Synthesis in the Human Evolutionary Behavioural Sciences

Running title: the human evolutionary behavioural sciences

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Abstract

Over the last three decades, the application of evolutionary theory to the human sciences has shown remarkable growth. This growth has also been characterised by a ‘splitting’ process, with the emergence of distinct sub-disciplines, most notably: Human Behavioural Ecology (HBE), Evolutionary Psychology (EP) and studies of Cultural Evolution (CE). Multiple applications of evolutionary ideas to the human sciences are undoubtedly a good thing, demonstrating the usefulness of this approach to human affairs. However, this fracture has been associated with considerable tension, a lack of integration, and sometimes outright conflict between researchers. In recent years however, there have been clear signs of hope that a synthesis of the human evolutionary behavioural sciences is underway. Here, we briefly review the history of the debate, both its theoretical and practical causes; then provide evidence that the field is currently becoming more integrated, as the traditional boundaries between sub-disciplines become blurred. This article constitutes the first paper under the new editorship of the Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, which aims to further this integration by explicitly providing a forum for integrated work. (Words 177).

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1. Introduction

The application of Darwinian thought to the human behavioural sciences, beginning in earnest with the publication of Wilson’s *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* in 1975, has had a turbulent history. Sociobiology applies gene-level selectionist models directly to behaviour enabling both the explanation of the ultimate causes of behaviour, and the prediction of specific behaviours under a variety of ecological conditions. The rather hostile reception of these ideas by the social sciences is well documented (see Segerstråle 2000 for a excellent account). Our concern here is not with the misinterpretation of evolutionary theory by the social sciences, but the ‘splitting’ process that the human evolutionary behavioural sciences has undergone over the last three decades. Broadly speaking, three sub-disciplines have emerged: Human Behavioural Ecology (HBE), Evolutionary Psychology (EP) and studies of Cultural Evolution (CE). This internal fracture has been tracked by a consistent flow of papers and books (Crawford 1993; Sherman and Reeve 1997; Daly and Wilson 1999; Heyes 2000; Smith 2000; Smith *et al.* 2000; Downes 2001; Smith *et al.* 2001; Barrett *et al.* 2002; Laland and Brown 2002; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005; Kaplan and Gangestad 2005; Dunbar and Barrett 2007b; Gangestad and Simpson 2007a; White *et al.* 2007). See Table 1 for a list of articles which have reviewed or attempted to synthesis these sub-disciplines, many of which provide informative summaries of the key issues.

Here we provide our own overview of the key boundaries that have arisen, but emphasise that in recent years there is strong evidence that a reintegration of the discipline is on the horizon. We argue that theoretical synthesis, while still far from ubiquitous, has become a significant feature of the contemporary literature. Traditional methodological boundaries have also attenuated, and some genuinely integrated research programmes and research groups have arisen in recent years. We briefly consider the role of relevant studies beyond our three-way split, and the rise of applied, rather than purely academic, studies,
before concluding with some optimism that a synthesis of the human evolutionary
behavioural sciences is truly underway. We start with a brief description of each of the three
sub-disciplines.

2. The Three Approaches

2.1 Human Behavioural Ecology

HBE emerged directly from Sociobiology (Wilson 1975), inheriting a core concern with the
ultimate functions of behaviour rather than its underlying mechanisms. Throughout this
article, we concentrate on HBE as a subcategory of human evolutionary ecology (an umbrella
term including applications to non-behavioural aspects of the phenotype), as the focus of this
paper is the behavioural sciences. However, we note that most of the points could be applied
to human evolutionary ecology at large.

HBE is concerned with explaining adaptive behavioural variation within its ecological
context. Organisms are understood to be attempting to maximize their fitness under specific
ecological conditions. Today, HBE remains virtually identical in approach to animal
behavioural ecology (e.g. Krebs and Davies 1993), using the same tools and techniques, such
as optimality theory, to generate testable predictions (Parker and Maynard Smith 1990;
Borgerhoff Mulder 1991; Cronk 1991; Winterhalder and Smith 2000). At the heart of HBE
lies a black box approach to understanding the traits in question, referred to as the phenotypic
gambit (a term first coined by Grafen 1984). This assumes that there is some linkage between
genes and behaviour, and therefore behaviour can be analysed in ultimate terms, but the
nature of this linkage is not an explicit concern. HBE explains behavioural variation using the
concept of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the same genotype can give rise to
multiple phenotypes dependent on ecological conditions. Testing models requires that the
fitness differentials associated with behavioural strategies are identified. As long-term fitness
is difficult to measure directly, proximate outcomes are used as proxy measures, most
commonly number of children or grandchildren, but also alternative measures such as health
or social status outcomes. Such models have performed well, and demonstrated predictive
power in a variety of domains, such as foraging, mating and parental investment
(Winterhalder and Smith 2000 for a review).

2.2 Evolutionary Psychology

In contrast to the phenotypic gambit approach of HBE, the focus of EP is upon the
proximate psychological mechanisms that cause behaviour. The broad conception of EP is
that proximate psychological mechanisms will be better understood in terms of their ultimate
functions. Put more prosaically, given that the brain is an evolved organ, there must be some
interesting theoretical constraints upon psychological theory from evolutionary biology.
Under this formulation there is a lot of room for different approaches to the application of
evolutionary biology to psychology, some of which would not necessarily be that removed
from HBE. This broad conception of EP is to be regarded as theoretically integrative.
However, one particular school of thought has dominated EP, which emerged primarily (but
not exclusively) from the Psychology Department at the University of California, Santa
Barbara (Barkow et al. 1992). This school has actively sought to differentiate itself from
HBE, principally on theoretical grounds. This distinction has been noted by a number of
authors (e.g. Downes 2001; Gray et al. 2003; Buller 2005; Dunbar and Barrett 2007a), though
it is not universally accepted within EP. Nonetheless, we find the distinction useful and will
adopt Dunbar and Barrett’s (2007a) terminology of EP *sensu stricto* (EPSS). It is to this that
we now turn.

Unlike the broad conception of EP, EPSS has some firm views on the precise nature
of psychological adaptations. EPSS characterises these adaptations as domain-specific,
claiming that this is a consequence of evolution by natural selection, for natural selection only selects adaptations that solve specific problems (though see Atkinson and Wheeler, 2004, for a discussion of degrees of domain specificity). Given this, each psychological adaptation was selected to solve a particular ancestral problem, and as such each adaptation has its own Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA; pace Bowlby 1969) which is the specific environment in which the adaptive problem presented itself and was solved. In the canonical book, *The Adapted Mind* (Barkow *et al.* 1992) this Pleistocene EEA epoch was described as a period of sustained and consistent selection pressures. EPSS has now hypothesised specific mechanisms relating to such diverse factors as – fear of snakes, detection of social cheats, language acquisition, preference for foods rich in fats and sugar, sex differences in sexual jealousy and mate preferences (relating to economic resources, age, attractiveness, body shape and sexual variety), and even landscape preferences for savannah like environments (reviewed in Buss 1995). These mechanisms are seen as universal species-typical adaptations with any cultural and individual differences explained by their regulated interaction with local environmental conditions (Tooby and Cosmides 1992).

Domain-specificity was subsequently discussed in terms of cognitive modularity (Fodor 200; Atkinson and Wheeler 2004). The architectural descriptions given in *The Adapted Mind* conform to aspects of modularity theory in that they assume specific content and specific processing for each adapted mechanism. This has led some to refer to this position as Darwinian Modularity, in contrast with Fodorian Modularity, which is process based, and Chomskyan Modularity, which is content based (Samuels 1998; Samuels 2000). The position EPSS takes on modularity is a consequence of theoretical commitments within cognitive science (Dickins 2003). The idea that psychological adaptations are domain-specific and modular is core to EPSS.
2.3 Cultural Evolution

CE shares some important commonalities with both HBE and EP (Henrich and McElreath 2003b). Like HBE, CE is concerned with the current adaptive utility of traits. Like EP, it is also interested in the proximate mechanisms by which adaptive behaviour is brought about, though it is concerned specifically with the mechanisms of social learning and transmission of cultural traits. It differs from both in its conviction that a robust understanding of human behaviour requires explicit consideration of cultural as well as genetic evolution. There is also some focus on population-level phenomena (such as the transmission of cultural traits), rather than the largely individual-level work of the other two sub-disciplines. We should note that our tripartite split glosses over some distinct traditions within CE, and that the field itself is not particularly unified. Many researchers stress a distinction between memetics and gene-culture coevolution (Laland and Brown 2002). Broadly speaking, memetics considers cultural evolution to be entirely divorced from biological evolution, though the evolution of cultural practices can be modelled along similar lines to those of genetic evolution (Aunger 2000). This branch of enquiry is a considerable smaller area, and has come under harsh criticism for a number of controversial assumptions, and a reliance on purely theoretical application (see Laland and Brown 2002). We focus more specifically on gene-culture coevolution (also known as dual inheritance theory), a larger and rapidly growing group area that consider human genetic and cultural inheritance to be decidedly interdependent (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Feldman and Laland 1996; Henrich and McElreath 2003a; Richerson and Boyd 2005).

We now lay out in turn the theoretical, methodological and sociological issues which have distanced the three sub-disciplines, but in each section provide evidence that resolution may be underway in each area.
3. Theory

HBE and EPSS have historically been at odds with one another (see, for example Symons 1989; 1992; Daly and Wilson 1999; Smith et al. 2000), and CE has been somewhat marginalised. Below we briefly describe the theoretical arguments between HBE and EPSS. We then go on to explain why we take the view that, on the whole, there are no insurmountable theoretical boundaries between EPSS and HBE. Finally, we discuss the extent to which CE can also be integrated into a wider framework.

3.1 The HBE/EPSS Dispute

The core difference between HBE and EPSS has been captured by the distinction between fitness maximizers and adaptation executors (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). HBE (the former) assumes that behaviours are adapted to current ecologies, and EPSS (the latter) assumes current behaviours are the products of ancestrally selected psychological adaptations. EPSS has used this distinction to criticise HBE for being naively adaptationist, and providing no explicit method for distinguishing an adaptation (Symons 1989; 1992). The HBE research programme assumes extreme phenotypic plasticity which EPSS characterises as an emphasis on humans as unconstrained fitness maximizers and argues that this implicitly advocates a domain-general cognitive system (Buss 1995). This directly contradicts EPSS’s defining assumption of domain-specificity. In turn, the claim of EPSS that psychological mechanisms are adaptations to past environments has led to HBE criticism that EPSS puts a misleading over-reliance on a simplistic hypothesis of our ancestral environment (Foley 1995; Irons 1998; Potts 1998; Strassmann and Dunbar 1999). Furthermore, it is claimed that a consequence of this focus is that EPSS emphasises human universals at the expense of exploring the full behavioural repertoire of our species (Gray et al. 2003).
3.2 Resolutions

The theoretical disagreements between HBE and EPSS have involved a considerable amount of misinterpretation. It is not unusual to draw lines in the sand using extreme descriptions of alternative positions, especially in the early days of a discipline, but this hinders integration. These disagreements have centred on the following three issues: the role of adaptive fit to current environments; with the domain-specificity or otherwise of the proximate psychological mechanisms; and, with the role of human universals versus variability.

The domain-specificity problem is easy to dismiss, as EPSS and HBE do not need to disagree on this issue at all. HBE is agnostic about the proximate mechanisms by which traits are brought about, and therefore has nothing to say about whether psychological mechanisms are domain-specific or not (Smith et al. 2000). Thus, the phenotypic gambit neither commits HBE to a domain-specific nor to a domain-general cognitive architecture: its focus is exclusively upon the behavioural outcome. As to specific notions of modularity, we endorse the view of Dunbar and Barrett (2007a) that this is simply not a very interesting problem from an evolutionary point of view, though it may well be of interest to psychologists, who aim to explore the precise nature of proximate psychological mechanisms. This issue should not therefore hold up the integration of the field.

Turning to the issue of universals versus variability, this is also perhaps not quite as divisive as it might appear. EPSS, for example, is quite explicit that observed behaviour results from the interaction of a universal human nature with environmental conditions, such that behaviours are contingent, just as HBE assumes. Psychological mechanisms themselves are to be seen as conditional, or decision architectures, just as genes and other biological systems are (Dickins and Dickins 2007). This can work in two ways: (1) we have an evolved capacity to remember stimuli and make associations between them, for example, but the actual remembered material and associations made are a consequence of external factors and
their salience in a given ecology; and, (2) psychological mechanisms are information processors designed to make judgements about best utility, which means that they embody strategies for different contingencies. This latter notion is incorporated in psychological work on future discounting (Daly and Wilson 2005) as well as work on more deliberative judgement and decision-making (Gigerenzer and Todd 1991). It would be a peculiar notion of a psychological universal if it only allowed for one possible behavioural output. The disquiet about claims to psychological universals, which arises from observations of behavioural variation, amounts to no more than a grain-problem. The level granularity required to claim behavioural variation is different from that used to claim psychological variation. Psychological mechanisms are discussed in terms of the type of thing they do, and behaviour (at least for HBE) is often focused on at the token level: so, there are mechanisms for memory (for example, procedural memory for doing and making things) and there are the actual memories that different groups value (for example, how to make a canoe versus how to make a dinghy). Thus, EPSS can safely lay claim to the human universal of procedural memory, whilst HBE is right to focus on variability in the actual products. Such a distinction can be made across all of human activity.

Finally, we need to deal with the issue of adaptation to past versus current environments. This is also not necessarily polarising, but, it has produced the most heated arguments between HBE and EPSS. Clearly, many of the problems faced by our species, to which we might have evolved adaptations, have been around for a very long time, and the potential solutions are likely to have evolved sometime during our past. Additionally, there are some aspects of the modern industrialised world which are novel, and it is possible we may be responding non-adaptively to them. Equally clearly, there is strong evidence that adaptations have continued to form in response to selection during the Holocene epoch (Hill et al. 1991; e.g. Holden and Mace 1997; Williamson et al. 2007), and that even Pleistocene
hunter-gatherer environments are likely to have been considerably diverse, rather than presenting a set of static homogenised selective pressures. This is especially pertinent given the wide geographical range hominins and early humans colonised (e.g. Dennell and Roebroeks 2005). HBE of course does not deny that there were crucial selective environments in the past that shaped the underlying proximate mechanisms that in fact deliver behaviour, it is just that the phenotypic gambit renders theories of these environments inconsequential. Nor do they naively assume that every trait is optimally adapted to its current environment (there is an implicit recognition of this in the fact that HBE has largely restricted its analyses to traditional societies). On the other hand, EP rarely operates according to a stringent Pleistocene notion of the EEA (Daly and Wilson 1999), though some researchers within EPSS do (e.g. Symons 1992; Kanazawa 2004). Most EP researchers look at modern behaviours and try to hypothesise the adaptive utility of the current behaviour. This is clearly evident, for example, in the mate-preference literature, which assumes that modern mating decisions are governed by universal instincts that are effectively designed to maximize fitness. The main points of attraction, such as symmetry, are argued to be indicative of developmental stability which is a current concern, as well as presumably one for our Pleistocene ancestors and beyond. It is only when non-adaptive behaviours present that hypotheses about ancestral environments aid the development of mismatch explanations. Some evolutionary psychologists are also coming round to the idea that there may well be genetic differences between populations that affect behaviour, as has been shown for a number of physiological traits (Nettle 2007). This of course means there has been a diversity of selection environments.

So we believe the theoretical differences between HBE and EPSS to have been somewhat over-emphasised in earlier writings. However, we do not mean to suggest that all theoretical differences are now resolved. Debates still remain, for example, on the extent to
which particular behaviours are universal versus ecologically variable, or the extent to which behaviours are adapted to current environments. But these debates are now being subjected to empirical testing (see, for example, Section 4.2 on the rise of cross-cultural work), rather than used as evidence of irreconcilable theoretical differences that hold up the synthesis of the discipline.

3.3 The Cultural Evolution Position

Despite CE’s relatively long history (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Lumsden and Wilson 1981) it has largely been ignored by the EP and HBE literature (for example, in the 2-year period before 2007 only 8% of articles in the main journal in the field, Evolution & Human Behavior, considered culture as the topic point of interest: Hill 2007). The focus of EPSS on human universals means it has paid relatively little attention to cultural differences, and where it does allow for cultural differences there is a tendency to assume they are ‘evoked’ (i.e. the result of context-dependent psychological mechanisms interacting with local environments) rather than ‘transmitted’ (i.e. the result of social learning: Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Gangestad et al. 2006; Mameli 2007). HBE has tended to brush aside the issue of culture by assuming that cultural differences between populations are simply part of the environment, rather than make cultural variation itself the focus of their investigations. As part of the phenotypic gambit it does not directly concern itself on the matter of whether behaviour is brought about through purely genetic evolution, cultural evolution or gene-culture evolution, only the extent to which the end result fits adaptive predictions.

Its interest in current adaptiveness means that theoretically CE is more closely aligned with HBE than EPSS. Much of the previous discussion on the differences between HBE and EPSS therefore also applies to differences between CE and EPSS. Given that CE is not yet a particularly unified field, and that it is at an earlier stage of development than either HBE or
EPSS theoretical debates in CE often revolve around disputes within the field itself: for example, the extent to which cultural evolution is inter-related with genetic evolution (Laland and Brown 2002); and debates around the importance of horizontal versus vertical transmission of cultural traits between populations (Mace and Holden 2005; Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2006; Collard et al. 2006). Part of the reason for the marginalisation of CE does, however, hinge on theoretical differences of opinion on the importance of culture in explaining human behaviour. Some within EP and HBE take the reductionist view that cultural practices simply result from individual behaviour, and therefore that the action of natural selection will select for behaviours that are operate in a group context. A separate study of cultural behaviour is therefore not really necessary: adaptations or adaptive behavioural variability can be predicted without recourse to culture (Alvard 2003; Dickins 2005). There is also some unease about the introduction of cultural evolution into the evolutionary behavioural sciences from at least some members of both the HBE and EP camps. Genetic evolution through natural selection is a long-established and (reasonably) well understood phenomenon, even if its application to human behaviour is relatively new. The evolution of cultural traits through mechanisms analogous to genetic evolution (though integrated with genetic evolution) appears to some to be, firstly, stretching the analogy of Darwinian evolution too far; and secondly, uncomfortably close to the post-modern approach to human behaviour, with its associated lack of scientific rigour (Alvard 2003).

But overall, theoretical disagreements between CE and the other evolutionary behavioural sciences (over and above those between HBE and EPSS) are relatively minor: both HBE and EP largely admit that (transmitted) culture exists and matters at least to some extent to human behavioural evolution, even if the extent to which it matters, and the degree to which researchers think it necessary to include culture explicitly in their models, varies considerably. The marginalisation of CE by the other sub-disciplines may, in practice, have
more to do with methodological differences, to which we turn in Section 4. In summary, CE does not appear to have the programmatic aims of HBE, EP and especially EPSS. CE researchers are individually engaged in specific investigations that would be happily incorporated within the broader human evolutionary behavioural sciences. CE represents no threat to integration, but a fertile ground for cooperation. For example, Laland and Brown (2006) have suggested that the ability of our species to construct our own niches allows us to buffer ourselves against adaptive lag, so that behaviour even in modern industrial environments may well be adaptive. This is relevant to HBE/EP debates surrounding the EEA and notions of environmental mismatch.

4. Methodology

4.1.1 Methodological Differences

We now turn to more pragmatic reasons for the ‘splitting’ of the human evolutionary behavioural sciences. Substantial methodological differences have exacerbated theoretical divisions. Differences in preferred study populations, and methods of data collection and analysis have hampered communication and potential pathways to synthesis. In terms of study population, HBE has so far almost exclusively focused on traditional populations, with high fertility and mortality rates (and therefore high variance in the traits HBE is most interested in). In contrast, the vast majority of EPSS studies have been conducted on modern industrialised populations. There is an inherent irony in this division: EPSS lays much emphasis on identifying universal preferences, yet focuses almost entirely on Westernised populations, while HBE has assumed that their methods should be successful in any type of environment, yet have largely ignored the region in which most of them reside. For example, although cross-cultural analyses were not entirely lacking from early EPSS work, it tended to be relatively unconvincing at least to the anthropologically-trained HBE community. Buss’
(1989) highly cited work claiming to find consistent sex differences in mate preferences across 37 cultures used no fewer than 24 samples from groups which were European or derived from European populations (e.g. US, Australia, South African whites). And those non-Western populations which were included tended to be rather more ‘Westernised’ than the small-scale traditional populations HBE has been interested in. On the other hand, EPSS researchers may well consider HBE’s decision to ignore their preferred study population as an implicit recognition that their models hold little explanatory power when applied to the modern industrialised world. Therefore, these differences have traditionally left researchers on either side of the debate unconvinced by the potential relevance of the sister research programme.

Differences in methods of data collection and analysis are also apparent across the sub-disciplines. HBE researchers approach human behaviour from a background in animal behavioural ecology or anthropology, both of which have long running traditions of fieldwork, collecting data from observed behavioural outcomes. EPSS researchers, in contrast, trained in psychological methods that use self-reported preferences or experimental manipulations of behaviour, maintain that this is sufficient for distinguishing between alternative hypotheses about human psychology. For HBE, observational methods enable perfect ecological validity; an assessment of variable phenotypic expression in its true selective environment. For EPSS, experimental methods offer high reliability in controlling for independent variables that may otherwise confound results.

CE once again is best considered separately, since, initially at least, its methods focused almost exclusively on theoretical modelling rather than empirical study. While this approach is undoubtedly important in the evolutionary tool-kit, it has its drawbacks. Of necessity, strict assumptions need to be applied for reasonably simple models to be produced, which make it difficult for empiricists to relate such models to real world situations.
Secondly, few researchers trained in empirical methods are also trained in mathematical modelling. While mathematical modelling is not entirely alien to other behavioural scientists, in order to clarify relationships in observed data, it is usually a minor component of their approach. An over reliance on purely theoretical modelling by CE may distance it from empirical scientists. In addition, though it purports to be interested in the mechanisms of social transmission between individuals, CE research on how individuals do transmit information to each other was traditionally lacking. Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain which individuals people choose to obtain social information from (for example, conformist bias – behave like the majority; prestige bias – behave like the most successful members of the community) but the theoretical modelling of such transmission biases is rather more advanced than the study of how such social transmission works on the ground (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998; Eriksson et al. this volume). This methodological division between theoretical and empirical approaches is perhaps one of the principal reasons why CE has been somewhat sidelined in the human evolutionary behavioural sciences.

4.2 Narrowing the methodological divide

Movements to theoretical integration have been echoed by a softening of historical boundaries in methodology. It is encouraging that, while HBE research is still biased towards traditional populations, its theoretical framework is increasingly being applied to modern industrialised societies. One particular area of focus has been reproductive decision making. In part, this has been a direct response to early claims (e.g. Vining 1986) that adaptive models of human behaviour are clearly falsified by the emergence of negative or null relationships between wealth and fertility that characterise modernisation (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998). A significant body of research has now emerged encompassing both theoretical and
mathematical modelling of the relationship between wealth and family size across multiple
generations (Mace 1998; Hill and Reeve 2005; McNamara and Houston 2006) along with
directed empirical study (most notably Kaplan et al. 1995a; Kaplan et al. 1995b). Apparent
mismatch between Western family size and the seemingly low ecological costs of child-
rearing has led HBE to incorporate models from EP and CE. For example, Kaplan’s et al.
(1995a; 1995b; 2002) work has a distinct integrative flavour, containing hypotheses about
underlying psychological adaptations of fertility regulation that have predictive utility. While
reviews of the evolutionary approach to demographic transition by prominent HBE
researchers (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998; Mace 2007) have included integrative discussions of
relevant studies in EP (e.g. Perrusse 1993) and CE (e.g. Newson et al. 2007). Clearly this is a
potential further stimulus to theoretical development and synthesis in its own right.

Perhaps the methodological development most likely to promote integration is the
increasing inclusion of relatively non-Westernised societies in EP research. An active
movement to test models amongst a more representative set of human cultures is clearly
underway. Many EP researchers are now testing models in non-Western populations (e.g.
Barrett and Behne 2005; Brown et al. 2005; Hagen and Barrett 2007), and others are
attempting to reassess earlier demonstrations of universality with more diverse datasets (e.g.
Moore and Cassidy 2007). Although including understudied traditional populations, such as
hunter-gatherer groups, may be difficult in such large scale analyses, the potential
contributions are illuminating. For example, Moore and Cassidy (2007) have made efforts to
include societies with relatively high degrees of female access to resources in a cross-cultural
study of mating preferences. The study suggests that EPSS claims for universal sex
differences in the prioritisation of wealth in potential mates requires reconsideration.
Similarly, recent work by authors such as Furnham and Swami suggests that male preferences
for female phenotypic characteristics may be more diverse than implied in some EPSS
research (Furnham et al. 2002; Swami et al. 2006; Tovee et al. 2006; Swami and Tovee 2007). In general it appears that a fuller discussion of the role of contingency in psychological mechanism and of cross-cultural differences in EP literature is emerging, thereby increasing its relevance to HBE and CE. This development can only improve relations between the sub-disciplines.

There are also notable developments in the CE literature as its researchers are increasingly applying models to real data, at both the macro- and micro-evolutionary level. At the macro level, researchers are beginning to use comparative methods to test adaptive hypotheses about cross-cultural variation in cultural traits (McElreath 2004; Henrich et al. 2005). In particular, the emerging field of cultural phylogenetics has had success in explaining variation in traits such as lactose tolerance, sexual dimorphism in height and marriage practices (Holden and Mace 1997; 1999; Mace and Holden 1999; Borgerhof Mulder et al. 2001; Fortunato et al. 2006). At the micro level, CE is slowly moving into the lab using both Western and non Western participants. Studies of social transmission in action are beginning to appear in the literature (Baum et al. 2004; McElreath et al. 2005; Mesoudi et al. 2006; Efferson et al. 2007), and a recent call has gone out to CE practitioners to incorporate the methods of social psychology into the discipline to gain a better understanding of cultural microevolution (Mesoudi 2007).

The best demonstration of synthesis is collaborative research that genuinely integrates the methods of each sub-discipline. A particularly fruitful line of enquiry is cross-cultural research and there has been a recent surge of such projects. Such work can get to the heart of remaining debates about the level at which traits may be universal or variable between populations. A number of research projects have now been initiated with the aim of drawing together teams of researchers who pool expertise and study populations, in order to generate new databases of comparative data. Henrich and colleagues (2005), for example, combined
laboratory EP with HBE field methods: participants from a range of small-scale traditional societies were given economic games to play, in order to explore and explain cross-cultural variation in self-interest. A similar collaboration currently in progress is the Demography, Ecology and Mate Choice project\(^3\), run by Penton-Voak and Josephson and funded by the Leverhulme Trust. Other projects, bringing together existing databases and researchers across sub-disciplines, include the intergenerational transmission of wealth in pre-modern societies project at the Santa Fe Institute, organised by Bowles and Borgerhoff Mulder\(^4\).

Individual research articles are also beginning to use mixed methods, combining more than one approach to the study of a particular question. For example, Newson et al. 2007 combines lab testing of participants with cultural evolution models to examine how conversations with kin vs. non kin may influence reproductive decision making. And both Jones et al (2007) and Waynforth (in press) have recently combined the traditional preoccupations of CE and EP by looking at the social transmission of mate preferences.

Such collaborative ventures and the use of mixed methods raise the exciting prospect of gaining a much more detailed and complete understanding of human behaviour, by pooling the expertise of numerous scholars from diverse fields of enquiry but all working within an evolutionary framework.

5. Sociology

5.1 Issues

Just as it is important to identify methodological differences as a practical element in the ‘splitting’ of the discipline, we must also remember that theoretical debates do not occur in a sociological vacuum. Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) generated considerable controversy with

\(^3\) [http://www.demc.org](http://www.demc.org)

neighbouring disciplines, not just the social sciences, but also biologists, many of whom were opposed to the application of evolutionary models to our own species’ behaviour (e.g. Gould and Lewontin 1979; Lewontin et al. 1984; Rose et al. 2000). Internal debates within the human evolutionary behavioural sciences have always existed within a larger context of academic hostility. One might speculate that aggressive debates with neighbouring disciplines have exacerbated internal tensions, instilling a combative attitude to discussion.

Strains placed on the discipline by external hostility are magnified by departmental separations between sub-disciplines. EP is typically hosted within psychology departments, and HBE and CE within anthropology departments. The latter placements are somewhat ironic, as neither HBE nor CE has taken significant theoretical inspiration from traditional anthropological studies. However, this has resulted in closer collaboration between HBE and CE than between EP and either of these areas. Several prominent HBE researchers have, perhaps as a consequence, moved into CE research areas (for example: Cronk 1999; Mace and Holden 2005; Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2006). Physical separation of researchers hampers communication, and this enforced division pushes the discipline further apart in other ways, resulting in researchers publishing in different journals and attending different conferences. It could be that this is driven by an understandable desire to persuade other fields of enquiry of the usefulness of evolutionary theory, but it also occurs for more pragmatic reasons. For career advancement, evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists are required to build a reputation in their home disciplines. This means that it is their direct peers who will be reviewing their grants, applications for tenure and promotion. Necessarily this focuses activities within the relevant sub-discipline at the expense of engaging with other evolutionary sub-disciplines.

Distinct sub-disciplinary jargon is another barrier to integration which results from the different disciplinary backgrounds. For example, what HBE refers to as phenotypic plasticity,
EPSS would term evoked culture. Phenotypic plasticity is an important component of behavioural ecology, and there has been much recent work on the topic in the biological literature (e.g. West-Eberhard 2003). However, ‘plasticity’ is not a word that seems to find favour with EPSS where it is seen as too vague a term to be useful (Hagen 2005). Phenotypic plasticity is not simply a vague statement that phenotypes can vary, however, but a rigorous concept: reaction norms can be predicted which stipulate exactly how a phenotype changes in response to environmental cues thereby demonstrating the conditional nature of phenotypic expression (e.g. Allal et al. 2004). HBE has in turn found fault with the EPSS phrase ‘evoked culture’, arguing that culture should be used only to describe socially transmitted information, since there is much ‘evoked culture’ (i.e. adaptive behavioural variation in response to environmental conditions) in non-humans animals that is not usefully described as ‘culture’ (Alvard 2003). The term is not therefore useful, and may be unnecessarily confusing, when applied to our own species. The issues of terminology require resolution for if the sub-disciplines do not understand one another’s language, misunderstandings can easily arise.

Finally, the new and controversial nature of the discipline has enforced a strong concern for reputation. Researchers in the HBE and CE community have been particularly vocal about these concerns (Smith et al. 2001; Laland and Brown 2002). One major issue revolves around the relative dominance of EPSS in the popular media (Cassidy 2005; Cassidy 2006), with its attendant simplifications and lack of peer-review (Downes 2001; Gray et al. 2003). This media interest is undoubtedly due to the preoccupation of EPSS with ‘sexy topics’ such as mate choice. This has the consequence that assumptions about the characteristics of an evolutionary approach to human behaviour are more frequently based on knowledge of EPSS than any alternative approach. This leads to a one-sided, and often inaccurate view, of the human evolutionary behavioural sciences both by the public and other academic disciplines.
5.2.1 Solutions

Wider sociological issues may remain troublesome for the integration of the discipline until universities form unified departments of human evolutionary behavioural science. There are, however, already encouraging signs that some institutions are recognising that old disciplinary boundaries are out-dated, and combining evolutionarily-related departments and research groups in order to build more integrated units. Below we note a number of departments and research groups within the UK that contain representatives from more than one sub-discipline, rather than sequestering each into its home department. We restrict this section to the UK, as it is the area with which we are most familiar, but we hope that similar integration is occurring in other regions of the world:

- the Evolution and Behaviour Research Group within the School of Biology & Psychology at the University of Newcastle
- the Evolutionary Psychology and Behavioural Ecology Research Group within the School of Biological Sciences at the University of Liverpool
- the Centre for Culture and Evolutionary Psychology within the School of Social Sciences at Brunel University
- University College London houses two research groups with much cross-fertilisation, whose members are drawn largely from the Department of Anthropology and the Institute of Archaeology, the Centre for the Evolution of Cultural Diversity and the Human Evolutionary Ecology Group

Even where institutions are not sufficiently enlightened to provide integrated departments, it is still possible to create ‘virtual’ communities of like-minded researchers. For example, the Work in Progress group at the London School of Economics was the crucible for this particular collaboration between EP and HBE.
We have recently developed another forum which explicitly aims to promote an integrative framework for future study: The European Human Behaviour and Evolution Conferences\(^5\). Initiated in 2006, the EHBE conferences bring together researchers from all branches of the human evolutionary behavioural sciences and are deliberately designed to encourage communication and dialogue between sub-disciplines. Sessions are serial allowing delegates to attend all sessions and strenuous attempts are made to ensure a balanced programme, with representation from all main branches of the field. For example, the 2007 conference devoted a day each to human behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology and cultural evolution (though other branches, including evolutionary sociology, medicine and archaeology, were also represented, see Section 6). Papers presented at the 2007 conference have formed this opening issue under the new editorial board of the *Journal of Evolutionary Psychology*, which aims to become a similarly inclusive medium, interpreting psychology in its broadest sense to include HBE and CE.

6. Beyond HBE, EP and CE

Though we have divided the field into three for the purposes of this paper, not all researchers in the human evolutionary behavioural sciences align themselves with these camps. As the number of researchers on the field grows, new sub-disciplines are beginning to spring up and other social scientists are becoming interested in applying evolutionary ideas to their own discipline. Prominent examples of new sub-disciplines include:

- Reproductive ecology is an expanding branch concerned with understanding human reproductive physiology in adaptive framework (see Ellison 2001 or 2003)
- Evolutionary medicine (see Nesse and Williams 1995 for the seminal work in this field)\(^6\).

\(^5\)www.ehbes.com
\(^6\)see the Evolution and Medicine Network for more recent developments, http://www.evolutionandmedicine.org/.
Evolutionary archaeology (O’Brien and Lyman 2002; Bird and O’Connell 2006).

Prominent examples of the application of evolutionary theory to the social sciences outside of anthropology and psychology include:

- **Economics**: activities in this area include the Economic and Social Research Council-funded Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution at University College London, established by Binmore. Publications in this field include: Frank *et al.* 1993; Gintis 2000; Bowles and Gintis 2002; Binmore 2005; Gintis *et al.* 2006

- **Sociology**: activities include an Evolution and Sociology session at the European Sociological Association’s 2007 conference. Publications include: Freese *et al.* 2003; Davis and Were 2007

- **Demography**: activities include the Evolutionary Biodemography working group at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock; evolutionary demography sessions are now held at the annual conferences of the British Society for Population Studies, the Population Association of America, the European Association for Population Studies and the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. Publications include: Murphy 1999; Lee 2003; Baudisch and Vaupel 2005; Hobcraft 2006

Mainstream biologists may also be coming round to the idea that human behaviour can be studied using the standard evolutionary principles applied to the study of non-human animal behaviour, as evidenced by the joint School of Biology and Psychology at Newcastle University; Lummaa’s Human Life History Project in the Department of Animal and Plant Sciences at Sheffield University; and the UK Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour’s meeting on ‘Sex, shopping and sharing: insights from animals to humans and back again’ in September 2007.
6.1 *Applied work*

There could be no greater sign of the influence of evolutionary ideas in mainstream biological, social and medical sciences than its use in applied research. There are a number of recent publications by evolutionary researchers attempting to demonstrate the relevance of an evolutionary understanding of human behaviour to policy-making. The first examples include edited volumes which comprise a range of practical applications of evolutionary theory (Somit and Peterson 2003; Crawford and Salmon 2004), or monographs on specific areas of policy (Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Browne 2002). These largely theoretical publications had limited success. The former appear to have been largely ignored by policy-makers (Google Scholar states that both edited volumes have been cited merely twice since their publication). The latter have been unsuccessful, and heavily criticised, because they lack an integrated approach to their subject (Smith *et al.* 2001; critiqued respectively by Sear 2005). But, the fact that they exist demonstrates a clear interest in engaging with applied research.

A more promising line of applied work is that which is grounded from the beginning in empirical and often integrative work. The following research, focussing on a specific problem and testing it in the field, may prove to be more useful to policy-makers in the long run:

- Curtis *et al.* (2004) have developed an evolutionarily informed measure of disgust sensitivity and have begun to apply this in studies of hygiene behaviour in the developing world (see also Scott *et al.* 2007)

- A study on the effects of cues of being watched on honesty has already attracted interest from both the commercial and public sector (Bateson *et al.* 2006)

- Gibson and Mace made use of life history theory to analyse the impact of a water development project on the demography of a rural Ethiopian population, which
Several more examples of the application of evolutionary ideas to development were recently presented at the session on "Human Behavioral Ecology: Applications to International Development and Public Policy" organised by the Evolutionary Anthropology Section of the American Anthropological Association at the 2005 AAA annual conference (see: Leonetti et al. in press; Shenk in press; Tucker and Rende Taylor in press).

6. Conclusion: The Human Evolutionary Behavioural Sciences

We are optimistic that a synthesis of the human evolutionary behavioural sciences is not only possible, but underway. In recent years most sub-disciplines have taken significant steps towards theoretical integration and have broadened methodological frameworks beyond traditional boundaries. Moreover, integrated studies, while not ubiquitous, are a significant feature of the contemporary literature. This is not to gloss over differences between traditional sub-disciplines, as it must be remembered that each approach is effectively concerned with asking different questions about the evolution of human behaviour – but here lies the strength of an integrated approach, by tackling issues from multiple perspectives a complete understanding can emerge.

Acknowledgements

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References


Table 1: Examples of articles reviewing or synthesising evolutionary analyses of human behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Discipline of authors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Crawford</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The future of sociobiology: counting babies or studying proximate mechanisms</td>
<td>Trends in Ecology and Evolution</td>
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<td>Evolution of Cognition</td>
<td>Animal cognition</td>
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<td>Evolutionary analyses of human behaviour: a commentary on Daly &amp; Wilson</td>
<td>Animal Behaviour</td>
<td>HBE</td>
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<td>Smith</td>
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<td>Three styles in the evolutionary analysis of human behaviour</td>
<td>Adaptation and Human Behaviour</td>
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<td>Smith, Borgerhoff Mulder &amp; Hill</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: a guide for the perplexed</td>
<td>TREE</td>
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<td>Downes</td>
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<td>Some recent developments in evolutionary approaches to the study of human cognition and behavior</td>
<td>Biology &amp; Philosophy</td>
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<td>Laland &amp; Brown</td>
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<td>Human Evolutionary Psychology</td>
<td>CE &amp; BE</td>
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<td>Barrett, Dunbar &amp; Lycett</td>
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<td>Chapter 1: The evolutionary approach to human behaviour</td>
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<td>Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology</td>
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<td>Evolution of the Mind</td>
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<td>White, Dill &amp; Crawford</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>A common, conceptual framework for behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology</td>
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Note that these are our own categorisations of the authors’ disciplines