those who believe in the one who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead (ἐκ νεκρῶν), who was delivered up for our trespasses and was raised for our justification” (vv. 24-25). Thus, this hermeneutical assumption has a christological basis, being centered around the one who was raised from the dead, ἐκ νεκρῶν. This language echoes Rom 4:17 and 19 where Abraham believed in the resurrecting power of God “who gives life to the dead, τοὺς νεκροὺς” (v. 17; νεκρῶ and νέκρωσις in v. 19). The correspondence of language is suggestive: Those who possess similar faith are considered children of Abraham (v. 16). Indeed, Abraham’s faith for Paul finds its

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1022 Fitzmyer, Romans, 388.
1023 That this can shed light on Rom 9:25-26 cannot be overemphasized.
1024 This is not unlike the sectarian interpretations discussed above. See also Jewett, Romans, 340, who says Paul was “[f]ollowing the tradition of Jewish hermeneutics”; Barrett, Romans, 388. Cf. Robby Holt and Aubrey Spears, “The Ecclesia as Primary Context for the Reception of the Bible,” Manifesto, 76-77.
1025 Moo, Romans, 287. He says, “The conviction expressed in vv. 23-24 that what is written in Genesis about Abraham has relevance to the Christian believer has been the implicit assumption of the whole of chap 4.”
1027 Thus when Ibid., 325, attempts to subsume Christology under a more broader theological category, seemingly because in the Abraham story, “Faith is emphatically in the God who raised Jesus,” (emphasis original) is to perhaps miss the point. Of course, it is true that God (and not Christ per se) is the object of faith for both Abraham and Paul. But one should be hesitant to play the two against each other. Paul is, after all, reading this story as a Christian.
1028 See Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 134, who comments on the Abrahamic sonship of
present parallel in the Christian’s faith.  This faith has a specific object, which is God, specifically in his “life-giving power” as it relates to the resurrection of Christ. From an interpretive standpoint, one must notice how “faith” takes on a christological emphasis for Paul. Thus, as said above, while the content of Paul’s argument (i.e., that justification is on the basis of faith) is indeed rooted in Scripture by pointing out that the timing of Abraham’s justification in Gen 15 preceded the work of circumcision in ch. 17, it is not the case that this can account for the entirety of Paul’s hermeneutic. After all, Paul’s argument stands insofar as his christological horizon of understanding is in place. The Scripture, by itself, cannot establish Paul’s claim here since, after all, the fact that Abraham was deemed righteous prior to circumcision was true all the while the command for circumcision was in force prior to the Christ-event (as even Paul would agree; cf. Gal 3:23-29). Without Paul’s christological prejudgment in place, then, the rhetorical force of his argument is severely weakened. Paul’s argument from Scripture is what it is because of what he brings to Scripture, namely, his christological convictions. This dialogue between text and interpreter results in a fresh and revisionist understanding of the text. For Paul, the Jewish text speaks, but it speaks to new

the Gentiles in Gal 3:7 (where Gen 15:6 is cited, as in Rom 4:3).

1029 So Fitzmyer, Romans, 388: “Paul sees an exact correspondence between Abraham’s faith and the faith of all Christians.” See also Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 38.

1030 Bird, The Saving Righteousness of God, 146.

1031 So Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 17-19, who, commenting on “faith” and “obedience” in Jewish thought, says (18-19), “One of the most striking phenomena of the extant letters is that [Paul] nowhere debates the meaning of faith with his opponents. Faith as such was never a point of controversy… What is radical about Paul, however, is faith’s object—Christ. Apart from the scandal of a crucified Messiah, the deciding factor, to coin a phrase, was Paul’s ‘Christological eschatology’” (emphasis original). See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 9-13. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 388.

1032 This arguably solves a dilemma pointed out by Stanley, Arguing with Scripture, 151-153, in his evaluation of the rhetorical strategy of Paul’s use of the Abraham story in Rom 4. Stanley is correct to say that “a more skeptical member” of an “informed audience” (a hypothetical category employed by Stanley as part of his larger project; see 68-69) would have found a problem in Paul’s handling of the story (151). After all, Paul fails to mention, in line with Jewish custom, the essential relationship between Abraham’s faith and his latter action (not least the “covenantal context” of the rite of circumcision (151-152, esp. 38). Such a skeptic, then, would easily find Paul’s reading difficult. But again, as we propose above, the essence of Paul’s exegesis here is not divorced from its most fundamental element: Christology. When this element is granted full attention, the problem found in Stanley’s otherwise helpful rhetorical analysis is relieved. Thus, Stanley’s idea that because of “the ready availability of an alternative reading” on the part of an “informed audience” therefore “suggests that Paul did not expect the Romans to conduct a careful verse-by-verse analysis of his argument” ought to be reconsidered (153). See also Section 7.3 below.
purposes and into new horizons. Paul’s hermeneutic is not a mere exercise in repeating the historical facts of the text; he is doing more: he is *interpreting* them (in the way that Gadamer means).

The Abraham story, moreover, centered around the central plot of how “Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness” (4:3). Yet Paul understood “righteousness” as having been revealed “through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ” (3:22). The Abraham story found completion in this revelation. It is true for Paul that the faith Abraham exhibited “foreshadows” the faith of a Christian, as Fitzmyer says. It is equally true that Paul reads the entire Abraham story from the position of Christian faith. This is the point of vv. 23-25, namely, that the gift of righteousness seen in the Abraham story is really, Paul says, to be read not just for him but also for believers in Christ. Given the correspondence of language (vv. 17, 19, 24-25), Paul finds in the Abraham story answers to the questions of his Christian horizon. But in saying that believers in Christ are children of Abraham (vv. 16-17), Paul is also seeing the Christian horizon as an answer to which the story was a question.

That Paul’s Christology is supplementing the Abraham story and is operating hermeneutically is best seen when compared to a reading of the same story in Sir 44:19-21. There the Abraham story is told in such a way that,

Torah and circumcision are the central features, along with Abraham’s near-sacrifice of Isaac (Genesis 22, which is absent from Romans 4. Sirach also highlights Abraham’s faithfulness) (εὐφρέθη πίστος heurethē pistos, “he was faithful,” 44:20), but this does not have the sense of “believing the promise” that Paul has drawn out. The two belong on the same map; but Paul’s new construal, his new way of telling the story, grows directly out of what he now believes about God because of the events concerning Jesus, resulting in the establishment of the Jew-plus-Gentile family with faith as its central demarcating feature.

It can be said that the hermeneutical assumption, from which Paul read the Abraham story, is christological, for Paul’s particular reading of these texts is contingent upon

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1033 Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 388.
1034 Recall Section 4.5 and interpretation as dialogical.
this conviction. For without it, his reading simply does not work. In fact, it enables his interpretations. Thus, it functions as a Vorurteil.1036

6.3 Pursuing Righteousness (Romans 9-10:4)

While the literary divisions in Romans can be over emphasized, suggesting a fragmented plot, it is not unreasonable to treat chs. 1-4, 5-8, 9-11, and 12-16 as separate literary units.1037 For our purpose of examining Rom 9:25-26, and in light of space constraints, it will be necessary to bypass chs. 5-8 to get to the more relevant discussion occurring in chs. 9-10.1038 It was beneficial to begin our investigation of Rom 9:25-26 with an analysis of chs. 1-4 because Paul’s discussions in ch. 9 assume much of the content that occurs in those first four chapters. Specifically, the content of Rom 9:1-10:4 will be given attention.1039 Links between chs. 1-4 and 9-10:4 will be noted by attending to the stream of thought that begins in ch. 9.1040

Paul’s grief over Israel’s unbelief is recorded in 9:1-5, as well as the specific privileges that belong to them.1041 Verse 6a follows with, “It is not as though the word of God has failed.” Though Israel has failed to believe, their unbelief is not because “God’s word has failed; for God has always specified one son and not the other, one twin and not the other, one small group while the rest fell away, one tiny remnant while the rest were lost to view...”1042 For Paul, “[n]ot all who are descended from Israel (ἐξ Ἰσραήλ) are those who belong to Israel” (6b).1043 Thus, not everyone who is a physical

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1036 See Section 4.5 above on Gadamer’s concept of Vorurteil. Cf. Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 45, about Paul’s “christological ‘reconfiguration.’”


1038 This is not to deny that these chapters are digressions to Paul’s overall argument. E.g. see Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, esp. chs. 4-5.

1039 This is so because of the explicit discussion and interconnected use of righteousness language, law, and the Gentile question. Cf. Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 494, who notes a specific conceptual link between the subject matter of ch. 3 and ch. 9.


1042 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 634.

1043 On defining the second use of “Israel” in 9:6b, see Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 143.
descendant of Abraham (σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ) is included among Israel (v. 7a). Rather (ἀλλά), it is “in Isaac your offspring will be called [καλέω, ‘named’]” (v. 7b). This citation from Gen 21:12 is explained in v. 8: “That is, it is not the children of the flesh (τὰ τέκνα τῆς σαρκὸς) who are the children of God, but the children of the promise who will be counted as offspring.”

Verse 7 is concerned with the question of who the people of God are, an echo back to Rom 2:12-29. In both places, the questions are: Who are the people of God? and How are they classified as such? In Rom 2:13 and 28-29 it is “the doers of the law” and the circumcised in heart, respectively, who are classified as the people of God. In 9:7 Paul continues this discussion, though providing more detail. Paul says the true descendants are those who are “children of the promise.” This refers to the promise of providing Abraham a son through Sarah (v. 9). It reminds the reader of 4:13-25, where Abraham believed God and was given a righteous status. There the precedent had already been established that God operates on the basis of the divine calling.

The purpose of promise and election, i.e., of divine calling, over and against the “flesh,” is further substantiated in 9:10-13, where the story of Jacob and Esau is given. Before these twins could do “good or bad” (11), and “in order that God’s purpose of election might stand,” he chose one over the other—Jacob over Esau (12-13). This “doing” (πράσσω) “good or bad” (11) is clarified in v. 12: “not by works, but by the one who calls” (οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος). This must refer to “works of the law” in the Jewish cultic sense. The reason is because, like Paul’s point with the Abraham story (concerning a specific prescription of the Law, namely, circumcision in 4:10-12), the same narrative is still at work, arguing that covenant status (those who are truly “Israel,” v. 6) is conferred prior to the giving of the Law. Thus, in terms of designating who the people of God are, observing the Law no longer does that in Paul’s

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1044 Σάρξ in v. 8 is used disapprovingly as in Rom 2:25-29; cf. 3:20.
1045 See also Bird, The Saving Righteousness of God, 74, who says the same question “permeates” ch. 4.
1046 See Gorman, Crucified Lord, 381, on the link to 2:28-29.
1047 See Ibid.
1048 Against this, see Schreiner, Romans, 499, fn. 23.
view. Before Jacob or Esau could do “anything good or bad” (11), a status of “loved” (ἀγαπάω) was given to Jacob, though he was “lesser” than his brother (12-13). Thus, covenant love and covenant status precede “doing good” (11), i.e., “works” [of the law] (12). Moreover, that “works of the law” primarily mean those ordinances which separate Jews from the nations is evidenced when one takes into account the passage cited in 9:12b, namely, Gen 25:23, where the distinction between “nations,” ἕθνη, and “peoples,” λαοὶ, is clearly made (LXX), which is “precisely the point at issue: the identity and status of two eschatological nations or peoples.”\textsuperscript{1049} Along with this, one should note the primacy of “love” in v. 13 and its connection to “calling” in v. 12 (cf. 9:25). Again, “love” and “hatred” refer specifically to the status of different peoples\textsuperscript{1050}—specifically, covenant status. What Paul is ultimately arguing for here is nothing less than that covenant status, even for the Jewish nation, came prior to their works of the law—indeed, prior to the giving of the Law.

Verse 14 begins with a question, “What, therefore, shall we say? Is there unrighteousness with God?” The οὖν serves to connect with the previous thoughts, not least with v. 6 and is parallel to 3:5.\textsuperscript{1051} Is there ἀδικία with God? For Paul this is inconceivable. This is confirmed because even Moses was told that mercy depends upon divine prerogative, not human willing or exertion (9:15-16). Pharaoh is utilized as support for this assertion (17). Following this is the discussion concerning divine hardening and mercy (18-23). Significantly, all of this occurs in the context of explaining the question posed in v. 14: “Is there ἀδικία with God”? This question is put forward because of the audacious world of thought compressed in v. 6b. If not everyone who happens to be a descendant of Israel is really to be counted as “Israel,” and if Jewishness is defined as a circumcision of the heart (2:28-29), and if Jewishness is not defined by nature—by those who have the law, hearing it regularly (2:12-13)—then perhaps the word of God has failed; perhaps he is unfaithful to his promises through

\textsuperscript{1049} Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 153.
\textsuperscript{1050} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{1051} Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 638; See also Schreiner, Romans, 505–506.
Israel and hence, unrighteous, ἀδικία. Paul answers this charge by citing examples of how God’s mercy, calling, and faith have been how God’s redemptive story has always worked. But, polemically, these are now reworked around Christ (see below).

After rebuking his interlocutor, Paul asks: “What if God, although desiring to show his wrath and make his power known has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, and in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory?” (vv. 22-23). The question is left hanging, but the phrase “vessels of mercy” is picked up, bringing it into human focus. “There is no question, though, who Paul has in mind as these ‘vessels of mercy.’ It is ‘we, whom he has called,’” and those who have been called are not just from the Jews, but also from the Gentiles. Supporting this claim, Paul quotes Hos 2:25; 2:1 (LXX), which will be examined below.

Verses 30-32 bring the issue of Jew-Gentile righteousness to the fore and help illuminate the hermeneutical dilemma surrounding the Hosea quotation in vv. 25-26. Paul asks, “What, then, shall we say? That Gentiles who did not pursue righteousness have attained righteousness—a righteousness by faith, but Israel who pursued a law of righteousness has not reached the law? How come? Because they did not pursue it by

1052 Cf. Wright, PFG, 1186-1187, who sees the question of v. 14 as being one a Gentile would ask. It is agreeable that this is perhaps in view (however partly). However, one should not dismiss the polemic still being pressed against Jews as well. True, Paul is putting on display the story of Israel to show that God is faithful to his promises through Abraham, as Wright says. But a case could still be made that the argument here is still against Jews (contra Wright, PFG, 1187). There are a couple of reasons for this. First, since 9:14 and 9:6 is linked back to 3:3-5 (and that back to the argument of ch. 2), then v. 6ff should still be seen as continuing the same line of argument—namely, to reorient what Jewishness means. Second, the greater argument includes a provocative statement about the inclusion of Gentiles in 9:24-26, which no doubt would have, as Wright admits (1185, 1187), stirred Jews to cry foul. The fact is that vv. 24-26 are no mere aside (as Wright seems to suggest) to the greater narrative; rather, it is perhaps a climactic part of it.

1053 I take the participle as a concessive. Regarding the different views, see Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 641.

1054 Ibid., 642.

1055 Ibid.

1056 Postponing this discussion until Section 7 is to establish a context so that the logic behind the citations’ use becomes clear. Following these are quotations from Isaiah (10:22; 28:22), which speak of how only a remnant from Israel will be saved. For the view that ηῆμας in v. 24 encompasses both believing Gentiles and believing Jews, see Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 156. On Rom 9:6-29, cf. Ticciati, “Romans 9-11,” 259-261, and her larger discussion.
faith, but as from works” (vv. 30-32). Various approaches to the enigmatic phrase “law of righteousness” have been given. Arguably, it becomes clear when it is set in parallel with Rom 2:13-14: “Gentiles who did not pursue righteousness” in 9:30 is conceptually parallel to “Gentiles who do not have the law” in 2:14, and “Israel who pursued a law” in 9:31 is parallel to “the hearers of the law” in 2:13. Thus:

A “Gentiles who do not have the law” (2:14)
B “the hearers of the law” (2:13)
A¹ “Gentiles who did not pursue righteousness” (9:30)
B¹ “Israel who pursued a law” (9:31)

This parallel is not without basis, for in addition to 9:30, “Paul connects righteousness language and the word nomos absolutely in only two other verses in Romans: 2:13 and 10:5.” Moreover, the narrative from which Paul has been arguing is that those in lines A and A¹ are those who become “justified” (2:13), i.e., those who have “attained righteousness” (9:30). Conversely, those in lines B and B¹ are those who will not be justified (2:13), having not reached righteousness (9:31). Thus, Rom 2:12-16 aids in understanding 9:30-31 and, as we will see, vice versa.

Concerning how this might shed light upon the quotations from Hosea, one sees that 9:30-32 pertains to the exact issue found in 9:25-26—namely, Gentile inclusion. The Gentiles have attained covenant status, i.e., “attained righteousness,” because they pursued it by “faith” (32). The Jews, on the contrary, did not “reach righteousness” because they “did not pursue it by faith, but as through works” (32), which refer to Jewish “works of the law.” Two observations are noteworthy. First, it is recalled that Rom 2:12-15 mentioned nothing about “justification by faith,” only a “justification” by “doing the law,” but in 9:30-32 the answer to that riddle becomes clear. Both passages concern the issue of covenant inclusion. Those who “do the law” are justified and the

1057 On the textual issue here, see Moo, Romans, 620, fn. 13.
1058 See Ibid., 622–627. See also Fitzmyer, Romans, 577-578; Barrett, Romans, 180; Stuhlmacher, Romans, 152.
1059 Ibid., 625.
1060 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 539–540, who sees “works” in the broad sense.
“hearers of the law” are not because, as 9:32-33 shows, the former believed (i.e., had faith), while the latter did not express faith and so stumbled. Second, carrying this logic specifically to the Hosea quotations in 9:25-26, one sees again that there is no mention of “faith in Christ” as the means by which the Gentiles attained covenant status—i.e., a status of “my people,” “beloved,” and “sons of the living God” (9:25-26). That said, what Paul does include in the Hosea quotation is the divine call, which of course he connects to faith (see below). But it is not enough to say that covenant status is gained “by faith” or not gained by “not having faith.” The real issue—to which all the discussions about faith, calling, and covenant have been implying all along—is christological.

Verse 32 suggests that Christology served as the interpretive foundation for Paul’s reappraisal of OT themes in his narrative.\textsuperscript{1061} If v. 32a explains what caused the Jews to fail to reach covenant status (“they did not pursue it by faith but as by works”), then 32b perhaps explains how the Jews failed at what they did.\textsuperscript{1062} “They stumbled over the stone of stumbling” (32b).\textsuperscript{1063} This is grounded on the scriptural quotation which immediately follows: “Behold, I lay in Zion a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense, and everyone who believes upon him will not be ashamed” (33ab). Importantly, the substance of what was previously discussed in regard to “faith,” “calling,” and “righteousness” has now been summed up into this “stone of stumbling.” This is reinforced by v. 33b, which connects the concepts of “the stone of stumbling and rock of offense” in v. 33a with the concept of “faith.” Thus, the deciding factor for Gentile inclusion and Jewish failure (spoken about in 30-32a) is how each group responded to “the stone/rock” in v. 33a.\textsuperscript{1064} The obvious conclusion is that the Gentiles believed “upon him,” but the Jews did not. Therefore, it seems that this “rock of offense” is the

\textsuperscript{1061} Moo, \textit{Romans}, 626–627, notes Paul’s “christological emphasis” here. See also Ticciati, “Romans 9-11,” 261.

\textsuperscript{1062} Cf. ibid. who also makes a similar observation.


\textsuperscript{1064} See Ticciati, “Romans 9-11,” 261.
axis around which Paul’s ecclesiology and soteriology rotate, being central to Paul’s hermeneutic.\textsuperscript{1065}

Paul begins ch. 10 by saying that the Jews have zeal, “but not according to knowledge, ἐπίγνωσις” (v.2). Some have argued that the zeal in question should be understood in terms of devotion to God, that is, “for God.”\textsuperscript{1066} It is best to see, unambiguously, “zeal” as still having to do with the issue of Jew-Gentile relations, i.e., with ethnocentric concerns.\textsuperscript{1067} The γὰρ immediately following in v. 3 connects this “knowledge” with saying they are ignorant (ἀγνοέω) “of the righteousness of God, and seeking to establish their own, they did not submit to the righteousness of God” (3).\textsuperscript{1068} Thus, the problem of Jewish zeal for righteousness “not according to knowledge” is that they have failed to understand the righteousness from God, since they have sought to “establish their own.” Likewise, the γὰρ in v. 4 serves to connect it with v. 3: “For [γὰρ] Christ is the culmination (τέλος) of the law for righteousness to all who believe” (v.4).\textsuperscript{1069} Here Paul seeks to explain the Jewish failure to “reach righteousness” (9:31)\textsuperscript{1070} and make explicit how this happened, that is, to describe the nature of their “stumbling” (9:33). The Jewish problem, then, is christological. Thus, Paul’s understanding that the Jewish failure to “reach righteousness” was founded upon a fundamental pre-understanding about the faith and the Christ event and its unique role it has come to play in redemptive history. (This pre-understanding, interestingly, also informed his particular construal of the Isaiah texts in 9:33.) Christ, as “the culmination of the law for

\textsuperscript{1065} Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 157, calls 9:30-33 a “theological summation” of 9:6-29. Cf. the following statement by Holt and Spears, “The Ecclesia,” Manifesto, 78: “…Paul reads the Scriptures ecclesially because he reads them christologically” (emphasis original).

\textsuperscript{1066} Dane C. Ortlund, “‘Zeal Without Knowledge’: For What Did Paul Criticize His Fellow Jews in Romans 10:2-3?,” WTJ 73, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 23-37, citing 26 (emphasis original); See also Moo, Romans, 623; However, one should specifically understand this in the context of covenant: Dunn, Romans, 38b, 586–587; See also Morris, Romans, 378, fn. 5; See esp. Wright, PFG, 1169.


\textsuperscript{1068} Cf. Ortlund, “Zeal Without Knowledge,” 34, who describes the “ignorance” in question as anthropological (i.e., their sinful state), christological, and salvation-historical.

righteousness to all who believe,” is Paul’s way of explaining how the Gentiles have “attained righteousness” in v. 30—i.e., *they have believed in Christ*.

If, for Paul, the Jewish problem of *exclusion* was christological, then the Gentile solution of *inclusion* was also christological (a point not insignificant for when Rom 9:25-26 is analyzed below). According to Paul, covenant status is found in “attaining righteousness,” in reaching a point of culmination of the law, which was the entire point of Rom 2:12-29, namely, that Gentiles could be considered part of God’s covenant—circumcised (*spiritual*)—people. Thus, the implicit features that served to enable the interpretations of key OT themes given in Rom 2:12-29 and 3:20-21 (and ch. 4) come to light in 9:32-10:4. Specifically, Paul’s christological convictions undergirded his fresh, revisionist understanding of the prevailing motifs found in his working narrative, namely, *righteousness, law-keeping, and the Gentile question*.

### 6.4 Interpretive Horizons

The clearing of distinction between Jew and Gentile was founded upon Paul’s use of scriptural texts, stories, and quotations—all of which were christologically construed. Without Christology, there is still “distinction” between Jew and Greek, for the Law—which served to divide the two ethnic groups—would still be in place (3:20-31). With the Jewish texts contributing to Paul’s argument, Paul’s Christology dialogued with Scripture, functioning hermeneutically. It was with the christocentric

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1070 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 656.
1071 See Section 4.5: “Vorurteil” above.
1072 Τέλεσα is used Rom 2:27 in terms of Gentiles keeping and fulfilling the law, linking it to τέλος in 10:4 (Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 657).
1074 Space does not permit looking into Rom 10:5-13, which explains in large part 10:4. On this, see Wright, *PFG*, 1165–1176.
1075 See esp. the way v. 29 functions significantly within the overall argument, as Wright, *Justification*, 211-212 (see also 52-53, 179), observes. See also Garlington, *The Obedience of Faith*, 255.
1076 Cf. Starling, *Not My People*, 185, who observes the hermeneutical role christology played in Ephesians, saying, “For the writer of Ephesians, the death of Christ is thus not only a soteriological event (reconciling Jew and Gentile to God) and an ecclesiological event (reconciling Jew and Gentile to one another within the ‘new humanity’ of the church) but also a hermeneutical
retelling of the Abraham story that this became evident. In fact, the story itself in some ways climaxed everything leading up to it by revealing how all who believe as Abraham are his children (4:11-12). The “as” is important, for Abraham’s faith was never originally christocentric. Even though the Abrahamic covenant spoke of a future blessing upon the nations (e.g., Gen 12:3), and though Paul probably had this in mind in his retelling of the story,\(^\text{1077}\) it would be a mistake to think that Paul’s christological convictions contributed nothing to the Abraham story itself—and hence to the entire narrative which centered upon the Jew-Gentile question.\(^\text{1078}\) This is apparent when one considers how the story was employed as a rhetorical event.\(^\text{1079}\) These christological convictions, being central to Paul’s exposition,\(^\text{1080}\) allow the story of Scripture to be meaningful to the Roman Christian community. The place where the Horizontverschmelzung takes place (and only there) is where the Pauline hermeneutic is understood.

As dialogue, therefore, Paul’s Christology is not engaged in a battle with Scripture. This is not the essence of his exegesis, for the Jewish text is important for Paul (Rom 1:2). However, one cannot clarify his interpretive activity without taking into account his prejudgments; his exegesis was such that he did more than merely repeat the original text and its meaning. Paul’s way of reading Scripture cannot be described as interpretation-as-repetition. Paul, after all, is reading the texts as a Christian. This is where Gadamer’s hermeneutic is clarifying.\(^\text{1081}\) Interpretation cannot be limited to mere reproduction of the text, for every act of interpretation involves the interpreter’s own prejudgments.\(^\text{1082}\) The text has its own horizon; the reader theirs.

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1078 Cf. the discussion about Gospel writing in Murray Rae, “Theological Interpretation and Historical Criticism,” Manifesto, 105-106.
1079 In regard to the implicit role Paul’s christological beliefs played in ch. 4, see Forman, “The Politics of Promise,” 316.
1080 Cf. Holst, “The Meaning of ‘Abraham Believed God’ in Romans 4,” 325, who argues that christology is subsumed under the broader category of “theology” and covenant.
1081 See Section 4.4 above on Gadamer’s idea of “tradition.”
1082 Gadamer, TM, 272.
Understanding is accomplished when a fusion of horizons takes place.\textsuperscript{1083} It can be said, then, that Paul views Jewish texts, motifs, and stories \textit{from} a christological horizon. Both the horizons of the text and of Paul inform the other. For example, the text of the Abraham story demonstrated the historical fact of Abraham’s reckoning of righteousness as being prior to Mosaic Law observance—i.e., circumcision—and that is indeed what Paul concluded.\textsuperscript{1084} The text, as such, was a distanced text. But texts must speak to the present, as Gadamer says: “Nun haben uns unsere Überlegungen zu der Einsicht geführt, daß im Verstehen immer so etwas wie eine Anwendung des zu verstehenden Textes auf die gegenwärtige Situation des Interpreten stattfindet.”\textsuperscript{1085}

It was in 4:23-24 where Paul sought to apply the text to his contemporary situation (i.e., to the Christian community at Rome), establishing an “archetype of Christian belief in (relation to) Jesus.”\textsuperscript{1086} The rhetorical force inherent to the Abraham story, therefore, served to validate his previous discussion about circumcision in 2:25-29, namely, that uncircumcised believers can share in the righteous status as well, which was exactly Paul’s point with the Abraham story all along (4:16-17, 22-25). Yet, underlying all this was a certain christological conviction—already in place for him, as well as, presumably, for his implied audience. Similar to how the Qumran community interpreted covenant inclusion from a decidedly sectarian sort of away, so did Paul. For the pesherist, to be included in the covenant was to be \textit{in the sect}. For Paul, it was to be \textit{in Christ}.\textsuperscript{1087}

Recalling the sectarian texts, it is remembered that DiMattei argued (as we did similarly) that a “central characteristic” of the pesherist’s reading of Scripture was its “contemporizing eschatological interpretation.”\textsuperscript{1088} Interestingly, and with an affirmative answer in mind, he asks, “Are these not the same hermeneutical principles that govern

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1083] Ibid., 305.
\item[1084] Dunn, \textit{Romans}, 38a, 239.
\item[1085] Gadamer, \textit{WM}, 313; \textit{TM}, 306-307. See also Section 4.7 above.
\item[1086] Dunn, \textit{Romans}, 38a, 239. Recall Gadamer’s idea of “contemporaneity,” \textit{Gleichzeitigkeit} (see Section 4.3.2). See again DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” \textit{As It Is Written}, 77-78.
\item[1087] See e.g., 2 Cor 5:17.
\item[1088] DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” \textit{As It Is Written}, 77-78. See Section 6.1a.
\end{footnotes}
Paul’s approach to biblical narrative...?" He also affirms, and gives recognition to the fact, that Paul’s Christology plays a role in the interpretive act, though he is quick to locate Christology as something that “influences and shapes the content of [Paul’s] hermeneutic” in distinction to “the underlying hermeneutical assumption that guides his interpretation,” namely, a “contemporizing eschatological interpretation,” an assumption shared between Paul and the pesherist.\footnote{DiMattei’s distinction here is unnecessary for us—not least because of our adoption of Gadamer’s theory. This, arguably, sets our thesis apart from DiMattei’s otherwise helpful proposal. Whereas he is right to notice the similarity between the pesherist’s and Paul’s contemporizing hermeneutic, he falls short by not connecting this strongly to Christology, pushing the latter to the background and thus failing to see this as the distinguishing hermeneutical factor for Paul (in relation to the pesherist). With Gadamer’s hermeneutic in hand, one can bring back to the forefront Pauline Christology as a key hermeneutical component, specifically as an integral prejudgment, one not shared by the pesherist.\footnote{Thus, Joseph Fitzmyer, citing Rom 4:24-25, can say Paul “differed from his Essene contemporaries,” not least regarding the fact that, “Paul speaks of justification as an effect of the Christ-event. Christ Jesus has brought it about that sinners stand acquitted before God’s tribunal...That God’s justifying grace comes to human beings through Jesus Christ obviously has no place in Essene thinking.”\footnote{Thus when Moyise (“Quotations,” As It Is Written, 20) asks whether or not there is “a ‘christological’ or ‘messianic’ dimension to Paul’s hermeneutics that cannot be paralleled in the Qumran writings,” demands—at least based upon the specific observations above—an affirmative answer in many respects.}}

Thus, Joseph Fitzmyer, citing Rom 4:24-25, can say Paul “differed from his Essene contemporaries,” not least regarding the fact that, “Paul speaks of justification as an effect of the Christ-event. Christ Jesus has brought it about that sinners stand acquitted before God’s tribunal...That God’s justifying grace comes to human beings through Jesus Christ obviously has no place in Essene thinking.”\footnote{Thus when Moyise (“Quotations,” As It Is Written, 20) asks whether or not there is “a ‘christological’ or ‘messianic’ dimension to Paul’s hermeneutics that cannot be paralleled in the Qumran writings,” demands—at least based upon the specific observations above—an affirmative answer in many respects.} Thus, what makes possible Paul’s re-appraisal of the Jewish tradition (i.e., the concepts and themes inherent to the Jewish nation—circumcision, Torah, \textit{inter alia}) is his Christology.\footnote{Indeed, “Christ is the key to Pauline hermeneutics.”\footnote{Lim, \textit{Holy Scripture}, 171. He says elsewhere that for Paul, “To understand the true meaning of scripture is to read the texts from [a] Christological perspective” (171); “At the heart of...}
mere imposition onto the text; rather, it is active dialogically (see below). On the one hand, the christological convictions allow the text of the Abraham story to be meaningful for the community of Christians. On the other hand, the text also informs these christological convictions. The point, moreover, is that the Abraham story had the meaning it did because of its precise application to the Christ-believing community. Gadamer is clear: “Verstehen ist hier immer schon Anwenden.” Thus, Paul’s Christology and Abraham’s story must be seen as engaged in a sort of dialogue. Both inform the other, despite the fact that each distinct horizon remains exactly that: distinct, separate from the other. Following Gadamer, Paul’s Christology was acting as a type of Vorurteil, a prejudgment by which he was able to render his judgments. This was a pre-understanding that enabled his understanding

Paul’s hermeneutics is his own and fellow believers’ experience of Christ” (172); “Paul’s hermeneutics are anchored in the revelation of God through the belief that Jesus, the Messiah, was crucified, died, was buried, and resurrected. Through his own experience on the Damascus Road and subsequent, trance-like, ecstatic encounters with the visionary Christ, he has come to interpret scripture not according to the traditions of the fathers, but in the new light of this revelation” (172); “Central to Paul’s hermeneutics is his own experience of Jesus and understanding of the significance of the cross. On this basis, all his exegetical techniques and scriptural interpretation depended” (175); “Whatever [Paul] may do exegetically, there is a theological agenda around which the biblical texts had to be conformed…To be sure the authoritative writings of Israel constituted the framework in which he worked, but his hermeneutics and exegetical endeavors have their source beyond these boundaries” (176). The benefit of using Gadamer’s hermeneutic is that it brings clarity to how Paul can do all that Lim has described above. For example, a hermeneutic that seeks to understand how Scripture contributes to Paul’s arguments must also at the same time coherently take into account Paul’s assumption that his arguments from Scripture can only be what they are in light of what he brings to Scripture, namely, his christological prejudgments. Gadamer’s theory provides such a hermeneutic.

The story holds very little rhetorical weight if Christology is not already being assumed. Moreover, these observations are not without warrant; see e.g. Käsemann, Romans, 129, who discusses this issue along the same lines when he mentions the circular relationship between Christology and the doctrine of justification (see also 95-96). It is our present contention that Gadamer’s theory helps to bring explicit illumination to this fact.

Cf. Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 76-83, who discusses how the OT acts as a preunderstanding for NT writers (not least Paul). This study brings more attention to this idea.


Gadamer, WM, 314; TM, 308. See again Section 4.7 above.

Gadamer, TM, 361–362.

Ibid., 271–272 (see also 303–306).

See Section 4.5 above.
of the story of Scripture. Truly, “the being of the interpreter belongs intrinsically to the being of what is to be interpreted.” Paul’s fundamental conviction served as the mediality between the past stories of Israel (depicted in her texts) and Paul’s present situation—i.e., the question of a Jew-Gentile church.

Applying these observations through Paul’s argument, one can see further that his idea of covenant inclusion in Rom 2:12-16 and what counts as true circumcision in Rom 2:25-29 work if and only if certain prejudgments were in place—which were later revealed in chapters 3-4. What sustained his interpretation of “law” in 2:13? Though it was not told at the time (except for a subtle reference in 2:16), the decisive point for Paul was later seen to be christological (3:20ff; 4:23-24). In Gadamerian terms, Paul’s christological convictions permeated his historically-effected consciousness. And so: “Darum sind die Vorurteile des einzelnen weit mehr als seine Urteile die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit seines Seins.”

One should posit, then, that Paul’s experience of the resurrected Christ on the Damascus road (see Acts 26:12-32; Gal 1:11-24) was an experience (in Gadamerian language) that helped give shape to his hermeneutic. This thesis is not without warrant among some exegetes. For instance, Seyoon Kim in his excellent work, The Origins of Paul’s Gospel, grants special attention to Paul’s account of his conversion on the Damascus road and offers a rather convincing exegetical case that Paul’s gospel—not least his own mission to the Gentiles—found its beginning in his experience of the resurrected Christ. Kim describes this event as having “brought about a revolution in Paul—both in his thought (i.e., theology) and life: he received his gospel and apostolic call to preach it among the gentiles.” Our aim has

102 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” Gadamer Reader, 263.
103 So Wright, PFG, 922 (see especially fn. 412).
104 Gadamer, TM, 301.
105 Gadamer, WM, 281; TM, 278. Emphasis original.
106 See Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall in the translators’ preface in Gadamer, TM, xiii. Here, the translators observe the way Gadamer used the word Erfahrung (“experience”). See also Ian W. Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing: Story, Experience, and the Spirit (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 169–178, who, similarly, argues in the same vein and offers an excellent commentary on the relationship between Paul’s narrative logic and Paul’s experience in Galatians.
108 Kim, Origin, 274. In depth interaction with Kim’s argument is not possible. However, his work demonstrates that our conclusions, which have been drawn from a distinctly philosophical-
been to elaborate more on this issue, namely, to propose via Gadamer that while Christology indeed played a crucial part in shifting Paul’s theology and gospel, it also served, arguably, to shift his hermeneutic.\textsuperscript{1109}

Though the entirety of Kim’s exegetical work does not need to be affirmed, much of it lends to otherwise helpful conclusions.\textsuperscript{1110} Indeed, his insights serve to buttress the conclusions of the present study. Arguably, too, our study offers a philosophical, and hence hermeneutical, support for his own. For example, after spending a great deal of time working out the exegesis of the relevant texts, Kim concludes that Paul’s gospel and apostleship (and all that these entailed) found its root in the Christophany itself.\textsuperscript{1111} But Kim rightly acknowledges along with this that Paul’s Damascus road experience, while altering his theological disposition, does not imply “that up to that moment his mind was theologically a \textit{tabula rasa}.”\textsuperscript{1112} Kim acknowledges that Paul held to Jewish traditional thoughts and beliefs, e.g., “messianic beliefs,” “conceptions of the law and Wisdom,” as well as “other ideas and concepts in Judaism and the primitive Christian kerygma,” and “Hellenistic ideas and concepts”—all things with which Paul would have been familiar.\textsuperscript{1113} That being said, Kim rightly asserts that “these \textit{religionsgeschichtlichen} materials neither made Paul a Christian nor produced his theology.”\textsuperscript{1114} The major turn, Kim says, was when Paul experience the

\textsuperscript{1109} Cf. Hays, \textit{Echoes}, 182, who rightly says that one cannot separate Paul’s gospel from his interpretive practices. Lim, \textit{Holy Scripture}, 172, makes a remarkably similar observation: “Through his own experience on the Damascus Road and subsequent, trance-like, ecstatic encounters with the visionary Christ, he has come to interpret scripture not according to the traditions of the fathers, but in the new light of this revelation. The hermeneutical shift involved the reading of scripture around this basic belief that ‘in Christ’, a formula for the significance of the Christ-event, the intended will of God can be ascertained, and he used all the techniques known to him as [an] exegete to argue for its biblical indications.”

\textsuperscript{1110} E.g. his failure to see \textit{telos} in Rom 10:4 as anything but “termination” (Kim, \textit{Origin}, 307-308). This is not, arguably, a mistake with minor consequences.

\textsuperscript{1111} See Kim, \textit{Origin}, 330ff.

\textsuperscript{1112} Ibid., 334. Cf. Starling, \textit{Not My People}, 121-122, who, although citing Kim’s work positively (122, fn. 52), seems to suggest later that this would be untenable for passages like Rom 9:25-26 where OT texts are used as an argument. His fear is that this would amount to vicious circularity. Gadamer’s theory, however, sets such fears aside.

\textsuperscript{1113} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1114} Ibid.
resurrected Jesus, and at that point—that is, at that “catalyst of the living experience” of seeing Jesus—“were these materials precipitated into Paul’s Christian theology.” He says,

To put it another way, the real experience of the Damascus revelation led Paul to use all those religionsgeschichtlichen materials as interpretive categories and concepts for his Christian theology. That is to say, those materials provided Paul only with certain categories and concepts with which he could interpret the Damascus experience and produce his theology. But without the real experience of the Damascus revelation Paul could not have had his gospel at all, not to mention his unshakable and lively conviction in it.¹¹¹⁶

Put in Gadamerian terms, one might say that Kim notices a certain Pauline dialectic where both the traditional “materials” come into a temporally-distanced (indeed, a tensioned) dialogue with his own experience of Christ. Thus, a fundamental dialogical interaction occurs in Paul’s reading of Scripture—one informed by the horizon of the textual material (being imbedded with traditions inherent to the Jewish people) and with that which served to make up his own horizon, specifically his own christological convictions. Truly, “the events of Jesus’ death and resurrection…caused [Paul] to read old texts in new ways.”¹¹¹⁷ Gadamer’s hermeneutic gives language to this dialogical tension in way that is not detrimental, but rather in a way that reveals, cogently, its essential character.

Paul’s use of key motifs like righteousness and law keeping (see above) were interpreted in light of the Christ-event. Significantly, the Gentile question was understood in light of the re-appraisal of these two motifs and in light of the Christ-event.¹¹¹⁸ Thus, it seems that Paul’s christological convictions served to support his entire narrative substructure (a narrative comprised of these three motifs). Faith in Christ, one can conclude, is the interpretive Vorurteil for matters regarding law keeping, righteousness, as well as in terms of answering the Gentile question itself.¹¹¹⁹ Thus,

¹¹¹⁵ Ibid.
¹¹¹⁶ Ibid.
¹¹¹⁷ Wright, PFG, 827. Emphasis original. See the context of the discussion, esp. 825-828.
¹¹¹⁹ See Starling, Not My People, 162–163, who observes that, instead of “incorporation into Christ” being the dominant hermeneutical motif in Romans, the theme of “the righteousness of faith” takes its place. The lack of attention to chs. 5-8 (see below) is because, even though it does address
Paul’s christological convictions informed his readings of Jewish texts; conversely, the texts themselves, comprised of these motifs, served to give shape to this key conviction. Thus, Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutical dialogue is once more helpful in bringing clarity and insight. And it will continue to prove helpful as Paul’s use of Hosea in Rom 9 is explored below.

6.5 Summary

The purpose for having drawn out parallels from Rom 1:5, 18-32 to 2:12-29 continuing through chs. 3-4 to the immediate context of 9:6-10:4 was to display the re-occurring, relevant thematic construals within them. Moreover, this gives Rom 9:25-26 a proper narrative context—i.e., the surprising announcement of Gentile righteousness/inclusion—and allows one to engage the perceived hermeneutical dilemma. What should be seen therefore at this point is that any difficulty with the quotations from Hosea in Rom 9 (i.e., with a Jewish text being applied to non-Jewish people) mirrors the previous discussions concerning Jewish motifs, which began before the quotations in 9:25-26 (e.g., 1:5; 2:12-29; chs. 3-4) and after them (9:30-10:4). Thus, by analyzing these passages, it should be clear that, far from being an odd and isolated instance of a novel interpretive event, the re-appraisal of the Hosea quotations in 9:25-26 remain part of a larger pattern of re-appraisal.

Paul argued, first, that righteousness was attained by some Gentiles but not some Jews (2:12-29). He concluded, second, that this was because Gentiles pursued righteousness “by faith,” and the Jews did not (9:30-32). It was found, third, that Christology played a role in this entire evaluation. Thus, Paul’s christological

the so-called “union with Christ” motif, it does not explicitly deal with the Gentile question (as Starling, too, has noted; see 162). Moreover, one shouldn’t forget that the “in Christ” theme isn’t completely lacking from the texts we have examined (see Starling, Not My People, 162, fn. 209). Thus, taking into account the context of Gal 3:14, union with Christ ought to be seen as an implicit Pauline assumption at work within the Abraham story in Rom 4. “Faith” or “faithfulness” in relation to “righteousness” is always for Paul wrapped up in the person of Christ.

1120 Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing, 170-171, reaches similar conclusions, howbeit via a different route. See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 247-248, who discusses how for Paul, in an act of “reversal of his heritage as a Jew” which would have made it “inconceivable” to understand the phrase ὑπακοὴ πίστεως “apart from Jewish identity,” has allowed the “the complex of eschatology and Christology” to be instrumental in “expand[ing] the horizons of ‘the obedience of faith.’”
convictions in 9:33 and 10:4 proved both instructive and significant. It was instructive because one can see how Paul connected it with his previous use of righteousness language (chs. 2-4) and significant because it revealed just how hermeneutically indispensable Christology proved to be in the re-appraisal of Jewish motifs and stories. For Paul, after all, there exists no scenario where righteousness is attained by faith (or failed to have been attained by faith) in 9:30-32 if there fails to exist an already assumed christological backdrop. If that is true in 9:30-32, then it is also true in the parallel texts examined (e.g., 2:11ff; also chs. 3-4). Indeed, Paul’s interpretations concerning the three motifs (see above), which served to frame his working narrative, simply do not work without this essential fore-structure of understanding. Paul’s revised understandings of the aforementioned Jewish motifs did not occur in a vacuum, but were formulated as a result of fusion between the horizon of the traditional stories and texts (e.g., the Abraham story) and his christological horizon. How do these insights, specifically, come to bear upon the Hosea citation in Rom 9:25-26?

1121 See again Campbell, “An Evangelical Paul,” 337–51 (see esp. 342-349).
1122 Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing, 173, makes a similar argument in his analysis of Galatians, referring to a “dialectical interplay of story and experience.” Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 31, speaks likewise of “Paul’s exposition of Abraham” and how it did not occur “in a vacuum” (though here Moyise is emphasizing how Paul’s reading “competes” with other contemporaneous readings).
Chapter 7: Finding Fusion in Romans 9:25-26

Paul’s use of Hosea is initially difficult to understand because he explains very little about it. He quotes it in passing and quickly moves on. Considering the above argument, however, Paul does not need to elaborate further. This is conceivable because, as said above, Paul’s re-appraisal of the Hosea oracle is quite consistent with the pattern that has gone before it. In the narrative leading up to the Hosea quotations, important details, assumptions, and implied beliefs were already at work (hermeneutically).\footnote{Cf. the argument given in Christopher D. Stanley, “Rhetoric of Quotations,” Exploring Intertextuality, 42-62, esp. 56, 60-61, on Paul’s lack of interpretive explanation.} In what follows, therefore, an account of Horizontverschmelzung in Rom 9:25-26 will be offered.

7.1 Hermeneutical Tension

Continuing with his ongoing re-appraisal of Jewish texts and motifs, Paul does nothing novel in 9:25-26. For example, that Paul allowed himself considerable freedom to invert the Hosea text, substituting καλέσω for ἐρῶ in 9:25, ought to be seen as an echo back to 4:17, where Abraham’s justifying faith was described as a belief in the God who could “call [καλέω] the things that are not as though they are.” It should be remembered, moreover, that this story took on applicability with respect to a christological horizon.\footnote{See Sections 6.3 and 6.5 above.} This observation needs to be given its due weight. Christologically, the motif of God’s “calling” remained significant for Paul throughout key parts of the narrative. This ought to be carried over to 9:25-26. For example, “faith” and “calling” were depicted as opposed to “works” in both the Abraham story (4:2-4, 16-17) and in the discussion about Jacob (9:11), respectively. Likewise, the motifs of “calling” and (covenant) “love,” being syntactically linked in Rom 9:11 and 13, were seen as opposed to “works” and covenant rejection, respectively. Tellingly, this is not unlike the Hosea quotation in 9:25, where the motifs of “calling” and “love” are likewise linked regarding the inclusion of the New Covenant people of God, the Gentiles.\footnote{In v. 24, Paul says that the “vessels of mercy” are those who have been “called” (καλέω). Here it}
is not the Jews of Hosea’s prophecy, but specifically the Gentiles, which the immediate quotation from Hosea reinforces:\footnote{1126}

I will call the Not My People, “My People,” and the Not Loved, “Loved.” And in the place in which it was said to them, “You are Not My People,” they shall be called sons of the living God (9:25-26).

This brings us to the fundamental question: How might the tension inherent in Paul’s use of the oracle be accounted for? Like the discussion concerning Gentile inclusion in Rom 2:13-29 (with the subsequent discussion in chs. 3-4), and the reappraisal of certain key motifs inherent to the Jews, the Hosea interpretation appears corroborated, not because of explicit reasons that are given at this point (they are not), but rather when—and perhaps only when—Paul’s \textit{Vorstruktur des Verstehens}, which has been operative throughout, is still seen as having full force. As will be seen, this intertextual passage can be described as a dialogue between text and reader.

\section*{7.2 Horizons: Text and Reader in Dialogue}

This instance of intertextuality is clarified when one addresses it with Gadamer’s concepts of \textit{horizons} (and from there, the \textit{fusion of horizons}).\footnote{1127} What comprised Hosea’s interpretive horizon was Jewish unrighteousness and rebellion and the prophetic announcement that this would be reversed—with, to be sure, a Davidic King playing some role.\footnote{1128} What made up Paul’s horizon of understanding was the prophetic announcement of Christ, who, for Paul, was the means by which both reversal would be fulfilled and divine faithfulness be manifested for those who believe.\footnote{1129} Paul read the oracle in light of this fundamental conviction, but his reading was not merely \textit{his}.\footnote{1130} Understanding as an interpretive event is not a one-sided process; it is dialogical.\footnote{1131}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
    \item \footnote{1125} See Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 155.
    \item \footnote{1126} Starling, \textit{Not My People}, 116.
    \item \footnote{1127} See Gadamer, \textit{TM}, 305.
    \item \footnote{1128} See Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 above.
    \item \footnote{1129} See e.g., Rom 3:22.
    \item \footnote{1130} Cf. Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” \textit{What Does The Scripture Say}, 50, who says, “Paul \textit{does} seem to be engaged in something more sophisticated than simply replacing the original meaning with his own” (emphasis original; see the discussion on 47-50).
    \item \footnote{1131} See Gadamer, \textit{PH}, 57; \textit{TM}, 271-272.
\end{itemize}
Meaning is authored in this dialogical process. Paul’s reading of Hosea, then, can be described as a dialogical re-authoring since it takes what is relevant from the original text (e.g., a new covenant reversal of unrighteousness) and applies it to the present question of Gentile inclusion. But determining “what is relevant” (and consequently what is not relevant) in the original text is possible only in light of the specific questions Paul poses to the text and the specific answers Paul gives to the text’s own questions. Texts must be able to speak; the text’s “otherness” must be respected, but this does not entail the preclusion of the interpreter’s prejudgments. Gadamer is clear that understanding is hindered if “the text remains mute.” But when the text is unmuted and is speaking, its speaking is not “in lifeless rigidity,” but rather “gives ever new answers to the person who questions it and poses ever new questions to him who answers it. To understand a text is to come to understand oneself in a kind of dialogue.” In this dialogue, Paul can understand the oracle afresh, letting what was irrelevant fall away (Jewish exclusivity) and what was situationally relevant emerge (Gentile inclusion). This is the way one can account for the hermeneutical phenomenon—not in covering up the tension between Hosea’s text and Paul’s revisionist reading, but in letting it appear.

Additionally, it was seen in one proposal for understanding Rom 9:25-26 that Paul was illuminated by a “new covenant awareness” which enabled him to read the oracle anew. That hypothesis, however, lacked clarity for it could not account for the entire hermeneutical event: The citation was used rhetorically by Paul to argue for a so-

1132 Cf. Steve Moyise, “Dialogical Intertextuality,” Exploring Intertextuality, 3-15, whose essay is not, it seems, incompatible with the present thesis. Indeed, the idea of a “dialogical intertextuality” is helpful, for it gives space to multiple voices (see pp. 13-14). It seems, though, that a better term might be dialogical re-authoring, as the reader does have a choice “to amplify one of the voices” involved in intertextuality (p. 14). And when certain choices are made, new meaning is authored. This is, arguably, one of the benefits of utilizing Gadamer’s theory. With his emphasis on dialogue, prejudgments, and, not least, application by the interpreter as being integral to interpretive activity, the notion of re-authoring must be given its due weight.

1133 Gadamer, PH, 57.

1134 Gadamer, TM, 271-272 (see also 272-285).

1135 Gadamer, PH, 57.

1136 Ibid (see also 58).

1137 See Sections 1.3 and 1.4. (See specifically Tanner, “The New Covenant,” 102–110; esp. 106.)
called “new covenant awareness,” not the other way around. The quotations in 9:25-26 took on a specific function in the overall narrative. Thus:

Inevitably, enquiries into Paul’s hermeneutic and its relationship with other Second Temple readings of Scripture will be informed by assumptions, articulated or implicit, about the situations into which Paul understands his letters to be directed, the purposes which he intends them to accomplish, and the ways in which he expects his scriptural citations and allusions to serve those purposes.

One sees this clearly in 9:24, where Paul uses the word “calling” to refer to Gentiles who are now part of the covenant of God. The quotations from Hosea immediately follow this verse, and therefore serve to function in a way so as to reinforce that claim, namely, that Gentiles are included among the people of God. This reinforcement is done via scriptural citation, an argument for the fact of a new awareness of Gentile inclusion. The citation functions here rhetorically. The point in highlighting these features is to say that the otherness of each horizon—the text’s and interpreter’s—must be acknowledged without one overcoming the other. And it is the proposed dialogical re-authoring that can allow for Paul to read the text afresh in light of his horizon all the while allowing the text to speak rhetorically as part of an argument. This observation is not insignificant. Thus, both text and reader bring meaning (i.e., “author” it) together dialogically.

It is conceivable that one might object to our proposed term, dialogical re-authoring, on the grounds that it could lead to the charge of frenzied, interpretive relativism. If interpreters can re-author texts, after all, does this not do violence to the texts being read? A few responses are in order. First, dialogical re-authoring is a term used in this study to describe Paul’s reading of Scripture in light of the hermeneutic put forward by Gadamer. In this sense, the term is merely a description of Gadamer’s theory. That said, Gadamer has already discussed the charge of this sort of relativism,

See Section 1.4. That said, considering our investigations, we of course would affirm Tanner’s thesis that something informed Paul’s reading. Our point presently is that Gadamer’s hermeneutic can make sense of both realities. See Section 7.2.1 below.

Starling, Not My People, 16.

This was the problem with Starling’s thesis. Indeed, the idea of dialogical re-authoring alleviates some of the problems found in the scholars examined in Section 1.4.
dismissing the concern.\textsuperscript{1141} Second, the term “re-authoring” is deliberately qualified by the preceding term “dialogical,” thus implying that re-authoring is always in light of, and not apart from, a dialogue with the text being read.\textsuperscript{1142} Third, with respect to the Pauline texts examined above, we have shown that Paul’s re-authoring is not divorced from his Christology.\textsuperscript{1143} Therefore, modern interpreters, if they are to follow Paul, are not free to re-author the biblical text apart from a thorough commitment to the limits set by Christology.\textsuperscript{1144}

\subsection*{7.2.1 Christology as Question and Answer}

Being an answer to Paul’s question, the Hosea text was read in light of his christological convictions. Paul’s Christ illuminated the Hosea text. Tanner was correct to imply, then, that something informed his reading of Hosea.\textsuperscript{1145} Considering the exegetical investigations above, clarification is afforded when the Christ-event is seen as acting as the key \textit{prejudgment} for Paul’s reading of the oracle. It is only in light of this prejudgment that the text was able to take on new meaning. The relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutic is clear when Moyise’s comments regarding intertextuality are considered:

\begin{quote}
It is not that the meaning of Hos 1:10 and 2:23 can be “objectively” described as a reference to Gentile inclusion but rather that, when the text is read in the light of what Paul thinks God is doing in the present, his interpretation becomes understandable and perhaps even inevitable… It should be noted that this does not imply that readers can make texts mean whatever they like. This is a common objection to ‘reader-centered’ approaches, but it is mistaken. We could not talk about interpretation at all if there were not a text to interpret. The point is that texts do not present themselves to readers as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1141} See again Section 4.7 above (esp. fns. 503-504) where I discuss the question of radical subjectivism in Gadamer’s theory.

\textsuperscript{1142} In light of Gadamer’s discussion about “co-determined” interpretation (see \textit{TM}, 296 and my Section 4.4 above), I have often used the term “co-creation” as a description of his hermeneutic (see e.g., Section 4.2.5 above and Sections 7.2.2 and 8 below; cf. Vanhoozer, \textit{Is there a Meaning in this Text?}, 107, who also describes Gadamer’s hermeneutic as a process of “co-creation.”). Thus, for Gadamer, meaning is \textit{determined} and \textit{created} within a dialogical context and can therefore be described as dialogical re-authoring.

\textsuperscript{1143} See e.g., Section 6.2 above.

\textsuperscript{1144} Christology, of course, is inclusive of the teachings of Christ. Thus, to re-author the texts of Scripture, the interpreter reads the texts creatively and freshly \textit{within} the boundaries of Christ’s teachings. (See also fn. 1175 below.)

transparent packages of meaning; readers have to do something in order to interpret them. Intertextuality suggests that what they do is relate them to other intertexts, which might be actual texts or, more generally, events, cultural phenomena, or personal experiences and commitments.1146

This is particularly clear when the interpretive differences between Paul and the pesherist are compared. Moyise says the differences are what they are because of how each brings texts to bear upon “a different set of intertexts,” and this includes their respective understandings about God’s “particular purpose for their own community.”1147 And yet for Paul, this “particular purpose” for the Christian “community” is decidedly christocentric. After all, Christ is the focus of the “obedience of faith” (Rom 1:5) for both Jew and Gentile, a truth that reaches its interpretive pinnacle in Rom 9:25-26.

This is not a one-sided reading, as said above.1148 It is true that the oracle served to inform his apostolic horizon, for it is the subject of covenant inclusion spoken about in the original oracle that comes to bear upon the eschatological reality of Paul’s Christ and what his work has accomplished, namely, covenant inclusion. It is equally true that the Pauline Christ—and the profound effect that his coming occasioned on behalf of Gentiles—spoke afresh to the promised covenant inclusion of the “Not My People,” as it was itself not merely a question to which the text was an answer, but also an answer to which the text was a question. As Warnke says:

> We come to works of literature from the horizon of our lives; we bring to those works certain questions and issues, whether we have articulated them explicitly or not, and the answers we find in literature are answers to our questions, just as the questions literature asks of us are questions we apply to our lives. Gadamer thus sees the interpretation of works of literature as dialogue in which both work and interpreter must raise and answer questions they address to one another.1149

Thus, this intertextual event is neither (1) a mere repetition of the original meaning of the past into the present nor (2) a complete abrogation of the past in favor of the present. In other words, this interpretive event was not a monologue, an overbearing emphasis

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1146 Moyise, “Latency and Respect for Context,” *Paul and Scripture*, 134. See also his thoughts on “theological outlook” and “rhetorical situation” (138).
1147 Ibid. Hence, the value of ch. 6 above.
1148 See 7.2 above.
1149 Warnke, “Literature, Law, and Morality,” *Reperccussions*, 91. Recall Sections 4.5 and

223
on either horizon. What characterizes Paul’s reading of Hosea is that it was *dialogical*. In this way, neither horizon is obscured.1150

7.2.2 Horizontverschmelzung

At this point, the perceived problem of historical distance of Paul’s use of Hosea is alleviated.1151 Gadamer’s theory, after all, renders this not just as unproblematic, but rather “positive and productive.”1152 For this distance, again, “is not a yawning abyss but is filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything handed down presents itself to us.”1153 The interpreter’s consciousness of their “hermeneutical situation,” that is, a “consciousness of being affected by history (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein),” is what allows them to formulate and assert “the right questions to ask.”1154 This emphasis on question and answer, as seen above, is fundamental to the hermeneutical event. Paul’s “hermeneutical situation,” therefore, was “determined by the prejudices” he had.1155 And while these made up his own “horizon of a particular present,” they were not “fixed” or existing in distinction to “the otherness of the past.”1156 The place of meaning was, therefore, in the act of application—in his “present situation.”1157 Thus, in ways perhaps foreign to post-enlightenment hermeneutics, Paul in this way is able to read the Hosea text with a considerable amount of freedom. In fact, *he does*. Interpretation is an act of co-creation.

4.6 above; see esp. fn. 449.

1150 In this way, the Gadamerian approach offers clarity into making sense of how Paul’s use of the OT can be both “contextual in nature” yet all the while “fresh,” as David J. H. Beldman and Jonathan Swales (“Biblical Theology and Theological Interpretation,” *Manifesto*, 163) rightly observe in the general apostolic use of the same. The “issues are complex,” as they say (p.163), but one must wonder if such complexity is not due to the meddling of certain enlightenment assumptions.

1151 See again ch. 1 above.


1153 Ibid.

1154 Ibid., 301. Emphasis original.

1155 Ibid., 304.

1156 Ibid., 304-305.

1157 Ibid., 306-307. See Section 4.7.
It is a dialogical re-authoring which began at his conversion, where Paul acquired a new conceptual language (though, again, not one untethered from his Jewish past). And his new language—indeed, new Welt—was the very thing from which he could read and understand and find fresh meaning in the Hosea oracle. The oracle found “expression in [Paul’s] own language” by speaking not just about renewed Jewish people, but Gentile people. This was clear in our evaluation of Rom 2, where Paul understood righteousness in terms of law-keeping. But this was not the type of law-keeping that meant being a Jew; this meant being in Christ. Truth, faithfulness, righteousness, and covenant keeping culminated in Christ (Rom 2-4; 10:4). Thus, in what one could describe as nothing less than dialogue, the oracle posed new answers and new questions to Paul, and he to it. Hermeneutically speaking—as our analyses of the relevant passages from Romans sought to elucidate—Paul’s own apostolic questions (not least about Christ and Gentiles) came to be a conversation starter as he looked backward onto the text of Hosea. There, he found answers about covenant inclusion. But, again, he also discovered this as a question itself, namely, about divine promise and redemption for castaways, to which his Christ was the answer. In an act of Horizontverschmelzung, Paul’s reading can be (and should be) understood as more than merely a repetition of the oracle. Following Gadamer, rather than seeing (Paul’s) interpretation as repetition, one should understand interpretation as co-creation.

This act of question-and-answer between Hosea and Paul resulted in higher ground, indeed a higher horizon of understanding, such that the conclusion both (1) affirmed and (2) moved beyond Hosea’s and Paul’s respective horizons. On the first, Paul found a basis for the claim of covenant inclusion and redemption in Hosea’s oracle, thus affirming its promise. Yet Paul could move beyond the text’s original horizon of understanding as his prej udgments allowed him to find the oracle meaningful to his own situation and apostolic calling to the Gentiles. On this, Paul’s beliefs about covenant inclusion were affirmed by the Hosea oracle in that it, too, promised so much.

1158 Gadamer, *PH*, 57.
1159 See Section 5.6.
1160 E.g., see Rom 1:5.
1161 See Section 4.6.
Yet, arguably, the Hosea oracle did more than merely affirm Paul’s situation; it also expanded his horizon so as to move it beyond any false conception that the Christ event was an autonomous phenomenon about redemption, but rather one rooted and grounded in Jewish religion and tradition.1162

7.3 Quotation as Application

In Gadamerian language, one would speak of the rhetorical use of the oracle as therefore being applied to an already working narrative. As Gadamer says, it is the understanding of “the text of Christian proclamation,” that is, in the sermon, that “the understanding and interpretation of the text first receives its full reality.”1163 Here understanding happens because the text speaks via the sermon and “begins to find expression” in the person’s “own language.”1164 Specifically, “one must take up into himself what is said to him in such a fashion that it speaks and finds an answer in the words of his own language.”1165 Thus, the text is only understood if it speaks “directly” to the recipient in their situation, and the “completion of understanding” happens in the sermon’s “reception as an appeal that is directed to each person who hears it.”1166 Similarly, the rhetorical use of the Hosea quotations are an appeal for the claim of (Gentile) inclusion. This accords well with the notion of dialogical re-authoring.

Therefore, the use of the Hosea quotations is to be seen as an instantiation of Gadamer’s idea of Anwendung.1167 The assumption behind the rhetorical use of these quotations is to bring the Hosea oracle into dialogue with Paul’s present purposes, situation, and questions, namely, that of Gentile inclusion.1168 That narrative was traced by calling attention to a substructure of motifs: righteousness language, law-keeping, and the Gentile question. Along the way, these three have at times intertwined and

1162 See Section 7.5.
1163 Gadamer, PH, 57.
1164 Ibid.
1165 Ibid.
1166 Ibid., 57-58.
1167 See Section 4.7.
intersected. As the claim for Gentile inclusion began to accelerate (particularly in Rom 2), that claim was later reinforced and anchored in a certain conviction—namely, Paul’s christological conviction (Rom 3-4). After placing the Hosea quotations in Rom 9:25-26 within their literary and thematic context (9-10:4), the use of the oracle itself can be said to be a pinnacle of the narrative. In other words, the oracle was the applied answer to the Gentile question itself. That is, as it was functioning rhetorically, it served to reinforce the claims made about Gentile inclusion earlier in his letter (e.g., Rom 2:12-16). The text of Hosea was applied to Paul’s present situation, not least in regard to Gentiles and his apostolic Christian mission (Rom 1:1-5).  

It was in this application that Paul found the meaning he did. The text, if not applied, would have remained only an historical text concerning the New Covenant, but it found meaning when Paul assigned, or applied, to it the question—not least of which was the Gentile question.

In terms of the rhetorical and applicative nature of the Hosea citation, Gadamer’s insights remain key. In an important essay, Gadamer discusses the relationship between rhetoric and hermeneutics. Importantly, he says, this relationship finds its link in that both require attention to kairos, “time.” His thoughts are worth quoting at length:

1169 Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 242, is right to connect Paul’s train of thought in Rom 9:25 (with the citation of Hosea and use of ἠγαπητοὶ θεοῦ) back to the context of Rom 1:5, specifically 1:7 where Paul applies the “honorable title of Israel,” ἐγνωκαὶ ἀδελφοί, to the Roman Christians.

1170 See Gadamer, TM, 307–308.

1171 See Section 4.5. As Evans, Reception History, 234, has said, Gadamer has been criticized for not providing a means by which “valid,” “responsible,” or “adequate” interpretation could be determined; here Emilio Betti (Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften [Tübingen: Mohr, 1962], 49), Thiselton (in Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout and Anthony Thiselton, The Responsibility of Hermeneutics [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985], 110), and Hirsch (Validity, 251) are cited. Evans states that what could “possibly” offer a “constraint, a measure of ‘adequacy’, is [Gadamer’s] emphasis on ‘the rightness of the question’” (234). Evans then discusses how such “questions” find themselves in both the horizon of the text and the reader, such that the text and reader are both questions and answers to each other (234-235). In this dialogical process, “Understanding is neither merely the reconstruction of the author’s view nor an assertion of the reader’s. Understanding takes place in ‘dialogue’, in which to reach understanding (as a fusion of horizons) means ‘being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were’” [Gadamer, TM, 371]. In this construction, ‘truth’, ‘tradition’ and ‘prejudgment’ are dialectically, not subjectively, conceived.

Only the individual is truly capable as a speaker who has acknowledged as good and right the thing about which he is trying to persuade people and is thereby able to stand up for it. This knowledge of the good and this capability in the art of speaking does not mean a universal knowledge of “the good”; rather, it means a knowledge about that to which one has to persuade people here and now, a knowledge of how one is to go about doing this, and a knowledge of those whom one has to persuade. Only when one sees the concretization required by the knowledge of the good does one understand why the art of writing speeches plays such a role in the broader argumentation…In addition to all that goes into knowledge…, real knowledge also has to recognize the kairos. This means knowing when and how one is required to speak. But this cannot be acquired merely by learning rules or by rote. There are no rules governing the reasonable use of rules, as Kant stated so rightly in his *Critique of Judgment.*

Linking rhetoric to application, Gadamer continues,

In Plato this comes out in the *Phaedrus* (268ff.) by means of an amusing exaggeration: if anyone were to possess only all the physician’s information and rules of thumb without knowing where and when to apply them, he would not be a physician. Were a tragedian or musician only to have learned the general rules and techniques of his art and yet produced no work using that knowledge, he would not be a poet or musician (280ff.). In the same way, the orator has to know all about where and when to speak (*hai eukairiai te kai akairiai; 272a6*).

For Paul, *now that Christ has come in the present time*, the text of Hosea can speak afresh to the situation at hand, i.e., be applied, even in the most intuitive (indeed, artistic) of ways. After all, Paul’s arguments in the passages examined would not have worked had the Christ-event not yet happened. It is true, for example, that his arguments are rooted in the text of Scripture, as in the case of the Abraham reference in Rom 4. The point, as we have said, with referencing that story was to show that Abraham was deemed righteous before being circumcised thus leading to the conclusion that Gentiles *qua* Gentiles are now to be seen as included in the covenant. And so, Paul’s argument was exegetical: as a matter of textual and historical fact, that Abraham was justified prior to being circumcised was true, being clearly seen by a chronological reading of Scripture. But it would be a mistake to think that Paul’s argument here rested entirely upon this historical/exegetical fact—namely, that since the text undoubtedly shows Abraham was deemed righteous prior to receiving circumcision, such works of

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1173 Ibid., 253. (Italics original.)
1174 Ibid. (Italics original.)
1175 It should go without saying at this point, but the term “Christ-event” at this point as a hermeneutical prejudgment should be understood “to speak not only of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection but also what followed, namely, the birth of the church and especially the inclusion of the Gentiles” (Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context?” *Paul and Scripture*, 97, fn. 1.)
the law are therefore unnecessary for justification and the Roman church should therefore get on board. Paul’s argument here should not be understood as resting upon such thinking. It was much more than “historical” or “exegetical” (in the strict sense of the terms). After all, the historical/textual fact (that Abraham was justified prior to being circumcised) was true prior to the Christ-event just as surely as it was after it. And yet such an argument from the text based upon this historical/textual fact would not have been intelligible prior to the Christ-event. Therefore, it is not helpful to say that Paul’s argument from Scripture (i.e., of the Abraham story) rests exclusively upon this fact. His argument, rather, must have been based upon something much more fundamental. What mattered for Paul—and this is our entire point—is that he argues from the scriptural text by means of an already-assumed christological horizon of understanding. Now that Christ has come, the Jewish texts, stories, and oracles, as well as the small details in them (e.g., the historical fact that Abraham was declared righteous prior to being circumcised) are now, in the present time and situation, to be read quite differently.

Furthermore, the philosophical-hermeneutical observations on application here (and earlier on in the study) are congruent with mainstream scholarship. For example, DiMattei notices a difference between the way the pesherist and Paul utilize Jewish texts. The former uses the paradigmatic textual formula for introducing interpretations, namely, “this is interpreted,” while such formulas remain largely absent in the latter. “Usually,” says DiMattei, “the scriptural passage is cited in its interpretive context; that is, the interpretive meaning of the base text is already assumed, and the text is simply presented in its contemporized context.” Interestingly, DiMattei observes this very feature in Paul’s quotation of Hos 2:23 in Rom 9:25. He says:

Unlike Pesher, Paul does not provide his readers with a hermeneutical key that bridges text and interpretation, translating Hosea’s “my people” as “the Gentiles.” He simply assumes the interpretive connection by means of its application: Hosea’s “my people” are “the Gentiles.” It has often been asserted that Paul cites this passage with no regard

1176 See Section 4.7.
1178 Ibid. Emphasis ours.
for its original context; through its application, the text assumes a new meaning and thus a new context. The hermeneutical assumption at work here, however, mirrors the principles of Qumran pesharim: for Paul, the prophetic text speaks of contemporary events and/or personages, here specifically the Gentiles...Thus for Paul, the appropriate and perhaps the only context within which to read and understand the prophetic text is the contemporized eschatological context.1179

DiMattei’s findings here confirm our own. The essence of Paul’s use of Hosea is its application to Paul’s present situation. Textually speaking, DiMattei is right.1180 Indeed, in line with our investigations above, such was the case for many writers in the first century, not least Paul and the sectarians.1181 Yet what distinguishes this thesis from DiMattei’s is that where he rightly shows what Paul is doing intertextually, we are here attempting to go one step further to show how Paul is doing what he is doing, not least in a way that is grounded hermeneutically.1182

1179 Ibid., 78-79. Emphasis ours. We have waited until this point to highlight DiMattei’s insights until after Gadamer’s theory had been developed so that the former’s thesis might be given full weight and value.

1180 Our conclusion that the Hosea quotations should be understood most basically as being applied to Paul’s contemporary situation was found independently of DiMattei, whose own conclusions were largely drawn from an awareness to the textual features of the passage. Our own findings, however, have come via a distinct philosophical-hermeneutical analysis that offers its own unique approach (e.g., for Gadamer, the term “application” is a technical term loaded with philosophical meaning, being located within the context of his larger hermeneutical project). That said, DiMattei’s textual work confirms exactly what we have been saying in terms of hermeneutic theory. For what further distinguishes our project from his ideas, see below.

1181 See Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context?” Paul and Scripture, 98, who observes how, in contrast to 21st century “conventions,” these early writers would “fuse” the various steps of textual explanation and interpretation “in the form of a modified quotation.” This is the very thing Paul does in Rom 9:25-26. It is worth comparing Moyise’s observation here with Gadamer’s hermeneutic which grants philosophical space for accounting for such fusion.

1182 DiMattei’s clarifying textual insight confirms our utilization of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, and our study gives hermeneutical clarity to his textual observations. Thus, we can proceed beyond DiMattei’s insightful observations. For example, our thesis has been that Paul’s reading of Hosea is patterned to a larger project of reappraisal, one grounded largely on Christology. Despite the otherwise helpful comments regarding the key role of application, DiMattei seems to minimize the hermeneutical role of Christology. Commenting on another passage, DiMattei (“Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 81) observes rightly how Paul does not “simply narrate the past” but rather that “he also reshapes it, retelling the story and often interjecting elements and themes drawn from the context of the contemporary situation to which the narrative is being applied.” He is also keenly aware that, “Past and present, the text and its re-presentation (not to mention its interpretation) seem to coalesce into a single narrative fabric,” noting even how the “Qumran pesharim display this same tendency toward reshaping the historical story or narrative to suit the contemporized situation” (82). The problem perhaps is that DiMattei makes Paul’s contemporizing of texts do too much hermeneutically. For Paul, this contemporizing is only possible in light of Christology and, in contrast, should therefore be seen as being part of Paul’s hermeneutic posture; in
7.3.1 Interpretation as Performative and Situational

Recalling Gadamer’s remark that, “Schauspiel ist erst eigentlich, wo es gespielt wird, und vollends Musik muß ertönen,” one quickly recognizes how his aesthetic critique can be applied presently.\textsuperscript{1183} That is to say, the Hosea text was a performative event, providing for Paul a picture, ein Bild, as to what covenant inclusion looks like in the present. As Kunstwerk, the original Hosea text existed for Paul in its presentation, a Gadamerian instance of Darstellung, bringing its latter reader into play; Paul’s reading, then, was an act of Spiel, a deconstruction of autonomous subjectivity.\textsuperscript{1184} The Hosea text, as a reading, presented itself as a kind of play for Paul’s aim of Gentile inclusion. Moreover, this intertextual reading is helpfully clarified if it is understood in light of the fact Paul “[brought] into play… certain ideational ‘preconceptions.’”\textsuperscript{1185} After all: “There is no pure seeing and understanding of history without reference to the present. On the contrary, history is seen and understood only and always through a consciousness standing in the present.”\textsuperscript{1186} Thus, the text itself is given the framework it is because of Paul’s bringing into play his most basic present assumptions. Interpretation is thus performative and situational.

other words, Paul’s Christology and contemporizing of texts must be seen as comprising one hermeneutical event (see Section 4.7 above). The problem, again, is that DiMattei divorces the “content” from “method” (77). On “content,” he says Christology “influences and shapes the content of [Paul’s] hermeneutic,” for it is part of Paul’s “specific historical circumstances” and is definitely central to Paul’s “theological beliefs” (77). However, this “is not to be confused with the underlying hermeneutical assumption that guides his interpretation,” what DiMattei calls Paul’s “approach” and “method,” namely, the idea that the text speaks to the reader’s contemporary “situation” (77; emphasis original. See also 82-83). Such distinctions make his later comments about “Christ” being part of the interpretive context confusing (see 92). At any rate, distinctions like these are hard to substantiate under a Gadamerian paradigm where application and understanding are not two distinct events—prejudgments cannot be so easily severed from one’s application to a situation. In this manner, Gadamer provides clarity.

\textsuperscript{1183} Gadamer, \textit{WM}, 121; \textit{TM}, 115. See Section 4.3.2 above.

\textsuperscript{1184} See Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2

\textsuperscript{1185} Palmer, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 176. Here (and in the following quote) Palmer is commenting on Heidegger’s thought, which was formative for Gadamer.

\textsuperscript{1186} Ibid.
7.4 Interpretation as Traditioned and as Movement within Tradition

Yet, the beauty of this approach is such that it also “affirms the operativeness of the past in the present: The present is seen and understood only through the intentions, ways of seeing, and preconceptions bequeathed from the past.”\footnote{1187} The past for Gadamer is not a “pile of facts… but rather is a stream in which we move and participate, in every act of understanding,” as Palmer says.\footnote{1188}

Considering all that has been said about Pauline prejudices, it would be inaccurate to conclude that there is an inherent contradiction in Gadamer’s theory. For example, if one’s prejudice comes from tradition, then how can the interpreter’s prejudice inform, critique, or modify the tradition from which it came? On the contrary, Gadamer’s “concept of tradition is not to be construed as something fixed or reified. Rather, it is a formal concept which exhibits no concrete content of its own and, perhaps, could be said to have more of a regulative than a constitutive function.”\footnote{1189} Atkinson admits that “particular traditions” do carry with them content, but “truth or meaning” is found “by engaging in dialogue with it,” that is, the questioning is what matters.\footnote{1190} Thus, “Someone can embrace certain aspects of his traditions or he can reject those parts that he regards as degenerate, obsolete, or irrelevant. What finite human beings cannot do is transcend the effects of their history or traditions as a general rule.”\footnote{1191} The point is not so much that one cannot critique one’s tradition as it is that one cannot critique that one has a tradition. Thus, as Gadamer says, “In Wahrheit gehört die Geschichte nicht uns, sondern wir gehören ihr.”\footnote{1192} It must not be forgotten that, “understanding always involves something like applying the text to be understood to the interpreter’s present situation.”\footnote{1193} Thus, while each interpreter operates from within tradition, being historical persons, each nonetheless interpret from within their

\footnote{1187} Ibid.
\footnote{1188} Ibid., 176-177.
\footnote{1189} Atkinson, “Hermeneutic,” 289.
\footnote{1190} Ibid.
\footnote{1191} Ibid (and 290-293).
\footnote{1192} Gadamer, \textit{WM}, 281; \textit{TM}, 278. See Section 4.4 above.
respective, even differing, present circumstances. Like a jurist who does not see the “law” as something “to be understood historically,” but rather something “to be concretized,” so also Paul sought to concretize the Hosea text into his own situation. 1194
Like a preacher who does not see the “gospel” as something “to be understood as a merely historical document, but to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving effect,” so also Paul sought to let the Hosea text speak afresh into his present. 1195
Therefore, “the text…if it is to be understood properly—i.e., according to the claim it makes—must be understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way. Understanding here is always application.” 1196 This makes sense as to why Paul the apostle’s reading might have been radically different from, say, that of his own former self. The differences lie in differing prejudgments, indeed in differing experiences, present situations, and horizons. Since, therefore, interpretation is both traditioned and also a movement within tradition, it makes sense, then, that Paul can at the same time both appeal to the Hosea text as an argument from Scripture and also read it radically afresh.

For, by virtue of how all interpretive activity happens, as Gadamer taught, “meaning” and “understanding” are not attained when the object of interpretation (the text) is dominated by the subject (the reader) or when the latter is dominated by the former. 1197 If interpretation is dialogical, 1198 the reader’s own particular “situation” remains the place where the production of meaning happens. 1199 That is to say, the text takes on meaning when the reader applies it in light of his or her own acquired tradition and historicality.

Thus, Gadamer described the process of understanding as being “weder subjektiv noch objektiv” but rather “als das Ineinanderspiel der Bewegung der

1194 Ibid., 307.
1195 Ibid.
1196 Ibid., 307-308.
1197 See Section 4.7.
1198 See Section 7.2 and Gadamer, TM, 301; 356–371, especially 366–368.
In this case, the traditionary text, Hosea, remains a dialogue partner with Paul. Gadamer states that the “anticipation of meaning that governs [a person’s] understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality [Gemeinsamkeit] that binds [the person] to the tradition.”

To clarify the phenomenon of Paul’s use of Hosea in Rom 9:25-26, one must enquire, therefore, into this “commonality” (Gemeinsamkeit). Gadamer is clear concerning the unstatic characteristic of this commonality, namely, that it is “constantly being formed in our relation to tradition.”

It is important to remember that tradition is itself also unstatic. It is not “a permanent precondition,” but something “we produce…ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves.”

This accords, then, with what is observed in Paul’s reading of the text of Hosea, namely, its non-static characteristics. Paul’s own “relation to tradition,” as Gadamer might say, was in movement, for it is true that “ideological commitments are integral to the historical contingencies of both text and reader.”

Moreover, given the original contexts of Hosea and Rom 9:25-26 within the greater argument of Romans, it can surely be argued that Gadamer’s “commonality” principle finds its instantiation in the New Covenant theme inherent to both biblical texts. The New Covenant motif itself, being a preoccupation for Paul (e.g., Rom 2:25-29), is what binds him to the Hosea text. But this commonality is likewise not static; it, as Gadamer says, “is constantly being formed in [Paul’s] relation to [Jewish] tradition.”

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1200 Gadamer, WM, 298; TM, 293. This effectively fills in gaps found in our analysis of several positions in Section 1.4.
1201 Ibid (WM, 298).
1202 Ibid.
1203 Ibid.
1204 Evans, Reception History, 254. Emphasis original. Cf. 260-263, 272, where, in a different context and argument, Evans makes the point against critics who claim that “ideological” or “theological” claims are “external” in some way to the process of understanding. The context of these points are much different than our present one, though the point stands.
1205 Gadamer, TM, 293.
Moreover, tradition itself is not a "permanent precondition," for Paul himself is active in its own production and "evolution."\footnote{1206} Because Paul’s own horizon is itself in movement,\footnote{1207} as the Christ-event dawned, his horizon was filled with the light of Christology and therefore was able to find fresh meaning in the Hosea text, a meaning that spoke to the question of the place of Gentiles in the commonality of New Covenant. “The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter,” says Gadamer, “does not depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience.”\footnote{1208} As we have already seen, meaning for Gadamer is a “co-determined” process “by the historical situation of the interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective course of history.”\footnote{1209} Hence, Gadamer’s famed line: “It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.”\footnote{1210} Such statements reveal the heart of Gadamer’s theory. Joel Weinsheimer’s comments are helpful:

Sameness and difference are indivisible in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and neither can be suppressed if interpretation is to be made intelligible. An interpretation that is not the same as what it interprets is not an interpretation but a new creation; an interpretation that is not different from what it interprets is not an interpretation but a copy. What distinguishes Gadamer’s hermeneutics in this regard is that for him interpretation involves this interminable interplay between sameness and difference, the irreducible \textit{methexis} of the one and the many.\footnote{1211}

In light of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, Paul’s use of Hosea likely represents a bigger hermeneutical event than is typically recognized by interpreters.

\section*{7.5 Interpretation as Prejudiced}

With a detailed analysis of select pesher texts, we have highlighted the sect’s prejudiced and situational readings, and in comparison to Paul, we have discovered both dissimilarity and similarity in their respective interpretations.\footnote{1212} That Paul’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1206} Ibid.
\item \footnote{1207} Ibid., 303.
\item \footnote{1208} Ibid., 296.
\item \footnote{1209} Ibid.
\item \footnote{1210} Ibid. Emphasis original.
\item \footnote{1211} Weinsheimer, “Meaningless Hermeneutics,” \textit{Repercussions}, 165.
\item \footnote{1212} See Sections 6.1 and 6.4.
\end{itemize}
Christology was an integral prejudice for his interpretation of similar prophetic texts found in the Scrolls is clear. The notion of prejudice, as seen above, was for Gadamer a subversive concept in light of the Enlightenment’s project of neutrality. It has been shown, moreover, that the concept of prejudice was for Gadamer more than the mere imposition of the interpreter upon texts; rather, prejudice was seen to exist within an horizon, which is capable of genuine fusion.

Gadamer’s concept of prejudice, therefore, is helpful in regard to this instance of intertextuality, as it is able to (1) deflect the charge of a theological interpretation of Hosea that merely imposes upon Hosea and (2) still provide an account for an active and creative role of Paul as reader. Because of its dialogical character, Gadamer’s theory, while accounting for Paul’s prejudgments, can also at the same time account for Paul’s rhetorical use of the oracle. That is, one can make sense of how Paul can both argue from Scripture, saying, “As it is written,” all the while accounting for his often-revisionary conclusions of the said Scripture. Hence, by reflecting on Gadamer’s idea of Vorurteile (and all that it entails), Paul’s reading of Hosea is afforded clarity.

One might probe further. It is surely the case that any enquiry into the legitimacy of the Hosea quotations—that is, whether Paul’s is a good reading, a good judgment of the texts—is to be placed squarely back upon Paul’s theological assumptions. In other words, his interpretive judgments are to be evaluated by his pre-judgments. One should ask, therefore: Are Paul’s christological convictions warranted? Perhaps that is the ultimate hermeneutical question.

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1213 See Section 6.4.
1214 See Section 4.5.
1215 See Section 4.6.
1216 See again Gadamer, *TM*, 278, where he discusses the prime position a person’s “pre-judgments” have in relation to their “judgments.” (Cf. 1 Cor 15:14.)
1217 See Gadamer, *TM*, 298, about the “question of critique.” See also Section 4.4. Cf. Rae, “Theological Interpretation and Historical Criticism,” Manifesto, 105-106. This is not unlike Moyise’s observations about the use of Hos 13:14 in 1 Cor 15:54. There he discusses how, for those who argue for a christological interpretation, the question of what it means to “respect” a text is to be placed squarely back upon the veracity of the christological assumptions that make them possible in the first place (“Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does the Scripture Say, 43; see also his evaluation of this on 44). Indeed, Gadamer’s hermeneutic would advance such a thesis.
Chapter 8: Final Summary & Further Questions

This study began in a place where the co-creative nature of understanding is most clearly seen in, perhaps, all of Scripture: Rom 9:25-26. These verses appeared at first enigmatic. Surveying key scholarly approaches, as well as how gaps and questions still remained, this research sought to bring to bear upon the issue the hermeneutic theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer. It was argued that Gadamer’s theory could be utilized as a clarifying basis upon which the biblical scholar could carry out his or her work. It was observed that, at the heart of his intentions, Gadamer sought a thorough and decisive critique of some of the Enlightenment’s most guarded tenets. It was argued in this research that some of his conclusions could be used in a helpful way to make sense of Paul’s interpretive reading—a reading, obviously, that existed prior to, and therefore outside of, the restrictions imposed by the Enlightenment’s influence. Accounting for the intuitive nature that typified Paul’s seemingly odd use of Hosea, it was argued that perhaps a hermeneutic that did not carry some of the Enlightenment’s interpretive assumptions and baggage could contribute to clarifying Paul’s otherwise elusive interpretive activity. Gadamer’s aesthetic-based hermeneutic provided such a hermeneutic. With his emphasis upon the situatedness of the interpreter, their horizon and prejudgments, as well as his equally consistent emphasis upon the otherness of the text itself, Gadamer’s theory laid a particularly helpful groundwork for a way to make sense of interpretive phenomenon—not least what is observed in Rom 9:25-26, an epitome (if there ever was one) of the problem of understanding a distanced text.

To accommodate such an approach to its fullest extent, at least within the constraints of this research, Paul’s interpretive practices were brought into a comparative relationship with other readers of his time, namely, the interpreters at Qumran. The pesher texts, it was argued, allowed for the modern reader to see, in a profound way, how one’s situatedness in tradition, affects one’s own interpretive activity. This was equally true when it came time to examine the key texts in Romans. The substructure of key motifs, which served to frame the narrative of Paul’s argument, displayed a rather intriguing result—namely, that these motifs took on new meaning for Paul. That is to say, they were re-aligned around Christ. These observations helped lead us into an analysis of Rom 9:25-26.
Thus, in order to account for what was observed in the texts examined, Gadamer’s theory provided helpful terminology. That is, it made hermeneutical sense of, and afforded interpretive clarity to, what was encountered in Paul’s text. His hermeneutic illumined the dialogical character of Paul’s use of Hosea. As a hermeneutic based upon dialogue, that is, question and answer, the Hosea oracle was allowed to be understood as both (1) a text from which Paul could make an argument and (2) a text to which Paul’s assumptions could illuminate. The Hosea text was, therefore, both question and answer. In this way, insights were gleaned that could, conceivably, address the problems posed in chapter 1 above. We have described the phenomenon in terms of a dialogical re-authoring: “dialogical” because of Gadamer’s emphasis on the co-creative nature of all interpretation, and “re-authoring” because of the co-creative nature of the same. Hermeneutically, meaning for Paul was found to be both tied to the text of Hosea and at the same time existing beyond it in a fresh way.

At this point, it would be beneficial to consider areas of further enquiry. In what follows, suggestions will be made that might spurn others working in the field to consider avenues for further research. First, it might be intriguing to expand what has been done in this research to other second temple texts. This would include not just Jewish texts, but also those which come from the NT canonical writers. Due to space constrains, this has remained unexplored. Second, how might Gadamer’s theory hold up when applied to other Pauline instances of intertextuality? How would the conclusions compare to what has been argued for here?

Third, and finally, how might Gadamer’s theory come to bear upon some of recent theological controversies where text, reception, and application seem to be interrelated? An example might be in regard to the so-called “New Perspective on Paul.” How might Gadamer’s idea of Anwendung forge a hermeneutical peace between Luther’s application of key Pauline texts to his own situation—namely, to his battle with Roman Catholicism—and the prevailing post-Sander’s scholarship regarding phrases like “the works of the law”? Is it conceivable that, in the view of many new perspective advocates, Luther’s somewhat slippery exegesis of Paul’s key texts is a

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1218 E.g., 1 Peter 2:10.
mere instance of situational application, much like Paul’s use of Hosea? That is, is it possible, from all that has been learned about Gadamer’s theory, that Gadamerian hermeneutics could help to affirm both new perspective insights as well as Luther’s creative application of the biblical text?

However Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics might be utilized in the future, it is hoped that, at the very least, biblical scholarship will seek fresh ways in which it might glean from the insights afforded by philosophical enquiry itself. It is, after all, quite illusory to think that biblical scholars are immune to philosophical assumptions and pre-commitments. The great need, arguably, for those working in the biblical text—not least for commentators—is to clarify and give thoughtful expression to the underlying pre-understandings that, like it or not, ground their own approach and methodology. Perhaps it is appropriate, then, to let the text which has been so central to this study have the concluding, yet ever-applicable, word:

Es bedarf einer grundsätzlichen Rehabilitierung des Begriffes des Vorurteils und einer Anerkennung dessen, daß es legitime Vorurteile gibt, wenn man der endlich-geschichtlichen Seinsweise des Menschen gerecht werden will.1219

1219 Gadamer, WM, 281.
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