Introduction

Introductory box: FARClndia

In 1998, as part of a peace deal seeking to end a long running and brutal civil war, the government of Colombia agreed to cede control of a 42,000 km sq. chunk of territory (roughly the size of Switzerland) to the left-wing insurgents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Since 1964 FARC, who seek the establishment of a Marxist state, have waged a well-organized military campaign partly funded by criminal activity, against both the Colombian government and irregular right wing militia within the country. The territory ceded by the government unofficially became known as FARClndia with the guerillas assuming control of an economy (largely based on cocaine), border crossings, policing, and around
Although this represents an extreme example, many governments across the world struggle to assert their sovereign control, leading some to speculate that we may soon enter a post-sovereign age in which our conventional image of the political world divided into just under 200 autonomous states is superseded by a new, more globalized order.

Throughout this book you have explored how the international political system has evolved. You have learned about the persistence of perennial international political issues concerning military and economic interactions between states and also about the impact of ‘newer’ issues dealing with concerns such as environmental change and human rights. You have also learned about how international organizations have emerged to facilitate dealing with the increased range of issues on the international political agenda and about the evolution of IR theories seeking to conceptualize all of this. Underpinning all of this is sovereignty and contention over whether the significance of this concept is changing, in line with a globalizing world. This is explored in this, final chapter.

In this chapter you will learn about the following come to be able to;

- Understand the legal and political meaning of sovereignty.
- Evaluate rival perspectives on the significance of sovereignty in the contemporary world.
- The idea of global civil society.
• Compare competing theoretical predictions over whether the future of international relations will be continue to be based on interactions between sovereign states or on some alternative form of global governance.

Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the basis of statehood and, hence, is central to the orthodox understanding of the political world as a system of states. Politically, there are two sides to sovereignty: an internal and an external dimension.

i) Internal sovereignty

Internally, sovereignty refers to exclusive political control. Hence a state’s government can be referred to as the sovereign, in that it is the ultimate source of legal and political power. The government, be it a monarchy, dictatorship or democratically elected cabinet, is solely responsible for making and upholding the most important laws of the land. The world’s sovereign entities, of course, come in many shapes and sizes and many states devolve some powers to regional governors but, even in the most decentralized political systems, certain key responsibilities reside exclusively with the central government and it’s agencies. Monetary policy and foreign policy are never devolved and sovereigns have an exclusive
right to use force to uphold the law, through the enforcement agencies of the police and military forces. Hence the use of force by non-sovereign entities (such as armed secessionist movements) is invariably denounced by the governments affected as illegitimate and ‘terrorism’.

ii) External sovereignty

The exercise of internal sovereignty also has external significance since exclusive legal and political control over a country must also mean that other governments have no right to interfere in that state’s affairs. In addition to this right of non-interference, sovereignty also confers upon a country legal equality with other sovereigns including the right to be an entity in diplomacy and international law. Hence non-sovereign entities in international relations are denied a seat and a vote in the United Nations and most other intergovernmental organizations and also the right to have diplomats protected by laws of immunity stationed in other states. Hence whilst colonies of sovereign states (such as Greenland, a colony of Denmark or Puerto Rico, a colony of the US) and disputed territories (such as North Cyprus or Taiwan) can interact with other countries, they are not able to engage as fully in international relations as they would if they were sovereign.

What, then, distinguishes a sovereign state from any other sort of territory? In Public International Law the key reference point is the Montevideo Convention, which arose out of an International Conference of American States in 1933. The Convention sought to clarify the which territories of the Americas were entitled to enjoy the privileges of sovereignty and, in doing so, came to be seen by the wider international community as an expression of customary international law (i.e. having applicability the world over as accepted practice) (see box 33.12).
Predictably, the third legal criteria for statehood is the most contentious and less easily defined, but the first and second are not without controversy and are enshrined in International Law for a good reason. There are many uninhabited islands and tracts of land in the world which are deemed in International Law to be *terra nullius* or territory of no one. In order to avoid the potential chaos of states scrambling to claim any inhospitable chunks of rock that lie above sea level for purely economic reasons (i.e. to gain exclusive rights for extracting resources or fishing in the surrounding seas) International Law considers such places to be beyond sovereign reach. The most prominent example of this is Antarctica, actually covered by a specific treaty, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Antarctica remains *terra nullius* in spite of the teams of scientists who periodically reside on the continent and the sometimes bizarre efforts of governments like Argentina’s to assert sovereign control through
acts such as flying out couples there to get married and even pregnant women to give birth. Such events are not deemed sufficient in law to constitute a permanent human occupation.

Claims to statehood have also sometimes been made in instances where there is no land but there are people purporting to be citizens of a country. The self-styled principality of Sealand was founded by UK citizen Paddy Roy Bates (Prince Roy) on an abandoned British World War Two fort in the North Sea, outside of UK territorial jurisdiction (and which, under International Law, should have been disbanded by the British at the close of the war). Although Sealand has no prospect of being accepted as a sovereign state the fact that it is beyond the jurisdictional reach of any country has created some legal headaches. Prince Roy, for example, has profited from allowing internet providers to operate from the fort unrestricted by British, or any other national, laws. Beyond producing such jurisdictional grey areas, some have come to speculate that cyberstates, comprising online virtual communities of citizens, could soon come to pose a challenge to the level of control governments have over their country’s societies as people’s loyalties and interests shift to cyberspace (Smith 2008).

The third criteria for statehood (a government capable of maintaining effective control) is more open to interpretation and is triggered by diplomatic recognition; the official acknowledgement of a newcomer amongst their ranks by the existing members of the sovereign club. This is usually followed by the new state’s diplomats being allowed to operate, under the protection of law, in other states and also take up their place in the United Nations (replacing the previous regime of that country if it is a case of a revolution changing the sovereign). Hence becoming a sovereign state is somewhat akin to joining an exclusive
golf club in that to get in you need to be an adult and have some clubs but must, crucially, also be judged suitable by the current members.

The traditional practise for judging the suitability of a new sovereign state is, however, supposed to be a value-free determination as to whether the new government is in control or not, rather than a show of support for the newcomer, which may be an emotive issue given that they may well have emerged from a civil war or revolution. This tradition, known in International Law as the *Lauterpacht doctrine*—after Austro-Hungarian born lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht, is still broadly followed but diplomatic recognition became more politicized during the *Cold War* and is today not entirely value-free. The US heralded a new tendency to withhold recognition of new states it found unpalatable by failing to recognize Communist China after the 1949 revolution. [The British, in contrast, followed the Lauterpacht doctrine and recognized the post-revolutionary regime in China despite sharing the same ideological hostility to Communism as their American allies.](Formatted: Superscript) Thirty years on, however, much of the international community had come to share the US’s laxer interpretation of the Lauterpacht doctrine and when the UK became the first government to recognize the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia they were isolated and widely vilified by their fellow sovereigns for conferring legitimacy on a genocidal dictator. A side-effect of not recognizing governments as a statement of disapproval of their human rights record, however, is that in doing so you cede any real prospect of diplomatic leverage over that government. This will make it difficult to undertake foreign policy initiatives to improve human rights and sometimes even to enact diplomatic initiatives for purely self-serving reasons. This became apparent in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 strikes when neither the US nor any of their Western allies could wield any direct diplomatic pressure over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to give up al-Qua’ida operatives within their territory or secure the release of several hostages. Giving
diplomatic recognition to the Taliban would doubtless have been controversial, given their appalling human rights record, but it could also have provided a means of influencing them short of the full-scale war that was quickly resorted to.

Sovereignty became established at the 1648 **Treaty of Westphalia**, which ended the Wars of the Reformation that pitted Northern Protestant Europe against the Catholic South. The Protestant victory resulted in a peace treaty which asserted that Europe’s kingdoms were not answerable to the Pope or any other external authority, thus enshrining the notion of sovereignty in international relations. Hence what is often referred to as the ‘Westphalian System’ of sovereign states was inaugurated, a system we still have today over three hundred and fifty years nearly half a millennium later. In the 17th Century sovereignty was only considered relevant to Europe and so did not restrain its great powers from continuing to colonize lands outside of their continent. With the onset of decolonization in the 19th and 20th Centuries, however, the Westphalian system and the notion of sovereignty as underpinning international relations became **globalized**. The independence of Namibia in 1990 - the last colony of Africa - is often considered to mark the completion of this process. By 2010 there were 192 states in the United Nations covering nearly all the land mass of the world bar Antarctica. The colonies that remain - like Puerto Rico or the UK’s Falklands Islands - do so because they are happy to be that way, maintaining the protection of their imperial power whilst largely running their own internal affairs.

Whilst sovereignty may have globalized but many contend that globalization from the mid 20th Century, in a number of ways, has also served to undermine the concept.

a) *Dominance by superpowers*
Sovereign states have, of course, never been equal in power terms and meddling in the affairs of the weak by the strong has always gone on, but this became so pervasive in the Cold War era that it could be said to have rendered any notion of legal equality as meaningless. The dominance of the US and USSR in this period created asymmetries of power in the state system not seen before which, when added to the ideological zeal that compelled both superpowers to promote their economic model to others, saw the notion of non-interference in the affairs of others go out of the window. The USSR’s Warsaw Pact / COMECON allies—Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania—were no more than notionally independent from Moscow and became widely referred to as ‘satellite states’. Soviet ‘advisors’ influenced government meetings and, when the Hungarians and Czechs ignored advice and sought to take full control of their affairs, in 1956 and 1968 respectively, Moscow sent tanks in instead. In a less explicit fashion several Latin American countries, and most notably Guatemala, Chile and Nicaragua, were subject to US interference in their affairs when they appeared to be moving politically leftwards.

b) Economic interdependence

The unprecedented increase in transboundary movements of traded goods and money that characterizes contemporary globalization is seen by many to undermine the notion of even today’s most powerful states really being in control of their own affairs. In the contemporary world governments are more than ever at the mercy of global economic forces with financial flows negating their efforts to control the national money supply and the desire not to be uncompetitive leading most to surrender full control of trading policy to the World Trade Organization and regional trade blocs. In light of this could it be said that legal sovereignty has little practical meaning?
The globalization of trade and monetary issues due to economic interdependence has also spilled over into other policy areas. Policy areas once thought of very much as domestic rather than international concerns, like law and order or health, are also increasingly global as well as national concerns. The criminality that undermines the ability of the Colombian government to control their country, referred to in the opening box, is inextricably linked to many countries around the world. Colombia is the world leader in coca plant production and the earnings from the illegal trade of the plant’s narcotic derivative cocaine to countries like the US, UK and Spain have funded right wing and left wing insurgents as well as internationally-operating criminal cartels.

From the 15th Century when the Black Death plague swept from Asia to Europe and became the single most deadly event in history, it has been apparent that trade and travel can bring disease as well as prosperity. In the contemporary age, whilst medical progress has given us much greater means to contain the spread of diseases than in the pre-modern age, the scale and rate at which goods and people can cross borders makes implementing such measures increasingly difficult. The 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and 2009-10 ‘Swine Flu’ influenza pandemics were the latest in a long line of international diseases that globalized but were distinct in the rapidity in which they were able to move between countries tied together by business interests, tourism and a global food industry. Economic and cultural globalization also accounts for the internationalization of non-contagious ‘lifestyle illnesses’, like lung cancer, diabetes and obesity. M, with many countries—principally in the Global South—have had to contend with ailments, previously barely known to them, associated with the spread of largely Western habits like smoking and consuming a high fat and sugar foods diet. Western Multi-National Corporations have been keen to exploit
new markets for tobacco and fast food with the demand for such products fuelled by their exposure through a globalizing media.

c)  **Rise of ‘micro-states’ and ‘failed states’**

The economic and political changes unleashed by globalization have also contributed to the proliferation of sovereign states of a smaller and weaker form than generally seen in earlier eras. Given that economic interdependence has reduced the real autonomy of even powerful countries, the notion that certain small or economically-dependent territories should not be deemed sovereign has weakened. Many of the 192 UN member-states could now be said to struggle to meet the third Montevideo Convention criteria. Most new additions to the sovereign club are tiny countries who have earned recognition despite being what would have been thought of in the past as *sub-sovereign* entities such as principalities. Recent members of the UN include territories like Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein and San Marino (all previously rejected as League of Nations members) with a long history of making their own laws but dependent on powerful neighbours for defending this autonomy and providing a currency, the two areas of political authority most associated with sovereignty. When in 1998, Lesotho, a tiny enclave surrounded by South Africa, experienced widespread rioting caused by a disputed election result, they called in their neighbours to sort it out and restore law and order. In such cases it could be concluded that internal sovereign control is not in place and recognition has been given too readily. If a country entirely dependent on another for its internal and external security can be considered a sovereign state does this not render the notion of sovereignty redundant?
In addition to cases where sovereignty is gained more easily than it once was, several established states could be said to have held on to their sovereign status despite it ceasing to have any practical meaning. Chapter 28 explains how the phenomenon of failed states has become more pronounced in recent years. There have always been weak states but rarely in the Westphalian system has there been places like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan; existing as coherent political entities in name only. These states have continued to be represented at the UN and have the diplomatic recognition of most sovereign states but these have been privileges conferred on governments demonstrably no longer running the territories they represent. In Afghanistan, for example, recognition of the previous regime persisted in the late 1990s and early 2000s despite the clear fact that they had ceded control to the Taliban. Whilst granting the privilege of sovereignty upon a country is subject to much debate, there is no real precedent for withdrawing recognition for states where sovereignty has vanished.

**Economic interdependence**

The unprecedented increase in transboundary movements of traded goods and money that characterizes contemporary globalization is seen by many to undermine the notion of even today’s most powerful states really being in control of their own affairs. In the contemporary world governments are more than ever at the mercy of global economic forces with financial flows negating their efforts to control the national money supply and the desire not to be uncompetitive leading most to surrender full control of trading policy to the World Trade Organization and regional trade blocs. In light of this could it be said that legal sovereignty has little practical meaning?

b) *Dominance by superpowers*
Sovereign states have, of course, never been equal in power terms and meddling in the affairs of the weak by the strong has always gone on but this became so pervasive in the Cold War era that it could be said to have rendered any notion of legal equality as meaningless. The dominance of the US and USSR in this period created asymmetries of power in the state system not seen before which, when added to the ideological zeal that compelled both superpowers to promote their economic model to others, saw the notion of non-interference in the affairs of others go out of the window. The USSR’s Warsaw Pact / COMECON allies- Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania- were no more than notionally independent from Moscow and became widely referred to as ‘satellite states’. Soviet ‘advisors’ influenced government meetings and, when the Hungarians and Czechs ignored advice and sought to take full control of their affairs, in 1956 and 19668 respectively, Moscow sent tanks in instead. In a less explicit fashion several Latin American countries, and most notably Guatemala, Chile and Nicaragua, were subject to US interference in their affairs when they appeared to be moving politically leftwards.

dc) Growth of Non-state actors

In order to deal with the uncertainties produced by economic and other forms of globalization governments have increasingly turned to Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) to simplify their foreign relations and reap mutual rewards from collective action. IGOs have grown in accord with globalization and have tended to become more significant over time (see Chapter 12). In some cases, such as with some elements of the World Trade Organization and European Union, governments have formally ceded some sovereignty in order to permit supranational decision making in a phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘dual sovereignty’. It is established, for example, that EU law has primacy over the national
laws of its member states. Many member-states have had to amend laws passed through their own parliaments and approved by their own courts because they were not in accord with the treaties of the European Communities / Union (see chapter 15). In most IGOs supranational decision-making is not the case and governments retain full legal sovereignty but, even here, the need to do business and get on with others can produce compromises and bargaining in which governments essentially end up doing something other than they would have chosen if acting in isolation.

As is highlighted in Chapter 123 the proliferation of IGOs is not taken by everyone as evidence of a commensurate decline in state sovereignty. Realists posit that that since IGOS are, after all, comprised of government representatives they can be used by powerful states to buttress their power vis à vis other sovereigns. Perhaps more pertinent to the future of sovereignty, then, is the proliferation that has also occurred in non-state actors not comprised of states; International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs). This is analyzed in the next section.

**Towards Global Civil Society?**

The rise of formal International Organizations, in which decisions are taken by government representatives, over the past sixty years has also been accompanied by the growth on the international political stage of a variety of organizations in which governments play no or little part. Elsewhere in this volume we can see how some Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) have become wealthier than many sovereign states and influence the decision-making of both governments and IGOs like the World Trade Organization (see Chapter 17).
Equally we can observe that IR has been greatly affected by the rise of armed non-state actors (or ‘terrorists’) with the world’s most powerful state (the US) having been at war with a non-sovereign group (al-Qaeda) for the past decade. It is still, however, possible to contend that terrorists and MNCs are inextricably linked to states and do not, therefore, necessarily represent a diminution of state power in the world. Terrorists are often state-sponsored and fight for particular countries (like Afghanistan) or in the case of secessionist movements (like Basque separatists) are seeking to become new sovereign states. Similarly, MNCs are often used by governments for international political influence as seen in the Cold War when US businesses played a key role in buying influence in strategically important countries in Europe and Asia. Hence the non-state actors which most challenge the logic of a sovereign state system, possibly, are those that explicitly forego governmental influence and, to some extent, exist to challenge the perceived inadequacies of sovereign rule; international pressure groups.

Pressure groups, or not-for profit groups, can be dated as far back as the late 19th Century. The Sierra Club, for example, was established in 1892 to promote the conservation of nature in the US and is still influential in environmental politics today. It is from the 1960s, however, when public protest became a regular and systematic feature of political life in Western Liberal democracies, that we can see the real emergence of a realm of politics outside the mainstream of government and inter-party parliamentary debate. With industrialization widespread public protest, in the form of demands for the enfranchisement and social protection of the newly-emergent working class, became prominent in the late 19th and early 20th Century but, by the 1950s, this had largely come to be accommodated by democracy and welfare policies entering the mainstream in most developed countries. Hence political scientists in North America and Western Europe had come to talk of an ‘end of
ideology’ with a consensus having emerged in which peoples interests were largely satisfied (Bell 1960). In the 1960s, however, this consensus started to break down and more and more people became attracted to political activism outside of the traditional arena of party politics, giving support to pressure groups and / or taking to the street in protest. Unlike protest in previous ages this has proven to be a structural change and has persisted, grown and internationalized since the 1960s for the following reasons, very much linked to globalization:

- **Technological change**

  The whole of human history can, in the main, be viewed in terms of technological progress but it was not until the modern era that we can see this as something that empowered those outside of the political and social establishment. Key travel and communications advances, such as the development of aeroplanes and telephones, emerged in the late 19th Century but from the 1960s these became commonplace and accessible to people outside of the elites. Organizing marches and linking together with like-minded activists in other countries hence became more and more of a realistic prospect. With the continued advancement of communications technology this phenomenon has persisted with mobile phones, the internet and budget airlines giving larger swathes of societies dissatisfied with the political mainstream the opportunity to voice that dissatisfaction in ever greater numbers.

- **Social change**

  From a Sociological perspective, by the 1960s whilst a new working class was, by the 1960s, now accommodated in mainstream politics in liberal democracies, sociologically this era is thought to have spawned new social change in the emergence of a ‘new middle class’. This refers to a growing number of people with sufficient wealth to afford to take part in
regular political protest and not necessarily supportive of the political status quo in the way normally expected of the relatively well off in society. People able and inclined to take advantage of the technological opportunities offered to them have become a feature of political life and demanded changes from governments in a way which has served to break the consensus of the 1940s and 50s. Governments in the developed world have become weakened by a ‘revolution of rising expectations’. Democratic governments have simultaneously been: weakened by economic interdependence and swamped by more and more demands from their citizens. Whilst, for governments, taxes and managing the economy remain central political concerns, albeit ones over which they have less and less control, they governments have increasingly also had to address issues like human rights and the environment, advanced by pressure groups and wider social movements.

Whilst from the 1960s to the 1990s this phenomenon of regular protest and lobbying was largely confined to democracies in the Global North, this pervasiveness of contemporary information technology (IT) and the globalization of ideas that this facilitates has increasingly empowered more and more people in undemocratic and previously closed societies. Hence in 2009 a new generation of IT savvy Iranians were able to give voice to their disapproval of apparent electoral fraud by their government to much of the world in the so-called ‘Twitter Revolution’.

Pressure groups with international political influence have grown hugely in recent decades from around 1,000 at the end of the second World War to a figure of over 60,000 in the world today (UIA 2009). Previous In later chapters have it is shown how pressure groups have been key players in the emergence and evolution of international politics with regards to the environment, human rights and development. As well as holding governments of their
home country to account in the way that has come to be accepted as integral to modern

democratic state governance (See Chapter 21) groups like Amnesty International, Greenpeace

and OXFAM also influence the conduct of international relations by moulding the

international political agenda throughby advancing issues outside of the obvious interest of
governments and helping implement international law. Over 2,500 pressure groups have

consultative status with the United Nations which gives them the right to attend and

contribute to important conferences. The 1992 UN Conference on the Environment &

Development at Rio, the most significimportant international political event in the history of

these two issue areas, was actually organized and managed by pressure groups on behalf of

the UN. Groups like Amnesty have been pivotal in monitoring whether governments who

have ratified international human rights conventions actually live up to their word after

smiling for the cameras when signing up at the founding treaty. The UN - pressure group

relationship is a symbiotic one. The pressure groups benefit from the global exposure that the

UN provides. The UN benefits from being able to draw upon the specialist and independent

expertise the pressure groups can offerprovide. Most high profile pressure groups can boast a

significant budget usually drawn from individual donations which gives them the capacity to

hire high quality professionals and make their presence felt in international political

diplomacy without being tainted by association with parochial national interests. Amnesty,

Greenpeace, OXFAM and many other groups have memberships in the millions and budgets

in the tens of millions ($) which, since they are focussed on specific areas, buys them the

expertise and means to rival even the wealthiest states. For Liberals this represents the

emergence of a global civil society which can check the excesses of governments in

international politics in the same way such groups have in Western liberal democracies,

acting as what former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan referred to as the ‘conscience of the

world’. Hence, in this view, pressure groups are central to the achievement of humane global
governance in place of the traditional practise in international relations dictated by state interests. As with the rise of all non-state actors and the phenomenon of globalization in general, however, not everyone is convinced that the political world has really changed or is set to do so. Realist Kenneth Waltz, for example, opines that:

“States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones.”

(Waltz 1979 93-4.)

For Realists the notion of global civil society has little substance and IR continues fundamentally to be about inter-state politics. This debate is explored further in the next section.

d) Rise of ‘micro-states’ and ‘failed states’

Many of the 192 UN member-states could now be said to struggle to meet the third Montevideo Convention criteria. Most new additions to the sovereign club are tiny countries who have earned recognition despite being what would have been thought of in the past as sub-sovereign entities such as principalities. Recent members of the UN include territories like Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein and San Marino with a long history of making their own laws but dependent on powerful neighbours for defending this autonomy and providing a currency, the two areas of political authority most associated with sovereignty. When in 1998, When Lesotho, a tiny enclave surrounded by South
Africa, experienced widespread rioting caused by a disputed election result, they called in their neighbours to sort it out and restore law and order. In such cases it could be concluded that internal sovereign control is not in place and recognition has been given too readily. If a country entirely dependent on another for its internal and external security can be considered a sovereign state does this not render the notion of sovereignty redundant?

In addition to cases where sovereignty is gained more easily than it once was, several established states could be said to have held on to their sovereign status despite it ceasing to have any practical meaning. Chapter 28 explained how the phenomenon of failed states has become more pronounced in recent years. There have always been weak states but rarely have places like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan existed as coherent political entities in name only. These states have continued to be represented at the UN and have the diplomatic recognition of most sovereign states but these have been privileges conferred on governments demonstrably no longer running the territories they represent. In Afghanistan, for example, recognition of the previous regime persisted in the late 1990s and early 2000s despite the clear fact that they had ceded control to the Taliban. Whilst granting the privilege of sovereignty upon a country is subject to much debate,
there is no real precedent for withdrawing recognition for states where sovereignty has vanished.

Towards Global Governance?

Whether or not, in line with the arguments of the previous section, the sovereign state is in terminal decline and the Westphalian system ready to be succeeded by a new era of international relations, based on global governance, is hotly disputed. In this section the positions of the main IR theories on this question are explored.

Liberals

The Liberal political thought that emerged in the 18th Century was built on the premise that the state needed to be limited so that it was not allowed to endanger the liberties of the people it was supposed to represent. By the 20th Century, this logic had also come to be applied to international relations. The widespread feeling that the First World War was an avoidable conflict prompted the emergence of Idealism (see Chapter 7) which manifested itself in the creation of the League of Nations and the penning of a number of polemical works advocating world government in place of the sovereign system of states. British political activists John Hobson and Leonard Woolf (husband of renowned literary figure Virginia Woolf), for example, wrote books advocating world government as a means of retreating from endemic conflict and imperialism (Hobson 1915, Woolf 1916). Woolf was a firm advocate of the League of Nations, which emerged after the World War One, whereas Hobson was highly dismissive of this organization as little more than a victors club for a nationalistic and pointless conflict. Woolf was more positive, considering the League to be furthering the trend established in nineteenth century international affairs, before the build up
to world war, of international organizations like the Universal Postal Union assuming the political stewardship of certain functions not achievable by governments acting independently.

We are accustomed to regard the world as neatly divided into compartments called states….But this vision of the world divided into isolated compartments is not a true reflection of facts as they exist in a large portion of the earth today (Woolf 1916: 216-7).

Woolf and Hobson were thus pioneers of two differing strands of global governance theory which were further developed after the Second World War. Woolf’s work was a source of inspiration for David Mitrany and the Functionalists, a branch of Liberalism comprising scholars and activists who favoured a gradualist, bottom-up approach towards world government in which ordinary people would rationally come to switch their loyalties from their states to international non-governmental bodies. In this view, global governance was inevitable as the inadequacies of states, preoccupied with military concerns at the expense of peoples real interests of health, welfare and education, became apparent and saw them slowly lose legitimacy and authority (Mitrany 1975).

Hobson’s route to world government was more direct and ‘top down’: the immediate creation of supranational federal global agencies assuming control from governments of certain, clearly defined political areas. World Federalism of this sort gained momentum with the failure of the League of Nations and the even greater horrors that unfolded in the second of the century’s two world wars. For example, the British and Indian premiers, Churchill and Nehru, both spoke of federation as a recipe for world peace. Advocacy for world Federalism,
however, receded, however, from the 1950s as the Cold War divided the world again and economic recovery convinced even the countries of the emergent European Communities that they need only should merely cooperate rather than federate into a new state.

World Federalism continues to be advocated by some thinkers and pressure groups, such as the group Federal Union, but this is now very much a minority view unlikely to receive the endorsement of today’s prominent international statesmen. Similarly, Functionalism at a global level, even to modern day Idealists, appears too utopian to be a practical international political aspiration. International organizations have proliferated as Mitrany predicted but the most influential ones remain strictly intergovernmental and few people do appear to have switched loyalties and abandoned their states. Consequently, many contemporary Liberals have come to predict and advocate less radical and more pragmatic forms of global governance.

Robert Keohane, for example, has reasoned that there is a state utilitarian logic for global governance (i.e. a rationale for states themselves to want to surrender certain powers to global political institutions (box 33.23).

**Box 33.32 Keohane’s tasks requiring global governance**

In Keohane’s view the following political aspirations cannot be met by the sovereign state system but are, nonetheless, desirable for those sovereign states.

- A proper functioning system of Collective Security (where all countries together agree to uphold international law and collectively uphold to punish unlawful aggression)
- Limiting state recourse to ‘negative externalities’ (acts favouring one state in the short term but, ultimately, damaging the international community- e.g. polluting the atmosphere).
- Common trading standards
These forms of global governance would be in the interests of ordinary people but also in the interests of most governments since the political tasks concerned cannot be accomplished by states themselves acting in isolation. Hence this Liberal vision is more a case of refining rather than abandoning the concept of sovereignty.

**Social Constructivists**

Social Constructivists have added to the pragmatic Liberal perspective that International Relations needs to re-appraise the nature of sovereignty rather than assuming that it is disappearing. A central tenet in Social Constructivist thought that has risen to prominence in IR over the last two decades is the notion that sovereignty is, like all political concepts, a social construction and should not be treated in the same way as a material fact. Alexander Wendt’s famous maxim that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ neatly captures the idea that some states behave as if they have exclusive control over their own affairs but others choose not to (Wendt 1992). Hence within the European Union France and particularly Germany have embraced European integration and a single currency in the way the UK and Denmark have not. Wendt is not a Liberal and, indeed, is better summed up as a Neo-Realist turned Constructivist since he considers that most countries— but, crucially, not all— are driven by a
selfish, blinkered pursuit of power. He has, however, come to share much common ground with Keohane in formulating a state-utilitarian case for the inevitability of global governance within the next two centuries.

**Box 33.43  Wendt and the inevitability of a ‘world state’**

Wendt reasons that the international system has gradually evolved from a condition of anarchy to a more cooperative ‘system of states’ and then a ‘world society’, through the self-interest of states seeking to restrain the recourse to international war. In line with this it is posited that further progress towards a ‘world state’, in which war-making power is fully pooled in a global system of collective security, is both inevitable and in the interests of even the most powerful states.

“(I)f the choice is between a world of growing threats as a result of refusing to recognize others versus a world in which their desires for recognition are satisfied, it seems clear which decision rational Great Powers should take”.

Social Constructivist ideas on re-defining sovereignty have informed thinking on how many of Europe’s long-established sovereign states have come to embrace regional international governance for utilitarian rather than Idealist of Functionalist reasons. The Consociationalist theory of European integration, for example, does not see the European Union’s future as a case of taking one of two directions: a federal ‘high road’ or a strictly intergovernmental ‘low
road’ (with, for example, no majority voting and state vetoes on all issues). Instead, this approach suggests that the states of the European Union will continue to merge economically and politically, not inspired by any holy grail of an idealized United States of Europe but through pragmatic, economic necessity (Taylor 1991). Hence, from this perspective, the launch of a single EU currency did not mark the beginning of the end of sovereign member-states so much as the practical realization by the governments concerned that this would speed up business and that, German mark apart, the national currencies had, in any way, become largely irrelevant on the global stage. In this frame of thought sovereignty is not being abandoned but pooled in a manner that actually makes rational sense for the governments concerned.

Though principally applied in the context of European integration, Consociationalism could be seen to have global application to the development of the WTO and the numerous international regimes of common rules to which governments increasingly voluntarily commit themselves in order to ease the complications of dealing with modern economic interdependence. In this view, then, sovereignty and regional or global governance should not be understood as opposites but actually complimentary. In order for modern governments to exert influence on the world stage they need to come to terms with the limits of their independent power and embrace a more restricted interpretation of their sovereignty.

*Marxists*

For IR Marxists the significance of states and sovereignty has always been overstated in the face of the global economic structures that they feel actually determine the paths states take. Hence, from this perspective, governance has long been global: the imposition of rules and practises that facilitate the accumulation of ever more wealth by the world’s economic elite.
What is both prescribed and predicted by Marxists, therefore, is a radically different and better form of global governance: a stateless and classless world.

**Box 33.54 Antonio Negri on contemporary ‘Empire’**

Negri contends that state sovereignty has already been replaced by the ‘empire’ of a ‘new sovereignty’ of global governance based on the interests of a transnational elite. He does, however, view this development as actually offering hope of triggering the global socialist revolution he both predicts and desires.

‘…globalization can be desirable and can correspond, and be part of, a revolutionary process….the very possibility of sovereignty can be destroyed by such a regime of desire. …[This can] transform the oppressive state of permanent war in which we find ourselves into a liberating war which can eventually lead to an authentic social peace’ (Negri, Hardt & Zolo 2008: 59).

Realists

For **Realists** talk of sovereignty’s demise is much exaggerated and it is too soon to write off the state. Sovereignty continues to be cherished by those who have it and desired by many of those who do not. The number of sovereign states in the world has continued to grow in recent years and this trend looks likely to continue. Some colonies, like Greenland, have edged closer to full independence and many separatist ‘stateless nations’, like the Chechens, Basques, Kurds and Quebequois, continue to pursue sovereignty. Additionally, the reach of sovereignty is being extended by states looking to expand their territorial claims to include
continental shelves hundreds of miles from their coastlines and so erode the notion of *terra nullius*. The scramble that has emerged in recent years to claim large tracts of the Arctic Ocean is a case in point.

Realists also suggest that the growth of global cooperation that has undoubtedly occurred in recent years does not necessarily indicate a decline in state power. International organizations and international treaties have proliferated and, beyond this, less formal rules within *international regimes* in particular areas of common interest have emerged but these can still be seen as arrangements agreed to by sovereign state governments for their mutual interests. Indeed, the more there are of such cooperative arrangements the more there are means for powerful states to exercise hegemonic leverage over other states.

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*Box 33.65 Gilpin and the persistence of state power*

The renowned neo-Realist IPE specialist Robert Gilpin argues that globalization has not altered the fundamentals of IR and that we still inhabit a statecentric world.

‘It is certainly true that economic and technological forces are profoundly reshaping international affairs and influencing the behavior of states. However, in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry.’ (Gilpin 2001: 5)
Realists not only dispute that the sovereign state is in decline but also caution against wishing it away. Sovereign stewardship is still seen as the best means of maintaining order from a power politics perspective. As far back as the 1970s the renowned ‘English School’ Neo-Realist Hedley Bull warned that allowing state sovereignty to erode risked ushering in an era of ‘new medievalism’ with a retreat to the chaos of pre-Westphalian Europe, when competing jurisdictional claims overlapped and there was no clear understanding of where political authority lay (Bull 1977: 254).

Conclusions
Transnational criminal organizations have thrived under globalization. The opportunities offered for legitimate business by the shrinking of the world and opening up of many of its borders are there also for the world’s growing band of illegitimate businesses.

The sheer volume of goods crossing borders makes it ever easier to smuggle in illegal cargoes and the increased ease of moving money across borders makes it ever easier to launder the profits of such transactions and other criminal ventures. When criminal organizations then learn to break up their operations into different countries, corrupting officials in some and perhaps investing in legitimate business in other countries, it then becomes even less likely that they will be brought to justice. Few now doubt that the robbers are more globalized than the cops. Though Interpol dates back to the 1920s (see Chapter 12) it is still no more than a means for national police forces to exchange information on request and is constrained by sovereignty. Like in the old US movies, the villains have come to learn that if they can cross the borderline the police will have to call off the chase. Interpol is no global police force and its reach and budget is dwarfed by groups like the Russian mafia with tentacles in dozens of countries and strategic alliances with other n’er do wells such as Latin American drug cartels.

‘States have become almost outmoded organizations: in effect, we are attempting to deal with a twenty-first century phenomenon using structures, mechanisms and instruments that are still rooted in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concepts and organizational forms’ (Godson & Williams 1998: 324).

Crime has risen on the global political agenda and some robust state responses have been deployed but the problem continues to grow. In 2007, in a neat encapsulation of the impact of globalization on crime and sovereignty, at the same time as British and US troops were being despatched to Colombia to help its government fight drug barons, the Colombian government were sending ministers to London and Washington to plead for help in curbing the demand for cocaine amongst their populations which was, ultimately, fuelling the whole phenomenon.

Interpol are unequivocal in recognizing their impotence in the face of the globalized criminals;

‘No one country can effectively fight transnational organized crime within or outside its borders. Therefore, I submit, countries must relinquish some of their procedural or substantive sovereignty in order for the purpose for which sovereignty exists in the first place to remain intact.’ Ronald Noble, Secretary General of Interpol 2003’ (Noble
REFLECTION

List the political issues - if any - that you think would be better decided at the global rather than
sovereign state level. (the fewer there are the more of a Realist you probably are).

There seems little doubt that governments have become less and less able to fully control
events in their states in the face of globalization. Whether this signals the end of sovereignty
as we know it, a re-definition of the concept, or the need to bolster the state in order to tame
globalization is, however, open to debate.

- Sovereignty is defined clearly in International Law but it is increasingly debateable
  whether sovereign states really do control their own affairs any more.
• IR theories differ in their interpretations of the future of the state; Liberals envisage that global governance is inevitable, Social Constructivists similarly see many states coming to embrace elements of global governance. Marxists have long downplayed the significance of the state and forecast global socialist revolution. Realists contend that the state is here to stay.

QUESTIONS

• Explain what is meant by sovereignty and consider whether the significance of this concept has changed over time.

• Evaluate rival theories of how the international political system is likely to evolve in the future

• Are we heading inevitably towards some form of global government?

RECOMMENDED READING


The coming together of the thoughts of a man widely held to be the most influential thinker in contemporary IR. Keohane sets out his vision of how the world is transforming and of the form it may evolve to; one of global governance but in which states continue to be significant entities.

Lupel re-evaluates classic historical and contemporary works on both International Relations and democracy, by the likes of Locke, Rousseau, Habermas and Held, in light of the changes being brought about by globalization. The debate over whether contemporary global change threatens to undermine or enhance the democratic notion of ‘rule by the people’ is analyzed in an authoritative way that bridges Political Theory and International Relations.

WEBSITES


Global Policy Forum, ‘What is a State?’ http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/statindex.htm

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