Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries

Pascual-Ezama, David, Fosgaard, Toke R., Cardenas, Juan Camilo, Kujal, Praveen ORCID logoORCID:, Veszteg, Robert, Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz, Gunia, Brian, Weichselbaumer, Doris, Hilken, Katharina, Armenak, Antinyan, Delnoij, Joyce, Proestakis, Antonis, Tira, Michael D., Patromo, Yulius, Jaber-López, Tarek and Branas-Garza, Pablo (2015) Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 116 . pp. 379-386. ISSN 0167-2681 [Article] (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020)

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Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their
institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across sixteen countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens' honesty for our sample countries.

Item Type: Article
Keywords (uncontrolled): Honesty corruption economic experiments cultural differences
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 16806
Notes on copyright: ©2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY-NC-ND license(
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Depositing User: Pablo Branas Garza
Date Deposited: 08 Jun 2015 09:16
Last Modified: 29 Nov 2022 22:34

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