Towards a theory of decision-making with paradoxes.

Belavkin, Roman V. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2356-1447 (2006) Towards a theory of decision-making with paradoxes. In: Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Cognitive Modelling, 2006, Trieste, Italy. .

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Abstract

Human subjects often violate the rational decision-making theory, which is based on the notion of expected utility and axioms of choice (Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). The counterexamples, suggested by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961), deserve special attention because they point at our lack of understanding of how humans make decisions. The paradoxes of decision-making are particularly important for the ACT-R theory which currently relies on expected utility. The paper presents two alternative methods: a random prediction method that uses subsymbolic computations and a method that uses symbolic reasoning for qualitative decision-making. Both methods are tested on ACT-R models of the paradoxes, and the advantages of each method are discussed.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Research Areas: A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science
A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence group
Item ID: 5
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Repository team
Date Deposited: 08 Sep 2008 10:46
Last Modified: 31 May 2019 06:04
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/5

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