Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity

Clots-Figueras, Irma, Hernán González, Roberto and Kujal, Praveen ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2917-9724 (2016) Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity. Economics Letters, 147 . pp. 168-170. ISSN 0165-1765 [Article] (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019)

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Abstract

We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 20276
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Praveen Kujal
Date Deposited: 01 Aug 2016 11:31
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2022 13:12
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/20276

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