Unraveling public good games
Branas-Garza, Pablo and Espinosa, María Paz (2011) Unraveling public good games. Games, 2 (4) . pp. 434-451. ISSN 2073-4336 [Article] (doi:10.3390/g2040434)
|
PDF
- UNSPECIFIED
Download (333kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end-game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Keywords (uncontrolled): | public good games; end-game effects; beliefs; experiments |
Research Areas: | A. > Business School > Economics |
Item ID: | 10197 |
Notes on copyright: | open access |
Depositing User: | Pablo Branas Garza |
Date Deposited: | 25 Mar 2013 07:16 |
Last Modified: | 30 Nov 2022 00:43 |
URI: | https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/10197 |
Actions (login required)
![]() |
View Item |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.