Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

Capraro, Valerio ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0579-0166, Schulz, Jonathan and Rand, David G. (2019) Time pressure and honesty in a deception game. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 79 . pp. 93-99. ISSN 2214-8043 (doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.01.007)

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Abstract

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 28838
Notes on copyright: © 2019. This author's accepted manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Depositing User: Valerio Capraro
Date Deposited: 22 Jan 2020 10:41
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2020 14:37
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/28838

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