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Affectivity, Expertise, Inequality: three foundations of trust in education.
Reflections on their presuppositions and (unintended) consequences, with some notes on possible alternatives

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1. An overlooked concept for a sociological analysis of education: unintended consequences of action

The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that actions always have effects that are unanticipated or unintended. The concept of unintended consequences is one of the building blocks of economics: Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, maybe the most famous metaphor in social science, is an example of a positive unintended consequence. Smith maintained that each individual, seeking only his own gain, is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention, that end being the public interest. “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, or the baker, that we expect our dinner”, Smith wrote, “but from regard to their own self interest” (Smith, 1776/1977).

In the first half of the nineteenth century Frédéric Bastiat often distinguished in his writing between the “seen” and the “unseen.” The “seen” were the obvious visible consequences of an action or policy. The “unseen” were the less obvious, and often unintended, consequences. In an essay, titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen” Bastiat wrote: “here is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen” (Bastiat, 1848/1995: 1).

In the influential article titled “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action” (1936), Robert K. Merton extended the analysis of the concept of unintended consequences to all fields of society. In this article, Merton analyzed and classified types and determinants of unanticipated consequences of purposive action. Since Merton’s groundbreaking article, the problem of unintended and unanticipated pertained not only to economy but also to the
effectiveness of practices and the boundaries of social planning. This is particularly important for education, which is the most ambitious social system with regard to social planning, aiming to produce and preserve the presuppositions of social cohesion. In fact, for decades now, pedagogical theories have been experiencing severe difficulties in avoiding the unintended consequences of educational intentions.

For Merton, the functions of a social practice are its “observable objective consequences” (Merton, 1936). Manifest functions are those outcomes that are intended and recognized by the agents concerned; latent functions are those outcomes that are neither intended nor recognized. With regard to the educational system, this defines a contrast between the expressed or manifest purposes of the official curriculum, and the latent functions of the system which are fulfilled alongside of the official curriculum. A hidden curriculum is promulgated by how schools are organized and operated as much as by explicit teaching methods and content, and may be far from the expressed motives of teachers and curriculum planners. The concept of hidden curriculum is built by means of Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent functions (Merton 1957), to define the contrast between the expressed or manifest purposes of the official curriculum, and the latent functions of the system which are fulfilled alongside of the official curriculum.

Although the distinction between manifest and latent functions has been the object of sociological critical accounts (Campbell, 1982), pedagogical research towards the unintended consequences of an educational system that aims to rationalize socialization still uses it as a basic analytic concept (see Kendall, 1998). For its part, sociology has not always been concerned about the unintended consequences in the field of education; for Parsons (Parsons et al. 1951), socialization (which includes education) fulfilled a fairly unambiguous role within society: due to socialization, individuals bear the stamp of their social environment, their inner structure is determined by the norms and value orientations of the society in which they live. The idea of human beings as open systems, exchanging input and output with the environment, of which Parsons made use, lead to an “oversocialized view of man” and woman. That human beings dispose of means to make use of their individual degrees of freedom, for instance, cannot adequately be taken into account.

A more realistic approach, giving attention to the mutual operational closure of psychic systems and social systems, suggests that it is not possible to describe socialization in terms of the transfer of a meaning pattern from one system (society) to the other (the individual). In fact, the interaction between a human being and his or her social environment might or might not provoke particular structural changes in the “inner sphere” of the individual. Looking at the interactional foundations of the educational relationship, unintended consequences emerges as a concept that any sociological
analysis of education should take into account: when a pedagogically stylized act communicates its own intention, the person who is expected to be educated acquires the freedom to travel some distance, for instance, to pursue the intention out of mere opportunism or to avoid “being educated” as much as possible. One can describe these effects as unintended consequences of intentional socialization, referring to the consequences of the particular social settings that are used to educate. Thus, an interesting question, of concern to educators and educational scientists, is whether the possibility of unintended consequences of pedagogical action may be eliminated through pedagogical means.

According to Luhmann, “education is action that is intentionalized and attributable to intentions” (Luhmann 1984: 244); education aims to attain something that cannot be left to chance socializing events, something that presupposes coordinating a plurality of efforts. Education differs from socialization: socialization is limited by stimuli of the socializing context, while education strives for a particular, “unusual” output. The modes of behavior that one would like to achieve are defined, the pedagogical means to achieve what could not occur by itself are chosen. Once a relatively high degree of complexity is reached, societies cannot avoid going beyond mere socialization and mere ad hoc education. “Only thus can they reproduce knowledge and capabilities acquired in long sequences of coordinated individual steps. Only this enables processes of specialization and the distribution of roles on the basis of specialization” (Luhmann 1984: 206).

The current large-scale organization of learning situations, school classes, and school systems is an illustration of the application of this principle.

Socialization comes about by living in a social context. It presupposes the possibility of reading the behavior of others as selected information such as potential dangers or social expectations (Vanderstraeten 2000); the meaning of this communication can be rejected if the addressee or receiver finds the information unsatisfactory or unacceptable. Education cannot eliminate this possibility of resistance. It cannot be conceived of as the rational form of socialization. In fact, intentional communication with educational goals doubles the motives for rejection. In any communication, the meaning can be rejected if the addressee or receiver finds the information not only unsatisfactory but also unacceptable, and education has no magic weapons to eliminate this possibility of resistance. The addressee has the opportunity to reject the communication, if he or she refuses the role of someone who needs to be educated. One can underpin this conclusion with a simple social experiment: try to educate someone who does not expect to be educated, for example a young boy or girl you meet by chance on the street. It is indeed very likely that your efforts will not be appreciated and will fail.
In sum, education cannot guarantee that socialization will be successful: unintended consequences are always possible in education. In fact, there are many options: students can react with total rejection, but also with unexpectedly good performance, with nonchalance vis-a-vis evaluation criteria, with humor and irony, with the celebration of a deviant school or youth subculture, with deviant or alternative assessments of qualities and personal merits, and so on.

Before the “crisis of education” became a major concern for education scientists and politics in the 1950’s, pedagogy used to understand education as social engineering, which task relies on a linear logic in which goals are manifest and the task consists of devising means to achieve them. Thus, education was understood as a linear process which may be represented by a straight arrow between the avowed goal of actors and the achieved end-state. In fact, it took a long time for pedagogy to understand that “the crisis of education” was nothing more than a translation to the political agenda of its structural limits (Arendt 1961/1993), that is, the incapacity to control the development of children’s personality, calling to mind James’ idea of the inescapable role of children in their own development (James, 1899/1983).

James’ assumption that the development of children’s minds cannot be completely controlled by educational techniques, because of the independence of psychic processes through which people attribute meanings to communication, could be integrated in a more extensive concept developed by Portes (2000): in any social relationship, a possible derailing factor to purposive designs is that participants may react to being manipulated by a higher authority and devise means of bypassing the intended consequences of their actions. Thus, even if the announced goal is intended by the educators, their actions may have other significant, and often unintended, consequences which the educators cannot control, and of which they are unaware.

The unintended results of education cannot be eliminated with the help of a careful selection of subject matter, no matter how much this selection focuses on usefulness in later, professional life, on “pure” intellectual development or on the students’ life world and interests: they inevitably appear in an educational context. Facing these problems, for decades pedagogy has devoted theoretical and methodological efforts to avoid the unintended consequences of education: “trust building” between educators and students appears to be one of the most relevant strategy.

2. Three basis of trust in educational relationship: expertise, affectivity, inequality. Their limits and their consequences

Education is the most important social system involving trust of children, which should support acceptance of teaching, requests of learning and evaluation. Education is a system where
interactions are of the greatest importance: trusting commitment in specific interactions with teachers is vital for the reproduction of education. For this reason, education is particularly affected by lack of trust, which creates perverse effects as alienation, prevents commitment and leaves the floor to disappointment of expectations. For Giddens (1990; 1991), modern societies, and the education systems within modern societies, have two options for building trust. Firstly, trust can be built through expertise, which guarantees basic presuppositions of action and relationships. This way of building trust, however, is considered weak in motivating to commitment, and can easily fail when expertise proves ineffective in facing risks. Secondly, trust can be achieved through interpersonal affective relationships, which mobilize it through a process of mutual disclosure. In this second case, trusting commitment concerns the relationship in itself, a “pure relationship” (Giddens 1991), and trust results in a demand for intimacy. Interpersonal affective relationships seem to be much more motivating than expertise but it is not possible to give up trust in expertise in social systems where actions can only be based on expertise; for example, trust in educational, medical or economic expertise seems to be unavoidable.

For many decades, pedagogical reflections on education have been connecting children’s trust and commitment in education exclusively or primarily with their trust in adults’ expert guidance, counselling and teaching (Vanderstraeten 2003, Britzman 2007). However, since the 1980’s, childhood studies challenge this representation of the relationship between children and adults. According to these studies, children cannot be considered passive recipients of adults’ information and command (Jenks 1996); on the contrary, they are social agents who actively participate in the construction of social systems (James et al. 1998). Children have their own agendas and concerns which may go beyond the institutional scopes of education and the mere self-interest in educational career; the educational relationship is a different environment for adults and children, who may take into account risk which are neglected by adults. Therefore, social attention moves towards children’s trusting commitment and necessity of building trust in their relationships with adults (Hill et al. 2004).

Lack of trust activates a vicious circle between lack of trust and social participation (Luhmann 1988): it implies loosing opportunities of children’s action, reducing their preparation to risk trust, and activating anxiety and suspicion for educators’ actions. One can describe these effects as secondary socialization, when “secondary” refers to the consequences of the methods that are used to educate. Some of these consequences are of course currently fairly well known: distrust in interactions with specific teachers can determine children’s marginalization or self-marginalization.
in the education system, with possible drop-out and consequent reduction of effectiveness of education in society; these may be understood as unintended consequences of education.

Critical pedagogy and childhood studies have questioned the effectiveness of teachers’ expertise in promoting students’ trusting commitment. According to childhood studies, in education, children’s opportunities of participation are strongly reduced “by curricular and behavioural rules and structures” (Wyness 1999: 356), that is, by the latent functions of the system which are fulfilled alongside of the official curricula. The success of person-centred approaches in critical pedagogy demonstrates this change of perspective in education: Carl Rogers (1951) suggests that teachers should risk interpersonal affective relationships with students, listening to their personal expressions and supporting them empathically. In other words, teachers should understand that children are social agents who can and must tackle important issues, “dancing” with them (Holdsworth 2004: 150). These ideas have inspired the concept of facilitation.

Facilitation means supporting children’s self-expression, taking their views into account, consulting them, involving them in decision-making processes, sharing power and responsibility for decision making with them (Matthews 2003). This transformation of cultural presuppositions is important for the construction of children’s citizenship. It leads to consider citizenship as based on principles of co-operation as well as critical and responsible participation (Osler 2005). Citizenship requires the empowerment of different ideas and perspectives; therefore education to citizenship should encourage critical thinking and responsible participation, inviting children both to assert their rights (Invernizzi and Williams 2008) and to accept different perspectives. This is precisely what facilitation tries to promote: building trust though the experience of active citizenship, in order to avoid the risk of marginalization and feelings of alienation which among the unintended consequences of education.

However, facilitation may meet important obstacles in conditions of radical distrust, which prevent from the construction of person-centred relationships and affective expectations. Kelman (2005) analyses conditions of radical distrust and building trust in workshops involving Israeli and Palestinian representatives trying to reach peaceful agreements. In these workshops, Kelman analyses the difficulty of building trust when mutual distrust is the basis of the interaction. According to Luhmann (1984), while trust enlarges the range of possible actions in a social system, distrust restricts this range, in that it requires additional premises for social relationships, which protect interactants from a disappointment that is considered highly probable. When distrust is established, building trust appears very difficult because the interaction is permeated by trust in distrust.
Trust in distrust seems to be incompatible with the reproduction of social systems because it provokes institutional mistrust. According to Kelman, in this condition trust can be built through successive approximations of increasing degrees of commitment, starting from the building of a feeble trust which does not commit participants to anything relevant. Therefore, trust does not presuppose sympathy, friendship, and interpersonal closeness. On the contrary, trust can be built only on self-interest, enhancing mutually acceptable accommodation and joint solution of specific problems, and thus being working trust. Self-interest is contrasted with interest in the other, which is the basis of interpersonal affective relationships; working trust and interpersonal relationships (self-interest and interest in the other) can merge, but only at a later stage of the interaction. Interpersonal closeness is not the basis of trusting commitment and may only be created after working trust has been built. In other terms, trust building is expected as an unintended consequence of self-interest.

Kelman agrees that trust can be built through facilitation. Facilitation, however, regards interactive problem-solving activities. The facilitator has the task “to create the conditions that allow ideas for resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interactions between the parties themselves” (Kelman 2005: 642). Facilitators set rules for the discussion and monitor their respect, helping participants to create constructive and non-adversarial debates. They do not participate in the actual discussion, do not offer their own perspectives or solutions, nor evaluate the parties’ ideas. Facilitators must be the repository of trust, “bridging the gap of mutual distrust that divides the parties and enabling them to enter into a process of direct communication” (Kelman 2005: 645). Ultimately, facilitation establishes the preconditions for mutual trust, i.e. mutual humanization and mutual reassurance, based on acknowledgment of participants’ needs and fears and on responsiveness to them. Both parties must show trusting commitment in the interaction with the facilitator, who can be considered trustworthy because s/he shows commitment to her/his role.

Differently from socialization, education takes place in organizations, from relatively small-scale organization such as school classes to large-scale organizations as the school systems. For that reason, while discussing the social foundation of educational relationship, it is necessary to take into account a source of trust connected to organizational structures, which is not included in Giddens’ repertoire, that is, trust based on categorical inequalities.

In order to explain this type of trust it is necessary to introduce its theoretical presupposition, which may be recognized in Tilly’s idea that inequality becomes embedded in the organizational structures (Tilly 1998). This is particularly true for education, which is a system in which inequality among individual performances and goal attainment is at the same time a basic structural feature of
social relationships (selection motivates the acceptance of educational communication) and an expected output of the system.

Tilly elaborates an inventory of causal mechanisms through which categorical inequality is generated and sustained by organizations. Tilly argues that certain kinds of social structural relations are solutions to problems generated within social systems. This does not mean that he argues for a smooth, homeostatic kind of functionalism in which all social relations organically fit together in fully integrated social systems. The functional explanations in Tilly’s arguments allow for struggles and contradictions. Nevertheless, his arguments rely on functional explanations insofar as at crucial steps of the analysis he poses a problem generated by a set of social relations and then treats the demonstration that a particular social form is a solution to the problem as the core of the explanation of that social form.

For instance, education creates, through selective events, categorical forms of inequality. In education, durable, categorical distinctions make easier to knowing who to trust and who to exclude. As Tilly puts it: “organizational improvisations lead to durable categorical inequality”. Children, and adolescents are categorized and those categorical inequalities become stable features of organization because they enhance the stability of educational relationships.

Categorical inequalities pose new challenges to organizations since they potentially constitute the bases for deviant solidarities opposed to the dominant categories. On the one hand, they sustain stable educational relationships; on the other hand, they also potentially reduce transaction costs for collective struggles by subordinates. Categorical inequality, in short, sets in motion a pattern of contradictory effects. To the extent a given form of categorical inequality can be diffused throughout the education system (“emulation”) so that it appears ubiquitous and thus inevitable, and to the extent people living within these relations of categorical inequality elaborate daily routines (“adaptation”) which enable them to adapt to the conditions they face, then the categorical inequalities themselves will be stabilized. The result is that the excluded groups along the axes of categorical inequality are less likely to form the kinds of oppositional solidarities that pose a serious threat to the beneficiaries of educational selection.

Tilly distills the core explanation of categorical inequality to three positions: (1) Organizationally installed categorical inequality reduces risks. Categorical inequalities sustain in the risky choice to accord or not trust. This is a claim about the effects of categorical inequality on the stability of organizational relationships: the former stabilizes the latter; (2) Organizations whose survival depends on stability therefore tend to adopt categorical inequality. This is a selection argument: the functional trait, categorical inequality, is adopted because it is functional, (3) Because
organizations adopting categorical inequality deliver greater returns to their dominant members and because a portion of those returns goes to organizational maintenance, such organizations tend to crowd out other types of organizations. With regard to educational organization, the limitation of risks free resources for the attainment of curricular goals. This is, in effect, a quasi-Darwinian selection explanation which explains why the functional traits generalize.

In educational situations, categorical distinctions make it easier to know whom to trust and whom to exclude. On the one hand they stabilize social relationships, on the other hand they stabilize position of marginalization. The stabilization of educational organizations, that is, their condition of possibility, has a paradoxical consequences, that is, to limit the potential of the organizations themselves in accomplishing their institutional goal, that is, to socialize all individuals.

Tilly explicitly argues that the functional arrangements need not be created by design when he states “Inadvertently or otherwise, those people set up systems of social closure, exclusion and control.” What matters is that certain traits, categorical inequalities in this case, become stable features of organization because they enhance the survival of organizations that have such traits, and that as a result over time organizations with such traits predominate. The adoption of the organizational trait in question may be a conscious strategy intentionally designed to enhance exploitation and opportunity hoarding, but equally it may result from quite haphazard trial and error.

Taking into account Tilly’s inventory of causal mechanisms through which categorical inequality is generated and sustained by organizations, it appears clear that institutional trust and institutional distrust may be understood as consequences of the operations through which educational organization reproduce themselves. However, the problems of institutional distrust are well known, and described in terms of alienation, self-marginalization and educational failures. It is for that reason that an important concern for education has become to place side by side to trust based on categorical inequality, a form of trust which could be able to sustain children’s and adolescents’ involvement in the system.

3. Promoting alternative forms of trust. Some insights from an empirical study on peace education

From a pedagogical perspective, the problem is to evaluate whether or not facilitation may substitute categorical inequalities as a basis for trust in educational activities. Some important insights on that issue are offered by a recent study regarding two international summer camps promoted by the School of Peace of Monte Sole, established in the Province of Bologna (Italy), in
the place where in 1944 a Nazi assault killed almost 800 children, women and old people may
provide (Baraldi and Farini 2010).

We briefly outline the context of the study. Each summer camp lasted two weeks, and was attended
by four delegations of ten adolescents coming from different countries, two of which were always
Italy and Germany, to symbolize peaceful resolution of extreme conflict. The other two were
Serbian and Albanian Kosovo (first camp), France and Poland (second camp). The camps aimed to
promote adolescents’ ability in conflict resolution, their interest in peaceful relationships and their
respect for different perspectives, and reducing their prejudices and stereotypes. English was
normally used as a lingua franca during the activities.

The activities were not part of a school programme which can satisfy adolescents’ self-interest
enhancing their individual careers; adolescents’ voluntary participation was based on personal
motivation. The fact that the activities were not part of a school programme implied that
categorization processes based on selective events (examinations, tests and so on) couldn’t take
place. Therefore, the presupposition of the stability of ordinary educational relationships, that is,
trust based on categorical inequalities, must to be substituted by a different form of trust. Was
facilitation capable to build an alternative form of trust, based on interpersonal affective
relationship?

The context of the camps was not favorable for a form of trust based on affectivity: voluntary
participation did not assure the success of peace education, because the nature and details of
peaceful relationships were unknown to the participants and were created only in group interactions.
Participants did not share ideas, values or principles; rather, at least some of them (i.e. Serbs and
Albanians) shared the perspective of unavoidable differences and conflicts. Since peace was far
from being a common practice in adolescents’ social environment, the risk of distrust could not be
avoided and trust had to be built in the interaction.

We believe that the summer camps represent an interesting case-study: in order to sustain
participation of adolescents, a form of trust which is not based on categorical inequalities must be
created in the interaction. Education to peace and dialogue must be inclusive: the creation of areas
of marginalization would represent complete failure of the educational project. All participants
need to participate actively in the activities, as participation is the presupposition of experience of
dialogue and working trust. Under these conditions, facilitation is requested to promote
adolescents’ trusting commitment, to enable their participation in communication, and to assure
their mutual responsiveness in a situation where trust based on categorical inequalities is not
available.
The analysis of the interactions which took place in the summer camps highlights three types of facilitators’ actions promoting adolescents’ trusting commitment: 1) promotional questions (Baraldi 2009), which open alternatives for adolescents’ actions, demonstrating facilitators’ trust in their agency and active participation; 2) feedback questions, which verify and explore the understanding of adolescents’ interpretations, demonstrating attentiveness to their needs; 3) formulations (Hutchby 2007), which both demonstrate responsiveness to adolescents’ needs and open alternative possibilities for adolescents’ actions.

These types of actions promoted adolescents’ and facilitators’ mutual trusting commitment, in a situation where trust based on categorical inequalities was excluded. Moreover, while trust based on categorical inequalities makes it easier to know whom to trust and whom to exclude, stabilizing social relationships, it also stabilizes position of marginalization. On the contrary, in the context of our study, these types of facilitators’ action enhanced adolescents’ mutual accommodation and upgraded their authority, avoiding unintended consequences of education by increasing the possibilities of active participation.

Below, we offer a short example of these three types of actions, taken from an activity called “borders and bridges”, where adolescents are asked to take pictures of objects which represent either borders, as symbols of separation, or bridges, as symbols of contact, and to interpret these pictures in the group discussion. The excerpt aims at illustrating promotional questions, feedback questions and formulations, within the frame of an empirical educational activity.

Marek (Facilitator): it's a bridge
Alain (Facilitator): for Marek it is a bridge
Leni (Facilitator): for me too
Alain (Facilitator): for Leni too ((3 seconds pause)) and for you, boys and girls?
Matthias: for me it is a border and also a bridge because it doesn't divide
Federica (Facilitator): so, you mean that a border is not always dividing two things maybe then, it can be also?
Matthias: yeah, in some way, yes
Federica (Facilitator): and what do you mean for the border or the bridge?
Luca: I think that a border is a line where two things are near, nearby

In this excerpt, Alain’s coordination of the interaction downgrades facilitators’ authority as experts and upgrades the adolescents’ interpretation; with his lexical choices (“for him/her”), Alain
introduces the facilitators’ interpretation as hypothetical (“for Marek is a bridge”; “for Leni too”), thus putting forward the legitimacy of different interpretations. Furthermore, Alain deals with this interpretation as subject to the adolescents’ authority: after a meaningful long pause, which indicates the expectation of new interpretations in the group, he involves the adolescents through a *promotional question* (“and for you, boys and girls?”), which is a cue for his trust in the adolescents’ agency, suggesting that they have the right to produce interpretations in the same measure as facilitators.

Following Matthias’ response, which introduces new opportunities for interpretation, Federica’s *formulation* of Matthias’ turn highlights its interactional relevance, while encouraging new action on his part. The formulation is followed by a new *promotional question* (“it can be also?”), which gives Matthias the opportunity to reject Federica’s position, promoting alternatives for next actions. Matthias ambiguous alignment (“in some way”) projects a new question, which is prefaced by a sequential marker (“and”) that stresses continuity with the previous turn. This is a *feedback question* whereby Federica explores the meanings of Matthias’ interpretation, showing attentiveness to it and treating it as relevant to the interaction, therefore upgrading Matthias’ authority in interpretation.

Another adolescent, Luca immediately self-selects as principal interlocutor, expanding on Matthias’ interpretation. On the one hand, Luca’s self-selection shows that the interaction has successfully opened alternatives for new actions and expansions; on the other hand, it shows he is risking trust in the facilitator’s interest for the adolescents’ interpretations.

**4. Conclusions: avoiding unintended consequences of educational intentions**

During the last two decades, scholars and social planners have been giving particular attention to the connection between lack of trust, loss of confidence in the educational relationship and perverse effects of educational intentions.

Facilitation is considered an effective means of building trust in group interaction in educational situations, and in situations of distrust; trustworthiness of facilitators is considered a crucial starting point for building trust. However, the meaning of facilitation is controversial. On the one hand, studies on children-adults relationships stress that facilitation enhances interpersonal affective relationships; facilitation is understood as active promotion of agency and support of personal expressions, and trusting commitment requires affective expectations. On the other hand, studies on situations of distrust stress that facilitation is not based on interpersonal relationships, as building trust requires mutual accommodation and joint solution of problems, based on self-interest (working trust).
Combining Gidden’s theory of trust in modern society with the concept of trust based on categorical inequalities, developed on the basis of Tilly’s reflection on the function of inequalities in organizations, it is possible to observe that trust in educational activities is generally based on educators’ expertise and categorical inequalities. These two sources of trust are intertwined: educators’ expertise legitimizes their role as evaluators in the frame of institutionalized selective events, selective events produces material references to build and develop categorical inequalities. Both trust based on expertise and trust based on categorical inequalities open the floor for problems of institutional distrust. Again, these two types of trust are coupled: the effects of one form are the presuppositions of the other. In the education system, trust based on categorical inequalities builds systems of social closure, exclusion and control, where children or adolescents may experience anxiety about the future outcome of present actions, with a general suspicion towards educators’ expertise, which creates the material foundations of categorization (selection). These problems are well known, and described in terms of alienation, self-marginalization and educational failures. It is for that reason that an important concern for education has become to place side by side to trust based on categorical inequality, a form of trust which could be able to sustain children’s and adolescents’ involvement in the system. 

The analysis of educational activities in the summer camps shows that in a situation where trust based on categorical inequalities and trust based on expertise are normatively and materially excluded, unintended consequences of education such as self-marginalization and alienation, may be avoided through facilitation. The relationship between facilitation and the creation of alternative to the coupling between trust based on categorical inequalities and trust based on expertise is of particular interest, because trust is understood as a resource to avoid unintended consequences of education. Trust increases the possibilities of adolescents’ active participation, avoiding perverse effects of educational intentions such as alienation and self-marginalization, by reducing their anxiety and suspicion for interlocutors.

In school education, which has the function to socialize, but also to select, marginalization and self-marginalization may be understood as a side effect of lack of trust, but also of trust based on categorical inequalities, which solve problems of stabilization for the educational organizations. For a project aiming to educate to peace and dialogue, on the contrary, selection and exclusion are consequences to avoid, so it becomes important to create effective conditions for trusting commitment, promoting possibility for social action and relationships, avoiding marginalization, alienation and loss of confidence in the educational relationship.
The study in international summer camps organized by Monte Sole School of Peace offered us an opportunity to reflect on a form of facilitation that is effective, at least in some cases, in promoting trust, where trust based on categorical inequalities, created by means of selective events, was excluded, on the one hand because of the methodology and goals of the educational intervention, and on the other hand because of the nature of the educational activities, which were not part of a school programme.

This form of facilitation is based on patterns of expectations regarding (1) facilitators’ personal commitment, which permeates their role performances, and makes them trustworthy, and (2) affective results (affective expectations). It is a form of facilitation is a form of mediation (Baraldi 2010) if facilitators’ questioning and formulating actively coordinate interactions between the parties. Our analysis show some ways in which facilitators’ actions create the conditions of adolescents’ trusting commitment in group activities; this enhances a reflection on the relationship between trust building and avoidance of the unintended consequences of education related to lack of trust. Education is a system where trusting commitment in specific interactions is vital for its reproduction; in education, creating effective conditions for trusting commitment means promoting possibility for social action and relationships, thus avoiding marginalization, alienation and loss of confidence in the educational relationship. Thus, trust building maybe intended as a strategy to avoid unintended consequences of education.

Taking into account Tilly’s idea of categorical inequality, we have moved from the theoretical presupposition that education is a system in which inequality among individual performances and goal attainment is at the same time a basic structural feature of social relationships and an expected output of the system. While categorical distinctions make easier to knowing who to trust and who to exclude, on the one hand they stabilize social relationships, on the other hand they stabilize position of marginalization. Institutional trust and institutional distrust may be understood as consequences of the operations through which educational organization reproduce themselves. The (often unintended) consequences of institutional distrust are well know, in terms of alienation, self-marginalization, educational failures. Our study suggests that facilitation is may be effective in creating a form of trust which could be able to sustain children’s and adolescents’ involvement in the system, surrogating the coupling between trust based on categorical inequality and trust based on expertise.

At least in the educational contexts we have analyzed, facilitation can dramatically change educational interactions, preventing marginalization, self-marginalization and the other unintended consequences of education related both to lack of trust and to trust based on categorical
inequalities. How far it can get along with education in different contexts can be the object of further and much broader research.

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