The phenomenology of professional practice: A *currere* [1]

Abstract: In the shift to a more clearly economic imperative for universities than social good, the relationship between higher education teaching and professional practice has become increasingly apparent. It is seen in the courses offered by universities, and the relationship with employment and employers advocated by government and funding agencies. From a social realism perspective, this paper envisions all high-level vocational education as professional and discusses how an understanding of the phenomenology of practice could help to define how it might be structured and by whom it may be best delivered.

This paper concerns a phenomenological analysis of practice through the lens of social realism. It leads to a proposed curriculum of *self*-understanding, or *currere*, for the practice of becoming a professional.[2] The phenomenological approach is grounded upon the works of Heidegger (1962), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Bourdieu (1990), which are used to engage with the principles of social realism found, for example, in Young (2008), Beck (2009), Maton and Moore (2010), Moore (2013) and Wheelahan (2010). This exploration offers practice 'possibilities for creating formative relations between being and acting between who we are and how we act' (van Manen 2007, 13).

Specifically, it appeals to the notion of *currere* to reflect the embodiment of being through practice in social settings. A *currere* is the realisation of the multiplicity and the weaving of context that helps an understanding and supports one's becoming. It

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[1] I am very grateful for various suggestions for improvement and additions to this paper offered by the two referees and the editor, who kindly read and commented on the initial draft submission

[2] Following CEDEFOP, all vocational education in higher education is referred to as 'professional education'.

is not a curriculum for the development of generic employability skills for students (see Andrews and Higson 2008, for a critique of such an approaches), but as a way of becoming a professional. The hope is that a *currere,* a lifetime journey*,* might reconceptualise professional practice curriculum (Pinar and Grumet 1976), from a course outline to what Pinar calls 'a complicated conversation' (Pinar 2011, 47). In doing so it creates 'lucid and legitimate thinking of the ontological potential of humans' (Magrini 2010, 1).

To realise this, I turn to social realism as an approach that

> treats both the social basis of knowledge and the knowledge itself as real. It follows that instead of concentrating solely on ideology critique, a social realist approach to the curriculum seeks to identify the social conditions that might be necessary if objective knowledge is to be acquired. (Young 2008, 165)

To expand, Moore argues that social realism is a 'sociological approach that attempts to work through the implications of critical realism (CR) in relation to education' (2013, 336). Moore also confronts the Platonic dilemma inherent in social realism: if knowledge is objective it can't be social, and if it is social it can't be knowledge! He does this by producing a solution to the potentially irreconcilable division between epistemology and sociology of knowledge, proposing object criteria for knowledge that are enacted in practice rather than enshrined in propositional knowledge. Such an approach is opposed to standardisation and the closing down or suppression of what a profession might be (Beck 2009; Beck and Young 2005). It implies a critical capability: an ability to engage in practice based on active engagement with acquired knowledge and demonstrable understanding.

This paper is in three sections. The first considers various notions of being social through practice and the possible tensions between the two approaches of social realism

and phenomenology. The second considers curriculum and the ontological concept of *currere* as a guide to professional development through practice, and the final section proposes a *currere* for professional practice.

Section 1: Practices are with others

Schatzki (1996) suggests that practice is 'a temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings' (1996, 89). This meaning differs from doing things, which the 'Western philosophical tradition has opposed to theory: theory versus practice, contemplation and reflection versus doing' (1996, 90). It is this use of the term 'practice' and how the common rules for practice might be understood that mainly concern us here. This familiarity becomes the 'presupposed basis of any thoughts [which] are taken for granted and go unnoticed, and because in order to arouse them and bring them into view we have to suspend for a moment our recognition of them' (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xiii). It is this actuality that a phenomenological analysis of practice is intended to reveal. Following Bourdieu, the logic of this practical awareness is not distinct from, nor reducible to, formal logic. The logic of this practical approach is a 'logic that is intelligible, coherent but only up to a certain point (beyond which it would no longer be "practical"), and oriented towards practical ends, that is, the actualization of wishes, or desire (of life or of death), etc' (Bourdieu 1998, 132). This applies to all modes of knowledge that cannot be translated into conceptual; theoretical representations are 'corporeal, relational, temporal, situational and actionable knowledge' (Van Manen 2007, 22). To understand professional practice, we need to question its notions of acceptable knowledge; its creation and its purpose. Especially in the context of a professional body (Beck and Young 2005), we need to be aware of how reconceptualising agencies (Bernstein 2000) can filter what is known through

curriculum control and attestation.

Bernstein's advocacy (see also Jones and Moore 1995) on such disruptions of 'taken for granted' knowledge has resonance with Heidegger's proposal that understanding is through how we act within the 'taken for granted' context. When these context are disturbed, we are 'awakened' towards the referential totality that previously had been encountered without question. Such disruption draws our attention and in response we reorient and reassess our relationship to the newly disclosed circumstances. It is not just a matter of what others might consider appropriate or what had previously been available; it is what one cares about and directs one's attention to in the processes of certain practices. It is not just an intellectual review of change; rather, it is constituted with a sense of dislocation, turning the 'taken for granted' familiarity of the context and exposing it as a new context requiring careful understanding and conspicuous action.

This theme is taken up by Merleau-Ponty in his account of how we assimilate such disruptions and regain our sense of equilibrium. Drawing on this work, Dreyfus argues that practices 'are acquired by dealing with things and situations, and in turn they determine how things and situations show up for us as requiring our responses' (2002, 368). For Heidegger, the *habitus* or epoch by which our practices gain their meaning is a web of social practices into which we are 'thrown' and through which we can express ourselves and grasp our future possibilities. Within any epoch our understanding of identity will evidentially be an interpretation of our accumulated experience, choices and future actions.

This understanding of ourselves in our every-day-ness is, as Heidegger proposes, a making ourselves at home in the world. It is the management of this process without inappropriate loss of either self-concern or being with others that Merleau-Ponty (1962) conceptualises as 'maximum grip' on reality. Merleau-Ponty and, more recently,

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Kemmis and Smith (2008) suggest that expert practitioners are 'searching for saliencies' in settings to inform practice within both their conceptual and contextual boundaries. For example, when we are looking at something, without thinking about it we tend to find the best distance for taking in both the object as a whole and its different parts. When grasping something, we tend to grab it in such a way as to get the best grip. In so doing, the totality of the event is presented in the actuality of our response.

Social realists' development of critical realism departs from, although does not reject, the phenomenological outlined above. Maton and Moore (2010) describe the major concern of the 'social realist school is to replace this "either/or" with a refined and developed "both/and"'. This alternative view recognises, *contra* positivism, the inescapably social character of knowledge but, *contra* constructivism, does not take this inevitably to entail relativism. In other words, rational objectivity in knowledge is acknowledged as itself a fact (we do actually have knowledge), but it is also recognised as a *social* phenomenon (it is something that people do in socio-historical contexts), and it is *fallible* rather than absolute or merely relative (2010, 2). The realist approach to knowledge as a re-valuing of disciplinarity, as Green, 2010 terms it, does not go uncontested by him or others (e.g. Balarin 2008), although Moore (2013) provides a strong defence. However, I am not claiming for *currere* the development of epistemologists but informed practitioners able to discern practice issues through the lens of their professional knowledge within the social reality of their profession.

Section 2: Curriculum issues

Much has been written about the importance of curriculum studies to the realisation of the true function of any constructed curriculum. Kelly (2011) provides a good general introduction to the scope of this analysis and what curriculum itself might be. Important

as she shows much of this work to be (and often conflated as subject–discipline

knowledge in higher education institutions), Kelly's point is her metaphysical and

epistemological analysis of curriculum and the evident lack of a sustained and

ontological approach to much of what is considered as the content in curriculum studies.

There have been others central to this more critical ontological stance on curriculum and

pedagogy: Freire (see especially his work on higher education curriculum, 1994),

Giroux and Giroux (2004), Greene (1988) and Pinar (2011) are perhaps the most

significant. Their foci have been on emancipation, liberty, freedom and the subjugation

of knowledge in curriculum development and pedagogical implementation, and their

work offers analogies for the discussion of how workplace practice knowledge might be

treated in formal education.

Efforts have been made to consider curriculum from the perspective not of

educational institutions but of the workplace. Billett (2006, 2009), along with Boreham

(2004) and Mulcahy (2011), has presented notions of workplace curricula. Indeed,

Billett goes so far as to claim that there is 'an urgent need for workplace curriculum

practices and principles to be identified, elaborated and evaluated' (2006, 31). He

suggests that the goal for such a curriculum is to 'assist individuals' identity and realise

their full vocational potential' (2006, 34). He draws what seems to be an important

distinction between the structured prudence of the learning environment of formal

institutions and the workplace, where the benefit of the learning is mainly for others

(owners, affiliations, cliques and participation therein). Billett's recognition of the

intended, enacted and experienced curriculum has practical implications for the

integration of work experience in higher education (Billett 2009), yet it pulls back from

engaging in a more radical approach in which critical ontological theorists such as

Greene and especially Pinar engage. Billett does refer to *currere* as a conceptual way of

organising learning in the workplace but, unlike Pinar's more radical use (to explore

what this more profound way of being might be), his use of pathways of structured

assimilation into workplace practices lacks real, liberating notions of what the future

workplace might hold for the being of a worker. The use of curriculum is akin to the

'work process' knowledge of Boreham (2004) and is based on the premise that much of

the knowledge that guides work is created in the process of work itself and in the

performance of the practice.

These practices are often evidence of tacit knowledge that Polanyi (1958) has

suggested is both inaccessible to its possessor and incommunicable to others. Moreover,

it is situational and, often, knowledge without power for it is neither readily

recognisable nor tradable, whilst critical to organisational success. Such knowledge is

revealed in practice situations and suggests that its nurture requires both a

presupposition of technical knowledge and experience. This brings into question a

system of privileging external accreditation through modularity that has excluded

practice in favour of instrumental measures of accepted knowledge, often maintained

through the knowledge of the powerful enshrined in traditional curricula. It does not

exclude formal instruction on what is known about a subject, but argues that it ought to

be provided in the context of the practice. Moreover, this unexpressed and often

embodied knowledge is knowledge learned and expressed through others. It is shared,

whether in the presence of others or alone for, as knowledge of practices, it has itself a

collaborative history fostered or inhibited by the nature of the facilitating environment

(e.g. Evans et al. 2006). Practices are a symbiosis of being within a process of being that

is experienced, but which has a temporality of joint construction. It is a temporal event

in which the past of its learning and the future of its effect are acknowledged in the

phenomenological presentation of the practice.

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There is little doubt that higher education helps create, store and disseminate the conceptual knowledge that facilitates the capabilities for enactment within a professional practice. It allows a systematic encounter with a repository of specified knowledge that formulates the nature of a profession's know-how. The relationship between a formal higher education provider and the practice of professional practice is complex, as Barnett (2009) has indicated. Moreover, Schwandt argues compellingly that the contemporary higher education sector struggles with 'how to frame teaching, learning and inquiry in the professional practice fields' (2005, 313).

These forms of contextualisation, however, ought not to be external to any core of the *currere*: they are critical to its realisation. Traditional disciplines leading to what might be known as the traditional professions—Law, Medicine, the Church—may still have a direct relevance, but in the newer interdisciplinary professions of Sports Therapy, Leisure, Tourism and Business there is no such reliance on single-discipline conceptual knowledge, and practice is central to, and mingled with, conceptual pragmatic knowledge to form professional practice. Here the relationships between profession, workplace and education are intertwined, not as in transition between two separate experiences but in the context of widening networks of collaboration and achievement. It is here, in the discursive spaces where the forms of knowledge are not clearly identified with specific disciplines, that attention should be concentrated. This is separate practice knowledge as located at their point of engagement. This epistemology position is not in opposition to either constructivist or positivist claims of what is taken as knowledge, or that knowledge can exist in the sense that there are real things we can know about, which offers a phenomenological sense: what we take to be known as real is constructed also within our social or professional contexts. This continuum is intentionally premised on a condition that conceptual knowledge forms a part of all

occupational knowledge that Winch (2010), Wheelahan (2009) and Young (2008) have recognised as important for epistemological, economic and social justice reasons.

Section 3: A *currere* of professional practice

The phenomenological approach inherent in *currere* makes visible the importance of conceptual knowledge in the development of practice and the extent to which it is a prerequisite of the needs of practice. Clearly, there is value in the Muller (2009) model of higher education curriculum design for the intertwining of formal higher education with that of the workplace, where certain levels of conceptual knowledge are demanded by the technical capabilities that make a student eligible for a chosen professional practice. However, the complex conversation that is at the core of the *currere* is an understanding of 'the contribution that academic studies makes to one's life' (2011, 43). It is a conversation with oneself and others: running a 'thread through academic knowledge as an ongoing project of self-understanding in which one becomes mobilized for engagement in the world' (ibid: 47). It thus introduces a temporality to the understanding of practice as structured in the profession. This is presented through their relation to its history and future and determines the form of the practices of the present. It accepts the disciplinarity of knowledge, as does social realism, and seeks to understand how its meaning is grasped in the experience of becoming, in our case, a professional. Such an approach may lead to what Thomson has called an 'ontological revolution' (2005, 159) in the way we approach education.

Dall'Alba and Barnacle summarise the views of both Thomson and Heidegger as, if 'being and knowing are inextricable, then exploring this interdependence provides a means of not only problematising but also transforming higher education' (Heidegger 2007, 682). This view is voiced by Barnett, who argues that we are 'urgently in need of

an ontological turn in our thinking about higher education' (2007, 9). Taking an

ontological perspective requires a totalising *currere* that attempts to blend the

conceptual needs of caring engagement, reflection and critical practices with the

presenting phenomena of the practice in ways that enable the experience to be

understood and facilitates the agency of the candidate in the being of a professional life.

To facilitate this, the becoming of being discourse of *currere* involves the integration of

'ways of knowing, acting and being within a broad range of practices' (Dall'Alba and

Barnacle (2007, 683) leading to a process of becoming; an unfolding and transformation

of the self over time' (Dall'Alba 2009, 43). This is not a call for sequencing work and

practice as separate but interleaved activities such as internships and work placements,

but a radical rethink of the nature of higher education institutions' relationship to

professional practice.

Here, a warning appears to those involved concerning the chosen language for

this conversation—the language of neither university nor practice must be allowed to

dictate its form, as this determines the meaning of practice. An emergent language of

professional becoming is needed, distinct from the either/or of the contesting sites of

learning. This is an approach advocated by Rorty (1999) and requires us creatively to

facilitate a new way of talking about professional becoming. It needs a language of

professional agency to contribute to and be contingent upon the emerging vocabulary of

professions. This is not to deny that there has been dialogue about the integration of

workplaces and educational institutions (Billett 2009; Johnson and Hager 2008), but

that it was negotiated by means of word games that are resolved by the most powerful. I

am not proposing to cross-reference terms developed in either location to create a

dialogue of opposing meanings, but to nurture a fresh, generative language of

professional ontology with its own metaphorical meanings and symbols. Take, for

instance, the word 'breach' in the UK's nursing profession. In the world of Accident

and Emergency the term is laden with meaning derived not from gynaecology but

managerial expediency. It refers to any occasion where someone has to wait in Casualty

for four hours or more, and has a political meaning almost more powerful than a

medical emergency, surrounded by many issues that contextualise the reality of nursing

practice.

In Heideggerian terms, what is hidden and taken-for-granted in our

everydayness is made conspicuous for investigation into the social and cultural nature

of what is taken to be professional. The learning of situated practices is vital to

understanding how professionals relate to their work world (Pigrum 2007). Through an

understanding of how the phenomena of the professional world appear to professions

and are disclosed by them, it is possible to grasp the everyday meaning of the

professional practice. It is possible to comprehend how professionals reveal their

identities through the development of practices grounded in equipmental references and

functionality. Indeed, Billett holds that 'more than an end in itself, participation in

activities, such as those in workplaces, incites change in individuals' understanding and

capacities—that is it constitutes learning' (2004, 315). The 'what' of learning in the

professional has been mapped by Eraut (2004) as a heuristic device to assist research

and understanding.

How such a *currere* might proceed is not to be established by separating

preparation for professional candidature from the context of that profession's working

environment (the assumption is that graduate employment may be termed higher-level

engagement in society and considered as professional endeavour), that is, to distinguish

between workplace proration and professional body preparation. This distinction applies

more to the licensed professions than professionalised occupations, but even here it is

important if workplace practices, as opposed to professional practices, are not to erode the values and principles of the profession (for instance bribes, personal advancement, bullying, research fraud and theft). The preparation has to be flexible in duration, location and practice. Moreover, it needs to transmit professional knowledge from one generation to another whilst offering critical opportunities to ensure the knowledge's historicity is still relevant to its present use. This knowledge needs to be relied upon by the profession, the professional and the society in which the professional practice is enacted. In this the constraints of the structures of the profession must be recognised. It is this professional knowledge that is powerful for the professional existing curriculum, but which is reviewed within the *currere*. This will have an impact how the profession is defined through cultural rituals and symbols that exclude others and, notably, it shifts personal agency to the collective.

As we seek the powerful knowledge and practices of the profession, this approach has a significant policy impact. It reclaims a central role for the profession, not just in the selection of content but in nurturing the tacit situated learning that helps the expert professional emerge from the novice. This will see the reversal of an academic model institutionalised as a part of higher education. It makes professional bodies stronger and independent of the universities in their recruitment and gives them control over their relationship with the university supplying 'technicalist knowledge' with routes in academic disciplines in modes of delivery acceptable for development of professional practice. This will clarify that what is considered professional knowledge, and the power attributed to it, will be sanctioned by the professional body.

So what might a *currere* for professional practice look like? It would be centred on reflective practices seeking an understanding of what drives our practice autobiographically, either in conversation of through personal narrative. It would create

a path, not a map, along which the profession might grow through its members rather than instrumentally through its regulations. It would enrich the candidates for the profession but engage them in an explicit understanding of how and why personal practice changes, and provide a deep understanding of the structural principles upon which the profession is based. The power and the justification of the profession's rituals, knowledge and principles that support the structures shaping practice would be revealed.

Based on a reflective stance, the *currere* of professional development would assume the propositional transfer of knowledge and a realist epistemological stance. (Winch's 2013 discussion of the *duree* of agency as a taking a stance on one's being offers helpful insights into the blending of what he calls propositional and practical knowledge, especially the role of liberal education in this process.) It would differ from current forms of university taught courses in that it would require professionals to reflect on their practice and synthesise this in the context of their own history and build, dialectically, into the professional training. This way the professional is, at all stages of becoming a professional, informing the profession of what it ought to be—not the other way around. As continuing professional training, *currere* would require discursive engagement of professionals with others about their practice, its boundaries and how these might change the accepted protocol in terms of what is taken as knowledge, the practices themselves and the structure of the profession. Profession *currere* is structured around questioning practice, not accepting authorised authority. It requires tutorials, work groups and located learning so that practice, not just the disembodied facts, is conveyed. It will mean that personal values of the professionals may counter the principles of the profession. It will call for change and a more responsive profession, evaluating maturing practice rather than disengaged knowledge. It is where practice-

based learning is integrated, informed but not driven by the knowledge of the powerful in small partnerships of practising becoming a professional, informing each other's practice not for uniformity but for diversity, with the constraints of what might be identified as a specific professional practitioner.

A *currere* of professional practice will:

- Mediate local practices through professional engagement.

- Engage in, and with, professional practices and the needs of emerging networks of practice competence when faced with need policy changes.

- Move from a didactic-dominated conceptual form of provision of context-independent knowledge to a broader pedagogical base where the pedagogical tempo and the relationship between conceptual and contextual knowledge is delivered as an integrated (but boundary clarified) way, so as to encourage participation in professional practice and subsequently to support professional becoming.

- Pragmatically resolve quality; the responsibility for any formal qualification is jointly determined by the professional body and employer association or relevant body.

- Make the duration of the professional practice training a function of the profession's need, not a pre-set period for university degrees and the economics of cohort teaching.

- The ontological stance of professionals would be supported during their becoming, through continued professional development that would inform practice and conceptual knowledge revealed through such practices.

- Satisfy employers over the employment potential of those graduating from these professions and. As successful candidates would evidently be 'becoming

professional' from the outset of their higher education training (note: not defined

as university education) in ways that are phenomenologically located in

professional practice and values, it is rational that employers will appreciate that

they are 'workplace tested'.

- Remove the university (but not the specialised institute run by the professional

  body—teaching hospital, engineering college, institutes of finance and

  accounting)—from the accreditation function of professional status but retain it

  as a source of discipline knowledge. Universities flourish as knowledge creation

  and transfer bodies with a distinctive and social function.[3] In Bernsteinian terms,

  their role is with the singularities of disciplines, whereas professional bodies

  deal with the realisation of knowledge for their professional practices.

The *currere* 'shifts the emphasis from the duration of learning and the institution

where it takes place to the actual learning and the knowledge, skills and competences

that have been or should be acquired through the learning' (CEDEFOP 2011). This shift

may incur the realignment of values to those principles that define a specific profession.

To achieve this transition from novice to professional involves facing what Young calls

'a fundamental incompatibility between acquiring skills and demonstrating competence

on the one hand and acquiring knowledge on the other' (2008, 7). Such a position

requires the profession to determine what knowledge is context-dependent and what is

not, and how knowledge can be acquired. In the first group, procedures and regulations

can assist but the reality of the practice situation determines its value, whereas content-

independent conceptual knowledge determines what is powerful knowledge for

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[3] For an interesting comparison of this proposal to the current formation of professions, see
  Beck and Young (2005, 188).

professional membership (Young 2008). This chimes with Muller's (2009) analysis of university curricula, but not the ontological realism of a *currere* of being a professional. The *currere* needs assessment by demonstration, attested to by all those whose judgement on the professional candidate practice is necessary for admittance to a particular community of practice. It requires the de- and re-construction of the role of the university as the sole provider of higher conceptual learning and of the profession as a self-servicing, profit-optimising entity.

Professional becoming becomes the core of the educational endeavour. This involves mixing conceptual and everyday practice in the shaping of the experiences of the potential professional candidate. It requires a conversation that stretches from the past into the future. Students cease to be students of accountancy and become candidates for accountants instead, as if this was some neutral discipline. The same applies to tourist management or nursing, where students begin a process through which they become candidates for admittance to the community of practice of tour managers or nurses. This switch in name is important: it shapes the direction and form of learning. Moreover, students are involved in a process of moral edification that includes civic liberal studies with the aim of ensuring an awareness of basic shared responsibilities to others, of respect, duty and gratitude. This sets the context of a higher-level analytical and critical education. This is within the short-term goal of the *currere,* to qualify the candidate as a professional in their community of practice.

This has clear consequences for our understanding of higher education, professions and the nature of the workplace, as this model neither restricts higher education to a formal institution, nor leaves the profession and workplaces solely as places for profit and surveillance, but as a place for emancipation and challenge. Naturally, professional candidates have the scope to influence the values of their

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profession and their workplace, and facing the difference in personal values and group principles is a matter of personal agency. However, the full integration of each world means confronting how the knowledge of the power can be tested for the economic enhancement for the wider common good.

Such change, where the phenomena of practice determine the content dependent knowledge of the *currere*, opens spaces to explore a dialectic and ontological conversation between professionals and their profession, as well as a reflexive conversation about their personal way of being and the stance they take on their expertise. This may confront those who determine what has previously been the domain of the professional hierarchy through questioning why, and on what basis, specific knowledge is included in the definition of the profession. The opening up of possibilities beyond a structured curriculum for professional certification and continued development may well disrupt professional authority and structures. These include the professions' relationship with university provision. The *currere* attempts to reconceptualise reflexively the curriculum of being a certified professional as an ontology in the lifelong pursuit of becoming professional. It accepts that knowledge is selected and recontextualised for its relevance to the profession, but questions the process and looks to develop it through the *currere*. It thus changes the institutional nature of the profession from a hegemony to an emergent organisation of expert labour (Fincham 2012). With this change, all those structures that once protected its hegemonic position will also need to be re-negotiated.

Final thoughts

The tone of this paper has proposed ways of radically restructuring the barriers between professional status and university education by exposing them to the phenomenological

furnace of professional practice. Radical but not new, professional education outside of the core mission of the university was advocated by Mill in his *Inaugural Address* ([1867] 2000). Given our present situation, it requires a special understanding of professional higher education and is an addition to the re-defining of the role of the professional body and the idea of university, as some may see a back-to-the-future argument (see *Reid et al's* 2008 discussion on the formation of a professional identity). This is an argument for a radical revision of the higher education professional and vocational curriculum, along the phenomenological lines of a *currere*. It would be mistaken, however, to assume aspects of this ontological approach have not been developed in the past. Black Mountain College (now closed) and Alverno College,[4] both liberal arts colleges in the USA, had and have a similar ethos if not practice. Moreover, there are signs of departments and units grouping within the existing structure of university education and blending contextual and conceptual knowledge in ways indicated here, despite the constraints of power and structure that inhibit genuine integration.

The new structure suggested above will call for a more nuanced notion of human capital. The benchmarks of independent knowledge, susceptible to the knowledge of the powerful, will be less reliable for judging economic performance. Discipline knowledge will be best situated in the university and expert practice in the professions. It will also call for a more diverse discussion of human capital if used for policy purposes as the tacit knowledge of practice is less easily commoditised.

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[4] Thanks are due to Alison Pringle and Garth Rhodes for these examples.

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