Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation

Guillen, Pablo, Fatas, Enrique and Branas-Garza, Pablo (2010) Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31 (6) . pp. 872-883. ISSN 0167-2681 [Article] (doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.07.002)

Abstract

This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat
treatment.

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