Self-selecting into being a dictator: distributional consequences

Ezquerra Guerra, Lara and Kujal, Praveen ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2917-9724 (2020) Self-selecting into being a dictator: distributional consequences. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics , 101559. ISSN 2214-8043 (Published online first) (doi:10.1016/j.socec.2020.101559)

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Abstract

We allow for principals to self-select into delegating, or not, the allocation decision to an agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game arises when principal´s choose to make the allocation decision themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent under delegation (or in the standard dictator game). Principals choose to be a dictator nearly half of the time. The average amount transferred by individuals who delegate in more than half of the rounds is significantly higher than the quantity transferred by those who choose to delegate in less than half of the rounds. Finally, the distributional consequences of delegating, or not, vary with less inequality obtained when the decision is delegated.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 30341
Notes on copyright: © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Praveen Kujal
Date Deposited: 09 Jun 2020 11:08
Last Modified: 12 Jun 2020 01:34
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/30341

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