Towards a theory of decision-making with paradoxes.
Belavkin, Roman V. (2006) Towards a theory of decision-making with paradoxes. In: Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Cognitive Modelling, 2006, Trieste, Italy.
- Accepted Version
Human subjects often violate the rational decision-making theory, which is based on the notion of expected utility and axioms of choice (Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). The counterexamples, suggested by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961), deserve special attention because they point at our lack of understanding of how humans make decisions. The paradoxes of decision-making are particularly important for the ACT-R theory which currently relies on expected utility. The paper presents two alternative methods: a random prediction method that uses subsymbolic computations and a method that uses symbolic reasoning for qualitative decision-making. Both methods are tested on ACT-R models of the paradoxes, and the advantages of each method are discussed.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Research Areas:||Middlesex University Schools and Centres > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science|
Middlesex University Schools and Centres > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence group
|Deposited On:||08 Sep 2008 10:46|
|Last Modified:||06 Jan 2015 19:05|
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