Corporate lobbying and executive networks in determining executive compensation

Nandy, Monomita, Lodh, Suman ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4513-1480, Wang, Jin and Kaur, Jaskaran (2020) Corporate lobbying and executive networks in determining executive compensation. International Journal of Finance and Economics . ISSN 1099-1158 (Accepted/In press)

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Abstract

In this paper we predict and find that lobbying activities of firms can complement executive networks in determining executive compensation. Firm of all size, after considering market competition as a governance mechanism prefer to consider lobbying as a mean of networking along with the executive level networking to determine the executive compensation. The empirical implication of the study provides guidance to researchers who must consider lobbying along with executive networks in determining the executive compensation. The composite theoretical underpinning and the importance of information flow through lobbying activities of firms will be an important insight for the policy makers involved in determining executive compensation.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Accounting and Finance
Item ID: 30444
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Depositing User: Suman Lodh
Date Deposited: 22 Jun 2020 08:17
Last Modified: 24 Jun 2020 05:34
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/30444

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