Optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks when costs are sunk and revenues are uncertain

Clark, Ephraim A. and Easaw, Joshy (2007) Optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks when costs are sunk and revenues are uncertain. European Journal Of Operational Research, 178 (2). pp. 595-602. ISSN 0377-2217

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Abstract

This paper studies optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks with large sunk costs and uncertain revenues. Using techniques from the option pricing literature, we show that the optimal access price corresponds to a risk-free form of the Efficiency Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), that is, where the opportunity cost is based on the risk free rate of return. We also show that at levels of revenue above the optimal level that triggers entry, the entrant should pay a premium above risk-free ECPR that rewards the incumbent for relinquishing his rights to the risky cash flows at the higher revenue level.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Accounting and Finance
ISI Impact: 8
Item ID: 547
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Repository team
Date Deposited: 26 Nov 2008 16:38
Last Modified: 27 Jan 2016 11:54
URI: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/547

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