Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: an experiment

Cerrone, Claudia ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1551-6723 and Engel, Christoph (2019) Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: an experiment. Economics Letters, 183 , 108616. ISSN 0165-1765 (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108616)

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Abstract

We test whether deciding on behalf of a passive third party makes participants less selfish in a subsequent decision on behalf of themselves. We find that, in a standard dictator game and in a modified dictator game that allows for "moral wiggle room”, the experience of having decided for others does not mitigate selfishness.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 30772
Notes on copyright: © 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Claudia Cerrone
Date Deposited: 03 Aug 2020 08:27
Last Modified: 07 Aug 2020 15:04
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/30772

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