Hiring and escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations: a laboratory experiment

Angelovski, Andrej ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3011-8002, Brandts, Jordi and Sola, Carles (2016) Hiring and escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations: a laboratory experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 121 . pp. 114-129. ISSN 0167-2681 (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.012)

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Abstract

In many organizations the measurement of job performance cannot rely on easily quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ subjective evaluations of employees. Employees can either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We present data from three different treatments. For all three treatments we find escalation bias by managers. Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one towards those they have explicitly not hired. For three treatments we find that managers’ and employees’ biases are connected. Exogenously assigned employees are biased in favor of employees hired by the manager and against those explicitly not hired.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
A. > Business School > Leadership, Work and Organisations
Item ID: 27755
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Andrej Angelovski
Date Deposited: 09 Oct 2019 08:45
Last Modified: 23 Oct 2019 15:04
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/27755

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