The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
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We investigate, within a Cournot supergame, whether optimal punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible. We show that, for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale, the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to optimal penal codes.
|Research Areas:||Business School > Economics and International Development|
|Citations on ISI Web of Science:||1|
|Deposited On:||27 Nov 2008 12:08|
|Last Modified:||11 Mar 2014 07:42|
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