WP2
NATIONAL FRAME FOR THE INTEGRATION OF NEWCOMERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

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About the Project

While integration policies as such are not new, and in some countries date back to the 1980s and beyond, there have been important shifts in the debates on integration and in related re-configurations of integration policymaking in the past decade or so. One of the main recent trends is the linkage of integration policy with admission policy and the related focus on recent immigrants. A second trend is the increasing use of obligatory integration measures and integration conditions in admission policy, and third, integration policymaking is increasingly influenced by European developments, both through vertical (more or less binding regulations, directives etc.) and through horizontal processes (policy learning between states) of policy convergence.

An increasing number of EU Member States have, in fact, adopted integration related measures as part of their admission policy, while the impact of such measures on integration processes of immigrants is far less clear. In addition, Member States’ policies follow different, partly contradictory logics, in integration policy shifts by conceptualising (1) integration as rights based inclusion, (2) as a prerequisite for admission residence rights, with rights interpreted as conditional, and (3) integration as commitment to values and certain cultural traits of the host society.

The objective of PROSINT is to evaluate the impact of admission related integration policies on the integration of newcomers, to analyse the different logics underlying integration policymaking and to investigate the main target groups of compulsory and voluntary integration measures.

The project investigated different aspects of these questions along five distinct workpackages. These analysed (1) the European policy framework on migrant integration (WP1), (2) the different national policy frameworks for the integration of newcomers in the 9 countries covered by the research (WP2), the admission-integration nexus at the local level in studied in 13 localities across the 9 countries covered by the research (WP3), the perception and impacts of mandatory pre-arrival measures in four of the nine countries covered (WP4) and a methodologically oriented study of the impact of admission related integration measures (WP5).

The countries covered by the project were Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Apart from individual cases project reports generally cover the period until end of 2010.

For more information about the project visit http://research.icmpd.org/1429.html
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I Migration integration nexus

Historically there was little link between integration and migration in UK policy or discourse but in the past few years this has begun to change, especially in terms of the discourses and policies promoted by the UK Border Agency. Amongst other government departments, such as the Department for Communities and Local Government, and regional and local authorities, this link was at best weakly conceptualised (according to several interviewees). Several reasons lie behind the weakly interventionist attitude to and funding for integration. Until the 1980s, immigration had been dominated by migrants from former colonies and it has only been since the 1990s that flows have become highly diverse (Vertovec 2007) due to large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, labour migrants from Third countries and especially the new accession countries, and students. Multiculturalism too was an official policy and diversity seen as an integral aspect of British society.

Thus, until recently, migration in terms of controls and admission has been dealt with entirely separately from settlement and integration. Policies on settlement and integration have been most developed in relation to refugees; there was little that dealt directly with third country nationals. Where attention to integration extended beyond refugees it had tended to be framed in terms of community relations, cohesion and inclusion, particularly with the rise of community cohesion in relation to established minority ethnic groups as a dominant policy concept. This was coupled with security concerns that were clearly aimed at Muslim populations. Although integration was recognised as a distinct concept to cohesion, it was not necessarily explored more fully. A general meaning of participation, including in the labour market, and interaction with the host community can be found in many policy documents.

The arrival of large number of A8 migrants in the UK (Home Office 2010) following the eastward enlargement of the EU signalled a greater interest in issues of integration at the local level as such migrants moved into areas which had not been affected by previous labour and family migration, including in rural areas and small cities or by asylum seekers (a number of medium-sized and metropolitan centres such as Leeds, Glasgow). Calls from local authorities for more support for services led to the creation of a Migration Impact Fund in 2008 (now disbanded by the new coalition government). At the same time, the discussions generated by the disturbances in Northern cities in 2001 and the notion of parallel and separate lives (Cantle 2001) led by certain minority ethnic groups, together with a questioning of the effects of diversity (Goodhart 2004), resulted in several reports on Integration and Cohesion and on Citizenship (see section 2). UK Border Agency (2008:2) noted in relation to an unprecedented inward migration that there is ‘a considerable challenge to ensure that it remains integrated and unified’. It concluded however that one size does not fit all and that future integration policies would have to be ‘sufficiently flexible to meet the widely different needs of individuals from different cultures, linguistic backgrounds, educational attainment etc’ (p. 9).
In all of these reports there was considerable emphasis on language as a crucial element of socio-economic integration and the need to make it a priority of policy and migrant integration. This focus is also exemplified by revisions to the Points Based System, the cornerstone of labour migration into the UK, which was implemented as from 2008 (see section 3). Here the UK Border Agency included language requirements as part of the admissions criteria and argued that they helped to promote integration in the workplace and in social intercourse. By 2007 the UK Border Agency undertook consultation on pre-entry tests for spouses which very clearly linked quality of immigration flows, protection of vulnerable migrants and integration. In part this stemmed from its concern with larger numbers settling, and in particular those who faced disadvantages in the labour market, such as Asian women. We shall discuss this more fully in WP4.

The election of a new coalition government in May 2010 (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) heralds a new policy framework, at least in its intentions, though there are indications already that the contradictions thrown up by its aim may make its objectives of reducing net immigration to the levels of the 1990s difficult to achieve (Home Office 2010b). Their objective is to be accomplished by capping the level of immigration and imposing quotas on labour migrants amongst the highly skilled (tier 1) and skilled (tier 2) and bringing forward measures such as pre-entry tests, whose rhetoric is about benefits for integration, but which are intended to reduce immigration by spouses, especially from South Asia, traditionally the largest group of spouses. There are other preoccupations derived from the previous Labour government which they are likely to carry forward, such as the increasing numbers settling (Achato et al. 2010; Home Office 2005, Home Office 2010b) and ways to decrease numbers of those entering under routes leading to settlement. See Appendix 1 on a comparison of those settling in relation to the main routes of entry. As Ryan (2008) comments the focus of integration policy is no longer on the equalisation of opportunity, but rather on the discouragement and penalisation of migrants who do not possess certain attributes. As Goodman (2010: 764) has shown in her compilation of a civic integration index in different European states, the UK is one of the countries with a large change in its integration requirements across the three major stages (naturalisation, settlement, admission) – up from 0.5 in 1997 to 4.5 in 2009.

However, whilst at the national level, and especially at the Home Office, the nexus between migration and integration, that is immigration controls and integration requirements, has been discussed and put in place since 2005, those working at other levels and more concerned with integration do not perceive such a nexus already being in place. As one expert working at a regional level replied, ‘there are separate agendas: immigration is about controls; integration fits with cohesion and security’.
II Integration policy and concepts

II.1 What integration policies are there? Whom do they target?

Integration policies have been most developed for refugees. Integration policies for other types of migrants are slowly emerging, often based on concepts and practice developed in relation to refugees, or in relation to established minority ethnic groups. The UK Home Office published its first refugee integration policy, ‘Full and Equal Citizens’ in 2000 and an updated policy in 2005 ‘Integration Matters’ which was followed by a refugee integration strategy document ‘Moving on Together: Government’s Recommitment to Supporting Refugees’. In the Integration Matters strategy, the government positioned refugee integration in relation to the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, stating that it was written in light of the duty on the government, and on all public bodies to work for the promotion of good race relations (Home Office, 2005b). However, there have been no policies specifically relating to other types of migrants. A ‘Review of Migration Integration Policy in the UK’ in 2008 by the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) included an assessment of the policies they considered relevant to the integration of migrants as a whole. The review lists refugee policies (including the ‘Gateway’ resettlement programmes, asylum case resolution programme and Refugee Integration and Employment Service (RIES)) alongside policies seen as relating to the integration of migrants more broadly: The Home Office green paper on Earned Citizenship (February 2008), investment in ‘Community Cohesion’ and ‘investment in affordable housing and rough sleeping support’ (DCLG, 2008: 8).

It is noted that refugees constitute a minority of migrants, and that support for the majority of other new migrants is left to local areas, leading to duplication of effort (CIC, 2007, DCLG, 2008). This recognition led the Commission for Integration and Cohesion to recommend the establishment of an independent body to manage the integration of all new migrants, sponsored by the Department of Communities and Local Government. However, the DCLG argued in its review of migrant integration policy that there was no clear rationale for developing an Integration Agency ‘on the basis that these functions can feasibly be provided within existing structures, and that the development of an additional agency does not justify the cost that this would entail’ (DCLG, 2008: 19). Hence, up to the end of the Labour administration the integration of new migrants continued to be dealt with via a variety of policies and programmes not necessarily targeted at integration specifically, or at any one migrant group, or targeted at the integration only of limited types of migrants, particularly refugees. At the time of writing it is not known how this might change in the new coalition administration (with the exception of announcements of the introduction of pre-entry language tests for spouses, discussed below).

The DCLG integration policy review noted reviews underway across government departments at the time of publication to look at provision for new migrants, including reviews of the private rented sector, access to healthcare by foreign nationals, access to benefits for EEA migrants, criminality of EEA migrants, and of...
citizenship and immigration rules for migrants who come to the UK to work or study (DCLG, 2008). As subsequently noted in the review, this list leaves substantial gaps, particularly around ‘new arrivals who are not refugees or EEA nationals’ – that is, third country nationals. Prior to the DCLG review, the Commission for Integration and Cohesion in their report ‘Our Shared Future’ promoted the lack of a specific policy or programme in positive terms:

‘Integration and cohesion is no longer a special programme or project. It is also not about race, faith or other forms of group status or identity. It is simply about how we all get on and secure benefits that are mutually desirable for our communities and ourselves. It is both broad and deep, and influences all levels of activity in every part of England.’ (CIC, 2007: 5)

The list of relevant policies in the DCLG review of integration policy reveals a mixed group of reactive policy concerns emerging from public debate and media discourse, particularly relating to the sharp rise in international migration from the new European countries (A8, and less so A2): pressure on housing; charging for healthcare of foreign nationals; the exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state; criminality among migrants and concerns over long term settlement of labour and student migrants and the credibility of student migrants. Taken together, this list of topics adequately demonstrates the tendency towards reactive, restrictive policies in relation to the integration of migrants which is coupled with little in the way of proactive or supportive policies or practices. Direct service provision and funding for integration is largely confined to refugees (and even then, only refugees in certain categories – for example, the large group of refugees being granted leave to remain through the asylum case resolution programme are not eligible for support from RIES (Brown, 2008).

II.2 How was integration debated and negotiated?

A number of formal advisory and consultation processes have debated and developed governmental approaches to the integration of migrants over the past decade. Starting in 2001 there were national refugee integration conferences organised by the Home Office, and ongoing development and discussion through the National Refugee Integration Forum.

Migration Impact Fund was set up in 2008 based on a migrant levy on non-EU visa applications which was used to fund projects which mitigated the effect of increased numbers of migrants in specific localities although its beneficiaries were not only those who paid the levy eg. Roma. Funding was allocated regionally with the amount weighted regionally towards areas where international migration had the greatest short-term impact. A total of £23,581,306 in 2009-10 and £22,099,223 in 2010-11 was made available. Its abolition was announced (The Guardian 6 August 2010) in an answer to a parliamentary question and the Department of Communities and Local Government stated that “Ending the ineffective migration impacts fund will save £16.25m this year. We believe the impacts of migration are better addressed through controlling immigration, which is why the government will reduce the level
of net migration back down to the levels of the 1990s – tens of thousands each year, not hundreds of thousands."

**Migration Advisory Committee** is a non-statutory agency sponsored by the UK Border Agency. It was set up in 2007 and meets regularly to advise the government on migration issues. It has not been abolished in the cuts to quangos. It has produced a number of papers on points based system and the criteria to be used for determining shortage skills.

The **Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration** was established in November 2004 by the Government to advise and report on the processes of assessment of an understanding of English and Knowledge of Life in the UK required of applicants for Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK and British Citizenship. It ended its work in November 2008.

### II.3 What features of integration do policies emphasise?

Integration is widely recognised as a slippery term with multiple definitions and applied to a complex set of interacting social processes and functional activities. Definitions of integration (and related concepts) in key government policies and strategies:

**Integration Matters, Home Office, 2005**

‘Integration takes place when refugees are empowered to: achieve their full potential as members of British society; contribute to the community; and access the services to which they are entitled’ (Home Office, 2005b: 15)

**Our Shared Future, Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007**

‘We do not believe integration and cohesion are the same thing as some argue. Cohesion is principally the process that must happen in all communities to ensure different groups of people get on well together; while integration is principally the process that ensures new residents and existing residents adapt to one another.’ (CIC, 2007: 9)

**Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration (Final report), 2008**

‘It has long been accepted that integration is a two-way process and that one key component of it is participation in public, economic or social life which brings interaction between different ethnic and linguistic groups with the receiving community. The aim of the current naturalisation requirements was to promote the learning of language skills to encourage migrants to become socially and economically active and thereby foster in them a sense of belonging to a wider community’. (ABNI, 2008: 22)

The UK Home Office approach to integration has been partly influenced by work done by Ager and Strang to develop a framework of ‘indicators of integration’. They group indicators into domains of means and markers (employment, housing, education, health), social connections (social bridges, social bonds, social links), facilitators (language and cultural knowledge, safety and sustainability) and
foundation (rights and citizenship) (Ager and Strang, 2004, Ager and Strang, 2008). The notion of integration as a two-way process has been adopted in the voluntary sector and in regional or local approaches to refugee integration (e.g. Yorkshire and Humberside Consortium for Asylum Seekers and Refugees, 2003) from a widely used definition developed by the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) in 1999, and points towards the importance of understanding integration as a process of mutual accommodation (Ager and Strang, 2008).

In much writing and in research on the experiences of refugees, however, social integration is seen as a one-way process onus is placed on the migrant to mix with the majority community (Rutter et al., 2007: 99, Atfield et al., 2007: 31). Despite this, several studies point towards data from migrants and refugees that highlight how they have found it hard to meet British people and make friends, often reporting experiences of attempts to make contact not leading to sustained engagements, or of perceptions of British people being unfriendly (Spencer et al., 2007, Rutter et al., 2007). Lack of language skills is almost universally recognised as a serious barrier to integration and a prominent marker of difference (e.g. MacKenzie and Forde, 2008, Spencer et al., 2007, Rutter et al., 2007); the language barrier 'pervades all aspects of life for a migrant with a low level of English competence' (Experian, 2007, 4). A reduction in funding and eligibility for English language classes has been coupled with increasing requirements for English language skills in the points-based admission system and through ‘earned’ citizenship which awards time spent volunteering and language capacity with a shorter route to gaining citizenship. The discourse on citizenship and social cohesion marks a shift towards a more assimilationist model of integration (Zetter et al., 2006: 23).

The emerging assimilationist agenda is identifiable in prominent debates and discourse of community cohesion, a policy and concept that has rapidly replaced both ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘integration’ in discussion of managing diversity and recent immigration. Emphasis has been placed variously on new arrivals, Muslims, and minority ethnic groups in general being seen to be making an effort to learn about and demonstrate ‘common values’. These concerns were brought to prominence by the Cantle report (Cantle, 2001) on disturbances in northern towns in 2001 considered to have a ‘race’ element. The Cantle report accused minorities of living ‘parallel lives’, and subsequent widespread attention to ‘community cohesion’ at local and national levels has tended to assume and perpetuate the notion of segregated ethnic communities—an assumption strongly questioned in a growing body of evidence (Finney and Simpson, 2009, Robinson, 2009, Worley, 2005).

Further to the definition above provided by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, their report discusses how they understand the links between cohesion and integration. They suggest that cohesion is a more developed policy framework (CIC, 2007: 38), and go on to advocate a new definition that links the two concepts. They posit a development of previous definitions of ‘cohesive community’ and integration into a linked concept of an ‘integrated and cohesive community’. By combining the two, the definition seeks to link hosts and migrants, or ‘both those who have strong local attachments and those that are strangers locally’ (CIC, 2007:
Their ‘aspirational’ and ‘clear’ definition of an integrated and cohesive community is one where:

- There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country
- There is a strong sense of an individual’s rights and responsibilities when living in a particular place – people know what everyone expects of them, and what they can expect in return
- Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities, access to services and treatment
- There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in arbitrating between different interests and for their role and justifications to be subject to public scrutiny
- There is a strong recognition of the contribution of both those who have newly arrived and those who already have deep attachments to a particular place, with a focus on what they have in common
- There are strong and positive relationships between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and other institutions within neighbourhoods. (CIC, 2007: 42)

This definition distances from blame being placed on particular groups based on racial, ethnic or immigration status categories, and it is likely that ‘problems’ of ‘cohesion’ are experienced differently according to local patterns of ‘difference’. While the policy concept of community cohesion was initially linked to settled minority ethnic groups, as a catch-all term it has served well as a repository for concerns relating to any type of difference. In this way, it has also been applied to new arrivals including third country nationals, usually with an overt emphasis on onus being placed on migrants to learn about the UK and speak English.
III Admission-related integration provisions? Managed migration and the Points Based System

If there is little in the way of clearly identifiable policy approaches to integration for migrants in the UK, there is even less that demonstrates any explicit link between pre-entry admission policies and integration. Although changes to immigration policies are clearly linked to the settlement of migrants and social cohesion generally, it is possible to talk only of general trends and indications in seeking to draw any link. There were vague connections drawn between integration and immigration by the government, but in practical terms the focus has been very much on increasing controls - first, in order to shape immigration to serve the needs of employers, and latterly more as an end in itself as asserting state control has become the main policy goal (Flynn, 2005). During the Labour administration the concept of ‘managed migration’ became an increasingly common and popular umbrella term to refer to immigration controls and policies. Developments under ‘managed migration’ have led to the emergence of stronger pre-entry admission policies and increasing requirements placed on migrants to meet certain criteria, primarily to demonstrate English language ability. These changes have not been primarily linked to the integration of migrants but are intended to maximise the potential economic gains of immigration for the UK (Home Office, 2005a, Sales, 2007, Somerville, 2007).

III.1 What pre-admission policies are there? What are the aims / rationales of pre-entry admission policies? Do they refer to rights and duties to host society?

In reviewing policy developments under ‘New Labour’ up to 2007, Somerville (2007) states that the start of the shift towards a more pro-active economic migration policy is difficult to determine precisely, but that it emerged through a series of policy changes in 2000 to 2001 that contrasted with the absence of policy proposals prior to this time. In this period changes were aimed at attracting highly skilled migrants through the introduction of the Innovators Scheme and the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP); at the same time there was a relaxation of administrative criteria for work permits led by an objective to meet employer needs (Somerville, 2007). The creation of a points-based system was orientated to the supply side: the skills of the individual migrant.

The HSMP initially required an applicant to reach 75 points on a scale that awarded points for ‘human capital’ (skills or education) and ‘achievement’. The threshold for entry was later made easier before concerns indicated by pronouncements by government officials from late 2004 and 2005 about the threshold being too low led to changes, such as the introduction of a mandatory language requirement (Somerville, 2007). In 2003 Sector Bases Schemes were created, based on the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) that had existed since the Second
World War. This opened up low-skilled migration to other labour-market sectors - hotel and food-processing. In 2005 the SBS attracted 7,401 persons, 23 per cent of whom were from Bangladesh and 17% from the Ukraine (Salt and Millar, 2006). However, the enlargement of the EU has led to an almost complete end to low-skilled non-EU migration. The SAWS was dedicated to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals following EU accession in 2007. There was also an increase in the number of student migrants from 85,300 registered for formal study in 1997 to 136,100 in 2004 and schemes introduced to encourage students to stay in the UK to enter high-skilled jobs by allowing students to apply to stay for one or two years after graduating (Somerville, 2007: 36). It can also be argued that efforts to reduce the number of unauthorised migrant workers through policy decisions that have ‘amounted to de facto regularisations’ (such as the overnight regularisation of ‘illegal’ workers from the A8 countries that joined the EU in 2004) (Somerville, 2007: 37) have contributed to improving integration outcomes for large numbers of migrants.

The introduction of a points requirement in the HSMP evolved into a points-based system to draw all categories of economic migration into one of five tiers which replaced most work-based categories in 2008. It was widely stated by politicians at the time that the system was based on the Australian points system. The five tiers categorise migration streams into groups: Tier 1, highly skilled; Tier 2, skilled with a job offer; Tier 3, low-skilled; Tier 4, students; Tier 5, ‘temporary workers and youth mobility’. Overall, with the advancement of ‘managed migration’ with the introduction of the points based system there has been a shift from employer-led to government-led policies and a focus on control (Somerville, 2007: 37). The criteria has a differential impact for different categories – age, gender, nationality, race (see Kofman et al. 2009 for an analysis of the PBS in terms of these equality strands).

In 2005, the Home Office set out a five year strategy for asylum and immigration, ‘Controlling our borders: making migration work for Britain’. The dual focus of control and economic benefit is expressed in this title. Nevertheless, there was a brief mention indicating an intention to link integration outcomes with admission:

> We will continue to allow a small proportion of those who come here to settle permanently where there is clear economic benefit and where they are prepared to integrate socially. We will tighten our conditions to reflect this by requiring those who want to settle to pass tests on English language and knowledge of the UK...

Although aims of integration (as opposed to control) are far from explicit in much subsequent discussion of language level tests for achieving indefinite leave to remain and UK citizenship, the close association of ‘migrants being prepared to integrate’ with language and knowledge of the UK tests in this passage does demonstrate some thinking in UK government policy around admission-related integration provision. However, again economic benefit is key as proficiency in English tends to be associated not with good community relations and integration outcomes for the migrant themselves, but is associated only with employment and migrant workers: ‘the Points Based System expects the vast majority of workers to
speak English’ (DCLG, 2008: 3). Nevertheless explicit language requirements were introduced in the revised HSMP in November 2006, taken forward into tier 1, and tier 2 in November 2008 (see table 2). The high level of English required for highly skilled migrants (tier 1) are to ensure they are able to work immediately in highly qualified jobs. For ordinarily skilled migrants, the level is low (A1 and indeed not much higher than what will be required for the entry of spouses) and this is seen as not just desirable for workplace but also to interaction with the wider society.

While any positive connection between admission policies and rights and duties to the host society is oblique, the question of integration—or the assumption that migrants create social problems due to an assumed lack of integration—has been strongly linked with admission controls in a shift towards public anxiety and political debate linking immigration and population growth.

Increasingly, media stories and policy updates on immigration have been combined with estimates on population growth and density that identify the foreign-born population as largely responsible for predicted growth. Based on alarmism regarding population growth Cross-Party Group on Balanced Migration, for example, put forward the position that ‘immigration has reached unsustainable levels and must be brought back into balance with emigration’ (Migration Watch, 2008: 5). The report ‘Balanced Migration: a new approach to controlling immigration’ though presenting the policy positions put forward by the Cross-Party Group on Balanced Migration was actually published by the right-wing think tank Migration Watch. Migration Watch has become notorious for its impact in contributing anti-immigration positions to media coverage on migration. Migration Watch also created, update and finance the website ‘Balanced Migration’ for the Cross-Party Group which presents statements from the Group and their coverage in the media. They promote and have sought to push forward the debate on a cap on immigration. Other commentators, such as the think tank IPPR (which tends to be described as left-wing or centre-left) have pointed out (Finch, 2010) that this, and other similar reports, use population growth estimates that were falsely inflated due to calculations being made at a time of high immigration in 2007 which was quickly followed by a sharp drop attributed largely to effects of the economic recession. Balanced Migration also link immigration with detrimental effects on community relations and pressure on health services and schools. They recommend greater controls and capping of non-EU immigration to stabilise the population and reduce pressures, also claiming this would ‘improve the prospects for integrating newcomers into our society’ (Migration Watch, 2008: 43).

Most recently, one of the first policy decision taken by the new coalition government in relation to immigration was to introduce pre-entry English language tests for spouses which perhaps provides an indication of a desire of this government to strengthen links between pre-entry admissions and integration requirements, presaged by the Labour five year strategy in 2005. Unlike the requirements for the PBS, this development will have a particular gendered effect given the dominance of women and their socio-economic characteristics (literacy, level of education) in the countries of origin. These will be discussed more fully in WP4.
IV Post-arrival provisions: citizenship and settlement

As mentioned above, there have historically been almost no policies and no provision for the integration of third country nationals after arrival. While debates around community cohesion can be linked to the integration of new migrants, the previous government began to develop policies to link transition to settlement through the criteria imposed for indefinite leave to remain (ILR) and citizenship more overtly with integration requirements and outcomes (see table 2). Similar conditions for ILR (2007) followed on from very quickly from those set for naturalisation. The INTEC project (Ryan 2010) has examined in detail the application of the language requirement and the Knowledge in Britain test, the extent to which it is felt to actually promote integration and the differential success rates by nationalities (but not by age or gender). The results will be discussed more fully in WP5 in relation to an evaluation of the measures involved.

In the past two years, much of the debate on proposed reform of the naturalisation process for migrants has focused on the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 and discussed in responses to the Bill and Act and consultations on earned citizenship. The changes proposed by the previous government aimed to ‘encourage more eligible migrants to naturalise as British Citizens rather than simply remain in the UK with settled status’ (House of Commons, 2009: 13). The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 introduced changes to the citizenship process, which, despite being billed as a simplification process have been criticised for making the process of becoming a British citizen longer and more difficult. At the same time a proposal for regulated voluntary work as a form of ‘active citizenship’ was suggested as a route to shortening the process (MRCF, 2010). The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants summarise the proposals, which are to introduce new period of ‘probationary citizenship’ to last one to five years; to introduce a points test at the stage of applying for probationary citizenship; as with the points based system, the government may lower or increase points in response to numbers applying for citizenship; if migrants cannot met the required point level they will have to leave the UK; and only once the specified amounts of time and additional requirements have been met in the ‘probationary citizenship’ stage have been met can migrants progress onto British citizenship or permanent residence (JCWI, 2009).

Responses from key refugee and migrant advocacy organisations to the Green Paper ‘The Path to Citizenship’ in February 2008, to a further consultation ‘Earning the Right to Stay – A New Points Based Test for Citizenship’ in 2009, and to the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill and Act 2009 concentrated on reform of the naturalisation process as the main issue of concern. Criticisms highlight five key areas of concern: proposals for a new status of ‘probationary citizenship’; how the proposed changes and general tone of the discourse promotes mistrust and suspicion of migrants; that extending the period before citizenship or residency can be achieved actually counters rather than promotes integration; discrimination again certain groups of migrants; and the paradox of enforced volunteering.
In relation to probationary citizenship, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association argue that introducing a new status not only fails to simplify the process, but, that the need for a probationary stage is ‘imaginary’ since there are already several stages on the route to citizenship at which a person’s status and background is reviewed (ILPA, 2008). Invoking a link and contradiction between integration aims and policies of community cohesion, Liberty argue that the changes could hinder community cohesion (Liberty, 2008). They suggest that though integration is a stated aim, arguably extending length of integration process will be counterproductive and that a prolonged process of scrutiny combined with tests may well perpetuate feelings of exclusion. Requirements on all visa applicants to pay a migrant levy and the requirement for volunteering to demonstrate ‘active citizenship’ are criticised as being likely to discriminate against certain groups as they will disproportionately affect those most vulnerable: single mothers with young children, the elderly, disabled, those with mental or physical trauma, previous unaccompanied asylum seeking children (Scottish Refugee Council, 2009). Scottish Refugee Council further note that an Equality Impact Assessment (a requirement placed on public bodies through equalities legislation) has not been conducted on active citizenship. Several organisations argued that the idea of enforced volunteering is a paradox, and, furthermore, that formal volunteering ignores significant existing contributions made by migrants in small and migrant-based organisations that would not be recognised under the terms proposed for active citizenship (Liberty, 2008, MRCF, 2010). This has not been implemented by the Coalition.
V The Effects of European Integration on the Migration-Integration Nexus

In general, the UK has opted out of European directives which would in any way open up uncontrolled mobility from within the EU and thus reduce its sovereignty in relation to border control and the regulation of numbers of migrants entering the UK. It has thus opted out of the family reunification (2003/86/EC), the rights of long-term residents (2003/109/EC) as well as the Blue Card for the purpose of highly qualified employed (2009/50/EC)). Opting out from family reunification probably stemmed from a more general antagonism to loss of sovereignty. The UK imposes housing and income conditions for family members and in fact allows spouses to work upon entry. Yet in terms of restrictive legislation on spouses (raising the age of marriage and pre-entry tests for spouses), it has looked to other European countries such as the Netherlands.

In terms of the Blue Card, the UK was concerned about the ability the directive gave to move to another EU country after 18 months and further argued that it already had a skilled migration route recruited through the Points Based System for which Australia and Canada has been the inspiration. The Blue Card is based on meeting thresholds (1.5 higher than average gross salaries in the destination country, the educational qualifications to be able to undertake highly qualified employment and a formal offer of employment) rather than a more complex points based system as in the UK. Here variable points for tier 1 can be earned from salaries in country of origin, educational qualifications, additional points for youth, language ability and maintenance (Kofman et al. 2009). Furthermore there is no need to have an offer of employment and students can transfer into this route. One of the ensuing problems is that amongst those from outside OECD who manage to get a tier 1 visa, many are not working in highly skilled employment (Home Office 2010c), possibly because of racial discrimination and lack of recognition of their qualifications.

On the other hand, the UK has transposed the European anti-discrimination directives. It has enacted the following legislation to implement Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78: Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI2003/1626) and Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003 (SI2003/1660). The anti-Race directive was inspired to some extent by the UK which was the first country in Europe to implement anti-racist legislation. This legislation emerged from a perspective connecting immigration control and integration which had been enunciated in the late 1960s (Schuster and Solomos 2002). Laws against race and ethnic origin discrimination were enacted to lighten or soften the impact of harsh and restrictive immigration and asylum rules and to show that these were not based on racism and prejudice against people because of their race/ethnic origin. The main Act against racial discrimination is now the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976), as amended which covers discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origin.

At the time integration was more about equality of opportunities and anti-discrimination legislation, especially in employment, rather than ability to speak the
language. Later on with much lower levels of immigration and the acceptance of multiculturalism, issues of integration largely disappeared in discourse and policy making until the beginning of the decade (see section 1 and 2).

Recent UK thinking about integration has been fairly consistent with the EU Framework of Common Basic Principles for Integration. UKBA stated in its multi-annual programme 2007-2013 for the European Integration Fund for Third Country Nationals that its view of integration was one of ‘supporting and enabling people to integrate into UK society rather than having absolute requirements to conform to a set of cultural norms”. The EIF has been important in getting the UK to clarify its integration policies which include ensuring that only those migrants that have the skills that enhance the UK economy are admitted’ ie. an active managed migration programme. To this end, the UK Border Agency appropriated the major part of EIF funding in 2007-8 to develop its admissions policy, especially for managed migration. For the current coalition, reducing the numbers admitted is the key way of reducing the level of funding needed for integration (see comment on the abolition of the MIF).

**Funding and Research**

Government funding for integration has been cut after a period of substantial increase in ESOL funding until 2008 and the creation of the MIF which distributed money to the regions for local projects. EIF money, on the other hand, has shifted more towards projects rather than supporting the UK Border Agency own work. The priorities for the 2010 call were firstly for projects that introduced newly arrived third-country nationals to the UK and enable them to gain basic knowledge about the UK’s language, history, institutions, socio-economic features, cultural life and fundamental norms and values and secondly, prepare third-country nationals for integration into the UK through pre-travel measures which allow them to gain skills and knowledge necessary for integration.

The British Council is one of the lead partners in MIPEX (integration indicators and benchmarking) which has so far produced two studies and is currently working on the third study. Andrew Geddes, University of Sheffield, designed the labour market access strand. The UK is very active in European civil society organisations. Several of its foundations (Barrow Cadbury Trust, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Fund) are members of the European Program for Integration and Migration which has funded a number of European and national integration and rights-based projects.
References


HOME OFFICE (2010b) Damian Green's speech: the real immigration question, speech given on 6 September at the Royal Commonwealth Society

HOME OFFICE (2010c) Points Based System Tier 1: An operational assessment


Annex

**Table 1 Proportion of migrants in 2004 cohort granted non-visit visas under the main entry routes and still in the UK after 5 years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>2004 cohort on non-visit visas</th>
<th>% in UK in UK after 5 years</th>
<th>% achieving settlement after 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>63,400</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work (leading to citizenship)</td>
<td>105,880</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work (not leading to citizenship)</td>
<td>94,540</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>185,600</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These 4 routes cover 82% of migrants granted non-visit visas and of course does not include asylum seekers or refugees. It would also not capture those who have become undocumented amongst those still here.

**Source:** Achato et al. (2010).

**Table 2 Integration regulations, status and policy developments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Criteria/regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Secure Borders, Safe Haven</td>
<td>7/02/2002</td>
<td>28/07/2004</td>
<td>Spouses/civil partners and all naturalisations</td>
<td>Language requirement ESOL entry level 3 (B1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>1/11/2005</td>
<td>Naturalisations</td>
<td>Knowledge of life in the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission</td>
<td>Summary of changes in Immigration Rules HC1702, 2005-6</td>
<td>7/11/2006</td>
<td>5/12/2006</td>
<td>Highly skilled migrants, now tier 1 PBS</td>
<td>Language at C1 level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite leave</td>
<td>Controlling our Borders: making migration work for Britain</td>
<td>7/02/2005</td>
<td>2/04/2007</td>
<td>All ILR</td>
<td>Language (ESOL 3 or progression in level) and Knowledge of Life in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission</td>
<td>Skilled workers Statement of Intent</td>
<td>6/05/2008</td>
<td>27/11/2008</td>
<td>Skilled workers tier 2 PBS</td>
<td>Language at A1 including writing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Admission | Marriage visas: pre-entry English requirements for spouses | 5/12/2007 | 29/11/2010 | Spouses, civil and unmarried partners | Language A1 but not writing*

*Those from 16 majority English-speaking countries or who have done their degrees in English ie. CEFR C1 are exempt. The countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, New Zealand, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the USA.