Evaluation
of the Turkish accession
to the European Union,
the structural changes
and EU cohesion

I. C. CHARALAMBIDES
DPROF

2009
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the European Union, the structural changes and EU cohesion

A research on the Turkish accession to the EU and whether such accession will threaten -or not- the cohesion of the EU

National Centre for Work Based Learning Partnerships

Middlesex University

April 2009
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments p. 5

Summary p. 6

Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 General Introduction p. 7
1.2 Working Position and Project Rationale p. 8
1.3 Importance of the Project p. 9
1.4 Themes and Problems under Investigation p. 12
1.5 An Appropriate Project p. 13

Chapter 2 - Terms of Reference/ Aims /Objectives and Literature Review
2.1 Aims and Objectives p. 14
2.2 Research Questions p. 14
2.3 Literature Review and Theoretical Approach p. 15
2.3.1 The EU: A ‘Sui Generis Organisation’ p. 16
2.3.2 Classical Realism, National Interest and Power Games p. 17
2.3.3 Structural Realism and Changes in the International System p. 19
2.3.4 Functionalism, Neo- Functionalism, Integration and Common Interest p. 21
2.3.5 Cohesion Policy in the EU p. 22
2.3.6 Absorption Capacity p. 26
2.4 Conclusions and EU Cohesion p. 28

Chapter 3 - Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction p. 29
3.2 Rationale for Research Approach p. 30
3.2.1 Scope of the Project p. 34
3.3 Methodological Design and Research Procedures p. 36
3.4 Rationale for Selection and Application of Data Collection Techniques p. 38
3.4.1 Qualitative Approach p. 38
3.4.2 Secondary Sources p. 43
3.4.3 Quantitative Approach p. 44
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

3.4.3.1 Pre - Testing the Survey Instrument p. 46
3.4.3.2 Pilot Study p. 49
3.4.3.3 Questionnaire Rating Scale p. 50
3.4.3.4 Population and Sampling Frame p. 52
3.5 Data Analysis p. 53
3.6 Ethical Considerations p. 54
3.7 My Role as a Worker/ Insider Researcher p. 55
3.8 Research Limitations p. 56

Chapter 4 - Evaluation of the Turkish Political System and the Turkish Accession to the EU
4.1 Introduction p. 57
4.2 Euro- Turkish Relations p. 59
4.3 European Streams of Thought p. 61
4.4 The Stance of European Citizens p. 65
4.5 Turkish Republic and the Principles of Ataturk p. 80
4.6 Turkish Political System and the European Union p. 83
4.6.1 Turkish Economic Background p. 83
4.6.2 The Evaluation of the EU p. 86
4.6.3 Black Holes p. 87
4.7 Cohesion Policy, Turkey and the EU p. 91
4.7.1 The Lion's Share p. 97
4.8 The Turkish Army in the System p. 100
4.8.1 The Role of the Army in the Economic System p. 102
4.8.2 The Black Box, the Army and the AKP p. 103
4.8.2.1 The Delphic Sword p. 105
4.8.2.2 The Beacon of a Moderate Islam p. 106
4.8.2.3 Risks and Human Rights p. 107
4.9 Turkey in the European Security and Defence Policy p. 111
4.9.1 Traditional Power p. 112
4.9.2 US, NATO and ESDP p. 113
4.10 The Institutional Power of Turkey in the EU p. 120
4.11 Conclusion p. 128

Chapter 5 - Survey Findings and Analysis
5.1 Introduction p. 130
5.2 The Role of the US p. 131

Ioannis Charalambides
5.2.1 Defence Deficit, Soviet Syndrome and Babylon State  p. 140
5.3 Negative Reasons  p. 143
5.4 Leading Countries and Power-Sharing  p. 147
5.5 Positive Reasons  p. 150
5.6 Turkish Contribution to the EU and the Strengthening of the EU Position in the Global System  p. 153
5.7 Redistribution of Power  p. 158
5.8 Structural Changes  p. 160
5.9 The Cohesion of the EU  p. 163
5.9.1 The Threat  p. 164
5.9.2 National Interests and Balance of Power  p. 165
5.9.3 The Role of the US and Conflicting Interests  p. 166
5.9.4 Double Structural Changes  p. 167
5.10 Democracy and Human Rights  p. 168
5.10.1 Political Rights  p. 168
5.10.2 Women's Rights  p. 169
5.10.3 Religious Rights  p. 169
5.10.4 Minority Rights  p. 169
5.10.5 Freedom of Expression  p. 170
5.10.6 Corruption  p. 170
5.10.7 Turkish Army  p. 172
5.10.8 'Democratic Deficit'  p. 174
5.11 The Reforms  p. 174
5.12 List of Variables  p. 180
5.13 The Next Step  p. 182

Chapter 6 - Recommendations and Conclusions

6.1 Introduction  p. 183
6.2 Theories and Justifications  p. 184
6.3 Variables and Model of EU Cohesion  p. 186
6.3.1 The Main Pillars of EU Cohesion  p. 191
6.4 Recommendations  p. 193
6.4.1 First Scenario: Negative  p. 193
6.4.2 Second Scenario: Positive  p. 194
6.4.3 Third Scenario: the Two Capitals of the EU and the Historical Circle  p. 196
6.4.4 Fourth Scenario: Worst Case Scenario and Crisis  p. 197
6.4.5 Fifth Scenario: Democracy in Relation to Turkish Accession to the EU  p. 201
6.4.6 Sixth Scenario: the EU Institutions and Turkish Accession to the EU  p. 202
6.4.7 Seventh Scenario: Cohesion Policy and Turkish Accession to the EU  p. 205
6.4.8 Eight Scenario: Economy and Turkish Accession to the EU  p. 206
6.4.9 Ninth Scenario: Society and Turkish Accession to the EU  p. 207
6.5 Conclusions  p. 209
6.5.1 The Model of EU Cohesion  p. 209
6.5.2 Third Road and Unpredictable Development  p. 212
6.5.3 Epilogue and Impact  p. 214

References  p. 215

Bibliography  p. 234

List of Visual Representations  p. 237

List of Appendices  p. 241

Appendices  p. 242
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special acknowledgements I owe to my friend Dr. Antonis Theocharous and my colleague Maria Spanoudaki for their unique support and contribution to this project.

I also heartily thank my family for their endless support whenever I needed it. Last but not least, I deeply thank MEP Yiannakis Matsis for providing me with all the means to conclude this Project and his continuous professional and spiritual support advice and experience.
SUMMARY

The main question that this research attempts to tackle is whether the Turkish accession to the EU will threaten or not the cohesion of the EU. This question is answered in the framework of: 1) The evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, especially through the relevant EU decisions and the Turkish political, economic, social, military and institutional reality. 2) The various theories of International Relations (Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism, Neo-Functionalism). What I try to do is examine the structural changes which could occur as a result of the Turkish accession to the EU.

Therefore, my aim is to analyse the EU -Turkey relations in the context of the EU Enlargement taking into consideration the policy of the US, which is the dominant actor of the international system in the current era. This study attempts to investigate and identify the factors influencing the policy of the EU on the Turkish accession to the European Union and vice versa. These factors constitute, in fact, variables upon which a model of EU cohesion can be based in order to find out whether the European system -as defined on legal, institutional, economic, military and social level- can be threatened or not by Turkey or even other new member states.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 General Introduction

Euro-Turkish relations constitute one of the main issues prevailing on the European political landscape, classified at the top of the European agenda. Turkish accession to the European Union (hereafter EU) is a complicated matter, closely connected to the coming Enlargements of the EU and to their resulting implications. In this context, a chain of questions are tabled, questions which hold much significance for the potential role of Turkey within the EU. One of the most important questions is whether or not the EU is capable of absorbing new member states, especially a state such as Turkey, whose population numbers the second largest in Europe after Germany (Muenz 2006). Even more relevant is the question of what impact the inclusion of Turkey would have on the EU. In this regard, it is instructive to focus on the 'German question,' (Bertram 1990) which was re-raised in particular just after the collapse of the Soviet Block; will we have a European Germany or a German Europe? (Ifestos 1999, pp. 203-204; Spanger 1992, pp. 67-78)? Similarly, the question on the Turkish membership is whether we will have a European Turkey or a Turkish Europe.

In light of these, the central question which this study will address is the following: will Turkish accession to the EU threaten the cohesion of the EU? This question is to be answered in the context of various theories of International Relations (such as Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism) with particular reference to Gilpin's theoretical approach. According to this approach changes occurring in the international system bring about the rise or decline of the international system and may lead even to conflict and war (Gilpin 1981).

---

1 The ‘German question’ results from the German imperialistic policy which cost humanity, and especially Europe, two bloody wars. The division of Germany was decided for security reasons. The allies, in other words the victorious power of the Second World War, considered that a divided Germany was less dangerous for itself and for Europe. Whether or not democracy would be consolidated in Germany was the big bet. A democratic Germany would reduce the risk of the outburst of a new catastrophic war. Finally, Germany won the bet. There is no doubt that in the current era, Germany is a democratic country and one of the leading EU member-states.
The aim, therefore, of this study is to analyse relations between the European Union and Turkey in the framework of International Relations and the Enlargement of the EU, taking into consideration the policy of the US as the dominant actor in the international system in the current post-Cold War era. This study attempts to investigate the potential causes of problems for the accession process and to identify the factors influencing both the policy of the EU on Turkish accession and the policy of Turkey regarding the accession process. Having these in mind, I will investigate the cohesion of the EU in relation to Euro-Turkish relations. The aim is to establish a ‘model of cohesion’ and to determine, in relation to this model, whether the European system - legal, institutional, economic and social - will be threatened by the accession of new member states or not. At the same time, this investigation will constitute a self-evident ratification or rejection of Gilpin’s theory and other theories of International Relations (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992, pp.167-168).

1.2 Working Position and Project Rationale

Since 2004, I have been the main consultant to and director of the office of the MEP Mr. Yiannakis Matsis. More precisely, I am responsible for the smooth functioning of three political offices, based in Brussels, Strasbourg and Nicosia. Euro-Turkish relations are one of the main areas of interest of the office.

In the context of my position, I am in charge of the following issues:
1) I coordinate the political efforts of Mr. Matsis’ office inside and outside the European Parliament.
2) I attend all the meetings in the European Parliament, especially those of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. In short, I attend the meetings in which the Members of the European Parliament present reports, exchange views and arguments and shape the policy of the EU in co-operation with officials and technocrats from the European Commission and the European Council.
3) I accompany Mr. Matsis to official meetings as well as on official or unofficial missions organised by the European Parliament in Turkey and elsewhere.
4) I shape, in conjunction with Mr. Matsis, the political positions he expresses, orally or in writing, at the European Parliament and in the context of Cyprus political life.
also help shape the strategy that informs his political goals. Acting within this framework, we take political decisions within the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.

In addition to the above-mentioned tasks, my duties also include:

a) Reading all the documents tabled at the Committees of the European Parliament by the MEPs and by the European Commission and the European Council.
b) Closely following the Press and the mass media in general, in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Europe and elsewhere.
c) Collecting relevant data and information within the framework of an established collection network.
d) Maintaining contact with European technocrats and diplomats in order to remain informed about events both on and behind the political scene.

It is obvious that my interest in this project results from my daily office tasks. Being involved in political, economic and social affairs related to Turkish accession to the EU, I realised that by definition, I had a personal and professional interest in more deeply investigating the phenomenon of Turkish accession to the EU. Such interest does not reflect my personal interest alone, but also reflects the interest of my employer and the office of Mr. Matsis in the context of taking concrete political decisions.

1.3 Importance of the project

Turkish accession to the EU is a matter upon which an extensive discussion has erupted, not only within the EU but within Turkey as well. Turkish accession to the EU is related to:

- The structural changes which must be carried out within Turkey if this country wishes to join the EU (European Council 1993, Commission of the European Communities 2005).

According to the official website of the European Union, any country seeking EU membership must conform to the conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty
The future EU Enlargements. These Enlargements are connected to the new EU budget, which will be adopted in 2014 (Council of the European Union 2005). At the same time, these Enlargements are also related to the political, institutional, social and economic orientation of the EU (Council of the European Union 2004). EU policies in these sectors should be continuously reformed and adapted with a view to achieving regional integration. Will changes in these areas be directed towards the deepening of the EU or towards consolidating integration? Having these questions in mind, institutional reforms are at the top of the European agenda. These institutional reforms constitute a precondition for the functionality of the EU, comprised of 27 or 30 member states (Informal European Council 2007).

Turkish accession to the EU is, by definition, an issue coherent to the next Enlargements and to the ‘absorption capacity’ of the EU, as well as to the cohesion of the EU and the relations between the EU and the US. This study aspires to address problems that both the EU and Turkey encounter on a daily basis and in the long term. In fact, it aims to examine whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten or not the cohesion of the EU. The more research is undertaken about Turkish accession to the EU, the more reliable the decisions taken within the EU and Turkey will be. After all, research provides methodological tools for the shaping of policies, especially on issues as sensitive and complicated as the case of Turkish accession to the EU.

In light of the above, the main subject of this study is to:

---

1 By ‘absorption capacity’, we mean the ability of the EU to smoothly integrate new member-states. In this project, a short definition is given in Chapter 2.3.6 by the Commissioner of Enlargement, Olli Rehn. ‘Absorption capacity’ also means the capacity of a member-state to absorb Structural Funds programs.
• Present research on an issue which dominates and will dominate European affairs for the coming years. This issue is closely connected to the policy of the US in Europe and the global role which the EU wishes to play in the new era under the spectrum of globalisation.

• Assist politicians and civil society to understand and successfully face the political, legal, economic, cultural and social phenomenon of Turkish accession to the EU.

• Contribute to the designing of policies which rely on rational approaches and not on sentimental motives.

• Contribute to the existing dialogue on Turkish accession to the EU. Such a dialogue has developed on various levels as follows:
  a) Within the European Commission and its yearly reports evaluating Turkish accession to the EU.
  b) Within the European Parliament, which issues reports on Turkish accession to the EU and which comments or sends political messages both to the European Commission and the European Council.
  c) Within the European Council, which takes political decisions that are legally binding both for the EU and Turkey.
  d) Within civil society and the context of public opinion, both in Turkey and in the member states of the EU.
  e) Within the realm of scientific society.

The main intention is to contribute catalytically to the scientific and political discourse on Turkish accession to the EU by establishing a model of EU cohesion. This model will incorporate factors and variables related to the cohesion and the 'absorption capacity' of the EU. This model can be employed on the one hand as a methodological tool for politicians dealing with Turkish accession to the EU and on the other hand as a model for academic society. It will facilitate examination of the concept of Enlargement and more precisely of Turkish accession to the EU.

4 By 'scientific discourse', I mean the discussion on and examination of the question on whether theories of International Relations can be justified in practice -or not through Turkish accession to the EU and whether such accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not. Furthermore, the main relevant question is whether the EU moves -in the course of its structural changes- towards regional integration (theories of Functionalism) or whether it remains bound on the theories of Realism (see Chapter 2 and scenarios of Chapter 6). Such structural changes may be affected by the Turkish accession to the EU.
1.4 Themes and Problems under Investigation

As stated, the purpose of this research is to examine whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not. Thus, the priority is to examine the meaning of cohesion and to investigate the impact of structural changes on EU cohesion.

In light of this focus, I examine:

1) Whether there is confusion between the definition and the content of the cohesion policy of the EU on the one hand and the cohesion of the EU on the other.
2) The abovementioned issues (cohesion policy and cohesion of the EU) in the context of the Structural Funds and the relevant task of levelling disparities between the regions.
3) The cohesion of the EU by taking into account economic, political, social and institutional aspects, as well as the issue of the ‘EU absorption capacity’.5

However, we can not obtain scientific results unless we couple theory with practice. The theoretical context I will work within is, on the one hand, Realism and Structural Realism, and, on the other hand, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism (Pentland 1960; De Vree 1972; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992, pp. 162-169; Deutsch, 1978). These theories provide a foundation upon which I build my main question as to whether the Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not). There is a huge debate within the field of political science on theories of Realism and Functionalism, and this debate is reflected as well in the EU and in efforts towards European integration. Moreover, in the framework of the current discussion, Enlargement and EU 'absorption capacity' are closely related to theories of International Relations, and so must be assessed within this context.

To achieve this goal, some issues relevant to Turkish accession to the EU must be classified. Following is a supplementary list of themes and problems related to Turkish accession to the EU:

---

5 For a definition of EU Cohesion, see Chapter 2.4; Chapter 4.7, footnote 40. For 'absorption capacity", see Footnote 3 -Chapter 1.3, p. 11 and Chapter 2.3.6, pp.27-28.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

- Relations between the US, EU and Turkey.
- The next EU Enlargements within the spectrum of 'absorption capacity' and cohesion policy.
- The main obstacles to Turkish accession to the EU.
- The role of the Turkish political system, the army and the Turkish economy in the contemporary international environment.
- The structural changes to be made within Turkey in the context of reforms required by the EU, and the structural changes which should be enacted within the EU as a result of Turkish accession to the EU.
- The 'political games' (if there are such games), developed within the EU in relation to Turkish accession to the EU.
- The role the EU wishes to play within the regional and global system. This role is connected to future Enlargements, and is fundamental to the question of whether there should be a move towards the deepening or the consolidation of the EU (Lagendijk, 2007).

1.5 An Appropriate Project

This project reflects my professional, personal and political concerns and interests. It is a subject closely related to my job and professional aspirations, and one which offers the opportunity to become more politically mature within the field of Euro-Turkish relations.

By undertaking this project, I hope to effectively assist my office in making reliable decisions and in assuming a serious political stance, one reflected in votes at the level of both the Committees and the Plenary of the European Parliament. Certainly, this project will help me in the future, at any post in which I may serve, in analysing international affairs and, especially, Turkish accession to the EU - an issue that dominates and will dominate European affairs in coming years. Through the analysis of Turkish accession to the EU and European cohesion in the context of Enlargement I hope to offer a scientific and political instrument for European politicians and academics.
 CHAPTER 2

Terms of Reference/Aims/Objectives/ and Literature Review

2.1 Aims and Objectives

The aim of this study is to examine whether the Turkish accession to the EU can bring structural changes as well as changes on the balance of power within the EU, to what extent and whether such changes will threaten the cohesion of the EU. My objective is to investigate and find out the factors-variables influencing and defining the EU cohesion in relation to the Turkish accession to the EU.

The theoretical framework for my analysis is based on theories of International Relations, such as Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, on the methodological instruments of surveys and interviews, on archival research and on the conceptions of key political players shaping policy in the context of the EU. In this respect, I seek to draw information and useful conclusions as to the way the EU operates within the context of Enlargement. In particular, I question whether Turkish accession to the EU threatens the political, institutional, economic, cultural and social cohesion of the EU. Such a focus requires, by definition, analysis and exploration of the nature of the Turkish political system.

By elucidating the factors shaping Turkish accession to the EU, this study also endeavours to examine the way in which decisions are made and should be made in the concept of EU stability, ‘absorption capacity’, functionality and cohesion.

2.2 Research Questions

The questions below are embedded in the aims and objectives of this project:
1) Which main factors affect the shaping of the EU’s policy on Turkish accession to the EU?
2) What is the role of the US on the matter, as a major actor of the international system, and to what extent does it influence the shaping of EU policy and decision-making on Turkish accession to the EU?

3) Are the decisions of the EU taken in accordance with the national interest of its member states or in accordance with common European interest? What is the role of the national interest in the EU decision-making process?

4) What is the Turkish political situation?

5) What is the role of the Turkish army within the Turkish political system?

6) Are Europeans afraid of Turkish accession to the EU? To what extent and why?

7) Will Turkish accession to the EU bring about a redistribution of power?

8) Will Turkish accession to the EU bring structural changes?

9) Could such structural changes threaten the cohesion of the EU?

These questions are answered through methodical research. The findings are of both theoretical and practical importance, as they form a political instrument useful for MEPs, governments and the decision makers of the EU.

2.3 Literature Review and Theoretical Approach

Euro-Turkish relations have been developing under the influence of various International Relations’ schools of thought. They have been developing, in particular, under the influence of two main theories: that of Classical and Structural Realism, on the one hand, and that of integration, encompassing Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, on the other (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992). These two theoretical streams of thought, Realism and Functionalism, are two sides of the same European coin. In this study, I deal with both the terminology and essence of theories of International Relations, as well as with EU cohesion policy, the cohesion of the EU, the EU absorption capacity, national interests, 'power games' and regional integration. Definition of these terms is of great importance in order to follow the argument of this study. In particular, EU cohesion and absorption capacity are consistent with each other terms and have great significance within discussions of EU Enlargement and its successful outcome. At the same time, elucidation of the theoretical background of the project is necessary. This chapter therefore, deals with the following issues:
2.3.1 The EU: A 'Sui Generis Organisation'

The EU is a multinational organisation consisting of European sovereign states. According to the EU official website (www.europa.eu), the EU constitutes "a unique economic and political partnership between 27 democratic European countries". This is a short description of the EU, which has been established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 upon the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community. The EU is a 'sui generis' organisation. Its legal, political, economic and institutional construction constitutes a primary structural procedure. Theoretically, and to some extent practically, Europeans - politicians, theorists and states, as well as the bureaucratic machine in Brussels - focus their efforts on achieving regional integration and on the establishment, step by step, of a supranational government and authorities. These efforts find fertile ground in terms of convergence of interest, and lead to decisions which rely on a minimum code of common interest. Such efforts are based on theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism (see Chapter 2.3.3). On the other hand, these efforts also fall under the strong influence of

---

6 As the International Monetary Fund reports in its database (www.imf.org) on April 2008, the EU combined, generates an estimated 30% share of the world's nominal gross domestic product; that is US 18.49 trillion in 2008.
7 The Europeans rejected the idea of a federal Europe during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. The problems of regional integration are evident in the French and Dutch 'no' during the ratification process of the Treaty in 2005, and then the Irish 'no' on the Treaty of Lisbon on June 13, 2008, among other examples. On the other hand, further positive steps have been taken, reflected in the Treaty of Lisbon, which provides for a President of the European Council and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Treaty of Lisbon 2008).
8 This minimum code of common interests is reflected, in practice, in the EU decisions on the budget for the period 2007-2013. Such a process is also followed in the drafting of European Parliament reports and opinions. Certainly, the minimum code of common interests is the combination of and compromise between conflicting national interests and the political, social and economic interests of political parties acting in the European Parliament and in other EU Institutions in general. Such parties include the European People's Party - European Democrats, the Socialist Group, the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Group of the Greens, Union for Europe of the Nations Group,
conflicting national interests, irrespectively of whether these occur within social, economic, security or foreign policy fields. In fact, European integration moves between theories of Realism and Structural Realism on the one hand, and Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism on the other. This is the crucial point influencing the political attitude of various governments of the member-states of the EU, political parties or/and groups acting within the EU.

Realism as a theory assumes that national interests are the main instruments in the state struggle for power (Morgenthau 1978, pp.4-15). Taking into account the theories of Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, I will examine the functionality of the EU in relation to Euro-Turkish relations and within the context of the power games which develop between:

1) the member-states of the EU;
2) the member-states of the EU in conjunction with Turkey;
3) the member-states of the EU in conjunction with Turkey and some key third parties and external actors within the international system, such as the US.

Whether or not the EU achieves regional integration is a historical, political and economic bet. The effort to do so is closely connected to EU Enlargement. Turkey, as a candidate state, is part of this bet and this game (Council of the EU 2005d).

2.3.2 Classical Realism, National Interest and Power Games

Realism bases its theoretical content on power (strength), and in particular on the six principles9 defined by Hans Morgenthau in 'Politics among Nations: Struggle for

9 Hans Morgenthau's principles of political Realism are the following:

1. Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature which is unchanging; therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these objective laws.

2. The main signpost of political Realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political Realism stresses the rational, the objective and the unemotional.

3. Realism assumes that interest, defined as power, is an objective category which is universally valid, but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Power’ (1978). As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) maintain, traditional Realism is based on four axioms:

1) Nation-states are the main component actors of the International system. 2) Domestic policy is separated from foreign policy. 3) International politics is struggle for power within an anachronic international environment. 4) There is a hierarchy in the abilities of the nation-states. This is why we have the big powers and smaller states within a decentralised international system of states, which enjoy legal equality or sovereignty (p.115).

National interest is a major analytical tool for the explanation of various phenomena existing within the international system on the level of state relations and interactions. In his theoretical discussion, Hans Morgenthau (1978) stated that “as far as the world is divided to nations, the national interest has the last word in international politics” (p.13). Morgenthau (1978) defined the concept and practice of national interest as a state's struggle for power within an anachronic international system (pp. 9-14). Such a struggle for power is mostly defined by the concept that states act within the international system in order to enhance its strength. Classical Realism focuses on national interests in terms of security issues, which are closely related to the capacity of the state to exercise its foreign policy (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 115-184). As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) note

it is said that strength is a multidimensional phenomenon with military and non-military constituents and the theory of Realism had developed a framework for the classification of the elements of national strength (p. 116).

That is, beyond military power, there are other constituents of strength, such as “technology, population size, natural resources, geographical factors, the type of governance, political leadership, strategy and ideology” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 116). In light of these factors, the question arises as to how a system can be maintained in stability. Realists support the position that the stability of the international system can be maintained if there is a balance of power, either on a regional or global level. As Morgenthau (1978) stated:

4. Political Realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension between moral command and the requirements of successful political action.

5. Political Realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from moral excess and political folly.

6. The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. He asks “how does this policy affect the power of the nation?” Political Realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but “political man” would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. But, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behavior, “political man” must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature (Morgenthau 1978, pp. 4-15).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Before the balance of power imposes its limitations on the aspirations of states for strength, through the mechanism of contradictory forces, competitive nations should firstly confine themselves by accepting the system of balance of power as a common framework of their efforts (pp. 226-227).

In this context, International Relations and Turkish accession to the EU can be examined in terms of the struggle for power and the 'power game'.

2.3.3 Structural Realism and Changes in the International System

Structural Realism is a theory aiming at enriching classical Realism. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) stated "classical Realism accepts that the prospects for the fulfilment of dramatic or fundamental transformations in the International system are unfavourable" (pp. 115-116). In parallel, Structural Realism emerged in the field of International Relations in order to ascertain under which circumstances an international system can be subjected to structural changes. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979) -who studied the structure of the international system in depth- changes in the international system result from changes occurring within its component actors, such as states. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) observe: "The international system can be held in balance as long as its main actors are satisfied by the status quo they enjoy on territorial, political and economic levels" (p. 167). The question that must be posed in this context is this: Does Turkish accession to the EU threaten the existing balance of power within the EU?

As Gilpin (1981) stated, there are three types of changes in the international system:

- The first is the 'systems change'. According to Gilpin:

  The character of the international system is identified by its most prominent entities: empires, nation states, or multinational corporations (see EU). The rise and decline of various types of entities and state system must of necessity be a fundamental concern of a comprehensive theory of international change (p. 41).

  That is, the system changes itself. (Gilpin 1981, p.40)

- The second is the 'systemic change.' This refers to

  a change in the form of control or governance of a system.... It entails changes in the international redistribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige and the rules and rights embodied in the system although these changes seldom, if ever occur simultaneously. Thus, whereas the system change is the rise and decline of state systems, the focus system is the rise and the
decline of the dominant states or empires that govern particular the international system (p. 42).

- The third type is the 'interaction change'. As Gilpin (1981) said: "we mean modifications in the political, economic and other interactions or processes among the actors in an international system" (p. 43). At the same time he added that

Interaction changes frequently do result from the efforts of states or other actors to accelerate or forestall more fundamental changes in an international system and may presage such changes (p. 43)

Gilpin (1981) stated that structural changes are brought about on two levels: domestic and international (p. 67, 96). He based his analysis of structural changes occurring within the international system on various factors, including the military, economy, culture, technology, society and Institutions, and on systems of communication and transportation (pp. 27, 60, 85, 97). What Gilpin tried to examine is: 1) whether and how a dominant entity of the international system may decline, and 2) when and how the high cost and the redistribution of power may lead to the worst case scenario, which may be synonymous with crisis and war.

Taking into account what Gilpin and Structural Realism as well as Classical Realism uphold about the redistribution of power, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) state that "in the place of a dominant actor finally appears a new balance of power, which reflects the changed redistribution of power" (pp. 168-169). Such a redistribution of power and the new balance -or imbalance- of power, may result peacefully or violently. According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a), the declining power has the following options: 1) enhance its abilities in order to encounter the rising power; 2) reduce its needs and "consent politely" to the new circumstances; 3) form coalitions with other powers in order to encounter the rising one; 4) retreat before the rising power (p. 169).

As Gilpin (1981) stated, war is always a result of the redistribution of power, especially in the case of high and irrevocable cost. This is the worst case scenario (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 168). On this point, Gilpin also referred to the other side of the coin. As he added, "the primary means through which the problem of the imbalance of power was resolved was war. The result of war was redistribution
of power between the winners and losers” (cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 230).

Within this theoretical context, I examine whether and to what extent Turkish accession to the EU will bring structural changes in Turkey and the EU. Will there be a redistribution of power? On what level and to what extent? Will such changes threaten the cohesion of the EU? Such cohesion, or lack thereof, is linked to the decline of international actors and to conflicts. Can such a theoretical framework be justified in terms of Turkish accession to the EU?

2.3.4 Functionalism, Neo-Functionalism, Integration and Common Interest

In contrast to theories of Realism, theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism suggest a theoretical context upon which integration can be founded (Pentland 1960; De Vree 1972). This effort aims at bypassing the obstacle of conflicting national interests and creating, through a spirit of consent, a common ground in order to establish multinational and supranational Institutions (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992b, p.162; Deutsch 1978). Such a model can work in terms of input and output, as articulated by Haas in theories of spill-over (Haas 1964, p.48). According to Haas, an international organisation can go beyond national borders, and thus an international organisation can transform the international system. This procedure is based on previous common decisions which spill over new functional frameworks. These frameworks involve more and more persons and demand more and more bureaucratic support and cooperation, contact and consultations in order to face new problems resulting from previous compromised decisions. (Haas 1961, p. 372).

According to Haas (cited in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992b) this is a procedure “in which states can upgrade their national interests within a wider framework of integration” (p. 169). Basing his work on Haas’ theory, Leon Lindberg (1971) provided the following definition of ‘integration’:

Integration refers to the procedures with which the nations resign from their desires and abilities to exercise foreign and internal policies on basic issues, the one irrespectively of the other, pursuing common decisions or conferring the decision-making procedure to new central Institutions (p.45).
Lindberg (1971) took a step further, stressing that the actors of the international system transfer "their expectations and political activities to a new centre...to a new collective system of decision-making among nations"(p. 46). In fact, regional integration - based on the theories of Functionalism or Neo-Functionalism - promises continuous structural changes within member states and EU candidate states. Through these structural changes, member states seek to harmonise their legislative, economic and political systems with common European decisions, in the context of efforts to build supranational Institutions. Through this methodology member states take brave steps towards regional integration. Therefore, the structural changes that occur within member states also change the structure of the European system.10

In light of these, I come to the main question: Whether Turkish accession to the EU will bring about structural changes within the EU and whether these structural changes will affect the structural changes of the EU's political, economic and institutional system positively or negatively.

Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism constitute a theoretical and practical attempt to move away from conflicting national interests and towards the common European interest. The question is whether this goal can be fulfilled in practice, or whether the international system is doomed to function within the framework of national interests, thereby limiting the role of common European interests. This is why, as far as the practical aspects of Realism and Functionalism and the role of national interest are concerned, one may find oneself in a vicious circle.

2.3.5 Cohesion Policy in the EU

Beyond the theories of International Relations, I focus on practical issues, terms and policies, which are closely connected to the cohesion of the EU. In particular, I

10 The EU Directives constitute, in fact, binding legal rules for member states, bringing structural changes within their political, economic, social and legal-institutional systems. Similarly, the EU Treaties define the structural changes occurring within member states and the EU as such. Therefore, we have structural changes on two levels: on the level of member states, which constitute component actors of the international system, and on the level of the EU, which constitutes a subsystem of the global international system.
concentrate on the EU’s cohesion policy and its absorption capacity. As a result of the peculiarities ensuing from the variety of economic and social realities existing within EU member states, the EU established a cohesion policy. A definition of this cohesion policy can be given in the following way: cohesion policy aims at filling the gaps resulting from the disparities existing on national and pan-European levels. Not all regions and peripheries have the same economic growth and Gross Domestic Product (hereafter GDP). Some of them suffer from severe economic and social problems. These problems are coherent with phenomena of unemployment, poverty and demographic attenuation of the rural regions, matters relevant to urbanism (European Commission 2007a, p. 25-30, 46, 62-64). In this context, the EU examines the economic and social situation and problems not only of its member-states but also of its potential or candidate states. One of these states is Turkey (see relevant analysis in Chapter 4.7; 4.8.2.3).

To explain cohesion policy in more detail one may note the following:

Cohesion policy was enshrined in the Treaties with the adaptation of the Single European Act in 1986. This policy has been built on the assumption that redistribution between richer and poorer regions in Europe is needed in order to balance out the effects of further economic integration. Through three and soon four generations of Structural Funds programs, the Union has invested around €480 billion in the ‘less favoured’ regions since 1988. Before Enlargement, the main beneficiaries were Greece (42.6%), Portugal (35.2%), Ireland (26.7%), the new East German ‘Länder’ (18.9%), Italy (Mezzogiorno - 17.4%) and Spain (14.7%). (EurActiv.com 2004)

During the budgetary period of 2000-2006 the EU allocated €129 billion for the implementation of the cohesion policy, and during the current budgetary period it allocated the amount of €307.6 billion (EurActiv.com 2004; European Commission 2007a, p. 98). The final decision on the budgetary policy for the period 2007 -2013 was made in the context of negotiations between the Institutions of the EU, the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council. On July 15, 2004 the Commission proposed a legislative package on structural and cohesion funds, responding on the one hand to the cohesion policy of the EU and the reduction or even elimination of existing disparities, and on the other hand to the aims of Lisbon Strategy - innovation, growth and creation of new jobs- and to the Gothenburg strategy; a strategy of sustainable development (EurActiv.com 2004; European Commission 2007a, pp. 25-27, 42, 58).
The issues that the Structural Funds\(^{11}\) are to address during the budgetary period 2007-2013 are the following:

- **Convergence (formerly Objective 1):** Regions whose per capita GDP is less than 75% of the EU average are eligible. However, due to the problems existing after the new Enlargements, and at the risk of making unfair arrangements regarding regions belonging to the 'old states', the EU laid down derogations. The problem was that the average EU GDP was reduced over 4% after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Inforegio portal 2007). Therefore, temporary support, until 2013, could be given to regions whose GDP is above the threshold of 75%. The justification for this derogation and the eligibility of these regions was the following: if the average EU GDP was not reduced as a result of Enlargement, then the GDP of some regions would have been below the threshold of the 75%. (This is the so-called “statistical effect”). Convergence policy aims at supporting growth and job creation in the lagging member states and regions.

- **Competitiveness and employment (formerly Objective 2):** Regions whose GDP is less than the threshold of 75% are eligible. This is a policy designed to assist and support even rich states in responding to the challenges and problems of the new era. Member states and regions should deal with the economic and social changes which occurred within the context of globalisation. Employment initiatives are to be based on the European Employment Strategy (EES) - adaptability of the workforce, job creation and accessibility to the labour market for vulnerable persons (European Commission portal 2007).\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\) Structural Funds constitute, in fact, those funds, which are employed by the EU and its member states in order to fill economic and social disparities and gaps existing within the EU and its region (European Commission 2007).

\(^{12}\) On the European Commission's website it is mentioned that:

The Luxembourg Jobs Summit (November 1997) launched the European Employment Strategy (EES) on the basis of the new provisions in the Employment title of the Treaty (Development of EES). The ambition was to achieve decisive progress within five years. An extensive evaluation of the first five years carried out in 2002 identified major challenges and issues for the future of the EES. It also emphasised the need to revamp the EES with a view to aligning it more closely to the Lisbon goal of sustained economic growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010 which occurred with new simpler guidelines in 2003 (European Commission portal 2007)

A new revision took place in early 2005. This revision was launched as a result of the Commission's proposal for a refocusing of the Lisbon strategy. The renewed EES includes three main pillars: a) The EES as a Key Component of the Lisbon Strategy, b) The Co-ordination of Employment Policies at the EU level. c) The Added Value of an 'Open Method of Co-ordination'. (European Commission portal 2007)
• Territorial co-operation: All member states and regions are eligible. This policy aims at stimulating and supporting cross-border co-operation in order to find joint solutions to problems such as urban, rural and coastal development, the development of economic relations, and the networking of SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) (EurActiv.com 2004; European Commission 2007a, pp. 95, 120-121).

In terms of financial resources, on December 17, 2005 the European Council took a decision relevant to the structural funds. According to this decision the EU will allocate €307.6 billion to the cohesion policy for the budgetary period 2007-2013. 81.7% of this amount serves Convergence regions, 15.8% is allocated to regions which are eligible under the Competitiveness priority, and 2.44% remains for European Territorial Cooperation13 (EurActiv.com 2004; European Commission 2007a, p. 129).

By definition, cohesion policy is related to the absorption capacity of the EU, i.e. its capacity to integrate new member states smoothly. Therefore, the cohesion policy of the EU comprises the following aspects:

• Economic
• Social
• Political
• Institutional
• Cultural
• Territorial

13 A document issued by the European Commission, bearing the title “Growing regions, growing Europe, Fourth report on economic and social cohesion,” (2007a) describes economic, social and territorial cohesion as following:

Disparities in GDP per head between regions in the EU narrowed markedly over the past decade as growth in the least prosperous regions has outstripped that elsewhere. This has meant at the same time a lessening of the division in terms of economic potential between the core and the periphery and a corresponding reduction in territorial imbalance. However, although convergence of levels of GDP per head across regions has been accompanied by a narrowing of disparities in rates of employment and unemployment, these remain wide between both different parts of the Union and different areas within regions so posing a threat in some places to social cohesion.

The concern here is to document these developments and examine economic and demographic changes across the EU over the recent past at national and regional level and assess their implications for cohesion, not only economic and social but also territorial, in the sense of the balance between and within regions and between different territories. Its primary focus is on the extent to which regional disparities in terms of GDP per head, employment and demographic territorial trends have changed since the mid-1990’s (p.7).
All these fields are closely connected to each other. They comprise a chain of cohesion policies which include respect for human rights (minority, women’s, religious, etc); the Copenhagen Criteria, the Lisbon Strategy (sustainable development, competitiveness, struggle against unemployment, social stability); new challenges (also included within the programs of the Structural Funds) concerning climate changes; institutional reforms reflecting the new Reform Treaty of Lisbon; social stability and mutual respect for the European multicultural character which provides the foundation for the European cultural identity.

Question: What perspectives and expectations will emerge if Turkey joins the EU as full member-state? Will Turkey strengthen or threaten EU cohesion policy? This is the issue that Chapter 4.8 and 4.8.1 deals with.

2.3.6 Absorption Capacity

EU cohesion is pertinent to the following questions: Does the EU have the capacity to integrate new member states? As the Commissioner for Enlargement Oli Rehn (2006) said, in a speech delivered at a conference organised by the European Policy Centre in Brussels:

Absorption capacity is determined by two factors: The transformation of the applicants into worthy member states, and the development of the Union’s policies and Institutions. The capacity of would-be-members to accede is rigorously assessed by the Commission of strict conditionality. Absorption capacity is about whether the EU can take in while constituting to function effectively. It has economic, financial, institutional and democratic dimensions.

In addition, the Commissioner (2006) states that in the context of preparing candidates or acceding states, the EU presents "successful examples of the large Enlargements". This means, as he explains, that:

- Trade-related agreements have been established with the view to stimulating economic developments and avoiding a trade shock once countries enter the EU. According to Commissioner Rehn (2006), this model of action "stimulates Turkey’s bold economy reforms resulting in economic dynamism". This is what has happened in the case of Turkey.
The Association Agreement concluded with the Western Balkan countries and the Regional Free Trade Agreement paves the way for regional economic integration, as well as for stabilisation.

Commissioner Rehn also asserted that:

*As for the budget and common policies, our absorption capacity was dealt with by the Commission’s agenda 2000 document (1997) which proposed reforms of structural funds and agriculture policy. It enabled a successful accession of the new Enlargement of the ten new member states* (Rehn 2006).

On this point, I quote the Chairman of the Committee of Budgets of the European Parliament, Mr. Reimer Böge, who, during an interview for the purposes of this research stated that he supports the view that "the EU can take Turkey in after it reforms regulations concerning structural funds" (Böge 2007).

Moreover, as Commissioner Rehn (2006) additionally stated:

*Concerning the institutional set up, the Nice Treaty provides rules for up to 27 members, i.e. up to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. The Constitutional Treaty is currently a Sleeping Beauty. To maintain the EU in functionality we need an institutional architecture for an efficient, transparent and democratic Europe.*

In fact, Commissioner Rehn notes the twofold meaning of the phrase 'absorption capacity'. One the one hand, this capacity is closely related to the cohesion of the EU. On the other hand, it is related to the cohesion of the candidate and potential candidate states. The first meaning suggests that structural changes should be made within the EU so that Institutions will function adequately. The second meaning falls under the rubric of structural changes which should be enacted by the candidate and potential candidate states with the goal of harmonising with the *acquis Communautaire*. This leads us to the main question of Chapter 4: Can the EU absorb Turkey?
2.4 Conclusions and EU Cohesion

In concluding, one must distinguish between ´cohesion policy´ and the ´cohesion of the EU´. Cohesion policy is part of EU cohesion. EU cohesion depends upon, not only the cohesion policy of the EU and all its objectives (i.e. economic, social, political and territorial cohesion, to name but a few), but also upon issues of Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism as they relate to the international system, its stability, its cohesion and its decline. Some of the factors affecting the stability, cohesion and decline of the system are: a) common interests, b) conflicting national interests c) redistribution of power, d) share of power, e) threats to existing balances of power, f) the upsetting of the balance of power g) structural changes, h) culture i) military power, j) social factors, k) economy and l) governance and institutions. What this research seeks to investigate is whether the combination of all these factors can maintain a system in cohesion or whether it will lead it to decline, crisis or even collapse.

The cohesion of the EU goes beyond the cohesion policy of the EU. In defining the former, one could say that it constitutes a system of factors -as those mentioned above- which aim at holding regions, societies, economies and EU Institutions together by filling the existing gaps and dealing with the problems that the EU faces throughout its process of integration. This set of factors - variables maintains the EU in cohesion and in case that some of these factors is disrupted, then, the EU cohesion may be placed under threat. A typical example is the current economic crisis, which negatively affects the economy of the EU as well as the economies and the social and political stability of its member states.

For the purposes of this project, I must determine whether these abovementioned factors -or others- can be considered as variables affecting the cohesion of the EU in relation to Turkish accession to the EU. This research is to be conducted in the context of a methodology explained in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 3
Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed, in-depth description and justification of the methodological framework underlying the current thesis. The Chapter offers a methodological roadmap for addressing the research questions set forward to be examined by the current thesis. The roadmap follows the format outlined below:

- Rationale of the Research Approach
- Scope of the Project
- Methodological Design and Research Procedures
- Rationale for the Selection and Application of the Data Collection Techniques
- Qualitative Approach
- Secondary Sources
- Quantitative Approach
- Pre-testing the Survey Instrument
- Pilot Study
- Questionnaire Rating Scale
- Population and Sampling Frame
- Data Analysis
- Ethical Considerations
- My role as an Insider Researcher
- Research Limitations

All in all, the purpose of this chapter is twofold:
a) Provide a detailed account and justification of the methodology and research procedures of the current thesis.
b) Offer a sufficiently detailed description of the methodology in order to allow possible replication in the future.
3.2 Rationale for Research Approach

The subject that is being investigated by the current thesis is an interlinked and multidimensional social, political, economic and even institutional and legal phenomenon (to reiterate, the Turkish accession to the EU and whether such an accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU). At this point, it should be noted that research is always closely connected to a theoretical background, since most of the times, one completes the other. As pointed out by De Vaus (1991), social research usually attempts to answer two fundamental questions: First, What is going on? And second, Why?

The current project takes as its cornerstone the assumption that a research project attempts to collect data, investigate and analyse an event or phenomenon in order to provide explanations and either suggest a new theory or justify, review, complete or reject an existing one. That is, research without theory constitutes a deficient enterprise, a simple project of data-collection. On the other hand, theory without research is only speculation. In short, one can maintain that theory guides research and research justifies, tests and at the same time offers reliability and validity to a theory (Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Johns and Lee-Ross 1998; Finn et al 2000).

Kerlinger (1973) provides an enlightening definition of theory. He maintains that:

A theory is a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions and proportions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena (p.9).

What is needed for the purposes of this thesis is a theory which can provide a basis for the analysis and interpretation of a particular phenomenon – in this case, Turkish accession to the EU and whether such an accession will threaten EU cohesion. On the other hand, theory is an indispensable methodological tool by which a research project reviews, modifies or even rules out a theory (Finn et al 2000). For exactly this reason, this thesis has provided a detailed, critical and thorough review and analysis of various theories of International Relations (see Chapters 2.3; 2.3.2; 2.3.3; 2.3.4). At the same time, having in mind the complicated nature of the research questions of this thesis, a methodological design has been formulated so as to facilitate the process for identifying variables that would allow the empirical examination of the research hypotheses of this study. The utilisation of existing theories of International
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Relations, the empirical identification of variables, as well as the integration and cross-examination of conceptual and empirical models has eventually led to the formulation of a 'theory' compatible to what Kerlinger (1973) had defined.

The aim of this research is to examine Turkish accession to the EU and investigate whether such an accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU. To achieve this goal, the 'case study' methodology was adopted by utilising the 'triangulation' approach (Yin 1974; Denzin 1978). Besides, case study is considered as 'triangulated research strategy' (Tellis 1997). Therefore, the case study under investigation is the Turkish accession to the EU and whether this accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU. The hypothesis of this case study is based on Gilpin’s (1981) theory that: if structural changes occur in the component actors of the international system and result to redistribution of power, then the international system or sub-systems may be led to decline or even to conflict (see Chapter 2.3.3).

This hypothesis was tested vis-à-vis the case study of the Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, by evaluating Turkish accession to the EU, I attempted to examine whether such an accession will threaten EU cohesion. To attain this goal, I draw, through the evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, factors-variables affecting Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion. The validity of these variables was crosschecked by using methodological triangulation (see chapter 3.3). To achieve the aims and objectives of this thesis, and at the same time to maintain methodological and conceptual clarity, I employed both quantitative and qualitative approach. In the context of qualitative approach:

a) Secondary sources (documents, books, journals, archival material, polls) and primary sources (interviews) were identified and used.

b) I presented and evaluated the Turkish political system and Turkish accession to the EU by employing official documents from the Turkish government and the EU (archives, books, journals, polls as well as interviews). Through this evaluation, I defined a list of variables affecting Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion (see Chapter 4).

Following the completion of the qualitative examination, I proceeded to the quantitative approach by employing a 'survey' methodology via the design,
development and testing of a survey instrument (questionnaire). I also employed data from recent international developments, which are related to ‘Survey’ questions as well as data from Chapter 4, in an effort to compare whether the answers of the questionnaire comply with real facts and current trends. The questionnaire was based on the research questions and on the findings of the qualitative approach (see Chapter 4) taking also into account the theories of International Relations (Realism, Structural Realism etc). By analysing the findings of the survey, I have identified a list of factors – variables affecting Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion (see Chapter 5). Through this methodological process I tested whether the variables, which resulted from the quantitative approach, are justified.

At the last stage of the project (Chapter 6), I defined the final list of variables which derive from the findings of Chapter 4 (qualitative approach) and Chapter 5 (quantitative approach) and affect Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion. The critical analysis and synthesis of these variables led to the formulation and development of a model on EU cohesion. In practice, due to the nature of the variables of this model which constantly adapt to new circumstances, it will be possible for someone to monitor Turkey's progressive course to the EU and evaluate whether such a process -and under which circumstances- will lead to the threatening of EU cohesion. By employing this model (see Chapter 6), various scenarios were elaborated through which I examined and tested not only whether the Turkish accession to the EU is to threaten EU cohesion but also whether the main hypothesis of this project is justified or rejected. This is the same methodological approach through which I investigate when and how, theories of International Relations and especially, structural realism can be coupled in practice through Turkish accession to the EU (by practice we mean the evaluation of Turkish accession to the EU) (see Chapters 6.4.1-6.4.9).

14 In Chapter 6, I present the ‘worst case scenario’ which responds to theories of Realism and Structural Realism. Furthermore, it is examined and analysed how and why Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU on the basis of Realism and Structural Realism. It is also explained that this is the dominant scenario as it results from this project, justifying, at the same time, the main hypothesis of this project; whether structural changes and redistribution of power may lead to the decline of the system. In other words, I explain how and under what circumstances and structural changes, the system of the EU will be under threat. In order to be objective, I had to take into consideration and present, theories that criticise Realism and Structural Realism. These theories are Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, which they also approach international system under the concept of structural changes. However, the latter theories focus on the efforts of common instead of conflicting interests in the context of regional integration. The EU is deemed to be function between Realism and
I employ case study with ‘triangulation’ method for the following reasons:
1) The current project is quite a complicated one and as such, it required a multi-method design.
2) The study had to ensure that its empirical findings would be characterised by face and content validity. For this reason, I have employed, in the context of triangulation, both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. As far as the quantitative methodological approach is concerned, I have utilised the Survey technique, taking as my population sample the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament (for more details see Chapter 3.4.3.4). Regarding the qualitative methodological approach, I have utilised primary and secondary sources such as documents, archives, journals, polls and interviews (see Chapter 3.4.1; 3.4.2 and Chapter 4).

The case study approach is a common and frequently used method for conducting social science research (Yin 2002). It was deemed as the most suitable approach for this research project for the following reasons:

1) The case study is an ideal methodology to use when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed in order to examine an event or a case to test a hypothesis. (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991). According to Stake (1995) and Yin (2002) there are six sources of evidence in case studies. These include:

   • documents\textsuperscript{15}
   • archival records\textsuperscript{16}
   • interviews\textsuperscript{17}
   • direct observation\textsuperscript{18}
   • participant-observation\textsuperscript{19}

---

\textsuperscript{15} Documents can be letters, memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, newspaper articles, or any other document germane to the investigation.
\textsuperscript{16} Archival documents can be service records, organisational records, lists of names, survey data and other such records.
\textsuperscript{17} Interviews can be open-ended, focused or structured. They can also be conducted through a survey.
\textsuperscript{18} This can be as simple as casual data collection activities, or it can involve more formal protocols to measure and record behaviours. This technique is useful for providing additional information about the topic being studied.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

• physical artifacts

Four of these sources have been employed in the course of this project (see Chapters 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) 'Direct observation' and 'physical artifacts' were not used as sources of information as they were deemed unsuitable to the nature of this research. These two sources of evidence are mainly employed in other kinds of research projects, such as those dealing with medicine or physics (to name but two), and they do not apply to this specific project.

2) The case study approach is a methodology falling under a triangulated research strategy (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991; see Chapter 3.5).

3.2.1 Scope of the Project

The main purpose of this research is to examine:

1) Whether theories of International Relations, especially Structural Realism, can serve as valid theoretical framework for actual events, (in this case the process of Turkish accession to the EU) and whether the Turkish accession will threaten or not the cohesion of the EU. Taking into account theories of International Relations and what Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg (1991) argued, one can observe that the EU member states constitute the main component actors of the EU and international system. The EU, as such, constitutes a subsystem of the international system (see chapter 2.3.1). At the same time, Turkey constitutes an actor of the international system and is connected to the EU through the status of candidate state. Therefore, what is aimed is to observe the actors’ actions and reactions within the EU in relation to the Turkish accession to the EU.

2) What factors-variables can bring structural changes and affect the cohesion of the EU in the context of Turkish accession to the EU? As a researcher, I assigned these factors the status of variables (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26-28).

19 Participant-observation makes the researcher into an active participant in the events being studied. In this case, the researcher attended and followed closely European Parliament meetings, which are relevant to the topic of Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, he had the opportunity to participate and observe the whole process. The researcher also notes that the Turkish accession to the EU is not only discussed on the level of the European Parliament but also on the level of other EU Institutions.

20 Physical artifacts can be tools, instruments or other kinds of physical evidence that may be collected during the study as part of a field visit (for all six sources see Stake 1995).

Ioannis Charalambides
In the context of 'triangulation', I could not rely only on the findings obtained through the qualitative methodological approach. For this reason findings were obtained through a quantitative methodological approach, the 'survey' technique. Therefore, this research employs a combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach in the framework of a 'case study' methodology. The survey questionnaire used in this project was formulated by taking into account the research questions and the findings of the document analysis of Chapter 4. The aim was to:

1) Fill in gaps from literature and Chapter 4.
2) Cross-examine the findings of the literature and Chapter 4 with those obtained through the survey. This cross-examination makes possible the formulation of a list of variables affecting EU cohesion.
3) Examine whether theory can be justified in practice.

To conclude, this project attempts to establish a model through which to examine whether Turkish accession could threaten the cohesion of the EU. At the same time, the model and methodological approach developed for the purposes of this study would be easily replicated for examining the accession of other countries in the EU and the possible impact on the cohesion of E.U. To achieve this goal, the main factors affecting structural changes within the EU must be identified and subsequently justified, both conceptually and empirically.

\[21\] Taking into consideration the literature findings (see Chapter 2.4; 4.11), the variables, which mainly affect the structural changes of an international system and the EU include social, political, economic and other factors, such as the concept of 'power game', national interests, redistribution of power, balance and imbalance of power, human rights, and democracy. At this point, it should be pointed out that, for the purposes of this research, I consider as variables all factors upon which the EU is based and which maintain the EU in cohesion. The cohesion of the EU is the dependent variable of this research, and this variable is affected by and depends on other independent or intermediate factors-variables. For example, democracy is an independent factor, indispensable for the cohesion of the EU. That is, the cohesion of the EU depends on the variable of democracy. Other factors on which the cohesion of the EU depends include economy, balance of power, society and political stability (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26). Intermediate variables are those which act between the dependent and independent variables. For example, in practice, the imbalance of power is affected by the independent variable of redistribution of power. Therefore, concerning the relation between the variables of contribution of power, imbalance of power and cohesion of the EU we note the following: The contribution of power is the independent variable and the imbalance of power is the intermediate variable in relation to the dependent variable, that of EU cohesion. The intermediate variable results from an independent variable and affects the dependent variable. Moreover, the relation between contribution of power and imbalance of power is the following: The variable of contribution of power plays the role of the dependent variable and the imbalance of power plays the role of the independent variable (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26-27).
3.3 Methodological Design and Research Procedures

As already stated, the subject and focus of this thesis, namely, Turkish accession to the EU, constitutes a complicated issue. A single methodological approach is incapable of providing adequate explanations for analysing such a phenomenon. In light of these facts, the method of triangulation has been chosen in order to achieve more reliable and valid results (Tellis 1997). This is a methodological approach which can safeguard the validity of the findings. Therefore, for the purpose of this research a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches has been adopted.

According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1992), the combination of these two approaches can provide a reliable basis for the development and implementation of a research design. Ultimately, such combination will allow the adaptation of a 'triangulation approach' (Campbell and Fiske 1959; Pelto and Pelto 1978; LeBlanc III 2002). As Philip (2000 cited in Finn et al) stated:

> Researchers should think beyond the myopic quantitative – qualitative divide when it comes to devising a suitable methodology for their research, and select methods – qualitative, quantitative or a combination of the two – that best satisfy the needs of specific research projects (p.12).

In addition, as Dreher and Hayes (1993, p. 217) have stated: "triangulation is not just a combination of methods but a back and forth movement between the quantitative and qualitative components throughout the research process".

In literature, five basic types of triangulation can be identified:

a. Data triangulation, involving time, space and persons.

b. Investigator triangulation (multiple rather than single observers).

c. Theory triangulation (in which more than one theory is used).

d. Multiple triangulations (in which a researcher combines multiple theoretical perspectives, sources of data and methodologies in one investigation).

e. Methodological triangulation (in which a researcher uses more than one method or chooses between method strategies) (Denzin 1978).
It is obvious that for the purposes of this research more than one theory is used (Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism). Similarly, several methods and techniques for data collection have been used in order to analyse both, theoretically and empirically, the very complicated phenomenon of Turkish accession to the EU and to assess whether or not such an accession threatens the cohesion of the EU. As Dreher and Hayes (1993) have stated, by using a combination of methods, theories and investigators, triangulations increase the researcher’s confidence in the findings.

Therefore, the adoption of multiple triangulation design in the context of the current study is justified on the following grounds:

- The political scenario of the Turkish accession to the EU. Whether such an accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not is a thorny question. To answer it, I draw on the classic theories of International Relations, theories which also influence European affairs, such as Realism, Structural Realism, Liberalism and Neo-liberalism (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 166-168; 1992b, pp. 160 - 178).
- The collection of data from primary and secondary sources. These modes of data collection fall into the context of multiple triangulation. An example of multiple triangulation in literature is ‘The Police Peasant in Europe and America’ by Thomas and Znanieck’s (2000, cited in Eberhardt 2007). Their investigation uses triangulated data, theories and methods.
- The employment of multiple methods. For instance, qualitative and quantitative methods and techniques may be combined. Within the framework of this research, triangulation is employed as follows:
  a) Qualitative methods (interviews, archives, documents and diaries).
  b) Quantitative methods (survey and data analysis).

In short, by applying 'triangulation', an efficient and effective analytical framework is established, which in turn will allow rigorous analysis that will eventually lead to valid and reliable results. In brief, triangulation is a traditional methodological framework in behavioural and social sciences, one which uses multiple methods to study a single phenomenon (Chong 1996).
3.4 Rationale for Selection and Application of Data Collection Techniques

Due to the nature of the subject, one single method or technique is not adequate to provide reliable results. In the context of triangulation, a combination of approaches, techniques and methods are used in order to increase confidence in the results (Morgan 1998; Morse 1991; Tschudi 1989).

In light of these facts, both qualitative and quantitative primary sources of data will be employed. At the same time, secondary sources will be also used. These will include archival materials, official documents, bibliographical materials and polls (Benjamin 2003; UM Libraries).

3.4.1. Qualitative approach

In-depth interviewing was one of my techniques of qualitative data collection. Interviews were conducted with experts on the issue of Turkish accession to the EU. The sample consisted of experts who satisfied the following criteria:

1) Respondents who have dealt with the Turkish accession process as well as International Relations and European studies.
2) Politicians, scientists or technocrats involved in European affairs who also deal with issues related to the European defence system, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)\textsuperscript{22} and the European and Turkish economies.
3) Respondents with extensive experience in Euro-Turkish relations or in other areas relevant to this research study.

For the purpose of this project, semi-structured interviews were also used. When employing semi-structured interviews, a researcher has a list of questions on specific topics. Answers to these questions may fill in gaps which exist on the core issues of the research project, or may fill in gaps arising from the literature review. Other questions, not included on the list, were raised in accordance with the answers given by the interviewees (Lupton 1996; Beardsworth and Keil 1992, pp.261-262). As
Leidner stated, "the interviews also allow room to pursue topics of particular interest to the workers (i.e. the researcher)" (Leidner 1993, p. 238).

In this respect, MEP Joost Lagendijk was chosen as one of my main interviewees. Mr Lagendijk fulfills all criteria described above. First, he is the Chairman of the EU - Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee since 2002. This Committee, along with the Committee on Foreign Affairs have the competence of monitoring and evaluating the progress of Turkish accession to the EU. As a Chairman, Mr Lagendijk has close cooperation and takes active part in negotiations with technocrats and officials of the European Commission and the Council dealing with Turkish accession to the EU. 2) Mr Lagendijk visits Turkey frequently for meetings with Turkish politicians, technocrats, academics, local authorities and NGOs. Therefore, he knows first hand and in detail, what really happens with Turkish accession to the EU, which are the problems it faces, why and how these can be resolved. He has long experience and knowledge on European issues as he is a Member of the European Parliament since 1999.23 The interview was conducted in October 23, 2007 in Strasbourg (where the official seat of the European Parliament is founded) at the office of Mr Lagendijk.

Additional interviews were taken from the Chairman of the Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament, Reimer Böge and two Turkish academics of Istanbul Bilgi University (specialising on economic and political issues), Professor Yunus Emre Gönen and Professor Erol Katircioglu, as well as from a military attaché in Brussels, expert in security and defence policies of the EU.24 The underlying aim behind taking these interviews was:

1) To focus my attention on some specific issues which are important for the project, such as the structural funds and the financial perspectives of the EU. Through the expertise and knowledge of the interviewees, I clarified technical issues with which I was not very familiar (this is why, for example, I have chosen Reimer Böge, Chairman of the Committee on Budgets). 2) To investigate the position of Turkish experts on Turkish accession to the EU. In particular, I opted to examine their opinion about economy, reforms and the structural changes that Turkey should

22 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe, committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 (www.nato.int)
23 The interview of Joost Lagendijk is annexed at the end of the project as Appendix 1.
24 Extracts of their interviews have been used throughout this work and especially in Chapters 4 and 5 (see for example Chapters 4.6.3 and 5.5)
undertake in its accession to the EU as well as other political issues related to the Turkish accession to the EU.

Extracts from these interviews, especially from the interview of MEP Lagendijk, are presented in Chapters 4 and 5 with a view to analyse the findings of the survey and to compare them with the findings of Chapter 4. This methodological process aims at enhancing the validity of the findings and the final results of this project.

The preparation of qualitative interviews is an important matter. As Lofland (1995, p. 78) suggests, in preparing a qualitative interview a researcher should ask himself the following question: "Just what about this thing is puzzling me?" Additionally, a researcher should have identified what he/she needs to know in order to answer each of the research questions of interest. In preparing the interviews for this project, I therefore took into account the following guidelines:

- Ordering of topics.
- Formulation of interview questions or topics in a way that help answer the research questions. Such topics included the role of the US in European affairs, the role of the Turkish army in the national system, and the questions of whether Turkish accession to the EU will bring about a redistribution of power and whether it will threaten the cohesion of the EU.
- Use of language that is understandable for the interviewees.
- Avoidance of leading questions unless this is necessary in order to draw out straight answers on core issues. Such issues may be raised from public debates, from literature or from any other source. For example, the interviewees had to answer a question on whether or not Turkey will constitute a 'Fifth Phalanx' within the EU on behalf of US national interests (Kalin & Gerras 2005, p.17).
- Careful record-keeping of general 'fact sheet' information (position, number of years at the work etc) (Zikmund 1994).

25 The interview of MEP Reimer Böge was conducted in October 30, 2007 in his office at the European Parliament in Brussels. The other two interviews with Professors Yunus Emre Gönen and Erol Katircioglu were conducted in their offices at Bilgi University in Istanbul (see also footnote 26).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Through 'semi-structured' and 'face to face interviews', I had the advantage, as a researcher, to:

1) Clarify in depth a topic by posing supplementary questions to the interviewee.
2) Obtain as much qualitative data as possible.
3) Exhaustively investigate the selected topics.
4) Realise the importance of issues that I had possibly underestimated before the interview, such as the significance of structural changes not only in Turkey but also in the EU.
5) Cross-check information from literature and other sources with data resulting from the interview.

On the other hand, the `semi-structured´ and `face to face' interview technique has certain disadvantages:

1) As a researcher, I run the risk of losing control over the discussion and thereby, missing the aim of the interview. However, taking into consideration the rigid and well defined theoretical context of this thesis, this danger was minimised.
2) An exhaustive investigation may lead to a long interview. As a result, I would need more time to get to the essence of the answers and to achieve the aims of the interview in the context of the research goals.
3) As a researcher, I need to maintain a certain discipline, knowing in advance what I will ask and how. This is why is of great importance to put the topics in order. Furthermore, the topics: a) should correlate with the research questions and b) should stem from data and information obtained from literature, official documents, archives and other sources. This data and information should be cross-checked through the answers received during the interview.

In addition, there is another principle that I had to have in mind during the interview process, related to the issue of 'ethical sensitiveness'. The researcher should respect the interviewee. In this context, I note what Kvale (1966) asserted:

An ethical sensitive interviewer will not want to place undue pressure on the person he or she is talking to and will need to be prepared to cut short that line of question if it is clearly a source of concern (p.319).

As a back-up measure, in addition to tape-recording the interview, written notes were also kept. Notes can generate a substantial list of the main points raised during
the interview, and therefore provide a safe alternative to the tape recorder (Rafaeli et al 1997).

The open question constitutes a fertile way of drawing out qualitative and useful information on the research topic (Weisberg, Krosnick & Bowen 1996; Brenner, Brown & Canter 1985; Kvale 1996). In addition to face to face interviews, telephone interviews were also planned so as to facilitate the data collection process both for the researcher and the interviewee; however there was ultimately no need to employ this technique.\(^{26}\) The main goal of the interviews was to collect data and responses on issues raised from bibliography. Due to the special needs of my research, I found it necessary to interview people who wished to remain anonymous, due to their profession and/or role (for example, diplomats and military attachés). These interviews were not recorded, but were documented in written notes alone. The anonymous interviewees allowed me to use information and even refer to their interviews without any personal reference to them (i.e. the interviewees).\(^{26}\) (On the issue of interviews conducted without taping the interviewee, see Rafaeli et al (1997)). As Rafaeli stated, a participant may refuse to be taped, but for interviews not taped, detailed notes should be taken. In following these methodological principles, which at the same time involve fundamental ethical issues that had to be endorsed by the researcher, I was able to assure that the responses of the interviewees would remain confidential and anonymous. At the same time, however, I was not limited only to the information given to me, but I was able to double-check this data through further investigation (for more information about morality and ethical considerations of the research, see Chapter 3.6).

The interviews brought to light important issues which were ultimately included within the questionnaire of this study, justifying in this way the need to adopt a triangulation design. At the same time, the interviews allowed me to fill in gaps existing in literature or other sources of data as well. A peculiarity of the current project is the fact that it focuses on a phenomenon that has not ended. It is an ongoing economic, political, social, cultural and economic process. Therefore, the current project is characterised by potentiality. For this reason, it was decided to implement the following combination

\(^{26}\) Telephone interviewing was an option chosen due to geographical limitations and practical reasons, when for example, an interviewee was in another country. The initial plan, for example, was to have
of research methods in the context of triangulation: 1) to conduct interviews; 2) to use their results to partially formulate the questionnaire, and 3) to conduct an additional number of interviews with experts on the subject with the aim of comparing the answers received from the questionnaire with the answers given during the interviews. This meant that the interview questions had to be the same or similar to those included within the quantitative questionnaire. Subsequently, answers given or points made during the interviews were compared with answers given on the survey. Through this approach I was able to verify and cross-check the information and data obtained through my research.  

3.4.2 Secondary Sources

Quite apart from interviews and the survey, and in the context of the qualitative approach, secondary sources were also used. According to Howel and Prevenier (2001),

> an example of a secondary source is the biography of a historical figure in which the author constructs a narrative out of a variety of primary source documents, such as letters, diaries, newspaper accounts, photographs, and official records. A scholarly secondary source is familiar with the existing secondary literature and seeks to engage it in terms of arguments and evidence. Most, but not all, secondary sources utilize extensive citation (book, article, web page). Scholarly secondary sources are peer-reviewed by scholars before publication in book or article form, and books are reviewed and evaluated in the scholarly journals (p. 79).

For the purposes of this research, the secondary sources used were the following:

1) EU polls, namely ‘Eurobarometer’, on the issues concerning the Turkish accession to the EU. Useful qualitative information was drawn about public opinion on Turkish accession to the EU and the reasons why some Europeans support Turkish accession to the EU and some others do not.

2) Archives and official documents of the EU Institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council.

3) Books and essays on the topic, newspapers, academic and professional analyses, government documents, and statements from statesmen and key politicians.

---

27 Telephone interviews with Turkish academics of Istanbul Bilgi University. Finally, I had the chance to travel to Turkey and interview them face to face.

27 The main interview of MEP Joost Lagendijk is included in Appendix 1. The other two interviews are saved on a disk.
3.4.3 Quantitative Approach

Within the context of the quantitative approach, survey instrumentation was employed as one of my methodological tools for obtaining data and drawing conclusions from a defined population. The survey technique is used when a researcher wants to collect data on a phenomenon that cannot be observed directly. One way of accomplishing this is by gathering data on the opinions and attitudes of a specified population on the subject (Kinnear & Taylor 1996). As Busha and Harter (1980) stated: "a population is any set of group of persons or objects that possesses at least one common characteristic" (p. 98). These persons are, in the context of a research project, specialists on the investigated subject. In this context, I designed, developed and tested a questionnaire whose questions are based on the extant literature and other sources of data. The results obtained from the questionnaire have provided insight into to critical aspects of my research.

For the purposes of this research, the 'survey' was employed both as a methodological approach and data collection technique. According to Doyle (n.d.)

> surveys can be a powerful and useful tool for collecting data on human characteristics, attitudes, thoughts, and behaviour. And, sometimes, conducting a survey is the only available option for acquiring the data necessary to answer an important research question.

The 'survey' technique was employed in order to measure and determine the opinions and political stance of the population sample. In this case, the population sample used was the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament (see Chapter 3.4.3.4). The advantages of the 'survey' method are as follows:

1) Specific answers are collected for specific research questions allowing in this way the researcher to obtain and I am thereby able to obtain the necessary information to proceed with the goals of the research project (in this case, I formulate a list of variables affecting the cohesion of the EU).

2) I avoid the risk of deviating from research aims (Doyle n.d.; Fowler 1995).

On the other hand, this approach has certain limitations:

1) Each question of the questionnaire relies on self-reported data. Some of the participants may answer truthfully and accurately, however, some others may not feel
comfortable revealing their true beliefs (Doyle n.d.). To avoid such a situation, I reassured the participants of the confidentiality of the survey, and allowed them to keep their anonymity if requested.

2) A survey can accurately present the opinions, judgements, evaluations and attitudes of its participants. However, this does not mean that these opinions are correct (Yin 2002).

In order to deal with this limitation and in the context of this thesis, I combined the 'survey' technique with the ‘interview’ technique and document analysis. Case studies, interviews and document analysis can offer in-depth analysis, thereby limiting the possibility of using incorrect findings obtained through a survey. This is in fact the essence of cross-checking.

The questionnaire of the 'survey' was conceptualised, designed and developed on the basis of the following criteria:

- Inclusion of research questions. The questionnaire should respond to, and even include, the main questions upon which the researcher intends to build his/her research. The questions I attempted to include in the questionnaire address the main topics of this research. For example, questions included the following: What is the role of the army in the Turkish political system? Will the Turkish accession to the EU bring a redistribution of power or not?

- Inclusion of questions emerging from the literature review and other documents or interviews. For example: whether Turkey constitutes a big market for the EU (Question 13 of Survey instrument, Appendix 2; Chapter 4.4); whether the historically negative stereotypes of Turkey underlie the stance of those Europeans who do not wish to see Turkey in the EU (see Question 11 of Survey instrument, Appendix 2).

- Use of an understandable language. I tried to formulate the questions in a simple, clear language, in order to facilitate responses and avoid the possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. To make sure that this would in fact be the case, the questionnaire was proofread and piloted by my colleagues, and their comments and corrections were taken into account.

- Attractive and professional design. The quality of the questions implicitly reflects the professionalism of the survey. To achieve a high standard of professionalism, I sent the questionnaire to academics who deal with issues
of International Relations and EU-Turkey relations, asking for their feedback.

- Avoidance of leading questions. By keeping in mind the need to avoid leading questions, I sought to ensure a lack of bias.
- Rational order of the questions or classification of specific topics\textsuperscript{28}. For instance, questions with similar content were placed together in the survey in a rational order (Babbie 1973; Busha & Harter 1980). For the purposes of this project, I formulated the questionnaire in accordance with the following topics, which are also related to the Research Questions:
  1) EU-US relations.
  2) Negative and positive European conceptions regarding Turkish accession to the EU.
  3) Human rights, corruption, role of the army in the Turkish political system.
  4) The role of national interest in the EU decision-making process.
  5) The possibility of Turkey itself terminating its accession process.
  6) Redistribution of power and structural changes following Turkish accession to the EU.
  7) Impact of Turkish accession on EU cohesion\textsuperscript{29}.

In this context, the sequence of questions moved from the general to the specific. The main task was to draw out as specific answers and results as possible (Babbie 1973; Busha & Harter 1980; Newsted, Huff & Munro 1998; see also Survey instrument, Appendix 2).

3.4.3.1 Pre-Testing the Survey Instrument

The pre-testing stage is an important stage of the survey procedure. This process aims at ensuring that the respondents understand the questions and their purposes, and that they can respond to them. According to Finn et al. (2000) "the results of

\textsuperscript{28} See for example Questions 11 and 13. Here, one can find all relevant questions on the reasons why Europeans favour or oppose Turkish accession to the EU.

\textsuperscript{29} A similar structure was used for the interviews in order to more easily compare the collected data. Certainly, with regard to the interviews, I had the chance to make a more detailed and qualitative investigation by posing questions and eliciting more data on topics where things were not clear.
pre-testing can be annoying, but can make the difference between an instrument yielding data or not, or meaningful or useless data” (p.102). The main goal is to obtain feedback from expert respondents in order to modify the questionnaire before the pilot study. Boyd and Westfall (1989) stated that the number of the pre-test interviews should be around 20–30. However, Parasuraman (1986) held that the essence of the pre-testing instrument is not quantitative but qualitative. He maintained that it is better to pre-test the questionnaire systematically by using relatively small samples of respondents than to pre-test it with a larger sample by only asking the respondents to fill out the questionnaire. For the purposes of this project, Parasuraman's suggestions were adopted. I worked with a short list of professors, exchanging views and getting feedback on the structure of the questionnaire. The main 'backbone' of the questionnaire was designed pursuant to literature review, to data collection, and partially to interviews.

The main goal of this pre-testing process was to improve the quality and the structure of the questionnaire. Certainly, even before going to the pilot stage I had implemented some changes to the questionnaire. These changes resulted from issues identified in literature, as well as from data and information which I had gathered. The piloting process resulted in the identification of new questions, which in turn required the reviewing and rephrasing of the questionnaire in order to fill in gaps and also aimed at getting more specific answers. At the same time, I discussed these changes with my supervisory team as well as with other academics. Their experience on methodological matters was of great importance for the conclusion of my project, and their comments and advice have been very useful in the process of formulating a valid and reliable research instrument.

First, the questionnaire was sent to my supervisors, asking them for comments. For example, I asked for input on how to avoid biased or leading questions, or on the most suitable way of placing a question in order to avoid common or even grave mistakes, ensuring in this way that the questionnaire adhered to the criteria of reliability and to the purposes of the research.
Second, each time I was coming across in the literature with something that I considered important for my research and that would possibly need to be investigated further, I included it within the questionnaire. I did this because I believe that the more precise the questionnaire is, the more reliable the answers and the results will be. My main concern was to fill in all gaps resulting from my review of the literature and other documents, and from the interviews.

In the course of discussions with my supervisory team and other scholars, I used the methodological technique of the open-ended question. As Kotler (1997) observed, the application of open-ended questions is considered advisable in the context of the explanatory state. The key open-ended questions which were used were the following:

1) ‘Are there any other factors - variables which, according to your opinion, are important for my research and are not included in the questionnaire? Please mention.’

2) ‘Are there any other reasons, not included in the questionnaire as to why Europeans might or might not wish to see Turkey as a full member state of the EU?’

Through this procedure, I had the opportunity to re-evaluate the questionnaire, fill any existing gaps, and therefore design and develop the questionnaire in the best possible way. Explanations, comments and other reactions from the respondents were essential in order to enrich the list of factors - variables of the EU cohesion model that I aimed to establish. This enrichment included the following factors:

a) Factors/variables related to the democratic principles affecting the EU, including women's rights, religious rights, minority rights and corruption.

b) Factors-variables connected to the concept of power, including cultural, diplomatic, economic, military and the institutional spheres of power.

Regarding the second question, I received the following input:

a) Reasons for which Turkey can not join the EU: negative historical stereotypes and geographical reasons.

b) Reasons why Turkey can join the EU as full member state: cultural enrichment of the EU, Turkish cheap labour.
The aforementioned comments and suggestions were incorporated into the survey tool in order to fill any gaps and improve the quality of the questionnaire.

3.4.3.2 Pilot Study

Taking into consideration the conclusions and observations derived from the procedures described above, a pilot version of the questionnaire was designed. The next step was to send the pilot questionnaire to chosen MEPs for feedback. Their comments were important in examining whether the criteria of the questionnaire structure had been met or whether further improvement was necessary. The main goal was to deliver a questionnaire that would be understandable and easily answered. The pilot study also served as advance warning on whether a question might run the risk of failing (Baker 1994). Bell (1993) postulated that the identification of bugs in the questions and their correction would help make sure that the subjects of the main study would experience no difficulties in completing it. At the same time, pre-testing allowed me to carry out a preliminary analysis of the survey results and to conclude whether the wording and format of the questions will present any difficulties when the main results are analysed (p. 49).

After completing the pre-testing stage and the formulation of the questionnaire, I proceeded to the pilot stage. The letter and the spirit of a pilot have been described by De Vaus (1993) in his succinct advice: "Do not take the risk. Pilot test first" (p.54). In this context, 10 MEPs were chosen who were familiar with the subject under investigation. The goal of this procedure was to draw useful conclusions from the analysis of the pilot study and to find out whether anything had to be reviewed and corrected. I explained to the MEPs the need for feedback as to whether the questions were understandable, how long it took them to answer them, whether the questionnaire included biased or leading questions, and any other useful comments. The feedback was largely positive. Some comments were made on the order of the questions and the possibility of confusion on the way they should be answered. After receiving the feedback, a serious consideration of the issues raised took place with my supervisory team. As a result, these corrective measures were initiated:

a) I partially reordered some of the questions so as to facilitate the interviewees' answering of the questionnaire. In addition, I restructured some of the
questions so that they would appear more straightforward and easily answerable. Furthermore, I included some new questions in an effort to fill in some newly identified gaps in the literature.

b) I had some doubts as to whether some questions were biased or leading. After discussing this with my supervisory team, I concluded that there was not a simple solution to this issue. These questions result from essential issues raised from literature and constitute core issues of the current research. These questions had to be included in order to examine and measure reactions and the opinions of the defined population on the issues at hand.

One of the most important issues was the following: Whether or not Turkey would become a ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of US national interests (Kalin & Gerras 2005, p.17). This is one of the arguments dominating the political debate on Turkish accession to the EU, and it would be a great omission if I did not include it within the questionnaire (see Question 11 of the Survey instrument in Appendix 2).

The next and last step of piloting the questionnaire was to double-check the final details so that the questionnaire would be as professional as possible. At this point, special attention and emphasis were paid to the borderlines, the formatting and the design in general.

3.4.3.3 Questionnaire Rating Scale

The rating scale adopted for the evaluation of the attitude and opinions of the sampling frame quality was a 5-point Likert scale. A Likert scale "is a measure of attitudes designed to allow respondents to rate how strongly they agree or disagree with carefully constructed statements" (Zikmund 1996, p. 348). It consists of a series of evaluative statements concerning an attitude object (Parasuraman 1986). The Likert scale is one of the most widely used attitude-scaling techniques in marketing research (Churchill 1996).
Respondents were invited to indicate the extent of their feeling towards each of the statements in the questionnaire. The responding scale ranges from 'to a large extent' to 'very little' by using a 5-point Likert-type scale, which also included the 'No answer' option. It was decided to offer verbal tags between the two extreme anchors of the scale to avoid problems of misinterpretation. The verbal labels for the scale points 1 through 5 are indicated as follows:

1 = To a large extent
2 = To some extent
3 = Little
4 = Very Little
5 = Do not know
6 = No answer

There are several reasons why the Likert scale was chosen for the purposes of this study. First, the scale was constructed to measure interval data (Madsen 1989). Second, in the literature, the Likert scale is almost always treated as interval scales (Kohli 1989). Third, interval scales typically provide the best measurements for most behavioural related social research (Aaker et al 1998).

In addition to the above reasons, sensitivity is another consideration in the adoption of Likert rating scale. Zikmund (1996) maintains that the sensitivity of a scale is an important measurement concept, particularly when changes in attitudes or other hypothetical constructs are under investigation. Sensitivity refers to "an instrument's ability to accurately measure variability in stimuli or responses" (Zikmund 1996, p. 338). That is, sensitivity of an attitude scale is the extent to which it is capable of discriminating between respondents with different attitudes. A dichotomous response category such as 'yes' or 'no' does not reflect subtle attitude changes. A more sensitive measure with numerous categories on the scale may be needed. Because the Likert scale can offer more choices for respondents to express their attitudes, it is considered to have higher sensitivity.

However, there is still no agreement on the optimal number of scale points. One study (Devlin, Dong & Brown 1993) showed that the 5-point Likert scale appears to capture more information than its 4-point counterpart; it was not demonstrated
whether the 5-point is superior to the 7-point scale. Taking into consideration the particularities of the current research project, a 5-point scale was deemed to be the most suitable.

The option of 'no answer' was included in the questionnaire to avoid forced answer bias. Researchers have suggested reasons for the inclusion of this option. For example, Hughes (cited by Smith 1995) argued that bias was introduced when forced choice scales were compared with unforced ones. Hawkins and Coney (1981) found that the inclusion of a 'don't know' option appeared to have no effects on questionnaire response rate for factual questions, but their examination of fictitious issues revealed that this would appear to reduce uninformed responses. Thus, a forced choice scale may offer potential for the misinterpretation of responses.

### 3.4.3.4 Population and Sampling Frame

In the context of triangulation –which, as stated earlier, constitutes a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches - a target population was identified for the purposes of the survey.

The target population consisted of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament. The role of this Committee is, in fact, to monitor the Turkish accession to the EU. At the same time it closely cooperates with the Directorate General of Enlargement of the European Commission, the Subcommittee of Security and Defence of the European Parliament as well as the European Council.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs is composed (as of September 2008) of 172 permanent and substitute members out of the 785 members of the European Parliament. The members of this Committee represent various European political parties and streams, especially those concerning views on Turkish accession to the EU. They are directly elected by the European citizenry. For reasons mentioned above, the total population of the members of this Committee was chosen to be used
as a proxy sample, whose generalisation of views and opinions would reflect the views and opinions of the European electorate who voted for them in the 2004 elections of the European Parliament. This method of proxy sampling is widely used in national surveys by statistical bureaus and offices (see for example US Statistical Office, UK Office of National Statistics), and it aims to simulate research findings originating from a smaller population to reflect the views/opinions and attitudes of wider populations. It is strongly believed that the results of the questionnaires can generally reflect the political views and concepts in Europe. This sample was used in the context of the quantitative approach of my survey (Labossiere 1995).

The survey instrument was distributed to the total population of 172 MEPs. Following completion of the fieldwork process, 65 questionnaires were returned (37.79 response rate). Considering the sensitive nature of the research topic, as well as the difficulties of contacting the MEPs and securing their cooperation, the achieved response rate is deemed as satisfactory. However, I recognise that this represents a limited response, and for this reason I exercised special care in interpreting and generalising the results and extrapolating the findings. It has to be stated that in the literature, there is an ongoing debate regarding the issue of sample representativeness and extrapolation of findings. On the basis of this ongoing debate, I strongly believe that I have managed to collect a reliable dataset which eventually led to reliable conclusions.

In addition, it must be acknowledged that sample error cannot be estimated for the purposes of this research, since judgemental, non-probability sampling has been employed (De Vaus 1991; Nachmias & Nachmias 1992).

### 3.5 Data Analysis

Data analysis is dependent on the nature of the data collected. In the case of this project, data analysis took into account whether the data was obtained through interviews, documents, diaries, archives, notes, or surveys. Similarly, data was categorised according to whether it was qualitative or quantitative. Regarding the interviews for instance, the results were categorised according to what subject the
data focused on. For example, one issue was the role and the influence of the US on European affairs. A second issue was the role of the army within the Turkish political system and how it might affect Turkey's accession to the EU. A third issue was whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten -or not- the cohesion of the EU cohesion and why. In fact, this is the core question of this research and the answers received were vital and have contributed catalytically to the qualitative findings as well as to the conclusion of this research.  

The same technique was followed in the case of the answers I received from the questionnaire. In any case, the questions included in the interview questionnaire were the same or similar to those of the survey questionnaire. Therefore, one of the core questions of the questionnaire was whether Turkish accession to the EU will contribute positively or negatively to the economic, political, cultural, military and diplomatic policies of the EU. Through analysis of data obtained from both qualitative and quantitative sources, I tried to elicit the variables upon which to build the model of this research. By analysing and comparing the collected data, I attempted to ensure the highest possible validity for the results of this research.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

In a work-based research some ethical issues can arise. As a result, I had to take a clear position in advance by informing the potential participants of the research about the reasons for, and the nature, duration and aims of the undertaken research. Furthermore, I had to respect the confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants, especially with regard to the survey. Such respect is closely related to respect for the spiritual and political identity of the interviewees, and in the case of personal interviews, especially is essential to establish. Moreover, as researcher, I was committed to:

1) Avoid any misrepresentation and misinterpretation of evidence, findings or data.

---

31 The validity of the answers from the interviews is directly correlated with the quality of the interviewees. By 'quality', I mean the criteria that I defined in Chapter 3.4.1 as requirements that had to be met by the experts in order to be selected for an interview for the purposes of the research. In Chapter 3.4.3, one can find more details on the structure of the survey questionnaire in relation to the topics responding among others to the Research Questions.
2) Follow a transparent procedure by allowing other researchers to examine, understand and interpret the results. Certainly, such commitment is connected to the reliability and objectivity of the research.

In addition, I explained to the research participants (politicians, academicians and other experts) the nature, purpose, aims and the duration of the research project. I had also respected the confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants and the information they provided. For the purposes of this research, I conducted interviews with people who wished to speak off the record. During the discussion with these particular interviewees, notes were taken, allowing me to preserve the anonymity of these interviewees and maintain ethical confidentiality.

Last but not least, the requirements of ethical considerations are related to the credibility, the variability and the validity of the researcher and of the University of Middlesex.

3.7 My Role as a Worker/ Insider Researcher

Although my research is a project related to political affairs, I have not felt any external negative influence from any politicians or even my employer in performing my work or concluding my research. On the contrary, while discussing the subject of this research with politicians and especially with several MEPs, I saw that they considered it an interesting and important topic. Indeed, both Turkish accession to the EU and the cohesion of the EU are sensitive issues of wide concern across the European political scene.

At the same time, I had to undertake the role of an insider researcher. I was aware of the risks of this role, and I tried to foresee and eliminate any possible conflicts of interest that could result from this dual role. On the one hand, my role as a worker complements my role as a researcher, and vice versa. On the other hand, it does

---

32 For the Questionnaire, see Appendix 2

Ioannis Charalambides
present potential conflicts of interest. As the main consultant of an MEP, I participate in shaping decision-making. Thus, objectivity is a challenge, due to the fact that I am part of the whole. It was difficult to keep myself at a distance, and I always ran the risk of losing my impartiality (Hockey 1993; Senge 1998). Therefore, I needed self discipline. A discipline that I gradually but satisfactorily acquired throughout my years of working as journalist. As a journalist I was trained to avoid subjectivity, and to become, instead, as objective as possible. I faced the same risks as the insider researcher. 'I was part of the game,' and as a result I had to make sure not to report my personal beliefs and emotions at the cost of objectivity. As a researcher, I face the same tasks of viewing information from the stance of an impartial observer - or at least, of trying to do so. According to Bell, objectivity is an "impossible goal" (Bell 1993); however, the researcher must nonetheless strive to obtain it.

3.8 Research Limitations

In the context of implementing the methodological framework of the current project, I have faced some difficulties resulting from the peculiar character of the project. These difficulties were especially related to the interviews and the survey. Regarding the interviews, some interviewees, due to their status diplomats and military attachés, only accepted to be interviewed 'off-the-record'. With regard to the survey, the population chosen belongs to a very politically sensitive and close society - the 172 MEPs who comprise the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament. It should be noted that a number of MEPs were unwilling to fill out the questionnaire although they found it challenging, interesting and important. Turkish accession to the EU is a very complicated and delicate issue, and a number of MEPs were worried about freely expressing their views and opinions on this subject. Two facts encouraged the reluctant MEPs to answer the questionnaire. First, the questionnaires would be anonymous. Second, filling in the 'personal data' part of the questionnaire was not compulsory.
CHAPTER 4
Evaluation of the Turkish political system
and the Turkish accession to the EU

4.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe and evaluate the Turkish political system and Turkish accession to the EU through official documents, interviews, polls, archives, political statements and positions and thereby to determine independent, dependent and intermediate variables affecting the cohesion of the EU (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26-27; Chapter 3.2.1, footnote 21, p. 36) An understanding of these factors and variables is indispensable to the construction of a model of EU cohesion in the context of Turkish accession to the EU. For the purpose of this research, Turkey is, by definition, a point of reference. The problems of the Turkish political system compel the EU to set out requirements and obligations that Turkey should implement in order to join the EU. Otherwise, the EU will face severe problems of cohesion at Turkey’s accession. Such requirements are not set out for Turkey only. It is the normal, technical, legal and political procedure that the EU adopts with candidate states in order to assure their smooth and without any serious problem integration. Certainly, the accession procedure is formed and developed by taking into account the peculiarities of each candidate state. For this reason, EU evaluation of Turkish accession must be considered in relation to the existing situation in Turkey. In particular, I examine the economic, social, political and cultural problems Turkey faces within the framework of its existing political system. It is a political system based on the six principles of Kemalism (see Chapter 4.5).

Through the examination of the Turkish political system, my main aim is to find out: 1) factors - variables, which affect and maintain the Turkish political system in cohesion and those, which may create structural economic, social, political and institutional problems; 2) which of these factors -variables can threaten the cohesion of the EU and why.
The evaluation of the Turkish political system is carried out on the basis of the European Commission's monthly and yearly reports on Turkey's progress towards the EU as well as through other books, surveys and essays. By examining this data, I can identify variables, which affect both Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion. As it has been already explained in Chapter 3, what I am trying to do is identify a list of variables upon which a model of EU cohesion can be established.

The first stage of this methodological procedure is Chapter 2, in which theories of International Relations are analysed and various terms related to EU cohesion are defined. Chapter 4 is the second stage. In this Chapter, there is a presentation of data in rational order, responding to the arguments of the research in an effort to draw a first set of variables through a qualitative methodological approach. Each section of Chapter 4 is related, for example, to the political, social, economic, institutional and military aspect of Turkey's accession to the EU in relation to EU cohesion. The third stage is Chapter 5 in which the findings of the survey are analysed and the last stage is Chapter 6. In the framework of Chapter 6, I define and present a list of variables stemming from Chapters 4 and 5, upon which a model of EU cohesion can be based.

In determining these variables, I address the following issues:

- Euro-Turkish relations
- The various European streams of political thought
- The stance of European citizens
- The Turkish Republic and the principles of Ataturk
- The Turkish political system and the EU
- The Turkish economic background
- The EU evaluation of Turkish candidacy
- Black holes
- Cohesion policy, Turkey and the EU
- Lion’s share
- The Turkish Army
- The role of the army in the economic system
- The black box, the army and the AKP
- The Delphic sword
- The beacon of modern Islam
- Risks and human rights
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\textsuperscript{33} includes the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. Established in 1999 at the Cologne European Council, the ESDP aims to allow the Union to develop its civilian and military capacities for crisis management and conflict prevention at international level thus helping to maintain peace and international security, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. (http://dictionary/babylon.com/esdp) (see also: www.consilium.europa.eu)

4.2 Euro – Turkish Relations

Euro-Turkish relations date back to July 1959, shortly after the Europeans set the foundation stone of the European Economic Community (EEC) by signing the Treaty of Rome. In July 1959, Turkey submitted its first application to join the EU. The EEC, responding to the Turkish request, proposed the establishment of an association with Turkey until such time as the maturation of Turkey’s political context would permit Turkish accession to the EU. After a turbulent Turkish course towards the EU, at the Helsinki Summit on the December 10, 1999 the European Union recognised Turkey as a candidate state (Council of the European Union 1999; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey 2007).

The Turkish policy of seeking EU accession continued, and on October 3, 2005 the EU took the historical decision to give the green light to Turkish aspirations (Council of the European Union 2005d). In conjunction with other relevant decisions, the European Council decided to open Turkish accession negotiations with the European Union. It also enacted other decisions defining the legal and political context of Turkish accession to the EU, such as the 'Negotiating Framework' (Council of the European Union 2005c) and the 'Accession Partnership' (Commission of the European Communities 2005). The EU also enacted further decisions outlining the
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

legal and political procedure Turkey should follow in order to comply with the criteria set out by the EU on its path toward becoming a full-member state of the EU. In particular, the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of September 21, 2005 defines some obligations for Turkey concerning the Cyprus issue:

- Turkey should lift the embargo it imposes on vessels and aircrafts that bear the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, and/ or that have sailed from ports or taken off from airports which are under the control of the Republic of Cyprus.
- Turkey should normalise its relations with all member states of the EU.
- In this context, Turkey should recognise the Republic of Cyprus. In this regard, the Declaration makes clear that the EU "recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law" (Council of the European Union 2005a, p.2 ; Brok 2005, pp.4-5; see also Appendix 4 :Declaration of 21st of September)

Furthermore, every step of the Turkish accession process is subjected to EU evaluation and is scrutinized in the reports issued by the European Commission and the European Parliament (Commission of the European Communities 2004; Eurlings 2004; Brok 2006).

The decisions of the EU on October 3, 2005 regarding the opening of the accession negotiations with Turkey created strong EU political and legal commitments. However, the Turkish candidacy is, by definition, a big challenge. In fact, it falls under the umbrella of wider strategic, political and economic issues concerning the process of the shaping and functioning of European identity. That is, it is related to the future of the EU. At the same time, the peculiarity of the Turkish candidacy, resulting from its Muslim religious identity, its large size, the role of its army within the political system, and its economic, social and institutional problems, all generate great concern in the EU. These problems are of high importance because they are connected to the way the Institutions of the EU will function in the future within an enlarged EU.
Turkish accession to the EU is causally related to the capacity of the EU to absorb new member states. Internal economic and social problems within the EU, as well as enhanced competitiveness in the context of globalisation, have obliged member states and the EU as such to think twice about Enlargements. The political position formulated within EU Institutions is the following: Europe should take concrete steps towards regional integration by avoiding wrong decisions.

4.3 European Streams of Thought

Turkish accession to the EU attracts the interest of European citizens and politicians. Various political positions have been already formulated and reflected in the political wording of political groups acting within the EU and its member-states. These various opinions have been delivered on the level of the European Council and the European Parliament by various political groups, thereby designing a political map of Turkish accession to the EU. At the same time, similar statements have been made on a national level. Three main streams of thought prevail on the European political scene.

The first stream of thought is put forward by the Socialists, the Liberals and the Greens. All three parties articulate that if Turkey meets all criteria set out by the EU at the end of the negotiations, then Turkey must join the EU as full member-state. MEP Wiersma, Vice-Chairman of the Socialist Group, delivering a speech at the Plenary Session of the European parliament on behalf of his political group, described the political stance of the Socialists on Turkish accession to the EU in the following way:

_Turkey’s integration in Europe will be a crucial step and a symbolic one. In this respect, the EU should not, in principle, behave like a closed club, but should open itself up to a country that is guided by European standards._

---

34 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Debate on Brok’s report on the ‘Commission’s 2005 Enlargement strategy paper’, 28 November 2005. There was a huge discussion on Brok’s report where the Socialists, the Liberals and the Greens alleged that there was a paragraph within the report clearly supporting the possibility of a privileged regime for Turkey instead of full membership. Therefore, they called for a compromise amendment in order to change the vocabulary of the disputable article otherwise, they would vote against the Report as a whole. This problem led to the postponement of the voting on the level of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for more than one month, until the parties agreed to a compromise formula (Brok 2005, Paragraph 10, p.2).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

In the past, our group has emphasised four aspects. First of all, the negotiations are about EU membership. We reject any other formula that has a different goal in mind. Secondly – and everyone should realise this – the negotiations will be protracted. Thirdly, given that the negotiations will take such a long time and so much needs to be done, the opening of the negotiations does not, of course, guarantee a successful outcome from the outset. Actual accession will eventually depend on the progress of the reforms and the developments in Turkey itself (Wiersma 2004).

The second stream of thought is expressed by the 'Union for Europe of Nations' Group of the European Parliament and other politicians from various political parties, who state that there is no place for Turkey in the EU. The arguments provided by the supporters of this position are based on the following parameters: 1) Geography 2) Culture 3) Religion 4) Economic cost 5) System of values. The Vice-Chairman of the 'Union for Europe of Nations' Group, MEP Mogens Camre, stated officially during the European Parliament Plenary Session:

Mr President, the citizens of Europe do not welcome Turkey to the EU. If this Parliament votes for the opening of the negotiations, it will be acting against the wishes of the citizens who voted us into this House. The citizens of the EU do not want to see a non-European country and a non-European culture in the EU. Our citizens do not want the Koran to have any influence on European democracy. They do not want to pay for the development of Turkey.

The politicians who would like Turkey to enter say that Turkey must take on all of our values. They do not know what they are asking for. You cannot take the culture out of a people. We believe our culture is unique. We are building the EU upon it. But the Turks think their culture is the best and they demand space for it in Europe. They tried that for a thousand years. We rejected it, but now some politicians will open the door that can destroy the EU. They underestimate Islam; they underestimate the demographic and economic effect of a country in which the religion is not only a religion, but also decides the politics (Camre 2005)

The third stream of thought is mainly expressed by Christian Democrats – the European People’s Party (EPP) and European Democrats (ED). The vast majority of its members, both in the European Parliament and at the level of national governments, maintain that the maximum that Turkey can achieve at the end of its negotiations with the EU is the status of ‘privileged partnership,' not of full membership (Toubon, Tannock, Posselt 2004). This political attitude upholds the view that even if Turkey meets the criteria set out by the EU, it should not join as a full member state. Besides, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council

---

35 The EPP-ED preparatory meeting took place on 4/12/2004 before the voting of the Report at the Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 30, 2004, when key politicians of the EPP group, such as Mr. Toubon, Mr. Tannock, and Mr. Posselt, strongly resisted the Turkish accession to the EU. The majority of the EPP-ED party does not support Turkey’s full membership to the EU, but rather supports the status of ‘privileged partnership.'
meeting, held on December 16-17, 2004, opened the door to a 'third road', by which Turkey could get a 'privileged partnership' instead of becoming full member. In paragraph 23 of the conclusions, the following is stated:

*These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the candidate State is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond* (Council of the European Union 2004, p. 7).

An indicative sample of what the EPP-ED believes regarding Turkish accession to the EU is reflected in the following statement by the President of the European Parliament, Hans Gert Poettering. In February 2006, when Mr Poettering was the leader of the EPP-ED group, he stated:

*Now Europe faces a crucial decision: Do we want not just an economic Union, or a Union enlarged merely for reasons of security, but a political Union with its own European Constitution? If so, we must weigh up these issues when considering further Enlargements. If, for example, Turkey were to join the EU, not only would the character of the Union change fundamentally, it would also soon be geographically, politically, culturally and financially overburdened. The borders of the Community would shift and other applications for membership would follow. In particular, Turkish accession would “over-stretch” the Community, and might mean losing the common factors which unite Europeans, the power which creates identity.*

*Turkey and other – European – countries might be offered a ‘privileged partnership’ as an alternative to membership, to promote their democratic stability and economic development. This assumes that the Union has a real capability to give financial and technical assistance to ensure internal security and the modernisation of the whole continent. For example, in the common interest, we must promote the major transport and energy networks and work together to combat terrorism, crime and illegal immigration* (Poettering in Group of the EPP-ED 2006, pp.14-15).

Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, has already put his own stamp on this political discourse by making clear, during the electoral campaign of 2007, that he is against Turkish accession to the EU as full member-state. According to his position, there is no place for Turkey in the EU as full member-state because, geographically, it does not belong to Europe. In June 18, 2007 just before the European Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the French Foreign Minister, François Fillon, stated that in the Intergovernmental Conference to be held on June 26, 2007 Turkey should open only two instead of three accession chapters. The French political position can be summarized as the following: We can not give the green light to Chapter 17 on the Single European Currency (SEC), because should we accept the opening of this chapter, we run the risk of prejudging the final outcome of the Turkish negotiations with the EU and of Turkey becoming full member. Nicolas Sarkozy openly supported the position that Turkey should only receive the status of a 'privileged partnership'.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

The French government also grounded its political attitude on the decision of December 16, 2004 issued by the Council of the EU. This decision provided that negotiations with Turkey are open ended, and that if the outcome is not positive, then the EU must find other ways to anchor Turkey to the EU (Council of the European Union 2004, p.7).

Sarkozy was punctual in his rendezvous. On June 26, 2007 the Intergovernmental Conference approved only two of the three chapters proposed by the European Commission. The French government had the full support of Germany and of Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the same time, Sarkozy offered full support to Chancellor Merkel on the issue of the Reform Treaty (Council of the EU 2007). Moreover, it was considered a matter of common sense within Turkey that neither Sarkozy nor Merkel had any intention of offering Turkey full EU membership (Birand 2008). From this perspective, Turkish accession to the EU seemed to fall victim to the leading EU countries’ national interest.

However, Turkish accession to the EU could also fail for other reasons: a) If Turkey does not complete required reforms and Ankara does not comply with its obligations by fully implementing the acquis communautaire, b) if Turkey falls victim to internal political power games between Kemalists and Islamists or c) if Turkey encounters unpredictable developments which might negatively affect its process of accession to the EU before it concludes the reforms and complies with its legal, political, social and economic obligations.

While EPP-ED’s political position does not, in fact, fully correspond to the opinion that there is no place for Turkey in the EU, one may allege that it implies it. This position also describes the existing problems of Turkish accession to the EU and the issue concerning EU cohesion within the context of power struggle and the future cultural, political and economic identity of Europe (Morgenthau 1978). In short, the cohesion of the EU is not restricted by the framework of the EU Cohesion policy, which aims at reducing economic and social disparities and the gap between the development levels of the various regions of the member states of the EU (Crozet & Koenig 2004; Cuadrado et all 2004). By definition, Euro-Turkish relations come
under the procedure of EU Enlargement and are also closely related to the cohesion of the EU and its capacity to absorb new member states.

4.4 The Stance of European Citizens

Beyond the position of European political parties and politicians, one must also take into account the political beliefs of European citizens, as reflected in various ‘Eurobarometers’. It is interesting to see how these positions are revealed through the Eurobarometer of 2006 (European Commission) with questions such as the following: 1) Are you in favour of or against Turkish accession to the EU? 2) Once Turkey has met the Copenhagen criteria, would you like to see it in the EU or not?

According to the results of the Special Eurobarometer 255 (European Commission 2006):

- In the EU of 15 member-states, 38% were in favour of and 49% against Turkish accession to the EU.
- In the EU of 25 member-states, 39% were in favour of and 48% against Turkish accession to the EU.
- In the EU of 27 member-states, 39.9% were in favour of and 46.1% against Turkish accession to the EU.

The analysis of the above data mentions that:

"The Turkish Cypriot Community (67%) is most in favour of Turkey’s joining the EU, even more than Turkey itself (54%). The strongest opposition of the accession of Turkey can be observed in Austria (81%), Germany (69%) and in Luxemburg (69%). Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%) are also fairly against Turkey’s membership in the European Union, even though they support the accession of countries in general (European Commission 2006 p. 71)."
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

**Figure 1**

![Graph showing the progression of European citizen attitudes to Turkish accession to the EU over a period of years.](image)

*Note: Eurobarometer does not ask about Turkish accession in all its surveys. Source: Standard Eurobarometer, cited in Zaubauer, see footnote 1.*

(Barysch 2007, p. 2)

*In the above graph, one can observe the progression of European citizen attitudes to Turkish accession to the EU over a period of years.*

**Figure 2**

![Bar graph showing opposition to Turkish accession among EU-25 and EU-15 countries.](image)

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer No 66, December 2006.

(Barysch 2007, p.3)

*The above graph demonstrates the percentage of the EU-25 and EU-15 who are opposed to Turkish accession to the EU.*

Regarding this point, I note that the aforementioned countries are not randomly opposed to Turkish accession to the EU. Greek Cypriots have been under Turkish military occupation since 1974; Greece has an open dispute with Turkey over the
Aegean; and Austrians carry the historical burden of the ‘syndrome of Vienna’\textsuperscript{36} (Barysch 2007, p.4). In addition, Germany faces the problem of about 2.1 million Turkish immigrants (Flam 2004, p.179). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots by definition would like to see Turkey in the EU. Of course, Turkish Cypriot accession to the EU in the framework of a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus issue could be achieved earlier than that of Turkey.

\textsuperscript{36} Some Austrians still refer to the historical memory of Ottoman Armies laying siege to Vienna; however, most seem to have more contemporary concerns. Certainly, beyond the psychological resentment the Austrians have against Turkey, other reasons exist to encourage them not to support Turkey’s succession to the EU: such as cultural differences and the difficulty of integrating 200,000 Turkish immigrants into Austrian society (Barysch 2007, p. 4).
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>In favour</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU25</td>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 AC</td>
<td></td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td></td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td></td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY (TCC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td></td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(European Commission 2006a, p. 71)

This table demonstrates the positions of the member states andcandidate states of the EU on Turkish accession to the EU.
The above graph is important in showing what European citizens believe about Turkish accession to the EU as full member-state, in the event that Turkey implements the reforms package. One can observe that the citizens of a group of leading countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, do not support the full membership of Turkey to the EU even if it concludes and implements the reforms required by the EU.

(Barysch 2007, p. 7)
Katinka Barysch (2007) and other researchers and journalists explain in detail the reasons why European citizens oppose Turkey's accession to the EU:

1) Lack of positive political leadership in support of Turkish accession to the EU (Barysch 2007, p.1). MEP Lagendijk (2007) also supported the idea that European politicians and the media should convince the majority of the European people “that the Turkish accession to the EU is a good thing”.

2) Negative stereotypes of and prejudice against Turkey. As Paul Taylor, Reuters European Affairs Editor, maintains:

   On television, Turkey means minarets, headscarves and the Bosphorus bridge... in the newspaper, a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population, gets edited down to a Muslim country (Barysch 2007, p. 1).

Similarly, the Chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Joost Lagendijk (2007) stated the following:
Most people believe that Muslims are fundamentalists. So when terrorists attack in Iraq, people think that these people are Muslims. People in Turkey are also Muslims and (thereby) we have to get them out or keep them out (from the European Union). It is an impression that being Muslim is a problem. And because we have already 18 million Muslims in the EU, this is indeed, a problem. It is an irrational fear based on culture and religion. But that is the way it is (Appendix 2).

3) Perceived connections between Turkish accession and social and economic problems, such as loss of jobs, threats of terrorism, weakening of national culture (Barysch 2007, p. 2). Turkey is a Muslim country, and its accession to the EU raises issues related to European cultural identity and value systems. The question posed is whether Turkey will adapt to the European system of values, or whether Europeans will accept Turkey's cultural differentiation. Can the Muslim cultural and religious value system coexist with Christianity and the other western systems of values which dominate the existing European identity? By definition, if Turkey joins the EU as full member state, then we will not only have a new Turkey, but also a new Europe (Quaisser & Wood, 2004 p.1). As Joost Lagendijk (2007) stated:

*In my country and I think in many European countries, the European citizens are afraid of Turkey because it is a Muslim country. Can we fit them in? The Europeans have their doubts. There are many negative things in their minds. They consider that Islam in Turkey is something like the Islam in Saudi Arabia, in Iran or in Northern Africa. This is a matter that we should discuss because if you do not make a difference between the Islam in Turkey and the Islam in other countries you are into problems.*

4) The potential of a huge wave of Turkish immigrants to other EU states, upon achievement of full-member status. (Lenski in Group of the EPP-ED 2004, p.3; Flam 2004, pp.179-186). The high growth of population in Turkey does not correspond to the creation of new jobs. The estimate is that an initial wave of about 4 million Turkish immigrants will flow towards Europe shortly after accession. By definition, the phenomenon of emigration is closely related to social, cultural and economic problems (Quaisser and Wood 2004, p.29). According to Joost Lagendijk (2007):

*There is the fear that after accession, millions of Turks will come to the Netherlands and Germany to get a job. Nobody can predict what will happen, we are talking about 2025 or after, but still some people have fears about that. I still think that within the EU more than 25% of the people and also of the politicians who are against immigration, Islam and for other reasons, 25% who is in favour and 50% who is in between. When they are optimists as it happened in 2004 they say let's do it. When they are sceptical, they say do not do it. The proportion of 50% is open to arguments and sometimes say yes sometimes say no. But Islam and immigration are fears that will be with us for long - long time. These are the basic things they are afraid of.*

5) The risk of upsetting the balance of power in an enlarged Union with Turkey as a full member-state. As Nicolas Véron (cited in Barysch 2007) supports the balance of
power and cultural differences are important issues related to Turkish accession to the EU. As he maintains:

Many French people already worry that their country’s central role in the EU has been weakened by successive Enlargements. For them, Turkey is a step too far. By the time Turkey is ready for EU membership, it could be the biggest country in Europe, with 80-90 million people. French politicians ask whether Turkey as an EU member would behave more like Germany (indebted to the European cause and instinctively pro-integrationist) or the UK (often eurosceptic and fiercely protective of its national sovereignty). Of course, France itself is a large country with an ambiguous stance to pooling sovereignty. But it would not want another large eurosceptic country in the EU (p.4)

This position may be encompassed in the following statement: Some of the leading European countries are not ready to share their power with Turkey.

6) The unresolved Cyprus issue. The importance of this issue is shown in the decision of December 14-15, 2006, when the European Council froze eight accession chapters relevant to the Turkish obligations towards Cyprus. These obligations stem from the Additional Protocol and the EU Declaration of the 21st September 2005 (Council of the European Union 2007).

7) The belief that Turkey has no place within the EU because it is a state a) with no European identity and which b) does not geographically belong to Europe. As MEPs Tannock and Toubon stated during the EPP-ED preparatory meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 9, 2004, if the EU accepts Turkey as a full member state, how can it exclude Morocco, for example, or other African or Asian countries, such as Kazakhstan or even Russia, from becoming full member-states? In other words, where is the red line separating those countries eligible for candidacy to the EU from those who are ineligible? Is the geographical position of a state one of the criteria for full membership (Poettering cited in Group of EPP-ED 2006, pp. 9-16; Tannock 2006, Toubon 2006)?

8) The fear that Turkey may play the role of a “Trojan horse” on behalf of the US within the EU, creating problems in the EU Institutions. In this context, it seems that some European leaders and public opinion leaders are not ready to share their European power -whatever this power means- with Turkey (Laçiner, Özcan & Bal 2005, p. 71, Kalin 2005, p. 17).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Of course, every coin has two sides. There is also another perspective on Turkish accession to the EU. Those who favour accession provide the following rationales for Turkey's inclusion in the EU:

1) Turkey's important geo-strategic position (Kalin & Gerras 2005, pp. 5-6). Turkey is a country situated in the heart of Eurasia, and its location points toward its crucial role within the context of a contemporary oil route. Turkey wishes to reveal itself as key player by restoring the historical silk-route (Aras 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2008d).

2) Turkey's importance to a stronger EU foreign policy. Turkey is a member of NATO and has the second largest army in the North Atlantic Alliance. As such it would play a key role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the most complicated pillar of European integration (Kalin & Gerras 2005; Barysch 2007).

3) Energy and security sectors are causally related to the geo-strategic Turkish importance, and Ankara's desired role as a regional power (Kalin & Gerras 2005, pp. 6-9, Barysch 2007a, Aras 2002, pp.7-15).

4) Turkey's ability to contribute a new, young labour force to an EU suffering from population ageing (Kalin & Gerras 2005 pp. 9-11; Barysch 2007, p. 2).

Table 2
Labour market statistics (in thousand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October 2006</th>
<th>September 2007</th>
<th>October 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>72,879</td>
<td>73,719</td>
<td>73,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population aged 15 and above</td>
<td>51,922</td>
<td>52,709</td>
<td>52,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force</td>
<td>25,148</td>
<td>25,766</td>
<td>25,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>22,805</td>
<td>23,361</td>
<td>22,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>2,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in workforce</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women participation rate</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Turkstat in European Commission 2008, p. 35)
Turkstat\textsuperscript{37} as cited in European Commission's, ‘Turkey Monthly Pre-Accession Report’ (2008, p. 35):

... The population of Turkey is 70,586,256 as of December 31, 2007. This figure is only 2.8 million higher than the latest population figure recorded in 2000 census (67,803,927). The male population is 35,376,533 and the female population is 35,209,723. 70.5% of the people are living in cities (in provincial and district centres). The number of people living in Istanbul is 12.6 million (17.8% of total). The other most populated provinces are Ankara with 4.5 million (6.3%), Izmir with 3.7 million (5.3%), Bursa with 2.4 million (3.5%) and Adana with 2 million (2.8%), respectively. The median age of the population in Turkey is 28.3, i.e. half of the population is below age 28.3. Turkey's population density is 92 persons per square kilometre. Istanbul has the highest population density (2,420 persons/km\textsuperscript{2}), while Tunceli has the lowest density (11 persons/km\textsuperscript{2}).

5) The fact that the EU is not a Christian Club, which implies that Turkey should have the same opportunity as other states to acquire the place it merits in the EU (Erdogan cited in EurActiv 2006, Lagendijk 2007).

6) Long-term future economic benefits for the EU (Kalin & Gerras 2005, p. 8). Turkey, because of its size, is considered both a large goods market for the EU and a cheap labour market, one which offers investors the possibility of establishing new enterprises in a location where costs can be minimized and benefits maximized (Flam 2004, pp.190-206).

At this point, it would be interesting to examine relations and perspectives between the EU and Turkey on the level of trade balance. Analysing the official statistical data issued by the Directorate General TRADE of the European Commission (2006b) for the years 2002 to 2006 I note that in real numbers, the average of Turkey's exports to the EU in the period 2002-2006 totalled 27.374 million euros per year. On the other hand, the average of the EU's exports to Turkey for the same period totalled 36.248 million euros per year. Taking into account the sizes of the two economies I note that:

- Within these five years Turkey exported to the EU an average of 53, 6% of its total exports (see Figures 6 - Turkey, Trade with the EU).
- Within these five years, the EU exported to Turkey an average of 3, 6% of its total exports (see Figures 5 - EU Trade with Turkey).

\textsuperscript{37} Turkstat: Turkish Statistical Institute
At the same time, in real numbers, Turkey's imports from the EU during the period 2002 - 2006 totaled an average of 34.86 million euros per year. This amount corresponds to 45.3% of the total Turkish imports from the EU. Moreover, Turkish global imports for this period averaged 78.36 million euros per year. Therefore, Turkish imports from the EU correspond to an average of 44.4% of the total Turkish import from the world.

On the other hand, in real numbers the average of EU's imports from Turkey is 30.51 million euros per year. This amount corresponds to 2.78% of total EU imports from Turkey per year. The average EU trade with the world for this period totals 1.089.481 billion euros per year. Therefore, the average of EU imports from Turkey corresponds to an average of 2.8% of total EU imports from the world.
Within the period 2002-2006, the average of the trade balance of Turkey in relation to the EU was –7.495 million euros per year. In contrast, the average of the trade balance of the EU was 5.740 million euros per year. Taking into account the fact that in real numbers, within these five years Turkey’s exports to the EU averaged 27.374 million euros per year while EU exports to Turkey averaged 36.247 million euros per year, we may conclude that the EU is the main importer of Turkish products. This fact cannot, however, lead to the conclusion that Turkey is the main market for EU interests. Rather, the main market for EU interests is that of the US. Indeed, in 2006 the EU exported to the US 23% of total European exports. In real numbers, this equals 267.895 million euros.

At the same time, taking into account data issued by the European Commission, I note that:

- The main market for Turkey's interests (exports) is that of the EU. In 2006, Turkey's exports to the EU arrived at 51.7%. In real numbers, that means 34.865 million euros. The EU is also Turkey's major trade partner. In 2006, Turkey's trade exports to the EU reached 44.4% of the global Turkish trade exports- in real numbers, 77.647 million euros. On the other hand, in 2006, Turkey was the seventh market for EU interests. EU exports to Turkey were 2.9% - in real numbers, 38.538 million euros. In 2006, the EU trade exports to Turkey totalled 3.4%. Or, in real numbers, 84.995 million euros.

- The Turkish economy depends on exports to the EU. Indeed, during the period 2002-2006 an average of 53.6% of total Turkish trade exports were absorbed by the EU per year. That is, a large part of the Turkish economy survives due to its exports to the EU.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Tables 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The major imports partners</th>
<th>The major export partners</th>
<th>The major trade partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partners</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mio euro</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>1.350.494</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  China</td>
<td>191.769</td>
<td>14,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  USA</td>
<td>176.514</td>
<td>13,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Russia</td>
<td>137.022</td>
<td>10,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Norway</td>
<td>79.061</td>
<td>5,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Japan</td>
<td>76.483</td>
<td>5,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Switzerland</td>
<td>70.898</td>
<td>5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Turkey</td>
<td>38.538</td>
<td>2,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Korea</td>
<td>38.334</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Brazil</td>
<td>26.280</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Taiwan</td>
<td>26.127</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Libya</td>
<td>25.763</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Algería</td>
<td>23.970</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>23.511</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 India</td>
<td>22.361</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Canada</td>
<td>19.565</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Singapore</td>
<td>19.398</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 South Africa</td>
<td>18.431</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Malaysia</td>
<td>17.699</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Romania</td>
<td>17.639</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 WA_AO</td>
<td>16.581</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(European Commission 2007e, p. 3)
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Tables 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>107.507</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>42.782</td>
<td>39,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>13.864</td>
<td>12,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7.581</td>
<td>7,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>4.694</td>
<td>4,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>4.463</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3.173</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>2.762</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.532</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.392</td>
<td>2,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.077</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1.819</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1.783</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1.447</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1.422</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.297</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.237</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>67.468</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>34.865</td>
<td>51,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3.988</td>
<td>5,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.561</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2.040</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1.857</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emir.</td>
<td>1.562</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Rep</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(TURKEY’S TRADE BALANCE WITH MAIN PARTNERS)

(European Commission 2007e, p. 4)
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Figures 6

**EVALUATION OF THE TURKEY’S TRADE BALANCE**

(Mio euro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Yearly % change</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Yearly % change</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Imports + Exports</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Yearly % change</th>
<th>EU Share of total imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Yearly % change</th>
<th>EU Share of total exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Imports + Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>53,998</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>57,883</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-16,075</td>
<td>91,862</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>25,924</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>48.05</td>
<td>20,586</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>54.34</td>
<td>5.508</td>
<td>46.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>60,432</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>55,350</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>-18,974</td>
<td>102,990</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>29,610</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>48.84</td>
<td>22,886</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>54.97</td>
<td>6.712</td>
<td>52.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>72,385</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>75,720</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>-23,335</td>
<td>127,815</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>36,520</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>47.35</td>
<td>27,655</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>54.73</td>
<td>8.865</td>
<td>64.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>79,469</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>89,994</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>-33,492</td>
<td>151,460</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39,510</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>53.23</td>
<td>30,866</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>52.32</td>
<td>8.864</td>
<td>70.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>107,507</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>67,468</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>-40,039</td>
<td>174,975</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>42,782</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>39.79</td>
<td>34,865</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>51.60</td>
<td>7.917</td>
<td>77.647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual growth</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>Average annual growth</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF (Dots)

(IMF in European Commission 2007e, p. 2)
4.5 Turkish Republic and the Principles of Ataturk

European opinion on the Turkish accession to the EU has been already analysed in Chapter 4 (see Chapters 4.3 and 4.4). For the purposes of this project it is also important to look at Turkey, and, more precisely at its political system and roots. No reference can be made to Turkey unless its political system and its institutional, economic and cultural identity are investigated. Such an investigation offers a methodological tool to ascertain what problems the country faces, what reforms must be completed and what structural changes must occur within Turkey so that it will be able to successfully conclude its accession negotiations with the EU.

The establishment of the new Turkish state in 1923, as a result of the victorious war against the Greeks in Minor Asia relied on the political ideology of Kemalism (Ahmad 1993, pp. 52-53). This political ideology was constitutionally reflected in the political system of Kemalism, a system geared toward the modernisation and westernisation of Turkey. Throughout the years Kemalism has been politically consolidated as the dominant practical model of Turkish governance. Its legal foundation is based on article 2 of the Turkish Constitution, which states: ‘The Turkish state is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist and Revolutionary – Reformist’ (Ahmad 1993, p. 63).

The six principles of the Kemalist political system are the following:

1) **Secularism**: Although the principle of secularism did not advocate atheism, the state’s civil forces distanced themselves from the various religious doctrines still existing in Turkey. Secularism stood as an anticleerical principle relying on rationalism and nationalism. It could not be turned against an enlightened Islam. However, it was opposed to an Islam based on extreme interpretation of the Koran-an Islam which holds the Turkish society down and renders it hostage to the past (Tocci 2001; Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62).

2) **Republicanism**: Kemalist reforms constitute in fact a political and ideological revolution upon which the new Turkish state can be based. These structural changes transformed the multinational Ottoman Empire into a ‘Turkish nation state’. This political process aimed at
creating a strong national consciousness and identity within the context of a modern Turkish state. In other words, Kemalism recognises a Republican political system able to incarnate the wishes and the destiny of the Turkish nation (Maynor 2003; Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62).

3) **Populism**: Kemalism represents itself as a revolution incorporating multiple dimensions. Since Kemalism aimed at bringing about profound and well-founded structural changes, these reforms were expected to spark social revolution. This aspect of Kemalist revolution developed from top to bottom. It was a revolution led by the elite, influenced and inspired by western societies. Its reforms focused on the integration of women in society and on the role they could play in the new Turkish political system. The cornerstone of these reforms was 1934 Legislation based on articles incorporated from the Swiss Civil Code, granting women the right to vote\(^\text{38}\) (Ahmad 1993, p.65; Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62).

4) **Reformism**: Kemalism promoted a related principle, which fell under the same framework of Ataturk's effort to establish a new political system and state: that of reformism. In the context of this emphasis on reform, Ataturk attempted to install new Institutions corresponding to the new political philosophy and practice of the state: the state whose duty was to maintain itself, tightly bound by modernisation (Killi, 1980, pp. 381-404, Sarris 1992, p. 63). In implementing his political intentions, for instance, Kemal Ataturk obliged Turkish males to remove the traditional fez and wear European headgear. Such a reform symbolised the new western political character of Turkey. Since then, Turkey has gradually taken further steps reaffirming its course towards Europe. Such steps are reflected in its adherence to NATO and its will to join the political Institutions, initially of the European Economic Community (EEC) and afterwards of the

---

\(^{38}\) The explanation and the spirit of this principle were described by its founding father, Moustafa Kemal, who flatly stated that populism constitutes a principle against class privileges and class distinctions. At the same time, populism recognised no individual, no family, no class and no organisation as being above others. This conception falls under the political efforts to create a common national consciousness. Such a national consciousness was reflected in the supreme value of Turkish citizenship. It was, in fact, a methodological way to escape from a multinational Ottoman Empire to the model of Kemalism, which will be sealed by the Turkish national identity and citizenship.
European Union (EU). This Turkish political approach brought about some reforms. However, these have not been sufficient to integrate Turkey into the club of European states. If they had been, there would be no need for Turkey to implement or abide by the legal, political and economic reformations required by the EU in order to successfully conclude its accession process towards the EU (Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62).

5) **Nationalism:** This indispensable principle of Kemalism aimed at maintaining the cohesion of the new Turkish state despite its multi-religious and multinational character. Atatürk attempted to present his nationalism as a mode of anti-imperialism which relied on the independence of the Turkish state. Nationalism was not only anti-imperialistic, it was also opposed to dynastic or class rule over Turkish society. Kemalist nationalism promotes the political and legal position that the Turkish state is indivisible. This indivisible character of the Turkish state focuses in particular on territory and population (Gellner 1983). The advocates of Kemalism asserted that Turkish nationalism was not turned against other religious, national groups or minorities living within the territory of the Turkish Republic. However, even if this was the genuine intention of Atatürk, in the current period this nationalism is used as methodological tool for discrimination against other national and religious minorities living in Turkey. A simple example may be found in article 301 of the Turkish penal code providing for penalties against those who insult Turkishness (Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62).

6) **Statism:** Kemal Atatürk wished to enhance the role of the state in the new political system. With this in mind, he supported the principle of statism (étatisme). Through this principle, he aimed at state regulation and control of the Turkish economy (Hamilton 1995; Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62). This principle functions upon the following levels:
   a) The state controls economic activity and is responsible for a healthy national economy.
   b) The state is involved in those areas of the private sector in which private enterprise is not active or in which it has been proven inadequate.
c) The state may be involved in the private sector, should such an action be required by national interest.

Therefore, 'statism' revealed the state as the owner of private industry and as the safeguarder of the economic national system (Sarris 1992, pp. 166-167; Ugur in Ugur & Canefe 2004, pp. 76-77).

Since the political system of Kemalism is presented as a model of stability and cohesion for the Turkish state, the question is whether the reforms required by the EU will bring changes leading to the decline or to the reinforcement of the system. That is, it is unclear whether the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Turkish political system will lead towards a new ‘velvet revolution’, one which will re-orientate the principles upon which a moderate Turkish political system can be based.

4.6 Turkish Political System and the European Union

I have already elaborated the principles upon which the Turkish political system is based. Kemalism was a system that brought structural changes to Turkish policy, society, culture and Institutions, while keeping a multi-national country in cohesion throughout the last eight decades (Sarris 1992, p. 58). However, whether this system can respond to the requirements of globalisation and the EU is an open question. Therefore, one must observe the existing political, economic, social and institutional situation in Turkey, in conjunction with the existing situation in the EU, in order to determine the problems of the Turkish system and to ascertain its potential impact on EU cohesion.

4.6.1 Turkish Economic Background

Since 1930, the Turkish political system has been based on ‘étatisme’ (devletçilik). The leaders of the state maintain control over the Turkish economy as they try to forge the Kemalist character of the Turkish political system. In this respect, they deploy national resources in the service of the main governmental aim, that of the
consolidation of the nation state. The phenomenon of ‘étatisme’ constituted part of a national policy aiming at the restoration of the then-new Turkish state. At the same time, state leaders had the political will to follow a European course (Ugur in Ugur & Canefe 2004, p. 77).

The phenomenon of ‘étatisme’ brought about three main consequences:

1) The leaders of the state controlled national resources. In particular, the Turkish establishment used the political and economic mechanism of ‘étatisme’ in order to obtain the highest electoral support for their efforts to impose a concrete Kemalist regime.

2) The phenomenon of ‘rent seeking’ flourished in Turkey. This phenomenon results from the need of the economic private sector to make a profit through participation in state’s development. The army guides the government in legislating rules, laws and regulations which help individuals, organisations, or firms to make money by manipulating the economic environment, rather than by making a profit through trade and the production of wealth (Tullock 2005). Certainly, this phenomenon is causally connected to corruption (Ugur in Ugur & Canefe 2004, pp. 77-79).

After Turkey signed the additional protocol with the European Economic Community in 1970, the philosophy, practice, and mode of functioning of the Turkish economy was expected to change. Turkey was intended to harmonise its economy with the Western European economies while the Cold War was still at its peak. However, the inflexibility of the Turkish political system caused problems to the Turkish economy. In particular, the phenomenon of galloping inflation obliged the government to take measures to save the economy. Therefore, the Turkish government took the two following measures:

1) devaluation of the Turkish lira
2) liberalisation of the economy.

These two measures led to the removal of the ceilings on interest rates and on the price of the goods within the public sector. Both of these measures proved important: they gave the Turkish economy an outlet from the crisis by stimulating foreign
demand for Turkish product and by boosting Turkish exports. At the same time, they facilitated the growth of the Turkish economy.

However, these reforms were insufficient for long-term economic stability. Should Turkey wish to avoid new crises and continue its course towards Europe it must undertake more comprehensive reforms (Ugur in Ugur & Canefe 2004, pp. 77-79). The measures taken during the crisis of 1970 were not part of a long-term strategy, and so they did not provide long-term resolution of the severe structural problems of the Turkish economy. Even now, 'statism' remains an economic and political practice, since the army is involved in the economic and commercial affairs of the state and controls the system both politically and economically. The army is shareholder in various companies and uses these in its dealings with political actors, as well as to influence public opinion. Through these dealings, the army attempts to maintain and protect the existing political system (see Chapter 4.8.1).

This situation still prevails within the Turkish political system, and is reflected in the various economic crises that have afflicted Turkey since the crisis of 1970. The crises that followed in 1981, in November 2000 and then in February 2002 did not erupt without reason. They appeared on the Turkish political and economic scene as the result of the 'structural problems' that the Turkish political system suffers from. These 'structural problems' include that of the banking system (European Commission 2007b). The Turkish lira depreciated almost by 50% overnight, just after the onset of the crisis and almost by 65% by October 2001. At the same time, the country encountered a severe problem of unemployment. The International Monetary Fund intervened by promoting an economic package, one which not only included 16 billion dollars in financial aid, but also provided for reformations within the private sector and the banking and monetary system.

As a result of these crises, the huge fiscal costs of bank restructuring and the deep recession:

a) public debt rose from 57% of GDP in 2000 to 95% of GDP in 2001.
b) unemployment rose to 7.7% in 1999 and to 10.3% in 2002 (Quaisser & Wood 2004, p.29).
4.6.2 The Evaluation of the EU

On October 3, 2005 Turkey was given the green light by the EU to open accession negotiations with Brussels. Turkey is under continuous evaluation by the European Commission. According to the Commission’s 2007 progress report (2007b, p.26) the current account deficit of Turkey increased from 6.1/3% of GDP in 2005 to 8% of GDP in 2006. In the first half of 2006, however, strong export activity contributed to a slight deficit reduction, to approximately 7% of GDP.

According to the 2006 Progress Report, in spite of high growth, few new jobs have been created in Turkey. Unemployment rates range between 8% and 10.3%. The skill mismatch between labour demand and supply and some labour market rigidities continue to hamper job creation. Unemployment is much higher among young people (around 18%) and is of a long-term nature for more than half of job-seekers. The employment rate fell slightly to 43% by mid 2006. The European Commission’s 2006 Progress Report (2006c) notes that: "The scale of unregistered employment continues to be of concern. It constitutes 50.1% of overall employment and 88.2% of employment in the agriculture sector" (p. 50).

A review of the European Commission’s Turkey 2007 Progress Report (2007b, p.26) shows that no serious progress has been made in the sector of unemployment. The report records only a slight growth in the sector of new jobs, an increase of 1.3% from 2006.

- According to the 2007 Progress Report (p. 27) the inflation for the second quarter of 2007 was 7.1% of the GDP, which is higher than the Turkish Central Bank’s year/target of 5%.

- According to the 2006 Progress Report (European Commission 2006c), the lira’s exchange rate against the Euro fell by 25% in May-June 2006, but significantly recovered in the following months. The Central Bank of Turkey has increased overnight borrowing and lending rates by 425 and 625 basis points respectively. Financial markets have recently been very volatile. (p.26)

- According to the 2007 Commission Report, "the general government gross debt fell markedly to 60.7% of GDP by the end of 2006 from 69.6% the year before" (2007b, p.28).
4.6.3 Black Holes

The Turkish goal of accession to the EU created a new impetus for changes within the Turkish political, economic and institutional scene. Upon initiating accession negotiations with the EU, Turkey simultaneously agreed to make profound structural changes. The implementation of these changes is vital, for the Turkish economy cannot stand on its own feet unless reforms are put in practice. However, modernising the Turkish economy is not an easy task. This is well understood by the Turkish government and by the Kemalists political establishment. Modernisation depends on the implementation of a package of structural changes.

As a result of these changes:

First, more concrete steps must be taken towards the transformation of the Turkish economy and productivity in the context of privatisation. According to the 2006 European Commission's report on Turkey (2006c):

> Privatisation receipts amounted to about 2.8% of GDP in 2005. Largest privatisations included the Turpas oil refinery and the steel an iron producer Erdemir. The privatisation of Turk Telekom has been finished. Delays on the privatisation in electricity distribution were incurred. Public ownership in the business sector downscaled to 5% excluding agriculture (p. 28).

With regard to the necessity of privatisation in transforming the Turkish economy, one must note the importance of reforms in the sector of the Competition Policy. The European Commission noted that some positive steps concerning anti-trust and mergers issues related to legislative alignment have been already taken in this sector (European Commission 2006c, p. 37). The Competition Authority is an active player in and has operational independence with the Government. Therefore, it can play a key role in controlling the mergers and business through anti-trust practices. At the same time, the Turkish economic system faces another problem: Although the European Commission notes its satisfaction with the operational action of the Competition Authority, the fact remains that the Turkish government has not yet proceeded with either

> the adoption of state aid legislation [or] the establishment of an operationally independent state aid and monitoring authority. The absence delays the adoption of implementing rules for competition under Custom Union Decision 1/95, and results in serious distortions of competition (European Commission 2006c p. 38).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

One year later, according to Commission's 2007 Progress Report, the role of the state as an active player in the market has been further reduced. At the same time, it noted that:

*Transparency in the corporate sector improved and accounting standards were upgraded although the new legislation has not yet been fully implemented. The absence of a transparent monitoring of state aid and of supporting policies to decrease distortions adversely affects competition and competitiveness in the economy. Public procurement policies continued to be undermined by the exceptions made to the regulatory framework* (European Commission 2007b, p. 31).

Moreover, the Commission stresses in its report that 'in 2005, 100,000 enterprises were established and more than 26,000 firms went bankrupt. These numbers were about 5% higher than in 2004" (2007b, p. 28). The Commission adds:

a) **Restrictions on foreign ownership still exist in the areas of civil aviation, maritime transport, road transport, ground-handling services, yachting, broadcasting, electricity, financial corporations, private employment offices, tourism, education and defence sectors** (European Commission 2006c, p. 28).

b) **Barriers to market exit have not been significantly reduced** (European Commission 2006c, p. 28).

**Second**, the agriculture sector has been reduced, while some other sectors have been developed. According to the 2006 Progress Report:

*The share of agriculture in employment decreased markedly during 2005, from 33% to 26% of total employment. This trend continued in 2006. At the same time jobs were created in industrial sector (including construction) and its share in the total labour force rose from 18% to 26% in 2005. However, job creation in industry and services was not strong enough to fully compensate for the reduction in agricultural employment. The share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 11.7% to 10.7%. Industry gained in importance, increasing from 29% of GDP to 31.2%. Services remained stable at around 58% of GDP. In summary, the process of structural transformation of the economy accelerates* (2006c, p. 29).

**Third**, the situation of the small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) was slightly improved in 2007 according to European Commission Report (2007b).

*SMEs in Turkey account for 99% of total enterprises and 80% of total employment. However, SME ratios for capital investment (38% of the total), value added (26%), exports (10%) and bank credit (5%) point at low labour productivity, insufficient access to finance and barriers to enter foreign markets* (p. 31)

---

39 Transparency is also a political, economic, social and judicial phenomenon which is strictly connected to that of corruption. It is a crucial issue that Turkey should face in order to harmonise its legal, political, social and economic system with that of the EU.
Hereupon, I must note that the Turkish economy depends on external loans, especially from the IMF (International Monetary Fund 2007; SETimes.com 2006; BBC News 2002). After discussions with the Turkish Authorities, the IMF made some proposals that must be implemented by Turkey in order to establish a reliable market and attract foreign investors who seek to function in a secure environment. These proposals included:

- **a)** continued fiscal and monetary discipline to secure low inflation and lessen vulnerabilities, especially from the still high public debt
- **b)** supply-side structural reforms to bolster productivity and increase employment and investment.

Successful implementation of these policies could raise potential growth well above 5 percent. Stronger growth, in turn, would reduce susceptibility to external shocks by improving the economy’s ability to sustain current account deficits and by tilting external financing toward more stable sources, such as foreign direct investment. (International Monetary Fund 2007)

On the other hand, I must assess the Turkish economic future in relation to that of the EU. As Katircioglu states (in LaGro & Jorgensen 2007) "globalisation needs a well-developed local economic environment" and he comes to the conclusion that Turkey must proceed with more structural changes for the functioning market economy is not yet complete (p. 114 -115). In addition, Professor Erol Katircioglu (2007) of Istanbul Bilgi University, in the context of an interview conducted for the purposes of this research, stated:

> The reforms implemented as part of ‘the structural adjustment programme’ being carried out in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank after the economic crisis of 2001, and those implemented as requirements of the accession process for the EU, have led Turkey to come closer to global world. However, problems of development have still not been solved despite these steps being taken and reforms being implemented.

As Professor Katricioglou (2007) also maintained:

> Turkey will not be able to sustain an economic growth of 5% every year whereas the EU will achieve paces of economic growth of more than 2% annually. However, Turkish economy will need almost forty years to catch up with the EU economy and the welfare level of its member-states.

---

40 This political instability, which has already been analysed in Chapter 4.4, has been recorded throughout the last five decades in Turkey. The last political crisis occurred in 2007 during the Parliamentary and Presidential elections.
Furthermore, Katircioglu provides a model of development for his country. This model, he says, is necessary to solve development problems resulting from structural ones, and he adds that "this model should take the democratic contribution of the whole society as its starting point". According to Katircioglu, this model of development is based on the following points:

1. **Such a model has to be democratic enough.** Therefore a new industrial policy in line with development targets needs to be established based on a new organisation including all - local and national - parties. This approach comprises the representation of different views and thereby will have the least of wrong decisions because of its richness.

2. **In such a model, all parties should have a place as parties (sectors) to the problems.** Among these parties, depending on the nature of the problem, bureaucrats, employers, representatives of labour unions, scientists, consumer representatives and other related social groups should also participate.

3. **In this model (organisation) the representative should participate through elections.** This process will increase the responsibility of the participants and the credibility of the organisation.

4. **Such model (organisation) will not only eliminate the consequences of decision making at the government level, but will also eliminate the consequences of decision making in a poorly-functioning market.** With this characteristic, accurate decision-making will be achieved.

5. **In such model (organisation), which will be established with the participation of different people from different sections, it is evident that the rent seeking behaviour will be minimized.**

In other words, what Professor Katircioglu suggests, is the establishment of a model of development with the involvement of all Turkish productive powers and social forces. As he said (2007), "such process will maximize the interests of social forces as the decisions will be taken by their own on a democratic basis". What he supports is a democratic model of development starting from the bottom, from ordinary people and going up to the highest level of the government machine. On the basis of this model of development, strategic and other decisions will be directly legalised by the participants.
4.7 Cohesion Policy, Turkey and the EU

Turkish accession to the EU relates to the next Enlargements and the absorption capacity of the EU. Certainly, European integration is not an easy task. Although many steps have been taken towards European integration, disparities still exist within regions of the EU. Therefore, the EU has established a cohesion policy aiming at reducing or, if possible, eliminating economic and social disparities. By definition, this policy is related to the Enlargement of the EU and its capacity to absorb new member states (see analysis in Chapter 2.). On the other hand, disparities exist within the Turkish state. According to a Commission decision on a multi-annual Indicative Planning Document 2007-2009 for Turkey (2007c)

...Turkey has to contend with regional disparities that are much more marked than in any country of the EU. In 2001 per capita income in the five poorest NUTS II regions was between 33% to 53% of national average and another seven regions scored below 75% while income in the 5 richest regions varied between 127% to 190% of national average. Other social and economic indicators -life expectancy, literacy rates, education, and access to health services, sanitation, industrial activity, FDI fluxes and employment- also underline the development gap among Turkish regions. These factors lead to mass migration of skilled people to the more dynamic western regions, placing significant pressures on urban centres (p. 14).

The EU has scientifically examined its capabilities to absorb new member states. In this context, the Policy Department, responsible for the structural and cohesion policies of the European Parliament, issued a report in November 2006 analysing the future Enlargement of the European Union (from 27 to 34 member states) and its cohesion policy (European Parliament 2006). Referring to the most recent Enlargement of the EU to incorporate Romania and Bulgaria, as well as to the likely addition of Croatia, Turkey and the Western Balkans, the report along with that of MEP Marcus Pieper on Cohesion (2006), indicates that should Turkey join the EU:

1) 27.3% of the resources of the Convergence Objective will be allocated to Turkey. That means that Turkey could absorb about 8.43 billion euros during a budgetary period of seven years. In parallel, the European Commission has also undertaken an initial estimation of effects on the EU budget of the Turkish accession process (Table 5). There are in fact two scenarios. In the first scenario, the cost would rise to 16.5 billion euros by 2025. In the second, the cost would rise to 27.6 billion euros (Quaisser & Wood, 2004, p. 11).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support to regions GDP &lt; 75% EU average</th>
<th>Cohesion Fund</th>
<th>Convergence Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Million €</td>
<td>% EU-34</td>
<td>Million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cz Czech Republic</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>1685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ee Estonia</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gr Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fr France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lv Latvia</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lt Lithuania</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hu Hungary</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>1588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mt Malta</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pl Poland</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>4497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pt Portugal</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>1493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>si Slovenia</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sk Slovakia</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bg Bulgaria</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hr Croatia</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ro Romania</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>1329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tr Turkey</td>
<td>2681</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>5362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mk FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cs Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al Albania</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ba Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ko Kosovo</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(European Parliament 2006, p. 16)

2) Turkey will absorb about 63% of the additional Structural Funds, whilst Croatia and the other Western Balkan countries will absorb only 9% (Pieper 2007, p. 3).

3) The Turkish entry in the case of an EU-34 will bring a reduction of the European GDP per capita about – 10.5% (Table 6- European Parliament 2006, p. 6).

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase on EU-27</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Western Balkans</th>
<th>EU-34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>€, EU-27 = 100</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (€)</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (€)</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-10.5%</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
<td>-13.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Based on data taken from EUROSTAT.
Figures in italic are based on data taken from National sources (See section 7.1. Sources).

(European Parliament 2006, p.6)

 Ioannis Charalambides
In addition to this data concerning Turkish accession to the EU as a member state, I also note the following:

1) Turkish productivity is concentrated in some big cities. The problems in Turkish rural areas are severe. According to the European Commission's October 2006 Report, Turkey suffers from regional disparities. More specifically, according to Quaisser and Wood (2004)

80% of its value added is produced in Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir and other large cities. The richest region reaches 46% of the EU-25 average (comparable to Slovakia) but the poorest only 8% (p.23)

Turkish accession to the EU will increase the number of people eligible to be covered by the Structural Funds by 33% and the areas by 39% (See Figure 7 below). Within the EU-27, 31% of the whole population lives in regions with a GDP less than the average 75% of the EU GDP, which is the limit for a region to take part in the Structural Funds under the Convergence Objective. Upon Turkish accession to the EU, the population eligible under the Convergence Objective will be increased by 32% (Figure 8 below- European Parliament 2006, p.8).
Figure 7 illustrates the consequences of previous and future EU Enlargements (including Turkey) on the Structural Funds, and more accurately, on the Cohesion Fund\(^4\). In this figure are reflected the increasing tendency of areas and population of the EU, which are eligible for absorbing funds from the Cohesion Fund. In fact, Figure 7 is a comparative figure demonstrating the negative consequences of the Enlargements before and after Turkey’s possible accession to the EU. Why are the consequences negative? The answer is simple. As long as the areas and the population, which are eligible for absorbing funds from the Cohesion Fund, increase, the budget of the EU is further burdened. This is a negative development on the cohesion policy of the EU. The same applies to Figure 8 concerning regions with GDP less than 75% of the average EU GDP, which are eligible for receiving funds under Objective 1 (see Chapter 2.3.5).

---

\(^4\) According to Europa Glossary the Cohesion Fund is defined as following:

In order to speed up economic, social and territorial convergence, the European Union set up a Cohesion Fund in 1994. It is intended for countries whose per capita GDP is below 90% of the Community average. The purpose of the Cohesion Fund is to grant financing to environment and transport infrastructure projects. However, aid under the Cohesion Fund is subject to certain conditions. If the public deficit of a beneficiary Member State exceeds 3% of national GDP (EMU convergence criteria), no new project will be approved until the deficit has been brought under control.

A huge number of Turkish workers – up to 3-4 million - are expected to migrate towards other countries of the EU upon Turkish accession (Group of the EPP-ED 2004, p. 3; Erzan, Kuzubas & Yildiz 2004). These figures are not only presented by the services and the Institutions of the EU but also by independent researchers. These researchers argue that the wave of Turkish immigration after accession to the EU would be between 0.4 and 4 million (Quaisser & Wood 2004, p. 11; Kalin & Gerras 2005, pp. 10-11). On the one hand, Europeans are afraid of this expected wave of Turkish workers. On the other hand, the argument put forward by Turkey is that young Turkish workers could offer a solution to an ageing Europe and that Turkish migrants will return to their motherland when they feel economically comfortable (Flam 2004, pp. 183-186).
The large population of Turkey, in conjunction with the disparities between the big cities and the rural regions and the structural problems of the Turkish economy, create negative perspectives within Europe on Turkish accession to the EU. Such an example is reflected in Table 7 above. In this table, one can observe that in the event that Turkey joins the EU as full member-state, Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia will be excluded from the Structural Funds.

The solution to this problem is, firstly, that structural changes should be made within Turkey and secondly, that the EU should insist on its own structural changes in order to integrate Turkey. The President of the Budgetary Committee of the European
Parliament, Reimer Böge, stated (2007) in the context of an interview for the purposes of this research that:

The next financial perspectives are to be based on the existing rules that entered into force in 2013. Then, we have to agree the rules of the new financial perspectives for the period 20013-2020 before Turkey can become member of the EU, if it meets all the requirements set out by the EU and if all EU member states ratify its membership. Turkey amounts more than 72 million of inhabitants. Therefore, if Turkey joins the EU with the existing rules, then there will be countries and regions, especially those including in "Objective 1"\(^{42}\), that will not have any longer profit from the cohesion policy and the structural funds. Such regions are located in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Eastern Germany. The existing framework of the financial perspective is not possible to finance the Turkish Enlargement. Therefore, the EU cannot take Turkey in unless we reform the rules of financial perspective and structural funds, our cohesion policy.

In addition, as Böge maintained, "cohesion policy is related to absorption capacity and EU cohesion. The EU cannot absorb Turkey and thereby, for this and other reasons, the Turkish accession to the EU will bring the end of the EU!"

### 4.7.1. The Lion’s Share

The EU assists candidate and potential candidate countries in their efforts towards harmonisation with the *acquis communautaire*\(^{\text{a}}\). The whole instrument for pre-accession assistance is to help candidate and potential candidate states to face economic, social and human rights problems, and of course to face the disparities between big urban centres and rural regions.

In this context, Turkey receives the lion’s share of European financial aid for candidate and potential candidate EU member states. This club of states includes not only Turkey, but also Croatia and the Western Balkan Peninsula. Taking into account the latest strategic planning document, adopted by the European Commission on June 20, 2007, the financial assistance of the EU to candidate and potential candidate states over the period 2007-2009 amounts to 3.961 billion euros.

---

\(^{42}\) For more details on ‘objective 1’, the cohesion policy of the EU and the cohesion of the EU in general, see Chapter 2.
Turkey receives 1.602 billion euros, 40.4% of the total amount of the European pre-accession financial aid. Pre-accession financial aid is allocated in the following way:

- Turkey: 1.602 billion euros. (225 euros per capita).
- Montenegro: 97.3 million euros. (142 euros per capita).
- FYROM: 210.4 million euros. (103 euros per capita).
- Croatia: 438.5 million euros. (94.4 euros per capita).
- Kosovo: 199.1 million euros. (90.5 euros per capita).
- Albania: 212.9 million euros. (59 euros per capita).
- Serbia: 527.4 million euros. (56.4 euros per capita).

This pre-accession assistance has a multidimensional character. It constitutes a package aimed at helping candidate and potential candidate countries align themselves with the EU’s laws and the *acquis communautaire* in general. In particular, this financial aid assists in establishing infrastructures and creating fertile ground to enable candidate and potential candidate states to harmonise their political, economic and institutional systems with that of the EU, and to streamline their entry to the EU as smoothly as possible.

Turkey has the opportunity to absorb 40.4% of the total amount. It is an impressive proportion. However, it is essential to see what the Turkish Professor Emre Gönen stated for the purposes of this research:

> The financial support of the EU is not as impressive as it looks like. If one takes into consideration the budget of Turkey and its financial perspectives, the Turkish economic growth, the size of the country and the population, he can easily come to the conclusion that the financial assistance from the EU is not so large.
Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATIVE ALLOCATIONS TO MAIN AREAS OF INTERVENTION</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component I (Transition Assistance and Institution Building)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Criteria</td>
<td>20-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquis Implementation</td>
<td>40-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Dialogue</td>
<td>15-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component II (Cross-Border Co-operation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey – Bulgaria</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey – Greece</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey – Cyprus</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI Black Sea multilateral Sea Basin prog.</td>
<td>9-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other ENPI and ERDF programmes</td>
<td>32-34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component III (Regional Development)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment:</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport:</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Competitiveness:</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component IV (Human Resources Development)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>40-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>30-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Inclusion</td>
<td>20-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component V (Rural Development)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation of the agricultural sector and implementing Community standards</td>
<td>50-80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory actions for agri-environmental measures and LEADER</td>
<td><em>not foreseen under present MIPD</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of rural economy</td>
<td>20-50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(European Commission 2007c, p. 49) In the table above, one can see how financial aid to Turkey will be allocated in the context of the structural reforms that this candidate country should complete as a result of its course towards the EU.
4.8 The Turkish Army in the System

The Turkish army plays a manifold role in both domestic and foreign affairs. The army holds a significant position within the system through the powerful Institution of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu), the economy and society (see analysis for 4.6.1 on the Turkish economy and 'statism'). The decisive role of the army is mainly reflected in the National Security Council. Important decisions are taken by this Institution; decisions which focus on foreign affairs, security and other crucial national issues (Özcan, cited in Kirişçi & Rubin 2001, pp. 16-20). Under the pressure of the EU, the Turkish government proceeded to reform the National Security Council (NSC), an institution which draws its legal ground from article 118 of the Turkish Constitution (2001). According to this article, the National Security Council functions as an advisory body comprised of the Chief of General Staff, four main Commanders of the Turkish army, and selected members from the Council of Ministers (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 2001). The NSC is chaired by the President of the Republic and acts within the context of what the Turkish scholar Sakallıoğlu (1997) described as,

\[ \text{a double headed political system: the civilian council of ministers coexists with the national Security Council on the executive level, and the military system of justice continues to operate independently alongside the civilian justice system (p. 157).} \]

The NSC strengthened its status within the political system as a result of the coup d'état organised by the Armed Forces in 1980. In 1992, when the Turkish army's political power was at its peak, the Chief of the General Staff General Doğan Gürüş asserted: "Turkey is a military state" (cited in Özcan 2001, pp. 16-20).

Under pressure from the EU, the Turkish government proceeded toward reformation of the NSC. In July 23, 2003, these reforms were outlined in a package comprising seven changes. According to Morris (2006) they constitute a 'quiet revolution'. Some of the most significant include the following:

a) The NSC was transformed into a consultative body. Hence, its structure consists of a civilian majority.

b) It was made possible for a civilian to be appointed as Secretary General of the NSC.

c) The NSC no longer has extended executive and monitoring authorities.
d) The NSC no longer has the authority to follow up the implementation of NSC's recommendations on behalf of the President and the Prime Minister.
e) The NSC no longer has unlimited access to Civil Institutions.
f) The NSC is no longer represented in the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music. In 2003, after the report issued by the European Commission and under EU pressure on the Turkish government, the NSC was pulled out from some civil Institutions, such as the High Board of Radio and TV (RTUK) (European Commission 2003a, pp. 18-19; European Commission 2004, pp. 21-23; European Commission 2005a, pp. 12-15).

Regarding the NSC reforms, the Commission's Monthly Report of September 2005 on Turkey notes the following:

*Key posts in the NSC for the first time have been given to three civilians, including two women. Three civilians have been appointed as head of departments to which Generals used to be appointed. Former Counsellor Gürsel Demirkol has been appointed as head of Research Department, and two women, Füsun Arslantosun for Press and Public Relation, and Asuman Orhan for Personnel have been appointed as acting heads of departments. Besides, for the first time ever, by-laws of the NCS concerning personnel advancement, and personnel education have been published in the official journal. (European Commission 2005b, p.20)*

Although some changes have occurred within the NSC, the influence of the Turkish army on political life remains significant and determinant. The EU continues to criticise the role that the army possesses within the system. The European Commission states in its 2005 annual report:

*Reforms concerning civil-military relations have continued, but the armed forces still exert significant influence by issuing public statements on political developments and government policies (p. 41).*

Two years later, the 2007 Report of the European Commission followed the same line; it criticised the stance of the army and its involvement in the secular state. According to the Report (2007b):

*There were several attempts by senior members of the armed forces to restrict academic research and public debate in Turkey, in particular on security and minority right issues. Furthermore, the military targeted the press on various occasions (p.9).*
4.8.1 The Role of the Army in the Economic System

The role of the Turkish army can be seen within the Turkish political system and more precisely through the Institutions that the army established in order to take over the system. To achieve this goal, the Turkish army on the one hand builds on the Kemalist principle of ‘étatisme’, while on the other it seizes the opportunity offered by privatisation to achieve deeper involvement in the Turkish economic system by establishing an Institution under the army’s control. This Institution is the ‘Armed Forces Pension Fund’ (OYAK), founded in 1961, just after the coup d’état in 1960, which today has around 217 million shareholders who are obliged to contribute 10% of their salaries every month to the Fund (OYAK portal; Massavetas 2007, p.23). Through this mechanism, OYAK – which functions within the system as an Institution – always has ready cash flow: indeed, it achieves an annual turnover of 6, 6 trillion dollars. Its activities occur within the following sectors:

1. Banking (OYKA Bank) and Insurance (OYAK Bank portal; AXA OYAK portal).
2. Food, energy, steel and technology industries as well as cement plants. (OYAK cement portal; OYAK beton portal) According to the Chief Executive Officer, Şerif Coşkun Ulusoy (in OYAK portal),

   the OYKA participates to the privatization that took place in 2005. OYAK submitted bids in the tenders for Erdemir Turprafi, and a number of cement factories. The steelmaker Erdemir, which has consistently ranked among the top biggest companies in our country, joined the OYAK family. In a televised bidding on 4 October 2005, OYAK won the tender for a 46.12% stake in Erdemir with a bid of USD 2.77 billion.

On this issue, the monthly report of the European Commission of September 2005(b) notes the following:

46.12 percent stake of Turkey’s biggest steel-maker state-owned Erdemir was sold for $2.77 billion to OYAK which was one of the biggest item on the privatization list. OYAK had been failed in Tüpraş, which is Turkey’s biggest oil-refinery auction but prevailed in the bidding for Erdemir paying $2.77 billion for the steel giant. OYAK Holding is a group of companies owned by the Military Personal Solidarity fund which has total assets of $10.7 billion in 2004, now with the Erdemir OYAK has become the third biggest enterprise in Turkey comprising about 40 companies with total assets of $15.4 billion after KOÇ and SABANCI Holdings (p. 20)

3. Automotive industry (Renault portal; Massavetas 2007, p.23).
   The ‘OYAK’ participates in the process of privatization, and constitutes, in fact, an economic colossus including about 40 companies. OYAK is a shareholder of, among others, ‘Renault’, ‘General Motors’ and ‘General Electric’. In 2006, ‘OYAK – Renault’ claimed 16% of the Turkish market,
a turnover of 2, 2 billion euros. According to ‘Radical’ newspaper, in the last ten years the ‘OYAK – Renault’ car exportations totalled 6, 7 billion euros. (Massavetas 2007, p. 23)

In light of this, and keeping in mind what has been already noted in Chapter 4.8, I conclude that the army plays a dominant role within the Turkish economic system. On the one hand, it employs the principle of ‘étatism’ to consolidate its prevailing political, social and economic presence. On the other hand it uses Turkish infrastructures to become one of the key players in the process of the economic and social changes Turkey is required to pursue as a result of its course towards the EU accession.

4.8.2 The Black Box, the Army and the AKP

The Turkish political system is similar to that of the Soviet Union, whose political philosophy relied on the phenomenon of the ‘black box’. This phenomenon may be described by noting the following characteristics: All contradictory powers are locked in the ‘black box’. It is like a ‘can of worms’. Should the contradictory powers be set free, then the system gets in trouble and runs the risk of collapsing. The army constitutes the main actor controlling and keeping in its possession the key that opens the ‘black box’. Thus it presents itself as the depository of the system.

In the current period, however, the army is obliged to share power with the Islamists of the AKP43, since the latter enjoy the support of public opinion. During the political crisis of 2007, both sides adopted a rational mode of action. The army could not conduct a military ‘coup d´ état’ as it had done in the past. On the other hand, the

43 The AKP won the Parliamentary elections by a majority of 46, 6%, resulting in 341 seats. The Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) won 20.9% and 99 seats, and the Nationalist Movement Party (NHP) obtained 14.3% and 70 seats. Independent candidates were also elected, gaining 26 seats, 20 of those from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP); these formed their own political group. Additional parties represented in the Parliament included the Democratic Left Party (DSP) with 13 seats and the Grand Unity Party (BBP) and the Freedom of Democracy Party (ODP) with one seat each (European Commission 2008, p. 6). In parallel, the AKP also won the Presidential elections. Mr. Abdullah Gül was the first Turkish President to be elected from an Islamist party.
leaders of the AKP, even if they had this at the back of their mind, could not bring to the surface of the political system any political agenda aimed at the erosion of the system’s secular character. An indication of this political approach may be found in the statement of Tayip Erdogan on April 24, 2007 just before the August 28, 2007 announcement of Mr Gül’s candidacy for the Presidency of the Turkish Republic. According to Mr. Gül, "the aim of the AKP was to serve our people and to reach the contemporary civilisation objective of Atatürk" (European Commission 2007d, p. 9). Gül himself, after his nomination, underlined his commitment to the basic principles of the Republic (democracy, secularism, state of law). If the AKP acted or acts in the political context of threatening the secular state, it would lose the support it enjoys in the current period from the EU given its presentation of itself as the reformist power of Turkey. Besides, the AKP and the Islamists in general consider the EU to be the shelter which protects them from the Kemalists.

On the other hand, if the Generals attempt to overthrow the AKP, then progress toward Turkish accession to the EU would run the risk of stalling. On March 31, 2008 the Turkish Constitutional Court accepted prosecution charges against the AKP party, Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan, President Abdullah Gül and 69 officials of the party. The Court decided to try them on the allegation that the AKP had put at risk the secular character of the state. The stormy petrel was the Government's decision to authorise the headscarf in the universities. These developments sparked a new period of political instability. Behind the judicial power, there was the army – or at least, this was the international impression. Thereby, the trial was named a ‘judicial coup d’ état’ (Abramowitz & Barkey 2008; Akyol, Koker & Soysal 2008). Regarding this development, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that such issues should be discussed on a political level, not before the courts, and that a judicial intervention would affect Turkish accession to the EU. At the same time, he supported AKP by evoking the rules and preconditions set out by the Council of Europe. These preconditions refer to the dissolution of a party, but according to Rehn (2008), in Turkey the reasons for dissolving a party do not exist (see Appendix 5).

In that case, the army should be ready to pay the cost - whatever that entails. On the other hand, should the AKP attempt to 'pull the carpet' out from under the feet of the
Turkish army, a crisis would erupt. In the case of a severe turbulence in political life, there is high risk that the country will face the nightmare of Kurdish secession. The Kurdish issue is thereby transformed into a political cancer for Turkey, one which discourages Turkish politicians from putting Turkish national interest and territorial integrity at risk. Finally, on July 13, 2008 the Constitutional Court took a rational decision. On the one hand, it imposed financial penalties on AKP, on the other hand it did not deprive the party's officials of their political rights (Hooper 2008; see also Chapter 6.5.2).

4.8.2.1 The Delphic Sword

The AKP presents itself as the reformist power in Turkey, one which enjoys the full support of the EU. Before the 2007 elections, and during the political crisis in Turkey, the EU sent its own message, which seemed to be a ‘Delphic Sword.’ The Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, set out the position of the European Commission in an address to both the Turkish army and the Islamists. In this statement, he maintained that democratic civil power will prevail over the power of the army.

The declaration of the European Commission notes the following:

*The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and the supremacy of democratic civilian power over the military. If a country wants to become a member of the Union, it needs to respect these principles. This is the core of the Copenhagen criteria of EU accession (Rehn 2007).*

In fact, this declaration of the European Commission supports the secular Turkish state, while at the same time it warns the Islamists of the AKP that they will have no chance to enjoy European support if they hold a secret agenda aimed at eroding the secular identity of the state.

---

44 The threat of a crisis is always there, if both sides do not play their political game in a rational way.
4.8.2.2 The Beacon of a Moderate Islam

The EU believes that Turkey should be anchored to Europe in some way or another. In order to achieve this, it puts forward a policy aimed at safeguarding the secular character of the state. This is accomplished by establishing a modern democratic political system, one which could serve as a model for other Muslim countries. On July 4, 2007, during a speech before a conference organised by the SDP in Germany, Olli Rehn stated the following:

*The EU's relationship with Turkey is a valuable way to strengthen our links with the Muslim world. Turkey is undergoing a difficult process of self-transformation at the moment. EU conditionality can help the country to see its choices clearly, and to emerge from this process as a stronger democracy and a more vibrant society. Turkey can then provide a beacon to all the moderates in the Muslim world who want to see their own societies open up and democracy become the normal mode of their politics. But to use the EU's conditionality to help Turkey to move from modern to post-modern democracy, we have to ensure that the Turks know that we are serious about negotiating accession with them (Rehn 2007b).*

This statement seems to be the answer to the French policy. During the Intergovernmental Conference held on June 26, 2007, the French government rejected Chapter 17 on the Single European Currency. Paris considered that this Chapter is included in the 'hard core' of European economic integration and Turkish membership. President Sarkozy publicly stated that there is no place for Turkey in the EU as a full member-state, because it does not belong to Europe. The French President offered Turkey two options: first, the status of a 'privileged partnership', and second, the establishment of the *Union for the Mediterranean* in which Turkey could participate as a full member state (Seale 2008; Driss 2008; Schmid 2008).

Therefore, the main European goal is not to blow the 'black box' up. On the contrary, the European states believe that the reforms required by the EU in the context of Turkish accession to the EU can depressurise the Turkish political system before it explodes.
4.8.2.3 Risks and Human Rights

Returning to the concept of the 'black box,' it should be noted that some Turkish politicians are afraid that democratisation and Europeanisation could place the country at risk if Turkey does not, in the end, obtain the legal status of full member (European Parliament 2006b). They also fear that the Turkish state could run the risk of dissolution. Their fears are based on the following line of reasoning: the territorial, social and national cohesion of Turkey, which appears to be a multiethnic and multi-religious mosaic, is actually based on the 'democratic deficit' and on the role that the army plays in the system as a depository of Kemalist precepts and principles, especially that of nationalism. The implementation of human rights is likely to bring problems to the political surface; problems that the Turkish establishment was trying to conceal. As a result, minority, religious and women's rights -to name but three- are not fully respected by the state. Indeed, a constant breach of human rights is recorded in the reports of the European Parliament and the European Commission. It is illustrative that the Turkish penal code has had to be amended. Article 301 of this code provoked negative reactions from Europeans and was viewed as challenging the democratic system of values. This article, which referred to the concept of 'Turkishness', offered the opportunity to extremist lawyers, politicians or even public prosecutors to turn against journalists, the press in general and the spiritual elite (European Commission 2007, p.14).

On April 30, 2008 the Turkish National Assembly amended article 301 as follows:

a) The word 'Turkishness' was replaced by 'Turkish nation'. That is, the key phrase is no longer 'insulting Turkishness', but rather 'insulting the Turkish nation.'

\[45\] The first use of the term ‘democratic deficit’ can be found in the German publication JEF Manifesto in 1977. The phrase, however, has been attributed to British MEP Bill Newton Dunn who used the term in a pamphlet in the 1980s (Wikipedia). According to Sanford Levinson "a ‘democratic deficit’ occurs when ostensibly democratic organisations or Institutions in fact fall short of fulfilling what are believed to be the principles of democracy" (cited in Wikipedia). The term ‘democratic deficit’ is employed by the US in the context of addressing gaps within the American democratic system and avoiding problems in the functioning of this political system. It is also used in reference to the UN, an organisation that has no directly elected representatives (Moravcsik 2004; Follesdal & Hix 2005).

In the context of this project, the term ‘democratic deficit’ is understood as the existing gap between the reality of EU institutional functioning and decision-making processes on the one hand, and beliefs about or understanding of these Institutions and decisions by EU citizens on the other. That is, it refers to a lack of communication between European public opinion and the elite on how EU Institutions and processes actually function. The ‘democratic deficit’ reflects a lack of political and even legal legitimacy. For example, the only institution of the EU directly elected by the European citizens is the European Parliament, whose authority, competence and effectiveness is much less than those of the national parliaments. Therefore, the ‘democratic deficit’ is also connected to the full respect of democratic principles and values. For this reason, the term is not limited to the EU and regional European integration, but concerns as well the degree of democracy within a state.
b) The permission of the Minister of Justice is now required in order to file a case on this issue.

c) The maximum penalty for such a violation has been reduced from three years to two.

The EU welcomed these amendments as a first step towards Turkey's harmonisation with the democratic system of values. As Commissioner Rehn stated on April 30, 2008, "this is a step forward." At the same time, he added that he is waiting for further steps and changes on similar articles in order to ensure that unfounded prosecutions will stop (Today's Zaman 2008). Joost Lagendijk welcomed the amendment of article 301 but made clear that, "this will not win the beauty contest of the legal reforms" (Today's Zaman 2008). That is, Turkey should do more. On the other hand, some MEPs, such as Jacques Toubon, were more severe in their comments on and criticism of article 301. Mr. Toubon asserted, during the Plenary Session of the European Parliament on May 21, 2008, just one month before the official ratification of the amendment on article 301 that the content of this amendment was not enough.

Democracy, economy, human rights and corruption are factors affecting the cohesion of the EU. Documents evaluating Turkish accession to the EU give evidence of Turkey's 'democratic deficit' in the following areas:

1. Violation of human rights. According to the European Commission report (2007) of the European Commission, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) "delivered a total of 330 judgments finding that Turkey had violated at least one article of the ECHR. More than two thirds of the applications before the ECHR refer to the right of fair trial and the protection of property rights" (p.12). This report also stresses that:

   there have been no developments as regarding the Institutions in charge of monitoring and promoting human rights. These Institutions such as the Human Rights Presidency, lack independence and resources.... There is a lack of prompt, impartial and independent investigations into allegations of human rights violations by number of security forces (p. 60).

2. Corruption. An example is the statement of MEP Ria Oomen-Ruitjen, the Rapporteur of the European Parliament for the Turkish accession to the EU,
who alleged that corruption is one of the main problems in Turkey. A relevant paragraph (35) appears in the Oomen-Ruijten report (2008) as well as in the European Commission progress reports (2008, p.29; 2007b p.14). In the latter it is stated that corruption is related to the violation of fundamental human rights and the judiciary system. Among other matters, the report maintains that "there was no progress on the development of anti-corruption strategy." It adds that: "no public body is in charge of collecting data and statistics on corruption" (European Commission 2007b, p. 11). Moreover, the reports stresses that there is no overall National Reform Strategy for the judiciary, nor are there plans to implement such reforms (European Commission 2007b, p. 59; Bryane 2004, pp. 19-23). The Diagnostic Household of Istanbul created a table to delineating the sectors affected by corruption. The aim was to measure corruption in Turkey and to compare the results with those in other countries. The sectors affected by corruption include the following: traffic policy, customs, tax inspectors, land registry, municipalities, non-traffic police, public hospitals, courts, primary and secondary schools. In addition to these areas, I would add the army, which was excluded from the table. It has been already mentioned how the army employs ‘étatisme’ in the context of the ‘rent seeking’ phenomenon, with the goal of accruing political profit and presenting Kemalism as the saviour of the Turkish nation and of the political system (Bryane 2004 p. 20). The remedy to corruption is the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria. Institutions must guarantee democracy, rule of law and functionality of economy, and must successfully carry out the obligations linked to Turkish accession to the EU. Within the context of these obligations, Turkey should "adopt a number of international conventions making bribery a civil and/or a criminal offence in domestic legislation" (Bryane 2004, p.20).

3. Lack of respect for minority and religious rights. According to European Commission report (2007b) on Turkish accession to the EU, "the Circular acknowledges that there has been an increase in individual crimes against non Muslim citizens." The report also notes that restrictions on the training of the clergy as well as on their property rights remain (pp.16, 17, 23, 60).

---

46 Statement made on 11.3.2008 during the EPP-ED Preparatory Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
4. Lack of respect for freedom of expression. An indication of this inadequate respect for freedom of expression may be seen in the 2007 assassination of Hrant Dink\footnote{Hrant Dink (1954-2007) was a Turkish-Armenian editor, journalist, and columnist. As editor-in-chief of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, Dink was a prominent member of the Armenian minority in Turkey. Dink was best known for advocating Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and human and minority rights in Turkey. Hrant Dink was assassinated in Istanbul in January 2007, accusingly by Ogün Samast, a 17-year old Turkish nationalist.} in Istanbul. The handling of this case has made clear the problems existing in the judicial sector. Until now, the Turkish justice system has not delivered a decision and the procedure has been stigmatised by negative developments (European Commission 2008 p. 29). The 2007 report on the Turkish accession to the EU notes that “the number of persons who were prosecuted almost doubled in 2006.” The main reason for this phenomenon is rooted in article 301 of the penal code prohibiting the insulting of Turkishness (European Commission 2007b, p.16).

5. Lack of respect for women’s and children’s rights. According to the 2007 European Commission report, the Law of Protection of the Family, whose definition of family includes family members living separately, has been amended. However, problems persist:

\textit{The access to reliable data for these types of crimes continues to be problematic. More shelters for the victims should be established. At the same time training for law enforcement bodies, judges and prosecutors should be stepped up (European Commission 2007, p.18).}

One example of the lack of respect for children’s rights is child labour – a major problem for Turkish society. “A child survey revealed a decrease in the proportion of working children, from 10.3% in 1999 to 5.6% in 2006” (European Commission 2007, p.19). Although the statistical data show a decrease in child labour, children face obstacles in accessing health and education services. As the report stresses (2007), "shortcomings remain in the labour law and its implementation and the national recourses allocated to tackle child labour are insufficient" (p. 19).

6. Violation of cultural rights. The report of the European Commission (2007) states that no progress has been made in the area of cultural rights. Expressing oneself in a language other than Turkish remains illegal in political life, and no steps have been taken to amend the law on foreigners residing and travelling in Turkey. Such law contains discriminatory provisions (p.22).
All these problems mentioned above compose the mosaic of the ‘democratic deficit.’ This deficit results from the principles of Kemalism, including Nationalism, Republicanism and Secularism. The Turkish state was founded on the concept of Secularism. Although Secularism advocates respect for religious and minority rights, in Turkey both have been systematically violated. Kemalism was highly effective at keeping Turkey in cohesion. However, political, economic and social realities have changed dramatically. Therefore, Kemalism should be reformed if Turkey intends to respond to the new contemporary era. Its principles do not comply with those of the EU, and indeed are considered a threat to the cohesion of the EU. For this reason, the EU evaluates Turkey’s progress within these and other sectors.

One of the most important points to be made is this: no serious progress can be made in Turkish accession negotiations unless Turkey achieves political stability. This was the conclusion of the European Commission and other EU Institutions such as the European Parliament. Certainly, Turkey cannot join the EU while the Turkish armed forces play a key role in ruling the country. Turkey’s army is the second largest force in NATO and the largest in Europe. If Turkey joins the EU, it will have the opportunity to play a key role within the Institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)\(^\text{48}\). Europeans therefore have real reason to be concerned about the power and influence of the Turkish army.

### 4.9 Turkey in the European Security and Defence Policy

The European Defence System stands on two feet. The one is NATO, which plays a global catalytic role in security issues due to the experiences and prestigious

---

\(^{48}\) According to the official website of the European Commission (www.ec.europa.eu):

The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht ... and since then there have been numerous developments in CFSP. It has been agreed to embark on a common security and defence policy (CESDP) within the overall framework of the CFSP... The European Council at Laeken of 14-15 December 2001 adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognising that the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis management operations.

The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of CFSP: a) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter; b) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; c) to preserve peace and strengthen international security; d) to promote international co-operation; e) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
character that it gained during the Cold War. The other is that of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). NATO and the EU have established a structural dialogue aimed at finding a formula for coexistence. It is in this context that the US has acquired a dominant leading role in the European and global system. Throughout the years NATO and Europe have created many concrete links of interdependences; these have been transformed to links of dependence which favour American national interests. Turkey was a devoted ally of the US and an important NATO state, especially during the Cold War era (Ifestos 1999, pp. 23-24).

4.9.1 Traditional Power

Turkey could be considered a traditional military power. During the Cold War, it acquired an essential role within NATO as a result of its pivotal geo-strategic and geopolitical location. Thereafter, Turkey built a strong and reliable army and employed it as a methodological tool for achieving the following goals:

- Becoming an indispensable ally of the US during the Cold War era and beyond, continuing into the current period, in which a volatile political environment still exists, especially in the sensitive Caucasus region49 (Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp: 162-163). Its military strength and strategic location offer Turkey the opportunity to play a key role in the diplomatic arena. In the current period, Turkey prospects to revive its historic role in a new version of the silk-road, by presenting itself as the bridge between Asia and Europe and a crucial geopolitical oil crossroad (Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp. 99-108; Turkish Foreign Ministry 2007d; Robertson 2001a).

- Confirming that the Turkish army is the guarantor of the territorial integrity and the depository of the Turkish secular state (see Chapter 4.8).

- Using its military forces to participate in international operations organised by NATO, the ESDP and others operations under the auspices of the UN and within the context of peace-keeping missions (Turkish Foreign Ministry 2008a).

49 See also the crisis in Georgia (8-12 August 2008).
Turkey is a member state of NATO and a candidate state of the EU. Official figures from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed during an official presentation of the Turkish delegation at the European Commission in Brussels on October 6, 2006, give an idea of the army’s spending allowance. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008a, see Appendix 6), the entire Turkish National Defence budget is 6.406.436 billion euros. This amount represents 6.81% of the entire national budget, one of the highest in Europe. These figures show that for the Turkish political system, investments in the army sector are of great importance. Indeed, Turkey uses its army in order to serve both domestic and external interests and needs. Such interests and needs are focused on Turkey’s aspiration to play a key role in the international field and consolidate itself as a regional power (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008b).

4.9.2. US, NATO and ESDP

The political developments in the Post Cold War era seem to have moved beyond the Turkish political system, which remains faithful to Kemalism and thereby runs the risk of missing the European train. The end of the Cold War created a new momentum. At the same time, as Europeans took further steps towards European integration, they also undertook to establish a more independent and reliable European security and defence system. The ESDP is an EU Institution responding to the needs of the new era. However, Turkey does not belong to the EU. Consequently, Ankara was concerned that the ESDP would progressively replace NATO and that Turkey would be excluded from the European Security and Defence Policy. According to Ambassador Marc Otte, former Head of ESDP Task Forces in the Council Secretariat of the EU, the time has come for the EU to “develop its own security needs and the means to defend itself” (Gerry 2001, p. 26). Meanwhile, the US gave the green light to the restructuring of the European security system in the context of the ESDP. The former Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, stated the following:

*Strengthening the EU does not mean that NATO will lose its central role in European security, nor will the transatlantic security link will be weakened. On the contrary, when the long-sought European security identity comes to fruition, Europe and North*

50 The presentation took place in the context of the screening of Chapter 31 on Turkey’s participation in CFSP/ESDP. Turkey needs to fulfil 35 Chapters in order to become full member-state of the EU.
In January 1, 2007 the EU, in the context of the ESDP and responding to the Petersberg\textsuperscript{51} tasks, established ‘battle groups’\textsuperscript{52} with full operational capacity to promote the following aims:

- To undertake military and civilian operations, either autonomously or in the event of joint action between EU and NATO (Terzi 2002, pp: 44-46).
- To prevent conflicts, to manage crises, including humanitarian operations, peacemaking and joint disarmament operations, and to combat terrorism with the support and participation of third countries. (Sanberk 2001; Council of the EU 2006). The ESDP takes action by using NATO capabilities and strategic planning in situations which NATO has no intention of engaging in (2002 Terzi, p.46).

The EU and the ESDP have no adequate infrastructure with which to carry out their military, civil and humanitarian missions in the context of led operations and ‘battle groups’ (Council of the EU 1999a). Thus, should the EU wish to conduct its operations successfully, two conditions are required. First, it is obliged in some cases to get the green light from NATO, of which Turkey is a member state with the right of veto. Second, it may need to invite Third countries and especially its candidate states to participate and contribute to the operations (Terzi 2001, p. 47; Council of the EU 2001, NATO IMS Press Release 2001).

According to a military attaché in Brussels (2007)\textsuperscript{53}:

\textsuperscript{51} The Petersberg tasks are those military tasks of humanitarian peacekeeping nature that both the EU and Western European Union (WEU) are empowered to follow. They were created in June 1992 at Hotel Petersberg near Bon in Germany. The Petersberg tasks constitute a list of military and security priorities of the EU Security and Defence policy.

\textsuperscript{52} The idea of establishing ‘battle groups’ within the EU was launched at the European Council summit on 10-11 of December 1999 in Helsinki. This issue was also touched upon during the Franco - British Summit in February 2003 in ‘Le Touquet’. At that summit the EU considered as priority the need to improve its rapid response capabilities in order to have the opportunity to deploy land, sea and air forces within 5-10 days. In the framework of the next Franco - British summit, which took place in November 2003, the member states decided that the EU should be able to deploy forces within 15 days in responding to a UN request. In February, 10 2004 France, Germany and the United Kingdom drafted a document proposing a number of ‘battle groups’ consisting of about 1500 personnel and able to be deployed within 15 days. The whole plan was approved in November 2004 and the first thirteen ‘battle groups’ were pledged.

\textsuperscript{53} Because of his position this military attaché only agreed to give a confidential interview, without mentioning his name. For reliability purposes, his testimony was crossed-checked with other sources in
In the case of a military operation falling within the military operation of the EU and more precisely in the ‘Battle Groups’, not only the Member states but also Third states can be invited and contribute to the military operation. The Decisions are taken by the European Council and the invited Third state has no vote on the decisions and on the implementation of the schedule and the operation (Terzi 2002, p. 47; Council of the EU 2001). Theoretically and practically it has no vote (Terzi 2002, p. 54). However, beyond typical and legal aspect, there is the political aspect too. Turkey and any other invited countries can enjoy the support of friendly countries that take into account the Turkish interests (Council of the EU 2001, Terzi 2002, pp. 47-50, 55). Besides, although Turkey has legally no right of vote, the Council should logistically take on board its views and interests under the status of the invited country. Thus, Turkey has a political say through member states whose national interests are in line with its own. Since member states invite Turkey or any other Third country to participate in the ‘Battle Groups’, this initiative means that the member states of the EU -or at least some of them- should respect Turkey and its interest if they do not contradict those of the EU or of its member states.

Turkey is not a member-state of the EU. However, it is a member state of NATO with the right of veto. In this context, should Turkish interests impose it, Ankara can use its right of veto (Terzi 2002, p. 56). Certainly, the use of the Turkish veto is not only related to the Turkish national interests but, also, to the American ones.

In any case, Turkey has two options: Either block the allowance of NATO assets to the EU or get involved in a diplomatic process of ‘trading off,’ predicting that by threatening to use its veto it will get an ‘equivalent exchange’. Turkey has already proven that it knows the ‘trade off’ game very well. In 2002, “in order to voice its concerns, Turkey chose to veto the EU’s use of strategic NATO assets” (Terzi 2002, p. 53). At the end, NATO and the EU reached an agreement reflected in a document bearing the title, 'ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the involvement of the non-EU European Allies'. This document paved the way to the North Atlantic Council of the December 13, 2002 where EU-NATO cooperation was decided upon, and to the EU-NATO joint Declaration of December, 13 2002 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008c).

During that period, Turkey's "contribution to the EU’s Headline Goal stands as the sixth largest contribution in total” (Hurriyet, in Terzi 2002, p. 53). In the current period, Turkish contributions remain important. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry (2008c):

order to examine if what he stated was in line with legal documents of the EU (see also Chapter 3.4.1- Methodology).
Turkey is making a significant contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA, including to its civilian aspect. In total, her contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA comes to nearly 255 personnel. Furthermore, Turkey has 4 police officers deployed to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey also contributed one police officer to the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa, plans to send one police officer to the EUPOL-COPPS Mission in Palestine and is also considering participating in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah/Palestine. Turkey has also participated in the EU's EUFOR RD Kongo mission aimed at assisting the UN in the Democratic Republic of Kongo, with one Turkish C-130 aircraft and its crew deployed in Gabon. Turkey declared her readiness to contribute to the EU Battle Groups in November 2004. Turkey will provide both troops and capabilities to the Italian led Battle group which will be assigned to the EU for the second half of 2010.

Due to its crucial contribution, Turkey's influence over the ESDP is not trivial. Certainly, the Turkish impact on ESDP should be seen within the spectrum of Turkish military contribution globally, including its role in International Peace-Keeping Activities through: 1) UN Operations, 2) NATO, 3) Led Operations in the Balkans, 4) International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and 5) NATO Training Mission in Iraq (Turkish Foreign Ministry 2008a - Appendix 6).

By definition, Turkish accession to the EU is related to Turkish participation in the common European security policy and European Institutions as a full and equal member enjoying the right to vote. The US wants Turkey to join the EU for its own national interests. As the President of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Joost Lagendijk (2007), stated:

The US is strongly in favour of the Turkish entry as a member of the EU. The Prime Ministers of Italy and Spain, Berlusconi and Aznar, who were then in power (2004) said publicly that they did not like this US pressure... So they made clear to the Americans: "do not push us too much..."

On this point Mr Lagendijk (2007) explained why the US supports the Turkish accession to the EU:

- It argues that since Turkey is already a member of NATO, why should it not become a member of the EU?
- It wants to see a democratic and stable Turkey.

Certainly there is another side of the coin. One view asserts that the US may use Turkey as its 'Fifth Phalanx' or 'Trojan Horse' within the EU (Kalin and Gerras 2005, p.17). Other political views articulate that Turkey is an important actor for regional, even global security and as such, it is indispensable for the fulfilment of EU's
ambition to play a global role in foreign and security affairs (Kalin and Gerras 2005, pp. 5-6; Rubin, 2005, p. 1). Indeed, this is Joost Lagendijk’s (2007) point: “Turkey is indispensable for NATO, why can not it be indispensable for the EU”?

However, the strategic game is not so simple. The US supports the Turkish accession to the EU but, at the same time, creates fertile ground for the upgrading of the Kurdish role in the region, especially after the Turkish refusal to permit American troops to pass through Turkish territory to invade Iraq. In northern Iraq, the Kurds have established their own autonomous region with American blessings. Turkey considers this region as a basis of Kurdish military operations and as a permanent threat to its soft belly (de Benderm 2008). On the one hand, the US pushes Turkey to the EU, and on the other it puts a Kurdish stiletto into the Turkish back.

Turkey is an important country for the Common European Security and Defence Policy for the following reasons:

- Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and the largest army in the EU.
- Turkey has an embattled army always ready to take action.
- Turkey has a very important and dominant geopolitical and geo-strategic location in the region of Eurasia.
- Turkey is a big contributor to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP and NATO) and to UN led operations.
Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Active Personnel</th>
<th>Reserve Force</th>
<th>Paramilitary</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Active troops per thousand citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>🇨🇳</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>2,255,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>3,969,000</td>
<td>7,024,000</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>🇺🇸</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,426,026</td>
<td>1,458,500</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>2,937,526</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>🇮🇳</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,325,000</td>
<td>1,155,000</td>
<td>1,293,300</td>
<td>3,773,300</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>🇰🇵</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,106,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>189,000</td>
<td>5,995,000</td>
<td>49.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>🇷🇺</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,037,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>359,100</td>
<td>3,796,100</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>🇰🇷</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>687,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>5,209,000</td>
<td>14.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>🇵🇰</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>619,000</td>
<td>528,000</td>
<td>302,000</td>
<td>1,449,000</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>🇮🇷</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>545,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>11,390,000</td>
<td>12,285,000</td>
<td>11.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>🇹🇷</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>514,850</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>148,700</td>
<td>1,043,550</td>
<td>7.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Wikipedia 2008)

In this table, one can observe that indeed, Turkey possesses the ninth biggest army globally, the second biggest in NATO after the US, the biggest army in the EU in the context of the Western Security Institutions and the second largest in the Old Continent after Russia. Therefore Turkey is a pivotal country for European and international security issues because of its geo-strategic and geopolitical position and the large size of its army.

Turkish accession to the EU falls under the question of whether Turkey can bring structural changes to the European Security and Defence Policy. If one considers that the political word of a member state is defined by its strength and contribution to the ESDP, then if Turkey becomes a full member state of the EU, it could play a leading role within the ESDP. Should Turkey have a strong say on defence and security issues, then Ankara will also have a strong political say on issues of foreign affairs, since defence and foreign policy are the two sides of the same coin. The main issue is that should Turkey join the EU as a full member-state, redistribution of power will occur and a new balance of power will be shaped. Turkey has a strong powerful
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

army, while the EU has developed a 'soft, power' army. In light of this, the big bet is whether both sides could find a way to couple their different types of military strength and mentality. At the same time relevant questions must be raised: are the leading countries of the EU ready to share European power with Turkey? Is the cohesion of the EU under threat as a result of the redistribution of power?

Map 1

Major Pipeline System and Projects

This map demonstrates the importance of the Turkish geopolitical and geo-strategic position on regional and global levels. It explains why Turkey positions itself as a regional power, a geopolitical bridge between Europe and Asia and an energy crossroad. At the same time, it shows why advocates of Turkish accession to the EU consider Turkey as an indispensable actor, should the EU wish to play a global role. This would play to Turkey's great advantage within the context of accession to the EU. However, it also stands as a disadvantage, if we take into account that leading countries of the EU are not ready to share the power they enjoy in the EU with Turkey.
4.10 The Institutional Power of Turkey in the EU

Turkey is currently the largest country in Europe. If Turkey joins the EU as a full member state, it will be the largest country both in Europe and in the EU. The Turkish population is currently estimated to be 73.792 million (European Commission 2008, p. 35). By 2025, Turkey's population will reach 87 million (Neuwahl and Kabaalioglu 2006, p. 76). The size of a state is a decisive factor of its institutional power within the EU. The political discussion on the capability of the EU to absorb new member states sparked by the Enlargement process is based on the following question: whether the Enlargements will lead the EU towards regional integration or towards a Babylon state.

Whether or not the EU can absorb new member states—its absorption capacity—is of great importance in relation to the functionality of the EU, as well as to its economic, social and political cohesion. This issue is closely connected to the institutional reforms indispensable to the operational ability of an enlarged EU. Two conditions create fertile ground for the establishment within the EU of an institutional and political system based on the classical hierarchy of an international system structured according to the principles of Realism: on the one hand, the abolition of veto, which symbolises the legal equality between the member-states; on the other hand, the implementation—in same cases—of the 'weighted vote.' The needs of the EU resulting from the process of Enlargement guide the EU, in theory, to regional integration and in practice, back to the political rules of Realism. That is, they guide the EU back to the hierarchy of an international system based on the power of each member state (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 115-127a).

It is in this context that Turkey aspires to become a full EU member-state. The question is whether the leading counties of the EU will wish to share with Turkey—a Muslim country with different culture, mentality and even different system of values—not only the EU's military power but also its institutional power.54

---

54 On this point, note that institutional power in general is also related to military power, as the ESDP is an integral part of the European institutional system.
In the event that Turkey joins the EU as a full member-state, it will be in possession of:

- The second largest number of MEPs at the European Parliament after Germany, due to its population size.
- Strong political say in the context of the ESDP. Turkey has: a) the second largest army in NATO and the largest within the EU, b) an important geo-strategic and geo-political role as a bridge between Asia and Europe and c) embattled troops, as a result of its ongoing conflict with the Kurdish regions. The embattled troops offer Turkey the experience and capability needed to contribute to the operations of the EU as well as to the building up of the ESDP.
- Strong political say in the European Council and the European Commission.

Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén (2005) have elaborated scenarios on the basis of a particular methodology to examine the absorption capacity of the EU in conjunction, among others, to Turkey’s power and its contribution to the EU after its accession to the EU. For the purposes of their research, they name the measures that they use the Normalised Banzhaf index (NBI) and the Shapley-Sjubik Index (SSI). These indices test how likely it is that a nation will find itself in a position of breaking a winning coalition on a randomly selected issue, and therefore how influential a country is likely to be. More concretely, the NBI assumes that each possible coalition has the same probability of occurrence. According to the researchers:

This makes all the winning coalitions equally likely as well and the measurement of power is simply counting the score of breaking positions for each player. To derive a relative measure of power this is then divided by the total number of scores. Of course, on particular issues various countries may be much more or much less powerful -especially if they are part of a like-minded group, but the NBI has recently proved its worth, especially as unbribeable tool in assessing and designing voting rules (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p.2)

55 The European Commission is, by definition, an institution which has been established to serve the common European interests. At the same time, the European Commission is also always under pressure to serve the national interests of the member-states. The common European interest is comprised of convergent national interests. At the same time, the leading countries in particular attempt to identify their national interests with the common European ones. Therefore, politically and practically speaking, in the context of the ‘power game’ the most powerful member-states can exercise their influence over the European Commission. If Turkey joins the EU, it will be one of the most powerful member-states.
This study examines the effect of Turkish accession to the EU in the context of the voting rules of the Treaty of Nice (weighted vote) on the one hand and of the Constitutional Treaty (double majority) on the other. The researchers draw the following conclusions:

- If the voting rules of the Constitutional Treaty had come into effect, Turkish accession to the EU would have had “relatively small impact” on the EU's capacity to act (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8). However, were the EU functioning under the Nice Treaty, then an enlarged Europe of 27 to 29 member-states would substantially reduce the EU-25's ability to act. According to the analysts, "our findings confirm that the enlarged EU cannot function well under the Nice Treaty rules" (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8). Indeed, the researchers note the necessity of institutional reform in the event that the Constitutional Treaty was rejected (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8).

- If the Constitutional Treaty had been adopted in the context of a new institutional reform, then all member states within an EU of 29 states, with the exception of Germany and Turkey, would lose power. Moreover, the leading countries would lose more of their power than the small countries. The researchers give the following example: "the power loss of France under the Nice rules is something like seven times larger than power loss of Malta" (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8). At the same time, Turkey would be - in the framework of the Constitutional Treaty - one of the most powerful member-states, the second most powerful after Germany (figure 1 below). Under the Nice Treaty, Turkey would be also one of the most powerful member states of the EU, together with Germany, France and Britain (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8).
This figure illustrates the redistribution and reshaping of power after Turkish accession to the EU. If the rules of the Constitutional Treaty had come into force Turkey would have been the second most powerful country of the EU. The Constitutional Treaty was rejected and was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon. However, even this reformed Treaty was turned down by Ireland on June 13, 2008.

Turkish accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power within the EU. Turkey will be in the club of the leading countries. Baldwin and Widgrén note in their conclusions that

under either the Nice or the CT voting rules, Turkey would be the second most powerful member of the EU-29. Under the CT rules, Turkey would be substantially more powerful than France, Italy and the UK, while under Nice rules the power differences among those countries with populations of 50 million or more would be small (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 9, see Figure 2).

On this point, they prophetically note the following: "plainly, this might decrease the acceptability of the Constitutional Treaty or Turkey's membership (or both)" (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 6).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

and Widgrén 2005, p.9). In fact, the Turkish accession to the EU is considered as one of the reasons for the French and Dutch 'no' to the Constitutional Treaty. Going one step further, in accordance with some statistical estimations, one comes to the conclusion that if Turkey is to surpass Germany "becoming the largest country in about 2020, then it will be the most powerful country of the EU" (Flam 2004, p. 177).

On the other hand, some other analysts argue that:

*Germany and Turkey will be strong players but unable to block proposals even together... However, to block a decision, they need the votes of another strong player or the votes of other medium and small countries. At the same time, the leading countries can not take decision by their own due to the fact that their votes are not enough since they also need the majority of the European population"* (Hughes 2004, p. 3; Neuwahl and Kabaalioglu 2006, p. 76).

The essence of this political position is the following: both Turkey and all the strong players of the EU have casting votes regarding decision-making. Therefore, Turkey will be one of the most powerful countries and as such it could catalytically:

a) Influence the decisions taken on the level of the European Council.

b) Participate in the winning-vote process. The power of a member state does not focus only on its capacity to block a decision but also on its contribution to the procedure of a winning vote. This contribution is proportional to the power of each state and to the coalition that this state can obtain in the context of the European Council mechanism. Therefore, leading countries can play an increased political role in the EU. If Turkey becomes the biggest country of the EU, then institutionally, it will also be the most powerful.

The scenarios referred to are still valid, since the decision of the European Council on June 22, 2007 paved the way to the voting on the Reformed Treaty or Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 14, 2007. The new Treaty endorsed the same voting procedure provided for in the Treaty of the European Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The figures and elements of Baldwin and Widgren's research are employed to infer conclusions on the blocking votes and the political and institutional power of each member state. However, the result of the referendum which took place on June
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

13, 2008 in Ireland was negative. The Irish voted 'no,' and therefore the Treaty of Lisbon remains pending.56

Figure 10

This figure, which envisages an EU of 29 states, shows the balance of power which might ensure between the EU member-states, including Turkey. The figure also demonstrates how powerful each member-state would be in the context of the Treaty of Nice versus the Constitutional Treaty. The figure clearly shows that if Turkey joins the EU under the rules of the Constitutional Treaty it would be the second most powerful country of the EU. However, the Constitutional Treaty does not exist anymore. It was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which was rejected by the Irish on June 13, 2008.

(Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 6)

---

56 Even if changes will be made on the Treaty of Lisbon, it will be difficult to overturn its essence. Therefore, the power sharing on the institutional level will remain more or less the same. In any case, if Turkey joins the EU it will also join in the 'club' of the leading EU countries.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member state</th>
<th>NBI EU-29</th>
<th>NBI EU-25</th>
<th>SSI EU-29</th>
<th>SSI EU-25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.10203</td>
<td>0.10407</td>
<td>0.13556</td>
<td>0.15816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.09960</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.13152</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.07644</td>
<td>0.07614</td>
<td>0.09389</td>
<td>0.10332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.07611</td>
<td>0.07587</td>
<td>0.09339</td>
<td>0.10278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.07469</td>
<td>0.07475</td>
<td>0.09121</td>
<td>0.10041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.05491</td>
<td>0.05670</td>
<td>0.06313</td>
<td>0.06798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.05429</td>
<td>0.05602</td>
<td>0.06203</td>
<td>0.06694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.03785</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.03564</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.03052</td>
<td>0.03715</td>
<td>0.02701</td>
<td>0.03440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.02495</td>
<td>0.03104</td>
<td>0.01991</td>
<td>0.02721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.02474</td>
<td>0.03287</td>
<td>0.01964</td>
<td>0.02695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.02463</td>
<td>0.03279</td>
<td>0.01950</td>
<td>0.02680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.02453</td>
<td>0.03271</td>
<td>0.01916</td>
<td>0.02666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.02422</td>
<td>0.03262</td>
<td>0.01922</td>
<td>0.02651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.02314</td>
<td>0.03162</td>
<td>0.01758</td>
<td>0.02489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.02250</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.01676</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.02239</td>
<td>0.03103</td>
<td>0.01663</td>
<td>0.02403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.01940</td>
<td>0.02870</td>
<td>0.01288</td>
<td>0.03000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.01940</td>
<td>0.02870</td>
<td>0.01288</td>
<td>0.02000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.01918</td>
<td>0.02854</td>
<td>0.01261</td>
<td>0.01975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.01885</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.01221</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.01768</td>
<td>0.02737</td>
<td>0.01077</td>
<td>0.01785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.01768</td>
<td>0.02737</td>
<td>0.01077</td>
<td>0.01785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.01628</td>
<td>0.02630</td>
<td>0.00905</td>
<td>0.01631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.01585</td>
<td>0.02598</td>
<td>0.00853</td>
<td>0.01568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.01521</td>
<td>0.02447</td>
<td>0.00774</td>
<td>0.01487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.01445</td>
<td>0.02490</td>
<td>0.00680</td>
<td>0.01384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.01413</td>
<td>0.02465</td>
<td>0.00641</td>
<td>0.01342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.01413</td>
<td>0.02465</td>
<td>0.00641</td>
<td>0.01342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculation.

(Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 10)
By observing tables A1 and A2 above, one can see how the researchers measured the institutional power of the member states of the EU, first under the Nice rules and second under the Constitutional Treaty rules. It is obvious that if Turkey becomes a full member-state of the EU, it will belong to the club of the leading countries, and will indeed be the second most powerful country of the EU.
4.11 Conclusion

In analysing the data regarding the Turkish accession to the EU, I come to a number of conclusions:

a) Kemalism can not lead Turkey to the EU. Turkey needs to make profound structural changes if it wishes to achieve accession. On the other hand, the EU should be ready to implement structural changes of its own if it really wants Turkey to join as a full member-state. My research shows that it is obvious that Europeans suffer from prejudice and preconceptions regarding the Turkish accession to the EU. At the same time, whether the Europeans and especially the leading countries, such as France, are truly willing to share their EU power with Turkey remains a question. This question will be answered through the questionnaire survey which follows in the next chapter.

b) The decisions in the EU are not taken only on the basis of common interests, but also on the basis of national interests and under the influence of the US, a dominant global power. The decisions on Turkish accession to the EU have been made within this spectrum of interests.

c) Turkey intends to play the role of a regional power and a key role within the international system and the EU by contributing to and participating in the missions and operations of NATO, ESDP and others, under the auspices of the EU and the UN.

d) The EU cohesion cannot be restricted in the context of the cohesion policy. The cohesion policy of the EU is only one parameter of the EU cohesion. The latter is composed of more than one variable. It is causally related to the Enlargements of the EU, and is consistent with the absorption capacity of the EU. The absorption capacity is related to the structural changes that both the EU and Turkey should enact: Turkey in order to join the EU and the EU in order to achieve smooth Enlargements.

Taking into account the analysis of this chapter, and extrapolating from the research, one can infer some crucial factors - variables integral to EU cohesion, beyond the traditional factors identified in the cohesion policy of the EU. These factors - variables comprise the following:

1) democracy, which includes the rule of law and human rights (freedom of expression, religion, property, women’s and children rights, minority rights); 2) corruption; 3) economy and commerce; 4) social stability; 5) cultural rights and
policies; 6) immigration (related to size of population); 7) army’s role in the system; 8) prejudice, racism and syndromes; 9) institutions and their functionality; 10) redistribution of power, share of power and balance of power; 11) common European interests and national interests.

The main objective of the survey discussed in the next Chapter is the verification of the factors-variables mentioned above. The survey provides a means of triangulating available data, with the aim of reliably defining the factors-variables upon which a cohesion model of the EU in the context of Turkish accession can be based.
CHAPTER 5
Survey Findings and Analysis

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the results of the survey within the context of theories of International Relations as they apply to Turkish accession to the EU and to European integration. Theories, of Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, constitute the theoretical basis of this research (see Chapter 2) and provide the framework for my data analysis and conclusions. The survey results are also analysed in the context of the findings detailed in Chapter 4, which examined the Turkish political system and Euro-Turkish relations. By analysing the survey results in the framework of this theoretical and practical body of information, I attempt to delineate the variables affecting the EU cohesion in the context of Turkish accession to the EU.

The design of the survey questionnaire not only draws upon the theories mentioned above but also derives from information and insight obtained from bibliographical sources, archival material, newspaper articles, official EU documents, personal interviews, and debates on Turkish accession to the EU within the European Parliament and other Institutions of the EU (see Chapter 3). The debate on Turkish accession to the EU is not limited to institutional contexts, but is widespread across the EU.

By exploring issues and attitudes related to Turkish accession to the EU, the questionnaire seeks to achieve the following goals: a) Measure political attitudes of MEPs; b) Compare and cross-check information and data concerning Turkish accession to the EU with the political opinions and attitudes of Members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament\(^57\) (See Chapter 3.4.3.4);
c) Fill in any gaps of knowledge existing within the literature;
b) Examine whether the factors - variables identified during research, especially those identified in Chapter 4, are in accordance with the results of the survey.

Therefore, the survey provides a means of verifying data presented in primary and secondary sources within the context of ‘triangulation’ (see Chapter 3.3). The conclusions arrived at by analysis of the survey data provide a framework for assessing the impact, positive or negative, of the Turkish accession on EU cohesion. In particular, this Chapter examines the following:

- The role of the US
- Negative reasons
- Leading countries and power-sharing
- Positive reasons
- Turkish contribution to the EU and the strengthening of the EU position to the global system
- Redistribution of power
- Structural changes
- The cohesion of the EU
- Democracy and human rights
- Reforms
- List of variables
- The next step

5.2 The Role of the US

My main concern here is to examine relations between the EU and Turkey from the stance of legal, economic, social, military and political issues and their relevance to Turkish accession to the EU. The EU is a multinational regional organisation, one consisting of independent member-states. It is therefore a multinational and multi-

ideological trends existing within the EU. The Committee on Foreign Affairs is in charge of evaluating Turkish accession to the EU on behalf of the European Parliament. Therefore, the positions and ideas of the MEPS reflect the various opinions, ideas and political stances of the European peoples. Some of them also participate to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.

58 According to the theory of Realism, the international system is composed of sovereign independent states. The EU, despite its ongoing efforts towards regional integration, has not yet transformed the
state player within the international system. As such, it acts in the context of 'globalisation'. Within this international system, the US is not only a superpower but also the major actor of the system, one which plays a key role on both global and regional levels. It thus plays an external but decisive role within the European system. It is therefore a matter of great importance to determine whether and to what extent the US influences EU decisions, especially those concerning Turkish accession to the EU.

Within this context, I note that the US has been playing a significant and catalytic role in European affairs since the Cold War, and still maintains its influential role in the Post Cold War Era both on its own and through its role in NATO\textsuperscript{59} (Valasek 2007; World Security Institute 2006; Kucheida 2005)\textsuperscript{60}. The Northern Atlantic Alliance plays a leading role in European security issues and is also closely connected, politically and institutionally, to the EU through agreements such as 'Berlin Plus'\textsuperscript{61} and others (Kucheida 2005; Council of EU n.d.)

The influence of the US is reflected both in the decisions of the EU in general and in decisions related to Turkish accession to the EU. As shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3 below, MEPs clearly agree with this analysis of the US relationship to the EU. In Q8, 'Do you believe that the US influences the decisions of the EU', 87\% of the MEPs answered that the US influences the decisions of the EU (Figure 1). In Q9 'Do you believe that the US influences or not the Turkish accession to the EU?', 93.8\% answered positively (Figure 2). In Q10 'In what way does the US influence the Turkish accession to the EU?' (Figure 3), 30.5\% of the MEPs believe that the US influences Turkish accession to the EU negatively. On the other hand, a percentage of 67.8\% maintains that the US has a positive influence on prospects for Turkish accession.

\textsuperscript{59} The dialogue between the EU and NATO on security issues shows the close relations still existing between the EU and NATO. Certainly, behind NATO one can find the US functioning as the leading country. Furthermore, in the global economic system the EU and the US constitute two important poles of a multi-pole international system. In this context the one affects the others economically and commercially. They are allies and competitors at the same time.

\textsuperscript{60} To avoid any misunderstanding, I mark that the US involvement in the European affairs begun during the World War I and intensified during the World War II.

\textsuperscript{61} 'Berlin plus' is the arrangement between NATO and the EU that in event of crisis an EU-led operation would make use of NATO assets and capabilities (Council of the EU, n. d.)
accession to the EU. This position can be seen as the view that American policy favours Turkish national interests. If this is so, one may also assume that, by definition, US policy on Turkey serves American national interests. However, one may maintain that US policy favours the interests of all three involved parties; itself, the EU and Turkey (Lagendijk 2007).

---

62 On this point, one could raise the following question: If the EU is so influenced by the US, how could the ‘banana wars’ be explained, or the issues of the steel industry and CAP? The answer is the following; the US is a dominant power attempting to govern the international system. To achieve this goal, it tries to influence the decisions of the EU. Such influence varies depending on the issue under discussion and its importance to the EU and the interests of its member-states on the one hand and the interests of the US on the other. Therefore, the cost-benefit analysis of national interest defines the extent and weight of US influence on the EU decision-making. Besides, this is the process usually followed by international actors in order to reach a compromise and to follow a minimum code of common interest. This is a power game existing within and even ruling the international system.
Figure 2: Degree to which MEPs believe that the US influences Turkish accession to the EU.

Figure 3: The way that the MEPs believe that the US influences Turkish accession to the EU.

The EU is part of the global system. It constitutes a political, economic and social arena within which conflicting and converging national interests are addressed. The US functions as an external actor trying to serve its own national interests. However,
within the EU there are two types of interests: the common European interest and member-states’ national interests. The US has the political ability to intervene in European affairs in order to serve its own national interests\textsuperscript{63} (Lagendijk 2007; Laçiner, Özcan & Bal 2005, p. 71). Therefore, one must see EU-US relations through the lens of conflicting, converging and common interests. What remains in question is whether such an American engagement is in accordance with or in opposition to the interests of member states of the EU and the EU as such. If the US supports Turkish national interests, this does not necessarily mean that such an American policy is in opposition to the common European interest. Taking into consideration that the member-states of the EU decided, on December 16, 2004 to begin Turkey's accession negotiations, and on October 3, 2005 (Council of the EU 2004; Council of the EU 2005c) to open negotiations with Turkey, one can assume that Turkish accession to the EU has been defined as a common EU interest. However, the common European interest is likely to be in contrast to the national interests of some member-states. An example is the French position on Turkish accession to the EU arguing that Turkey can only acquire the status of a ‘privileged partnership’ and not that of full membership (see Chapters 4.3 and 4.8.2.2).

How and why Turkish accession to the EU fell 'victim' to the Franco-German axis, the national interests of these countries and the ‘trade-off’ which both states engaged in have been already analysed (see Chapter 4.3). With regard to the Franco-German position, Chancellor Merkel of Germany supported French President Sarkozy in his refusal to open the chapter on Turkey's participation in the Single European Currency. Sarkozy reciprocated by demonstrating a positive stance towards the Treaty of Lisbon in the EU Summit of June 2007(Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 2007). However, Turkish accession to the EU is not just a 'victim' of external factors, it is also a 'victim' of Turkey's own internal problems, which present impediments to rapid structural change\textsuperscript{64}. The impediments to rapid structural change in Turkey were expressly mentioned on March 11, 2009 by

\textsuperscript{63} The efforts of the US to install antiballistic missile systems on the territory of Czech Republic and Poland gave rise to an ambivalent discussion between EU member-states, the US and Russia. The Russians clearly view the installation of such antiballistic systems as a way of serving US interests in Europe (Shanker 2007). At the same time, one may allege that this action is a new step, one expected to reconnect the European and especially the EU defence system to that of the US.

\textsuperscript{64} Reference has already been made in Chapter 4.8.2 to the political and constitutional crisis from which Turkey suffered before the Parliamentary and Presidential elections, as well as to the judicial ‘coup d'état’ against AKP.
MEP Ria Oomen-Ruitjen, during a Plenary Session debate on Turkish accession progress.

The political games which develop within the EU, having Turkish accession as their epicentre, are closely connected to the serving of national and common interests. In this respect, Q 19 of the survey queries whether ‘the decisions of the EU are taken according to national interests, common interests or both?’ Examination of Figure 4, which charts the responses to this question, leads one to make the following observations about the EU decision-making process:

a) 50% of the MEPs replied that decisions are taken in accordance with national interests.

b) 50% replied that decisions are taken in accordance with common interests.

c) A majority (81.3%) believes that the decisions of the EU are taken on the basis of both common and national interests.

In other words, decisions result from a combination of common and national interests. The process of decision-making is a matter of interaction between the policies and interests of the EU member-states. The EU functions as an international landscape where national interests are met. It is not a 'closed club'. Rather, it is part of the international system.
American engagement in European affairs and the influence that the US exercises on the decisions of the EU regarding Turkish accession to the EU have been testified by Joost Lagendijk (2007; Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp. 68-69). As Lagendijk stated, two years before the summit of December 16, 2004, in 2002, the US had begun exerting pressure on EU governments in order to push EU leaders to give the green light to the commencement of Turkish accession negotiations. (2007) On the other hand, US support for Turkish accession to the EU provides evidence for the allegation that Turkey will turn into a ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of the US (Laçiner, Özcan and Bal 2005, p.71). In other words, support for Turkish accession to the EU is a political position bearing a serious risk. In particular, one risk is that Turkey might serve American rather than common EU interests. Whether or not this is true depends on the extent of the convergence or the divergence between:

1) Turkish national interests on the one hand and common European interests on the other.
2) Turkish national interests on the one hand, and on the other, the national interests of EU member states of the EU, especially the leading countries.
3) Turkish national interests on the one hand and US interests on the other.

There is always another side of the coin. In the post-Cold War era, a new political and strategic web of relations has been created within the Caucasus region and Iraq, thereby affecting US-Turkish affairs. The alliance between the US and Turkey still exists. However, the refusal of Turkey to allow the US to pass through Turkish territory in order to invade Iraq in 2003, and some differences between Ankara and Washington on the Kurdish issue, may imply that Turkey does not completely agree with American foreign policy, and that their national interests are not entirely congruent (Larrabee 2008, p.9).

On top of this, there are those who allege that Turkey follows an independent policy devoid of the strong American influence of the past. Taking the above issues into account, these analysts raise the following question: Can Turkey become a ‘Fifth American Phalanx in the EU’ (Laçiner, Özcan and Bal 200, p. 71)? However, the situation is a complicated one. It might be argued that Turkey needs US support for the following reasons:

1) The US presence in Iraq and especially in northern Iraq can reduce the threat of PKK and of the creation of an independent Kurdish state, a scenario which could
have a domino effect that would irrevocably harm Turkish national interest\textsuperscript{67}. In addition, the US appears to support the Kurds of Northern Iraq even as it also backs Turkey in its fight the PKK, considered by the former and the EU as a terrorist party\textsuperscript{68} (Larrabee 2008, pp. 10-11). At the same time, "Iran has conducted military operations in 2004 in line with Turkey's requests" (Laçiner, Özcan and Bal 2005, p.58).

2) Turkey is opposed to Iranian aspirations of acquiring nuclear weapons for three main reasons: a) the threat of destabilising of the region, b) the threat of terminating the Turkish aspiration of becoming a regional power and c) the threat of getting involved in a post-Cold War nuclear arm race with Iran in order to preserve the balance of power (Larrabee 2008, p. 13).

At the same time, Turkey does not support massive military action against Iran for fear of destabilising the region. Moreover, it clearly takes into account the fact that Iran is the "second biggest supplier of natural gas to Turkey after Russia" (Larrabee 2008, p.11). Given these facts, Turkey's political refusal on supporting military action against Iran appears to approach the stance of the majority of EU member-states\textsuperscript{69} (Aras 2002, p. 47) However, if Iran continues its current policy of testing ballistic missile systems with the aim of becoming a nuclear power, Turkey will be obliged to follow American strategic options\textsuperscript{70}. At the same time, if it takes action against Iran, the US will need Turkish territory and support.

In any case, Turkey is a member of NATO and a reliable US ally. After the Russian-Georgian war of August 8-12, 2008, which brought with it the allegation that Europe is running the risk of 'going back to the future' to a political situation similar to that of the Cold War, Turkey enhanced its geo-strategic role in the wider Caucasus region. This development is not only connected to NATO Enlargement towards Georgia and Ukraine but also to relations between Russia and NATO, the US, the EU and EU

\textsuperscript{67} The Turks are afraid that if a Kurdish state is established in northern Iraq, they will face an increased Kurdish irredentism aiming at the annexation of part of Turkish territory inhabited by Kurds. In the context of the 'domino effect', one incident will bring the other, and thereby Turkey will run the risk of collapse or being found in big trouble.

\textsuperscript{68} In 2004, the Council of the EU included PKK in the list of terrorist organisations (wikipedia.com).

\textsuperscript{69} As Aras stated (2002) "an Iranian-Turkish-European natural gas pipeline project has been proposed. This project would take Iranian natural gas to Europe through Turkey" (p.47). This example can explain how states can be bound by national interests and why the Turkish national interest may not be completely in line with that of the US.

\textsuperscript{70} On July 7, 2008, Iranian TV showed pictures from ballistic missile systems tests, thereby causing the American reaction (Mooney 2008).
member states. By definition, it is also connected to the new EU Enlargement and the Turkish role as a close ally of the US. 

The assertion can therefore be made that after a further EU Enlargement, one which will include Turkey, the pro-American block within the EU will become stronger, respectively or irrespectively of the strategic conception of the “three American wedges on the European back”. It does not, therefore, come as a surprise that in response to Q11, ‘According to your opinion which are the reasons behind the stance of some Europeans, who do not wish to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member state?’, the majority (53%) of MEPs answered that Turkey will become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of the US. (Figure 5). This view of Turkey as a ‘Trojan Horse’ results from US influence on EU decision-making and from the American position toward and support for Turkish accession to the EU (see Chapter 5.2.1). In addition, there is yet another reason: that of the historically close relations between the US and Turkey, and the inclination of new member states toward the US, many of whom follow a pro-American policy, especially on security issues. This pro-American political position is reflected, among other ways, in the installation of American antiballistic missile systems in the Czech Republic and Poland (US Today 2007; Russianforces.org 2006; APF 2007).

71 The political atmosphere of tension between the US and Russia offered Turkey the opportunity to provide a balance between the two ‘superpowers,’ thanks to its pivotal geostategic location. In times of crisis, it is very important for the US to have a strong and embattled army like that of Turkey by its side (see Chapter 4.9.2). The US cannot afford to lose Turkey, even though Ankara has already established commercial and economic interests with Moscow. At the same time, Turkey cannot align with Russia in the event of the latter flirting with Iran. If Russia further strengthens its relations with Iran, such a development may be considered as presenting an increased threat for Turkey, thereby encouraging it to more deeply align itself with the US. Therefore, a rational game of interests and influence is already under way in the context of controlling energy resources (see Chapter 4.9.2).

72 Britain is a traditional ally of the US, and its policy vis-à-vis the EU is imbued with scepticism. For the British, NATO has the primary role. At the same time, the safeguarding of their sovereignty within the EU is also of utmost importance. The views and interests of the British regarding issues of security and foreign affairs are mostly in line with those of the US. At the same time, they refused to participate in the Euro zone. Inspired their lost Imperial identity, the British is supporters of ‘Real Politic’. Furthermore, their geographical location situates them as an American “wedge” located in the northwest. After the EU Enlargement of May 1, 2004, there was a tendency of central European countries to function as other American ‘wedges’ in the heart of Europe. As a result of agreements signed between Poland and the US on the deployment of antiballistic missile systems, Polish security was placed under the American shield (MFA of Republic of Poland 2008; Hildreth & Ek 2008, pp. 6-8). In the case of Turkish accession to the EU, a third American ‘wedge’ will appear in the European soft belly, on the south-eastern side. Although the puzzle is incomplete, this is a scenario which is not so far from reality. Such a situation is related to US efforts during the NATO Summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008 to establish a roadmap for incorporating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and therefore isolating Russia geo-strategically. In other words, this American policy tends to justify the thesis of Richard Holbrook, former US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, as set forth in his 1995 article ‘America, a European Power’.

73 The US wishes to establish missile systems on the territories of both the Czech Republic and Poland, thereby preventing possible terrorist threats from looming over Europe and the world in general. However, Russia fears that these missiles might be turned against it in the future. At the same time,
5.2.1 Defence Deficit, Soviet Syndrome and Babylon State

The EU is currently experiencing the consequences of two recent Enlargements. Some EU countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, are increasingly ‘flirting’ with the US. This is especially the case given two factors: the EU ‘defence deficit’ and the ‘soviet syndrome’. These terms may be understood as follows: the EU does not yet have an adequate or reliable European defence system, nor does it have defence Institutions or an army upon which member states can credibly rely for their security. In light of these deficiencies, European citizens have good reason for not feeling safe. There is, in fact, a ‘defence deficit,’ one filled by NATO and even more by the US. Meanwhile, the countries of the former Soviet block feel insecure. They always have in mind the Russian threat, and in the context of a preventive policy they want to be supported by a reliable military power. They consider that the only military powers able to offer them security are those of the US and NATO. This explains why the Czech Republic and Poland have both established constructive dialogue with the US to install antiballistic missile systems on their territories.

On August 20, 2008, the American and Polish governments signed an agreement providing for the establishment of an anti-ballistic antimissile system. The signing came just after the ceasefire between Russia and Georgia and within the polarised climate of tension and the fear of returning to the Cold War Era. Among other things, the agreement charges the US with the “duty to defend Poland in the event of a ballistic missile attack” (MFA of the Republic of Poland 2008). This phrase illustrates the extent of American engagement with and influence over European affairs. The entire political situation also manifests the above-mentioned ‘security deficit’ and ‘Soviet syndrome’, which one may allege that emerged once again on the European scene after the Russian invasion of Southern Ossetia (Boot 2008, p. 15; Baran 2008, p.15).

missile systems will consolidate and enhance the American geo-strategic presence in Europe despite the end of the Cold War and the absence of the Soviet threat.

74 The European defence deficit focuses, among other things, on the issue of infrastructures. No EU-led operation may be successfully concluded unless it uses NATO infrastructure. The ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement provides the rules upon which defensive NATO and EU relations are based. (NATO 2006).

75 The American argument was that this antiballistic missile system was to be installed in order to protect Europeans from rogue states with a technological capacity to manufacture nuclear bombs. On the other hand, Russia strongly opposed the installation of such an antiballistic missile system. As President Bush stated, the US is planning to install 10 interceptors in Poland and radar operations in Czech Republic (Shanker 2007).
Such an action as the Russian invasion can be seen as a reaction to the US plan to integrate Georgia into NATO and thereby isolate Russia geo-strategically. As the agreement states, Poland is to be placed under the American Antimissile Defence System (MFA of the Republic of Poland, 2008). Such a political scene demonstrates the complicated relations between the EU, its member-states, the US and Russia. Such complicated relations are ruled by conflicting national interests, as follows:

a) The interests of member states on the one hand versus the interests common to all parties on the other (such common interests are defined in the context of efforts towards regional integration).

b) The interests of the EU member-states versus those of the US or even of Russia.

Turkish accession to the EU is a primary goal of the US. At the same time, Turkish accession to the EU must be seen in the context of its potential impact on the cohesion of the EU and political and strategic bilateral relations between the US and EU member-states. Considering that these relations are ruled by conflicting and convergent national interests, we may conclude that regional integration of the EU might run the risk of becoming trapped in a Babylonian situation. Such a situation

76 There are voices in Russia, such as that of military expert Anton Surikov, which maintain that the US aims to surround Russia. As Surikov stated: “We are witnessing US intensive efforts to create a sanitary cordon around Russia in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. The euphemism for this plan is creating a so-called ‘Eurasian transport corridor.’ Our duty is to counteract these plans” (Surikov, cited in Aras 2005, p.20).

77 On the 26 of September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev delivered a statement understood to convey the message that if the Americans and the western countries wish to have a war, they will have it (CNN News, 2008; ERT SAT, 2008). This was in the headlines of various TV channels, including CNN, BCC and ERT Sat. It also constituted a statement in support of the view of going back to the Cold War political climate.

78 Following the crisis in Caucasus (August 8-12, 2008), Russia, indeed, plays a role of an external, power in EU affairs. However, it cannot directly affect EU decisions on Turkish accession to the EU. On the other hand, in analysing the volatile political environment emerging after the crisis in Caucasus, I note the following:

a. If Russia is deemed a threat to the European interests, the supporters of Turkish accession to the EU could put forward the following argument: We must integrate Turkey into the EU, as its alliance is necessary to prevent the Russian threat. Such a threat hearkens back to the Cold War era, but has a new geostrategic, economic, commercial and political identity. Moscow acts within the international system by employing the rules of capitalism, tailored to its interest and to the peculiarities of the Russian political system.

b. If Russia is not considered a threat, the decision regarding Turkish accession to the EU will be mainly defined within the framework of EU relations on the one hand and US and NATO relations on the other, as the latter are external actors who nonetheless play a part in the EU. Hence, whether, to what extent and how Russia will affect the Turkish accession to the EU positively or negatively is a matter connected to the interests of the EU and its member states on the one hand and those of Turkey in relation to Russian and American interests on the other.

79 Babylonian situation: Chaotic, incomprehensible situation. On July 10, 2008, during the EP Plenary Session, MEP Jean Marie Le Pen stated that the EU is becoming “a new Babylonian state found on the ruins of the national identities of the member states”. Le Pen alleged that the EU cannot function in such
would hamper regional integration, and prevent the EU from creating one common voice on sensitive and important issues. Therefore, the weakness of not having a European common policy on important issues places EU political cohesion at risk.

In light of this I note the following:

1. The creation of a 'Babylonian state' may threaten the cohesion of the EU. Why? According to the 'theory of Babylon' the more the states which join the EU, the less is the possibility for regional EU integration. The problem becomes more severe in the case that a state, which is characterised by 'democratic deficit', different system of values and economic problems, joins the EU. This is why the argument of the 'Babylonian situation' may be used by those who do not support Turkish accession to the EU. How Turkey is related to the 'Babylonian state'? Turkey has a large territorial size and population. According to a European Parliament research (2006a) presented in Chapter 4.7. Turkish accession to the EU will cause problems on cohesion policy and furthermore on EU cohesion (For a definition on the difference between EU cohesion policy and the cohesion of the EU, see Chapter 2.4). At the same time, the creation of a 'Babylonian state' is further encouraged through the existence of conflicting national interests, an issue already examined in this Chapter (National interest constitutes one of the main variables related to EU cohesion). The significance of national interests has been also presented in Chapter 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 in the context of theories of International Relations.

2. The European 'defence deficit' is connected to the cohesion of the EU and Turkish accession to the EU. Why? As it has been already seen in Chapter 4.9.2, Turkey has the largest army in Europe and thereby it will have a strong political say within the institutions of the EU in case that Ankara joins the EU as a full member state. Therefore, this issue falls under the concept of 'power game' which is one of the main theoretical issues of this project (see Chapter 2.3.2) able to affect both Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion. Both national interest and 'power game' are relevant to the question of whether the leading European countries are ready to share their power - which they enjoy within the EU - with Turkey. Analysis on national interests is already presented in Chapter 2.3.2, where I explained theories of Realism and Structural Realism as the main theoretical background of this project. The other theoretical background is Functionalism and Neo- Functionalism. In this concept, it is also important to examine the bloody incidents in Georgia in summer 2008. Such incidents and others -as for example, the current economic crisis - constitute unpredictable developments able to negatively influence European affairs and Turkish accession to the EU. On this point, I refer to the following example: as a result of a military or economic crisis, European economy may be negatively affected and member states or even Institutions of the EU may argue that the EU can not absorb new member states. The excuse might be the possibility of putting EU cohesion at risk.

3) The crisis in Georgia and the strategic relations between the US and Czech Republic, both, are incidents, which reveal the dominant role of the US within Europe. They are also incidents, which are connected to the balance of power and the redistribution of power within Europe. This redistribution of power can affect, at least, the political cohesion of the EU. Structural changes and redistribution of power are of great importance regarding the aims of this project.

4) The 'Soviet syndrome' explains why member states of the EU support the US as an external actor of the EU and how the US influences European geo-strategic issues. The US affects the Turkish accession to the EU and such a development may be put forward as an argument against Turkish accession to the EU under the allegation that Turkey may play the role of a Trojan horse on behalf of the US. The presentation and in-depth analysis of the aforementioned issues is needed in order to enhance the validity of this research.
5.3 Negative Reasons

The fear that Turkey could become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of US national interests is only one of the reasons given by those who do not wish to see Turkey join the EU. The answers to Q11 (see Figure 5) identify a number of other reasons put forward by the MEPs for opposing Turkish accession to the EU. The MEP’s answers to the question were as follows:

1) Turkey's Muslim character. 75.4% agreed and 24.6% disagreed.
2) The role of the Turkish army in the political system. 73.8% agreed and 26.2% disagreed.
3) The fact that leading countries of the EU are not ready to share with Turkey the power they now enjoy in the EU. 67.7% agreed and 32.3% disagreed.
4) The unresolved Cyprus issue. 67.7% agreed and 32.3% disagreed.
5) Negative stereotypes. 58.5% agreed and 41.5% disagreed.
6) Extra burden on cohesion policy. 58.5% agreed and 41.5% disagreed.
7) The flow of Turkish immigrants to the EU. 56.9% agreed and 43.1 disagreed.
9) Prejudice against Turkey. 55.4% greed and 44.6% disagreed.
10) Turkey is seen as the US’s ‘Fifth Phalanx’. 53.8% agreed and 46.2% disagreed.
11) Political instability. 53.8% agreed and 46.2% disagreed.
13) Turkey's economic weakness. 52.3% agreed and 47.7 disagreed.
14) The strengthening of the status of the Turkish immigrants already residing in the EU. 52.3% agreed and 47.7% disagreed.
15) Cultural differences. 46.2% agreed and 53.8% disagreed.
16) Turkish foreign policy. 41.5% agreed and 58.5% disagreed.
Taking these results into account, one can see that the list is reduced from 16 to 14 reasons, as the MEPs answered negatively on the factors of culture and foreign policy. That is, they do not consider cultural differences and Turkey's foreign policy as reasons to oppose Turkish accession to the EU. However, taking into account the analysis of Chapter 4 in relation to the answers to Q 11, one could conclude that there are some parameters within which Turkish cultural factors might be viewed as negatively impacting the cohesion of the EU. As outlined in Chapter 4, the factors and variables capable of affecting the cohesion of the EU, include negative stereotypes, prejudice against Turkey, immigration, syndromes like that of Vienna, religion and racism. These factors are causally connected to the issue of cultural differences.

On this point, two observations can be made:  
First, a majority (67.7%) of respondents support the statement that the unsolved Cyprus issue is one of the main reasons for opposing Turkish accession to the EU. Indeed, eight Turkish accession chapters have been frozen by European Council
decisions because of this issue (Council of the EU 2006a). The Cyprus issue is integrally related to Turkish foreign policy due to the fact that Turkish troops have been occupying the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. Furthermore, Turkey is engaged in 'border disputes' with Greece in the Aegean Sea and with the Kurds in Northern Iraq (Oomen-Ruitjen 2007; Oomen-Ruitjen 2008; Council of the EU 2006a).

However, 58.5% of the MEPs do not consider that Turkish foreign policy, and the way Ankara exercises it, constitutes a negative factor towards Turkish accession to the EU. This answer is relevant to that of Question 13 of the questionnaire (Figure 7 below) referring to the geo-strategic and geopolitical position of Turkey as well as to the stabilising role that Ankara can play in the region (Rehn 2007b; Chapters 4.8.2.2; 4.9; 4.9.1 and 4.9.2). A majority (87.7%) of respondents consider that Turkey should join the EU due to its significant geo-strategic and geopolitical position. Furthermore, a majority (73.8%) of respondents support the statement that Turkish accession to the EU will bring political stability both to the country and the region. Therefore, some Europeans connect the geo-strategic and geopolitical role of Turkey to their national and common European interests. Other countries, like France and Germany, take a negative view of the Turkish role in the EU, and see Turkish accession to the EU as standing in opposition to their national interests. Both of these states, numbered among the leading European countries, try to promote their own policy within the EU and to identify their national interests with the common European ones. In other words, they attempt to dress their national interests in a European costume.

---

81 On this point, one may raise the following questions: how can Ankara play such a central role, while not possessing the necessary financial power to address relevant issues? What about Turkey’s own political instability and the overall role of the Turkish military in domestic issues? Although Turkey has internal economic and political problems, it is still considered a strong military-regional power. Its army is the second largest in NATO and the largest in Europe (see the analysis in Chapter 4.9.2 of Turkish strategic advantages and why the US and some European countries view Turkey as both an indispensable ally and a stabilising factor in the region). In addition, one may recall that Commissioner Rehn called Turkey the "beacon of a moderate Islam" (Rehn 2007b).

82 On this point one should note that the political stance of France and Germany results from two factors. First, both in France and in Germany the President and the Chancellor belong to the right wing parties. If the leftists-socialists come to power then it is likely that we will see a new political approach to Turkish accession to the EU. Second, in both Germany and France a huge majority of public opinion is against Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, even if the politicians wish to express a different political position they can not oppose the peoples' political will (see Chapter 4.3 and 4.4).

83 Article 23 of the EU Council Presidency Conclusions (2004, p. 7) opened the window for the 'third road'. In other words, the decision is clear about the unclear future of the Turkish accession to the EU. The Presidency Conclusions document supports the idea that Turkish accession to the EU is an 'open ended' process. Paragraph 23 includes an additional phrase stressing that in case negotiations do not come to a successful end, the EU should find other ways to anchor Turkey within the EU.
In light of these facts, the following can be noted: the majority of the MEPs consider the Cyprus issue as an argument against Turkish accession to the EU. However, they are ready to turn a blind eye to this matter and to support the position that the Turkish foreign policy might bring political stability to the region. But there is another explanation for this European attitude: the idea that Turkish accession to the EU will transform Turkey into a moderate democratic state, one more flexible and capable of resolving its problems with neighbouring countries than before. According to the answers to Q 23, ‘According to your opinion, for what reasons is Turkey undertaking reforms?’, 55.4% support the statement that one of the main reasons Turkey is undertaking reforms is its desire to establish a moderate state (Figure 21). Therefore, one may witness a conflict between respect for human rights and international law on the one hand and the obligation to serve national interests on the other. On the one hand, Europeans know and realise that the illegal presence of the Turkish troops in Cyprus systematically violates international and European laws, values and principles. However, on the other hand, they are guided by their national and common interest to tolerate the illegal reality in Cyprus under the pretext that efforts are being carried out to find a comprehensive solution.

The Turkish side alleges that in 1974, the Turkish army did not invade Cyprus but rather intervened in response to the ‘coup d'état’ organised by the Greek Junta. It asserts that the ‘intervention’ was aimed at restoring Constitutional order and protecting Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, Ankara alleges that the Turkish troops brought peace in Cyprus. However, these troops violated the Charter of the UN, the principle of human rights, and the values upon which the EU is founded. They are still occupying Cyprus. If we take into account its small size, Cyprus is one of the most militarised regions in the world (UNSC 2003). At the present time, the Republic of Cyprus is a member state of the EU. Yet Turkey refuses to recognise it. This is why the EU issued, on the September 21, 2005, a declaration making clear that Turkey should recognise the Republic of Cyprus and that such recognition is a precondition for Turkish accession to the EU (Council of the EU 2005a).

At this point, I must note that the unresolved Cyprus issue constitutes a negative factor in the question of Turkish accession to the EU. It is true that the purpose of this research is to examine whether the Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not, and the unsolved Cyprus issue does not fit directly in the list of variables that could negatively affect the cohesion of the EU. However, due to the fact that this issue falls within the spectrum of human rights violations and International and European laws and principles, the member-states of the EU could eventually use the issue to allege that Turkey is not a democratic country and that its accession to the EU will threaten not only the system of European values and principles but the very cohesion of the EU. Therefore, a solution of the Cyprus issue in line with the principles and the values upon which the EU is founded will facilitate Turkish accession to the EU, and will prevent those who do not want Turkey to join the EU as full member state from using the unresolved Cyprus issue as an argument against Turkish accession. Consequently, the unsolved Cyprus issue can be considered a variable of conflicting national interests between the member states and Turkey, or between member states on the one hand and Turkey and the EU on the other.

Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn (2.4.2008) stated during a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs that the responsibility for the solution to the Cyprus problem belongs to the leaders of the two Communities. In fact, the Commissioner avoided making any reference to the responsibility of Turkey for the solution, despite its role as an occupying force in Cyprus since 1974 (Charalampidis 2008; Xanthoulis 2008).
Secondly, a majority (53.8%) considers that cultural differences are not an argument against Turkish accession to the EU. This may be interpreted as evidence of an absence of racism on the part of Europeans. However, this conclusion does not address the issue of immigration. Problems stemming from immigration are among the most significant issues confronting the EU. These problems include unemployment and xenophobia (see Chapter 4.4). In the case of Turkey, the immigration issue is accentuated by the fact that an estimated 4 million Turkish workers are expected to migrate to richer European countries when Turkey becomes full member-state of the EU (Lenski in Group EPP-ED 2004, p. 3). Taking into account the fact that there are already thousands of Turkish nationals residing in Europe, especially in Germany (Erzan, Kuzubas & Yildiz 2004) and taking into account as well the results of the survey (Figure 1) showing that prejudice still exists against Turkey, reflected in negative stereotypes about Turkish Muslim character, one may come to the following conclusions:

a) The majority of Europeans are afraid that Turkish accession to the EU will strengthen the status of Turkish nationals already residing in Europe.

b) Turkey has a good reason to allege that Europeans have not overcome their fears about Muslims and that they still consider the EU as a 'Christian Club' (Johnson 1999; Lugo, Davidson, & Pirzio-Biroli 2005).

c) The vast majority of Europeans are afraid that Turkish accession to the EU will create social and economic problems related to immigration and unemployment (see Figure 1 above; Chapter 4.4).

5.4 Leading Countries and Power-Sharing

One of the main questions raised by this project is whether leading European countries are ready to share their EU power with Turkey or not. In this section, I analyse the opinions of the MEPs on this crucial matter.

Question 12 asks, 'If in Q 11, option 2 is chosen (i.e. that the leading countries within the EU are not ready to share their power with Turkey), please specify, which kind of

---

87 With regard to prejudice and negative stereotypes, one may recall the Vienna Syndrome analysed in Chapter 4.4.
In response to this question, a majority (67.7%) considers that the leading countries of the EU are not ready to share the power they enjoy in the EU with Turkey.

![Figure 6: The kinds of power which, according to MEPs, leading EU countries are not ready to share with Turkey.](chart)

Analytically, and according to Figure 6 above, it can be stressed that:

1) A majority (60%) considers that the leading EU countries are not ready to share their EU institutional power with Turkey. A minority (40%) holds the opposite opinion. Institutional power is related to the political power that member-states possess within the EU. This answer justifies the conclusions already reached about the conflicting national interests and the 'power game' still existing within the EU. The leading countries of the EU are not ready to share their institutional, political and economic power with Turkey. This is one of the main conclusions reached by the survey.

2) A majority (52.5%) supports the statement that the leading countries of the EU are not ready to share their economic power with Turkey. A minority (47.5%) considers that the leading countries are ready to share economic power with Turkey in the context of the EU.

Data shows that if Turkey joins the EU as full member state it will be institutionally, the second most powerful country within the EU. This assessment is based on the existence of the blocking vote and on the way that the member states take decisions on the level of the European Council (Chapter 4.10). However, there is another aspect one may focus on: Due to its territorial and demographic size, Turkey will...
have, after Germany, the second largest delegation of MEPs in the European Parliament. In this context, Turkey will acquire political and institutional power beyond that it will enjoy on the level of the European Council. The argument that Turkey will possess extra political and institutional power is grounded on the following fact: Pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the competence of the European Parliament, its political power, its legal power and its institutional power will increase. The impression created by the survey data is that the leading EU countries do not want Turkey to join the EU because they are afraid of losing their power, and because their national interests will be at stake. Therefore, one may maintain that Turkish accession to the EU does not depend only on the objective criteria the EU has determined for Turkey, but also on political criteria. In this context, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that Turkey should acquire a ‘privileged partnership,’ not full membership (see Chapter 4.3) According to Joost Lagendijk (2007):

When Turkey becomes member it will be, probably, the biggest member with regard to size and population. This means that in the new system, Turkey will be a big player in the Council.

Noting that Turkey is approximately the size of Germany, Mr. Lagendijk observed that according to the rules of the EU one or two states can not in fact block a policy or push through policies, but it is clear that Turkey will be a dominant player. And I think this is one of the reasons why especially France is not very happy. France is one of the one or two big players and if Turkey joins the EU, then France will lose its influence in the EU (2007).

3) A majority (65.6%) supports the statement that the leading countries of the EU are not ready to share their political power in the EU with Turkey. A minority (34.4%) expressed opposition. The view here is based on the fact that political power is related to economic and military power. Moreover, should the EU truly wish to play a global political role, economic power is not enough. As Lagendijk said: "if we want to be players, it is good to have Turkey because we will be stronger on the global scene" (2007). The EU must enhance the functionality and capabilities of its Institutions, in particular those belonging to the common defence and foreign policy. In other words, the EU must enhance the pillar of political integration. Turkish military power is closely connected to the European Security Defence Policy (ESDP). On this point, it should be noted that the issues of Common Defence and Foreign Policy

---

88 The question is whether the EU will find the formula to break the deadlock created by the Irish “no” on the referendum of June 13, 2008.
89 European Security Defence Policy (ESDP)
are related to the global role that the EU wishes to play. At the same time, Turkey, which has a huge military budget and the biggest and one of the most embattled armies in Europe, is a significant player in the geo-strategic and geopolitical game. (Chapter 4.9.1;4.9.2). On the one hand, the fact that Turkey has a strong army which will participate in EU missions through large contributions is a positive factor. On the other hand, such contributions can offer a member-state a strong political say within the Institutions of the EU, especially in the context of the ESDP (see Chapter 4.9.2). In light of this evidence, one may question why the leading countries would want Turkey to join the EU as a full member-state, given the fact that Turkey will be able to use its army even in the context of a ‘privileged partnership’? Why should they bring Turkey into the EU ‘power game’?

5.5 Positive Reasons

Supporters of Turkish accession to the EU provide a number of answers to the aforementioned questions. Q 13 asks, 'According to your opinion, which are the reasons behind the stance of some Europeans to support that Turkey should join the EU as a full member state?' In response, a majority (87.7%) answered that one of the main arguments of those who support Turkish accession to the EU is the importance of the Turkish geo-strategic and geopolitical position in Eurasia. A percentage (12.3%) held a negative position on this issue (Figure 7).

![Figure 7: The reasons given for supporting the entrance of Turkey to the EU as a full member state](image-url)
Another relevant question and answer on this point concerns the stabilising role that Turkey could play in the region. Reading the results of Question 13, Figure 7, it can be observed that:

1) A majority (70.8%) supports the idea that Turkey, as a Muslim democratic country, could become a model for other Muslim countries in the region. A smaller percentage (29.2%) answered negatively.

2) A majority (73.8%) supported that Turkish EU membership would bring stability within the countries of the region. A percentage (24.6%) held the opposite position.

Joost Lagendijk (2007) stated that Turkey would not be a model but rather an example in helping the countries of the region. At the same time, speaking about the geo-strategic role of Turkey, he said that Turkey will provide ‘a buffer zone’ between the EU and the Middle East. Similarly, Professor Yunus Emre Gönen (2007) from the Social Sciences Institute and European Studies Program of the Istanbul Bilgi University, interviewed for the purposes of this project, stated that

*the Turkish model can not be exported and Turkey can play only a role model if you wish to establish a 'Laïcité Republic' (for the countries of its region). It will be an example that such a thing is possible and ultimately these societies do have a chance if properly governed for instance.*

Other reasons in support of Turkish accession to the EU put forward in the survey include the following:

1) A majority (69.2%) considers that Turkey must join the EU because its large size provides the promise of a large economic market. This is one side of the coin. However, there is another side to the issue, one which has been already analysed in Chapter 4.4. Turkey is the seventh biggest market for the EU and the EU is the biggest market for Turkey. At the same time, the EU would be perceived as providing an opportunity for young Turks to immigrate to the EU. The implications of such immigration could be put forward as reasons to oppose Turkish accession to the EU for the reasons already analysed here and in Chapter 4.4. These reasons include economic problems, especially unemployment. A huge part of the European population bases their views on Turkish immigration to the rest of the EU on prejudicial stereotypes of Muslims and Turks, and link social and economic problems in the EU to Muslim immigrants. Since Turks are Muslims, they are considered to play a role in these problems, or to be a factor contributing to such problems (see analysis in Chapter 4.4). These prejudicial views could have ramifications for EU cohesion should Turkey join the EU.
On the other hand arguments put forward by both Turkey and the European supporters of Turkish accession to the EU include the following: a) Turkey has a big economy, and b) the young Turkish population can revive the ageing European Society. However, this second point is a 'Delphic Sword' due to the prejudice of the Europeans against Turkey and the 'power game' which does not allow Turkey to share European power with the leading countries of the EU, especially France and Germany. In addition, the historically close relations between Turkey and the US - reflected among others in the strong public American support for Turkish accession to the EU- make Europeans more suspicious of Turkish accession. Therefore, some of them consider Turkey to be the American 'Fifth Phalanx' within the EU. On this point, it is important to note what Professor Yunus Emre Gönen (2007), of Istanbul Bilgi University, stated during an interview for the purposes of this research: "we will not make war with the US in order to show that we are not their Fifth Phalanx!" And he added: "Turkey cannot wait for ever the EU to give the green light in order to become full member. The EU should respect the procedure and the decisions by taking Turkey in. In other words, it is a matter of political will". And he added: "if the Turkish economy becomes strong and healthy, there will be no reason for Turkey to join the EU".

2) A majority (50.8%) supports the idea that one of the benefits of Turkey joining the EU is its cheap labour. An explanation for this opinion is that Europeans view Turkey in the same way that Americans used to consider the countries of the Far East. This view of Turkey as a source of cheap labour is related to the estimate that Turkey will need forty years in order to catch up with European economic standards (see Chapter 4.6.3). At the same time, this political stance is also based on the huge disparities between the big Turkish cities on the one hand and the poor rural regions suffering from high unemployment rates, on the other.\(^{90}\) Such a situation makes the Europeans conclude that Turkey is and will be a place of cheap labour. On this point, an important factor should be noted: One of the main reasons for cheap labour is not only the lower (compared to the EU) Turkish standards of living, but also

---

\(^{90}\) During the meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 7, 2005, the Mayor of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir asserted that there are regions in South Eastern Turkey where unemployment is higher than 65% and inflation is around 39%, and where the people of the region cannot feel safe due to the presence of the Turkish army.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

the ‘democratic deficit’, evidenced in part through the lack of reliable legislation to protect children’s rights. As a result of the illegal exploitation of children in the market as cheap labour, the EU urges Turkey to improve legislation on children rights (see Chapter 4.8.2.3).

3) Only a small minority (15.4%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will enrich European cultural identity. This answer is linked to the responses given to Question 11 (Figure 5) on the Turkish Muslim character. In response to that question, a majority (75.4%) considered the Turkish Muslim character as a negative factor affecting the desirability of accepting Turkish accession to the EU. 84.6% answered that Turkish accession to the EU would not enrich European cultural identity. However, this answer is also related to that given to Q11 as to whether cultural differences are a negative factor affecting Turkish accession to the EU. A majority (53.8%) considered this not to be a negative factor. One can allege that this reply shows that there are no racist feelings against Turkey in Europe. At the same time, however, Europeans seem to feel that Turkey does not have much to offer culturally. A question must therefore be posed: is this a sign of European cultural superiority?91

5.6 Turkish Contribution to the EU and the Strengthening of the EU Position in the Global System

Question 14 is important in the context of assessing Turkish contribution to the EU position: ‘Will the accession of Turkey to the EU contribute to the strengthening of the EU position on the global system?’ Positive answers totalled 60% and negative responses totalled 33.8% (Figure 8).

91 As analysed in Chapter 4.4, Europeans possess by negative stereotypes of Turkish people. Such negative feelings may negatively affect European willingness to endorse Turkish accession to the EU.
In the context of the power game, the argument that Turkey will strengthen the EU globally has two sides:

First: The idea that Turkey will strengthen the EU position globally constitutes a positive argument for Turkey's supporters in the EU. Within this framework, advocates of Turkish accession to the EU point toward Turkey's important geo-strategic and geo-political location as their main argument (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2008d). By definition, the importance of Turkey's geopolitical and geo-strategic position is related to its military strength, energy resources, economy and commerce.

Second: The statement that Turkey’s accession to the EU will strengthen the position of the EU globally can also constitute a negative argument for those who do not support Turkish accession to the EU. Why? A strengthened EU, as a result of Turkish accession to the EU, means that Turkey will be, by definition, one of the most powerful and leading countries of the EU (scenarios analysed in Chapter 4.10). In the context of the ‘power game’, the leading EU countries, especially France and Germany, do not wish to see a powerful Turkey joining the EU. They are not ready to
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

share their power with Turkey (Figure 5)\(^2\). In light of this, Turkish contribution to the EU can be transformed into a negative factor with regard to Turkish accession to the EU.

In addition, I note the following: in the event that the Turkish contribution to the EU is seen in positively, then, with the contribution of other factors -variables, it can positively affect the cohesion of the EU. One such variable could be the structural changes to be followed by both the EU and Turkey. Most important is Turkey's reform of the role of the army within the political system. Certainly, it takes two to tango. Therefore, the Europeans must move away from their negative stereotypes of Turkey and their prejudicial views of Turkish accession. As MEP Lagendijk (2007) points out, politicians and the media should do direct their best efforts towards this goal. On the other hand, if Turkish accession to the EU is viewed negatively, then Turkish inclusion in the EU can negatively affect EU cohesion. This will especially be true if Turkey cannot positively respond to the reforms required by the EU for full member-state status, or if the EU, for its own reasons – including problems of absorption capacity, conflicting national interests, negative stereotypes and lack of political will from European states to share power with Turkey- chooses not to integrate Turkey (see Chapter 4). Relevant to the above is Q15: If (answer to Q14 is) yes, to what extent? This question focuses on the areas in which the EU will be strengthened after Turkey's accession.

\(^2\) The political stance of France and Germany regarding Turkish accession to the EU currently relies on two main reasons: Firstly, public opinion in both countries is for the most part against Turkish accession to the EU as full member-state. Secondly, the governments of these two countries mostly belong to the right wing. Although in Germany there is a coalition between the right and the socialists, the Chancellor belongs to the right and has the first say on foreign policy, especially on crucial issues such as that of the accession to the EU. If the government changes, it is likely that the policy will change too. Certainly, this scenario might occur if public opinion and national interest impose different policies.
As for other areas in which it is thought that Turkey will contribute, the answers are the following (Figure 9):

1) 29.2% consider that Turkey will contribute economically to some extent; 12.3% consider it will contribute to a large extent. 18.5% answered that there will be little economic contribution by Turkey and 1.5% believed there will be very little contribution. 38.5% of the MEPs did not answer this question, either because they do not believe that Turkey's contribution in general is to strengthen the EU within the global system, or because they estimate that Turkey will not contribute to the EU economically or simply because they did not wish to commit themselves.

2) 35.4% consider that Turkey will contribute politically to some extent to the EU and 12.3% believe it will contribute to a large extent. 12.3% answered that Turkey's political contribution will be little. 40% of the MEPs chose not to answer this question, either because they believe that Turkish accession will not strengthen the EU within the global system or because they believe that there will be no political contribution by Turkey to the global position of the EU or simply because they did not wish to commit themselves.

3) 43.1% consider that Turkey will contribute militarily to the EU to some extent and 13.8% believe it will contribute to a large extent. 6.2% answered that there will be little military contribution. 36.9% of the MEPs chose not to answer this question, perhaps because they do not believe that Turkey's contribution will strengthen the
EU within the global system, or because they do not believe that Turkey can contribute to the EU militarily, or simply because they did not wish to commit themselves.

4) Taking into consideration the answers to this question, I note that 20% answered that Turkish cultural contribution to the EU will be little and 10.8% very little. The percentage of those who answered little and very little totals 39.8%. Only 23% supported the position that Turkish accession to the EU will contribute culturally to the EU to some extent. Just 1.5% considered that it would contribute culturally to a large extent. Regarding this point, it should be noted that Europeans believe that Turkish accession to the EU will not enrich European culture, and moreover hold negative views of Turkish religion and culture. In this context, one could allege that such an approach demonstrates either an arrogant European cultural attitude or the fact that Europeans still harbour negative stereotypes and prejudice (Chapter 4.4).

Analysing the results above, one can observe that many European MEPs (43.1%) believe that Turkey will make an important military contribution to the EU. This is the highest result in this set of questions. One may allege that the perception of the European MEPs is that Turkey constitutes a strong military power. Therefore, it seems that they believe that Turkey can play a key role in the European defence system. This conception is grounded on the following reasons: 1) Turkey has the biggest army in Europe and the second biggest army in NATO. 2) It makes an important military contribution to NATO-, UN- and ESDP-led military missions. 3) It has an embattled and experienced army (see Chapter 4; 4.9; 4.9.1 and 4.9.2). The relevance of these may be seen in the context of French President Nicola Sarkozy’s statement on July 10, 2008, during the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, that the EU should acquire “its own, even autonomous defence.” Moreover, he added, “the European defence system cannot be based on the contribution of four or five member-states.” Although, in principle, Sarkozy does not agree with Turkey’s full EU-membership and Ankara’s influential role in the institutions of the EU, Turkish accession to the EU may be considered by some Europeans as a means to partially resolve a number of the existing defence problems.
As a military press attaché\(^\text{93}\) in Brussels stated:

\[
\textit{there are member-states who want Turkey in for two main reasons: 1) its contribution }
\]
\[
to the ESDP and 2) the Turkish contribution will release the countries which do not
\]
\[
wish to contribute economically to the common European defence system from the
\]
\[
obligation to do so, or, at least, reduce their military expenditure (2007).}
\]

At the same time, in terms of the 'power game', such a military contribution maybe

\[
turned against Turkish accession. Turkey, as Joost Lagendijk (2007) maintained, will
\]
\[
become one of the dominant countries of the EU. Therefore, the interest of other
\]
\[
leading countries may be at stake, forcing them to vote against Turkish accession to
\]
\[
the EU or forcing them to believe that Turkish accession will threaten the EU
\]
\[
cohesion. Indeed, this is the answer given to the following question on whether
\]
\[
Turkey's accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU (see Chapter 5.9.1
\]
\[
and Figures 14, 15).
\]

5.7 Redistribution of Power

Redistribution of power is a key issue related to the contribution of Turkey to the EU,

\[
the balance of power, the new share of power, the conflicting, converging and
\]
\[
common national interests, the structural changes and the cohesion of the EU.
\]

Pursuant to the findings of the survey, in the event of Turkey's accession to the EU,

\[
redistribution of power will occur on the economic, military, political and institutional
\]
\[
levels. Relevant to this is Q16 'Will Turkish accession of the EU bring a redistribution
\]
\[
of power within the EU?' and the complementary Q16a on the extent of redistribution
\]
\[
of each kind of power.
\]

\(^{93}\) See footnote 35, Chapter 4.
The answers to these questions suggest the following (Figures 10 and 11):

1) A majority (75.4%) felt that Turkish accession to the EU will bring about an economic redistribution of power. A minority (15.4%) answered negatively. Those who supported the economic redistribution of power, 41.5% answered that such redistribution will occur to some extent; 13.8% replied that it will occur to a large extent, and 24.6% responded that little redistribution will occur. 20% preferred not to answer, perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the EU will not bring
about a redistribution of power in general or else will not bring about an economic redistribution of power.

2) A majority (84.6%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring about a redistribution of political and diplomatic power within the EU. Only 9.2% answered negatively. Out of those who replied positively, 58.5% consider that political redistribution will occur to some extent, 13.8% consider it will occur to a large extent and 13.8% held that little redistribution will occur. 13.8% preferred not to answer, perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the EU will bring neither a redistribution of power in general nor a political and diplomatic redistribution of power.

3) Certainly, political and diplomatic redistribution of power is relevant to military power. According to the results of the survey on this topic, a majority (84.6%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of military power. Only 9.2% answered no. 38.5% consider that military redistribution of power will occur to some extent, 27.7% believe it will occur to a large extent and 20% believe that the redistribution of power will be little. In other words, they support the position that Turkish accession to the EU will not bring a redistribution of military power. 3.1% preferred not to answer, perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the EU will bring neither a redistribution of power in general nor a diplomatic redistribution of power.

5.8 Structural Changes

This redistribution of power can enhance the global role of the EU, should Turkey continue its substantial military contributions to the ESDP (see Chapter 4.9.2). There is another factor supporting this political position, that of the Turkish pivotal geo-strategic location. Furthermore, the Turkish military forces and Turkish contributions to various military and civilian missions under the auspices of the EU enhance and will enhance Turkish political role and power, both institutionally and politically, for the reasons already explained in Chapter 4.10. The political say of a member-state, especially on the level of the Institutions of common defence and foreign policy, and more precisely within the context of the ESDP, is proportional to its military strength and to its contributions to EU, NATO or UN-sponsored missions (Chapter 4.9.2). It is
safe to say that Turkey will be one of the dominant European powers, not only due to its size, but also because of other relevant factors by which the strength of each member state is defined, such as economic, political, military and institutional power. As far as institutional power is concerned, a majority (81.5%) considers that Turkish accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power. (Figure 10) 41.5% believe that such redistribution will occur to some extent, 32.3% believe it will occur to a large extent and 10.8% believe that little redistribution will occur. 15.4% did not answer the question, perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the EU will bring neither a redistribution of power in general nor a diplomatic redistribution of power or simply because they did not want to commit (Figure 11). If Turkey joins the EU as full member-state, it will be the second most powerful country of the EU after Germany. If Turkey’s population surpasses that of Germany, it will institutionally be the most powerful state of the EU (see Chapter 4.10).

As has already been mentioned, the redistribution of power is related to the structural changes that Turkish accession will bring to the EU. This is a major reason for the huge debate prevailing across the EU over Turkish accession, a debate which focuses on the role of Institutions in founding a functional EU. The question posed is whether we will go towards a "wider or a deeper EU" (Lagendijk 2007). Certainly, the redistribution of power is also connected with the 'power game' within the EU. Turkey is not only part of the game, it plays a role in the balance of power between the member states of the EU and the resulting consequences, negative or positive, for EU cohesion in the event of Turkish accession. Therefore, on Q17 ‘According to your opinion, would Turkish accession to the EU lead or not to structural changes?’ (Figures 12 and 13), I received the following answers:

---

94 One of the main debates is whether we should have a wider or a deeper EU. In other words, if priority should be given towards expanding or/and enlarging Europe or whether we should first deepen the EU by making it economically, politically and socially strong and institutionally functional before proceeding to new Enlargements.

Ioannis Charalambides
1) A majority (75.4%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring military structural changes; 12.3% gave a negative answer. Out of those who answered yes, 44.6% consider that military structural changes will occur to some extent and 13.8% to a large extent. 18.5% believe that little structural changes will occur. 12.3% answered that they do not know.

2) A majority (89.2%) considers that political structural changes will occur. 63.1% considers that these political structural changes will occur to some extent, 13.3%
believe they will occur to a large extent and 16.9% believe that little political structural changes will occur. A minority (12.3%) answered no to the question that Turkey of whether bring political structural changes and 3.1% answered that they do not know.

3) A majority (87.7%) considers that Turkish accession to the EU will bring institutional structural changes. 46.2% believe that institutional structural changes will occur to some extent, 35.4% believe they will occur to a large extent and 7.7% believe that little institutional structural change will occur. 7.7% answered no and 4.6% said they do not know.

4) A majority (76.9%) considers that cultural structural changes will occur. 35.4% believe that these cultural structural changes will be realised to some extent, 36.9 to a small extent and 9.2% to large extent. A minority (16.9%) gave a negative answer and 4.6% answered that they do not know.

5) A majority (75.4%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring social structural changes. A minority (15%) answered no and 6.2% said they do not know.

6) A large majority (90.8%) considers that Turkish accession to the EU will bring about economic structural changes. 53.8% consider that such economic structural changes will occur to some extent, 21.5% believe they will occur to a large extent and 16.9% believe they will occur to a small extent. Only 3.1% answered that no changes will occur and 3.1% said that they do not know.

5.9 The Cohesion of the EU

The findings of Q17 on whether Turkish accession to the EU will lead to structural changes have been already presented above (Figures 12 and 13). The findings of this question are relevant to Q18 on whether such changes will threaten or strengthen the cohesion of the EU (Figure 14). This means that the structural changes as well as the redistribution of power are -according to the terms set out in theories of Realism and Structural Realism - theoretically and practically consistent with the cohesion of the international system or subsystem. On this point, it should be noted that I consider the EU as a subsystem of the global system. Therefore, as analysed in Chapter 2 (2.3.2 and 2.3.3) the redistribution of power and the structural
changes that could occur within a system or subsystem will bring a new balance or imbalance of power. Such an imbalance of power could threaten national interests, especially those of the leading countries of a system or subsystem. In light of this, in order to assess whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU, one must examine the following:

1) Turkey's contribution to the EU
2) Redistribution of power
3) Structural changes

### 5.9.1 The Threat

Topics 1 (Turkey's contribution to the EU) and 2 (Redistribution of power) have been already addressed. Therefore, I will focus on the answers to Q 18 (i.e. ‘Taking into consideration your response to question 17, will such changes potentially threaten or strengthen the cohesion of the EU?’—Figure 14)

![Figure 14: Effect of the potential structural changes on the cohesion of the EU due to Turkish accession.](image)

According to the answers to Q18 a majority (47.7%) believes that the structural changes that Turkey will bring to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU. A minority (35.4%) considers that Turkish accession to the EU will strengthen the
cohesion of the EU. 10.8 % answered 'do not know.' The percentage of those who ticked 'no answer' totals 4.6%.

Examining Figure 15 below, one can see that from the majority of 47.7% a smaller percentage (24.6%) considers that the cohesion of the EU will be threatened to some extent. 20% believe that the cohesion of the EU will be threatened to a large extent, 9.2% believe it will be threatened a little and only 1.5% feel it will be threatened to a very small extent. 4.6% did not give an answer to this question. On the other hand, a percentage of 35.4% believes that Turkish accession to the EU will strengthen the cohesion of the EU. Of these, 24.6% believe that such a strengthening will occur to some extent, 9.2% to large extent and 9.2% to a small extent.

Figure 15: Extent of effect of potential structural changes on EU cohesion

5.9.2 National Interests and Balance of Power

As has already been noted, Turkish contribution to the EU and the strengthening of the EU role in the global arena is one aspect of the argument. Two other aspects involve the redistribution of power and conflicting national interests, factors related to the cohesion of the EU. That is, Turkish contribution to the EU is one thing, and the
way that the leading and other member-states evaluate and measure it, as well as the political position they take on this, is another. The position that the contribution of Turkish accession to the EU will strengthen the EU in the global arena is justified by the following arguments: First, Turkey is a vital actor on the international scene and will play an indispensable part in the EU's global role. Second, if Turkey joins the EU it will be a leading and dominant power. However, the fact remains that the leading EU countries are not ready to share their EU power with Turkey. This political attitude results from the conflict of national interests within the EU which rule, to a large extent, the international system, even though the EU, functioning within the context of regional integration, seeks a code of minimum common national interests. The end result of this is what we call 'common European interests'.

In light of these common interests, it should be noted that if Turkish accession to the EU threatens to upset the existing balance of power, then those member-states whose interests are at stake will react, whether before or after accession. We have already noted the reactions of France, Germany and Austria as well as from other countries of the EU. Even if one considers that popular reactions result from, among other things, prejudice and xenophobia, leaders may be assumed to act rationally, in accordance with national interests, rather than in accordance with prejudice. If Turkey's accession results in structural changes which lead to the upsetting of the existing European balance of power, then it is logical to assume that the EU could run the risk of facing a crisis and/or a cohesion problem (see Chapter 6.4.4, Worst case scenario).

5.9.3 The Role of the US and Conflicting Interests

One cannot turn a blind eye to the role that the US plays within the EU and the global system. What might happen if the US insists on supporting the full Turkish membership despite the opposition of leading EU countries? First, a conflict among the member-states of the EU may occur between those who support Turkish accession to the EU and those who wish to offer Turkey a 'privileged partnership'. Among the leading countries, England's position is typically in line with that of US. Furthermore, some of the new member states, such as Czech Republic and Poland, typically choose to go along with US decisions. In such a situation things will not be
easy. The final decisions will depend on the national interests of each member-state, on the extent of US influence, and on the results of cost-benefit calculations in the context of a rational game.\(^95\) (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 135). Second, if both sides remain adamant, conflict among member-states of the EU may occur. Is it possible or not that the US might use Turkey to create a crisis in the EU? Might it exploit Turkish accession to the EU, playing upon the rifts created by conflicting European national interests?

5.9.4 Double Structural Changes

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned issues, the following can be stressed: Contribution to power leads to redistribution of power and to structural changes. These factors - variables not only affect the cohesion of the EU but also lead to new power-sharing arrangements. The combination of these factors-variables threatens to harm national interests, to upset the existing balance of power, and to destabilise the cohesion of the EU leading to a possible threat to the cohesion of the EU.

Therefore, these key questions must be addressed:
First, will the EU or not undertake such structural reforms in order to avoid upsetting the balance of power and threatening to EU cohesion? Certainly, structural, institutional and economic changes are not enough. If the member-states, especially the leading ones, have no political intention to integrate Turkey because they fear losing their power, then no one can predict whether Turkish accession will lead to internal trouble in the EU or not.
Second, will Turkey conclude or not the structural reforms required by the EU and by the contemporary economic and political international environment? If Turkey concludes the whole package of reforms, will the EU take it in as a full member-state? If not, will we have a crisis or not? At the same time, if Turkey does not conclude the reforms but joins the EU, will the EU cohesion be threatened or not?

\(^95\) As Morgenthau wrote, national interest has the last word in international politics (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 138).
In this context, it can be articulated that EU cohesion depends on structural changes that must be enacted from both sides, Turkey and the EU. Given that the absorption capacity of the EU is crucial to the success of the coming Enlargements, if the EU does not wish to see itself in trouble, then Turkey should be absolutely ready before joining the EU. The Turkish entry to the EU must not threaten the social, political and institutional stability, nor must it burden the budget of the EU, for, the EU cannot be expected to accept or take responsibility for Turkey's economic, political and 'democratic deficits.'

5.10 Democracy and Human Rights

Relevant to the cohesion of the EU are the concepts of human rights, transparency and the democratic system of values as they are described in the context of the Copenhagen criteria (Europa Glossary). All these factors are crucial to democracy, which is indispensable to, and underlies, EU cohesion. Therefore, my study measures opinions on issues such as respect for political rights, women's and children's rights, religious and minority rights and the right of freedom of expression. Pursuant to my analysis in Chapter 4, these topics constitute dependent variables, affecting the independent variable of the cohesion of the EU (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26-27).

5.10.1 Political Rights

Regarding Q 20, 'According to your opinion, to what extent are human rights respected in Turkey?' the answers we received are the following. On 'political rights', the majority (42.2%) answered that there is 'little' respect, 37.5% answered that they

---

96 Respect for human rights is a fundamental factor of EU cohesion and one of the main issues upon which the EU evaluates Turkey (European Commission 2007, pp. 18-19; Chapter 4.8.2.3). Respect for human rights is included in the Copenhagen criteria (Chapter 1, footnote 2), which Turkey must fulfill in order to become full EU member-state). This is why human rights are measured in my Survey. In fact, I try to investigate whether the MEPs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs consider human rights as an important factor of Turkish accession to the EU. According to the results of the Survey, there is no adequate respect for human rights in Turkey. In case that Turkey does not fully respect human rights, two things might happen: 1) Turkey will not join the EU as a full member-state. 2) If, nevertheless, Turkey joins the EU, the cohesion of the EU might be placed under threat (see also Chapter 6.4.5).
are respected to some extent, 10.9% specified 'very little' and 9.4% said they are respected 'to a large extent'. The answers of 'little' and 'very little' arrive at a percentage of 53.1%. 46.9% choose to answer 'to some extent' and 'to large extent' (Figure 16).

5.10.2 Women's Rights

Regarding respect for women's rights: 49.2% answered that in Turkey there is 'little respect,' 27% answered 'very little,' 17.5% specified 'to some extent' and 6.3% said they are respected to 'a large extent.' That is, a majority (76.2%) answered 'little' and 'very little' while 13.8% specified 'to some extent' and 'to a large extent' (Figure 16).

5.10.3 Religious Rights

Regarding respect for religious rights, 39.1% answered 'little,' 34.4% 'very little,' 20.3% 'to some extent' and 6.3% to 'a large extent.' 73.5% answered that religious rights are respected 'little' and 'very little.' 26.9% answered 'to some extent' and 'to large extent' (Figure 16).

5.10.4 Minority Rights

Regarding respect for minority rights, 45.3% answered that minorities enjoy 'little respect,' 40.6% specified 'very little,' 9.4% said they are respected 'to some extent' and 3.1% said they are respected to 'a large extent.' 85.9% answered 'little' and 'very little' while 12.5% answered 'to some extent' and 'to a large extent' (Figure 16).
5.10.5 Freedom of expression

Regarding respect for the right of freedom of expression, a 46.9% answered that in Turkey there is 'little respect,' 18.8% specified 'very little,' 32.8% said that freedom of expression is respected ‘to some extent,’ and 1.6% said it is respected to ‘a large extent.’ That is, a total of 65.7% chose 'little' and 'very little,' while 34.4% answered ‘to some extant’ and ‘to a large extent’ (Figure 16).

![Figure 16: The extent that the MEPs believe that human rights are respected in Turkey](image)

5.10.6 Corruption

Combating corruption is one of the main criteria a state should fulfil if it wants to join the EU. In Q21, ‘Is there corruption in Turkey?’ and the relevant Q21a, 'To what extent?’ a huge majority (92.1%) answered positively (Figure 17). From this majority, 46.7% considers that this corruption exists ‘to some extent,’ 45% ‘to a large extent’ and 8.3% ‘to a small extent’ (Figure 18).
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

These results give the picture of what the surveyed MEPs believe regarding the respect of human rights in Turkey. The extent of respect of human rights is related to the Turkish political system and the role of the army within that system. As discussed
in Chapter 4, the army is deeply involved in the political system and enjoys a large share of the ‘pie’ of Turkish economy. In addition, it employs the Kemalist principle of ‘statism’ in order to achieve political, economic, social and institutional consolidation within the system. Throughout the years, the Turkish army ruled the country by relying on the ‘democratic deficit’. This deficit now comes to the surface for two main reasons. First, Turkey's accession negotiations require that the Turkish political system proves that it enacts all necessary reforms before accession. In the context of these requirements, deficits become apparent. Second, the Turkish state must enact these reforms not only to meet EU entrance requirements, but also in order to be able to function without serious problems on internal and international levels. An inability to do this will point toward Turkey's weakness to escape from the above-mentioned ‘democratic deficit’.

5.10.7 Turkish Army

The role of the Turkish army within the Turkish system is relevant to the cohesion of the EU on the one hand and Turkish cohesion on the other. Since the establishment of the Turkish democracy, the army has structured itself on the basis of Kemalist principles (see Chapter 4.5). As such, it defines itself as the depository of the system and of the territorial integrity of the state, in case these are placed under external and internal threats such as those presented by the Kurdish PKK. On the other hand, the EU rejects the existing dominant role of the Turkish army within the political system. One of the essential criteria required by the EU for Turkey’s accession is that its army should act like a European army (European Commission 2006c; European Commission 2007b.) That is, the Turkish army should act within a ‘democratic political system,’ and the upper hand should belong to the politicians, not to the generals (Rehn 2007a). By observing the answers to Q22, ‘Is the Turkish army involved within Turkey’s political system?’ and Q22a, ‘To what extent’, one can see that a huge majority (96.8%) believes that the Turkish army is involved in the Turkish political system (Figure 19). The opinions are measured as follows: 72.6% believes that the army is involved ‘to a large extent,’ 25.8% ‘to some extent’ and 1.6% believes that there is ‘little’ involvement of the army in the system (Figure 20).
Despite this fact, if Turkey enacts the reforms, then a new Turkish political system will be born, thereby reducing any risk of threat to the EU and its cohesion, and
Turkey is likely to coexist tolerably with the EU member states. However, there are some factors that will influence some of the leading EU countries to consider the Turkish course towards the EU with scepticism, or to support the 'privileged partnership' option. Such factors include Turkey’s size, the army, the Muslim character of the Turkish state, and the leading role that Turkey will play within the EU. As the results of the survey show, the leading countries of the EU are not ready to share their EU power with Turkey. Therefore Turkish accession to the EU does not depend only on reforms but on the serving of national interests, especially those of the leading countries of the EU. Besides, the accession negotiations constitute an open ended procedure. Thus, nobody can guarantee that Turkey, at the end of its European road, will meet the status of full member-state (Council of the EU 2004, p.6).

5.10.8 'Democratic Deficit'

These results presented above suggest why the Europeans are afraid of Turkish accession to the EU. The impression is that the Turkish political system will threaten the ‘democratic system’ of European values, principles and Institutions as well as the cohesion of the EU in general. Why? Because democracy is one of the main factors affecting the functionality and the cohesion of the EU. In this context, the role of the army in the Turkish system increases the 'democratic deficit' which is, by definition, a negative factor with regard to Turkish accession to the EU.

5.11 The Reforms

Turkish accession to the EU depends on the political will of the member states of the EU and the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and other obligations stemming from the accession partnership between EU and Turkey (Europa Glossary; Council of the EU 2006b). This is one side of the coin. On the other side, Turkish accession to the EU depends on the Turkish political will and on the manner in which the Turkish side approaches its course towards EU accession. On this point, it is important to see what the MEPs answered to Q23, 'According to your opinion, for what reasons is Turkey undertaking reforms?' (Figure 21)
The answers to this question were as follows:

1) 'In order to fulfil EU obligations.' A majority (84.4%) answered yes and a minority (15.6%) answered no. Hereupon, I note that the reforms in Turkey will be not implemented simply as a result of the requirements imposed by the EU, but for another crucial reason: because the reforms constitute an economic and political necessity if Turkey wishes to stand on its own feet within the competitive global system. In order for Turkey to respond to internal necessities, Kemalism must be reformed on political, institutional, economic and social levels. In Chapter 4 was analysed why ‘statism’ is a negative factor for the development and viability of the Turkish economy. As Professor Yunus Emre Gönen stated, "statism helped the Turkish economy in the past" (2007). However, in the contemporary period 'statism' can not adequately help the Turkish economy. At the same time, as was also analysed in Chapter 4.8, the EU considers institutional and constitutional structural changes to reduce the role of the army an issue of priority97 (Oomen- Ruijten 2008). This role should be constitutionally and institutionally defined and clarified in the context of a democratic political system such as those existing and functioning within the member-states of the EU.

97 The EU considers the procedure leading to the amendment of the Turkish constitution to be very important. Such a reform is viewed as fundamental to the establishment of a democratic political system based on European principles, one which can counteract the existing “democratic deficit.”
The way the internal economic, political, social and institutional sectors function in Turkey affect its reliability on an international level, enabling the country to become friendlier to and approachable by the EU and democratic states internationally. On the flipside of the coin, proponents of Turkey's accession argue that the existing 'democratic gap' between Turkey and the EU as well as the required structural reforms, are not huge, and that the only thing that remains to be done is the following: that the EU as such and its member-states should show political intention to assist Turkish accession by avoiding an interminable procedure. The argument is that “Turkey can not wait for long…” (Gönen 2007)

2) 'In order to establish a modern state.' A majority (56.3%) chose to answer yes and a minority (43.8%) answered no. Analysis of the answers to Q23 suggests that Turkey intends to complete reforms in order to establish a new political system, one able to respond successfully to international, economic, social and political challenges. Certainly, on this point one should take into account the sensitiveness of the Turkish people, as based on two points:

a) The Turkish political message is that, indeed, the Turkish political system needs to be reformed, but that it is not much worse than the ones existing in other candidate countries at the time they joined the EU.

b) Therefore, the key word is 'moderate'. It is regarded as a challenge to refer to a 'moderate state'. The Turks consider that it is too much for someone to allege indirectly that the Turkish Republic does not belong to the 'club of contemporary political systems'. The Turks accept that they have to improve their existing political system, but they can not accept that theirs is not a democratic one.

3) 'In order to stabilise the political system.' A majority (67.2%) answered that this is true. A minority (32.8%) answered no. This is a justification to Question 23 regarding the reasons for Turkey undertaking reforms (Figure 21). The argument is the following: The reforms in Turkey aim at stabilising the 'political system' and

---

98 One of the arguments of the proponents of Turkey's accession is that, despite its problems, Turkey deserves to join the EU. They argue that neither Greece nor other countries, including Portugal, Bulgaria and Rumania, had fully met the criteria necessary to join the EU (then EEC) at accession (This argument, employed many times in the context of the EU- Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee in 2005 and 2006, is frequently provided as an answer to those who argue that Turkey cannot join the EU as a full member-state, and/or to those who alleged that Turkey was not even ready to open accession negotiations with the EU).

99 This position was articulated by Mr Onur Öymen Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly during the EU -Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting in Ankara on 2-5 May 2006. The summary here is based on my personal notes.
responding to the necessities of the contemporary era, so that Turkey will be capable of acting positively within the European and the global scene.

4) ‘In order to stabilise the economy.’ A majority (67.2%) answered yes and 32.8% no. This answer is related to the political stability of the system and to Question 22 on the involvement of the Turkish army to the system. The message is clear: The Turkish economic system should be reformed so that the Turkish economy can stand on its own feet. A stable economy should rely on market rules and on a democratic political system free of the army's involvement. (Chapter 4.8; 4.8.1; 4.6.3)

5) ‘In order to strengthen social cohesion.’ A majority (63.5%) answered yes and a minority (36.4%) no. As we analysed in Chapter 4, reforms should be undertaken for the sake of strengthening Turkey's social cohesion. Turkey's social and economic cohesion will become of concern to the EU after its entry in the context of the structural funds. This concern is also reflected in Question 11, regarding the reasons behind the stance of some Europeans who do not wish to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member state. According to the results received on this question (see Figure 5), a majority (58.5%) of the MEP's considers that Turkish accession to the EU will place an extra burden on EU cohesion policy and on the structural funds. It is also reflected in research undertaken by the European Parliament (2007c), and analysed in Chapter 4.7.

Another issue regarding Turkish accession to the EU is set forth in Q24. This question asks, ‘Regardless of the EU requirements, should Turkey continue with the reforms?’
A huge majority (98.4%) answered yes and only 1% answered no. Such an answer reflects the opinion that even if Turkey undertakes the reforms only to fulfil EU obligations, it should continue with them regardless of EU requirements (Figure 22). This question is related to Q25, ‘Do you believe that Turkey will by itself put an end to its course to the EU?’ (Figure 23). A majority (45.2%) answered no and 25.8% said yes. 27.4% answered that they do not know. This percentage shows that this is a difficult question and that in politics, it is rather difficult to make speculations on a prickly issue.
Those who answered yes to the question of whether or not Turkey is likely to stop its course toward the EU chose the following reasons for such possible behaviour: (Figure 24)

1) Privileged regime (partnership): 56%.
2) Political forces in Turkey do not wish to see Turkey in the EU: 43.8%.
3) Turkey cannot successfully respond to the reforms required by the EU: 62.5%
4) Fear that Turkish Europeanisation will threaten territorial cohesion: 66.7%.
5) Fear that Turkish Europeanisation will threaten social cohesion: 66.7%.
6) Fear that Turkish Europeanisation will threaten state cohesion: 62.5%.
5.12 List of Variables

One of the main goals of this project is to find out the factors - variables which could affect the cohesion of the EU as a result of Turkish accession to the EU. The survey was the last step of this procedure. The results of the survey have been analysed in this Chapter and compared to those of Chapter 4. Bearing in mind the results of the survey as well as the theoretical literature, I have arrived at some useful conclusions regarding the variables upon which a model of EU cohesion in relation to Turkish accession to the EU can be based.

---

100 This development triggered a political and institutional instability, ended by the verdict of the court which provided for a financial penalty against AKP because of the law it had voted into effect on the headscarf (Boland 2008).
In Chapter 4 a list of factors -variables which may affect EU cohesion was set forth. The survey shows that those variables mentioned in Chapter 4 do indeed affect the cohesion of the EU. By analysing the results of the survey, one can get a clear picture of the variables affecting the cohesion of the EU either positively or negatively. Within this spectrum, some other variables can be included, such conflicting national interests, the economic, social, cultural political and military contribution of Turkey to the EU, the redistribution of power and structural changes. There is a causal coherence between them. These variables affect the EU by creating a redistribution of power and subsequent structural changes such as new power-sharing, a change in the balance of power and an upsetting of the balance of power. Such an upsetting of the balance of power may lead to conflicting national interests or even to a crisis and hence threatens the cohesion of the EU.

Therefore, in the event that military power brings about a redistribution of power and structural changes, and that the structural changes threaten EU cohesion, one could note the following: The cohesion policy is the independent variable, while the economic, social, institutional and military variables become dependent and redistribution of power becomes an intermediate variable. In the event that the redistribution of power brings about structural changes threatening the cohesion of the EU, then the cohesion of the EU will become an independent variable, the structural changes will become the dependent variable and the redistribution of power will be the intermediate variable (see Footnote 21 in Chapter 3.2.1).

Therefore the list of the variables affecting the EU cohesion regarding Turkish accession to the EU comprises the following:

1) Democracy and respect for human rights. (Religion, women’s rights, children’s rights, property and political rights as well as freedom of expression).
2) Economy (inflation, competitiveness, unemployment, banking and monetary system, statism)
3) Society
4) EU cohesion policy
5) Culture
6) Immigration
7) Role of the Turkish army
8) Corruption
9) Size of population
10) Prejudice
11) Negative stereotypes
12) Functionality of Institutions.
13) Contribution to the EU
14) Balance of power
15) Redistribution of power
16) Structural changes
17) Share of power
18) Conflicting and national interests (Cyprus issue)\(^{101}\)

In order to explain how these variables can contribute to the establishment of a model of the EU cohesion in relation to Turkish accession to the EU, I must stress a point of methodological importance. Each variable affects the others, and all, taken together, shape, through their interaction, the model of the EU cohesion. For example, by examining the variable of democracy we can obviously see that it is causally related to human rights. Human rights are indispensable components of democracy. If democracy is considered as an independent variable, then human rights are dependent. If the cohesion of the EU is considered as an independent variable, then democracy is the dependent variable and human rights is the intermediate variable, leading to democracy and to the cohesion of the EU (Van Evera 2001, p. 26-27). There is, in fact, a chain of variables.

5.13 The Next Step

This chapter lists the variables that will affect the cohesion of the EU as a result of Turkish accession to the EU. The next step is to analyse the conclusions of this project in the context of our main goal, that of establishing an EU cohesion model for Turkish accession to the EU.

\(^{101}\) See Footnote 64
CHAPTER 6
Recommendations and Conclusions

6.1 Introduction

Turkish accession to the EU is one of the main issues prevailing across the European political scene. It bears much in common with the so-called 'German question.' With regard to this question, politicians and academics were trying, especially after the reunification of Germany, to determine whether there would be a German Europe or a European Germany. Similarly, the question which emerges from the process of Turkish accession to the EU is whether we will have a European Turkey or a Turkish Europe. A second question which complements the first is this: Will Turkish accession to the EU threaten the cohesion of the EU.

In this chapter, various scenarios will be elaborated on regarding the question of whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten EU cohesion. Through the analysis of these scenarios, and by employing variables affecting the cohesion of the EU, I will establish an EU cohesion model. Therefore, in this Chapter the following issues are examined: Theoretical justifications for Turkish accession, EU cohesion models, potential positive and negative scenarios linked to the accession process, issues of democracy, EU Institutions, and economic and societal factors. These topics are comprised under the following sub-headings:

- Theories and Justifications
- Variables and Model of EU Cohesion
- The Pillars of EU Cohesion
- First Scenario: Negative
- Second Scenario: Positive
- Third Scenario: The Two Capitals of the EU and the Historical Circle
- Fourth Scenario: Worst Case Scenario and Crisis
- Fifth Scenario: Democracy in Relation to the Turkish Accession to the EU
- Sixth Scenario: The EU Institution and the Turkish Accession to the EU
- Seventh Scenario: EU Cohesion policy and the Turkish Accession to the EU
- Eight Scenario: Economy and the Turkish Accession to the EU
- Ninth Scenario: Society and the Turkish Accession to the EU
6.2 Theories and Justifications

The analysis of this project has been based on theories of International Relations, including Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. One of the main challenges of this project has been to examine whether theory could meet experience and reality. This is the quintessence of the scientific method (see Chapter 3.2). As analysed in Chapter 3.2, a theory cannot be considered concrete and reliable unless it is justified by real facts. For the purposes of this project, the theories of Realism and Structural Realism are used as a theoretical basis. Particular emphasis is given to Gilpin’s theories about the causes for the decline of an international system (see Chapter 2.3.3). As Classical and Structural Realism point out, structural changes and the redistribution of power can upset the existing balance of power, thereby causing the decline of a system (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 167). This is likely to trigger a crisis, perhaps even lead to armed conflict (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 166; Gilpin 1981, p. 230). Such a worst-case scenario may particularly occur if the cost of structural changes and the imbalance of power are significantly higher than any benefit (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 169; Gilpin 1981). The theories of Realism and Structural Realism focus on the way that national interests affect or even rule the international system and shape and guide the behaviour of international actors (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 166-169; Gilpin 1981, pp.9-11, Waltz 1979, pp. 60-67).

On the other hand, the EU has been constructed in the concept of regional integration. This political, legal and economic structural process of integration is fuelled by the creation of common interests as the theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism underlie (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992b, p. 161; Groom & Taylor 1975, p. 2). In this respect, Europe moves between Realism and Structural Realism on the one hand and Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism on the other (See Chapter 2.3.4). What this project attempted to examine was whether Turkish
accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power and structural changes, and whether, at the end of the day, Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU.

In order to fulfil this aim, nine research questions were identified in Chapter 2:

1) Which are the main factors affecting the shaping of the EU’s policy on Turkish accession to the EU?
2) What is the role of the US, as a major actor of the international system, and to what extent does it influence the shaping of EU policy and decision making on Turkish accession to the EU?
3) Are the decisions of the EU taken in accordance with the national interest of its member states or in accordance with the common European interest? What is the role of national interest in the EU decision making process?
4) What is the Turkish political situation?
5) What is the role of the Turkish army within the Turkish political system?
6) Are Europeans afraid of Turkish accession to the EU? To what extent and why?
7) Will Turkish accession to the EU bring a redistribution of power?
8) Will Turkish accession to the EU change the structure of the EU?
9) Could such structural changes threaten the cohesion of the EU?

In answering these questions I expected to form a list of factors-variables affecting the cohesion of the EU (see Appendix 7—Short list of answers to research questions). These variables have been generated through the analysis in Chapter 4 and their credibility has been cross-tested in Chapter 5. At the same time, in the framework of the following nine scenarios on Turkish accession to the EU, one can observe under what circumstances and what combination of variables should come together so that the aforementioned theories of international relations are to be justified\textsuperscript{102}.

\textsuperscript{102} Theories of International Relations, which constitute the theoretical basis of this project, have been presented in Chapter 2. Their justification (or not) is reflected in the conclusions of this research. This justification is connected to Chapter 3 (methodology) where I explain that science can be justified only if theory is coupled with practice. The diagrams, which follow, present the findings of this research and illustrate, step by step, though various scenarios, why, how and under which circumstances, Turkish accession to the EU may threaten or not the cohesion of the EU.
6.3 Variables and Model of EU Cohesion

In Chapter 2.4, it is already clarified that through this project I attempt to examine what factors-variables affect the cohesion of the EU in practice and more specifically, using Turkish accession to the EU as my case-study (see Chapter 3.2). Therefore, in this sub-chapter and taking on board the findings of Chapter 4 and 5, I aim at two things: 1) Identify the factors affecting the cohesion of the EU in conjunction with Turkish accession to the EU. 2) Define the EU cohesion as such. That means the EU cohesion on its own and not in relation to Turkish accession to the EU.

With these issues in mind, I attempted to construct a model of EU cohesion, focusing in particular on how and under what circumstances the EU and its cohesion might be at stake. Responding to the first aim mentioned above and taking into account the analysis of Chapter 4 and the relevant answers from the questionnaire (Chapter 5), one can infer that the following variables affect the cohesion of the EU:

1) Democracy (rule of law and respect for human rights which include, in the case of Turkey, religious, minority, property, women’s, and children’s rights, as well as the right of freedom of expression).
2) Economy (‘statism’, unemployment, inflation, banking system, privatisation, competitiveness, role of the army).
3) Military power (state expenditures, size, quality, ability and embattled character of the Turkish army; contributions to the ESDP, NATO and the UN).
4) Society (immigration, prejudice, religion, system of values, racism).
5) Cohesion policy (structural funds, disparities, large size of state and populace).
6) Culture (Muslim identity, system of values, education, nationalism as one of the main principles of Kemalism).
7) Corruption (political system, ‘democratic deficit’, deficiency of the judicial power and other Institutions).
8) Role of the Turkish army.
9) Institutions (democratic nature and functionality of Institutions and of the European system).
10) Immigration (inflation, unemployment, racism, prejudice, negative stereotypes).
Each of these variables affects or is affected by other variables, and vice versa. In other words, these variables illustrate the phenomenon of interaction. A chain of causal relations is thereby created between the independent variables of cohesion on the one hand and the dependent and intermediate variables on the other. Analysing Chapter 2 (theories of International Relations) and Chapter 4 in relation to the results of the survey (Chapter 5), I note that the cohesion of the EU is a matter of a ‘power game,’ and is affected by the following factors variables:

1) Contribution to the EU.
2) Redistribution of power.
3) Structural changes (The EU absorption capacity is included in the positive structural changes).
4) Share of power.
5) Threat to the balance of power.
6) Upsetting of the balance of power.
7) Conflicting national interests\(^{103}\).

These variables are closely related to the ten variables mentioned above. A negative combination of these variables may even cause a crisis threatening the cohesion of the EU. On the other hand, a positive combination of variables might reduce the threat to EU cohesion. In other words, if a crisis scenario occurs, then the theories of Realism and Structural Realism are justified.

According to the results of the survey, Turkish accession to the EU will contribute to the global position of the EU (Chapter 5, Questions 8 and 9). On the one hand, this is a positive development for Turkey and for the EU as well. However, these results must be also examined in relation to other answers. In this context, one can observe that despite the positive assessment of the potential Turkish contribution to the EU, the answers to other questions - for example, with regard to the redistribution of power and whether this redistribution will bring structural changes - are related to the political will and national interests of the leading EU countries such as France and Germany. Indeed, regarding the political will of the leading countries, the majority of the MEPs appear to believe that some of the leading countries of the EU are not ready to share the power that they now enjoy within the EU with Turkey. In this

\(^{103}\) These may include the Cyprus issue (see also Footnote 64, Chapter5).
framework, it is obvious that the variable of 'national interest' affects the political scene and developments, as well as the EU cohesion, such as the relevant theories of Realism and Structural Realism suggest (Chapters 2.3.2 - 2.3.3).

At the same time, the majority of answers to questions about cohesion confirm the view that Turkish accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU (see Questions 16, 17, 18 of the Questionnaire). The majority agreed with the argument that structural changes in relation to the Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU. Even if Turkey’s economic, military, political and cultural contribution affects the EU in a positive manner, such a development does not necessarily ensure that the EU will be spared problems of cohesion (Chapter 5.7; 5.8; 5.9.1). This is true for two reasons: 1) what one has to examine is not only the extent and the size of the contribution but at the same time, the political consequences of such a development in terms of balance of power. 2) Because the redistribution of power, as a result of a positive contribution, will bring structural changes, power-sharing, upsetting of the balance of power, conflict of national interests and possibly even a crisis. In such a case, the cohesion of the EU and the existence of the EU will be threatened. This is the rational political hypothesis of this research, which responds to and justifies the theories of Realism and Structural Realism, in particular what Gilpin argued about the decline of the international system (see Chapters 2.3.2; 2.3.3 & 4)

Therefore, the key issue is not only whether Turkey does or does not have the political intention to fulfil the legal and political commitments undertaken in the framework of EU accession negotiations, but also whether the leading countries of the EU - or some of them - have the political intention - in accordance with their national interests and in the context of the 'power game' - to integrate Turkey into the EU.\textsuperscript{104} Acting within such a 'power game,' the leading countries would follow the rules of the 'balance of power' and seek to serve their own national interests.

In addition, there are some other reasons contributing to this development:

\textsuperscript{104} The results of the survey were very clear on this question. The MEPs believe that Turkey will not stop, by itself, its route toward EU accession. As the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ali Babacan stated on May 26, 2008 before the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, the reforms are not undertaken only because of the Turkey’s obligations but for its own people.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

First, European prejudice against the Turkish Muslim cultural identity has become a methodological tool for those who want to close the EU full-membership door to Turkey, only offering Ankara the status of a ‘privileged partnership’ (see Chapters 4.3 and 4.4).

Second, American support for Turkish accession to the EU, while positive both for Turkey and for those who support Turkish accession to the EU, has raised suspicion on the part of those who view Turkish accession to the EU with scepticism. The American stance fuels the fear that if Turkey joins the EU, it is likely to become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of the US within the EU (see Chapter 5.2 and Question 11- Figure 5). These fears are reinforced by the sceptical role that Britain plays in the EU, as well as by the political positions of some new member states such as Poland and the Czech Republic. Each, in various cases, has supported the American rather than the EU interests, especially on issues of security and foreign policy (see for example, Chapter 5.2.1 on the establishment of antiballistic missile systems on their territories as well as the crisis in Georgia).

Third, the impression that the economic problems of the EU result from negative consequences of the 2004 and 2006 Enlargements (see Chapter 4.7). In relation to this point, one should note the reports issued by the services of the European Parliament (2006a) regarding the consequences of Turkish accession to the EU: for example, the fact that Turkey will absorb 27.3% of the whole package of structural funds, or the fact that the GDP of the EU is to be reduced by an average of 10% (European Parliament 2006a).

Certainly, beyond the positive or the negative political intention of the EU member states regarding Turkish accession to the EU, one must also assess the reality within Turkey. The Turkish state is currently encountering severe problems. The conclusions of this project suggest that, these problems include the following:

1) The role of the Turkish army. On the one hand, the army is the source of the ‘democratic deficit’. On the other hand, this ‘democratic deficit’ is the main pillar upon which Kemalism is founded. Hereupon, one could mark that, whilst democracy (one of the main variables) constitutes a component factor upon which the cohesion of the EU is founded, in the case of Turkey the ‘democratic deficit’ constitutes a component factor upon which the Turkish Kemalism system is based. Democracy is considered a factor threatening the cohesion of Kemalism, whilst it keeps the EU in cohesion.
2) ‘Statism’ and other structural economic problems that Turkey faces, such as problems in the banking system, inflation and the instability of the monetary system. These problems compose the picture of an unhealthy economic situation (see Chapters 4.6.1, 4.6.2, 4.6.3). Such a situation is connected to the wider structural problems of the Turkish political system, which itself is still founded on the principles of Kemalism. This situation offers the army the opportunity for deep involvement in economic affairs and thereby, an important role in the reforms (see Chapter 4.8.1). In the past, ‘statism’ used to have a decisive influence on the stability of the Turkish system and the Turkish economy. However, nowadays, it has been surpassed by global economic, social and political realities and necessities. This procedure is employed by the Turkish army to consolidate its dominant role in the system, through wangles for example, thus contributing to the reinforcement of corruption (see Chapter 4).

3) Social problems. These are related to: a) the ‘democratic deficit’, in particular the lack of respect for fundamental human rights such as religion, women’s rights, children’s rights, property rights, and freedom of expression, and b) economic problems (see Chapters 4 and 5).

The aforementioned reasons are not the only variables negatively affecting Turkish accession to the EU. There is another one: Turkish strength and especially its military strength, which is causally connected to Turkey’s important geopolitical position. It is true that Turkey’s strength and size as well as its geo-strategic position constitute a political and diplomatic advantage. This fact is actually one of the arguments employed by those who support the Turkish accession to the EU. However, these factors are turned into disadvantages in the context of the ‘power game’ between the EU member states on the one hand and Turkey on the other. Why would the leading countries of the EU wish to see Turkey in the EU and to see it become, at the same time, a leading country? If Turkey meets the criteria of Copenhagen and establishes a strong economy and a stable political system, it will grow stronger. This very fact, could make it even more undesirable for certain leading European countries to allow Turkey to enter the EU, and could therefore work to its disadvantage (Lagendijk 2007).

---

105 Joost Lagendijk ascertained that if Turkey joins the EU it will be a dominant country. In terms of the ‘power game’, why should the leading countries want to share the power they now enjoy in the EU with Turkey? However, what argument could they put forward for rejecting Turkish membership if it fulfils the Copenhagen criteria and its other EU obligations? In such a situation, the leading EU countries, or any other country which does not wish Turkey to enter the EU as a full member-state, will find themselves in
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Certainly, the situation will improve if both sides achieve a code of common interests. If this code of common interests is combined with positive structural changes and a rational redistribution and share of power, guaranteed by the functionality of the relevant Institutions, then both Turkey and the EU will be able to create a fertile ground for Turkey's accession to the EU as a full member-state. Based on the results of the survey as well as the data already collected for this project, one may come to the conclusion that under certain circumstances Turkey has no chance of joining the EU with the status of a full member state. Such circumstances include an absence of adequate reforms in the areas of human rights, the role of the army in the political system, corruption, economic problems and political instability (see Chapter 4 and 5). However, if Turkey successfully completes proposed reforms, not only does accession become more possible, but in addition we will have a new Turkey, not the one we have now.

6.3.1 The Main Pillars of EU Cohesion

In response to the second aim of Chapter 6.3, a definition on EU cohesion must be given, or better, on internal EU cohesion. In other words, I refer to the following: How the EU constructs its own cohesion and what are the factors-variables upon which such an internal cohesion can be founded. This internal EU cohesion and the factors-variables which is consisted of, are affected by factors-variables which result from Turkish accession to the EU or/and from other accession processes in the context of Enlargement. All these factors-variables deriving from the findings of this project are listed above (Chapter 6.3).

To avoid any confusion, I reiterate the difference between EU cohesion policy – the strategy by which the end goal of cohesion may be reached - and cohesion itself. Therefore, the cohesion policy of the EU is one of the main pillars upon which EU cohesion relies. This policy aims at filling gaps and overcoming disparities within the EU, as well as at bringing about economic, social, territorial, cultural and political stability (see Chapter 2.3.5). It is, also, related to the EU absorption capacity and the predicament. Certainly, such a difficult position will depend on the general political situation and on the alliances that will be formed in favour of or against Turkey's full membership. Moreover, issues of national interest will play a significant role in the decision-making.

Ioannis Charalambides
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

structural changes, which must be enacted within the EU should it wish to be enlarged in a smooth way. This is why cohesion policy constitutes an indispensable component factor-variable of EU cohesion. In this respect, a short definition of internal EU cohesion may be articulated as follows: internal EU cohesion is composed of a set of factors-variables that when they come together can hold EU in economic, social, political, territorial and institutional stability, i.e. in cohesion.

Taking into account the results of this Project, the EU cohesion is based on of the following variables:
1) Cohesion policy.
2) Economic factors. This is not only a specific area of concern within cohesion policy, but is also related to social, political and institutional stability.
3) Democracy and respect for human rights, the rule of law and other areas of concern outlined in the Copenhagen criteria (Europa Glossary).
4) Social stability. This is related to economic, political and institutional stability.
5) Culture. This is connected to issues of both national identity and a broader 'European' identity. Culture is usually presumed to be consistent with a system of values and principles as well as with tradition, and to reflect both the past and the future. If EU cohesion depends among others, on a European cultural identity, then the question of how 'European' Turkish Muslim culture actually is or could be, becomes an area of debate. This issue is further complicated by the existence of negative stereotypes of and prejudice against Turkish Muslim culture and Turkey itself.
6) Institutional stability. The stability and functionality of Institutions is related to democratic values and principles as well as to the structure of the Institutions. This stability and functionality is negatively affected by the "democratic deficit" which exists between the EU and its EU member-states. It is also positively or negatively affected by the quality of the treaties upon which the Institutions of the EU are founded.

Given the above factors as well as the factors presented in Chapter 6.3, one can see that a model for EU cohesion depends on two sets of variables: circumstances favouring cohesion and circumstances which threaten it. Therefore, the model of EU
cohesion that I establish in relation to Turkish accession to the EU includes all factors-variables listed in Chapters 6.3 and 6.3.1. Based on this model, I elaborate in Chapter 6.4 nine scenarios on EU cohesion in connection to Turkish accession to the EU in order to examine whether such accession will threaten EU cohesion -or not- and whether the hypothesis of this project is justified or not.

6.4 Recommendations

Taking into consideration the variables of EU cohesion and the impact, positive or negative, on this cohesion of Turkish accession to the EU, I present the following possible scenarios, upon which recommendations may be based. Through this exercise, one can also assess the circumstances under which theories of International Relations, such as Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, constitute descriptions of reality.

6.4.1 First Scenario: Negative

The first scenario draws on and justifies theories of Realism and Structural Realism. As previously noted, theories of Realism and Structural Realism posit that military power, economic and social factors, the redistribution and balance of power can either keep the international system in cohesion or lead to its decline and/or collapse. The scenario proposed here is based on the theory of ‘domino effect’\(^\text{106}\). That is, if Turkey enters the EU and its contribution\(^\text{107}\) to the EU (see Chapter 5.9, Question 18) will bring negative redistribution of power and negative structural changes, what will follow will upset the existing balance of power, create a new balance of power, produce conflicting national interests, and lead to a situation of crisis. Furthermore, such structural changes will negatively affect EU Institutions and their decision-making processes, as well as increasing the ‘democratic deficit’. The results of these effects will be to threaten EU cohesion.

\(^{106}\) Domino effect: when an action causes a sequence of other actions. ‘Domino effect’ was the prevailing doctrine of international system during the Cold War.\\(^{107}\) I have already analysed under what circumstances the Turkish contribution to the EU may negatively affect the redistribution of power in favouring Turkey and putting the national interests of the leading member – states at stake (see chapter 5.6).
6.4.2 Second Scenario: Positive

The second scenario draws on the theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. In this scenario, Turkey will meet its obligations, thereby showing its readiness to join the EU as a full member state. Its positive contributions to the EU will result in a normal redistribution of power, and the structural changes that occur will be the result of reforms implemented to facilitate Turkey's integration into the EU. In this scenario the EU as well will be ready to promote and fulfil new reforms and structural changes (Böge 2007; Chapter 4).

If the following factors-variables are implemented with positive effects, then the risk of upsetting the balance of power and giving rise to conflicting national interests will be reduced: 1) Turkey's economic, social, cultural, or militarily contribution, 2) the redistribution of power and 3) structural changes. In addition, common interests could restrain conflicting national interests. At the same time, such a scenario would have a
positive affect on EU Institutions and on the decisions of the EU, thereby maintaining EU cohesion. In this case, in the context of a normal Enlargement we may take a step further towards European regional integration, as suggested by the theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. However, this result is not certain. Why? Because whether or not this step towards regional integration will occur depend on the structural changes which will take place on the institutional level in particular - the level at which the relations and the power games of the EU member-states are most evident.

Therefore, one of the main preconditions of achieving regional integration is the progressive limitation -or even full conference- of state sovereignty to supranational Institutions. Consequently, if the EU member-states, in the context of their power games, have no political intention of undertaking such structural changes which will eventually lead to less state sovereignty, then, how can one allege that an enlarged Europe moves towards regional integration? How can one allege that state's role in the international system will be replaced by enhanced supranational Institutions? At the same time, the EU Enlargements depend on successful structural changes upon
which the absorption capacity can be constructed. Otherwise, the EU can not proceed towards normal and successful Enlargements.

In case of a normal Enlargement, the scenario of having a new Turkey acting in the context of a democratic political system may become a reality. In light of this, Turkey will not only be a full member state of the EU but will also be:

1) A leading country of the EU due to its territorial size, its young and large population, its military power, its economy and its pivotal geopolitical and geo-strategic position situating it as a bridge between Asia and Europe as well as one of the main energy crossroads (see Chapters 4.4 and 4.9.2).

2) A democratic country playing a dominant role within the EU, with extensive political and institutional power within the Institutions of the EU. If this occurs Turkey will play a regional or even global role of high importance (see Chapter 4.9.2 and 4.10).

3) A centre of attraction for Muslims living in Europe and elsewhere. Muslim European citizens will turn to Turkey, as a powerful member state of the EU, for protection and promotion of their interests. As Muslims, they feel close to Ankara or Istanbul, which will be turned into their second unofficial capital of the EU, after the official one, i.e. Brussels. They will have more confidence in Turkey unless their interests impose them a different reaction. However, it is not certain whether the other European countries will feel comfortable with such a development.

6.4.3 Third Scenario: the Two Capitals of the EU and the Historical Circle

A third scenario illustrates how Turkey’s geo-strategic and political position might function within the EU. The more powerful Turkey is – especially if this power stems from its Muslim character – the more likely it is that it will upset the existing balance of power, leading to the creation of a new balance or imbalance of power, to a conflict of national interests, and possibly to a crisis. Certainly, this crisis would threaten the cohesion of the EU. The first stage of such a scenario would be the establishment of two European capitals, one Western and one Eastern, as occurred with the separation of the Roman Empire, which led to the rise of the Byzantine Empire. In the event of a severe crisis, even one that does not lead to a military
confrontation but rather to a ‘velvet divorce’ between the EU and Turkey, we will have come full circle, historically speaking. To avoid such an evolution, the EU, its member states and Turkey must eliminate all those factors-variables—that stand in the way of Turkish accession to the EU and that threaten EU cohesion.

These factors-variables, which have been analysed in previous Chapters, are summed as follows: 1) Prejudice 2) Historical stereotypes such as reflected in the Vienna syndrome. 3) Religion as a political, social and economic tool as a means of achieving national interests. 4) Redistribution of power. 5) Upsetting of the balance of power, cost and conflicting national interests. The latter are included in the context of the ‘power game’ (Chapter 2.3.3; Chapter 4 and 5).

Therefore, even if Turkey finally joins the EU as full member-state, it is likely that the cohesion of the EU will come under threat. This could happen under the following circumstances: The combination of a powerful Turkey within the EU on the one hand, and the action, either separately or accumulatively, of those variables which negatively affect the cohesion of the EU on the other. The conflict of vital national interests could be an adequate reason to spark a political, economic or even military crisis. On this point, if one takes for granted that before any decision, the actors of the international system think rationally, then, most probably, the results of their decisions and actions will bring higher benefit than cost. Or their decisions will seek to minimise the cost even as prevent the crisis (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 168 and Gilpin 1981, pp. 10, 42). As we recall, according to Realism and Structural Realism, one of the main causes of conflict is the following: when the cost which occurs from the redistribution and the upsetting of the balance of power is high and irrevocable. In other words, such a cost will not be marginal. In this context it will be difficult for the actors of the International system to avoid the crisis (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp.167-169).

6.4.4 Fourth Scenario: Worst Case Scenario and Crisis

Bearing in mind everything mentioned above, I focus on the worst case scenario which is the based on the combination of two hypotheses. The first is that Turkey will
meet its obligations and will fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The second is that the EU, guided by the interests of its member states, will say ‘no’ to full Turkish membership. Under such circumstances we must examine the political stance of the US, a stance defined by American national interests. A possible ‘no’ to the Turkish full membership would be motivated by the national interests of a) a strong member state, b) a club of strong member states, c) a club of strong member states and other states. It would be difficult -although not impossible- for a small member state to stop full Turkish membership by veto or through a referendum, because the political cost would be too high, unless it has the backing in the context of secret coalitions, of strong member states or of a combination of leading and medium or even small European countries.¹⁰⁸

If a negative decision on Turkey's full-membership is taken unanimously or by the majority of the member states then a minimum code of national interests will be met. That is, the European ‘no’ would stem from common EU interests. However, if this decision results from the serving of the national interests of a leading country alone or of a block of leading countries and others, then it is likely that an internal EU crisis would occur, especially if the US, as a super power and an important external EU actor, fully supports the Turkish accession as full member state. The crisis may develop in the following manner:

1) Between the EU on the one hand and the US and Turkey on the other.
2) Between the member- states who will impose their decision on the EU -or form a majority- on the one hand and the US and Turkey on the other.
3) Among the member- states of the EU. In this case, we will have an internal crisis within the EU, due to conflicting national interests resulting from disagreement on Turkey's status in the EU; for instance, whether Turkey is to join the EU as full member state or in the form of a ‘privileged partnership', or whether it is to be completely left out.

¹⁰⁸ This is the scenario most likely to occur if the Cyprus issue remains unsolved and/or the French government or any other government do not want to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member state, each for its own reasons and interests.
The US and NATO play a significant role in the European affairs. It has already been explained that the EU is a subsystem of the global international system. The data we gathered from Chapters 4 and 5 shows that it is believed that the US influences EU decisions and especially those concerning the Turkish accession to the EU (see Chapter 5.2 and Questions 8, 9, 10 of the Questionnaire). Such influence is a matter of serving national interests. However, if the American intervention in European affairs is not in line with common European interests or with those of the leading countries, then there will be a conflict of interests. Such a conflict of interests is part of the ‘power game’. If US interests are in line with common European interests and with those of the leading countries, then all sides will have the most possible benefit and the least possible cost. Thus, there is no need for any kind of conflict. Regarding this point, we should also take into consideration the worst case scenario. What will happen if the EU offers Turkey only the status of a ‘privileged partnership’? A crisis! When? In the event that the EU does not offer Turkey ‘full membership’, the US may seize the opportunity as a pretext in order to create a crisis and harm EU common
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

interests. The areas most likely to be affected by that crisis are the Balkan Peninsula, Greece and Cyprus.

In parallel, if Turkish accession to the EU upsets the existing balance of power within the EU system by putting national interests at stake, especially those of the leading countries, then a crisis is likely to burst out. This may occur in the event that Turkey serves US national interests more than those of the EU as well those of the European traditional leading countries. The realization of this scenario is to be reinforced in the event that US and EU national interests or the interests of some leading EU countries are in conflict. Such a scenario is fuelled by the argument that in the context of globalisation, the EU and the US are not only allies but also competitors, and that the US uses Turkey as another geo-strategic wedge in the soft European 'belly' of the Balkan Peninsula, thereby targeting Europe in its south-eastern wing (With regard to this, it should be remembered that the US already has allies elsewhere in Europe: Great Britain in the north and the new EU member-states in Central and Eastern Europe). Such a possibility reinforces the allegation that Turkey will become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of the US in the EU.

Taking into account the principles of Realism, which are justified by the results of this research, one could note the following: If all the factors-variables mentioned above come into play, either separately or accumulatively, and if the EU member states do not show positive political intention by giving Turkey the green light to join the EU as a full member state, then the threat of a crisis will constitute a continuous `Damocles sword' over the EU\textsuperscript{109}. This is also a justification of the hypothesis of this project: 'if structural changes occur in the component actors of the international system and result to redistribution of power, then the international system or sub-systems may be led to decline or even to conflict'.

\textsuperscript{109} The crisis in Caucasus after the Russian invasion in August, 8 2008 reveals the US as an external yet prevailing actor in the European affairs. The conflicting and converging national interests were the criteria according to which the member states of the EU defined their position. The principles of the EU and International Law were the minimum code of converging principles according to which the member states shaped their position on the level of the European Council and the European Parliament. (Council of the EU 2008; European Parliament 2008) The Caucasus crisis demonstrated that the Americans and the Europeans are not only allies but also competitors in the International and European political field. Therefore, the US foreign and defence policy influences, either negatively or positively, the interests of member states. This game of military, political and economic interest between the US and the member states of the EU reflects on the EU and its decisions.
6.4.5 Fifth Scenario: Democracy in Relation to Turkish Accession to the EU

Beyond the worst case scenario mentioned above, other scenarios are also possible which focus on the democratic, economic, social and institutional aspects of the EU cohesion. The presentation of these scenarios will lead us step by step to the last scenario of what may transpire regarding EU cohesion in the context of Turkish accession to the EU (see Paragraph 6.1).

The examination of democracy and its role in the cohesion of the EU in relation to the Turkish accession to the EU leads us to the following conclusions:

As shown by the survey, opinion is strong that Turkish accession to the EU will negatively affect the European code of respect for human rights, including religion, minority, children's, women's and property rights as well as freedom of expression. (See Questions 20, 21 and 22 of the Questionnaire). At the same time, problems in the sector of human rights fuel the role of the army in the Turkish system, as the role of the army negatively affects respect for human rights as well as judicial power, thereby negatively affecting the possibility of Turkish accession to the EU. The 'democratic deficit' characterizing Turkish judicial power leads to corruption and corruption helps the Kemalist system to be kept in cohesion.
Within the context of a democratic political system such as that of the EU, Turkey’s internal problems, such as the lack of respect for human rights as well as the role of the army and the deficiency of the Turkish judiciary power, threaten to lead to social and political instability. This political instability threatens the functionality of the Institutions and at the same time puts the democracy and the cohesion of the EU at risk. All these variables act as a threat to the EU cohesion. On this point, the following contradiction must be noted: Whilst democracy is a main factor-variable in the cohesion of the EU, at the same time it negatively affects the cohesion of the Kemalist system.

6.4.6 Sixth Scenario: the EU Institutions and Turkish Accession to the EU

In accordance with the results of this project, the following conclusions can be reached regarding the Institutions of the EU in relation to Turkish accession to the EU. The role and the say of a member-state within the EU Institutions are
proportional to five variables (see Chapter 4.9.2): geopolitical and geostrategic role, demographic size, military power, and military contribution to the EU. The combination of the large size of the Turkish population, its geopolitical, geostrategic position, its military power and its military contribution to the EU affect the role of Turkey in the ESDP. The population factor also defines the role of Turkey and its political power within the three main Institutions of the EU: the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The size of the population is related to the political power of a member state in the decision-making process and to its qualified majority (Treaty of Lisbon 2007; Treaty of Nice 2001). It is also one of the main elements defining the number of MEPs that each member state can possess.

Turkey's military contribution to the EU and to UN missions as well as to Turkish military power in general will bring about a redistribution of power, structural changes, new power-sharing, and a conflict of national interests between the member states of the EU and Turkey.

These factors:
1) Affect the status of the leading countries of the EU and define the power of their political say within the EU Institutions (see Chapter 4.9.2). This reality also concerns the political saying that Turkey will have if it joins the EU, and it is connected with the establishment of a new balance of power and a new share of power between the leading countries of the EU and Turkey.
2) Lead to the upsetting of the balance of power and to a threat to EU cohesion.
The US influences EU decisions and European political-power games. Therefore, one cannot ignore the US as an important external actor affecting European affairs, whether positively or negatively. It has already been shown throughout this project that the US holds a positive political stance toward the Turkish accession to the EU (Chapter 5.2, Question 10). What will happen if the EU does not wish to offer Turkey full membership, and the US does want to see it in the EU? By definition, we will witness the existence of conflicting national interests, with two main results. The first will be the negative reaction of the Europeans toward the US. This occurred even before the decisions of the European Council on December 16, 2004 (Lagendijk 2007; Chapter 5.2). The second will be the emergence of a political perception that Turkey is playing the role of a US Fifth Phalanx in the EU (Chapter 5.2; Question 11).

110 During an interview given to me for the purposes of this project, Joost Lagendijk testified to the reactions of the Spanish government to the huge pressure that the US tried to exercise on the European governments in 2004, in order to prejudge a positive decision of the European Council on the commencement of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU.
6.4.7 Seventh Scenario: Cohesion Policy and Turkish Accession to the EU

In this scenario, I examine the cohesion policy of the EU in relation to the Turkish accession to the EU. More specifically, Turkish economy (whose problems include inflation, the role of the army in the Turkish political system, unemployment, competitiveness, corruption, banking, fluctuations in the monetary system, and ‘statism’), the great disparities between large cities and rural regions, and the redistribution of structural funds due to the large size of the Turkish population all come together to create a negative effect on the GDP of the EU and the GDP per capita, as well as on other areas belonging to Objective 1 of the Structural Funds (see Chapter 2.3.5). Such an evolution may spark negative reactions within the EU towards Turkish accession as full member state. In addition, in this scenario the combination of great disparities, large population, a negative economy and negative structural changes will lead to conflicting national interests. As a result, both the cohesion policy of the EU and the cohesion of the EU will be under threat (Chapter 2.3.5; 5.9.1).

Figure 6

Cohesion policy and Turkish accession to the EU
In the framework of this scenario, if redistribution of the structural funds occurs both the EU and Turkey should undertake positive structural changes. Such a development would help the EU serve its common national interests and maintain its cohesion.

6.4.8 Eighth Scenario: Economy and Turkish Accession to the EU

In this scenario, the structural problems of the Turkish system, the phenomenon of immigration, and a series of factors and variables - including the role of the army within the Turkish political system, 'statism' as a Kemalist principle upon which the Turkish economic system is based, economic problems as they have been described in Chapter 4, and corruption - lead the EU towards economic and social instability and thereby put its cohesion at stake.

In analysing this scenario, one should stress the significant role that the army plays in Turkey’s economic system. This role is related to ‘statism’ as a Kemalist principle, and is employed by the army to consolidate its status politically and socially (Chapter 4.6.1 & 4.8.1). In this context, the way the Turkish army acts within the Turkish economic, political and social systems produces corruption (Chapters 4.8.2.3 & 5.10.6 Question 21). At the same time, the army controls a chain of companies and has already involved itself in reforms (Chapter 4.8.1). All these factors cause problems within a democratic society. They also create problems within the context of the free market. Respect for the rules of the free market constitutes one of the main pillars of the functionality of the Single European Market. The combination of the factors-variables mentioned above, the structural problems of the Turkish system, and the phenomenon of immigration could lead the EU towards economic and social instability and thereby put its cohesion at stake.

These problems constitute factors-variables, which affect the cohesion of the EU.
6.4.9 Ninth Scenario: Society and Turkish Accession to the EU

In this scenario, society is examined in relation to economy and politics: each one affects the others. In the case of this project, one observes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring changes to EU society (this conclusion is based on Q17 as discussed in Chapter 5.7). The results of this project show that Turkish accession to the EU is connected to prejudice against Turkey due to its Muslim identity and character (see Chapter 4.4 & Question 11 in Chapter 5.3). Such prejudice is related to the phenomenon of immigration. Data regarding this issue shows that about 4 million Turks will immigrate to EU countries after Turkish accession to the EU (Group of EPP 2004), a result of Turkey's large, young population looking for economic opportunities (see Chapter 4.4). The aforementioned factors-variables, such as prejudice, immigration and Turkey's large population size, affect and are affected by the economy. Therefore, economy is another important variable which affects and is affected by the factor-variable of society.
Figure 8

Society and Turkish accession to the EU

There is a rational chain of interaction among all these factors-variables, which also includes:

1) The factor-variable of unemployment. This affects and is affected by the factors-variables of prejudice, immigration, population and economy. Economy includes and is comprised of some other factors, such as: Inflation, role of the army, competitiveness, corruption, banking and monetary system and 'statism'.

2) The factor of prejudice and other issues closely related to prejudice such as: a) religion, including Islamism and Christianism, which are also connected to racism and b) negative stereotypes. The combination of these factors-variables may lead to a threat to social cohesion, political and economic instability as well as to a threat to the whole cohesion of the EU.
6.5 Conclusions

6.5.1 The Model of EU Cohesion

The scenarios already mentioned lead to the construction of the whole model of EU cohesion. Certainly, the coin has two sides. On the one side are the variables leading to the threatening the cohesion of the EU and on the other side is the question of how the EU could maintain cohesion in the context of Turkish accession to the EU. According to the conclusions of this research, in the case of Turkish accession to the EU there are five main factors-variables contributing to the cohesion of the EU. These factors – variables are evident in the literature and are justified by the survey. They are summarized as follows: economic, political, military cultural and social factors (see Chapters 4 and 5). Each one affects others and all of them affect the redistribution of power, which will also, if Turkey joins the EU as full member state, leads to structural changes and new power-sharing within the EU. In Chapter 5.12, I note the interrelation between the various factor-variables affecting the cohesion of the EU. In this context, we have already explained the role of independent, dependent and intermediate variables and how one affects the other, either positively or negatively (Van Evera 2001). This process has two dimensions, one positive and one negative. The positive leads to the cohesion of the EU and the negative to the threatening of EU cohesion.

-First dimension: Threat to the EU cohesion

According to this research, this is the prevailing scenario as justified by literature (see Realism, Classical Realism and Structural Realism), Chapter 4 and the results of the Survey (see Chapter 5.9.1- Question 18). The results of the survey show that the Turkish accession to the EU will bring about structural changes that will threaten EU cohesion. What the survey demonstrates can justify and be justified by theories of Realism and Structural Realism on the redistribution of power, structural changes, power-sharing, conflicting national interests and the decline of a system. Furthermore, the analysis of all data, literature and secondary sources gathered for this research lead us to the same conclusions, due to the peculiar characteristics of Turkey. If power-sharing is combined with negative instead of positive structural changes, either in Turkey or the EU, then we will have an upsetting of the existing EU balance of power. This upsetting of balance of power will harm national interests and result in causing military, economic, social and even cultural cost. Such a combination of factors-variables can lead to conflicting national interests and then to
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

crisis. Thereby, this chain of combined factors–variables will threaten the cohesion of the EU (see Chapter 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).

Quite apart from what is mentioned above, there are other factors which negatively affect the cohesion of the EU. These include the ‘democratic deficit’ upon which the Turkish Kemalist political system is based. Such a political system is stigmatised by the lack of respect for human rights. This ‘democratic deficit’ affects the structural changes and the decisions of the EU either positively or negatively. At the same time, the decisions of the EU are negatively or positively affected by the negative or positive nature and action of economic, political, military, cultural and social factors – variables. On this point, one should mark that the decisions of the EU are negatively or positively affected by external actors such as the US and NATO. The US stance, negative or positive, toward EU decisions, and its influence on these decisions, is related to and affected by the conflicting and converging national interests between the member states of the EU, the EU as such and the US (see Figures 1 and 3). The negative contribution of these factors – variables leads to the threatening of the EU cohesion. On the other hand, the positive contribution of these factors and variables would lead to the cohesion of the EU.

-Second dimension: Cohesion of the EU

In this case, one takes Turkey's positive contribution to the EU for granted. On this point, I add the following: If power sharing is affected by common interests and positive structural changes, then a balance of power will exist that will have a positive influence on the cohesion policy of the EU and on the cohesion of the EU as such \(^{112}\) (see Chapter 2.3.4). The cohesion of the EU will be under a positive influence if, instead of "democratic deficit,’ we have respect for human rights, and if economic, political, social, cultural and military variables come together to enact a positive contribution to the EU. In this case, EU decisions, including on Turkish accession, will be favourably affected. An important factor in this process will be the positive stance of the US and NATO, a stance connected to and affected by converging and common interests of the US, the member states of the EU, the EU as such and Turkey (see Figure 2).

\(^{112}\) Through analysis of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, we can also see in practice how the common interest contributes to the maintaining of a system in cohesion by also assisting the efforts towards regional integration, whose major precondition is successful structural change.
This 'mind map' (Figure 9 above) comprises all previous scenarios, including both dimensions of threat and of maintenance of the EU cohesion in relation to Turkish accession to the EU.

In order to complete the picture of this model, the following must be stressed:

1. Democracy is, on the one hand, negatively affected by the lack of respect for human rights and by a 'democratic deficit' in general (see Figure 4). On the other hand, it functions normally in the context of full respect for human rights. Building on this concept, we note that whilst 'democratic deficit' keeps the Turkish Kemalist system in cohesion, at the same time, it threatens the cohesion of the EU.

2. Both Turkey and the EU must enact structural changes. Turkey must meet Copenhagen Criteria and successfully fulfil its legal economic and political obligations. At the same time, the EU must conclude the reforms, which are necessary for new normal Enlargements.
6.5.2 Third Road and Unpredictable Development

-The Third Road
The two aforementioned dimensions focus on the model of EU cohesion and Turkey's full EU-membership. Beyond these dimensions there is another possible outcome regarding the final status of Turkish accession to the EU. This is what a large part of European politicians maintain (especially the rightists of the EPP); the possibility of a 'privileged partnership' (see Chapter 4.3). This is an alternative option to Turkey's full EU-membership. In this respect, at the end of Turkey's course to the EU, in order to prevent the worst-case scenario and in the concept of a win - win game, the common interest may compel all involving parties, and especially Turkey, to accept the status of 'privileged partnership' instead of full membership. This is an unprecedented, sui generis status. What the legal and political content of such a status might be no one knows yet.

-Unpredictable Development
The Turkish accession to the EU presents a great challenge not only to Turkey but also to the EU. In the context of the 'power game,' the question is whether Turkey will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not, and whether we will have a European Turkey or a Turkish Europe. If Turkey joins the EU as full member-state but does not enact democratic reforms, and attempts to prevail over the others as a leading country, the worst case scenario will most probably occur113 (Gilpin 1981, pp. 10-15; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 167). In contrast, a European and democratic Turkey will reduce the risk of threatening the cohesion of the EU.

Certainly, in addition to the above-mentioned, there are two more factors one should take into consideration:

a) External developments, such as the crisis in the Caucasus of August 8-12, 2008114 and the current international economic crisis.
b) Internal developments, such as internal political situation in Turkey.

113 This is a phenomenon observed in the context of the struggle for power (Morgenthau 1978). This struggle for power was explained by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) as "the states’s struggle to increase their influence over other states by using threats, imposition, alliances and sphere of influence" (p. 167). States always want to acquire more and more power in the International system. If a state disrupts the existing 'equilibrium', thereby causing high cost to other countries’ national interest, the political situation may be put into crisis. The possibility of such a crisis is augmented if the cost is extremely high and irrevocable (Thucydides, cited in Gilpin 1981, pp. 90-93).
It is possible that internal political decisions will halt the Turkish accession to the EU. This is likely to occur if a combination of negative variables comes into play, such as the role of the army in the system and the 'democratic deficit'. According to the results of the Survey in Chapter 5, it is less likely that Turkey will stop, of its own accord, the accession negotiation with the EU (see Chapter 5.11, Question 25).

However, if forces acting within the Turkish political system attempt to cause troubles and political instability, then under these circumstances, Turkey may risk losing control and the EU may even decide to freeze or halt its accession negotiations with Turkey. Such a scenario was evident in the so-called 'judiciary coup d’État' which took place in Turkey, through which the public prosecutor expects to dissolve the AKP and ban Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gül from politics (Abramowitz & Barkey 2008). The EU reacted to this decision through oral and written statements issued by Commissioner Oli Rehn (2008). During the May Plenary Session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Commissioner Rehn (May 21, 2008, personal notes) flatly stated the following: 1) The decision of the Turkish Court to ban the AKP and 71 of its members from politics, including President Gül and Prime Minister Erdogan on trial, would have been against the decisions of the European Court of Justice, and against the European Council definitions of when and how a political party can be outlawed. 2) If the Constitutional Court of Turkey had dissolved AKP and bans its 71 officials from politics, this would have negative consequences for Turkish accession to the EU (Kuru 2008, pp. 101-110).

Finally, on July 30, 2008, Constitutional Court took a rational decision. On the one hand, it imposed financial sanctions on AKP, due to the latter's call for lifting the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf at the universities, but on the other hand it did not deprive the party's officials of their political rights (Hooper 2008). The conflict between the army and the AKP is still alive. Nobody can exclude similar problems in the future which may trigger obstacles to Turkish accession to the EU. What must be pointed out is that both sides play a rational game, using the Constitution and the Institutions of Turkey while also bearing in mind that any fallacious or irrational action will result in a high cost to themselves and to the country. At the same time, this
incident, and similar ones in the past show that Turkey's EU accession process is always at risk of unpredictable political developments.

6.5.3 Epilogue and Impact

Only a prophet can predict the future. In the context of this project, what I have done is to establish a model of EU cohesion through variables taken from literature, from the analysis presented in Chapter 4 and from the answers to the survey questions (see Chapter 5). Through these variables, I have presented and elaborated on scenarios regarding the potential for EU cohesion in the context of Turkish accession to the EU. Certainly, the model I have established may be used in the coming years by politicians, EU and other technocrats as well as academics to monitor the progress and development of Turkey's (or any other country's) accession to the EU and to examine whether such accessions will threaten EU cohesion. The positive impact of this project is mainly reflected in the great interest that both MEPs, and Peter Lang GmbH (Publishing House) have demonstrated in publishing this research. I have already signed a contract for the publishing of my DProf with Peter Lang GmbH. Paragraph 7 of the contract states that 'the publisher shall be responsible for worldwide announcement, for enlistment in the most important national bibliographies, and shall endeavour to have the works reviewed in scientific periodicals' (see Appendix 8).

Last but not least, I note the following: the model of EU cohesion I establish in this project can serve as a source of evidence for future studies and researches on Enlargement. The set of variables, which the model consists of, will continue to be supplied, renewed and reinforced by current data so that it will always be up to date. More importantly, this research will provide us with a tool by which to answer (among others) this central question: will we have a European Turkey, or a Turkish Europe?
REFERENCES


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Böge R (Member of the European Parliament, Chairman of the Budget Committee) Personal interview given for the purposes of this research in Brussels on 1 December 2007.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Bouchoux, D 2000, Cite- Checker: a Hands-on Guide to Learning Citation Form, Thomson Delmar Learning, viewed 8 October 2008, <http://books.google.com/books?id=RJ4viBrWu0MC&pg=PA45&dq=%22primary+sources%22+%22science+citation%22&as_brr=3&sig=75RwFqQHgKs49LHcbhnE1M4RHw0>.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Churchill, A 1979 'A paradigm for developing better measures of marketing constructs', Journal of Marketing Research, 16, pp. 64-73.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


EurActiv.com 2004, The New EU Cohesion Policy, 5 November, viewed 1 April 2008,
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Erzan, R & Kirisci, K, (to be published), "Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration within the EU and Migration to Turkey", Bogazici University -OSIAF ongoing joint projects on Employment and Immigration Issues in Turkish -EU Relations.


Gönen Y (Director of Social Sciences Institute and European Studies, University of Bilgi) 2007, Personal Interview given for the purposes of this research in Istanbul, 17 November.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Hoffmann, S 1966, 'The Fate of the Nation-State', Daedalus, summer.

Hoffmann, S 1968, Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, McGraw-Hill, New York.


Howell M & Prevenier, W 2001, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Sources, Cornell University Press, US.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Katircioglu, E (Chair of the Department of Economics of Istanbul Bilgi University) 2007, Personal Interview given for the purposes of this research in Istanbul, 17 November


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Lagendijk, J (Chairman of the EU- Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee of the European Parliament) 2007, Personal Interview given for the purposes of this research in Brussels, 9 October.

Lannon, E 2005, "The Long and Winding Road of Turkish Accession to the EU", *Collegium*, no. 31, spring, College of Europe.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Morse, J 1991, 'Approaches to Qualitative-Quantitative Methodological Triangulation', *Nursing Research* 40.2.

Muenz, R 2006, 'Europe: Population and Migration in 2005'.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Özbudun, E 2000, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 117.


Parasuraman, A 1986, Marketing Research, Reading, MA: Addison and Wesley.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Ioannis Charalambides


Society of European Journalists 2005, True, Baski, Turkey, 31 May.


Ioannis Charalambides
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Tschudi, F 1989, ‘Do Qualitative and Quantitative Methods require different approaches to Validity?’, Issues of Validity in Qualitative Research, Steinar Kvale: Germany.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Altunisik, M 2005, 'The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter- Spring, pp. 45-63.

Balci, A & Mis, N 2008, 'Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?', *Turkish Studies*, vol. 9, no. 3, September.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion


Kennan, G 1985/86, 'Morality and Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, winter.


Larsen, J, Mascharka, C & Toronski C 1987, 'Does the wording of the question change the number of headaches people report on a health questionnaire?', Psychological Record 3, pp. 423–427.


Olson, R 2007, 'From the EU Project to the Iraq Project and Back Again? Kurds and Turks after the 22 July 2007 Elections', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 18, no.4, Fall, pp. 138-141.

Poe G, Seeman, L, McLaughlin, J & Mehl, E. "Don’t know' boxes in factual questions in a mail questionnaire: effects on level and quality of response' Public Opinion Quarterly 52, pp. 212–222.


Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

LIST OF VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS
Tables and Graphs

Chapter 4

Figure 1
Are you for or against Turkish accession?  p. 66

Figure 2
Opposition to Turkish accession  p. 66

Table 1
In favour of and opposed to Turkish accession  p. 68

Figure 3
What if Turkey implements reforms?  p. 69

Figure 4
According to you, EU accession of Turkey would be...?  p. 70

Table 2
Labour market statistics (Turkey)  p. 73

Figures 5
Evolution of the EU's trade balance with Turkey  p. 75

Tables 3
EU trade with main partners (2006)  p. 77

Tables 4
Turkey's trade balance with main partners (2006)  p. 78

Figures 6
Evolution of Turkey's trade balance  p. 79

Table 5
EU Cohesion policy allocations  p. 92

Table 6
Effect of Enlargements on EU GDP per capita  p. 92

Figure 7
Percentage of population and area in states <90% EU average GDP  p. 94

Figure 8
Percentage of EU population in regions <75% average EU GDP  p. 95

Table 7
Potential statistical effects on the Cohesion Fund  p. 96

Table 8
Indicative allocations to main areas of intervention  p. 99
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Table 9
Biggest military countries p. 118

Map 1
Major pipeline system and projects p. 119

Figure 9
The NBI values under the Nice rules and CT rules in EU-29 p. 123

Figure 10
The power difference between the CT and Nice rules in EU-29 p. 125

Table 10
Power indices under the CT rules p. 126

Table 11
Power indices under the Nice rules p. 127

Chapter 5

Figure 1
Degree to which MEPs believe that the US influences the decisions of the EU p. 133

Figure 2
Degree to which MEPs believe that the US influences Turkish accession to the EU p. 134

Figure 3
The way that the MEPs believe that the US influences Turkish accession to the EU p. 134

Figure 4
The kind of interests that MEPs believe to define the EU decision making p. 136

Figure 5
The reasons that -according to MEPs- the Europeans do not wish to see Turkey in the EU as a full member state p. 144

Figure 6
The kind of power that, according to MEPs leading EU countries are not ready to share with Turkey p. 148

Figure 7
The reasons for supporting the entrance of Turkey to the EU as a full member state p. 150

Figure 8
Degree to which MEPs believe that Turkish accession will strengthen the global EU position p. 154

Figure 9
The area within and the extent to which Turkish accession will strengthen the EU position p. 156
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

**Figure 10**
Whether Turkish accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power  p. 159

**Figure 11**
The extent of power redistribution following Turkey's accession  p. 159

**Figure 12**
Whether Turkish accession to the EU could lead to structural changes  p. 162

**Figure 13**
The extent of the structural changes following Turkish accession to the EU  p. 162

**Figure 14**
Effect of the potential structural changes on the cohesion of the EU due to Turkish accession  p. 164

**Figure 15**
Extent of effect of potential structural changes on EU cohesion  p. 165

**Figure 16**
The extent that the MEPs believe that human rights are respected in Turkey  p. 170

**Figure 17**
Existence of corruption in Turkey according to MEPs  p. 171

**Figure 18**
Extent of corruption in Turkey  p. 171

**Figure 19**
Involvement of Turkish army in politics according to MEPs  p. 173

**Figure 20**
Extent to which MEPs believe that the Turkish army is involved in politics  p. 173

**Figure 21**
Reasons for which MEPs believe that Turkey is undertaking reforms  p. 175

**Figure 22**
Whether MEPs believe that Turkey should continue with reforms  p. 178

**Figure 23**
Possibility of Turkey putting by itself an end to its course towards the EU  p. 179

**Figure 24**
Reasons for which MEPs believe that Turkey could put by itself an end to its course towards the EU  p. 180

Chapter 6

**Figure 1**
Cohesion of the EU in relation to Turkish accession to the EU  p. 194
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

**Figure 2**
Cohesion of the EU in relation to Turkish accession to the EU  p. 195

**Figure 3**
Worst case scenario and crisis  p. 199

**Figure 4**
Democracy in relation to Turkish accession to the EU  p. 202

**Figure 5**
EU Institutions and Turkish accession to the EU  p. 204

**Figure 6**
Cohesion policy and Turkish accession to the EU  p. 205

**Figure 7**
Economy and Turkish accession to the EU  p. 207

**Figure 8**
Society and Turkish accession to the EU  p. 208

**Figure 9**
Cohesion of the EU in relation to Turkish accession to the EU  p. 211
LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1
Interview by MEP Joost Lagendijk p. 242

Appendix 2
Survey Questionnaire p. 250

Appendix 3
Ethics Release Form p. 258

Appendix 4
Declaration by the European Community and its Member-States p. 260

Appendix 5
Statement by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on the latest development in the prosecution case against the AKP in Turkey p. 261

Appendix 6
Turkey’s Contributions to International Peace-keeping Activities p. 262

Appendix 7
Short List of Answers to the Research Questions p. 265

Appendix 8
Impact of the Project p. 268
Question 1:
What is the role of the US on the decisions of the EU and especially on the Turkish accession to the EU?

Answer
It is clear to everybody that over the last couple of years the US is strongly in favour of Turkey’s entry as a member state of the EU. I think that in the years of 2002 -2003, the US was very explicitly pushing for the Turkish membership. They made comments, they made statements, and they made phone calls. Then, if I remember well, in 2002, before the European summit on the decision on Turkey in 2004, Prime Ministers like Berlusconi and Aznar said publicly that they did not like this pressure from the US side. They said in public that it is up to us, the Europeans to decide, whether Turkey will be member and not to the US. It was a good lesson to the US, not to push too much on the EU to do what they think would be good. So, I think after 2002, we have seen that the US is still in favour of the Turkish accession to the EU, but without pushing the Europeans too much because it was counterproductive. I have talked to a lot of US diplomats and they got the message from 2004. So in general, everybody knows that the US is in favour but it is not pushing too much as this could backfire on them because the Europeans say, "look, this is a matter of our club and it is up to us to decide". Even the pro-American Prime Ministers like Aznar and Berlusconi said so. So, I think that we know, of course, that the Americans are in favour, but I think the EU, the EU member states, also the Commission and the Parliament, they are well able to make up their own mind. And they had made it clear to the Americans: don’t push us too much because it is counterproductive.

Question 2
What are the reasons for the US favouring the Turkish accession to the EU?

Answer
From the US perspective, they compare EU membership with membership of NATO. They say Turkey has always been member state of NATO, so why not member of the EU? And of course, for more strategic reasons for the US, for the Middle East policies especially... They want to see a democratic and stable Turkey in the EU and not a sort of Turkey floating around in a very heated region. I think for those two reasons, NATO and strategic long-term interests in the Middle east, the US would like to see Turkey becoming more democratic and more stable.
Question 3
We often hear that Turkey wishes to establish a model for the other Muslim countries.

Answer
That is of the last couple of years. On top of those arguments that I mentioned, there has come the argument to promote democracy in the Middle East and that Turkey could be some sort of model there. To a large extent, I subscribe to that thesis, but the problem is that Turkey has totally shot itself on the foot by invading Iraq. So nobody believes the Americans, when they say that we want to promote democracy and Turkey is a good model. For Europe, for the European Union thought that this could be the way of showing to all sceptics (who say) that democracy and Islam do not go together, that Turkey is an example where this could work out. I do not believe so much in models. This is the American way of thinking. The differences between the Arab world and Turkey are very big. But it is an example, I am sure, for Egypt and Morocco...Turkey is definitely an example closely watched in the Arab world, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Egypt, in Morocco... In Morocco you have a party, which is called AKP party that won the last elections. So, there is an influence of Turkey on the region but it is not, I think, a model you could copy in other countries because of the differences.

Question 4
Which are the problems that Turkey faces in the context of its accession to the EU?

Answer
There are many but the most basic ones are the very concrete problems of human rights and minority rights. Both on the level of ideas, minority rights are a highly controversial issue. Also because some of the groups that we would call minorities, in Turkey they don't want to be called minorities because they think that minority is something inferior. While in Europe, minorities have their own rights and status. So sometimes it is difficult the discussion between the EU and the Turks because we do not have the same language. The Turks understand differently the term 'minority' from us. This is a point of discussion in Turkey as well. Reports by academicians give now emphasis to a new constitution which, I think would solve this problem concerning minority language and minority status. This is one thing on the level of concepts and ideas.

Very practically of course, there is the problem with the large Kurdish minority in the South East, which is a cultural problem, but also a social and economic problem. There is a big challenge for Turkey to get that region develop as the rest part of the country has been doing over the last couple of years.

Another problem is the role of the army...totally different in Turkey than in the other countries of the European Union...There is a whole debate on how to change it, to what direction; this is really a challenge for Turkey.

Also, Turkey has to change its Cyprus policy....

Changing the role of the army can only be a gradual process. What is unacceptable from the European point of view is the political role of the army in the system, the
intervention of the army in the political life, in education and the Media. Again, I think the new Constitution could clean parts of the problem. Still, the army will be a long running issue. This also has to do with Turkey's surroundings, the fact that Turkey's neighbours are not Denmark or Luxembourg but Iran, Iraq and Syria. Anyhow, the role of the army in politics has to be gradually diminished to the level we know from other European countries. So this is one of the big challenges.

But when you look at this, the whole issue of minorities -religious and ethnic- the Kurdish problem, the role of the army, all this is going to the roots of the society. So we are talking about a society in transition. A society that faces strong changes -also economic, especially with the pressure of globalisation. So this is why so many things are happening at the same time. It is a process that in other European countries took many more years and was sometimes separated. But in Turkey, everything is happening at the same moment and at a high speed.

**Question 5**
**Does the role of the army in the political system influence the Turkish accession to the EU?**

**Answer**
Definitely, it influences Turkey's chances to become member. It is very clear that the political role of the army has to come to an end. I think this is one of the things that Europe will be watching very carefully in the coming years during the negotiations. Whether, step by step, the role of the army in Turkey will become that of armies in European countries. There is a whole tradition and libraries full of books to explain why the army became such an important player in Turkey. In the past, it had to do with the weakness of politics et cetera, et cetera...It is all understandable, but now, this has to change. Together with the minority issues and the Cyprus issue, it is one of the key issues that will determine whether Turkey will make it to the EU.

**Question 6**
**Will the Turkish accession to the EU cause a redistribution of power?**

**Answer**
Inside the EU, it definitely will. When Turkey becomes a member, it will probably be the biggest member regarding size and population. This means that in the new system that we will have, Turkey, in the Council and also among the member states, will be a big player, one of the big players. Having said that, also in the present EU, we have big players and small players. So when you compare the size of Turkey in an EU of 30 or 30 + members, it is more or less the same as Germany in the present EU of 25 and 27 members. So we have been here before. With the new rules it is not one, two or three member states that could block a policy or push through policies, but it is clear that in an EU with Turkey, Turkey will be a dominant player. And I think this is one of the reasons why especially France is not very happy. France is one of the one or two big players and then, if Turkey joins the EU, France will lose influence in the EU. In the European Parliament of course, it is one reason why colleagues say we will lose votes, we will lose seats if Turkey becomes member. It is true. Like we did when Poland and Romania became members. It is something that cannot be neglected. It is true but it is part of the process as we have seen it...
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

over the years that the old member states, by sharing sovereignty with Turkey, will lose some of their power that they have now.

**Question 7**
Do the leading member states of the EU wish to share power with Turkey?

**Answer**
It depends on your vision of Europe. I think we see clear differences between the UK and France. I think that in the long run, not only with the Turkish accession but also with the accession of ten member states in 2004, the model of Europe is changing. It is changing from the French model, a very integrated, centralised harmonised EU and what the French thought of a 'big France'. French thought of Europe as an extension of France. This is not any longer possible. Not because of Turkey, but because of the UK and because of Poland. So Europe has expanded to 25 and now 27, which means that differences within the European Union have room. This is also part of the new Treaty and it was part of the Constitution. We go to a different Europe. A Europe that does some things on European level, like foreign trade, environment, security and foreign policy etc, but also leaves a lot of other thinks to the member states because the differences among the member states are very big. This is more or less the British model. The French do not like this. This is why the French were not very happy with the Enlargement of 2004, they are not very happy with the Balkans entry, they are not very happy with Turkey's entry for several reasons. One being that the old idea of Europe as a coherent body that does everything together is disappearing - and I think has already disappeared. So, in a Europe that the differences are big culturally, but also economically, this is the reason why there is room for Turkey. In a Europe that should become 'big France', Turkey would be outside. Like Romania or Poland or Sweden would be outside. They do not want to be like France. So, it is the development we have seen and we are still experiencing whereby Europe gradually changes. The model of Europe is changing and in the new Europe where we accept differences, where we leave a lot of things to the member-states, in such a model, Turkey fits. In the old model, the very centralised, Turkey would not fit. Because Turkey would not accept it and because Turkey is simply too big and too different to fit to that.

**Question 8**
Why are some Europeans afraid of Turkey's full membership to the EU?

**Answer**
The two basic reasons for citizens and party politicians to be afraid of Turkey's membership are the fear of Islam and the fear of migration. And these two fears, which in my country, but I think in many European countries, are the biggest fears, coincide in Turkey. Because most of the people in Turkey are Muslims, the European citizens ask themselves: Can we fit them in? People are not sure about that, they have their doubts. There are a lot of negative things in their minds about Islam. Not so much in Turkey but still, for a lot of people, Islam in Turkey is the same as in Saudi Arabia, in Iran or in Northern Africa. This is a difficult thing to discuss because if you do not make the difference between the Islam in Turkey and the Islam in other countries you are into problems.
Secondly, there is the fear that after accession, millions of Turks will come to the Netherlands or Germany to get a job. Nobody can predict what will happen, we are talking about 2025 or after, but still, these two fears make people doubt.... I still think that inside the EU, there is more than 25% of the people and also of the politicians who are against Turkey because of immigration, Islam and for other reasons, 25% who is in favour and 50% who is in between. Sometimes when things go well in Turkey like in 2004, there is optimism in the EU and they say lets do it. When they are sceptical about the EU and when things do not progress in Turkey, they say let's not do it. So, there is this 50% that is open to arguments, and sometimes they say yes, sometimes they say no. But Islam and migration are fears that will be with us for long, long time. These are the basic things that the people are afraid of.

**Question 9**
Why are they afraid of these things?

**Answer**
Most of the people believe that Muslims are fundamentalists, terrorists. So when there are terrorist attacks in Iraq people think, they are Muslims, people in Turkey are Muslims, so get them out or keep them out. It is lack of knowledge and the impression that being Muslim is a problem. And because we have already 18 million Muslims in Europe, we should not make them 80 million. It is almost an irrational fear based on culture and religion. But that is the way it is.

**Question 10**
Which are the factors defining the cohesion of the EU?

**Answer**
That is a difficult question. We are in the middle of the shift. In the past, it used to be the economic cohesion, all the financial instruments for cohesion, which were very important for Spain, Ireland, Italy etc. The basic idea was that these people are like us. So we belong together (culturally, religiously, same sort of societies etc). This already changed when Eastern Europe came in, because culturally, there are differences in these societies and economies. But we said "ok we promised them in the past, we should do it".

Now with the Balkans and with Turkey, you see that these people are different religiously, culturally, historically. To defend the accession of those countries, you have to say that it is in our self-interest to have them in and for them to be democratic and stable instead of excluding them. So now, we have reached the borders of whether you can defend membership on the basis of the old arguments that "they are socially and culturally like us". But they are not always like us. Still, I think there is a new paradigm around and it is in our interests to have them in if we want to be major players in the Global scene. If we want to be strong against the Chinese, the Americans, the Indians.... It is in our interest to be united and also to be united on a largest scale including Turkey. There is a shift from the old arguments, which were more cultural and social, to interest. It is in our interest. If we want to be players it is good to have Turkey because we will be stronger on the Global scene. There is a shift in the arguments and in the reasons that keep the Union together. These
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

reasons now are different than in 1957 because Europe has changed and the European Union, the world has also changed.

**Question 11**
What are the factors that can keep the EU in cohesion?

**Answer**
From an economic point of view, a strong internal market keeps the economies together and makes it easier for companies to work together. That is a good basis. But it is not enough. So we will have an ongoing debate for the next 10-20 years on how big are the differences that we can accept within the European Union on culture and religion. I think that we can go quite far in accepting these differences. But the differences within the European Union are growing and there are all kinds of new discussions taking place saying that the old cohesion can not work any more. It is more than economy. But what is on the top of them? Is it also culture? Yes, but then we have to accept the differences within the EU. Can we cope with that? Yes, I think we can. Nothing is fixed yet, it is still under debate. And some people say that because of cohesion we should not include another religion in the EU. I think that Europe can cope with that. It is partly a matter of a political debate, how far can you go and when cohesion is under threat. Some people say that with Turkey (the cohesion of the EU will be under threat). I will not agree. But it is a political debate now taking place.

**Question 12**
What do the Europeans means when they are talking about absorption capacity, the capacity of the EU to absorb new member states?

**Answer**
It is partly this...There are different factors. Do the internal rules of the EU allow for new member states to come in? This is why I always agree with those who support that we need a new Treaty, we need new rules, which will make the taking of the decisions easier and less easy for one country to block the decisions. This is the institutional capacity to integrate new members. When the new Treaty will be adopted -and it looks quite good at the moment- the EU would at least have the rules, and the structures to include a big country like Turkey.

Then there is the financial capacity. Turkey is a poor country (the same applies for Ukraine by the way) so, do we have the money to pay for the cohesion funds or the agriculture policy? So there we have to look closely at the present policies and at the budget. I do not believe those who say that the EU will go broke or will have a financial disaster if Turkey comes in. We decide for ourselves how much we want to spent for Turkey. It is as blunt as it is. I think that Turkey realises too that the golden days of the past, as for the Spanish and the Irish are over. The EU is never going to pay this amount of money again. The Polish already get less and the Turkish will get less. In Turkey, they know that.

The third aspect of integration capacity is public opinion. We cannot push such an important Enlargement of the EU against the big majority in society. The most challenging aspect of this whole integration capacity debate is neither the Institutions
nor the finances, but to convince the 50% of the people, who are in doubt, that it would be good for Europe, it would be good for Turkey, that Turkey is changing and therefore it can accede. This is the big challenge for us, the politicians and for the Media and the journalists; to convince the majority of our people, that it is a good thing. Because we know that for the moment a lot of people are against or have their doubts. That is the most important part of the integration capacity that I think we should be working on.

**Question 13**
Will the Turkish accession to the EU bring structural changes?

**Answer**
When the new Treaty will be accepted, we can integrate Turkey with those rules. It will be clear how the votes will take place, how the veto is distributed... So institutionally the EU does need to change. On the budget, we have strong budget implications but we can decide on this by ourselves.

Also, with the EU bordering Iraq, Iran and Syria... that would be a great difference comparing to now.

The Turkish accession will definitely change the EU. I see a lot of positive things that will allow the EU to be player in the Middle East. It (the Turkish accession) will make the EU stronger but it will also make the EU more vulnerable because we will border countries which for the moment are politically unstable. I can understand the fears of the people who say "why should we want to border Iraq? Let's have a state in between". So Turkey is a sort of buffer between the Middle East and the EU. I think that in the long term, it does not work like that. If there are problems in Iraq, they will come to us anyway, even if Turkey is not a member. These are the issues we have to convince our citizens about. The first reaction of the people is that the European Union is safe, we are civilised people and we do not want to border these very dangerous lands. It will definitely change the perceptions of Europe, where Europe ends, what is European or not. That's why it is good to take a longer period of time to take in Turkey. We should not overdo it or rush Turkey into the EU. Ten years is a long period to get used to the fact that Turkey will be with us. We need that time.

**Question 14**
Will the Turkish accession to the EU threaten the cohesion of EU or not?

**Answer**
No, I don't think so. But we have to work institutionally, financially but especially to the heads of the people. People have to realise and accept that Europe has different chambers and different rooms and the rooms are not all the same, like Poland. And I think in that respect it is good, because now people say, "yes ok the Polish are European" and nobody discusses about that, "they are Catholics, ok, no problem", but they act differently than the Portuguese or the Irish. So it is good to get used to the fact that now we have extended EU to include countries that for historical reasons or others, they act differently than we do, like the Dutch or Germans. And this is good because it gets the Europeans used to the fact that the European house has different rooms and some of the rooms we do not know very well. And Turkey could be one of
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

the rooms and that is definitely the way forward. And therefore, it does not threaten
the cohesion of the EU. I mean, you know I am in favour of the Turkish accession,
but do not rush into it, get people used to the fact that they (the Turks) will be
eventually with us but not tomorrow and not the day after.

Question 15
Will Turkey end by itself its course to the EU?

Answer
Theoretically, I can really imagine that there will be moments during the negotiations
when people will be frustrated with Europe and want to leave. However, it is really
difficult to tell whether Turkey will decide to stop its course towards the EU.
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

APPENDIX 2
Survey Questionnaire

EVALUATION OF THE TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND THE EUROPEAN COHESION

Dear Member of the European Parliament,

Your perceptions, opinions and attitudes with regards to the issues addressed in this questionnaire are very important for the purpose of this project. Your responses are important in order to evaluate the opinions and attitudes of European MEPs towards the accession of Turkey to the EU. The information that you provide will be kept completely confidential and the final results of the research will not reveal the respondent's identity.

Please, fill out the questions below and sent it back either by fax at +32 22849128, by email at yiannakis.matsis@europarl.europa.eu or in person at ASP 8E254. Additionally, should you wish we can also pass by your office and collect it.

Thank you for your time and help.

Yiannos Charalampidis
tel. +32 22847128 / GSM: +32 494621100

PERSONAL INFORMATION (OPTIONAL)

Q.1 Which age category do you belong to? (tick the box of your choice)

☐ 20 - 24 YEARS ☐ 25 - 34 YEARS ☐ 35 - 44 YEARS

☐ 45 - 54 YEARS ☐ 55 - 59 YEARS ☐ 60 YEARS OR OLDER

Q.2 What is your gender? (tick the box of your choice)

☐ MALE ☐ FEMALE

Q.3 Nationality (Please specify): _______________________

Q.4 Country (Please specify): _______________________

Q.5 Political party (Please specify): _______________________

Q.6 Years of experience in the European Parliament (Please specify): _______________________

Q.7 Have you ever visited Turkey? (tick the box of your choice)

☐ YES ☐ NO

If yes:

☐ OFFICIAL VISIT ☐ PERSONAL BUSINESS
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Evaluation of the Turkish Accession to the EU

Q.8 Do you believe that the US influences the decisions of the EU? (tick the box of your choice)
[ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] DO NOT KNOW [ ] NO ANSWER

Q.8a If yes, to what extent? (tick the box of your choice)
[ ] TO A LARGE EXTENT [ ] TO SOME EXTENT [ ] LITTLE [ ] VERY LITTLE [ ] DO NOT KNOW

Q.9 Do you believe that the US influences or not the Turkish accession to the EU? (tick the box of your choice)
[ ] YES (PLEASE, GO TO QUESTION 10) [ ] NO (PLEASE, GO TO QUESTION 11) [ ] DO NOT KNOW

Q.10 In what way does the US influence the Turkish accession to the EU? (tick the box of your choice)
[ ] POSITIVELY [ ] NEGATIVELY [ ] DO NOT KNOW [ ] NO ANSWER

Q10a If positively, to what extent? (tick the box of your choice)
[ ] TO A LARGE EXTENT [ ] TO SOME EXTENT [ ] LITTLE [ ] VERY LITTLE [ ] DO NOT KNOW

Q10b If negatively, to what extent? (tick the box of your choice)
[ ] TO A LARGE EXTENT [ ] TO SOME EXTENT [ ] LITTLE [ ] VERY LITTLE [ ] DO NOT KNOW

Q.11 According to your opinion, which are the reasons behind the stance of some Europeans, who do not wish to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member state? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)

[ ] TURKEY’S MUSLIM CHARACTER.
[ ] THE LEADING COUNTRIES WITHIN THE EU ARE NOT READY TO SHARE THEIR POWER WITH TURKEY. (SEE QUESTION 6)
[ ] FEAR OF FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS FROM TURKEY.
[ ] FEAR OF STRENGTHENING THE STATUS OF TURKISH MIGRANTS ALREADY RESIDING IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
[ ] PREJUDICE AGAINST TURKEY
[ ] ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES
[ ] EXTRA BURDEN ON EU COHESION POLICY AND STRUCTURAL FUNDS
[ ] POLITICAL INSTABILITY
[ ] ROLE OF THE ARMY IN THE SYSTEM
[ ] CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
[ ] NEGATIVE HISTORICAL STEREOTYPES AND GEOGRAPHICAL REASONS
[ ] TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY.
[ ] TURKEY WILL BECOME THE ’FIFTH PHALANX’ OF THE US WITHIN THE EU
[ ] THE UNRESOLVED CYPRUS ISSUE
[ ] NONE OF THE ABOVE
[ ] OTHER REASONS: (PLEASE MENTION)
   A) .................................................................
   B) .................................................................
   C) .................................................................
Q.12 If in Question 11 option 2 is chosen (i.e. that the leading countries within the EU are not ready to share their power with Turkey) please specify, which kind of power. (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)

☐ ECONOMIC  ☐ INSTITUTIONAL  ☐ POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC

Q.13 According to your opinion, which are the reasons behind the stance of some Europeans to support that Turkey should join the EU as a full member state? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)

☐ TURKEY’S GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION IN EURASIA.
☐ TURKEY’S BIG SIZE SEEN AS A BIG MARKET
☐ TURKEY’S CHEAP LABOUR
☐ CULTURAL ENRICHMENT OF THE EU
☐ TURKEY WILL BECOME A MODEL OF A DEMOCRATIC MUSLIM COUNTRY FOR OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND FOR THE ARAB WORLD
☐ EU MEMBERSHIP WOULD BRING ABOUT POLITICAL STABILITY WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND THE REGION
☐ NONE OF THE ABOVE
☐ OTHER REASONS: (PLEASE MENTION)

A) ..................................................................................................................

B) ..................................................................................................................

C) ..................................................................................................................

Q.14 Will the accession of Turkey to the EU contribute to the strengthening of the EU position on the global system? (tick the box of your choice)

☐ YES  ☐ NO  ☐ DO NOT KNOW  ☐ NO ANSWER

Q.15 If yes, in which area and to what extent? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)

Q.15a Economics

☐ TO A LARGE EXTENT  ☐ TO SOME EXTENT  ☐ LITTLE  ☐ VERY LITTLE  ☐ DO NOT KNOW  ☐ NO ANSWER

Q.15b Politics/Diplomacy

☐ TO A LARGE EXTENT  ☐ TO SOME EXTENT  ☐ LITTLE  ☐ VERY LITTLE  ☐ DO NOT KNOW  ☐ NO ANSWER

Q.15c Military

☐ TO A LARGE EXTENT  ☐ TO SOME EXTENT  ☐ LITTLE  ☐ VERY LITTLE  ☐ DO NOT KNOW  ☐ NO ANSWER

Q.15d Culturally

☐ TO A LARGE EXTENT  ☐ TO SOME EXTENT  ☐ LITTLE  ☐ VERY LITTLE  ☐ DO NOT KNOW  ☐ NO ANSWER

Q.16 Will the Turkish accession of the EU bring a redistribution of power within the EU? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)

Q.16a Economic power

☐ YES  ☐ NO  ☐ DO NOT KNOW  ☐ NO ANSWER

If yes, to what extent?

☐ TO A LARGE EXTENT  ☐ TO SOME EXTENT  ☐ LITTLE  ☐ VERY LITTLE  ☐ DO NOT KNOW  ☐ NO ANSWER
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Q.16b  Political/ Diplomatic power
☐ YES  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent  ☐ To some extent  ☐ Little  ☐ Very little  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.16c  Military power
☐ YES  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent  ☐ To some extent  ☐ Little  ☐ Very little  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.16d  Institutional power
☐ YES  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent  ☐ To some extent  ☐ Little  ☐ Very little  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.17  According to your opinion, would the Turkish accession to the EU lead or not to structural changes? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)

Q.17a  Military
☐ YES  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent  ☐ To some extent  ☐ Little  ☐ Very little  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.17b  Political
☐ YES  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent  ☐ To some extent  ☐ Little  ☐ Very little  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.17c  Institutional
☐ YES  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent  ☐ To some extent  ☐ Little  ☐ Very little  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.17d  Cultural
☐ YES  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent ☐ To some extent ☐ Little ☐ Very little ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

Q.17e Social
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent ☐ To some extent ☐ Little ☐ Very little ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

Q.17f Economic
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?
☐ To a large extent ☐ To some extent ☐ Little ☐ Very little ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

Q.18 Taking into consideration your response to question 17, will such changes potentially threaten or strengthen the cohesion of the EU? To what extent? (tick the box of your choice)
☐ Threaten (go to Q.18a) ☐ Strengthen (go to Q.18b) ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

Q.18a Threaten
☐ To a large extent ☐ To some extent ☐ Little ☐ Very little ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

Q.18b Strengthen
☐ To a large extent ☐ To some extent ☐ Little ☐ Very little ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

Q.19 The decisions of the EU are taken: (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)
☐ According to national interests (go to Q.19a)
☐ According to common interests (go to Q.19b)
☐ On the basis of both (go to Q.19c)
☐ Other (go to Q.19d)
☐ Do not know (go to Q.20)
☐ No answer (go to Q.20)

Q.19a According to national interests.

To what extent?
☐ To a large extent ☐ To some extent ☐ Little ☐ Very little ☐ Do not know ☐ No answer

Q19b According to common interests

To what extent?
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Q.19c On the basis of both
To what extent?

Q.19d Other (please specify)

Q.20 According to your opinion, to what extent are human rights respected in Turkey?
(tick the box of your choice - Multiple answers possible)

Q.20a Political rights

Q.20b Women rights

Q.20c Religious rights

Q.20d Minority rights

Q.20e Freedom of expression

Q.21 Is there corruption in Turkey? (tick the box of your choice)

Q.21a If yes, to what extent?

Q.21b If no, to what extent?
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Q.22 Is the Turkish army involved within Turkey’s political system? (tick the box of your choice)

☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, to what extent?

☐ To a large extent  ☐ To some extent  ☐ Little  ☐ Very little  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.23 According to your opinion, for what reasons is Turkey undertaking reforms? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible):

☐ Fulfil EU obligations
☐ Establish a moderate state
☐ Stabilise political system
☐ Stabilise economy
☐ Strengthen social cohesion
☐ Do not know
☐ No answer
☐ Other reasons: (please specify)

A) ........................................................................................................................................

B) ........................................................................................................................................

C) ........................................................................................................................................

Q.24 Regardless of EU requirements, should Turkey continue with the reforms? (tick the box of your choice)

☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

Q.25 Do you believe that Turkey will by itself put an end to its course to the EU? (tick the box of your choice)

☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ Do not know  ☐ No answer

If yes, for what reasons? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)

☐ Possibility of a “privilege regime” instead of full membership
☐ Political forces in Turkey do not wish to see Turkey in the EU
☐ Turkey cannot successfully respond to reforms required by the EU
☐ Fear that Turkey’s “Europeanisation” will threaten its territorial cohesion
☐ Fear that Turkey’s “Europeanisation” will threaten its social cohesion
☐ Fear that Turkey’s “Europeanisation” will threaten State’s cohesion.
Any other comments you would like to share.

If you would like to comment on anything else, please use the space below. We welcome your comments.

Thank you for participating in this study. We anticipate that your input will assist us in evaluating the opinions and attitudes of European MEPs towards the accession of Turkey to the EU

For processing only:

Date received: ___________________ Entered by: __________ Survey number: ___________________
APPENDIX 3

Ethics Release Form

All candidates planning to undertake research are required to complete this Ethics Release Form and to submit along with their Programme Planning documentation (DPS4541). Please note the following:

- It is essential that you have an understanding of ethical considerations central to planning and conducting research.
- Approval to carry out research does not exempt you from Ethics Committee approval from Institutions within which you may be planning to conduct the research, e.g. Hospitals, NHS Trusts, Local Education Authorities, HM Prisons Service, etc.

Please answer all of the following questions:

1. Has the project proposal and ethical considerations in draft been completed and submitted to the advisor or consultant?  
   - Yes  
   - No

2. Will the research involve an intervention or change to an existing situation that may affect people and/or an evaluation of outcomes of an intervention?  
   - Yes  
   - No

   If yes, have participants been given information about the aims, procedure and possible risks involved, in easily understood language. (Attach a copy any information sheet you may have provided)  
   - Yes  
   - No

3. Will any person’s position, treatment or care be in any way prejudiced if they choose not to participate in the project?  
   - Yes  
   - No

4. Can participants freely withdraw from the project at any stage without risk or harm of prejudice?  
   - Yes  
   - No

5. Will the project involve working with or studying minors (i.e. <16 years)?  
   - Yes  
   - No

   If yes, will signed parental consent be obtained?  
   - Yes  
   - No

6. Are there any questions or procedures likely to be considered in any way offensive or inappropriate?  
   - Yes  
   - No
7. Have all necessary steps been taken to protect the privacy of participants and the need for anonymity?  
   Yes  No

   Is there provision for the safekeeping of written Data and video / audio recordings of participants?  
   Yes  No

8. If applicable, is there provision for de-briefing participants after the intervention or project?  
   Yes  No

9. If any specialised instruments, for example psychometric instruments are to be employed, will their use be controlled and supervised by a qualified practitioner e.g. a psychologist?  
   Yes  No

10. Will you need to put your proposal through an ethics committee related to your professional work?  
    Yes  No

If you have placed an X in any of the bold boxes please provide further information.
APPENDIX 4

DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES

1. The European Community and its Member States acknowledge the signature by Turkey of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States on the one part and Turkey on the other, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004. They regret that Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration regarding the Republic of Cyprus at the time of signature.

2. The European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol.

3. The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006. The European Community and its Member States stress that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations.

4. The European Community and its Member States recall that the Republic of Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. They underline that they recognise only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law.

5. Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process. Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible.

6. The Council will ensure a follow-up on the progress made on all these issues in 2006.

7. In the context of this declaration, the European Community and its Member States agree on the importance of supporting the efforts of the UN Secretary General to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in line with relevant UNSCRs and the principles on which the EU is founded, and that a just and lasting settlement will contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.

(Source: Council of the European Union, 21 September 2005 Declaration by the European Community and its Member States, 12541/05, Brussels.)
APPENDIX 5

Statement by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on the latest development in the prosecution case against the AKP in Turkey

01/04/2008

"I take note of the decision of the Constitutional Court to deal with the case seeking to ban the AKP and 71 of its members from politics. The concerns I expressed on this matter on Saturday remain valid: In EU Member States the kind of political issues referred to in this case are debated in the parliament and decided through the ballot box, not in court rooms.

In particular, the prohibition or dissolution of political parties is a far-reaching measure which should be used with the utmost restraint. According to the guidelines of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission on best practice for European democracies, such a measure may only be justified in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order. I do not see any such justification for this case. The Commission has long stressed the need for Turkey to reform its law on political parties, including the financing of political parties.

This case has revealed a systemic error in the Turkish Constitutional framework that may need to be addressed through a Constitutional amendment. I welcome the government's intention to conduct an overhaul of the provisions that are causing problems for Turkey's democracy.

There is much at stake in the handling of this issue. Turkey's European perspective was the vision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. I fully support Turkey's long-term interest to play its full role as a vital European democracy.

Turkey needs to devote all its energies to undertaking long-awaited reforms that will benefit the Turkish people and advance Turkey's integration into the EU. This case should not distract attention from those reforms.

I will inform my colleagues in the College of Commissioners about this matter on Wednesday."

II Turkey’s Contributions to International Peace Keeping Activities

Turkey makes a substantial contribution to various international peace-keeping activities. Since the end of the Second World War, Turkish troops have served under numerous UN, NATO and EU (ESDP) missions:

1. UN Operations:

To date, Turkey has taken part in the following UN operations:

- The Korean War, with a brigade of 4500 troops,
- UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), between 1988-1991, with 10 personnel,
- UN Iraq-Kuwait Military Observer Group (UNIKOM), between 1991-2003, with 75 personnel,
- Operation “Sharp Guard”, aimed at monitoring the embargo towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 1992-1996, with naval assets,
- Operation “Deny Flight”, aimed at implementing flight restriction over Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 1993-1996, with an F-16 squadron,
- UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 1993-1995, with a mechanized regiment of 1450 troops,
- UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), between 2000-2001, with one military advisor.
- UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-II), between 1993-1994, with over 300 troops. For more than a year, this operation was under the command of a Turkish General.

Moreover, Turkey has also played an important role in UN relief efforts for Northern Iraqi refugees during and after the first Gulf War. Turkey continues to be an important lifeline for Iraq today as well.

Turkey’s contributions to international peace and security continue despite the cost in terms of loss of life in the line of duty, not to mention the heavy financial burden. To date, Turkish troops have the unfortunate distinction of ranking second in terms of the number of casualties suffered in the service of world peace under the UN flag.

Currently Turkey has 296 police officers, 5 military observers and 993 officers serving in UN peace keeping operations in Europe, Asia, Africa and America. In this regard, Turkey is one of the leading countries in terms of contribution in police officers to such operations.

2. NATO and EU led operations in the Balkans:

Turkey has participated in all operations led by NATO in the Balkans since 1995. As such, it contributed to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Turkey maintained her support for international efforts to enhance peace and stability in Macedonia after Operation Allied Harmony was terminated and the EU launched a military crisis management operation under the name “Concordia”. Turkey provided 11 personnel to this operation, which was later succeeded by the EU Police Mission, “Proxima”. It is beyond doubt that these operations have played a key role in re-establishing security and stability, thus contributing to the restoration of peace in the region. In total, over 1150 Turkish troops are currently serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. The majority of these forces now serve in KFOR, NATO’s mission in Kosovo, where Turkey undertook the command of the Multinational Task Force-South for a year, starting from 29 May 2007. 101 Turkish police officers took part in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in Kosovo. Since 1 January 2003 Turkey has also been contributing to the EU Police Mission in
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion

Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is the EU's first civilian crisis management operation. Currently 4 Turkish personnel are serving within this Mission. In accordance with the NATO Istanbul Summit decision, NATO’s SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was terminated to be followed by the EU operation “EUFOR-ALTHEA.” This operation was launched on 2 December 2004, under the “Berlin plus” arrangements, with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Turkey has maintained her contributions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this time under EUFOR-ALTHEA with around 255 personnel, including 48 gendarmerie officers in the Integrated Police Unit (IPU).

3. ISAF (Afghanistan):

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, under the existing UN mandate (UNSCR 1386), by assuming strategic coordination, command and control of the operation. Thus, ISAF became the first ever NATO operation conducted beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Being an ambitious step forward in the history of the Alliance, ISAF is a challenging operation with difficulties in terms of geographic distance and demanding human and financial requirements. Success of ISAF, in spite of the challenges it poses, constitutes a key priority for the Alliance as confirmed in the 2004 Istanbul Summit Declaration.

The Alliance’s political objective is to assist the Government of Afghanistan in ensuring security in the country so that reconstruction efforts can continue without interruption. That would enable the government to assume full ownership of the task of maintaining peace and security within the country.

With this aim, the expansion of ISAF throughout Afghanistan has been underway, supported by subsequent resolutions of the UNSC. The Alliance has concluded the first stage of expansion in the north in October 2004, the second stage of expansion in the west in August 2005, and the third stage of expansion in southern Afghanistan in August 2006. Currently, the leading issues on the agenda for NATO are the challenges brought by the expansion of ISAF, helping the government extend its rule into the provinces, forging ahead with the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process, as well as the build-up of the Afghan National Army, and last but not least, contributing to the extent possible, to international efforts towards eradicating illegal drug/narcotics production and trade. Work is ongoing to increase synergy between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom conducted by the Coalition Forces.

The Bonn-agenda was successfully completed with the holding of the presidential elections in October 2004, and the Parliamentary and Provincial elections in September 2005. In the London Conference, held on 31 December 2005-1 January 2006, the “Afghanistan Compact” document was adopted. The Compact, endorsed by UNSCR 1659(2006), provides the framework for partnership between Afghanistan and the international community. As a country with deep historical ties and a particular bond of friendship with Afghanistan and in line with her responsibilities within NATO, Turkey strongly supports and takes part in the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan.

In this vein, Turkey first assumed the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan between June 2002 and February 2003 for a period of eight months, with 1400 troops. Turkey maintained its support to ISAF after it became a NATO operation in August 2003. Between 13 February – 4 August 2005, Turkey once again assumed the leadership of the ISAF-VII operation, this time under the NATO banner, with over 1400 troops. Turkey has also assumed the responsibility to maintain Kabul International Airport during her leadership of ISAF-VII.

Turkey’s role continued within ISAF. SEEBRIG (South Eastern European Brigade) assumed the responsibility of Kabul Multinational Brigade Headquarters between February – August
2006, in which Turkey has also participated actively.

Under the new structure of ISAF with five regional commands, the leadership of the Central Command in Kabul (RCC) has been assumed jointly by Turkey, France and Italy, on a rotational basis for a two year term commencing in August 2006. Turkey commanded the RCC between April 2007 and December 2007 and the Turkish contingent serving there was raised to 1200 personnel, including the crew of the two general utility helicopters throughout this period. Moreover, in addition to the present Turkish contingent (consisting of 800 soldiers), Turkey has pledged to supply an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) to the 201st Corps based in Kabul.

Alongside its troop contribution, the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Minister Hikmet Çetin, served with distinction in Kabul as NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative between January 2004 – August 2006.

4. NATO Training Mission - Iraq:

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to assist Iraq with the training of its security forces. Subsequently, the North Atlantic Council was tasked to develop the modalities to implement this decision with the Iraqi Interim Government. On 30 July 2004 a NATO Training Implementation Mission was established. The name of the mission was subsequently changed to NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM).

The Iraqi Staff College was founded in Rustamiyah, in the process. Turkey currently has 2 staff officers in NTM-I. Also, more than 110 Iraqi personnel have been trained in Turkey since the inception of the mission.

APPENDIX 7

Short List of Answers to the Research Questions

The research questions constitutes the basis upon which I built this Project in order to find out the variables upon which the cohesion of the EU can be based so as to arrive at the final conclusion on whether the Turkish accession is to threaten the cohesion of the EU.

As to the first question on the main factors affecting and shaping the EU policy on the Turkish accession to the EU, we can enlist the following reasons resulting from the research:

1) The legal and political criteria the EU imposes on the candidate states. These criteria are included in the 'Copenhagen criteria' and reflect on the legal, economic and political status of the Turkish accession to the EU. Such a status is defined in the Commission and European Parliament reports, the Accession Partnership between Turkey and the EU and the 35 Chapters that Turkey should conclude in order to fulfil EU requirements and become full member-state.

2) The negative stereotypes and syndromes of the European citizens about the Turkish accession to the EU.

3) The national interests of the member states of the EU and especially those of the leading countries. The leading countries are not ready yet to share with Turkey the power they now enjoy in the EU. (As national interests one can mention, the economic, military, strategic and political interests).

4) The role of the US, which constitutes an external actor of the EU, affects the decisions of the EU and especially those concerning the Turkish accession to the EU.

As to question 2 on the role of the US as a major actor of the International system and the extent of the US influence on the decisions of the EU as well as those concerning the Turkish accession to the EU, the answer seems to be positive. This stems from the findings of the Survey Questionnaire, analysed in Chapter 5. According to the results, the majority of the MEPs-participating in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament-believe that the US influences positively the Turkish accession to the EU. On the other hand, if we take Chapter 4 into consideration, the strong American pressure may give rise to negative reactions. MEP Joost Lagendijk was clear on this issue. In the interview given for the purposes of this research, he testified that Spain and other member states call the Americans to stop their pressure on the issue of the Turkish accession to the EU. The position of the leaders of some European states was that the EU can decide on its own. In fact, the US wishes to play a catalytic role on the Turkish accession to the EU. Because of this American political attitude Turkey is always under the accusation that if it joins the EU, it is likely to become the 'Trojan Horse' of the US within the EU.

As to question 3 on whether the decisions are taken in accordance with the national or the common interests, Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that the EU takes its decisions on the basis of both national and common interests. However, the EU, at the end of the day, finds, in terms of compromise, a minimum code of common national interests, which constitute the common European interests. In the case of the Turkish accession to the EU and in the context of the power game, the leading countries wish to serve their national interests. Therefore, they consider that the Turkish accession to the EU is related to their national interests which are at stake. If Turkey joins the EU, it will become a dominant European power (Lagendijk 2007).
Thus, the leading countries should share their European political, economic, military and institutional power with Turkey. However, the leading EU countries like France and Germany are not ready to share their power with Turkey and thereby they suggest that Turkey should only take the status of privileged partnership and not of full membership.

As to the question 4 on the situation of the Turkish political system and the role of the army in this system, Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the following:

1) The dominant role of the Turkish army in the political, social and economic system. 'Statism' was employed by the Turkish Army to consolidate itself as a dominant power and the depository of the Turkish political system and Turkey's territorial integrity.

2) The Turkish political system suffers from economic and social problems as well as from corruption and 'democratic deficit'. There is a lack of respect for human rights. Therefore, the Turkish political system needs 'lifting' and structural reforms if it wishes to join the EU as full member state. These reforms reflect in the EU political economic and institutional requirements. Certainly, taking into consideration the political stance of the leading countries, the syndromes and the fears of the Europeans, one comes to the conclusion that the legal, economic and institutional requirements are not enough to get Turkey in the EU. Turkey also needs the political will of the European public opinion and the governments of the Member-States.

As to question 5 on whether the Europeans are afraid of the Turkish accession, to what extent and why, I mark that the Europeans are afraid of the Turkish accession to the EU for the following reasons: 1) They suffer from negative stereotypes and syndromes against Turkey regarding its accession to the EU. These syndromes and negative stereotypes are connected with the Turkish Muslim religious character and historical background. The Austrians for example, suffer from the syndrome of Vienna having always in mind that the Turks had arrived at Vienna's doorstep in the 16th and 17th century (Ripperton n.d.). 2) The leading countries are not ready to lose or/and share their power with Turkey. 3) The Europeans are afraid of a first wave of at least four million workers immigrating to the EU directly after Turkey's EU membership. For a large part of European citizens, the Turks -due to their Muslim identity- and Muslims in general are related to the economic and social problems that the EU faces, and especially unemployment.

As to question 6 on whether the Turkish accession to the EU will bring redistribution of power, the answer is positive. This question is connected to that on whether the Turkish accession will bring structural changes to the EU. The answer is also positive. More specifically, the Turkish accession is to bring a redistribution of political, economic, military, institutional and social power as well as structural changes in the same fields. These developments will lead to a new share of power within the EU that the leading countries are not ready to accept. Besides, this new redistribution of power, the structural changes and the new share of power will result in conflicting national interests and may lead to crisis. Such a crisis is to threaten the cohesion of the EU. However, even if there is no crisis, the cohesion of the EU is likely to be threatened due to the redistribution of power and the structural changes through which a new balance, or more precisely a new imbalance of power, will result. Certainly, if the theories of Realism and Structural Realism are put in practice then a crisis will burst out due to the conflicting national interests and the imbalance of power. On the other hand, the European system could be kept in cohesion if both Turkey and the EU proceed to relevant structural changes, especially on the institutional level so that the Turkish integration to the EU is to be concluded successfully. This procedure has as preconditions that Turkey will successfully close its 35 Accession Chapters and that it will fulfill all legal, political, economic, social,
cultural and institutional requirements imposed by the EU. On the other hand, the European public opinion and the European leaders, especially those of the leading countries, have to show political will to accept Turkey in the EU as a full member-state. For the time being, the second scenario has much less chances to occur. According to the results of this research, the first scenario seems to be the prevailing one.
APPENDIX 8

Impact of the Project

The aim of this project is to establish a model of EU cohesion regarding Turkish accession to the EU and new Enlargements. This model addresses the main question; whether the Turkish accession to the EU can threaten or not the cohesion of the EU. It can be, also, employed by political, social and economic scientists, politicians and technocrats, especially those working in the EU institutions and deal with the Turkish accession to the EU and Enlargement issues.

Even before the final approval of the project, I have received the following reactions; a fact which shows the positive impact of this project:

1. Members of the European Parliament, especially the ones, who closely follow Turkish accession to the EU, such as members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the EU -Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, have already expressed their positive comments, demonstrating, at the same time, their noble intention, even to organise a conference on my project. They have also expressed their will to contribute to the publishing of this research. As the Chairman of the Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament Reimer Böge stated: “This research is an excellent methodological tool for those who wish to profoundly examine Euro-Turkish relations and whether the Turkish accession to the EU will threaten EU cohesion”.

2. I have presented my project to the owners of Dias Publishing, which is the biggest complex of Mass Media in Cyprus (including TV channel 'Sigma', Radio 'Proto', newspaper 'Simerini' and various magazines) and maintains contacts and cooperates with Mass Media agencies in Greece and internationally. The owners of Dias Publishing gave me the green light to present my project on the TV with the participation of MEPs and politicians. I was also given the possibility to use Radio 'Proto' and newspaper 'Simerini' for the promotion of my project.

This is a great opportunity for the public opinion to be informed of the Turkish accession to the EU and of whether Turkey's full membership will threaten the cohesion of the EU, or not. Such a procedure falls under the efforts of covering the existing 'democratic deficit' by involving public opinion on an issue that dominates and will dominate European affairs. As Joost Langendijk (2007) stated for the purposes of this research, there is "lack of knowledge" about Turkey and moreover, about its accession to the EU. Additionally, he maintained that "this is a big challenge for us, the politicians and for the Media and the journalists".

3. The Peter Lang GmbH (Publishing House) was very interested in my project and I have already signed a contract for its publishing. Paragraph 7 of the contract mentions that "the publisher shall be responsible for worldwide announcement, for enlistment in most important national bibliographies, and shall endeavour to have the works reviewed in scientific periodicals". The Publishers consider that the content of the project is up to date and focused on an issue, which currently dominates and will keep dominating the EU in the next years. Therefore, they believe that the publishing of this project will have a positive impact on the discussion on Turkish accession to the EU, which already exists in academic society and on whether such an accession is to threaten or not the cohesion of the EU.
The aforementioned facts illustrate the positive impact that my project may have on academic society, politicians and on public opinion.