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‘Liberating the Repressed Form of Self in Post-Traditional

Ru-Influenced Chinese:

A Theoretical Study of the Responses of Tu Weiming and Jürgen Moltmann’

Tsung-I Hwang

OCMS, Ph.D.

May 2018

ABSTRACT

The repressed form of self (RFS) that is caused by repressive social impositions in its different degrees is prevalent in post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese (PTRIC) societies. Certain non-Confucianist (non-Ruist) scholars identify it as a significant factor causing a variety of emotional, psychological, interpersonal and communicative problems, to the extent that in some cases it acts as a risk factor towards suicide. Accordingly, the need to analyse, reflect on, and overcome this problem related to a relational understanding of selfhood in PTRIC contexts is imperative. However, many post-traditional Ruists, such as Tu Weiming, claim this problem is caused by a relational selfhood derived from the small folk tradition of Confucianism (Ruism) that is not directly related to orthodox Ruist traditions.

This research starts by exploring Tu Weiming’s responses to this research problem through examining critically his interpretations of and arguments for New Ruist relational selfhood, which he claims to be stemming from orthodox Ruist traditions. In terms of his attitudes, I claim that the responsive Tu possesses a potential to solve the problem, but not the resistant Tu. In terms of his interpretations, I demonstrate that the features of Tu’s relational selfhood are not significantly different from the features of PTRIC relational selfhood in shaping a closed and repressively imposed relational self.

Subsequently, this research presents and examines critically Jürgen Moltmann’s responses to this research problem through his account of Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood. One of the most important features of Moltmann’s account is an open relational self embedded within a dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in diversity. Though there are other issues that complicate Moltmann’s claims, I argue that his account of relational selfhood contains a positive potentiality to liberate the RFS.

Finally, this research critically compares these two theoretical accounts of relational selfhood by means of a thorough analysis of the similarities and essential differences in their presuppositions and claims. In conclusion, three possible alternative solutions for the problem are put forth: 1. the responsive Tu’s account; 2. the selective combination of the resistant Tu’s account and Moltmann’s account; and 3. Moltmann’s account.
‘Liberating the Repressed Form of Self in Post-Traditional Ru-Influenced Chinese: A Theoretical Study of the Responses of Tu Weiming and Jürgen Moltmann’

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Doctor of Philosophy

in Middlesex University

May 2018

Oxford Centre for Mission Studies
DECLARATIONS

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed  ____________________________________________ (Candidate)
Date  ___________________________ 23 May 2018

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote.

Other sources are acknowledged by midnotes or footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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DEDICATION

To My Dear Social Trinitarian God

of both Chinese and Non-Chinese in the World

With Gratitude and Love
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this thesis is the result of a long journey of mine worked and accompanied by many to whom I indebted. I cannot show my gratitude and appreciation too much to these wonderful persons:

The Triune God: Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit

My supervisors: Lauren Pfister and Jeremy Law

The faculty and supporting team at OCMS

The encouraging tutors: Damon So, Wright Doyle, and Ben Knighton.

The scholarship providers: Mr. O. H. Lee, Mr. S. Hong, Mr. Chang, and the Mylne Trust

My supporting family: my wife Shuman Tsai, my parents Linhe and Chomei Hwang, my sister Tsung-Ni Hwang, my sister-in-law Lily Tsai, my father-in-law Fuding Tsai, and my mother-in-law Chojin Tsai, and other sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law

My supporting friends: David and Grace Perng, Zhijien Bai and Bo Li, Jack and Ruth Huang, Jack and Cindy Hwang, Timothy and Phoebe Xu, Joseph and Cherry Lai, Godfrey Stone, Ili Lin, Robert Reynolds, Caiyu Chang, Jerry and Huejin Chen, Anna Barnes, Mirasy Pfister, Jesse and Emily Ciccotti, Robin Wong, Yunru Chen, Jessie Hsieh, Hueming and Zhihue Xu, Yanbei and Quixing Jiao, David and Xinhue Sih, Catherine Su, Jienkun Li, and James Zhan

My supporting churches and organizations: Community Church of Taichung, Zurich Living Spring Chinese Church, China Institute, Beijing Church of Mission, Olive Mount Fellowship in Shanghai, and Central Taiwan Theological Seminary

Tsung-I Hwang
Puli, Taiwan,
May 2018
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A- Appendix
C Chapter
eo Emphasis Original
Footnote F
n. Note
NIV New International Version
NKJV New King James Version
NRSV New Revised Standard Version
p. Pīnyīn 拼音 (A Phonetic Transcription System for Chinese Characters)
PTRIC Post-Traditional Ru-Influenced Chinese
RFS Repressed Form of Self
S Section
trans. Translated

ADDITIONAL NOTES REGARDING FORMAT AND STYLE

1. Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture quotations are from the New Revised Standard Bible (NRSV).
2. Since there are many non-English sources referred in this thesis, the English translations of those sources are generally this author’s translations, except when other translators’ names are specified.
3. When Chinese and Korean persons’ names appear without their Western given names, their English-spelt family names come first without a comma before their personal names, as is customary in Chinese and Korean styles of naming. Otherwise, their Western given names come first, followed by their Chinese or Korean given names, as is customary in Anglophone and Western European styles of naming.
4. Since there is no consistency of whether or not a hyphen is used between two words of a Chinese or Korean person’s first name, even for the same person, a hyphen will generally be not used for it in these cases within this thesis, except when a quotation is involved.
5. Chinese characters for the same names and terms, including Pīnyīn with tone marks for the same Chinese characters, are given in the first instance, and are not usually repeated.
6. Underlining is only used for indicating non-English languages in their transcribed form. Non-English words in their transcribed form that are names of people, institutions, languages, or places are not underlined.
7. Italics is generally used for published titles and the emphasizing of a particular word or phrase in the text. Within the bibliography or bibliographic references, however, bold fonts are included for the book titles found in English titles of works and single quotation marks (in the book titles) or double quotation marks (in the journal titles) for the original emphasis of a particular word or phrase by the authors of sources.
8. When any section number (S#) or footnote number (F#) is mentioned without specifying the chapter (C#) or the appendix (A-capital letter), it is in the current chapter or appendix.
Chapter One

Introduction: The Contexts and the Problem

A repressed form of self (RFS) resulting from the relational selfhood among the Chinese has been disclosed, described, and discussed by more and more Chinese and non-Chinese non-Ruist\(^1\) scholars\(^2\) since, but not limited to, the 1970s-1980s in the contemporary Chinese contexts. This prevalent feature is a fact affirmed and tacitly consented to by both Chinese and foreign scholars. Most of these scholars’ studies point out that such a RFS is a product of the relational dynamics, social structure, and ideology influenced by Ruism. They also indicate that this feature of the repressed self might be to some extent one of the factors preventing Chinese people from attaining a true liberated inner transformation of character and virtue because they continuously strive to reach a goal of performance dictated by forms of moral cultivation emphasized in Ruism (see C2 and A-F). How do contemporary Ruists or Ruist scholars respond to this criticism? While Ruification\(^3\) is also a very common phenomenon among some contemporary Chinese societies and even, not limited only to,\(^4\) Chinese Christian groups,\(^5\) how can they respond to or overcome this

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1 The terms *Ru/Confucian, Ruist/Confucianist, Ruism/Confucianism*, and *Ruification/Confucianization* are interchangeable in general usage in this thesis. However, there is some subtle difference of meaning between them that are explained in A-M. Therefore, the term Ruist/Ruism, rather than Confucian/Confucianism, might be a more helpful and pertinent description.

2 The term *non-Ruist scholars* used in this research indicates those scholars whose academic fields are not mainly in Ruism or Ruist studies, irrespective of nationality or ethnicity.

3 Sinicized Buddhism has been a typical example of Ruification since five hundred years after Buddhism was transmitted into China in the Han Dynasty (Song, Jün 宋軍 2016). Ruification, in the context of post-traditional Chinese Christians, describes Christian lives lived more in a Confucian way rather than a Christian way because the Ruist influence in their daily life, to some extent, is stronger than Christianity since it still dominantly influence contemporar y Chinese people and societies. For example, sermons that usually focus on moral teachings and admonition and some traditional and post-traditional Ruist teachings, such as moral self-cultivation and the goodness and perfectibility of human nature, are still taken as golden rules even when they contradict Christian doctrines.

4 So is it among other East Asian Christians (Koh, Byongik 1996). See also Oh Myungseon (2003:132) and Helen Lee (2006).

5 This observation resonates with many Chinese Christians and is supported by a number of scholars, for example, Tan Cheming 陳濟民 (p. Chén Jìmín) (1988:18-21), Andrew Chiu 丘恩處 (p. Qiū Ēnchù) (1999:222-3), Yáng Fènggǎng 楊鳳崗 (2004), Jackson Wu (2011), and Tsai Lēechen 蔡麗貞 (p. Cài
obstacle to inner transformation? These are practical and fundamental questions deserving exploration and research, but, first of all, the research context and the nature of the problem will be identified in this introductory chapter.

1. The Post-Traditional Ru-Influenced Chinese Contexts

Before introducing my research problem based on non-Ruist scholars’ findings and criticisms, I first need to clarify the context of Ruism in the Ru-based cultural heritage they deal with because most scholars tend to use the term Ruism as a generalization without specifying the school, or tradition of Ruist influence. A new term, post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese (PTRIC) is coined in this research for solving this problem of generalization and ambiguity.6 Most of the literature I investigated which is relevant to such issues within Chinese Ruism does not cover a geographically and generationally specific Chinese people group. Therefore, in this research, I am dealing with specific problems occurring generally among contemporary Chinese people7 who fall under the influence of Ruism.


6 Ideally one would avoid all generalizations, let alone over-generalizations, such as Ruism or Christianity, both of which have pluralistic forms, and seek to avoid the stereotypes or over-simplistic and discursive conceptualization of understanding that can be produced, especially via dichotomized pairs of terms, for example, Western and Eastern or Chinese, collectivism and individualism, or spiritual and secular. See Johnson (1985:91–2) and Solomon (1994:22). Since such generalizations and dichotomies are adopted in most of the literature I have explored, I cannot entirely avoid their use. However, I will use them as little as possible. About the pluralistic forms of Ruism, see Lauren Pfister (2015a) and the pluralistic forms of Christianity, see Andrew Walls (1996).

7 It is notable that terms such as Chinese people, Chinese culture, Chinese society, and Chinese tradition are ethnicity not about nationality in this thesis, otherwise their specific nationality will be indicated.
1.1 The Terms Ru and Ruism

Most Chinese people proudly recognize Ruism as a Chinese tradition and culture, an essential legacy inherited from their Chinese ancestors. The term Ruism to some extent has been used and abused as a synonym of Chinese culture, especially by western sinologists (Zhèng, Zhìmíng 鄭志明 1986:333–4). Even if not many Chinese people claim to be Ruists or believe in Ruism, their value system, ethical standards, worldview, educational and thinking style, the manner in which they deal with their neighbours and other people, their customs and etiquette in daily life are all subtly influenced, both tangibly and intangibly, by Ruism. However, Liu Shuhsien 劉述先 (p. Liú Shùxiān) (1934-2016) (1996a:92), a contemporary New Ruist, indicates the ambiguous meaning of the word ‘Confucianism’ due to the different ways in which even Ruist scholars understand it. Tu Weiming (1985:113) also states that Ruist views on ‘perennial issues’ can never be generalized because of Ruism’s ‘elasticity’ and ‘vicissitudes’ during its long history. From a more general understanding one can confirm that Ru is the major Chinese tradition that emphasized from ancient times the interrelationship between ‘politics, ethics and religion’ by way of enhancing ‘ritual, education’, and moral cultivation (ibid.).

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9 Tu Weiming (2010 in Hóng, Gǔ 洪鵠 2010) identifies the greatly close relationship between the deep value of (both traditional and post-traditional) Chinese culture and Ruist tradition.
11 Some scholars interpret it as ‘a philosophy of evolutionary change and continual adaptation’ (Roy, AT 1903, cited in Abbott 1970:293).
1.2 The Development of Ruism

Ruism is mainly related to hermeneutics, epistemology and methodology in the realm of moral ethics. But Ruist scholars, even though they portrayed themselves as Confucius’ faithful followers, had no enduring consensus on the understanding and adoption of the ancient traditions, especially ‘the true Way in the world’ because of their different approaches and methodologies (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:2). Thus, even from the period immediately following Confucius’ death, there were at least eight distinct and competing schools, let alone the different schools and divergent interpretations that emerged during the more than two-millennia-long evolving history of Ruism. There is no consensus among contemporary scholars on the existence, development, and evolution of Ruism over its more than 2,500 years in Chinese history. The generally recognized historical development after the formation of Ruism in the pre-Qin period is briefly introduced in A-A. Generally speaking, however, there were two major renaissances after the formation of Ruism in the pre-Qin period: the first one in the Han-Jin period (206 BCE-420 CE) and the second in the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127), the latter being commonly called Neo-Ruism (Neo-Confucianism) because of its responses to the challenges from both Chinese Buddhism and Daoism. In the twentieth century, another revival movement based on Neo-Ruism arose, known as (Contemporary or Modern) New Ruism, one facing challenges from aggressive and dominating forms of international cultures, primarily from European and American intellectuals (Mou, Tsungsan 1949 in 2003a:1–16).

After the end of the imperial age in 1911, Ruist education no longer dominated educational curricula and the national examination based on Ruist principles had been replaced. At that point in time which marks a new beginning era of post-tradition, Ruist

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12 That is ‘during the Warring States period’ (475-221 BCE) (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:2).

13 It is notable that this third revival movement or developmental epoch of Ruism is not recognized by all scholars, for example, not by Tang Yijie (1988 in 1997:302).
thinking no longer occupied the status of ‘a state religion or ideology’ (Bresciani 2001:410). Rather, the development of society’s structure, economy, and social values evolved rapidly in all Chinese societies across the globe. Individualistic ideologies became evermore strongly promoted and developed significantly within Chinese societies (Hong, Guiyoung 2004:61). But still there were scholars who claim that the main ‘ideas and ideals’ of Ruism continuously formed ‘the basics of the way of life’, values, and ethics in modern China and other East Asian countries (Yao, Xinzong 2013:5).14 Although all the ‘Three Teachings’ (Sānjiāo 三教) — Ruism, Daoism, and Buddhism — have been influencing traditional Chinese culture, the personalities of Chinese people were formed and nurtured predominantly by Ruist ethics (Lo, Pilgrim WK 2009:168).16 Although the influence of Ruism had been a main target challenged by the May Fourth New Cultural Movement (1920s), it became yet an object of derision and was scheduled for destruction during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1960s) and the Anti-Confucius and anti-Lin campaign (1970s). Still, in spite of all these harsh realities, Ruist influences on most Chinese people in reality never completely disappeared (ibid.).17

Therefore, the tendency of some of the main contemporary Chinese values can be easily associated with the Ru-nurtured Chinese cultural tradition. Traditional Ruist cultural values and relational ethics still play a very important role deep in the hearts of most Chinese people (Berger 1988:7–8).18 These observations are supported by many

14 See also Lau Sing et al. (1990:677) and Tu Weiming (1997 in Lin, Siqi 林思齊 et al. 1997:8–9).
15 Tu (1985:19) refers the Three Teachings in East Asia discussed in this context to the ‘Mencian line of Confucianism, the Chuang Tzu [莊子 p. Zhuāngzi (ca. 369-286 BCE)] tradition of Taoism [(Daoism)], and the Ch'an (Zen) [p. chán 禪] interpretation of Buddhism’.
16 See also Xie Wenyu (1997:55). Various forms of Ruism even influenced the developments of Chinese Buddhism (Yang, Huinan 楊惠南 2000), Chinese folk religious practices and other religions, such as Daoism, Islam, and Christianity (Xie, Wenyu 謝文郁 2011:18f.). See also Huang Shiru 黃詩茹 (2008:121–2).
17 See also Thomas A. Metzger (1977), Karl-Heinz Pohl (2009:91), and Alexander Chow (2013:23).
18 Even now Marxism in China cannot escape the tendency of being Ruified. For example, Marx’s class struggle in China cannot but give way to ‘rénqíng’「人情」(favour) and ‘héxié’「和諧」(harmony) (Xie,
1.3 The Main Categories of Ruist Tradition

But what does Ruist tradition mean, since as Liu Shuhsien points out ambiguities in the use of the word ‘Ruism’ still persist? Liu Shuhsien (1996b:85) generally differentiates Ruist tradition into three categories:22

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Wenyu 2011:18f.) that are stressed and valued more in human relationships in Ruism. For other examples, see also Lucian Pye (1988:30–35), Jin Guāntāo 金觀濤 (1988 in 1997) and C5F68.


21 It consists of a comprehensive literature review on the background and history of Ruism, and providing summaries from the results of empirical research on Chinese societies.

22 See also Liu Shuhsien (2002:56–7). Wang Gungwu (1930-) (1988:4) differentiates Ruist tradition into two categories: ‘high’ Ruism and ‘low’ Ruism. According to their definition, high Ruism includes Liu Shuhsien’s first two categories and low Ruism Liu Shuhsien’s third category. Li, Minghuī 李明輝 (2001b:144) classifies Ruist tradition into four meanings: (1) Ruism as the tradition of spirit and thought; (2) Institutionalized Ruism; (3) Socialized Ruism (the value system that standardizes people’s social behaviour and social relationship at the level of civil society; and (4) Deepened Ruism (the psychological accumulation of people’s thinking mode and behavioural custom influenced subtly and insensibly in the deep cultural structure. The first and second meanings in Li Minghui’s classification are respectively the same as the first and second categories in Liu Shuhsien’s. Li Minghui classifies Liu Shuhsien’s third category into his third and fourth meanings so that his classification can be more helpful in embodying and understanding PTRIC contexts. There are some similar categorizations of Ruist tradition with different category titles by other scholars in F23 and F27.
(1) ‘Rújiā jīngshén de dàchuántǒng’（儒家精神的大傳統）（the great tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit), adhering to what Mou Tsungsan （牟宗三）（p. Móu Zōngsān, 1909-95）（1959 in 2003a:1–15）calls the three developmental epochs of Ruism, as described in Appendix A;

(2) ‘Zhèngzhì huà Rújiā de dàotǒng’（政治化儒家的道統）（the tradition of the Way expressed in politicized Ruism) that is imperially-oriented in the name of Ruism, but synthesized with Daoism and Legalism after the Han dynasty;

(3) ‘Mínjiā de xiǎochuántǒng’（民間的小傳統）（the small folk tradition) that has existed for over centuries and been influenced by the above two traditions is the mental habits and behavioural customs of the majority of common Chinese people from ancient times to the present, accumulated for a long time. The third Ruist tradition indicates wider and looser meanings of Ruism that must be interpreted by researchers rather than ordinary people themselves (Liu, Shuhsien 1996b:85). How much overlapping it has with and how much distortion it has from the above two


24 This also can be explained by Triandis’ (1989:512) observation that ‘when a person is socialized in a given culture, the person can use that custom as a substitute for thought, and save time’. The most typical example in the context of PTRIC society for Triandis’ observation is the custom of filial piety influenced and formed by Ruist tradition, so that the shadow of ‘fàn xiào zhǔyì」（泛孝主義）（pan-filialism) can be found within the lives of Chinese people (Yang, Kuoshu et al. 1988:171–4). Pan-filialism denotes the extensive application of the parent-child ethics of filial piety to all other superior-inferior relationships. Concerning the description and discussions of such phenomenon in detail, see also Hsieh Yuwei (1967), Yang Kuoshu and Yeh Kuanghui 葉光輝 (p. Yè Guānghuī) (1991:194–5, 208–9, 236), Yeh Kuanghui (1997:179–83, 1998:61–2; 2009b:238), Yang Kuoshu (2009:24–7, 36), and Yeh Kuanghui and Yang Kuoshu (2009:356).
traditions, therefore, cannot be explored by empirical studies without the data of the ancient traditions but can be studied theoretically by the interpretations of them.

1.4 The Characteristics of Post-Traditional Ru-Influenced Chinese Contexts

The integrated evidence of relevant literature for Ruist influence in the contemporary world can be summarized into three main features:

(1) The influence of a post-traditional form of Ruism persists, although it might weaken in part due to modernization, industrialization, and external cultural influences (such as democracy and egalitarianism);\(^{25}\)

(2) Its influence varies because of changes in geographical location, ethnographic background, levels of education, socio-economic status, age, and gender;\(^{26}\)

(3) The majority of ordinary Chinese people are inspired in their daily language use, mental habits and behavioural customs by this post-traditional expression of Ruism, even if they have had little or no Ruist education, and so cannot self-consciously recognize the origins of special sayings or explanations, specific mental habits and behavioural customs as traceable to Ruist positions and interpretations.\(^{27}\)

So the question remains: What kind of traditions and interpretations within the Ruist traditions are actually influencing and being ingrained in the contemporary or post-traditional Chinese cultural contexts after 1911? Moreover, considering the constant changes that Ruist teachings have endured throughout Chinese and other histories, there


\(^{27}\) Liu Shuhsien (1996b:85) and F22.
must surely be a plurality of interpretations of Ruist traditions that do not follow classical forms (such as those found in the *Classic of Filial Piety*). For the purpose of differentiation and further discussion, therefore, I would suggest on the basis of an integration of many scholars’ studies, that the phrase *post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese (PTRIC)* persons indicates those post-traditional Chinese persons whose mental habits and behavioural customs are more of the small folk Ruist tradition mentioned above and influenced by a Ru-based, or Ru-derived, cultural heritage. Some are Ru-inspired explicitly because they consciously adopt orthodox or classical version of Ruist teachings for their own expression; and they claim or sense Ruism consciously as the source of their own expressions as a direct inspiration. Many others are only Ru-influenced implicitly because they neither necessarily adopt any orthodox or classical version of Ruist teachings for their own expression, nor do they claim or sense Ruism consciously as the source of their own expressions as a direct inspiration. Such Ru-influenced persons take some common Ruist value system or worldview for granted but without dictating how the influence came, such as performance-emphasized moral self-cultivation, hierarchical social structure (or power distance and gender-bias), and a

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28 Lin Ānwú 林安梧 (1997:70f.) points out that contemporary Chinese intellectuals often disregard the pluralistic traditions of Ruism.


30 Roderick MacFarquhar (1980) and Peter Berger (1988:7–8) use ‘post-Confucian’ and ‘Confucian-derived’ to describe Chinese cultural settings, which are cited by Tu Weming (1998c:134) later. Tu (2008c:96 n.6) also equates ‘New[-]Confucian’ to ‘Post-Confucian’, the meanings of both of which seem to me contradicting each other because he claims New Ruism as the third epoch of the great orthodox tradition of Ruist spirit but post-Ruism indicates a secularized, non-orthodox from of Ruist tradition. However, *post-traditional Ru-influenced* might serve the purposes of this research in a clearer and more precise way because it refers to the contemporary Chinese setting on the basis of a self-conscious historical awareness of the ideological shift in the way Ruism is presented after 1911.

31 These features can also be seen in Ru-influenced Japanese society (de Vos 1993:130).
relation-based (or collectivistic)\textsuperscript{32} self (Nielsen n.d.:5, 16f.).\textsuperscript{33} But some Ru-inspired ones might consciously adopt a post-traditional mode of Ruist expression without even being conscious of their own more liberal interpretation of Ruist tradition, that is to some extent a twisted and refractory form of the better (or more orthodox or classical) Ruist sub-tradition,. Since Ru-influenced Chinese people would normally (in the sense of the term) include Ru-inspired Chinese, PTRIC in this thesis includes Ru-inspired ones.

2. The Research Problem: A Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts

2.1 Ruist Contributions in PTRIC Contexts

Ruism has contributed to education, the establishment of family relationships and social order through building fundamental relationships in a society based on:

(1) a social ethics highly emphasizing ‘responsibility’ (Broadbent 2010:18) or ‘obligation’ (Tong, Cheekiong 2007:115);\textsuperscript{34}

(2) the nurture of an ‘attitude of valuing diligence, integrity’ (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111) and ‘loyalty, dedication … commitment’ through intensifying ‘identification with the organization and one’s role’ in it (Kahn 1979:122);\textsuperscript{35}

(3) the exploration of the value of cultivated humaneness (rēn 仁) and the reality of the self through the cultivation of ‘moral greatness’ (Ching, Julia 1993b:90).

\textsuperscript{32} The Oxford English Dictionary gives different nuanced definitions for individualist and individualistic as adjectives. Individualist denotes the stronger meaning of individualism: ‘Relating to or characterized by the habit or principle of being independent and self-reliant’ or ‘Relating to or denoting a social theory favouring freedom of action for individuals over collective or state control’ (Oxford Dictionaries 2016c) while Individualistic refers to: ‘More interested in individual people than in society as a whole’ or ‘Marked by or expressing individuality; unconventional’ (Oxford Dictionaries 2016d). Oxford English Dictionary (2016a) defines the adjective collectivist as ‘Relating to the practice or principle of giving a group priority over each individual in it’. But it does not give the adjective collectivistic under the word collectivist any additional definition. Based on the nuanced differences between individualist and individualistic, in this thesis I use collectivist in differentiating it from collectivistic. Collectivist is used to emphasize the collectivist-oriented society, relationships, or selfhood that are harmful to the development of personality concerned by social psychologists. Collectivistic denotes a general and neutral meaning.

\textsuperscript{33} See also Shenkar and Ronen (1987:574), Lockett (1988:486–90), and Helen Lee (2006:16, 23).

\textsuperscript{34} See also Wang Qian et al. (2007:216), Mullis (2008), and Rhyne (2014:website).

\textsuperscript{35} See also Wang Qian et al. (2007:216) and Rhyne (2014:website).
The fundamental concerns of Ruism strongly value ‘humanism’, ‘social relationships’ and ‘reciprocity’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:374). Undoubtedly, they contribute to maintaining ‘a warm human feeling between people’ (ibid.) in what has become a more materialized and individualistic modern world (Hang, Lin 2011:443–4). Accordingly, Ruist ideology, especially the attributes of Ruist ‘collectivism’ and hierarchical society, is assumed to be better fitted to ‘the age of mass industrialization’ than ‘western [or modern European, more precisely] individualism’ (MacFarquhar 1980:71, eo). Undoubtedly, such a positive appraisal and praise for Ruism is affirmed by a vast number of Chinese people, Chinese and foreign scholars in different fields, and many East Asian people and scholars, such as Lin Siqi (1997 in Lin, Siqi et al. 1997:7).

2.2 Acquired Relational Self in PTRIC Contexts

2.2.1 The Characteristics of PTRIC Self

Nevertheless, the impression that Chinese persons are inscrutable can often be experienced by foreigners and even among the Chinese persons themselves (Smith 1890:265–85); and very few Chinese people would disagree that Chinese people are very sensitive to being scrutinized by others. In general, Chinese people are especially sensitive about being evaluated by their superiors because they desire to be seen as performing well, thereby generating a positive impression. Although this tendency of

36 See also Tu Weiming (1985:12, 58, 67) and Yeh Kuanghui (2003:67–9, 77–9).
38 See also Choong Cheepang 鍾志邦 (p. Zhōng Zhìbāng) (1999).
39 See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:511) and Lin Yi 林藝 (n.d.:website).
40 This kind of behaviour can be also found in non-Chinese contexts (Smith, David W. 1983) and is confirmed theoretically by Daniel Goleman (1946-) (1996). Goleman points out that when men are not in reality strong enough to meet the high expectations placed on them by their society, the only way for them to survive is to hide and deny their weakness, inadequacy, and dark side, even to themselves (ibid.:91-127).
pretending to be stronger and better must be common behaviour among women and men in all cultures (Tournier 1957:12, 44–5), it is worse among Chinese, Japanese and Korean men influenced by the social values and ideology of Ruism.\(^{41}\) We might describe this characteristic as a self being repressed, or a self being forced to wear a mask in front of others, in order to please them (Zhanglaoshi Yuekan 1987).\(^{42}\) Consequently, in a conflict situation, Chinese persons may tend to lack of honesty or be less-than-rigorous honesty because they used to hide their true feelings, opinions, and intentions in order to maintain the harmony of relationships on the surface, but disclose their true thinking, reactions, and even plans to work against another only under the table, in secret.\(^{43}\)

Wm. Theodore de Bary (1919-) (1996:x) remarks in his book, *The Trouble with Confucianism* (1996), on the distrustful fear of the young generations in Singapore and South Korea due to the possible advancing authoritarian dominance displayed by Lee Kuanyew 李光耀 (p. Lǐ Guāngyào) (1923-2015), the former prime minister of Singapore, and by the Korean government, through promoting and reviving Ruism.\(^{44}\) The existence of such fear reveals that features of social imposition and authoritarian hierarchy in Ruism are still issues for PTRIC persons\(^{45}\) as well as Koreans. Therefore, the argument of this thesis is intended neither to deny the positive contribution of the Ru-based cultural heritage, including the relational self, to Chinese society, nor to compare its positive and negative influences.\(^{46}\) Instead, this thesis will focus on examining whether or not post-

\(^{41}\) This is perhaps even more prominent among modern Japanese and Koreans than among modern Chinese men because they are more deeply affected by Ruism (Tu, Weiming 2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 衣俊卿 2009:11). The evidence of this phenomenon among Japanese is briefly described in A-B.

\(^{42}\) See also Hwang Tsungi 黃宗儀 (p. Huáng Zōngyí) (2017:12f.).

\(^{43}\) See also Jack (1993), Turner (1999:78–83), and Helen Lee (2006:66-7).

\(^{44}\) See also Cho Hyunyi (2000:318).


\(^{46}\) For there are always two attributes of the interpersonal relationships in PTRIC relational ethics: the ‘reciprocal’ one which ‘represents beneficial effects’ and the ‘authoritarian’ one which ‘represents harmful ones’ (Yeh, Kuanghui 2003:79). See also Singh et al. (1962:126, 130), David Yaufai Ho and Lee Lingyú (1974), Lau Sing and Cheung Pingchung (1987), David Y. F. Ho (1996:165), Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford
traditional New Ruism, in the light of Tu Weiming’s account, contributes to the problem of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood as criticized by those scholars in different disciplines.

2.2.2 PTRIC Relational Selfhood

The Ruist self is explained ‘as a centre of relationships, by Tu Weiming 杜維明 (1940-)
(p. Dù Wéimíng),47 a Contemporary New Ruist.48 Such a kind of self is different from the individual-oriented or individualistic self. In Jess Fleming’s interpretation (2002:184), the self in Ruism invariably subsists ‘in defining relationships with others’. The German Sinologist, Wolfgang Bauer (1930-1997), while affirming the individuality of the Ruist self, finds unequivocally that such individuality cannot be detached from its neighbouring relationships.49 The American Sinologist and historian of China, Derk Bodde (1909-2003), argues that the individual in Ruism is ‘subordinated’ to society (Bodde 1957:66). The Chinese historian, Sun Lungkee 孫隆基 (p. Sūn Lóngjī) (1945-)(1983, reprinted in 2004:7), also indicates that the meaning of ‘a person’ in Ruism is based on the relationship with others or precisely the relationship of ‘two persons’ within the five dyadic relationships50 (ibid.), namely ‘wǔlún」五倫 according to (the Mencius 《孟子》 {p. Mèngzǐ}, 3A:4): father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder brother and young brother, and friend to friend (to be explained in detail in later chapters). Ruist

(2003), Chuang Yaochia (2005), and Angel N.M. Leung et al. (2010). Even the authoritarian attribute of the interpersonal relationships in post-traditional Ruist relational ethics is not all dysfunctional or negative. It might be positive in ‘reducing parent-child conflict and conveying ‘coordination and order’ in enhancing ‘interpersonal relationships’ (Yeh, Kuanghui and Bedford 2003:226). See also Leung Kwok et al. (1998), Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2004:141), Chuang Yaochia (2005), and Jīn Càncàn 金燦燦 et al. (2011).

47 Tu Weiming (1985:12–14, 125–8).
48 Tu Weiming is referred to as part of the ‘third generation (1980-)’ of Modern New Ruists all of whom, including for example, Liu Shuhaien and Cheng Chungying 成中英 (p. Chéng Zhōngyìng) (1935-), are still alive (Bresciani 2001:11–31). Therefore, the phrase Contemporary New Ruists used in this thesis specifically distinguishes this third generation from the previous two generations of Modern New Ruists.
50 Or ‘the five cardinal relationships’ (Wong, Melvin W. 2001:2).
tradition in its various forms, as manifested above, always plays a dominating role in the
core development of Chinese people and so this raises the question of the place and extent
of individual autonomy in Chinese culture (Yú, Déhuì 余德慧 1987b:3). 51

2.3 A Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts

2.3.1 The RFS-Related Characteristics in PTRIC Contexts

Melvin W. Wong (2001:2), a Chinese clinical psychologist, distinguishes five main
factors of Ru-based ‘cultural heritage’ and examines their impact in the developmental
process of the self and in ‘personality disorders’. 52 These factors include wulun, ‘filial
piety, gender-bias, shame and guilt complexes, and co-dependency’ (ibid.). I will argue
that in all cases, perhaps except that of gender-bias, these factors are manifestly related
to the strong ideology of fulfilling filial piety, namely jìnxìàodào/xiàoshùn 尽孝道/孝順.

For this strong ideology enhances the motivation and obligation of Chinese people to
pursue achievement in order to please or glorify their parents and seniors in the family as
well as the ruling elite, and so to engage in unquestioning obedience to them, even to the
severest degree of giving up their own selves (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111). 53 Gender-bias
not only makes men more important than women (to be explained later), but also in Ruism
makes men bear heavier cultural burdens than women, and so tends towards the
repression of female creativity and leadership (Yeh, Minghua and Yang, Kuoshu
1997:210f.). The above two factors, filial piety and gender-bias, consequently contribute

51 Although this core is transformable, there are ‘wénhuà yuánxíng」「文化原型」(cultural prototypes)
within it that cannot be erased totally (Yu, Dehui 1987b:3, eo) (ibid.:3, eo). These cultural prototypes form
the putatively unchangeable ‘xīnlǐ yuánxíng」「心理原型」(psychological prototypes) of the Chinese people
(ibid.). These cultural and psychological prototypes or ‘xīnlǐ jiégòu」「心理結構」(psychological structures)
(Li, Zéhòu 李澤厚 1980:77) are also recognized by some other scholars.

52 Although he does not specify what context Ru-based cultural heritage denotes, I infer from his
contemporary Chinese audience that this should be PTRIC contexts.

53 See also Wilson and Pusey (1982:206), Liào Huīyīng 廖輝英 (1991:7), Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu
to ‘the permanent dominance of parents over children and of men over women’ (Ching, Julia 1993b:90). Shame and guilt complexes and co-dependency are the products of the first three of these five main factors. Shame and guilt complexes prompt, or even force, persons to pretend to be something other than they know themselves to be, or to wear a mask in order to appear stronger (than they are in reality) and so hide their weakness (as they are in reality) (Zhái, Xuéwěi 翟學偉 2010:181–203). Co-dependence is also a way of hiding one’s weakness in a relationship (Xie, Yao 2005:13–15).

We must recognize first that Ru-based cultural heritage is identified as being a complicating factor, but not the only one, related to personality disorders. Taking Melvin W. Wong’s aforementioned five chief factors of Ru-based culture as an example, by promoting the five cardinal relationships, Ruism not only advocates the practice of filial piety, which is the root source of many other unequal hierarchical relationships (Evasdottir 2005:31–8), but also provides a general justification for gender-bias, as well as for co-dependency, which may lead to severe shame and guilt complexes (Slote 1998:44). As mentioned above, all these five factors also interweave and contribute to aspects of relational selfhood. Moreover, these factors more or less prompt, or even force, persons into a RFS through wearing a mask in order to hide their weakness, inadequacy, and dark side, and appear stronger, nicer, better, and more moral in the presence of the


55 The Chinese term Xie Yao (2005:13–15) uses is ‘互賴’ ‘互賴’ which is translated from English as ‘interdependent’ (Gao, Ge and Ting-Toomey 1998:9–12) instead of co-dependent. These two English terms in strict psychological speaking refer to different meanings in explaining interpersonal relationships, interdependency denoting the healthy and co-dependency the unhealthy one (Lancer 2013:website). But what Xie Yao describes as the interdependent Chinese self in its relations to others and the collective is similar to the characteristics of co-dependency pointed out by Melvin W. Wong. I argue that there is an overlapping range between interdependency and co-dependency rather than demarcating two opposite zones. Concerning the discussion of interdependence in relation to collectivism, see also Sampson (1977), Smith (1978:1062), Waterman (1981), Markus and Kitayama (1991b), and Gao Ge and Ting-Toomey (1998:9–12). Since the definition and usage of the term interdependency (or interdependent) are not consistent among scholars, especially in different disciplines, in order to avoid any confusion, I will use the phrase unhealthy interdependency (or unhealthily interdependent) to denote negatively interdependent interpersonal relationships, which in fact mean co-dependency in strict psychological sense.

56 See also Rhyne (2014:website) and Hofstede and Bond (1988:8).
people with whom they have any of the wulun relationships except the friend to friend relationship. About the feature of masking in PTRIC contexts, Zhai Xuewei (2010:182), a Chinese sociologist (in social psychology), explains:

In the relationship between the mask and the self, the face (mask) of Chinese people has a bidirectional function: showing off self and defending self bidirectionally, which reflects concretely the dialectical relationship between face (mask) (liǎnmiàn 面) and the self. But in reality, it leads to the alienation of face (mask) (liǎnmiàn 面) and the self, no matter in what kind of direction it functions; and at the same time, it makes its operation increasingly difficult without a group. This kind of dependent relationship makes the success or failure of the individual face (external prestige) (liǎnmiàn 面) become its group’s face (external prestige) (liǎnmiàn 面). Chinese persons in this state began to pay attention to situational factors, learning how to say and act depending on different occasions, so that they can defend or show off their own face (mask) (liǎn 面) and face (external prestige) (miànzi 面子) while giving others face (external prestige) (mianzi 面子).58

In such a repressed behavioural custom of masking, the expression of ‘hypocrisy and false-heartedness’, including so-called ‘false humility’, 60 is the content of formalism which is intensified by Ruism (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:344).61

2.3.2 The Problem of PTRIC Repressed Form of Self

Studies from various fields disclose this RFS as a very important feature of relational selfhood arising from a Ru-based cultural heritage. Such a Ruist RFS is even criticized by some psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and theologians, as a significant factor contributing to personality disorders or other psychological and social

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57 All the three Chinese words liǎnmiàn 面, liǎn 面, and miànzi 面子 are literally translated as face. But their meanings might not be the same and vary according to different contexts. For example, miànzi 面子 can be literally translated as face but means external prestige. Therefore, I translate them in this paragraph according to the context but not literally. In Zhai Xuewei’s study, one of the meanings of liǎnmiàn is very close to the English word mask (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:182). Therefore, the concept of masking in the Western social psychological studies is closest to the concept of liǎnmiàn in Ru-influenced Chinese context (ibid.:183-90). About the discussion of nuance of the differences between liǎnmiàn, liǎn, and miànzi, see Hu Hsienchin (1944), Cheng Chungying (1986), Zhai Xuewei (2006; 2010), and Wei Xiaohong and Li Qingyuan (2013).

58 See also Hsu Jing (1985:100) and Harter (1997:100).


60 Helen Lee (2006:62) explains what ‘false humility’ means as that ‘[O]n the opposite end of the spectrum from excessive authoritarianism lies another [Ru-]cultural tendency: … displaying what appears to be humility in the guise of deference, deflection of compliments or resistance to … speaking out on critical issues’.

61 See also Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh (1994:555).
problems (Wong, Melvin W. 2001:2). Therefore, the RFS becomes a significant and fundamental research problem in this context. Scholars’ criticisms of this problem will be demonstrated in more detail in C2.

The research of Zhai Xuewei (2010:182) discloses that the RFS leads to alienation between the internal self-reflective and emotional experience, ‘feelings, intentions, and beliefs’ (Gergen 2000:203) of the self, and its external social mask(s). In other words, the RFS denotes that one is untruthful to both one’s selfhood and one’s sociality, i.e. self-deception (see C2S1.2). This RFS essentially belongs within a group setting because it is closely related to some Ru-influenced Chinese cultural features: familism, hierarchical society, Ruist relational ethics and ‘jūnzi réngé」 (the noble human’s personality, namely the noble human’s moral self-cultivation) (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:183–90). For the purpose of discussing this research problem in this thesis, the problem of the RFS will always denote a repressed mental habit, a repressed social behavioural custom, and a repressed tendency in PTRIC contexts in which one’s true feelings (including emotional experience) and thoughts (including self-reflective intentions and beliefs) are to some extent suppressed by repressive social imposition. Besides, the self in its repressed form is understood and discussed in the social psychological sense because it is shaped by way of response, reaction, and adaptation in its cultural and social contexts.

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64 In empirical research on ‘true self-concept’ and ‘meaning in life’, true self-concept is defined as ‘those characteristics that you possess and would like to express socially, but are not always able to, for whatever reason . . . those traits you are able to express around those people you are closest to’ (Schlegel et al. 2009:475).
3. Research Questions

3.1 Alternatives for Transforming the Repressed Self among PTRIC

Some non-Ruist scholars also have presented the need for a modification of (contemporary) Ruism, especially in its expressions of filial piety, including the application of the ‘dual framework of filial piety’ promoted by Yeh Kuanghui (p. Yè Guānghuī) (2003:73), and the ‘new principle of filial piety’ presented by Yang Kuoshu (p. Yáng Guóshū) (1986b). Some Ruist scholars give different insights in their interpretations in Ruism, for example, Leung Insing (1951-) and James Legge. However, these modifications of Ruism focus on how to modify the way or degree in applying it pragmatically to meet the needs of modernization within Chinese societies. They do not reinterpret Ruist relational selfhood comprehensively in terms of the RFS.

However, very few Ruist scholars beyond Henry Rosemont, Jr. (2012), Roger T. Ames (1947-) (2006:312–41), and David L. Hall (1937–2001) (1998) have ever recognized, addressed, or dealt with this question. Most traditional and post-traditional Ruists have never discussed these issues to any extent (Zhái, Xuéwěi 翟學偉 2010:204) — though a minority (like Tu Weiming and Liu Shuhsien) have discussed it briefly. Nevertheless, Tu (1985:13) indicates that the problem of the RFS is not caused by orthodox Ruist relational ethics. He argues that the relational selfhood criticized by the

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66 Or ‘dual filial piety model’ (Yeh, Kuanghui and Bedford 2003; Yeh, Kuanghui 2009a).
68 This can be also observed in the empirical survey. For example, a survey by Chuang Yaochia (2005) finds Ruist positive impact on Chinese ‘family harmony and well-being’ in Taiwan. But the Ruist relational-model is a modified one for fitting the need of modernization of Chinese society.
69 At the very end of this research, I found that the New Ruist Liu Shuhsien (1988:263–4, 268–9) identifies this problem of the RFS in post-imperial Ruism and describes it as hypocrisy, wearing masks, and ‘yǐn è yáng shàn’ 隱惡揚善 (concealing the faults of others and praising their good points) in traditional and post-traditional Chinese societies. However, I have not yet found his further comprehensive discussions for solving this problem.
scholars as the cause of the RFS (to be discussed in C2) is the one formed in the small folk tradition of Ruism that is not the typical Ruist tradition.\textsuperscript{70} If what Tu argues is true, Tu’s New Ruist (or post-traditional Ruist)\textsuperscript{71} relational selfhood can be considered first as an alternative for solving the problem of the RFS resulting from relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts. Besides, what other alternatives are there that should be considered?

3.1.1 Tu Weiming’s New Ruist Relational Selfhood

Tu (1985:13) Weiming as a contemporary New Ruist and an internationally famous scholar claims to be an orthodox follower of the great tradition of Ruist refined intellectual spirit.\textsuperscript{72} He (2014b:website) is one of the promoters\textsuperscript{73} who advocates the universal value of Ruism. Among contemporary Ruists including all three generations of New Ruists, such as Liáng Shùmíng, Mou Tsungsan, Xú Fùguān 徐復觀 (1903-82), Táng Jūnì, 唐君毅 (1909-78), Liu Shuhsien, and Cheng Chungying, Tu is probably the only one who explores and delves into the issue of Ruist selfhood at some depth.

Additionally, Tu is probably the most representative Ruist who is open to other religions, including Christianity, while still being an influential promoter of contemporary New Ruism in Anglophone circles (Liu, Shuhsien 2000:560). Because of his openness, he expects less conflict between other religions and New Ruism, and recently promoted in two public lectures\textsuperscript{74} the historical and cultural realities supporting the presence of both Ruified Christians and Ruified Muslims in the contemporary world as some of the major

\textsuperscript{70} The first generation New Ruist Liáng Shùmíng 梁漱溟 (Zhèng, Dàhuá 鄭大華 2007) and the contemporary Ruist Zhèng Zhìmíng 鄭志明 (1991) also maintain a similar argument.

\textsuperscript{71} In order to avoid confusing readers by the two different phrases with similar appearances: post-traditional Ruist relational selfhood and post-traditional Ru-influenced relational selfhood, I will use only the phrase New Ruist relational selfhood in place of the phrase post-traditional Ruist relational selfhood in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{72} See also Tu Weiming (1979a:xxiv).

\textsuperscript{73} Liu Shuhsien is another promoter (1998a; 2002). See also Peter K. H. Lee (1991:69).

\textsuperscript{74} One in Beijing at the Fourth World Congress of Sinology, 6 September 2014, and the other in Oxford at the Oxford University Jin-Long Philosophy Society, 18 October 2014.
expressions of contemporary Ruism. Therefore, as a post-traditional and post-secular Ruist scholar, Tu’s interpretation of the relational self in the context of post-traditional New Ruism is worth studying in order to explore how a contemporary post-traditional New Ruist responds to the challenges raised about the relational self as it is developed within his own account of a Ru-based cultural heritage.

As I will describe in detail in C4, Tu (1985:8) tries to defend an orthodox Ruist understanding of relational selfhood in answering those who criticize the problematic collectivist Ruist selfhood (Bellah n.d., cited in ibid.:7). From his vantage point, the orthodox Ruist tradition is merely a scapegoat for such criticisms. But do his arguments succeed in identifying significant differences in the characteristics of relational selfhood promoted by Ruist orthodoxy and distinguishing them from those of the small folk tradition influenced by Ruism in terms of causing the RFS criticized by those scholars? If the answer to these questions is positive, Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood would be a suitable alternative and the first priority for solving the problem of the RFS within the theoretical context where a PTRIC relational selfhood is applicable.

3.1.2 Jürgen Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood

As mentioned in the beginning, regarding the Ruification in contemporary Chinese societies, both within and without Chinese Christian churches, there are some significant and inescapable challenges related to PTRIC contexts that the majority of Chinese churches most frequently face, no matter whether in fellowship, evangelism, or justifying the Christian faith to Chinese audiences. Whether or not there is a Christian relational

75 For example: (1) The main reason Chinese people refuse the gospel of Christianity follows from the widespread view that all religions are equally good, since all of them exhort people to do good. The assumption is that Christianity is Western (Tong, Cheekiong 2007:8) whereas Ruism, Buddhism, and folk religion are Chinese. What is the benefit of switching to Christianity at the cost of betraying one’s Chinese or family culture and traditions, Ruism, Buddhism, or folk religion? This phenomenon is so common among Chinese people and thus a common issue discussed in Chinese missiology (Zhōng, Wěiqiáng 鍾偉強 2005a:14). (2) When Chinese people are interested in or have gone further and believed in Jesus Christ, the main barrier hindering them from being converted or baptized is the objection of their parents, family, and
selfhood that can transform this kind of RFS in PTRIC contexts is a very fundamental and significant question to be explored.

Among the possible alternatives, including the concept of Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood, another account of relational selfhood from the Christian ‘social trinitarian anthropology’ is presented in Jürgen Moltmann’s writings, mainly in his works *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God* (1981) and *God in Creation* (1985). Moltmann (1992b:256), through his social trinitarian anthropology, not only presents the possibility of a *relational self* (although he has not used this term) without losing its distinctiveness, but also maintains its necessity for expounding such a relationality between human beings.76 Moltmann and Pannenberg are contemporary pioneers in the Anglo-European Church tradition (including Protestant and Catholic Churches) who ‘inaugurate’ the step to argue for the social trinitarian doctrine and extend it to develop there interpretations of relational selfhood (Grenz 2001:16). According to Moltmann (1981:189), this concept of social Trinity can be trace back to ‘the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity’. There are other

culture, involving the fear of being accused of being 不孝 (unfilial) or 背祖 (betraying ancestors) (Tong, Cheekiong 2007:10f.). This is also another phenomenon so common among Chinese people and thus a common issue discussed in Chinese missiology (Zhōng, Wēiqiáng 鍾偉強 2005a:14). This resistance from family is a factor used to explain the phenomena of the stagnant growth in the Taiwanese church during 1964-1979 (Zhào, Xīngguāng 趙星光 2014:106) and an extremely high proportion of those who have become Christians overseas gave up their faith on return to their home country. This phenomenon might also have contributed to the fast growth of churches in Taiwan in the prior period 1945-1965 after many Mainland Chinese left their families and moved to Taiwan at the end of the civil war of China (Zhao, Xingguang 2014:105) and the significant success of evangelism among overseas Chinese (see also Doyle 2005:website). (3) The repressed form of self resulting from Ru-influenced relational selfhood is also one of the reasons why Ruified Chinese Christians, especially men, find it harder to be connected intimately, mentored in spirituality and trained in discipleship (Lù, Kun 2010). See also Hu Zhìwei (2006:website) and Xi Wan (2009:website), and Prayer Team (2011:website).

76 The doctrine of the *imago Dei* in Christian social trinitarian anthropology establishes ‘human persons being and becoming in relationship’ on the basis of ‘the unique trinitarian Persons in relationship’ and produces an understanding of ‘the human being as [a] reciprocating self’ (Balswick et al. 2005:30). Stanley J. Grenz (2001:302, 312) also affirms that ‘the new humanity in communion with the triune God’ in social trinitarian theological anthropology is a *relational self*, a ‘person in relationship’ as well as the ‘ecclesial self’ (namely the ‘social self’ in theology). This relational self is not only in relationship with God, but also with human others (Shults 2003:1–2).

77 Joy Ann McDougall (2003:197) summarizes Moltmann’s argument as ‘[A] person neither appropriates nor possesses another, nor do the two become subject to one another. Rather each creates the space for the other person’s freedom to emerge’.
contemporary theologians who pay attention to the social model of the Trinity, but vary considerably in their interpretations. However, few of them, like Moltmann, develop a comprehensive social trinitarian anthropology (human selfhood) through the doctrine of the *imago Dei* based on social trinitarian theology. For example, Zizioulas’ (2004:141) discussions of his social trinitarian theology and anthropology are more based on an ‘ontology of communion’ and Lacugna (1991:209-418) focuses more on the soteriological perspective of social trinitarianism. Moltmann (1981) is one of the few who presents the social Trinity from both historical and eschatological perspectives and shows its relevance to both the whole of theology and politics (Gresham 1993:326). His eschatological perspective of the social Trinity is very important in the *becoming* aspect of human selfhood in his interpretation of social trinitarian anthropology. Besides, Moltmann is probably the only social trinitarian theologian who is not only interested in understanding Chinese culture but also engages himself in dialoguing with Ruism and Daoism in his works (1989:87-101; 1998a; 2008b) and with Chinese theologians, Chinese philosophers, and scholars in other disciplines in person. It is notable that he has made at least eight academic visits to Taiwan and China, including a dialogue with Tu Weiming in China in 2011 (Lin, Honghsin 2002; Hóng, Liàng 洪亮 2011).

The important feature of this concept is a relational selfhood embedded within a dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in diversity, namely maintaining relational

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79 Moltmann’s historical perspective of the Trinity is not about the history of dogma or historical theology. It denotes a notion of the triune God who engages in history and indeed possesses a *history* of His own.
unity without sacrificing personal diversity and allowing for personal diversity without sacrificing the dynamics of its basis in relational unity (see C6). Therefore, Moltmann presents and argues that this concept of relational selfhood shaped by social trinitarian anthropology provides a healthier selfhood, namely balanced relationships between the individual self and the group, compared to the problematic modern individualist selfhood. Can this social trinitarian relational selfhood interpreted and presented by Moltmann be argued or justified to be another suitable alternative for solving the problem of the RFS within the theoretical context of a PTRIC relational selfhood? Could it be a beneficial resource for modifying the form and expression of PTRIC relational selfhood?

3.1.3 Possibilities of Tu Weiming in Conjunction with Jürgen Moltmann

There exist many differences between the main traditions within Ruism and Christianity, for example, their ontologies, their concepts about human nature, and their solutions for human suffering. Although comparisons could and can still be made through dialogues in different forms (Pfister 2000:69–79), it is not easy to find intersections to have an essential dialogue between them (Liú, Qīnpíng 劉清平 2012:5f.). Could ethics and the transformation of humans be such an intersection? Li Yúnquè 李雲雀 (2002:60–66) in her study of the uniqueness of Christian ethics points out that ethics is a core value in Ruist context, and so can serve as a common ground for dialogue between the main

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80 Moltmann, as some other scholars, tends to generalize and homogenize accounts about the actual pluralities existing within Western civilization, and characterizes individualist selfhood as if all Westerners think and act in the same way. From an empirical point of view, this is blatantly false, for example, individualism. Modern individualism is related to European humanist forms of Christianity (or even to ancient Christianity and Roman Philosophers, such as Cicero, that provided its elements) (Hayek 1944:14), but not to the West as a whole. It is notable that from Moltmann’s (1981:199) viewpoint, the development of ‘[European] individualism’ started since ‘the social doctrine of the Trinity’ disappeared.

81 See also Preece (2004:2).
traditions in Ruist and Christian contexts. Zhou Cuishan (2006: website) argues that, besides ethics as an intersection, the dialogue is more feasible between main traditions of Christianity and the small folk tradition than other ancient forms of Ruism. In my own case, after I found that the concept of selfhood in Christian social trinitarian anthropology is also relational and transformational, this dialogue became much more feasible and meaningful.

When no common ground for a dialogue between Christian theology and non-Christian disciplines appears, the theologian Langdon Gilkey argues that secular experience, for example human nature, provides a common ground for starting a dialogue. The ultimate concern about common secular experience makes such a dialogue possible. Furthermore, any critical dialogue cannot ‘do full justice to’ both Ruism and Christianity without involving ultimate concern. I agree with Gilkey. The RFS is exactly a common secular experience among PTRIC societies. Behind PTRIC relational selfhood and relational ethics by which the RFS is shaped, any ultimate concern about the RFS involves the worldview related to religiousness, ontology and cosmology,

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83 Two years later, I found support from other scholars. For example, both Zhōu Wěichí 周偉馳 (1999:75), a researcher in Christianity, and Edwin C. Hui 許志偉 (p. Xǔ Zhìwěi) (1998), a theologian, have asserted that the essential dialogue between Christianity with its trinitarian doctrine and Ruism with its promotion of cultivated humaneness becomes possible by means of the common ground found between the relation-based and love-based social doctrine of the Trinity. Besides, Lauren Pfister (2001:348) also points out that both Ruism and Christian traditions are highly interested in the transformation of individual person towards sagehood or sanctification. See also Edwin C. Hui and Chen Rongyi 陳榮毅 (p. Chén Róngyì) (1998), Edwin C. Hui (2000:65), Tang, Andres S. K. (2000), Joseph Hongzhang Bai (2013:203f.), and Simon Chan (2014:42–3).


85 Gilkey (1978:489) proves through his own experience living in a Japanese ‘internment-camp’ in China that there is always an ultimate and transcendental dimension, the ‘original sin’ of humankind in his case, in common secular experience which secularism cannot understand, explain, or escape from. The sociologist Peter Berger (1929-2017) (1999:13) also highlights such a ‘religious impulse’ in pursuing transcendental meanings of life within the secularized world from an ‘anthropological’ aspect.

according to Gilkey.\footnote{Gilkey (1969, cited in Huáng, Lùpíng 黃路蘋 2016).} Therefore, the problem of the RFS provides a common ground for a dialogue between the main traditions of Ruism and Christianity, especially between Tu Weiming and Moltmann, who both articulate their concern about this issue (to be discussed in C3).

Moreover, Tu (1990a:179–80) stresses that Ruist relational selfhood not only stays away from the problems of ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’, but also prevents itself from developing into ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’.\footnote{Tu Weiming tends to generalize and homogenize accounts about the actual pluralities existing within individualism and collectivism, too. See F78 above. Further explanation will be given in C4S4.5.1 and C8S2.2. Regarding different types of individualism and collectivism, consult Appendix 3. However, according to the individualists Tu (1990a:78) mentions in this work, it is modern Anglo-European individualism.} In Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology, the relational selfhood is not the separate and autonomous self developed in ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’, nor the soluble-in-relation self developed in ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ (see C6). Tu and Moltmann both claim their projects of the relational self constitute a synthesis of the dialectic ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ (as the thesis) and ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ (as the antithesis). Both of them also recognize that neither the collectivist selfhood nor individualist selfhood develops balanced relationships between the individual self and the group, namely a relationship of keeping one side intact without sacrificing the other side.

Besides relational selfhood, these two international thinkers aver similar concerns in other various ways, for example, individual transformation (or ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ in Moltmann’s language),\footnote{Moltmann (1981:216f.).} protecting human rights, criticizing ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’, and valuing dialogue between differences. But do both of these accounts of the relational self amount to the same thing? Whose account of the relational self successfully produces a synthesis of ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ and ‘[modern
Anglo-European individualism’? Thus, it is meaningful and valuable to study these two accounts of the relational self, precisely because they are possible solutions for the predicament of relational selfhood in the contexts of PTRIC drawn from resources in different cultures and traditions.

3.2 Research Questions and Framework

3.2.1 Research Questions

In researching for a solution to the problem of the RFS within the theoretical context of a PTRIC relational selfhood, the following main research question will guide our discussions:

To what extent do Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s conceptualizations of relational selfhood provide a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood?

In order to explore and examine this research questions, two primary subsidiary questions will be explored and examined. They can be expressed as follows (while relevant secondary subsidiary questions will be pursued in following chapters):

(1) To what extent is the conceptualization of the New Ruist Chinese relational selfhood presented by Tu Weiming a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood?

(2) To what extent is the conceptualization of the social trinitarian relational selfhood presented by Jürgen Moltmann a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood?

Based on these main research question and two primary subsidiary questions, through comparing the doctrines and presuppositions of relational selfhood both in Tu Weiming’s
New Ruism and in Jürgen Moltmann’s social trinitarian theological anthropology in modern European and North American Christianity, this study may help to liberate Chinese Christians and non-Christians from the RFS.

3.2.2 Research Framework

In order to study the research problem and these main and primary subsidiary research questions, the main themes and framework of this research are divided into four topics according to their logical sequence as follows (with relevant chapter numbers indicated in parentheses at the end of each topic) and illustrated in Diagram 1.1:

(1) the research problem of the repressed form of self shaped by PTRIC relational selfhood (C1 to C3);

(2) Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood in responding to the research problem (C4 and C5);

(3) Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood in responding to the research problem (C6 and C7);

(4) the possible alternative solution(s) for liberating the repressed form of self (C8).
Diagram 1.1 The Framework of the Research

1. The Main Research Question

   The Repressed Form of Self

   Tu’s Post-traditional Ruist Relational Selfhood

   The Post-Traditional Ru-Influenced Chinese Relational Selfhood

2. Solution(s)?

   Keeping Diversity in Sociality and Unity

   Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood

3. 2nd Primary Subsidiary Question

4. 1st Primary Subsidiary Question
Chapter Two
Understanding the Criticism of the Repressed Form of Self
in Contexts of PTRIC Relational Selfhood

1. Clarification of Terminology

In order to avoid ambiguity in the use of the concepts of individual, self, and person, it is necessary from this point on to clarify them. In additions, descriptors of the real self and its repressed form will also be introduced and discussed.

1.1 The Concepts of Individual, Self, and Person

The meanings of individual, self, and person are distinct in the social sciences, while most other scholars often appear to use them interchangeably (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164). Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish their nuanced differences in this thesis. I adopt Hwang Kwangkuo’s and Grace G. Harris’ definitions that are synopsized in Chart 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Biological As a Single Member of Humankind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Psychological As Locus of Experience: A Subject Making One distinct from Others to Acquire Self-Identity and Making One Self-Aware as an Object in Differentiating Oneself from Others that also Acquire Personal Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Sociological As Agent-in-Society: Having a Certain Position in a Social Order and Conducting Actions Purposively towards Personal Goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 2.1 Brief Definitions of Individual, Self, and Person (Based on Harris, Grace Gredys 1989:599–604; Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164)

There is a different dominant ‘ontology of self’ in each separate culture, including such notions as birth, aging, illness, and death, as well as ‘the relationship[s] between self

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1 In terms of being as agent, the self should be identical with the person in the argument of John MacMurray (1891-1976) (1953, reprinted in 1993:100–102) that ‘the self is subject in and for the self as agent’.
and morality, and … between self and others’ (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164). Accordingly, the self is an integrative ‘locus of experience’ is ‘a cultural carrier’ whenever the individual and its social world meet, and so the self functions within an ‘individuated interpretive framework’ (ibid.). Markus and Kitayama (1994:93 n.3) explain:

The nature and course of social behaviour (which includes the emotional experience and its instrumental consequences) will be pervasively influenced by whether good feelings are experienced … as realizing one’s own … ideas, motives, [and goals[,] or as fulfilling the expectations of significant others. The nature of the mediating self is thus significant. It is the self that is one of the personalized carriers of the social context … [t]he meanings and practices accorded to the self by a given cultural group are among the important features of the social context that can be localized, specified, and assessed.

This individuated framework interprets the ideas and practices about which persons are good or bad, and the values reinforced by socio-cultural contexts to mould ‘one’s thinking, action, motivation, and emotional reactions’ (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164). Therefore, the understanding of self as a cultural carrier in the context of social psychology is the basic domain for the meaning of self in this thesis.

1.2 Descriptors of the Real Self and its Repressed Form

But what self is repressed or masked negatively? The most common expressions in the Chinese language (used either implicitly or explicitly) to denote the intact zìwǒ 自我 (self), wǒ 我 (I), zìjǐ 自己 (myself), and gèrén 個人 (individual person) in contrast to the various degrees of affected or suppressed selves (I, myself, and individual person) are listed as follows:

1. ‘zhēnwǒ ‘真我’ (Tournier 1993)(Li, Lukyan 李耀全 (p, Lǐ Yàoquán) 2005)(Li, Lukyan 李耀全 (p, Lǐ Yàoquán) 2005);²

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² See also Tu Weiming (1996b), Li Lukyan 李耀全 (p, Lǐ Yàoquán) (2005), and Lín Yúlín 林瑜琳 (2011).
It has been noted that the Chinese adjectives for describing the intact self are almost the same (‘zhēn’ or ‘zhēnsí’, translated as true, real, or authentic in English) or have the same meaning, even though there are different terms used to denote the self. The above Chinese phrases can be understood in English as:

1. the ‘real self’ (Horney 1950);
2. the ‘actual self’ (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:24–5, eo);
3. the ‘true self’ (Tu 1985);
4. the ‘authentic person’ (ibid.:52);
5. the ‘authentic self’ (Tu 1979a);
6. the ‘genuine selfhood’ (ibid.:19).

Certainly some of these phrases carry with different meanings in varying contexts. For example, the phrase true self has such different meanings. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of my research problem that is focused on the social psychological sense of the phrase to explore and clarify all of these other passages. A brief attempt at unearthing the range of distinctions in the terminology of the true self is made in A-D.

Besides, both sets of Chinese and English phrases indicate similar meanings, though some might possess nuances different from others. For example, the actual self denotes

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4 See also Tu Weiming (1992a).
5 See also Jourard (1971) and Turner (1999).
6 See also Jourard (1971:133–5) and Dana Crowley Jack (1993).
different meanings in different contexts. Therefore, in order to avoid any confusion about the meaning of the *actual self*, this term will not be used in this thesis. Instead, the term *real self* will be used in discussing both the private and public facets of selfhood.

The descriptors *true* and *authentic* generally denote the real self, which accords with the empirical fact of the self. These descriptors denote opposite meanings to the adjectives *pretending*, *posing*, and *replicating* (Vannini and Williams 2009:2). From the examination of secondary literature and also other relevant sources above, the real self, the true self, and the authentic self are interchangeable phrases in social psychological studies. All of them describe an unveiled self (2 Corinthians 3:17f.), a disclosing self, a transparent self (Jourard 1971), or a ‘reveal[ing]’ self (Moltmann 1976:3) as opposed to a masked (c.f. 2 Corinthians 11:13f.) or veiled self (c.f. 2 Corinthians 3:17f.), or even a ‘false self’ (Winnicott 1965). In other words, one who lives out one’s real self (or true self, authentic self) is the one who fully grasps one’s own essence, affirms one’s self-

7 Some surveys about self-harmony among Chinese people in Taiwan and Hong Kong compare and analyse the difference between the ’zhēnshí zìwǒ’ 「真實自我」 ‘true self’, the current situation of the self which can be also translated or understood literally as the *real self*, ‘lǐxiǎng zìwǒ’ 「理想自我」 the ‘ideal self’, or the desired or favoured situation of the self (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:24–5, eo). However, differentiations between the ‘actual self’ and the ‘ideal self’ are made in the context of discussing the private facets of selfhood (Baumeister and Tice 1986:64–8, eo). See also Higgins (1987:319). Such a discussion deals with the self-concept without involving others, even though the ideal self might be shaped by social values based on others’ expectations and/or ‘the long-range expressive goals of the self’ (ibid.:64). Therefore, the actual self in the context of discussing the private facets of selfhood will not be confused with the real self, in contrast to the repressed or negatively masked self, especially in the context of discussing the social facets of selfhood even when they denote the same present real self in a particular context. Still, in empirical research on ‘true self-concept’ and ‘meaning in life’, the ‘actual self-concept’ is defined in contrast to a true self-concept as ‘those characteristics that one possesses and is often able to express to others in social settings’ (Schlegel et al. 2009:475). In this context, the actual self is best understood as ‘a public self’ (ibid.).

8 ‘False self behaviour’ is defined as acting ‘in ways that are not the *real me*’ (Harter et al. 1996:306, eo). See also Harter et al. (1996), Harter (1997:101), and Li, Lukyan (2005).

9 In explaining what ‘the false self’ is, Winnicott (1965:133, 148, eo) states, ‘The concept of the false self… is not a difficult one. The false self is built up on a basis of compliance. It can have a defensive function, which is the protection of the true self’ and ‘the existence of a false self results in a feeling unreal or a sense of futility’. See also Ryan (1991:230).
existence, and is one’s own master\textsuperscript{10} and so ‘true to one’s self’ (Vannini and Franzese 2008:1621).

The real self (or true self, authentic self) denotes the self open and truthful to oneself and others (Spitzmuller and Ilies 2010:306–8).\textsuperscript{11} In other words, there is no alienation between its two facets — ‘the public self’ and ‘the private self’,\textsuperscript{12} no inconsistency in the expressions and acts (or attitude and behaviour, or personality and behaviour) of the self (Markus and Kitayama 1991a:41), namely that personal consistency or self-consistency in different situations is very high (Yang, Guoshu 2002:88–9).\textsuperscript{13} Tu Weiming (1979a:19–22)\textsuperscript{14} defines an ‘authentic’ person to be ‘truthful’ to ‘one’s genuine selfhood’, or ‘one’s inner self’, and to harmonize ‘one’s sociality’ with ‘sincerity’.\textsuperscript{15} Jürgen Moltmann (1926-) (1974b:93) uses ‘authentic’ to describe the life or forms of living of a person who is unmasked or revealing himself.\textsuperscript{16} In this perspective, the self is discussed and understood in terms of a living and active person who is an embodied being and is dynamically changing over time, instead of being static and absolute (Rogers 1961:171–2).\textsuperscript{17} Whether the self is real or not is based on the nature of its self-consciousness (Tournier 1957): that is, the self-reflective and emotional experience (Vannini and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{11} See also Jourard (1971:133).

\bibitem{12} Yang Guoshu (2002:102). These two terms are used to explain the concept of Tournier’s person (real self) and personage (social mask).

\bibitem{13} I.e. so-called ‘situational determinism’ (Hsu, Francis L. K. 1963:164-5; Yang, Guoshu 2002:88–9). As for the inevitability of wearing one’s social masks, it will be discussed in C3 and C6 and A-E.

\bibitem{14} See also Tu Weiming (1976a:34–6; 1979a:68, 73–7, 81; 1989a:27).

\bibitem{15} It is notable that Tu Weiming (1985:52, 68) later changed this definition to being ‘honest with oneself and loyal’ or ‘considerate to others’. Did he intend to mean in this new definition that it was not necessary to be honest to others? I will explore this issue later.

\bibitem{16} See also Moltmann (1976:3).

\end{thebibliography}
Franzese 2008:1621) involving ‘true feelings, intentions, and beliefs’ (Gergen 2000:203). It is notable that Tu Weiming (1985:19) indicates that knowing the true self in traditional and post-traditional Ruism is neither ‘a cognitive grasp of a given structure of objective truths’, nor ‘an acquisition of internalized skills’, but ‘basically an understanding of one’s mental state and appreciation of one’s inner feelings’. Such a definition was reflected in a Chinese informant’s description about her real self in the following way in another cultural study:

My inner self is my real self, my consciousness of awareness of being. It is a self not easily revealed to others and guarded [by] myself as a basis of my secured well-being, especially in a society where truth is arrived at empirically, not scientifically. (document RCC-CH 689 Informant 45F pp. 169, 171 in Mead and Métraux 2000:169–74)

Finally, having no self and other similar phrases are metaphorical expressions of the severest degree of either self-deception or the ‘persona trap’ (Winnicott 1965:133). Self-deception means that one is untruthful to both one’s selfhood and one’s sociality when the civil but false self ‘gets itself mistaken for real’ (ibid.). The persona trap occurs when one’s masks cannot be removed (Schwalbe 2009:151).

2. Measuring the Repressed Form of Self

Due to the limitation of space, the theoretical bases for discussing the issue of the RFS mainly in the light of social psychology will not be presented here, but provided in A–E. The RFS is a psychological, ethical, and relational issue open to influences from theology, religions, or worldviews. But can it be measured? In their empirical researches about the

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18 See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1971), Tu Weiming (1985), and Hall (1994:217).
19 In an empirical study of the ‘true self-concept’ and ‘meaning in life’, the former is defined as ‘those characteristics that you possess and would like to express socially, but are not always able to, for whatever reason . . . those traits you are able to express around those people you are closest to’ (Schlegel et al. 2009:475).
20 See also Dana Crowley Jack (1993:29–54).
21 In Turner’s theory of ‘self-concept anchorage’, one might anchor one’s true self in institutions (society), so that one’s true self might be revealed through conforming to institutional (social) norms or core values (Turner 1976; Sloan 2007:307).
‘real self’ and ‘inauthenticity’ in the workplace, Rebecca J. Erickson and Christian Ritter (2001) as well as Melissa M. Sloan (2007, eo) use several statements to measure responders’ inauthenticity in relation to emotional experiences.\textsuperscript{22} According to such statements, we can find that the states of inauthenticity they describe are all about a RFS. Since they were originally drawn from research in the workplace, I modified them for a more general social environment. These statements can help to embody the meaning of the RFS discussed in this research. These following eight statements are modified for the sake of this new research purpose:

1. To get through my social life, I feel like I must conform to others or to general social expectations;
2. When I am among others or in society, I become unsure of what my real feelings are;
3. I worry that social life is making me hide my true feelings and emotions;
4. I do not feel I can be myself among others or in society;
5. I have to fake how I really feel when I am among others or in society;
6. I basically have to become a different person when I am among others or in society;
7. The way I act among others or in society is very different from the way I act privately;
8. I feel that I cannot express my true self when I am among others or in society.

It is worth noting that the RFS is generally not caused by only one factor. Besides social impositions, one’s personality as well as the dynamics and tensions of interpersonal relationships should also be considered. Another tool needs to be identified in order to measure all these factors, something to be anticipated in the future from scholars in the social sciences. Since many scholars criticize Ruist relational selfhood as the cause of this research problem, this thesis only involves factors that are originally external to the self, such as cultural heritage and relationships.

\textsuperscript{22} These forms are found in Erickson and Ritter (2001:152) and Sloan (2007:309). Four statements in the latter research were replicated from claims found in the former study).
To sum up, the phrase *the repressed form of self* in this research is used to convey the sense that one’s real self is restrained in the presence of others at every moment of its existence;\(^\text{23}\) in other words, one hardly lives as a real self, rarely discloses oneself, or allows the expression of one’s real self to be realized.

3. **Complications with the Repressed Form of Self**

3.1 **Psychological and Interpersonal Problems**

Longing for sincerity and genuineness is essential to personal relationships (Tournier 1957:23–4); acceptance of the reality of ‘our existence’ maintains the ‘inner harmony’ which strengthens our ‘physical and moral health’ (ibid.:55).\(^\text{24}\) Ellul (1973:151–2) warns that to suppress the need to express one’s ‘passions and desires’ to some extent might be dangerous. Tournier (1957:82–3) points out that any RFS\(^\text{25}\) arouses ‘uneasiness’.\(^\text{26}\) Such uneasiness is exemplified by Tournier and other scholars as follows:

- (1) ‘agony … disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness’ (Higgins 1987:319), and ‘hopelessness’ (Jack, Dana Crowley 1993:168);\(^\text{27}\)
- (2) ‘prolonged indecision’ and fence-sitting (Tournier 1957:201) (to be discussed more in A-ES4);
- (3) ‘tension’ (Ellul 1973:152);\(^\text{28}\)

\(^{23}\) Carl Rogers’ (1961:172, eo) ‘to be all of oneself in each moment’.

\(^{24}\) See also Schlegel et al. (2009).

\(^{25}\) Or in Tournier’s (1957:82) own language: any alienation and inconsistency between the true self and its mask. It appears as an RFS is built out of ‘discrepancies between the actual/own self-state (i.e., the self-concept) and ideal self-states … [or] between the actual/own self-state and ought self-states’ in E. Tory Higgins’s (1987:319) ‘self-discrepancy theory’. ‘Ideal self-states’ denote ‘representations of an individual’s beliefs about his or her own or a significant other’s hopes, wishes, or aspirations for the individual’ (ibid.). ‘Ought self-states’ refer to ‘representations of an individual’s beliefs about his or her own or a significant other’s beliefs about the individual’s duties, responsibilities, or obligations’ (ibid.).

\(^{26}\) See also Bai Chongliang (2007:116).

\(^{27}\) See also Tournier (1957:29).

\(^{28}\) See also Tournier (1957:29, 83, 201, 224).
(4) fear, threat, [and] restlessness’ (Higgins 1987:319);

(5) resentment and rage;

(6) ‘feelings of insecurity or bombastic defensiveness’ (Rogers 1961:175);

(7) ‘feelings of guilt or self-depreciation’ (Rogers 1961:175);

(8) feeling of alienation (Wáng, Yòulíng 王幼玲 1987:62);

(9) ‘silencing the self’ (Jack and Ali 2010), or even ‘denial of the self’, including denial of one’s own emotional and physical reactions or ‘needs, and memories’ (Miller, Alice 1997:40–52 and back cover).

Although the RFS might not necessarily cause any significant psychological, physical, or social problems in the present moment, the accumulation of these varieties of uneasiness listed above might make one feel ‘despair’ or even be in ‘torment’ (Kierkegaard 1941:17f.). It might also result in psychological symptoms such as ‘anxiety … [and] obsessions’ (Tournier 1957:82), other psychological problems, personality disorders, or even physical problems. An RFS can display:

(1) ‘a passive, uncritical, and uncreative orientation’, ‘cognitive conservatism’, and the burial of original creativity;

(2) ‘neglect, even inhibition of expressing of opinions (self-assertion), of independence, and of self-mastery’ and controlling of emotions and desires for the sake of keeping

relational harmony\textsuperscript{39} or preventing ‘social stigma and shame’ (Kramer et al. 2002:228);\textsuperscript{40} this may lead to the difficulties in discovering, diagnosing, and treating psychological problems (ibid.);

(3) ‘negative personality orientation’, ‘some harmful effects on personal growth and interpersonal relationships’,\textsuperscript{41} such as divorce,\textsuperscript{42} and the complexity of communication and unnecessary hurts from relationships;\textsuperscript{43}

(4) the economic ineffectiveness of social operation\textsuperscript{44} mainly due to indirect communication;\textsuperscript{45}

(5) ‘addiction’ and abuse-related individual, familial, and social problems (Wong, Melvin 2001:16, 36, 43);\textsuperscript{46}

(6) ‘psychological distress’, such as depression,\textsuperscript{47} and the difficulties in psychotherapy (Hsu, Jing 1985:107);\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{39} David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:10).

\textsuperscript{40} This is because Ruist socialization of personal development is underlaid by filial piety ‘characterized by authoritarian moralism, putting the accent on obedience and indebtedness to parents, not self-fulfilment, on impulse control, not self-expression, and on moral correctness, not psychological sensitivity’ (Ho, David YF 1996:161). Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh (1994:557) point out that Chinese ‘emotions are masked behind the forms of propriety’. See also Bodde (1953:69), Solomon (1971:61–2), Tseng Wenshing (1973), Bond et al. (1982b:158), Hsu Jing (1985:100, 107), Pye (1988:71), Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh (1994:555–7), and Shi Yuanyuan (2013:359).

\textsuperscript{41} Yeh Kuanghui (2003:67, 78).

\textsuperscript{42} Wu Fei (2011:213–19).

\textsuperscript{43} See also Rohner and Pettengill (1985), Lau Sing and Cheung Pingchung (1987), and Lau Sing et al. (1990).

\textsuperscript{44} Zheng Zhengbo (1990:172).

\textsuperscript{45} See also Arthur H. Smith (1890:91–7), and June Ock Yum (1988:386).

\textsuperscript{46} The addiction-related problems are manifested in the ways of ‘risk-taking, gambling, smoking, rage-episodes (the use of profanity), sex, drugs, alcohol, food seeking, and food preparations’. They are the other kinds of negative masking in avoiding or denying one’s shame (Wong, Melvin 2001:43). See also Jones and Berglas (1978), Baumeister (1988; 1993), Leary et al. (1994), and Harter (1997:101).


\textsuperscript{48} See also Jourard (1971:25–33, 133–5), Sheldon et al. (1997), and Ryan et al. (2005).
health problems, such as ‘malnutrition and eating disorders’, cancer, infection, ‘injuries and accidental death’ (Leary et al. 1994).

3.2 The Problem of Suicide

Undoubtedly the worst possible pathological effect of the suppressed self is suicide (Wong, Melvin 2001:24). Hiding one’s true condition, weakness, or problems might be a common self-defence mechanism in order to reduce the anxiety of disclosing them (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:50). Nevertheless, Donald Winnicott (1896-1971) (1965:133), a psychoanalytic psychiatrist, indicated that one possible pathological state — caused by the false self (resulting from social ‘compliance’) being ‘exploited and treated’ as real — is ‘a growing sense in the individual of futility and despair’. In the worst case of this abnormality of self-deception, ‘the false self can easily get itself mistaken for real’. It leads to the ‘annihilation’ of the real self and presents suicide as a way to reassert the real self (Li, Minlong and Yang, Kuoshu 1998:54).

Some recent field research and studies verify that some aspects of PTRIC cultural heritage, especially relational selfhood, are significant factors leading to suicide among Chinese persons, being more significant than individual factors (Zhang, Jie et al. 2004:431), especially among young rural females. It has also been noted that female suicide rates outnumber the male rates, a situation unique to post-traditional Chinese societies internationally according to known suicide data (Zhang, Jie 2014:146). For example:

49 See also Winnicott (1965:133), Harter (1997:101), Baumeister (1990), and Hewitt and Flett (1991:468).

50 See also Tournier (1957:30, 148) and Saari (1982:46).

51 Sidney M Jourard asserts that ‘a person who has not made himself known to another human being … [and] in consequence does not know himself. Nor can he be himself” (Jourard 1971:32–3).
(1) Shame cultures (face culture) and Ru-based collectivism are major risk factors in Chinese suicides, especially among rural females (ibid.:435). Hierarchical social structure and Ru-based collectivism are the factors for Chinese male suicides (Chen, Yingyeh et al. 2012:139).

(2) Post-traditional Ruist (as well as Daoist and Buddhist) Chinese worldviews that lack a single God and afterlife in the Christian sense are risk factors for suicide (ibid.:435-6).

(3) Both post-traditional Ruist patriarchy (involving a male gender-bias and obedience to superiors) and social conformity based on the ideology of the doctrine of sāngāng 三綱 (the three bonds) are risk factors for Chinese rural suicide, especially among rural married women (Zhang, Jie 2014:151–2).

In Durkheim’s (1951:208) claim that domestic social integration counters suicide, marriage should be a protective factor against suicide (ibid.:263). Unfortunately, this is not the case for rural Chinese married women. Similar evidence was also found in some European countries in his studies. In a further analysis, Durkheim found that marriage in such social contexts did not favour wives, but only husbands (ibid.:269). Besides, he also argued that excess regulations are also a risk factor for suicide (ibid.:276). Durkheim’s social theory of suicide and his explanation of different social contexts are helpful in explaining findings about the role of PTRIC cultural heritage in Chinese suicides.

Jacques Ellul’s theory of propaganda can also be adopted to explain some reasons why the RFS in collectivist social contexts can be a factor leading to suicide. He (1973:94)

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52 As explained in A-C, Ru-based collectivism is a familistic collectivism not concerning for a general collective body but being bound by the social networks of family or kinship. More discussions of it will be in C4S4.5.1.

53 See also Chen Yingyeh et al. (2012:139).

points out that when people face strong public opinions and ‘social constraints’ (ibid.:151) in mass and collective society (ibid.:152), ‘latent private opinions’ are either repressed, diminished, or increasingly eliminated.55

The above evidence demonstrates the existence and the severity of the problem of the RFS in PTRIC contexts. I will now examine scholars’ criticism of the relevance of PTRIC relational selfhood to this problem.

4. The Criticism of the Repressed Self in Contexts of PTRIC Relational Selfhood

Before examining scholars’ criticism of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood, I want to first offer a summary of the factors motivating or inducing the RFS, or the repressed behavioural custom of wearing social masks in Paul Tournier’s language (1957). It has been noted that the social behaviour of wearing social masks might not be expressed in a repressed form, because social masks are sometimes not worn under coercion.56 But paradoxically, self-repressing and being repressed by external social factors can also slip in unwittingly. They might happen due to one’s self-deception or intentionally hiding the inner real self behind one’s social masks (ibid.:49-50, 101).57 It can also occur because of one’s unhealthy dependence on performance and achievement, resulting from ‘over-inflated’ social masks.58 Therefore, I argue that the clear boundary between the repressed and unrepressed parts of the self hidden behind social masks might not always be perceived and demarcated. Their relationship might be more like a

55 For example, Mao Tsetung's ‘propaganda of integration’ (ibid.:74-9, 304-14) is a brainwashing technique employing ‘horizontal propaganda’ (ibid.:80-84, 111, 310-13). Under this devastating pressure, many intellectuals were finally ‘homogenized’ into the pro-Maoist ‘class’ (Diana Xiaoqing Lin 2016 quoted in Pfister forthcoming-b: SIV), such as Féng Yǒulán馮友蘭 (1895-1990) and Jīn Yuélín金岳霖 (1895-1984) (Pfister forthcoming-b: SIV). Many others who resisted to be homogenized committed suicide, such as Jiǎn Bóbàn翦伯贊 (1898-1968) (ibid.:26).

56 For example, social roles can be played voluntarily out of one’s own accord, with responsibility and sincerity (Goffman 1956).

57 See also Martin (1999:120) and H. Bruce May (2012:95).

spectrum with a large overlapping zone. Nevertheless, since the research problem involves the RFS, the repressed behavioural custom of wearing social masks mentioned and discussed in this thesis refers only to its repressed form.

The factors motivating or inducing a RFS listed below are mainly found in works by Tournier and supported by psychological and sociological studies. I identified them, integrating their claims, and then classified them into five main factors. It has been noted that these various factors regularly overlap, ‘combining’ and ‘interacting’ with each other, instead of being individually and exclusively present (Tournier 1957:28). After taking root in a person’s life, they gradually govern one’s ‘attitudes and [one’s] words’ and then mould one’s social masks (ibid.:30f.). These five main factors with their primary related features in PTRIC contexts include the following main categories:

1. the factor of pursuing one’s own ideal (Tournier 1957:30f., 51) (related to moral self-cultivation in S4.2 and Ru-based collectivism in S4.3);  
2. the factor of adorning and preserving one’s expected and ‘imaginary self’ (ibid.:28, 35-36), such as found in face culture (Yu, Dehui 1987b:4) (related to moral self-cultivation in S4.2 and Ru-based collectivism in S4.3);  
3. the factor of tensions created when learning how to survive in a society (Tournier 1957:33–40), especially in settled but unequal relationships (Schwalbe 2009:140) or collectivist societies (Doi 1981:132–41), such as feeling bound to others’

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59 These five factors can be also influenced by sub-factors in each category. Due to the limitation of space, a summary of these five factors with their sub-factors is provided in A-F for reference.  
60 See also Dong Fangyuan (1995:298).  
63 See also Dana Crowley Jack (1993; 1999:190f.), Dana Crowley Jack et al. (2010), Sikka et al. (2010), Mauthner (2010), Stoppard (2010), and Dana Crowley Jack and Ali (2010).  
64 This factor is enhanced when rejection of the ‘small self’ for the sake of the ‘larger self’ or ‘great self’ is lauded ‘as a virtue’, and the opposite alternative is ‘negated’ or disparaged (Doi 1981:134, eo). See also Tu Weiming (1985:14, eo).
expectations, or being driven by a strong collectivist ideology shaped by ‘the herd-instinct’ (Tournier 1957:40), ‘group mentality’ (Doyle 2006:website, eo), ‘shùnzhòng xīnlǐ’ 「順眾心理」 (conformist mentality), or ‘qióntóng xīntài’ 「求同心態」 (uniformity mindset) (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:130) (related to Ru-based collectivism in S4.3 and hierarchical society in S4.4); 67

(4) the factor of hiding inadequacies because of a lack of ‘self-confidence’ (Doi 1981:152) and the presence of ‘internal doubts’ (Tournier 1957:31–6, 46–50) (related to moral self-cultivation in S4.2 and Ru-based collectivism in S4.3); 68

(5) the factor of interacting with others effectively (Harter 1999:100) and harmoniously (Tournier 1957:34, 46), surviving other’s dominance and constraint (ibid.:137, 212), or bowing to the pressure of rénqíng 「人情」 (favour) 69 or guānxì 「關係」 (‘network and connections’) 70 (Lin, Honghsin 2008b:57) (related to Ru-based collectivism in S4.3 and hierarchical society in S4.4). 71

These five main factors listed above motivate the formation of a RFS in varying degrees and lead to the establishing of what is primarily:

[References cited in the text]


70 Tu Weiming (1991:6). The Chinese term guānxì can be literally translated as the English word relationship. However, it denotes a nuanced particular concept of relationship in Chinese society that Tu Weiming translates as network and connections. In cultural psychology, it is not exactly identical with the word relationship (Yáng, Yíyǐn 楊宜音 2008:152). Although most of discussions by scholars in this thesis do not make such nuanced distinctions in discussing guānxì in the Chinese context, my translation depends on its context in the light of my understanding.

(1) an imaginary self based on self-expectations;
(2) an ordinary but restrained self based on others’ expectations;
(3) a civil but false self which seeks to hide or avoid the circumstances where the undesired self would be seen.

Uneasiness and ‘repression’ are caused by ‘discord’, separation, and even conflict between the ‘personage’ (social masks) — namely the imaginary self, the ordinary but restrained self and the civil but false self — and the ‘person’ (true self) (Tournier 1957:76, 82). However, this problem of uneasiness is not caused by ‘the mask, [or] the personage in itself, but [by] its artificial and deceptive character’ (ibid.:81). I think that this is the reason why this kind of uneasiness when experienced in severe degrees might be expressed in ‘psychical symptoms such as anxiety, depression, obsessions and inhibitions’ (Tournier 1957:81–2). Whenever a person denies the existence of his/her real self behind an imposed mask, the root problem will not be faced, so that the situation cannot be dealt with and the person healed. In doing so, those psychical symptoms cannot be relieved, and the conflicts or even broken relationships with others cannot be reconciled and restored.

4.1 Ru-Affected Chinese Culture and the Repressed Form of Self

4.1.1 The Shaping of the Traits of the Chinese Self (Character)

Sun Lungkee 孫隆基 (1983, reprinted in 2004:17) indicates that there is a major problem in the character of modern Chinese selfhood that he identifies as the repressed self. He criticizes it as a severe concern among modern Chinese people and recognizes its close correlation with traditional Ruism. Nevertheless, based on some other scholars’ empirical research, the psychologist Yang Kuoshu (1986a) claimed later that the traits of a

72 For the definition and discussion of the concepts of personage and person in Tournier’s integrative and transformational psychology, see A-E.
generalized Chinese self (character) have to some extent a ‘genetic basis’, besides having acquired cultural influences from traditional Ruism and other ‘moral and religious thoughts’. But he also highlighted another influential factor, that of adapting to one’s ‘ecological environment’. As shown in Diagram 2.1, he also applied his ‘cultural-ecological view’ to document and analyse empirically the change within post-traditional Chinese selfhood in modernizing Taiwan. Yang Kuoshu’s theory seems more convincing, for this cultural-ecological view in comparison with other theories.73

It has been noted that almost all of the elements that Yang Kuoshu lists in Diagram 2.1 are related to risk factors for Chinese suicides discussed above. They include all of the main features of traditional Chinese social structure, most of the main traditional Chinese socialization practices (except multiple parenting), and the whole of a generalized Chinese social-oriented character (except for an effeminate disposition). I will examine various scholars’ criticisms of these Ru-influenced or Ru-enhanced features of this portrayal of relational selfhood below.

73 Sun Lungkee attributes the cause of both this modern Chinese form of repressed self and the dominance of traditional Ruism in post-traditional Chinese culture to a built-in ‘liángzhī xìtǒng’ 「良知系統」(self-conscious value system) developed through ‘genetic evolution’ (ibid.:7). This theory might be related to the co-evolutionism of gene-culture (Sterelny 2006; Fincher et al. 2008; Mesoudi and Danielson 2008; Boyd and Richerson 2009; Linquist 2010:xxvii; Shi, Yuanyuan 2013:358), which Boyd and Richerson are probably the first ones to present in their book *Culture and the Evolutionary Process* (1988). Yang Kuoshu’s theory seems more convincing, for this cultural-ecological view can explain what Sun Lungkee’s theory cannot. According to Sun Lungkee’s theory of genetic evolution, there would be no expectation of having any obvious and evident hope to breakthrough this problem of the repressed self, if in fact Chinese people are born to be dominated by such a built-in value system. But in the preface to the first edition of his work, Sun Lungkee (1983, reprinted in 2004:3) also mentions that a possible solution to this problem within the deep structure of post-traditional Chinese culture is through ‘zì jué chóngzǔ’ 「自覺重組」(the reorganization of the self-awareness) of the whole person. His solution for the problem of any Chinese’s repressed self apparently is questionable, for how can one’s built-in self-conscious value system resulting from one’s genetic evolution be adjusted or changed through the reorganization of self-awareness? His theory also cannot explain the characteristics of traditional Ruist influences that vary depending on geographical, educational, socio-economic, generational, and modernization factors, as mentioned in C1S1.4.
Diagram 2.1 Yang Kuoshu’s Interactionistic Cultural-Ecological View in the Shaping of the Traits of the Chinese Self (Character) (1986a:162, original in English)

Ecological Environment in the Area Along the Yellow River Conducive to the Development of an Agricultural Subsistence Economy

Chinese Agricultural System

Chinese Social Structure

Chinese Socialization Practices

Social-Oriented Character

Genetic Traits (Morphological, Physiological, and Behavioural) of the Ancient Chinese Race

Dominant Moral and Religious Thoughts or Doctrines: Mainly Confucianism, Secondarily Taoism and Buddhism
Yu Dehui (1951-2012) (1987b:5) demonstrates how post-traditional Chinese persons’ harmful habit of negative masking is identified through correlating features of face-orientation, repression and dual personalities among Chinese people. Speaking in typically generalized ways, Yu Dehui indicates that modern Chinese people tend to protect themselves by using their mianzi (face) as armour. In the traditional and post-traditional systems of self-formation among Chinese people groups, Yu Dehui (1987b:4, eo) highlights that modern Chinese persons feel more often that they are ‘bèi rén kàn de’ 「被人看的」 (viewed by others) than being ‘zìjǐ kàn zìjǐ’ 「自己看自己」 (viewed by oneself). Yu Dehui’s observation resonates with Francis L. K. Hsu’s (ibid.:29, eo) insightful rendering of 人 (rén), the Chinese word for ‘[hu]man’ into ‘personage’ rather than person, as explained in A-E and A-G. Therefore, the real self of post-traditional Chinese persons tends to be obscured (Berling 1985:107).

In *Chinese People’s Character of Masking: Favour and Face* (1987), the cultural factors forming this negatively masking phenomenon among post-traditional Chinese persons are listed and analysed as follows:

1. Ru-based collectivism;
2. Familial co-dependent relationships through excessive expressions of filial piety (jìnxìàodào 盡孝道);
3. Face-oriented shame culture;
4. The law of returning past favours; and
5. A boundless ‘yìlùn xìtǒng’ 「議論系統」 (commenting system).

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74 *Zhōngguórén de Mìanjù Xìnggé: Rénqíng yǔ miànzi* 《中國人的面具性格：人情與面子》 (Chinese People’s Character of Masking: Favour and Face) prepared by The Editorial Board of *Zhānglǎoshī Yuèkān* (1987).

75 See also Wang Minglei (2013:7–10, 40).

These post-traditional Chinese interpersonal relationships are relation-oriented rather than truth-oriented because all these five factors are of ‘the construct relationship dominance’ and a typical ‘relationalism’ (David YF Ho 1998:21). Due to the limitation of space, further discussion of Ruist relationism is provided in A-K.

On reflection, one can add that the law of returning past favours is a by-product of Ru-based collectivism and face-oriented shame culture. Also, the last factor refers to a behavioural custom of criticizing and judging others, especially by means of harsh critical statements employed by superiors against subordinates. In this way, superiors highlight their social status, often done by emphasizing wealth as a sign of success and their reputation linked to a performance-oriented value system. This not only reinforces authoritative superiority and obedient inferiority, but also intensifies the suffering of PTRC persons from the moral taboos for so long in Chinese society about publicly discussing love and sexual behaviour (Yu Dehui and Gu Biling 1987:64–5, 67). Consequently, these factors depend on and interact with each other reciprocally. They accompanied by such social moral taboos cause various anxieties in many aspects of the life of PTRIC persons: love, sex, status, exposure of weakness, and performance (ibid.:67). Moreover, almost all of them are obviously derived from post-traditional cultural influences of traditional Ruism as demonstrated by Melvin W. Wong in C1, although the work Chinese People’s Character of Masking itself does not elaborate this claim.

4.1.2 Ru-Affected ‘Interpersonal Relationships’ and ‘Communication Patterns’

June Ock Yum’s (1988:374, 378) study on the Ru-affected ‘interpersonal relationships’ and ‘communication patterns’ can also provide us with a clearer picture of the direct or

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77 The Editorial Board of Zhanglaoshi Yuekan (1987).
indirect influences of Ruism on the RFS. She highlights five areas of ‘interpersonal relationships’ most influenced by traditional Ruism:

1. ‘particularism’;\(^{78}\)
2. ‘long-term and asymmetrical reciprocity’;
3. the ‘sharp distinction between in[-]group and out[-]group members’ (namely Fei Xiaotong’s chàxì gējú 差序格局, as described in A-EF77 and A-K);\(^{79}\)
4. the role of ‘informal intermediaries’;\(^{80}\)
5. ‘the overlap of personal and public relationships’.

All these elements within interpersonal relationships most influenced by traditional Ruism demonstrate characteristics of Ru-based collectivism and the hierarchical social structures that are risk factors for suicide in modern Chinese societies and also related to the RFS mentioned above.

June Ock Yum (1988:374) also lists four Ru-affected ‘communication patterns’:

1. ‘process orientation’;\(^{81}\)
2. ‘differentiated linguistic codes’;\(^{82}\)
3. ‘indirect communication emphasis’;\(^{83}\)
4. receiver-centred communication’.\(^{84}\)

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\(^{78}\) Particularism denotes that ‘particular rules and interaction patterns are applied depending upon the relationship and context’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:378).

\(^{79}\) See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1982:124, 129), Zhāng Qiáng 張強 (2003), and Xie Yao 謝曜 (2005:13f.).

\(^{80}\) Informal intermediaries means that ‘personally known intermediaries’ instead of ‘professional intermediaries’ are often ‘utilized for diverse relationships’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:378). See very early documentation of this feature in traditional Chinese settings in Arthur H. Smith (1890:193–200).

\(^{81}\) Process orientation means that ‘communication is perceived as a process [with] infinite interpretation[s]’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:381).

\(^{82}\) Differentiated linguistic codes means that ‘different linguistics codes are used depending upon [the] persons involved and [their] situations’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:381).

\(^{83}\) See also Yang Zhongfang (1991b:131) and Hwang Kwanguo (1998:28–9).

\(^{84}\) Receiver-centred means that ‘meaning is in the interpretation’ and ‘emphasis is on listening, sensitivity, and removal of preconception[s]’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:381).
When these Ru-affected communication patterns are combined together and are sustained over time, they can obviously tend to lead to a RFS.

It is worth noting that all of the main PTRIC characteristics mentioned above align strongly with tendencies for developing forms of RFS. The features of particularism, the overlap of personal and public relationships, differentiated linguistic codes, indirect communication emphasis, and receiver-centred communication are all related to Ru-based collectivism, face-oriented shame culture, and a boundless critical and often aggressive commenting system. It emphasizes the importance of others, ‘discreetness with others’, Ru-based collectivism, and pleasing others more than the importance of self, or of European individualism, or of expressing one’s real personal feelings. Joan G. Miller’s research (1994:3, 13) also supports the influence of ‘duty-based interpersonal moral codes’, which is another PTRIC feature (to be discussed below). Significantly, these moral codes suppress the freedom of personal choice, oppose ‘individual responsibility’, as well as resisting ‘the true underlying self’, all of which are the signs of the RFS.

4.2 Moral Self-Cultivation and the Repressed Form of Self

The Chinese senior social worker, Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510, eo), claims that the consequences of Ruist ideology can be summarized into three prominent ‘behavioural traits in East Asians’: ‘lack of personality’, ‘lack of principled moral thinking’, and ‘lack of assertiveness’. The last one partly results from the traditional Ruist preference of valuing the fulfilment of social duties more than assertions of ‘individual rights’

85 Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:224, eo)
86 Stephen K. K. Cheng’s claims tend to be too reductionist and generalized but not totally groundless and invalidated as explained in A-ES6.
In other words, ‘agreeableness’\textsuperscript{87} is lacking due to the negative influence of ‘authoritarian filial piety’.\textsuperscript{88} To fulfil such social duties and expectations is entirely a matter of moral self-cultivation in traditional Ruism.\textsuperscript{89}

Lin Xiaodong’s study (2010) also affirms traditional Ruist moral self-cultivation (\textit{xiūshēn} 修身) as the cultural factor that most influences masculine Chinese persons, even among rural Chinese men who did not receive much education. Philip J. Ivanhoe (2000:ix) identifies moral self-cultivation as one of the most often and comprehensively discussed topics among philosophers in Chinese ethics. He indicates that Chinese Ruist thinkers, unlike Anglo-European philosophers, pay more attention to ‘the problem of how to become good’ than to the definition and epistemology of ‘the good’ (ibid.).

Tu Weiming (1982b) emphasizes the importance of the bodily work of establishing the self in order to prevent one’s morals from being merely a vain armchair strategist’s talk without the reality of moral cultivation. This might sound like a characteristic of virtue ethics, if one simply depends on this statement (Fraser et al. 2011:2–4). However, some contemporary Ruist scholars (for example, Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr.) insist traditional Ruism is instead a relational ethics or ‘role ethics’ (Ames 2011); it is not a virtue ethics because the purpose of moral self-cultivation in traditional Ruism is not for oneself, but for fulfilling one’s ‘social roles — especially family roles’ (Fraser et al. 2011:3). I will discuss this in detail in C4 and C5 and argue that role ethics enhances the influence leading to the RFS.

Tu Weiming (1985:55) emphasizes moral self-cultivation as ‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’ (to be discussed more in detail in C4). In other words, self-

\textsuperscript{87} The technical term ‘\textit{agreeableness}’ here means the freedom allowed or granted to agree or disagree. This is not the normal meaning of the term in contemporary English. It seems to be closer in meaning to a form of broad tolerance of diverse opinions.

\textsuperscript{88} Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:224, eo). See also David Yaufai Ho (1981).

\textsuperscript{89} ibid.
cultivation is the only ground for becoming a good person in Tu’s interpretation of Ruism. Jess Fleming (2002:183) echoes Tu’s interpretation of the inseparable correlation between self-cultivation and selfhood in Ruism, but goes further in pinpointing its possible consequence in a ‘loss of identity’.

Fleming explains his claim in a reductionist and generalizing way, but with insights true to some versions of traditional Ruism, that ‘personal identity’ in traditional Ruism is based on an individual’s ‘moral quality’, namely ‘a matter of moral commitment’ (ibid.). Accordingly, unceasing pursuit of moral cultivation, especially ‘jen’ (p. rén) (benevolence), ‘chih’ (zhì) (wisdom), and ‘te’ (dé) (virtue), builds up one’s ‘humanity and identity’ and one’s harmonious ‘social nexus’ (ibid.). These qualities are the criteria for the ‘success in being somebody’ (zuòrén chénggōng 做人成功) (ibid.). If one cannot keep one’s own personal moral equilibrium, one will lose one’s ‘identity’ in one’s harmonious social network, and in the ‘consequent moral turmoil’, one will eventually lose one’s ‘identity for both the individual in question and his or her society at large’ (ibid.).

Following Fleming’s discussion of this problem of a loss of personal identity, a RFS is cultivated by endeavouring to pretend to perform one’s moral equilibrium and gain one’s identity. Therefore, I argue that one is vulnerable to developing a RFS if one neither wants nor dares to disclose the reality of one’s failing to reach moral equilibrium and/or to admit the actuality of losing one’s identity. This phenomenon is even more distinctive amongst Chinese men, due to the existence of a strong Chinese gender-bias. Alister E. McGrath and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:38) mentioned that both Carl Jung and Carl Rogers have illustrated ‘role performance as a mask’, which hides ‘the real or whole self’. According to Jung’s argument, McGraths point out that ‘true personal development’ can happen only if a person gives up relying on an ‘omnicompetent persona’, namely the hero ideal (ibid.:38, eo). I argue accordingly that this is probably one of the main reasons why
many contemporary Chinese men hold secrets which they keep hidden throughout their lives — and this could hinder their healthy personal development.

4.3 Ru-Based Collectivism and the Repressed Form of Self

In summarizing how traditional Ruism constructs a post-traditional ‘Chinese social psychology’, Michael Harris Bond and Hwang Kwangkuo (1986:216) pinpoint three fundamental characteristics:

(1) ‘[hu]man[ity] exists through and is defined by … relationships to others’;  
(2) ‘these relationships are hierarchically structured’; 
(3) ‘social order is ensured through each party’s honouring … [their duties within those] relationships’.

These three characteristics lead to collectivist ideology.

They suggest that many features of the social relationships among post-traditional Chinese persons are connected to this ‘distillate’ of traditional Ruism (ibid.). In this cultural context, one’s self-identity is based on traditional Ruist norms of human relationships (Lǐ, Xiángjùn 李祥俊 2005). Admittedly, the motives informing self-presentation tend to be geared towards fulfilling social norms and others’ expectations, but not aimed at realizing one’s own inner expectation or personal characteristics of the self (Xie, Yao 2005:13).

On the other hand, David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:9) point out that although the traditional Ruist cultural ideal is ‘seemingly oppressive’, post-traditional Ruist ‘conformity to cultural norms’ is merely a ‘superficial conformity’.  

No wonder there is a saying that Chinese persons have no complete selves and will always find their meaning of existence only through depending on a group (Zhanglaoshi Yuekan 1987:1).

See also Baumeister and Tice (1986:63–4) and Gao Ge and Ting-Toomey (1998:13).

David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:9) articulate that such superficial conformity might be the reason why ‘fundamental changes’ do not happen in mainland Chinese society in spite of numerous social and political reforming movements.
comformity looks like wearing a mask of conformity. Therefore, this kind of conformity can be identified as a form of masking, even a repressed form of masking. Besides, I find it very significant that this collectivist ideology of traditional Ruism is closely related to all of the aforementioned three prominent behavioural traits listed by Stephen K. K. Cheng. 93 Contemporary Chinese persons’ personality and principled moral thinking are products of Ru-based collectivism, but are more directly related to the hierarchical society in the context of Ru-based collectivist ideology. Therefore, they are to be discussed in the next section, which is concerned with the hierarchical nature of post-traditional Chinese society.

As for the lack of assertiveness, the aforementioned Ru-influenced characteristic of the fulfilment of social duties outweighing the assertion of one’s individual character has been nurtured within the context of Ru-based collectivist ideology. In this ideology, interpersonal harmony is supremely important. Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:512) argues that self-assertion, or ‘idiosyncratic individualized self-expression’ (Young 1998:137–8), is consequently viewed as showing off a vexatious and disruptive individual’s attitudes that resist ‘deferential attitudes’, and so threatening ‘the harmony and the cohesion of the group’. 94 Consequently, the self is to be repressed.

In Ellul’s (1973:150–51) theory of propaganda, to satisfy the need of self-assertion among diminished individual selves is one of the reasons why propaganda can succeed in collective movements, as seen in Mao Tsetung’s propaganda (ibid.:304-314). While agreeing with Vandermeersch that ‘family structure’ is one of the three particularities of a traditional Ruist ‘legacy’ that distinguish it ‘from Western [or Anglo-European, more


94 A similar ideology is also seen in post-traditional Ru-influenced Vietnamese (Young 1998:137–8, 142).
precisely] individualism’, Hans Küng (1993:96, eo) remarks that traditional Ruist family-centred social structure can be understood as ‘communitarian’ i.e. collectivistic.

As the aforementioned summary indicates, such a strong Ru-based collectivist ideology leads to the development of the problem of the RFS. David Yaufai Ho states that it entails not ‘autonomy’ and ‘unique individuation’, but (unconditional) ‘[unhealthy] interdependence’ and ‘conformism’. The Chinese theologian, Kwok Hungbiu, articulates the problem of selfhood as the shrinking-back of the self among contemporary Chinese people, and attributes its root to the strong Ru-based collectivism emphasized in PTRIC culture, which always belittles European individualism.

Ess argues that the self in traditional Ruism is indeed ‘constituted by its diverse relationships with others’ (Ess 2009:website) because ‘for Confucius, the human being is his or her relationships’ (Ess 2010:111). Henry Rosemont, Jr. (2012:lecture) uses the analogy of an ‘onion’ to explain traditional Ruist relational selfhood. Every relationship with others — as ‘parent, child, friend, lover, sibling’ (Ess 2010:111), teacher, student, classmate, colleague, boss, employee — composes ‘a layer of this onion self’ (Rosemont 2012:lecture). ‘Such relationships are intrinsic to such a self’ (Ess 2009:website). Therefore, the self varies along with the change of ‘any given relationship’ (Ess 2010:111). If a relationship is lost, the self corresponding with it is consequently lost as well. If all relationships are eliminated – peeling away all layers of the onion, so that

95 The other two are ‘rites’ and ‘officialdom’ (Küng 1993:96, eo).
96 In this context, I would suggest co-dependence might be a better term for denoting such a negative feature of the strong Ru-based collectivist ideology, according to the explanation in C1F57.
nothing is left, then there exists no unique self within or no self\(^9\) as given (Rosemont 2012:lecture).\(^{100}\)

Robert Neville (1939-) does not totally agree with the onion analogy of the traditional Ruist self presented by Rosemont, but he (2000:82) indirectly supports the vagueness and unimportance of traditional Ruist selves by stating:

> The [traditional] Confucian way of specifying the vague notion of self is neither to claim it has a core nor that it is wholly to be negated in terms of relations but that it is a structure of poised balancing of orientations to the ten thousand things.

Even if Rosemont’s analogy is too reductionist and generalized without considering the plurality of both Chinese selves and non-Chinese selves, it still can provide clues for understanding the causes of some extreme cases of the loss of self that happen within the Ru-based collectivist contexts. It is notable that the Chinese scholar, Xie Wenyu (1998), understands the formation of selfhood in traditional Ruist ideology in a similar way to Rosemont.\(^{101}\)

\(^9\) It is necessary to explain once more that no self or loss of the self in Rosemont’s analogical account does not mean that one’s self does not exist, but that one either does not know or does not adequately know what ‘his real nature’ is (Tournier 1957:46). In this context, then, the meaning of one’s own real self is missing. See also Guō, Qīngxiāng 郭清香 (2006:129).

\(^{100}\) In contrast, Rosemont uses another analogy of a peach to describe the ‘atomistic self’ (ibid.). Like the ‘peach-pit’, the ‘atomistic self’ underlies an ‘external body’ (ibid.). The ‘atomistic self’ stays unchanged all the time even though the external body goes through change, decay or even loss (Ess 2009:website).

\(^{101}\) As post-traditional Korean and Japanese societies are also Ru-influenced, they share in common with PTRIC societies, sometimes in even stronger forms, Ru-influenced features in relational selfhood, situation-oriented interpersonal relationships, and collectivist and hierarchical social structures (Park, Sangchul 2016). See also Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:41–68) and Lee Choong Y. (2012:184–8). According to research by Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:11; See also Kim, Heupyoung 金 洮 2001:127), South Koreans among all East Asian peoples are influenced most by traditional Ruism. Japanese are the second and Chinese, the third (Ching, Julia 1993 in Ching, Julia and Küng 1993:81–2; See also Liu, Shuhhsien 2002:58–9). Among Chinese people groups, those in Hong Kong are influenced most by traditional Ruism, the second are those in Taipei and the third, those in Shanghai. We can also find similar evidence of a RFS from studies in contemporary Japanese society. Nevertheless, it seems that there are very few selfhood-related studies focused on South Koreans, or at least they do not appear in English publications (Levi 2013). After the scandal of the South Korean president, Park Geunhye, broke out near the end of 2016, the strong significant correlation between the Ru-influenced South Korean culture heritage and political corruption has received attention and been discussed. South Koreans seem to be one of the most honest societies in the world, but personal and political dishonesty has become a severe contemporary issue in that country (BBC Asia 2016:website). A recent study disclosed that South Koreans are one of the top three dishonest peoples among fifteen countries (Hugh-Jones 2016). Professor Kyung Moon Hwang (2016:website) of USC pinpoints traditional Ruist values of ‘hierarchy’ or patriarchy and ‘reciprocity’ in social relations as the main cause of this issue, because they cultivate a strong ideology that ‘one must repay
4.4 Ru-influenced Hierarchical Society and the Repressed Form of Self

In Ruist classical texts, lǐ (禮) (translated as ‘rites, rituals, rules of propriety, or codes of behaviour’102) defines every social role in ‘all interpersonal relationships’ and prescribe the codes of ‘interpersonal transaction’ (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:511). Lǐ is equally applied to everyone. But Xuánzǐ 荀子 (298-238 BCE), an ancient Ruist philosopher, interpreted its significance in Chapter Ten of his work (10:3),103 the Xuánzǐ 《荀子》:

[lǐ is] the observance of the differentiation of the ranking between the noble and the lowly, of the difference between senior and junior, and of the distinct rules of propriety between the rich and the poor as well as between the politically powerful and the powerless.

Due to a traditional Ruist concept of ‘the moral-political system’ of society, human dignity and the recognition of social position are determined by morality (Lo, Pilgrim WK 2009:176). Mencius also taught (the Mencius, 4A:7) that social relationships should require that ‘people of little virtue should be submissive to those of great virtue, and those of little morality should serve those of great morality’.104

I argue that even if there is a good purpose for maintaining a good social order (ibid.:173), such teachings105 undoubtedly lead to the forming of a hierarchical society,106 including gender-bias and patriarchy as mentioned above, restrictively controlling ‘the self-seeking nature of [hu]man[ity]’ (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:511). The origin of lǐ is due to the need for controlling people (according to Xunzi) by means of external

kind treatment’ (See also GlobalSecurity.org 2016:website). Due to limitations of space, evidence related to contemporary Japanese society is documented in A-B.

102 Lǐ, derived from its original meaning of ‘a religious sacrifice’, has come to denote ‘ceremony, ritual, decorum, rules or propriety, good form, and good custom’ in traditional Ruist contexts (Chan, Wingtsit 1967:367, eo). The main canonical work discussing lǐ is the Lǐjì 《禮記》 (the ‘Book of Rites’ or the Record of Rites) (ibid.).

103 Chinese Text Project, Xuánzǐ, 10:3 Available at: http://ctext.org/xunzi/fu-guo/zh Accessed 13.8.2017


105 Such teachings were also utilized by Chinese emperors for centuries (Cho, Hyunyi 2000).

impositions and sanctions (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2002:150). The ‘social institution’ of ă as a socially controlling tool expressed in the rules of propriety stresses and demands ‘external conformity’ to replace either ‘internal repression’ or inner conflict between external oughts and internal intents (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:510ff.).107 Its impact unavoidably contributes to the lack of one’s personality and the ‘dramaturgical character’, because one’s personality is encased ‘within the parameters’ of one’s ‘prescribed roles’ (ibid.:511).

Basing his argument on a definition of personality entailing a ‘separate entity’ which is related to one’s own psyche and different from one’s social roles, Francis L. K. Hsu (1971:29, eo) argues that the equivalent in English for the Chinese word rên 人 (translated as ‘[hu]man’) should be ‘personage’ rather than person, because the concept of human in Chinese language and culture is rooted in the ‘individual’s transactions with his fellow human beings’. No wonder a German theologian, Helmut Thielicke (1908-86), found Chinese people to be ‘the most magnificent play-actors in the world’ lacking ‘the will to be individual human beings, to be themselves’.108 Although Thielicke’s statement tends to be too reductionist and generalized, he is not the only foreigner who has noticed this characteristic of Chinese persons. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, foreigners such as Arthur H. Smith (1890:15–17), Chester Holcombe, and J. Macgowan, began to describe, study, and discuss this phenomenon from the aspect of Chinese face culture, for they are closely related to each other (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:26–32). Since then there have been many Chinese and foreign scholars engaged in studies of this issue (ibid.:26-55). It has been noted that this characteristic of play-actors, like wearing social

107 See also Hwang Kwangkuo (2002:150, 159–60).

masks, might not all definitely be in a repressed form, but is an important factor leading to a RFS.

There are some other observations which also provide relevant evidence, even though they are expressed in a reductionist and generalized way. Chén Jiànyù 陈剑誉 (2006:blog) asserts straightforwardly that younger generations inevitably lose their selfhood because superiors are granted absolute authority in the Ruified modern Chinese culture. David Y. F. Ho (1994:361–3) is not the only scholar who calls this Ru-influenced feature ‘authoritarian moralism’ or similar phrase, shaped by PTRIC filial piety that demands children’s ‘obedience and indebtedness’ to their parents instead of ‘self-fulfilment’ (ibid.:361).109 Their ‘impulse control’ rather than ‘self-expression’ is trained so that their ‘moral correctness’ rather than ‘psychological sensitivity’ is built up (ibid.). Therefore, the pattern of socialization of PTRIC is shaped concretely with ‘twin features’: ‘absolute parental authority and the imperative nature of moral upbringing’ (ibid.). As a result, it forms a ‘cognitive conservatism’ bound together with a high level of motivation for good performance and achievement (ibid.:361).110 Although the natural ‘inner/outer division’ of the self might appear universally, Jon L. Saari (1982:43) also maintains that the intensified inner/outer split is salient among modern Chinese people because of these strict filial norms and the ‘authoritarian style of kinship and kinship-based institutions’.

The lack of independent individual ‘principled moral thinking’ is the other behavioural trait that Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:511) pinpoints related to hierarchical society in the context of post-traditional Ru-based collectivist ideology.111 He links this problem to the lack of ‘the capacity to form independent moral judgement apart from a

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110 See also David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:10), David Y. F. Ho (1996), and Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:225).
111 See also Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:225).
given moral system’, and attributes its causes to wulun and its hierarchical and asymmetrical conception of human relationships’ within traditional Ruist ethics (ibid.). This ‘widely recognized social phenomenon’ is illustrated by Y.C. King and Michael H. Bond (1985:40) in the following example:

[Modern] Chinese individuals unabashedly show a kind of egocentric behaviour outside their family, particularly in a nonkin social context ... When the [modern] Chinese individual is not structurally situated in a relation-based social web, [traditional] Confucian values and norms cease to be morally binding or ... morally relevant’.

Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:512) highlights the uniqueness of Ru-based collectivism due to the confinement of its ethics to wulun, a system that can hardly be applied to ‘the multi-faceted relationships that exist between an individual and the community at large’. As a result, such an ‘ethical system’ becomes ‘too family-centred and too restricted to the dyadic relationships between individuals’, leading naturally to the lack of gōngdé 公德 (public morals) among modern Chinese people (ibid.).112 This hierarchical characteristic of traditional Ruist ethics regularly rejects or ‘condemn[s]’ the ‘universalist, egalitarian principles’ that ‘moral thinking’ is based on (ibid.).113 Not only might a RFS often result in a lack of public morals, but a strong ideology of public morals might also lead to a RFS when PTRIC persons behave according with public morals due to social pressure instead of their own will. Therefore, I found that this characteristic of lacking public morals is both a particular product and an enhancer of the RFS resulting from PTRIC contexts of Ru-based familial collectivism and hierarchical social structure.

4.4.1 Fatherlessness and the Repressed Form of Self

Loss of self (a severe case of RFS) in a father causes him not to express his true feelings as a father directly towards his children, making them feel fatherless and underdeveloped.

112 See also Wei Zhengtong (1990:74–5) and Ambrose Y. C. King (1994).
113 See also Arthur H. Smith (1890:138–44).
in their self-knowledge. However, this particular feature of fatherlessness in Ru-influenced hyper-hierarchical social structure will not be included in further discussions in the thesis, because my primary sources are not engaged with this issue. A-L provides a reference for scholarly criticism on the causal links between fatherlessness and the RFS in PTRIC contexts.

4.5 The Absence of God and the Repressed Form of Self

Takeo Doi (1981:132–41) suggests that the issue of fatherlessness is related to ‘the question of the absence of God’, because the absence of God has been progressively taken for granted ever since the declaration by Nietzsche that ‘God is dead’ (quoted in ibid.:156). According to this context, the God Doi mentioned here should be the transcendent personal being who is the Creator in the general Christian sense of that term. Bellinger (2010:51) further asserts that humans’ selfhood should be decided and shaped by ‘God and God’s Word’. Following Bellinger, I agree that the definition and further development of human selfhood should come from a transcendent other, instead of a human other at the same level. Likewise, since sinful humans cannot normally mature enough ethically by themselves, the starting point for ethics cannot be based merely on humans’ selfhood, but should necessarily include ‘God’s will’ (ibid.:88). Bellinger (2010:88–9) asserts that to become an ethical self is to ‘become attuned to God and one’s created nature’, echoing Karl Barth’s argument that theological ethics is not about ‘the Word of God as it is claimed by [hu]man[ity], but the Word of God as it claims [hu]man[ity]’ (Barth 1957:546).

It is reasonable to argue that the healthiness of one’s self-development is to some extent based on one’s philosophy of religion, even though it is clear that several complicated causes are involved in this problem of the loss of self (or the RFS and fatherlessness) in contemporary post-traditional Chinese culture. The Chinese General
Liú Yàzhōu, 劉亞洲(2002), even though living in a communist and atheist context, expresses this concern boldly:

Nowadays many problems of China are exposed in the process of her great progress; all of them indicate that the system is the root problem. And all the problems of the system point to culture as their root; all the problems of culture point to religion as the root of their problems. Morality is culture ... Nationality is morality. Religion produces culture; culture, the character of the nation; the character of the nation, the destiny of the nation.

Therefore, in his observation, Liu Yazhou concludes that the problem of a nation might be a symptom of its cultural and moral problems, which in turn can be traced back to the problem of religion. This observation is similar to Weber’s basic theory in explaining the development of capitalism in Europe (Redding 1993:8, 238–9). Historically, the evidence of the influences of Christianity, secularism, or atheism in Anglo-European and other international settings all confirm Liu Yazhou’s observation that cultural and moral problems can be traced back to the problem of religion.114

4.6 Summary of the Criticism of the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts

On the basis of all the secondary literature revealing scholarly criticisms of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood, the following main relevant points in terms of the traditional Ruist doctrines can be underscored:

First of all, in terms of the traditional Ruist moral self-cultivation and relational ethics, the RFS in a culture of moral self-cultivation that emphasizes good performance and achievement, especially in terms of moral qualities, is shaped as it pretends to be good enough to attain high social norms, ethical standards, and other ideals, especially as these ideals cannot be realized in one’s actual life.

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114 In Anglo-European and many other international settings, some cultural characteristics and behavioural customs reveal the impact of long-term influences of Christianity. Nevertheless, it is notable in Anglo-European contexts in particular that over the past two centuries, the influences of secularism and atheism have more and more been rapidly and prevalently shaping these cultural characteristics, or even replacing them with new cultural characteristics and behavioural customs. Ironically, some of these secular and atheist cultural trends might prove to be too liberal for more conservative East Asian settings – for example, the promotion by liberals of same sex marriage.
Closely related to this is the traditional Ruist relational ethics where the RFS appears whenever one is regularly forced to wear social masks in a Ru-based collectivist society, because one can neither express oneself freely nor assume responsibilities for one’s real self for various reasons. In addition, within a hyper-hierarchical social structure that demands one’s good performances and achievements to satisfy others, especially for one’s seniors and superiors, a pressure put on a person to pretend or to mask oneself by a hierarchical collectivist and moralizing society is expected. Therefore, this kind of social imposition might complicate and extend the problem of the RFS.

Finally, in terms of the traditional Ruist cosmology, the absence of a belief in God as the creator (in the Christian sense of that phrase) has been noted by some scholars as a possible factor influencing the appearance of the problem of the RFS.

The above summary manifests that PTRIC relational selfhood complicated by the problem of the RFS is closely related to various main features of traditional Ruist values, especially traditional Ruist relational ethics. Although there must be more than one or two factors contributing to the formation of the mental habits and behavioural customs related to the RFS, Ru-influenced relational ethics undoubtedly are one of the main contributors because of its multiple points of influence. Therefore, non-Ruist scholars in particular have recognized this range of problems linking relational selfhood to post-traditional expressions of a Ru-influenced cultural heritage, and so criticize them as we have seen above.

Even if not all of these tendencies related to the RFS in PTRIC contexts result in psychological problems or personality disorders, and even if we take account of a decline in traditional Ruist influence, their risk factors in ‘negative psychological
consequences … [on] human development’ are still significant (Ho, David YF 1996:165) and will be elaborated in C4). 115

According to the above findings, the tendency to form the RFSs is indeed a fundamental and common problem of persons in PTRIC contexts. People living in these contexts more or less promote, and/or are enculturated into, a socially imposed relational selfhood that is a performance-oriented. In addition, they are indoctrinated with the value of moral self-cultivation within the context of a hierarchical social structure that has been promoted regularly by traditional Ruist ideologies emphasizing relational ethics. Such a tendency is a fact accepted with both explicit and tacit consent among modern Chinese persons, and so has become a mental habit and behavioural custom possessed by many modern Chinese people. Although it can be found more or less in any people group in the world, because it is a general feature of social behaviour (as manifested in S3), it is enhanced in a Ru-affected society (Saari 1982:43). 116 This fundamental social behavioural custom prevents many modern Chinese persons from experiencing a true and liberated inner transformation of character and virtue, even while they are striving by means of outer performance to achieve the moral cultivation upheld by traditional Ruism.

5. Indicator for the Research Problem

In this thesis, the research problem of the RFS is generally not described or discussed under the same rubric within the relevant literature. In order to decide if the tendency of the RFS exists, a (collectivist) repressive social imposition existing in a society or within relationships that the self belongs to might be adopted as its indicator. 117 For the issue of a (collectivist) repressive social imposition, especially in a Ru-based cultural heritage,

115 See also Li Minlong and Yang Kuoshu (1998:11, 51).
116 Jess Fleming (2002:184), not a Ruist, argues that ‘Confucius would seem to agree … that one’s personal identity is largely an artificial social construct (a mere matter of convention)’.
117 Or ‘external, artificial constraints and superimpositions that bridle manifestations of the real self’ (Turner 1999:79). See also (Mullis 2008:182, 191).
can be summed up as a core concern from which this research problem arises. Is there a dynamic factor of collectivist repressive social impositions existing in relational ethics found in PTRIC cultural contexts? Zháí Xuéwěi 翟學偉 (2010:109–203) explains such a repressive social imposition as an influence or dynamic factor formed by the values or ideologies of first of all, ‘jiāzú zhǔyì」家族主義 (familism) (ibid.: 253) that devalues the individual self,118 and then also of asymmetrical hierarchical social structure or relationships, as well as of moral cultivation that emphasizes external behaviour, achievement, and performance. Tu Weiming (1985:22) identifies this indicator as ‘a coercive imposition of well-established social norms upon the individual’, so that one has no freedom to choose, but has only the obligation to conform to ‘the all-powerful society’.119 Repressive social ‘imposition[s]’ is also what Zhuāngzi 莊子, according to Judith Berling (1985:104–7, 112f.), criticizes as the repression of the ‘real (inner) self’ in Ruism through ‘socialization’, ‘a hierarchical society’, and ‘self-cultivation’. Therefore, repressive social imposition is appropriately adopted to be the indicator of the research problem of the RFS in this thesis.

6. Conclusion

I end this chapter by summarizing my research problem as it relates to criticisms of the RFS within PTRIC relational selfhood.

118 Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond point out that in Ruist teaching a ‘person is not primarily an individual … but a member of a family. Children should learn to restrain themselves, to overcome their individuality so as to maintain the harmony in the family (if only on the surface)’ (Hofstede and Bond 1988:8).

6.1 Description, Complications, and Indicator of the Research Problem

The concepts of the individual, self, and person adopted in this thesis have first of all been clarified and differentiated. The descriptors of the real self and its repressed form described and criticized by scholars have been explained, especially in Chinese language studies. The RFS has been subsequently characterized as a common problem in PTRIC cultural contexts. Complications related to the problem of the RFS have been disclosed, especially in its significant relationship to a high suicide rate in contemporary Chinese societies. As interpretations of relational selfhood in the source materials might not always refer directly to the problem of the RFS, repressive social imposition serves as an indicator of that problem within this thesis.

6.2 The Criticism of Relational Selfhood in PTRIC Contexts

A summary of relevant literature produced by non-Ruist scholars discloses that relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts that may result in the presence of RFS is Ru-influenced, and is closely related to traditional Ruist relational ethics. Its expressions are shaped by core values within Ru-based collectivism and traditional Ruist familism, and strengthened by the promotion of a hierarchical social structure and moral self-cultivation. The tendency of the RFS might not have resulted directly from traditional Ruist teachings, but the end-product reflects the impact of the cultural heritage of Ruist core values. As some non-Christian scholars or observers point out (for example, Sun Lungkee, Doi, and Liu Yazhou), the issues relevant to the tendency of the RFS may also be related to the absence of a belief in God the creator in the general Christian sense of that phrase, an aspect which is also related to traditional Ruist cosmology, and so will be discussed in C4 and C5. But do New Ruists such as Tu Weiming recognize this problem as being related to an orthodox Ruist account of relational selfhood? This issue will be discussed in detail in C4.
Chapter Three

Research Sources and Methodology

As discussed already in C1 and C2, there are groups of the scholars, especially those in fields of the social sciences, who criticize PTRIC relational selfhood, leading to the problem of the RFS and its influences in psychological problems, personality disorders, making interpersonal relationships all the more complex and difficult, even to the point of suicide. Accordingly, a solution for this problem is imperative, even if not Ru-influenced. Following the research questions asked in C1, this research will examine the solutions provided by Tu Weiming and Jürgen Moltmann respectively in responding to the research problem of the RFS and the criticisms of PTRIC relational selfhood. This chapter will introduce my research sources and methodology.

1. Research Sources

As C1S3.1 indicates, it is meaningful and valuable to study Tu Weiming’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood and Jürgen Moltmann’s version of relational selfhood shaped by Christian social trinitarian anthropology. In this section, I will introduce their works, focusing on their concerns about selfhood.

1.1 Tu Weiming and His Concerns about Selfhood

1.1.1 Who Is Tu Weiming?

Tu Weiming has been recognized as one of the most prominent contemporary scholars and thinkers in interpreting Ruism. Born in 1940, he was Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy and Religious Studies at Harvard University from 1981 to 2009 (Tu
Tu Weiming is a Contemporary New Ruist, an adherent of the Mencian (p. Mèngzi (372-289 BCE) line and Wang Yangming (1472-1529 CE) school (Tu 1985:13), and one of the founders of Boston Ruism. He works within a post-traditional Ruist context and was known in the 1980s as the ‘foremost exponent’ of Ruism in the U.S.A. (Barrett 1986:319). Later, he was described as ‘a kind of missionary’ for advocating (at least potentially) Ruism as a contemporary world religion in the Western world (Berger 2012:blog). He never views Ruism as a ‘historical relic’, but understands it as a comprehensive ‘spiritual humanistic’ heritage and philosophy providing a creative transforming force for modern life (Tucker 2013:622). Furthermore, he acknowledges that Ruism is not a complete and perfect system and so needs a modern transformation to develop and extend the positive parts and to review and correct the negative parts.

During the last twenty years, he also accepted that contemporary Ruism and Chinese culture should learn from Protestant Christianity, following the precedents set by another contemporary Ruist, Liu Shuhsien. He (2008a:445) often claims that he benefited from ‘monotheistic philosophizing’ and the styles and strategy of Christian theologizing are more congenial to his way of doing philosophy than that of treating it ‘as an analytical and objective professional discipline’.

Tu Weiming was born in Mainland China, but moved to Taiwan with his family when he was nine years old. His interest in traditional Ruism arose during his high school years, so that he later become a disciple of Mou Tsungsan, Xu Fuguan, and Tang Junyi, all of whom are representative figures of the second generation of Modern New Ruists.

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1 See also Tucker (2013:622–3).
5 The Boston Ruists he has led are probably best known as ‘Protestant successors to Matteo Ricci’ (Berger 2012:blog).
During his academic career, he has devoted himself to the following seven main discourses (Tu 2015b:website):

(1) ecological consciousness;
(2) dialogue among civilizations;
(3) cultural Chinese;
(4) reflection on the Enlightenment;
(5) global ethics;
(6) Ruist creativity;
(7) the humanist spirit.

According to the analysis of Guō Qìyǒng 郭齊勇 (2002:114–15), up to this point in time, Tu’s scholarship can be generally divided into three periods.

In the first period (1966-1978), his focus was on the interpretation of Ruist tradition, especially Wang Yangming, whom Tu considered to be a faithful transmitter of traditional Ruist philosophy systematized by Confucius and Mencius (Tucker 2013:622). He also endeavoured to advance a collective and critical post-traditional Ruist self-consciousness. The main works he wrote during this period were *Centrality and Commonality* (1976a) and *Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang Yangming’s Youth* (1472-1509) (1976b) (Tu 2013:website). It is worth noting that the themes of self-cultivation, sagehood, and traditional Ruist religiosity are stressed by Tu from the very beginning and restated frequently in most of his later writings (Tucker 2013:622).

In his second period (1978-1989), the elucidation of what he counted to be intrinsic experiences of Ruist tradition and the promotion of the modern vitality of Ruism in post-traditional cultural settings were his main concerns. Therefore, he expanded his discussions into a number of new discursive contexts including tradition and modernity,

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6 See also Xi Liúqín 奚劉琴 (2011:4, 14) and (2012:12–15).
Ruist creativity, and East Asian core values. His main works in this period were *Humanity and Self-Cultivation* (1979) and *Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation* (1985).7

After 1990, during his third period, Tu broadened his studies to pay more attention to the dialogue among civilizations, the nature of cultural Chinese, the justification of global ethics, the humanist spirit in Ruist cultural contexts, and reflections on the European Enlightenment. In facing the challenges of the twenty-first century, Tu has applied traditional Ruist ideas to address questions in pluralistic cultures, including environmental problem and ecological ethics, as well as political values, and human rights. In this period, unlike his previous efforts, his main works have been mostly written in Chinese. They include *Rújiā Zìwǒ Yíshí de Fǎnsì* 《儒家自我意識的反思》 [Reflections on Ruist Self-Consciousness] (1990b); *Rújiā Chuántǒng de Xiàndài Zhuānhuà* 《儒家傳統的現代轉化》 [The Modern Transformation of Confucian Tradition] (1992b), and *Duì huà yǔ Chuàngxīn* 《對話與創新》 [Dialogue and Creativity] (2005).8

It has been noted that Tu’s interpretations and discussions of traditional Ruism is developed in order to identify and advocate its universal value (Tu, Weiming 2014b:website) by creatively expounding the intrinsic spirit and modern meaning of basic traditional Ruist concepts. The universal values in traditional Ruism Tu has identified as worthy of consideration include human’s self-transformation, different themes and approaches in morality and ethics, and the principle of being human.9 Generally speaking,

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7 His other two main works in this period are *Confucian Ethics Today* (1984) and *Way, Learning and Politics* (1989, re-published in 1993c).
8 His other two main works published in this period were *A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights* (1996a) and *Wénhuà Zhōngguó de Rènzhí yǔ Guānhuái* 《文化中國的認知與關懷》 [Cultural China: Issues and concerns] (1999).
Tu’s post-traditional Ruiism promotes a new kind of philosophical anthropology and ethics rather than expounding metaphysical themes.

Tu’s research and published writings about New Ruiism are very comprehensive. For the purpose of dealing with the tendency of the RFS addressed in this study, the following four perspectives are parts of what, Tu argues, New Ruiism can contribute directly to the issue of the RFS, especially as addressed within this democratic and scientific modern era. In the following section, I explore how Tu’s concerns are relevant to the tendency of the RFS in the lives of PTRIC.

1.1.2 The Authentic Self as a Goal

Tu Weiming (1985:20) emphasizes that in East Asian thought ‘how to cultivate oneself’ is important in revealing ‘who and what the true self is’. Being an authentic, genuine, sincere, real, or true self (or person or human) in Tu’s eyes (ibid.:150-53), as well as being one’s own self, is a central goal and therefore a core value for New Ruist self-cultivation, what he also refers to as ‘[learning to] become a sage’ (ibid.:151). He (1979a:73, 86) argues that an ‘authentic and genuine, and sincere’ person — his modern way of describing a sage — should be truthful to one’s ‘inner self’ and ‘one’s sociality’ (ibid.:22). Being ‘zhíchéng」（至誠）(‘absolute sincerity’) is pinpointed by him (1976a:117) to be one of the indicators that human nature is ‘perfectible’ (Tu 1985:27); this is another way of describing sagehood. In his account, then, a sage is not only ‘honest with

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11 Namely the so-called Three Teachings of Ruism, Daoism, and Buddhism.
13 As promoted in the 22nd Chapter of the Zhōngyōng《中庸》(The Doctrine of the Mean). This book title is also translated as Centrality and Commonality by Tu Weming (1976a).
14 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77).
oneself’ but ‘loyal to others’ (ibid. 52).\(^{15}\) This will be discussed in much greater detail in C4. In order to pursue one’s authentic self, one cannot hide inconsistencies with one’s self (as discussed in C2S1.2). For Tu Weiming (1976a:33–5, eo), the concept and ‘spiritual discipline’ of ‘*self-watchfulness when alone (shen-tu)*’ or ‘*vigilant solitariness*’ (1989a:108, eo) (慎獨 p. shèndú) in traditional Ruism is one of the key approaches to reaching sagehood; it is accomplished by means of examining ‘one’s inner self’, that part of one’s inner life that is not disclosed to others.\(^{16}\) He also argues (1985:12) that traditional and post-traditional Ruism value individual ‘dignity, independence, and autonomy’ as integral parts of the authentic self.\(^{17}\) Yet in this regard, it is important to note that Tu (1979a:38) emphasizes the virtues of self-transformation rather than the moral concerns linked to ‘obligation’. He also opposes insincere and superficial harmony and relationships, criticizing people like this as ‘hollow and unreal personality’ (ibid.).\(^{18}\) For example, Tu argues that ‘the hyper[-]honest villager (hsiang-yüan)’ (鄉愿 p. xiāngyuàn)\(^{19}\) whom Confucius criticizes, is in fact ‘*the ... thief ... of virtue*’ (dé zhī zéi 德之賊) (ibid., eo). In this way, Tu seems to be concerned about the tendency of the RFS, especially when it is identified by critics as being one of the by-products of Ru-based cultural heritage by certain scholars. Therefore, he reacts against this claims arguing that

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\(^{16}\) See also Tu Weiming (1989a:26–7, eo).


\(^{19}\) For the classical texts mentioning and interpreting xiangyuan 鄉愿, see *Analects* 17:13 and *Mencius*, 7B:37. Tu Weiming (1979a:38) adopts the rendering of Lau D. C. (1970:203) to explain the term as the ‘village honest man’ or ‘village worthy’ (1970, revised in 2004:166) believing that ‘being in this world, one must behave in a manner pleasing to this world’. It is worth noting that Confucius not only criticizes hypocrisy and duplicity (*Analects* 7:26, 17:12f.) but also admits it is not easy to find a person without hypocrisy and duplicity (ibid. 7:26).
the RFS is contrary to absolute sincerity, the core value and sagely goal of traditional Ruist self-cultivation (ibid.:20-22).20

1.1.3 Criticism of Hegemony and Sāngāng 三綱

Tu (1976a:87–97) reacts against authoritarianism (Tu 2006:226–8) and any form of hegemony (‘pa’ 「霸」 p. bà),21 even including the traditional Ruist teachings of ‘sān-kang’ 「三綱」 (p. sāngāng) (the ‘Three Bonds’) (Tu 1985:139):22 the ruler are to be the standards of the ruled, the father the standards of the sons, and the husband the standards of the wives (according to the interpretation in Chan, Wengtsit 1969:272). Accordingly, he (1979a:20–23) is concerned with the issues and criticisms of the impositions of social values with Ru-influenced cultural contexts. He (1976a:48, 53, 77) implies the existence of ‘coercive rules’, ‘the dominance of outside influences [or authorities]’, and ‘social coercion’ in traditional and post-traditional Ruist contexts while defending his interpretation of the ideal Ruist relational selfhood.23 Nevertheless, he denies they come as the result of traditional and post-traditional Ruist teachings (ibid.).24 In his mid-career publications, he (1985:58–62) claimed that the uniqueness of every person in traditional Ruism should be equally maintained and cherished, so that the self should not be reduced to ‘its social roles’. He (1976a:53) also recognized possibilities of the growth of unhealthy personalities and struggles for self-identity caused by problems related to sangang.25

20 See also Tu Weiming (1982 in Tu 1982b:460f.).
22 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:112–13; 1998c:122–4; 2006:227–8; 2001 in Ding, Guo 2001:66; 2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yáng, Xuégōng 2003:9; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fán, Cèng 2010b:55–6). It is worth noting that Tu’s viewpoint about sangang has been adjusting and changing through four decades. It will be shown later in C4S4.4.
23 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:35, 40, 54).
24 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:20, 22–23).
Nevertheless, he did not think that ‘self and society’ or ‘one’s individuality’ and ‘sociality’ are irreconcilable (ibid.:52-4). Accordingly, he devoted himself to defending his account of New Ruism and its understanding of a relational self as a synthesis of the advantages of ‘[European] individualism’ and ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’, but without their disadvantages\(^{27}\) (Tu 1985:10, 77–8). Is his account a synthesis as he claims? How does his New Ruism deal with the teachings of sangang? How does he reconcile ‘one’s individuality’ and ‘sociality’? I will explore the answer to these questions in C4 and C5.

1.1.4 Heaven, Earth, and Humanity (Tiāndìrén 天地人)

Following specific Ruist traditions, Tu (1985:45–6, 60–63) repeatedly emphasizes three interrelated visions of human flourishing: tiānrén héyī 天人合一 (‘the complete unity between humanity and Heaven’), tiāndìrén sānhéyī 天地人三合一 (a ‘trinity’\(^{29}\) among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’),\(^{30}\) and humanity ‘forming one body with the universe’ metaphorically as the highest transcendental goal and the full realization of the self.\(^{31}\) In his account of the second vision (ibid.:60), a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’ is the reification of the ontologically ‘highest transcendence [of humanity] within its own

\(^{26}\) See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–40).

\(^{27}\) The disadvantages he finds within those two alternative positions are mainly ‘egoism’ within ‘[European] individualism’ and unwanted repressively social imposition found within ‘collectivism in a general sense’]. Other related disadvantages within ‘[European] individualism’ recognized earlier on by Tu (1976a:52–4) are self-centredness, isolation, exclusiveness, enclosedness, loss of relatedness, and ignoring ‘social responsibilities’. Other related disadvantages within ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ recognized earlier on by Tu (1976a:52–4) are social-roles-assigned self, loss of individual subjectivity and autonomy, ‘dominance’, and ‘coercion’.


\(^{29}\) It is worth noting that the term *trinity* used here by Tu (1985:46) means something completely different from Christian trinitarian theology. In fact, ‘humanity’, Heaven, and Earth in Ruist context do not form a real triangular relationship but take on more of a dyadic relation between humans and their cosmic parents, Heaven-Earth.

\(^{30}\) Tu Weiming (1989a:106).

Tu denies that Heaven (天) can be conceived as a ‘creator’ understood to be an external being (ibid.:45, 73) but still insists constantly that human nature’s goodness is bestowed by Heaven (ibid.:14, 23-4). What does Heaven and Earth really mean in these visionary contexts? Do human beings have the ability to reach such a transcendent goal by their own abilities and capabilities? What roles do these claims play in the formation of Tu Weiming’s New Ruist selfhood? These questions will be discussed in greater detail in C4.

1.1.5 Humanity in the World

Based on his conception of ‘Chinese cosmology’ or ‘Chinese cosmogony’, and so extending his claims to embrace the notion of forming an unity of Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’, Tu underlined that human beings also form one body with the universe (ibid.:35, 40). He argued that ‘all things are the companions’ of human beings because all ‘share the same consanguinity’ (ibid.:45). But even so, human beings must cultivate themselves well enough to become deserving such a status and its inherent relationships (ibid.:47). The sociality of human beings predicated on the same basic notion of Chinese cosmology is highlighted by Tu (1979a:20–22, 90). For the purpose of self-cultivation, namely authenticating oneself, the self must ‘harmonize [its] relationship[s] with others’ (ibid.:20). Yet for the purpose of becoming worthy of those relationships with others, self-cultivation is a necessary prerequisite (Tu 1985:55). Do not the claims related to self-
cultivation and proper relationships with others appear to be locked into a form of circular reasoning? This problem will be discussed in detail in C4.

1.2  Jürgen Moltmann and His Concerns about Selfhood

1.2.1 Who Is Jürgen Moltmann?

Jürgen Moltmann has been recognized as one of the most influential theologians stemming from the contemporary German Protestant Reformed tradition. He was born in 1926, and was Professor of Systematic Theology at Tübingen University from 1967 until his retirement in 1994. His influence is not only in Anglo-European contexts, but also in some non-Anglo-European circles. He underwent a profound transforming experience while he was a prisoner of war (POW) during the period from 1945 to 1948 in Belgium, Scotland and lastly England (Moltmann 2007a:6–18). The events in a POW camp totally changed Moltmann’s life as he (2009a:12, 19–35, eo) describes in his autobiography, A Broad Place:

The sciences I took so seriously did not at that time make a realist of me … Each of us tried to conceal his bleeding heart behind an armour of untouchability and indifference. That was the inward imprisonment of the soul which was added to the outward captivity … [When] one was exposed without any defence to what one had experienced and suffered, and had to come to terms with it … [it is indeed a] mental and spiritual torment … Depression over the wartime destruction and a captivity with no end in sight was compounded by a feeling of profound shame at having to share in shouldering the disgrace of one’s own people … Psalm 39[:2, 5b, 12] caught my attention particularly [because] that was an echo from my own soul, and it called that soul to God … When I heard Jesus’ death cry [in Mark’s Gospel 15:34], I felt growing within me the conviction: this is someone who understands you completely, who is with you in your cry to God and has felt the same forsakenness you are living in now … I summoned up the courage to live again, and I was slowly but surely seized by a great hope for the resurrection into God’s wide space where there is no more cramming … I am certain that then, in 1945, and there, in the Scottish [POW] camp, in the dark pit of my soul, Jesus sought me and found me … Jesus’ Godforsakenness on the cross showed me where God is present — where he was in my experiences of death, and where he is going to be in whatever comes. Whenever I read the Bible again with the searching eyes of the Godforsaken prisoner I was, I am always assured of its divine truth … I was still searching, but I sensed that God was drawing me and that I should not be seeking him unless he had already found me … The question of how long the captivity was going to last no longer bothered me … I had experienced something that was to determine my whole life. For that reason this time is for me so important that I would not have missed a day of it … [because] I experienced the turn from the hidden face of God to his shining countenance in the nearness of Jesus, the brother in need and the leader of resurrection into true life.

36 See also Moltmann (2002b:2; 2009a).
Therefore, he (2000a:3) claims that his theology is ‘existential theology’, developed originally for his ‘particular existential situation’ and his own need and then further enriched by the existential dimension of theology (‘shénxué de shícún céngmiàn’ 『神學的實存層面』) (Moltmann 2002b:2–4) and the collectively, not merely individually, experienced ‘social situation’ (Moltmann 1992a:166).37 For example, because of personal experiences of ‘the collective suffering and guilt’ of his country, Germany, he (2000a:4) started his earlier works from his need to understand hope and suffering. It is notably that his (2009a:147–85) later theological engagements have involved many public and political issues.38 Although he has tried to initiate dialogues between Christian theology and some other disciplines and religions, he (2002b:2–3) has never tried to present Christian theology in the light of religious studies or cultural studies. However, he does not confine his theological research and written works to the area of Protestant theology. As indicated in the summary of his journey of theology in Experiences in Theology (2000a), Moltmann is open not only to engaging age-old theologies from both Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions, but is also willing to address questions from a wide variety of contemporary theologies, including liberation theology, charismatic theology, and public theology.39

Moltmann’s Theology of Hope (1967, German original 1964) expresses his long struggle to formulate a description of God ‘“with future as his essential nature’” (as Ernst

37 See also Moltmann (1988, excerpted and trans. in 1994a:61–72; 1996:13ff., 44-6; 1997:2; 2000a:4) and Neal (2009:368–9). Moltmann (2000a:139–45, eo) promotes the integration of ‘the hermeneutics from above and the hermeneutics from below’. The former is his ‘trinitarian hermeneutics’, emphasizing the aspect of God’s revealing of God- self within the Bible, perceiving the function of the Bible ‘in the trinitarian history of God’ (ibid.:144, eo). The later, emphasizing the aspect of human beings’ expressing their faith based upon claims in the Bible, is ‘existential-[historical, socio-historical and psychosociological’ (ibid.:142). See also Kwok Hungbiau (2007:18f.).

38 See also Bauckham (2005:147).

39 See also Moltmann (2009a). It is notable that he has made at least seven academic visits to Taiwan and China and has had a number of encounters and dialogues with Chinese theologians, Chinese philosophers, and scholars in other disciplines (Lin, Honghsin 2002; Hong, Liàng 洪亮 2011).
Bloch puts it’) (ibid.:16, 30). The Crucified God (1974b, German original 1972) is his second major influential work, dealing with issues of suffering and the impassibility of God. In this book, he (ibid.:247-9) interpreted the event of the cross as a trinitarian event, and so presents God there as a Trinity open to the world. Following this initial trinitarian emphasis, Moltmann stressed the role of the Holy Spirit in a more systematic pneumatology expressed in his The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1977, German original 1975). Still later, he developed a social view of the Trinity in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1981, German original 1980), responding to the dispute on the issue of ‘filioque’ (ibid.:xv) and overcoming the dialectic of accounts of God as the supreme substance and God as the absolute subject (see C6S3 and C6S4). Such a relational trinitarian theology turns out to be the overarching theological framework of Moltmann’s writings from that point of time in the early 1980s. It is worth noting that this work is also a turning point for a ‘paradigm shift’ in Moltmann’s theological journey ‘from the order of domination and obedience (Karl Barth and Ernst Kasemann) to the new and democratic order of community, freedom, and friendship’ (Moltmann 2008a:369). It is also a

40 Moltmann expanded this notion of God in an account of God and creation through a new focus on the Holy Spirit in God in Creation published in 1985.

41 The third one of his trilogy, the first and second are Theology of Hope and The Crucified God respectively.

42 This term filioque, deriving from Latin, literally means ‘and from the Son’ (Bromiley 1984, eo). This phrase was seemingly first added into the Nicene Creed (325) at the local Council of Toledo in 589 by the churches in the Latin West to highlight that ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son’ (Dulles 1995:31–2). In order to defend themselves against Arians, this insertion served to stress ‘the perfect equality of the Son and the Father’ (ibid.), namely the full deity of the Son and His consubstantiality and co-eternity with the Father (Edgar & Oliphint 2009:16). But this was not the content agreed upon within the confessions at Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381), when a statement based on John 15:26 was cited, where Jesus Christ promises: ‘When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who comes from the Father, he will testify on my behalf’. At that time it simply was affirmed that ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father’ (Dulles 1995:31–2). Therefore, this insertion was rejected by the churches in the Greek East (Bromiley 1984) in order to stress the full deity of the Holy Spirit (Moltmann 1981:181), even though they also opposed Arianism (Blaising 1984). Nevertheless, based on the same verse, the Latin Western churches asserted that from both the Father and the Son the Spirit proceeds (ibid.). This main doctrinal bifurcation led to the great schism in 1054, when the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Western Roman Catholic Church split apart. This dispute has never been resolved since then (Moltmann 1981:178–80; Pless 2005:116f.; Siecienski 2010). See also Walter F. Hook (1887:352), Gerald Bray (1983), and Joannes Metaxas-Mariatos (1988).

43 See also Moltmann (2000a:303–333).
journey for him from ‘the God of Hope to the Inhabitable God’ (ibid.) or from a ‘theology of time’ to a ‘theology of space’ (ibid.:371). Besides, starting from this work, he began to write the ‘theme-orientated series’ that he entitled ‘systematic contributions to theology’ (Moltmann 2000a:xvii, eo).44 The other volumes in this series include God in Creation (1985), where he expressed his concerns about the ecological crisis, The Way of Jesus Christ (1990, German original 1989) focusing on Christology, The Spirit of Life (1992, German original 1991), presenting his advanced pneumatology, The Coming of God (1996, German original 1995), his eschatology merging universal salvation and divine indwelling together, and Experiences in Theology (2000), that has served as both an introduction to and afterword of his approach to Christian theology. For understanding his development of trinitarian thought beyond The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, his set of essays published as History and the Triune God (1992, German original 1991) is particularly helpful. Additionally, God for a Secular Society (1999, German original 1997) makes a significant contribution to his development of public theology.

In the following sections, I will concentrate on Moltmann’s concerns about relational selfhood. Some of the issues with which Moltmann is concerned are relevant to the tendency of the RFS in PTRIC contexts.45

1.2.2 The Inevitability of Masking

In his book, Man: Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the Present, Moltmann (1976:2–3) indicated the inevitability of negatively masking one’s identity among human beings, tracing the root of this behaviour to an embarrassed and naturally shameful ‘self-encounter’. ‘Naked honesty’ to the self is itself agonizing, because human beings incline

44 See also Moltmann (2009a:286).

45 It is important to observe that even when Moltmann mentions Ruism directly in his writings, he never specifies which epoch or school of Ruism he is talking about, let alone its specific teachings. This is not to say that what he understands about Ruism is wrong. Rather he shares the general concept about traditional Ruism that prevails among many scholars and other people outside the professional circles of sinology.
to repress the ‘consciousness of the ambiguity’ of their self-awareness, namely to intentionally evade facing their true selves (ibid.:3). It is because losing ‘their secret’, in Moltmann’s account, is equivalent to giving up ‘their future’ (ibid.). Furthermore, human beings also tend to make themselves ‘recognizable’ to others, gaining value, confidence, or security from others’ affirmations (ibid.:2). But how can who one really is be better than what one appears to be? Accordingly, Moltmann argues that everyone requires a mask as long as they find it hard to accept being ‘identical with’ one’s inner real self (ibid.:3). Precisely in this context, Moltmann realizes that a dilemma arises: on the one hand, one is neither able to ‘completely identify [oneself] with [one’s] mask’, and so one is unable to accept the ‘appearance’ shown to others; on the other hand, one cannot easily ‘get right down’ to oneself even if one desires to expose oneself unreservedly (ibid.). Although Moltmann pinpoints humans’ limitations in living authentically, at this point, he does not explain the basic reason for these phenomena from the perspective of Christian anthropology. Nevertheless, although Moltmann does not make much use of this language, I suggest that the doctrine of original sin in Christian anthropology explains the root cause of such a RFS (or hiding one’s real self). That is a common reason why one hides one’s real self from oneself first and then from others in any cultural contexts.46

According to the account in Genesis, the first thing the first man and woman did after the Fall was to hide their naked selves because of ‘shame’ (Genesis 3:7) (Henry 1706:56). From whom did they hide? Besides from their own eyes or ‘consciences’, the second thing they did was to hide from each other’s eyes because at that time, of course, according to the narrative, there were no other human persons alive than those two (ibid.). The third thing they did was to hide from the Lord God (Genesis 3:8). The example of this experienceable reality of fallen human beings in this way can be found through the

46 This independent suggestion of mine is supported by the similar arguments of Thomas Merton (1961:34–5, 43, 280f.) found after I completed the first draft of this thesis.
whole Bible. For example, the Apostle Paul precisely and vividly depicts such conscious struggling in Romans 7: 18b-19: ‘I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.’

Moltmann (1976:3) refers to this imposed mask presented to others as ‘the external face’ that is given by both traditional and contemporary ‘culture[s]’. He thinks that one cannot be satisfied with a mask acquired externally; in the long run, one will eventually become stagnated or alienated by it (ibid.). For one’s ‘real self’ cannot be involved in a mere ostensible conformity to unsought ‘social compulsions’ outside (ibid.:39, 41). Undoubtedly, the repressed behaviour of masking can develop into a form of ‘inward emigration’ to some extent or other; through that masking one seeks to preserve and hide one’s ‘true inward nature’, expressing what appears to be only a passive conformity in order to evade relational conflicts and stresses (ibid.:39-40). Inward emigration seeks only for ‘freedom in privacy’, ‘self-protection from social pressures’ or the ‘inward cultivation of the beautiful soul’ (ibid.:41). I find that this inward emigration is exactly a RFS. Accordingly, Moltmann calls this passive ‘attitude of resistance’ a ‘tragedy’, because Christians holding such a passive ‘attitude of resistance’ will not address their ‘inhuman circumstances’ (ibid.). Moltmann’s concern for and criticism of inward emigration originates from the context of European industrial society (ibid.:22-45) and the ‘Third Reich’, that is, Nazi Germany (ibid.:16). But the phenomenon of inward emigration can be also evidently applied to describe the tendency of the RFS in PTRIC contexts. This application is explored in C2 and C4, as well as in A-E.
1.2.3 Criticism of Patriarchy

Moltmann (2008b:4) demonstrates that he is concerned about and advocates ‘human rights’,47 ‘freedom’ and justice for the oppressed, criticizing ‘jíquán」 (totalitarianism) in its many aspects.48 From his viewpoint (2000a:332), the enlightened understanding that flows from the trinitarian concept of God makes possible ‘the equilibrium between personal freedom and a just society’. He has not yet discussed or mentioned directly the problem of the RFS in these contexts, but has been concerned with the results of self-contempt and the insurmountable hindrances to self-liberation due to the imposition of mainstream value systems, especially patriarchy. For him (1981:214), the passive side of freedom is at least to be liberated from ‘compulsion and necessity’. The active side of it is to strive ‘for the realization of the Good’ 49 (ibid.). Consequently, he has proposed a way to find one’s self through finding the Kingdom of God and experiencing reconciliation with God in Christ (Moltmann 1994b:8–19, 29, 135). These initiatives are in fact closely related to the problem of RFS in PTRIC contexts. The main question he has focused on in feminist theology 50 is nothing but to challenge the fundamental age-old masculine rule in societies dominated by patriarchy and androcentrism (Moltmann 2000a:272). This heritage influences and predominates every


49 Moltmann (1981:213f.) denotes ‘the realm of the Good’ as the domain from where the ‘purposes and values’ of morality shine into freedom’s domain, so that ‘freedom may be used properly … for life’s preservation and not for its destruction’.

50 Influenced by his late wife, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, a feminist theologian who published in this realm from 1972, his attention has been focused on the issue of patriarchy as it relates to the ‘deformation’ of females (Moltmann 1985d:57) and the construction of a feminist theology for males (Moltmann 2000a:268–92). See also Moltmann (1988, excerpted and trans. in 1994a:68–9; 1992a:xiiif., 1–25).
aspect of life, including concepts of religion, the image of humankind, and the familial framework and its functions (ibid.).

Although Moltmann discusses the above issues without reference to any contemporary or past Chinese cultural contexts, such phenomena can also be seen among many Chinese men (Tang, Catherine Sokum et al. 2010:538). He argued these matters on the basis of common experiences documented within his own generation, including the expectations in a patriarchal society that usually require a male person ‘to be a man’, and found notably among those who brought him up (Moltmann 2000a:289, eo). While Moltmann admitted that it is impossible for men to reach this idealized vision of being a man, in the process of trying to live up to those external demands, they have to not only repress some of their ‘feelings’, ‘senses[,] and inner needs’, but also rule over some of their instinctive drives, and play other roles in order to ‘make something of [themselves]’: such as being a victor, master, superior, succedeer, owner, conqueror, controller, and leader (ibid.:275, 289, eo). The constant fear of ‘not being anything’ can split a male person into two parts. One is to ‘identify himself’ with an false image of being a ‘subject of understanding and will’; the other is to escape from becoming a true ‘object of heart, feeling and needs’ (Moltmann 2000a:289).

51 Moltmann (2000a:274) identifies two essential elements in ‘patriarchy’: ‘an institutionalized system of sexual hierarchy and a psychological mechanism for its justification’ in both ‘family and society’. In such a patriarchal society, the mastery of the man over the woman is acquired by birth (ibid.). Accordingly, the father assumes the responsibility as the ‘family priest’ in the familial ancestral worship and passes it down to the eldest son of every generation (ibid.:275). The external ‘forms and appearances’ of the gender-biased hierarchy in patriarchy have been transmitted through thousands of years in the vast majority of cultures (ibid.). Moltmann argued that male ‘supremacy’ over females has remained alive and visible in three aspects of male persons’ self-perceptions and roles: ‘sexually active roles’, ‘supposed potency’, and ‘life-long narcissism’ (ibid.).

52 See also Sun Lungkee (1983, reprinted in 2004:113) and Fanny M. C. Cheung et al. (2010:302).

53 For Ru-influenced Chinese people, the goal to be a human can be usually summarized with idioms such as ‘chūrén tóudi’ ‘出人頭地’ (to become honoured and distinguished among others) and ‘guāngzōng yàozǔ’ ‘光宗耀祖’ (glorifying and illuminating the ancestors) (Hé, Yǒu hui 2006:18). See also Hu Hsiencchin (1944:45, 64), Shenkar and Ronen (1987:573–4), Jin Shenghua et al. (2009:1004, 1008–1011), and Zhào Fúlóu 趙福樓 (2012:blog).
Moltmann notices especially the ‘depreciation’ of females in traditional Ruism, a set of phenomena dating back to ancient times in China (ibid.:273). These phenomena are highlighted precisely when men’s actual achievements are not strong enough to meet the culture’s high expectation. So, in order to be accepted by their own Chinese society (especially when it is influenced by traditional Ruism), men manage to survive only through hiding and denying their weaknesses to everyone, including hiding them from themselves (ibid.:273-5). Consequently, by maintaining this split ‘conscious self’, the male is hunting endlessly for ‘security’ to relieve his internal ‘anxieties’ through dominating and repressing female persons (ibid.:277). Moltmann’s observations and explanations are consistent with evidence found among contemporary Chinese, Japanese, and Korean societies as mentioned in C1 and C2 and developed further in A-E and A-F.

According to Moltmann’s analysis of patriarchy, I can see that there is a strong tendency to develop a problem related to the RFS, though he did not use this phrase, in these kinds of patriarchal cultural settings. What a paradoxical relation and tension exists between the putatively strong and external appearance of the dominant male and the hidden, weak, and oppressed internal reality males can experience! I share the concern with Moltmann that a patriarchal rule develops regularly by the same logic of ‘male sexism’ (Moltmann 2000a:275), so that it supports a hierarchical society, racism, and nationalism. As he documents in this same context, it is even more difficult for male rulers to give power away when it has been acquired through kinship, even though there may be other factors including ethnicity. Consequently, the RFS may well become much

54 So it seems precisely when a man’s identity and self-value are based on his masculinity that he views femininity as being only ‘weakness’, and does not allow himself to ‘get soft’ (Moltmann 2000a:277, eo).
55 Moltmann is concerned not only with masculine problems of the self as described above, but also notices some feminine problems of the self developed in these contexts. As females are ‘culturally conditioned’ to be relation-oriented in a patriarchal society, they tend to despairingly flee from ‘solitariness’ and being themselves (Moltmann 1992b:253). Evidently, such a problem is also a by-product of patriarchy, under which the meaning of ‘being a human’ for females is disrespected (ibid.:254).
stronger within male dominant cultural contexts in order to hide and suppress its contrasting weaker internal reality. This can turn into a vicious cycle: employing a status of being the ‘master in the house’ (ibid.:289, eo) with all its power may also become a way to suppress one’s weakness.56

Although Moltmann’s discussion of patriarchy does not always address the general cultural contexts of either traditional Ruism, post-traditional Ruism or of modern Chinese people, he addressed this in other places.57 In his eyes (Moltmann 1989:87–101), however, PTRIC society is a typically patriarchal one. This is so, he recognized, even if he does not use the same terms to describe post-traditional Ruist contexts as he did in other discussions of patriarchal societies, to highlight the features of modern Chinese patriarchy. Moltmann does point out, however, that a patriarchal sex hierarchy is the basic type or archetype within a traditional and post-traditional Ruist hierarchical society (ibid.:91). Patriarchal society demands that men live out their identity in such a way that they are perceived as being strong, exercising full control of their inner feelings, and supressing any weaknesses. This demand can come from women just as much as from men, due to their sharing an overwhelming collectivist ideology that makes ‘the individual consciousness’ embedded in and taken hold of by ‘the collective consciousness’ (Moltmann 1998a:28). Although Moltmann addresses his observation and understanding in a general ‘Asiatic’ context (ibid., eo), they can be validly extended to explain that the strong ideology in Ru-based collectivism demands the relational self to excel in moral self-cultivation (as discussed in C2S4). Moltmann (2000a:292; 1981:165) concludes his discussion of patriarchy by stating that the theology of ‘the tri-une God …

56 Certainly the level of oppression may become worse in contexts of political power, since the act of exposing one’s own weaknesses as a ruler may counter the preferred image of a strong leader, causing tensions with others’ expectations or demands regarding the ruler. Consequently, it is necessary to suppress one’s real self all the more diligently.

57 It is worth noting that he has felt personally more distant from traditional Ruism than traditional Daoism (Moltmann 2008b:ix). For example, he (1998a:23, eo) views Singapore as a representative of traditional-Ruist ‘educational dictatorships’.
in sociality’ within the trinitarian doctrine can overcome or avoid the problem of patriarchal monotheism, with its earthly patriarchy and problematic sexism. How can this doctrine effect a change? This will be discussed in C6 and C7.

1.2.4 God and Human Selfhood

Moltmann is concerned with the issue of selfhood. He (1967:91, 285) indicates that the predominant questions in biblical anthropology — ‘Who or what is man? Who am I?’ — are not based on comparing humans with the other myriad things in the world, but on the ‘revelation of God’.58 This does not mean, however, that Moltmann (1967:89–91) denies the reality of the existing problem about who I am. Instead, he sees ‘the revelation of God … in the promised future of Christ’ as the light illuminating the reality of human beings, as well as who I am, and the hope of who I will be (ibid.:91). Through ‘the revelation of God in promise’, I come to myself ‘in spe’ (in hope), but find ‘disharmony’ with myself ‘in re’ (in reality) (ibid.). For Moltmann (ibid.:285), the quest for the real self is based not simply on being ‘coram Deo’ (in the presence of God), but rather on facing and taking up a transcendent ‘mission, charge and appointment’ from God. Precisely in this light, Moltmann does not agree with existentialist understandings of human selfhood, which are merely based on ‘self-endorsement’ (ibid.). The knowledge of oneself develops in the process that one understands an ‘emptying’ of oneself in confronting with ‘the other’ (Moltmann 1990a:245). One comes to know oneself only through knowing the ‘otherness’ of others (ibid.).59 Moltmann emphasizes that it is only from God that we can demonstrate the reality and existence of humanity and the world, not the other way round.

58 Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) (1970:10–13) also agrees with this point.
59 Moltmann (1990a:246, eo) points out that ‘the most profound and most primal form of knowledge of the other – namely the Wholly Other’ – is through perceiving ‘the dead Christ in the eternal livingness of God’ because of the greatest ‘antithesis … between absolute death and eternal life’. Accordingly, he (1967:58–69, 84–94) repudiates the ‘theology of the transcendental subjectivity of [hu]man[s]’ presented by Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976), a proof of the existence of God based on the affirmations determined by the authentic existence of humans. See also Moltmann (1999:83).
Most importantly, to understand human beings after the Fall through the revelation of God for Moltmann (2007b:63) can be only done through an indirect or ‘mediated’ approach to this issue. The only way comes to be known recognizing that the ‘crucified Christ’ is ‘the mirror of God and the mirror of ourself[f]’ (Calvin, John n.d., cited in Moltmann 1976:18). The *imago Dei* is the key to Moltmann’s understanding of this close relationship between God and human selfhood. This will be discussed in greater detail in C6 and C7.

Significantly, Moltmann has never directly applied his discussions about the revelation of God and the real self to the sphere of my research problem. In other words, his discussions are not addressed directly to the issue of the RFS as it appears in the context of and in dialogue with post-traditional Ruism. However, they are logically meaningful and relevant to it, as will be shown in C6 and C7.

### 1.2.5 Humanity in the World

Based on the theological approach of demonstrating the reality and nature of human beings and the world from the existence of God, Moltmann (1967:65) doubts that solitary self-reflection without any recognition of the existence of the world would be an effective path to ‘self-understanding’. For Moltmann, one can only find the ‘authenticity’ of one’s self in God (ibid.:67, 89–94). Nevertheless, one still needs the external social, material and historical *worlds* and one’s relation to the natural world at large as a mediating reference to objectify, experience, understand, and express the authenticity of one’s self and one’s relation to God (ibid.:65). When one can come to one’s real self only in the promised future of Christ, namely, in the new creation found in Christ, one not only restores one’s real self but also reunites with others and the world.

However, unlike the concept in Ruism that ‘[hu]man[s] and heaven and earth are one thing’ (Chan, Wingtsit 1969, cited in Tu 1985:46), the world in Moltmann’s eyes is not on the same plane as the selves of humans or of God, whether in understanding them
distinctly or in their relationships with each other.\textsuperscript{60} Moltmann (1998a:28–31, eo) makes a distinction between the biblical understanding of the human individual ‘as a person’ and the general Asiatic cosmological understanding of the human individual ‘as part of nature’ (ibid.:28).\textsuperscript{61} In the latter concept of human beings, the individual person is merely a member throughout many ‘generations’, and so the private self, its life, and its death are not at all significant (ibid.). In the former concept of human beings, every person should be regarded ‘as a subject’, and none of them should be taken to be merely ‘as an object’, because God creates every human to be ‘free and equal’ (ibid.:29, eo). Based on being created in the \textit{imago Dei}, a person is ‘in the resonant field of the relationships of I-you-we, I-myself, I-it’. In these relationships, the person turns out to be the subject of his/her actions and behaviours and cannot be reduced ‘to slaves, to mere labour, or to merchandise … [for example, as a] prostitute’ (ibid.:29). Accordingly, the life of the person on earth is ‘singular and incapable of repetition’ in front of God (ibid.:30). Humans are lifted above other living creatures with ‘relative freedom’, and are bestowed a special mandate by the creator God who is transcendent, but they also are burdened ‘with special responsibility for other living creatures’ (ibid.). They not only dominate ‘over nature’, but also are alienated ‘from nature’, because they are creatures and followers of the promising God. In this sense, nature cannot be their ‘mother’ (ibid.:31, eo).

Therefore, in Moltmann’s Christian perspective human beings are entirely distinguishable from the world, and every individual person is unique because their personal history is distinguished from one another.\textsuperscript{62} On the contrary, according to

\textsuperscript{60} For example, in explaining how we should view and experience the world from the aspect of ‘Christian eschatology’, he (1967:69) remarks that (Christian) ‘faith cannot suffer the world to become a picture of God, nor a picture of [hu]man[s]’.

\textsuperscript{61} In the concept of human beings as part of nature, people call the earth ‘mother’ and the moon ‘grandmother’, and believe that ‘their lives are floating in the great family of all living beings in the cycles and rhythms of the sun, moon, and earth’ and that all living beings reincarnate (Moltmann 1998a:28–9, eo).

\textsuperscript{62} Moltmann’s concept of history is based on ‘Hegel's philosophy of history’ (Moltmann 2000a:119; Kwok Hungbiu 2007:22–6). In discussing and emphasizing Christianity as a religion of history, along with Judaism and Islam, Moltmann (1990a:237) differentiates it from the general Asiatic religions that do not
Moltmann, human beings and their individual selves as seen in the Asiatic religions are identical with nature and society. This will be discussed in detail in the latter portion of this thesis, from C4 to C8.

2. Methodology

This research is text-based and will make textual analysis through the employment of logical dialectics. As this is also a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary study, I include here discussions about the methods and approaches used by Tu Weiming as well as those adopted by Christian theologians.

2.1 Clarification of the Application of Contextual Theology

As mentioned in C1S3.1.2, quite a few Chinese people think that every road leads to Rome and all religions are good. Furthermore, they might easily be inclined to reject Christianity as a foreign religion, because Ruism, Buddhism, Daoism, or Chinese folk religious practices are inveterately accepted as Chinese religious traditions and more or less a major part of what is generally considered to be Chinese culture. Therefore, a dilemma appears. On the one hand, avoiding unnecessary cultural conflicts is a challenge for sharing the Christian gospel and theology effectively and fruitfully especially in the context of post-traditional Ruified Chinese culture. On the other hand, the distinctions between the Christian gospel and theology and other religions are especially crucial in the approaches to Christian evangelism and its related apologetics in Asian cultural contexts. In other words, this dilemma is how the Christian gospel and its related theology focus on history or historicity but prefer to seek an equilibrium between internality and externality. He further points out specifically that the equilibrium Daoism focuses on is ‘in nature’, Ruism ‘in society’, and Buddhism ‘in one’s own soul’ (ibid.). Yet he argues that it is what we experience and remember in the past and what we expect and hope in the future that determine what we perceive in ‘historical time’ (ibid.:236) (Moltmann 1990a:237). In Moltmann’s understanding, history happens between God as the Lord of history and human beings who are the mortal experiencers of history (ibid.:245). So too, then, being an individual self is ‘personhood in a history’ (ibid.:267).
can be communicated and understood in other cultural contexts without distorting, 
missing, or replacing their content and meaning.

This kind of dilemma is studied and debated in the realm of contextual theology, 
including indigenous theology, especially in the post-traditional Chinese cultural contexts 
(Kwan, Kaiman 2010). It is because of this dilemma that contextual theology may be 
confused with indigenous theology (ibid.). But if we carefully rethink and study this 
cross-cultural dilemma by means of two distinctive aspects, including their differing 
functions and purposes, a prudent examination of these issues may reveal that the two 
concerns in that dilemma mentioned above might not be contradictory, but instead 
actually complement each other. In order to avoid any ambiguity of the contextual 
thetical terminology in use currently, I coin two phrases to name and clarify these two 
distinct aspects. One aspect of this approach, then, is the issue of theology-
contextualizing, dealing with addressing Christian theological content in non-Christian 
cultural contexts (also involving questions of language). For example, although moral 
cultivation, the transcendental self, filial piety, and lunli (倫理) (the Chinese translation 
for ethics) are not in the English vocabulary of Christianity and Christian theology, they 
can still be adopted to discuss and compare issues within Christianity and Ruism (Ames 
2011). Through explaining some of the etymological definitions of key theological 
concepts by means of non-Christian cultural contexts and languages, Christian

Tsai Lee Chen (2001:211–20), Lín Ruìlóng 林瑞隆 (2003), Wáng Chóngyáo 王崇堯 (2003), Kāng Láichāng 
康來昌 (2004:27–33), Sebastian C. H. Kim ed. (2008), and Craig Ott (2015). It is worth noting that non-
Christians, such as the nationalist Gu Hóngmíng 盧鴻銘 (1912, reprinted in 1994:29) and the New Ruist 
Mou Tsungsan (1995:54), might not appreciate indigenous theology developed in Christianity because it 
makes Christianity impure.

64 For example, the understanding of the word ‘lunli (倫理)’ (ethics) in Chinese means mainly the order of 
basic human relationships, and so it involves some differences in use from the normal understanding of 
the word ethics in English, when it is taken to mean the study of or ‘a set of beliefs about what is morally right 
and wrong’ (Cambridge University Press 2012).
theological content can be addressed more easily and without distortion in PTRIC contexts. This is what is involved in the aspect of theology-contextualizing.

However, the other aspect of this approach is the issue of content-theologizing, understanding and addressing the non-Christian cultural content by means of a Christian theological methodology. For example, this could involve the exploration of theological meanings of issues occurring in PTRIC contexts. In other words, theological analysis of particular themes related to PTRIC contexts engages in examining cultural questions through theological concepts and methods, leading to some critical insights that might suggest ways to modify or correct certain ways of life, if and when needed (Abraham & Rufaedah 2014:519). This is why Sino-Christian theology has developed and has been given more and more attention by scholars studying Christianity in Chinese contexts.

Only in the context of Sino-Christian theological studies (Ames 2011) can questions raised in this thesis be dealt with more faithfully, relevantly, and profoundly.

Therefore, from the perspective of contextual theology, this research is engaged in a Sino-Christian theological study. I will apply Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian theology to pursue content-theologizing, and then focus on the issue of the RFS in PTRIC contexts as it is addressed in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood in order to create a theology-contextualized bridge or dialogue between PTRIC and Protestant...

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65 This phrase content-theologizing is coined by the inspiration of the discussion of ‘theologization of psychology … regarding how theology should address psychology’ presented by Abraham and Rufaedah (2014:516).

66 Chin Kenpa 曾慶豹 (p. Céng Qìngbào) (2006:126, eo) differentiates Sino-(Christian) theology from Chinese theology. In his distinction, ‘Sino-theology … takes the existential hermeneutics of the individual’ as its domain. In this domain, its purpose is to understand what occurs for the sake of personal comprehension; its theme is focused on the ‘fundamental issues of faith’. It emphasizes the ‘effects of differences’. But the main impetus of Chinese theology is based on the ‘national prosperity or discourse of nationalism’; accordingly, theology becomes substitutively ‘a tool of nationalism’ rather than ‘being the faith’ demanded for the crisis of the existence in humankind. Therefore, on the contrary, ‘Sino-theology no longer takes the [nationalistic] identification with Chinese culture … as its object of thought; [but] … it takes on a more radical meaning of existence’ so that ‘the identification with the God’ who is completely different can be strengthened.

67 See also Lai Panchiu and Jason T. S. Lam (2010).
theological perspectives relying on Moltmann’s studies. The content-theologizing method intends to discern the nature of the problem of RFS and its accompanying theological and spiritual concerns within the PTRIC cultural contexts. The approach of theology-contextualizing will seek to explain how Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian theology might address this problem in PTRIC cultural contexts. For example, although *moral cultivation* is not part of the normal vocabulary employed in Protestant theology, it can be adopted and modified so that it can be employed within theological language, resulting in our creation of *gracious moral cultivation*. By this means a more robust comparison between Moltmann’s Protestant theology and Tu Weiming’s Ruist philosophy can be pursued as the problem of RFS in PTRIC cultural contexts is elaborated.

2.2 Pragmatic Arguments Approach

Klaus Nielsen (n.d.) states, ‘[Traditional Ruism] is a set of pragmatic rules and lessons in practical ethics for daily life ... [but] not a religion’. Similarly, in psychological studies, the self within socially oriented psychological constructs is categorized as a ‘pragmatic self’, and put in contrast to a ‘principled self’ embedded within intrapersonally oriented psychological constructs, as shown in Chart E.1 in A-E (Greenwald 1982:128). Significantly, traditional Ruism or post-traditional Ru-influenced culture is recognized as being pragmatic in nature (to be discussed in C4) because of the ‘situational determinism’ that generally shapes many aspects of its teachings and values (Yang, Kuoshu 2002:88–9), as mentioned in C2 and will be explored in more

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69 This term and concept of ‘situational determinism’, adopted by Yang Kuoshu, was presented by Francis L. K. Hsu in 1963. He (1963:164-5) explains it as ‘to think of multiple (not double) standards of conduct;
detail in C4, A-D, and A-E. Tu Weiming (1998c:128) himself stresses that Ruists are ‘pragmatists and realists’. Admittedly, the use of *pragmatic arguments* is obviously the major approach adopted by Tu Weiming in his New Ruist dialectical interpretation of relational selfhood, especially when he is defending his version of Ruism against scholars’ criticisms that both traditional and post-traditional Ruism lead to RFS (Bellah 1985:4). In fact, the appearance of the RFS in PTRIC societies is an outcome of their social or relational ethics, and so associates closely with PTRIC persons’ psychological health and the formation of healthy interpersonal relationships among them. Accordingly, the issues of this research relate significantly to the benefits of PTRIC individuals and their societies, precisely because there is a need to identify a solution for the problem of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood. Therefore, this research also adopts a pragmatic argument approach, especially when analysing Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s interpretations of relational selfhood.

Generally speaking, a method relying on pragmatic arguments transfers ‘the value of consequences’ to their ‘antecedents’ or what causes them (Perelman 1959:18f.). Therefore, this approach is obviously more practical-oriented or ‘benefit-directed’ than ‘truth-directed’.70 In other words, a pragmatic argument purports to argue for ‘the formation and maintenance of a certain belief’ based on the ‘beneficial consequences’ it brings about (Jordan 1999).71 Although pragmatic arguments are often adopted in justifying ‘theistic belief’,72 they are also naturally ‘accepted by common sense’ without the differing standards prevail according to the differing varieties of human grouping in which particular events occur’. 

70 ‘[O]ntological, cosmological, or teleological arguments … are … primarily … truth-directed’ (Jordan 1999). However, there are two kinds of pragmatic arguments: ‘truth-dependent’ one and ‘truth-independent’ one. The definition and distinction between them can be grasped in detail in Jordan’s two references (1999; 2010:425–6, eo).

71 See also Jordan (2010:425).

72 ‘Theistic pragmatic arguments are not arguments for the proposition that God exists …[but] arguments that believing that God exists is rational.’ (Jordan 2009)
‘any justification’ so that their use is also employed in many other fields (Perelman 1959:18f.). It is worth noting that it is particularly effective within contexts where moral arguments are of distinctively importance (Jordan 2009). In this light, it is important to underscore the practical character of Tu Weiming’s writings. Although Tu denies that any external personal creator exists in traditional Ruism, he bases his interpretations of New Ruism on his faith or belief in a specific form of the ‘Chinese cosmology’. Sometimes he takes this cosmology to be self-evident in its nature, especially in its conception of Heaven (to be explored in greater detail in C4). He not only justifies his interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood mainly through pragmatic arguments, but also defends his belief in his preferred ‘Chinese cosmology’ by means of pragmatic arguments. Consequently, in order to evaluate any possible alternative solutions for the problem of the RFS found in PTRIC contexts of the relational selfhood, pragmatic arguments can be applied to analyse not only Tu’s account of relational selfhood in New Ruism, but also to assess parallel concepts raised in Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian anthropology.

2.3 Presuppositional Analytical Method

In terms of comparing the conceptualizations of relational selfhood in New Ruism presented by Tu Weiming within that in modern Protestant Christianity by Moltmann, this research is a religious ethics study (Little and Twiss 1978) and/or a comparative theological study (Neville 1991) in the Sino-Christian theological context. However, David L. Hall asserts that ‘any coherent concept of self presupposes some coherent sense of culture’ (Hall 1994:214). So it is important to add here that, in agreement with Hall’s claim, I find that both the New Ruist relational selfhood interpreted by Tu Weiming and the Protestant account of relational selfhood offered by Jürgen Moltmann both are based on some explicitly stated cultural presuppositions. Therefore, this research applies specifically a presuppositional analytical method in Christian theology to the comparative
study of Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood in order to analyse the similarities and differences of their presuppositions.

Presuppositional analytical method, also known as ‘presuppositional apologetics’ or ‘presuppositional argument’ (Boa & Bowman 2005:26), was adopted originally by modern Reformed theologians, initiated by Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) (1898:56–227) and then subsequently integrated and revitalized into apologetics by van Til (1895-1987) (1976). It is based on the insight that ‘the given presuppositions’ of any theological, religious, and philosophical standpoint, view, or argument ‘predetermine[d] and govern[ed] much of its later outworkings’ (White, William 1979:74). John Frame (1987:45) explains that ‘a presupposition is a belief that takes precedence over another and therefore serves as a criterion for another.’ When there is no other presupposition taking precedence, we describe this presupposition as being an ‘ultimate’ one. Therefore, van Til (1976:61–2) defines the presuppositional analytical method as indicating ‘what are the epistemological and metaphysical principles that underlie and control one’s method’, namely ‘the final reference-point’. Compared to the directness of evidential argument, this method is indirect (ibid.:62. 65. 68). When a situation has gone beyond the limitation of evidential proof, or there is no common ground that can be agreed upon in a dialogue or debate between two completely different concepts or positions or evidential arguments, the presuppositional analytical method is probably the best way to deepen the dialogue or debate. Instead of focusing on the two parallel arguments without moving forwards to any interaction, the presuppositional analytical method seeks to further discuss and compare their different presuppositions.

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74 See also Timothy I. McConnel (1999) and Greg L. Bahnsen (2008).
75 See also Boa and Bowman (2005:26), Edgar and Oliphint (2009:4, 36), and Glynn (2011).
When the RFS is found as a common experience among PTRIC societies, the ultimate concern about it must involve particular cultural presuppositions as well as ultimate presupposition(s) undergirding PTRIC relational selfhood and relational ethics by which it is shaped. Therefore, it is particularly helpful to compare and analyse the similarities and differences between Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts by means of a presuppositional analytical method.

2.4 Measurement Reference for Transforming the Repressed Form of Self

Transforming the RFS into a liberated or unmasked real or true self promises to lead towards a development of healthier personalities and ‘healing[s] of the dissociated identity’ of human beings who have become wounded individuals living in problematic interpersonal relationships (Tam, Ekmon PC 1998:72). Through accumulating knowledge and experience from his integrative psychotherapeutic practice based on his own account of transformational psychology, Tournier suggests a positive direction for dealing with the problem of the RFS. This direction is adopted for the purpose of measurement in this thesis. As explained in A-E, Paul Tournier (1898-1986) is one of very few persons who offers a comprehensive discussion of the problem of repressed behavioural customs of social masking. Moreover, he is also among the few persons who devoted himself in integrative psychotherapy and transformational psychology in the twentieth century. Since this research is an attempt to deal with this social psychological problem of the RFS from a Christian theological approach, Tournier’s account affords a theoretical measurement reference to this research.

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76 As mentioned in C1S3.1.3, Gilkey (1969, cited in Huáng, Lùpíng 黃路蘋 2016) proved and asserted that the ultimate concern about common secular experience makes a dialogue possible between Christian theology and non-Christian disciplines. For example, in the cases of this thesis, besides being based on some other assumed cultural presuppositions, Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood is also based upon an atheistic conception of ‘Chinese cosmology’. Similarly, Moltmann’s interpretation of social trinitarian relational selfhood is based upon a more general account of Christian theism.
What the standard of measurement adopted will accomplish is to examine whether or not the conceptions of relational selfhood studied in this research are following a path described by Tournier as moving towards transforming the personage into the person or reversing that process. As Rogers (1961:171–2) observes and suggests by quoting Kierkegaard’s words, ‘to be that self which one truly is’ (Kierkegaard 1941:18) or moving away from the contexts where a RFS is found necessarily involved ‘a process, a fluidity, a changing’. This process is inherently dynamic and so is one that is not ‘consistent’ or unchanging all the time.

Tournier (1957:213) maintains that human beings must rediscover their ‘natural spontaneity’ in order to disclose ‘the true colour’ of the self behind the varnish of the personage. Still, however, it is not enough to merely rediscover one’s natural spontaneity. He continues by asserting that the ‘natural self’, driven by natural spontaneity, is different from the real self (ibid.). One’s natural spontaneity can make anyone ‘a person’ that is seen to be only different from ‘an animal’ (ibid.). Instead, the real self appears when one ‘make[s] a personal choice’ voluntarily and independently about the code of behaviour one will observe and the ways to exert one’s freedom, namely when in some respects ‘the instincts of one’s natural self’ are conquered (ibid.).

But how can this real self conquer natural instincts? In contrast to any naturalistic solution, Tournier claims that the only way to discover a full resolution to the problem is by reference to the transformative supernatural power that is in the person and is granted to us by God (ibid.):

It is here that I part company with my agnostic colleagues who have only a purely naturalistic conception of the evolution of the person … For me the person is more than one’s nature; it is a supernatural power in us which rules our nature according to the choice it makes. What matters, what makes [any hu]man a person, is the sincerity of that choice, even if it means … that [one] must adopt a line of conduct very different from [one’s] natural reactions.

Through this assertive statement Tournier discloses his Reformed Christian doctrine of anthropology: any human being’s will power is totally depraved in salvation or in overcoming sinful nature, a position also claimed and justified by Martin Luther in
his monumental masterpiece, *The Bondage of the Will* (1525, trans. in 1972). Accordingly, for Tournier, ‘reason’, or any ‘[moralistic] system of abstract principles’, or ‘the sincerest of resolves’ cannot liberate the real self (Tournier 1957:215). The solution can only be discovered ‘in living fellowship with God: the experience of forgiveness’ (ibid.). He explained that in this fellowship with God:

> Choice is made not of principles but of a person, of the living God, of Christ. It does indeed bring with it all the moral principles that can be discovered by reason. But it makes us something more than mere machines applying principles: it makes us persons. It brings us much more than a code of ethics. It brings us a personal relationship, a current of life springing from the very source of all life, and true liberty. (ibid.:215f.)

Therefore, does this mean that completely stripping off the personage is the one and only way to transform the RFS? Tournier’s answer is no. Tournier (1957:81) quotes Pindar’s (n.d.) adage — ‘Become what you are’ — to suggest a totally innovative direction for harmonizing the personage with the person, and so to transform it in accordance with the person’s ‘sincerest convictions’. I find that what Tournier refers to can be understood in biblical terms as *expressing truth in love* or *living out the truth in love* (Ephesians 4:15). It is a transformative process rather than a radical surgery that would seek to cut off the personage once and for all. Instead, Tournier’s goal is that the personage will gradually ‘express and show forth’ more and more of the person genuinely (ibid.). In fact, the reality is that our personage also ‘moulds our person’, so that the external social roles we adopt affect us constantly, exerting their influences ‘even on the deepest and most intimate recesses of the person’ (ibid.:80). I have found that when the value of the real self conflicts with expectations from within and without, one subsequently feels unable or fearful to express one’s real self. In those kinds of contexts, not only is the real self repressed, but also its inherent value is harmed. Under this repression that can be described as *negatively masking*, the real self is not empty, nor is it

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77 Neither does Doi (1986:77–8) by quoting the similar opinion of the critic, Hideo Kobayashi (1902-1983).
absent or non-existent, but it suffers from the immaturity of the person. It is at least underdeveloped, or perhaps even left undeveloped, and so has not grown into its real self. Therefore, when one encounters the problems of the RFS as expressed in the personage, the way one approaches a solution — the restoration of the real self — is through committing the personage to act according to the values of the real self, instead of merely negatively removing the personage from an active engagement with others.

As mentioned above, the problem of the RFS results from a natural reflex involving self-protection of our inner fears, anxieties, and insecurities. Its remedy will never be merely to evade others outside and concentrate on our own selves inside ‘where the true nature of the person always eludes us’ (ibid.:81). The path for the personage to genuinely express and show forth the person must be to take courage to form a personage for the person, namely, to ‘look outwards, towards the world, towards our neighbour, [and] towards God’ (ibid.).

For Tournier, the true solution for the problems caused by the hindrances within the personage is the ‘grace’ and the transforming power granted by God the creator and redeemer, rather than ‘the pseudo-solution[s] of pathological reactions’ (ibid.:220). A gracious fellowship will be surely supportive for those following the path transforming from the personage to the person. Only when ‘being loved and understood’ is assured in a genuine fellowship, can fragile persons dare boldly to express their negative feelings towards the strong (ibid.:29–30, 159). Confession reaches the zenith when one gives up one’s ‘most intimate secrets’. Tournier defines this fellowship specifically as ‘personal fellowship with God and with our neighbour’, and explains how it works in leading one

78 For Tournier (1957:223), these pseudo-solutions of pathological reactions suggested by psychologists all rely on humankind’s own individual capability, such as ‘will-power … good resolutions … the impulsions of instinct and the determinism of powerful psychological complexes’.
further on the path towards becoming a real and vital person (ibid.:224). He elaborates this by explaining that in this fellowship (ibid.):

> Life is renewed and the person is revealed … we become conscious of our deepest problems, and … the breath of the Spirit comes to sweep away like dust the automatisms we had thought to be a part of our person, when they were in reality only a deposit from the past.

How does this happen? Tournier points out that this only springs ‘spontaneously from within’ and any attempt to make it happen will be in vain (ibid.). Therefore, what one can do is to devote one’s entire effort to seeking such a fellowship. But he also argues that there is not any real dialogue between human beings ‘unless it is … doubled by an inner dialogue with God’ (ibid.:160). The personal encounter with God can produce an overpowering force inside us, which obliges us to be honest and sincere even though it may be painful, ‘to throw off the mask of the personage and uncover the person’ (ibid.:159). This throwing off the mask is different from the stripping off the personage mentioned above. The former is done by a transforming force within given by God’s grace, but the latter is accomplished by human beings’ own power. God’s grace is granted ‘drop by drop’ to awaken and liberate the person to a flourishing and forgiven lifestyle. It comes about through an inner dialogue with the trinitarian God: Jesus Christ’s atonement and redemption to restore and re-establish the dialogue, the Holy Spirit’s renewal in raising the quality of the dialogue, and the calling of God the Father to instill a loving and wise purpose for life within us for the sake of our present and future fellowship and service (ibid.:169-76).

Chart 3.1 summarizes Tournier’s two ‘diametrically opposite paths’ to the person (including his practical path to the person through the revealing personage) (ibid.:81) and to the personage in seeking freedom (ibid.:224). In order to contrast the path to the

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79 The perfect example Tournier employs here is the precedent for such an encounter seen in the transformative encounter of the Samaritan woman during her dialogue with Jesus at Jacob’s well in John 4:3-29, 39.
personage with the practically transforming path of the revealing personage to the person, I call the path to the personage the path to the contrastive personage. In considering these claims of Tournier, I have realized that the behavioural customs among post-traditional Ru-affected Chinese people reflect much more the characteristics of the path to the contrastive personage rather than the path to the person.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Features of the Path</th>
<th>To The Person</th>
<th>To The Person through the Revealing Personage</th>
<th>To The Contrastive Personage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Starting from</td>
<td>Trusting in a Personal Encounter (With Jesus Christ)</td>
<td>Seeking the Safe and Healthy Conditions for Being Reborn</td>
<td>The Effort of One’s Own Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Way of</td>
<td>Acknowledging the Deepest Problems in the Fellowship</td>
<td>Confessing the Problem of the Personage, in a Gracious Fellowship</td>
<td>Achieving a Certain Skill at the Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Purpose of</td>
<td>Boldly Revealing the Person</td>
<td>Boldly Revealing and Acting Out Conforming to the Person</td>
<td>Artificially Making Up a Personage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resulting in</td>
<td>Easing Tensions</td>
<td>Liberating Confession</td>
<td>Exciting Tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressed through</td>
<td>Relying on a Self-Abandonment (to Jesus Christ)</td>
<td>Waiting for the Renewal by the Holy Spirit</td>
<td>The Glorification of Will-Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embodied in the Principle of</td>
<td>(Christian) Modern Psychology</td>
<td>Acknowledging the True Solution of Grace</td>
<td>Relying on Any Self-Generated System Or Rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.1 Summary of Tournier’s Paths to the Person and the Personage (Tournier 1957:81, 224)

Although Tournier insists that the person cannot be reached without being renewed by the salvation and grace of God (ibid.:76), he does not engage more deeply in discussing the transforming process of the reborn person in terms of an already-and-not-yet process of present realization as well as the eschatological realization of the true self. As can be seen from this perspective, the dynamics of the person and its eschatologically promised futurity in this process (as emphasized by Moltmann) are very important dimensions that should not be overlooked in dealing with the problem of the RFS. This will be discussed in much greater detail in C6 to C8.
Tournier believes that modern psychology has recognized the futility and even the harm of depending on ‘our own efforts’ in moving towards the path of the discovery of the person within us (ibid.:223). But all schools of modern psychology, he argues, involve ‘only mechanisms of the mind’ which are not within the dimension of the person, but within the dimension of the personage, following precedents in the studies of ‘all the physiological mechanisms of the body’ (ibid.:23).80 While Tournier’s approach engages in the personage’s showing forth the person genuinely through God’s grace, the solutions Jung and Rogers present are still merely by way of processes of self-transformation, from different psychological perspectives.81 Therefore, due to the limitation of space, Jung’s (1966) ‘individuation’ and Rogers’ (1961) self-transformation of ‘becoming a person’ will not be included in further discussions of this thesis, but only introduced in A-I.

2.5 The Dimensions of Transformation within the Repressed Form of Self

As previous studies in secondary literature disclose, the issue of the RFS is mainly about the social facet of self, namely the transformations between negatively masked selves and real selves. In terms of time, the person who tends to be repressed or negatively masked is as s/he is at every moment and so the transformation of the RFS is in the present dimension (i.e. the horizontal arrows shown in Diagram 3.1). However, ‘transformation’ of the self, in Tu Weiming’s language (1985), or ‘becoming’ of the self, in Moltmann’s

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80 For dealing with the compatibility between Christian faith and psychology (psychoanalysis), Tournier (1968) wrote another book entitled, A Place for You: Psychology and Religion. At the last stage of this research, I found David. G. Benner (2012), a Christian psychologist, who applies his expertise in psychoanalysis to offer a path (or ‘journey’) towards ‘unfolding self’ (unmasking self) based on Christian faith, especially through the perspectives of ‘Christian mystics’. He (2012:55–88) also stresses that the complete transformation into an authentic self cannot only happen by means of what Tournier called the mechanisms of the body and mind.

81 Besides Tournier, both Rogers and Jung are also concerned about the problem of the RFS, and so suggest directions to deal with it. However, in terms of ‘the discovery of the person’ for Tournier, all the schools of psychotherapy take the path of ‘trusting relaxation of tension’ towards ‘abdication of self-constraint’ (ibid.:224). Of course, these schools are not exactly the same. But how does one overcome the difficulties and barriers internally and externally appearing in their processes of self-transformation? Jung and Rogers seem not to engage in these related issues. In terms of self-transformation, Jung’s and Rogers’ directions for dealing with the problem of the RFS look like an Anglo-European form of traditional and post-traditional Ruist moral self-cultivation (as explained in C4 and C5).
language (1985a:227), cannot be overlooked in facing the problem of the RFS in terms of Tournier’s paths moving from the personage to the person or vice versa (as demonstrated by the arrows of the social facets in two-directions shown in Diagram 3.1). In addition, I will argue here that the self also has a future dimension especially in solving the problem of the RFS (or the personage), because the self is in a state of dynamic change and so is neither static nor absolute in character. In the future dimension of the self, its private facets (the transformations from the negatively masked self towards full loss of self in the personage on the one hand, and from the real self towards the ideal self in the person on the other hand) are also involved in its social facets (as shown in the vertical and diagonal arrows shown in Diagram 3.1). Therefore, the two possible transforming paths presented by Tournier actually involve two dimensions, as they apply to the transformation of the private facets of the self at the same time. Diagram 3.1 integrates and illustrates the two-dimensioned framework of the concept of transformation of those two facets of self discussed in terms of the RFS (the negatively masked self).

82 It has been noted that the transformation paths symbolize the general direction of change instead of the detailed movements of these changes. The movements of change are absolutely not as simplistic as a linear process. They are more like ‘a series of spirals’ with interwoven progress and regress, ups and downs (Benner 2012:191–9).
2.6 Additional Explanations

Some additional explanations about the use of the terminology collectivism and individualism in this thesis and the scope of the research are provided here below.

2.6.1 The Terminology of Collectivism and Individualism

As mentioned, both Tu Weiming and Moltmann are concerned about the issues of collectivism and individualism. Still it is the case that both of them do not specify what kind of collectivism and individualism they are talking about. In other words, they, as well as many other scholars tend to generalize individualism as being Western and collectivism as being Eastern. On the contrary, however, Western or Eastern behaviours are not uniform in terms of collectivism or individualism. One should also add that the reasons shaping any variety of collectivism or individualism are also not the same. Besides, there is more than one type of collectivism and individualism and so there are and should be more than one single categorization for each general topic. However, the definitions and types of collectivism and individualism found in secondary literature are not the main focus of this research and so in order to address this problem, a discussion of this matter is placed in A-C for reference. Whenever it is necessary, I will specify the type of collectivism and individualism intended in discussions that refer to them in order to avoid simplistic such generalizations or even reductionism, especially in terms of certain local ‘cultural patterns’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:375).

2.6.2 The Scope of the Research

The goals of this research will be confined to the scope described in the following seven propositional claims:

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83 It is notable that ‘holism’ is another term denoting ‘collectivism’. There is no general consensus about the scope of individualistic and collectivistic (or holist) explanations or the standards related to their usage and definition (Zahle and Collin 2014a:6, 11).
First, this research is to some extent pursued in the form of a dialogue between Tu Weiming and Moltmann. Therefore, in terms of the forms of dialogue in a ‘multifaith society’, this research is what Moltmann (2000a:18–22, eo) calls an ‘indirect dialogue’ instead of a ‘direct’ one. The purpose of a ‘direct’ dialogue is for exchanging different ‘religious ideas’ [even in a simplistically and culturally relativistic form], but the purpose of an ‘indirect’ dialogue is for searching for a common solution for any social question that is being discussed and might be globally significant (ibid. 21). This kind of dialogue is ‘indirect’ because its focus is not on ‘ourselves or each other … [but on] a third factor — something outside ourselves’ (ibid.). It would seem that Tu Weiming would also agree that the approach of this thesis involves an indirect dialogue; for in his book, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (1985), Tu claims that it is not meant to be ‘a mere exchange of information’, but is intended to respond to ‘perennial human concerns’ or ‘a living encounter’ (Tu 1985:7). Although the research problem is contextualized in this thesis partly because of the limitation of space, the complications related to the problem of the RFS is and will be globally significant across ethnicities and cultures, especially when New Ruism becomes a global value that New Ruists pursue and promote. Particularly in this light, then, Protestant Christianity should not be limited to or over-generalized as being only Western, nor should Ruism be taken merely to be Chinese or East Asian, just as Thomas A. Metzger (2001:566) challenges New Ruists.84

With regard to what kind of attitudes are appropriate to adopt whenever one faith engages in discussions with another faith in a ‘multifaith society’ (such as exclusivist,85 inclusivist, pluralistic,86 or some other approaches), these questions are part of ongoing debates (Hick

84 Metzger (2001:566, eo) challenges New Ruists by saying: ‘The “Dao” (「道」) is a human way, but not a Western or Chinese way; the Confucian orthodoxy should go towards globalization, but not towards Sinicization, let alone Westernization. Is this not [New] Ruists’ own perspective?’

85 Or ‘particularist’ in McGrath’s (1997:158–9) language.

86 It is worth noting that over the years, Tu (2007a:4–15) has been devoting himself to various dialogues among civilizations in contemporary contexts of cultural pluralities. He contends that any alternative
However, this is not the place to go into an extended and detailed discussion of these debates due to the limitation of space.

Secondly, Arthur Wright (1964:v) pointed out that there are basic problems produced by ‘false antitheses’, ‘monolithic comparisons’, and ‘cliché generalization[s]’ or overstatements inherent in cross-cultural comparative studies, especially in comparative studies of the so-called ‘East’ and ‘West’. These problematic ways of comparison tend to either cover up the diversity within each generalized side by highlighting differences between each (Johnson 1985:91f.), or elude ‘cultural critic[ism]’ by means of a form of ‘simple cultural relativism’ (Kasulis 1994:85). Most criticisms of post-traditional Ruism as a major cause for this RFS research problem are argued in reductionist and generalizing manners. They tend to over-generalize regardless of the historical facts that document the plurality of varying schools of Ruism that exist currently as well as throughout appropriate cultural histories. However, it is not the scope of this research to comprehensively examine these problems of reductionism and generalization, because neither Tu Weiming nor Moltmann defend their accounts against these kinds of problems. The task of this research is to examine how Tu Weiming and

cultural model that serves as a unitary standard will have to be aware of and respond to the possibility of becoming an assimilating power for Western dominance in modern cultures. Even if he does not claim himself to be a philosophical pluralist, he (2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yang, Xuegong 2003:12) discloses his pluralistic tendencies and proudly presents ‘殊途同歸’ (different roads leading to the same goal) as a traditional Ruist proposition. See also Tu Weiming (2007a:4–16).


See also C1F6, C1F7 and C1F86.
Moltmann defend their accounts of relational selfhood against criticisms of PTRIC relational selfhood as a source of RFS and so, in response to the research problem, to suggest an alternative solution. In Moltmann’s case, this is rarely done in any direct manner, but is pursued in dialogues with some of his Chinese contemporaries in ways that suggest relevant criticism. However, in order to achieve this task, the problems will be disclosed whenever it is deemed necessary to do so, in order to avoid any over-generalization and distortion of the evidence referred to or criticisms that are raised by other scholars.

Thirdly, this research explores the different conceptualizations of relational selfhood related to the issue of the real self (or unveiled self) instead of merely the issue of identity, although they are related to each other and possess overlapping meanings (Lawler 2008:7). In other words, my identity denotes mainly who I am, but my real self, while involving about who I am, denotes about what I think and how I feel in the following discussions about the problem of the RFS.

Fourthly, the influences of different cultures, beliefs, and thoughts on people in the modern world are ‘manifold’ in both conscious and unconscious ways (Nakamura 1964:37). Therefore, there must be many factors interactively contributing to the problem of the RFS. Due to the limitation of space, however, this research focuses only on the social behavioural factors related to RFS as resulting from PTRIC cultural phenomena addressing relational selfhood that are criticized by scholars.

Fifthly, this text-based research is not a comprehensive comparative study between Ruism and Christianity in general but an attempt to identify and analyse alternative theoretical solution(s) for the fundamental problem of the RFS existing in PTRIC societies. Evidence supporting the existence of this problem in PTRIC cultural contexts is provided by scholars in both empirical and theoretical studies. The alternative
solution(s) suggested at the end of this thesis still need(s) to be further verified by advanced empirical and additional theoretical studies.

Sixthly, the explorations of Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood and Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood are mainly based on their works. In order to analyse, compare, and criticize these concepts as discussed within their works, other relevant writings by other scholars, Ruists, theologians, and philosophers will also be discussed.

Finally, it should be noted that immoral or illegal behaviour that is conditioned by society or coerced by the state (Sider 2012:55) is excluded from this research.\(^{90}\)

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\(^{90}\) In answering the common question — ‘Does this imply being evil?’ — asked in the context of being or living out one’s real self as it is, Rogers (1961:177) relieves such worries by explaining that when one ‘lives closely and acceptingly with’ the complexity of one’s true feelings, one’s true feelings ‘operate in a constructive harmony rather than sweeping [oneself] into some uncontrollably evil path’.
Chapter Four

Tu Weiming’s Understanding of Self

1. Introduction

Challenged by Robert Bellah (1927-2013), an American sociologist of religion, Tu Weiming (1985:12–4) included nine essays in his book, Confucian Thought: Selhood as Creative Transformation, to answer the question, ‘What is the Confucian self?’ He also discusses the issues of selfhood in his other works. Among Contemporary New Ruists, Tu Weiming is probably the one who is most engaged in these related discussions. Although the conceptualization of relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts is recognized by many scholars as Ru-influenced or Ru-based, Tu does not usually view it as an orthodox Ruist account but disputes their criticisms as misunderstandings of Ruism. As C2 has already clarified, a solution for the problem of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood is imperative, even if it is not Ru-influenced. Therefore, in this chapter, I will explore Tu Weiming’s responses to the research problem (the RFS) and its indicator (repressive social imposition) through his conceptualizations of New Ruist relational selfhood.

1 Bellah worried about the possibilities that the radical trend of individualism would sabotage the social structure of ‘American civil religion’ (Bellah 1980, cited in Tu 1985:8). About the definition of ‘American civil religion’ and its related discussion, see Bellah (1970:168; 2005:54). However, he did not consider Ru-based collectivism as an alternative solution for individualism (Bellah 1982, cited in Tu, Weiming 1985:8; 2005:54). He (1970:95) was also worried by issues caused by the collectivistpressive imposition found in the context of Ruism and ‘the centrality of self-cultivation’ (xiūshēn 修身) in Tu Weiming’s ‘characterization of the Mencian line’ of Ruism (Bellah n.d., cited in Tu 1985:7–8, eo). Bellah is just one of many scholars who are concerned about Ruist relational selfhood as mentioned in C2, precisely because it tends to lead to the RFS. Robert Neville and John Berthrong, as founders of Boston Ruism, claim the issue of selfhood is one of the three important issues New Ruism should deal with (Cài, Déguì 蔡德貴 2004:80). The key issue is whether the self is an isolated entity or a centre of a relational nexus. It is obvious that selfhood is a big issue drawing the attention of contemporary Ruists, based on their interest in the study of selfhood in Neo-Ruism, mainly of Chu Hsi 朱熹 (p. Zhū Xī) (1130-1200) and Wáng Yángmíng 王陽明 (1472-1529 CE) (Hè, Zhiqīng 何志青 et al. 2007:87).
2. Tu’s Interpretation of Relational Selfhood in Responding to the Research Problem

In interpreting Ruist selfhood, Tu (1985:8) intends to look into ‘the authentic possibility of a new vision of the self’. Evidently, his interpretation of the Ruist self is not merely limited to disclosing the traditional Ruist concept of selfhood. He does not dispute the fact that to generalize about Ruist doctrines is a near impossible task because of the ‘elasticity’ of Ruism and its ‘vicissitudes’ over decades and centuries (ibid.:113). Furthermore, he does not believe there is either a ‘trans-temporal coherent’ understanding of Ruism or a consensual concept of it that, once revealed, would not change essentially any more (ibid.:13). However, he still tries to explain the Ruist self through his Mencian definition of Ruist sagehood as an ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’ that attains the highest excellence of morality in community (ibid.:113). In his understanding, Ruist sagehood is the embodiment of a complete self-realization (ibid.:10, 15). For him, this definition of Ruist sagehood (selfhood) is based on two main basic ‘interrelated assumptions’ (ibid.:113):

(1) the Relational Assumption (A1): ‘the self as a centre of relationships’, instead of an ‘isolable individuality’;

(2) the Self-Cultivation Assumption (A2): ‘the self as a dynamic process of spiritual development’.

Since the self is a centre of relationships and the so-called ultimate self-transformation is a communal act, the Ruist self in Tu’s understanding is basically a relational self and, therefore, viewed by Tu as an ‘open system’ (ibid.:8, 127). This means

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2 The Chinese brief version of S2 to S4 in this chapter was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi [forthcoming]2018:S2), but this English one was the original text.
3 About Tu’s definition of ultimate self-transformation as a communal act, see also Tu Weiming (1979b).
4 See also Tu Weiming (1986:176; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:20).
5 See also Tu Weiming (1990a:172, 176).
that the manifestation of the ultimate self-transformation can be seen through the ‘existence’ of the self as a centre of relationships (ibid.:127). Such a self is opposite to the ‘privatized ego’ (ibid.:57, 95). But Tu insists (1976a:52–4) that this kind of self is never collectivist. I find that, according to Tu’s definition, Ruist selfhood seems more functional than ontological. Therefore, does sociality not conflict with individuality in New Ruist selfhood? Will this highly-emphasized sociality lead to a RFS? These will be the main problems addressed in this chapter.

In order to answer the first primary subsidiary research question – To what extent is the conceptualization of the New Ruist Chinese relational selfhood presented by Tu Weiming a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood? – several relevant secondary subsidiary questions will need to be investigated:

(1) What are the meanings of Heaven, ‘the complete unity between Heaven and humanity’, and self-cultivation as disclosed in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood, especially in relation to their involvement with repressive social impositions?

(2) What are the ‘fiduciary community’ and ‘open system’ in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood in terms of the problems of repressive social imposition, and what are their implications for the unmasking of the real self?

(3) What is Tu Weiming’s New Ruist ‘cultural design’ in terms of a repressed form of self?

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6 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–40).

7 This observation of mine was found later to be supported by Robert Neville (2000:168).


9 Social scientific observations, by Zhèng Zhènbó (1990:169–70) and Zhuāng Huìqiū (1991:156–8), indicate that the traditional values of Ru-based collectivism and its concomitant RFS are...
(4) What are the presuppositions for Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood?

In order to understand Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist selfhood in a more profound way, I will start by examining the aforementioned two interrelated assumptions, beginning with the second because the first depends more on the second than the other way around.

3. Self-Cultivation Assumption (A2): The Self as a Dynamic Process of Spiritual Development

For Tu Weiming (1985:9–10), the character of the self is a dynamic process of spiritual development. Then, what does ultimate self-transformation mean and what is this process? This process is what Confucius in Analects 14:24 defined as ‘wéiji zhī xué’ 「為己之學」 (‘learning for the sake of the self’) (ibid.:52). The goal of this learning process is ‘to be human’ (zuòrén 做人) (ibid.).

Tu (ibid.:8, 15) emphasizes continually that everybody is equipped with ontologically ‘inherent’ self-sufficient ‘internal resources’, so that everyone is able to ‘become a sage’ through learning by means of their own effort. In this way, Tu views a Ruist ‘sage’ (shèngrén 聖人) to be a synonym for a Buddhist buddha (fó 佛) and a Taoist ‘true person’ (zhēnrén 真人) (ibid.:8). He explains Ruist sagehood as ‘the complete realization of the self’, the ‘full actualization’ of a perfect human nature, ‘the most genuine and authentic manifestation of humanity’, or, in Neo-Ruist terminology, ‘truly understand[ing] my human nature and … know[ing] Heaven’ (ibid.:10, 15). These abstract terms can be embodied by the saying found in Dàxué Wèn 《大學問》 (Inquiry parts of the ‘wénhuà shèjì」 (cultural design) of a post-traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. This was also been identified as ‘wénhuà yuánxíng」 (cultural prototypes) by Yu Dehui (1987b:3, eo), another concept already mentioned in C1S2.2. The discussion of this cultural design in detail is presented in A-N.

10 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:20).
11 See also Bodde (1953:63–7).
on the Great Learning) by Wang Yangming, ‘forming one body with Heaven and Earth and the myriad things’. Tu (ibid.:46) names this saying as a ‘trinity’ of Heaven, Earth, and ‘humanity’ and subsequently describes it as ‘self-transcendence’ (ibid.:10). In order to understand ultimate self-transformation and its assumed processes, the Self-Cultivation Assumption (A2) alone is insufficient. Other interrelated subsidiary assumptions are required.

3.1 First Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.1): Human Nature Is Perfectible through Self-Cultivation

Tu Weiming is one of the Ruists who engaged most in arguing for Ruism as a religion (Weber 2007:94). Therefore, he (1985:58) asserts that self-cultivation is a form of spiritual development and ‘ethico-religious growth’ and tends to adopt religious terminology in his argument. Tu (1990a:173) shares the same ‘faith’ with Mencius and other Ruists in the ‘transformability and perfectibility’ of both human nature and its condition. This means that human nature’s perfection can be attained through learning and ‘self-effort’ or self-cultivation, because the ‘ultimate reason’ for its perfection is human’s own internal strength (ibid.:27). This is Tu’s first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1): human nature is ‘perfectible’ through self-cultivation (ibid.).

By quoting from the Zhongyong 22, Tu (1976a:116f.) emphasizes that only when one is ‘absolutely sincere’ (namely the ultimate expression of self-cultivation), can one not only ‘fully develop’ one’s nature, but also one can fully develop others’ natures, and


13 See C3F29.

14 See also Tu Weiming (1985:10, 63, 137, 153; 1990a:180). This use of ‘humanity’, ‘humankind’, or ‘[hu]man’ in Tu’s other similar expressions, is very awkward in this phrasing. One would normally need a definite article, the, in front of it, or need to make the term plural as humans. Here he is stretching English, as if making ‘humanity’ or ‘[hu]man’ into a Platonic form or eidos.

15 See also Tu Weiming (1985:15; 1990a:173).

16 See also Tu Weiming (1985:74, 82, 117, 135; 1990a:174–8).

17 See also Kuiper (2011:63).
the ‘nature of things’ and then help in ‘the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth’ and form a trinity with them.\textsuperscript{18}

This perfection of self-transformation is stressed by Tu (1985:19, 22) repeatedly as ‘a ceaseless process’, \textsuperscript{19} or ‘an unceasing process’, \textsuperscript{20} one that ‘never ends’ (Tu 1989a:95).\textsuperscript{21} On the one hand, Tu emphasizes that everybody can become a sage, but, on the other hand, he recognizes the fact that in terms of the full development of personality, it is very difficult to become a ‘noble[hu]man or profound person’\textsuperscript{22} (‘jūnzi’ 「君子」), let alone to become a sage.\textsuperscript{23} In order to resolve this obvious conflict, he argues that a ‘minimum requirement’ for personality can work as the standard, while the full development of it should not serve as this standard but ‘maximum fulfilment’ or realization (ibid.:90).\textsuperscript{24} Does Tu mean by this argument that there are at least two levels of sages — one that is unreachably perfect, and the other that is reachable as the minimum required for perfection? Can this reachable minimum standard required to become a perfect sage still mean perfect? Tu (1979a:142) introduces Wang Yangming’s notion and states unequivocally that the ‘potentiality’ to be a sage is inherent in everyone as a reality that ‘can never be fully realized’. Tu (1985:24–5) admits that it as an ‘ontological postulate’ cannot be ‘empirically’ proven or experienced in the existent world.\textsuperscript{25} He (1976a:31–2) also recognizes that neither Yán Huí 颜回 (521-481 BCE).\textsuperscript{26} Confucius’

\textsuperscript{18} See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77).
\textsuperscript{19} See also Tu Weiming (1985:31, 39, 52, 63, 67, 74, 94, 113, 131; 1990a:177).
\textsuperscript{20} See also Tu Weiming (1979a:xii, 28, 68, 86, 89, 141, 143).
\textsuperscript{21} See also Tu Weiming (1979a:90).
\textsuperscript{22} Tu Weiming (1990a:177).
\textsuperscript{23} Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10).
\textsuperscript{24} See also Tu Weiming (2008a:438).
\textsuperscript{25} See also Tu Weiming (2014b:website).
\textsuperscript{26} See also Tu Weiming (1989a:25).
best disciple, nor even Confucius himself can ‘claim to be a sage’ (Tu 1985:25). He (1976a:44) claims that this is simply an ideal nobody can reach in the future as well as in the past. Nevertheless, Tu (1985:24–5, eo) still justifies his faith in the perfectibility of human nature by two arguments:

(1) A logical pre-condition for his ‘ontological postulate’: human perfectibility is the ‘rational’ assumption about human beings. He (ibid.:24) states:

> common to all Three Teachings is the further claim that inherent in human nature is the moral and spiritual propensity for self-development … It is in this connection that Mencius insists upon the goodness of human nature as the real basis for self-realization.

This assumption leads to what he calls the ‘Moral Universal’, which assumes that ‘[H]uman beings are moral … [and] self-perfectible beings’ (ibid.:27, eo).

(2) An ‘experiential assertion about the concrete path [of self-cultivation] (ibid. 24). He (ibid. 25, eo) states:

> the human condition here and now, rather than either the original position in the past or a utopian projection into the future, is the central concern. It is in this sense that the ontological postulate of human perfectibility must be supplemented by an experiential assertion about the concrete path by which one's own germinations and seeds can eventually be brought to fruition.

Nevertheless, this experiential assertion is not what Tu and any other Ruist, including Confucius, can ever experience if this fruition means perfection. Based on this

27 Analects 7:34a: 14:28a and Zhongyong 13d. See also Tu Weiming (1979a:7; 2014b:website).
28 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:32).
29 About sagehood, see Analects 7:26.
30 Some other modern or New Ruists apparently share the same attitude. For example, the other third generation New Ruist, Liu Shuhsin (1987:229), does not think such an ideal world can ever exist on the earth, even the world of King Shun (舜) and King Yáo (堯) that Confucius dreams of cannot be called an ideal one, let alone for Confucius himself. Or as Wéi Zhèngtōng (韋政通) (1927–7) (1990:26–7), a Chinese historian, points out, the legendary personalities of King Shun and King Yao are an idealization of ancient kings in the ‘past time orientation’ (Chónggǔ de Jiàzhí Qǔxiàng ‘崇古的價值取向’) of Chinese culture promoted by Ruism.
31 Tu (1985:19, 26) asserts a common assumption shared by all of them that ‘moral and spiritual self-development involves not only a convergence of stages to be perfected but also a multiplicity of ways to be pursued’. This assertion can be understood simply through a popular saying, ‘all roads lead to Rome’.
32 From the doctrines of the Three Teachings, their unobjectionable conclusions on their selfhood all mean the human perfectibility in their respective context: everyone can become a sage in Ruism, everyone can become a Buddha in Buddhism, and everyone can become a real human in Daoism (Cài, Rénhòu 蔡仁厚 1984:77).
belief, Tu extends the ‘transformative potential’ of this perfectibility of the self to ‘the family, the state, and the world’ (ibid.:135). Surprisingly, in another place where he interprets ‘the profound person’ as discussed in the Zhongyong, Tu (1976a:30–33) not only accepts the problem that such a contradiction between reality and his claim of the perfectibility of human nature creates, but also suggests that persons need to bear this in mind as ‘the apparent incompatibility’, viewing it as ‘the assumptive reasoning’ within the Zhongyong.\(^\text{33}\) This means that, in order to insist upon this sub-assumption (A2.1), another assumption must be added to his argument as its basis.

### 3.2 Second Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.2): The Intrinsic Goodness of Human Nature

As is well-known, the core value of the Mencian line of Ruism is that human nature is good. In Tu’s (1985:24) interpretation, this assumed and asserted the Ruist doctrine of the ‘intrinsic goodness’ (ibid.:126) of human nature, as his second self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.2), becomes the source of any human’s ‘inner worth’ (ibid.:77). I find that it is also the basis for all other related discussions about self-cultivation.

In order to strengthen this doctrine, Tu (ibid.:24-5) argues on the basis of Mencius’ famous thesis, xìngshànshuō 性善说 as an ‘idealism’ (Tu 2014b:website).\(^\text{34}\) This theory claims the ‘intrinsic goodness’ of human nature is manifest in ‘the four germinations [sìduān 四端] of the four basic human feelings’\(^\text{35}\) that are themselves ‘inherent’ in every human’s ‘hsin [心 p. xīn]’ (heart-and-mind) (Tu 1985:23–5).\(^\text{36}\) On the one hand, Tu

\(^{33}\) See also Tu Weiming (1989a:24–5).

\(^{34}\) Confucius himself never discussed the issue of human nature, whereas his followers separated into two major wings: the ‘idealist and rationalist’. The former is based on the Mencian (孟子) thesis, xìngshànshuō 性善說 (the goodness of human nature), and the latter on Xunzi’s (荀子) thesis, xìngèshuō 性惡說 (the badness of human nature) (Tan, Jonathan Y. 2003a:96–7).

\(^{35}\) Sìduān is later translated as ‘the Four Sprouts’ by Tu (2008a:438).

\(^{36}\) Although some might still debate its meaning, Mencius’ thesis xìngshànshuō 性善說 should be precisely understood and translated as ‘the goodness’ of human nature (Pfister 2014b:20–26). Tu Weiming’s
(ibid.:24-32, 128) recognizes the corruptibility, fallibility, and immorality of human beings, to the point that he (1979b:238, eo) even uses the Christian terms ‘prelapsarian’\textsuperscript{37} and ‘postlapsarian’ to indicate that the ‘transcendence’ of human beings before the Fall is ‘alien’ and not ‘experienceable’ after the Fall.\textsuperscript{38}

Yet, on the other hand, he (1985:24, 128) imputes the causes of these failures in human nature to be completely determined by other ‘internal and external’ factors and so rejects the concept of original sin in his New Ruist account. He (1979a:8) also rejects ‘God’s grace’ as the ‘ultimate source’ of moral cultivation. However, he (2014b:website) recently argues that the intrinsic goodness of human nature can never be deprived of by any external force.\textsuperscript{39} In fact, Tu (1985:24) himself also uses the term ‘propensity’ to describe his own account of the goodness of human nature.\textsuperscript{40} Why, then, is self-realization needed if human nature is intrinsically good according to Tu’s interpretation? Tu (1985:126) explains it further:

> The intrinsic goodness in our nature is often in a latent state: only through long and strenuous effort can it be realized as an experienced reality. In a deeper sense, however, a distinction between [the] ontological assertion and [the] existential realization must be made. Self-realization is an existential idea, specifying a way of bringing into existence the ontological assertion that human nature is good. Precisely because human nature is good, the ultimate understanding and translation as the ‘intrinsic goodness’ of human nature is actually ‘xingbēnshàn’「性本善」interpreted and supported primarily by Chu Hsi (Liu, Chengwei 劉振維 p. Liú Zhènwéi 2005).

\textsuperscript{37} Tu Weiming (1985:128).

\textsuperscript{38} See also Tu Weiming (1986:175–6). However, Tu (1985:158) also denies the post-lapsarian state of human beings in another place by asserting that ‘it appears that there is no post-lapsarian state to encounter and that alienation as a deep-rooted feeling of estrangement from one’s primordial origin is nonexistent’.

\textsuperscript{39} It is notable that not every Ruist and research scholar in Ruism agrees with this Mencian thesis, but some of them understand this theory of the ‘intrinsic goodness of human nature’ to be merely a ‘tendency of [it] to good’ (Pfister 2013b:107). James Behuniak Jr. (2002:105) demonstrates his similar interpretation based on modern archaeological findings, mainly on a document from the unearthed Guōdiàn Zhújiǎn 郭店竹簡: \textit{Xìng zì Mìng Chū》(Dispositions Arise from Conditions). He argues that the notions of human nature in the Mencian four germinations should be most appropriately realized as ‘a dynamic disposition’, a ‘process’ of becoming human, or ‘a product of experience’ formed by external socio-environmental and temporal ‘conditions’, instead of ‘an essential attribute’ or an intrinsic biological shared nature found in all human beings at all times (ibid.:v, 97-132). See also Legge (1875 reprinted in 2011b:17–70, 178).

\textsuperscript{40} It is worth noting that Tu (1976a:9; 1979a:18; 1985:10) uses the term ‘self-actualization’ as an interchangeable synonym of self-realization, self-cultivation, and self-effort to explain the perfectibility of human nature, but it does not mean the same thing as in Aristotelian philosophy. Tu’s actualization or existential realization is merely a tendency to cultivate one’s self without ‘a predetermined \textit{telos}’ that ‘Aristotelian actualization’ has in the ‘potentiality’ of any being (Weber 2007:87, eo).
basis for self-realization and the actual process of initiating self-cultivation are both located in the structure of the self … There is an implicit circularity in this conception of the self: human nature is good so that there is an authentic possibility for dynamic spiritual development and vice versa. If we accept that the … distinction of ontological assertion and existential realization also involves a dialectic relationship, the circularity is no longer a vicious one.

Although he recognizes the circular argument implied by this explanation, Tu argues that this circular reasoning can be accepted as long as the differentiation between the ontological assertion and the existential realization can be viewed as ‘a dialectic relationship’ (ibid.). However, in his earlier explanation (1979b:238, eo) that a transcendence of self other than the ‘experienceable’ one can be justified for ‘postlapsarian … human nature’, we must continue to ask, does this argument suggest that either the ontological assertion cannot stand, or the existential realization cannot be experienced after the Fall of human beings? Tu obviously wavers between his positions about the experienceability of the intrinsic goodness of human nature.41

It has been noted that Tu (1976a:115–21) uses a similar argument to bridge the gap between the need to ‘learn to be sincere’ and the ‘reality of … [the] heavenly endowed nature’ of sincerity.42 In fact, regarding the issue of human nature’s sincerity, he also contradicts his other statements when he affirms the ‘incompleteness’ of sincerity in human nature in one context,43 while denying it in another context (ibid.:115, eo; 1989a:77, eo):

41 However, another New Ruist, Liu Shuhsien (1989:267–8), stresses that the goodness of human nature cannot be understood on the level of experience because it is not established by arguing from the experiential evidence.

42 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77–9). Based on the account of Chou Tuni 周敦頤 (p. Zhōu Dūnyí) (1017-73), Tu (1985:151–2, eo) further stresses an ontological understanding of Cheng (誠), instead of an ethical and psychological concept of it, and renders it also as ‘truth or reality’. He consider it denoting ‘honest genuineness’ which should ground ‘a heartfelt feeling’ on ‘realities’ rather than ‘semblances’. See also Tu Weiming (1976a:104–106; 1989a:70). But, based on his studies on the Daxue 6 and the Zhongyong 20 and 25, Plaks (2003:107, eo) disagrees the common rendering of Cheng by most traditional and post-traditional Chinese and Western commentators and scholars: ‘truthfulness or sincerity’. He renders it as ‘integral wholeness’ because in those contexts Cheng denotes the ‘authenticity’, ‘completion’, or ‘integrity of the inner self’ instead of ‘the self’s faithful representation to others’.

43 Tu (1976a:35) states, ‘Unless one has already come to terms with one’s inner self, that which is hidden and subtle to others but visible and manifest to oneself, modelling one’s life upon an established pattern of behaviour will be a limited and limiting experience.’ See also Tu Weiming (1989a:27).
Underlying this assertion is the premise that the human way is, in an ultimate sense, identified with the Way of Heaven because they share the same ontological reality. To be sure, Heaven is by nature sincere and human beings must learn to be sincere. Yet the reason human beings can learn to be sincere is not because of Heaven’s grace but because their nature is originally so endowed. The reason that human beings must learn to be sincere is not because of any incompleteness in their ontological reality but because their existential situations make it necessary.

Nevertheless, Tu asserts that Ruists do not agree with the ‘existentialist belief’ related to human nature (1976a:95, eo). The issue of whether both Tu’s ontological and existential notions in this context mean the same as essentialism and teleology might not be directly relevant to this research because it does not matter what he really means in his argument. The more relevant question comes about due to Tu’s argument for defending his own circular reasoning. This I will discuss later. However, he also bases this assumption (A2.2) on another assumption: a human’s original and inherent nature is bestowed by Heaven (ibid.:24-5, 126).

3.3 Third Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.3): Human Nature Is Endowed by Heaven

Based on Chan Wingtsit’s indirect interpretation of the Zhongyong and the ‘postulate’ of Chang Tsai 張載 (p. Zhāng Zǎi) (1020-77), Tu (ibid.:14, 23-4) believes that any human’s original nature is ‘endowed by Heaven’. Put in other words, Heaven is the ‘source’ of ultimate self-transformation (Tu 2002c:36). What the term Heaven means in Tu’s interpretation will be explored in the next section. This ‘Heaven-endowed’ human

44 Namely that ‘since our existence precedes our essence we can shape our nature according to our own independent action through conscious living’ (ibid.:95).

45 Tu tries to apply an essentialist concept and terminology to Ruist context of self-cultivation, namely to explain Ruist self-cultivation with a solid start and an expected goal. But Ralph Weber (2007:86–7, eo) criticizes his ontological assertion and existential realization as just a ‘processual and contextual’, instead of an essentialist ontological and ‘teleological’, notion of self-cultivation. He points out that in Tu’s interpretation of Ruist self-cultivation, both the solid ‘ground’, namely ‘is’ (Tu 1979a:142), and the expected goal or more rather the ‘concrete process’, namely ‘ought to be’ (ibid.), are susceptible to ‘change and circumstantiality’. For Tu emphasizes further ‘[one]’s being what [one] is must be sought in [one’s] becoming what [one] ought to be, and vice versa’ (ibid.:143, eo).

46 Based on Cheng Hsüan 鄭玄 (p. Zhèng Xuán) (127-200), the Zhōngyōng Zhù 《中庸注》 (Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean) (Chan, Wingtsit 1969:98).

nature is defined, explained, and described by Tu (1985:127) in the following terms or phrases:

(1) ‘conscience’ (ibid.);

(2) ‘the reality known as the principle [理]’ (ibid.:131-2, eo);

(3) the original inner ability and wisdom to ‘know and experience ultimate reality in its all-embracing fullness’ (ibid.:161);

(4) the assumed ‘ability of intellectual intuition (智的直覺)’ as the ‘Chinese mode of thinking’ (ibid.:163, eo);

(5) ‘the germinations of morality or seeds of enlightenment’ (ibid.:23, eo);

(6) the Mencian moral ‘sensibility of the 心 (p. xīn)’ (ibid.:24);

(7) ‘the humanity of the heart’ for self-realization (ibid.:30, 32, eo);

(8) ‘the irreducibility of the vital energy and raw stuff for personal growth’ (1990a:172).

Tu Weiming (1985:12) does not think that either he himself or Mencius is promoting a ‘romantic advocacy’ or ‘optimism’ (2014b:website) of the perfectibility of humankind. He (1979a:30) himself had earlier acknowledged that Ruist sagehood is ‘the personality ideal’ that even Confucius himself could not attain. Therefore, Tu explains that the ‘theory’ of Heaven-endowed human nature is for directing us to appeal to ‘our internal resources for spiritual growth’ (ibid.). Since Tu believes that human nature is endowed by Heaven, why is that same nature also identified with our internal resources? Does he mean by this theory that all of the resources human beings need to attain an ultimate and perfect spiritual transformation are endowed by Heaven, and so it simply is assumed to be realizable for this purpose?

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49 See also Tu Weiming (1985:30, 74, 127).
In several places, Tu (1976a:35; 1989a:27) stresses human nature as a ‘self-generating source of strength’. For example, he (ibid.) says, ‘What [Zhōngyōng] envisions seems to be a creative process of self-realization, fostered by a self-generating source of strength’. He (1985:126) also says in the context of explaining ‘Heaven-endowed’ human nature:

[w]e can well see that inherent in the structure of the self is a powerful longing for the transcendent, not for an external supreme being but for the Heaven that has bestowed on us our original nature. This longing for the transcendent, in a deeper sense, is also an urge for self-transcendence, to go beyond what the self existentially is so that it can become what it ought to be. Although we are, in ontological terms, never deficient in our internally-generated capacity for spiritual development, we must constantly open ourselves up to the symbolic resources available to us for pursuing the concrete paths of self-realization. The participation of the other is not only desirable but absolutely necessary.

His assertion here sounds confusing. What does ‘Heaven-endowed’ mean while he also stresses the ‘internally-generated capacity’ in human beings which is never deficient ontologically? What does ‘the symbolic resources’, indicating the other, which is ‘absolutely necessary’ mean while ‘[one is] … ontologically … never deficient in one’s internally-generated capacity for spiritual development? Tu does not go further to clarify it.

3.4 Fourth Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.4): Reaching Heaven Is Precisely Full Self-Realization

3.4.1 The Meaning of Heaven

Tu Weiming clearly assumes that Heaven is a central concept for self-cultivation in the context of Ruist spirituality. Yet for him, this concept of Heaven appears to be self-evident in the context of East Asia, so that he does not need to define it and explain it. Only in two places, Tu (1985:73) denotes Heaven as ‘the ultimate reality’ and equates it with the Way as ‘the ultimacy’ (ibid.:125). Nevertheless he hesitates to recognize it as ‘a transcendent reality’ (ibid.:27, 73). Even if he calls Heaven ‘the transcendent’, he still denies that it is ‘an external supreme being’ (ibid.:126). In his eyes, the profound purpose of the self’s longing for Heaven is for ‘self-transcendence’, so that the self would no
longer be as it is ‘existentially’, but it can ‘become what it ought to be’ (ibid.:126, 136-7), or what he (1989a:98) calls the ‘godlike sage’. It is worth noting here that, as mentioned in C2S4.4 and A-ES3 to A-ES6, the strong sense of pursuing oughts, especially being imposed externally, is related directly to the RFS.

It is also notable that Tu seems not to make any conceptual distinction between the two terms: *transcendent* and *transcendental* (cf. Tu 1985:126 and 132). In his interpretation (1976a:7–9, 102–104), Heaven is transcendent but ‘immanent’, absolutely not an external and personal Creator-God. Since Heaven is not a personal being and human nature is not created by Heaven, would that Heaven imparted human nature be a merely metaphorical way to describe the innateness of human nature? He seems never to clarify it.

Therefore, in Tu’s account the self’s *hsin* 心 appears to be ontologically equivalent to Heaven as long as the self decides with a strong will to pursue self-transcendence. In the context of the legendary Sage-King Shun (Shèng-Wáng Shùn 聖王舜) (ca. 2294-2184 BCE) as exemplifying the case of ‘reaching Heaven’, Tu (1985:127) assumes one sense of reaching Heaven as ‘fully realizing [one’s] selfhood precisely’. He (1976a:128–9)

50 This independent finding of mine is verified later by Li Minghui’s (2001a:132) finding in the similar undifferentiated usages of these two terms by Tu Weiming’s teacher, Mou Tsungsan. The term ‘transcendental’ is a particular technical word in Kantian epistemological vocabulary. It refers to ‘a priori cognition … by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori)’. In this sense, it always is part of human experience and cannot be associated with an ontologically transcendent reality (Kant 1781, trans. in 1998:196).

51 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:9, 69, 116; 2008a:445). It has been noted that only in one place within his works Heaven appears to Tu (1990a:180) looking like a personal being who is ‘omnipresent and may be omniscient’ but ‘is certainly not omnipotent’ and ‘do[es] not speak’. See also Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:11f.). Tu (1985:132) unequivocally differentiates the Ruist Heaven (including similar concepts in Daoism and Buddhism) from ‘a transcendent personal God’ (ibid.), ‘an external supreme being’ (ibid.:126) as a ‘source of authority’ (ibid.:125), ‘a wholly other’ (ibid.:132, eo), a higher ‘external intelligence’ (ibid.:36), or ‘an almighty creator’ (ibid.:38). Tu Weiming’s concept about the Ruist Heaven is not unusual. In differentiating the Ruist ‘Lord-on-High and Heaven’ from the Creator God (Yahweh) in Christianity, Julia Ching (1934-2001) (1977:143) states that the Ruist Heaven lacks ‘a theory of creation ex nihilo’, ‘inherently a notion of personality’, and ‘any clear historicity’.

52 Tu’s interpretation of Heaven obviously follows the interpretation of Neo-Ruists because for them ‘Heaven, the Way of Heaven, principle, nature, and the heart/mind are regarded as being essentially the same’ (Yao, Xinzong 2000:148–9).
explained earlier the ontological reality of human as the ontological reality of Heaven in this way:  

Since the ontological reality of [hu]man is none other than the ontological reality of Heaven, and since the ch'eng [誠 (sincerity)] of the sage is the same as the ch'eng of Heaven, they can be fully united … not [as] an antinomic bi-unity but [as] an indivisibly single oneness. The sage as the most authentic manifestation of humanity does not coexist with Heaven … [but forms] a coincidence with Heaven … not the unity of opposites but a continuous, lasting and homogeneous whole … an unbreakable organismic continuum.

Apparently (on the basis of his argument) because the self (or ‘Humanity’) ought to be so, therefore, it does not merely long for Heaven, but also can be recognized as being ontologically indistinct, ‘indivisib[le]’ and ‘inseparab[le]’ from Heaven (Tu 1976a:129; 1989a:84).

According to this assumption, assigned as the fourth self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.4): reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization, Heaven itself must be based on the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible) and his definition of Ruist sagehood as an ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’.

Tu recognizes in the Three Teachings the promotion of a kind of atheism in a religious sense and so argues as well that there is no after-life within Heaven or an

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53 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:84).


eternity in Ruism.\textsuperscript{56} When discussing the concept of creation, he (1979a:86) stresses that ‘the very nature of [hu]man … is imparted, but not created, by Heaven’. However, in the same work, he (ibid.:20, eo) also says:

\begin{quote}
[Hum]an has the inner strength to actualize the full potential of his/[her] being, and his/[her] creativity is inherent in his/[her] humanness. [Hum]an, therefore, is not a creature but a creative agent who gives meaning to Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things.
\end{quote}

How can human nature be imparted by \textit{Heaven} which humans give meaning to?

Tu (ibid.:159) follows in the footsteps of his teacher, Mou Tsungsan (1962 in 2003b:22–3), a second generation New Ruist, by viewing Heaven from the functional aspect instead of the ontological perspective based on a personal God as an ‘entity’. Tu (1976a:104–106, 116–18) argues that human beings partake ‘their nature from Heaven’ and so share an identical ‘essence’ with Heaven due to their Heaven-endowment (ibid.).\textsuperscript{57} Even he himself admits that ‘the likelihood of one’s becoming completely identified with heaven and earth is extremely limited’ (1989a:118f.).\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, he argues this because it appears to him as a self-evident truth. He (1985:158) asserts:

\begin{quote}
For we are all potentially guardians and indeed co-creators of the universe. In this holistic vision of man, an ontological gap between Creator and creature would seem to be almost inconceivable. It appears that there is no post-lapsarian state to encounter and that alienation as a deep-rooted feeling of estrangement from one’s primordial origin is nonexistent.
\end{quote}

Not only does Tu (ibid.) deny that there is any ‘ontological’ difference between ‘Creator and creature’, but he also promotes human beings to the level of being ‘co-creators of the universe’, namely ‘godlike sage’ (1989a:98), making humans’ efforts necessary in fulfilling Heaven’s infinite creative power.\textsuperscript{59}

If Heaven in this account is by no means a transcendent personal God or an external supreme being, what sense does it make to say that Heaven is omnipresent and omniscient

\textsuperscript{56} Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10).
\textsuperscript{57} See also Tu Weiming (1989a:70, 77).
\textsuperscript{58} See also Tu Weiming (1989a:78).
\textsuperscript{59} See also Tu Weiming (1976a:104–106, 129–30; 1989a:70, 84, 98, 102, 106; 2002c:37; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:10f.).
but not omnipotent? Tu (1989a:120f.) does state that the heart-and-mind is ‘omnipresent but not omnipotent’. Would it then be possible to summarize this position by stating that Heaven is in fact the perfect ideal heart-and-mind of human beings? In order to stress the value of humanity, would Heaven’s authority and will be replaced by the ultimate realization of benevolence and righteousness in human’s heart-and-mind as Zheng Zhiming (1986:183) points out? Since there is no creator and no creature in terms of creation, where does the concept of the fully realized human as co-creator come from? With whom do human beings co-create? Who are the creatures that are being created? Or is it the universe that is being extended or created? What then constitutes this universe? Tu (1989a:106) seems to call human beings co-creators in order to promote them to the same level of Heaven and Earth in this Ruist trinity.60

3.4.2 The Transcendence of Heaven

In discussing ‘the transcendence of Heaven’, Tu (1985:125) recognizes a significant difference with ‘the transcendence of God’. Based on his Mencian thesis, he defines ‘the transcendence of Heaven’ as the ‘understanding of Heaven’, appreciating the value of ‘the subtle meanings of the Mandate of Heaven’ (ibid.). This transcendence can be reached only after ‘a full realization of our minds’ and then ‘a comprehension of our nature’ (ibid.). Therefore, the ‘transcendent dimension’ of Ruist selfhood is that ‘Heaven resides in it, works through it and … is also revealed by it’ and ‘selfhood so conceived maintains a tacit communication’ with Heaven (ibid.:125-6), or a ‘dialogical response to the transcendent’ (Tu 1989a:x, 94). He explains more recently this communication or dialogical response in Chinese by means of a literary idiom, ‘xiānghù gǎn tōng’ 「相互感通」(reciprocal perceiving and connecting),61 however, he (2008a:440) also admits

60 I consider that Tu derives this concept from the Zhongyong 22.
that ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act and as a faithful dialogical response to the transcendent … does not entirely sound Confucian’, as criticized by Roetz (2008:370). In terms of this admission, can he still claim the orthodoxy of his New Ruist interpretation (C1S3.1.1)?

Tu insists that the full realization of the self can be embodied ‘within its own reality’ without any help from external non-human others (Tu 1985:45–6, 60–63). In his understanding (ibid.:60), the full realization of the self, namely ‘absolute sincerity’ (Tu 1976a:116f.), is to attain the ‘highest transcendence’, namely ‘the complete unity between humanity and Heaven’ or a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’. Tu goes to great lengths to emphasize the importance of this highest transcendence and tries to interpret and discuss these concepts in most of his works. Although Tu denies that Heaven is a creator or any other external being, he emphasizes that, in an ultimate sense, Heaven and humans form a relationship of ‘mutual fidelity’ and that humans ‘serve Heaven’ (Tu 1985:73, 132, 163). He also defines the ‘religiosity’ of Neo-Ruism by the ‘mut[u]ality of Heaven and [hu]man’ (ibid.:132). In this sense, he unusually states that ‘the gap between Creator and creature is bridgeable’ based on Confucius’ words quoted


63 It is notable that he (2002a:429–30) points out that there has not been any systematic works, either in the field of Ruism or of Chinese philosophy, probing into them seriously until now, even though they have been recognized as an essential characteristic of Chinese thought by some influential Ruists and Chinese philosophers (see also Cheng, Chungying and Leung, Insing 2004; Li, Ming 李明 2009). Why? He does not explain this claim any further. Might this claim imply that ‘the complete unity between humanity and Heaven’ is merely a not-well-understood speculation, and that real transcendence is unfathomable for human beings without revelation from that transcendent external one? Ruist schools have no consistent understanding and interpretation of the complete unity between humanity and Heaven. (Guō, Qingxiang 郭清香 2006:66) For example, the Ruist school of philosophy of the Song dynasty (960-1279) and after asserts that there is no difference between Heaven and humanity and, therefore, there is not any need for them to form into one body (Zhōu, Xiǎoān 周小安 2001:78, 83; Li, Ming 2009:27). This assertion is quite different from the one before the Song dynasty.

64 I consider that Tu’s concept of serving Heaven is based on claims from Mencius, 7A:1, where the phrase ‘shìtiān’「事天」appears.

65 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:9; 1985:63, 137).
in the *Zhuāngzǐ* 《莊子》 that refer to ‘Zàowùzhě’ 「造物者」 (the Creator) (ibid.:93).

By means of this interpretation, he (Tu 1985:93, 109 n.4) tries to soften the strong statements made both by himself more than once and by Frederick W. Mote (1922-2005):

The Chinese [people] … are apparently unique in having no creation myth; that is, they have regarded the world and [hu]man as uncreated, as constituting the central features of a spontaneously self-generating cosmos having no creator, god, ultimate cause or will external to itself. (Mote 1971, revised in 1993:13)


Tu (1985:47) mentions ‘the spirit of Heaven and Earth’ in discussing the relationship between humanity and nature. How can the meanings of the technical terms ‘mutual fidelity’, ‘communication’, *reciprocal perceiving and connecting*, and

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66 *Zhuangzi* 《莊子》, 6: 「彼方且與造物者為人，而遊乎天地之一氣。」 ([The other two men, moreover, make [hu]man to be the fellow of the Creator, and seek their enjoyment in the formless condition of heaven and earth] (trans. by James Legge in 1891:251–2).

67 ‘The lack of a creation myth is not only a prominent feature of Confucian symbolism but also a defining characteristic of Chinese cosmology’ (Tu 1976a:103; 1989a:69).

68 In fact, there is a *Maker* or ‘Creator’ found in this special chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, but Mote seemed to have never seen it before. It should be read as an early Daoist claim, however, and is not repeated in any early Ruist canonical texts. Like Mote, Walter H. Medhurst (1796–1857) (1838:181–219), E. J. Eitel (1838–1908) (1879:390), J. Edkins (1823-1905) (1885), Derk Bodde (1953:68; 1961:405), Joseph Needham (1956:581), Chang Kwangchi 張光直 (1959), Angus C. Graham (1919-1991) (1989:12), David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames (1995:184), and Geoffrey MacCormack (2001), Robert Cummings Neville (2007), also unanimously aver, despite their different arguments, that there is not any myth of cosmogony in traditional Chinese culture. But J. Chalmers (1825–1899) (1885), Berthold Laufer (1874-1934) (1912:146–7), Eduard Erkes (1891-1958) (1931), N. J. Girardot (1976), David C. Yu (1981; 1986), Michael J. Puett (2001:12–20), Andrew H. Plaks (2005), Paul R. Goldin (2008), and Erica F. Brindley (2013) disagree on such a consensus. It is notable that Paul R. Goldin (2008:3, eo) does not consider that Bodde, Mote, Graham, and Hall and Ames who deny the existence of creation myths in ancient China are mistaken. He suggests they based their arguments on a presupposition that China ‘cannot have creation myths’. Besides, Laufer (1912:146–7) also asserts that the insistence of the absence of Creation myths in Chinese traditions is only ‘a one-sided and biased version of their religion abridged and curtailed after an eclectic method stamping out everything that did not fit the Confucian system’. Due to the limitation of space, the comprehensive discussions about this issue in Chinese traditions are not included in this thesis.

69 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:70, 77).
'mutuality’ make sense if Heaven is not a being? He seems to personalize Heaven and Earth at some places. Since he repeatedly stresses the impersonality and internality of Heaven, why does he personalize Heaven and Earth or nature in these other contexts? Does he intend to interpret these claims only in a metaphorical way?

On the one hand, he emphasizes that human nature is endowed by Heaven, yet on the other hand, he explains that Heaven is revealed by selfhood. At other points he claims that the ‘whole universe’ can be embodied by human beings and that fully realizing and understanding selfhood are the preconditions for knowing Heaven (ibid.:15, 46). Since he (1979a:67) believes that ‘the mind as the defining characteristic of human nature is itself the ultimate basis’ for reaching full self-realization through moral self-cultivation, is Heaven defined by selfhood? Is the term Heaven borrowed only to indicate metaphorically the transcendence of selfhood in moral excellence in the human community?

Tu does not clarify these ambiguities. But in one place, he (2008a:440) shows his agreement with Roetz’s (2008:369) explanation that traditional Ruism ‘did not inherit the religion of “Heaven” as such but only its normative content—the primacy of morals—and that it advocated a basically a-religious ethics of self-cultivation based on individual self-respect’. However, Tu does quote the saying of Ch’eng Hao 程灝 (p. Chéng Hào) (1032-85) ‘[Hu]man[s] and Heaven and Earth are one thing’ to underscore the trinity of the unity between Heaven, Earth and humanity by ‘forming one body with the myriad things’ (yǔ wànwù wéiyītǐ 與萬物為一體) (ibid.:46). By means of this interpretation, Tu obviously denies ‘the subject-object dichotomy’ of the relationship between humanity and nature (that is, Heaven and Earth) (ibid.). From his interpretation of the Zhongyong.

70 See also Tu Weiming (1985:9, 61–3, 72–3, 125–6).
Tu also emphasizes that humans cannot be ‘alienated from Heaven in any essential way’ (ibid.:73). Following the Mencian tradition, Tu insists that ‘Heaven sees as the people see and Heaven hears as the people hear’ (tiānshì zì wǒmín shì, tiāntīng zì wǒmín tīng 天視自我民視，天聽自我民聼) (ibid.:132). Do these claims sound like metaphorical expressions? If humans, Heaven, and Earth are one thing, or if Heaven depends on humanity, does the Heaven-endowment simply metaphorically mean an inborn inherence? Since the terms ‘transcendence’ or ‘the transcendent’ are regularly used by Tu to describe and explain his self-cultivation assumptions, it is necessary to understand fully his definition of transcendence.

3.5 **Tu’s Definition of Transcendence**

Undoubtedly, Tu’s self-transcendence never refers to a metaphysical meaning beyond the plane of human beings because he (1976a:116f.) emphasizes the ‘actualization’ of self-transcendence ‘is not to transcend humanity but to work through it’. He (1979b:238, eo) also does not think a transcendence other than ‘the experienceable human self’ can be justified for ‘postlapsarian … human nature’. But he (1989a:97–8) still insists that in Ruist religiosity ‘faith in the perfectibility of human nature through self-effort is, strictly speaking, a faith in self-transcendence’. He (1979b:13) explains that ‘radical otherness’ cannot be conceptualized as transcendence in Ruis (1985:136) and the ‘ultimate meaning’ of human life can only be found in the ordinary existence of daily life (ibid.:13).

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72 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:9).

73 James Legge’s translation from *Mencius*, 5A:5 (Tu 1985:146 n.11).

74 Transcendence in Western philosophical context usually denotes ‘a deity existing beyond or above created things, distinct from an immanent divine’ (Levenson & Aldwin 2013:583).

75 This independent argument is later found to be supported by Wen Weiyao’s (2001:192–5) analysis of the meaning of Heaven in traditional and post-traditional Ruis.

76 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77).
Besides the significant difference between the transcendence of Heaven and the transcendence of God recognized by Tu (ibid.:125-6), most of the time, it seems to Tu that transcendence and Heaven (including Earth, the nature, and the universe) are self-evident terms used interchangeably to describe the ultimacy expressed when anyone recognizes that humans, Heaven, and Earth are one thing. He generally tends to define one by the other and vice versa.

However, Tu does seek to explain the meaning of transcendence in a few places. In terms of human-relatedness, self-cultivation in Ruism involves the establishment and enlargement of an ‘ever-expanding circle’ of relationships, developing from ‘the structures of the self’ towards ‘the family, the country, and the world’ (ibid.:14). Therefore, in this sense, Tu (1990a:10) emphasizes that ultimate self-transformation as a communal act must transcend beyond ‘culturalism’ (ibid.:10), ‘egoism, regulation of the family … racism’ (ibid.:137), ‘nepotism, parochialism, ethnocentrism … chauvinistic nationalism … and ‘anthropocentrism’ (ibid.:179-80). Under these conditions, transcendence appears to mean simply mere self-transcendence (Tu 1985:10, 126).

Tu acknowledges that Heaven or the Way is not ‘a transcendent reference point (such as God)’ and asserts Ruist selfhood itself is a transcendent reference point (ibid.:125). He underscores this assertion when discussing the self-cultivation assumptions and argues that selfhood is ‘divine in its all-embracing fullness’, being ‘both immanent and transcendent’ because selfhood is ‘intrinsic’ to us and ‘belongs to Heaven’

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77 Tu’s concept of Heaven is close to the one interpreted in the Ruist school of philosophy of the Song and Ming dynasties. In this school, as Zhāng Dàinián 張岱年 (1993:154–5) points out, Heaven represents the nature, the whole universe, and the fundamental basis rather than implication of a dominator with will-power in Mencius’ interpretation.

78 See also Tu Weiming (1986:190).

79 See also Tu Weiming (2002c:37; 2008a:446). Guo Qingxiang (2006:67–8) points out that the starting point and focus in discussing the relation of Heaven and humankind in the traditional Ruism is humankind and their nature and their doing goodness instead of the former. Therefore, she concludes that Ruist dialectics is from humankind to humankind and its argumentation on the relation of Heaven and humankind is in reality about the relation of humankind and their nature (ibid.:80–82, 114).
at the same time (ibid.). It is notable that Tu emphasizes self-realization as ‘a process transcending the anthropological realm’ because human nature is bestowed by Heaven (ibid.:74). But he also states that the actualization of the reality underlying human nature and the myriad things is not about ‘transcend[ing] humanity’ but about ‘work[ing] through it’ (ibid.). His explanation is based on a Ruist belief that Heaven endows human nature, so that ‘the original ability and the original wisdom to realize the ultimate meaning of Heaven’ exist ‘ontologically’ in all ordinary human beings (ibid., eo).

In spite of the significant difference between the meanings of transcendence for the Ruist Heaven and the Christian God, Tu parallels a Ruist account of the ‘original human nature’ to ‘God’s image in [hu]man[s]’ in the ‘Christian idea of humanity as divinity circumscribed’ (ibid.:125). Does the term divine in this Ruist context mean the same thing as it does in the Christian context?

When Tu explains the moral metaphysical ontology of the sage, he quotes Mencius (ibid.:152, eo):

The desirable is called good. To have it in oneself is called true. To possess it fully in oneself is called beautiful, but to shine forth with this full possession is called great. To be great and be transformed by this greatness is called sage[ly]; to be sage[ly] and to transcend the understanding is called divine [spiritual].

The term ‘divine’ here, which actually refers to the spiritual (shén 神) in a more general way, is defined by Mencius as being sagely and transcending the understanding of other humans. Furthermore, following the interpretation of Chu Hsi, Tu denies any possibility of ‘a spiritual being (shen-jen) [神人 p. shénrén] … above the sage’, as indicated here by the term ‘divine’ or spiritual (ibid.). It means that the sage’s transforming power is beyond what ordinary humans can comprehend. In other places, he asserts that the ‘perfected self’ in East Asian thinking does not absolutely assume ‘a superhuman quality’

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(ibid.:27). In another book, Tu (1993c:29) states that the sage is a person with ‘a godlike stature in the pantheon of the virtuous’ and one who is widely exalted among both ancient and modern Chinese persons. In still another context, where he (Tu 1989a:119f.) is talking about the ‘profound person ([the] ideal personality’) (ibid.:40), Tu explains the status of such a perfected self or sage as ‘not only as an empirical entity but also, in the ontological sense, as an absolute, transcendental reality’ (ibid.:120). It happens when one’s ‘heart-and-mind’ (hsin [心]) or self’s resolution decides to establish the will. Still Tu denies unequivocally that this expression of absolute reality is just ‘another version of God talk’ or thinking ‘theologically about Confucian religiousness’, but is instead an attempt to grasp religiously Ruist humanism (ibid.:120, eo).

4. The Relational Assumption (A1): The Self as a Centre of Relationships

Tu Weiming (1985:54) argues that the self, being a centre of relationships, possesses ‘a communal property which was never conceived of as an isolated or isolable entity’ in the orthodox Ruist context. He further emphasizes that the meaning of the self constituted by this communal property in Ruism is completely distinct from the meaning of the self in a modern Western context (ibid.). Undoubtedly, this Ruist account of the ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’ is based upon a relational assumption (A1): the self as a centre of relationships. In one place, Tu states that self-transformation ‘assumes the form of mastering the self’ that includes realizing one’s ‘original nature’ and transforming one’s self-centredness and so it requires a ceaseless struggle to remove ‘selfish and

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81 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:54).

82 The phrase modern Western context in Tu Weiming’s context refers to modern individualism. Undoubtedly, this is a reductionist expression. Scholars, including Tu Weiming, usually tend to generalize and homogenize accounts about the actual pluralities existing within Western civilization. Precisely speaking, modern individualism is related to European post-Enlightenment forms of Christianity, see also C6F2. Besides, there is not only one Western or even modern Western concept of the self, see also A-D. It is worth noting that Tu (1982:6) claims his Ruist position of anti-reductionism and often pinpoints others’ ‘deceptively simple’ questions, interpretations, statements, or arguments (Tu 1985:7, 25, 29, 54, 95, 153).
egoistic desires’ (ibid.:137). In what follows I will examine some related aspects of the conception of the relational self in Tu’s New Ruist context.

4.1 First Relational Sub-Assumption (A1.1): All Things Are My Companions

Besides ‘human-relatedness’ within ordinary daily existence, the other characteristic related to this account of a New Ruist version of ultimate spiritual transformation is the ‘continuity of being’ in the context of a modern conception of traditional ‘Chinese cosmology’ or ‘Chinese cosmogony’ (Tu 1985:35–50). This cosmology is based on the notion of ‘all modalities of being … made of \( \text{ch}’i \ (p. \ \text{qi}) \) (energy)’ (ibid.:8-15, 43, eo).\(^{83}\) Tu believes, as do many other modern Chinese scholars, that the continuity of being appears to be a self-evident truth (ibid.:36-40).\(^{84}\) Based on his account of a traditional ‘Chinese cosmology’, Tu claims that the cosmos is viewed as a continuous ‘spontaneously self-generating life process’ without beginning and end, in which ‘inner connectedness and interdependence’ are inherent (ibid.:9, eo). Although there is still differentiation in it, ‘all modalities of being are organically connected’ as ‘integral parts’ that is called by Tu an ‘organismic unity’, and so is conceived as one aspect of a ‘cosmic transformation’ process (ibid.:39-44, 138). It is in this ‘metaphysical sense’ (ibid.:44) that Zhang Zai expresses his ‘ontological’ account of human beings\(^{85}\) that he has faith in, as quoted by Tu several times (ibid.:42):

Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even such a small being as I finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore, that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that

\(^{83}\) About Tu’s discussion in detail on ‘Chinese cosmology’ and ‘Chinese cosmogony’ and \( \text{qi} \) 氣, see Tu Weiming (1985:35–50; 2007b). For Tu’s tendency to refer only to a singular generalized ‘Chinese cosmology’, see C3F34 and C5F95.

\(^{84}\) For Tu Weming (1976a:103; 1989a:69), ‘Chinese cosmology’ is also self-evident because of its defining characteristic he claims. However, he (1985:38) also acknowledges that there is a puzzle regarding whether the conception of a continuity of being is informed by traditional ‘Chinese cosmology’ (ontology) or vice versa.

\(^{85}\) In fact, such an ontology of human beings is based on a cosmology that lacks ‘any ontological claims, positive or negative’, regarding a transcendent external supreme being who creates and acts providentially (Tucker 2013:622).
which directs the universe I regard as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.\(^{86}\) (Zhang Zai n.d., cited in Tu 1985:42–3, 137, 157)

Since the ‘sense of cosmic togetherness’ (ibid.:33) or ‘all things cosmologically share the same consanguinity with us’ (ibid.:45), is the core claim of his New Ruist relational self in its cosmological expression of the continuity of being, I assign it as his first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) (‘all things are my companions’)\(^{87}\) for the purpose of discussion.

Tu explains this in ‘anthropocosmic’ terms, arguing that a complete self-realization entails both ‘the full actualization of humanity’ and a unity or ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth, and ‘humanity’ or ‘humankind’ (Tu 1985:10).\(^{88}\) In this sense, the first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) is also the premise for the fourth self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.4) (*reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization*).

Based on this sub-assumption (A1.1), the dichotomous differences between self and society, creator and creature, as well as body and mind, are no longer important. What matters in this traditional form of this Ruist cosmology for Tu Weiming is its emphasis on the ‘part/whole, inner/outer, surface/depth, root/branches, substance/function, and Heaven/man’ correlative pairs (ibid.:9). Accordingly, discussions about the nature of the wholeness-related and dynamism-related issues\(^{89}\) involving the ‘subtle relationships,

\(^{86}\) Quoted from the *Western Inscription* 《西銘》 (*Xīmíng*). Its English translation is by Chan Wengtsit (1969:497).

\(^{87}\) It is worth noting that there is a difference between a continuity of being and an extension of intimate relationships. The first two sentences in this quotation from the *Western Inscription* allude to that contradictory of being, whereas the third sentence deals only with relationship. Therefore, in terms of the ontological sense of human beings, the sub-assumption provided by this account would be ‘that which fills the universe I regard as my body’ or ‘what fills Heaven and Earth constitutes our concrete presence’ in Pfister’s (2014a:638; 2015c in 2018 (forthcoming):216) rendering, that is not a relational one. However, Tu emphasizes (1985:45) through this account of continuity of being that ‘all things cosmologically share the same consanguinity with us’ and that is an *onto-relational* one. Consequently, ‘all things are my companions’ is a proper account for his relational sub-assumption.

\(^{88}\) See also Tu Weiming (1990a:180f.).

\(^{89}\) ‘Continuity, wholeness, and dynamism’ are ‘three motifs’ in ‘Chinese cosmology’ (Tu 1985:38–40). Chin Kenpa (2011:560, eo) points out that this kind of characterization of Chinese cosmology (culture) adopted by New Ruist in contrast to Anglo-European culture is a parlance of ‘Zhōngguó zhéxué yōuyuèlùn’ 《中國哲學優越論》 (theory of superiority of Chinese philosophy).
internal resonance, dialogical interplay, and mutual influence’ of those correlative pairs, instead of the issues involving merely ‘static, mechanistic, [or] analytical distinctions’, are relevant for an understanding of this traditional ‘Chinese cosmology’ (ibid.:8-9, 38). On the one hand, Tu (ibid.:15) follows the Mencian suggestion that ‘ultimate self-transformation is a communal act’, rather than ‘a lonely quest for one’s inner spirituality’; on the other hand, he (ibid.) argues:

To take one’s situatedness in a particular network of dyadic relationships as the given is not total submission to the prescribed social roles but a recognition of the most immediate and fruitful way of initiating and completing one’s task of learning to be human. After all, in the Confucian view, the ultimate meaning of life is never found in a radical otherness, but it is inseparable from our ordinary daily existence.

Here, Tu (ibid.) still denies that ‘total submission to the prescribed social roles’, defined by relationships instead of achievement, would be a corollary for taking the given ‘situatedness’ in any account of Ruist wulun, as pinpointed by Richard H. Solomon (1971:105–6). However, he (1985:15) asserts that this involves a recognition of the best and most effective way to initiate and complete one’s mandate of ‘learning to be human’ because, as mentioned above, the ultimacy of life is tied to human’s ordinary daily existence instead of a radical otherness.

According to the above modes of modern and traditional forms of Ruist thinking, it is understandable how, in Tu’s view, moral self-cultivation is emphasized as:
(1) ‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’ so that the relations are not superficial only (ibid.:55);
(2) ‘the aesthetic experience of mutuality and immediacy with nature’ (ibid.:47);

90 Huang Junjie 黃俊傑 (2002:37–8) stresses that such a monist cosmology leads to the traditional Chinese ideology of ‘the self being absorbed into the collective’ and individuality obeying sociality’.
91 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:54; 1989a:40).
(3) the realization of the ‘ultimacy’ of human beings in forming a trinity with Heaven and Earth (ibid.:137) and so to have transformed and further realized the processes involved in the universe (ibid.:74).92

Therefore, in order to predicate the first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) (‘all things are my companions’), the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible) and the definition of Ruist sagehood (i.e. ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’) must be its premises. Here again, the first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) as well as all four self-cultivation sub-assumptions assume and define each other in a closed system.

In the light of this closed system, it is not surprising to find that Tu summarizes the features of the transformed self ‘as the manifestation of the great self [(dàwǒ 大我)] and the concomitant dissolution of the small self [(xiǎowǒ 小我)]’ (ibid:14, eo).93 His notions of honouring the great self and devaluing the small self are linked by Tu to the Mencian honouring the great body (dàtǐ 大體) and devaluing the small body (xiǎotǐ 小體),94 even as both Mencius and Wang Yangming did honour the great person (dàrén 大人) and devalued the small person (xiǎorén 小人).95


93 It is worth noting that some scholars consider that the ethical claims by Zhang Zai in the quoted passage from the Western Inscription are ‘egalitarian benevolence’ (Lee, Junghwan 2010) and ‘broad love (bó’ài 博愛)’ both of which might even destroy the Ru-based familism, ‘a more restrictive form of hierarchical ethical values’ (Pfister 2015c in 2018 (forthcoming):199, 202, eo). Since Tu goes to great lengths to stress very much that moral self-cultivation must be ‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’, Tu seems not to accept Zhang Zai’s more radical egalitarian vision of human relationships and ‘broad love’.

94 Mencius, 6A:15. See also Yeh Kuanghui (2002:239–40).

95 The Inquiry on the Great Learning. It is notable that the meaning of small person could be very negative, especially in classical Chinese language. In one place where Confucius defined the meaning of small person as the antonym of the great or superior person, James Legge (1869 reprinted in 2011a:170) translates it as ‘the mean [person]’ in the Zhōngyōng 2.
4.2 The Precondition for the Self as a Centre of Relationships

In Tu’s definition of Ruist selfhood, it seems that human relatedness is valued more than one’s inner spirituality, and the great self more than the small self because he (ibid.:15) stresses that ‘ultimate self-transformation, instead of a lonely quest for one’s inner spirituality, is a communal act. Human-relatedness is thus an integral part of one's quest for spiritual fulfillment’. We can see that one’s ‘own inner transformation’ is still stressed very much by him, not only because of inherent problems in Ruist ‘learning for the sake of the self’, as already explained above, but also because of quandaries related to the whole concept of ultimate self-transformation. Tu (1985:52) insists that the self is ‘an end in itself’ in the process of learning, instead of being ‘a means’ to that goal:

It may also mean substantively that the person in ordinary daily existence is the basis for the full realization of humanity. The Confucian insistence that learning is for the sake of the self, an end in itself rather than a means to an end, speaks directly to this. Learning, for the Confucian, is to learn to be human.

Accordingly, Tu asserts that one should not superficially learn how to be human in response to the repressive impositions of others, because that will lead to indulging in ‘xūtuō wàizài’ (prostration inside with hypocrisy outside) and ‘sīyù héngliú’ (cross-flowing lusts).96 Willingness for self-transformation is highlighted by Tu’s (ibid.:141) counsel, ‘Voluntary change of attitude is preferred; an arbitrary imposition of an external standard, despite its possible heuristic value for self-discipline, can never bring about genuine self-transformation.’97 But preparing oneself to become ‘worthy of a relationship’ is always the precondition for the self in order for it to realize itself as a centre of relationships in Tu’s account (ibid.: 9, 47). Therefore, again, this precondition must be based on the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1), that human nature is perfectible through self-cultivation. It is notable that this precondition of

97 Ambrose Y. C. King (1985:57) coined the phrase ‘self-centred voluntarism’ to typify this form of cultivation.
*self-worthiness of a relationship* not only makes relationships with other human beings feasible, but also supports Tu’s New Ruist ideal reinterpreted for post-traditional Chinese and international audiences as a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’ (ibid.:9, 47).

From a practical perspective, we should also ask, how does one evaluate one’s worthiness of a relationship? Tu responds that it is according to ‘socially recognized forms’ (ibid.:22). Moreover, Tu emphasizes that ‘character formation’ is primarily realized in self-cultivation, and is ‘defined in ethical terms’ (ibid.:52). Even if he asserts self-realization as ‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’, the former is evaluated by actual achievement in the latter (ibid.:55).

Since ethics are constituted by principles guiding relationships and Tu’s New Ruist ethics emphasize social or relational ethics, the vision of an ultimate self-transformation in his account is inevitably defined by social relationships. Tu (1979a:20) asserts that in the traditional Ruist approach of ‘*lì* [禮] as process of humanization’, sociality is ‘a defining characteristic’ of the ultimate self-realization as well as ‘a desirable trait’. In other words, the precondition for a self to serve as a centre of relationships is to win social recognition. Besides ‘social approval’, Tu (1985:89) also indicates that ‘personal integrity’ is an even more important concern than social approval for one’s maturity, namely, one’s worthiness for entering relationships. However, the problem of a relational self being shaped by external social recognition is still there. Where does the standard for defining personal integrity come from? When conflicts between standards within society prevail, how would one determine which standard should be followed? On the one hand, in order to deny the reality of the problem of ‘the imposition of external values upon the self’, as noted critically and very early on by the ancient Daoist intellectual, Zhuangzi, Tu highlights ‘the *mutual nourishment* of inner morality and social norms’ in the Mencian tradition (ibid.:25, eo). On the other hand, he especially emphasizes that ‘morality or
spirituality is not internalized by but expressed through learning’ (ibid.:25). Accordingly, it appears that the outward appearance and expression of morality in the context of gaining social recognition is inevitably far more important than the internalized morality achieved by self-transformation in the light of Tu’s interpretation.

4.3 A Sense of Community for Moral and Spiritual Self-Development

Tu (1985:26) emphasizes that preventing repressive social imposition on others involves a basic respect for their personal integrity. He argues this way because no one can fully understand the other and so no socially imposed form of life could ever adequately nurture the complete range of traits involved in full self-realization. However, he never ceases in stressing the absolutely essential ‘sense of community’ for self-development in morality and spirituality, because other people are always ‘an integral part of one’s own quest’. He even uses a very strong term, ‘symbiosis’, to highlight the necessity of others’ ‘participation’ in this Ruist conception of selfhood (ibid.:113). It means that this account of the Ruist self cannot exist without being intimately bound up with other selves. Based on his interpretation of the Zhongyong, Tu (1976a:52–99) presents a New Ruist model for human-relatedness and sociality, the ‘fiduciary community’. He pictures it as a community of reciprocal trust, one without coercive ‘pressure groups’, a vision on which Confucius based his ideal state (ibid.:67). In facing the challenge of a pluralistic post-modern era, Tu (2007a) presents this community as a framework that offers enough shareable commonality for converging divergences and seeking unity in diversity (‘qiûtóng cúnýì’「求同存異」), instead of promoting a more restrictive conformity. But

98 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–66). It is worth noting that Tu’s fiduciary community which is ethical differs from John Locke’s ‘fiduciary trust’ (Locke 1988:115) which is juridical (Chan, Joseph 2013:43).

99 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:48).

100 See also Tu Weiming (1989 in Tu 1989b:16).
how can this ‘fiduciary community’ in contemporary societies be established and built up?

In a passage where he discusses the ‘rhetorical situation’ of the Analects 《論語》，he (1985:82) highlights that human beings are created ‘into existence through symbolic interchange’ (namely ‘sharing intentions, values, meanings’) and a ‘rational atomic’ human is ‘value-free’. By quoting Wayne C. Booth’s argument,101 Tu (1985:82) argues for ‘the malleability of human nature … [and] the perfectibility of undivided selves through group sharing and mutual exhortation’. Such kinds of ‘psychic’ and ‘social ethos’ are described and conceptualized by Tu as ‘fiduciary community’. In such a community, Tu argues, by the above quotation from Booth and Fingarette’s (1972:72–3) argument referred to in his Footnote (Tu 1985:91 n.10), that the boundary between ‘individual and society’ should disappear, and even the usage of first person pronouns as well as the word ‘self’ should be ‘reconsidered’ (ibid.:82, eo).102

In defending the proper meaning of ‘self-watchfulness when alone’, mentioned in C3, Tu (1976a:33–6) argues that its purpose is to attain the actuality underlying ‘common humanity’, not for pursuing ‘the idiosyncrasy of an atomized individual’ and the proper behaviour of self in public as well as in private (1989a:108).103 He insists that ‘self-watchfulness when alone’ is not at all for ‘the intrinsic value of being alone’ but for the total integration of solitariness ‘into the structure of social relations’ (ibid.). Does Tu

101 Booth (1974:134) argues that human beings are ‘in fact more like each other than different, more valuable in our commonality than in our idiosyncrasies: not, in fact, anything at all when considered separately from our relations’. He even stresses that ‘every usage of words like I, my, mine, self, must be reconsidered, because the borderlines between the self and the other have either disappeared or shifted sharply’ (ibid., eo).

102 I consider that Tu’s arguments, including Booth assertion, must be overstated. Is an individual without any relationship with others nothing or non-existent? Can an individual disappear in fact into a society? Is this a notion of extreme collectivism? Even so, is such an anti-realistic and radical notion of selfhood more close to a Buddhist (see A-DS2.2.), Daoist (see A-DS2.4.), or postmodern one (see A-DS3) rather than a usually common Ruist one? About postmodern selfhood see also David L. Hall (1994:223–5) and Paul C. Vitz (2006:xii–xviii).

103 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:26–7).
assume that one cannot pursue ‘self-watchfulness when alone’ when *alone*? Tu’s interpretation of ‘self-watchfulness when alone’ might not be agreed by other Ruist scholars such as Andrew Plaks (2003:112).

Accordingly, this Ruist self as a centre of relationships, viewed by Tu (1985:26) as ‘a sharable commonality’, is open to others and so never becomes ‘an isolated and enclosed individual’. He asserts that personal differences beyond mere ‘sameness’ are assumed in such a commonality. Precisely in this case, Tu claims that the commonly shared concept of *all roads leading to Rome* in East Asian thought implies that exclusivism is rejected (ibid.). However, he does not deny the fact that it is only Ruism, among the Three Teachings in East Asia, unequivocally asserting ‘society’ is both a necessary and intrinsic value required for ultimate self-transformation (ibid.).

Major interpretive themes among them all show how they stand against ‘the falsehood of self-centredness’ (Ruism), egoism (Ch’an) (p. Chán), and an assertive self by means of self-forgetfulness (Daoism) (ibid.). Tu, therefore, insists that ‘eradicating the alleged fallacy of individualism’ is a shared commitment found within all the Three Teachings (ibid.:27).

Moreover, Tu feels strongly that ‘the necessity of participating in ‘a shared vision’ which is ‘beyond the private’ is not just because of the relatedness of human beings (ibid.). It is also because his New Ruist ‘collective judgment’ involves ‘the survival and continuation of their civilization … not [as] a given reality but a communal attainment’

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104 Based on his studies on the *Daxue* 6 and the *Zhongyong* 1 and their contexts and related interpretations by scholars, Plaks (2003:112, ed) renders the Chinese term *shendu* (慎獨) as ‘to pay great heed to the core of one’s own individuality’ instead of merely ‘watch over your behaviour when you are alone’. He as well as other scholars consider the Chinese word *du* (獨) pointedly referring to ‘one’s singularity … the uniqueness of one’s individual self … which lies at the very centre of one’s selfhood’ but not simply one’s solitariness (ibid.). Tu (1989a:108f.) might not deny such a rendering of *shendu* but he insists on shifting its centre and purpose from the ‘singularity, uniqueness, and innermost core’ of the self to ‘human-relatedness’. In Tu’s interpretation of traditional and post-traditional Ruism, a sage ‘is never self-centred … defines his/her existence in terms of human-relatedness’ (ibid.:35).

105 Since the lived world must be always accounted for in all the Three Teachings, Tu’s (1985:26) differentiation among them in this sense seems to indicate that human-relatedness (rén 仁) is primary for ultimate self-transformation in Ruism, but only secondary in Buddhism and Daoism.
Tu (1990a:173). Tu (1976a:60-70, 87-91) points out that such an attainment is by means of ‘moral persuasion’ and moral or ‘ethical education’, including rites and ceremonies which constitute New Ruist methods to advance human beings’ ‘virtue’. Tu explains that such a judgment comes from ‘a fundamental faith’ in the condition of human beings that can be transformed and perfected by ‘communal self-effort’ (ibid.). According to Tu’s interpretation, self-cultivation in New Ruism is obviously a communal business and so will also be judged by society. Since there is no external supreme being as a source of authority, it is understandable that collective judgment based on ‘a strong sense of shareability and commonality’ (Tu 1985:23) is the only and ultimate source of authority in New Ruism. For if one of the New Ruist core values is to eradicate the alleged fallacy of individualism, New Ruism, as Tu emphasizes, does not want to support or ‘give any particular individual privileged access to truth’ (ibid.), namely, there is no ‘individuality’ in terms of this, even for the sage.

Tu pragmatically argues that without the communal dimension in moral cultivation, an individual self is incapable of attaining spiritual self-transformation (ibid.:128). While arguing for the indispensability of this communal dimension, he not only admits human beings’ ‘propensity for self-destruction’ and vulnerability to fall into immoral situations, but also acknowledges ‘the tremendous difficulty’ inherent in his account of New Ruist self-cultivation (ibid.). He even uses the term ‘salvation’ to indicate how much human beings require this communal dimension (ibid.). It is precisely because of these difficulties in individual self-cultivation that Ruists are prompted to ‘define personal spiritual development as a communal act’ (ibid.). In terms of solving the pragmatic predicament they face in self-cultivation, the logic justifying the need for a communal act of self-transformation is understandable. However, Tu’s denial of the possibility of

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106 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:45–9, 60f.).
individual self-cultivation in order to assert the necessity of relying on communal acts seems to negate almost all the previous assumptions at the same time, especially the first three self-cultivation sub-assumptions, unless he conditions them only in a communal context. It is notable that, as mentioned above, Tu asserts unequivocally more than once that the full realization of the self can be attained without any help from non-human others. Since one individual person alone is not able to attain one’s own goal of perfection for Ruist self-cultivation by means of overcoming its tremendous difficulties, must two or more incapable persons help each other to attain one’s individual own goal? Or must they aim at attaining their common goal, promoting a standard that is much lower than the individual’s one?

In the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (*human nature is perfectible*), the perfection of self-cultivation is assumed to be attained by one’s own inner strength or self-effort without any external help. Yet here the assumption is that the transformability and perfectibility of the human condition can only be processed through communal self-effort. According to Tu’s more Buddhist and post-modern notion of ‘undivided selves’ (ibid.:82) in society as mentioned above, it follows that the communal self-effort actually equates with self-effort in the integrated concept of Tu’s assumptions because he takes off the boundary between ‘*individual and society*’ by quoting Fingarette’s words (ibid.:82, eo). Therefore, it can be inferred from this that there is no personal or individual self allowed in terms of this New Ruist ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’, especially in one’s dignity. For the convenience of discussion, I have, therefore, modified the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) to become *human nature is perfectible through mutually edifying communal effort*. It has been noted that in

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107 This argument must assume first that the modified first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) does not conflict with the original one, or with all the other assumptions.
order to sustain this modified first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1), the relational assumption (A1) (‘the self as a centre of relationship’) must be its premise.

In discussing human-relatedness, the formative powers within hierarchical societies in particular must not be overlooked.

4.4 The New Ruist Relational Self in a Hierarchical Structure of Social Roles

4.4.1 The Independence and Autonomy of the Ruist Self

As mentioned above in C3S1.1.2 and C4S3, through emphasizing the centrality of self-cultivation, Tu (1985:55–8) asserts the independence and autonomy of the Ruist self.\(^{108}\)

But how does he deal with the self’s independence and autonomy in a traditional or even post-traditional Ruist hierarchical society?\(^{109}\) Tu recognizes a hierarchical structure of society, a tendency of familism (a strong emphasis or overemphasis on familial or consanguineous relationships within society) and ‘authoritarianism’ as products of traditional Ruism, especially as undergirded by wulun (ibid.:12).\(^{110}\)

Moreover, in the context he discusses the ‘principles of government’, he (1976a:77–9, 98–9) ascribes the hierarchical feudal social complex system to the highly elaborated development of dyadic relationships.\(^{111}\) He (1985:139) never denies that despotism, gerontocracy, and ‘male-oriented society’ are the politically ideological products of Neo-Ruism in pre-modern

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\(^{108}\) See also Tu Weiming (1993a:16).

\(^{109}\) Zhāng Dōngsūn 張東蓀 (1886-1973) (1974:57–8), a well-known Chinese philosopher, indicated that Chinese society based on the Ruist teaching of wulun is ‘a hierarchical system of families’ — a big family with multi-layered and seemingly countless numbers of small families inside. Therefore, the independence of individuals was never acknowledged in traditional Chinese thought, because an individual was always recognized to be a ‘dependent being’ born to fulfil particular duties and roles towards others. Precisely in this sense, individuals do not exist for themselves, but for others (ibid.). Liáng Shùmíng 梁漱溟 (1893-1988) (1949 reprinted in 2005:81), a founder of early twentieth century New Ruism, also shared this same viewpoint with Zhang Dongsun. Although their claims tended to be overstated, too generalized and reductionist, what they understood and observed about Ruist teachings and PTRIC societies coincide with those other scholars’ criticisms.


\(^{111}\) See also Tu Weiming (1989a:54, 66).
Chinese history. But in his earlier academic stages, he usually imputed all of them to be results of a sangang system, as a highly politicized, distorted, ‘outmoded’, and alienated application of (Mencian line) Ruist teachings in the Han dynasty (ibid.:139, 145). However, his attitudes towards sangang are not consistent all the time. Let me now explore more deeply how Tu deals with problems and criticisms of one of the core ethical values in Ruist moral education — sangang.

4.4.2 Tu’s Denial of Sangang’s Orthodox Ruist Origin

In his first two academic stages, Tu Weiming almost does not recognize sangang as a main value within the Ruist classics because its origin is from the Legalistic classic ‘Han Fei Tzu’ (p. Hánfēizi 《韓非子》), although it is also briefly mentioned in the Xunzi. Accordingly, sangang should be ‘thrown out’, but not wulun. For him (1998c:122–31), familism and ‘authoritarianism’ are absolutely not based on (Mencian line) Ruist teachings but arise in cultural and political contexts a long time before the modern era.

In his eyes, although the teachings of sangang involve ‘authoritarianism’, their ‘functional utility’ (ibid.:122) became a political tool using Ruist values to sustain ‘social order’ and stability (ibid.:122-3, 129-30).

However, in order to correct some common misunderstandings of forms of Ruism that he disputes, Tu (1985:12, 138) clarified that traditional Ruism values individual

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112 See also Tu Weiming (1998c:122–4; 2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yang, Xuegong 2003:9; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:55; 2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10). However, it is also notable that Tu (2010 in Hong, Gu 2010) recently identifies Ruist feudal inveteracy and dregs bound with autarchy and authoritarianism as the biggest obstacle to China’s modern civilization.

113 Zhāng Āizhū 張靄珠 (1991:8–9) points out that sangang as well as wulun are prevalently identified as the most basic values of traditional Ruist relational ethics. It is also, as Chan Wingtsit (1969:277) asserts, recognized as a fortifier of the asymmetry inherent in the four dyadic relationships. See also June Ock Yum (1988:378–9).


116 See also Tu Weiming (2003 in Xu, Jilin et al. 2003:138).
'dignity, independence, and autonomy' because it supports the aforementioned Ruist
‘learning for the sake of the self’. He (1979a:71) highlights that the real focus is not ‘the
corresponding society’, but ‘the perfecting self’. Furthermore, he argues that the ‘father-
son dyad’ should not be assumed ‘as a model’ for others because each dyadic relationship
is unique and will never be ‘subsumed’ under the other.117 Yet in some places, he
(1985:140) also acknowledges the occurrence of an ‘obvious asymmetry’ in dyadic
relationships, and notes the ‘hierarchic’ and ‘absolutely binding’ relationship of the
father-son dyad.118 Still, in another place, he (1985:139) disputes the ‘asymmetry’ or
‘one-dimensional dependency’ of the inferior on the superior in four of the dyads
(ibid.:139).119 Tu (1985:139–42, eo) argues for ‘reciprocity (pao)’ (報 p. bào)120 (or ‘the
principle of reciprocity’) and ‘the principle of mutuality’121 rather than dependency as the
underlying value. Will this argument of Ruist reciprocity prevent Ruist social structure
from being hierarchical? I will discuss and evaluate it in C5S7.

4.4.3 Tu’s Positive Attitude towards Sangang

In his second academic stage, Tu (1985:147–8 n.30) adopted a translation of this value as
‘the minister [is bound] with the ruler, the son with the father and the wife with the
husband’. He attributed the thought of one-dimensional dependency to ‘a highly
politicized interpretation of the whole matter’ (ibid.). Tu even emphasized the equality of
the genders in traditional Ruist moral ethics and attributes it to Chinese ‘functional’ non-
anthropomorphic cosmology (ibid.:144). For ‘Chinese cosmology’ results naturally in no

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117 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:48–9; 1989a:35).
118 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:55–6; 1989a:41).
119 Lin Honghsin (2008a:79) highlights asymmetry in four of the dyads as a feature of persons living within
any traditional Ru-based cultural heritage.
120 About the concept of bao, Tu refers to Yang Liensheng’s (1957, eo) ‘The Concept of Pao as a Basis for
Social Relations in China’.
‘theological justification for the creation of an exclusively male spiritual leadership’ in traditional Ruism. However, Tu later explains *sangang* as ‘three types of domination’ (Tu 1992 in Tu et al. 1992:55).

In the first ten years of his third academic stage, based on the argument for ‘the [Ruist] principle of reciprocity’ as mentioned in the previous section, he (1998c:128–33) later goes so far as to justify Ruist hierarchical society as a necessary social stabilizer. (ibid.:128-9) He asserts:

Undoubtedly, in the Confucian order of things, virtue takes precedence over rank and age. However, as pragmatists and realists, the Confucians are acutely aware of the necessity of hierarchy in establishing stability and harmony in society …Suffice it to say that the Confucians are aware of the ambiguity and paradox involved in assigning great value to generation and age in harmonizing interpersonally relationships at home.

Tu (1998c:129–33) also argues for and justifies unequivocally traditional and post-traditional Ruist hierarchical society in an article written in English as a ‘particular pattern of authority’ informed by the complex interaction between *sangang*’s authoritarianism and *wulun*’s reciprocal ‘benevolence’ (*rén* 仁). As the family is the most vital ‘political unit’ in traditional Ruist thought, the particular pattern of authoritarianism in hierarchy, age, and gender informed by *sangang* is significantly important in traditional and post-traditional Ruist family ethics (ibid.:130f.). However, Tu argues that *wulun* should not be misinterpreted as the social consequence of *sangang* but rather serves ‘as an ideological background’ for it (ibid.:130, 133). However, in reality, Mencian ideals for *wulun* that keep equality within the particular pattern of authority have been rarely realized.

122 The renowned Chinese scholar in Chinese philosophy and religion, Chan Wingtsit (1901-1994) (1969:277–8), whose book *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (1969) is one of Tu’s important references, emphasizes that *sangang* means not only ‘a relationship’, but also ‘a standard’. Even if the basic meaning of *wulun* is about ‘mutual moral obligation’, the ruler in traditional Ruist ethics has been the standard of the minister, the father the standard of the son, and the husband the standard of the wife since the Han dynasty. This superiority of the ruler to the minister, and so forth, had been according to Chan Wingtsit ‘inherent’ in the traditional Ruist system (Chan, Wingtsit 1969:277). He also argues this kind of ‘double standard’ for superior and inferior is ‘natural’ because ‘yang’ [(陽 p. yang)] is superior to ‘yin’ [(陰 p. yin)]’，so that it is also reflected in the dyadic relationships in *sangang* (ibid.:277-8). See also Cho Hyunyi (2000:318).
throughout history (ibid.:133). It is notable that Tu (1998c:134–5) only addressed this alternative argument, for the particular pattern of authoritarianism informed by sangang, during a period when positive roles of PTRIC society were linked to ‘the economic development and social stability’ in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea).

Nevertheless, fifteen years earlier he (1983:514), and other scholars such as Ambrose Y. C. King (1983:55) were not certain whether or not post-traditional Ruism had made any direct contribution to economic development. In the meantime, Tu (1998c:130) emphasized the traditional Ruist tendency of adjusting to the world. This

123 See also Tu Weiming (1993a:8, 18; 1993c:141–60; 1997b:327–72).

124 Herman Kahn (1979:118, 122) is the first one who tried to attribute the industrialization and economic miracle in East Asia to Ruism, overthrowing Max Weber’s theory (1930; 1951) that Christian ethics avails to capitalism unlike Ruist ethics. Since then, a debate about this issue started (Jochim 1992:137–8). Weber’s theory is followed by other scholars, for example, Talcott Parsons (a sociologist), John K. Fairbank (a well-known China expert) (Zurndorfer 2004:1), and Yu Yingshi (a Chinese historian) (1986; 1987b; 1987a). Kahn’s proposition is supported by Xia, Guang’s (1997) PhD thesis, the empirical study of Yang Kuoshu and Cheng Poshyun (1988), and other scholars, for example, Fan Ruiping (2010:xix) in China’s case, Michio Morishima (1984:86–7) in Japan’s case, Jones and Il Sakong (1980:48, 256–7, 291–303) and Park Sangchul (2016) in Korea’s case, and Hicks and Redding (1982:214), Redding (1993:238–40), and (Crawford 2000) in overseas China’s cases. See also Ambrose Y. C. King and Peter J. L. Man (1979), Berger (1988:7–8), Tu Weiming (1988), Julia Ching (1993 in Ching, Julia and Küng 1993:82–6), Ambrose Y. C. King (1996), and Liu Shuhsien (1998a). However, through empirical studies in Taiwan over ten years, Hwang Kwangkuo (1991:189) concludes that there is not enough evidence to disprove Weber’s theory or prove Kahn’s opposite one. Some other scholars also do not see any evidence that Ruist ethics contribute directly to the successful economic development in East Asia (Li Shuqing 1985:176; Wan, Hsienfa 1986:36; Li Guoqing 李國鼎 1989; Yang, Junshee 杨君實 1989; Dong, Xiaochuan 董小川 1999:295; Ye, Renchong 葉仁昌 2003) let alone overthrow Max Weber’s theory by the economic success of the Asian four-dragons (Sun, Zhongxing 孙中興 1989; Yang, Junshee 杨君實 1989). In Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond’s (1988:16) analysis of two studies, one study shows positive evidence, the other no evidence. These related debates was rekindled after the outbreak of economic crises in Asia and the Ruist positive role in contributing East Asian economic success is questioned again (Li, Minghui 2001b:125). Harriet T. Zurndorfer (2004) argues that both views of two opposite sides tend to be reductionist.

125 See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1992:152–69).

126 The first Prime Minister, Lee Kuanyew, in Singapore, attributes the success of the East Asian economy to Ruist collectivism and authoritarianism as Asian values (Li, Minghui 2001b). Ambrose Y. C. King and Peter J. L. Man (1979:54), Roderick MacFarquhar (1980:71), and S. Gordon Redding (1993:239) also attribute it to Ruist ‘paternalism’ and other features of hierarchical and collectivistic society. But other New Ruists fight against such an interpretation of Ruism and attribute its success to the seed of democracy in Ruism and Ruist capitalism (Li, Minghui 2001b).

127 This is exactly one of the traits of Ruism that Max Weber (1951:235) points out for his evidence on Ruism as a factor hindering China’s modernization.
meant that instead of transforming societies, traditional Ruism consented to and endorsed the differentiation of human society by means of ‘hierarchy [or status authority], age, and gender [(sangang)] as an irreducible reality’. He argued this was to distinguish the ‘secularity’ of Ruist ethics from those found in Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity (ibid.). It is notable that in an article published ten years earlier, Tu (1988:45) argued to the contrary that ‘transforming society from within’ by values of traditional Ruism was strongly preferred to adjusting to it, so that a sense of social ‘mutuality and harmony’ was strong in traditional Chinese societies (ibid.:45). In another dialogue with a Chinese scholar twenty years later, he once again presents this same claim.

4.4.4 Tu’s Negative Attitude towards Sangang (and Sometimes Wulun)

Surprisingly, just one year before that article in English, Tu, in 1997 within a dialogue with Chinese scholars, admitted that ‘lǐjiào’ (education by li, Ruist code of ethics or Ruist ethical morals) brought about by sangang and wulun as one of the ‘zuì è’ (罪恶) brought about by sangang and wulun as one of the ‘zuì è’ (罪恶).

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128 See also Tu Weiming (1992 in Tu et al. 1992:55). Herman Kahn (1979:121–2) attributes the harmony of human-relationships in Ru-influenced society partly to ‘a sense of hierarchy’ and asserts that such a society with ‘enough hierarchy, discipline, control, or motivation’ works out better than the society that restrains ‘excessive tendencies to egalitarianism, anarchy, [and] self-indulgence’ which leads to ‘disunity, … confrontation, and … excessive compensation or repression’.

129 See also Tu Weiming (1990a:176–7; 1994a:181–2).

130 Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:15).

131 It is worth noting that the function of such an education by lǐ is morally-cultivating Chinese people to conform to Ruist code of ethics, which as listed in the Ruist classics the Lǐjì《禮記》 and the Zhōulǐ《周禮》 includes comprehensive details related to every aspect of daily lives, mainly by moral persuasion or ethical education (Chang, Wenchang 張文昌 [p. Zhāng Wénchāng] 2008:22). See also Fan Ruiping (2010:165–88) and Gǔ Tāo 顧濤 (2014:120f.). According to Fan Ruiping’s (2010:171) explanation, two types of Ruist code of ethics are divided in the Lǐjì (the ‘Records of li’): ‘yílǐ (儀禮), ceremonial rituals, and qūlǐ (曲禮), minute rituals’. This minute rituals (quli) refer to the ‘partially-exhibited ceremonial rituals … employed in a small degree in ordinary human interactions and behaviours’ (ibid.). One of the criticisms of the Ruist lǐ by modern Chinese intellectuals such as Hu Shih 胡適 (p. Hú Shì) is not about the total inappropriateness of its contents but about the externally-imposing way of its education that results in hypocrisy and repression due to disregard to one’s liberty of conscience (Zhōu, Chānglóng 周昌龍 1999:111). However, the purpose and way of lǐ is not for expressing direct feeling, according to Lǐjì《禮記》, 2B:43 and 8:22 (ibid.).
」（evils）in traditional and post-traditional Ruist culture.\textsuperscript{132} This tends to weaken the importance of Ruist moral education he promotes because as mentioned above, in Tu’s eyes moral persuasion or ethical education is the New Ruist method to establish the ideal fiduciary community. Since traditional Ruist ethics is constructed around moral virtues and relational ethics, what exactly makes this dimension of traditional and post-traditional \textit{lijiao} evil? Could it become evil partly or mainly because it is imposed on individuals repressively by the superiors in the asymmetrical dyadic relationships? Is it involved also in justifying and imposing those asymmetrical dyadic relationships on traditional and post-traditional Chinese society?\textsuperscript{133} Do the evils of a traditional Ruist code of ethics that Tu identifies reveal remnants of a traditional ideology passed down and still existing in PTRIC societies? Tu did not explore this possibility and does not provide the conceptual framework to decipher the differences these Ruist forms of life would give.

Around the turn of the twenty-first century, educated Chinese people became Tu’s main audience. In facing the challenges inherent in contemporary concerns about gender equality, scientific complexities and democratic trends in valuing the dignity of human persons, he admitted that the aforementioned problems criticized by modern Chinese scholars to be the ‘dark side’ of traditional Ruism, starting from criticism raised in the May Fourth New Cultural Movement.\textsuperscript{134} Poignantly, at this time, he (1998c:123) actively


\textsuperscript{133} Significantly, Zhao Zhiyu (1991:271–3) argues that maintaining the traditional hierarchical dyadic interpersonal relationships, the stability of kingship, and the feudal system became the ultimate ideal of the rules of propriety and \textit{yì} (義, rightness). This occurred especially after traditional Ruist concepts and practices based on the rules of propriety and its related concept of rightness shaped the spirit of the law in imperial China. See also Zhang Jinfan 張晉藩 (1930-) (1984:252–6) and Lu Jianrong 廖建榮 (1991:165–73). Zhang Jinfan (1984:252–6), a Chinese juridical scholar, even pointed out that traditional Ruism because a deceptive ideological tool in the traditional system of imperial law and punishment after the Han Dynasty. Under a mask of morality and holiness, imperial age Ruism was even more powerful than the law itself for justifying the brutality of its systems of laws and punishments, thereby suppressing the people. See also la Barre (1946b:382). Although the criticisms by Zhao Zhiyu and Zhang Jinfan tend to be over-generalized, they seem to pinpoint the same thing as Tu.

\textsuperscript{134} Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10).
pinpointed the ‘coercive nature’ of sangang. Tu (2006:227–8) publicly began to assert that the anachronous sangang must be discarded, ‘chèdǐ xiāochū’ ‘徹底消除’ (completely eliminated), and transformed.\textsuperscript{135} He justified these major changes because sangang could never answer modern needs in PTRIC societies, especially with the development of ‘rénégé zūnyán’ ‘人格尊嚴’ (dignity of human personality) as a key element in Post-Mao and post-secular educational contexts.\textsuperscript{136} He also admitted at this time that PTRIC Ruist society has tremendous difficulties in dealing with the related issues of gender equality (ibid.:61-2). According to his latest views in 2010, Tu unequivocally urges a return to the true spirit of wulun by means of either discarding sangang completely or reconceiving it according to a mutually respectful style of wulun.\textsuperscript{137} If in fact sangang is so alienated from wulun, how can it be restored or reconceived on the basis of wulun? Once again, Tu offers no further details. Furthermore, even if sangang is discarded, can he deny that a double standard still resides within the dyadic relations in wulun based on the superiority of yang to yin as promoted in the Yi Jing 《易經》 (Book of Changes)?\textsuperscript{138} For the Yi Jing is not only one of the most important of the nine Ruist classics,\textsuperscript{139} but also ‘the source of the Five Classics’ (Chan, Wingtsit 1969:477).

Therefore, it seems that Tu (1985:139–40) may in fact have tried to correct the imbalance within those relationships by strengthening the reciprocity of all the other four dyadic relationships based on the friend-friend dyad as the model of his ideal ‘fiduciary community’. Intending to defend New Ruism from any criticism based on the imbalanced

\textsuperscript{135} See also Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:55–6).
\textsuperscript{136} Tu Weiming (2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yang, Xuegong 2003:9). See also Tu Weiming (2001 in Ding, Guo 2001:66).
\textsuperscript{137} Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:55–6).
\textsuperscript{138} See F131 above.
\textsuperscript{139} Namely Sìshū Wǔjīng 四書五經 (The Four Books and Five Classics).
relationships within the first four of wulun, Tu, in an interview, relies on such a criticism originally raised by Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927). Accordingly, it is surprising to find that Tu simply attributes this notorious imbalance to a mere ‘assumption’ on which critics rely, when the very same phenomenon of relational imbalance in Ruism had been disclosed and criticized by many scholars (ibid.:13). The phenomenon they challenged was that the post-traditional Ruist self is still ‘inevitably submerged in the group’ (ibid.) in order to fulfil its ‘multivalent’ roles within those imbalanced hierarchically loaded dyadic relationships. Did Tu at this time indicate that all of the studies disclosing such problems, relying on their wrong assumption, mistakenly impute them either to traditional or post-traditional Ruism? Or did he recognize the need to modify the teachings of human-relatedness in traditional Ruism in order to present his corrected interpretations of a post-traditional Ruism which is more thorough and honest? Or did he simply present his new vision, without any further critical awareness, offering his own New Ruist account of an ideal Ruist selfhood without explicitly pointing out the problem in traditional Ruism?

Tu (2002b:641–2) tried to present and justify the concept of (fiduciary) community (‘shèqún’ 「社群」) as a New Ruist synthesis to escape the different problems caused by both individualism and collectivism as mentioned in C3S1.1.3; but he did so without qualifying his ideas as post-traditional, and so leaving the impression that he was somehow representing all forms of Ruism. His basic ‘thesis’ (1985:27) was summarized in a single phrase: ‘equality without uniformity’. Tu (1976a:53–4) focused on the key to

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140 Kang Youwei was a famous Ruist reformer in the Qing Dynasty who devoted himself to reform Ruism to adapt to the modernization of China.


143 See also Power (2007:151).

the problem of repressive social imposition or ‘coercion’.\textsuperscript{145} However, where does equality in post-traditional Ruism come from? According to Tu’s understanding (1985:77), it ultimately comes from a person’s ‘inner worth’, namely ‘the inherent ability to attain moral excellence’. In other words, one’s ‘inner worth’ is tied to one’s functional ability. Does this inner worth affirm simultaneously the perfectibility (A2.1) and the ‘intrinsic goodness’ (A2.2) of human nature? Does every person have the same inherent ability? Tu might say yes but he does not explain his claim any further. Whatever he meant at that time, both assumptions are not an experienced reality as we learned previously from his work. Therefore, how can the ‘inner worth’ of persons be prevented from collapsing due to humanity’s inability to realize it in reality? How then can equality within these key dyadic relationships be sustained in post-traditional Ruist relational selfhood? Before I move on to the evaluation chapter, I need to address an issue of the possibility of a transformative cultural design within New Ruist settings.

4.5 The Privatized Self Is Devalued for the Sake of the Great Self

4.5.1 Post-Traditional Chinese Ru-based Familistic Collectivism

Tu Weiming (1990a:175–6) emphasizes that the ‘closed private ego’ should be self-transformed into the ‘open communicating self’, ‘an encompassing self’. He (1976a:48) also reacts against any repressive imposition of social values or ‘coercive rules’ employed to restrain and distort the self.\textsuperscript{146} However, can we find such a transformative cultural design of New Ruist relational self in Tu’s interpretation? Although Tu does not directly use these terms, he unfortunately manifests a tendency to promote a RFS as found in


\textsuperscript{146} See also Tu Weiming (1989a:35).
coercive cultural designs supported by traditional imperial Ruism as expressed in the *Dàxué* 《大學》 (*The Highest Order of Cultivation*).\(^{147}\) He (1985:57) states:

> It is not at all surprising then that, despite the centrality of self-cultivation in Confucian learning, autobiographic literature exhibiting secret thoughts, private feelings, and innermost desires and drives is extremely rare in the Confucian tradition. Obviously, the cultivated self is not private property that we carefully guard against intrusion from outside. The ego that has to be protected against submersion in the waves of social demand is what the Confucians refer to as *ssu* (私, *p. sī*) (the privatized self, the small self, the self that is a closed system). The true self, on the contrary, is public-spirited, and the great self is the self that is an open system. As an open system, the self in the genuine sense of the word is expansive and always receptive to the world at large. Self-cultivation can very well be understood as the broadening of the self to embody an ever-expanding circle of human relatedness.

Not only does Tu emphasize social harmony as a precondition for individual dignity,\(^{148}\) but here he (2002c:32) also goes further later to suggest that our *private feelings*, *secret thoughts*, and ‘innermost desires’ should not be considered to be acceptable aspects of our private selves but that each of us should become ‘receptive to the world at large’ and so be able to *broaden* ourselves to become sharable public-spirited agencies with others. He (1990a:177) also directly stresses giving up one’s self as the goal to become a ‘noble[hu]man’ by quoting Fingarette’s argument.\(^{149}\) For both Tu Weiming and Fingarette, ‘self’ seems to be equivalent to ‘ego’. As pointed out in F79, in Tu’s (1976a:48) interpretation of traditional and post-traditional Ruism, a sage should ‘define[s his/her] existence in terms of human-relatedness’.\(^{150}\) Otherwise, s/he is unqualified because of self-centredness.\(^{151}\)

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\(^{147}\) *Dàxué* 大學 can be literally translated as *the great learning*. But in considering the theme of this classic, ‘the highest order of cultivation’ is a more pertinent translation (Plaks 2003).


\(^{149}\) Fingarette (1972:79) concludes that ‘the noble [hu]man is the [hu]man who most perfectly having given up self, ego, obstinacy, and personal pride follows not profit but the Way. Such a [hu]man has come to fruition as a person; he is the consummate [Hu]man’.

\(^{150}\) See also Tu Weiming (1989a:35).

\(^{151}\) Such a conception accords exactly with what the Chinese psychologist Yu Dehui’s (1987b:5, eo) criticizes as a post-traditional Ru-based collectivist selfhood: ‘自私’ (selfishness) is a taboo in such a post-traditional Ru-based collectivism, so that *selfishness* and ‘自我’ (self) become synonyms for an unacceptable character in its collectivist psychological account. This indeed resonates deeply with observations made by another contemporary Chinese psychologist, Yang Zhongfang 杨中芳, as discussed in A-E. She asserts that there is no a meaningful distinction between *self* (‘自我’ ‘自我’) and *ego* (‘yiwo’ ‘一我’) in the psychological studies of Chinese selfhood as there is in the psychological studies.
It is notable, as seen above in Tu’s quotation, that the ‘great self’ always has priority over the ‘small self’ in imperial traditional Ruist accounts, so that the primary social groups or relationships always have greater value than the secondary groups. In this imperial traditional setting it seems that the private dimensions of any self are declared to be expressions of an immoral selfishness or egocentrism. In PTRIC contexts, it is still normally the case that the primary group where the ‘great self’ is manifest is identified with the family in the framework of Ru-based familistic collectivism as explained in A-C. In this modern Chinese cultural setting, another distortion occurs that Tu’s account does not anticipate: even the society and the nation are demoted to the level of a secondary group. I find that this subtle and dynamic relationships between the great self and the small self in their connection to what are considered to be the primary and secondary groups coincides with what Tu (2006:215f.) calls ‘chàdēng de ài’ 「差等的愛」 (the private-to-public priority of loves) in the teachings of traditional and New Ruist relational ethics. This is a typical feature of Ru-based familistic collectivism.

4.5.2 Post-Traditional Chinese ‘Shame-Based Culture’

It is worthwhile here to discuss briefly some dynamics in post-traditional Chinese ‘shame-based culture’ recognized by most culture-related scholars and researchers, including Tu Weiming (1988:45). Shame-based culture is mainly established by traditional Ruist

of Western selfhood since the self and ego in the Chinese language is usually devalued to be self-serving, self-caring, and selfish (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:18, eo). Therefore, showing off one’s self is discouraged in the behavioural code of PTRIC societies (ibid.:66). In a much earlier study, Singh and Sophia Chang Huang (1962:128) concluded in their empirical research that ‘self-centredness is socially disapproved in the Chinese culture’. This conclusion resonates Tu’s (1985:137) assertion, as mentioned above in S4, that transforming one’s self-centredness requires a ceaseless struggle to remove ‘selfish and egoistic desires’.


This rendering is according to Tu’s definition of ‘chàdēng de ài’ which is commonly translated as differentiated loves.

teachings based on the Ruist classic *Liji*. \(^{155}\) Tu and some other New Ruists revised this phrase by referring instead to the ‘shame and guilt complex’ \(^{156}\) (Tu 1988:45). \(^{157}\) Therefore, a ‘shame and guilt complex’ is another Ruist cultural design in Tu’s account. Leaving aside the differences between shame and guilt and their nuanced relationships in different cultural contexts (see F156) due to the limitation of space, the more pertinent issue relevant to the research problem is whether there is any correlation between repressive social impositions and the shame-and-guilt complex. In explaining the contribution of post-traditional Ruist ethics and values, especially in Ruist familism as found in East Asian industrialization and modernization, Tu (1988:45) states that ‘the psychology of guilt and shame is often mightier than brute force’. It is mainly by means of such a psychology that ‘ideological pressure’ \(^{158}\) formed by ‘social consensus’ can often deter ‘deviant behaviour’ (ibid.). \(^{159}\) These *functions* of ideological pressure and social

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\(^{156}\) According to scholarly research, shame is basically associated with judgments made by others against oneself that are felt externally, while guilt deals with responses to (objective) standards taken on as one’s own values internally. Wong Ying and Jeanne Tsai (2007:210f.). See also Fingarette (1972:20–30), Li Jin et al. (2004:793), and Tennent (2007:94). The definitions of shame and guilt and their related details have been discussed, studied, and debated for years, including a number of nuanced meanings and accounts of the mutual interactions of shame and guilt, especially in different cultural contexts. See more details in works by Ausubel (1955), Eberhard (1967), Ambrose Y. C. King (1986), Cho Hyunyi (2000), Bedford and Hwang Kwangkuo (2003), Hong Guiyoung (2004), Li Jin et al. (2004), and Wong Ying and Jiaomei Tsai (2007:210f.). Therefore, I do not think New Ruist expressions of guilt mean exactly the same as Christianity-based guilt culture, because New Ruist standards ultimately come from traditional Chinese society, whereas the Christian standards comes from biblical teachings associated with the revelation from the Creator God. Moreover, as discussed above (especially in S4.2), preparing oneself to become ‘worthy of a relationship’ is always the precondition for the self as a centre of relationships, especially mainly driven by a ‘coercive and narcissistic’ shame (Lin, Delia Q. 2012:170–76). As a result, traditional forms of Ruist culture is definitely experienced more as a shame-based rather than as a guilt-based culture (Wong, Ying & Tsai, Jeanne 2007:213). See also Cho Hyunyi (2000:307–9) and Bedford and Hwang Kwangkuo (2003:141). Arthur Wright (1962:8f.), an American sinologist, summarizes thirteen ‘approved attitudes and behaviour patterns’ taught in the *Analects*. On examining them carefully, it is not difficult to find that all of these taught behavioural norms are driven by shame-based motivations. All the figures discussed in his book illustrated facets of shame-based motivated personalities.

\(^{157}\) See also la Barre (1946b:381) and Melvin Wong (2001:42).

\(^{158}\) Such a recognition of the power of social ideological pressure is also confirmed by another New Ruist, Cheng Chungying (1986:341). About the mechanism of social control by way of shame functioning better than the impersonal and ‘[F]ormal law’ and rules in Ruist ‘traditional Chinese society’, see Cho Hyunyi’s (2000:307) discussion and references.

\(^{159}\) See also Yang Zhongfang (1991b:115f.) and Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:12).
consensus arise through a thick guanxi (‘connections and networks’) ‘informed by familial, communal, and national sentiments’ (ibid.). This ‘mechanism of control’ or the ‘patterns of symbolic control’ are also based on the assumption that one has the ‘ability to transform one’s primordial ties into vehicles of self-expression and self-realization’ (ibid.:38, 45).

To summarize, we are left here with an unresolved set of contrary claims in Tu’s early works, portraying his account of New Ruist selfhood as both autonomous and yet one that cannot refuse social expectations and demands. I now move on to evaluate in the next chapter Tu Weiming’s interpretation of New Ruist selfhood and how well he responds to the challenges and worries raised by the scholars about the tendency of a RFS.
Chapter Five

Evaluations of Tu Weiming’s Views on Selfhood and Their Implication for the Repressed Form of Self

1. Introduction

After examining Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood in terms of the tendency of a RFS, I will evaluate the validity of Tu’s account in responding directly and indirectly to modern scholars’ criticism of Ruism as the main cause of repressed form of selves in PTRIC societies. In terms of this research problem, is Tu’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood significantly different from PTRIC relational selfhood? To what extent is Tu’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood a suitable alternative or modification for solving this problem within the cultural and theoretical context of PTRIC relational selfhood?

As discussed in C4, Tu (1985:78; 1990a:179–80) recognizes the different problems caused by individualism and collectivism and so has tried to present New Ruist selfhood as a dialectic synthesis of individualism and collectivism through his complicated interpretations and arguments. Undoubtedly, he pictures an ideal blueprint for a healthy transformation project of selves and communities. Can his account successfully relieve modern scholars’ worries about the tendency of the RFS? His (ibid.:27) main basic ‘thesis’ is that properly aligned selves in PTRIC contexts should embody ‘equality without uniformity’. Tu focuses on this as the key to solving the problems of repressive social impositions. But how can equality be supported and sustained in his New Ruist relational selfhood?
2. The Differentiation of Tu’s Responses to Criticisms: the Resistant Tu and the Responsive Tu

As displayed in the previous chapter, Tu’s defensive arguments are not always consistent, especially in relation to problems associated with sangang (and sometimes wulun). In some contexts, he shows his extreme opposition against sangang. For example, he recognizes ‘lǐjiào’「禮教」brought about by sangang and wulun as one of the ‘zuì è’ 「罪惡」 (evils) in traditional and post-traditional Ruist culture.1 Tu (2006:227–8) publicly began to assert that the anachronous sangang must be discarded, ‘chèdǐ xiāochū’「徹底消除」 (completely eliminated), and transformed. He justified these major changes because sangang could never answer modern needs in PTRIC societies. These are his soft, more responsive and flexible responses to overcoming the repressed form of self in PTRIC societies, as disclosed in C4S4.4.4. His responses admit that problems exist and so support to some extent modern scholars’ concerns.

But still in some other contexts, his responses are either denying the existence of the problem in orthodox Ruist relational selfhood, as shown in C4S4.4.2, or justifying them as positive aspect of traditional Ruism, as disclosed in C4S4.4.3. These are his hard, strict, resistant, and less flexible responses to overcoming the problem in PTRIC societies.

In his ‘Probing the Three Bonds and Five Relationships in Confucian Humanism’ (1998c, eo), an important work on this issue, Tu’s attitude toward sangang and hierarchical society is significantly much more positive than his extremely negative attitude shown in other works although Tu never supports the politicized application of extreme authoritarianism in Three Bonds (i.e. sangang). Especially, he affirms ‘the need to reassess the Confucian role in East Asian modernity’ after mentioning the iconoclastic attacks on Ruist familism after the May Fourth and stresses the change of the rhetorical

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situation as the rise of the Four Dragons (ibid.:133-4). Suffice it to say that in this article Tu (ibid. 127-8) affirms the necessity of social hierarchy for the social stability and harmony and supports ‘a particular pattern of authority’ informed by sangang (ibid.:129-33). According to his understanding of this article, Pfister (2018, eo) concludes that ‘Tu continues to deny-and-affirm at key points within the text, and so this sets up the [problematic] … ambiguity that he creates by seeking a middle way between two alternatives, even though they may not be always strictly opposites’, especially in pp. 130, 133, 134-5 (Tu 1998c). Such a denying-and-affirming attitude makes the analysis of Tu’s arguments more difficult. For example:

In order to affirm ‘a particular pattern of [hierarchical] authority’ informed by sangang, Tu asserts that ‘Confucians accept the concrete living human being differentiated by hierarchy, age and gender as an irreducible reality’ (ibid.:130). Why does he refer to only ‘the concrete living human being’ in the singular, as if it is a collective term, when it can never be actually such a simple depiction? There are human beings concretely, in intergenerational contexts that are highly patriarchal in orientation, and so an unqualified affirmation of ‘hierarchy’ here leaves one with many puzzles. I would have many more questions to ask about these matters here, as they are expressed by Tu, but I leave that ‘irreducible reality’ problem at least as an indication of the non-stated, semi-supportive, and non-critical affirmation of situations that could easily tend toward authoritarian structures in societies that support such an ‘irreducible reality’.

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2 Does he mean by this that only power-senior-males have authority? Or can there also be unempowered-senior-females with suitable authority? Or would it only allow for power-not/sosenior-males to have authority, but very seldom for any female, even though senior, to have that authority? These ambiguities open a door for suggesting that his post-traditional Ruist-influenced version of wulun still cannot really handle the concrete living conditions of many post-traditional Chinese, Korean, Japanese and other Ruist-informed contexts in East Asian settings that tend toward a patriarchal authoritarianism.
This is most strongly underscored in his admissions related to Max Weber’s analysis of Ruism within his *The Sociology of Religion*. Tu (ibid., eo) admits on the same page:

[	]hough this does not mean that the Confucians uncritically accept the existing power relationships, [nevertheless, they are] prone to adjustment to rather than transformation of the world … Confucian ethics is more likely than, for example, Protestant ethics to be politicized.

What does ‘politicized’ point to? Not to *becoming involved in lobbying tactics*, but on the contrary, to *submit to the current ruling authority*, or even *authoritarianism*, without a critical awareness or the political courage to challenge that authority. It is precisely here, then, that his *middle way* discourse appears to breakdown into an inarticulate submission even to questionable forms of governance and so would tend to *adapt to* authoritarianism, because that is the concrete living reality for many East Asian peoples even within post-traditional Ruist-inspired/-informed/-influenced societies.

Based on the long history of the prevalence of sangang, I find that Tu seems to be more concerned pragmatically with the social consequences of sangang, instead of the core teachings of sangang. This provides further evidence that the post-traditional Ruist self is more pragmatic than principled, as predicted in C3 (Greenwald 1982:128). Ultimately, we need to ask Tu what specific kind of Ruism actually transforms the world, because it would be questionable to argue that it does so precisely by conforming to what it adjusts to.

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3 As mentioned in C3S2.2, Tu Weiming (1998c:128) himself stresses that Ruists are ‘pragmatists and realists’. Some contemporary scholars, such as Kennedy et al. (2016), also support similar situation-determinist justification for the hierarchical authoritarian social structure in post-traditional Ruist ‘communitarian perspective’ as long as ‘low-ranking individuals’ dignity’ can be protected through ensuring ‘their good life or well-being’. It is worth noting that the New Ruists in Mainland China have been obviously parting ways with the ones in Taiwan and Hong Kong since 2014 (Gé, Zhàoguāng 葛兆光 2017:241–2). They are now engaged in the promotion of Ruifying China and establishing a contemporary Ruist political status by endorsing the legitimacy of the current Chinese Communists regime by means of values in their own post-traditional Ruist writings.

4 See also Ames (2006:87–93).
Tu (1998c:133) presents a position opposing *sangang* but admits that in spite of them being ‘at most a mixed blessing, if not outright negative’, his version of an alternative *wulun* drawn from the Mengzi ‘have been realized only on rare occasions throughout Chinese history’. In addition, on the same page, he admits that ‘the authoritarianism of the Three Bonds’ have been topics of disdain in novels written by Chinese authors such as Bā Jīn (巴金) and Lǔ Xùn (鲁迅). So, in the end, is the responsive Tu’s idealized situation so far from the concrete living context of post-traditional Ruist-influenced Chinese families that it is useless in the face of critical rejection of the authoritarianism that others recognize is so prevalent?

While believing a positive side to Ruist ‘psychocultural dynamics’ or *family dynamics* is manifest in the Four Dragons, Tu concludes that ‘the role of the Confucian family in making a positive contribution to the economic development and social stability of these dynamic areas in the Pacific Rim has gradually been recognized’ (ibid.:134-5). He (ibid.:135) not only acknowledges ‘the perennial issues engendered by the authoritarianism of the Three Bonds and the benevolence of the Five Relationships are still readily visible in East Asia’ but also admits:

> Both the corporate spirit of industrial East Asia and the feudal ghost of communist East Asia is infused with a strong dose of Confucian familism. The East Asian strength in maintaining social stability and the East Asian weakness in developing a full-fledged democracy are both intimately intertwined with Confucian ethics. The great subtlety in honoring age, and the blatant insensitivity in deprecating gender, equally reflect on East Asian mentality with deep Confucian roots.

If these factors that include a ‘blatant insensitivity’ in speaking down and against women and children are ‘equally’ reflecting what is actually occurring within social settings as well as within the minds of those who have been nurtured in those contexts, does this not sound like it is conceding to certain forms of patriarchalism, if not also authoritarianism, that are morally questionable?

To sum up, as shown above and also in C4S4.4, these two distinct voices within Tu’s discursive texts are intertwined. He speaks differently to audiences in English than
to those he addresses in Chinese. In different historical moments, for example, before and after the rise of the Four Dragons, as well as the places, for example, in Western countries and in China, where his works are stated/published, these two voices appear in varying contexts, as well as within the same document such as the article mentioned above. Based on his different attitudes towards sangang (and sometimes wulun), his other standpoints in responding the scholars’ criticisms in terms of the RFS, its problematic cultural and theoretical context, and of relational selfhood in PTRIC societies are also not always consistent. Therefore, for the convenience of discussing, analysing, and evaluating Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist selfhood, it is wise to differentiate between Tu Weimng’s two different attitudes towards sangang and scholars’ criticisms of it and the RFS in Ruist selfhood. I call his soft, more responsive and flexible attitude the responsive Tu, that supports to some extent modern scholars’s concerns about Ruist problems of sangang, wulun, and the RFS. I call his hard, strict, resistant, and less flexible attitude the resistant Tu, that either denies the existence of the problems in orthodox Ruist relational selfhood or justifies them as positive aspects of traditional Ruism.

3. General Responses to the Criticisms

3.1 The Resistant Tu

In some contexts, as shown in C4S4.4.3, the resistant Tu argues for and justifies unequivocally that the particular pattern of authoritarianism promoted by sangang in its hierarchy, age, and gender is significantly important in traditional and post-traditional Ruist family ethics (to be discussed later in S7.1). However, more often the resistant Tu (1985:13) inclines to ascribe all of these criticisms to a misunderstanding of orthodox Ruism (i.e. related to the issue of what orthodox Ruism is), arguing they are based on misleading assumptions related to the orthodoxy of PTRIC cultural heritage (i.e. related
to the issue of whether PTRIC cultural heritage can represent orthodox Ruism). Even if Tu discusses the related issues mentioned in psychological and cultural studies, he generally avoids social scientific studies of these matters. Chinese psychologists Albert H. Yee (2000:277–8) and David Y. F. Ho (1996:156) point out that many modern Ruists and sinologists, including Tu Weiming, simply pay less attention to studies in the social sciences that ‘elucidat[e] the families of societies’ inspired by traditional Ruism. This is exactly how Tu is criticized by David Y. F. Ho (1996:162). As early as in 1967, Tu (1967:77–8) had warned by pointing out the misinterpretations of some famous scholars, such as Max Weber, Arthur Waley, and Lucian Pye, that not all the social scientific methodology adopted to study Ruism might be valid unless it is based on the proper understanding and interpretation of Ruism. This is not the place to go into a comprehensive evaluation of the validity of Ruist interpretation by Tu and social scientific scholars. This thesis is neither to evaluate Tu’s interpretation by social scientific scholars’ interpretations as a standard nor the reverse. It is to verify the validity of social scientific scholars’ criticisms of post-traditional and traditional Ruism by Tu’s own interpretation.

According to the characteristics of PTRIC context explained in C1S1.4, we might not be able to ascertain what parts and how much of traditional or post-traditional Ruism are distorted in this context. In this situation, orthodox Ruism of whatever sort might just be a scapegoat. However, the critical issue for discerning observers is whose commentary or which Ruist school has the perceived authority to standardize the orthodox Ruist interpretation.

The resistant Tu tends to assume the Ruist school he belongs to is the orthodox and authentic Ruism. What he is saying is that if one follows his interpretation of Ruism

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5 See also Tu Weiming (1985:114–6, 134, 141).
(which is orthodox) and not be distracted by other unorthodox interpretation, then one will not encounter the RFS problem. However, he easily generalizes without differentiating and excludes others’ interpretations as inauthentic Ruism. This is how Fāng Kèlì 方克立 (1991:40) criticizes New Ruists; apart from Tu’s wavering attitude towards sangang, are the ones promoting sangang in the Han dynasty not authentic Ruists? The answer to this question for some is still debatable. However, this debatable issue will not be elaborated here because it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

3.2 The Responsive Tu

However, we have seen in C4S4.4 that some of Tu’s views, especially in his third academic stage, are obviously distant from the resistant Tu’s views in his second stage, especially about sangang. The responsive Tu seems to have given up defending sangang and was even willing to drop it from his original stand. He also stopped defending the perfectibility of humanity and the non-existence of God as a living reality, but still, in spite of all these, he did not change his commitment to his original stand related to these two major features of his worldview. In that vein, however, the responsive Tu recognizes that the problems stemming from repressive social impositions have already existed in pre-modern Chinese history and so he imputes them to and criticizes some teachings and applications of some Neo-Ruists who rely on social impositions. He clearly senses and

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7 The first generation New Ruist, Liang Shuming, points out that ethics and politics are the same scholarship in Ruist concept (Liang Shuming 19?? in Cáo, Yàomíng 曹耀明 and Líú, Xiǎochén 劉曉辰 1995:53). Contemporary traditionalist Ruists, Fan Ruiping (2010) and Jiáng Qíng 蒋慶 (2011:17–19, eo), and a contemporary Chinese historian, Zhāng Fēntián 张分田 (2016:website), argue for a form of ‘political’ Ruism with sangang at its core as the orthodox expression and do not recognize New Ruism (what Jiang Qing calls ‘Mind’ Ruism), specifically Tu Weiming (Fan, Ruiping 2010:166), as authentic. Jiáng Qíng (2011:18–19, heading eo) criticizes three main problems of New Ruism as follows: ‘The Extreme Tendency of Individualizing Confucianism’, ‘Over-emphasis of Abstract Metaphysics’, and ‘The Extreme Tendency of Internalization’. In Fan Ruiping’s (2010:xii) viewpoint, the orthodox Ruism is not of European individualism emphasizing ‘individual rights, equality, autonomy, and social justice’. In Fang Keli’s view (1991:38), the feudal ideology (based on paternalistic bureaucracy and a familist vision of society) and traditional Ruism cannot be separated, because the origin and development of Ruism is a self-conscious reflection upon it. Therefore, there exists ‘a plurality of interpretive positions within Ruist traditions’ (Pfister 2015b:7). See also Pfister (1995:9) and Billioud and Thoraval (2008).
understands the challenges and worries raised by contemporary scholars about the
tendency of a RFS in Ru-based cultural heritages in post-traditional times. Although it is
hard to identify a decisive change in his two standpoints even in this third stage of his
academic career, there are some hints that changes were at least being considered as
mentioned in the previous chapter.\(^8\) According to his latest attitude towards sangang, the
responsive Tu has obviously recognized its involvement with repressive social
impositions, which lead to a RFS.

4. Tu’s Disputation about a Ruist Repressed Form of Self

It is notable that Tu tends to argue his case only theoretically.

4.1 The Resistant Tu

4.1.1 Tu’s Defence by Extreme Cases

The argument of the resistant Tu focuses on that there will not be the tendency to have an
illegitimate or repressed form of self if one follows orthodox Ruism because the orthodox
Ruist teachings do not lead to such a tendency. Besides clarifying the proper interpretation
of Ruist selfhood, Tu always uses good/bad dichotomous terms such as open/enclosed,
open/isolated, shared/private, shared/self-centred, inclusiveness/exclusiveness,
relatedness/individualism, and relatedness/egoism, all for the sake of disputing the
tendency of a RFS in Ruist relational selfhood. On the one hand, the resistant Tu
(1985:12, 22) repeatedly clarifies and justifies Ruist relatedness in order to prevent it from
being mistaken for the bad extreme case characterized by the problem of repressive social
impositions. To bolster his case, he argues that the problems caused by repressive social
impositions are bad extreme cases and that traditional Ruist relatedness is never so

\(^8\) Is it that he became aware of these matters because he was addressing a Chinese audience at that time or
because he began promoting some parts of New Ruism as an advocate of global ethics during his third
academic stage? The answer is not easily discerned.
On the other hand, Tu justifies his New Ruist claim by setting it against the bad extreme cases of egoism, absolute self-centredness, and a type of so-called self-contained individualism (see A-C). In other places, he (1976a:53) asserted that a total alienation from sociality and its values can only take place under the influence of ‘an extreme display of individualism’. Here the approach adopted by the resistant Tu is too simplistic, because the options are not only determined by an either/or absolutist assessment. Besides, these issues related to the tendency of repressive social impositions are most of the time not extreme on either side.

There is evidence of its existence even when individuality and autonomy are not totally repressed. For example, Marc L. Moskowitz (2007) in describing Chinese women’s struggles to achieve independence from their abusive husbands coined the phrase ‘quiet individualism’ to characterize those women. He found that these husbands justified their putative superiority in these cases based on a tradition-bound Ru-based ‘male oriented’ cultural heritage. Erika Evasdottir (2005) coined another oxymoronic phrase, ‘obedient autonomy’, to describe the special phenomenon of PTRIC 9 See also Tu Weiming (Tu, Weiming 1985:114–6, 134–7, 145). Hall and Ames (1998:24) adopt the same strategy as Tu’s to defend traditional Ruist selfhood. 10 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:40). 11 In contrast to the more overt Western European individualism, ‘quiet individualism’ denotes that ‘individuals attempt to protect their own interests while maintaining an ideological commitment to Confucian precepts that familial concerns outweigh individual interests’ (Moskowitz 2007:157). Some of the women in the accounts studied by Moskowitz ‘still maneuver to fulfill their own wants and needs to the degree that it is possible’ even though they suffer ‘familial abuse’ (ibid.). 12 Or the similar phrases ‘covert rebellion’ adopted by Dana Crowley Jack (1993:49–52) and passive resistance expressed by Chinese idiom ‘yāngfèng yīnwei」「陽奉陰違」(outwardly obeying but secretly ignoring) adopted by the New Ruist Liu Shuhshien (1991:54–5) to denote one of the post-traditional Ru-cultivated Chinese persons’ popular attitudes towards their superiors. 13 In contrast to ‘uncompromising autonomy’ typical in Anglo-European thought (Evasdottir 2005:xi-xii), the term ‘obedient autonomy’ a kind of strategy that ‘achieve[s] and maintain[s] [social or organizational] order, while still intervening in the process of [individual] judgment’ (ibid.:22). Such a strategy ‘obey[s] because they maintain and even strengthen order’ (ibid., eo). It leads to ‘autonomy because, once [social or organizational] order is established, [individual] intervention, manipulation, and the management of reputation, and therefore of identity, may begin’ (ibid., eo). Another study by Ronald P. Rohner and Sandra M. Pettengill (1985) revealed similar evidence that Korean adolescents raised within a strong Ruist ideology respond positively to their parents’ authoritarian control with unflinching obedience.
hierarchical relationships mainly between teachers and students in her case studies of Chinese intellectual archaeologists. All the above examples are evidence of certain features of a Ru-influenced ‘wénhuà—xīnlǐ jiégòu’ 「文化—心理結構」 (cultural-psychological structure). From the Shāng 商 and Zhōu 周 dynasties onwards, Chinese persons exposed to such a cultural-psychological structure justified by rényì dàodé (仁義道德) (a morality of benevolence and righteousness) and the rules of propriety learned to accept and even could not help choosing to conform themselves to social impositions from this major pre-imperial Ruist tradition.

4.1.2 Tu’s Defence by Anti-Egoism

Moreover, as mentioned in C4, Tu (1985:14, eo) summarizes the main feature of the traditional Ruist self as dissolving the small self in order to manifest the great self. In C4S4.3, he stresses that the ‘commonality’ of human beings is more valuable than their ‘idiosyncrasies’, and agrees with Booth that human beings become nothing when separated from their relations with others (ibid.:82). Furthermore, the distinction between ‘individual and society’ should disappear, and the first person pronouns as well as the word ‘self’ should be ‘reconsidered’ how to be used (ibid.:82, eo). Tu’s arguments also provide evidence for the aforementioned imperial traditional Ruist cultural design.

14 Hwang Kwangkuo (1995:247). He explains further that after external rules of propriety with their impositions and sanctions were developed in the Shāng 商 and Zhōu 周 dynasties, Confucius provided the teachings that internalized them into this cultural-psychological structure (ibid.).

15 The social psychologist Yang Zhongfang (1991a:77) identifies these features in traditional and post-traditional Chinese society.

16 As the Chinese psychologist Yu Dehui (1991a:109–11, eo) points out, to take care of one’s own self would seem ironically to imply ‘selfishness’ in traditional Chinese cultural settings, because of its stress on filial piety, collectivism, harmony, and shame culture. Zhuang Huiqiu (1991:156–7) also confirms Yu Dehui’s viewpoint that the privatized self or the small self is devalued as ‘selfishness’.
Besides, Tu tended to conflate ‘[European] individualism’ with ‘egoism’, criticizing them as immoral, even though they do not mean the same thing (Li, Shuqing 1941b:24). Tu has identified ‘[European] individualism’ with ‘selfishness’ and ‘parochialism’. Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005) (1992:67), a notable Chinese anthropologist, indicated that ‘[European] individualism’ pursues a particular ‘balance’ between individuals and their whole group. Accordingly, ‘[European] individualism’ yields two political outcomes: equality: no individual is allowed to ‘encroach on’ others, and constitutionality: the whole society is not allowed to negate the rights of any individual except ‘the partial rights’ handed over by them willingly (ibid.). Therefore, does Tu misexplain the term ‘[European] individualism’ or does he always criticize it in its ‘extreme display’, or ‘egotistical individualism’, as mentioned above? In Lucian Pye’s (1988:59–60) analysis, it is a natural thing in Ru-based collectivism to view ‘[European] individualism’ ‘in a negative light’ because the strong ideology of the great self in Ru-based collectivism ‘debases the value of [European] individualism’ and sees it as ‘the source of corruption and selfishness’.

17 Private and self-centred, or private and isolated, or individualism and exclusiveness, may not be synonyms. However, Tu also tends to conflate these pairs of terms.

18 See also Hayek (1944:14) and Leung Insing (2004 in Cheng, Chungying and Leung, Insing 2004:8).

19 Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:20, 23, 103f.).

20 Hayek (1944:14) points out that ‘[European] individualism’ was notorious to-day because the term has been always linked to ‘ego[ism] and selfishness’. He argues that when we use this term ‘in contrast to socialism and all other forms of collectivism’ is not necessarily linked to these (ibid.). In his view, ‘[European] individualism’ is based on an attitude of ‘tolerance to other opinions’ (ibid.:170). According to Hayek’s (1944:14) context, I consider what he denotes here is egoism instead of ‘egotism’. According to Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford Dictionaries 2016b, eo), these two words are often adopted as ‘interchangeable’, but it is worth noting their distinctions. The more common term Egotism denotes ‘the fact of being excessively conceited or absorbed in oneself’. In a strict sense, the term egoism is adopted in Ethics to denote ‘a theory that treats self-interest as the foundation of moral behaviour’. This meaning is less dominant nowadays. In the Oxford English Corpus, most of the citations for egoism actually mean ‘excessive conceit’. See also Li Shuqing (1941b:24).

21 This term is coined by Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:54) to portray ‘the core values of the Hong Kong Chinese’.

22 Although Tu claims that his New Ruist account is a synthesis of individualism and collectivism, his interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood is still a Ru-based collectivist form. This will be demonstrated later in S7 and S8.
Moreover, while Tu tries to argue for New Ruist relational selfhood as an ideally anti-egoistic form, he might ignore the ‘egocentric behaviour’ (even though which might appears more or less in any cultural contexts) in Ru-based familial collectivism pinpointed by scholars mentioned in C2S4.4. Such an ‘egocentric behaviour’ is evidently manifest in making the delimitations of primary groups and secondary groups by the small self in a situational-determinist way. Besides, Lucian Pye (1988:58–61) also pinpoints that both ‘self-sacrifice’ and ‘self-aggrandizement’ are characteristics of the Ruist self although they look like opposite and mutually exclusive. I think that the latter is also cultivated by the collective value and so a particular form of self-sacrifice to fulfil others’ expectation and achieve a degree of worthiness to strengthen a relationship. Besides, self-sacrifice might be a way of survival or self-protection in a ‘co-dependen[t]’ relationship cultivated in Ru-based collectivism which has been mentioned in C1 and so might be also an ‘egocentric behaviour’ although it literally seems to be opposite to egocentrism. No wonder Pye highlights that the egos in such a collectivist ‘egotism’ are paradoxically fragile (ibid.:71). In terms of both the differential mode of association (Fei, Xiaotong 1992:60) (see A-EF75 in and A-K) and within the dynamics of the relationships of collective selves (Yeh, Kuanghui 2002:230f.), such a egocentric behavioural feature in the Chinese Ru-based collectivist ideology is verified by Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi’s (1988:41–68) and Xie Yao’s (2005) field research.

23 Under Ru-based collectivism (utilitarian familism), the interests of a primary group (family) have unexceptionally priority over the interests of a secondary group (society) (Lau, Siukai & Kuan, Hsinchi 1988:54). That is to say, this ‘egocentric behaviour’ acts outside one’s primary group and views one’s secondary group as ‘potentially dangerous foes’ (ibid.:59), or treats two groups in a double-faced manner which will be discussed later in S8.1.

24 This is what Henri Tajfel (1919-1982) and John Turner (1979:38–42) refer to as ‘in-group favouritism’.
A Chinese historian, Guō Hóngjì 郭洪紀 (1948-2013) (1997:70), coined ‘shēnfèn lúnli’ 「身分倫理」 (role ethics)\(^{25}\) to characterize the feature of ‘the operation of situational morality’ in traditional Ruist ethics.\(^{26}\) He argues that traditional Ruist role ethics in the context of PTRIC societies is maintained within an imbalance of oppressing mode with two polarized extremes: one extreme demands ethical obligations in human relationships, but simultaneously the other extreme provides no protection for personal rights.\(^{27}\) Therefore, it follows that this post-traditional expression of Ruist role ethics will not help resolve the problem of the RFS: it seems that this form of role ethics can only offer verbal comfort to suffering souls, because they are the very ones who are being oppressed within their inferior positions by this same hierarchically loaded role ethics.

In this sense of Ruist role ethics, individualism, which values the individuality of any individual self, is opposite to egoism or ‘egocentrism’, which devalues the individuality of any individual self who does not conform to the social demands of the dyadic relationships. *Individuality* in traditional Ruist selfhood tended to mean ‘unique[ness]’ rather than autonomy (Hall and Ames 1998:25, eo).\(^{28}\) However, the majority of the Chinese individuals lacked any *uniqueness* in terms of its meaning in Ruist context because only very few could reach superiority and excellence, or ‘churen toudi’ 「出人頭地」 (to become honoured and distinguished among others) as mentioned in C3F53, so as to be unique.\(^{29}\) Because of such strong motivation of ‘churen toudi’, there

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\(^{25}\) Literally, ‘*shenfen lunli*’ is to be translated as identity ethics or status ethics. However, Guo Hongji (1997) coins this term to feature ‘the operation of situational morality’ in Ruist ethics. Therefore, ‘role ethics’ coined by Roger Ames (2011) (to be discussed later) is a more appropriate rendering.


\(^{28}\) See also Ames (2006:63–5).

\(^{29}\) It is notable that Zizioulas (1995:57–8) differentiates the meaning of the person from the individual by the uniqueness, unrepeatability, and ‘particularity’ of the person. However, the characteristics of the person he points out are acquired in creation in the sense of ontology (See also Moltmann 1981:188–90). The
exists an ideology of competition and utilitarianism among Chinese individuals and families which cultivate egoism or ‘egocentrism’ instead of the opposite. Lin Honghsin (2008a:79) claims that a strongly competitive and utilitarian mentality driven by traditional Ruist values associated with self-cultivation has nurtured Chinese people’s attitudes for thousands of years. Such a utilitarian mentality in post-traditional Ru-based collectivism is named by Lau Siukai (1947-) (1978) as ‘utilitarianistic familism’, which he claims is the foundation of ‘political stability’ in Hong Kong in the twentieth century but may no longer be guided by more humane values within traditional Ruist ethics.

In terms of the above understanding of individual in post-traditional Ruist role ethics, ‘equality can only mean parity’ (Hall and Ames 1998:25). For if only a Chinese individual in a PTRIC cultural context is valued, recognized, and distinguished by how well or how much one achieves within one’s roles, this still must be expressed within ‘multivalent relationships’ through ‘communal deference’ to the requirements of different roles demanded by post-traditional Ruist social ethics (ibid.). As already mentioned before, Tu (1985:27) supposes that the eradication of the fallacy of individualism is a shared goal among the Three Teachings, and that post-traditional Ruism in particular stands against ‘the falsehood of self-centredness’ in this context. Then, in terms of Fei Xiaotong’s (and Hayek’s, in F13) understanding of individualism as mentioned above, does Tu mean to eradicate the fruit of equality in individualism? Does Tu recognize that egocentrism can also appear in the post-traditional Ru-influenced forms of relationships? Unfortunately, Tu offers no further clarification of these matters.

In terms of a Ruist RFS, we can see that the attitude of the responsive Tu shows his willingness to review and correct the negative parts of traditional Ruism as indicated in

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uniqueness in Ruist selfhood is acquired by moral self-cultivation and other achievement in the sense of functionality.

the previous section. However, the resistant Tu tries to dispute this criticized problem by categorizing it to the extreme case which does not exist. I find that the resistant Tu does not argue against the criticism but evades it.

5. **Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Self-Cultivation**

In Tu’s interpretation, absolute sincerity serves as both an ultimate goal and core value of self-cultivation as well as an indicator of the perfectibility of human nature. He also assumes that every Ruist follower theoretically should pursue becoming a sage.

5.1 **The Resistant Tu**

Orthodox Ruism, the resistant Tu argues, never teaches people to be insincere or to make others insincere.\(^{31}\) He emphasizes repeatedly that Ruist selfhood is about a ceaseless process of self-cultivation and nobody, even Confucius himself, has ever attained or will attain sagehood (C4S3.1). Besides, in arguing that an individual self is incapable of attaining spiritual self-transformation without a communal act with others, Tu indirectly admits the imperfectibility of individual human nature,\(^{32}\) unless the reason of the incapability of Confucius himself to attain sagehood is that he was *alone* without a communal act with any other.

5.2 **The Responsive Tu**

In facing the challenges from modern ideologies, such as humanism, democracy, and human rights, the responsive Tu makes a great effort to show the importance of individuality in Ruist self-cultivation,\(^{33}\) even in which ‘sociality’ must be grounded

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31 C3S1.1.2. and C4S3.1.

32 This independent argument is later found to be supported by other scholars. Both Wm. Theodore de Bary (1996:37) and Ralph Weber (2007:88–9) argue that the ‘unattainability’ of the perfectibility of human nature and the unending process of learning to be humane ‘belie’ his first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1): human nature is perfectible through self-cultivation.

33 C3S1.1.2. and C4S4.4.
(2008a:444). The responsive Tu insists that the end of self-cultivation is the self itself.\textsuperscript{34} While emphasizing self-cultivation, the responsive Tu asserts: that Ruism does not devalue the self and its duties, a position shared with Hsieh Yuwei (1968:280–83). In terms of these assertions, the responsive Tu is more responsive to scholarly criticism and shows the same concern with them about the RFS in PTRIC contexts.

But in both the resistant Tu’s and the responsive Tu’s account, as long as perfection has not yet been reached in reality, his theoretical arguments cannot be sustained because absolute sincerity has never yet existed. Under those conditions, the existence of a RFS as documented by social scientists of various sorts is much harder to deny. Scholars do not criticize insincerity as coming directly from traditional Ruism teachings. Instead, they criticize repressive social impositions as coming from traditional and post-traditional Ruist emphases on self-cultivation in the context of their various forms of Ru-based hierarchical and collectivist societies.

We shall continue to ask whether the resistant Tu’s theoretical arguments are sustainable. For Tu (1985:94), learning to be human means learning to be ‘humane’,\textsuperscript{35} because he still insists that ‘humane possibilities’ are ‘inherent’ in human nature. Yet the term ‘possibilities’, actually meaning impossibility in reality, appears to deny the intrinsic goodness of human nature and even the effort of learning to be humane seems to deny the existence of any inherent humane attribute (Weber, Ralph 2007:88). Therefore, logically speaking, Tu’s second self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.2) (human nature is good intrinsically) becomes questionable in his emphasis on learning to be humane and its implications. Besides, Tu’s own argument in defending the second self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.2) is not convincing, because he (1985:137) refers to that nature

\textsuperscript{34} C4S3 and C4S4.4.

\textsuperscript{35} See also Tu Weiming (2001a:74).
understood as an ‘original nature’, arguing for an ontological postulate undergirding non-experienceable reality.

Nevertheless, Tu (1989a:95–6) attempts to explain away this logical doubt by differentiating between the ultimate goal of learning to be humane and the intrinsic goodness of human nature. He refers to the former as ‘the greatest possible’ or ‘the maximum realization of humanity’, while the latter he describes as a natural and inescapable nature, ‘the minimum condition’ of ‘the lowest common denominator’. The latter is the ‘minimum requirement’, the ground for the qualitative transformation leading to former. Yet there is a qualitative difference between them to the point Tu admits that human nature cannot be good enough and consequently cannot reach perfection. Therefore, learning to be humane as a social norm and requirement tends to cultivate an illegitimate or repressed form of self because one is unable to attain its goal and, as a result, tends to live by pretending to be humane within the framework of PTRIC roles and their social impositions.

6. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Heaven

In Tu’s interpretation of the framework of New Ruist relational selfhood, the assumed concept of Heaven plays an important role. It is the extremely significant premise among all the other assumptions. Tu seeks to present a coherent argument based on his conception of Heaven. However, there are some weak points in his argument that relate to his account of Heaven.

Diagram 5.1 sums up all the aforementioned assumptions and their interrelated relations and discloses at least five circles:
The whole concept of Tu’s New Ruist selfhood is based on many interrelated assumptions, some of which assume each other in circular reasoning as discussed in C4. As long as one of the assumptions is not sustained, the related arguments are falsified. For example, perfectibility is negated by the phrase *ceaseless self-cultivation*. Naturally and logically, there would have to be an end to this process if human nature is in fact perfectible. Tu (1985:126) admits that in his New Ruist account the goodness of human nature and its perfectibility through communal moral self-cultivation involve ‘an implicit circularity’. However, this circularity he does not see as a ‘vicious one’ (ibid.), as

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36 The Chinese version of this diagram was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi {forthcoming}2018:S2).

37 Tu (1985:126) says that ‘human nature is [intrinsic] good so that there is an authentic possibility for dynamic spiritual development and vice versa’.
explained above in C4S3.2. Leaving alone his reasons supporting these claims. Tu does not even find that these circular statements themselves are falsely argued. For the former can only be the premise for the latter but not the other way round and the latter cannot be sustained without the former as its premise. Therefore, the latter cannot be the premise for the former. In his efforts to deepen the meaning of intrinsic goodness of human nature and, at the same time, to deny the repressive imposition of social norms in New Ruism, Tu stresses the ‘mutual nourishment of inner morality and social norms’ (ibid.:25, eo). This argument appears to indirectly disclose the insufficiency of human’s intrinsic goodness, precisely because it requires ‘nourishment’ from outside. Besides, can social norms increase human’s intrinsic goodness or grant human power to be a perfect sage? Can this term nourishment explain away any repressive imposition of social norms? However, this is not the only kind of circular reasoning he employs in his arguments supporting the post-traditional concept of New Ruist selfhood (or sagehood).

As mentioned in C4S3.4, according to his fourth self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.4), reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization, Heaven itself must be based on the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible) and his definition of Ruist sagehood as an ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’. The first and fourth self-cultivation sub-assumptions (A2.1 and A2.4) also fall into the same form of circular reasoning.

However, the fatal problem of Tu’s circular arguments is that his own claim of no one ever having attained sagehood falsifies all the related arguments. As his New Ruist definition of sagehood (i.e. ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’) is the premise of both first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) (‘all things are my companions’) and fourth self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.4) (Reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization) as illustrated in Diagram 5.1, the reality of the non-existence of the sage, claimed by himself, makes all his circularity related assumptions crumble. It is exactly
the internal tensions and circular reasons among Tu’s interrelated assumptions of New Ruist relational selfhood that make Tu’s account ultimately an unrealizable perfectionism, which will be discussed in detail in S9 below.

Although human nature, according to Tu and other contemporary Ruist scholars, is endowed by Heaven, everything is defined, or given meaning, by human beings as mentioned above in S3.4.1 (Tu 1979a:20), because, according to Tu’s account of the traditional Ruist conception of Heaven, Heaven is not an external being or creator and human nature, in ontological terms, has ‘self-generating source of strength’ and ‘internally-generated capacity’ which are never deficient (as mentioned in C4S3.3). Therefore, humans can define cosmology, the continuity of being, and they are able to be united with Heaven and Earth. 38 Even if transcendence is highly valued, this transcendence only means *surpassing within the plane of human existence,*39 or ‘*lìxìng běntǐ*’ 「理性本體」40 (rational being). In reality, there is no higher personal being above human beings, even though the universe and some of Heaven’s positions are greater than any human person’s life. As mentioned in C4S3.4.1, Tu (1989a:106) seems to call human

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38 This independent argument of mine is supported by the evidence found later. Chien Yeongshyang 錢永祥 (p. Qián Yǒngxiáng) (2008:14) argues that Ruists are not concerned whether or not Heaven itself exists, but which kind of transcendental source human’s moral practice needs to presuppose. Mou Tsungsan (2005:60–63) emphasizes that Ruist metaphysics and cosmology are based on morality, but not the reverse. Accordingly, the ‘metaphysics of morals’ in Ruism is ‘moral metaphysics’ but not ‘metaphysical ethics’. Chén Lái 陳來 (2009:197, eo) points out that after the Zhou dynasty, ‘*tiānmìng*」 「天命」 (the Mandate of Heaven) in Ruism denotes Heaven endowed with ethical character, embodied as people’s desire and demand. Yu Yingshi (1986:113), a world-known historian, also points out that the Chinese Ruist concept of a transcendental Heaven is developed from the fact that human beings have the capacity for a self-awareness of inner value. Heaven is unknowable, but human beings are knowable. Heaven can be known only through ‘*jīnxìng*」 「盡性」 (the complete realization of [human] nature). Yu Yingshi argues from interpretations of the Xunzi and the Dàxué and some other Ruist classics that it was it was meaningless for Chinese persons to construct (‘*xūgòu*」 「虛構」) a ‘*réngéhuà de shàngdì*」 「人格化的上帝」 (personalized God) to represent the image of Heaven. Liang Shuming, by citing the argument of Japanese Ruist scholar Kinzó Gorai 五來欣造 (1875–1944), underscores that Ruism is actually a ‘*lìxìng zhìshàng zhǔyì*」 「理性至上主義」 (ration supremacism) and argues that Heaven, gods, kings, nations, and the collective, are all but a pronoun for *reason* in Ruism (Liang Shuming 19?? in Cáo, Yàomíng 曹耀明 and Liú, Xiǎochén 劉曉辰 1995:65). Robert Eno (1990) concludes from the result of his studies that the term Heaven is a Ruist creation.

39 According to Tu’s usage of transcendence in interpreting traditional Ruism, this is what Tu really means.

40 Li Dàhuá 李大華 (2002:569–70).
beings co-creators in order to promote them to the same level of Heaven and Earth in forming a trinity. However, if he makes this kind of assertion, this appears to contradict his atheistic claim for Ruism. He also argues that human nature must be identical with Heaven because it is endowed by Heaven and reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization. Whether or not is this argument convincing logically, he actually pulls Heaven down to the plane of human existence instead of lifting up human beings to the plane of Heaven.

In differentiating the transcendence from the transcendent God in Christianity, which some New Ruists refer to as external transcendence (‘wàizài chāoyuè’ 「外在超越 ’ ) (Liu, Shuhsien 1998b:105–108) and Tu (1989a:121) refers to as ‘radical transcendence’, Tu (1989a:102,121) and some other New Ruists highlight the goal of post-traditional Ruist self-cultivation as ‘immanent transcendence’ (nèizài chāoyuè 内在超越) (Tu 2008a:445) or ‘immanence with a transcendent dimension’ in Tu’s own language. 41 However, just as Xie Wenyu (1997:57–8) has pointed out, immanent transcendence does not really transcend what is understood to be physical reality. Within this conception of qualified transcendence, the constitutor(s) of the standard of transcendence, the evaluator(s) of achievement, and the one who tries to transcend (namely the self-cultivator) are all internalized to the same entity, namely a particular human being (ibid.). 42 I find that, in Tu’s account, whether something or anyone is transcendent is determined by the extent of its/one’s self-realization. A Chinese analytic

41 The concept of immanent transcendence was coined first by Táng Jūnyì 唐君毅 (1909-78) (1951 10th ed. in 2005:336). Mou Tsungsan (1909-95) (1962 in 2003b:22), Liu Shuhsien (1972:49), and Tu Weiming (1982a; 1989a:93–122) succeed him to elucidate it further. All these three other scholars focus on this concept in terms of Heaven. However, Tu (1985:125) extends it to refer to the original nature of humankind and the realization of their selfhood, because he highlights ‘humanity’ and Heaven and Earth as one. Contrary to Tu, Liu Shuhsien (1972:49) differentiates Heaven as an ‘all-encompassing creative power’ from the human as a ‘creature’. It is notable that the phrase immanent transcendence adopted by these New Ruists refers to something completely different from what the phrase ‘immanent transcendence’ refers to in Moltmann’s account discussed in C6S3. 

42 See also Guo Qingxiang (2006:78–82).
philosopher, Fung Yiuming 馮耀明 (p. Féng Yàomíng), started with semantic criticisms of ‘immanent transcendence’ presented by New Ruists, including Tu Weiming, in 1990s. Through his research on this issue over ten years, he consequently criticized the concept of it or ‘transcendent immanence’ as a fundamental problem for New Ruism in his monograph entitled The Myth of ‘Transcendent Immanence’ (《「超越内在」的迷思》) (2003). As Fung Yiuming points out, one of the main logical problems among works by New Ruists is that they either involve logical contradictions or circular arguments. Roger Ames (1997:43–57, 60–63) has ultimately suggested that New Ruists would be wise not to use the terms ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in their own interpretations of Ruism. One reason why Ames makes this suggestion is that New Ruists do not adopt generally shared meanings in their ‘strict’ sense of these terms, and so their interpretations confuse readers (ibid.:43-56). In facing these criticisms, Tu (2008a:445) rejects following the dichotomous methodology and Christian definition of transcendence (1988 in 1997a:309), even if he claims his ‘interpretive strategy’ for the idea of ‘immanent transcendence’ is inspired by Christian and Islamic monotheistic theology. Then he justifies ‘the fusion of the transcendent and the immanent’ a symbolism of a complex mutuality and mutual interaction and responsiveness (ibid.). However, I find

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43 Fung Yiuming’s semantic criticism of New Ruis ‘immanent transcendence’ and his series of debated on this issue with Tu Weiming can be found as follows: Fung Yiuming (1993a; 1993b; 1993c), Tu Weiming (1993b), Fung Yiuming (1994a), Tu Weiming (1994b), Fung Yiuming (1994b), and Tu Weiming (1994c).


45 For example, New Ruists use ‘transcendence’ to denote an idealization of reality within a post-traditional Ruist monism, instead of following standard meaning set in a dualist metaphysical framework suggested by monothemism. See also Schwartz (1975a; 1975b), Gān Yáng 甘陽 (1988 in Tu, Weiming 1997a:308), Li Minghui (1994:65–8), and Berthrong (2004:430–33). However, whether or not Ruists need to follow its strict meaning in using transcendence is still debatable (Hall & Ames 1987:iii, 13-20; See Li Minghui 1994; Zheng, Jiadong 2000).
this to be important evidence for explaining why Tu Weiming’s relational selfhood and the complete unity between ‘humanity’ and Heaven tends towards idealism or perfectionism. Modern Chinese Buddhism criticizes the concept of internal transcendence as a self-delusion, according to Xie Wenyu (1997:58). Self-delusion or self-deception could also be one of the sources for the creation of a false self or a masked real self as mentioned in C2S4, but this is not something I will address at any length here.

As a result, in the sense of New Ruist account of selfhood, the self can only be defined either by itself, by another individual self, or by other collective selves. Since the former two cases are unacceptable to Tu’s New Ruist ideology, because it seeks to eradicate individualism, the New Ruist self can only be defined by the other collective selves. Therefore, in Tu’s post-traditional cultural and interpretative context, the tendency to create conditions where a RFS emerges is hard to avoid because self-value can only arise from social recognition, being something I achieve or based on how I perform.

7. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Reciprocal Relationships

Regarding Tu’s (1985:27) basic thesis about New Ruist selfhood that relationships of Ruist selves are based upon ‘equality without uniformity’, I agree that uniformity can be prevented in these relational contexts because it would appear only in extremely collectivist situations. What remains problematical is how equality can be generated in the context of Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood. In the light of Tu’s interpretation, I argue that equality is not easily obtained or maintained between self and society, or between the small self and the great self because of both the traditional and post-

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46 Xie Wenyu (1997:58) also argues that Chinese Buddhists do not appear to provide a better solution for this self-delusion except by nullifying all of its three elements: the standard of transcendence, its judge, and the self-cultivator.

traditional Ruist cultural design supporting some form of collectivism. This will be discussed more in S8. I also find that equality might at most refer to an egalitarian relationship between two selves, but only if the so-called reciprocity between the dyadic relationships can practically and actually take the place of a prioritized asymmetrical relational pattern. But do reciprocal relationships normally replace the hierarchical asymmetrical relationships stemming from traditional Ruism? Tu’s most incoherent standpoints are about these two issues.

7.1 The Resistant Tu

As mentioned above in S3.1, the resistant Tu (1985:13), on the one hand, more often inclines to ascribe all of these criticisms to a misunderstanding of orthodox Ruism. On the other hand, the resistant Tu, in some contexts, justifies unequivocally the significant importance of the particular pattern of authoritarianism promoted by sangang in post-traditional Ruist family ethics. When the positive roles of traditional Ruist values had been noticed and discussed as contributing to economic developments and social stability in East Asian countries, the resistant Tu emphasized that the traditional Ruist tendency of adjusting to the world, and so also to being politicized in consenting or endorsing a harsher form of differentiation within human society taught by sangang, was an irreducible cultural reality. Therefore, on the basis of the resistant Tu’s claims in this regard, not only these justifying claims negates his New Ruist interpretation for an orthodox Ruist form of symmetric non-hierarchical societies and interpersonal

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48 Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:43–4) identify the influences of traditional Ruist values in shaping ‘the ethos of [modern] the Hong Kong Chinese’. One of these values is the concept of individual. They recognize that the values of ‘individual equality, rights, duties, and freedom’ were definitely addressed in Ruism. However, they argue further that Ruism articulated these values in the particular way to make them ‘compatible with steep status inequalities and the subordination of the individual to society and state’. One reason for this is because the individual rights in society in Ruism are possessed by birth but given by society (or ruler and superiors) (ibid.: 50f.). The other reason is that a right in Ruist relational ethics is more like what Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill (1983:126, eo) call a ‘privilege’ or a reward for being worthy of a relationship or one’s status-role through proper conduct, moral achievement, or conformity to social norms.
relationships, but also the RFS becomes an inescapable corollary to his post-traditional New Ruist relational selfhood, precisely because it supports particular patterns of authoritarianism in PTRIC societies within a hierarchy and between ages and genders.

7.2 The Responsive Tu

On the contrary, critiquing and discarding the teachings of sangang (and even wulun in very few contexts) as the products of a highly politicized forms of imperial traditional Ruism during long periods of Ru history, the responsive Tu defends a purified New Ruism that has not insisted on forms of cultural expression based upon hierarchical relationships and collectivism. We cannot deny or ignore completely that New Ruism, as the responsive Tu (1985:12) highlights it, respects and emphasizes to some extent the importance of the self or individual, including its ‘dignity, independence, and autonomy’. However, the existence of traditional and post-traditional asymmetrical relationships due to Ruist teachings are historical facts, phenomena verified indirectly by Tu’s denial that these expressions come from a pure and traditional orthodox Ruism.

Based on ‘the [Ruist] principle of reciprocity’ as mentioned in C4S4.4.2, Tu indeed tries to argue for a non-hierarchical social structure in orthodox Ruism. Instead, I argue here that not only are there problems related to the asymmetry and inequality within the three dyadic relationships constituting sangang as well as in the first four of five relationships in wulun, but also that the priority of the importance of different relationships disclosed by the sequential presentation of wulun and sangang indicates another dimension of asymmetry and inequality, especially for the status of women (especially wives).

Although the sequence of the dyadic relationships in wulun and

49 We can also find that Ruist classics, as Wáng Jué 王珏 (2014:140) has argued, do not always teach an ‘one-sided submission’ within the relational contexts of filial piety and wulun.

50 Yuán Xìnài 袁信愛 (2008:69) points out that wives and their relationships with husbands are less important than both of the father-son and ruler-subject relationships in wulun and are least important in sangang.
sangang might look like an order of increasing equality, I do sense that the sequence of their presentations indicates their priority rather than the order of equality in the traditional Ruist context. As for the Ruist teaching of bao (reciprocity) adopted by Tu for defending Ruist relational equality, I argue that equal reciprocity only happens when the relationship is equal. When the relationship is unequal, this Ruist reciprocity becomes a demanding pressure to the inferior side in the relationship coerced by the superior side in the relationship and social imposition. Therefore, equal reciprocity cannot be expressed within the relationships guided by filial piety, wulun (except the last one, friend-friend, relationship), and sangang. In other words, Ruist reciprocity remains asymmetrical and unequal in all those relationships. Besides, Ruist reciprocity, even if equal, in the face and shame culture of Ru-based collectivism also leads to the RFS.51 Does this not look like another of Tu’s circular arguments in managing the relationships between bao and asymmetrical relationships?

It is notable that Tu’s interpretive Ruist ‘psychology of guilt and shame’ as the ‘mechanism of control’ in Ruist thick guanxi, as mentioned in C4S4.5.2, is exactly what scholars in different fields called ‘social manipulation’52 or ‘social control’53 by way of feeling shame. Cho Hyunyi (2000:318) indicates further that ‘filial duty’ is ‘an ideology of social and political control’. Undoubtedly, this is related directly to the repressive social imposition discussed in this research. We can by no means deny the positive role

51 This independent argument is supported by Francis L. K. Hsu’s work which was found after the viva of this thesis. Francis L. K. Hsu (1963:165) says that ‘[In the Ruist] kinship scheme, one’s obligation tends … to equal one’s reward’. And then he adds an explanation to this statement in its note: ‘Obligation and reward … refer … to tangible goods and services. But the worth of such goods and services is, of course, measured by the extent to which they satisfy the social needs of the individuals concerned’.

52 Melvin Wong (2001:43). It is worth noting that Melvin Wong points out, ‘The social manipulation of the feeling of shame is the basic driving force in the control of human behaviours in Chinese culture. (“Knowing shame is the beginning of courage!”) (“zhīchǐ jǐnhū yǒng” 从汉书·21)’ (ibid.). For example, ‘When it was shameful for others outside the family to know of the absence of filial piety within a family, often the virtue of filial piety was coerced or forced by way of shame and guilt’ (ibid.:20).

of shame culture from the perspectives of social development, stability, harmony, industrialization, and modernization. Furthermore, it is also active to some extent from the perspectives of individual personal growth, behavioural development, and the establishment of relationships. However, we should not also deny its complications in shaping distorted personalities and restricting behavioural and relationship developments. This is evident especially when human beings cannot attain self-realization as we saw in Tu Weiming’s discussions above. Such complications are not only recognized by psychologists, but also lead to the behavioural custom of ‘denial’ and ‘pretence’ (Wong, Melvin 2001:34, 42).

Whether or not that traditional orthodox Ruiism teaches these things even while a politicized traditional form of Ruiism does so, as Tu claims, is still a debated issue among modern post-traditional Ruiists. However, according to the responsive Tu, it is hopefully possible that his ideal New Ruiist relational selfhood is different from the PTRIC one because of its rejection of an asymmetrical hierarchical social structure criticized by other scholars. Accordingly, it might provide a solution for the problem of the RFS in PTRIC societies.

8. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Fiduciary Community

As mentioned in C4F9 and explained in A-N, social scientific observation indicates that the traditional values of Ru-based collectivism and its concomitant RFS are parts of the cultural design of a post-traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. Can we find such a post-traditional cultural design of Ru-based collectivism and its concomitant expression of a RFS in Tu’s New Ruiist account of relational selfhood?

See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1986:60, 72).

For example, Zhāng Lìlì 張麗麗 (2015:website), through her studies of Ruist classics, argues that Ruist oppression of women did not start from Dǒng Zhòngshū 董仲舒 in the Han dynasty but from Confucius.
8.1 The Resistant Tu

According to the aforementioned analysis of the resistant Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist selfhood, collectivism and a RFS are definitely parts of post-traditional Ruist cultural designs. So even if the Chinese person’s self is the end of New Ruist self-cultivation (i.e. so-called ‘learning for the sake of the self’ mentioned in C4S3), as the responsive Tu insists, the resistant Tu emphasizes so much — as Bodde (1957:66) also pointed out — that fulfilling the requirements of social norms and the duties of one’s social roles are preconditions for reaching the end of self-cultivation and becoming worthy of any particular relationship or community. Although willingness for self-transformation is necessary as highlighted by Tu’s (1985:141), can one’s willingness make one attain the standard of a dynamic relational self? What if one cannot attain it by one’s willingness as Tu (ibid.: 25) admits, as mentioned in C4, that even Confucius himself could not do it?

Since humans, Heaven, and Earth are united into one as Tu argues by quoting Ch’eng Hao’s words as mentioned above in S3.4.2, and human beings are ‘consanguineous with nature’, that is, with Heaven and Earth (ibid.), why is there a need for self-cultivation in order to become worthy of relating with all of them? Can this precondition of self-worthiness of a relationship also be assumed as an incentive for appealing to our presumably internal vast resources, because there are no external resources that Ruist selfhood can rely on?

Therefore, in Tu’s account (1985:22), one’s worthiness of a relationship is evaluated according to ‘socially recognized forms’. Undoubtedly, I find that this is the only way through which one can establish what Tu calls ‘the communication necessary for self-cultivation’ (ibid.), since there is no external source of authority to be addressed or relied upon. Besides, self-realization is evaluated by actual achievement in harmonizing human relations (ibid.:55). Therefore, I argue that when this kind of performance-based self-cultivation combines with a traditional expression of shame-
based Chinese culture, the problem of a destructive kind of repressive social imposition becomes unavoidable.\textsuperscript{56} Moreover, as found in C4S.2, it shows that the outward appearance and expression of morality in the context of gaining social recognition is inevitably far more important than the internalized morality achieved by self-transformation in the light of Tu’s interpretation.\textsuperscript{57} As a result, it inescapably conceives, cultivates and fosters the tendency to cultivate a RFS.

From this perspective, the post-traditional Chinese self is designed to contribute to its PTRIC society, and so to be accepted by it and survive it. The collective self or \textit{great self} is always given more value and authority than the individual self or \textit{small self} in the resistant Tu’s account (C4S4.1 and C4S4.5), even if some other scholars, such as Hsieh Yuwei (1968:282–3), insist that the importance of the individual is equal to the importance of the community. Accordingly, in PTRIC societies, it is still often the case that to sacrifice the small self for the good of the great self is highly valued as a virtue. In this cultural context, to pursue the good of the small self is devalued as a selfish and shameful act. However, the interest or profit of the small self might not disappear from PTRIC society so easily. Understandably, these devalued interests tend to remain hidden and unexpressed while the harmony and the interests of the great self are being promoted publicly and sought for idealistically.

\textsuperscript{56} This kind of understanding of classical Chinese self-cultivation is exactly a ‘performance-based’ one, as the Chinese clinical psychologist Melvin W. Wong (2001:13, 42) points out. It values a person by the ‘measurable outcomes’ which are manifested concretely and outwardly (ibid.:42). For example, the ‘measurable outcomes’ originally include conforming to \textit{li} (p. \textit{Lǐ}: rituals or the rules of propriety) in a Ru-influenced society, that includes fulfilling the demands of ancestor reverence (or \textit{worship}) and embodying filial piety in families within that society (Wong, Melvin W 2001:42). Melvin W. Wong emphasizes that when a form of filial piety is strictly operating in a family, it can be applied to small matters such as the ‘grades’ children receive from school or big matters such as family members’ ‘social status and reputation’ (ibid.). Nadeau (2002:115f.) points out that Ruist rules of propriety are sometimes easily operated in an ‘oppressive’ way.

\textsuperscript{57} This is all the more evident in a ‘\textit{fándàodé zhùyì de shèhuì}’ 「泛道德主義的社會」 (pan-moralistic society) (Wen, Chongyi 1988:29–31), like PTRIC cultural contexts. Pan-moralism judges everything by morality. Anything measuring up to a moral standard is good. Otherwise, it is bad (Wen, Chongyi 1988:29), especially in politics (Tang, Yijie 1996a:60f.). See also Auyang Sunny Y. 歐陽瑩之 (p. Ōuyáng Yingzhi) (2015:1–6).
As seen in the resistant Tu’s version of New Ruism, individual interests and rights in a community are recognized, but belong to the collective self instead of the individual self. Although the responsive Tu asserts that the self and its duties are never devalued in New Ruism, this is exactly what Nathan (1986b:138) denies. Nathan points out instead that the individual self ‘is born into society’ and ‘depends on the harmony and strength of the group’ but ‘cannot prosper alone’ (ibid.). Like the resistant Tu and some other modern Ruists as reflected in Munro’s (1977) research, selfishness is recognized in traditional Ruism as ‘a failure to perceive oneself in terms of a more comprehensive entity to which one belongs and a futile attempt to isolate oneself from it’. Tu (1985137) asserts that self-transformation ‘assumes the form of mastering the self’ that includes transforming one’s self-centredness, and so it requires a ceaseless struggle to remove ‘selfish and egoistic desires’. From this angle, it can be reasonably understood that the ultimate self-transformation of a selfish self is an assumption needed to undergird the concept of the self as a centre of relationships. Or are they mutually related so that they

58 Donald Munro (1977:162) even highlights the lack of the concept of an individual ‘natural rights’ in traditional Ruist philosophy as one of the reasons that made the reign of the Chinese Communists and Mao’s regime possible. This does not mean that contemporary Ruists do not recognize any personal rights, but that they frame personhood always within ‘typical social roles’ accompanied by ‘particular duties’ (ibid.). Consequently, it is very hard in the context of such ‘an organicist conception of society’ to imagine that individual existence and rights can be ‘prior to joining society by consent’, let alone that ‘a society … has an obligation to protect those rights that existed before it’ (ibid.). Anyone claiming such rights tends to be charged as egotistical and so devalued as a ‘selfish’ person (ibid.). Karl Marx (1818-1883) (1845:14) argues against individualism by indicating that the individual in reality is ‘the ensemble of the social relations’. In the middle of twentieth century, an Austrian and British economist and philosopher, Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) (1944; 1949), warned against collectivism as ‘the Road to Serfdom’ (totalitarianism), the end of socialism. A first generation New Ruist, Qián Mù (1895–1990) (1974:184) identified the direct link from collectivism to communism. Lucian Pye (1988:30–74) argued that the significant common deeper psycho-cultural root of a post-traditional Ru-based collectivist selfhood is shared by two opposing political cultures in modern China: Maoism and Dengism. See also Edwards (1986:44), Shenkar and Ronen (1987:573), Julia Ching (1993 in Ching, Julia and Küng 1993:86–8), Jones (2001:164–5), and Sunny Y. Auyang (p. Ōuyáng Yingzhi) (2015).

59 Munro’s argument (1977:162) is supported by his quotation from the words of Chu Hsi in the Zhangzhi Shù Yì 《張子之書一》 64, ‘selfish intentions separate, causing a polarity between the self and things’ (translated by Munro). One of the founders of modern New Ruism, Liang Shuming (1949 reprinted in 2005:81), emphasized that human relations in traditional Ruism are ethical relations, and so obligatory relations. Consequently, he (ibid.:111) highlighted ‘impersonal feeling[s]’, namely unselfishness and obligation, instead of ‘common rights’, as the most important in establishing the ‘common values’ within a community (Zhang, Lily 2011:829).
entail each other? From this perspective, it seems that any self to some extent must be consistently suppressed by a communal ideology. This may prove true either directly, or indirectly.

As mentioned in C3S1.1.2, the resistant Tu seemed to adjust his definition for an ‘authentic’ person from being ‘truthful’ to both one’s inner self and one’s social relationships by means of sincerity (1979a:19ff., 68-81) to being ‘honest with oneself’ and ‘loyal [or considerate] to others’ (1985:52, 68). But in Tu’s (1979a:20, 22) definition, being truthful to one’s social relationships means ‘making sincere attempts to harmonize his relationships with others’. Along with his overall thinking and logic and also the common understanding of the term ‘harmonize’ in the context of modern Chinese language (see also A-EF63), it implies that in Tu’s account being loyal and considerate to others is more important than being honest with them because ‘worthy of a relationship’ is always the precondition for the self in Ruist self-cultivation as disclosed in C4S4.2.

It is notable that Roger Ames (2011) tries to coin a new English term and concept, ‘role ethics’, in order to differentiate what he (ibid.:88, 153-4) considers to be the

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60 In 1999, Henry Rosemont, Jr. (1999) had applied the concept of ‘role-bearing persons’ to Ruist relational ethics in differentiating it from the modern Western ethics which emphasizes the concept of ‘rights-bearing individual’. Literally, ‘shenfen lunli’ is to be translated as identity ethics or status ethics. It has been noted that, in as early as 1997, Guo Hongji (1997) had already coined ‘shenfen lunli’ (role ethics) as mentioned in F18 in this chapter, and later in 2004, Huáng Yùshēng (2004:947, 950), a Chinese philosopher, had coined ‘juésè lúnlǐ」（角色倫理）(translated directly into English as role ethics), to categorize Ruist relational ethics. Tu Weiming (2014b:website) himself identifies it as part of Ruist ethics recently. Ames and Rosemont (2011:17) point out that this traditional Ruist role ethics, starting in the ‘pre-Buddhist’ stage of early Ruism, was based on two specific visions of human beings and their moral life: (1) human beings are ‘relational persons constituted by the roles they live rather than as individual selves’; (2) the entry point for developing a consummate moral competence is at ‘family feeling’ rather than at individual feelings. Robert Neville (2000:168) argues that the problem of the self was not treated profoundly in Chinese cultural settings until Buddhism’s influences on later traditional forms of Chinese culture were manifest in the Song and Ming dynasties (960-1279 and 368–1644). This observation verifies indirectly that the concern about the individual self was not strongly asserted in traditional orthodox Ruism. Robert Neville deems that it is because of the Buddhist notion of reincarnation that personal identity in traditional Chinese culture began to be ‘less a function of individuated relations with others and the environment’ and ‘more a matter of an individual’s own journey through time’ (ibid.). This is because reincarnation is a personal (individual) matter, just as salvation is a personal matter in Christianity.
‘unique’ system of Chinese moral philosophy from the ‘Western’ or ‘Greek’ one.\textsuperscript{61} This approach supports the similar concept Tu (1985:8–9) presents that the differences between self and society are not as important in traditional Chinese or post-traditional Ruist thinking.\textsuperscript{62} As mentioned in C4S4.3, Tu (1985:82, eo) argues that the boundary between ‘\textit{individual} and \textit{society}’ should disappear, and even the usage of first person pronouns as well as the word ‘self’ should be ‘reconsidered’. Hall and Ames (1998:42) describe in detail this similar vision of a traditional Ruist cultural design:\textsuperscript{63}

In the classical Chinese language, there is no distinction between the first person singular, \textit{I}, and the first person plural, \textit{we}. An \textit{I} is always a \textit{we}. Equally significant … is the absence … of any explicit and consistent distinction between the subjective \textit{I/we} and the objective \textit{me/us}. The \textit{I/we} is embedded in the \textit{me/us}.

Even if their assertion can be criticized as being too reductionist and over-generalized,\textsuperscript{64} it is still notable as a claim that requires some thoughtful consideration. For example, this manifests a form of repressed self. This is exactly one of the reasons Zhai Xuewei (2010:204) attributes to why there are very few studies focusing on the Chinese self (excluding the ones measuring it with a ‘Western scale’ of self).\textsuperscript{65} He generalizes that ‘the Chinese individual self’, in comparison with ‘the Western one’, is not as important or emphasized as a Chinese cultural feature, and so is not thought to be worthy of study (ibid.).\textsuperscript{66}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} See also Fáng Wěi 房偉 (2014:110).
\item \textsuperscript{62} This is my independent criticism in 2014 which is supported by Huang Yusheng’s article that I found later in 2016. In this article, he criticizes Ruist role ethics.
\item \textsuperscript{63} In his other book, Ames (2006:520) states that the Ruist self is not an individualized one.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Angus C. Graham (1989:398) pinpointed their problems of generalization for the other interpretative issues in their earlier other book. It is worth noting that Ames, in a section of his work \textit{Confucian Role Ethics} (2011:20–35), stresses the ‘necessity of informed generalizations’ in comparative cultural studies and argues that ‘the only thing more dangerous than striving to make responsible cultural generalizations is failing to make them’ (ibid.:23 and see also Rosemont & Ames 2010:56–7). Such an argument might not be convincing. Some scholars criticize either his interpretative problems of ‘generalization’ (Weber, Ralph 2012:623) or this ‘methodological problems’ of his (Ihara & Nichols 2012:523–4) emerging in this book.
\item \textsuperscript{65} See also Yang Zhongfang (1991a:48–9; 1991b:95) and Zhèng Jiādòng 鄭家棟 (2003:63).
\item \textsuperscript{66} See also Pong Wenberng 彭文本 (p. Péng Wénběn) (2009:77) and Yang Yiyin (2008:152).
\end{itemize}
It is worth noting that the post-traditional cultural design of collectivism and its reinforced expression of a RFS that Hall and Ames support, as shown above, might parallel to what the resistant Tu's account supports and this will tend towards another cultural design of double-facedness (‘liǎngmiàn xìng’ 「兩面性’) called by Zhuang Huiqiu (1991:157). In this double-facedness, two games being played out at the same time: one game is played out idealistically for the sake of the great self, remaining on the surface; and the other for the small self, which lies hidden under the surface (ibid.:157-8). Therefore, on the one hand, if the perfection has not yet been reached in reality, the self tends to be repressed by social demands and so ends up wearing a personally unwanted social mask. On the other hand, this post-traditional Ruist cultural design of double-facedness makes human nature’s perfectibility impossible, since absolute sincerity is one of the prerequisites of its perfectibility.

8.2 The Responsive Tu

Based on his interpretation of the Zhongyong, the responsive Tu (1976a:52–99) presents the ‘fiduciary community’ as a New Ruist model for human-relatedness and sociality. He depicts it as a community with reciprocal trust, one without coercive ‘pressure groups’ (ibid.:67). In facing the challenge of a pluralistic postmodern era, he presents it as a framework to share enough commonality for converging divergences and seeking unity in diversity rather than promoting a more restrictive conformity. Such an account tends to relieve the worries of otherwise critical scholars and liberate the RFS in PTRIC contexts.

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67 This view is also supported widely by other scholars, such as Donald J. Munro (1985:40), Randle R. Edwards (1986:44), Louis Henkin (1986:39), Andrew J. Nathan (1986b:141–7), and Lucian W. Pye (1988:59).


69 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–66).

70 Ibid.:48.
9. **Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of What Ought-To-Be**

As aforementioned, the core source causing the problem of the RFS is the suppression of the *intents* of the self by externally imposed *oughts*.\(^1\) David Yaufai Ho (1996:162) points out that Tu Weiming, a follower of the idealist Mencian line, deals exclusively with what ought to be the case, namely ‘the ethical question of what ought to be’. Nevertheless, Tu offers almost nothing that deals with what actually is the case, namely ‘the scientific question of what is’ occurring in PTRIC societies. Both moves are made by Tu in order to answer scholars’ criticisms of post-traditional vision of Ruist relational selfhood. Similarly, Zheng Jiadong (2003:55, eo) criticizes Tu’s approach, claiming that the ought-to-be interpretation of modern New Ruists confuses the issues because it replaces historical research with philosophical interpretation. The intention of these moves by Tu and some other New Ruists is problematic because they tend to turn a philosophical ‘*yīngrán*’ 「應然」 (ought-to-be) into a historical ‘*shírán*’ 「實然」 (reality).\(^2\)

9.1 **The Resistant Tu**

Is the resistant Tu’s argument and defence for his interpretation of a New Ruist relational selfhood an unrealistic perfectionism, as I have argued above? This is originally the result of my own independent research, but two years later, I found some supporting evidence confirming my position in the writings of other scholars.

As pointed out in C4S4.3, Tu stresses the importance of ‘moral persuasion’ and moral or ‘ethical education’ advancing human beings’ ‘virtue’. It implies that Tu affirms indirectly that humans are lacking in intrinsic goodness, consequently also the perfectibility of human nature.\(^3\) It is notable that this tends to support the tendency of

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\(^1\) C2S4.4, A-ES2 to A-ES5, and C4S3.4.1.

\(^2\) This independent observation is supported by Zheng Jiadong’s (2001:2) account I found two years later. He pinpoints this tendency generally seen in New Ruists’ accounts.

\(^3\) Logically speaking, promoting moral persuasion and ethical education might imply a lack of intrinsic goodness in human nature. However, as mentioned in S2.1.1 and S2.1.2 in this chapter, Tu’s first self-
relying on repressive social impositions, in spite of Tu’s arguments against scholars’ criticisms in this realm.

Tu puts all his faith in humans, so that he essentially rejects any other possibility. Although he more than once denies that his position is a romantic utopia, it is very hard not to view it as simply an imagined and unrealizable idealism. Over 140 years ago, James Legge had already expressed his doubts about whether the doctrines of the perfectibility and intrinsic goodness of human nature in Mencian Ruism can be sustained (Legge 1875 reprinted in 2011b:47, 54). He further pointed out that it is not an actuality but an ‘ideal’ and ‘a brilliant and unsubstantial phantasm of our philosopher’s own imagining’. 74 However, I argue that when there are no external resources that New Ruist selfhood can rely on in his account, Tu’s first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) about human perfectibility can be in fact merely a beautiful ideal, serving also as an incentive for appealing to our internal resources, the only possible ones, because nobody has ever attained this ideal. This independent argument of mine relies on sources mentioned by other scholars.

In his study of traditional and post-traditional Ruist political philosophy for modern society, Joseph Chan (2013:193–204) coins the phrase ‘Confucian perfectionism’ to denote the idealization of traditional and post-traditional Ruist ideal political concepts and framework. However, he only espouses ‘moderate Confucian perfectionism’, rejecting ‘extreme Confucian perfectionism’. 75 Joseph Chan’s rejection of extreme Ruist

cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible) is based upon his second self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.2) (the intrinsic goodness of human nature). Therefore, a lack of intrinsic goodness would tend to the concerns related to the imperfectibility of human nature within the framework of his arguments.

74 This is also what Wei Zhengtong (1990:33–9) criticizes Ruism, including New Ruists specifically. See also Zheng Shuchuan (2006:167–8).

75 Although traditional and post-traditional Ruist political philosophy is totally beyond the scope of this thesis, its principles of governance are based on relational ethics rather than jurisprudence as mentioned in F44.
perfectionism and his espousal of moderate post-traditional Ruist perfectionism not only confirms the problems of traditional and post-traditional Ruist idealistic tendencies in relational ethics and moralism, but also verifies the contemporary necessity of offering substantial modifications and advocating only a partial adoption of traditional and post-traditional Ruist relational ethics. A Korean sinologist, Song Youngbae (宋荣培, 1944-) (2006:255–9), also criticizes New Ruist modernization as a utopia and describes what Neo- and New Ruism pursue as moral idealism. He quotes the criticisms of Metzger (1933-) to pinpoint Neo- and New Ruist ‘optimistic this-worldliness’ and ‘perfect justice’ (Metzger 1988:298–348). In order to get rid of such a utopian impression of traditional Ruism, Tu (1985:25) highlights the central concern shared by all Three Teachings about existential human beings: Tu claims that they are all concerned about ‘the human condition here and now, rather than either the original position in the past or a utopian projection into the future’. In a dialogue with Tu Weiming in Beijing, Moltmann also emphasized the traditional Ruist this-worldliness. But the resistant Tu continued to support that the perfection of self-transformation in New Ruism is a ceaseless process which never ends, even though human beings are still claimed by him to be perfectible. Does not what he promotes look like a utopian and optimistic this-worldliness?

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76 Similar criticisms of Ruified Japanese societies have been observed both by Japanese and foreign scholars (Ballhatchet 1988:363).

77 Max Weber (1864-1920) (1920 translated in 1951:235) names this feature of Ruism as ‘radical world-optimism’.

78 See also la Barre (1946b:388) and Latourette (1943:v.1, 215).

79 Weston la Barre (1946b:388) points out that ‘Confucius … knew that human beings could live and grow most happily and fully only in an atmosphere of properly cultivated interpersonal relationships’. His observation about the traditional Ruist context discloses not only that one’s individual value and happiness depend on one’s relationships with others, but also that this-worldliness is far more important than other-worldliness.


81 Although not only in the post-traditional Ruist context, socially prescribed perfectionism has proved to be significantly related to problems of silencing the self, unjust social imposition, diminishing marital satisfaction, neuroticism, hopelessness, maladaptation, and even, in extreme cases, the tendencies towards
Mou Tsungsan in his *Idealism of Morality* (*Dàodé de Lǐxiǎng Zhǔyì*) argues that New Ruism is a cure for the social and human problems of his age.\(^{82}\) His Ruist idealism can also be found in a context where he criticizes Christianity.\(^{83}\) He emphasizes that everyone in principle can become a sage in traditional Ruism (ibid.). But he adds that it nevertheless is not so in reality (ibid.). Cai Meili 蔡美麗 (p. Cài Měili) (1987), a philosophy scholar, criticizes traditional and post-traditional Ruist ‘dàtóng shìjiè’ 「大同世界」 (the stateless world of the *Great Unity*) as a utopian idea based on traditional and post-traditional Ruist relational ethics and moral self-cultivation.\(^{84}\) Liu Shuhrien (1987:228–30) as a New Ruist not only agrees with her,\(^{85}\) but also points out that the New Ruist unrealistic and unattainable idealism expressed in moral self-cultivation — namely what Tu continues to emphasize when he argues that everybody can become a sage — results in producing a philosophical vice, hypocrisy.\(^{86}\)

Accordingly, I have also argued at great length in this work that Tu’s interpretation and defence of New Ruist relational selfhood itself promotes a post-traditional form of repressive imposition in PTRIC contexts. It confirms evidence documented in an empirical survey conducted by Lǐ Mǐnlóng 李敏龍 and Yang Kuoshu (1998:51) about the endurance of contemporary Chinese people. In their survey, nearly forty percent

suicidal attitudes (Baumeister 1990; Hewitt and Flett 1991; Flett et al. 2007; Lucy M. Kim et al. 2011). Perfectionism also appears in contexts of the problems of parent-child relationships especially when it is contrasted to in the ‘good enough’ parent. (Bettelheim 1988; Winnicott 1992:10, 173–6) In an empirical study, excessive alcohol use is linked to a way ‘externaliz[ing] the causation of poor performance’ (Jones & Berglas 1978); another particular problem is found in an over-concern with poor performance. Yet these attitudes appear to be directly linked to cultivated values in New Ruist perfectionism in Tu’s account.

\(^{82}\) Mou Tsungsan (1959 in 2003a:7 of Preface).

\(^{83}\) Mou Tsungsan (1977, cited in The Editorial Board of *Éhú Yuèkān* 《鵝湖月刊》編輯部 1977:3).

\(^{84}\) See also Wei Zhengtong (1990:217–22).


\(^{86}\) It is notable that the original meaning of the Greek word ὑποκριτής, i.e. *a person of hypocrisy* in English, is ‘*play-actor*’ (Moulton & Milligan 1929:657, eo) and metaphorically denotes ‘a pretender’ or ‘a dissembler’ (Robinson 1852:854; Liddell & Scott 1882:1631; Grimm & Wilke 1889:643).
identify the negative influences of the value of endurance (‘rên’ 「忍」) in their mental health, even though all teachings about endurance in traditional Ruist or non-Ruist classics and traditional Chinese proverbs are positive. In facing various psychological situations of suppression in the process of moral self-cultivation, Tu’s and some other New Ruists’ solutions endow such psychological states of self-suppression with strong moral justifications (ibid.:11f.). That the boundary between the self and the other should be vanished in order to fulfil ‘jen [humanity] as a living metaphor’ is stressed by Tu (1985:11, 82) by quoting Fingarette’s (1972:36) argument that ‘in the larger context of Confucius’s view of man … the images of the inner man and of his inner conflict are not essential to a concept of man as a being’. In other words, the New Ruist solution is to suppress or harmonize the inner conflicts between the oughts imposed repressively by an external New Ruist moral code of ethics and their self-suppressed intents. Ultimately, even these self-confessed inner intents or desires are considered to be unjustified in post-traditional New Ruist moral self-cultivation (Qian, Mu 1974:198). Will the RFS in such contexts be liberated?

10. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of ‘Cheng’ 「誠」(Sincerity)

This section closes with an examination of whether or not Tu’s account of absolute sincerity values the individual self enough so as to liberate the repressed form of self which definitely appear in the other facets of the transformative cultural design in his account demonstrated above. From another angle of interpretation focusing on a major virtue in traditional Ruist self-cultivation, Tu emphasizes repeatedly the importance of ‘cheng」 「誠」(sincerity) as an ultimate goal and core value in self-cultivation

87 See also Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997:181, 175).
88 See also Yuan Xinai (2008:62).
Absolute sincerity is viewed as both the equivalent of ‘heavenly endowed nature’ and an indicator for human nature’s perfection (1976a:116–121). As mentioned in C4S3.1, by quoting from the Zhongyong 22, Tu (1976a:116f.) emphasizes that only when one is ‘absolutely sincere’, can one ‘fully develop’ one’s nature, but also one can fully develop others’ natures, and the ‘nature of things’, and then help in ‘the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth’ and form a trinity with them. But since absolute sincerity is the full realization of the self, namely the full development of one’s nature, how can one reach absolute sincerity without having fully developed one’s nature and why does one still need to fully develop one’s nature when one has been absolutely sincere? There is an obvious logically circular reasoning in the Zhongyong that Tu does not pinpoint, but he regularly relies upon.

Tu (1985:58, 131) also argues that self-transformation is ‘a deliberate communal act’ but ‘not reducible to its social roles’. However, the traditional cultural design for any account of a Ruist relational self does not allow it to refuse freely any social expectations and demands. In another place, Tu even explains through his interpretation of the Analects that a ‘[hu]man as an ultimately autonomous being is unthinkable, and the manifestation of the authentic self is impossible except in matrices of human converse’ (ibid.:83, eo). This is obviously basic to the relational assumption (A1) (‘the self as a centre of relationships’). In explaining the deeper meaning of ‘self-watchfulness when

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90 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77–9).
91 In C2S4.4, it was mentioned through Thielicke’s observation (1959, cited in Cheng, Stephen KK 1990:511) that Chinese people are ‘the most magnificent play-actors in the world’; lacking ‘the will to be individual human beings, to be themselves’. Samuel Kidd (1841:205) criticizes the doctrine of sincerity taught to Chinese as ‘not only to be set at defiance in practice, but to form the most striking contrast to existing manners’. Arthur Henderson Smith (1890:265–7) also wrote a chapter entitled ‘The Absence of Sincerity’ in his volume on Chinese Characteristics and points out Chinese native characteristics of ‘pretensions, falsehood, duplicity, insincerity, and obsequious accommodation to favourable circumstances’ by Confucius and Mencius as two of his many evident examples. See also A-EF69, C1S2.2.1, C2S4, and more discussion in C8S3.3.
alone’, Tu (1989a:108) does not think its main purpose is for behavioural consistency both in private (or innermost self) and in public (self-presentation).

By quoting Fingarette’s observation\(^{92}\), he (1985:82) asserts there should be no ‘borderlines between the self and the other’. He (1989a:108) argues that ‘self-watchfulness when alone’ is essentially for recognizing the self’s ‘own face’ and ‘own voice’. But what really is the self’s own face and own voice? Tu defines them as a ‘common’ face and a sympathetically resonant voice with all the others in the community and nature (ibid.:108f.). He asserts that the real self, the ‘innermost core’ of the self, is shared with all the others in the community (ibid.:109). Since the commonality of the self with others is the essential meaning of this post-traditional Ruist understanding of the true self, also referred to as the sincerity of the self, these interpretations and arguments can be viewed as a post-traditional Ruist cultural design supporting the tendency of a RFS.

Ironically, he (1985:131) emphasizes unequivocally:

> One learns to be human not to please others or to conform to an external standard of conduct.

Indeed, learning to be human (hsüeh tso-jen) [[學習做人, p. xué zuorén]] is a spontaneous, autonomous, fully conscious, and totally committed intentional act, an act of self-realization. It gives its own direction and generates its own form and creates its own content.

But if this is his real position, such a description can only be viewed as idealistic at best. If one needs to learn to be human, how can one afford to escape from repressively imposed social demands before one reaches this idealistic perfection which anybody, including Confucius himself, cannot ever attain\(^{93}\)

As early in his first academic stage, Tu (1979a:20) had started to base such kinds of arguments on two ‘interrelated assumptions’. The first one is that ‘the ultimate ground of [human] self-realization lies within his[er] own nature’, ‘inner strength’, and

\(^{92}\) ‘The images of the inner man and of his inner conflict are not essential to a concept of man as a being’ (Fingarette 1972:36).

\(^{93}\) For if one’s nature is as good intrinsically as described above in S3.2, why does one need to learn to be human?
‘inherent’ creativity though s/he has all the time been ‘conditioned by a given structure beyond his/her control’. The second one is that in order to ‘become a fully actualized human being [human] must constantly engage in the process of learning to be a sage’ in spite of his/her ‘ontological self-sufficiency’. Precisely speaking, these two assumptions themselves are problematic? How can the ultimate ground of ‘self-realization’ lies within one’s ‘own nature’, ‘inner strength’, and ‘inherent’ creativity while one is controlled by an external social structure? How can one’s ‘own nature’, ‘inner strength’, and ‘inherent’ creativity be recognized as ontological self-sufficient while one is controlled by an external social structure? And how can one fully actualize oneself by means of both ‘ontological self-sufficiency’ and ‘the process of learning to be a sage’ while one is controlled by an external social structure?

Notably, Tu actually admits that ‘[he], however, does not purport to defend the Confucian position by rigorous analytical argument … [but] intends to understand the general direction of the Confucian persuasion by a preliminary inquiry into the concept of li’ (ibid., eo). Tu’s candour implies that he is not arguing for Ruist position but introducing and advocating what he believes in by persuasion. Accordingly, it is understandable why his persuasion for avoiding the problem of the RFS in his account is not convincing all the time.

11. The Presuppositions within Tu’s Interpretations of New Ruist Selfhood

Both the responsive Tu’s and the resistant Tu’s interpretations of New Ruist selfhood in PTRIC social contexts are established by the same assumptions, some of which are based on circular reasoning. It is, therefore, not meaningful to include all these assumptions as presuppositions in Tu’s interpretations of New Ruist selfhood. I will specify here only the main ones that affect the knowledge of the self, the defining elements of the self, the property of the self, and the transformation of the self. It is these that are relevant to the
tendency of the RFS. (In what follows, P stands for presupposition; the relevance of the concept of the self is indicated in the parentheses found at the end of each P):

P1: Chinese Ruist classics and ‘Chinese cosmology’ (mainly involving the ‘continuity of being’) are the assumed sources for seemingly self-evident truths, as explained in C4S4.1. All of these works are sources of collected wisdom, observations, and assumptions of ancient Chinese persons mainly based on their experiences of ‘xiànshi shìjiè’ 「現實世界」 (the real world). (The knowledge of and the knowing by and of the self: Chinese Ruist classics and ‘Chinese cosmology’ as ancient Chinese persons’ wisdom, observations, and assumptions.)

P2: The self is determinedly shaped by other collective selves. Self-value is established by and from social recognition according to social norms and values, as explained in C4S4.1 and C4S4.2. (The defining elements of the self: given by social recognition, as well as social norms and values.)

P3: The self is a centre of relationships, an ever-expanding circle of relationships, developing from the structures of the self. Being worthy of a relationship is always the precondition for the symbiosis of the self and others, as explained in C4S4. (The relevant properties of the self: focusing on dimensions of relational selfhood.)

P4: Ultimate transformation is a ceaseless collective self-cultivation, a dynamic process leading towards a perfect sagehood, a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’,

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94 The concept of continuity of being in Chinese cosmology had not yet developed well and systemized until three centuries BCE, since when the Lùshì Chūnqī ē（呂氏春秋） (Lü, Büwei 呂不韋 239 BCE), the Chūnqī ē Fānlù（春秋繁露） (Dòng, Zhǒngshù 董仲舒 206 BCE), the Huáinnǎnzi（淮南子） (Liú, Ān 劉安 et al. 139 BCE), the Bāihǔ Tōngyì（白虎通義） (Bān, Gǔ 班固 79) had been written in succession (Henders, John B 2004:104).

95 Du Baorui and Chen Ronghua (2008:206, 223–4). The cosmology that Du Baorui and Chen Ronghua explain here is Chinese traditional Ruist cosmology and Chinese Taoist cosmology of the school of Lǎozi 老子 (ca. 571–471) instead of a single and uniform of Chinese cosmology. This is held to be different from other Chinese cosmologies that hold to the world view of ‘tāzài shìjiè’ 「它在世界」 (believing the existence of the other world) (Du, Baorui and Chen, Ronghua 2008:223–38). Tu tends to generalize them by referring only to a singular ‘Chinese cosmology’.
as explained in C4S3. (The transformation of the self: growing through a community-based moral self-cultivation towards becoming a perfect sage.)

The complicated and circular relations between these various presuppositions are illustrated in Diagram 5.2:

1. P1 is a presupposition of P2, P3, and P4;
2. P2 is a presupposition of P3 and P4;
3. P3 is a presupposition of P4;
4. P4 is also a presupposition of P1 and P3.

Diagram 5.2 Interrelationships between the Tu’s Presuppositions and Their Relevance to the Concept of the Self (The direction of the blue arrows is from the presupposed to the predicated)

12. Conclusion

The highly industrialized and materialized Chinese social development in post-traditional society that has become a concern internationally in the past decades prompts new questions. A need is recognized by some writers and scholars for a new synthesis to be developed between individualism and collectivism, while there are problems connected

96 Other philosophers and theologians also have similar concerns, either directly or indirectly, about collectivism and individualism and try to argue for or present a synthesis of them. For example, Bonhoeffer
to both of these ethical orientations. Tu Weiming’s post-traditional interpretations of New Ruist selfhood aim to change the collectivist image of traditional Ruism in the past and to present an account of New Ruist relational selfhood that he claims to be part of an orthodox vision. He pictures a circumspect and ideal blueprint for a healthy transformative project involving self and community, and argues theoretically for his case. He insists that it is completely different from a PTRIC relational selfhood, because it does not produce a RFS and its repressive social impositions. However, the traditional and post-traditional Ruist tendencies of imposing repressively a relational view of self within modern Chinese societies is the main feature and issue related to traditional and post-traditional Ru-based collectivism discussed by many scholars. Tu is not ignorant of these criticisms of traditional and PTRIC Ru-based collectivism. The more acceptive responsive Tu shows the potentiality of his account to be different from this collectivism. But to the contrary, the resistant Tu’s relevant works are a self-conscious defence of New Ruism in response to these criticisms. Nevertheless, the resistant Tu does not succeed in saving ‘the great [cultural] tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ from problem associated with Ru-based collectivism, even in spite of his efforts to describe a New Ruist cultural structure that is significantly distinctive from the one criticized by these scholars.

The resistant Tu’s arguments show that he either denies the existence of the tendency of a RFS in orthodox Ruism, or disputes the blame imputed on post-traditional Ruism as an incorrect assumption or a misunderstanding. I agree that it is not easy to see in what way post-traditional Ruism has been distorted within PTRIC cultural contexts. The answers vary, depending on studies about different individuals, families, societies,

and locations in our post-traditional pluralized age. But could ‘the great [cultural] tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ be merely a scapegoat in this situation? Further field research which surveys PTRIC people extensively and comprehensively might be helpful in answering this question more objectively.\(^97\) However, would we be able to find a comprehensive resolution of these problems through Tu’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood?

In order to maintain his New Ruism as a synthesis having the strengths of both individualism and collectivism, but without all of their weaknesses, his strategy in defending New Ruist selfhood is to prevent it from falling into the extreme collectivist case characterized by the serious problem of the post-traditional Ruist repressive impositions mentioned in C4. However, he disputes the problems of individualism by always referring to its extreme cases. I agree that there are no adequately justified reasons supporting such claims of extreme examples within either individualism or collectivism, except special individual cases such as individualist anarchism or extremely co-dependent relationships, extremely controlling families or communities, or totalitarianism, in any post-traditional pluralized age. The remaining problem which causes scholarly concern is the tendency of a Ruist RFS. In the way the resistant Tu interprets these matters, it is as if there will be no problem at all within a perfected New Ruist selfhood, even though he claims repeatedly that the process of self-cultivation is a ceaseless process. Is what he presents a utopian theoretical ideal of New Ruist selfhood, something unreachable as the ultimate goal of his synthesis?

Some twenty years later, the responsive Tu (2007c:153) unequivocally acknowledged human imperfectibility in reality, but still clings to this assumption as a guide to New Ruist practice:

\(^97\) For example, case studies mentioned above by Evasdottir (2005) and Moskowitz (2007) point in this direction.
Human nature … is endowed by Heaven. Yet the uniqueness of being human is our inner ability to learn to follow the Way. We are capable of educating ourselves to become worthy partners of the cosmic process. This is predicated on the assumptive reason that we are empowered to apprehend Heaven through our self-knowledge. As Mencius avowed, if we can realize the full measure of our heart-and-mind, we will know our nature; if we know our nature, we will know Heaven. Surely existentially we cannot fully realize our heart-and-mind, thus, in practical terms, it is unlikely that we will ever know our nature in itself and, by inference, it is unlikely we will ever know Heaven in its entirety. But, in theory and, to a certain extent in practice, we can be attuned to the Way of Heaven (Tu 2007c:153)

Therefore, his arguments become invalid. This is because the tendency towards repressive social imposition plays no part in the process of developing into the ideal situation in his synthesis, so that the responsive Tu’s case for New Ruist selfhood turns out to be the resistant Tu’s unattainable utopian goal that never actually existed and will never exist. According to the responsive Tu’s account, the existence of this Ruist tendency to repressively impose a relational self in ancient and post-traditional Chinese communal contexts cannot be denied. It is still doubtful that this tendency of the New Ruist repressive imposition of a relational self can be easily prevented when there is, in fact, only an unreachable New Ruist ideal in the current cultural context.

Although the responsive Tu (1985:25) acknowledges the imperfection of human beings in reality, the resistant Tu (1985:12) still denies that New Ruist selfhood is merely a romantic utopia. Nevertheless, it follows that Tu’s concept of self-transcendence is based on a New Ruist idealism that is ultimately incomprehensible. If any externally transcendent God is rejected by Ruism (de Vos 1993:117), which appears to be the position in both the responsive Tu’s and the resistant Tu’s New Ruist accounts, then New Ruist selfhood itself becomes the transcendent reference point. This being the case, will Tu and other New Ruists be able to transcend, or precisely, surpass, their own concept of selfhood? No, and there seems to be not need for them to do so in their mind, in their

98 The Ruist tendency to repressively impose a relational self is still left unresolved, even if individuality and autonomy are not totally destroyed in New Ruist selfhood as Tu argues. As mentioned in C4, Ruism, especially in the responsive Tu’s interpretation, is also concerned about and recognizes the value, interest, and importance of the individual, highlighting a respect for individuality. But New Ruist individualism and the individual are secondary to New Ruist collectivism. The New Ruist individual self merely serves the purposes of the contemporary community, society and New Ruist collectivism.
system. Or will Tu’s New Ruist selfhood be able to transcend, or precisely, surpass, itself towards some other kind of real transformation?

However, if we get to the bottom of this subject, as shown in C4S3.5, Tu’s account manifestly reveals that, within his claims about reality, there actually is no transcendent reference point in his New Ruist selfhood, precisely because it is based on Heaven, but Heaven also cannot be a transcendent reference point. Therefore, logically speaking, there actually seems to be no transcendence in Ruisms, in spite of what Tu and other Ruists claim. The term *Heaven* seems only to be borrowed to make the ultimate transformation of selfhood in moral excellence sound like something religious and spiritual.

It is evident that Heaven, transcendence, and divine in Tu’s understanding are used to indicate only in a metaphorical manner the unfathomable and indescribable extent of self-realization that human beings may achieve. This is a form of self-realization that moves towards perfection, but does so without transcending the plane of human self-realization. Evidence for this claim is justified by considering his statements already quoted in C4S3.4.1 about the human as an indivisibly single oneness that is a coexistence, or in coincidence, with Heaven (Tu 1976a:128-9; 1989a:84). On the one hand, Tu exalts the incomprehensibility of the sage, Heaven, transcendence, and ultimate self-transformation, but on the other hand, he rejects the possibility of a transcendent God because he is ‘unknowable’ or incomprehensible (Tu 1985:36, 136). Therefore, self-cultivation is strictly a human matter in his view, even if there is a Heaven, because

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99 Li Ming (2009) argues that the complete unity between humanity and Heaven in Ruism is to represent the ‘horizon’ of ‘personality super-promotion’, which is another term to mean Ruist sagehood or Ruist ultimate self-transformation.

100 Three years after I stated this independent argument, I found support for it in Chin Kenpa’s (2011:557–71) criticism of New Ruist concept of Heaven. He argues that the meaning of Heaven is borrowed and moral subject (‘duódé zhǔtǐ」「道德主體」) recruits this virtualized (‘xūwèihuà」「虛位化」) and non-objectified Heaven to be the practice subject (‘shíjiàn zhǔtǐ」「實踐主體」) (ibid.:565, eo). Accordingly, in terms of moral metaphysics, ‘subject’, namely human beings, becomes subject-centralism (‘zhǔtǐ zhōngxīn zhǔyì」「主體中心主義」) (ibid.).
Heaven is not a personal being but an ultimate self-realization of human beings.\footnote{As Robert Neville (2000:86) points out, there is ‘nothing like a theistic notion of divine intervention or grace’ in Ruism. It has been noted that even though Tu has apparently come to accept the idea of the Christian God as a living reality when he was sixty-seven years old, he still rejects or have not yet accepted that such a personal external creator can be taken as a viable Ruist alternative (Tu 2007c:150, 152). See also Tu Weiming (2008a:445).}

Although Tu criticizes sternly the anthropocentrism developed from the European Enlightenment (Tu 2006:6, 11, 19), his interpretation of Ruist relational selfhood is in reality also still an anthropocentrism\footnote{This independent argument of mine is supported by Chin Kenpa’s (2011:564–5) argument (see F80 above) and Fan Ruiping’s (2010:xvi–xvii) work found later at the end of my research where he further distinguishes ‘three forms of anthropocentricism regarding [humans’] relationship with nature[,] … a robustly individualistic humanism … a contractual humanism … [and] a religious humanism’. The discussion here about Tu’s anthropocentric account is in the form of ‘a religious humanism’ related to ‘one’s general relationships to God or Heaven and the cosmos’ (ibid.). See also Nakamura (1964:233–5).} wearing a mask of ‘the complete unity between humanity and Heaven’ — Tu’s (1976a:8) New Ruist vision of ‘anthropocosmic’ humanism,\footnote{See also Tu Weiming (1985:10; 1989a:ix; 1990a:180f.; Tu 2007c; 2008a:438).} precisely because Heaven is defined in terms of human beings by themselves.

So we must continue to ask, because even if selfhood itself as Tu claims serves as a transcendent reference point, does the concept of self-transcendence become a vacuous idealism because of the incomprehensibility of selfhood and self-transcendence? Although Tu and other Ruists often emphasize ‘transcendence’, Tu’s assumptions regarding self-cultivation and rejections of any interpretive possibilities beyond his assumptions, obviously makes his account of New Ruist selfhood something that seemingly cannot be transcended.

Besides, the perfectibility and intrinsic goodness of human nature as a Heaven-endowed nature, along with the complete unity between humanity and Heaven as the form of ultimate self-transformation, are linked together in Tu’s interpretations by means of circular arguments.\footnote{For example, if one is as perfect as described, why does one need to learn to be human? If one is not at all perfect as described and needs to learn to be human within the PTRIC cultural contest, how can one afford to escape from a relational self repressively imposed by prevailing social demands?} Although there must always be some unproved assumptions,
Premises, or presuppositions as the basis of any belief system or philosophy, the more circular arguments there are in a system, the less open it is to criticism, and so the weaker it is.\textsuperscript{105} It is understandable that those assumptions must be based on each other, since within his system in his work there is no external transcendent being which serves as their foundation. Because of these claims, I suggest that the term \textit{surpassing}, simply meaning \textit{progressing}, would be a more proper account of this claim when applied to self-transcending realization, rather than the term \textit{transcendence} as it applies in the current context of Tu’s and others’ New Ruist selfhood.\textsuperscript{106}

Will Tu and other Ruists be able to transcend this conceptualization of selfhood? Even though Tu repeatedly stresses that the union of Ruist selfhood and the cosmos is an ‘open system’, it seems that his assumptions about self-cultivation make essentially make his form\textsuperscript{107} of New Ruism, or New Ruist selfhood, an enclosed and self-justifying system.\textsuperscript{108} I have argued that Tu’s New Ruist selfhood should be seen as an enclosed system, noting that it has no external supreme being as a source for human cultivation and for the legitimization of its authority. If Tu and other New Ruists are not open to any other possibilities, they are ultimately unable to move beyond this enclosed system.

Nevertheless, the main reason for the resistant Tu’s failure to save New Ruism from the mire of collectivism is the verification that there still is a tendency of asserting a RFS as a part of its post-traditional Ruist cultural design, namely that the privatized self or the

\textsuperscript{105} In spite of the claim that there are at least five circular arguments linked together as demonstrated in Diagram 5.1 in Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist concept selfhood, Tu still expresses his strong faith in those assumptions as mutually reinforcing premises and rejects any possibilities outside of them.

\textsuperscript{106} This suggestion appears to be supported by Ames (1997:44) whose discussion about it was found at the last stage of this research.

\textsuperscript{107} Three years after I stated this independent argument, I found support for it in Derk Bodde’s (1953:68) observation that the Chinese ‘cosmic pattern is self-contained and self-operating’. Wei Zhengtong (1988 in Tu, Weiming 1997a:305) also points out that the concept of the complete unity between ‘humanity’ and \textit{Heaven} is actually a closed subject.

\textsuperscript{108} The only openness found with this claim is merely that of the individual self towards the collective self (1985:57), as expressed in the quotation in C4S4.5.1.
small self is devalued in New Ruism. Since the resistant Tu’s ideal synthesis is neither individualistic nor collectivist, his interpretation of the New Ruist cultural design invalidates his arguments in distinguishing his non-collectivist claims from collectivism. In this context, it is very difficult for the resistant Tu to eliminate the problem of imposing repressively a Ruist relational selfhood by merely denying that it happens. In addition, a specific New Ruist cultural design is consequently enhanced by Tu’s repeated emphases on the importance of communal self-effort and communal attainment in an ultimate self-transformation as a communal act. In the end, the only way one can define the self is through one’s relationships with other collective selves.

As a result, Tu’s interpretations of New Ruist selfhood do not convince one that ‘the great tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ is just a scapegoat when it is blamed for repressively imposing a relational self on persons. Although Tu continues to emphasize within his thesis that all human relationships would be based on ‘equality without uniformity’, the meaning of ‘equality’ in this context of a New Ruist relational selfhood only refers to a possible theoretical state between two particular selves, and not a substantially supported social reality observed in PTRIC societies.


110 The sociologist Ambrose Y. C. King (1992.ix, 9-13) asserts that neither collectivism nor individualism is the central thought of Chinese Ruism. The individual is neither independent nor dependent but interdependent with others. He argues that the Chinese individual in Ruism is a ‘relational being’ with self-centred spontaneity and autonomy in one’s relational nexus (ibid.:10). Although one cannot escape from the nexus where one belongs, especially one’s family, one has enough freedom and space to choose the nexus and decide the boundary between one and others. However, he also notes that Chinese Ruism does not provide an ethics to guide one to establish a relationship with strangers, outside one’s relational nexus. Accordingly, one will become aggressive without constraint under one’s nexus. One, with total freedom, will behave or act differently, even beyond the reasonable boundary of morality and ethics. His explanation is that the Chinese individual is no longer a Ruist relational being in front of strangers. Ruist value loses the moral binding to the individual. Does Ambrose Y. C. King’s interpretation of Ruist relational selfhood indirectly provide the evidence that the RFS is cultivated in Ruist relational ethics? It is worth noting that he does not specify his Chinese Ruism and tends to be too reductionist and generalizing. But according to his discussion on the rational traditionalism in Hong Kong (ibid.:152-69), Chinese Ruism should denote the idealized great tradition of Ruist spirit because he specifies the one existing in Hong Kong as ‘social’ Ruism — a ‘gōngjùxìng de lixìng chuántǒng zhǔyì’ 「工具性的理性傳統主義」 (instrumental rational traditionalism) (ibid.:166).
Therefore, the issue is not whether the resistant Tu’s New Ruism completely ignores or denies these problems, but whether the responsive Tu’s New Ruism respects and emphasizes it enough to prevent any repressive social impositions to emerge within the post-traditional cultural design of (Ru-based) collectivism. \(^{111}\) From the above analysis, the answer is that in the responsive Tu’s account it might be possible if he allows for flexibility in adjusting the presuppositions undergirding his account. Otherwise, due to the multi-faceted circular reasonings of his four presuppositions, the answer still tends to be negative. The individuality of PTRIC selves as well as the equality between them in the society, not to speak of between selves and society, cannot otherwise be sustained because society and its relations would still determinedly shape the self according to presuppositions P2 and P3 (S10). \(^{112}\)

Accordingly, it would be worthwhile if Tu and other New Ruists would check whether the egocentrism that they generally claim to oppose can still be found as a facet of their New Ruist selfhood. \(^{113}\) Any Ruist cultural design that devalues the privatized self or the small self, because of egocentrism, supports a hierarchical social structure that tends to promote those unhealthy repressive situations for the small self.

Do these results lead us to the conclusions that New Ruism needs to be interpreted and justified in better ways? Do these indicate that some assumptions of New Ruism should be modified? Do these also reveal that traditional Ruism or New Ruist selfhood should be reevaluated?

\(^{111}\) This challenge can be also applied to Ambrose Y. C. King and Michael H Bond’s defence (1985) of the Ruist individualistic dimension due to Ruist spirit of ‘keeping to the middle way’ (zhōngyōng zhī dào 中庸之道) and Thomas A. Metzger’s defence (1988) for Modern Ruist Humanists’ emphasis on ‘the moral autonomy of the individual’. Both of their arguments also seem to ignore the empirical evidence that reveals the signs and symptoms for the existence of a Ru-influenced RFS. It is notable that emphasizing moral autonomy can be also a way of imposing oughts instead of encouraging intents on the inferior individual in the context of Ruist imbalanced relational ethics.

\(^{112}\) The standard of interpersonal equality cannot be realized in PTRIC cultural contexts between one self and the larger communal society. Put another way, cultural design lacks a concept of constitutionality, so that the rights of an individual will not be protected by the whole group.

\(^{113}\) Whenever self-realization in reality has not yet been reached, the traditional or post-traditional Ruist self is repressively imposed on by social demands.
becomes an enclosed system because of some unchangeable assumptions? Do they suggest that there would be some other possible interpretative options which New Ruism might find outside its own traditional resources? These are the questions which deserve to be explored by New Ruists and Ru-inspired Chinese intellectuals. However, a solution for the RFS in both PTRIC contexts and New Ruist context is necessary, as the evidence explored here has shown. It is in this light, and for these reasons, that a completely different solution is considered and proposed – one that has its origins outside the Ruist context.
Chapter Six

Jürgen Moltmann’s Understanding of Self

1. Introduction

I have argued in the preceding chapters that the relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts is the main factor contributing to the research problem of the RFS. I also found that Tu Weiming’s resistant account of New Ruist relational selfhood is almost the same as the conceptualization of relational selfhood in the PTRIC contexts criticized by the scholars, in terms of the research problem. Even though the responsive Tu’s account shows the potentiality to overcome the research problem, the presuppositions of his account are not at all adjustable for him. Accordingly, a completely different solution or some other culturally synthetic alternative for this problem in PTRIC contexts is necessitated. So what about the self in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology? Has it not been the impression that Christianity, especially trinitarianism, has promoted a view of European individualism1 — inaugurated by Augustine, augmented by the Enlightenment, and finalized by Kant (1724-1804) (Grenz 2001:60, 76)?2 I am interested to discover to what extent Moltmann’s thinking about the Trinity can escape this problem of individualism (Robbins 2012). For, as introduced in C3S1.2.2, the self in the account of trinitarian theological anthropology is indeed also a form of ‘relational self’ (Boff

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1 Through his works, surveys, and review of studies among Christian converts in different ethnic people groups, Joel Robbins (2012:5, 18f.) concludes that Christianity fosters ‘various kinds of individualism’. See also Hayek (1944:14).

2 Based on the Early Fathers’ models of inter-personal ‘distinction of the divine hypostases’, Augustine assumes ‘internal relations within the Godhead’. But he dissociates completely ‘these eternal intra-trinitarian relations from ordinary human relations’, so that he cannot but shape ‘a rather static concept of the deity’ and ‘an individualistic concept of humanity’ (Kaiser 2001:95). Grenz states that ‘Kant provides the final intellectual foundation for the shift to radical individualism’, because he develops ‘the capstone on the construction of the Enlightenment self’. He elevates the ‘active mind as the definitive agent both in the knowing process and in the life of duty, [and so] completed the turn towards the knowing subject’ (Grenz 2001:76). See also Moltmann (1998a:32) and Gunton (2003:93–5).
But is such a relational self different in kind from the one supported by the Ru-Based collectivism in Tu’s New Ruism? Can its perspective be applied to provide an alternative solution (or a modification reference) for the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood? In other words, are there any significant differences offered by the notion of a relational self following from Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood, namely social trinitarian anthropology, which might prove insightful and effective in responding to the tendency of the RFS in PTRIC contexts? This chapter will aim to discuss Moltmann’s distinctive account of relational selfhood. Before doing that, Moltmann’s theological method had better be first introduced.

2. Brief Introduction of Moltmann’s Theological Method

Moltmann (2000a:xiv, eo) did not begin his series of theological works with a so-called ‘prolegomena’. In other words, he did not do his theology in a fixed method adopted beforehand ‘but only as it was applied’ because he is not interested in theological method and its related questions but in the ‘real content of theology’ (ibid.:xiv-xv). To revise ‘theological issues’ based on their ‘biblical origins’ and to renew or rework them in facing the present challenge are more important to him (ibid.). Accordingly, theology for him is always ‘an adventure of ideas’ (ibid.:xv). Its methods are like an open and inviting road which ‘emerged only as [he] walked it’ (ibid.:xv, eo). His ‘personal biography … the political context[,] and historical kairos [(opportune moment)]’ in which he lives determine his road (ibid.:xv). However, he wrote Experiences in Theology (2000, German original in 1999) as an afterword for explaining the methods he had applied in his previous theological works (ibid.:xiv, xvi).

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3 See also Grenz (2001:312).
First, Moltmann argues the indispensability of natural theology\(^4\) in Christian theology (ibid.:64). He asserts three possible functions it has for Christian theology (ibid.:64-79):

1. ‘Natural theology is the general *presupposition* for specifically Christian theology’ (ibid.:65-70, eo);
2. ‘Natural theology is the consequence and the eschatological *goal* of historical and Christian theology’ (ibid.:70-73, eo); and
3. ‘Christian theology *itself* is the true natural theology’ (ibid.:73-79, eo).

Luther (1518:52-5) opposed natural theology as ‘the theology of glory’. But does he question whether God’s self-revelation is in nature itself? Moltmann does not think so. He (2000:78) thinks the reason why Luther opposed it is rather because of its abuse by ‘godless, self-deifying’ persons. He agrees with Luther that ‘the theology of the cross’ must come first to make the sinners who have gone astray right, namely making them justified by faith (ibid.). Accordingly, ‘the analogy of essence’ comes *after* ‘the analogy of faith’ and the theology of glory comes *after* the theology of cross (ibid.:79, eo). Likewise, ‘*after* the theology of grace [comes] the theology of nature, and *after* the theology of nature natural theology’ (ibid.). Consequently, he consider it as ‘a task for Christian theology’ (ibid.:79). Based on it, public theology can be developed, especially in facing the ‘new ecological crises’ (ibid.: 80).

Secondly, in terms of ‘the reasonableness of faith’ (ibid.:45), Moltmann holds together Anselm and Aquinas, the mythic theology and the scholastic theology,\(^5\) and so

\(^4\) Moltmann (2000a:64, eo) defines ‘natural theology’, derived from the ancient Stoicism, in Christian theological framework as ‘a discernment or knowledge of God derived from *the book of nature*, with the help of innate human reason’. He explains that ‘[it] is not self-evident, emerging of itself from observations of nature. It springs from a Christian theology of nature’ (ibid.:69). However, he does not think that it can stay still within ‘the closed Christian circle’ because such a natural theology must be ‘a cosmological and biological interpretative suggestion’ (ibid.).

\(^5\) Although both Anselm and Aquinas are scholastic theologians, their positions are different in ‘the reasonableness of faith’ (Moltmann 2000a:45–8). Anselm’s is ‘from faith to understanding’ (ibid.:47) but Aquinas’ is the reverse (ibid.:48).
'the modern subjectivity of faith and the modern objectivity of scientific or scholarly knowledge' in his theological methods (ibid.:48). In his ‘theological epistemology’, not only does Moltmann draw on Aristotle’s ‘axiom of likeness’, namely ‘like is only known by like’, as his principle of cognition for knowing God (ibid.:151, eo), but also he argues that knowing and talking about God by us ‘who are not like God’ must be done ‘through negation and apophaticism’ as well as by means of ‘analogy and metaphor’ (ibid.:151). He (ibid.:166, eo) argues that the ‘negative or apophatic theology’ ⁶ is necessary a 'corollary of analogical theology': ⁷

Nothing positive can be deduced from negations. It is only if the positive is experienced that negative paraphrases for it can be found. Negative theology is theology first of all, otherwise it insensibly becomes the atheistic negation of theology. So negative theology remains bound to affirmative theology as a necessary corrective, just as apophatic theology remains necessarily bound to cataphatic theology. It is a corrective, not a paradigm. (ibid.:169, eo)

Based on the above epistemological assumptions, he presents the principle of ‘dialectical knowing’ God, namely ‘unlike knows unlike’ (ibid.:169-73, eo). It is only in the realm of ‘what is essentially different’ from God that He can be ‘perceived as God’ (ibid.:172).

Thirdly, Moltmann does not begin from any adopted theological position and read from there into the biblical text but bases his theology on the biblical story of Christ in particular. For example, the point of departure of his trinitarian theology is ‘the three Persons of the history of Christ’ in the biblical testimony (Moltmann 1981:149). If philosophical logic is made the starting point, then in the context of discussing ‘Jesus was a Jew’, he (1967:141) asserts that the path of knowledge in theology ‘leads irreversibly from the particular to the general, from the historic to the eschatological and universal’.

For example, he (ibid.:17, eo) explains:

Christian eschatology … sets out from a definite reality in history and announces the future that reality, its future possibilities[,] and its power over the future … [It] speaks of Jesus

⁶ Negative theology, or Apophatic theology, is a theological approach to describe God only in terms of what He is not, instead of presumptuously attempting to describe what God is (Lossky 1948 renamed and edited in 2001:13–30).

⁷ In the ‘principle of analogy’, human beings’ ‘similarities’ to God are perceived ‘in still [their] greater dissimilarity’ to Him (Moltmann 2000a:155–61, 167–8, 172, eo).
Christ and his future … [and recognizes the reality of the raising of Jesus and proclaims the future of the risen Lord

Moltmann (1971:4–11) rejects reading the historical witnesses ‘like a palimpsest’ (ibid.:5), especially applying to both cosmological and anthropological starting points. He explains:

For the concrete texts of God, a generally approachable text is substituted through which the Bible is to become more readable and more understandable…Interpretation then becomes a bridge between the witness of a specific history and a sphere of generally accessible possibilities which recur through the ages. (ibid.)

For him (1967:142), a general truth in Christ does not become particular, ‘but a concrete, unique, historic event of the crucifying and raising of Jesus by Yahweh [the creator] … becomes general through the universal eschatological horizon it anticipates’. Accordingly, this particular history of Jesus will affect everything. It is worth noting that the Bible for Moltmann (2000a:xxii) is not ‘an authoritative blueprint and confining boundary’ but ‘a stimulus’ to the development of his own theology. However, what he means by such an assertion is about the transcultural and timeless relevance and application of ‘the matter of Scripture’ to the different cultural contexts of believers or its readers in different eras (ibid., eo). He explains that ‘the scriptural form of the matter’ is not important even though we reach ‘the substance’ only by way of that form. Only its matter pointing into believers’ future beyond the times and cultural contexts in which Scripture was written is relevant (ibid.:xxii).


Moltmann (1970:1f,) states that ‘Christian theology ... merges with specific recollection a universal and absolute claim ... As long as the dialectical unity of particular history and special historical mediation with the universally relevant that pertains directly to everyone can be retained ... Christianity is alive’. In other words, in his understanding, Christianity depends on ‘the unity of Jesus with God and of God with Jesus’. For ‘as soon as the dialectical unity between history and absolute is broken, Christianity disintegrates’.


9 Moltmann (1970:1f,) states that ‘Christian theology ... merges with specific recollection a universal and absolute claim ... As long as the dialectical unity of particular history and special historical mediation with the universally relevant that pertains directly to everyone can be retained ... Christianity is alive’. In other words, in his understanding, Christianity depends on ‘the unity of Jesus with God and of God with Jesus’. For ‘as soon as the dialectical unity between history and absolute is broken, Christianity disintegrates’. 
3. Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Anthropology⁠¹⁰

As described above in C3, Moltmann himself advocates freedom for the oppressed in many aspects and criticizes patriarchy. Nevertheless, instead of promoting individualism, he (1989:89) values much more ‘communalism’ and ‘personalism’ (‘réngé zhǔyì’ 「人格主義」) (2000b:64).¹¹ For him (2008b:72), the identity of individuals is shaped by the collective continuity of ‘the contract between the generations’ (1989:90) handed down from generation to generation, namely by the community existing between the generations at any one time. This is so in addition to the identity received from the *imago Dei*, upon which both ‘somatic identity’ (1990a:261–2), and ‘historical identity’ are based (ibid.:262). As mentioned in C2, Moltmann (2000a:333)¹² like Tournier also makes a distinction between ‘an individual and a person’.¹³ Through tracing back the definition of individual as ‘something … indivisible’ in both Latin and Greek, the separate and isolated individual without relationships is not identical to a person (ibid.). A person is an existing human being with sociality and history.¹⁴ Moltmann highlights both the importance of securing personal liberation and protecting personal dignity as a human and the value of communities where people make decisions socially about their lives for themselves (ibid.). For he understands and explains the nature of true human community based on the divine community (ibid.),¹⁵ because the precedent for that community comes from the image of the triune God who is the Creator, the Lord, and the possessor of the earth.

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¹⁰ The Chinese brief version of S2, and S4 to S7 in this chapter were created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi [forthcoming]2018:S3), but this English one was the original text.
¹¹ See also Moltmann (1967:304–28).
¹² See also Moltmann (2002a:7).
¹³ As early as in the fourth century, the Cappadocian Fathers differentiated the person, in ‘love and relationship with others, from the individual, isolated from others (Zizioulas 1995:58–9).
¹⁴ In terms of social trinitarian anthropology, a person’s history includes a forgiven past, a reconciled presence, and a promised redeemed future with hope.
¹⁵ See also Moltmann (1981:198).
Moltmann (1985a:215–43) presents the *imago Dei* as an ‘analogy of relation’ (ibid.:220) (‘*analogia relationis*’) (ibid.:77), namely ‘social likeness to God’ (ibid.:234), seeking to differentiate it from an ‘analogy of substance’ (ibid.:219). From this aspect of relations, Moltmann (1981:197–200) explains this image as the mirror of the trinitarian life within relationships. Therefore, in his social trinitarian anthropology, following the thought of the Eastern Orthodox Church (ibid.:171-178), he (1981:134–200) affirms that ‘individuality’ and ‘sociality’ are inseparable, and social relations are not to be prioritized over ‘personal identity’. Just as the unity and the distinction among the trinitarian Persons are equally preserved without sacrificing anything among them, so too human persons and relations are equally valued and maintained. The concept of the *imago Dei* in terms of relationships and community echoes Moltmann’s (1977) concept of ‘open friendship’ (ibid.:119-121), ‘open fellowship’ (ibid.:111, 189,343, 360), and ‘open church’ (ibid.:2, 334, eo) presented earlier, his understanding of which, argued by Bauckham (1995:126–30), can be traced back to his *Theology of Hope*. Such an open fellowship and church are realized and accessed by God’s grace instead of by the merits of human beings. Therefore, this kind of relational self in social trinitarian anthropology is developed from Moltmann’s concept of relationship, community and fellowship, all of those being based on his understanding of the *imago Dei*. Still, and here we come to a central question, is this kind of relational self able to escape or resist the tendency of

16 ‘An analogy of substance’, by McDougall’s explanation (2003:191), ‘focuses on a singular attribute inherent in human beings, such as the rational soul or the will’ and ‘fixes the likeness to God in the individual’s possession of such a capacity’.

17 Ibid.:192.

18 *Person* in Christian theological language to indicate the distinct trinitarian Persons of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, means ‘the individuality of each Persons who simultaneously exists in itself and in eternal communion with the other two’ (Boff 2000:123). Its origin is *persona* in Latin and πρόσωπον in Greek referring to the actors’ varieties of masks representing their varieties of *personae* in the play on stage (Geddes 1911). ‘[[ largely due to the theologians who hit upon it when they were looking for some term that would enable them to assert the trinity of Godhead without admitting more than one ‘*substance*’, it is then adopted to denote an *individual* human being (Barfield 1967:59, eo).
repressive social impositions and the RFS as a product of a Ru-based cultural design in PTRIC contexts?

In order to answer the second primary subsidiary research question in this thesis — *To what extent is the conceptualization of the social trinitarian relational selfhood presented by Jürgen Moltmann a suitable alternative or modification reference for solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood?* — several relevant secondary subsidiary questions will need to be examined first.

(1) What does Moltmann understand by the *imago Dei* and *gracious moral cultivation*\(^{19}\) (moral transformation by Christ’s grace) disclosed in his social trinitarian anthropology in dealing with this research problem?

(2) How does the open community in Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology confront and overcome the research problem, if it can do so?

(3) What are the theoretical presuppositions undergirding Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology?

4. **Historical Doctrine of the Trinity: The Triune God**

Moltmann (1981:19) first developed a ‘historical doctrine of the Trinity’ (or trinitarian history of God)\(^{20}\) by beginning with ‘the history of Jesus the Son’. He then developed ‘a social doctrine of the Trinity’ in distinction to what he calls ‘abstract monotheism’ (ibid.:3, 17).

\(^{19}\) See S8.5.

\(^{20}\) The phrase historical doctrine of the Trinity used here by Moltmann is not about the history of dogma or historical theology. It denotes a notion of the triune God who engages in history and indeed possesses a *history* of His own.
4.1 The Issue of Abstract Monotheism

For Moltmann (1981:16–18), both the Trinity of a homogenous divine substance as well as the Trinity of an identical divine subject result unwittingly in the collapse of trinitarian doctrine into abstract monotheism. The former is derived from the ‘general concept of the divine substance’ (‘*una substantia — tres personae*’, or one substance — three Persons) proposed by Tertullian (155-240) (ibid.:19). The latter is derived from the ‘general concept of the absolute subject’ (‘*one subject — three modes of being*’) proposed by Hegel (1770-1831) (ibid.).

In the former, God’s existence and uniqueness are to be proved and assured first, by means of the cosmological argument, namely derivations logically drawn from the premise of the existence of ‘an ordered cosmos’ (ibid.:19). Then the three Persons of this existing God are to be explained by the doctrine of the Trinity. Accordingly, not only is the unity of the three divine Persons stressed unduly, but also the triune God tends to be reduced to the One God (ibid.:13-17).

In the latter, God is presented as the absolute subject, namely ‘God reveals Himself through Himself’. In other words, God communicates Himself in ‘this triadic way’, namely the Father is the ‘*I*’, the Son the ‘*self*’, and the Spirit as ‘the identity of the divine *I-self*’ (ibid.:18, eo). In this portrayal of the Deity, there are no interpersonal relationships between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. The conceptualization of the absolute subject is based on ‘anthropological reasons’ (ibid.:15). In the light of such reasons, the centre and reference point of this world is ‘the human subject’ rather than a supreme divine substance; ‘the unity of what is real’ is not determined theocentrically and cosmologically, but anthropologically. Accordingly, the concept of the absolute subject, namely ‘God as person’ (ibid.:4), is to confirm God’s sovereignty and liberty, in order to prevent God from being a passively changeable object that would reduce God to the level of creation. However, this homogenization of divine subjects cannot but reduce the plural
concept of Persons to ‘the one, identical God-subject’ (ibid.:18, 189). Consequently, this approach reduces the language of three Persons to an alternative ‘non-subjective expression’, for example, ‘mode of being’ (ibid.:15-18, 63). Therefore, ‘the unity of the absolute subject’ is easily reduced to merely three aspects of the one subject, three modes of being (tending towards modalism)\(^{21}\) (ibid.:18).

In the Western European Church tradition, the discussion of the Trinity started from ‘God’s unity’ (mainly employing the above two types), and then moved to discuss His trinity (ibid.:2, 19). Instead, Moltmann (1981:19) begins with the trinity of the Persons, required to narrate the particular history of Jesus Christ according to the Biblical witness, and then goes on to discuss their unity, namely ‘a concept of the divine unity as the union of the tri-unity’. Therefore, Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity in the trinitarian history of God is in fact an attempt to build a *dialectical synthesis*\(^ {22}\) between the thesis of God as the supreme substance (God as supreme object) and the antithesis of God as the absolute subject based on modalism (God as supreme subject).

To sum up, even if the Western European Christian churches all reached a consensus in confessing trinitarianism, the tendency to abstract monotheism in Moltmann’s eyes appeared alongside it for the purpose of preventing the churches from falling into the trap of tritheism.\(^ {23}\) But how can we balance, on the one hand, the distinctiveness of the three Persons without falling into tritheism and, on the other hand, their unity without falling into abstract monotheism (erroneously as one substance)?\(^ {24}\)

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\(^{21}\) Three modes of being or modalism refer to the concept that the three Persons of God are not in fact ‘distinct from one another’, but just the one God expressed in different guises or roles (Rea 2003:443). Therefore, Moltmann criticizes modalism as ‘abstract monotheism’ (Moltmann 1981:16–18).

\(^{22}\) This phrase is suggested by Jeremy Law in our discussion on 29 July 2013.

\(^{23}\) Tritheism interprets trinitarianism as not a monotheism but as that ‘there are three eternals or three who are eternal, three Gods or … three who are God’ (Plantinga 1989:37). Such a God who is conditioned by other Gods could not be truly God.

\(^{24}\) Lin Honghsin (2010:30) does not think ‘an absolute balance’ between the distinctiveness of the three Persons and their unity can be maintained in reality. This is because even the definition or demarcation for such a balance is difficult to express concretely.
The former is the most common criticism\textsuperscript{25} levelled against the social trinitarian doctrine (Brown 1989:48);\textsuperscript{26} later we shall see how Moltmann also makes his own criticism along this line.\textsuperscript{27}

4.2 The Eucharistic Form of Trinity

In order to explain the reciprocal relationships between the three Persons of the triune God further, and so to distinguish them from the concept of the Trinity of the identical subject (God as absolute subject), Moltmann (2009b:299) presents ‘the eucharistic form of Trinity’. In this from, ‘activity proceeds \textit{from} the Spirit and \textit{with} the Son \textit{in the direction of} the Father’ (ibid., eo). In differentiating this form from the ‘monarchical form of the Trinity’ in which the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son, he highlights the role of the Spirit ‘as the real subject’, namely ‘the Spirit glorifies the Son and the Father’, instead of acting in a ‘subordinate’ and ‘purely passive’ position to them (ibid.:298-300). In the light of the trinitarian history of God, Moltmann understands different forms of the Trinity at different historical points. The monarchical form of the Trinity is understood in the light of the origin of the trinitarian history of God towards the past (Moltmann 1977:53–6; 2009b:298–300).\textsuperscript{28} The initiative lies with the Father who

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} See also McCall (2003:406; 2009:340), Meeks (2006:13), Chalamet and Vial (2014:6), and Venter (2015:3).
\item \textsuperscript{28} It is notable that Moltmann follows the theological tradition in the understanding of the monarchical form of the Trinity in the light of the trinitarian history of God. However, he (2009a:289, 327, eo) rejects ‘all monadic and all monarchical concepts of unity’ or ‘monarchical monotheism of the \textit{Lord God}’. Although he does not differentiate his usages of monarchical in different contexts, the former monarchical might mean more functionally but the latter two more substantially.
\end{itemize}
sent the Son and the Holy Spirit. But he (1981:188–9) accentuates that the concept of origin here is not about generation but understood only ‘in a transferred sense’. The ‘messianic’ form of the Trinity is understood in the light of Christ’s ‘messianic mission’ in the trinitarian history of God towards the future. The initiative lies with the Son who consummates his sending ‘in his self-giving’ and his incarnation ‘in his death’ (Moltmann 1977:56–7). The Eucharistic form of Trinity is understood in the light of the eschatological trinitarian history of God. The initiative lies with the Holy Spirit who glorifies the Father and the Son through Christ’s ‘transfiguration, resurrection … exaltation, and the consummation of the lordship of God (Moltmann 1977:57–60; 2009b:298–300). In the light of the ‘eschatological goal’ of trinitarian history of God and ‘the completion of God’s history with the world’, all of the above forms of the Trinity are ‘gathered up and transcended’ into ‘the trinitarian doxology of the eternal God’, namely ‘the fellowship of the Spirit with the Father and the Son’ (Moltmann 1977:57–60; 2009b:298–300, eo).

Moltmann (1981:64) also argues for ‘the eucharistic form of Trinity’ by stating that the Son and Father reveal each other (Matthew 11:27; Galatians 1:16) rather than God reveals God-self. It is not that God gave of Himself for us. But God simply gave His own Son up for us (Romans 8:32), and the Son, as subject, ‘gave himself for me’ (Galatians 2:20). Therefore, Jesus as the Son who incarnated in the midst of the histories of human beings was ‘not consummated and fulfilled by a single subject’ but emerged from the ‘co-efficacy’ of all the three Persons of the triune God.\(^{29}\) This miraculous act within human histories is derived from ‘the reciprocal, changing, and living relationship’ among them.

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\(^{29}\)This co-efficacy can also be manifestly obvious by Jesus’ baptism with the Father’s voice and the Spirit’s descending (Matt. 3:16f.) and His transfiguration with the Father’s voice (Matt. 17:1-5).
It is worth noting that Moltmann himself did not use Staniloae’s phrase *divine intersubjectivity*\(^{30}\) in the beginning to explain inter-trinitarian reciprocal relationships, but Richard Bauckham (1946-) (2005:155) uses it\(^{31}\) to introduce Moltmann’s concept of the ‘relationship between the divine Persons’.\(^{32}\) However, in one of his more recent work, he (2008a:374) adopted it in stating, ‘what constitutes the Unity is the triadic intersubjectivity we call *perichôrësis*’, although he did not continue to explain and expand it.\(^{33}\)

### 4.3 An Eschatological Panentheistic Perspective

Moltmann’s trinitarian concept of creation is presented from an eschatological panentheistic perspective. He (1985a:98) explains that ‘creation exists in the Spirit, is moulded by the Son and is created by the Father’ and, therefore, not only the creator God dwells in creation, but also creation is ‘from God, through God and in God’. This concept brings into focus two essential truths about God: ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ (ibid.). He (1992b:31–8) then calls this concept of ‘God in all things’ ‘immanent transcendence’.\(^{34}\) Stressing only one aspect, according to Moltmann, leads to either

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30 The concept of ‘divine intersubjectivity’ was proposed by Dumitru Staniloae (1903-1993) (1994:260–78) to explain inter-trinitarian reciprocal relationships. He emphasized that in divine perfect love the ‘Persons do not merely engage in a reciprocal exchange of self; they also affirm themselves reciprocally and personally, and establish themselves in existence through giving and receiving’ (ibid.:257). What does divine intersubjectivity mean? In a nutshell, it means there is no passive object and act in the triune relationship; all the divine Persons are subjects and all their acts are active. Staniloae (1980:94, eo) adopts the term ‘pure subjectivity’ to explain this absolute freedom, namely ‘existing in itself and determining itself’. God’s mode of perfect existence and being is as a subject. In the subject-object relations among the triune Persons of God, ‘even the object is all subject, even if it occupies the position of object’ (ibid.). He also terms this intersubjectivity (or ‘common subjectivity’) in God ‘the most consistent mode of reality, an objective subjectivity, or a subjective objectivity’ (ibid.:94). LaCugna (1985:647) also uses ‘intersubjectivity’ to describe triune God’s personhood.

31 The relationship implied by divine intersubjectivity is different from the one implied by ‘universal intersubjectivity’ in the philosophical discussions in cosmology, arguing that ‘objectivity is grounded in habit or repetition of pattern among [interrelated] subjects of experience rather than in fixed essences within a pregiven causal scheme’ (Bracken 1998:704). See also Bracken (2001).

32 See also Isaac (2010).

33 It is notable that ‘Divine intersubjectivity’ is a general term to describe the reciprocal relationships between the three Persons of the triune God. However, Moltmann’s ‘eucharistic form of Trinity’ is a particular term for a historical point in the trinitarian history of God.

34 This concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ about God in Moltmann’s account can be traced to Calvin, Luther, and Aquinas (1996:111, 128). See also Kwok Hungbiu (2001:83–4, 88–97). It is worth noting that this kind of ‘immanent transcendence’ in Christian theological accounts has a completely different meaning
‘deism’ (lack of God’s immanence) or ‘pantheism’ (lack of God’s transcendence) (Moltmann 1985a:98). Therefore, he (1985a:103) considers that panentheism can bind together God’s immanence and transcendence in his ‘trinitarian doctrine of creation’. As the Spirit creates the world and indwells in it, the Spirit not only sustains creation and its ‘communities’, but also guides them beyond themselves. Accordingly, the world becomes a ‘divine environment’ that shelters and nurtures every living creature.

Moltmann quotes ‘In [H]im we live and move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28) to support his ‘panentheistic understanding of the world’ (ibid.:103, 300). In this sense, God is the divine environment of the world through ‘the symbol of the redeeming cosmic human being, Christ’ (ibid.:300). Although panentheism is not a normal Christian theological term, it is evident that Moltmann (1996:327) uses it to apply and extend the relationships of the perichōrēsis among trinitarian Persons, and so is able to explain the relationships between the triune God and the created world from the perspective of this social trinitarian doctrine. However, as already mentioned above, God and the world are differentiated on the basis of panentheism. Moltmann (1985a:84) consequently asserts that ‘even in the kingdom of glory the world remains God's creation and will not become God himself’.

5. Social Doctrine of the Trinity through Perichōrēsis (Περιχώρησις)

From his understanding of the history of the three Persons’ relations of fellowship, to which the scriptures offer multiple testimony, Moltmann (1981:19) develops his social doctrine from the meaning of the same phrase in Tu Weiming’s account discussed in C5S6. Tu Weiming’s ‘transcendence’ is only about self-realization of humans.

35 Drawing upon the explanation of Heinrich Heine (1797-1856), Moltmann makes a distinction between pantheism and panentheism. Pantheism views everything as God without difference, and so sees only ‘eternal, divine presence’ (ibid.:103). However, panentheism differentiates God from the world, and so can identify ‘future transcendence, evolution and intentionality’ within the Deity (ibid.). For God discloses God-self in certain different degrees within various things, and so there is an impulse in everything to ‘strive after a higher degree of divinity’ (Heine 1882:57–8). It is worth noting that Heine (1882:57–8) points out the error of ‘the pantheism of the Goethe era’ through manifesting the meaning of what Moltmann (1985a:103) terms as ‘panentheism’ but Heine himself does not use the term panentheism.
trinitarian doctrine. This is based on a form of ‘trinitarian hermeneutics’. It directs us to the aspects of relationships and communities, first among the trinitarian Persons, and then as their form of fellowship becomes ‘open to men and women’, extending to the whole creation in the world (ibid.). In his view, this trinitarian hermeneutics takes the place of the ‘subjective thinking’ which can only function in ‘separation and isolation’ from its objects (ibid.).

5.1 The Concept of Perichōrēsis

Moltmann practically applies this social trinitarian doctrine to thinking ‘ecologically about God, [hu]man[ity] and the world in their relationships and indwellings’. For him, this application is drawing upon ‘panentheistic ideas’ which are rooted in both Jewish and Christian traditions (ibid.). While expounding on the concept of personhood in trinitarian terms in his The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Moltmann (1981:174–5) follows the thoughtful ‘doctrine of the eternal περιχωρήσις (perichōrēsis) of John Damascene (676-749). This term refers to the ‘reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration’ of the divine Persons without being mixed or divided. The concept of perichōrēsis highlights

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36 I assume that this is not in the sense of an ontic order but a noetic one. Carver T. Yu (1987:181–200) also highlights the similar ‘openness’ of these relations of ‘being-in-communion’. However, the openness in his account starts from the openness of the Creator God to His creatures but not from the openness of the Trinity.

37 Moltmann (2009a:288).

38 Moltmann (2008a:372). περιχωρήσις indicates ‘circumincessio of the trinitarian Persons’ (Moltmann 1981:174) and is transliterated to perichōrēsis as an English word. Semantically speaking, the original meaning of this Greek word is related to ‘rotation’ and ‘surrounding region’ in its noun form or ‘to go round … to encompass’ in its verb form (Moltmann 2008a:372–3). The concept of perichōrēsis was first used to explain ‘the intimate communion of the two natures of Christ’ by Gregory Nazianzen (329-390), in the fourth century, and Pseudo-Cyril (ca. 313-386) was probably the first to apply its usage further to ‘the trinitarian relationships, around 650’ (Otto 2009:368–9).
the ‘circulatory character’ of the triune God. Moltmann (1981:178) discloses its meaning when he states:

To throw open the circulatory movement of the divine light and the divine relationships, and to take men and women, with the whole of creation, into the life-stream of the triune God: that is the meaning of creation, reconciliation and glorification.

This manifests also how he applies panentheistic ideas to this realm of creation in his theological reflections.

Moltmann also explains perichōrēsis as a process of ‘the exchange of energies’ occurring in the trinitarian Persons of God (ibid.:174-5).\(^{39}\) They attain perfect oneness through their ‘fellowship and unity … in the eternal love’. In other words, through the eternal love of the triune God, the Persons live and ‘dwell in’ each other and communicate eternal life’ to each other. The divine Persons attain these aspects of mutuality to such a degree according to Moltmann that they become one (ibid.:175). He (ibid.) explains:

The trinitarian Persons do not merely exist and live in one another; they also bring one another mutually to manifestation in the divine glory. The eternal divine glory is for its part displayed through the trinitarian manifestation of the Persons … The Persons of the Trinity make one another shine through that glory, mutually and together. They glow into perfect form through one another and awake to perfected beauty in one another … The mutual transfiguration and illumination of the Trinity into the eternal glory of the divine life is bound up with [the perichoretic unity of the Trinity]. This uniting mutuality and community proceeds from the Holy Spirit. The unity of the Trinity is constituted by the Father, concentrated round the Son, and illumined through the Holy Spirit.

This is how Moltmann’s trinitarian doctrine still upholds monotheistic truth but differentiates this from abstract monotheism.

\subsection{5.2 The Issue of Tritheism}

Tritheism is most criticized by other theologians as a severe problem of social trinitarian theology. Moltmann is not exempted from such a criticism.\(^{40}\) However, he also worries

\footnotesize

39 As mentioned in C2S5, the term ‘exchange’ is used by Triandis (1989:517) to describe the relationship of the private self with others in a more individualistic culture.

about tritheism. Moltmann (1981:13–19, 175) convincingly presents the Trinity of *perichōrēsis* as a solution to the contradiction between the thesis as abstract monotheism and its antithesis in tritheism. As mentioned above, he criticizes both the Trinity of a homogenous divine substance and the Trinity of an identical divine subject as leading only to an ‘abstract monotheism’. As a result, through this dialectical synthesis, Moltmann argues that in the *perichōrēsis*, the ‘personal characteristics’ of the Persons, being ‘the very thing that divides’ the triune Persons, simultaneously turn out to be the very thing that ‘binds them together’ (ibid.:175):

Interpreted perichoretically, the trinitarian persons form their own unity by themselves in the circulation of the divine life. The unity of the trinitarian Persons lies in the circulation of the divine life which they fulfil in their relations to one another. This means that the unity of the triune God cannot and must not be seen in a general concept of divine substance. That would abolish the personal differences. But if the contrary is true – if the very difference of the three Persons lies in their relational, perichoretically consummated life process – then the Persons cannot and must not be reduced to three modes of being of one and the same divine subject. The Persons themselves constitute both their differences and their unity. If the divine life is understood perichoretically, then it cannot be consummated by merely one subject at all. It is bound to consist of the living fellowship of the three Persons who are related to one another and exist in one another. Their unity does not lie in the one lordship of God; it is to be found in the unity of their tri-unity.

Accordingly, the Persons of the Trinity are neither ‘three different individuals’ subsequently interacting with each other in relationships, nor ‘three repetitions of the One God’, namely ‘three modes of being’,\(^{41}\) based on the concept of God as the absolute subject (of revelation). The former is reproached usually as ‘tritheism’, and the latter as modalism (ibid., eo). The trinitarian ‘doctrine of the *perichōrēsis*’ integrates ‘the threeness and the unity’ in a perfect way, so that the threeness does not disappear in the unity and the unity does not collapse into Threeness (ibid.:175). The trinitarian and perichoretic unity of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit consists both of relationships — the relationship of their mutual ‘absolute dependence’ and of their ‘self-differentiation’ from

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\(^{41}\) This is exactly Barth’s (1886–1968) (1932 translated in 1975:44) understanding of the Trinity. See also Barth (1958a:44, 338, 341; 1975:382).
each other — and in their ‘reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration’ (Moltmann 2009a:288).

The concept of the Trinity transcends the ability of human reason to understand and describe it concretely and fully. Although the term perichōrēsis is useful and helpful in explaining more deeply the features of threeness and the unity of the triune God, particularly in a negative theological way, it is still an abstract or metaphysical term.

5.3 The Concept of Essence and Energies
Is the term energy, that Moltmann uses to explain the meaning of perichōrēsis as a process of ‘the exchange of energies’ within the threeness (as mentioned above in S5.1) a more understandable term? Unfortunately, this term, energy, is never fully explained by Moltmann. Rather its usage is confusing and misleading, because this term was never used within any pre-modern Christian tradition to explain the relations of the Persons of the Trinity. It is used, rather, to indicate ‘the knowable … in God’, in contrast with its ‘antinomy’, essence, indicating ‘the unknowable in God’ (Lossky 1948 renamed and edited in 2001:52).42

42 This word ‘energy’ or ‘energeia’, which is usually translated as ‘actuality or activity’, is taken to be the opposite to ‘dynamis or potentiality’ (Zavershinsky 2011:101, eo). Zavershinsky explains the theological development of the usage of the term energy (ibid.:101). The term energy was originally used by Aristotle (384-322 BCE). Aristotle used it to identify a ‘form or determinate structure’, and so to indicate God as a ‘pure form without … any potentiality’. Nevertheless, Aristotle did not differentiate God’s energies from God’s essence (ibid.:101). The Western philosophical and theological traditions followed Aristotle’s view of the inconceivability of both God’s essence and energies. It was St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1357) and his followers who overcame this problem by making them distinct. In differentiating between them, Palamas followed the earlier Fathers, like Dionysius the Areopagite [(ca first century)], Basil the Great [(330-379)] and Gregory the Theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus (330-389)]. Through Palamas’ understanding of these two terms, Zavershinsky explains that ‘God’s uncreated, eternal energies’ can be understood as ‘ineffable, suprasensible light’ that is graspable and felt as ‘Divine grace’ (ibid.:101). In Palamas’ observation, Orthodox theologians referred to the uncreated energy of God ‘as one and as many, as being divisible indivisibly’, but never mentioned the essence of God ‘in the plural form’ (ibid.:102, eo). For the uncreated energy of God would contrast with God ‘being one and altogether indivisible’. Unlike the essence of God that is beyond human reason and so unfathomable, the uncreated energy of God is ‘like the rays of the sun’ through which God’s existence is knowable, even if what He is not knowable (ibid.:102). Palamas asserted that the term ‘light’ is used to refer to God ‘not according to His essence, but according to His energy’ (Palamas n.d., cited in Zavershinsky 2011:109).
I infer that Moltmann has probably been influenced by the meaning of energies given by Orthodox theologians, and borrowing it to explain *perichōrēsis*. In expositing ‘you [(humanity)] may participate in the divine nature’ (2 Peter 1:4), Lossky (1903-58) explains that God can be ‘participable’ only ‘in His energies’, but not in His ‘essence’ (Lossky 1948 renamed and edited in 2001:56). I find that the divine participability in those energies and the meaning of 2 Peter 1:4 (‘you … may become participants in the divine nature’) can be also applied to understand Moltmann’s panentheism as explored in §4.3. The term *energies* and its differentiation from essence, according to the Orthodox tradition, does help to crystallize the meaning of the threeness in the divine unity (in the light of energies) and the unity of the threeness (in the light of essence), even though we acknowledge here again our human finitude in knowing and describing God.

### 5.4 The Importance of *Perichōrēsis*

Moltmann (1981:198, eo) points out that Patristic theologians understood the concept of *perichōrēsis* ‘as the sociality of the three divine Persons’. Perichōrēsis keeps

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43 Lossky (1948 renamed and edited in 2001:n.27) argued that if humanity could participate in God’s essence itself, then ‘God would no longer be [a] Trinity, but a multitude of Persons’. He explained that this is because the term ‘divinities (in the plural)’ is ‘proper to the Three consubstantial Persons as their life, power, wisdom, [and] sanctity, [being] common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’, therefore Palamas designated those energies by the term ‘divinities’ (ibid.:57, eo). Another term used by St. John Damascene to designates energies is ‘movement’ or ‘impulse from God’ (Lossky 1948 renamed and edited in 2001:55, eo).

44 Orthodox theologians down to the present day follow the ‘Cappadocian Fathers’ in the fourth century, who wrote about the analogical ‘category of community’, namely the church, as it applied to ‘the eternal life of the Trinity’ (Moltmann 1981:198). In contrast, the Western European Church has employed the analogical ‘category of the individual person’, the so-called ‘psychological analogy’ (Ormerod 2001), a concept Augustine developed in his ‘psychological doctrine of the Trinity’ (Moltmann 1981:198–9). Augustine (2002:4.9.12) had actually mentioned the sociality of the Trinity by indicating the Father and the Son are of ‘same society of love’. But he either did not emphasize and develop it for some undisclosed reason (Plantinga, Cornelius Jr. 1988:24; 1989:33) or rejected it because of his different interpretation of Gen 1:26f. and his shrinking from accepting ‘the (gnostic notion of a divine family in heaven’ (Moltmann 1985a:235). According to Augustine, the analogies of the trinitarian Persons are reflected in the psyche of every human, for example, ‘the self, the understanding, and the will’ (Moltmann 2009a:290–91). The
Moltmann’s social triune God distinctive and distinguishable from either God as the supreme substance or God as three modes of being. That unity obtained through perichōrēsis depends on ‘the circulation of the divine life’ that is fulfilled by the Three Persons in their reciprocal relationships to each other (Moltmann 1981:175). In this way, the personal differences are not ever abolished and ‘the very difference of the three Persons’ depends on ‘their relational, perichoretically consummated life process’ (ibid.). Consequently, by distinguishing his social triune God from a general concept of divine substance, would his position on the trinitarian ontology be vulnerable to criticisms laid against some other social trinitarian theologians (Wilks 1995)? In other words, does Moltmann indeed deny the fundamental, ontological, substantial, and objective nature of God’s reality? What viewpoint does Moltmann adopt with regard to this issue? This problem will be discussed later in C7S1.

Based upon his semantic studies of the term perichōrēsis and its theological meaning through interpreting the Gospel of John, Moltmann (2008a:372–5) establishes three indispensable elements in the interpersonal relationships of the Triune God by explaining his social trinitarian doctrine through ‘three levels of perichoretic existence of psychological analogy of the Trinity originates in Augustine’s De Trinitate (The Trinity, trans. and published in 2002) and was systematically made use of by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae (ibid.:281). Moltmann (1981:198–9) earlier on highlighted that the Eastern Orthodox theologians held firmly to the social trinitarian doctrine, disagreeing with the Western European Church’s ‘modalistic tendencies’ in understanding personhood in the trinitarian doctrine.

45 The explanation of Staniloae might be helpful to embody the understanding of perichōrēsis in Moltmann’s social trinitarian doctrine. In attempting to solve a dilemma of maintaining ‘the definition of love as the essential divine act and, simultaneously, the definition of this act as a relation while the divine being remains one’, Staniloae (1980:258) asserts that ‘we must see the divine being at one and the same time as unity and as relation, as relation in the very heart of unity’. Accordingly, ‘unity must not be destroyed for the sake of relation, nor relation abolished in favour of unity’. He further denotes this kind of perichoretic relation as a ‘“substantial relation” ’ by quoting Pavel Florensky (1914 reprinted in 1970 quoted in Staniloae 1994:258), stating that ‘“The true subject is a relation of the three but a relation which appears as essence, that is, a substantial relation” ’. He (1994:72, 100) also explains that the communion of the triune Persons is neither ‘a non-substantial relationship’, namely ‘emptied of nature’, nor ‘separated from relationship’. In other words, ‘the essence subsists only in the Persons found in community’. Therefore, the ‘person without communion is not person, while communion is conditioned by a common nature’, which Staniloae (1980; 1994:255) also terms as ‘consubstantiality’.

46 For example John Zizioulas (2004).
the triune God’: unity; diversity; and equality (‘non-hierarchical’ symmetry). In this way, what Moltmann tries to fight against is tritheism (polytheism), abstract monotheism (modalism), and subordinationism. The erroneous danger of tritheism (or polytheism) in the doctrine of the Trinity results from denying or debasing divine unity. The erroneous danger of abstract monotheism (or modalism) comes from denying or debasing the three Persons; while the erroneous danger of subordinationism happens in denying or debasing equality between the three divine Persons.

6. The Imago Dei in Moltmann’s Trinitarian Theological Anthropology

Grenz (2001:304) presents the imago Dei as a concrete and pragmatic basis for the self to be grounded in God. The imago Dei means that all human beings are created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26). Grenz (2001:17) summarizes four different approaches to understanding the imago Dei throughout theological history:

(1) as our soul (the substantial view) — ‘certain attributes or capabilities’ embedded within the human soul;

(2) as our God-given authority (the functional view) — the divine commission to ‘have dominion’ over the whole earth (Gen 1:26, 28);

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48 James R. White (1962-) (1998:28) defines equality as ‘the persons are coequal and coeternal’.

49 In the Bible, only five texts may be discerned to connect the image of God directly to humankind: Genesis 1:26-27; 5:1-3; 9:5-6; 1 Corinthians 11:7 and James 3:9. Psalm 8 as the ‘best commentary’ on Genesis 1:26-28 can be added (Grenz 2001:184).

50 Even though the imago Dei as the basis for constructing a Christian anthropology has been a common understanding throughout church history (Grenz 2001:141), what the concept entails has not been agreed upon by exegetes and theologians.


(3) as our relationality (the relational view) — a ‘fundamental relationship’ between God the Creator and humankind as creatures, including relationships between humans;\(^{53}\)

(4) as our God-given destiny (the telic view) — a God-given goal or destiny for humankind’s living in this life and becoming in the eschatological future.\(^{54}\)

Do these four different views mutually exclude each other? I do not think so. In terms of the selfhood of human beings, all of them together might disclose the comprehensive meaning of the *imago Dei*. These four interpretations function in logical correlation and overlap to a certain degree. They can be integrated, and their correlation explained, from three historical aspects of God’s creation. I find that in Moltmann’s *God in Creation* (1985a), his ‘threefold’ historical doctrine of the *imago Dei* includes all of the above four views related to the *imago Dei* (ibid.:215-29):

(1) ‘nature’, in ‘creation in the beginning’ (ibid.:226-9) (mainly the substantial, functional, and relational views);\(^{55}\)

(2) ‘grace’, in ‘the beginning of the new creation’ (ibid.:225) in ‘the continuous creation’ (ibid.:206-14) (mainly the functional, and relational views);

(3) ‘glory’, in the ‘consummation’ (ibid.:5-8) of the new creation in the continuous creation (mainly the functional, relational, and telic views).\(^{57}\)

Through these three historical aspects of God’s creation, Moltmann seeks to understand and explain the *imago Dei* as related to the doctrine of Trinity. I shall now exploit these three aspects to look at human beings as the image of God in the history of


\(^{55}\) See also Moltmann (1979:118–22).

\(^{56}\) Calvin (1559, trans. in 1909:173–7) stresses his understanding of the *imago Dei* as ‘the glory of God’.

\(^{57}\) See also Moltmann (1979).
God’s creation: that is as the ‘imago Dei’ (‘Trinitatis’) (Trinity), as the ‘imago Christi’ (the image of Christ), and as ‘gloria Dei est homo’ (the glory of God is human) (ibid.:215-43).

6.1 Nature, Imago Dei, and the Original Designation of Human Beings

Firstly, Moltmann (1985a:216–25) follows the traditional Christian hermeneutics in explaining the imago Dei as the source of the original designation and superiority of humankind above all other living things. He (ibid.:218, eo) explains:

God created human beings to be his image. But the traditional translations say ‘according to his image’ — on the pattern of his image. In saying this they are presupposing an archetype in God, a pattern on which human beings are modelled and of which they are the copy, the sensible counterpart. This is based on the Platonic ‘archetype-representation’ thinking of patristic theology.

Human beings are also granted the commission of ‘dominum terrae’ (being lord of the land) (Moltmann 1998a:30). He argues that, theologically speaking, it comes from ‘the imago Dei structure’ that endows meaning to being human (ibid.). Based on biblical traditions, he also maintains that humans’ dignity in their superiority above other creatures originates in their unique status as being created in the image of God. In his understanding (ibid.), such a unique status justifies humans in having more freedom, precisely an ‘infinite freedom’, and ‘a special commission’ in God’s name that includes ‘special responsibility’ for other living creatures.

6.1.1 The Theologically-Based Interpretation of the Imago Dei

Yet with regard to the question about the constituents of human beings’ likeness to God, Moltmann (1985a:219–20) rejects each of the answers given by theological traditions in the history as ‘a false inference’. These include:

58 Schwöbel (1995) uses imago libertatis to denote and explain such true human freedom from Divine freedom.

59 Moltmann (1976:109) highlights the meaning of the imago Dei is to destine humankind to infinite freedom over against all finite things and relationships and even [their] own reality.
(1) ‘the soul’ — based on ‘the analogy of substance’;

(2) ‘the human being’s upright walk and upward glance’ — based on ‘the analogy of form’;

(3) the biblical interpretation of ‘man’s lordship over the earth’ — based on ‘the analogy of proportionality’;

(4) ‘the community of man and wife’ — based on ‘the analogy of relation’.

This is because each of them in their own way have reduced the meaning of the likeness to God to humankind’s relationship to God in general. While all of them distinguish human beings from animals by their distinctive characteristics, any one of them is merely a reduced form of their relationship to God in general described in religious terms rather than the theologically-based interpretation rooted in the imago Dei of the social Trinity. As God created human beings ‘out of His special resolve’ instead of ‘through God’s creative word’, he argues that humankind’s likeness to God should be ‘a theological term’ before it becomes an ‘anthropological’ one (ibid.:217-220). In other words, God ‘creates his image’ and participates in ‘a particular relationship with that image’, so that God creates humans in likeness to Him for Himself (theologically), but not primarily for humankind’s superior status over creatures (anthropologically) (ibid.:220). This means that God actively intends to have an extraordinary relationship with His image for His own sake, so that He creates His image as humankind.

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60 Namely, ‘Let us make … So God created’ in Gen 1:26-7 when He created human beings.

61 Namely, ‘Let there be [X] … and there was [X]’ in Gen 1:3, ‘Let there be a [X] … So God made [or created] the [X]’ in Gen 1:6-7, 20-21, 24-5 ‘Let the [X] … and it was so’ in Gen 1:9, 11, or ‘Let there be a [X] … and it was so’ in Gen 1:14-16, when He created other things except human beings.

62 In explaining this, Moltmann (1985a:218–221, eo) makes a distinction between the two terms for describing God’s creation of human beings: image and likeness (דמות and יראה in Hebrew, εἰκόνα and ομοιωμένῳ in Greek, or imago and similitude in Latin). In his understanding of them, the former denotes ‘the concrete representation’ and thus ‘more the outward representation’ but the latter denotes ‘the similarity’ and thus ‘the reflexive inward relationship’. As representing God on earth, human beings are ‘God’s representatives’ to ‘rule over’ other creatures on earth, ‘God’s counterpart’ to communicate with Him, and God’s ‘appearance’ of glory and splendour on earth.
Accordingly, the nature of human beings comes from being created in the imago Dei and being related to God. As a result, human nature should be defined by this special relationship to God, instead of through some set of distinctive characteristics over against other living things. It is human beings’ ‘whole existence’, ‘whole person’ (rather than only ‘his soul’), and ‘the true human community’ (rather than the mere ‘individual’) that make them God’s image (ibid.:221, eo).\(^{63}\)

### 6.1.2 The Exegesis of Genesis 1:26-29

The evidence for this kind of argument comes from Moltmann’s exegesis of Genesis 1:26-27 (Moltmann 1985a:222). In Genesis 1:26, a ‘singular’ human being, Adam, ‘corresponds to a divine plural’.\(^{64}\) However, in Genesis 1:27,\(^{65}\) a ‘plural’ set of human beings, men and women, ‘corresponds to a divine singular’. Moltmann (1985a:218–22) believes that the ‘interplay’ or ‘grammatical shift’ of the singular and plural of the divine and human beings here is deliberate, purposeful, and so highly meaningful (ibid.:218).

Accordingly, the shift from a singular human being to plural human beings is intended to disclose that to be human implies not only ‘being sexually differentiated’ (as a singular human being), but also ‘sharing a common humanity’ (of plural human beings).

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\(^{63}\) On this point of analogia relationis, both Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-45) (1937 trans. in 1959 reprinted in 1997:41), Karl Barth (1958b:185–6, 1961:150), and other theologians, such as Oshima (1973:185–9), Frykberg (1993:32–3), and Congdon (2007), had also made a similar observation.

\(^{64}\) Moltmann (1985a:217) disagrees other interpretations of this divine plural, for example, ‘an assembly of God’, God and goddess, or ‘plural of majesty’ (W. H. Schmidt 1967 quoted in Moltmann 1985a:217) because none of them denotes that God in this passage addresses Himself.

\(^{65}\) Cf. different English versions of Gen 1:26-7 (especially the different translations of ‘humankind’ in NRSV and ‘man’ in NKJV).

NRSV Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’ So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them.

NKJV Then God said, ‘Let Us make [hu]man in Our image, according to Our likeness; let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.’ So God created [hu]man in His own image; in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them.
(ibid.:222). Both facets are ‘equally primary’ (ibid.). For him, this observation also invalidates the argument that ‘being human is the generic term for which man and woman are simply sub-divisions, or that man and woman are two different creatures’ (ibid.).

Moltmann agrees that the commission to have dominion over other living creatures and the charge to ‘subdue the earth’ are granted to human beings following ‘the creation of God’s image on earth’ according to Genesis 1:28 and 29 (ibid.:224).

However, he views these commissions as ‘a specific addition’ to ‘the likeness to God’, instead of being congruent with it, but these two diverse commissions obviously complement each other. The first is determined by the second. For Genesis 1 reveals that the rule of humankind over other living creatures has to be separated from humans’ ‘subjection of the earth’ in order to nourish humans and animals (Gen 1:29-30). He (1985a:224) criticizes and blames the traditional theological doctrine of the dominium terrae for intermingling the two commissions together, and so bringing about the ‘disastrous consequences for the world’.

6.1.3 Human’s Perichoresis-Oriented Relationships

Besides the nuance of the interplay of plural and singular grammatical forms of the Creator triune God and humanity, Moltmann also explores the subtle different meanings of the two words describing the designation of human beings in Genesis 1:26: image (imago in Latin) and likeness (similitudo in Latin). He (1985a:219) explains:

The first of these terms is used for the concrete representation, the second is used for the similarity. The first first expresses more the outward representation, the second rather the reflexive inward relationship. Both terms have probably been borrowed from Egyptian royal theology ... If it is correct to see the terminology about the image of God as derived from royal theology, then this derivation itself contains revolutionary political potential: it is not a prince who is the image, representative, deputy and reflection of God; it is the human being — men and women in like degree, all human beings and every human being ... [t]his passage has certainly had a democratizing effect throughout the whole of Jewish and Christian

66 Moltmann’s explanation (1985a:224) of the sequence of the charges of ‘rule over the animals’ and ‘subdue the earth’ from God in the text of his God in Creation has an obvious error of transposing verses about the references to Genesis 1. The charge of ‘rule over the animals’ from God appears actually for the first time in verse 26, instead in verse 28, and then the second time in verse 28.
political history. As far as the subsequent charge to rule over the earth is concerned, there is no distinction at all between human beings; there is only equality.

Subsequently, Moltmann demonstrates how a perichoresis-oriented relationship can be a functional, but not ontological, element of the triune God’s image and the triune God’s likeness in which the Deity made human beings (ibid.224-34).\(^{67}\) He (1992a:xiii) asserts that ‘the Trinity is our [functional] true social programme’. In this way, the triune Persons not only set the ontological relationships among them as a functional template for human interpersonal relationships, but also endowed them to humanity through creation (Moltmann 1985a:234).\(^{68}\) Accordingly, the perichoretic divine community is not only in se (in itself) or directed ad intra (within), but also directed ad extra (without) as an open community (Moltmann 1981:198).\(^{69}\) Such interpersonal relationships integrate and maintain the unity of the divine community, the (ontological) equality among the individual Persons, and the diversity of each individual Person with different functions. These three elements (unity, equality, and diversity) endowed in humanity’s perichoresis-oriented communal relationships are parts of the likeness of the triune God among whom these three (unity, equality, and three Persons) are indispensable, as mentioned above.\(^{70}\) He (2008a:372) considered this image of perichoresis-oriented relationships endowed by the triune God as of ‘a community without uniformity and a personhood without

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\(^{67}\) As I will demonstrate later in this section and argue in C7S3, the functional likeness of the perichoretic relationship of the triune God is different from the ontological perichoretic relationship of the triune God which provides a functional proto-type of human interpersonal relationship through the \textit{image Dei} in Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology. Therefore, I coin the term \textit{perichoresis-oriented} to denote this functional human interpersonal relationship for the purpose of differentiating it from the ontological \textit{perichoretic} relationship of the triune God.


\(^{69}\) See also Moltmann (2000a:333). In Venter’s (2015:4) language: the triune God ‘first lives for God-self and then enters into some relationship with creation’.

\(^{70}\) In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the trinitarian anthropology is based on these three elements: ‘person (\textit{hypostasis}) … communion (\textit{koinonia})’, and ‘nature (\textit{ousia})’ (Bates 2012). But in Moltmann’s (1981:188–9) viewpoint, the Eastern Orthodox tradition still support an asymmetrically hierarchical Trinitarian structure because the Father is still as ‘sole origin’ of the Son and the Holy Spirit (Zizioulas 1995:50–55; 2004:45; Volf 1998a:76–81). See also C7F6.
individualism’. Therefore, Moltmann (1998b) goes to great lengths to emphasize the value of freedom (to be discussed in 2.6) and equality in being human, especially in his work, God for a Secular Society (1999:46–70).

In Moltmann’s concept of the imago Dei, though it has not been accepted without criticism (see S4.1 above), the relational self is developed from God’s image as part of a community characterized by perichōrēsis. Needless to say, perichōrēsis is used here to expound the functional meaning of analogia relationis imaged in human beings, but this is not the same thing as the ontological relationships of the three Persons of the triune God. The relational self also will neither be the separate, isolated, and autonomous self developed in ‘egoistical individualism’ (Moltmann 1990a:270f.), nor be similar to the socially soluble or ‘absorbed’ and devalued self developed in collectivism (Triandis, Brislin, et al. 1988:272). 71 In Moltmann’s social trinitarian doctrine (2009a:288), ‘individual and community’ are maintained as ‘equally primal’. He (ibid.) explains:

In Trinitarian thinking, however, substances and relations are equally primary. According to the new ecological understanding, everything has its time, and every activity its occasion, and every living thing its environment among other living things. Consequently, individual and community are equally primal too.

In the same dialectic, we find this balanced relational self is a dialectic synthesis drawn from the separate and autonomous self in individualism as the thesis, and the socially soluble self in collectivism as the antithesis (Moltmann 1992b:254; 1990a:269–71).

6.2 Grace, Imago Christi, and the Messianic Calling of Human Beings

Moltmann (1985a:215) disagrees with a ‘one-sided viewpoint’ of theological anthropology, because it confines the consideration of human beings’ ‘likeness to God’ merely within the doctrinal context of creation. This means, in that particular interpretation, the image of God that first was blurred or ruined through the Fall is then

71 See also Moltmann (1990a:270f.) and Bochner (1994:281).
restored through God’s grace. This approach was only used to describe an ‘ideal picture’ of human beings in their original condition (ibid.).

He reinterprets such a classical notion of the imago Dei along ‘the messianic alignment’ of the historical trend of human beings (ibid.). Following the Christology of the New Testament, Moltmann (1985a:94–5) applies the likeness to God to the incarnated, transfigured, and raised Messiah, Jesus Christ. For He is ‘God’s true image’ (2 Corinthians 4:4), ‘the reflection of God’s glory and the exact imprint of God’s very being’ (Hebrews 1:3), ‘the glory of God’ (2 Corinthians 4:6), ‘the first-born of all creation’ (Colossians 1:15), ‘the first-born from the dead’ (Colossians 1:18), and ‘the image of the invisible God’ (Colossians 1:15). Jesus Christ is the image of the invisible God mediating in the work of creation, reconciling the world to God, and ruling as the divine Lord. Based on these claims, Moltmann (1985a:226) argues that ‘God appears in his perfect image, God rules through his image, God reconciles and redeems through his image on earth’.

Not only is Christ ‘God’s true image’, but also everything is created by Him (Colossians 1:15f.; Hebrews 1:3). Therefore, the Apostle Paul stresses that ‘[F]or those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family’ (Romans 8:29). Based on such Christology in the New Testament, Moltmann (1985a:218) develops and presents:

The imago Christi is an imago Dei mediated through Christ. Christians therefore liked to translate the Genesis passage we are considering as ‘according to his image’. But the christological bearing of the phrase can also be read into the translation to be his image, if this is taken to mean that the human being has been created ‘in the direction of’ the image of God which Christ is — that this is the whole trend of his designation — so that the creation of human beings is open for the incarnation. Then the christology is understood as the fulfilment of the anthropology, and the anthropology becomes the preparation for the christology.

72 See also Moltmann (1977:101f.).
73 Cf: Barth (1963 quoted in Zhou Cuishan 2006:website) asserts that Jesus Christ is the only ‘real man for God’.
Besides, Moltmann maintains on the eschatological principle that the end reveals the beginning that ‘Christ must already be the mystery of creation in the beginning’ that is comprehended according to ‘the [later] consummation’ (ibid.:226). Accordingly, seeing God’s creation from an eschatological perspective, he (2003:189) indicates that ‘the final is greater than [the] original’. This is not only in relation to human beings’ present misery, but also points to their transformed future revealed and promised by the triune God.

Therefore, for him (1985a:227), ‘being human means becoming human in this process’.74 In other words, the imago Dei will be consummated and the consummation is to be obtained at the end of the history, when God is in full communion with human beings, rather than at its prelapsarian beginning before the ‘lost origin’75 (ibid.:225-7). However, ‘as goal’, the imago Dei indeed exists throughout ‘every moment of that history’, from its beginning to its messianic end. According to this interpretation, the reality of the imago Dei in human beings is a dynamic process of already-and-not-yet, instead of a static one.76 This statement can be also understood by claiming that this final real self is far more complete than the original because in Moltmann’s (1981:116) eschatological perspective Christ did not become incarnate ‘simply because of the sin of [humans], but rather for the sake of perfecting creation’ so that ‘the Creator no longer remains over against his creation’ (Moltmann 1996:295).77

Moltmann cannot understand the imago Christi apart from his social doctrine of the Trinity. It is in the ‘fellowship of believers with Christ’ and through the grace of God that

74 See also Benner (2012:199).
75 McDougall (2003:190).
76 As Hebrews 2:5-18 and Romans 8:18-30 reveal.
77 J. Matthew Bonzo (2009:82) summarizes this eschatological aspect of Moltmann in this way, ‘Creatio originalis with its historical transitions was destined from the beginning to be overcome (rather than restored or renewed) in the redeemed creation nova.’ According to Ilia Delio’s (2005) study, St. Bonaventure (1217-74) had earlier on held these similar concepts of ‘eternal creation’ and the purpose of Christ’s incarnation.
the ‘restoration or new creation’ of the *imago Dei* happens. It is because Christ is the ‘messianic *imago Dei*’ that believers can enter upon the path towards the ‘*gloria Dei* on earth’ (the glory of God on earth) (Rom 8:29-30) (Moltmann 1985a:226). For Christ is the only way (John 14:6) that persons can be ‘accepted and promised, wholly, bodily and socially’ into the ‘*imago Christi*’ (Moltmann 1985a:215–27). In other words, the holistically ‘embodied and social’ humankind can only be fulfilled in the ‘messianic fellowship of Jesus’; then, even death can never separate humankind from God and from each other, or separate them into ‘soul and body’ (ibid.:227). In ‘an open history’ (ibid.:350 n.22), the process of ‘the messianic[-]becoming-human’ of humankind will be neither complete nor completable (ibid.:227). Yet it is in ‘the process of resurrection’ that believers already live in fellowship with Christ here and now, so that they can ‘experience themselves as accepted and promised’ holistically (ibid.). According to the aforementioned Moltmann’s exposition of this likeness to God through the messianic *imago Dei*, believers are not only the *imago Christi* socially, but also the *imago Christi* wholly and bodily. Here, Moltmann does not exclude the ontic nature of humankind, but affirms its completion within the likeness to God expressed by means of the social Trinity.

6.2.1 The Concept of an Heir

Based on the Old Testament, Jesus’ revelation, and his own understanding of Jesus Christ as God’s true image, the Apostle Paul expounds his conception of the *imago Dei* and

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78 Since Moltmann (2003:189) highlights that the final creation is greater and better than the original one from the eschatological perspective of God’s creation, the ‘new creation’ of the *imago Dei* should be the precise expression here although he (1985a:227) uses the ‘restoration’ of the *imago Dei*, too. These two terms mean differently. Probably it is in adopting the Christian traditional way to express the transformation of the ‘obscured or destroyed’ *imago Dei* through Christ’s salvation that Moltmann uses the term ‘restoration’ (Moltmann 1985a:215, 227).

79 For the overcoming of separation, see Moltmann’s detailed discussion in his *The Way of Jesus Christ* (1990a:260–70).

80 Moltmann (1985a:350 n.22) here understands human beings in the light of the concept of ‘an open history’ in modern philosophical anthropology that assumes ‘the human being is not fixed by nature’.

81 Besides Colossians 1:15; and 2 Corinthians 4:4 mentioned in C6S6.2, there are Philippians 2:6, 3:21; Romans 8:29; and 2 Corinthians 3:18.
the nature of the relational self by means of a metaphor: being an heir.\(^8^2\) Moltmann (1981:120) is familiar with this metaphor presented by Paul and applies it to explaining his social trinitarian theological anthropology.\(^8^3\) In Paul’s works, the status of an heir belongs to the ones who are granted a privilege or adopted (Ephesians 1:5) as ‘sons of God by faith in the Christ’ (Galatians 3:29).\(^8^4\) In this sense, they are heirs according to God’s promise (ibid.), namely ‘συγκληρονόμος’ (joint-heirs or co-heirs with Christ) (Romans 8:17; cf. Mark 12:1-12; Galatians 3:28f.; Hebrews 1:2) (Tabor n.d.:website, eo).\(^8^5\) Based on this revealed concept of joint-heirs, Moltmann (1981:73) points out it as the source of the liberation of human beings by saying:

[w]hat he [(the Apostle Paul)] means is emancipation: the people who believe through the Son are no longer slaves under the law of a divine master. They are the beloved children of the heavenly Father. Sonship and to be the child of God therefore means liberation, the chance to come of age. As the Father's own sons and daughters, believers become 'heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ' in the fellowship of the Son.

He (ibid.:165) also points out it as the source of non-heirarchical equality among human beings by saying:\(^8^6\)

Monotheism was and is the religion of patriarchy, just as pantheism is probably the religion of earlier matriarchy. It is only the doctrine of the Trinity, with the bold statements we have quoted, which makes a first approach towards overcoming sexist language in the concept of God. It leads to a fellowship of men and women without privilege and subjection, for in fellowship with the firstborn brother, there is no longer male or female, but all are one in Christ, and joint heirs according to the promise (Galatians 3:28f.).

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\(^{8^2}\) The verses about it include, but are not limited to, Romans 8:17; 9:7-8; Galatians 3:29; 4:1,7; Ephesians 3:6.

\(^{8^3}\) See also Moltmann (1981:73, 165, 220).

\(^{8^4}\) James D. Tabor (n.d.:website, eo), a notable New Testament scholar, Professor at University of North Carolina at Charlotte, points out that Paul’s discussion of being an heir (κληρονόμος) has to do with ‘the issue of who is to be considered an heir’, namely ‘how one is declared righteous, and whether Gentiles must become Jews to be a part of God’s elect people’. This kind of concept of an heir does not originate from the Old Testament (cf. the concept of heir in Old Testament mentioned or quoted in Galatians 3:18, 28; 4:30; Romans 4:14).

\(^{8^5}\) See also Everett F. Harrison (1976:93), Moo (1996:505f.), and Haldane (1997:494).

\(^{8^6}\) In terms of the opportunity to be granted heirship, Gentiles and Christ-followers are equal with Jews (Cereghin 2013:252). In terms of the covenant with God, it stems ‘from the promise made to Abraham that he would inherit the world (cosmos) (Romans 4:13; Galatians 3:26-29; 4:1-7)’ (Tabor n.d.:website, eo). See also Campbell (2008:87, 153).
Through the concept of heir, Moltmann reinforces the strong link of the *imago Christi* not only to new human selfhood but also to new human interpersonal relationships.

### 6.3 Glory, *Gloria Dei*, and the Future of Human Beings

Moltmann (1985a:228) emphasizes that human beings are not only ‘commissioned by God’, but also made ‘the mode of his appearance in his creation’. Through Jesus the Messiah, human beings are called to enter into ‘the eschatological history of the new creation’ according to the form of their likeness to Christ (ibid.). This argument by Moltmann is based not only on the biblical tradition that ‘human beings are created as the image of God for the divine glory’, but also on his understanding of the *imago Christi* that human beings are redeemed to become the *imago Christi* for ‘eschatological glorification’ (ibid.). Human beings move from justification, through ‘sanctification’ and onto glorification. Even as ‘the coming glory of God’ shines upon the face of the resurrected Messiah, so Spirit-filled believers right now also have a reflection of the glory of God on their ‘unveiled face[s]’ (ibid., eo). It is obvious that this is how Moltmann interprets *Gloria Dei est Homo*.

In Moltmann’s opinion (1985a:228–9), ‘*theosis*’ marks ‘this promised glorification’ by way of human beings’ perfect likeness to God. *Theosis* means humankind’s eschatological becoming-one-with-God. In reality, this promised glorification can be fulfilled when ‘the *imago per conformitatem gratiae*’ (the image of the conformity of grace) is transfigured into ‘the *imago per similitudinem gloriae*’ (the image of the likeness of glory) through the work of the Holy Spirit. Human beings can eventually unveil their faces to reflect God’s glory. He stresses the differentiation of glory from grace, of redemption from reconciliation, and of ‘the eschatological *naturalizing of history*’ from ‘the *historicizing of nature*’ (Moltmann 1992a:129–30, eo). For, besides using the phrase ‘participation in the divine nature’ from 2 Peter 1:4 in describing the concept of ‘*theosis*’, Moltmann (1985a:229) also uses other phrases in a different context.
These include ‘becoming-one-with-God’, ‘to participate in the divine life and beauty’, ‘conformity to God’, ‘flowering into perfect resemblance’, ‘a realistic divinization’, ‘the deification of man’, and ‘the visible indwelling of God in His new Creation’ (Moltmann 1974b:93, 277).\(^7\) Does Moltmann mean by this that human beings will acquire the divine nature and become beings equivalent to God? Moltmann (1981:107) absolutely denies that humanity can be identical with God or the Son of God. This he (1976:108) asserts in his statement, ‘There are no divine men’, and stresses the absolute distinction between God the creator and the world God created by pointing out ‘the infinite distance of the creator from his creation’ (ibid.) and also by stating ‘[God’s] own infinity and the finitude of his world are eternally distinguished by their difference; but in this difference they are at the same time eternally united’ (Moltmann 1996:327). He (1981:68) unequivocally contrasts the likeness between ‘the Father and the Son’ with the unlikeness between humanity and God by referring to the exclusive mutually-knowing relationship between the Father and the Son in Matthew 11:27. In other words, what is ‘like’ (the Father) is exclusively known by what is ‘like’ it (the Son) (ibid., eo).\(^8\) However, what is like (the Father) can also be known by what is ‘unlike’ it (humanity), but only by means of revelation (ibid., eo).\(^9\) He (1981:107) also argues that the world and God’s ‘only begotten Son’ are not identical, and maintains emphatically the differentiation of ‘the world process’\(^9\) from ‘the inner-trinitarian process’ (ibid.:107).\(^1\) Only in one place, while explaining the relationship of Christology and eschatology, does he use theosis to indicate

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\(^7\) See also Moltmann (1992a:130; 1999:140).

\(^8\) In Moltmann’s language (1981:68), ‘like is known by like applies to the exclusive relationship of the Father and the Son.’

\(^9\) Moltmann’s distinguishing trinitarian God and humankind by Matthew 11.27 can be also understood by 1 John 3:1-3 where he states that the unlike (humankind) can be like the like (the Son) through revelation.

\(^9\) Moltmann seems to have not defined precisely the meaning of ‘world process’ in this book but from its context it means ‘the existence of the world and its history’ (Moltmann 1981:42).

\(^1\) Inner-trinitarian process’ means that ‘the Son to whom the Father has subjected everything will then subject himself to the Father and will give the kingdom (basileia) over to him’ (ibid.:92).
Jesus’ ‘becoming God’ (Moltmann 1979:86). But does it mean the same thing for human beings as for Jesus Christ? Seemingly not, even though he does not elaborate this point.

7. **Imago Trinitatis: Eternal Fellowship with the Open Trinity**

Moltmann’s (1981:199) concept of the *imago Dei* is self-consciously never merely about an individual, so that it stands in contrast to accounts of individual human beings ‘made in the image of God’, as presented in Augustine’s writings (Moltmann 1985a:235).

7.1 **The Imago Trinitatis as the Imago Dei**

Moltmann’s (1981:199) *imago Dei* involves ‘person[s] with person[s]’, such as Adam, Eve and Seth as a family being made in the image of ‘the unity of the Triunity: three Persons — one family’.92 This perspective was specifically and first proposed by Gregory of Nazianzus (Moltmann 1985a:235).93 Though Adam and Eve and Seth are ‘dissimilar’ persons, they are ‘an earthly image and parable’ of the Triune God because of their shared life together, their consubstantiality (Moltmann 1981:199).94 When they are united perichoresis-orientedly together, they are ‘the *imago trinitatis* and correspond to the triune God’ (Moltmann 1985a:216).

Through this approach to the *imago Trinitatis* and ‘the first human family as a trinitarian analogy’, Moltmann (1981:199) underlines the importance of harmonizing ‘personality and sociality’ in the human community without compromising or surrendering the one to the other. He (1985a:241) here indicates that this designated ‘true human community’ as the *imago Trinitatis* should not be misunderstood as and reduced to ‘a religious family ideology’. According to his explanation, this ‘true human

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92 Referring to Moltmann’s distinction between an individual and a person in S3.

93 What Moltmann (ibid.:250 n.22) refers to is *The Oration*, 31.11, by Gregory of Nazianzus (fourth century, trans. in 2011).

94 Moltmann (1981:199) here adopts the term ‘consubstantial’ used in *The Oration*, 31 of Gregory of Nazianzus (fourth century, trans. in 2011) to describe Adam and Eve and Seth as ‘consubstantial persons’.
community’ — ‘the simultaneous community of the sexes in space’ (husband-wife) and ‘the community of the generations in time’ (parent-child) — is the basic unit within human cultures, no matter what their religious orientations would be. The former indicates an ‘inextinguishable sociality’, and the latter, an ‘equally unalterable generativity’ (ibid.). On the basis of his observations, Moltmann (1981:199, eo) feels that the lack of stress on perichōrēsis in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the Western European Church leads to ‘the development of individualism, and especially possessive individualism’.\(^9^5\) Already within theological developments in the fourth century, individualism became inconceivable within the Cappadocian Fathers’ concept of the trinitarian doctrine, because the unity of the three divine Persons is unbreakable (Zizioulas 1995:48).

Therefore, Moltmann (ibid.) raises a further question: ‘everyone is supposed to fulfil himself[,] but who fulfils the community?’ Accordingly, he (1985a:223–4) argues that ‘the trinitarian concept of community’ is the solution to this question, because it surmounts both ‘the ego-solitariness of the narcissist’ and ‘the egoism of the couple’ — husband and wife. For Moltmann, the triune God is the source and the ‘archetype of true human community’, and so human beings in community are the ‘imago Trinitatis’ (ibid.:234); therefore, he maintains that they can correspond to the trinitarian God only when they are united as a community (ibid.:216). Based on his commentary on John 17:21, he defines his social Trinity as the ‘the community within the Trinity’, instead of simply ‘the Fatherhood or the Sonship’ within the Trinity (ibid.:241, eo).\(^9^6\) Accordingly, based on the imago Trinitatis, what is intended are earthly representations at the level of ‘the relations in the Trinity’ rather than at the level ‘of the trinitarian constitution’

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\(^9^5\) ‘Possessive individualism’ is the idea that ‘everyone is a self-possessing, self-disposing centre of action which sets itself apart from other persons’ (Grenz 2001:11).

\(^9^6\) See also Moltmann (2009a:289).
But since perichōrēsis and Trinity are terms used to describe the trinitarian mystery of God, how is the concept of perichōrēsis applied rightly to the relationships between human beings? What does ‘the trinitarian concept of community’ mean? What can the unity within the Trinity portray to reveal actualities and possibilities in the unities among human beings? How do the relationships in the Trinity, even when they are united with one another, offer new insights for the relationships among human beings? These important questions must be considered in the next section.

7.2 The Open Trinity

Moltmann (1985a:242, eo) uses the primal and fundamental human community in the imago Trinitatis, namely Adam, Eve, and Seth, to understand human beings as a whole because in the unity of the triune God ‘the Trinity itself is whole’. He further explains that after the Fall, human beings are not only to be ‘restored … to this divine image’ from their sinful natures ‘through the messianic fellowship with the Son’, but are also to be called together into the ‘open Trinity’ (ibid.:242). But what is this open Trinity? Based on John 17:21, Moltmann (1981:90–96) uses this phrase to disclose a relationally and dynamically open unity of the Trinity towards His people, contrasting it with a closed or exclusive unity. For the fellowship of disciples is not only ‘a fellowship with God’, but also more than that, becoming ‘a fellowship in God’ (ibid.:96. eo). There are three main aspects of Moltmann’s open Trinity revealed in his discussion of ‘the sending of the creative Spirit’ (ibid.:90).

(1) It opens a way for believers to participate not only in ‘the eschatological history of the new creation’ but also in ‘the trinitarian history of God himself’;  

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97 The concept of ‘open Trinity’ is presented as early as in Moltmann’s The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1977:55, eo).
98 See also ibid.
99 See also Venter (2015:3).
(2) It opens a way towards a ‘forwards-looking’ future;

(3) It is ‘open for unification with’ believers, with humankind, and with all other living creatures, including the whole of creation. Therefore, according to his viewpoint the ‘union’ of the Trinity is a ‘soteriological’ (and functional) term as well as a (trinitarian) ‘theological’ (and ontological) one (ibid.:96) because the union of the whole creation with one another must ‘resemble the union of the son with the Father’, based on John 17:21 (ibid.:95).

However, before the open Trinity opened itself externally, the triune Persons first internally offered themselves as ‘the inviting, open [and wide] rooms’ for each other to move, live, and indwell in themselves (Moltmann 2008a:374). As ‘there can be no personal freedom without free spaces’ in a community, Moltmann states that they are not only Persons, but also ‘spaces’ (ibid.).

Noticeably, based on the concept of the *imago Christi* and following the Orthodox theologians who rely on the teachings of Gregory of Nazianzus, Moltmann (1985a:242–3, eo) presents his account of the ‘open Trinity’ as standing apart from ‘a closed and self-contained Trinity’ as promoted by Augustine and followed by Thomas Aquinas. An open Trinity manifests the divine Persons ‘outwardly in differentiated form’, whereas a closed and self-contained Trinity only manifests the divine ‘outwardly without differentiation’ (ibid.:242). In Moltmann’s understanding, Augustine views the Trinity as a ‘whole’ (ibid.:242, eo). For Augustine, the *imago Dei* ‘in the unity of the Tri-unity’ indicates ‘the image of the whole Trinity’, instead of the image of the differentiated three Persons in the unity of the triune God (ibid.). As a result, the whole Trinity is a closed and self-contained Trinity. On the contrary, in the open Trinity, the restoration of sinful humans is through

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100 The union of the whole creation is not only ‘with’ the union of the triune Persons but also ‘in’ itself (Moltmann 1981:96). The unity of the triune Persons lies in the ‘union’ or ‘fellowship’ of them but not in ‘their numerical unity’ or ‘the identity of a single subject’ (ibid.:95). So does the unity of the whole creation.
conformity to ‘a single Person of the Trinity’, only the Son who incarnates and embodies the *imago Dei* (ibid.:242). It is through the Son that the Triune God throws God-self into an openness for humankind. (ibid.:243). Consequently, human beings regenerated in the *imago Christi* are creatively assembled ‘into his relationship of sonship’ and so call the Father, ‘Abba, Father’ (Galatians 4:6) and Jesus the Son, their brother. From these reflections, we can see how the *imago Christi* of the open Trinity is the key to understanding the meanings of the *imago Dei* and the *imago Trinitatis* in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology. Through the Son, not only the divine Triune God unfolds God-self to welcome humankind, but also human beings ‘as God’s image[s] on earth’ obtain admittance to the Father (ibid.:242). In other words, Moltmann states, ‘the Father creates, redeems and perfects human beings through the Spirit in the image of the Son’ (ibid.:243). It is worth noting that this statement should be understood as a promised process towards an eschatological future of new creation as mentioned above. Apparently, only an open Trinity makes possible an interweaving of the *imago Dei*, the *imago Christi*, *gloria Dei est homo*, and the *imago Trinitatis* into a harmonious whole. But does this lead Moltmann into a commitment to the universalist’s salvation? That is, does Moltmann intend here a necessary salvation for all, since he mentions the openness of the open Trinity for uniting ‘with mankind, and with the whole creation’ (Moltmann 1981:90)? This issue will be discussed in more detail in C7S2.

8. Open Friendship: The Community of Grace

Jesus’ relationship with his Father and the relationships amongst his believers can be explored further in order to inform us about the *imago Dei* (*imago Trinitatis*) and the significance of this trinitarian theological anthropology. For Moltmann (1978:50–63),

Jesus’ ministry exemplifies and characterizes perfectly what he terms ‘open friendship’.

8.1 Open Friendship

By means of his concept of the ‘open Trinity’ (1977:55, eo), Moltmann develops his trinitarian concept of fellowship (ibid.:111, 189, 343, 360). The English word fellowship is translated from the Greek word κοινωνία (koinonia) in the Bible. It is also a business term and can be also translated as partner (Moulton & Milligan 1976:351). Therefore, we can understand Moltmann’s trinitarian concept of fellowship to mean that we have partnership/fellowship with/in the perichoretic Trinity.

Fellowship is described as ‘the special gift of the Spirit’ (Moltmann 1992b:217). In his trinitarian concept of fellowship, Moltmann asserts that the Spirit gives Himself in order to participate in fellowship with believers, and then attracts them into fellowship with Him (ibid.). Karl Rahner’s (1904-84) words are quoted to emphasize that God’s fellowship with us is a ‘free and unmerited’ relationship of grace. In Moltmann’s understanding, fellowship ‘liberates’ and attracts others to enjoy relationships, instead of possessing and taking the other ‘by force’ (ibid.:217f.). In a true fellowship, people open themselves to each other with ‘respect for one another’, so that they let each other have a share in themselves and participate in each other’s lives on the basis of ‘mutual recognition’ (ibid.:217). Therefore, fellowship or community is formed ‘when what is in common is shared’ by dissimilar people with their own personal different attributes (ibid.). It is a community or fellowship of both ‘like with like, and … the unlike’, not

102 See also Moltmann (1977:119f.).

103 For example, Luke 5:10: ‘James, and John … were partners [or had fellowship] with Simon [in their father’s boat].’ N. T. Wright (1948-) (2013:10f.) explains this Greek word as follows: ‘the central Pauline theme of koinonia, fellowship or partnership, - a word with multiple resonances both in the commercial world, where it might describe a business partnership, and in many personal or familial settings.’


105 See also Moltmann (2000a:332).
exclusive, but ‘open, inviting, and embracing’ (Moltmann 2009a:289). For the purpose of contrasting with the repressively socially-imposed relational self, I suggest naming the relational self found in the open Trinity and grounded in the open friendship as the open relational self. This open relational self receives wide ‘space’ in the open Trinity and then gives to and receives from each other wide ‘space’ in the open friendship. Through this trinitarian perspective of community, Moltmann (1992b:220) emphasizes repeatedly ‘diversity in unity’ existing from the very outset of Christian faith. Community or fellowship in the trinitarian sense does not only ‘unite the differences’ — instead of ‘standardization’ — but also ‘differentiate[s] the One’ (ibid.). Differentiation is indispensable to a true community, where ‘individual potentialities’ can be developed in ‘the greatest given diversity’ (ibid.). This community or fellowship is not a general one. Instead, it is ‘the trinitarian fellowship of the Spirit’ with a love that binds together things in common and a freedom which develops the scope and uniqueness of things ‘individual and singular’ (ibid.). God can be experienced both individually and socially within interactions with others in this community.

8.2 Freedom in the Relationships

Talking about freedom, Moltmann (1981:214) stresses its two main elements: ‘the liberation from compulsion and necessity, and the striving for the realization of the Good’. Only in the realm of the Good, ‘freedom may be used properly — that is to say, for life’s preservation and not for its destruction’ (ibid.:213f.). About forms of human freedom, Moltmann (1981:216f.) first differentiates two dimensions of freedom:107

(1) a dimension involving a ‘function of property’: ‘freedom as lordship’ which exists in the subject-object relationship;

106 See also Joseph Hongzhang Bai (2013:247).
107 See also Moltmann (1985c:94–7).
(2) a dimension of ‘social function’: ‘freedom as community’ or as fellowship in the
subject-subject relationship.

He rebukes the former freedom as a ‘lie’, because it undermines community,
reviving ‘inflicted’ wounds from the past that persist even till today (ibid.:216). He
(ibid.:215, eo) explains:

The person who interprets freedom as rule is really only aware of himself and his own
property. He is not aware of other people as persons. Even when we say that a person is free
to do and leave undone what he likes, we are interpreting freedom as lordship — as the
person’s mastery over himself. Even when we say that a person is free if he is not determined
by any inner or outer compulsions, we are interpreting freedom as lordship: everyone is to
be his own king, his own master, his own slave-owner. And in saying this we have simply
internalized external compulsions, transferring them to an inward compulsion … Everyone
finds in the other person a competitor in the struggle for power and possession. Everyone is
for everyone else merely the limitation of his own freedom. Everyone is free in himself, but
no one shares in the other. In its ideal form this is a society of individuals who do not disturb
one another but who are themselves solitary. No one determines the other, everyone
determines himself. Freedom has then really become general. Everyone has the right to be
free. But is this true freedom?

In his view, true freedom can happen only in the love that tears down barriers, so
the wounds can be healed in ‘unhindered, open communities in solidarity’ resulting from
such a freedom (ibid.). Community does not limit the freedom of individual but expand
it. He asserts:

[The truth of freedom is love. It is only in love that human freedom arrives at its truth. I am
free and feel myself to be truly free when I am respected and recognized by others and when
I for my part respect and recognize them. I become truly free when I open my life for other
people and share with them, and when other people open their lives for me and share them
with me. Then the other person is no longer the limitation of my freedom; he is an expansion
of it. In mutual participation in life, individual people become free beyond the limits of their
individuality, and discover the common room for living which their freedom offers. That is
the social side of freedom. We call it love and solidarity. In it we experience the uniting of
isolated individuals. In it we experience the uniting of things that have been forcibly divided.

Based on freedom as community or fellowship, Moltmann presents a third, special
and indispensable dimension of freedom granted by ‘the experience of the Spirit’
(ibid.:216f., eo):\textsuperscript{108}

(3) a dimension of ‘creative function’: ‘Freedom as a passion for the future’ in ‘the
relationship of subjects to a project [of the future]’. In other words, this freedom

\textsuperscript{108} See also ibid.:97-9.
exists in the relationships enduring in the promise of love and so being filled with hope.

One is free to think, say, and do only when, in the Spirit, one ‘transcend[s] the present’ towards the promised future by God, that is, ‘the kingdom of not yet defined potentialities’ (ibid.:217). For the ‘kingdom of reality’ of the past is limited. Freedom as a passion for the future is not only a choice for ‘creativity’, but also an empowerment promoting ‘initiative’ (ibid.). Moltmann summarizes the above three dimensions of freedom respectively (ibid.):

1. ‘having’;
2. ‘being’;
3. ‘becoming’.

However, the most important concept of freedom is its theological dimension — the source of human freedom. Moltmann (ibid.:218, eo) states:

An immovable and apathetic God cannot be understood as the foundation of human freedom. An absolutist sovereign in heaven does not inspire liberty on earth. Only the passionate God, the God who suffers by virtue of his passion for people, calls the freedom of men and women to life … The triune God, who realizes the kingdom of his glory in a history of creation, liberation and glorification, wants human freedom, justifies human freedom and unceasingly makes men and women free for freedom. Trinitarian theology is directed towards the justification of a comprehensive, many-dimensioned doctrine of freedom. The conception we shall go on to develop is therefore the following:

*The trinitarian doctrine of the kingdom is the theological doctrine of freedom. The theological concept of freedom is the concept of the trinitarian history of God: God unceasingly desires the freedom of his creation. God is the inexhaustible freedom of those he has created.*

Therefore, human freedom comes from the triune God.

### 8.3 The Community of the Free

If everyone understands and desires ‘the project of the common future’ promised by God, and assumes their ‘common responsibility’, their society will turn into one that is ‘personal and authentically social’ (Moltmann 1981:217). I think that such a society can be formed because here persons act out of freedom instead of repressive social imposition. Accordingly, if freedom as a passion for the future initiates and assumes ‘the
responsibility for a common future’, in order to benefit freedom as community (being), freedom as lordship (having) would be abolished, or at least diminished significantly if it is not ‘possible and desirable’ to abolish it totally within our earthly existence (ibid.). Moltmann terms this new community in the Spirit ‘the community of the free’, where no relationship is defined merely by ‘privileges and subjection’ (ibid.:211). Such a community is called into being only by the passionate triune God on the cross, instead of ‘an immovable and apathetic God’. That is by the God who suffers for His people for the sake of their ‘liberation and glorification’ in the new creation of the continuous creation in His trinitarian history (ibid.:218). In the light of this, Moltmann argues that trinitarian theology can be used to justify ‘a comprehensive, many-dimensioned doctrine of freedom’ (ibid.).

Therefore, he (ibid., eo) proposes to unfold the following conception:

*The Trinitarian doctrine of the kingdom is the theological doctrine of freedom. The theological concept of freedom is the concept of the Trinitarian history of God: God unceasingly desires the freedom of his creation. God in the inexhaustible freedom of those he has created.*

Moltmann (1977:119–20) consequently presents his theology of open friendship to embody the conceptualization of such a community.

### 8.4 The Community of Grace

In the hope of the future, ‘the community of the free’ involves reciprocal self-giving and acceptance of other persons which can be practised only in grace.\(^{109}\) ‘Diversity in unity’ is realized and may abound (Moltmann 1992b:219–20, eo). The archetype of this open friendship is Jesus Christ, as cited in the New Testament: ‘“He is called the friend of tax collectors and sinners.” (Luke 7:34)’ (Moltmann 1992b:258, eo)\(^{111}\) Through ‘the law of

\(^{109}\) Moltmann (1981:218) criticizes the ‘atheistic justification of freedom’ in the ally of modern political world order and religion. He points out that the crude either-or alternative, ‘atheistic freedom’ or ‘monotheistic dependency’, leads to a world order ‘contrary to [hu]man’s freedom and self-responsibility’.

\(^{111}\) Moltmann (1981:221–2, eo) argues that the ‘indivisible and all-comprehensive’ complete freedom can be experienced only in the ‘growth’ of our experience as ‘God’s servants, as His children, and as his friends’ in the history of the trinune God’s kingdom and can be fulfilled in ‘the unhindered participation’ in the
grace’ (Moltmann 1977:117), Jesus offers open fellowship to other people who are not
only different, but also have been cast out of their community. In the joy of inviting them,
Jesus ‘celebrated the messianic feast with’ them, accepted them as human beings with
dignity, and respected them ‘as the first children of the divine grace’ which renews all
things. Accordingly, the ‘social prejudice’ and ‘self-isolation’ that they suffered could be
done away with (Moltmann 1992b:258).

Here, Moltmann (1974b:275–6) highlights a core truth distinguishing Christian
theology from other religions. It is exactly that God himself through Christ ‘creates the
conditions’ of participating in the relationship with the open Trinity for ‘the sinners, the
godless and those forsaken by God’ (ibid.:275).112 They are not able to ‘satisfy these
conditions’ by themselves (ibid.). Only through God’s ‘self-humiliation’ in Christ’s death
on the cross and ‘through his exaltation of [hu]man[ity]’ in Christ’s resurrection from
death, God creatively and purposefully provides the conditions for reconciliation with
God-self (ibid.). In other words, reconciliation with God can be accessed only through
the Person Christ and ‘His history’ (ibid.). Moltmann states very clearly that this
relationship with the open Trinity is neither a religion, a law nor an ideal (ibid.:276):

God does not become a religion, so that [hu]man[s] participates in him by corresponding
religious thoughts and feelings. God does not become a law, so that humankind participates
in him through obedience to a law. God does not become an ideal, so that humankind achieves
community with him through constant striving. He humbles himself and takes upon himself
the eternal death of the godless and the godforsaken, so that all the godless and the
godforsaken can experience communion with him.

Furthermore, only through the one-sided covenant provided by God for all by way of
Christ on the cross, do such true community and fellowship turn out to be a ‘gracious,

112 Marcus Borg (1942-2015) (1998:147) highlights Jesus’ holiness as ‘a contagious power’ to ‘overcome’
the ill and unclean but not to be overcome by them or needing ‘protection through rigorous separation’.
Luke Bretherton (2004:94, eo) emphasizes by quoting Borg that ‘Jesus’ holiness ‘infects the impure, sinners
and the Gentiles’ but not ‘sin and impurity infecting him’.
presuppositionless and universal community of God’ (ibid.:275). In this community, all miserable persons are welcomed unconditionally. Moltmann (ibid.:275-6, eo) stresses:

Christian theology cannot develop any dipolar theology of the reciprocal relationship between the God who calls and the man who answers; it must develop a trinitarian theology, for only in and through Christ is that dialogical relationship with God opened up … In Christian terms, therefore, no relationship of immediacy between God and man is conceivable which is separated from this person and his history … Only the covenant founded one-sidedly by God and opened to all in the cross of Christ makes possible the covenant relationships of dialogue in the spirit, in sympatheia and in prayer. God was in Christ — that is the presupposition for the fellowship of sinners and godless with God, since it opens up God’s sphere for the whole of man and for all men. We live in Christ — that is the consequence for the faith which experiences the full communion with God in communion with Christ.

Therefore, for the sake of this kind of ‘community of grace’, Christian theology must not separate ‘Christocentric’ thought from trinitarian thought (ibid.:275).

8.5 Gracious Moral Cultivation

Who can enter into this covenant relationship with the open Trinity? Is it only one who has been granted a new being made possible by divine calling? Without Christ and the cross, human beings are kept insuperably far from God’s call. Therefore, ‘Christian baptism … as a form of grace’ marks and displays an identity alteration by the burial of the old and the rebirth of the new (Moltmann 1976:16, 18). Although moral cultivation is not a term normally used in Christian theology, the theology of life transformation developed from imago Christi explained above can be understood and coined as gracious moral cultivation (moral transformation by Christ’s grace) in contrast to Tu Weiming’s New Ruist moral self-cultivation (moral transformation by oneself). This is worked out within discussions related to the imago Dei in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology. Nonetheless, Moltmann (1992b:259, eo) does not consider ‘the moral purpose of changing the world’ as ‘the motive’ for the imago Christi. It is instead a festive exultance over God’s kingdom having made itself ‘wide open for the others’. Yet though Moltmann gets this far, he does not explain more directly why he considers this to be so in this context. However, he (1981:125, eo) earlier states:
The experience of the Holy Spirit, as distinct from human forms of spiritualization and sublimation, is always a physical experience. This experience is the beginning of the resurrection of the body (Romans 8:23), which is the direct opposite of the body’s repression or exploitation. The experience of the Spirit sets the person who is touched by it in a beginning event which is open for the coming liberty of the whole creation, and is therefore still incomplete. The experience of the Spirit begins the completion and perfecting of the creation of human beings and all things, which makes them the home of the triune God. In the indwelling of the Spirit, whether it be in the heart, in the community of believers, or in the new creation, God always comes to be at home in his own world.

Therefore, it is not difficult to infer from Moltmann’s historical and cultural contexts (ibid.:248-63) his reasons for highlighting an ‘open friendship’ that is based on God’s ‘grace’ and ‘love’ through the work of the Spirit.

8.6 A Non-Hierarchical Fellowship

Open friendship is passed down through the community of God’s people: ‘Accept one another, then, just as Christ accepted you, in order to bring praise to God’ (NIV Romans 15:7). Therefore, Moltmann’s social Trinity provides a healthier relational self, the open relational self, one that can be built up in such a community made possible by Christ. For its basic law is ‘acceptance of others in their difference’ without surrendering one’s identity, but mutually revealing what each other is (Moltmann 1992b:258–9). In other words, the diversity reveals the individual identity more clearly.

Moltmann’s open friendship emphasizes ‘a non-hierarchical fellowship of equals in the Holy Spirit’ in which everyone in this community ‘contributes what is his or hers’ (ibid.:224). It is neither any kind of collectivisms nor any kind of individualisms, because as Moltmann states (ibid.):

The true unity of the church is an image of the perichoretic unity of the Trinity, so it can neither be a collective consciousness which represses the individuality of the persons, nor [be] an individual consciousness which neglects what is in common.

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113 Cf. ‘accept’ (NIV), ‘welcome’ (NRSV) and ‘receive’ (NKJV) are different English translations for the Greek term προσέλαβε in Romans 15:7:

NRSV Rom 15:7 ‘Welcome one another, therefore, just as Christ has welcomed you, for the glory of God.’
NKJV Rom 15:7 ‘Therefore receive one another, just as Christ also received us, to the glory of God.’
Moltmann (1998b:5, eo) emphasizes that ‘by equality we do not mean collectivism, but equality in the conditions and possibilities of life for everyone. As a social concept, equality means justice. As a human concept, equality means solidarity’. This open friendship provides the positive aspect of a non-hierarchical society in which people are not being repressively imposed upon, controlled, and suppressed. Nobody has a special prerogative and nobody’s freedom is offended (Moltmann 2000a:332). It is a kind of relationship where ‘what is truly human emerges and remains’, even if other types of relationships cease to exist, change more or less naturally, or move into unforeseen forms (Moltmann 1977:116). These other types include the ‘parent-child’, ‘master-servant’, superior-inferior, and man-woman relationships (ibid.). Such a friendship is not ‘existence for others’ but ‘existence with others’ where ‘freedom’ is sustained (ibid., eo). It can only happen ‘in unexacting friendliness’, namely under conditions that are exempt from ‘necessity and compulsion’ (ibid.,116). In this relationship within the grace of the triune God, ‘the new [hu]man, the true [hu]man, the free [hu]man [becomes] the friend’ (ibid.). The more people begin to trust one another as friends, ‘the more privileges and claims to domination become superfluous … the less they need to control one another’ (ibid.). Therefore, in this fellowship of grace, people are not necessarily there to please others and God, or to pretend to be good before them anymore. As a result, they can live out their real self without wearing a mask to hide their weakness, ugliness and sinful nature.114

As Carl Henry (1913-2003) (1999:136) argues, the rational part of humans, as a fundamental part of the imago Dei and human nature, makes communication possible and enables this sort of relationship. Therefore, I find that through rational communication,

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114 This open fellowship is similar to the Christian community Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) describes in his Life Together (1939, trans. in 1954, reprinted in 1996:95–6) (though not developed by Bonhoeffer on the basis of reflections related to social trinitarian doctrine).
open friendship is one of the practical outcomes of the *imago Dei* as a goal in trinitarian theological anthropology and is also the way to such a goal. However, because it is based on Moltmann’s analogy of relations as mentioned above, open friendship relies exclusively on a free gift of grace that God offers in Christ’s Spirit. It is absolutely not realizable by means of an inborn nature or any inherent capacity of humans after the Fall. McDougall (2003:192) points out that the analogy of relations also assures a ‘social or interpersonal reality’ that the *imago Dei* bestows. In other words, only through relationships in an open community can humans come to recognize and experience ‘their messianic destiny as *imago Trinitatis*’ (ibid.). It is through divine grace that ‘God pours the supernatural virtue of *caritas* (charity) into a person’s heart’ (Moltmann 1992b:249). Accordingly, anyone’s spontaneous longing for God will be adequately directed and consummated in ‘the friendship with God’ that God-self endows (ibid.). Consequently, such a person’s commitment will be aligned with God’s; everything will be loved which God loves for God’s sake. This is where, when, and how the personage will genuinely be expressed and so reveal the open and regenerated person.

In the next chapter, I shall evaluate Moltmann’s interpretation of Christian social trinitarian anthropology and how well his account of relational selfhood can be applied to overcome the repressed form of self in PTRIC contexts.
Chapter Seven

Evaluations of Jürgen Moltmann’s Views on Selfhood and Their Implication for the Repressed Form of Self

After examining Moltmann’s interpretation of Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood, I am going to evaluate to what extent Moltmann’s account can provide an alternative solution for the research problem of the repressed from of self in the PTRIC contexts. It is notable that Moltmann did not develop his account of social trinitarian relational selfhood for solving such a problem resulting from Chinese forms of (Ru-based) collectivism, especially New Ruist and PTRIC conceptions of relational selfhood, although he is always been concerned about any collectivist-related issues (as mentioned in C3S1.2). On the contrary, he developed that account mainly in response to individualist-related issues which he argues follow from the psychological aspect of trinitarian doctrine in the Western European Church tradition inherited from Augustine’s account. His response, notably, was presented as a synthesis between ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ and ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’, as mentioned above. As Moltmann himself has not yet addressed this PTRIC problem of RFS by reference to his social trinitarian relational selfhood, naturally there has been no direct discussion or criticism of Moltmann’s perspective about it by scholars. I, therefore, offer my own critical review. Although there are many other discussions and criticisms related to Moltmann’s theology, some of which to his social trinitarian doctrine (Gresham 1993), due to the limitation of space, I will only focus here on issues relating to Moltmann’s conception of relational selfhood as possible resolutions related to the problem of the RFS.
1. Moltmann’s Argument for the Ontology of God and Human Selfhood

Moltmann’s open Trinity and open friendship together make a strong case for rejecting not only a non-trinitarian theist conception of God, but also the other two visions of abstract monotheism in Christian theologies of the Trinity: God as a supreme substance, and God as an absolute subject. Nevertheless, his seemingly questionable denial of the ontological ground of God’s reality is criticized by a number of scholars.

It is insightful that Moltmann defines human nature first by means of theology and then by means of anthropology. Or more precisely, the *imago Dei* ‘refers to something [hu]man[kind] is rather than something [hu]man[kind] has or does … it is not dependent upon the presence of anything else’ but only on the Creator God (Erickson 1984:513).

Theologically speaking, we affirm that human beings are uniquely created in the *imago Dei*. Hebrews 2:5-8, quoting Psalm 8:4-6, reveal the particularity of humankind’s relationship to God above all creatures by stating:

> Now God did not subject the coming world, about which we are speaking, to angels. But someone has testified somewhere, ‘What are human beings that you are mindful of them, or mortals, that you care for them? You have made them for a little while lower than the angels; you have crowned them with glory and honour, subjecting all things under their feet.’ Now in subjecting all things to them, God left nothing outside their control. As it is, we do not yet see everything in subjection to them.

It seems methodologically justified that anthropology should be based on the knowledge of God’s creation held to be revealed through the Bible by God. But the question is, according to Moltmann’s account, whether or not God possesses ontological attributes that are fundamental to human nature and make human community possible (even necessary). Moltmann seems to want to avoid this question, yet as Carl Henry (1913-2003) (1999:136) argued, community presupposes intelligence. Can humankind without intelligence form a community? In other words, can relationship alone define

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1 ‘We are God’s treasured creatures who deserve respect, not because of what we have done [or what we have], but because of who we are’ (So, Damon WK 2012:email). Shirley Isaac (2010:326) argues that human beings, as ‘fragmented’ selves, evidently are not equipped to ‘answer the question “Who am I?”’. Assuming that the question can be answered, the answer cannot come from’ human beings themselves.
human nature, without any immanent reference to the ontological nature of the imago Dei?

1.1 The Issue about God in Se and God quo ad Nos

Henry Jansen (1994:106, 129) criticized Moltmann for basing his ‘concept of God’ exclusively on ‘God quo[ ]ad nos’ (to us) and at the same time plays down ‘God in se’ (in God-self) (ibid.:226). By citing Stoker’s argument (1985 in ibid. 1994:227-8), Jansen explains two different kind of relationships involved in the doctrine of God. God quo ad nos refers to the personal one which is ‘related to the world’, while God in se refers to the ‘(impersonal) ontological’ one which is ‘independent of the world’ (ibid.:228). Jansen insisted on maintaining both complementary ‘aspects of God as person and God as Being Itself’ in a ‘paradoxical’ tension with each other (ibid.). Although the conflict between these two aspects might not be utterly resolved, they ‘cannot be separated from nor reduced to each other[s]’. Otherwise, we would end up either losing ‘the notion of God as Being Itself’ or missing ‘the understanding of God as person’ (ibid.). Do these two aspects of God lose their balance in Moltmann’s account?

I find that Jansen’s criticism here is not based on a proper understanding of Moltmann’s account. First, Moltmann (1981:151–61) argues the equal importance of the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity to be discussed in the next section. Secondly, he (ibid.:xv) dedicated The Trinity and the Kingdom of God especially to overcome the disputed issue of ‘filioque’ causing the schism between the Eastern and Western churches, as introduced in C3S1.2.1. This attempt is made through resolving the problematic accounts of God as the supreme substance and God as the absolute subject in the Western

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2 See also Lee Seunggoo’s (2009:97–101) similar criticism.
3 In Moltmann’s (1981:151) definition, the immanent Trinity, also named the ‘substantial Trinity’, designates ‘the triune God as he is in himself’. The economic Trinity, also named the ‘revelatory Trinity’, is given to call ‘the triune God in his dispensation of salvation, in which he is revealed’.
church, as discussed in C6S4 above, and arguing his understanding of ‘the constitution of the Trinity’ (ibid.:162-71, eo), especially the crucial question whether or not ‘the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and from the Son’ (ibid.:178-90, eo). All of these discussions are about God in se rather than God quo ad nos. Thirdly, the very important concept of perichōrēsis adopted by him (ibid.:150-58, 174-87) is mainly for explaining the ‘inner-trinitarian’ relationships which are also about God in se instead of God quo ad nos, as discussed in C6S5.4 and to be discussed later in S3. Besides, the term ‘inner-trinitarian’ appears frequently in his discussion of the Trinity (ibid.:111-18, 182-9). Accordingly, it is very obvious that Moltmann’s concept of God is substantially based on God in se.

It is because of his deeper ontological concern that Moltmann (1981:171) emphasizes God’s three Persons as ‘the non-interchangeable, untransferable individual existence[s]’ as well as their relationships. He construes this so-called ‘existing-in-relationship’ in the following manner (ibid.:172, eo):

In respect of the divine nature the Father has to be called individua substantia, but in respect of the Son we have to call him Father. The position is no different in the case of the Son and the Spirit.

According to this evidence, Moltmann never ignores the importance of God in se while emphasizing the forgotten social trinitarian doctrine, which seemingly highlights more the importance of God quo ad nos, in the Western European Church.

1.2 The Issue about the Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity

Jansen holds the classic differentiation of the ‘economic Trinity’ from the ‘immanent Trinity’ that Moltmann has deserted. Moltmann follows Karl Rahner’s argument (1970:22, eo) that ‘the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and the immanent Trinity

\[\text{See also Moltmann (1981:25, 58, 92, 106., 127, 165, 169).}\]
is the economic Trinity’. Moltmann (1981:160, eo) tries to bring together ‘the substance’ (the ‘inwardness’ of the triune God) and ‘the revelation’ (the ‘outwardness’ of the open Trinity) through the crucified Christ. He argues that ‘the economic Trinity not only reveals the immanent Trinity; it also has a retroactive effect on it’. He (ibid., eo) interprets the trinitarian doctrine from the perspective of ‘the theology of the cross’:

The Augustinian distinction between the opera trinitatis ad extra, which are undivided (indivisa) and the opera trinitatis ad intra, which are divided (divisa) is insufficient. It ascribes unity to God outwards and three- ness inwardly. But the event of the cross (which is an outward event) can only be understood in trinitarian terms — i.e., terms that are divided (divisa) and differentiated. Conversely, the surrender of the Son for us on the cross has a retroactive effect on the Father and causes infinite pain. On the cross God creates salvation outwardly for his whole creation and at the same time suffers this disaster of the whole world inwardly in himself. From the foundation of the world, the opera trinitatis ad extra correspond to the passiones trinitatis ad intra. God as love would otherwise not be comprehensible at all.

In his social trinitarian doctrine (2009a:288), ‘substances and relations’ are maintained as ‘equally primary’. In the sense of the economic Trinity that we can experience, the triune God opens God-self to the world and enters into our histories through Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion. As is commonly understood, Jesus as the Son of God is the second Person of the Trinity. On the one hand, the Son is indeed a relational term, although eternally so in that relationship; on the other hand, the Son is also God — YHWH — I AM — and so possesses ontic identity as God. God is something distinct. Therefore, Jesus has both relationality and ontic identity.

At this point, I do not sense that Moltmann would understand God quo ad nos and God in se to be in conflict with each other. Instead, they are two descriptions and understandings about God, demonstrated in two different dimensions that complement each other in trying to paint a full picture of the triune God. Yet because there is a mysterious dimension of the Trinity that goes beyond the confines of human reason, I

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5 Nevertheless, Rahner (1970:106) rejects that there are three ‘subjectivities’ in the triune God.

6 It is through insisting this concept of ‘equally primary’ that Moltmann (1981:188–90) criticizes the hierarchical trinitarian structures in both accounts of the Latin church tradition and the Eastern church tradition. In his (1981:191–202) viewpoints, the two traditions both support ‘clerical monotheism’ and ‘political monotheism’ both of which are based on asymmetrical Trinitarian structure. See also C6F70 in this chapter and Moltmann (1977:291–300, 305–306; 1981:129–37; 1985d; 1992b:290–95).
agree to the subtle distinction Leonardo Boff (1938-)(1988:215) makes between them: ‘the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, but not the whole of the immanent Trinity’. For there certain mysteries within the immanent Trinity still exist, because they have not yet been revealed in the economic Trinity. Without the understanding of ‘God as Being Itself’, the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus Christ, the gift of grace, and even the relationship with a personal God, all become vague, abstract, metaphysical, and problematic. However, without any revelation in the economic salvation of Christ, the immanent Trinity is hard to grasp because God does not reveals Himself apart from His acts of salvation from a perspective of the theology of the cross.

Therefore, both aspects are also indispensable in establishing a foundation for a relational selfhood for humans. In facing the contemporary trend of uniting humankind’s dignity with the ‘purely humanistic’ philosophy of existentialism or ‘an autonomous morality’, Zizioulas (2004:27) argues that the link between the conceptualizations of selfhood or personhood and theology, especially within the trinitarian doctrine (ibid.:36), is indissoluble ‘historically’ and ‘existentially’ 7. He points out that ‘in one’s social or legal relationships … the moral or legal person … has nothing to do with the ontology of the person’ (ibid.:34, eo). If there is not ontology of the person, one’s selfhood can only be given and confirmed by one’s society, either relationally or legally and politically (ibid.:34-5).

Traditionally, the ontological dimension of God (the immanent Trinity) is discussed in the context where historical time is transcended, in timelessness, and the personal dimension of God (the economic Trinity) is discussed in the context within historical time. However, Moltmann does not see the necessity of such a distinction, 8 one that, he

7 See also (Zizioulas 1995).
argues, will dissolve ‘the one in the other’ (ibid.:160). Moltmann (1981:160) highlights that the sociality of the Trinity corresponds to the substance of the Trinity from the beginning of creation. We can use some terms by other scholars to denote this concept: such as ‘irreducible relationality of being’ by Torrance (1996:285) or ‘relational ontology’ called by some other scholars.10

Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood tends to be this kind of selfhood in which one’s individual self tends to be dissolved into the collective self or hidden behind one’s adopted social masks. On the contrary, Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood encourages people to search for liberty on the path to the person, rather than moving only towards the personage (Tournier 1957:224). This foundation is the relationship of grace with God, within the self, and with others.

1.3 The Source of New Human Selfhood

Although Moltmann’s account of the imago Dei (on which his social trinitarian relational selfhood is based) was not developed originally for liberating the RFS (C6S6), the doctrine of the imago Dei is unanimously recognized in the Christian world as the source

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9 Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) (2004:300–327) integrates these terms for explaining the seemingly conflicting concepts between God in se and God quo ad nos into a new term: ‘reciprocal’ or ‘mutual self-distinction’.

10 This is what Alan J. Torrance (1996:285) calls the ‘ontological originality of personhood’ and the ‘irreducible relationality of being’. See also Torrance (2003:148–9). This is also what Todd H. Speidell (1994) calls ‘a trinitarian ontology of Persons in society’, and what Gunton (1999:51) and some other scholars, for example, Catherine M. LaCugna (1991:46, 205), John Heywood Thomas (1995), Wildman (2010), Zizioulas (2010), David Martin (2010), and Coakley (2010), Sandage and Brown (2015; 2015), call a ‘relational ontology’. In ‘relational ontology’, being is understood ‘as being-in-relation, not being-in-itself’ (LaCugna 1991:46, 205) or ‘person as relational being’ (Chiu, Shungming 趙崇明 p. Zhào Chóngmíng2004). But it is worth noting that the term relational ontology does not necessary specify the Christian social Trinitarian relational ontology. It is also used to describe different concept of ontology in other contexts, for example in Foucault’s account (Asch 2009). There are some other terms used by scholars to describe the concept of relational ontology. For example, ‘being-in-communion’ is used by Edwin C. Hui 許志偉 (p. Xǔ Zhìwěi) (2002:197) and Carver T. Yu. With this term, Barth describes the feature of the triune Persons and human beings created in God’s likeness. Although Carver T. Yu (1987:147–213) use it to describe the relational ontology of both the Creator God and human being, his ‘being-in-communion’ of God denotes ‘being-in-communion’ with his ‘creatures’ instead of among three Persons (ibid.:180f.). Besides Carver T. Yu, based on Thomas Aquinas’ (1270s, trans. in 1921:34–37 {Q.29 Art.4}) account, W. Norris Clarke (1994:102–122) gave this similar concept of relational ontology the term ‘substance-in-relation’. See also Edwin C. Hui (2000:50–60).
of human selfhood and the foundation for a healthy selfhood. Moreover, Moltmann elaborates the doctrine of the *imago Dei* to focus more on the new creation of the triune God, i.e. soteriologically on the *imago Christi* (C6S6.2) which must be extended to stress eschatologically on *Gloria Dei est Homo* (C6S6.3). Will this focus in his account provide a basis for liberating the RFS?

Moltmann applies the concept of an heir presented by the Apostle Paul to explaining the significance of the *imago Christi* in providing new human selfhood and new human interpersonal relationships. Paul states that ‘Christ is both the *imago Dei* (Colossians 1:15) and the one in whose image believers are to be formed (Ephesians 4:13)’ (Grenz 2001:174). He presents the concept of an heir to show, firstly, the inevitability of parent-child relationship of the triune God with human beings, secondly, the necessity of redemptive salvation and gracious moral cultivation granted towards human beings by the triune God, and thirdly, the hope of the promised future transformed self as the *gloria Dei* in the consummation of the new creation in eternity (Titus 3:7). Therefore, I find that Paul’s concept of an heir employed by Moltmann is helpful in embodying the theological meaning of the *imago Christi* in Moltmann’s account, because it restores postlapsarian humankind to the *imago Dei* (the *imago Trinitatis*), by way of the *imago Christi*. The *imago Christi* denotes the action done and granted by the triune God. Being an heir denotes a status and relationship with the triune God, grounded in Jesus Christ the Son, which humankind accepts and receives.11

In Romans 8:29, Paul uses the Greek word ‘σώματος’, meaning having ‘a similar form, nature, or style’ (Bauer 2000:958, eo), or having ‘the same form’, sharing ‘in having the likeness of’ (Louw & Nida 1989:586, eo),12 to highlight God’s transformative work

11 I am indebted to Peter K. Chow’s inspiration, in our conversation (2012), for this application of Paul’s concept of an heir to explain relational selfhood.

12 See also Moulton and Milligan (1976:598), United Bible Societies (1987b), and Zodhiates (1993:1328).
in conforming the elect to the image of Christ. This depicts the meaning and effect of the 
**imago Christi** in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology. This is also the 
transformative goal of the Holy Spirit that Paul describes in 2 Corinthians 3:17f.:

> Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And all of 
> us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected 
in a mirror, are being 
> transformed [(μεταμορφούμεθα)] into the same image [(εἰκόνα)] from one degree of glory to 
> another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.

Paul used the verb *μεταμορφόμασι* with the noun *εἰκών* (image or form). This Greek verb 
means literally being changed in form, namely being changed ‘inwardly in fundamental 
character or condition … [and] be[ing] transformed’ (Bauer 2000:639, eo)\(^\text{13}\) and shares 
the same root of *μορφή* (form) with the adjective *σύμμορφος*. Paul, in this passage, clearly 
points out that the goal of transforming the elect to the same image of Christ will be done 
and fulfilled by the Holy Spirit. Moltmann (1981:124) explains this goal more concretely:

> In the Spirit is anticipated what will be in the future … In the activity of the Spirit, 
> consequently, the renewal of life, the new obedience and the new fellowship of men and 
> women is experienced. The marks of the eschatological experience of the Spirit are boundless 
> freedom, exhuberant joy and inexhaustible love.

Therefore, in applying theologically to anthropology, the source of our confidence is in 
the Holy Spirit, not any more in ourselves, in Moltmann’s account as already 
demonstrated in C6S8.5. For not any more are we ‘concerned about transforming 
ourselves, but rather in being transformed by the power of His Spirit’ (Swindoll 1989:47). 
Consequently, not any more do we live in fear that we are not good enough, ‘because we 
are free to live by His power’ (ibid.). This is the reason why the RFS can be liberated in 
the **imago Christi** through the work of the Spirit.

\(^{13}\) See also Moulton and Milligan (1976:403), United Bible Societies (1987a), Louw and Nida (1989:155, 
587), and Zodhiates (1993:968–9).
The destination or final stage of transformation is the glorification of the children of the triune God at the second coming of Christ (Seifrid 2014:183–6). In Philippians 3:21, Paul connects σώματος to this ultimate δόξα (glory):

But our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ. He will transform the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory [(or literally: transform our lowly body into the same form (σώματος) as his glorious body)], by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself.

Biblically it is stated that the first human creatures broke their covenant with God the Creator, and so the image and likeness of God imprinted within humans were marred and distorted (Romans 3:23), especially within their relationality. The main purpose of Jesus’ incarnation to redeem sinful humankind is not merely to absolve the punishment or condemnation of sin, but also to restore the broken imago Dei in humankind and in their relationships (Romans 8:29-30; cf. Matthew 5:48). We need to realize that the triune God has not yet finalized transforming us in God’s image (Moseley 1991:17), so that the restored imago Dei through Christ’s salvation, namely the imago Christi in Moltmann’s account, in us has not yet been able to manifest fully the glory of God, i.e. Gloria Dei est Homo in Moltmann’s account. Besides the liberation of our repressed form of selves, this transforming work of the Spirit should lead us into an even more robust

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15 In Paul’s conception of God’s glory and the imago Dei, it is because sharing in the glory of God involves conforming to the imago Christi (Romans 8:29-30; Philippians 3:21) so that ‘fall[ing] short of the glory of God’ (Romans 3:23) is evidence of a ‘declension’ from the imago Dei (Moo 1996:226). In other words, the absence of glory indicates that ‘all people fail to exhibit that being-like-God for which they were created’ (ibid.). See also Utley (2013:52).
16 ‘Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Matthew 5:48) because human beings were created to be the likeness of God (Constable 2017:121). See also Barclay (1958:176–7).
17 Those who suffer with the Son of Man ‘shall share his glory also’ (Spurgeon 1893:321). When He is ‘seated on the throne of his glory’ (Matthew 19:28), all things shall have been renewed. Then ‘the highest honours’ shall await the ones who have followed Him (ibid.). See also Calvin (1555, trans. and published in 1999:252) and Henry (1721:494–5).
security and self-confidence, as well as be realized in healthier and more intimate relationships with God and others.

2. Moltmann’s Arguments about Soteriology and Sin

Wáng Wénjī 王文基 (2005) is impressed with Moltmann’s concept of open friendship, but is very concerned about its obscurity. The boundaries of Moltmann’s open community work under the shadow of ‘universalism’ (ibid.:20), which is criticized by evangelicals.18 Wang criticizes Moltmann’s ‘over-optimistic’ attitude about ‘human nature’, noting that one’s ability to enter into this open community appears not to involve the problem of ‘sin’ in Moltmann’s theology (ibid.:19). Accordingly, Wang worries that human beings can enter into this open relationship with God without any mention of the Cross or messianic salvation.

2.1 The Issue about Universalism

Wang’s concerns about Moltmann’s universalist stance are reasonable from a Protestant evangelical perspective (one that I share), but his criticisms are not based on Moltmann’s clearly expressed rationale. Moltmann neither undervalues the despairing state of human sinful nature, nor opens a side door for salvation that avoids the messianic Cross or crucified Christ (Moltmann 1967:22–6; 1996:235–55).19

Moltmann (1974b:194–5) unequivocally takes his universalist stand early in The Crucified God, claiming that ‘the theology of the cross is the true Christian universalism’. For him, there cannot be any distinction among sinners and ‘all will be made righteous without any merit on their part by his grace which has come to pass in Christ Jesus (Romans 3.24)’. Jesus’ death for all the world must ‘undermine, remove and destroy the things which mark men out as elect and non-elect’ (ibid.:194). It is notable that Moltmann (1976:20, eo)

differentiates his ‘Christian universalism’ from general universalism, because he insists that the most fundamental rationale for his ‘Christian universalism’ is to believe in the crucified Christ, instead of relying merely on ‘monotheism, one God, so one humanity’. The only hope for ‘men in their shared lack of full humanness’ is the acceptance of the ‘crucified God’ (ibid.). He (1990a:222–5) also reclaims and emphasizes, at length and unequivocally, his universalist stand in some of his later works. Especially, Moltmann (1996:235–55) refutes ‘double predestination’ (p.246), and makes a synthesis between the thesis of ‘the universal theology of grace’ (p.254) and the antithesis of ‘the particularist theology of faith’ (ibid.).20 Based on God’s love for the sinner and that grace is greater than sin, Moltmann refuses to accept God as condemning any sinner to spend eternity in hell. Instead, he argues for his universalism on the basis of the purposeful and ultimate ‘restoration of all things’ by Christ’s ‘all-reconciling love’, because he takes the condemnation for all sinners on the Cross (ibid.:254, eo).

I do not find Moltmann’s account of ‘Christian universalism’ to be convincing. However, due to the limitation of space, my brief criticism of his ‘Christian universalism’ is provided in A-O for reference. Even though space does not allow for this issue to be analysed and argued comprehensively here, one could at least ask whether Moltmann’s positions on ‘human nature’ and sin are over-optimistic or not.

2.2 The Issue about Sin

As disclosed above, the imago Christi is central to Moltmann’s concept of the imago Dei. Moltmann (1985a:229–34) never undervalues the despair of humans’ sinful nature. He understands sin not as a change of substance, but as a relational change; in this way, therefore, his view is that ‘the image is in no way … diminished’ (ibid.:233).21 This is the

21 For Moltmann’s universalism, see also Nik Ansell (2011) although he does not analyse it in detail.
main reason that he might be misunderstood by Wang or some others. In trying to hold the position of ‘at once God’s image and a sinner’ (ibid.), Moltmann (1985a:232–4) argues that what sin may damage is not the **imago Dei** but humankind’s relationship to God. This is why he (1999:84) underscores humankind’s likeness to God as being not grounded in certain ‘qualities’ of humankind, but rather in their ‘relationship’ to the trinite God. Therefore, the sinners are ‘slaves of sin’ (Romans 6:17), instead of being servants of God. However, God’s relationship to humans, namely humans’ objective likeness to God’,\(^\text{22}\) cannot be damaged by sin, so that God’s presence faithfully keeps the **imago Dei** from being deprived.\(^\text{23}\) Does Moltmann, as Bonzo (2009:82) critically claims, try to defuse sin’s radical rupture, while admitting human’s sin? Indeed, it seems that Moltmann (1985:233–4) obviously contradicts himself when he discusses these matters. On the one hand, he calls a sinner God’s ‘refractory image’, reaffirming the need and hope for ‘the completion of the **imago Dei**’\(^\text{24}\) that comes about through the restoration from sin to the divine image. Furthermore, he explains that sinners maybe turned from being in the **imago Dei** into ‘an **imago satanae** or an **imago mammonis**’ (an *image of Satan* or an *image of Mammon*). Here, Moltmann clearly admits that a sinner may experience a situation of falling short of likeness to God. If the **imago Dei** is undiminished, how can it become ‘refractory’? Why would it need to be completed?

In fact, social likeness to God is the core value of the **imago Dei** in Moltmann’s (ibid.:234-43) social doctrine of the Trinity. Does social likeness to God not include

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22 Moltmann understands human beings’ relationship to God as ‘a double one. It means God’s relation to human beings and the relation of human beings to God.’ The former one cannot be destroyed or lost unless God ends it, ‘Human beings’ objective likeness to God subsists in God’s relation to them’ on both of which the dignity and human rights of each and every human being are based (Moltmann 1999:84). See also (Sider 2012:39, 105, 118).

23 See also Moltmann (2004:107).

24 As Moltmann explains (1985a:243, eo), ‘As God’s image, human beings are the image of the whole Trinity in that they are *conformed* to the image of the Son: the Father creates, redeems and perfects human beings through the Spirit in the image of the Son.’
humankind’s relationship to God? How can human’s relational social likeness to God in the *imago Dei* be kept intact, while humankind’s relation to God is *perverted* by sin? Since Moltmann accepts perverting but refuses to claim sin’s destroying power as the nature of its influence in humankind’s relationship to God, why cannot he accept that the *imago Dei* might be perverted, rather than insist on it being *undiminished*? I am afraid that Moltmann’s insistence and arguments on this issue are not very coherent or convincing.

While I disagree with Moltmann’s universalism, still his social trinitarian theology recognizes the reality of humankind’s imperfectibility because of their original sinful nature. After the Fall, imperfect human beings cannot and do not need to earn their worth by (moral) achievements and other performances before the Triune God and other people. As growth comes as a result of gracious moral cultivation in Moltmann’s social Trinitarian relational selfhood, instead of moral self-cultivation, imperfect humankind is ultimately and completely accepted by the grace of the Son through His crucifixion and resurrection, and will be perfected in the eschatological future as promised by the Father through the work of the Holy Spirit.

### 2.3 The Issue about the Tension between Divine Grace and Human Endeavour

It is obvious that Moltmann’s emphasis on Divine grace demonstrates his typical Reformed theological stand. Some people might criticize the unbalanced roles between Divine grace and human endeavour in the transformation of the self in his account. Does gracious moral cultivation implies no human endeavour in the transformation of the self? This criticism or question is not a new one. This debatable issue is about the tension between Divine sovereign grace and human responsibility in salvation that has been disputed for over two millennia. It is still an on-going debating issue between Calvinist-oriented or Lutheran-oriented theologians and Arminian-oriented theologians (Boyd and Eddy 2002:132-45). Therefore, it is not the scope of this research to comprehensively
discuss and solve this debate. I only try to clarify here what and why he really argues about Divine grace in his Reformed theological position as described above in Section 2 and C6S6 to C6S8.

Firstly, Moltmann tends to hold the doctrine of total depravity of human which is argued by Calvinist-oriented and Lutheran-oriented theologians. It follows that he might have not ever engaged in dealing the tension between Divine grace and human responsibility in salvation in his works. The Apostle Paul stresses in Ephesians 2:8-9: ‘For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God — not the result of works, so that no one may boast’. This theological position also shared by Martin Luther is suggested by Tournier as mentioned in C3S2.4.

Secondly, the transformation of the self is in the realm of salvation and new creation from the eschatological perspective of Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology. Accordingly, it can only be initiated and completed by Divine grace. Its initiation and completion does not matter with human endeavour because of total depravity of human or the bondage of human’s will. In other words, human endeavour or moral self-cultivation is not in the realm of salvation and new creation. Therefore, the transformation of the self is gracious moral cultivation in contrast to moral self-cultivation in terms of Ruist perspective of moral cultivation. As having been mentioned in C6S8.5, Moltmann (1981:125, eo) unequivocally highlights the incomparable distinction of these two different transformations in different realm by saying:

> [t]he experience of the Holy Spirit, as distinct from human forms of spiritualization and sublimation, is … the beginning of the resurrection of the body (Romans 8:23), which is the direct opposite of the body’s repression or exploitation … The experience of the Spirit begins the completion and perfecting of the creation of human beings and all things, which makes them the home of the triune God. In the indwelling of the Spirit … in the new creation, God always comes to be at home in his own world.

Accordingly, it can be inferred that this is the reason why Moltmann does not see the existence of the tension between Divine grace and human endeavour (or responsibility) and, therefore, does not talk about human endeavour while he is discussing the
transformation of the self by Divine grace. It follows that the RFS of the self can eventually be liberated when the initiation and completion of the transformation of the self does not depend on the endeavour of humans of total depravity but on Divine grace.

3. Moltmann’s Argument for the Perichoretic Relationship

In the *perichōrēsis* of Moltmann’s social trinitarian doctrine, three elements are not negotiable: unity, (ontological) equality, and diversity. In fact, like the term ‘Trinity’, it is to some extent a mystery that a dynamic ‘diversity in unity’ as well as a *unity in diversity* can simultaneously exist. In the cultural and theological contexts of the Western European Church, Moltmann is more concerned about the loss of diversity than the loss of unity in the conceptualization of the doctrine of Trinity.

Yet by seeking to sustain diversity within the Triune God, the dynamic equality associated with the three Persons is also being challenged. For example, based on Barth’s trinitarian concept of the modes of being, a Chinese theologian named Simon Chan (2014:43–4) criticizes Moltmann’s emphasis on equality within the triune relationship. He argues for a kind of semi-hierarchical Father-Son relationship based upon an assumed principle of a ‘command-obedience’ structure within that relational order informing the doctrine that the Father ‘eternally generates his only begotten Son’. However, as already demonstrated in S2.3 above, such an argument tends to fall into subordinationism, though we may ultimately require some form of a *functional* order, when trying to explain the trinitarian doctrine (Basil of Cæsarea 1895:27–8). Therefore, I argue instead that the triune Persons are ontological egalitarian, as revealed in John 5:17f., 14:9, and Philippians

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25 Intriguingly, the social trinitarian doctrine is also criticized for creating ‘inequality’ among the triune Persons by Brian Leftow (2002:243–8) just because it claims that the Father begets the Son.

26 See also Isaac (2010:333–4 n.2).
2:6, in their relational energies (status) where they operate within a triune (functional) order.\textsuperscript{27}

In Moltmann’s own language (2000a:317) according to the definition of trinitarian doctrine by the Council of Florence (1438–1445), the triune Persons are (ontologically) ‘non-hierarchical’ in the \textit{perichoretic life} of the Trinity and functionally hierarchical or ‘monarchial’ (1981:177), if possible, only on the level of His ‘constitution’. The divine \textit{oneness} (John 17:21-3; cf. 10:30) of Father and Son that in John appears to be synonymous with their mutual \textit{iness} (e.g., John 14:10f.,17:21), on which the doctrine of \textit{perichoresis} is based, is a unity both metaphysically ontological and morally functional (Barrett 1978:72). Thomas R. Thompson (1996:49, eo) interprets pertinently Moltmann’s (and Boff’s) conception in this way as:

\begin{quote}
A social model of the Trinity more properly distinguished economically and immanently better enables us to affirm the complete ontological equality of persons while simultaneously maintaining their differential freedom, and therewith those arrangements necessary to the functional well-being of society — \textit{subordinations} or \textit{hierarchies}, that is, based on abilities, gifts and the exigencies of life, and not upon any created distinctions which are rather to be celebrated.
\end{quote}

Human beings’ relationships are endowed with this kind of \textit{perichoresis}-oriented egalitarian capacities because they have \textit{imago Dei} as the foundation of their functional familial and social orders.

However, J. Matthew Bonzo (2009:126–7) and Nengean (2009:86) see as a fundamental problem in his account the applying of the concept of \textit{perichōrēsis} in the Trinity to humans as the \textit{imago Trinitatis}. As we have discussed above in C6S6.1.3 and C6S6.3, Moltmann (1981:68, 107) strongly disagrees that any redeemed human being can become identical with God or with the Son of God.\textsuperscript{28} Yet in other places Moltmann

\textsuperscript{27}This argument is supported by Millard J. Erickson (1984:338), Thomas R. Thompson (1996:292–303), and J. Scott Horrell (2004:420) whose sources were found later. There have been discussions and debates on how to understand such a functional unequal order in the triune Persons (Gons and Naselli 2015) and how to apply ‘functional hierarchy in the Trinity’ to social class structure, especially in an Asian context (Lee, Jungyoung 1996:205).

\textsuperscript{28}See also Moltmann (1976:108-11).
(ibid.:199) tends to obscure the differences between the triune Creator God and created humans by applying the concept of *perichōrēsis*. Moltmann (1981:199) even uses the term ‘consubstantial’ to explain how human beings bear the *imago Trinitatis* and experience their relationship within an open community. On the contrary, I argue that such terminology is normally adopted to describe only the mysterious attributes of God, ones that are beyond the confines of human beings’ reason and experience. Since human beings are created and sustained in the *imago Dei*, they are only *like* God and will never have the same attributes as the triune God, even during the glorious completion of God’s history with human beings.

It is noteworthy that what the relational view of the *imago Dei* denotes is more dynamic than static. The relational view of the *imago Dei* shifts the focus from ‘image’ as a noun to a verb (Hall, Douglas John 1986:98). Relationality is endowed for humankind in the image and likeness of the triune God through creation. This view is based on a relationship existing between Creator and creature, the triune God and humankind. Accordingly, the image is ‘as a consequence of the relationship’ — namely, humankind *images* the triune God (Grenz 2001:162).

Biblical teachings come after the created orders have been realized; they include obeying or disobeying (such as Acts 5:29) the (functional) authority, and how to function well with other human beings, including ‘be[ing] subject to one another’ (Ephesians 5:21), in that preferred social order operating in an open relationship in the open Trinity.

All of this is echoed in the metaphor of ‘one body with many members’ used by the Apostle Paul to explain how Christian relationships should be in Christ (see Romans 12:4-5 and 1 Corinthians 12). In this metaphor, unity, equality, and diversity are highlighted in balance. Based on this *imago Dei* with a Christological link in Hebrews 2:5-9 (mentioned

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29 See also Moltmann (1985a:17).
above and to be discussed in the next section), human persons with their superior position are not to abuse either the world or other living creatures. On the contrary, they are to take a special commission and exercise particular responsibility to rule in a way that nourishes the world and all other living things within it and even more to rule as Christ does, sacrificially, after they have been reborn in Him.

Moltmann (1977:116, eo) recognizes the fact that sustaining an ‘existence for others’ is necessary and legitimates the function of a social order. However, open friendship is also an ‘existence with others’ that does not involve ‘necessity and compulsion’. It has been noted that repressed forms of self in PTRIC cultural settings are cultivated by forced obedience under repressive social impositions.

It is notable that voluntary obedience, in this light has nothing to do with the RFS. For example, Jesus’ voluntary obedience to the Father in his prayer in Gethsemane included a request that the Father would take away his cup of suffering (Matthew 26:36-42). Luther highlighted and valued this kind of Christian voluntary obedience because of love in his famous work The Freedom of a Christian (1520a:344, eo). He explained:

A Christian man is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian man is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all. Although these two theses seem to contradict each other, yet, if they should be found to fit together they would serve our purpose beautifully. For they are both Paul’s own, who says, in 1 Corinthians 9:10, ‘Whereas I was free, I made myself the servant of all,’ and, Romans 13:8, ‘Owe no man anything, but to love one another.’ Now love by its very nature is ready to serve and to be subject to him who is loved. So Christ, although Lord of all, was made of a woman, made under the law, and hence was at the same time free and a servant, at the same time in the form of God and in the form of a servant.

Therefore, a self who is voluntarily obedient to anyone is not a RFS.

30 Gunton (1989:77) explains this perichoresis-oriented ecclesiology as a community without any ‘permanent structure of subordination’, but constituted by ‘overlapping patterns of relationships’ in which both subordination and superordination can be functions of the same person, dynamically activated according to their gifts and graces.
4. Moltmann’s Argument for Open Friendship and Relational Self

In response to Moltmann’s essay on modernity, Ellen T. Charry (1947-) (1998:102) indicates that ‘the modern worldview lacks not only a doctrine of sin, but also a doctrine of grace’. Even if ‘the self-sufficiency of the self’ has prevailed after Descartes, Charry (ibid.:100-101) points out that the other side of this trend is that the modern self depends on ‘the respect accorded one by others’. Such dependence leads to a distorted ‘natural self’, namely ‘just be yourself’, suffering from fear and insecurity before gaining respect from or ‘power over others’ (ibid., eo). I find that such a ‘self-constructed self’ (ibid.:100) is similar to the self-cultivated self in Tu Weiming’s New Ruism.31 This self is always striving for self-formation and achievements recognized by others through its own endeavours, will-power, and extrinsic ‘reinforcement’ (ibid.:101). Charry worries about the negative impact felt by a ‘self-esteem’ supported and strengthened by unrelenting efforts at straining for success ‘in a competitive, accomplishment-driven society’ (ibid.:102). As she notes, these are often established by the use of the psychological mechanisms of ‘guilt and shame as instruments of moral formation’ (ibid.). She is convinced that such a self-understanding would be hurt and damaged by these values and priorities. Charry points out that if self dignity relies on respect from others, it will cause ‘an insecurity in the self’ (ibid.:101). As discussed in C2, the insecurity in the self which Charry highlights is a sign of the problem of the RFS.

However, humans cannot live without getting along with others. Moltmann’s social trinitarian theological anthropology not only emphasizes the restoration of individual personal relationships in connection with God, moving from the imago Dei through the imago Christi so as to attain our real personhood, but also retrieves the likeness of the trinitarian perichoretic relationship as a relational prototype for human relationships. That

31 See C4S3, C5S12, and C8S3.2.6.
prototype, an image of divine communion, is obtained through the imago Trinitatis, providing a model and grounding for the interpersonal relationships in a community of grace, augmented by the redemptive human-divine relationship. Accordingly, ‘image’ becomes a verb and the subject is humankind in the relational view. None of this depends on human being’s efforts, but rather on the gracious salvation of the Son through the imago Christi and the work of the Spirit, as emphasized in Moltmann’s account (C6S8.5). Besides, these interpersonal relationships are in a community between subjects built upon a divinely-led project of hope (Moltmann 1981:216, 253 n.49).

Jesus, in Mark 12:28-31, ‘was laying out for us the three dimensions of reality as a self in terms of relation: God, others, and the self’ (Bellinger 2010:6). These three loves comprise ‘the core of healthy and balanced human existence’ (ibid.). In other words, missing any one of them and transposing their priority can lead to the problem of the RFS.

What about the priority of the self? Will not putting God and others prior to the self cause the problem? Moltmann (1967:91–2) argues that ‘the promised identity’ of human beings is acquired by ‘self-emptying’. Self-emptying is the way to gain oneself by ‘abandoning’ oneself, to find ‘life by taking death’ upon one, and to attain to ‘freedom by accepting the form of a servant’ (ibid.:92). I found that the self-emptying Moltmann uses here closely relates to the denying of oneself that Jesus teaches as the way of being His disciple and living well (Matthew 16:24-5, Mark 8:34-5, and Luke 9:23-5). The Greek term translated in English as ‘life’ in Matthew 16:25, Mark 8:35, and Luke 9:24 is ψυ χη, which may refer to one’s ‘physical life’ (Louw & Nida 1989:322) and might also mean

32 Compare the differences of English translation for the simple reflexive in the following two English versions:
NRSV Luke 9:25: ‘What does it profit them if they gain the whole world, but lose or forfeit themselves?’
NIV Luke 9:25: ‘What good is it for a [hu]man to gain the whole world, and yet lose or forfeit his very self?’

33 See also Danker et al. (Bauer 2000:1099).
one’s ‘inner self, mind, thoughts, feelings, heart, being’ (ibid.:106, 321, eo),\(^{34}\) namely one’s ‘conscious self’ (Liddell et al. 1940) according to its context.

In Luke 9:25, Jesus uses directly the singular reflexive pronoun to warn of losing one’s ‘very self’ (NIV). The ‘experience’ of this promised real self through self-emptying in ‘the event of promise’ in Christ’s resurrection has a very direct and close connection with a commensurate experience of the world. One attains one’s real self ‘by emptying himself into’ the world, rather than by differentiating oneself from it (ibid.:92).

Jesus reveals this paradoxical truth:

> If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me. For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will save it. What does it profit them if they gain the whole world, but lose or forfeit themselves? (Luke 9:23-25)

The translation of this passage in the NIV — ‘what good is it for a man to gain the whole world, and yet lose or forfeit his very self?’ (Luke 9:25) — highlights the relevance of Jesus’ statement on the issue of the self. For the Greek word here ‘ψυχή’ translated in English as ‘life’ in Luke 9:24, means one’s ‘inner self’ (Louw & Nida 1989:321) or ‘the conscious self’ (Liddell et al. 1940) as explained in C3S1.2.5. Accordingly, what Jesus means is that self-denial is the only means to ‘self-discovery’; to ‘die to our own self-centredness’ is the only means to live (Stott 2011:211).\(^{35}\) This self to be denied, emptied, lost, or forfeited is the self-centred self who amasses wealth, power, fame, and interest for oneself. In other words, ‘when you think you have lost everything, the miracle takes place and you find yourself’ (ibid.). François Bovon (2002:366, eo) stresses:

> To deny oneself [here in this context] does not mean to hate oneself (cf. 10:27), but, expressed in modern terms, to deny one’s inauthentic manner of existence, to deconstruct the proud

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\(^{34}\) Or ‘self, inner life, one’s inmost being’ (United Bible Societies 1987) and the ‘seat and centre of the inner human life in its many and varied aspects’ including ‘desires … feelings and emotions … heart … mind’, (Bauer 2000:1099, eo) ‘senses … affections, appetites, [and] passions’ (Zodhiates 1993:1494). See also Moulton and Milligan (1976:698).

farçade of one’s identity, and to bring to view one’s genuine, plain, fragile I in relationship to Christ.

Though this is paradoxical, it reveals where the value of the self comes from. One’s value is not acquired by one’s *doing* or *having* through *earning*, but by one’s *being* the *imago Christi* and so also as God’s child and Jesus’ follower, as Moltmann highlights. Such a value of one’s self and one’s relationship with God is not gained by one’s efforts but granted by the grace and works of the triune God.\(^{36}\)

Theologically I find the concept of the open Trinity Moltmann presents very suggestive. As the Trinity is open rather than closed, the Son was sent to suffer, risk, and sacrifice His life for human beings. Consequently, this radical openness of relational engagement stemming from the open Trinity brings an ultimate hope and possibility for humans to form their own open communities, serving in transformative mission work and nurturing an ecological transformation for all living things. As this crucified God is perichoretically trinitarian — suffering and groaning for and with us (Romans 8) — we can be released from the pressure to mask our real selves. In the presence of such a merciful empathetic Saviour, we do not need to pretend to be good and strong.\(^{37}\)

Based on the concept of the open Trinity, ‘community’ developed in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology is a community of grace, a fellowship of open friendship, and an *imago Trinitatis* of the open Trinity as described above. As explained in C5S8.1, I name the self cultivated in such a community of grace opened by the open Trinity the *open relational self* in contrast to the repressively socially-imposed relational

\(^{36}\) According to Brunner (1939:104): ‘Since then the gift comes first, and not the task — “Let us love Him because He first loved us” [1 John 4:19] — the original, God-created state of life is to be understood as an existence in love, as a *justitia originalis*.’ *Justitia originalis* here means original justice, namely ‘an actual communion with God’ (Pannenberg 1999:47). Grenz (1997:109) also stresses that living an ethical life for Jesus is realized through our responding to the triune God’s endowment of grace, love, and favour towards us, rather than through our attempting to ‘win God’s favour’ by means of our obedient acts.

\(^{37}\) Moltmann’s ‘crucified God’ challenges significantly and pertinently traditional theology in facing the wars and suffering of the twentieth century. God is no longer impassible but is present with us suffering and groaning for and with us (Moltmann 1972a; 1972b; 1974b).
self. This open relational self is based on the imago Dei, especially on the imago Christi. Therefore, I argue that one’s self can be transformed into an open relational self when one’s identity, in terms of the defining construal of the self, comes from the imago Christi by free and unmerited grace alone. Only when the self and the community can be transformed in God’s grace can the real self be experienced and unveiled. Then it does not need to be masked or hidden (Grenz 1997:139). One’s ‘intimacy with God’, referred to by Moltmann in terms of the Eastern Orthodox emphasis on theosis, forms the ground for liberation from ‘the pressure of the world’ (Charry 1998:106).

As mentioned in C6S8.5, Moltmann (1992b:259, eo) asserts that ‘the moral purpose of changing the world’ is not ‘the motive’ for the imago Christi. It is instead a festive exultance over God’s kingdom having made itself ‘wide open for the others’. I argue that the distinctive claim Moltmann (ibid.) wants to assert involves a disjunction between a celebratory meditation and exploration of God’s kingdom and an insistent moral purpose or ‘moral monotheism’. In other words, he (1981:8f.) tries to differentiate friendship or relationship from ‘moral notions’ or ‘competition’, to distinguish grace and love from being merely a ‘commandment’, an obligation, a duty, or a ‘law and compulsion’.

In this way, Moltmann drives a wedge between relational intents from moral oughts. Such a distinction to some extent also differentiates the human relationships shaped in Moltmann’s open friendship and rooted in the trinitarian reality from those guided by Tu Weiming’s New Ruism, because the latter still prioritizes moral purpose. In the former, the relationship is open to anyone unconditionally by grace and love in order for them to receive salvation and transforming powers continually offered through the imago Christi and the Spirit. Accordingly, the diversity of every individual self is accepted, encouraged, and valued within these open communities that embody such

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38 See also Moseley (1991:17, 78), Bellinger (2010:151), and Benner (2012:74).

39 Moltmann (1981:8f.).
liberating communion and share in a common future. But in the latter, the relationship is only open conditionally to those who can transform themselves morally and attain to shared elitist norms by their own capacities, even though it involves other communal acts. Accordingly, all privatized selves and their diversities are devalued within the conception promoted by the resistant Tu’s New Ruist collective self. Therefore, the latter relationship is in reality a closed one as mentioned in C5S11 and will be explained more in C8S3.2.5 and C8S3.3.3.

4.1.1 A Synthesis between Individualism and Collectivism

During the twentieth century, debates about individualism (prevailing more in Western Anglo-European countries) and collectivism (dominating more in Eastern Asian countries) have been discussed more than ever before. Problems on both sides of these debates have been examined and criticized, as mentioned in C1S3.1.2, C3S1.1.3, C3S1.2.3, C4S1, C4S4.1, C4S4.4.4, C6S6.1, C6S8.6, and A-C, and to be discussed in C8S2.2. These different problems are generally identified as self-centredness, egoism, isolation, exclusiveness, enclosedness, loss of relatedness, and ignoring ‘social responsibilities’ in the case of individualism in a general sense. Collectivism, in a general sense, promotes a social-roles-assigned self, loss of individual subjectivity and autonomy, repressive social imposition, ‘dominance’, and ‘coercion’ (Tu 1976a:52–4).

It is in this cultural and interpretive context that Moltmann presents his trinitarian theological anthropology as an alternative synthesis. He purposes to prevent not only the concept of the self developed in individualism from being merely separate and autonomous, but also the concept of the self developed in collectivism from being merely soluble in relationships. By suggesting a dialectical resolution of the relational self, Moltmann’s explanations and arguments for trinitarian theological anthropology not only display points of great relevance in facing the tendency of repressive social impositions and its outcome in a RFS, but also suggests a possible positive solution for the problem.
of the RFS found in PTRIC contexts as well as in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood.

Moltmann’s dialectical resolution is effective because one’s self is made secure by:
(1) the embedded imago Dei as the source of the self by creation, meaning that both the self and the community of selves come from creation in the form of the imago Trinitatis;
(2) the imago Christi as the reconciled and redeemed self appearing at the beginning of the new creation is made possible and sustainable by messianic grace applied as a form of continuous creation;
(3) the gloria Dei as will be realized in the promised future self revealed in the consummation of the new creation by means of gracious moral cultivation expressed in continuous creation.

As indicated above, both collectivism and individualism lead to the loss of self in human beings. I found that Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology is not only an open friendship that relies on neither collectivism nor individualism, but also locates the imago Christi as the source of the self. It follows that it is free and unmerited grace which makes possible the openness of friendship in the Spirit, the grounding for the relational self, and the attainment of the goal for humanity as promised by God. As mentioned above, it is the Triune God who creates the conditions for sinners to participate in the relationship with the open Trinity. It is also He who creates the conditions for sinners to live in an open community of grace.

Therefore, I assert that in this unconditional acceptance within the open Trinity and open relationships, where there is no need for repressive social impositions, there also are no conditions to support a RFS. It follows that Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood is manifested as a suitable and promising alternative paradigm as a synthesis between individualism and collectivism. The most important feature of this paradigm is a relational selfhood embedded within a dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in
diversity. Such a relational self and the community of selves come from creation in the form of the image of the Triune God. After the Fall, they have been redeemed through the image of Christ made possible by messianic grace in the continuous creation and they will be realized as the glory of God in the new creation promised by the Triune God. True unity or oneness is not achieved by demanding moral self-cultivation and conformity of others, especially that of inferiors. It is done by dying to self in Christ and letting the ‘motives and urges’ of a new self of the imago Christi arise in us (Sandford, John and Sandford, Paula 1982:378). Only when the self and the community can be transformed in God’s grace, can the individuality of self, the unique self within, become unveiled, with no need to be repressed and hidden anymore. Accordingly, this synthesis is theoretically also a solution for the RFS in PTRIC contexts.

5. Moltmann’s Argument for the Promised Future Self

It is obvious that Moltmann’s interpretation of Gloria Dei est Homo is drawn from his interpretation of Romans 8:30, 1 Corinthians 13:12, 2 Corinthians 3:12-18, 4:6, and 1 John 3:2. The veil presented in the context of 2 Corinthians 3:12-18 can be applied to referring figuratively to the relational barrier or problem between God’s people and God.

Furthering this point, I think the veiled face can also be extended to address the relational barriers or problems between human beings, and even the relational barrier or problem between the personage and person within any particular human being. Just as mentioned in C3S1.2.2, the initial actions of the first man and woman after the Fall of humankind were to hide their nakedness from their own eyes, and then from one another’s eyes (Genesis 3:7); their third action was to hide from the Lord God (Gen 3:8). As holistic beings, the relational barrier of human beings due to the Fall blocks their authentic relationships not only with God, but also with their fellows and their own true self.

As 2 Corinthians 3:18 promises, the glory of the Lord is to transform us sinners into the imago Christi, moving from glory to glory when the veil is taken away (2 Corinthians
3:14). This is by the grace and work of the Spirit. This is not only an eschatological goal promised by the Triune God, but also an anticipatory present experience of grace under the conditions of the history of God’s new creation. After the relational barrier between human beings and God is removed, human beings no longer need a mask to hide their true self from others. This is because the relationship between humans and God in a trinitarian theological anthropology is the first step for all the other relationships, because humans all have the triune God as the source of their selfhood and the template of their interpersonal relationships. These relationships include both social relations and relation to oneself. If the veil between human beings and God disappears, the veils between human beings will also disappear and eventually their masks can also be taken off, because their real self no longer needs to be hidden.

In Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood, the transformation of the self is by means of the free and unmerited grace granted by the Triune God. This kind of gracious moral cultivation is entirely an antithesis of Tu Weiming’s moral self-cultivation by which the achievement and social recognition of the ultimate self-transformation is earned. We can recognize gloria Dei est homo as the future of any self and so also for the goal of humanity, even in spite of our sinful nature after the Fall. Because of such grace, the real self can be contextualized in the community of grace. While there is no insecurity arising from a failure to win recognition from God, or from others, or even from one’s self, there is no need for the self to pretend to perform sufficiently well to acquire one’s self security. This corresponds to Touriner’s understanding of the person as a ‘true self’ in Christ.

Saint Irenaeus (ca. 130-202) (1985:IV, 20, 7) states that ‘for the glory of God is a living [hu]man; and the life of [hu]man consists in beholding God’.

See C3S2.4.
Besides, the concept of the real self discussed in the research problem found in A-ES2, can be also interpreted in Moltmann’s way: the real self focuses its present being in the process of its promised becoming in the future.\textsuperscript{42} As Jeroncic’s (2008:259–60) interpretation of Moltmann’s anthropology maintains, the ‘true self’, in contrast to the self-realization in Tu Weiming’s account, is not to be discovered inwardly, and then sought by striving to ‘overcome the various modalities of the false self’, but is to be approached or, rather, is ‘approaching me from the future and reaching into the present’. In Moltmann’s understanding, our eschatological adventus, instead of futurum, is based on a new divine work, the Son’s resurrection.\textsuperscript{43} Accordingly, he (1979:29) explains that ‘the future does not simply emerge from the present … the present springs from a future which one must be expectant of in transience’.

Therefore, I found that the being and becoming of the open relational self in Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology must be understood in the sense of adventus instead of futurum. The being of the open relational self is coming about from its becoming and, therefore, is dynamic. The promised future of self is neither based on moral self-cultivation nor on an expectation or hope growing out of humans’ experiences. It is a totally new thing, based on a new divine work, the Son’s resurrection. Of course, this understanding needs presupposing the existence of the Triune God and the Bible as the primary source of revelation,\textsuperscript{44} which will be discussed in C8S3.2.2.

\textsuperscript{42} See also Carver T. Yu (1987:163–81, 199).

\textsuperscript{43} It is worth noting that Moltmann (1979:29–31, eo) differentiates two understandings of the future: (1) futurum: ‘the future of what has already come’, namely, what is going to be develops out of the becoming of what was in the beginning. In other words, this kind of future is based on our past history as well as our ‘present experience and contingency’ (Neal 2009:373), so that we can seek to plan for it. (2) adventus (Zukunft in German): ‘the present of what is still to come’, namely, what is going to be does not develop out of the present, but comes or arrives to transform and/or impinge on the present. In other words, this kind of future is something radically ‘new and transforming’, something that has not existed before, in any form that we would recognize. See also Kelsey (1993:175).

\textsuperscript{44} Moltmann (2000a:61) views the word ‘revelation’ as a general term and does not consider that ‘revelation’ is originally a central concept in the Bible and Christian theology. It was for an apologetic purpose that in the European Middle Ages and the beginning of the Enlightenment it became the centre of theological discussions. ‘Revelation’ was highlighted to differentiate biblical knowledge particularly accessible to those supporting the Christian faith from knowledge generally accessible to reason (ibid.).
I consider the implication of Moltmann’s thought here for the RFS as that the RFS, whether in terms of any individual or any society at large, can be liberated only through the love of the crucified Christ which opens up a new future. The final real self in the promised future of Christ that Moltmann highlights provides a concrete and definite biblical description for the hoped-for goal. This goal is what Tournier affirms in his concept that the personage will express and show forth the person genuinely, instead of stripping off the personage directly, as discussed in C3S2.4. Therefore, this final real self is definitely not repressively imposed by society. That is to say, the final real self, as well as the ‘eschatological hope’ drawn from the divine ‘mission and call’ (Moltmann 1967:285), becomes the ultimate destination of the congruence of the personage and the person. The reverse is also true that the congruence of the personage and the person will never find its concrete and ultimate realization without the omnipotent and omnipresent personal creator God and divine revelation. Only with the hope for the promised eschatological real self and the ‘eschatological hope’ of the divine ‘mission and call’, can one accordingly resist the social pressure to turn to a RFS.

The RFS is cultivated mainly due to the imperfectibility of human beings, i.e. sinful nature in the language of Christian theology, under repressive social impositions (the social oughts). Without the promised future (the divine oughts) of self, liberation would definitely be a delusion. As argued in C3S2.5 and illustrated in Diagram 3.1, the two possible transforming paths presented by Tournier actually involve two dimensions: the present (being) and the future (becoming), and two transforming facets of the self: the private and the social, at the same time. Based on this two-dimensional framework of the concept of transformation of those two facets of self discussed in terms of the RFS (the

Moltmann seldom calls the Bible directly God’s revelation but identifies the Bible more often with (the ‘witness’ to or the ‘proclamation’ of) God’s ‘promissory history’ (ibid.:61, 126-34, 140). For the purpose of this thesis, the phrase the Bible as God’s revelation, as Moltmann (ibid.:140) himself recognizes, will be used to refer to this part of his worldview in contrast to Tu Weiming’s New Ruist account, where no external revealing God is acknowledged (as described in C4S3.4).
negatively masked self), the dynamic real self interacting with the masked self in Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology as illustrated in Diagram 7.1 is evaluated.

Diagram 7.1 The Dynamic True Self in Two Dimensions Based on Moltmann’s Account

Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood is easily understood in two dimensions, present and eschatological since eschatology is always his perspective in doing theology as mentioned and demonstrated in C1, C3, and C5. It is worth noting that sin not only leads to shaping the masked self under the social oughts in the present dimension but also impedes the real self from becoming the one of the divine oughts in the eschatological dimension. The future real self of the divine oughts will never be realized until sinful nature is eliminated in the consummation of the new creation in the second coming of Christ. The hope for the promised eschatological real self in the promised future of Christ plays a very important and significant role understanding and transforming the present real self as it is, as well as the imperfect past real self. Both elements of the self, the private and social facets, have been damaged by sin. No matter what the causal reasons for the tendency of the RFS, the common social behaviour associated with it is to hide the undesired self, precisely because it is perceived as being
not good enough to be accepted by others, or even by oneself. This hope for the eschatological real self gives one the courage to face, admit, suffer under, and contradict the reality of the imperfect and ugly past and present self as it is/was.

6. The Presuppositions of Moltmann’s Anthropology

Though biblically and theologically I do not agree with either Moltmann’s firm universalist position or his equivocal stand on the condition of the *imago Dei* after the Fall of humankind, neither of these are the central presuppositions of his trinitarian theological anthropology. According to the analytic studies of Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology presented in previous sections in this work, I can find and summarize the presuppositions of Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology in four claims. His trinitarian theological anthropology is predicated on: (1) specific knowledge of the self; (2) particular defining elements of the self; (3) the relevant properties of the self; and (4) the expected transformations of the self. These presuppositions are relevant to the tendency of the RFS and are expanded below (with the P standing for presupposition, and the relevance of each P to the concept of the self being indicated in parentheses at the end of each paragraph).

P1: The Bible constituted by Old Testament and New Testament is the revelation, or rather the ‘promissory history’, of the triune God (Moltmann 2000a:62, 129–30). Its function is perceived in and through the work of the Spirit as ‘the real interpreter’, experienced within the fellowship of human beings with the open Trinity (ibid.:145-9). Here is where the source of all Christian theology is found (ibid.:133-50), revealing how Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology is developed through his ‘trinitarian hermeneutics’45 (ibid.:145). (The knowledge of and the knowing by

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45 For a detailed presentation of Moltmann’s trinitarian hermeneutics, see Moltmann (2000a:134–51).
and of the self is: revealed through the Bible by the Holy Spirit as the promise of the triune God.)

P2: There is an ‘omnipotent, omnipresent’ (Moltmann 1981:108), and personal triune God (ibid.:139) who is the creator of all things in the world (ibid.:100), including humankind. Humankind is created by the creator triune God in *Their* image and according to *Their* likeness (Moltmann 1985a:218–22). (The defining elements of the self: given by the creator triune God.)

P3: The creator God is a triune God: three intersubjective Persons (Moltmann 2008a:374) — the Father, the Son, and the Spirit — united in Oneness through perichoretic relationships (Moltmann 1981:150–58, 174–87). Humankind is created in the image and likeness (the *imago Dei*) of God. The *imago Dei* includes the *imago Trinitatis* involving social and relational likeness to God (Moltmann 1985a:215–43). (The relevant properties of the self: focusing on dimensions of relational selfhood.)

P4: Humans became sinners after the Fall (ibid.:242), causing damage to human beings’ relationships to the triune God (ibid.:229-34). Though all sinners are slaves of sin (Moltmann 1981:66), through the triune God’s grace in the crucified Christ, the sinner receives the *imago Christi* for the sake of eschatological glorification (the *gloria Dei*), and the promised future of the true self (Moltmann 1985a:215–43). (The transformations of the self: growing through gracious moral self-cultivation towards a redeemed and promised future self.)

The relations between these various presuppositions are illustrated in Diagram 7.2:

(5) P1 is a presupposition of P2;
(6) P2 is a presupposition of P3 and P4.
Diagram 7.2 Interrelationships between Moltmann’s Four Presuppositions and their Relevance to the Concept of the Self (The direction of the blue arrows is from the presupposed to the predicated)

7. Conclusion

Given that post-enlightenment forms of Christianity are recognized or even criticized by some scholars as being the source for Western individualism, Moltmann has developed a social trinitarian anthropology relying on pre-Enlightenment teachings coming from Eastern Orthodox Christian traditions. According to Moltmann’s interpretation, one’s self is made secure by the embedded *imago Dei* as the source of the self by *creation*. This means that both the self and the community of selves originate from creation in the form of the *imago Trinitatis*. Those relationships within the Trinity described by the term *perichōrēsis* are endowed within humankind that bear the image of God described by the term *perichōrēsis*-oriented relationships. These two terms are meant to indicate how the three elements of unity, equality, and diversity maintained within the Trinity may be within human relationships (Moltmann 1985:1–19, 215–43; 1981:174–99).

Due to the reality of sin after the Fall, human beings cannot transform themselves in order to redeem the ruined *imago Dei*, because of ‘the bondage of the will’ (Luther, Martin 1525). In this predicament, gracious moral cultivation through the *imago Christi* is the promised way to liberate them from hiding their real selves, the way to unmask the
real self. Such an open relational self is developed in the open Trinity and strengthened in open friendship sustained within a community of grace. In the dynamic relational settings, one does not need to sacrifice one’s own individuality, but one is confirmed as a person, while also valuing others’ individuality in a perichoresis-oriented unity. In other words, one important feature of Moltmann’s account is a relational selfhood embedded within a dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in diversity. However, this means a person is able to maintain a relational unity with others without sacrificing their personal diversity while simultaneously maintaining that personal diversity without sacrificing the dynamics of its basis in relational unity.

Besides, the relational self is created in the imago Dei, and Moltmann, in his trinitarian theological anthropology, highlights two important affirmations. The first affirmation involves the restoration of individual personal relationships to God after the Fall through the imago Christi, so that all redeemed human persons may attain real personhood. Secondly, the provision of the likeness of the trinitarian perichoretic relationship serves as a prototype for interpersonal relationships in a community of grace through the imago Trinitatis of the open Trinity.

With the self in such a community of grace, a fellowship of open friendship is based on the imago Christi, so that each human’s identity comes from the imago Christi by free and unmerited grace alone. Only when the self and the community can be transformed together in God’s grace can the real self, the unique self within, be able to experience its fullness, and so become unveiled without a mask. The liberation experienced in such an open relational self from ‘the pressure of the world’ is based on one’s ‘intimacy with God’ (Charry 1998:106).

As already learned previously, the loss of self in human beings results from patterns of life and values supported in either collectivism or individualism, but because open friendship in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology does not appeal to either
collectivism or individualism, it can effectively avoid these dangers of the loss of self.
When the imago Christi is confirmed as the source of one’s self, free and unmerited grace directs one along the path of attaining the goal of humanity, namely gloria Dei est homo. The real self is subsequently nurtured and sustained in the community of grace. In this context, there is no insecurity about failing to win recognition from God, from others, or even from one’s self, because there is no need for the self to pretend to perform well enough to acquire one’s self security. Moltmann’s imago Christi within his account of trinitarian theological anthropology can be seen as deepening Tournier’s understanding of the person as a real self in Christ.

Some criticisms of the perspective related to Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology from certain aspects of Christian theology have been discussed mainly in S1 and S2. As discussed above, some are based on misunderstandings overlooking the actual content of Moltmann’s arguments. The others are not the central presuppositions of Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology so do not affect its relevance to the problem of the RFS and its implication on the issue of repressive social impositions. Therefore, in my comparison between Tu Weiming with Moltmann in the next chapter, I will suggest how Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood, shaped by his convictions regarding trinitarian theological anthropology, is an important alternative solution (or modification reference) for the research problem of relational selfhood in the PTRIC contexts.
Chapter Eight

The Solutions for the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts:

Three Possible Alternatives

1. Introduction

In C1 and C2, the problem of the RFS and the relational selfhood from which it results in PTRIC contexts was identified and described along with the necessity of a solution. In C4, Tu Weiming’s response to the problem was introduced and examined through his interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood. In C5, two forms of Tu’s responses were evaluated respectively: the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu. The responsive Tu’s account shows a potentiality to overcome the problem of the RFS if its presuppositions are adjustable. But the resistant Tu’s account discloses that his New Ruist relational selfhood is not significantly different from PTRIC relational selfhood criticized by various scholars. In C6, Jürgen Moltmann’s response to the research problem was introduced and, in C7, examined through his interpretation of Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood. His response shows a positive potentiality to be applied to overcome the problem of the RFS in PTRIC. In this chapter, I will compare Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s responses and analyse their similarities and differences in order to suggest some possible alternatives for solving the research problem. It is worth noting that it is not meaningful to always separate Tu’s responses into the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu in analytic comparison with Moltmann’s responses. For there is not a significant distinction between them in the main idea, framework, presuppositions of the interpretations and arguments of New Ruist relational selfhood, except the issues of sangang and wulun.¹

¹ The differences between the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu in the analytic comparison in C5 are mainly about Tu’s different attitudes towards scholars’ criticisms of Ruist relational selfhood in terms of the problem of the RFS. Except the issues of sangang and wulun, the main idea, framework, presuppositions
2. The Similarities between Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s Responses to Our Research Problem

In analytically comparing Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s responses to the research problem of the RFS, especially in PTRIC contexts for Tu’s accounts, we can find some similarities between them in the following areas.

2.1 General Concerns about the Repressed Form of Self

As introduced mainly in C3S1, Both the responsive Tu and Moltmann are concerned with the problems of any form of oppression and repressive social imposition, especially in patriarchal, totalitarian, and authoritarian social contexts. They advocate the values of freedom, autonomy, dignity, sincerity, and authenticity in individual persons and the values of equality and diversity among individual persons in their social relationships. However, as C4 disclosed, the resistant Tu still argues — in terms of post-traditional Chinese societies’ hierarchical social structures and the privatized self in comparison to the great self in New Ruist relational ethics — that Ruist hierarchical society is a necessary social stabilizer. Consequently, in the resistant Tu’s arguments, the privatized self is greatly devalued. He still justifies the particular traditional Ruist pattern of authoritarianism in hierarchy, age, and gender, and insists that sangang is significantly important in post-traditional Ruist family ethics.

_of the interpretations and arguments of New Ruist relational selfhood is the same between them. In his wavering positions about them in different contexts, the responsive Tu shows his willingness either to get rid of sangang, or even wulun in some contexts, or to reinterpret wulun into a five dyadic equal relationships. However, the responsive Tu has not yet shown his flexibility to any other parts of the framework and presuppositions of his interpretations that validate each other mutually in multiple circular reasoning.
2.2 The Pursuit of a Synthesis of Collectivism and Individualism

As C1S3.1.3 and C3S1 disclosed, both Tu Weiming and Moltmann are concerned with the different general problems of the self when influenced either by ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ or by ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’. Therefore, they both present their own accounts of relational selfhood as a synthesis of collectivism and individualism in responding to the research problem. In interpreting them, they all try to demonstrate that their own accounts keep the strengths of both collectivism and individualism but avoid the weakness of both of them.

2.3 The Framework of Three Views of the Concept of the Self

As discussed in the previous chapter, selfhood, namely the imago Dei, in Moltmann’s account of social trinitarian theological anthropology, can be understood as an integration of these three logically correlated views from a temporal perspective (Moltmann’s threefold historical doctrine of Trinity):

(1) the substantial view (the aspect of the creation in the beginning) explains the ontological and epistemological origin of the self that comes from the past: creation;

(2) the functional and relational views (the aspect of the beginning of the new creation in the continuous creation) shows the pragmatic and ecclesial receiving and retaining

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2 In discussing the issue of the self, the terms collectivism and individualism tend to be either too reductionist or misleading. A-C provides the ways suggested by social psychologists how to discuss it more specifically. However, like so many non-psychologist scholars, both Tu Weiming and Moltmann use these two terms in a very reductionist and generalizing way. Therefore, it is not proper for me to arbitrarily describe specifically all the times these two terms used by them.

3 In terms of the self, Bellinger’s (2010:3f.) three statements summarize the meaning of the imago Dei from the substantial view: (1) ‘there are some ways I am like everyone else’: ‘I am like all other human beings in terms of our basic physicality; we all need to breathe oxygen to survive; we have bones, muscles, skin, a brain, etc., that are expressions of our human DNA’ (ibid.:3); (2) ‘there are some ways I am unique’: ‘I am unique as an individual; I have my own memories, thoughts, emotions, plans, etc. Even if I had an identical twin, I would still be unique in this sense’ (ibid.:4); and (3) ‘there are some ways I am like some people and unlike other people’: ‘I am like some people and unlike others when I consider factors such as gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion. But all human beings are my neighbour’ (ibid.).
of the self that reveal the path to it now: reconciliation or already-and-not-yet redemption; ⁴

(3) the teleological view (the aspect of the consummation of the new creation in the continuous creation) reveals the transforming and eschatological goal of the self that directs it to the future: sanctification and redemption.

These three views can be understood as an ‘imprint’, ‘endowment’ and ‘gift’ from the triune God (Anderson 1982:71; Brunner 1939:104).

Can we find in Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood any significant similarities to the features of the *imago Dei* in Moltmann’s account? In responding to the RFS through interpreting the selfhood of New Ruism, the three aspects of the New Ruist self Tu presents seem to parallel the aforementioned three or four views of the *imago Dei*. Chart 8.1 illustrates the seeming parallel in this framework of three views of Tu’s concept of the New Ruist self to Moltmann’s concept of the social trinitarian self. From this perspective we can intuit that, first of all, Tu’s ‘Heaven-conferred self’ (Tu 1985:63) is more related to a substantial view; secondly, Tu’s relational self appears to match both relational and functional views, and thirdly, Tu’s ‘transcendental self’ (ibid.:137) is more related to a teleological view.

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⁴ As explained in C6, these different views might overlap. The functional view is put with the relational view in the same category for the purpose of illustration. For what both of them denote is more dynamic than static. As discussed in C6, Moltmann rejects the relational view as functional even if he does not view the relationality of triune persons as ontological but calls it existing-in-relationship.
### Chart 8.1 The Framework of Moltmann’s and Tu’s Concepts of the Self in Seeming Parallel

<table>
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<th>Substantial View</th>
<th>Relational and Functional Views</th>
<th>Telic View</th>
<th>Moral Gracious Cultivation</th>
<th>Theological and Philosophic Meaning</th>
<th>The Concept of the Self in Moltmann’s Account of Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood Based on the Image Dei</th>
<th>The Concept of the Self in Tu’s Account of New Rust Relational Selfhood</th>
<th>Basis of Selfhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature as God’s Imprint</td>
<td>Grace as God’s Endowment</td>
<td>Glory as God’s Gift</td>
<td><strong>God’s Historical Work of Creation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Priority on which Selfhood Based</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Reality the Self Can Reach</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Reality the Self Should Have</strong></td>
<td><strong>Self-Transformation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Creation in the beginning (Past)</td>
<td>The Continuous Creation (Now)</td>
<td>The New Creation (Future)</td>
<td><strong>Moral Gracious Cultivation</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Origin of Relation with</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Reality of Relation with</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Hope of Relation with</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Response of the Self</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Reconciliation of Already-And-Not-Yet Redemption</td>
<td>Sanctification and Redemption</td>
<td></td>
<td>God as Primary</td>
<td>God as Primary</td>
<td>God as Primary</td>
<td>Faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Origin of Security or Self-Confidence as Thirdly</td>
<td>The Reality of Security or Self-Confidence as Thirdly</td>
<td>The Hope of Security or Self-Confidence as Thirdly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Others as Secondary</td>
<td>Others as Secondary</td>
<td>Others as Secondary</td>
<td>Others’ Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing Confidence in God</td>
<td>Sharing Intimacy with God and Others</td>
<td>Receiving Glory from God</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Experiencing Confidence in God</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sharing Intimacy with God and Others</strong></td>
<td><strong>Receiving Glory from God</strong></td>
<td>Ceaseless Communal Self-Efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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It is worth noting that I found the three main elements: ‘faith, love, and hope’, in Christian belief stressed by the Apostle Paul (1 Corinthians 13:13) can interpret the responses of the self cultivated in Moltmann’s account in terms of the three views of the Image Dei. The self responds with faith in the triune God who creates relational ontological human selfhood, with love to the open Trinity and the open friendship in the community of grace endowed by Christ, and with eschatological and telic hope for the promised future self fulfilled by the Holy Spirit.
2.4 The Indispensability of Relationships with Others

Both Tu and Moltmann emphasize the relationality of the self and the indispensability of relationships with others. In Tu’s account (see C4S4), the absolute necessity of others’ participation in selfhood, especially in moral self-transformation, is emphasized. Accordingly, Tu describes such an indispensability of communal relationship as ‘symbiosis’. Likewise, as disclosed in C6, Moltmann highlights the necessity of relationship with others by differentiating a person with sociality from an isolated individual. In Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropological account, the sociality of humankind is endowed by the social triune Creator God through creating humankind in the imago Trinitatis.

2.5 The Ideal Community for Overcoming the Repressed Form of Self

Tu Weiming (1976a:52–99) presents the ‘fiduciary community’ as a New Ruist model for his ideal human-relatedness, promoting a sociality involving unity in diversity and equality in diversity without relying on coercive pressure groups or requiring conformity. Likewise, the term ‘community’ is used to denote the relationships among the three persons of God and the ideal relationships of humankind granted by God in Moltmann’s (2000a:333) account. He presents the ‘open community’ of grace in the ‘open Trinity’. Perichoresis-oriented relationships of humankind in this open community of grace uphold simultaneously the unity, diversity, and equality of all who are involved.

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6 Communitarianism is a philosophy, emphasizing the importance of community, as an antithesis to individualism and liberalism (Christians 2006; Bell 2012). Both Tu Weiming’s concept of (fiduciary) community and Moltmann’s concept of (open) community are similar to communitarianism although both of them do not identify their accounts as communitarianism. However, there are some other Ru scholars, for example, Russell A. Fox (1997), de Bary (1998), and Kim Sungmoon (2011), who identify Ruist accounts of community as a communitarianism. Moltmann’s social Trinity is also called communitarian Trinity by Kurt Anders Richardson (2012). There are some overlaps between the concepts of communitarianism and Tu’s (fiduciary) community and Moltmann’s (open) community. Since communitarianism is more of a political philosophy it is beyond the scope of this research.
2.6 The Being and Becoming of the Self

Both Tu and Moltmann highlight the *becoming*, as well as the *being*, of the self in the transforming process of the self. Although Tu assumes the perfectibility and intrinsic goodness of human nature, he admits that no one could and can ever attain the ideal sagehood — the ultimacy of self-transformation of the self (see C4S3). This reality of human nature he recognizes is similar to the reality of humankind with original sin in Moltmann’s theological anthropology. Since the transformation of the self is limited to this-worldliness in Tu’s New Ruism (Metzger 1988:298–348), and the promised future of the self is in the eschatological after-life in Moltmann’s theological anthropology (see C7S5), the unattainability of the ideal real self in this life in Moltmann’s account is similar to the unreachable absolute sincerity of the ideal self in Tu’s account. If there is no after-life and no Creator God and so a Bible without true revelation, the promised future of the eschatological self in Moltmann’s account becomes an idealistic utopia similar to the unattainable sagehood in Tu’s account.

2.7 The Presuppositions of Relational Selfhood

Both the relational selfhoods presented in Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts are based on some presuppositions they have faith in. Their presuppositions provide for the knowledge of the self, give definitions to the self especially as a ‘relational self’, and direct the ways and the goals of the transformation of each of those selves. (See Diagram 8.1.)
Diagram 8.1 Comparison of Tu's and Moltmann's Presuppositions and Their Relevance to the Concept of the Self (P Standing for Presupposition; the direction of the blue arrows is from the presupposed to the predicated).

P1: Chinese Ruist Classics and Chinese Cosmology (Providing the Humanly-Established Knowledge of the Self)

P2: Social Recognition and Social Norms and Values (Giving the Defining Elements of the Self)

P3: The Self as a Centre of Relationships (in the Form of a Relational Self)

P4: A Ceaseless Collective Self-Cultivation as a Dynamic Process (Towards a Perfect Sagehood)

P4: Humankind after the Fall Saved to be the Imago Christi for the Gloria Dei (Towards their Redeemed and Promised Future Selves)

P1: The Bible Providing Conditions for Revelation of the Triune God (Providing Divinely Inspired Knowledge of the Self)

P2: The Act of Creation by the Triune God (Giving the Defining Elements of the Self)

P3: Humankind Created in the Imago Trinitatis (in the Form of Relational Selves)

Tu's Humanly-Established Presuppositions

Moltmann's God-Revealed Presuppositions

The Chinese version of this diagram was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi {forthcoming} 2018:S4).
3. The Differences between Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s Responses to Our Research Problem

3.1 The Framework of Three Views of the Concept of the Self

According to C4 and C6, although both Moltmann and Tu Weiming highlight the transforming aspect of the self, Moltmann’s three views of the imago Dei are due to gracious moral cultivation in contrast to Tu’s three aspects of the transformation of the self that are based on one’s own disciplines of moral self-cultivation as shown in Chart 8.1. According to Moltmann, what the human self should do is to receive or respond to God’s imprint through His creation by faith; only by this means can a gracious and transformative endowment be received through His redemptive love as a hope-filled gift experienced through the Holy Spirit’s sanctification.

In Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood, Heaven is merely an ideal goal of ultimate self-realization defined by humankind. Accordingly, Tu’s Heaven-conferred self is not in fact an ontologically substantial view of the self. Furthermore, Tu is also concerned more about the present self rather than where it came from and where it will go, although he stresses that ultimate self-transformation is part of the definition of New Ruist selfhood. It is arguable whether or not post-traditional Ruism is in fact only dealing with epistemology and not with ontology. But the relational self in Tu’s account is merely a functional one, since it is situation-oriented. Since there is no external, supreme, personal Creator in Tu’s traditional Ruist ontology, the hierarchy, admittedly, is preordained by human relationships, and then the relational self also functions

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8 The Chinese brief version of this section was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi (forthcoming) 2018:S4), but this English one was the original text.

9 Cai Lizhen (2001:211–20) points out that these two completely different way of moral cultivation result in an essential conflict between Ru-influenced Chinese culture and Evangelical Christianity.

10 As Grenz (1997:109) states ‘we might say that for Jesus the ethical life arises as our response to God’s demonstration of love, grace and favour towards us, rather than as our attempt to win God’s favour through acts of obedience’.
according to its position in that hierarchy. Social norms and relationships determine all including the value of the self.

As for the relational self in Moltmann’s account, its source and value come through creation from the *imago Trinitas*. The *perichoresis*-oriented egalitarian relationship expressed through *diversity in unity and unity in diversity* is endowed to humankind first as the foundation for their social functional order. Based upon this foundation, biblical material provides teachings about how to live with others within a social functional order in distinct open communities sovereignly guided by the triune God.

The resistant Tu’s transcendental self appears to be an idealistic utopian illusion in the light of his concept of ultimate self-transformation. He presents the whole concept of the self as an expression of optimistic this-worldliness. However, this characterization reveals the helplessness and hopelessness of this portrayal because of unattainable sagehood. The difference of their frameworks will be discussed below.

3.2 The Presuppositions of Relational Selfhood

We can find in C4 and C6 that both Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts stress the importance of the conception of relational self and its relationship to community. Accordingly, what makes their accounts different in responding to our research problem are the different presuppositions that shape their varying construals of the relational self and their distinct conceptualizations of community.

John H Berthrong (1994:183) argues that ‘truth claims’ are one of the pivotal issues for advancing dialogue between Ruism and Christianity. Scholars should not ignore debates over truth claims ‘in the name of good taste or fear of disagreement’. In this light, it is clear that Tu’s and Moltmann’s presuppositions constitute a major part of their truth claims. Therefore, I will critically compare these differences within their accounts.
3.2.1 The Differences in the Sources of Their Presuppositions

As analysed in C5S10 and C7S7, Tu Weiming bases the framework of his New Ruist relational selfhood on some presuppositions he assumes to be self-evident and in which he demonstrates faith. The source of Tu’s presuppositions is rooted in a traditional Ruist worldview, including the reality of sages, but he claims to possess universal values.

In contrast to Tu’s presuppositions, Moltmann bases the framework of his Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood on the God-revealed presuppositions in which he has faith. Accordingly, the source of Moltmann’s presuppositions is the self-revealing Creator God. But we must admit objectively that any so-called God-revealed claims either would be considered to be untrue or would be possibly recategorized as self-evident if the Creator God does not exist. If it is the case, Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood, in term of the source of presuppositions, would not provide more significant strongpoints than Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood. It would be merely on the basis of very different cultural and historical presuppositions and worldviews than those appealed to by Tu Weiming. Consequently, the source of Moltmann’s presuppositions must be expressed in human language, but would claim a very different origin for its content. Accordingly, as mentioned above in S2.6, Moltmann’s would become, at least to some extent, also an idealistic utopia.

However, since the existence of the Creator God can be neither proven nor denied and the existence of Chinese sources (sages) past and present cannot be fully justified, the sources of both Tu’s and Moltmann’s presuppositions will not be questioned or challenged in my discussion. What we must question or challenge in the following evaluation is what significant differences the existence of the Creator God and the way He treats and interacts with humans and the world could make in solving the research problem. For example, will problems related to the RFS be solved by ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ or a humanistic synthesis of ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’
and ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ even if Tu could work it out successfully? The answer might be negative.

In order to avoid the problems of ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ and ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’, a social philosophy that distinguishes community from society emerges.\(^{11}\) In making such a differentiation, Gunton (2003:88) explains that a society is a unity constituted by groups of ‘isolated individuals’. Its existence is not for itself, but as ‘a means to some end’. Therefore, it is impersonal and external. Gunton (ibid.) highlights the features of a community further by quoting John Macmurray as ‘a unity of persons with persons . . . Each remains a distinct individual; the other remains really other. Each realizes himself in and through the other’.\(^{12}\) Both Tu and Moltmann value the importance of community (see below S2.5).

But as discussed in C5, the resistant Tu’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood fails to disprove that Ru-based collectivism is misunderstood by scholarly critics. Also whether or not New Ruism stems directly from the orthodox heritage inherited from ‘the great tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ remains a serious issue.

Likewise, as Tuan Yifu (1982:162) argues, similar questions regarding individualism arose from the European Renaissance. These questions ask whether or not

\(^{11}\) Leonardo Boff (2000:66) emphasizes their distinction by the equality of their members’ status and function. Community’s members share equal responsibility but society’s members’ ‘functions and tasks’ are not distributed equally. Philip Yancey’s (2009:174) distinction between ‘club’ or ‘clique’ and ‘community’ is even more relevant to the distinctive characteristics of Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood (see S2.5). A club, according to Yancey, is formed by the people who most want to live with by each other. By quoting Henri Nouwen’s words (originally quoted from Parker J. Palmer), Yancey explains that a community is ‘the place where you least want to live … always … and which ‘it takes grace, shared vision, and hard work to form’.

\(^{12}\) Macmurray (1961 reprinted in 1999:157–8). See also Carver T. Yu (1987:222–32). According to such a differentiation between community and society, I consider that the phrase communal Trinity rather than social Trinity might be more pertinent to denote Moltmann’s understanding of the perichoresis of the triune Persons (Isaac 2010:319, 331). It is notable that the English phrase ‘social doctrine of the Trinity’ in Moltmann’s account (1981:19) is literally translated from the phrase ‘soziale Trinitätslehre’ in Moltmann’s German version of The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1980:35).
there was ‘an authentic self exist[ing] behind the various masks’, since individualistic people still need to face ‘the question of self and of the roles [they] could play’ (ibid.).\(^\text{13}\)

Therefore, some Christian writers argue that both ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ and ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ can lead to a loss of self when there is no communion with God and His people (Grenz 2001:105–118).\(^\text{14}\) In other words, the problem of the RFS might occur in both ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ and ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’. However, since problems in individualist settings are not mainly caused by repressive social imposition in PTRIC contexts, further discussion will not be presented here but summarized in A-J for reference. However, it is notable that what matters is where the self comes from and what the centre of the self is. What is the centre of human beings? Humans themselves or something other?

3.2.2 The Tenability of Their Presuppositions

As discussed in C5 and illustrated in Diagram 5.2, Tu Weiming’s four presuppositions are arranged in a complicated set of circular arguments. Therefore, there is not any ultimate presupposition in Tu’s account, no single fundamental presupposition that grounds all of his various claims. In contrast to Tu’s multiple circular arguments, there is an ultimate presupposition within Moltmann’s four presuppositions: P1 (the Bible providing the primary revelation of the triune God), as discussed in C7 and illustrated in Diagram 7.2. The rest are based upon this ultimate presupposition and elaborated without any recourse to circular reasoning. In other words, as long as any one of the presuppositions in Tu’s argument is not tenable, the whole framework of relational selfhood collapses. Moltmann’s framework of relational selfhood collapses only when its ultimate presupposition cannot be sustained.

\(^{13}\) See also McCubbins and Turner (2014).

When we examine the content of these presuppositions illustrated in Diagram 8.1, none of Moltmann’s presuppositions are based upon the efforts or achievements of human beings. However, three of Tu’s presuppositions, P1, P3, and P4, must be sustained directly by the efforts or achievements of human beings because P4 (*a ceaseless collective self-cultivation as a dynamic process*) is the direct presupposition of P1 and P3, as explained in C5S11. The second presupposition, P2, is dependent indirectly on human activity because P1 (which depends on human achievement) is the direct presupposition of P2, as explained in C5S11. Under the realistic condition of human beings’ imperfection, Tu’s four interdependent presuppositions support cultural conditions that to some extent are sustained by means of repressive social impositions experienced especially by those in the lower ranks of hierarchical societies. As we have shown by means of empirical studies, the relational self shaped by these presuppositions unavoidably suffers to some extent from repressive social impositions. When both Tu and Moltmann base their interpretations of relational selfhood on very different presuppositions, we discover significantly different consequences of their claims within their conceptualizations, frameworks, meanings, construals, characteristics, and defining features of relational selfhood.\(^\text{15}\) However, the analytic comparison and discussion here will be limited to the significant contrasting differences theoretically and culturally relevant to the problem of the RFS in PTRIC contexts.

3.2.3 The Transcendent Reference Point

Tu bases his interpretation of Ruist relational selfhood on a traditional Ruist account of Chinese cosmology (P1), specifically the part predicating that ‘all things are my companions’ and there being a complete unity between ‘humanity’ and Heaven.

\(^\text{15}\) For the comparison of anthropologies in New Ruism and Neo-Orthodox Protestant Christianity, see Zhang Delin 張德麟 (p. Zhāng Délín) (1984).
However, Chinese cosmology was constructed by human beings and established through several circular arguments illustrated by Diagram 8.1, but not revealed by any suprahuman god. Besides, this particular part of Chinese cosmology has never been able to be sustained by ultimate self-transformation through collective self-cultivation. That is because Tu himself, as well as his teacher Mou Tsungsan, claimed more than once that in reality no such sage has ever existed (as explained in C4S4.1 and C5S6).

As disclosed many times in C4 and C5, ‘Heaven’ in Tu’s interpretation denotes something that is not at all an external, supreme, personal being or Creator, but is redefined as the ultimate realization of (communal) self-cultivation in morality even if no one has ever attained it. Since there are no external resources for humans to rely on, humankind, as Tu himself claims, the historically extended community of Chinese persons is the only transcendent reference point. This human-defined Heaven and the unreachable ideal unity between ‘humanity’ and Heaven in Tu’s (1985:12) account are advocated as metaphysical conceptual incentives in order to motivate humans’ action to appeal to their wills. Accordingly, they shall employ their own particular internal resources in pursuing that idealistic or utopian ultimacy of self-transformation. This kind of concept by Tu is exactly as what Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:39, eo) points out:

*There is not a transcendent principle of Heaven in Chinese culture. The so-called principle of Heaven is in fact only principles of humans (the idealization of human relationships, communities, and collective relationships).*

However, the notable New Ruist Liu Shuhsien16 (1988:263–5) earlier on suggested, or even warned, that the disparity between Heaven and humans (‘天人不一’ ‘tiān rén bù yī’ ‘天人不一’) in [New] Ruism should be also stressed in order to overcome the weaknesses of

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16 Liu Shuhsien was recognized as a ‘giant of Neo-Confucian study’ who was a researcher and advisor at the prestigious Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy at Academia Sinica in Taiwan (Fu, Sabrina 2016:82).
making Heaven succumb to humans (‘qū tiān yì cóng rén’ 「屈天以從人」) in the post-imperial traditional Ruism. Tu’s interpretation of Heaven reveals that he obviously ignored such kind of warning.

Tu argues for humans’ perfectibility by maintaining the intrinsic goodness endowed by Heaven. He (1976a:116, eo) also insists that Heaven’s endowment is not ‘Heaven’s grace’ and (1979a:8) rejects the Creator God’s grace as the ‘ultimate source’ of human’s efforts towards moral perfection or sagehood. I argue that the concept of Heaven in Tu’s account in fact does not provide a source of power and capability, but serves only as a symbolic source of moral pressure individually and of authoritarian imposition collectively in a Ru-based collectivism.

From a Christian theological perspective, Paul Fiddes (2000:24, eo) asserts that there is ‘a need for a return to the still centre in which the self finds unity by being grounded in God’. In contrast, Zhai Xuewei (2010:345), after summarizing the features of traditional and post-traditional Ruist ‘face culture’, unequivocally concludes by pinpointing an essential divergence in the motivations for personal growth between PTRIC and Christian persons:

The people who have God in their hearts neither consider how bright and beautiful their appearance looks, nor do things in a perfunctory manner, not in superficial ways. But the motivation of the people who live under the gaze of those who assess their ‘face’ is to get

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17 Does an externally transcendent Heaven exist in traditional and post-traditional Ruist interpretative and cultural contexts? If yes, is this externally transcendent Heaven a personal being? There have been many debates on these unsettled issues. This is not the place to go into an extended discussion of them due to the limitation of space. A contemporary Ruist, Lǐ Shēn (1995:4), claims that since Confucius, there has none of Ruist who does not believe in a personal God or acknowledge His existence. Although he is a theistic Ruist, his claim is over-generalized. Are all the atheistic Ruists not Ruists? Such as Xunzi, most of New Ruists. Through interpreting the Zhongyong, Hall and Ames (2001:27) claim that Heaven is merely ‘the environing social, cultural, and natural context that is brought into focus and articulated by sagacious human beings’. Pfister (forthcoming-a, eo) disputes their atheistic interpretation and through reinterpreting the texts problematically interpreted by them, argues for a ‘Ruist theism’, which is not a ‘Judeo-Christian theism, or European deism, and definitely not a Christian Trinitarianism’. Other sources related to the debate on these related issues are: Paul Fong (1967:79–199), Lǐ Dù (1978:1–115, 171–200), Yang Sēnfù (1984:85–98), Kūng (1993 in Ching, Julia & Kūng 1993:97–101, 109f.), Berthrong (1994:133–64), Chin Kenpa (1995; 1995b), Cheng Chungying (1998:226–7), Dong Xiaoqian (1999:153–5), Zhou Xiaoan (2001), Guo Qingxiang (2006:59–69), Li Ming (2009), Zhong Xinzi (2014:41–97), and C5F34.

18 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77, eo).
their work done so others will see it. For them, it is a waste of time to do things that others can not see.19

Although Zhai Xuewei’s argument and explanation are simplistic, appealing to cultural reductionisms and over-generalizations, the claims they underscore suggest an essential difference in that is worth considering.

Moltmann is interested in Chinese culture so that the concept of the complete unity of heaven, earth, and humans in Chinese cosmology is not unknown to him. However, in Moltmann’s account, humankind is not created by heaven, but by the triune Creator God, according to his understanding of heaven and earth and their relations with God and human beings in Christianity, especially in God in Creation (1985a). Therefore, from his viewpoint, God and God’s revelation, to which the Bible witnesses, become the most profound source for knowing one’s self, no matter what kinds of cultural or historical contexts would also be involved in forming one’s self.

Not only has personal identity originated in the triune Creator God, but also humankind in general has been created and human relationships with other persons have been ordained by the triune God. Heaven and earth are also created by God, so that their significance and value to God and human beings in Moltmann’s contemporary Protestant account20 are very different from Tu’s New Ruist account.21 In his account, human beings can enter into God’s heaven of ‘relative transcendence’ because God has absolute


20 For example, according to Moltmann (1985b:173–4), heaven denotes ‘Gottoffenheit der gottgeschaffenen Welt’ (the openness of God to the world God has created) (ibid.:173, eo) and reveals ‘the openness to God of the world he has created’ (Moltmann 1985a:165). I adopt this English translation for that phrase corrected by Lin Honghsin (2011:253 n.66). Moltmann’s former Ph.D. student. He pinpoints that this phrase in his English version is translated wrongly as ‘the openness to God of the world he has created’ (Moltmann 1985a:165). Also in his Chinese version. The whole sentence in his German version (1985b:173, eo) is that ‘Um aus der Zweideutigkeit herauszukommen und diese Abwege zu vermeiden, sprechen wir im Folgenden vom Himmel im Sinne der Gottoffenheit der gottgeschaffenen Welt’. However, its correct meaning and translation should be grasped from the whole context (pp.173–4).

21 See also Guo Qingxiang (2006:330).
transcendence and is open to human beings on earth. Heaven represents the relative beyond of the world and the earth is the relative this-worldliness of heaven (Moltmann 1985a:182 eo). In Tu’s account, human beings can unite with Heaven and Earth because human beings can be transcendental and open. Moltmann (1976:109) highlights the wretchedness of human beings in such thought by quoting both Luther and a Chinese proverb:

[It is … [human being’s] wretchedness that from the moment … [human beings] forget[s] … [their] transcendent background, [human beings] must expect or fear infinitude in finite things, and divinity in earthly and human relationships. ‘What you put your heart on is your God’, Luther rightly said in the Large Catechism. ‘[One] … who looks upon … [one]self does not give out light’, says a Chinese proverb.

However, in terms of relational selfhood, a comprehensively analytic comparison of Heaven and Earth in Moltmann’s and Tu’s interpretations is beyond the scope of this thesis.22

How does the self in Tu’s New Ruism find its definition and its unity with Heaven, Earth, and all other things by being grounded in Heaven? Is it enough to explain being grounded in Heaven by an abstract and vague concept such as ‘our nature is conferred by Heaven’ (Tu 1985:63), without any further, concrete, and pragmatic explanation or description? Or is this unity only to be experienced anticipatorily by an optimistic expectation of having ‘a transcendent vision’ that our infinite nature will be good enough to ultimately reach the stage of a Ruist trinity of Heaven, Earth, and ‘humanity’ (Tu 1985:137)?

Grenz (2001:304, eo) argues for a theological basis on which the self is grounded in God by maintaining the following:

22 Lin Honghsin (2011) provides a valuable analytic comparison of Heaven and Earth between Moltmann’s and Ruist understanding in his ‘Cóng Jīdū Zōngjiào “Tiān” de Gānmiàn Kān Rénwén Jīngshén: Yǔ Dōngyà Rúxué duìhuà chūyi’ (A perspective of the Concept of ‘Heaven’ in Christianity on Humanism: Discussion on the dialogue with East Asian Ruism). It is notable that the discussions of Earth between Moltmann’s and Ruist understanding are also included in this article although only the theme of Heaven is indicated in its title.
The intellectual journey through the *imago Dei* texts, read in the light of theological history and in the context of the contemporary loss of the centred self, has as its goal the construction of the relational *self* by means of a systematic delineation of an eschatologically determined, social conception of the image of God … [It is] the basis for bringing together human and divine relationality in a mutually informing manner.

Therefore, in Moltmann’s account, the human self not only comes into being by the creative act of the triune Creator God, but also comes from the divine through creation in God’s image and likeness. It is because of God’s absolute and external transcendence that the salvation in Christianity, the transformation of human beings through gracious moral cultivation becomes possible and unique.23

In Tu’s account, the Heaven-conferred self is in fact a human-defined self, because the meaning of Heaven is ultimately dependent on its conferment by humans. Tang Yijie (1988 in 1997:303) points out that the necessity of a ‘*wàizài chāoyuè*’「外在超越」(transcendence to the outside) in Ruism in order to overcome the limitation of its immanent transcendence.24 Although Tu admits the insufficiency in New Ruist concept of *surpassing the immanence* (‘*chāoyuè nèizài*’「超越內在」) (1995 in Tu Weiming and Zhou Qin 1996:65), he rejects a way of advocating New Ruist atheism from an aspect of instrumental rational traditionalism and also refuses any remedy of ‘*chāoyuè wàizài*’「超越外在」(transcending the externality) provided by Christianity or other monotheist religions. But of what type is the transcendence of Ruist religiousness? What are its internal resources? Which of them can be used for reference? Which of them must be complemented? Which of them can be put to good use? None of these questions posted by himself he and other New Ruists have had satisfactory answers because they have just begun to explore (ibid.). It seems that Tu puts himself in a predicament on the issue of


24 See also Tang Yijie (1996a:61–2).
Ruist transcendence by sticking exclusively to a seemingly inflexible concept New Ruists have not yet explored well.

I will go on to discuss other differences between Tu’s and Moltmann’s presuppositions derived from this difference in their primary and fundamentally presupposed transcendent reference point.

3.2.4 The Self-Definition within the Relational Self

As mentioned in C4S4, Tu Weiming (1985:54) stresses that the meaning of the self constituted by the communal property in Ruism is completely different from the meaning of the self in a modern Western context. Does the Ruist self, in his argument, inherently have a communal property that the Western one lacks? Or does it lack something that a modern Western one possesses? Could it be possible that what is missing within a modern Western account of the self is the very element leading to the tendency of a repressively imposed relational self in a PTRIC cultural heritage?

As clarified in A-C, other individuals and the social contexts are indispensable for both the interdependent self\(^{25}\) (collectivism) and the independent self (individualism). Therefore, the main distinction between the construals of these two selves relies on how others are involved in the self-definition of the self. Although both selves in Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts are relational, do their different presuppositions result in different self-defining features of their relational selves?

In Tu’s account, as discussed in C4S4.2, society in a general sense (including social norms, standards, and social recognition), but actually Ru-influenced societies in the concrete cultural contexts where his account applies, and important human others, are directly involved in the self-defining construal of the self. This is exactly the feature of

\(^{25}\) As explained in C1F57, interdependent self might mean co-dependent self in some collectivist context when it stresses an unhealthy interpersonal relationship between self and other persons.
the unhealthy interdependent self as explained in A-CS3. Social influence is a case in point. Social influence for persons and cultures supporting independent selves means the same thing as social ‘conformity’ (Markus and Kitayama 1991a:40, eo). It involves giving up ‘one’s own perceptions, attitudes, or beliefs (the defining features of the self)’ in order to adapt to an irresistible ‘social pressure’ (ibid.:40). However, social influence for persons and cultures supporting unhealthy interdependent selves means ‘adjustment of one’s self’ according to relevant significant others (ibid.:40f., eo). It is ‘a willingness to be responsive to others and to regulate one’s own demands and desires’ for the sake of maintaining those essential relationships (ibid.:41). Markus and Kitayama point out repeatedly that ‘the [unhealthy] interdependent selves do not prescribe or require consistency between behaviour and one’s internal attributes because the private, internal features of self are not given as much weight’ (ibid.). This is exactly the case of the devalued privatized self in both traditional and post-traditional Ruist cultural designs as mentioned in C4 and C5. Markus and Kitayama argue further that such inconsistency is rather unlikely to be cognitively sensed by the ones with an unhealthy interdependent self (ibid.). For ‘private attitudes’ might be neither important nor ‘self-defining’ for them. Within such a state, the unhealthy interdependent self, as Winnicott (1965:133) has described it (see also C2), ‘can easily get the false self mistaken for real’, i.e. self-deception. As the traditional and post-traditional conceptions of Ruist selfhood are more pragmatic than principled (as mentioned in C3 and C4), this problem can arise easily within the self.

Societies characterized by Ru-based collectivism tend to cultivate ideologies and standards of social conformity mainly by means of feelings of shame, in order to drive

26 In C2S4.4, it was mentioned through Thielicke’s observation (1959, cited in Cheng, Stephen KK 1990:511) that Chinese people are ‘the most magnificent play-actors in the world’ lacking ‘the will to be individual human beings, to be themselves’. See also C5F91.
their people to earn social recognition or worthiness in a relationship. Admittedly, there is no absolute and objective value for the self in Ru-based collectivism. The value of such a Ruist self depends on individual subjective efforts and social subjective recognition and, therefore, it is subjective, relative, and unsteady. Tu Weming (2006:227) admits this point:

I think that the criticism of Ruism by Christianity is acceptable. In Christianity, only God is absolute: any person, any group, any event, all are not absolute, but relative. Without the Christian God who is transcendent and external, tradition can probably turn the relative into the absolute.

However, as mentioned in C4, Tu (2007c:150, 152) still rejects such a transcendent God as the post-traditional Ruists’ alternative option.27 Does this not lead Tu into a theoretical predicament, when he excludes the adjustability of his presuppositions? Just as Abbott (1970:293) pointed out, changes that take place in traditional Ruism are changes ‘within the system rather than change[s] of the system’, because of the teachings of Yi Jing (Book of Change). He (ibid., eo) explains:

While the I Ching [Yi Jing] has since then always provided justification for change or adaptation it has provided for change within the system for the most part rather than change of the system. Evidence of change within tho system rather than change of the system can be seen in the current continuation of widespread adherence to Confucian thinking.

Therefore, besides Heaven serving vertically as an ideal of moral self-cultivation, the society with its pressures towards social conformity reinforces horizontally the realization of moral self-cultivation. As a result of such doubled up cultural reinforcements, especially in PTRIC context, repressive social impositions are often applied and become very hard to avoid.

As disclosed in C6S6, in Moltmann’s framework of relational selfhood, the self is created in and as the imago Dei. Its nature derives from the creator God, including its relationality. Obviously, in Moltmann’s account, the relationship with God is not earned

27 Mou Tsungsan (1977, cited in The Editorial Board of 西方視野 1977:3) stresses that the dignity of human beings is earned by moral practice, and accordingly rejects help from an external God. But how can humans maintain their dignity by themselves, since Ruist sagehood is unattainable (see C4S3.1)?
by efforts of the self, but bestowed by the love and grace of God. The absolute and objective value of the self is defined and granted vertically (from above) by God, so that the self does not need to earn the value of the self horizontally from others or from social recognition by means of moral self-cultivation. Since human nature is corrupted and every human’s relationship with God is broken after the Fall, the restoration cannot be attained by any efforts of incorrigible human beings. Only by God’s unflagging grace and love, faithful promise, and transforming power for fallen human beings can the damaged imago Dei of the self be restored to become even better than its original state before the Fall. In Moltmann’s account, it is the triune Creator God who is involved in the defining construal of the self. The initiation and completion of the transformation of one’s self in this account is not by one’s own having or doing but by one’s being and becoming the imago Dei by God’s promising and doing. Therefore, in the broadest sense of that term, there is no repressive imposition either from God or from society upon one’s being and becoming, and no cultural boundaries or historical conditions in the contemporary world can force God to stop this gracious work in terms of God’s omnipotence. However, God never forces anyone to accept it in terms of human freedom.

3.2.5 Unity, Diversity, and Equality in Community

In Moltmann’s account, as explained in C6S7 and C6S8, through creation in His image and likeness, the triune God endowed the imago Trinitatis (with the form of trinitarian elements and characteristics) to humans as a template for human interpersonal relationships. Such a perichoresis-oriented relationship aims at keeping simultaneously the three elements of unity, equality, and diversity. In other words, within Moltmann’s

28 In arguing for the sexual equality in 1 Corinthians 11:7, David T. Williams (2011:321), based on his interpretation through the imago Trinitatis and perichoresis, asserts, similar to Moltmann’s viewpoint explained in the C6F70, that ‘origin does not give superiority …the eastern tradition sees the Father as the
theological anthropology, personality and sociality can be harmonized. It is because of the *imago Trinitatis* that human beings can correspond to the triune God when they are united as a community. It is also because of the *imago Trinitatis* that the *imago Christi* as the only means for the restoration of fallen humankind becomes possible (to be discussed in the next section). Furthermore, because of the *imago Trinitatis*, human beings after the Fall can be restored not only from their sinful natures, but also from their sinful interpersonal relationships, even as Jesus Christ, the Holy Son, prayed for His people to be one as He and His Father are one (John 17:11). In this account, relationships with others are not earned but created, granted, and restored after the Fall by the triune God. In other words, the triune God is ‘the ground and paradigm of true social life and liberation’ as well as the source of the self and salvation (Thompson, John 1994:3). Therefore, equality and diversity are made possible to be kept in unity in Moltmann’s open fellowship within any cultural context, as argued also by Thomas R. Thompson (1996:49). It is notable that a recent paper by Lydia Hogewoning (2012) in the field of social work demonstrates how Moltmann’s and Volf’s social trinitarianism theology of equality as well as love and openness to other people can be applied significantly to enhance core ‘anti-oppressive social work’ principles of critical consciousness and empowerment.²⁹

The resistant Tu did his utmost to protect post-traditional Ruism from scholars’ criticism related to the problems of repressive social impositions and the RFS. However, in order to advance human beings’ virtues, his ideal fiduciary community is unavoidably a source of divinity of the other Persons, yet in *perichoresis* the three are equal; there is a parallel here to the relation of man and woman’. See also Tien, Hungen (2007:40), Huáng Yì míng (2009:82–5), and Lynne Taylor (2016:12f.).

²⁹ Some psychologists also base the anthropology of their social psychologies and psychotherapies upon social trinitarian anthropology, for example, Mark R. McMinn and Clark D. Campbell (2007:26–37), Todd W. Hall (2010:234–5), and Maria L. Boccia (2011:25–6).
established and built up by means of moral persuasion and education, especially by means of rites and ceremonies. Nadeau (2002:116) pointed out that rites and ceremonies operating within traditional Ruism have an ‘oppressive quality’. As argued in C4, such a Ruist method (moral persuasion and education) implies both the reality of human nature’s imperfections without ‘intrinsic goodness’, justifying the tendency to assert repressive social impositions, leading to a much devalued privatized self in Tu’s interpretation. Furthermore, such a cultural system of human relationships is in reality a closed one, since one must and prove to be good enough to be worthy of those relationships on the basis of standards established and proven to be supported by that cultural system. Therefore, individuality and diversity are not freely kept in unity within Tu’s account of traditional or post-traditional Ruist society, not to mention society at large. As argued in C5, equality in these cultural contexts is very hard to maintain between self and community, even if it might be achieved between two particular individual selves in various dyadic relationships.\(^{30}\) Besides, as discussed in the previous section, unity within Tu’s account of traditional or post-traditional Ruist society tends to be social conformity at the sacrifice of individuality and diversity because of a strong Ru-based collectivist ideology manifested in his account.

3.2.6 The Transformation of the Self

In Tu’s account explained in C3S3, moral self-cultivation is the only way to achieve the New Ruist ultimate transformation (New Ruist selfhood or sagehood). Even if Tu Weiming emphasizes the indispensable communality of moral self-cultivation, his account still depends only on humanity’s own admittedly imperfect internal resources as explained above in S3.2.3. The real self in Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood is

\(^{30}\) See also Peter K. H. Lee (1991:68).
inseparable from relationships with other human beings. He (1979a:26) has previously emphasized this claim in the following manner:

Sociality as a spiritual value is justified neither on grounds of transcendent reference nor on grounds of collective goal. It is in the perfectibility of man as an ethicof-religious being that the justification for sociality really lies. Indeed, a Confucian tries to be social for the sake of self-realization. His personal authenticity is inseparable from his sociality. If he fails to relate himself to others in a meaningful way, he does violence not only to his social relations but also to his authentic self. Unless he cultivates himself in the context of human-relatedness, no matter how high a spiritual level he is able to attain, from the Confucian point of view, his claim to self-realization is inauthentic.

However, moral self-cultivation (self-realization) is also for the sake of harmonizing human relations (Tu 1985:55). Accordingly, communal moral self-cultivation is motivated and driven inescapably by various kinds of repressive social impositions.

Unfortunately, another form of circular reasoning appears here. I have argued that such a circular argument is inescapable because there is no other absolute source and truth acceptable and accessible to New Ruists, but only their own preferred social norms and standards as well as various forms of recognition and approval. By this same form of reasoning, Tu’s efforts to avoid the problem of the RFS in Ru-based collectivist relational selfhood appear to be in vain.

In Moltmann’s account as explained in C6S6.2, in spite of the Fall of human beings created in and granted the imago Trinitatis (imago Dei), the image of and likeness to God is embodied by the incarnated, transfigured, and raised Messiah, Jesus Christ. What then is the status of this person in the Trinity, God the Son? Jesus Christ is the perfect image of the invisible God, through which God mediates all things in creation, reconciles the world to God-self, and rules now and will rule eternally on earth (Moltmann 1985a:226). Moltmann clearly views God’s creation from an eschatological perspective: the final true human self (or imago Dei) is more perfect than the original (Moltmann 2003:189). Therefore, in Moltmann’s account, being human after the Fall is a process of becoming transformed into being a full human through the imago Christi to the gloria Dei. This
process is revealed and promised by the triune God and being operated by His grace and work.

However, as some people, especially Chinese people, might ask, do gracious moral cultivation in Moltmann’s account and moral self-cultivation in Tu Weiming’s account need to exclude each other? The answer would be both yes and no.

As demonstrated above in Section 3.2, C4S3.4, C4S3.5, C5S5, C5S6, and C5S9, there is only human responsibility in Tu’s account because he does not accept the possibility of any external supreme being or the creator God. Humankind is the only transcendent reference point. Accordingly, moral self-cultivation in Tu’s account is only in the realm of self-transformation of imperfectible human beings. It will never be an attainable solution to the imperfectability of human beings in the transformation of the self.

However, as demonstrated above in Section 3.2, C6S6 to C6S8, and C7S2, Moltmann’s gracious moral cultivation is a solution to the total depravity of human beings. Accordingly, this kind of transformation of the self is in the realm of salvation and new creation provided by Divine grace. In other words, the transformation of the self can only be initiated and completed by Divine grace.

Therefore, Moltmann’s gracious moral cultivation and Tu’s moral self-cultivation exclude each other because they are two substantially different approaches engaging in two substantially different realms of transformation of the self. As having mentioned in C7S2.3, Moltmann (1981:125, eo) unequivocally highlights the incomparable distinction of these two substantially different transformations: ‘the experience of the Holy Spirit, as distinct from human forms of spiritualization and sublimation’ But since they deal with two substantially different realms of transformation of the self, there is actually no such an issue as excluding or including each other between them because Moltmann and Tu
Weiming are talking about two substantially different things in terms of the transformation of the self. We can explore this substantial difference.

Lawler (2008:101, eo) points out that ‘being an (authentic) identity’ in European and American cultural settings is conventionally counterposed against ‘doing an identity (performing)’. The former expresses ‘who we are, really’, but the latter usually involves ‘a false expression, denying, negating or concealing who we are really’ (ibid.). When there is a discrepancy found to exist between doing (‘semblance’) and being (‘substance’), ‘the person is liable to be accused of pretension, inauthenticity or acting a role’ (ibid.).

In these cultural contexts, it is deemed that semblance and substance should be consistent. If that is not the case, ‘that is because of some dissembling — some attempt to deceive others’ (ibid.:101). Acting is taken to be ‘acting inauthentically’ when one makes others believe that we are better than we really are (ibid.). Therefore, Lawler (2008:102) argues that ‘reality, of course, is seen to inhere in substance (who we are really) rather than in semblance (who we appear to be)’. No wonder Xunzi, a pre-imperial rationalistic Ruist and self-proclaimed followers of Confucius, insists that ‘goodness can only be imposed externally through education and disciplined self-cultivation’, as interpreted by Tan J. Y. (2003a:96–7). Xunzi’s imposed external goodness and Lawler’s semblance denote exactly the same thing, but use different terms to describe them. Both manifest cultural systems where repressed forms of self appear to be unavoidable.

As Jesus illustrates by the parables of *the wolves in sheep’s clothing* and *good and bad trees and their fruit* in Matthew 7:15-23, parables presented to warn against false prophets (hypocrites in spirituality), pretence in semblance is not merely non-identical with reality in substance, but is regarded as evil in God’s eyes. In terms of being as

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31 Alison Young (1995:112), a criminologist, recognizes semblance and substance as ‘two orders of being’ that should remain distinct; otherwise, a ‘misidentification of appearance and reality’ happens.

32 A good tree naturally bears good fruit, but this does not mean that good fruit makes a tree good. In other words, a bad tree can mask itself by hanging some fake good fruit (hypocrites in spirituality which Jesus referred to by metaphors of sheep’s clothing on ravenous wolves, grapes from thorns, and figs from thistles)
perfect as the *imago Dei* (Matthew 5:48), humans appear as thistles or thorn bushes which cannot bear fruit because of their corrupted human nature after the Fall. Likewise, fruit trees will never yield thorns. A change of environmental factors can only change the quality and quantity of the thorns or the fruit of fruit tree, but it does not transform the nature of their species. However, thistles or thorn bushes might be decorated by fake fruit to look like fruit trees, whom Jesus calls ‘false prophets’ (Matthew 7:15) or ‘hypocrites’ (Matthew 6:1-6). Such a pretence in semblance may be able to deceive others, but can never change one’s own substance. The effect of the *imago Christi* through one’s having died, been buried and resurrected with Christ by His grace (Romans 6:1-11; Colossians 2:12) is to be transformed by the indwelling Spirit in one’s spiritual nature. The Apostle Paul describes such a transformation of his own life in the following way: ‘it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me’ (Galatians 2:20b).

It is helpful to integrate the above clarification and distinction of *doing* (semblance) and *being* (substance) into the definition and dimensions of the personage and the person to make itself look like a good tree. But it is in fact a bad tree. God’s transforming work (gracious moral cultivation) makes what is a bad tree (sinner) into a good tree (the *imago Christi*). Good fruit will then appear naturally. Moral self-cultivation makes bad fruit look like good fruit, but does not make a bad tree into a good one.

33 The term *hypocrite* is also a metaphorical description of the one who wears a negative mask (see C5F95).

34 Then, as Jesus stated in Matthew 7:21, whoever does the will of the Father can enter the Kingdom. A bad substance (*being*) must be first transformed by salvation into a good substance, and then it can bear real good fruit (actual *doing*, and not just a semblance of goodness) whose good substance is the same as *being*’s transformed substance. If the *doing* (coming from bad substance) which is only a semblance of goodness, but is not stemming from an actual good substance, comes before the transformation of *being* (of bad substance), the *doing* (of bad substance) cannot produce good *being* (of good substance). Therefore, that kind of *doing* (of bad substance) is still a mask. A good tree (*being* of good substance) bears good fruit (*doing* of good substance). The *doing* that is a mere semblance can never make a bad tree good. If the *doing* is from a good substance, it will not be a mere semblance. Therefore, the *doing* stemming from a good substance is always the result of a transforming salvation upon that *being* (from bad to good). According to my own understanding, the main purpose or theme of these parables of Jesus is to remind or warn His audience of giving up the pretence of looking good, but instead admitting their needs to be transformed first. This teaching is reflected also in the first Beatitude (Matthew 5:3). It is also the core message of the work of His transformative salvation.

35 Based on these biblical principle and concept, Timothy S. Lane and Paul David Tripp (2010) developed a practical programme for life transformation.
explained in A-E and illustrated in Diagram 3.1 in C3. Based on this integration, the transformation trends in Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts are illustrated in Diagram 8.2.

In Tu’s account, to be a sage, namely a real or sincere self, means to be perfect in character or virtue (Power 2007). In order to attain such sagehood by emphasizing either individual or communal doing (self-cultivation) within a social imposing cultural context of Ru-based collectivism, this cultural design tends to cultivate the semblance instead of the substance of the self. This can easily lead to shaping a repressively social imposed self and a personage that often lives by dissembling. But to be a saint in Moltmann’s account means to be oneself (a real self as he/she is) before the Triune God by accepting His salvation through grace.36 In other words, the morality, holiness, and wisdom that humankind is encouraged to pursue through moral self-cultivation in the New Ruist tradition are granted to humankind as the renewed image and likeness of God through the transformative and gracious gift of the image of Christ.37

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36 I consider that Moltmann’s core conception of being a saint is the same as the main purpose or theme of Jesus’ parables explained in F31 and F33 above. Some other theologians, such as Merton (1961:31) and Rohr (2013), present a similar concept in searching for the true (or real) self.

37 Ephesians 4:24 and Colossians 3:10. This gift must beget a task. However, the task, or an action of good substance that is not a mere semblance, including the ability to do such things, are all the result of the gift and the transforming salvation explained in F31 and F33. It is notable that this semblance is exactly the ‘falsehood’ to be put away as a result of getting this gift, as mentioned in Ephesians 4:25.
Diagram 8.2 Comparison of the Transformation Trends in Tu’s and Moltmann’s Accounts
Therefore, Tu’s problematic perfect morality turns out to be a demand that will make imperfectible human beings hypocrites, because they cannot reach perfection even though they must aspire to do so (Hè, Zhāngróng 賀璋瑢 2002:204). Likewise, if Christians devote themselves by means of spiritual exercises energized by their own efforts to reach the ideal moral example set by Jesus or expected by Christian social norm, they will certainly become hypocrites as well (Martin Luther n.d., cited in Wilson 2016), especially in the families of ministers and missionaries, even in the Anglo-European Christian societies. This is the reason why the RFS or the behavioural custom of negatively masking is still a relatively prominent issue among Chinese Christians. However, the Triune God’s righteousness in Moltmann’s account is a free ‘gift’ (Luther 1545:337) promised by the Father, granted by the Son, and empowered by the Holy Spirit.

3.2.7 The Ultimacy of the Transformation of the Self

In Tu’s account, it is over-optimistic to say human nature is perfectible through a ceaseless process of communal self-transformation. It is utopian to claim that everyone can be a sage. It is this-worldly to say the central concern shared by all Three Teachings (Ruist, Buddhist, and Daoist) about existential human beings is ‘the human condition here and now’ but not in the past and utopian future (Tu 1985:25). An ultimate self-transformation is the foundation for Tu’s definition of New Ruist selfhood (or sagehood).

38 See Zhou Cuishan (2006:website) for a similar criticism on social Ruism.

39 Hypocrisy is exactly the danger Hiromichi Kozaki 小崎弘道 (1856-1938) (1986 in Ballhatchet 1988:359–60) was concerned about in the Ruified Japanese societies, where all the ethical teachings advocate self-cultivation. Another perspective related to these matters has been articulated by Kozaki (2000:162). He had pointed out that traditional Ruism contributed to preparing the hearts and minds of Japanese people to embrace this free gift. When Japanese persons despaired in reaching the ideal of moral self-cultivation and thereby recognized their sinful natures that they could not overcome, they consequently could see their need and accept this free gift. In terms of this empirical finding, this negative effect of self-transformation in Tu’s account might contribute to God’s transformative process of self in Moltmann’s account as it is predicated by Moltmann’s presupposition 4. This finding also witnesses the transformative procedure of sinful humans explained by the Apostle Paul in Romans C1 to C3.

40 See also Hwang Tsungi (2017:12f.).

41 See Kay Warren (2017). Warren’s example is typical and must be a case among many other similar ones.
However, what concerns Tu more is the *this-worldliness* of the self, rather than where the self came from and where it will go. Therefore, Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood is ultimately nothing other than a utopian optimistic this-worldliness. It seems that one has to pretend to be like a sage and to some extent deceive others, even to the point of self-deception as well and promote a kind of mutually enforced wilful deception if one embraces or conforms to such an optimistic worldly utopia because of the repressive social impositions that it presupposes.

In Moltmann’s account, the self comes from the *imago Trinitatis* (*imago Dei*), restored in the *imago Christi*, realized to be the *gloria Dei* in the future by the promise of the Father and the work of the Spirit. In this account, the becoming of the self cannot and, therefore, does not need to rely on oneself. For in reality, ‘our hope and confidence cannot be based on the capacities of human beings to survive death and become immortal … such confidence depends entirely on God’s promise of resurrection and new creation’ (Thiselton 2012:xiii). Therefore, the futurity of the self promised by the triune God can only be transformed and finished by the Deity’s work and grace. As I have already explained above, this ultimacy promised and done by the Creator triune God would also become an over-optimistic utopia in Moltmann’s account if it were the case that this God does not exist, or the Bible is not revealed by the triune God. However, these important issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, as explained above in S3.2.1.

### 3.2.8 Conclusion to the Evaluation of Tu’s and Moltmann’s Different Presuppositions

The above analytical comparison of the contrasting characteristics in Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood in responding to the research problem is based on their own different presuppositions. On the basis of what has been learned through this comparison, we can see the importance of the role of the *imago Dei* in Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood. His account provides a positive alternative
for relational selfhood in overcoming the RFS in PTRIC contexts. On the contrary, Tu’s account does not manifest a sufficiently significant difference from PTRIC relational selfhood criticized by the scholars and so does not provide a feasible alternative account that can effectively serve within those same cultural contexts.

3.3 The Openness of the Relational Self, Interpersonal Relationships, and Community

Both Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts stress the importance of community or communal acts (efforts) in the transformation of self, a matter that is also valued by other scholars, for example, Dave G. Benner (2012:173–90). In responding to the RFS or repressive social impositions, both Tu and Moltmann claim that their accounts of relational selfhood are open ones. I will critically compare the differences between their claims in this regard.

3.3.1 The Openness of the Relational Self

Openness is a standard of judgment to describe the varying degrees of overcoming repression; in its strongest expression it would indicate the least degree of repression. As we have seen abundantly above, in the resistant Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood, the privatized self is still devalued because New Ruism in his account is still associated with Ru-based collectivism. Therefore, a repressive and socially-imposed relational self cannot be avoided in his account. The degree of openness within Tu’s relational self is quite low for the ordinary people because the acceptance given to or received by others is conditioned by the achievement, in *excelling above the common*, of the perceived worthiness of the self in its relationships and within the community.

Moltmann’s account presents an open relational self based on the model of *perichoresis*-oriented interpersonal relationships and on the *imago Trinitatis* (involve also the *imago Dei* and *imago Christi*). As mentioned above, the three elements of unity, equality, and diversity are valued and so maintained simultaneously in such relationships. Consequently, theoretically speaking, the diversity and ontological equality of persons
are not devalued in unity, even while their unity is not devalued in maintaining their
diversity and equality. Practically speaking, as presented of the transforming direction in
C6 and C7, in such a fellowship of grace with the open Trinity and other persons, all
relational selves are cultivated *individually and communally* to open themselves up to one
another’s dissimilarity and distinctiveness while preserving mutual trust and respect
because they have received wide ‘space’ in the open Trinity. Accordingly, they give one
another their ‘space’ or a share of themselves, and creatively participate in each other’s
lives, or ‘spaces’ because of the degree of mutual recognition and openness they realize
in the *imago trinitatis*, with its high degree of mutual support and intimacy.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Western Individual-Oriented Social Structure</th>
<th>Chinese Society-Oriented Social Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Every Independent Autonomous Individual as a Unit</td>
<td>A Tight Superior-Inferior Ordered Society Composed of Ethics of Humanity as Longitude and Relationship as Latitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressing on Individual Freedom, Right, and Achievement</td>
<td>Stressing on Individual Responsibility and Obligation for Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasizing on the Cultivation of Individual Independence and Autonomy</td>
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<td>The Well-Being of Small Self as the Foundation of Social Well-Being</td>
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<td>Encouraging and Promising with Great Reward for Pursuing Individual Interests</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining Social Operation by Means of Individual Autonomy and Public Opinions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Justice: Making the Best Interests for the Vast Majority</td>
<td>Social Justice: Rewarding Norms-Observers and Punishing Norms-Violators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chart 8.2 Chinese and Western Cultural Conceptions of the Relation between the Individual and Society** (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:99, Chart 1)

Yang Zhongfang (1991b:99) makes a typical over-generalized distinction between
‘Chinese’ and ‘Western’ conceptions of the relationship between individuals and society
on the basis of their cultural influences. She claims ‘the Western’ social structure is
individual-oriented, but ‘the Chinese’ is society-oriented. Chart 8.2, translated from her
comparative chart (ibid., Chart 1), lists these comparative cultural features of two
stereotyped social structures. Even though her distinctions between so-called Chinese and
Western cultural features tend to be reductionist and over-generalized, these features are not groundless and invalidated in terms of some of their basic prevalent tendencies. Although Yang’s comparison does not add any critical value judgments on either side, it is notable that most of the features she describes for the Chinese society-oriented social structure match features of the post-traditional New Ruist relational selfhood highlighted in Tu’s account.

Robert C. Neville (2000:168) compares Ruist and ‘Western’ conceptions of selfhood through a lens of his account of Ruism. Accordingly, the features of ‘Western’ conceptions of selfhood in Neville’s account include criticisms that they are:

1. ‘too atomistic and individualistic’;
2. ‘too inwards-looking to be responsible’;
3. ‘too selfish to serve the community’; and
4. ‘too ready to give the personal sphere an unrealistic priority over both nature and social institutions’.  

Like Yang Zhongfang, the terms Western, Ruism, or Chinese Neville uses are also highly reductionist and over-generalized. However, can Tu’s interpretation of Ruist relational selfhood avoid the problems of so-called Western selfhood and at the same time prevent the typical problems of the RFS and its accompanying repressive social impositions in Ru-based collectivism, as criticized by the scholars’ accounts we have previously referred to? The answer is negative, at least in the resistant Tu’s account. Yi Junqing 衣俊卿, a contemporary Chinese philosopher, states in a dialogue with Tu Weiming that China has never gone through a cultural stage where the free development of the individual persons was permitted and there has not been a prevailing development of distinct personalities. Therefore, he argues that the development of Chinese persons’

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42 The features of Ruist conceptions of selfhood Neville’s (2000:168) account include (1) ‘attaining selfhood’; (2) ‘personal transformation’; and (3) ‘achieving concreteness’ in interpersonal relationships through affirming ‘the individual worths of people and things’.

43 Yi Junqing (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:14f.).
personalities would be suppressed if Ruist relational ethics would be applied to rectify the problems caused by the trend of individualist thought in PTRIC settings before Chinese persons’ individuality has been widely developed.44

3.3.2 The Openness of the Interpersonal Relationships

As manifested in C4S4.4, at different period of his career and writings, Tu Weiming wavers between opposing and supporting the Ruist asymmetrical hierarchical relationships. The responsive Tu admits that these asymmetrical and hierarchical relationships exist within PTRIC social contexts and goes so far as to suggest throwing away sangang. Yet the resistant Tu wavers between rejecting it as a politicized form of traditional Ruism and justifying it as a particular pattern of authority important in PTRIC family ethics. However, it seems clear that the resistant Tu’s equivocal attitude indirectly manifests how the existing asymmetrical hierarchical relationships could still serve as the social framework for one of his possible interpretations of New Ruist relational selfhood.45 His interpretations appear to be situation-oriented and so adapt to different

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45 Randall Nadeau (2002:114) argues that rēn 仁 (benevolence) in traditional and post-traditional Ruism, which defines human reciprocal relationships, is ‘fundamentally egalitarian … but the practice of rēn is never egalitarian. That is to say, it is a basic characteristic of human relationships that they are hierarchical and therefore non-egalitarian’.

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changing social conditions, revealing evidence of his internal self-inconsistency of argument and collectivist characteristic. Nevertheless, it is important to stress here that an asymmetrical hierarchical relationship generally will not be a truly open relationship.

As explained in S3.2 above, in Moltmann’s account, the *imago Trinitatis* is endowed in the primal and fundamental human community (the whole of human beings). Human beings restored through the *imago Christi* (the ‘messianic fellowship’ with the Son) are called together into the open Trinity (see C6S7.2 and C6S8.2). This openness is made possible only by means of God’s grace; only by the grace of the infinite triune God can the finite human beings go beyond their limitations. Therefore, the relationships in the open Trinity are built out of a dynamic reciprocity in uniting with the triune God, with other human beings, and with the whole creation. Because of the *perichoresis* of the triune Persons, the *perichoresis*-oriented relationships among human beings are equality-oriented. They depend on the openness (of spaces) of the triune God instead of the unattainable idealistic perfectibility of humankind that seeks to win a sense of personal worthiness in *Ru*-informed asymmetrical hierarchical relationships through a ceaseless process of moral self-cultivation. Consequently, it can release the felt burden of pretending to be good enough and empower persons to unveil the self-distorting masking they have submitted to. Lynne Taylor (2016:12f.) argues, therefore, that the ‘*imago Trinitatis* offers a model for relational authenticity’. We can infer that the Persons of the Trinity have no veil between them in their communication: total transparency, trust, and love, from the revelation in the Bible, for example, the authentic prayer of the Son in the Gethsemane (Matthew 26:36-42; Mark 14:32-9).

It is notable that in practice, this *perichoresis*-oriented relationships might be a challenge due to a functional difference in social order.
3.3.3 The Openness of the Community

As discussed and argued above and in C4 and C5, the fiduciary community in Tu’s account is an idealistic system of relationships that is, in fact, of closed relationships that tend to support repressive social impositions. Because one must be good enough to be worthy of such a relationship, the social impositions cannot be avoided, even although Tu tries to present them as working within an ‘open system’. Moral self-cultivation as an evaluating condition for those in such a fiduciary community only leads to the conditions for strengthening the closedness of those relationships.

On the contrary, the meaning, reality and goals of the self in Moltmann’s account can be realized only by the works of the triune God. All is from His grace. This is a form of gracious moral cultivation, set in contrast to the form of Tu’s New Ruist self moral cultivation.

For Christians, gracious moral cultivation means:

The renewal of human life depends on the relation to Christ. The imago Dei in Christ is the paradigm for the restoration of wholeness. This wholeness (shalom) is precisely what the resurrected Christ bequeathed to his disciples — “Peace be with you” (John 20:19). In the sacrament of holy baptism, we declare our acceptance of the transforming presence of the Holy Spirit. This paradoxical rite of death and rebirth marks the beginning of the conversion of the imagination to the wholeness of Christ. (Moseley 1991:78)

However, human persons, including some Christians and many Ruified Christians, tend to cultivate morality by their own efforts:

To be retaken and re-formed by God is a scary prospect, for it means that we live on the boundary of the finite and the infinite. In this state of vulnerability and fragility, we are tempted to cling to the finite, to what is immediately fulfilling and self-affirming. We are also tempted to resort to the will, as if by mere strenuous moral effort we could appropriate the imago Dei into the structure of our psyches. (Moseley 1991:17)

Therefore, besides the communion between the self and God being formed in and by divine grace, it is also crucial that the community constituted by the self and others in

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46 As Grenz (1997:139) affirms, ‘We can live ethically, then, only as we become the recipients of God’s grace. In short, ethics is God’s love for us; the ethical life comes as the gift of divine grace.’
God must be built up in the Deity’s grace. The true unity or oneness is neither reached by obliterating one’s self for the other, nor by expanding one’s self by various means over the other. This is the essence of Moltmann’s open Trinity, open fellowship, and open friendship. The possibility of humankind’s open community in Moltmann’s account is made by dying to the self in Christ and letting the ‘motives and urges’ of a new self of the imago Christi arise from within us. Only when the self and the community can be transformed in God’s grace, the real self, the unique self within, can become the open relational self in the open community that is unveiled and does not need to be masked or hidden any more. This is clearly a positive possibility for the RFS that could lead to a transformative solution to the problem.

Therefore, the potential for overcoming the research problem by means of Moltmann’s account of social trinitarian relational selfhood can be positively summarized by Bellinger’s words (2010:151, eo):

A way of existing as a human being that embodies humility in relationship with God (rather than arrogant self-righteousness and idolatry), openness to growth in selfhood (rather than egocentric refusal to change), and social solidarity (rather than splitting the world into good and evil camps).

Undoubtedly, when selves and communities are being transformed in God’s grace by means of the Christian liturgy, teaching, and practices in our age, ‘it becomes one of those very rare places where a genuine alternative to hypocrisy is found’ (ibid.:151).

This community is restricted only to the community of believers, namely the church, rather than wider society, as explained in C6, especially in S6.2, S7.2, and S8.1, because only believers accept the Deity’s grace and then live in this fellowship with and in the open triune God. However, Christians can treat non-Christians by the grace of God unidirectionally in the same way they treat Christian although non-Christians cannot reciprocate unless they accept God’s grace. Therefore, Christians can apply this understanding of open fellowship not only to evangelism but also to establishing a public theology that can speak and imply more widely in general societies. In *God for a Secular Society*, Moltmann (1999:19, 137–49) advocates such societies implied by this kind of public theology but he does not present it directly in the name of open Trinity or open fellowship. However, he (ibid.:139, 146, eo) adopts Karl Popper’s (1945a; 1945b) phrase to call such societies ‘open societies’.

See also Sandford, John and Sandford, Paula (1982:378).
4. Assessment of Transforming the Repressed Form of Self

As mentioned in C3 and A-E, the problem of the RFS (or the repressively masking personage) is not to be solved simply by discarding this personage. The solution is a journey of becoming the person, namely, transforming the personage to express and show forth the person in accordance with the person’s sincerest convictions (Tournier 1957:81). Tournier is a pioneer in the field of integrative psychotherapy. Therefore, his framework for dealing practically with the problem of negative personage is a valuable reference for measuring the value of any theoretical path that seeks to transform the RFS in PTRIC contexts, including those provided in Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood.

4.1 The Criteria for Tournier’s Path of Transforming the Personage into the Person

Both the pressures of repressive social impositions from outside and the fear, anxiety, and insecurity that lay bare the real self inside prevent the personage from expressing and showing forth the person in accord with the person’s sincerest convictions. Based on the discussions of Tournier’s conceptualization of two ‘diametrically opposite paths’ to the person through the revealing personage (ibid.:81) and to the contrastive personage in seeking freedom (ibid.:224) in C3S2.4 and their summary in Chart 3.1, we can identify Tournier’s (1957:220–24) essential elements for distinguishing these two paths as follows:

(1) The source: trusting in a personal encounter (with Jesus Christ, according to Tournier’s theology) or the effort of one’s own will;

49 As explained in C3S2.4, in order to contrast the path to the personage with the practically transforming path of the revealing personage to the person, I call the path to the personage the path to the contrastive personage.
(2) The action: acknowledging the deepest problems through the fellowship or attempting to insist on imposed expectation from others;

(3) The purpose: boldly revealing the person or artificially making up a personage;

(4) The result: easing tensions or exciting tensions;

(5) The means: relying on a self-abandonment (to Jesus Christ, according to Tournier’s theology) or the glorification of will-power;

(6) The principle: acknowledging the true solution of grace or relying on any self-generated system or rule.\(^{50}\)

4.2 Measuring the Transforming Paths in Tu’s and Moltmann’s Accounts

On the basis of Chart 3.1, Chart 8.3 manifests a comparison of the various features of the transforming paths disclosed in both Tu’s and Moltmann’s relational selfhood with the measurement reference to Tournier’s criteria for the path to the person through the revealing personage and his contrasting criteria for the path to a contrastive personages (Tournier 1957:224).

4.2.1 Tu’s Path for Transforming the Repressed Form of Self

As manifested in Chart 8.3, Tu’s transforming path reflects much more of the characteristics of the path to a contrastive personage than the path to the person through the revealing personage. Three of the six features — of the source, of the action, and of the principle — in Tu’s transforming path and Tournier’s path to a contrastive personage are obviously quite similar. In the other three features, of the purpose, of the result, and of the means, Tu’s transforming path and Tournier’s path to a contrastive personage are also quite similar through further logical inference of their relatedness. Based on one’s own efforts to pursue becoming a sage through learning, such a pursuit will naturally

\(^{50}\) What Tournier (1957:224) was particularly concerned with here in his cultural settings is Stoicism.
glorify one’s own will-power. Provided that humans cannot attain perfectibility or sagehood in reality, as acknowledged by Tu, the pursuit of becoming worthy of any a relationship in a context with a strong tendency for repressive social impositions leads regularly to making up an artificial personage, as illustrated in Diagram 8.2. It occurs within the cultural design that seeks to manifest the great self and dissolve the small self. Given such a cultural design, the inner/outer split within one’s self is a corollary and so creates a palpable tension between one’s person and personage.
For Moltmann (1976:20f.), the phrase ‘iconoclasm of liberation’ means that people do not need to ‘deceive themselves and others about the truth’ in a ‘beautiful and pious pretence’.

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4.2.2 Moltmann’s Path for Transforming the Repressed Form of Self

As manifested in Chart 8.3, Moltmann’s transforming path reflects much more the characteristics of the path to the person through the revealing personage rather than those of the path to a contrastive personage. Moltmann’s departure point to the person through the revealing personage is from being reconciled to God through the salvation of the crucified Christ, instead of from the effort of one’s own will. Christ’s salvation releases one from the pressure to mask their true self. Whenever one depends on one’s own effort in this realm, one does not release such pressure due to one’s limited capability and imperfectibility. When one can abandon illusions about oneself in an open friendship of grace, then there is no shame or troubles that would need to be hidden, and the tensions caused by anxieties and self-accusations can be eased.

In Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology and Tournier’s path to the person through the revealing personage, there are four of the six features — of the source, of the action, of the purpose, and of the result — obviously sharing similarities. In the other two features, of the means and of the principle, Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology and Tournier’s paths to the person through the revealing personage are also quite similar through extending the logical inferences from their relatedness. The transformation of the self in Moltmann’s Christian trinitarian theological anthropology undoubtedly depends totally on the grace of the crucified Son through renewal by the Holy Spirit in anticipation of the Father’s promised futurity. In Moltmann’s social trinity, human beings redeemed to become the imago Christi for eschatological glorification is a prominent feature. Therefore, comparing Tournier’s paths to the person through the revealing personage, Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology directs the path of the relational self to a more specific promised future, namely reflecting the glory of God with an unveiled face. This promised future for the relational self is an eschatological destination of the real self recreated by God, where the revealing personage becomes the
person, and the divine oughts become what the true self intends, as illustrated in Diagram 8.2. When the transformation of imperfectible human beings is initiated and is promised by the triune God, both human awareness of incompetency and willingness can accordingly increase, so that they can grow towards the path to the person through the revealing personage. Besides, in a community of grace, the imposition of external social oughts also tends to disappear. Consequently, it is apparent that Moltmann’s relational trinitarian theological anthropology provides a concrete foundation theologically and practically in overcoming the problem of the RFS.

4.3 Conclusion to Measuring the Transforming Paths

As discussed above, through this analytical comparison, the critical differences that have been revealed between Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts responding to the problem of the RFS do not stem from their methodologies, but from their ontologies because one’s ontology determines one’s methodology. In other words, the path to the person through the revealing personage depends on who the self is, where the self comes from, and where the self will go, rather than how to be the ideal self. Without Heaven and humankind defining each other in circular arguments, Tu’s account cannot provide concrete answers to those questions. Who is the self really? Where does the self exactly come from? Where will the self go in the future? In Tu’s account of relational selfhood without the creator God, the self is basically a functional concept, because it lacks an absolute and objective value. Consequently, living and acting according to the conditions of prevailing relationships becomes the main focus of the self in Tu’s account.

In Moltmann’s account, the main focus of the self is about who the self is, where the self comes from, and where the self will go. As the triune God grants humankind their identities and purposes in His image and likeness, the self finds its value and security in the open Trinity. The transformation of humankind after the Fall depends not on moral self-cultivation, but on gracious moral cultivation, i.e. the reconciling, redeeming, and
transforming work of the trinune God. This is done for the future consummated glory of God by His promise within human lives, as both an eschatological goal and an anticipatory present experience. Consequently, being and receiving becomes the main focus of the self in Moltmann’s account. In other words, applying Moltmann’s account to solve the problem, I argue that the first steps need to be taken by finding out who the self is, where the self comes from, and where the self will go in relationship to the triune God, who bestows on the self its dynamic authenticity in His image.

5. Suggestions for Alternative Theoretical Solutions for the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts

Undoubtedly, there are many strengths in the traditional Ruist cultural heritage as mentioned in C1. However, this research is to respond to the problem of the RFS and repressive social impositions found in PTRIC contexts criticized by scholars from many academic disciplines. On the one hand, the responsive Tu is quite alert to the problem and affirms some Ruist weaknesses, recognizing the necessity of some modification of New Ruist relational selfhood, especially by getting rid of the sangang traditionalism. However, the Ruist presuppositions in his accounts are unfortunately not adjustable, even on his own account. On the other hand, the resistant Tu’s interpretative approach shares the same problematic features with PTRIC relational selfhood in terms of the problem of the RFS and its accompanying repressive social impositions. Although Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood offers a constructive possibility for overcoming that same problem, his account is not developed originally for engaging in PTRIC contexts. Considering the fact that more and more Chinese Christians and non-Christians live in multi-cultural contexts, there are three possible alternative solutions offered to readers, especially those who are suffering in the problem of the repressed form of self, at the end of this research following an analytical comparison between Tu and Moltmann.
5.1 The Responsive Tu’s Account of New Ruist Relational Selfhood

This first possible solution is offered for people who admit that there exists, more or less, a significant Ruist problem that reinforces the RFS, even though they choose to stick to the Ruist presuppositions as stated in Tu’s account.52 These people might not see the need for any direct cross-cultural influences from outside into contemporary PTRIC cultural settings. They might think that the responsive Tu’s account, like some modifications offered by other scholars mentioned in C1, is a good enough modification of Ruism that can solve the problem without adjusting any Ruist presupposition. In other words, this alternative is engaged in retaining the strengths and abandoning or changing the weaknesses within Tu’s New Ruist presuppositions. It is worth noting that Tu insists (1979a:7f.) that to reach the ultimate achievement of self-realization in morality is a repeated ‘decision-making process … [for] the individual in all situations’ with no need for God’s grace. Therefore, there is no room in Tu for any possibility of gracious moral cultivation, such as Moltmann’s account.

The challenge for this alternative is how far this modification can eliminate Ruist weaknesses. This could involve, at the very least, the development of suitable models of Chinese personalities, a strong and new ideology supporting Ru-influenced hierarchical relationships, articulating a viable Ru-based collectivism, and enhancing its strengths without any significant change of any of the presuppositions anchoring that New Ruist relational selfhood. Within all of this, however, the most critical challenge is the possibility whether or not the fundamental issue of repressive social imposition can be prevented without any change, as Tu (1999 in Li Minghua 1999:33) himself insists, in spite of the multifaceted forms of circular reasoning that plague his presuppositions. Can

52 The New Rusti Liu Shuhsien (1988:259) also emphasizes that a New Ruist will not easily change his/her belief or ultimate mandate. The contemporary Ruist scholar Zheng Jiadong (2001:517) does not consider the possibility that New Ruists will accept a Christian understanding of ‘transcendence’ or adopt any compromise form of New Ruist understanding of it.
the problem of the RFS resulting from the burden of doing and achieving things in order to win social recognition be significantly improved without recourse to any alternative cosmologies or metaphysics? Obviously, this kind of question needs more advanced theoretical and empirical studies in order to provide justified answers to those who would support this perspective.

5.2 The Combination of the Resistant Tu’s Account of New Ruist Relational Selfhood and Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood

The second possible solution is offered for people who to some extent are not satisfied with both PTRIC and Tu’s relational selfhood in solving these problems. They are eager to find a possibility of a healthier version of Ruist relational selfhood, even by means of cross-cultural influences from outside, but without getting rid of Ruism totally. In other words, this is a solution through revitalizing instead of replacing Ruism with Christianity. Fang, Keli (1991:39), a contemporary Chinese historian and Ruist scholar, points out that Ruism can only offer a suitable ‘cí huì’ (vocabulary), but not an adequate ‘wénfǎ’ (grammar) for the framework of any future creatively synthesized civilization. Fang Keli neither specifies which kind of Ruism would suffice nor offers any details about what the contents of such a civilization should be. Nevertheless, his approach would support the application of other accounts of relational selfhood with different presuppositions (a different ‘grammar’ in a developing ‘language’) for solving the research problem we have been considering.

53 A version built upon balanced relationships between the individual self and the group.
55 Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:9, eo) also uses ‘wénfǎ’ (grammar) as a metaphor to denote and discuss the deep structure of Chinese culture mainly based on Ruism.
Therefore, Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood deserves to be considered as something that might be coalesced with some form of a revised Ruist account.

The challenges faced by this alternative are considered fundamental by some people. They would need to determine where the boundaries of cross-cultural influences would lie, and then reconsider its impact on the identities of Ruism, contemporary Chinese culture, and contemporary Chinese persons. As mentioned in C1, the term *Ruism* itself is ambiguous, so that there is no consensus about its definition among many contemporary Ruist scholars. Must the definition of Ruism be determined only by the Tu’s presuppositions? If not, by what? In spite of the length of Ruist history in varying ages of Chinese culture, must the preferred kind of Chinese culture and the cultural identity of Chinese people be construed only on the basis of Ruist teachings and institutions? Which kinds of Ruism would be most suitable for these developments? Some Ruists, including Tu Weiming, try to promote and justify some elements in their preferred Ruist worldview as universal values. Whether their arguments or strategies can succeed or not, should we reject the possibility of having some expression of Ruism as possessing universal values because it is of Chinese culture or East Asian culture? Likewise, shall we reject the possibility of various kinds of non-Chinese thought, and in particular Christianity, as a vital option for life in PTRIC cultural settings, as possessing universal values because they are stereotyped as of Western culture? Peter K. H. Lee and Lai Panchiu (2000:114, eo) remind that ‘internationalization does not necessarily mean *westernization*’. I believe that Tu Weiming and other post-traditional Ruists would agree with this ethos. However, would they agree that *internationalization* does not necessarily mean *sinicization*? Can we, at some time in the future identify Christianity, like Buddhism, as an inherent part of a new form of Chinese culture? There have been many

56 As Andrew F. Walls (1996:129–57) lists seven main traditions of Christianity, most of them are not Western.
discussions, debates, and studies seeking to answer these questions, but they still need more advanced theoretical and empirical studies, in order to provide justified answers for those who would support this perspective.

5.3 Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood

This third possible solution is offered for conception of people who are not satisfied with either the PTRIC cultural situations or and Tu’s (or any other Ruist) relational selfhood in solving these problems. These persons may be open to a large degree of cross-cultural influences from outside of traditional or post-traditional Chinese cultural societies, even if it might involve a replacement of Ruism. Therefore, Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood could serve as a living option for these kinds of persons.

The challenges that this alternative would have to face are the various kinds of perceived conflicts between two or more social contexts, two or more cultures, two or more worldviews, and two or more beliefs (Dong, Rui 2007:115). In terms of some degree of cultural replacement, what part(s) of Ru-influenced tradition should be replaced? Only those obstructive features of Ruist relational selfhood? Only simply the vision of Ruist relational selfhood? Or something more drastic? Since relational selfhood always involves relationship with other people, can Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood work out without this replacement occurring in the lives of all those involved? The processes involved in such a cultural transformation are not at all easy to conceive, but in the light of the tumultuous changes that occurred from the time of the last years of the Qing dynasty to the emergence of a Post-Mao era of the People’s Republic of China, this perspective remains a living option for those who support his perspective.
Chapter Nine

Towards the Liberation of the Repressed Form of Self

The motive in researching for a solution to the problem of the RFS within the theoretical context of a PTRIC relational selfhood started this academic and personally spiritual journey of discovery and liberation. The main research question guided the direction and range of this journey:

_to what extent do Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s conceptualizations of relational selfhood provide a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood?_

At the end of this Ph.D. thesis and research, but not the end of this journey, reviewing the whole course of it until now will be significant and valuable.

1. The Journey of Discovery and Liberation

David L. Hall (1994:214), as well as other scholars in different fields,\(^1\) asserts that a religion or a culture fundamentally shapes its people through the ways that selfhood is formed and morality is cultivated. Besides, studies in psychiatry as well as in the behavioural sciences have found that in dealing with mental disorders one cannot achieve insights without considering two other variables: culture and the concept of self. As these studies show, these three variables are ‘interdependent’ (Marsella 1985).

Without taking this journey of research, I could not have found evidence about how PTRIC cultural contexts had considerably and deeply shaped the ways I myself think and feel, the patterns of the ways I behave and react, especially interpersonally. I now see how

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the value system and the worldview that I regularly rely on stem from that cultural orientation; this includes perspectives by which I look at myself and other persons. I have grown up in an environment of Protestant Christianity mixed with the traditional Chinese Three Teachings, especially the small folk Ruist tradition. I became a devoted Christian in my early thirties and later also became a minister. Even though my Christian parents, especially my father, are very Ru-inspired and I was indoctrinated with Ruist teachings in my school education, nevertheless, I have never thought about becoming a follower of Ruism. Still, the Ruist influences on me have been, as I now realize, quite beyond my initial imagination or intuitions, far greater than most Christian influences. This journey has also made me more and more sensitive to such influences on other PTRIC persons, so that I have collected many stories from other persons echoing my own experience and identifying my research problem in their own lives. To liberate our repressed forms of self by means of overcoming repressive social imposition is undoubtedly our common yearning. To recognize its existence is a way to begin to identify the cause of its formation, and can become the departure point towards a path of personal and communal liberation.

Based on scholars’ evidence, studies of the way the repressed form of self appears in PTRIC cultural contexts are significant because they point to some underlying causes of certain mental disorders and their related personal and social problems (C2S3). As seen in the previous chapters, to deal with the problem of the RFS requires that we also deal with the religions or cultures that shape the RFS and might become engaged in liberating or transforming it. The varying ways of forming selfhood and pursuing moral cultivation influence the degree to which any RFS might be liberated. Before starting this research, I had no clear picture of the repressed form of self I suffered from, nor had I ever considered that the study of Christian trinitarian doctrine would be able to provide any solution for it.
What I did recognize was that when one’s self is repressed, a disharmony is formed between the self (the person, or the unique self within, or the spiritual self) and its presentation (the personage, or the social self). Through studies of Tournier’s observations and analyses (A-E), I came to understand that the problem of repression lies not in the personage itself, or its roles, but within the discord between the personage and the person. Under those discordant situations, people might cripple themselves by trying to live up to an ideal image, or acting out an ideal role, for instance, as a parent, a child, a teacher, or a student (Fiddes 2000:21–2). This is exactly what has been criticized by certain scholars from different academic disciplines: many PTRIC persons suffer from a RFS that is shaped by and sustained within the structures and institutions associated with PTRIC cultural settings and their associated understanding of relational selfhood.

In order to search for solution/solutions to liberating or transforming this RFS in PTRIC societies, this research first examined Tu Weiming’s New Ruist conception of relational selfhood, including looking in depth into his two inconsistent attitudes towards scholars’ criticisms, what I have referred to as the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu. Subsequently, Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood was explored as a potential means for responding to this problem of the RFS. These were done in order to assess whether or not any of Tu’s or Moltmann’s conceptions of relational selfhood could become an appropriate alternative solution/solutions for the research problem. However, this cross-cultural and interdisciplinary study proved to be a daunting task involving challenges and complicated interpretative difficulties. Here below I will summarize these challenges and difficulties, and indicate how they have been overcome.

As explained in C1, C3S2.6.2, and mentioned elsewhere regularly in most chapters, most of the primary and secondary sources I investigated are full of problematic expressions and arguments. Scholars make broad claims in these writings without specifying or analysing more precisely their ambiguous, generalized, or even over-
generalized, terminology and interpretations. This is especially manifest in the often used and abused monolithic comparative methods in their general cross-cultural (China-West or East-West) and other specific interdisciplinary analyses. In this regard, I am indebted to Lauren Pfister who always questioned and challenged such kinds of presentations appearing in my thesis, but also encouraged and instructed me how to avoid them as much as possible during this intellectual journey under his supervision.

Many of the efforts at dialogue among different cultures, religions, and disciplines within modern Chinese cultural contexts — especially between different cultural and religious studies, but also between them and the social scientific disciplines (Tu, Weiming 1967:77–80) — have been filled with interpretive challenges and difficulties. According to the evidence disclosed in the relevant literature, I have identified four main reasons for persistent difficulties leading sometimes to ineffectiveness in those dialogues:

1. Some of the same or similar terminology is employed to denote ambiguous meanings or different scopes of study as used by different authors in varying contexts. For example, consider the general use of terms such as Confucianism (Ruism) (as mentioned in C1S1.1), individualism (or collectivism) (as explained in A-C), Christianity (Walls 1996:129–57), true self (as explained in A-D), Heaven (as discussed in C4S3.4 and C5S6), transcendence (as discussed in C4S3.4.2, C5S6, and C8S3.2.3), and [European] individualism and egoism (as mentioned in C5S4.1.2) or Sino-theology and Chinese theology (Chin, Kenpa 2006:126).

2. Some different expressions, probably including employing technical terms in non-technical or other disciplinary contexts, are adopted to denote the same or similar thing (Tu, Weiming 1967:75–6) or two similar things without a clear demarcation. For example, there are different phrases describing the phenomena associated with the problems of RFS (as discussed in A-E), different phrases denoting the same or
similar meaning of true self (as discussed in A-D), or different Ruist traditions with high overlap of their characteristics (as discussed in C1S1.3 and C1S 1.4).

(3) Some evidence provided by social scientists is ignored or rejected simply due to the excuse of their unrecognized authority or different professional approach to interpreting religions or cultures. For example, this is one of the reasons the resistant Tu argues against the social scientists’ criticisms of PTRIC relational selfhood (as discussed in C5S3.1).

(4) Some terms and concepts used in Chinese language contexts are not precisely translated, and so cannot be adequately understood or communicated in English language studies (Tu, Weiming 1985:7). For example, consider the differences between zìwǒ 自我 and self (ibid. and as explained in A-E), guānxì 關係 and relationships (as explained in C2F70), lunli 倫理 and ethics (as explained in C3F64). This is a special challenge for this research, because most of the secondary sources in this research are presented in Chinese language, and the vast majority of the issues involve concepts linked directly to Chinese contexts.

As C4 and C5 disclosed, when discussing the issues related to asymmetrically hierarchical social relationships, Tu’s attitudes towards scholars’ criticisms are wavering and even reasoning circularly from time to time, without providing enough rationale to explain their decisive change. Besides, some of his arguments and expressions tend to be either extremely absolute or reductionist, and so easily appear to be over-generalized. The presentation and evaluation of Tu’s overall integrated account in both his English and Chinese works tend to look like I have a critical bias against Tu, especially if readers have no opportunity to review enough of his works in both languages. I have suffered from such a misunderstanding every time I presented this part of my thesis throughout this journey of discovery even at my pre-viva review. Tu addressed the same questions with different attitudes when he wrote and published in these two languages. This adds both
to the interpretive difficulties and to the sense of what some might see negatively as either his *inconsistencies* or his positively as *flexible explorations*. It is notable that these variances are more evident in Chinese than in English, especially in those works produced during the 1980s and 1990s.

As manifested in C6 to C8, Moltmann did not present and argue his vision of social trinitarian relational selfhood directly for liberating the problem of RFS, let alone for interacting with PTRIC cultural contexts. Although I was attracted to this conception of relational selfhood as soon as I got to know it, there is a significant explanatory challenge to apply it to this research problem within the particular cross-cultural contexts I have considered.

For my personal existential need and the yearnings of all the other suffering PTRIC persons mentioned above, this research adopts an ‘indirect dialogue’ as the main approach (C3S2.6.2) to solve the research problem, instead of merely exchanging information about different conceptions of relational selfhood. However, in PTRIC multifaith and multi-cultural societies within the contemporary world, the paths towards liberating the RFS for varying cultural types of Chinese Christians and non-Christians must be very different. While this is not the place to go into further diversifying PTRIC person into subgroups, as field research methodology does, it is enough to suggest possible alternative solutions based on the studies of Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood for readers, especially for those who are suffering problems related to the RFS.

While a comprehensive examination of all these difficulties in the primary and secondary literature would take us too far away from our declared research project, I believe it is enough to seek to avoid ambiguities caused by them as much as is possible in the discussions and arguments of this thesis. Without many good academic examples to follow and refer to, I have taken extra efforts in this thesis to avoid the over-
generalizations that are so prevalent in the secondary literature as much as it has been possible for me to do.

2. Discovery of Tu Weiming’s Account as Moving from the Person to the Personage

As manifested in detail in C1, the deep and profound influences of traditional Ruism across the spectrum of dynamic histories especially on Chinese peoples, societies, education, politics, and cultures are obvious to all. As a contemporary Ruist missionary in Anglophone settings, Tu Weiming has devoted himself for decades to introducing and re-interpreting the universal values of Ruism for modern Anglophone readers. The scale of his contributions in making non-Chinese persons understand traditional Ruism through cross-cultural dialogue and in applying traditional Ruist values to a wide variety of contemporary issues is unquestionable. As shown in C4 and C5, when facing scholarly criticisms of the RFS caused by repressive social impositions in PTRC cultural settings, Tu went to great lengths to defend his own conception of post-traditional New Ruist relational selfhood against these criticisms. Until now, he is probably the only contemporary Ruist who has published a monograph to defend a specific Ruist conception of selfhood.2

About the controversial and highly criticized problems involved in the asymmetrical hierarchical version of a traditional Ruist social structure, especially as it is expressed in the teaching of sangang (the three bonds), Tu’s positions obviously alternate and sharply divide into bipolar attitudes (the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu), seemingly depending on the situation he is addressing. This analytically creative account of Tu’s attitudes in C5 was generated by a very difficult effort at trying to make sense of what may appear to be immense inconsistencies within Tu's various writings. Tu’s

2 There are some other articles and chapters discussing this issue of Ruist selfhood by other scholars, but none of them have ever published a monograph specifically about this theme like Tu Weiming.
inconsistent attitudes towards them shift back and forth between (the resistant Tu) supporting and (the responsive Tu) denouncing sangang. His attitudes seem to change in order to avoid various objections, showing his pluralistic demeanour, and catering to his different audiences. However, his wavering bipolar attitudes towards scholars’ criticisms appearing in his textual accounts, his public lectures, and his interviews are confusing, frustrating, and even irresponsible; he seems to have never either explained or corrected his previous different attitudes or adjusted or reinterpreted the framework and presuppositions of his New Ruist relational selfhood whenever he changed. As a consequence, his attitudes of dealing with these related issues demonstrate one of the features of the PTRIC relational selfhood: situational determinism. It is worth noting that he is one among a number of contemporary Ruists trying to argue that some traditional and post-traditional Ruist values are universal values (C1S3.1.1), especially within internationally-interconnected modern and mass education in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. While this is not the place to go into an extended discussion of his motivations and rationales for engaging in this Ruist promotion campaign, it is enough to ask how an interpretation of these Ruist values depending only on specific situations, instead of consistently providing coherent evidence and universalizable moral arguments, can realize any universal value. In pursuing these claims, Tu also discloses a tendency towards supporting a Ruist moral perfectionism, so that Ruist values always appear to be morally impeccable and, consequently, not vulnerable to ethical criticisms. Whether or not other contemporary Ruists also speak in multi-form voices in facing criticisms of Ruism will not be addressed here, but I feel obliged to underscore this discursive problem in Tu’s own corpus.

3 In a recent interview, in defending the highly criticized ‘Chinese culture’ and ‘Ruist tradition’ in modern times, Tu Weiming (2013 in Lì, Huá 築華 and Tu, Weiming 2013) claims that the survival of ‘Ruist tradition’ until now proves its incorruptibility, because ‘it has smelted itself into a body with an adamantine skeleton’.
Although the responsive Tu offers criticisms of authoritarian hierarchical societies, especially by opposing the rigidity of the traditional Ruist teaching of sangang, the resistant Tu either denies that authoritarianism is part of orthodox Ruist interpretations and teachings, or seeks to justify a particular traditional Ruist pattern of authoritarianism promoted by sangang (as explained in C5S3.1 and C5S7.1). These inconsistent responses can only lead to frustration for those who would seek to follow his claims, but for those who have reasons to oppose his claims, this can only confirm their deeper suspicions. As already explained in C8S1, the responsive Tu has not yet shown any flexibility in adjusting any of his presuppositions or even some parts of the framework of his post-traditional Ruist interpretations. So, one is left with a quandary: the responsive Tu only continues to advocate the elements of a framework that validate each other mutually in multiple steps of circular reasoning, while the resistant Tu negates these interpretations of the responsive Tu by justifying a particular traditional Ruist pattern of authoritarianism promoted by sangang (C5S7.1).

There are some significant relational tensions and conceptual predicaments involved in Tu’s account as a path moving away from the person and towards the personage. These include at least the following problems.

Firstly, there are four major relational issues, rooted in the actual conditions affecting the personage existing in this idealized vision of Tu’s New Ruist community. These include (1) the restrictive imperfections plaguing humankind within our earthly lives, (2) the asymmetrical hierarchical version of a traditional Ruist social structure, (3) his version of Ru-based collectivism, and (4) his version of New Ruist cultural devaluation of a privatized self. In addressing these problems, Tu’s idealistic interpretations of traditional Ruist persons and communities do not provide any new solutions for problems of the RFS. Instead, within his discourse, the responsive Tu acknowledges the existence of certain problems including the RFS, but the resistant Tu
evades them. This kind of *moral idealism* manifests itself precisely in binding up the personage within a framework of a repressively imposed relational self. These findings, which are also supported by related conclusions found in other scholars’ criticisms, have helped me understand how PTRIC relational selfhood has been formed, and why PTRIC persons have been suffering from the RFS. Negatively masking one’s self indicates why it is such a struggle for PTRIC persons to liberate themselves from these complexities and their discursive justifications.

Secondly, Tu’s relational selfhood is in fact restricted within a tightly bound closed system. In relation to humankind in general, a group of collective selves for Tu constitutes a society, and so becomes the only effective transcendent reference point for any conception of selfhood (C4S3.5). In his interpretation, there is a discrepancy between the limits and imperfections of interpersonal relational reality and his idealistic assumptions about human perfectibility Tu claims. The existence of this discrepancy is critical for the emergence and liberation of any PTRIC personage under conditions of a repressed form of self or repressively imposed relational selves. Tu tries to resolve this discrepancy by adding several interconnected assumptions that he himself claims he has faith in, all being related to his post-traditional accounts of a traditional Ruist worldview. These involve teachings such as a Heaven-endowedly perfectible human nature of ‘intrinsic goodness’, an unceasing communal moral self-cultivation without help or grace from any external personal God, and the ultimate transformation of selfhood (or sagehood) as preconditions for knowing and uniting with Heaven. All of these have been discussed and evaluated in C4. For Tu (1985:125–7), Heaven is not ‘a transcendent reference point (such as God)’, but ‘reaching Heaven’ is precisely equivalent to a human being’s full self-realization of one’s selfhood. As a result, his putative solutions actually lead him into further discrepancies in linking his perfectionist relational selfhood to the circular arguments summarized in Diagrams 5.1 and 5.2. Consequently, this account of relational selfhood
becomes an idealized vision that is actually unrealizable. Besides, from Moltmann’s perspective (1974a:7), Tu’s vision of relational selfhood tends to become a form of humanistic idolatry, because Heaven is completely reduced to an aspect of selfhood. Although Tu unequivocally refuses that theism is a Ruist alternative (C4S3.4 and C8S3.2.4), the fact is that if he took up a theistic Ruist option as some other historical Ruists have done — such as the Han Dynasty Ruist, Tung Chungshu 董仲舒 (p. Dǒng Zhòngshū) (179–104 BCE) (Taylor 2005:599) and the Qing Dynasty Ruist, Lo Chungfān 羅仲藩 (p. Luó Zhòngfān) (d. circa 1850) (Pfister 1999) — there would be more flexibility for providing an ‘external transcendent reference point’ in a vital Tian/Shàngdì 天／上帝 theism. It might also even provide a real and open relational dynamic ‘dialogue with the transcendent’. 4

Thirdly, Tu denies that traditional Ruism is a form of collectivism, and so tries by this means to get rid of any elements of repressive social impositions and coercive strategies in his account of relational selfhood. Nevertheless, his interpretations still verify that the privatized self is devalued within his accounts of traditional Ruist cultural structures (C4S4.5). Given that it is not possible to valorize the person independent of his/her communal and social contexts in Tu’s closed system of relational selfhood, a PTRIC society can only be comprised of collectivist selves, instead of any freely interacting relational selves. As a consequence, his interpretations of PTRIC communities are unavoidably collectivist.

4 As I was completing this thesis, I found a subtle statement made by Tu Weiming in a recent interview in the year of his retirement from Harvard University and his inauguration at Peking University. He (2010 in Hong, Gu 2010) surprisingly expressed, in ways that are opposite to his previous positions, that ‘Ruism is not my faith because faith does not allow doubting … If I encounter a more powerful knowledge and thought which is opposite to Ruist tradition, I would choose truth’. He rejected the misunderstanding about him to say that ‘[Tu Weiming] is a propagator and believer of Ruism who hopes to expand its influences’ (ibid.). He even stressed ‘Ruism is not the basis of advanced humanistic studies, but merely an alternative for facing a problem’ (ibid.). Does this suggest that Tu Weiming has greatly changed his thought, positions, and direction? Or is this dramatic change still another situation-oriented expression? We all need to wait and see what the answer to these questions actually will be.
Fourthly, as mentioned in C1S1.3, C1S1.4, and C1S2, the third form of Ruist tradition — popular culture — embodies the social and relational problems mentioned above. Tu does not recognize that this popular expression of PTRIC culture is participating in or related to any form of orthodox Ruist tradition. Nevertheless, in terms of the problems of the RFS, Tu’s own so-called orthodox post-traditional New Ruist relational selfhood does not display any significant conceptual differences or relational values distinct from those that appear in PTRIC relational selfhood. Therefore, in an ironic twist, Tu’s account actually verifies indirectly the link between traditional Ruist orthodoxy and popular PTRIC forms of relational selfhood.

Due to all the above significant predicaments, the responsive Tu, along with some other contemporary Ruists, endeavours to defense for the healthy version of New Ruist relational selfhood which is built upon balanced relationships between the individual self and the group. Still, the most critical question they must answer is whether or not this version of New Ruist relational selfhood is possible to be formed without significant changes in any of the presuppositions anchoring it. Although I do not see this possibility through this research, this question deserves more advanced study by both Ruist and non-Ruist scholars.

To sum up, the discovery of Tu Weiming’s account answers the first primary subsidiary research question by indicating that his account of New Ruist relational selfhood generally is not a promising solution for the research problem related to the RFS shaped in PTRIC conceptions of relational selfhood. Although the responsive Tu’s attitude shows some potential to overcome the problem of the RFS, this can only occur if the presuppositions of his account are adjustable. From the analytical explanations\(^5\) presented in C3, C4, C5, and C8, it has been shown that Tu’s general interpretive account

\(^5\) Their summaries are illustrated in Chart 8.3, Diagrams 3.1 and 8.2.
of relational selfhood is based upon doing things by oneself (moral self-cultivation) within an authoritarian hierarchical society reinforced by a strong ideology requiring social conformity and enforced by means of feelings of shame. Therefore, it tends to lead to a repressive form of a socialized imposed relational self, moving along a path from the person to the personage, rather than the reverse. When the value of an individual human being depends so much on others’ subjective recognition for one’s own subjective moral cultivation, the problems of a repressive form of social imposition leading to the RFS are inescapable. This is especially the case when it is experienced within the asymmetrical hierarchical relationships found in PTRIC social structures. Accordingly, Tu’s account of relational selfhood is essentially the same as the account of PTRIC relational selfhood; he fails to prove that there is any significant distinction between his so-called orthodox Ruist account and the PTRIC account categorized as the small folk tradition.

3. Discovery of Jürgen Moltmann’s Account as Moving from the Personage to the Person

Given that post-enlightenment forms of Western European Christianity are recognized, or even criticized by some scholars, as being the source for Western individualism, Jürgen Moltmann creatively enriches a social trinitarian anthropology drawing upon Eastern Orthodox Christian traditions. According to Moltmann’s interpretation (summarized in C7S8), one’s identity is not made secure by moral self-cultivation, namely the efforts, performance, and achievements of human beings, to earn worthiness of social relationships, but by gracious moral cultivation. That is to say, a real self for any person is realized by the works, grace, and promise of the triune God, through the embedded imago Dei, in the form of the imago Trinitatis. This is a divine work within

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6 Scholars usually tend to generalize and homogenize accounts about the actual pluralities existing within Christianity as well as in Western civilization, characterizing them as if all Christians and Westerners think and act in the same ways. From an empirical point of view, this is blatantly false. For example, as mentioned in C6F2, modern individualism is related to European post-Enlightenment forms of Christianity, and not to Christianity as a whole.
human beings, a messianic reconciling and redeeming *imago Christi*, leaving a hope for
the transforming *gloria Dei* that is realized for future fellowship with God and others in
Christ.

Therefore, on the basis of these analytical explanations found in C3, C6, C7, and C8, Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood is grounded on *being* and *becoming* the *imago Trinitatis*, namely humans’ status as both existent and transformable beings as the *imago Trinitatis*. In other words, as demonstrated in C8S3.2.6, morality, holiness, and wisdom are the results of a renewed image and likeness of God granted to human beings in the New Creation, instead of pursuing but unattaining to them through a ceaseless activity of moral self-cultivation as promoted in Tu’s accounts of traditional and post-traditional Ruist ethics.

Consequently, the community in Moltmann’s account is an open community of grace framed within its relationship with the open Trinity according to the *perichoresis*-oriented template from social trinitarian relationships. Such *perichoresis*-oriented relationships among human beings are created in the *imago Trinitatis*, ruined after the Fall, and restored through the *imago Christi*. Accordingly, this Christian vision of open community includes open relational selves, an orientation towards relational ontological equality among individuals, a dynamic balance between the unity of the community and the diversity of each individual with their different duties and roles in the *functional* social order of that community. That community is lived out with an eschatological goal expressed in an anticipatory present experience, as mentioned in C6. Such a community helps the personage to reveal the true *person* without the persistent need for negatively masking, by offering relational options that do not require a repressively socially-imposed idealised morality, and so is able to liberate the repressed form of the self. In other words,

7 Their summaries are illustrated in Chart 8.3 and Diagrams 3.1 and 7.1.
Moltmann’s account forms a path to the person which is realized through the revealing personage, rather than moving from a form of relational personhood to an oppressed personage.

Before taking this intellectual journey of discovery, the social trinitarian doctrine was totally strange to me. I accepted and learned the trinitarian doctrine, but it was expressed merely as a metaphysical conceptualization that seemed irrelevant to my daily Christian life. The discovery of Moltmann’s account of social trinitarian relational selfhood, encouraged and inspired by Damon So, not only gave me a new perspective of relating human life to the Divine Trinity, but also made it relevant to my research into relational selfhood and the dynamics of interpersonal relationships in daily Christian living. The concept of the perichoresis-oriented open community created a new way of seeing others and myself, cultivating a new sensitivity to respect and cherish other persons’ diversity and my own diversity. This has been an immense breakthrough for my inherent collectivist mindset. This does not mean, however, that I agree with every aspect of Moltmann’s theological position. For example, I find good biblical reasons not to agree with Moltmann’s interpretation of sin and his promotion of ‘Christian universalism’ (C7S2 and A-O). Still, by exploring the path moving towards the already-and-not-yet person reached by means of the revealing personage, I came to realize how it could provide an alternative solution for PTRIC persons suffering from a RFS.

That an individual person is necessarily always embedded in his/her own communal relationships, and that some special synthesis of the best elements of both collectivism and individualism is to be pursued, form a universal hope among many scholars. These include Tu Weiming and Moltmann, both of whom argue that their accounts of relational selfhood can serve as such a synthesis (A-E, A-J, and C8S2.2). What this research is concerned about is what kind of synthesis can help in liberating the RFS prevalent in PTRIC societies. As mentioned in the previous chapters, mainly in C1 and C2 (and also
A-E and A-F), the problems of the RFS are closely related to problems of personal development; these naturally involve the dynamics of interpersonal relationships, linking them also to a variety of other social issues and problems. In this light, I have argued that Moltmann’s account has multiform significance for PTRIC selfhood. In other words, taking Moltmann’s account as a transformative model of relational selfhood that is able to overcome constraints leading to RFS can result in the following changes in any PTRIC social contexts.

Distinctively from a Christian standpoint, it offers an external transcendent reference point in addition to a relational foundation for affirming the absolute and objective value of the self. This serves well as a template for an open perichoresis-oriented community of selves shaped by gracious moral cultivation.

Moltmann’s approach also provides a theoretical foundation for integrative psychotherapy, transformative psychology, and counselling, in order to liberate those individuals and their communities who are suffering from repressive social impositions (and so negatively masking). In this manner it offers a concrete alternative to cultural conditions where there is a loss of self and various forms of related addictions, mental illness, or even felt pressures tending towards despair and committing suicide.

Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology nurtures a transforming perspective for personal development within familial and communal settings, especially in relation to growth in personality, creativity, moral thinking, assertiveness, self-affirmation, and self-confidence.

In addition, Moltmann’s promotion of open relationships based on the *imago Trinitatis* suggests ways to overcome coercive, hurting, broken, demanding, manipulating, and co-dependent interpersonal relationships.

Furthermore, the humanity envisioned through the *imago Trinitatis* provides a way and framework for establishing an open community of mutual reciprocity, expressed by
means of diversity in unity and unity in diversity. It could shape a more healthily and securely relational culture for building up mutually supportive relationships between parents and children within renewed love and new forms of filial responsiveness. In this same manner, it could enliven suitable relationships between husbands and wives, teachers and students, and other relationships between superiors and inferiors in various social settings.

The dynamics involved in Moltmann’s account of open relationships offer a transforming perspective for reconsidering the functional orders of families, communities, schools, businesses, and governments, that should lead to direct and effective communication, sincere and appropriately assertive expressions of self, as well as mutual respect and submission.

Moltmann’s engaged theology suggests a perspective of openness for reconceiving accounts of ethnicity and nationality, extending even to embrace ecological concerns. The openness of the open Trinity to the world which God has created (1985b:173–4) so that He can unite ‘with [hu]mankind, and with the whole creation’ (Moltmann 1981:90) provides a completely distinct perspective for addressing ethnicity, nationality, and ecology. Most other perspectives find it hard to escape from being either atheistically anthropocentric or theistically patricentric. Even if Tu claims his New Ruism is anthropocosmic, it is in fact still essentially anthropocentric (as argued in C4S3.5).

To sum up, this discovery of Moltmann’s account of a social trinitarian relational selfhood has answered the second primary subsidiary research question by indicating that his account provides an appropriate and better alternative account of relational selfhood. It can, therefore, serve as a promising solution for the research problem shaped in PTRIC conceptions of relational selfhood, because it opens up possibilities for liberating the RFS and replacing repressive social impositions with open relational options.
Related to all the above multifaceted possibilities of applying Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts, two very challenging questions arise for those who would want to put them into practice. Firstly, can his theoretical version of Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood really work within PTRIC cultural contexts? What kind of concrete institutional and relational options would need to be created or developed in order to make this feasible? Secondly, might Moltmann’s insights still be selectively applied even without accepting all of the presuppositions anchoring them? For example, could it be combined with some aspects of the responsive Tu’s approach to relational selfhood as a possible alternative (C8S5.2) or could it be adopted by Ruified Chinese Christians (as explained in C1F3)? These questions deserve more advanced exploration by researchers, especially in contexts where practitioners are applying Moltmann's insights in specific kinds of PTRIC cultural contexts.

4. Multiple Theoretical Alternatives for Liberating the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts

Effectively then, in C5, C7, and C8, analytical comparisons have revealed that, besides the similarities, the critical and decisive differences in those accounts leading to or preventing the problem of the RFS are related significantly to their different presuppositions. Therefore, the main finding of this research in answering the main research question is that the concept of relational selfhood nurtured within the social trinitarian anthropology of Jürgen Moltmann theoretically might lead to an inner transformation of character and virtue for PTRIC people, and would do so in ways that cannot be achieved easily by Tu Weiming’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood.

However, according to the analysis presented in the previous chapters, although Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood offers a more constructive possibility for overcoming the research problem of the RFS than Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood overall, nevertheless, Moltmann’s account was not originally designed for
solving that problem in PTRIC contexts. Since more and more Chinese Christians and non-Christians live in multi-cultural contexts, three possible alternative theoretical solutions have been considered in C8 for Chinese persons, especially for those who are suffering from the problem of the RFS:

(1) the responsive Tu’s account of new Ruist relational selfhood;

(2) a selective combination or synthesis of the resistant Tu’s account of new Ruist relational selfhood and Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood;

(3) Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood.

As presented at the end of C8, each of these above three possible alternative solutions has its own strengths, weaknesses, and challenges to face, and so each alternative has its own applicability for differing needs of suffering Chinese persons. As for how they might work in concrete circumstances, further empirical research in the future would be needed to verify each alternative’s worthiness. At the very least, there would be two other alternatives to try out further if one alternative were to fail. This kind of *indirect dialogue* (see C3S2.6.2) — searching for common solutions for resolving the social and practical research problem rather than merely exchanging different ‘religious ideas’ — is worth exploring, and may reveal even more benefits stemming from focused interactions between contemporary Ruist and Christian traditions.

5. Limitations of this Research and Future Research Possibilities

This research project has its inherent limitations, and so here I will suggest some future research possibilities in six topical realms based upon the theoretical discussions and evaluative conclusions already reached here and in previous chapters.

Due to focusing on the research problem of the RFS, the exploration and analytical comparison of Tu Weming’s New Ruist relational selfhood and Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood are limited to the materials relevant to my explicit research problem. In this sense, it is not an exhaustive or comprehensive study of the
nature of selfhood within a larger range of more diversified teachings with the major streams of Ruist and Christian traditions. All of the arguments in this thesis are about Tu’s and Moltmann’s interpretations, even though the discussions of post-traditional Ruist and Christian social trinitarian conceptions of relational selfhood have not been limited to them. This research is a pioneering attempt to apply Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood to the social scientific criticism of traditional and post-traditional Ruism in terms of the issue of the RFS among PTRIC persons. Similarly, this is the first time anyone has sought to apply Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood to both PTRIC contexts and the issue of the RFS. In addition, applying the method of an indirect dialogue to both Tu’s and Moltmann’s corpuses has been done here through an analytical comparison between their accounts of relational selfhood in searching for a solution/solutions for this fundamental problem among PTRIC persons. Based on this thesis, further research can both verify the results of this thesis and its suggestions for advanced studies and other dialogues, both direct and indirect, between PTRIC intellectuals and contemporary Christian scholars on these themes as well as on other related topics.

The characterization and evaluation of the research problem have been based upon previously published theoretical and empirical studies. In contrast, this research is primarily a text-based theoretical study. Therefore, there are needs for further empirical (qualitative and quantitative) field research and case studies to explore, verify, modify, and/or rectify these conclusions I have argued for in the latter part of this thesis. The topic is of such importance that it merits professional input from psychological perspectives, especially involving social psychology and personality psychology, to establish practical and effective strategies for helping Chinese people. This new kind of research may help substantially in understanding more precisely and insightfully ways of overcoming the problems related to the RFS due to the impact of a repressively imposed understanding of relational selfhood in PTRIC cultural contexts. Furthermore, efforts at applying the
results of this theoretical research to the fields related to social behaviour would further call for research to be undertaken by scholars in other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology (especially in the realm of culturology), history, ethics, behavioural sciences (especially in the realm of organizational management and organizational behaviour), religious studies, communication studies, political science, economics, theology, and missiology. The primary and secondary sources in this thesis have manifested that scholars in the above disciplines are concerned about and interested in the issues related to this research problem and have already provided valuable academic contributions in this area. However, the current academic situation would benefit greatly from more interdisciplinary studies and indirect dialogues to improve practical solution(s) for liberating the RFS in PTRIC contexts as well as in other relevant cultural contexts.

Although PTRIC societies are not the only ones influenced by traditional values related to Ruist teachings and their contemporary advocates, and the problem of the RFS might not even be found in its severest form in Chinese societies, this research is limited to those PTRIC cultural contexts. Further theoretical and empirical research needs to be done in relation to relevant dimensions in Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese cultural contexts across various periods of history because of the influence of various kinds of Ruist traditions within those cultural contexts over many centuries, including also the emergence of various Christian traditions within those cultural contexts, most notably in Korea.

Although this research has limited its scope to explore issues of the RFS prevalent in Ru-influenced relational selfhood, it would be valuable to identify and explore the problems of RFSs and their related repressive social impositions as they occur in international and cross-cultural contexts, especially where Ruist traditions have not been operative, such as in various Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Daoist cultural contexts, or
under various forms of ideology, such as chauvinism, racism, postmodern contexts⁸ and feminist contexts (Bacon 2009). Strong social expectations do exist in various kinds of contemporary European and North American cultures as well. A strong work ethic, linked to selfish and competitive drives and social pressures to succeed within contemporary societies, may involve people from many quarters, including even Protestant pastors.

This research has found that Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood can serve as a promising alternative solution for the RFS phenomenon related to conceptions of relational selfhood prevalent in contemporary Chinese popular culture (and also actually promoted generally by Tu Weiming’s account). However, in considering different needs of PTRIC persons in multifaith societies, two other possible alternative solutions have also been suggested here above and at the end of C8. Accordingly, these possible alternative solutions based on the discovery of Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood might be applied to those aforementioned contexts where problems of the RFS and a repressive social imposition of relational selfhood may also be found. This research can, therefore, also become a model for further studies in the above contexts where these problems may occur due to a relational understanding of selfhood that prevails in those settings.

Finally, the conclusions of this research reveal much about the actual conditions at large in PTRIC social settings. However, the influences of traditional and post-traditional Ruism vary among PTRIC persons in multifaith and pluralistic post-modern societies. There are definitely important sub-cultural differences manifested within its demographic

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⁸ Rebecca J. Erickson (1995:139) does not think there is an ‘unidimensional inner core to be trusted above all else’ in postmodern ideology. For ‘what is true’ for postmodern people is decided by ‘who you are talking to’ (ibid.). Accordingly, ‘the potency of relying on internal logic has been replaced by the power of presenting the right image’ (ibid.). Therefore, ‘being true to self for all time’ is no longer important (ibid., eo). What matters is ‘being true to self-in-context or true to self-in-relationship’ (ibid.). That is to say, ‘the importance of the particular self-values that are implicated in any two situational contexts or relationships may differ’ (ibid.). From this characterization of postmodern selfhood, we can find the similarities with selfhood in postmodern and PTRIC Ruism. However, insincerity or negatively masking is not an issue in postmodern contexts (Baudrillard 1983:5–13; Tseélon 1992). See also Gergen (2000:139–70).
subgroups (as mentioned in C1S1.4 and disclosed by other empirical studies in my secondary sources). This is especially the case when studies consider differences in sex, geography, age, and education, because PTRIC cultural contexts are more or less structured in authoritarian ways according to hierarchy, age, and gender (C4S4.4.3). Further theoretical and empirical research is needed in each of these realms, in order to assess how far the issues raised in this thesis can be concretely addressed within these specific sub-groups.

6. Details of this Research Project’s Original Contributions to Knowledge and New Insights

This research makes original contributions to knowledge and/or offers new insights in a number of areas that I will now highlight in this final section.

6.1 Neologisms and Conceptual Development

Firstly, in order to solve the problem of generalization and ambiguity of the term Ruism used in most of the literature I investigated, the phrase post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese (PTRIC), inspired by Pfister, is coined with the definition of its content. PTRIC specifies the cultural contexts of both the research problem and the Chinese societies within which Tu Weiming interacts (C1S1.4).

Secondly, different degrees of problems related to repression or negatively masking of the real self and the problem of repressive social impositions as found in PTRIC cultural contexts are integrated into the research problem. The phrase the repressed form of self (RFS) is coined to denote this integrated research problem (C1S2.3 and A-F).

Thirdly, the phrases repressive social impositions and the repressively imposed relational self are also coined to be designated as indicators of the problem of the RFS, since their phenomena are more easily grasped than the various descriptions presented in scholars’ discussion of the problem of self (C2S5).
Fourthly, in order to avoid any ambiguity in confusing contextual theological terminology in use currently with our own usage, two phrases have been coined to name and clarify two distinct aspects of contextual theology: *theology-contextualizing* and *content-theologizing* (C3S2.1).

Fifthly, in order to describe certain aspects of Christian theology expressed in Ruist language for the purpose of theology-contextualizing in comparative contrast to the Ruist doctrine of *moral self-cultivation*, the phrase *gracious moral cultivation* has been coined (C6S8.5).

### 6.2 Methodology

Firstly, contextual theology is applied to deal with the problem of the RFS in PTRIC contexts, and to offer multiple theoretical alternative solutions for the research problem in response to different needs of suffering Chinese persons (C3S2.1). Through the theology-contextualizing approach, the differences within the concepts of *moral cultivation* as expressed in both major traditions in this thesis can be articulated, compared, and communicated more lucidly and effectively (C6S8.5).

Secondly, when there is no common ground that can be agreed to advance effective interaction, the presuppositional analytical method is probably the best way to deepen the dialogue or debate between two parallel concepts, their positions and/or their varying evidential arguments. This situation is anticipated by this research and the presuppositional analytical method, originally used in Christian apologetics, has for the first time been applied to examine the alternative solution(s) for the research problem by means of a comparative analysis of Tu Weiming’s post-traditional New Ruism and Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropological relational ethics (C3S2.3).

Thirdly, *indirect dialogue* is applied to search for a solution/solutions for the research problem of the RFS in PTRIC contexts between Tu Weiming’s New Ruist account and Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian account of relational selfhood
(C3S2.6.2). As far as I know, this approach has not been previously employed in relationships to the worldviews and values promoted in the works of these two contemporary intellectuals.

Fourthly, Tu Weiming’s New Ruist interpretation of relational selfhood is comprehensively studied and systematically constructed from most of his works. As a consequence, it has been questioned from numerous perspectives in terms of the problem of the RFS, especially as evaluated through its influences involving repressive social impositions (C4). This has rarely been addressed in any academic context, being either avoided or only mentioned briefly.

Fifthly, this is also the first attempt to comprehensively analyse the interrelated assumptions informing Tu Weiming’s conception of a New Ruist selfhood, besides integrating and concluding them with the presuppositional analytical method as mentioned above (C4 and C5).

Sixthly, this is also the first attempt to comprehensively analyse Moltmann’s conception of social trinitarian relational selfhood with the presuppositional analytical method (C6 and C7).

6.3 Analytical Approaches

Firstly, in order to avoid any analytical tendency towards over-generalizing Tu’s different attitudes into only one attitude, I have distinguished two prominent interpretive attitudes expressed by means of the phrases the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu. Inspired by and worked out with Pfister, these two phrases have been coined to differentiate and analyse what otherwise would be simply considered to be Tu Weiming’s inconsistent attitudes towards the research problem and related criticisms raised by scholars. However, it is not easy in some contexts to discern completely independent voices that reveal these two attitudes in Tu’s works. In particular, it is worth noting that these two different attitudes do not indicate that Tu has two well-organized and systematically different visions of his
interpretations of New Ruist relational selfhood, but intends to indicate the range of interlinking evaluations and claims found within his wavering interpretations of sangang, and sometimes wulun, in different texts and contexts (C5).

Secondly, this is the first systematic effort at seeking to understand Tu Weiming’s claims in relationship to the phenomenon of the RFS and the social scientific criticisms of the RFS in PTRIC cultural contexts (C4, C5, and C8).

Thirdly, the concepts of the two facets (private and social) of the self in two dimensions (present and future) with two possible transforming paths (from the personage to the person or the reverse) are for the first time integrated into examining the conceptualization of the transformation of selfhood (C3S2.5 and C8S3.2.6).

6.4 Theoretical Innovation

Firstly, this is a pioneering attempt to suggest multiple theoretical alternative solutions for liberating the repressed form of self in PTRIC contexts by means of integrating the discoveries found in Tu Weiming’s account and Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood (C8S5).

Secondly, since this research is an attempt to deal with the social psychological problem of the RFS from a Christian theological approach, a comprehensive discussion of the problem of repressed behavioural custom of social masking offered by Tournier, but introduced by Pfister, has set out a suitable theoretical measurement reference to this research (A-E). Tournier’s psychological interpretations, especially in the concept of the ‘person’ and the ‘personage’, are for the first time applied as an assessment tool for examining the nature of the transforming path of Tu Weiming’s New Ruist and Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropological interpretations of relational selfhood (C3S2.4, C8S4, and A-E). This has never before been done by anyone.
Thirdly, this is the first attempt to modify Francis L. K. Hsu’s (1971) ‘psycho[-]sociogram of [the] human’ and to apply it to the understanding and explanation of Tournier’s concepts of the person and the personage, the tendency of negatively masking, and the path to the person in PTRIC contexts (A-G).

6.5 Explicit Cross-Cultural and Interdisciplinary Pioneering Explorations
Firstly, this is a pioneering study applying Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology to the problem of the RFS and to PTRIC cultural contexts (C6 to C8).

Secondly, this is the first dialogue, either direct or indirect, and comparative study between Tu Weiming’s New Ruist form and Moltmann’s social trinitarian vision of relational selfhood (C8). This has previously never been done by theologians or Ruist scholars.

Thirdly, in order to analytically compare Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s responses towards the problem of RFS in the light of contemporary social scientific criticisms, the cross-cultural and interdisciplinary understandings of the concept of a real self as an authentic expression of individual autonomy in light of the problem of the RFS are for the first time integrated into this project (C2S1.2 and A-D and A-H).

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9 The term psycho-sociogram is ‘an expansion of the term psychogram among psychologists’ to include a social dimension into psychological studies (Hsu, Francis LK 1971:41, eo).
APPENDICES

Appendix A

A Brief Introduction to the Historical Development after the Formation of Ruism

Ruism was formed as a system during the period of the Warring States (481-221 B.C.). Mou Tsungsan 卞宗三 (p. Móu Zōngsān) (1909-95) (1949 in 2003a:1–16) names this period as the first developmental epoch of Ruism, in reacting to the collapse of the ‘lǐ yuè wénhuà’ 禮樂文化 (the ritual and music culture) of the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE).

There is no consensus among contemporary scholars on the existence, development, and evolution of Ruism over its more than 2,500 years in Chinese history. However, it is generally recognized that there were two major revivals after the first developmental epoch of Ruism. In the first developmental epoch, Ruism was systematized in the pre-Qin period and developing in the Han-Jin period (206 BCE-420 CE) (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:8–9) after Ruist scholars won the trust of the rulers during the Former Han (or Western Han dynasty (206 BCE – 9 CE). However, Ruism receded into the background and its prestigious position was replaced by Buddhism after the Han dynasty fell (220 CE) and the rise of the Tang dynasty which favoured Buddhism. A revival of various strands of Ruist philosophy and political culture began in the middle of the ninth century and reached new levels of intellectual and social creativity in the eleventh century in the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127) (Overmyer 1986:48–51). This first revival is commonly called ‘Neo-Confucianism’, or Neo-Ruism (Berthrong 2005b:993). Mou

1 See also Li Ruiquán 李瑞全 (1997) and Hwang Kwangkuo 黃光國 (p. Huáng Guāngguó) (2006:292).
2 See also Yao Xinzhong (2013:8–9).
Tsungsan (1949 in 2003a:1–16) names this period the second developmental epoch of Ruism, in facing the challenge of Buddhism from India (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2006:292).³

Ruism came to dominate China and other East Asian countries over hundreds of years (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1) since the Wu Emperor (157-87 BCE) of the Western Han Dynasty established Ruism as the state ideology and dismissed the Hundred Schools (Xie, Wenyu 2011:18).⁴ Ruism has existed for more than two millennia, ‘as a cultural determining force’, educating the whole nation, dominating Chinese culture and thinking, and cultivating the Chinese civilization (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:510). Unsurpassed by any ideology or religion, it has also been more and more ‘revived … as an ideological antidote’ to fight against Westernization in East Asia (‘the Pan-Confucian region’) (ibid.). However, to maintain its dominant role, Ruist learning and teaching ‘changed constantly’ to fulfil the Empire’s requirement and so survive the challenges from other various schools of learning, especially the imported Buddhist and ‘[Anglo-European] Western learning’ (‘xīxué」西學) (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:4). Consequently, some of the teachings in the ancient texts might have been selectively ignored, for example, ‘the employment of remonstrance’ (‘jiànzhèng 諫諍’) (Pfister 2013a:3),⁵ reciprocal submission in son-father and wife-husband relationships (Wáng, Jué 王珏 2014:140), or ‘the advocacy of family-based vengeance’ (Pfister 2011:1).⁶ Others were selectively emphasized (even over-emphasized), for example, filial piety (Evasdottir 2005:31–8), ‘legalism’ (Keating 2004:website), and ‘absolute submission’ (Fu, Zhengyuan 1993:53).⁷ Therefore, Fu

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³ See also Li Ruiquán 李瑞全 (1997).
⁴ See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510) and Shizuka (2010).
⁶ See also Pfister (2013c:4–11).
Zhengyuan indicates that it is not easy to ‘disentangle’ the authentic teachings of Ru from the ‘misinterpreted and distorted’ ones (ibid., eo).\(^8\) There is no consensus among Ruists for a standard interpretation version for Ruism.

In the twentieth century, the second revival movement based on Neo-Ruism arose known as New Ruism, Contemporary New Ruism (Berthrong 2005a:995), or Modern New Ruism (Yao, Xinzong 2013:8, 10f.). This third developmental epoch of Ruism (Mou, Tsungsan 1949 in 2003a:1–16) is engaged in dialogue with Anglo-European Western philosophy in order to respond appropriately to the challenge of an aggressive and dominating Anglo-European Western culture (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2006:293).\(^9\)

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\(^8\) See also Arcodia (2003).

\(^9\) See also Li Ruiquán 李瑞全 (1997). To re-establish a Ruist value system under modern conditions and to strive for the modernization of Chinese culture and society through communication with and integration of western learning and knowledge are key features which differentiate New Ruism from other Ruist schools (Yú, Bìngyì 余秉颐 2008:58).
Appendix B

Evidence from Japanese Society:

Ru-affected Culture and the Problem of Negative Masking

There is a similar problem of selfhood, even worse among men, amongst the post-traditional Japanese who are also deeply rooted in traditional Ruism. The Japanese are another people group in the context of even stronger Ru-based collectivist ideology (Morishima 1984:198), hierarchical social structure (ibid.:7), and performance-orientation (ibid.:183). It is notable that there are still some differences between traditional Ruist influences on post-traditional Japanese and Chinese. Therefore, the studies on the same issue among the post-traditional Japanese are helpful in verifying the correlation of Ru-based collectivism and the problem of negative masking.

Chris Payne (2003:13–15) summarizes that the strong hierarchical society and relationships in modern Japan are connected with Confucius’ teaching of obligatory submission to elders and superiors. ‘Pleasure, comfort, and acceptance’ are yielded in this cultural foundation of hierarchically social relationships among the post-traditional Japanese, which are strongly dependence-based and ‘group-based’ relationships. The post-traditional Japanese self is concurred by many scholars as being socially ‘embedded’ or ‘defined’ (Lebra 1994:107), or precisely the post-traditional Japanese self is a ‘consciously socialized self’ (ibid.). William Nester (1995:327) explains further that ‘amae’ (dependence) is the ‘lubricant’ for a social community in which ‘hierarchy,
inequality, and conformity’, instead of ‘equality, liberty, and individuality’, are viewed as just and natural. De Vos (1993:135) also points out that in a culture where ‘role harmony’ dominates ideally and strongly, ‘equalizing relationships’ is never an aim except in the friendship of the same age group.

A Japanese psychiatrist, Takeo Doi (1920-2009) (1981:132–3), identifies the similar phenomenon of ‘have[ing] no self’ among post-traditional Japanese, that had been pointed out earlier by George Matheson (1842-1906) and Hiromichi Kozaki (1856-1938) according to Ballhatchet (1988:359–64). Doi indicates that the sacrifice of the ‘small self’ for the sake of the ‘larger self’ is still an extolled virtue in modern Japan (ibid.:135, eo). Not only the importance of Japanese tradition affixed to the group instead of the individual, but also humans cannot even survive without the group. Consequently, for the individual, it is easier to ‘act in concert with the group’ (ibid.:135). ‘Self-sacrifice’ for one’s superior, one’s family, one’s company, and one’s society and country is a prevalent ideology in post-traditional Japanese society (Morishima 1984:91, 117). Doi (1986:55–57) calls this trait ‘Japanese group-ism’. A psychologist, Alan Goldman (1994:7), concludes that post-traditional Ru-grounded Japanese behave extremely ‘conciliatory, group-oriented and non-confrontational’ and are always strategically concerned with saving face. To sum up and infer from the observation of the above scholars, it is understandable that ‘indirect communication’ (Goldman 1994:9) becomes a prevalent communicative way among post-traditional Japanese in order to be non-confrontational and save others’ and one’s own face when conflicts arise. Such indirect communication might be a sign of the tendency of the RFS. Post-traditional Japanese men

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3 See also Ballhatchet (1988:364) and Kasulis (1994:85).
4 See also de Vos (1985:156–69).
5 See also Doi (1986).
6 See also Fuki (2002).
in the Ru-affected relational society are trained to seek to demonstrate strength and domination in their outer appearance and performance and thus pretend externally to perform as expected because they are not so internally. In other words, even if post- traditional Japanese society is traditionally a male-dominant patriarchal society (Payne 2003:18) and the man is expected to be a stronger figure than a woman (Doi 1981:155), the reality is totally reversed. Juzo Itami (1933-97) (1999, cited in Payne 2003:18) states from his observation, ‘[post-traditional] Japanese men have always been weak … [post- traditional] Japanese culture is not one in which men are strong’. Their inner feelings and responses are in fact too weak to take action and responsibility, especially in dealing with relationships and their emotions. I infer that post-traditional Chinese men and post-traditional Korean men are the same.7

In spite of the tendency of reductionism and generalization, the problem of the RFS pointed out by Doi is never groundless and invalidated. Doi (1981:140), through comparison between the post-traditional Anglo-European Westerners and the post-traditional Japanese,8 concludes that ‘the absence of a self’ is valued as a virtue in post-traditional Japanese culture but not in the post-traditional Anglo-European Western countries. He finds that ‘the awareness of having a self’ is more difficult for the post-traditional Japanese than the post-traditional Anglo-European Westerner and attributes the cause of their difference to something in the Anglo-European West that is able to ‘transcend the group’ (ibid., eo). At the same time of transcending the group, it also gives a strong ‘sense of belonging’ to the individual (ibid.:140). I infer that what is able to transcend the group Doi mentioned in this context is the ‘God’ in the Anglo-European

7 Post-traditional Korea is the most Ru-based East Asian country and there are also similar strong traditional Ruist characteristics in post-traditional Korea as in post-traditional Japan and in post-traditional Chinese societies (Jones and Il Sakong 1980). However, I have not yet found any study and discussion about the issues of the repressed form of self in the post-traditional Korean context in English sources.

8 See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990).
Western Christian sense that he discussed in the context of ‘the fatherless society’ in modern Japan (ibid.:156). But why is the absence of a self not considered a virtue in the modern Anglo-European West? And from where do the different value and culture systems come in modern Japan and in the Anglo-European West? Doi did not pursue this question further. However, Doi discusses thereafter ‘the fatherless society’ issue and suggests it as the complication of ‘the lack of self’ (ibid.:150–57).

Doi finds that the problem of the ‘generation gap’ in modern Japan nowadays is actually the gap between the children or younger generation and their fathers (ibid.:150, eo). This gap results from the fathers’ failure to provide their ‘true feelings’ on ‘a set of values’ based on which children can live (ibid.:152). The main reason is that the fathers’ ‘loss of self-confidence’ and their influence on their children has weakened even to nothing (ibid.). In Ruth Benedict’s (1989:300f.) language, post-traditional Japanese fathers are characterized as ‘depersonalized objects’ as supported by the evidence of Dean C. Barnlund’s (1975:85–7) empirical research. What is another paradoxical phenomenon, pointed out by Doi, is that ‘there is nothing to convey a true sense of authority although power nowadays has become increasingly concentrated and extremely potent’ (ibid.:152). Doi calls it ‘a society without a father’ although he admits the impossibility of a ‘totally fatherless society’ (ibid.:152, 155, eo). It has been noted that what Doi means by without a father or fatherless is not the non-existence of a father but a child without a sincere, intimate, and transparent relationship with his/her father.

Doi argues that the phenomenon of a fatherless society can be understood as the anger of children at ‘paternal weakness’ for appealing to ‘a stronger father’ and draws this theory to explain ‘revolution’ as ‘a psychological slaying of the father’ (ibid.:155). Paradoxically, it seldom ends up without creating and worshiping another stronger father-

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9 To the best of Doi’s (1981:152, eo) knowledge, the phrase fatherless society was first expressed by Paul Federn, ‘On the Psychology of Revolution: The Fatherless Society, published in 1919’. 
like figure, such as Vladimir ‘Lenin’, Fidel Castro, Kim Il-sung, ‘Ho Chi-Minh’ (ibid.). He even states that ‘Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s appeal to youth all over the world may be a reflection of this state of mind’ (ibid.). Although this statement sounds too exaggerated, Doi pinpoints the psychological need of a father who can assume his responsibility. Hiroshi Wagatsuma’s psychological research (1977:204–205) supports Doi’s observation on the causality between the RFS and the fatherlessness and also attributes traditional and post-traditional Ruism as an important factor resulting in them. Nevertheless, Peter Bankart and Brenda Bankart (1985:689) feel that Wagatsuma’s conclusion on the fatherlessness of ‘the once [traditional] Confucian Japanese family’ is probably ‘too strong’. Michael Dziesinski’s further study (2004:2) indicates the ‘hikikomori’ (‘acute social withdrawal syndrome’) prevalent among the post-traditional Japanese younger generation is to some extent the effect of fatherlessness. I find that all of these studies disclose the vicious cycle in the post-traditional Ruified Japanese society: the father’s RFS results in the fatherless younger generation and the fatherless younger generation’s social withdrawal results in the RFS.

Doi (1981:132–41) also suggests that the issue of ‘fatherlessness’ should be dealt with ‘the question of the absence of God’ because the absence of God has been progressively taken for granted ever since ‘God is dead’ was stated by Nietzsche (quoted in ibid.:156). Post-traditional Japanese men as one of the most urbane peoples in the world had committed one of the most brutal holocausts in human history in China, the Nanjing Holocaust, and other atrocities during World War II. Is this inhuman behaviour related to their problem of loss of self and fatherlessness? Doi does not analyse this sensitive issue. However, Charles Bellinger (2010:81) argues that ‘the deepest root of violence is the self’s refusal to grow spiritually’. Dziesinski (2004:2) also indicates, by quoting from The Atlantic Online, that ‘violence’ is a result of hikikomori, which resulted from fatherlessness as aforementioned. This correlation between ‘violence’ and hikikomor.
verified by psychiatric experts, aroused the ‘Japanese government’ to take steps to deal with the \textit{hikikomor} problem (ibid.:7). The researches by Doi, Bellinger and Dziesinski provide initiatives to investigate further the correlation between the problem of loss of self (the RFS) and fatherlessness and also their correlation with violence, other anti-social and even criminal behaviour, and the absence of a belief in God.
Appendix C
The Definition, Attributes and Types of Collectivism and Individualism

Many scholars tend to generalize individualism as Western and collectivism as Eastern and do not specify which kind of collectivism and individualism they are talking about. However, Western or Eastern forms of behaviour are not uniform in terms of collectivism or individualism and the reasons shaping any variety of collectivism or individualism might not be the same. Accordingly, most discussions on collectivism and individualism seem to fall into generalization or even reductionism, especially in terms of certain local ‘cultural patterns’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:375). However, there is no general consensus about the scope of individualistic and collectivistic (or holistic) explanations and the usage and definition of their many key terms (Zahle and Collin 2014a:6, 11). The definition and types of collectivism and individualism are introduced briefly here for reference.

1. The Definition and Attributes of Collectivism and Individualism

At psychological levels, collectivism is more ‘allocentric’ and individualism more ‘idiocentric’ or in Markus and Kitayama’s language (1991b), ‘interdependent’ vs. ‘independent’ and in Sampson’s language (1988), ‘ensembled’ vs. ‘self-contained’. Personal interests, needs, and goals have priority over collective ones in individualism;¹

¹ It is notable that ‘holism’ is another term denoting ‘collectivism’ (Zahle and Collin 2014a:6, 11).
² Triandis et al. (1985). See also Triandis et al. (1988:336). Since collectivism and individualism are cultural terms and allocentric and idiocentric psychological terms, there are allocentric persons in an individualistic culture and also idiocentric persons in a collectivistic culture (ibid.:324).
³ As explained in C1F61, interdependent might mean co-dependent in some context when it denotes an unhealthy interpersonal relationship.
⁴ Hui C. Harry and Triandis (1986:229–32, 244–5) list seven aspects for such interests, needs, and goals: (1) ‘one's consideration of the effects of own decision on others’; (2) ‘sharing of material resources’; (3) ‘sharing of less tangible resources (as in sacrificing some interesting activities)’; (4) ‘willingness to adopt
in collectivism, either personal and collective interests needs, and goals are the same, or personal interests needs, and goals are subordinated to collective ones if there is a distinction between them (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988). Accordingly, the sense of pursuing harmonious and interdependent interpersonal relationships and concern for others is much stronger in collectivism than in individualism. Individualism tends to have high ‘power distance’ compared to collectivism (Triandis 1989:509). In terms of the in-group, collectivism tends to subordinate personal goals to the collective that is usually a steady ‘in[-]group (e.g., family, band, [or] tribe)’ and much of personal behaviour might aim at the consistent goals with the ones of this in-group. The individual tends to have a stable relationship with the in-group, even being highly costly demanded by the in-group. But individualism tends to have numerous ‘in[-]groups (e.g., family, co[-]workers, clubs, and motorcycle gangs)’ and much of personal behaviour might aim at the consistent goals with various in-groups. The individual tends to leave the in-groups which are too ‘demanding’ (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:324).

In comparison, their in-groups, in the eyes of the people in collectivistic cultures, are much more homogeneous than their out-groups. But the people in individualistic cultures see their in-groups as more ‘heterogeneous’ than their out-groups (Triandis et al. 1990:1018, 1020). This evidence might manifest that the collectivistic people used to think more of ‘groups’ but the individualistic ones more of ‘individuals’ (ibid.:1018, eo). Therefore, thinking more of individuals yields the effect of paying more attention to others’ opinions’; (5) ‘worry about self-presentation and loss of face’; (6) belief in correspondence of outcomes with others’; (7) ‘the feeling of involvement and contribution in others’ lives’.

5 See also Triandis (1989:509).
6 C. Harry Hui and Triandis (1986:244–5).
7 Power distance denotes the ‘difference between those with power and those without power’ (Triandis 1989:509).
8 See also LeFebvre and Franke (2013).
‘heterogeneity’ (ibid.:1018). Thinking more of groups yields the effect of paying more attention to homogeneity and eliminating ‘individual differences’ (ibid.).

It is worth noting that individualism might be misused or misunderstood as the synonym of egoism or egocentrism. However, they do not mean the same thing (Hayek 1944:14). Accordingly, it is necessary to clarify the true meaning of the relationship between individuals and the group in individualism. Hall and Ames (1998:25) point out that the equality in Anglo-European Western individualism emphasizes the equality of all individuals in front of ‘the law, loci of human rights, and … equal opportunities’ and each of them is one member of ‘God’s children’, especially in the group made up by them. Fei Xiaotong (1992:67), a Chinese anthropologist, indicates that individualism pursues the ‘balance’ between individuals and their whole group. Accordingly, individualism yields two fruits (ibid.):

(1) equality: an individual is not allowed to ‘encroach on’ the others;

(2) constitutionality: the whole group is not allowed to negate the rights of any individual except ‘the partial rights’ handed over by them willingly.

Finally, the attributes of collectivism and individualism can be compared and manifested in Chart C.1 although not every item is explained here. It is notable that individualism is often viewed as the opposite to collectivism. However, its opposite extreme should be totalitarianism, which is also the extremity of collectivism (Hayek 1944:60). I argue that there might accordingly exist a spectrum of different levels of social

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9 Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:20, 23, 103f.).
10 See also Cheng Chungying and Leung Insing (2004:8).
11 This chart is the summary and integration of the results of ‘the measurement of the individualism-collectivism dimension’ (Triandis et al. 1985:397–8) by asking 49 anthropologists and psychologists all over the world and ‘multimethod probes of individualism and collectivism’ (Triandis et al. 1990:1006, 1020) by surveying over 1,000 (social) psychology students and teachers from a variety of cultural backgrounds. For more detailed comparative differences between individualism and collectivism, especially from the cross-cultural psychological perspective, see Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012). They provide a very comprehensive analysis from their survey and summarize it into two valuable charts.
behaviour ranging from extreme individualism through different levels of mixed individualism and collectivism to totalitarianism. Therefore, collectivism and individualism are not necessarily two opposite and mutually exclusive extremities. They can be ‘two independent factors’ (Triandis et al. 1986:260).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collectivism</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In[-]group Regulation of Social Behaviour</td>
<td>Individual Regulation of Social Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Dissociative and Superordinate Behaviour towards Out[-]group</td>
<td>Less Dissociative and Superordinate Behaviour towards Out[-]group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much Emphasis on Hierarchy.</td>
<td>Less Emphasis on Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Self-Sufficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordination of Personal Goals to Goals of In[-]group</td>
<td>In[-]group and Personal Goals Are Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In[-]group Harmony and Intimacy Important and Strong in[-]group/out[-]group distinctions</td>
<td>Confrontation Within In[-]group May Be Good: Loneliness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In[-]group Is Seen as Homogeneous</td>
<td>In[-]group Is Seen as Heterogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization for Obedience and Duty; Sacrifice for In[-]group; Focus on Common Elements with In[-]group</td>
<td>Socialization for Self-reliance and Independence; Good skills in entering new groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame Control</td>
<td>Guilt Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Common Welfare and Fate with In[-]group</td>
<td>Personal Goals and Fate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In[-]group Is Centre of Psychological Field</td>
<td>Person Is Centre of Psychological Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In[-]group Is Extension of the Self</td>
<td>Self Is Distinct from In[-]group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart C.1 The Attributes of Collectivism and Individualism (Quoted from Triandis et al. 1985:397–8; Triandis et al. 1990:1006, 1020)

2. The Types of Collectivism and Individualism

As disclosed in C1, Hui C. Harry and Triandis (1986:240) distinguish two main types of collectivism according to their range: 1. ‘a certain subset of people’; 2. ‘the entire universe of human beings’ (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:333). Chao C. Chen et al. (1997:48) name the former ‘horizontal collectivism’ and the latter ‘vertical collectivism’. Theodore

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12 See also Bhawuk and Brislin (1992:418) and Ames (2006:513–18). It has been noted that, in the past, there is always a debate about the concept of individualism and collectivism: they are ‘separate constructs’ or ‘different ends of a single bipolar continuum’ (O’Neill et al. 2015). However, this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.
M. Singelis et al. (1995:240) emphasized that horizontal collectivism stresses ‘equality’ but ‘inequality’ is accepted in vertical collectivism when they originally presented these two dimensions of collectivism. June Ock Yum (1988:375) argues that the Ru-based collectivism in East Asia is less the former but more the latter, which is ‘a [familistic] collectivism only among those bound by social networks’, especially family or kinship in Chinese contexts,\(^\text{13}\) instead of ‘any abstract concern for a general collective body’.

Liang Shuming (1949 reprinted in 2005:71) draws a diagram illustrating this kind of a post-traditional Chinese Ru-based familistic collectivism\(^\text{14}\) in contrast to what he refers to as ‘the Western’ one as shown in Diagram C.1.

**Diagram C.1 Post-Traditional Chinese Ru-Based Familistic Collectivism Illustrated by Liang Shuming** (1949 reprinted in 2005:71)

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\(^{13}\) Edward Yuitim Wong (2001:5).


\(^{15}\) In other words, an ambiguous relation here means that there is no clear boundary. See also Yang Zhongfang (1991b:122–3), Stipek (1998:620), and Ames (2006:520).
Therefore, according to Liang Shuming’s analysis, this post-traditional familistic from of Ruism promotes a system where the priority is placed on the family, then the self, and only subsequently the society or the nation. Only if the family, society, or nation is threatened by a common enemy, then the society or the nation might temporarily become the primary group. In that kind of situation, the hierarchy of value priorities might place the society or nation first, then the family, followed by the self.

This can also explain why Fei Xiaotong (1992:67) criticizes the Ruist collectivist selfhood as another type of ‘egocentrism’ in the Chinese collectivist context because the primary group or in-group and its harmony is always prioritized over both the individual and the secondary group or out-group.16 The above observation is also agreed by other scholars’ observations (discussed in C4) and verified by some empirical research among Chinese intellectuals.17

There are different classifications of individualism. One is to classify it into two types according to the development of human society: ‘proto-individualism’ vs. ‘neo-individualism’ (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:324–9, eo). In proto-individualism, ‘the individual is closely related to very few others’ and thus can act independently of others quite freely (ibid.:324). This kind of individualism still exists in ‘extremely simple societies’ (e.g., in the undeveloped regions, ‘the Arctic, deserts, jungles’) (ibid.:324, 329). But in ‘extremely complex cultures (e.g., modern industrial cultures)’, the individualism adapts to be both independent from in-groups and distant emotionally from in-groups although the amount of in-groups the individual can be related to is far more exceeding than in collectivistic societies (ibid.:324). This is so-called neo-individualism. Its

characteristics are that one can do *one’s own thing* and get away with it and one is hardly influenced by any problem of one’s in-group (ibid., eo).

Edward E. Sampson (1988:15ff.) classifies individualism into two types in his study on the indigenous psychology of American individualism: ‘self-contained individualism’\(^\text{18}\) vs. ‘ensembled individualism’. According to the nature of ‘the self-other boundary, the understanding of control … and the conceptualization of persons’, the characteristics of these two types of individualism are shown in Chart C.2. Sampson coins ‘field control’ in contrast to ‘personal control’ (ibid.:16ff., eo). In an individualistic culture of high personal control, the individual tends to be governed not internally but externally and be suspicious about and even antipathetic towards social institutions (ibid.:16).\(^\text{19}\) However, in an individualistic culture of high field control, the ‘power and control in a field of forces … includes but goes well beyond’ the individual (ibid.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-Contained Individualism</th>
<th>Ensembled Individualism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Other Boundary</strong></td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Fluid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conception of Persons</strong></td>
<td>Excluding</td>
<td>Including</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chart C.2 Two Types of Individualism Classified by Edward E. Sampson (1988:16)**

From the characteristics of Sampson’s two types of individualism informed by Chart C.2, both types of the former classification of individualism belong to self-contained individualism. It has been noted that the term *ensemble* is originally used by Marx (1845:14) to reject individualism in order to argue for socialism. Therefore,

\(^{18}\) Sampson (1977:770) defines the self-contained person as ‘one who does not require or desire others for his or her completion or life; self-contained persons either are or hope to be entire unto themselves’.

\(^{19}\) See also Hogan (1975:530).
Sampson’s classification of individualism supports the aforementioned reminder that collectivism and individualism can be two independent distinct categories but they are not necessarily two mutually exclusive extremes at the opposite ends of a continuum (Triandis et al. 1986:260).

3. The Differentiation of the Construals of the Self in Collectivism and in Individualism

In discussing the issue of the self, the terms collectivism and individualism tend to be either too generalized or misleading as mentioned above and in the thesis. The tendency of reductionism is because there is more than one type of both collectivism and individualism respectively; the tendency to mislead is because individualism is easily mistaken for egoism or self-contained individualism. Psychologists have started to use more specific terms to denote and differentiate the features of the selves in collectivistic and individualistic cultural contexts: the interdependent self and the independent self (Markus and Kitayama 1991a). The most significant distinction between these two construals of the self is ‘in the functional role of other individuals in self-definition’. Other individuals and the social context are essential for both selves. However, ‘others are directly involved in the self-definition’ of the unhealthy interdependent self but not of the independent self. For it is relationships with others in specific social contexts that are ‘the defining features’ of the former self (Markus and Kitayama 1991a:40). The self-defining construal of the self distinguishes the features of the selves in collectivism and in individualism. However, non-psychologist scholars have not yet adopted this construal of the self in their discussions.

20 Edward Yuitim Wong (2001:8f.).

21 There are the other pairs of terms for differentiating these two distinctive selves adopted by psychologists: ‘the looking glass self’ versus ‘the organismic self’ or ‘the social-psychological me versus ‘the organismic I’ (Ryan 1991:227–31).

22 See also Zusho (2008) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012).
Appendix D
Clarification of Terminology:
Different Perspectives on the Meaning of the Real or True Self

The RFS or negative masking in its repressed form is a psychological, ethical, relational issue influenced by theology, religion, or worldview. Zhai Xuewei (2010:190) points out that the studies of mask were ignored in the realm of psychology but have received attention from social psychologists. Since the term real self or true self denotes different meanings in different academic contexts, it is necessary to introduce briefly at least four categories of different approaches that define and apply the meaning of the real self or true self to their disciplines.

1. Social Psychological Perspective

David L. Hall (1994:219, eo) highlights three elements of consciousness about the self: ‘knowing, acting, and feeling’. In order to study and discuss the self and its social behaviour in differing cultural contexts, Harry C. Triandis (1989:506), a social psychologist, understands the self as comprising all overt or covert expressions stated by a person, ‘that include the words “I” “me,” “mine,” and “myself” ’ (Cooley 1902, quoted in ibid.). This understanding manifests that every aspect of ‘social motivation’ is connected to ‘aspects of the self’, including:

(1) ‘attitudes (e.g., I like X)’;
(2) ‘beliefs (e.g., I think that X results in Y)’;
(3) ‘intentions (e.g., I plan to do X)’;
(4) ‘norms (e.g., in my group, people should act this way)’;

1 See also Zhān Qǐshèng 詹啟生 and Lè Guó'ān 樂國安 (2002:27).
(5) ‘roles (e.g., in my family, fathers act this way)’;
(6) ‘values (e.g., I think equality is very important)’ (ibid.).

Edward Slingerland (2004:336) finds that ‘the social self metaphor’ is a very common shared mode in both the classical Chinese and English. This metaphor indicates that the large experience of our ‘interpersonal relationships’ helps us to know exactly about ‘evaluative qualities of specific social relationship onto our inner lives’ (ibid.).

The study of the self in social psychology focuses on how people in a cultural and social context adapt and cope with its cultural and social system (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:182), which is an universal phenomenon and termed as a ‘social exchange’ (Befu 1980). Lin Xiaodong (2010:75) finds, through his review on ‘western literature’, that ‘the viability of understanding identity as individual forms’ is now questioned because they cannot be shaped without the influences from society and culture. Stephanie Lawler (2008:8, eo) claims that identity should be comprehended as brought forth ‘between persons and within social relations’ rather than ‘as belonging within the individual person’. Matthew Adams (2007:163) pinpoints the important role of ‘the cultural norms, traditions and sanctions’ in the formation of the self. The self is shaped by way of response, reaction, and adaptation in its cultural and social context.

The real or ‘true self” denotes the self open and truthful to oneself and others (Spitzmuller and Ilies 2010:306–8). In other words, there is no alienation between ‘the public self” and ‘the private self” (Yang, Guoshu 2002:102) or the consistency of the expressions and acts of the self, namely that personal consistency or self consistency in different situations is very high (ibid.:88-9). In order to emphasize ‘the highest form of

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2 These two terms are used to explain the concept of Tournier’s person (real self) and personage (social mask) in a similar way.
3 The opposite to personal consistency or self consistency is social consistency or role consistency. Both Francis L. K. Hsu (1963:164-5), a Chinese anthropologist, and Yang Guoshu (2002:88–9), a Chinese psychologist, indicate that because Ru-influenced Chinese is ‘situationally-determinism’-oriented, the Ru-based cultural heritage emphasizes more social consistency rather than personal consistency.
authentic humanity’ as the ultimate goal of ‘becoming a fully actualized human being’ (i.e. a sage), Tu Weiming (1979a:22, eo) defines an ‘authentic’ person to be ‘truthful to both one’s [genuine] selfhood and one’s sociality’. Jürgen Moltmann (1926–) (1974b:93) uses ‘authentic’ to describe the life or the forms of living for a person who is unmasked or revealing himself. From this perspective, the self is discussed and understood in terms of a living and active person which is a changing and embodied being and is dynamic instead of static and absolute over time (Rogers 1961:171–2). That the self is real or not is based on self-consciousness (Tournier 1957). Tu Weiming (1985:57) clearly emphasizes that the self, ‘I myself’, in Ruist self-cultivation is as an ‘experiencing and reflecting person here and now’. To experience and reflect, a person requires both ‘intellectual sophistication’ and ‘existential commitment’. This person is the ‘personal I’ other than the ‘impersonal self’ because I can think, speak, and act. Therefore, for pursuing my authentic self, I cannot hide the inconsistency in the self. He (1985:5) explains it as follows:

The safe distance between what I as a person speculate about in propositional language and what I speak as a concrete human being is no longer there. I am exposed, for what I think I know is now inevitably intertwined with what I do know. If I am wrong, it is not simply because what I have proposed is untenable but also because of a defect in the way I live.

Tu Weiming indicates that knowing the ‘true self’ in Ruism is neither through grasping cognitively ‘a given structure of objective truths’, nor through acquiring ‘internalized skills’, but through understanding basically ‘one’s mental state’ and

4 Tu Weiming (1985:52, 68) changes this definition later as being ‘honest with oneself and loyal’ or ‘considerate to others’. See also Tu Weiming (1979a:68–77, 81).
5 See also Moltmann (1976:3).
7 See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1971), Tu Weiming (1985), and Hall (1994:217).
8 It is worth noting that the phrase ‘true self’ in Tu Weiming’s New Ruism might denote other two meanings in different contexts. In the context of Tu’s New Ruist moral self-cultivation, knowing oneself also entails simultaneously transforming, shaping, creating, and perfecting oneself (Tu 1985:19f.), see S2 below. In the context of his New Ruist idea of the self, Tu (1989a:108f., eo) adopts the phrase ‘true self’ to denote an ideal Ruist self in contrast to ‘the private ego’ characterized by ‘self-centredness (ssu)’ (私).
appreciating ‘one’s inner feelings’ (ibid.:19). Therefore, the real or true self used in this thesis is understood from a social psychological perspective in discussing the tendency of the RFS.

2. Ethico-Religious Perspective

Tu Weiming (1985:20) emphasizes that East Asian thoughts, including traditional Ruism, Daoism, and Buddhism, weigh ‘how to cultivate oneself’ as important as ‘who and what the true self is’, which is related prevalingly to ‘an ethico[-]religious question … with epistemological implications’. From this perspective, the true self refers to an ideal self as explained in F9, which in Tu’s eyes equals the ‘sage’ in traditional Ruism, ‘one’s original mind’ in traditional Buddhism, and the ‘true person’ in traditional Daoism (ibid.:19). However, their concepts of selfhood are different although they appear similar.

Since traditional Ruism, Daoism and Buddhism (and its source: Hinduism) also influence post-traditional Chinese people and culture deeply, their concepts of selfhood will be introduced here for reference. However, comparative studies are beyond the scope of this research.

2.1 Ruism

The true self in traditional and post-traditional Ruism is a ‘self-realization’ with an ideal goal of moral ‘achievement’ through endless ‘self-cultivation’ (Tu, Weiming 1979a:7, 17). Furthermore, the meaning of the true self from a social psychological perspective is also subsumed in explaining the meaning of the true self from this ethico-religious perspective because being truthful to both one’s selfhood and one’s sociality with sincerity plays a very important part in moral achievement for the relational self in

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9 See also Yang Zhongfang (1991a:27).
10 See also Tu Weiming (1985:51–65) and Hershock and Ames (2006:11).
traditional and post-traditional Ruism (ibid.:19-22). Therefore, when the true self is mentioned by Tu Weiming, it presents the dual meanings from both social psychological and ethico-religious perspectives, at the same time. However, based on the frequent emphases of self-cultivation in Tu’s interpretation from both social psychological and ethico-religious perspectives, the self in Ruism is neither an ‘abstract’ entity, idea, and concept isolated from the world (Tu 2002c:30), nor based on an ‘abstract idealism’ or principle (Tu 1985:60) ‘devoid of psychological and ethical implications’ (ibid.:153). However, the self in traditional and post-traditional Ruism is ‘as the person living here and now’ (ibid.:57) and a ‘lived reality’ (ibid.:134), and based on ‘concrete practicality’ (ibid.:60) and ‘a mode of experience’ (ibid.:153). Tu Weiming presents two interrelated ideas as the basis to discuss his New Ruist proposition that ‘human beings are perfectible through self-effort in ordinary daily existence’ (ibid.:19):

(1) The uniqueness of being human is an ethico-religious question which cannot be properly answered if it is reduced to biological, psychological, or sociological considerations; and (2) the actual process of self-development, far from being a quest for pure morality or spirituality, necessarily involves the biological, psychological, and sociological realities of human life. (ibid.)

Tu Weiming refers to the former as an ‘ontological postulate’ (ibid.:20-27) and to the latter as an ‘experiential assertion’ (Tu 1989a:24–5). This thesis focuses on the behavioural tendency (or custom) of the RFS and follows Tu Weiming’s methodology. By this methodology, the real (or true) self refers to the process of self-development that belongs to the experiential assertion rather than the ontological postulate. Accordingly, it involves a more social psychological perspective than an ethico-religious one. In other words, the real (or true) self will be understood from a social psychological perspective, but there will be some overlap with an ethico-religious perspective.

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11 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:68, 73–7, 81; 1985:51–65).
12 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:68, 73–4, 81; 1985:51–65).
13 See also Tu Weiming (1985:57, 134).
2.2 Buddhism

Buddhism developed into eight schools, the doctrines of which are not all the same. Buddhism’s general concept of the self is ‘no-self’ (or no-soul), or wùwǒ (無我) (Fleming 2002:172, eo) and anatman. The doctrines of no-self in Buddhism ‘presuppose a concept of emptiness in which the ontological character of things is either dissolved or held to be ultimate’ (Hall 1994:226). This concept of ‘no-self’ understands the self as non-existent (Huebner and Garrod 1991:343) or rejects ‘the ontological reality of the self’ (Ho, David YF 1995:121) and views any notion of a ‘permanent and substantial self’ as an illusion which is the cause of suffering (Fleming 2002:173). Buddhist no-self doctrine basically denies a ‘permanent, substantial, selfhood’ in the Hindu concept from the aspect of history (ibid.:172)\(^\text{14}\) and views the individual as only ‘an ever-changing combination’ (Huebner and Garrod 1991:348), a ‘series composed of thoughts, sensations, volition, and material elements’ (de la Vallée Poussin 1914:674, eo). Accordingly, existence is a sequence that changes rapidly. Bowker (1970:244–5) describes it by means of a metaphor of film:

Like the frames of a film being projected on to a screen, there is the appearance of continuity; each frame is in fact a separate photograph, but the sequence of each photograph is so close that it gives the appearance of continuous movement’.

Therefore, the entity of ‘an enduring self or ego’ is denied completely (Bodde 1957:66) — it is merely in the observer’s mind without ‘reality in itself’ (Kolm 1986:254).\(^\text{15}\) In order to solve the problem of ‘suffering’ practically rather than metaphysically, Buddha bases his solution for suffering on the theory: the cause of suffering is ‘desire’, the cause of desire comes from the clinging to ‘objects of desire’ and the radical and original cause of them is illusion, or wúmíng (無明) and avidya (Fleming 2002:172–3). Accordingly, if ‘the illusion of a permanent and substantial self’ and the illusion of objects of desire are

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\(^{14}\) See also Joan G. Miller (1994:32–3).

\(^{15}\) See also Liáng Qǐchāo 梁啟超 (1936 collected and reprinted in 2001:84–6).
exterminated, there is nothing to stick to, no ‘enduring self’ to do it, and nothing left of it
(ibid.:173). Metaphysically speaking, the state of ‘no me or mine’ is hence the goal of
self-cultivation for solving the problem of suffering (ibid., eo).16 Buddha’s methodology
reaches a conclusion that ‘no such self’ is normally ‘assumed to exist’, is spoken, taught,
and ‘given in experience or justified by reasoning’ rather than by ‘speculative
metaphysics’ (ibid.). This is so called ‘nirvana’, or nièpán (涅槃) (ibid.).17 Nirvana
includes the ‘extinction of the illusion of a permanent self, the end of the torment of selfish
desire, and the end of the cycle of rebirth’ (ibid.:173). If one attains nirvana, then such a
‘vicious cycle’ of illusion, desire, suffering, and reincarnation is finally terminated.

Therefore, in Buddhism, no-self is a goal to be attained intentionally by way of self-
cultivation in order to live a better life. In Buddhism, ‘one’s own self’ must be ‘forgotten
or left behind’ in order to cultivate a ‘true compassion’ for others (Huebner and Garrod
1991:350). It is hypothetically based on its theory of illusion, namely a reachable state
subjectively. ‘No-self is the unity of unreal self and real self.’ The true meaning of the
self is no-self and the true meaning of no-self is the reality of the self.18 Buddhism does
not deny the existence of the self in terms of secular meaning or the individual personality.
However, Buddhism views such a self as the secular self or unreal self which is temporal.
The real self is on the deeper level behind the unreal self. No-self is emphasized as the
essence of the real self (Chén, Bīng 陳兵 1992:161–5).19 However, in the context of
Buddhism, the true self as it is tends to be hidden in order to pretend to attain to the state
of no-self because the self is still suffering from its existence and clinging to the objects
it desires. It is logical that the process of attaining to no-self in Buddhism also leads to

19 See also Péng Yànqín 彭彥琴 et al. (ibid.:218).
the RFS while the goal cannot be reached by way of self-cultivation. However, it is different from the case of traditional and post-traditional Ruism. In traditional and post-traditional Ruism, the RFS is the main form displaying the phenomenon of loss of self. However, in Buddhism, the RFS is for pretending to attain the state of no-self. In the context of traditional and post-traditional Ruism, there is no need to pretend about the loss of self. One hides the real self as it is when one is unable to attain moral achievement. This leads to the reality of loss of self.

2.3 Hinduism

The concept of the self in the Indian philosophical and religious context is monistic and metaphysical. Brahman is the ‘only one’ ultimate reality according to Advaita monism. Atman (the real or true self) is equivalent to Brahman (Ho, David YF 1995:121).20 Atman, ‘a non-material realization of the real self’,21 meaning ‘breath or spirit’, is untouched by anything material, and ‘permanent and unchanging’ (ibid., eo).22 The atman, as opposed to the experiential and empirical forms of self which involve thought, desires, and sensations, leads to a completely different understanding of the individual (de Vos et al. 1985:14). In Hinduism, ‘individuality and specific particulars’ are minimized (Nakamura 1964:60–67) and the priority of the ‘universal self’ is over the individual self (ibid.:93-106) because of ‘the concept of the unity of all things’ (ibid.:67-72). Consequently, the self in Hinduism is not that of an ‘individual’23 but that of a ‘dividual’ (Bharati 1990:200). Therefore, ‘self-inconsistency’ is perfectly acceptable in the eyes of Hindus because they do not identify their ‘situational behaviour’ with ‘a reflection of their true self’, but ‘a reflection of a lesser entity’ (de Vos et al. 1985:14). Reincarnation changes the body but

20 See also Nakamura (1964:68).
21 de Vos et al. (1985:14).
23 An individual in the Hindu traditions is to ‘denigrate’ but not to ‘analyse’ (de Vos et al. 1985:14).
not the real or true self (Chakkarath 2010:11). For the ‘true self’ is Purusha (a ‘pure consciousness’), namely, ‘a pure witness to nature’s doings’ without identifying with any ‘part of nature’, including one’s possessions, one’s fate and fortunes, and even one’s body (Neville 2000:116f.). It can be only found by means of abstracting from ‘attached involvements and the reestablishment of the consciousness as unmoved witness’ (ibid.:117). Therefore, it contradicts itself to discuss or construct the self and the real or true self in Buddhism and in Hinduism since ‘the notion of owning one’s self is nothing but an illusion’ (Ho, David Y. F. 1995:121, eo).24 Jess Fleming (2002:175, 185, eo) concludes in his paper that traditional Ruism, Buddhism, and Daoism all lack the constituent for a person’s ‘real self’ to be restored or ‘nourished’ which is an ‘eternal, substantial, independent core of selfhood’ although all are committed to searching for a ‘real self’. They all establish their real ‘personal identity’ in ‘one’s relations to the Other (significant others)’ in their own distinctive definition and interpretation while all abnegate ‘the existence of any permanent hidden ego or self’. In Buddhism, the Other which provides personal ‘identity’ or establishes ‘the only real self’ is ‘karma itself’ or ‘the chain of karmic accountability’.

2.4 Daoism

Throughout its history (sometimes referred to as the Daoist development of ‘continuous renovation’), Daoism has been one of the survivors of ‘the most misconceived traditions of antiquity’ (Pregadio 2008). Daoism has the ‘richness and complexity’ of many ‘schools, lineages, and traditions’ – each of which might lead to a different way, even the two terms Daoism and Daoist might not indicate the same realm of Dào 道 (way) (ibid.). The Daoist’s general concept of selfhood is basically the other kind of transformation of self-realization ‘leading to the embodiment’ of nàshēng wàiwáng 內聖外王 (‘sageliness

24 See also Chakkarath (2010:9–11).
within and kingliness without’) (Ho, David YF 1995:120, eo). Although Daoism does not deny an ontological self, it negates ‘the centrality of the self’, namely that ‘the perfect [person] has no self’, and the differentiation ‘between I and other’ in pursuing ‘a harmony with both nature and society’ so as to make human society secondary to nature (ibid.). Therefore, the conscious true self becomes what Daoism seeks to avoid because the sage in Daoism is the one who gives up ‘fixed (personal) ideas’ and takes others’ as his own (ibid.:120). The basic concept of Daoist selfhood is based on Zhuangzi’s statement of ‘wú sàng wǒ’ 「吾喪我」 in the essay of ‘Qí wù lùn’ 〈齊物論〉 in Zhuangzi. However, the interpretations vary among scholars.

For Zhuangzi, holding the opposite view to ancient Ruists, ‘the realm of self (roles, names, concepts, tradition, [and] ritual)’ needs to be ‘forgotten’ to make genuine connection possible — among people to some extent, but primarily with nature as a whole. For such realm of self is discordant through ‘creating artificial boundaries’, which makes distinctive and unequal, obstructing and damaging the harmony connection (Berkson 2005:327) and belongs to ‘the socialized self’ which ‘obscure[s] the inner self’ (Berling 1985:104–109).

Jess Fleming (Fleming 2002:177, eo) terms Daoist’s selfhood as ‘non-being’. There are some substantial distinctions between Daoist non-being and Buddhist no-self.

25 Or ‘the perfected self, a radically free being whose qualities and whose world are presented in paradoxical and fantastic imagery.’ (Berling 1985:102) or ‘The perfect [person] has no self-identity apart from others. His freedom from self makes this possible and in this is his freedom.’ (Legge, Russel D. 1979:18, eo)


29 See also Robinet (2008:6).

30 In his comparative study of the concepts of self between the Ruists and Zhuangzi, Mark A. Berkson terms Zhuangzi’s concept of self as ‘no-self’ in differentiating from the Ruists’ ‘self’ (Berkson 2005). Jess Fleming terms Daoist’s selfhood as ‘non-being’ for differentiating from the ‘no-self’ as he terms the
For Buddha, the most important thing is to terminate human suffering but for Daoists, ‘human freedom … to act creatively, spontaneously, flexibly’ means absolutely everything (ibid.:177). In order to attain this freedom, one must shape oneself ‘on the Tao [(i.e. Dao)] itself’ and make oneself liberated from restraints of ‘traditional mores and aesthetic norms’ (ibid.). As the Dao in Daoism is not concerned with morality and rationality and is ‘unintentional … in constant flux’, all social rules are ‘artificial’ biased restrictions and must be deconstructed (ibid.). Therefore, there is not and should not be a fixed and expected concept for selfhood. The way ‘really to be who we are (nothing in particular)’ (zhēnrén 真人) in Daoism is to let things go and forget ‘oneself and others’ instead of ‘making things better’ (ibid.:177-80, eo). Wolfgang Bauer (1990, cited in Fleming 2002:187 n.18) indicates that ‘the loss of self’ became the declared aim of Daoists because ‘the only real self is the individuated non-being’ (Fleming 2002:185). There is ‘a state of deep trance or intense absorption’ in Daoism, termed ‘zuòwàng 坐忘’ (‘sitting in oblivion’) (Kohn 2008:1308). During such a state, one does not feel any ‘ego-identity’ and the real thing one perceives is merely ‘the underlying cosmic current of the Dao’ (ibid.). Kohn describes this mental state in this way: ‘complete unknowing …

Buddhist’s selfhood (Fleming 2002:172, 177, eo). David L. Hall terms both Buddhist and Daoist concepts of the self as ‘no-self’ that have different meanings in different contexts (Hall 1994:226, 232).

31 According to Jess Fleming, Daoism is still similar to Buddhism in the following aspects: (1) attaining to the state of ‘no self’, stressing on ‘the process nature of reality’; (2) emphasizing ‘that all things are interconnected’; (3) highlighting the value of ‘minimizing desire and emotion’; (4) making much account of the notion of ‘non-being’ or wú (無) (Daoist non-being has been be likened to ‘the concept of emptiness’ or kōngxìng (空性) in the ‘Madhyamika’ Buddhism for about two millennia); (5) valuing ‘the infinite depth of the here and now, the importance of simplicity, naturalness, and spontaneity, and the frequent efficacy of silence, stillness, and inaction’ or wúwéi (無為) (the above are what ‘Zen’ Buddhism emphasizes), and ‘transformative texts’ (vs. ‘informative texts’ in ‘Western philosophical discourse’) and ‘speech acts’ (Fleming 2002:173, 176–7, eo).


loss of personal identity and self, and a kind of total immersion in the Non-being of the universe’ (ibid.).

According to Fleming (2002:177, eo), the worldview of Daoism is an extreme ‘holism, or organicism’ which views all existing ‘things or persons’ as interconnecting, interrelating, and interacting with each other intimately. In Daoism, a ‘person’ is merely a ‘process’ instead of an ‘entity’ because a person’s identity is composed of yīn (陰) and yáng (陽) ‘equilibrium’ of which is always changing between ‘predictable’ balance or unbalance and ‘mysterious unpredictable’ state although they complement each other (ibid.:177). In such a holism, one’s self is ‘transfixed’ by the other’s and the other’s is by it, so that in such a ‘reciprocal’ relationships, persons are like ‘two mirrors mirroring each other’ and ‘everything is left unsettled and indefinite’ (ibid.:180). Therefore, I find that everything is relative in Daoism just as David Y. F. Ho (1995:119) states, in Daoism, ‘Being and nonbeing produce each other; each derives its meaning from the coexistence of the other.’

By comparing the Three Teachings, I find that in Daoism, non-being, the only real self, is a goal to be attained intentionally by way of self-cultivation, in order to live a better life. But the better life Daoists pursue is to have freedom, other than Buddhist suffering, from any restraints, settlement, and fixation. It is also a hypothetically reachable state subjectively as in Buddhism. As Fleming points out, the concept of personal identity based on relations with others in Daoist holism is ‘far beyond’ the Ruist one which places ‘personal identity as a focal point on a social nexus, ... playing ... roles in relation to others’ (Fleming 2002:178). Therefore, the relativity of the self in Daoism is significantly different from Ruism (Bauer, Wolfgang 1990, in Fleming 2002:187–8 n.18). In the context of Daoism, it tends to hide the true self as it is in order to pretend to

34 See also Chen Shaoming (2014:48–9).
attain to the state of non-being. The self is still ‘being’ (ibid.:187 n.15, eo) or yǒu (有) and taking action or yǒuwéi (有為). It seems logical that the process of attaining to non-being in Daoism, just as in Buddhism, would also lead to the RFS while the goal cannot be reached by way of self-cultivation. Fleming criticizes Daoism that does not like to ‘recognize or address ... the problem’ of hiding from self or deceiving to self which would cause a ‘split’ identity (ibid.:185, eo). Such a problem is related to the repressed behavioural custom of masking.

3. Anglo-European Western Philosophical Perspective

The term and the idea of self are listed in the ‘standard vocabulary’ of the twentieth century. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists inquire into the self (Grenz 2001:58). There are varieties of different concepts of selfhood developed in Anglo-European Western societies (Hall 1994), generally including these aspects: ‘analytic, monotheistic, individualistic, and materialistic and rationalistic’ (Johnson 1985:113–128). Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity (1989) by Charles Taylor (1931-) is a very comprehensive reference work to understand them even if his focus in this work is on ‘modern identity’. Although the idea of ‘the centred self’ appears as a modern innovation, its roots can be traced back to Augustine’s creative concept of ‘turn inwards’ (Grenz 2001:16, eo). Augustine attempted to find God as the radical basis of ‘his mind and will’ and consequently set up an ongoing inquiry to construct the ‘individual’ human being with ‘the self as the stable, abiding reality’ (ibid.:16). At the pinnacle of this inquiry, Abraham Maslow eventually exemplified ‘the self-sufficient, 

35 See also Johnson (1985).

36 Roy F. Baumeister’s ‘How the self became a problem: A psychological review of historical research’ (1987) also provides a brief review of the issues of selfhood in different historical stages although from the psychological aspect.
self-constructing *therapeutic self* of modern psychology’ (ibid., eo). Such a self is based on ‘the mastering self’ that appeared in the Enlightenment (ibid.:16).

However, the ascendancy of the modern self did not last long. Various thinkers forayed into the inner realm and ‘netted a self-focused self’ more through ‘self-expression’ than through ‘self-mastery’ (ibid.). Stanley Grenz (1950-2005) (ibid.:16f.) summarizes this development of seeking the self inwardly as follows:

> By means of autobiography, Montaigne and then Rousseau sought to discover the unique self within. The Romanticists added the idea that the self is the expression of the indwelling infinite. But what happens when the concept of the infinite within the finite, upon which the self-expressive self depends for its sense of stability and for its ability to overcome its own particularity, proves to be an unstable centre? The destabilizing of this Romantic self, abetted by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the Vienna modernists (including Freud), is the rest of the story. The entire journey reached its climax when Foucault extended Nietzsche's metaphor of the death of God to encompass the death of the self as well, an event characterized not only by the loss of the self but also by the embracing of its demise. The resultant postmodern condition retains a semblance of a *self* that is constituted by a narrative, that is marked by a position in a vast relational web, and that looks to relationships for identity. The modern ideal of the stable, unitary self has come to be replaced by the decentred, fleeting *self* constructed in each moment of existence and by Global Soul. ‘

Indeed, depending on itself alone is the source of the ‘fragility and instability’ of the modern self (Charry 1998:106).

In other words, even if the Romantic Movement criticizes the Enlightenment, ‘the ideal of the centred self’ was not abandoned (ibid.:117). The gate for ‘the loss, dissipation, or even deconstruction of the self’ was opened naturally. Consequently, the postmodern era appeared in the twentieth century’ (ibid.:118).

However, the postmodern that detests the self does not mean the beginning of ‘pure selflessness’ (ibid.:134). According to Grenz (ibid., eo):

> The postmodern condition retains a semblance of a *self* or, perhaps better stared, a trace of the now absent self … Rather than being the agent of subjectivity, the postmodern self is a self-referential system … a *self-producing* system … a constant re-creation of itself through the selective reorganization of the disorder present in the surrounding world and within itself … Viewing it as a self-referential system leads to a highly social conception of the self.

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Taylor (1989:ix) integrates the understanding of being ‘a human agent’ into a succinct description or definition as ‘the senses of inwardness, freedom, individuality, and being embedded in nature which are at home in the modern Anglo-European West’. This definition of being a human agent is close to the definition of the true self in this research although he does not use this term. Some Anglo-European Western philosophical concepts of selfhood are also to some extent from psychological and/or ethico-religious perspectives, for example, from Christian, theistic, or deistic aspects. Some of them are from the aspect of philosophical existentialism which makes the topic of the self explicit (Neville 2000:167). For example, according to Plato, the ‘soul’ beholds the true self and is above ‘the realm of the material’ (body) (Vineeth 1997:xxi–xxii). Therefore, the basic common existential concept of selfhood is ‘the absoluteness in the depth of selfhood and … the lucidity of transcendence’ (Jaspers 1965:2). The true self is also an inherently unchangeable spiritual being. However, the discussion of the tendency of the RFS in this research is not from a philosophical perspective. Therefore, this is not the place to go into an extended discussion and comparison of the complicated philosophical concepts of selfhood developed in Western history.

4. Christian Biblical and Theological Perspectives

In traditional Christian terms, the *imago Dei* can be understood as the source of the real or true self in the creation through the hermeneutics of Genesis 1. After the Fall, the real or true self, although damaged, can be redeemed, transformed, renewed, and glorified by the creator God. These ontological and eschatological perspectives complement what the (social) psychological and the ethico-religious perspectives lack. The model path moving from the personage to the person presented by Tournier and adopted by this research is beyond what modern psychology can provide (Tournier 1957:23, 223–4).38 This path is

38 See also Tournier (1968).
discussed in C3S2.4. Through these perspectives, the real self is not only understood as the *imago Dei* in the creation but also as the promised future better self in the new creation, by way of the *imago Christi* and the *imago Trinitatis*. At the end of his conclusion in *Sources of the Self*, Taylor (1989:520) also places the hope of humans (or the self) in the Judaeo-Christian theistic ‘central promise of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever attain unaided’. All of these discussions are explained further in C5 through examining Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology based on his social doctrine of the Trinity. These perspectives are also included in the comparative analysis of Tu Weiming’s Ruist and Moltmann’s Christian trinitarian relational selfhood in C8.
Appendix E

The Theoretical Bases for the Issue of the Repressed Form of Self

In dealing with the behavioural tendency of the RFS which is prevalent in PTRIC contexts, I found Paul Tournier (1898-1986) is one of very few persons who offers a comprehensive discussion of the notion, or in his language a real self and the problem of repressed behavioural custom of social masking. Moreover, he is also among the few persons who devoted himself in integrating theology and psychotherapy, namely integrative psychotherapy (McMinn & Campbell 2007:51), in his transformational psychology in the twentieth century (Collins 1973).\(^1\) Besides, the transformation from a repressed self (a timid one with fear in front of others) to a real self (public speaker) was also his own personal experience (ibid.). Since this research is an attempt to deal with this social psychological problem of the RFS from a Christian theological approach, Tournier’s works afford me a theoretical base to articulate the concepts which are key to this research. In this section, Tournier’s paired use of the person and the personage is adopted to explain and contrast one’s real self and negative social mask(s) respectively. He also indicates why there is an inevitable need to speak of the personage, of the negative social masks.

1. The Person — the Real Self

In his book *The Meaning of Persons* (1957) (the English version of his original *La personage et la personne*), the Swiss physician and pastoral counsellor, Paul Tournier, contrasts personage with person.\(^2\) He defines person as one’s ‘intimate and deeper being’.

\(^1\) At the last stage of this research, I found David. G. Benner (2012) is another one.

\(^2\) According to the etymology of the term person, it originally meant a mask worn by the actor in ancient Greek theatre. About its meaning and how it was used to denote a human person later, see John Zizioulas (2004:27–35).
In his discussion the person is synonymous with ‘true nature’, ‘real nature’, or the ‘real self’ (Tournier 1977:9, 46, 79). He recognizes the person as the ‘original creation’ from God, as created “in the image of God” (Gen 1:27), in contrast to the personage as the ‘automatic routine’ (to be introduced in the next section) (ibid.: 39, 102). The importance and meaning of the person or real self depends on two fundamental elements:

1. ‘the free disposition of oneself’ (ibid.:39)(Tournier 1957:39) — one’s ‘autonomy’, one’s ‘free choice’, or one’s ‘right of self-determination’ (ibid.).

2. ‘responsibility’ (ibid.).

Since, as Carl R. Rogers indicates (1902-87) (1961:171), complete freedom demands one taking full responsibility for one’s choices and their consequences, one would definitely fail to be one’s real or true self if one refuses, or cannot take, the pressure resulting from the free choice one makes. Tracing back the root cause of failing to take responsibility for one’s free choice, Rogers suggests fear to be the reason to make one either actively decide not to reveal one’s real self or passively escape from deciding to reveal it. Don E. Hamachek (1978:246, eo) highlights this ‘courage to be known’ as the nature of the real self because it is not easy to disclose one’s self honestly, namely, ‘to be perceived by others as we know ourselves to be’, or to exhibit one’s own true attitudes and feelings. However, he also points out that such a ‘self-disclosure’ should not express candour cruelly without discrimination. Besides Rogers (1961:171), Zygmunt Bauman (1925-) (1988, cited in Lin, Xiaodong 2010:74–5) also views freedom or free choice as a necessary element in the ‘self-[con]struction of the self’. But he also recognizes the limitation of that freedom which makes the ‘self-[con]firmation of the self’ impossible (ibid.). I argue that this limitation of freedom may be understood and explained from the

3 Or ‘freedom’ (Rogers 1961:171).
4 See also Rogers (ibid.).
perspective of original sin, and so reveals ‘the bondage of the will’ (Luther 1525). In this sense the real self is, to some extent, affected, damaged, or limited. Besides, when talking about freedom, we must remember that what really affects freedom is not what comes from the outside of a person, but the fear that comes from inside in a person’s heart. In other words, when one is afraid of the consequences of one’s freedom or free choice, one may give it up.

Inspired by the book *I and Thou* by Martin Buber (1878-1965) (1937), Tournier (1957:129, eo) explains that responsibility must involve the *other* — ‘the second person, the *thou*. Accordingly, the true interpersonal relationship between two true selves is a ‘responsible dialogue’. This responsible dialogue cannot avoid risk while making choices because it leaves one ‘open to a reply’, requiring one to reply in turn. It also makes the *person* completely different from an ‘individual’ because the latter only involves *association* but the former *communication* (ibid.:129). The person communes spiritually with others. Tournier (1957:129) criticizes the limitations of ‘the objective scientific study’ of human beings because it only takes a human as ‘an individual’ rather than as ‘a person’ (ibid.). Such an approach usually isolates the human from his/her ‘environment’ (ibid.). Even if it includes environmental factors in its analysis of one’s ‘physical and psychical relationships’, it is not able to comprehend one’s ‘spiritual relationship’ and ‘personal communion’ with one’s associates (ibid.). Moltmann (2000a:333) also makes a similar distinction between a person and an individual (as explained in C6S3). Robert Kegan (1982:116) not only differentiates these two words but goes further to explain their relation. He points out a person’s two indispensable dimensions: individual and communal. In order to include the meanings of these two dimensions in denoting a person, he coined a new word ‘embeddual[s]’ to highlight an individual person who is always embedded in his/her own communal relationships. Such a dialogical concept was developed by influential contemporary American pragmatists into a theory which is used
to expound ‘the theory of meaning’ (Wiley 2006:19). They assert that conversations cannot take place without ‘the presence of selves’ and selves can neither exist without conversations or ‘dialogic acts’ (Perinbanayagam 2000:1).

From the above discussion, the real self (or the person) discussed in this research denotes an understanding rooted in social psychology. It does not refer to an absolutely isolated self.

2. The Personage — the Social Mask

Yet, can one identify easily what one’s ‘own real nature’/real self is? Can people easily find their ‘true person’? (Tournier 1957:21, 46) The answer Tournier gives is no, because what we can see is only the ‘distorted and varied images’ of the true person due to its natural and inevitable sociality (ibid.: 21). In other words, such images are not true to the self; they have become the master of the self and they are produced due to the expectations of others, which are preventing one from growing as the person. Moltmann (1976:1) describes the self-consciousness of losing oneself through such a series of self-reflecting statements as: ‘I must find myself again first’; ‘I wish I could be myself again’; and ‘I just don’t know who I really am any more’. In other words, being or living out one’s real self is to let that self be expressed and disclosed as it is in every moment of its existence without pretending to be the expected self valued by others, society or even by oneself. But from childhood, many things begin to ‘make up our personages’ (Tournier 1957:33). They include our education, interpersonal relationships, experiences in daily life, and ‘our titles, honours and decorations’ (ibid.). In this process or development, the reality of the self is divested in support of ‘an external role or … imagined meaning’ (Jung 1966:173).

Consequently, we become ‘role players’ (Tournier 1957:33) as a natural reflex of self-defence mechanisms, wearing ‘protective armour’ (ibid.:30) or building up a ‘protective barrier’ (ibid.:148). William James (1901:294) describes this similar phenomenon, using the terms of ‘social selves’ and social ‘images’ instead of social masks:

[A] [hu]man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups … From this there results what practically is a division of the [hu]man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere.

This is what Daniel Goleman (1996:166) calls the ‘shared self’ and the ‘group self’, which we create in order to safeguard and hide our true bare hearts ‘behind a mask’ (Jung 1966:174) or to protect our own inner selves from others’ prying ‘inquiry’ (Saari 1982:46). In this way, every relationship we have can be either consolidated or compromised (Tournier 1957:33). Jon L. Saari (1982:46) uses the ‘inner/outer split’ (real/social self) to denote such a social mask. In her definition, the inner/outer split refers to the three psychological facts:

(1) external ‘conformity’ is not out of ‘internalized commitment’;

(2) a social mask is shaped by much publicly disclosed action;

(3) ‘an explosive or evil potential’ are hidden within the people in an ‘authoritarian society’.

In other words, the real inner self is hidden behind the pretended social self that is ‘acting consciously and visibly’ at the presence of others (Saari 1982:43). Accordingly, people cannot see through the mask.

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7 ‘We are not only one personage throughout our lives; we are innumerable personages … We are even many personages at once’ (Tournier 1957:73). See also Zizioulas (2004:34).

8 See also Jung (1966:174) and Tournier (1977:9).

9 Tournier (1957:148) describes this phenomenon vividly as that ‘we conceal our person behind a protective barrier; we let it be seen only through the bars. We display certain of its aspects, others we carefully hide.’

10 See also Tournier (1977:9).
In Ralph H. Turner’s (1999:79) terms, the real self is ‘self as anchored in impulse’, and the imposed (or negatively masked) self is ‘self as anchored in institutions’, paralleling Sigmund Freud’s (1923 reprinted in 1960) id and superego. Although Turner (1999:80f,) uses the term hypocrisy rather than social mask or personage, his (1999) analysis of the crucial distinction between these two contrasting selves provides a valuable reference for understanding the features of the personage (or the person). Dana Crowley Jack (1993:168) quoted Gilbert and Gubar’s (1984:79, 198, 360) term ‘dark doubles’ to denote the two divided ‘opposing selves: an outwardly conforming, compliant self, and an inner, secret self’. The former self accepts ‘the social norms’ but the ‘desires and needs’ of the latter authentic one remain unmet.

The real or true self is described by Grenz (2001:100–102) as ‘the unique self within’, which is found in what one thinks instead of in what one acts. William James (1842-1910) (1901:292) identified it as the ‘spiritual self’,11 in contrasting it with the ‘material self’ (Benner 2012:96–7)12 and the ‘social self’. In James’ (1901:296) definition, the spiritual self is to ‘think of subjectivity’13 by discarding recognition of others. It is the ‘self of all other selves’ (Moseley 1991:23, eo) or ‘the innermost citadel of selfhood’, which ‘can never be objectified’ (Wild 1969:83). David G. Benner (2012:138–41, eo) calls it ‘the essential self: I am’.14

Therefore, in this sense of the similar conceptualization of the real self and the imposed self described above in different ways by scholars, I understand the RFS as denoting metaphorically that the spiritual self is hidden, suppressed, denied, or even

13 Namely, ‘to think ourselves as thinkers’ (James 1901:296, eo).
14 Benner (2012:85–154), a psychologist, presents a big complicated but detailed framework for organizing consciousness of identity (self) in human development, including four major frameworks: the body, mind, soul, and spirit-centred self. There are three or four sub-stages under each framework and totally fourteen levels of self. This is a valuable reference for understanding different levels of self from this psychoanalytic approach.
forgotten under the imposed mask of the social self as these two selves become inconsistent.

To some extent, the personage, which is the automatic routine, indeed represents a kind of compromise between an individual person and his/her society, family tradition, and social conventions (Zhuang, Huiqiu 1987c:176) because the personages of different people touch each other from outside by their external appearances but the persons of different people communicate with each other inwardly in a ‘spiritual communion’ (Tournier 1957:129). However, in Tournier’s explanation to differentiate persons from individuals, he emphasizes that the concept of the person is tied together with ‘the human community, a spiritual solidarity, [or] a common patrimony’. Consequentially, in order to follow a certain traditional manner of locution, one cannot but participate in ‘the nature of the personage’. Speaking succinctly, the personage acts according to ‘yinggāi’ ‘應該’ (should)15 or ‘oughts’16 in the context of social relationships and the person acts according to ‘xiǎng’ 「想」 (would like)17, ‘want[s]’18, or ‘inten[d]s’19 in the context of personal communion (ibid.:130). The personage can be formed by our ‘instincts … egoisms … vanities’ and also by our legitimate or justified ambitions (ibid.:36). Social psychological studies on the intergenerational relationships of Chinese people20 resonate with Tournier’s observation that, in order to please one’s parents, a child’s personage tends to be shaped to conform with the parents’ wish (ibid.:63). In this way, one’s intimate

16 Rogers (1961:168–70, eo).

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self might be well hidden behind a masking ‘façade’(s), specifically, the ‘socially imposed pattern’(s) (ibid.: 9–10).

In her book, The dialogic self (1999), Roxanne J. Fand (1999:129, eo) describes and analyses a concrete case of ‘the self without a mask’ as ‘the socially unformed, preoedipal child’. To demonstrate such a case with a vivid example, Fand (1999:129) quotes an episode of the central character in the novel The Four-Gated City (1993) by Doris Lessing (1919-2013), in which Martha Quest moves to London alone to find her ‘missing self’:

For a few weeks she had been anonymous, unnoticed — free. Never before in her life had she known this freedom. Living in a small town anywhere means preserving one’s self behind a mask. Coming to a big city for those who have never known one, means … freedom: all the pressures are off, no one cares, no need for the mask. (Lessing 1993:12)

Such a real self is purely open, subjectively ‘receptive’ to anything that comes and untroubled with ‘anxiety, conflict, and confusion’. On the contrary, it can be asserted from Fand’s account that negative masking is due to lack of freedom to be one’s real self.

It is worth noting that the definition of freedom can vary depending on the context or realm in which it is used. The two fundamental characteristics of the person Tournier highlights above might provide a basic definition of freedom as discussed in this thesis: freedom and responsibility. Freedom without responsibility can be abused. Responsibility without freedom can be imposed. This is exactly what the Apostle Paul instructs in 1 Corinthians 10:23-4, ‘“All things are lawful”, but not all things are beneficial. “All things are lawful”, but not all things build up. Do not seek your own advantage, but that of others.’ The exertion of freedom is neither a selfish action nor intended to deprive others.

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21 See also Ryan (1991:230).
22 Pre-Oedipal is used by Freud to indicate the developmental phase before the Oedipal phase. According to Oxford Dictionaries (2014), the Oedipus complex is: ‘the complex of emotions aroused in a young child, typically around the age of four, by an unconscious sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex and wish to exclude the parent of the same sex.’ It has been noted that this term was ‘originally applied to boys, the equivalent in girls being called the Electra complex’.
of advantage, including freedom. Ellul (1973:151–2) decidedly stresses that ‘repression’, both social and individual, results from restraining one’s exertion of ‘freedom’ and ‘independency’. Therefore, the research problem of the RFS in this thesis is identified in the social behaviour of responsibility without freedom. The real self, discussed in this thesis, is acquired through the social behaviour in freedom with responsibility.

3. The Inevitability of the Personage — the Social Mask

One cannot live alone all the time, so one never exists in the confinements of ‘an atomic self or substance’, rather one exists within the groups with which one interacts as an ‘entire organic being’ (Wild 1969:86, eo). Tournier (1957:131) notes that the person cannot exist without the personage, but the personage get its value only when it is an ‘expression’ of the person. Tournier (ibid.) explains the possibility of a true dialogue in spite of the inseparability of the person and the personage:

If then there is … only one language, that of our words, gestures and signs, in fact of the whole movement of our being, that language has two meanings: one nourishes and satisfies the personage, while the other, more ‘intrinsic’, always immanent, is always expressed and perceived by the person. And there … is the element of security which permits us to believe in the person in spite of the evidence of the personage; the key-element which makes dialogue always possible.

Therefore, he (ibid.:75) indicates the inevitability of the personage because one of the conditions of personal contact we seek is ‘a certain mutual intelligibility’ in the modes of our expression that belongs to ‘the order of the personage’. Consequently, through performing what Carl Jung (1875-1961) (1966:173) calls ‘alienations of the self’, the real self retreats into the less public side of a social scene to let ‘social recognition’ and ‘the auto-suggestive meaning of a primordial image’ have the upper hand. As a result, self-alienation in support of the collective conforms to ‘a social ideal’ or even simulates ‘social

23 Moltmann also observes the same reality of inevitable masking (as mentioned in C3S1.1.2).
24 Jung (1966:174, 304) defines ‘primordial images’ as ‘the influence of the collective unconscious’ which includes ‘unconscious collective ideas (mythical thinking) and vital instincts’. He also calls them ‘archetypes’ (ibid.:eo), ‘the unconscious world’, or ‘the world of historical images’ (ibid.:299).
duty and virtue’ (ibid.). This kind of individual self is identified by Doi (1986:55–6), a Japanese psychiatrist, as a very typical and prominent feature in the ‘group-sim’ of Japanese society.

However, for Tournier (1957:13), the problem of personage and person is complicated: the personage is inescapably tied to the person even though we in fact always prefer to hold on to the sense that the role we play is distinct from who we really are. Tournier finds that the ‘pure and unvarnished’ person evades us all the time (ibid.:15). He describes the fact in this way: ‘I can never grasp the true reality, of myself or anybody else, but only an image; a fragmentary and deformed image, and an appearance: the personage’ (ibid.:15, eo). It is only the personage that allows me to glance at the person ‘at one and the same time’ (ibid.:15). But it also inclines to conceal it from me. Therefore the veiled person is unmasked only in the really responsible behaviour when we cannot but take up a true stand in a true dialogue, namely through ‘inner personal communion’ (ibid.:130).

Igor’ Semenovich Kon (1928-2011) (1986:168), a Russian philosopher and psychologist, makes a revealing differentiation between the self and the mask in defining them through their relations. He bases the dialectics of the self and the mask on the premise of their totally absolute distinction: the mask is not the self and is something irrelevant to the I, for the purpose of masking is to hide and conceal the true fact of the self through wearing an appearance which does not belong to the self. The mask can release one from the constant necessity of guarding against others’ review and judgment regarding one’s own prestige and success at conforming to social restraint and to the wishes of others. Therefore, masquerade means freedom, means happiness, and means candour. However, the mask cannot be neutral to the self. In other words, it is not like the mask can be worn up and taken off ad libitum (according to pleasure), so that I am still I after taking it off. The mask is not merely painted cardboard or a plastic board. One cannot
choose the mask for the self *ad libitum*, for the mask must compensate for what one is not (according to one’s self-evaluation) and what one needs to be (to all appearances) because one thinks that who one ought to be or how one ought to behave is contrary to what one’s real self would intend. A busy person does not need to appear busy; a servile person does not need to pretend to be obedient; a cheerful person does not need to wear an optimistic mask. It is exactly because of the discrepancy between the true self and the mask that one believes oneself to need that we say the mask is external, adscititious, and not from the self.

The sociologist, Stephanie Lawler (2008:101, eo), points out that although the majority of people will more or less wear a ‘mask at certain points’ (probably due to ‘self-preservation’), there is always ‘a real person’ assumed to exist ‘behind the mask’. Most of the time, this *real person* is supposed to be more genuine than the ‘mask or masquerade’ (ibid.).

According to Kon’s and Lawler’s differentiation of the mask and the self, the mask almost equates to a false or unreal self. Nevertheless, I do not think it is easy to distinguish and separate one’s oughts from one’s intents so distinctly, because what one intends can be affected unconsciously by one’s *oughts*. Self-deception is discussed and recognized by psychoanalytic studies as one of the tricks people play on themselves to avoid anxiety and pain or ‘to hide … infirmity’ (Tournier 1957:12, 152). However, Tournier views one in one’s completeness with both consciousness and unconsciousness working within (ibid.:62). He disagrees with the oversimplified explanation that the ‘unconscious impulsions’ are out of our real nature but our conscious behaviour merely a personage, ‘an alien garment’ (ibid.:61). In other words, consciousness influences both the personage

25 See also Higgins (1987).

26 Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) named these tricks ‘defence mechanisms’, and Harry S. Sullivan (1892-1949) modelled them as ‘security operations’ (Goleman 1996:105, eo).
and the person since free choice is essential for the person. William James (1901:297, 305, eo) emphasized the subjectivity of the ‘innermost self’ and called it the ‘active element in all consciousness’. A more neutral, or even sometimes more positive, term denoting equivalently to social masking is ‘self-presentation’ (Goffman 1956). Roy F. Baumeister (1953- (1982:3, eo) explains self-presentation as the employ of communicating behaviour to real oneself to others in order to please them and to construct ‘one’s public self congruent to one’s ideal’. However, it is not self-presentation to construct ‘a true, real, or private self’. The real or private self is constructed via self-choices and self-performances (ibid.:4, eo).27

Furthermore, since the importance and meaning of the person depends on one’s free choice and responsibility (Tournier 1957:39), how can an unconscious person assume his/her free choice and responsibility? I think that it might be even easier for the personage to become more unconscious due to its feature of ‘automatism’ described by Tournier (ibid.:113). It is the concept of ‘the collective unconscious’ that Jung (1966) uses to explain the problem of ‘persona’ (personage) in his research and works. He says that ‘so long as the ego is identical with the persona, individuality forms an essential content of the collective unconscious’ (ibid.:304).28 Those observations from Tournier are also confirmed by the examples or explanations discussed in some other scholars’ works.29

We can see that the images of the true person acquire their source from other people and the entire environment as well as from the human him/herself (Tournier 1957:21), and all these additions cannot be removed completely. Even if negative masking is


28 Marie-Louise von Franz (1915-1998) (1964:161, eo) explains that ‘the ego’ in Carl Jung’s definition is the centre of consciousness and that ‘only if I know a thing is it conscious’.

29 For example, William James (1901:1, 294–5), the Editorial Board of Zhonglaoshi Yuekan (1987), Daniel Goleman (1996), and Zhai Xuewei (2010).
inevitable as discussed above, is it indeed hard to find out what the real or ‘unadulterated self’ \(^{30}\) is? The answer must be *negative*. As personage is related to ‘the motives of our behaviour’, even some of which are unconscious, we have to admit we are profoundly uncertain if we are honest. (ibid.:53, 58). Tournier even says that ‘the person pure and simple does not exist’ (ibid.:130).

In the pragmatists’ theory of the self, the dialogical self is more social than individual (Wiley 2006:16). For R. S. Perinbanayagam (2000:1, 4 ,5), the self even has no ‘continuous existence’ or doesn’t exist *per se* but ‘only as a facet of interaction’, namely ‘a mechanism’. In other words, the self only exists for its function of getting along with others from a social perspective. The repressed behaviour of masking indeed exists prevalently in dialogical acts but the pragmatists might not be concerned with it as a problem because their theory of meaning is ‘an action-based or practical’ one (Wiley 2006:5). Through ‘addressive actions’, the dialogical discourses decide ‘you and your relationship to others’ (Perinbanayagam 2000:2). Because of the ‘practical consequences’ orientation (Wiley 2006:5), the existence of self depends objectively more ‘upon the reaction of others (Perinbanayagam 2000:3).

The pragmatists’ concept of the self, therefore, looks very similar to a traditional and post-traditional Ruist account of the concept of the self because the selves in both are dependent on others and the relationship with others. Since traditional and post-traditional Ruist selfhood is the concept of interdependent self, it might not tend to prescribe or require consistency between one’s external behaviour and internal attributes (Markus & Kitayama 1991a:41). I will discuss this in C4 and C8.

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\(^{30}\) Tournier (1957:33, 46, 61).
4. More Considerations of Some Concepts Concerning the Person

There are several observations made by Tournier in this context that are worth considering in greater detail. They are related to what we might view as virtuous, beneficial, helpful or contributing concepts of a human being, especially as found among PTRIC people (except Item Five) but they are in fact detrimental to the development of being a real person.

(1) ‘In introspection, … the person vanishes’; the person is ‘buried in’ oneself in ‘solitude’ but ‘asserted’ when one is in dialogue with others because the person is ‘made more definite’ through one’s established personal relationships with others, even if the others are ‘silent’ in their presence. (Tournier 1957:168). In terms of self-understanding, Moltmann (1967:65) also has similar concerns about solo self-reflection without the world. Furthermore, the meaning of this dialogical self with others cannot be sustained coherently without a relationship to the creator God. I find that, in this sense of dialoguing with others, Tournier’s dialogical self is different from the one in pragmatism, for Tournier’s self is not defined entirely by one’s relationship to other people by dialogue but is created in the image of God and defined by one’s relationship with that Other, God. In Tournier, the person has his/her own meaning defined by God, which can be strengthened or weakened through dialogue with other people but in the pragmatist’s position that meaning is founded on the practical consequences which decide the self as a good or bad dialogical mechanism.

(2) Indoctrinating others is ‘acting as a personage and not as a person’ (Tournier 1957:192). The superior, instead of equal, position is taken in dialogical answering with ‘advice, exhortation … theories … denunciation … [and] moral uplift’ (ibid.:191). Consequently, the personage appears in the superior who inclines to confine him/herself to ‘the objective world of things’ but not ‘entering the subjective world of persons’ (ibid.). What one is concerned with in this position tends to be
‘ideas’ instead of ‘the person’ (ibid.). In this ‘crushing and repressing’ way, the personage of the inferior is also induced and imposed because the dialogue is substituted by a ‘moralizing or proselytizing’ preaching (ibid.:192). For Tournier, only being interested in others as persons can liberate them from wearing the personage, and so encourage them towards ‘self-knowledge and sincerity’ because of the importance of ‘making a personal decision’ in the formation of the person (ibid.:193).

(3) ‘Prolonged indecision is a poison’ to the person (Tournier 1957:201). The people with such indecision arising from ‘inner conflict’ caused by ‘domineering’ others, such as parents or superiors might look like personages that lose their selves, for they have no clear sense about their own ‘tastes … beliefs … and aim in life’ (ibid.:201).

(4) Irresistible ‘social conformity’ buries the person underneath his/her personages (Tournier 1957:204). When everybody obeys the ‘done thing’ so unquestionably that it is too arduous or dreadful to become detached from the flock, such a social community turns to be ‘a game of personages’ (ibid., eo). Durkheim (1951:252) also points out that obedience to regulation and the authority and power behind it should be out of respect, but not of fear, which, Rogers argues as mentioned above, will make one decide not to reveal one’s real self. Martin Luther (1520b:30f.) asserts that any kind of obedience and other good works would become ‘nothing but mere sham, show and pretence’ if it is out of one’s faith in the creator God’s love.

(5) Self-denial taught and valued in Christianity (e.g. Matthew 16:24-6; Luke 9:23-5) ‘means … refusing to invent for oneself a conventional personage’ (Tournier 1957:226). Self-denial has been mistakenly understood as compelling oneself to wear a ‘self-effacing personage’, suppressing one’s real judgments and convictions, and ‘pretending to have others which one has not got’ (ibid.). I find that the real meaning of self-denial, therefore, is to entrust one’s life and its direction to God’s guidance, so
that He may bring alive one’s person according to His plan and purpose. When one desires to seek God’s will, one will certainly dare to assert the real person within them because at this stage one’s oughts becomes one’s intents.

(6) Dependence on one’s own ability results in a ‘new artificial personage over the top of the first’ (ibid.:223). For Tournier, the true solution for the problems caused by the hindrances within the personage is the ‘grace’ granted by God (to be explored in detail immediately below) rather than ‘the pseudo-solution of pathological reactions’ (ibid.:220). These pseudo-solutions include ‘one’s own will-power … good resolutions … the impulsions of instinct and the determinism of powerful psychological complexes’ (ibid.:223). Although they might succeed in overcoming ‘a minor failing such as untidiness’, all of them will not eventually strengthen but ruin the person’s forces and lead to a lasting conflict and the new ‘slavery of one’s own resolutions’. This will not allow flexibility or ‘personal fancy’. Consequently, ‘a state of anxiety’ will be the end result (ibid.).

5. The Self and its Social Behaviour in PTRIC Contexts

However, it has been noted that the understanding of the self and the repressively imposed mask in the PTRIC context is not the same as in other cultural contexts, especially in the individualist-oriented context. Can the theoretical bases for the knowledge of the RFS in general presented above be applied to PTRIC contexts? In his analytic study of the individual differences between the ‘behavioural and personality constructs’, Anthony G. Greenwald (1982:139) discusses the correlation between the self’s social behaviour and level of (‘intrapersonally oriented’) individualism or level of (‘socially oriented’) collectivism. He displays the contrasting features between intrapersonally and socially oriented psychological constructs as shown in Chart E.1 (ibid.:128-9).
According to Lu Luo’s (2008) study in testing his contemporary Chinese bicultural self theory, all the features of both intrapersonally (individually) and socially oriented psychological constructs can be seen in the PTRIC.\textsuperscript{31} This evidence manifests that the theoretical bases for the knowledge of the RFS in general can be also applied to explain the self and its social behaviour in PTRIC contexts. We can see that among the features in socially oriented psychological constructs, impression management and self-presentation consistency tend to be directly related to the RFS while the self has no freedom to make its own personal choice under the social imposition formed in the other indirect socially oriented psychological constructs: conformity, affiliation, social comparison, need for approval, public self-consciousness, and high self-monitoring.

A pioneer of cross-cultural psychology, Harry C. Triandis (1989:506), explores further the differences between social behaviours of the self in different social environments.\textsuperscript{32} Based on the distinction of self into ‘private, public, [and] collective’ facets (Greenwald and Pratkanis 1984),\textsuperscript{33} he uses these as indicators to see their

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
Intrapersonally Oriented & Socially Oriented \\
\hline
Independence & Conformity \\
Isolation & Affiliation \\
Temporal Comparison & Social Comparison \\
Need for Achievement & Need for Approval \\
Dissonance Reduction & Impression Management \\
Attitude-Behavior Consistency & Self-Presentation Consistency \\
Private Self-Consciousness & Public Self-Consciousness \\
Low Self-Monitoring (Principled Self) & High Self-Monitoring (Pragmatic Self) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{Chart E.1 Intrapersonally and Socially Oriented Psychological Constructs} (Greenwald 1982:128)

\textsuperscript{31} See also Chang Weining and Wong Kaishi (2008).

\textsuperscript{32} William James (1901:182–94) divides the empirical life of self into ‘material me’, ‘social me’, and ‘spiritual me’. However, the problem of the repressed form of self is related to the social behaviours of the self. James’ division of the self will not be discussed in this thesis due to the limitation of space.

\textsuperscript{33} See also Baumeister and Tice (1986:64–8) and Breckler and Greenwald (1986).
differences across multiple cultures, differentiated by ‘three dimensions of cultural variation (individualism-collectivism, tightness-looseness, [and] cultural complexity)’. In this study, he examines cultures from three aspects: ‘the environment, childrearing patterns, and cultural patterns’. The definitions of the private self, public self, and collective self in Triandis’ and Greenwald and Pratkanis’ studies are integrated and displayed in Chart E.2.

According to their definitions, it is clear that the real self in this research is identical with the private self defined by Triandis; it is also clear that the self in Ru-based collectivism is more collective than public. June Ock Yum (1988:375) argues that the Ru-based collectivism in East Asia is more ‘a collectivism only among those bound by social networks’ instead of ‘any abstract concern for a general collective body’. This kind of collectivism might give people the impression of ‘egocentrism’ (Fèi, Xiàotōng 費孝通 1992:67) rather than the typical collectivism (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:94–5). It will be discussed more in C5S4.1.2.

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34 Hui C. Harry and Triandis (1926-) (1986:240) distinguish two main types of collectivism according to which range is in view: (1) ‘a certain subset of people’; and (2) ‘the entire universe of human beings’ (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:333). This will be discussed more in C4S4.5. However, although post-traditional Japanese people are influenced by traditional Ruism as well as post-traditional Chinese people, their nation, company, society are generally more important to post-traditional Japanese persons than their family as their main collective group. The definitions, attributes, and types of individualism and collectivism are given in A-C.
The Definitions of the Private, Public, and Collective Selves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>The Private Self</th>
<th>The Public Self</th>
<th>The Collective Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basis for Self-Evaluation</td>
<td>Internal Standards (Inner Audience)</td>
<td>Approval of Others (Outer Audience)</td>
<td>Internalized Goals of Reference Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation</td>
<td>Cognitions that Involve Traits, States, or Behaviours of the Person</td>
<td>Cognitions [that] Concern[s] the Generalized Other’s View of the Self</td>
<td>Cognitions Concerning a View of the Self that Is Found in Some Collective (e.g., Family, Coworkers, Tribe, Scientific Society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples</td>
<td>‘I Am Introverted’ ‘I Am Honest’ ‘I Will Buy’</td>
<td>‘People Think I Am Introverted’ or ‘People Think I Will Buy X’</td>
<td>‘My Family Thinks I Am Introverted’ or ‘My Coworkers Believe I Travel Too Much’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart E.2 The Definitions of the Private, Public, and Collective Selves (Triandis 1989:507; Greenwald and Pratkanis 1984:159)

The findings of Triandis’ (1989:517) study manifest that people in a more individualistic culture tend to have a more private self and people in a more collectivistic culture a more collective self. When the selves of people are more collective, they are more inclined to be influenced or imposed ‘by the norms, role definitions, and values of the particular collective’ and behave according to others’ expectations in the collective (ibid.). The private self tends to behave in an ‘exchange relationship’ with others (ibid.). However, the collective self tends to behave in a ‘communal relationship’ with others, and its social behaviour tends to be communal (ibid.). Triandis explains from the result of his study that the public and collective selves are more ‘allocentric’ but the private is more ‘idiocentric’ (ibid.:508). The public self is higher self-monitoring and situation-dependent but the private self is more ‘stable’ and ‘situation[-]independent’ (ibid.:508).
The collective self tends to subordinate personal to collective goals and benefits but the private self does not (ibid.:509).

In comparison with modern Europeans or North Americans, the post-traditional East Asian sense of self is more collective; thus ‘group norms or ... goals’ are more important among them. Triandis (1989:511) also stated that ‘[modern] China is a collectivist’. In such a culture, the private self seems unimportant. Therefore, Triandis’ cross-cultural study verifies that Tournier’s concept in general can be appropriately applied to PTRIC contexts.

It has been noted that there is not as meaningful a distinction between self (‘ziwǒ」「自我」) and ego (‘yǐwǒ」「—我」) in the psychological studies of post-traditional Chinese selfhood as there is in the psychological studies of Anglo-European Western selfhood since the self and ego in Chinese language is usually devalued to be self-serving, self-caring, and selfish (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:18, eo). This can be explained by the Chinese collective self described above.

Although Yang Zhongfang does not agree to use the term collective to describe the post-traditional Chinese self, she (1991b:101) concludes that the relation between their self and society is a relation between ‘bāohàn」「包含」(inclusion) and ‘héyī」「合一」(uniting) instead of between ‘gèrén」「個人」(individual) and ‘zǒnghé」「總合」(summation). In order to attain the ideal of self and society fusing into one (‘róng wéi yītǐ’)

35 See also Triandis et al. (1990:1018f.) and Power (2007:129).
36 However, Lei Ting (1991) does deep research on the differentiation between ‘self’ (‘zìjǐ」「自己」) and ‘ego’ (‘ziwǒ」「自我」). It is worth noting that his English translations for these two words are different from Yang Zhongfang’s translation, even opposite for zìjǐ and zìwǒ. See also Yu Dehui (1987b:5) and Yang Zhongfang (1991b:111, 125–32). However, the meanings of the English terms self and ego and their distinction might also vary depending on their definitions in the contexts. For example, ego might not always denote one’s isolated individuality but also denote one’s sociality (Sherif & Cantril 1947:117, 131; Greenwald 1982:112f.). Ego might be even defined as ‘nothing but the social part of man’ (Allport 1943:458).

37 The summary of four social psychological studies on self-boundary by Yang Yiyín 楊宜音 (1999) introduces all the above types of differentiations of the self.
（「融為一體」），它必须使‘

自己」（social self）超越‘

個己」（individual self）38 通过个体‘

內轉」（inner-transformation）。在那种理想状态，个体自我（‘

個己」）已不存在，或者‘去中心化’（Sampson 1985）或‘整合化’（Sampson 1988）。39 但即使避免使用术语‘collective’，所描述的自我特征似乎与上述的集体主义相似。


38 For explaining the Chinese self, Yang Zhongfang (1991b:97) makes a nuanced distinction between ‘

自己’ and ‘

個己’．He uses ‘

個己’ to represent the narrow self limited in its entity and ‘

自己’ to denote generally the broad self-containing specific other people. According to their definitions, ‘

個己’ is translated as the individual self and ‘

自己’ as the social self in this thesis.

39 The noun form of ‘ensemble’ used for describing the concept of social self can be traced to Karl Marx (1818-83). Marx (1845:14) argues in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1804–1872) that the single individual in reality is ‘the ensemble of the social relations’ (Gould 2001:1545). ‘[a]n encompassing self’ is coined for this similar ideal self in Tu Weiming’s language (1990a:175; 1985:47, 77, 137).

40 Yang Kuoshu also comprehensively discusses the features of Chinese self and its social behaviour in another work (1988). See also Yang, Kuoshu et al. (2010).

41 See also Yang, Kuoshu et al. (ibid.).
component because the social-oriented self is more related to traditional and post-traditional Ruism and the RFS.

Diagram E.1 Yang Kuoshu’s Interactionistic View of the Traits of Post-Traditional Chinese Self (Character) (1986a:162)

As manifested in A-G, Francis L. K. Hsu (ibid.:29, eo), the Chinese psychological anthropologist, insightfully rendered 人 (rén), the Chinese word for ‘[hu]man’ into ‘personage’ rather than person. The reason for this rendering is because that the post-traditional Chinese conception of human is not based on the individual’s ‘separate entity’ (ibid.:23) and ‘psyche’ distinct from his/her social roles but on ‘the individual’s transactions with his fellow human beings’ (ibid.:29). Therefore, the theoretical bases for the knowledge of the RFS in general, discussed above, are manifested to be applicable to PTRIC contexts. Francis L. K. Hsu’s psycho-sociogram of a human and his concept of the personage in Chinese contexts are presented in A-G for reference.

42 See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:511).
Besides, how one’s individual autonomy responds to external *oughts* from the society also decides the formation of the RFS. Based on Kon’s (1986:168) aforementioned revealing differentiation between the self and the imposed mask in defining them through their relations, two elements must be considered in terms of the individual autonomy in responding to external *oughts*: competency and willingness. If the person cannot refuse to do what one is either incompetent or unwilling to do, the personage will be imposed to be put on in order to pretend to conform to the external *oughts*. The degree of being repressed of the self depends on one’s willingness and competency in facing external *oughts*. The discussion with diagrammatic illustration is presented in A-H for reference.

### 6. Describing the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts

Contemporary Non-Ruist scholars in a variety of disciplines, as mentioned in C1, are concerned about the RFS in PTRIC contexts and criticize PTRIC Ruist relational ethics and selfhood as its main cause. However, they do not use the same terms and phases to describe and discuss it.

Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510), a Chinese senior social worker, draws attention to three behaviour traits common in East Asian Ruist contexts, two of which are manifestation of a RFS: lack of personality and lack of assertiveness. He (ibid., eo) states:

First, the East Asian’s lack of *personality* is traced to the Confucian social institution of *Li* ([禮: rites]) ... Second, the East Asian’s lack of principled moral thinking is linked to the dyadic, relation-based character of the Confucian ethic, its lack of hypothetical reasoning and its hierarchical view of human relationships. Third, the East Asian’s lack of assertiveness is rooted in the Confucian ideal of [human as a reflection of harmony in the cosmos and the Confucian ideal of society as based on the fulfilment of duties rather than the assertion of rights.

Stephen K. K. Cheng’s statement, like most of the scholars in my sources, tends to be too reductionist and generalizing, thus more or less overstating, by regarding neither

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43 The term *competency* denotes here both the capability to reach external *oughts* and the capability to look likely to reach external *oughts*.
the cultural and ethnic plurality in modern East Asia nor the differences of post-traditional Ruist contexts among different modern Chinese societies as mentioned in C1. Neither does he consider each of traits as a spectrum with its different degrees. But are these three behaviour traits related to Ruist contexts accordingly totally groundless and thus invalidated? In this research, I will not examine such kinds of expression by Stephen K. K. Cheng, as well as by many other scholars, as either quantitative or qualitative statements. I will consider them as evidence stating a tendency and prevalence of a trait and examine their validity through other common evidence of observation, empirical proof, argument, and interpretation of their sources of influence.

For example, Stephen K. K. Cheng (ibid.:511) describes the lack of personality as lack of ‘a conscious sense of being an individual person’, a lack of ‘any individual personality at all’, a lack of ‘central core of personality’, and ‘encasing the personality of the individual within the parameters of his prescribed roles’, to the severest extent that there is hardly difference between one’s individuality and these roles. I consider this as the severest as the loss of self because one’s individuality is dissolved into them. Therefore, even though his descriptions of such problems tend to be too reductionist and generalizing, if the trait he is concerned about is to some extent prevalent in modern East Asia, including PTRIC societies, it cannot be ignored. Joan G. Miller (1994:18) points out from an American perspective that social expectations are recognized as ‘external impositions’ on the individual self, especially when the self and the role expected are sharply distinctive. A Chinese psychologist, David Y.F. Ho (1994:349), observes that ‘cultural definition imposes a limit on the individual’s freedom of action’, for example, Ruist filial piety. 44 Therefore, social imposition is obviously a direct cause of a RFS. Lack

44 Or ‘group restrictions imposed on [one’s] outer behaviour … in the Chinese case’ (Saari 1982:43).
of personality is a description of it. Social imposition on the individual self is not unique to but fortified in the PTRIC contexts.

As explained in C1, the individual self in the Ruist context is a relational self. Therefore, the RFS is understood and discussed from a social psychological perspective because in this thesis it is developed in the interaction of the individual self with others (Spitzmuller and Ilies 2010:306–8). I integrate the findings of my exploration of the correlation of PTRIC relational selfhood and the RFS expressed in various ways and summarize them as follows (Please note that most of scholars discuss Ruism and its related issues in a reductionist and generalizing way and thus I interpret them as a prevalent tendency at large):

(1) The more hierarchical a social structure is, especially within a familial setting, the easier the individual self tends to become a socially-imposed relational self that can lead to selfhood-related problems. Bodde (1953:47–8) points out that in a collectivist society, hierarchical structure is perceived as an ideal way to organize relationships to make it function as a ‘harmonious organism’ for the ‘common good’, a value on which traditional and post-traditional Ruism places the ‘greatest insistence’ (ibid.).

For ancient Ruists, followed by all later Ruists, take an ordered unequal society for granted in order to maintain social harmony (ibid.:47–8, 67–9). Accordingly, harmony and hierarchy are twins in contemporary Ruist China (Rhyne 2014:website). The corollaries of this are authoritarian-oriented relationships characterized by ‘a

45 See also Taylor (1989:33).
46 The hierarchical social structure includes both the public and private social spheres. Although the hierarchical emphasis has been becoming weaker in both realms amongst post-traditional Chinese people in general, the concept is still manifested, especially in family social setting, which influences the ethical value system, upbringing, education and family relationship and interpersonal relationship in PTRIC society.
47 See also Hofstede (1980), Bond et al. (1982b:158), and Ambrose Y. C. King and Bond (1985:36).
large power distance’ and social imposition on the relational self (Leung, Kwok 2010:232). 49 No wonder ‘yángfèng yīnwéi’ 「陽奉陰違」 (passive resistance) 50 or ‘feigned compliance the norm’ (Pye 1988:80f.) as a display of a RFS becomes post-traditional Chinese’s popular attitude towards the superior (Liu, Shuhsien 1991:54–5). 51 Henry Rosemont, Jr. (2012:lecture) indicates that the relationships in such a social structure are ‘intrinsic to such a self: remove the relationships and there is nothing left’. The statement of Rosemont, Jr. is indeed overstating but I think that it is meant to exaggerate the dominant role of relationships in shaping this kind of self.

In confirmation of these observations, Richard H. Solomon (1971:78–80) differentiates three contradictions inherent in the Ruist tradition which all involve the issue of the self:

A. ‘dependency on hierarchical authority versus self-assertion’;
B. ‘social harmony and peace versus hostility and aggression’;
C. ‘group’ versus ‘self’.

Therefore, a socially-imposed relational self in hierarchy-oriented social contexts is to some extent unavoidable. Many other different expressions of this RFS in Ru-influenced Chinese hierarchical social contexts are adopted by scholars in their discussions. For example, Ru-influenced social-imposition would lead to the tendencies of being very hard to live out the true I. 52 In other words, such a socially-

49 See also Saari (1982:43).
50 I.e. outwardly obeying but secretly ignoring or ‘obey publicly and defy privately’ (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1998:30f).
51 See also Lin Anwu (1997:73–4).

(2) The more a culture stresses moral self-cultivation (xiūshēn 修身) and filial piety, the more performance is highly valued. Many different expressions of the RFS in PTRIC contexts with a strong ideology of moral self-cultivation and filial piety are adopted by scholars in their discussions. For example, being human (‘zuòrén」 「做人」)57 (Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:22) and ‘being somebody’ (Fleming, Jess 2002:183) demands one (Lin, Xiaodong 2010:259–60) to perform to the satisfaction of others (Tu, Weiming 1985:47, 55), especially one’s seniors. Accordingly, the problem of the

where the self was underdeveloped’ (Wong, Melvin 2001:31). Silencing the self (and depression as its result) associated with an unequal relationship has been studied and proved in quite a few researches some of which are cross-cultural studies although not in the PTRCI context (Jack 1999:190f.; Jack et al. 2010; Sikka et al. 2010; Mauthner 2010; Stoppard 2010; Jack and Ali 2010).


56 See also Cole (1971:6, 19f.).

57 Although translated as being human, the phrase ‘zuòrén」 「做人」 in the Chinese context, actually emphasizes more doing, behaving, and acting than being. Therefore, it can be translated as behaving or acting as human.
socially-imposed relational self becomes heightened. When the ones who live in such a Ru-influenced society are incapable of performing sufficiently well, they gradually become prone to hiding weakness and pretending to be good enough. Consequentially, people tend to hide their true feelings and thoughts, wear a mask (Zhuang, Huiqiu 1987c:172, 187). Then the ‘persona’ (‘role performance as a mask’) endures the self to be diminished ‘zìwǒ yāsuō’ 「自我壓縮」 (Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:22–3, eo). Ultimately, a performance-oriented culture tends to suggest a utilitarian form of interaction, and hence it reinforces tendencies of ‘hypocrisy’ (Dong, Fangyuan 1995:298).

(3) The more a culture combines Ru-based collectivism, ‘miànzi’ 「面子」 (face) culture (Yu, Dehui 1987b:4), shame culture, and a strong ideology of harmony (Weber 2007:230) and filial piety all together, all of which are closely related directly or indirectly to traditional Ruist teachings, the severer the RFS is in it. Melvin Wong (2001:38–43) points out, in this cultural context, not only might one allow one’s true feelings and thoughts to be suppressed by others and culture, albeit passively and

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60 Alister E. McGrath and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37–8, eo).
61 See also Lin Liyun (1987:6).
63 ‘To sacrifice the small self for the good of the great self’ is highly valued in the Ruist context (Abbott 1970:295–6, 302; Li, Minlong and Yang, Kuoshu 1998:10, 54; Guō, Qīngxiāng 郭清香 2006:82, 90; Broadbent 2010:18), the small self (xiǎowǒ 小我) means the individual person in contrast to the great self (dàwǒ 大我), or the social self, referring to the collective group the individual person belongs to. It has been noted that, in twenty-first century colloquial Chinese language, the Chinese original noun héxié 和谐 for English word harmony is used as a verb to mean sarcastically sacrificing the inharmonious parts for keeping the harmony of the whole.
65 In the traditional Ruist concept of parenting, the children should be taught ‘never [to] reveal [their] thoughts and feelings’ (Wu, David Y. H. 1996:146).
reluctantly, but also one might get used to suppressing one’s true feelings and thoughts actively for the sake of preserving one’s face and suppressing shameful feelings. In the scholars’ discussions of the socially-imposed relational self in PTRIC contexts, many different descriptions for such an active behaviour of suppression of one’s feelings and thoughts are as follows: ‘扭曲原来的我’ (distort the original I) (Lin, Liyun 1987:2), ‘沈默的大多數’ (the silent majority),67 wear a mask as mentioned above.68 In the face cultural contexts, there is a lack of recognition of the distinction of sincerity and acting (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:344).69 Although sincerity is highly valued in both traditional and post-traditional Ruist ethics as mentioned above and discussed in C4 and C5, a recent research on personal honesty in fifteen western and eastern countries discloses that the people in China are the least honest (Hugh-Jones 2016).

(4) As mentioned above, the tendency of losing the self (Lin, Liyun 1987:2) and lack of personality among post-traditional Chinese persons is highly significant in cultures and societies influenced more by traditional Ruism than other cultural forms of life.70

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66 For example, surveys among junior high school students in Taiwan disclose their low self-satisfaction. In explanation of this phenomenon, the psychologist, Yang Zhongfang (1991a:27) attributes it to the possible cultural factor that self-satisfaction is not allowed in Chinese Ru-influenced culture which emphasizes ceaseless moral self-cultivation. Self-satisfaction and most other words describing a similar meaning are negatively viewed as a form of pride that hinders one’s growth in self-cultivation (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:111).


69 Zhai Xuewei (2010:341) even states that ‘the complementarity of Ruism and Daoism is the foundation of the philosophy of life as play that is regarded and upheld by Chinese people’.

70 See also Li Mǐnlóng 李敏龍 and Yang Kuoshu 楊國樞 (p. Yáng Guóshù) (1998:54).
In post-traditional Ruism, loss of self is mainly a by-product resulting from attaining to ‘moral achievement’ (Fleming 2002:185) by way of self-cultivation in order to live a better life in a socially-imposing relational and hierarchical society. But how can one have no self, or come to the loss of one’s self, or the absence of one’s self? Undoubtedly, it does not mean that one has no existing self but denotes metaphorically that one remains uncertain to some degree of ‘what [one’s] real nature’ is (Tournier 1957:46); or that the meaning of one’s individual self is missing; that one has even ‘forgotten’ or ‘abandoned’ one’s deeper [individual] self’ (Bond, Jean 1993:back cover). In other words, in summary, one’s individual self is hidden behind a social mask (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:181–203).71 I will discuss more what this means later.

From the summary above, many psychologists, sociologists, and scholars in religious studies are concerned with this kind of issue of relational selfhood in Ru-based cultural heritage that Yang Kuoshu (2002:88–9) calls ‘situational determinism’ in social relationships (to be explained more in C4 and C8).72 Having integrated the scholars’ concerns, Ru-influenced relational selfhood might result in to some extent:

1. ‘the tendency to obey authority blindly’ (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111);
2. alienation between ‘the public self’ and ‘the private self’ (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:131–2), between ‘yingrán’ 「應然」 (the oughts prescribed for the one’s social roles) and ‘shírán」「實然」 (the reality or intents in one’s heart) (Yeh, Kuanghui 2002:241, eo),73 or between ‘assumed’ (obligatory and imposed) and ‘real’ (voluntary);74

71 See also Zhānglǎoshī Yuèkān 張老師月刊 (1987).
72 See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1963:164-5), Theodore T. Y. Hsieh et al. (1969) and Li Changjun (2010).
73 Intents means what one intends or would like to do. Oughts means what one thinks one should do according to other’s expectation. About the discussion and definition of intents from oughts in detail, see S3 above.
(3) the tendency to be ‘particularist’, which is to value exclusively one’s own ‘primary group’ in contrast to any ‘secondary group’, which, relatively speaking, results in being indifferent to public affairs, and social morality or righteousness (Zheng, Zhengbo 1990:169–70), the norms and measures of which are adjusted according to others’ expectation for one’s role and social status, thus substantially a kind of ‘status ethics’ (‘dì wèi lúnli」 「地位倫理」) (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2002:155);

(4) the inconsistency of the expressions and acts of the self in different situation, i.e. personal inconsistency or self-inconsistency (Yang, Kuoshu 2002:88–9);

(5) the obscurity of the boundary between self and other due to the individual is to some extent the possession of the superior or the primary group (Pye 1988:58-61, 71–74);

(6) a lack of self-consciousness of individual self, self-existence, uniqueness, sense of direction, object and willingness (Lin, Honghsin 2008a:79);

(7) a lack of ‘consciousness with respect to protecting human rights and exploring new frontiers’ (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111).

75 Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997:184).
77 Primary group and secondary group are always relative in terms of closeness, importance, and even utility in the context of Ruist human relationships. This Ruist feature of relationships is well described and explained by a Chinese anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong 费孝通 (1910-2005) (English version in 1992:60–70), in 1948, with his concept and theory of ‘chàxù géjú」 「差序格局」, namely ‘the differential mode of association’ (Chen, Xiaoping 陈晓平 2002:23; Li, Xiangjun 李祥俊 2005:66; Yang, Yiying 楊宜音 2008:154–7). Tu Weiming (2001b:7) call it ‘rén de chàdènxìng」 「仁的差等性」 (the differential mode of benevolence). Through a field survey by Xie Yao (2005), the social behaviour of the differential mode of association is proved to exist still even among post-traditional Chinese intellectuals. Scholars use different terms to describe and discuss this same Ru-influenced behaviour. A brief summary of it is provided in A-K for reference.
78 See A-DF3.
79 See also Shenkar and Ronen (1987:565).
80 See also David Yaufai Ho et al. (1989:62) and Li Minlong and Yang Kuoshu (1998:54).
All these possible tendencies resulting from Ru-influenced relational selfhood contribute directly and indirectly to the formation of the RFS in PTRIC contexts. However, there is no unified terminology used to describe or define this range of the RFS related to PTRIC selfhood in the literature reviewed, partly because they describe different degrees of it. Drawing upon the evidence from the related secondary literature, I summarize and list the different common expressions of the RFS in a PTRIC society in another journal article of mine as shown in Chart E.3. In order to make them be grasped easier, I separate them into three rough categories: mild, medium, and severe. Due to the lack of literature integrating and discussing these expressions, this rough categorization is according to my understanding. The nuanced differentiation in their degrees among

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81 From my secondary literature, there are innumerable stories of post-traditional Chinese people who share their struggle with their repressed form of self regarding their self-disclosure to varying degrees but do not always mention their connection with the term Ruism. For examples, as representatives of a much larger group of books and articles, see the following: Yu Dehui (1991c:5, 11; 1991d), Liao Huiying (1991:7, 9), and Lin Liyun (1991a:12).
these different expressions of the RFS in PTRIC contexts deserves to be researched through qualitative and quantitative studies to establish a spectrum of the RFS.

To sum up, the term for the RFS in this research is used to convey the sense that one’s real self is repressed before others as it is in every moment of its existence,\(^2\) not as it was or will be, in other words that one hardly lives out the real self, discloses oneself, or allows the expression of one’s real self to be realized.

\(^2\) Carl Rogers’ (1961:172, eo) ‘to be all of oneself in each moment’.
Appendix F

The Cause of the Repressed Form of Self

I want to offer a summary of the factors leading to the RFS. Their related main features in PTRIC contexts with their relevant sections discussed in C2 will be appended in brackets. These factors leading to the RFS are described mainly by Tournier and supported by other literature found in psychology and sociology. I classify them into five categories as follows. Some of them are mentioned in justifying the existence of the problem of the RFS in PTRIC contexts in C1 and C2. Due to the limitations of space, they are only enumerated here to show how the RFS is shaped. It is worth noting that these various factors regularly overlap, ‘combining’ and ‘interacting’ with each other, instead of being individually and exclusively present (Tournier 1957:28). After taking root in a persons’ life, they gradually govern one’s ‘attitudes and [one’s] words’ and then mould one’s social masks (ibid.:30f.). These five main factors with their primary related features in PTRIC contexts include the following main categories:

(1) the factor of pursuing one’s own ideal (related to moral self-cultivation in C2.4 and 
Ru-based collectivism in C2.3):

A. for either an ‘altruistic’ end, or an ‘egotistical end’,¹ for example, the conquest 
of ‘a woman … money, pleasure, esteem or notoriety’ as an aim (ibid.:30) in a 
utilitarian ideology (Dong, Fangyuan 1995:298);

B. in order to justify and defend ‘ourselves or our loved ones, or even … our 
opinions and our faith’ (Tournier 1957:30);

C. because of the force of habit (ibid.:51);

D. in order to take ‘revenge’ (ibid.:31).

¹ Pursuing one’s own ideal, no matter whatever one’s aim is for others or for oneself.
(2) the factor of adorning and preserving one’s expected and ‘imaginary self’ (Pascal in Tournier 1957:32) (related to moral self-cultivation in C24.2 and Ru-based collectivism in C24.3):

A. in order to consolidate ‘prestige’ and to give ‘to others the desired impression’ (Tournier 1957:28), or face or ‘miànzi」「面子」(Yu, Dehui 1987b:4);

B. in order to play a ‘successful role’ (Tournier 1957: 35-36);²

C. in order to appear ‘in a favourable light’ (ibid.:36) and to leave a good impression in front of others, especially superiors (Yu, Dehui and Gǔ, Bìlíng 古碧玲 1987:67).³

(3) the factor of tensions created when learning how to survive in a society, especially in a settled unequal relationship (Schwalbe 2009:140)⁴ (related to Ru-based collectivism in C24.3 and hierarchical society in C24.4):

A. because of:

1. expectations from culture (Rogers 1961:169);⁵

2. collectivist ideology which tends to collective interest at the expense of individuality (Doi 1981:132–41);⁶ ‘socialization’ (Jack 1999:191–5);

3. a ‘sense of guilt … in betraying the group’ (Doi 1981:49);⁷

B. because of being ‘imposed’⁸ upon by:

1. the ‘necessities of social life’ (Tournier 1957:33);

² See also Alistier E. McGrath, and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37), Moltmann (2000a:289), and Bai Chongliang (2007:116).

³ See also Moltmann (1976:3).

⁴ See also Jack (1993; 1999:190f.), Jack et al. (2010), Sikka et al. (2010), Mauthner (2010), Stoppard (2010), and Jack and Ali (2010).

⁵ See also Jack (1999:191–200).


⁸ This factor would be enhanced when the rejection of the ‘small self’ for the sake of the ‘larger self’ or ‘great self’ is lauded ‘as a virtue’ and the other way around is ‘negated’ or disparaged (Doi 1981:134, eo). See also Tu Weiming (1985:14, eo).
2. the ‘totalitarian self’, a group self with strong ‘dynamics of groupthink’
   (Goleman 1996:105, 182, eo);\(^9\)
C. because of ‘modern Taylorized methods of work’\(^10\) and living in ‘a mass society’
   (Tournier 1957:40);\(^11\)
D. because of ‘a long schooling’ of standardization starting ‘in the first few days of
   our life’ in ‘the increasing uniformity of’ modern life (ibid.:33, 39);\(^12\)
E. because of ‘the herd-instinct’ (ibid.:40), ‘group mentality’, (Doyle 2006:website,
   eo) and ‘shùnzhòng xīnlǐ’ 「順眾心理」 (conformist mentality) (Yu, Dehui and
   Gu, Biling 1987:66) or ‘qiútóng xīntài’ 「求同心態」 (sameness-oriented
   mindset) (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:130) in order to gain ‘social acceptance’,
   ‘social integration’,\(^13\) and ‘social recognition’ (Jung 1966:173);\(^14\)
F. through ‘inward emigration’ (‘a passive attitude of opposition’ or ‘an external
   appearance of conformity’) in order to survive in an environment of
   ‘dictatorship’ or to seek ‘self-protection from social pressures’ (Moltmann
   1976:39, 41);
G. because of:
   1. ‘the auto-suggestive meaning of a primordial image’ (Jung 1966:173); or
   2. ‘the influence of the collective unconscious’ which includes ‘unconscious
      collective ideas (mythical thinking) and vital instincts’ (ibid.:174, 304).

\(^9\) See also Doi (1981:132–41).
\(^10\) ‘Modern Taylorized methods of work’ is through scientific management (analysis and synthesis of work
   flows so as to improve efficiency in economic productivity of labours. As labour became the only means
   in reaching the ends of productivity according to this approach, Tournier (1957:40) worried about its
   negative impact, writing that ‘modern Taylorized methods of work create only personages; they
dehumanize’ humans, ‘depersonalize them.’
\(^11\) See also Rogers (1961:169).
\(^12\) See also Rogers (1961:168–9) and Fleming (2002:183).
\(^13\) Alister E. McGrath, and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37).
(4) the factor of hiding inadequacies because of a lack of ‘self-confidence’ (Doi 1981:152) and the presence of ‘internal doubts’ (Tournier 1957:50) (related to moral self-cultivation in C24.2 and Ru-based collectivism in C24.3):

A. in order to elude:
   1. ‘personal distress’ (ibid.:31);
   2. shameful self-image (Rogers 1961:168);\(^{15}\)
   3. embarrassing situations (Moltmann 1976:3);\(^{16}\)

B. in order to deny and hide ‘contradictions’ (Tournier 1957:46) and \(\text{quēdiǎn} \)「缺點」 (weaknesses)\(^{17}\) within;\(^{18}\)

C. because of:
   1. ‘a fear of exposing’ the true self behind ‘façades’ (Rogers 1961:167);
   2. the ‘fear of failure’ (Tournier 1957:36);\(^{19}\)
   3. the ‘fear of consequent rejection’ \(^{20}\) or the suffering from ignorance, devaluation, or denigration from significant others (Harter 1997:100);
   4. the anxiety of being criticized and laughed at (Yu, Dehui and Gu, Biling 1987:67);

D. in order:
   1. to preserve ‘the forces at work within … instincts, … desires, … feelings’ and the potential ‘actions’ (Tournier 1957:48);
   2. to avoid being outstanding;\(^{21}\)

\(^{15}\) See also Yu Dehui (1987b:5).
\(^{16}\) See also Goffman (1956:135).
\(^{17}\) Yu Dehui and Gu Biling (1987:67).
\(^{18}\) See also Moltmann (2000a:277) and Payne (2003:18).
\(^{19}\) See also Alister E. McGrath, and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:38).
\(^{20}\) ibid.
E. in order:

1. to avoid a direct ‘self-encounter’ and ‘the naked honesty’ to self (Moltmann 1976:3);

2. to refuse to accept the ‘is-ness’ of self (Rogers 1961:181, eo).

(5) the factor of interacting with others effectively (Harter 1999:100) (related to Ru-based collectivism in C24.3 and hierarchical society in C24.4):

A. in order to avoid conflicts with others (Tournier 1957:34, 46);

B. because of the ‘incredible power of suggestion’ by others (ibid.:50);

C. in order to seek:

1. to ‘please’ (ibid.:63) or ‘not disappoint’ others (ibid.:36) and to satisfy their ‘expectations’ (Rogers 1961:181) and ‘judgements’ (Bond, Jean 1993:back cover);

2. to win the ‘love’ of others, especially ‘parents’ (de Vos 1998:337);23

3. to gain ‘acceptance, power or approval from the significant people’ (Bond, Jean 1993:back cover);

4. to avoid the pressure due to human relationship or rénqìng 「人情」 (favour) (Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:22–3) or guānxì 「關係」 (relationship) (Lin, Honghsin 2008b:57);

D. because of:

1. ‘hàipà quánwēi」「害怕權威」 (the fear of authorities) (Zhuang, Huiqiu 1987b:109–19);

2. being always dominated and constrained by others, especially parents (Tournier 1957:137, 212);24

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22 See also Rogers (1961:170) and Schwalbe (2009:140).

23 See also Alice Miller (1997:back cover).

24 See also Alice Miller (1997) and Li Lukyan and Kwok Hungbiu (2005:19).
E. in order to counterbalance others, for example, accentuating ‘one’s own tendencies in order to counterbalance those of the other’ (ibid.:35);

F. in order to fulfil one’s own responsibility for others, such as being a counsellor, teacher, physician, teacher, lawyer, or professor (ibid.:38).
Appendix G

The Person and the Personage in Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-Sociogram of a Human

Borrowing the Psycho-sociogram and its concept from Francis L. K. Hsu, it will be helpful to use this tool to understand and illustrate the social interaction of the person and the personage in post-traditional Chinese cultural contexts.

Francis L. K. Hsu’s psycho-sociogram of a human illustrated in Diagram G.1 is a way to help examine ‘the elements of human existence’ that are used by psychologists and psychological anthropologists. Layers 7 and 6 are ‘the unconscious and the pre-conscious’ elements respectively, formulated by Freud, that consist of ‘repressed or semi-repressed psychic materials’ respectively. Layer 5 refers to the ‘unexpressed conscious’ elements containing the psychic materials ‘generally kept to the individual himself’. Layer 4 refers to the ‘expressible conscious’ elements whose contents are ‘ideas and feelings which the individual can and does communicate to his fellow human beings’. Layer 3 refers to the ‘intimate society and culture’ elements consisting of ‘humans, animals, artefacts, and cultural rules’ that the individual has intimate relationships with. These intimate relationships tend to be ‘feeling’-oriented instead ‘usefulness’-oriented. Layer 2 refers to ‘operative society and culture’ elements consisting of humans, animals, artefacts, and cultural rules that the individual has only ‘role relationships’ with. These role relationships tend to be ‘usefulness’-oriented instead of ‘feeling’-oriented. Layer 1 refers to ‘wider society and culture’ containing human beings, cultural rules, knowledge, and artefacts, in the same ‘larger society’, whom the individual may or may not be associated with. Layer 0 refers to the ‘outer world’ consisting of ‘peoples, customs, and artefacts belonging to other societies’ whom the individual has not yet contacted and thus has only wrong or even ‘no ideas’ about (Hsu, Francis LK 1971:24–8, eo).
Francis L. K. Hsu (ibid.:29, eo) insightfully adopted ‘personage’ (i.e. social mask, see A-E) rather than person or ‘personality’ as the ‘English equivalent’ to 人 (rén), the Chinese word for ‘human’. The reason for this rendering is because that post-traditional Chinese, as well as post-traditional Japanese, conception of human is on the basis of ‘the individual’s transactions with his fellow human beings’ rather than of the individual’s ‘separate entity’ (ibid.:23) and ‘psyche’ distinct from his/her social roles (ibid.:29). When, for example, ‘tā búshì rén 「他不是人」 (he is not a rén) is a very condemnatory saying in Chinese to criticize metaphorically a person whose ‘behaviour in relation to other human beings is not acceptable’ (ibid.). It absolutely does not mean he is not a human or ‘he is not a human animal’. For in the traditional and post-traditional Ruist concept of person, only one who behaves according to ‘the Way of Humanity’ is recognized to be a person (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:166). Therefore, by Francis L. K. Hsu’s definition, the personage consists of layer 4 (expressible conscious) and layer 3 (intimate society) (Hsu, Francis LK 1971:25, 29). Based on Tournier’s concept and its explanation of the person and the personage, the person simply consists of layer 5

Diagram G.1 Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-Sociogram of a Human (1971:25)
unexpressed conscious) and layer 4 (expressible conscious) while putting aside social interaction. It has been noted that only the conscious dimension of the person, excluding the case of self-deception as mentioned in C2S2.1, C2S4, and A-ES3, will be illustrated and discussed in this Psycho-sociogram due to its limitation.\(^1\)

It is notable that layer 3 (intimate society) is not equal to layer 4 (expressible conscious), for how much the contents in the expressible conscious layer can or will be shared by the individual with the people in the intimate society layer depends on the degree of the mutual trust and acceptance in their relationships. Layer 2 (operative society) is not included in the personage because it requires only a role relationship.\(^2\) In other words, when role relationships demand only one’s usefulness to the other rather than one’s feeling or truthfulness towards the other, there is no issue of being forced to wear social masks due to repressive social imposition.\(^3\)

But in Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-sociogram and definition for the personage, there is something missing without clear definition. In the personage, composed of layer 4 (expressible conscious) and layer 3 (intimate society), designated by Francis L. K. Hsu, where is the part that refers to expressing oneself to conform to social expectation in intimate society but is not the expressible conscious part? I argue that we should designate this part as the personage according to the definition of this term (Francis L. K. Hsu’s

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\(^1\) The eschatological dimension of the true self, the redeemed self or the promised future self, is not discussed and illustrated here but in C3S1.2, C3S2.4, and C6 to C8.

\(^2\) Due to the limitation of a simple Psycho-sociogram, the clear boundary between layer 3 (intimate society) and layer 2 (operative society) is artificial for the purpose of illustration. In fact, the boundary might be ambiguous and dynamic and there might be many sub-layers between them, depending on how the relationships are defined and developed subjectively by the interacting selves.

\(^3\) Yang Zhongfang (1991a:30, 52) points out that Chinese people are more publically self-conscious than privately self-conscious. They like to evaluate themselves by their roles and their performance of their roles. Accordingly, they pay less attention to the characteristics of their personality and feelings than their interpersonal relationships and the duty of their social roles. The feature related to this will be discussed further in C8S3.2.4. According to Yang Zhongfang’s description, Chinese people’s RFS might look like this case demanding only one’s usefulness rather than feeling or truthfulness. However, it is actually different from this because it is due to repressive social imposition that Chinese people pay less attention to the characteristics of their personality and feelings than their interpersonal relationships and the duty of their social roles.
explanation and also Tournier’s definition as mentioned in A-ES2). There usually must be more or less an overlap of layers 4 and layer 3. Accordingly, in considering social interaction, the layer 4 in the person can be divided into the independent expressible conscious part and this overlapping part (expressible conscious in intimate society); and the pure personage, namely wearing a social mask without revealing the expressible conscious self, is only the independent part of layer 3 (intimate society) which excludes its overlapping part with layer 4 (expressible conscious). In other words, rén in Francis L. K. Hsu’s explanation should include the independent part of layer 4, the overlapping parts of layer 4 and layer 3, and the independent part of layer 3. The more layer 4 and layer 3 overlap, the more the expressible conscious self is revealed in intimate society and the less there is the tendency of wearing a social mask. In other words, the tendency of wearing a social mask depends on how much layer 4 and layer 3 do not overlap. I simplifyFrancis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-sociogram and illustrate the person, the personage, and rén in it as Diagram G.2.

It is worth noting that we must not misunderstand that Francis L. K. Hsu denies the other layers as integral parts of a human (rén) because he designates only layer 3 and layer 4 to indicate rén. By way of his Psycho-sociogram, he purports to illustrate that the Chinese concept of rén is different from the Western concept of a human. He (ibid.:29, eo) characterizes rén in this way:

The concept of jen [rén] puts the emphasis on interpersonal transactions. It does not consider the individual psyche’s deep cores of complexes and anxieties. Instead it sees the nature of the individual’s external behaviour in terms of how it fits or fails to fit the interpersonal standards of the society and culture.

4 As only humans are involved in Tournier’s discussion, I have omitted the cultural elements. For illustrative purposes, I also remove other irrelevant layers shown in Diagram 2.2.
As more social conformity is demanded by the relationships in layer 3 (intimate society), more of the expressible conscious part in layer 4 recedes into layer 5 (unexpressed conscious). Additionally, as the relationships in the independent layer 3 are treated more as role relationships, the independent layer 3 overlaps more with layer 2 (operative society). Consequently the space for the person reduces and the demands for the personage increase. Therefore, the tendency of wearing a social mask is developed.

At worst, layer 4 (expressible conscious) could totally disappear into layer 5 (unexpressed conscious), and layer 5 could be totally compressed into layer 6 (pre-conscious) and Layer 7 (unconscious) and eventually disappear. This extreme case happens when ‘the false self can easily get itself mistaken for real’, a delusion that leads to the ‘annihilation’ of the real self (Winnicott 1965:133). Accordingly, the person disappears and only the personage is left. This is the worst condition of the conscious self that is metaphorically expressed as having no self, the absence of a self, or loss of self as mentioned in A-E.
At best, one’s unexpressed conscious part can be liberated in a healthy transformative process of the individual oneself and one’s relationships with others. Accordingly, not only can much of layer 5 (unexpressed conscious) be released into layer 4 (expressible conscious), but also layer 3 (intimate society) increases through absorbing layer 2 (operative society), while the independent layer 3 disappears into the overlap with layer 4. Therefore, the personage tends to be overlapped completely by the person and then the tendency of the RFS reduces or even disappears.

To sum up, the theoretical bases for the knowledge of the RFS in general is manifested to be applicable to PTRIC contexts by means of Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-sociogram and his concept of the personage in PTRIC contexts. According to my modified Psycho-sociogram, the real of true self discussed in this Psycho-sociogram is in the conscious dimension of the self, including layer 5 (unexpressed conscious), the independent layer 4 (expressible conscious part), and the overlapping part of layer 4 and 3 (expressible conscious in intimate society). The tendency of the RFS can be understood as the result when the expressible conscious self is not able or allowed to be revealed in layer 3 (intimate society) but is rather hidden in layer 5 (unexpressed conscious).
Besides the perspective of social interpersonal relationships, it is necessary and helpful to understand them from the perspective of individual autonomy in responding to external *oughts*. Based on Kon’s (1986:168) revealing differentiation between the self and the mask in defining them through their relations as mentioned in A-ES3, two elements must be considered in terms of the individual autonomy in responding to external *oughts*: competency\(^1\) and willingness.

In facing external *oughts*, the inner heart of the person will also respond in either willing or unwilling ways even if one agrees with the external *oughts*. If the person can choose to do willingly and competently only the agreed parts of external oughts without pretending to conform to external oughts what one is either incompetent or unwilling to do, the personage will not be put on by the imposition of the external oughts, as illustrated in Diagram H.1.

If the person cannot refuse to do what one is either incompetent or unwilling to do, the personage will be imposed to be put on in order to pretend to conform to the external *oughts*, as illustrated in Diagram H.2. The degree of being repressed of the self depends on one’s willingness and competency in facing external *oughts*. At worst, what the person can choose to do willingly and competently is very limited. At best, there are no issues of one’s incompetency and unwillingness.

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\(^1\) The term *competency* denotes here both the capability to reach external *oughts* and the capability to look likely to reach external *oughts*. 
Diagram H.1 The Person without the Personage in Facing External Oughts

Diagram H.2 The Person with the Personage in Facing External Oughts
Appendix I

The Directions for Dealing with the Problem of Negative Masking

Suggested by Carl Jung and Carl Rogers

Both Carl Rogers and Carl Jung are concerned about the problem of negative masking and suggest a direction to deal with it. In this Appendix, their concepts and suggested directions are introduced briefly for reference.

1. Jung’s Individuation

In proposing to divest ‘the self of the false wrappings of the persona … and of the suggestive power of primordial images’, Carl Jung (1966:174) might be the first to bring forth the concept of ‘individuation’ and apply it ‘as a model and guiding principle’ (ibid.:110) to analytical psychology and its treatment. He defines individuation as ‘coming to selfhood or self-realization’, which indicates ‘becoming one’s own self’ or ‘becoming an in-dividual’ and ‘embracing ‘our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness’ (ibid.:173). Significantly, individuation is completely distinct from Anglo-European individualism. In Jung’s explanation, individualism intentionally highlights and protrudes ‘some supposed peculiarity’ and devalues the value of ‘collective considerations and obligations’ (ibid.). But individuation is ‘a process of psychological development’ through which not only is the distinguishing characteristic of the individual one fulfilled and one ‘becomes the definite, unique being [one] in fact is’, but also ‘the collective qualities of the human being’ are fulfilled more completely (ibid.:173-4). He (1966:174) argues that ‘the idiosyncrasy of an individual’ means ‘a unique combination, or gradual differentiation, of functions and faculties which in themselves are universal’ rather than any unusualness of his/her nature or leading to ‘isolation’ (ibid.:155 n.10). It is rather contributive to ‘a better social performance’ or ‘an intenser and more universal collective solidarity’ (ibid.) when the distinguishing characteristic of the individual one
is taken into account more appropriately than when it is overlooked or ‘suppressed’. Jung (ibid.:174) demonstrates his argument by an example: ‘Every human face has a nose, two eyes, etc., but these universal factors are variable, and it is this variability which makes individual peculiarities possible.’ However since ‘the persona’ or the personage suppress one’s individuality, it is indispensable to differentiate what one is from how one appears to oneself and to other people (ibid.:195). Then the persona can be disintegrated (ibid.:297) for ‘the purpose of individuation’ (ibid.:195).

Individuation (as Jung understands and expounds it) is about highlighting different aspects of a unique individual, particularly those that reflect the collective aspects of the human being. Jung’s concept of individuation shows to some extent the similar features of *perichoresis* being applied to describe human relationship as *imago trinitatis* (see C6S7). His concept of individuation is to diversify the unique peculiarity of the individual in the universal collective solidarity and to fulfil the collective qualities of the human being in the fulfilment of the distinguishing characteristic of the individual. However, it is a process of self-transformation that can be practised through religious experiences (Jung 1958:157). For Jung (1966:190f.), the psychological aspect is what he is more concerned with than philosophical and religious or theological aspects — although he did not reject religion like Freud. Also, his religion is more psychological than theological because he (ibid.:191, eo) states that the ‘quality of personal immortality so fondly attributed to the soul by religion is, for science, no more than a psychological indicium’. He views the essence of religion as merely a psychological fact (Lú, Dé 2009:68–70). As for how to explain the soul’s ‘religious function’, he argues (1980:13) that it comes from the religious nature (*naturaliter religiosa*) — though he cannot make any sense of this concept except within a psychological frame of reference. Therefore, even if he admits the existing question of ‘human effort’, he still takes no account of ‘acts of grace’ because they are beyond human beings’ ‘control’. He does not deny that the soul
is deified in his psychological understanding of religion (Christianity) but attributes to God, as having ‘deified’ the soul.

As mentioned in C2, Jung’s approach to individuation, in pursuing the true self, engages in highlighting the uniqueness of the individual’s nature. The human relationships in the ways of his description are to some extent like an imago trinitatis or similar features of perichōrēsis in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology. Jung diversifies the individual’s unique peculiarity in the universal collective solidarity, and fulfils the collective qualities of the human being in the realization of the distinguishing characteristics of the individual. However, in terms of such an individuation promoted by Jung, Moltmann’s relational trinitarian theological anthropology evidently provides a more concrete foundation theologically and practically than Jung. Jung indeed tries to picture an ideal path to the true self, but it is almost a self-individuation. Therefore, Tournier (1957:23) would criticize it as ‘only mechanisms of the mind’ psychologically that are mere ‘of the order of the personage … [but] not of the person’. In Tournier’s eyes, Jung’s mechanisms are similar as the studies of ‘all the physiological mechanisms of the body’. However, Jung’s individuation in psychology and psychoanalytic therapy might substantiate indirectly the implications of Moltmann’s relational trinitarian theological anthropology in regard to the problem of negative masking.

2. Rogers’ Self-Transformation of Becoming a Person

In dealing with his issue, as part of problems raised by his clients, Rogers does not bring forwards opinions of his own, or give direction to the clients. Instead, Rogers (1961:167) seeks resolution for the clients’ problems from within themselves to be that self which one truly is coming from the clients themselves. He presents his observations taken from the therapeutic process of his clients in his book, On Becoming a Person: A therapist’s view of psychotherapy (1961). Towards such an attainment, the directions taken by his clients are summarized and listed as headings by Rogers as follows (ibid.:167-75, eo):
‘Away From Façades … Away From Oughts … Away From Meeting Expectations … Away From Pleasing Others … Towards Self-Direction … Towards Being Process … Towards Being Complexity … Towards Openness to Experience … Towards Acceptance of Others … Towards Trust of Self’. Rogers (ibid.:172-6) finds that most of his clients have a strong desire ‘to be all of oneself in each moment’ and this desire is not merely ‘an intellectual value choice’ but rather the groping, tentative, uncertain behaviours of moving towards becoming more accurately and deeply the self which one ‘most truly is’.

Rogers discloses that this process might not be ‘easy’ (ibid.:181). However, he does not think any other person (even a therapist), or any other method (even a counselling technique) can improve on his client-directed approach. It all depends on the individual himself/herself (ibid.:167). Therefore, it is indeed a process of (humanistic) type self-transformation — his ideas arise from his experience with clients who are, in his view, ‘self-actualizing people’ (Maslow 1954 in Rogers 1961:167).

1 ‘Towards being complexity’ in this context can be understood as ‘towards becoming all of the complexity of one's changing self in each significant moment’ and ‘towards acceptance of others’ as valuing and appreciating the ‘experience’ of ‘others for what it is’ (Rogers 1961:172, 174).
Appendix J

Is Anglo-European Individualism a Solution for Overcoming the RFS?

Collectivism in general is criticized as causing the problem of the RFS by the scholars because the individuality in it is suppressed for the benefit of the collectivity. However, will the problem of the RFS be solved by Anglo-European individualism or mere humanistic synthesis of Ru-based collectivism and Anglo-European individualism as Tu Weiming argues for his New Ruist relational selfhood? The answer might be no, even if the problem of repressive social imposition might disappear.

The Japanese psychiatrist, Takeo Doi (1981:132–41), suggests that the RFS manifested by the issue of fatherlessness in Japanese society should deal with ‘the question of the absence of God’. The Chinese sociologist and social psychologist, Zhai Xuewei (2010:345), argues that the essential reason for the prevalent issue of negative masking in PTRIC societies is the lack of the external personal God in traditional and post-traditional Ruism. The Taiwanese historian, Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:17), takes the similar view as the above two scholars. As Tuan Yifu (1982:162) argues, similar questions of Anglo-European individualism arise from the Renaissance. These questions ask whether or not there is ‘an authentic self exist[ing] behind the various masks’ since individualistic people still need to face ‘the question of self and of the roles they could play (ibid.).’

Some Christian writers argue that both collectivism in general and Anglo-European individualism can lead to a loss of self when there is no communion with God and His people (Grenz 2001:105–118). In other words, the RFS might occur in both collectivism in general and Anglo-European individualism in general. Therefore,

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1 See also McCubbins and Turner (2014).
the problem of the RFS resulting from the issue of relational selfhood is one of the ethics-related problems worthy of study.

Charles K. Bellinger (2010:81–2) rejects Anglo-European Western or modern individualism as a source of selfhood by saying that ‘fundamentalism, individualistic aestheticism, and utopianism … are forms of immature selfhood’ when they are alienated from ‘the call of creation’. Out of their common fundamental problem of rejecting ‘otherness’, what they try to do is to deny the possibility of becoming ‘mature, balanced, and expansive’ in order to hold their current form of ‘immature, unbalanced, and contracted consciousness’ (ibid.:82, eo). Through a critique of Anglo-European Western individualism, Carver T. Yu (1987:1–146) summarizes three main issues Anglo-European Western people experience: ‘ontological uprootedness … fragmentation of personal identity … and failure of human relation’ (ibid.:45). As for the crisis of self in the Anglo-European Western world in the late twentieth century, Alasdair MacIntyre (1983) attributed it to a loss of common moral parameters. For Charles Taylor (1989:3), the good (or morality) and the notion or sense of the self (or selfhood) are ‘inextricably intertwined themes’. The former defines the self because it defines ‘our spiritual orientation’ (ibid.:x, 42-7). Its power shapes the self (ibid.:103-105). However, can this power of the good come from human beings themselves as traditional and post-traditional Ruism suggests by moral self-cultivation?

Although admitting the ‘limits of one’s existential self’, Tu (1985a: 137) optimistically presents ‘a transcendent vision that ontologically we are infinitely better and, therefore, more worthy than we actually are’ and a Ruist trinity which is formed by ‘humanity’ with Heaven and Earth. However, this transcendent vision of a Ruist trinity is based on mankind’s expectation (ideal) and goodness, rather than the revelation from the

3 See also Carkner (2006:8f.).
Other who is the Creator and an existing personal Being. When there is no Creator God as the source or solid foundation for the self, the real self is either based on oneself, others, or relationships, which are the characteristics of Tu’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood. Unless being a perfect sage, people whose real selves are based on others must incline to conforming to others and being competitive with each other. Grenz indicates that emulating others will lead to ‘a lack of self-awareness’? He explains it by quoting Montaigne’s theory (1935, cited in Grenz 2001:103) that ‘we seek other lives because we do not understand how to use our own. We go out of ourselves because we are ignorant of what lies within.’ This, I suggest, is the main reason of loss of self in Ru-based collectivism.

Many modern Christian theologians and philosophers, for example, Colin E. Gunton (1999:60), John Macmurray (1999:211), Christoph Schwöbel (1992:70–74), and D. Stephen Long (2001:19-26), support trinitarian divine goodness to be the most meaningful concern for the self (Carkner 2006:6). Bellinger (2010:51) also highlights the necessity of the transcendent divine truth for the source of the self by saying that ‘God and God’s Word decisively shape how human selfhood and society are evaluated’. Through a Western intellectual journey, Grenz (2001:117f., 134) concludes that Anglo-European individualism leads to the destruction of self even through a process of socialization of the conception of the self. Ess (2010:114), following N. Postman (2006), also worried about the loss of the modern atomic self, which is crucial for modern liberal democracies, in the trend of networking infinitely with others, especially in the era of new digital communications. Gunton (2003:86–7) concludes the impasse of the theories of the dominating philosophies, either modern individualism or modern collectivism:

If the person is lost, then so are we, ripe for being swallowed up into an undifferentiated mass, the many absorbed into the embrace of the one. Just as philosophically a stress on the individual loses the person, so is it socially … Modern individualism and modern

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4 See also Aves (1999).
collectivism are mirror images of one another. Both signal the loss of the person, the
disappearance of the one into the many or the many into the one, and the reason is that there
is no mid term between the two features of our life, no way of ensuring the proper being and
hypostasis of both the universal and the particular.

Therefore, according to Grenz and Gunton, without communion with God and His
people, both modern collectivism and modern individualism lead to the problem of the
RFS. John Zizioulas (2004:27, eo) is also concerned about Anglo-European individualism
in modern times when ‘the person and personal identity’ are exalted as a supreme ideal.
He reminds us that the concept of the person and personal identity should be ‘historically
as well as existentially’ based on and ‘bound up with’ God, instead of an ‘autonomous
morality’ or a ‘purely humanistic’ existentialism. In other words, what matters is where
the self comes from and what the centre of the self is. What is the centre of human beings?
Humankind or God the Creator?

Bellinger (2010:88) asserts that ‘selfhood is not the starting point for ethics’
because the source, the origin, the starting point for ethics cannot be based on
humankind’s self but on God. According to D. Stephen Long (2001:19–26), ethics should
be subordinated to theology but not the other way around. Bellinger (2010:88) explains:

As selves we need to learn to become ethical as a life task; we do not start off with ethical
maturity as our default setting. If we did, humanity would have no problems at all; there
would be no oppression, violence, egotism, etc.

Therefore, ‘ethical reflection’ should start from ‘the will of God’. To be an ethical
self must first attune to ‘God and one’s created nature’ (ibid.:88–9). In Karl Barth’s words
(1957:546), the subject of theological ethics ‘is not the Word of God as it is claimed by
man, but the Word of God as it claims man’. Likewise, so are the two indispensable
fundamental elements of the person (true self) pinpointed by Tournier in C2: autonomy
(or freedom) and responsibility. Both of them are what the person needs to possess but
the person is not their ground and their source of meaning. First, both autonomy and
responsibility are only meaningful in relation with others. Autonomy refers to the space
given by others (Gunton 1999:59). In other words, both autonomy and repressive social
imposition happen in relationships. The main problem of Anglo-European individualism is to hold too much space between each other as human beings (Gunton 1999:55). On the contrary, the main problem of collectivism is to give too little. Second, the definition and norm for autonomy and responsibility cannot be based on any human being, people group or community, or social institution and system but on the Creator God (Huáng, Yùshēng 黃裕生 2004:948–9). For the absolute autonomy and responsibility of the person can only come from the Creator God. They can only be defined by the autonomy and responsibility in the relationships between the three persons of the triune God and only be granted through the relationships between human beings and the triune God. Furthermore, all of them precede the relationships in human society (Zizioulas 1999:37–46).

I argue that without God, the free self can also be the idol of one’s own construction. Only in the presence of the triune God’s grace is true freedom experienced, which is freedom apart from the tragedy of sin’s distortion of human beings.

But what is the origin and meaning of the individuality realized only in and through each other in a community? Gunton (2003:88–89, 99, eo) asserts that its roots are ultimately traced to ‘trinitarian relatedness’ of Father, Son and Spirit. This relatedness is manifested in the ‘profound meditations in John’s Gospel on the way Jesus and the Father exist only in each other, the extended exposition of the claim that from eternity and in the incarnation the Word is with God’ and the Word is God.

Similar terms and concepts to trinitarian relatedness are proposed and examined during and after the genuine revival of interest in the doctrine of the Trinity in the late twentieth century, such as ‘trinitarian self’ (Bellinger 2010), ‘trinitarian personhood’ (Seamands 2005), and ‘ecclesial personhood’ (Volf 1998a), ‘relational or social self’

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5 See also Macmurray (1936 reprinted in 1971:52).
6 See also McFadyen (1990:18–31) and Gunton (1999:53–61).
7 See also Thompson (1994) and Volf (1998a).
(Grenz 2001). All of these spring from a ‘desire to free the Trinity from its isolation in traditional statements with the consequent lack of relation to practical Christian faith and life’. They are to pose a question: Is the triune God ‘the ground and paradigm of true social life and liberation’ as well as the source of the self and salvation (Thompson, John 1994:3)?
Appendix K

A Brief Summary of Discussions about Chàxù Géjú 差序格局
(The Differential Mode of Association)

Primary group and secondary group are always relative in terms of closeness, importance, and even utility in the context of traditional and post-traditional Ruist human relationships. This Ruist feature of relationships, which is characterized as Ru-based collectivism in A-C and explained in C4S4.5.1, is well described and explained by the Chinese anthropologist, Fèi Xiàotōng 費孝通 (1910-2005), in 1948, with his concept and theory of ‘chàxù géjú 差序格局’, namely ‘the differential mode of association’.¹ A first generation New Ruist, Liáng Shùmíng 梁漱溟 (1893-1988)² and Zhu Cenlou (1988:116–18) calls it ‘lúnli běnwèi 儀理本位’ (ethics as the standard). Richard Solomon (1937-) (1971:106 n.2) suggests it to be ‘relation-centre’. Francis L. K. Hsu (1909-99) (1953:10f.) calls it ‘situation-centre’. Some other scholars identify it as ‘relational orientation’ (‘relationship orientation’) ‘guānxì qǔxiàng 關係取向’,³ relationship-determinism,⁴ ‘other orientation’, or ‘familistic orientation’.⁵ David Y. F. Ho (1998) uses ‘relationalism’, and Yeh Kuanghui (2002:229) uses ‘guānxì zhǔyì 關係主義’ (relationism), to sum up all of the above different terms.⁶ The typical example of such imbalance in canonical Ruist teachings is the famous passage about ‘the father

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⁶ See also Hwang Kwangkuo (2005; 2009a; 2009b; 2012:187–217).
conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father’ in *Analects* 13:18 (trans. by James Legge in 1869, reprinted in 2011a:129). The other two passages in *Mencius* with similar teachings are 7A:35 and 5A:3. It has been noted that there have been hot debates on these passages between the defenders and the critics. However, through a literature review study by Cheng, Poshyun 鄭伯壎 (p. Zhèng Bóxūn) (1995) and a recent field survey by Xie Yao (2005), the social behaviour of the differential mode of association is proved to still exist even among Chinese intellectuals.

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7 Guo Qiyong (2004; 2011).
Appendix L

Fatherlessness and the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts

Takeo Doi (1981:150–57) pays attention to and studies ‘the fatherless society’ issue in post-traditional Japanese society and suggests it as the complication of the ‘lack of self’, ‘absence of self’, or ‘having no self’ (ibid.:137–8). What Doi means by without a father or fatherless is not the non-existence of a father; rather, the expression metaphorically denotes a child without a sincere, intimate, and transparent relationship with his/her father when the father’ has failed to provide his ‘true feelings’ on ‘a set of values’ as a base on which children can live (ibid.:152). Or in Ruth Benedict’s (1989:300f.) language, such a father ‘as a respect-object is a depersonalized symbol of hierarchy and of the proper conduct of life’. In other words, if a father does not express his true feelings as a father directly towards his children, they will be easily prone to feel ‘fatherless’. Fatherless male children tend to negatively mask themselves and so later become fathers with negatively masked selves (Doi 1981:132–41, 150–58).¹ Doi believes that the main reason is the fathers’ ‘loss of self-confidence’, which has weakened their ‘influence’ on their children even to nothing. Doi (ibid.:152, 155, eo) calls it ‘a society without a father’ although he admits the impossibility of a ‘totally fatherless society’²

Sun Lungkee 孫隆基 (1983 reprinted in 2004:204–11) also describes this similar characteristic in PTRIC culture in which the relationship of father and son is often maintained directly instead by the mother herself because the fatherhood is prescribed


² ‘This expression fatherless society was first used, to the best of my knowledge, by Paul Federn, a pupil of Freud, in his On the Psychology of Revolution: The Fatherless Society, published in 1919’ (Doi 1981:152, eo).

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and expected to be played as a ‘strict and harsh role’ in an asymmetrical and hierarchical view of *wulun*. This estranged father-and-son relationship makes children depend unduly on their relationship with their mother and becomes one of PTRIC cultural factors that might result in to some extent the problem of the RFS amongst Chinese people, especially men. Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:211) concludes by quoting Lù Xùn 魯迅 (1881-1936): ‘Chinese people are “by default the chaps who can reproduce children but is not the father of *human*. He gives birth to a child but he is not yet the germination of *human*” (Lu, Xun 1973, quoted in Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:211, eo)’.

Both Zhū Jiànjūn 朱建軍 (2008:80–84), a Chinese psychologist, and Brian Griffith (2011), a Canadian historian, strongly suggest that one of the reasons Confucius emphasized filial piety and the absolute authority of the father is that he grew up without a father. Not only were ‘Confucius’ and ‘Mencius’ brought up ‘by their mothers alone’, but also many successive ‘leading Confucianists’ were, too. According to the biographies of major Ruist thinkers since the 1300s, Tu Weiming 杜維明 points out that the large majority of them, ‘including Wang Yangming’ 王陽明 (1472-1529), were mainly educated in the ‘formative’ years by their mothers instead of their fathers or male teachers (Tu, Weiming et al. 1992:72).

I suggest that fatherlessness and the problem of the RFS influence each other reciprocally and their problem will become worse and worse through generations. It is imaginable that most of the younger generations who were not treated sincerely, intimately, or transparently by their fathers do not know how to establish a sincere, intimate, or transparent father-and-son relationship with their own children. Both Takeo

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Doi and Sun Lungkee take the same viewpoint that in contrast to post-traditional Japanese and Chinese cultures, there is no such prevalently severe problem of the RFS in modern Anglo-European Western Christian culture (Doi 1981:133)\(^4\) even if this is not unique to the post-traditional Japanese and Chinese (Pittman 1993:258–60).\(^5\) The studies discussed in A-B show that fatherlessness in modern Japan comes from the lack of self in masculinity. As for this similar fatherlessness among post-traditional Chinese people or even in the modern West, more researches and surveys are worth doing. However, these observations reveal that the problem of the RFS in post-traditional Chinese and Japanese society tends to be significantly more severe among men than women.

\(^4\) See also Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:17).

\(^5\) See also Doi (1981:157–8).
Appendix M

The Difference of Meaning between the Terms Ruism and Confucianism

Ru (Teachings of the Literati) literally means literati. When it indicates a system of thought or teachings, its synonyms in Chinese are Rújīāo 儒教 (Education of the Literati) and Rúxué 儒學 (Scholarship of the Literati). Rújīāo can also mean Religion of the Literati (Tan, Jonathan Y. 2003b:100; Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1). The English term Confucianism\(^1\) was not used until the nineteenth century to indicate its original name Rú 儒, which is prevalent not only in Chinese societies, but also in Japan, Korea and some other East Asian countries (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1).\(^2\)

Ru was not created or founded by Confucius 孔夫子 (551–479 BCE). It is he who, in the pre-Qin period (551-221 BCE), studied it comprehensively, systematized it, contributing the primary redefinition of Ru as a ‘religio-ethical’ tradition transmitting ancient culture.\(^3\) It is also known as a doctrine that established ‘private schools’ in order to teach and preserve the passed-on Chinese canonical texts dealing with history, ritual, music, and poetry (ibid.:1f., 8).\(^4\) Therefore, the term Confucianism and the major Chinese tradition it names would not be sustainable alone on the basis of the person named Confucius (Tan, Jonathan Y. 2003b:100). In other words, Ruism has never been based on a ‘faith in Confucius’ (Tu, Weiming 1998a:5).\(^5\) Therefore, in the contemporary context, 

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\(^1\) Confucianism came from Confucius, the Latin transliteration of 孔夫子, used by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1; Nielsen n.d.:1). Confucianism might also have been coined by them (Nielsen n.d.:1).


\(^3\) See also la Barre (1946b:382).

\(^4\) See also Wu Chinghsiung (1976:83–4) and Kuiper (2011:63).

\(^5\) See also Yao Xinzhong (2013:1).
which is to say post-traditional, when most Ru-influenced Chinese are no longer worshipping Master Kong (Confucius), the term Ruist/Ruism, rather than Confucian/Confucianism, might be a more helpful and pertinent description. For the latter might exclude the Ruism/Ruists prior to Confucius or not associated to Confucius’ school⁶ and include the meaning of worshipping the person of the Sage, Confucius, which would lead to other kinds of distortions. Robert Eno (1990:6f., 190-97, 206) might be the first person in Anglophone contexts to use Ruism/Ruist in place of Confucianism/Confucianist; some others also follow this usage, such as Lauren Pfister (1995:55), David Elstein (2014:24), Peregrine de Vigo (2014:9, 16), Sòng Bīn 宋斌 (2016:blog), Diane Obenchain (199?, cited in Pfister 1995:55).

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Appendix N

The Cultural Design of Ru-Based Collectivism Observed in the Social Sciences

Zhèng Zhèngbó 鄭正博 (1990:169–70) and Zhuāng Huìqiū 莊慧秋 (1991:156–8), both Chinese psychologists, indicate that the traditional values of Ru-based collectivism and its concomitant RFS, are parts of the ‘wénhuà shèjì’ 「文化設計」(cultural design) of a post-traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. This was also been identified as ‘wénhuà yuánxíng’ 「文化原型」(cultural prototypes) by Yu Dehui (1987b:3, eo), another concept mentioned in C1S2.2. ¹ Both Zheng Zhengbo (1990:169–70) and Zhuang Huiqiu (1991:156–8) argue that a RFS is specifically the product of a traditional Ruist cultural design promoting authoritarian-oriented interpersonal relationships, where one is not encouraged to express one’s own opinions before authority,² even after the authority is dead.³ Zheng Zhengbo (1990:169–70) pointed out that post-traditional Chinese persons still tend to value one’s own ‘primary group’ exclusively in contrast to any ‘secondary group’,⁴ so that they may even become indifferent to public affairs, social (or public) morality (or righteousness) and ‘justice’.⁵ This is a distinctive feature of post-traditional

¹ See also Ambrose Y. C. King’s (1982:126–35), Sun Lungkee’s (1983 reprinted in 2004:12–40) and Yang Zhongfang’s (1991b) discussions in detail about the cultural design of Chinese self mainly based on traditional Ruism. Notably, Yang Zhongfang, unlike Sun Lungkee, hesitates to use the term collectivism to describe the form of post-traditional Chinese self that results from this basic cultural influence.


³ Analects 1:11.

⁴ Wén Chóngyì 文崇一 (1990:52–6). Yum June Ock (1988:378–80) also highlights such a Ruist feature of human relationships as ‘sharp distinction between in-[group and out-[group members’ (Zhái, Xuéwěi 翟學偉 2010:103–5, 227–34), which in Chinese are ‘zìjǐ rén 『自己人』 and ‘wàirén 『外人』 (Gù, Yújūn 顧瑜君 1987, eo; Zhāng, Qiáng 張強 2003). All of these terms and discussion might be based on William Graham Sumner’s (1906:12f.) pioneering differentiation of the ‘we-group, in-group’ from the ‘others-groups, out-groups’. See also Wilson and Pusey (1982:206).

⁵ See also Liáng Qǐchāo 梁啟超 (1902:12f.), la Barre (1946b:381), Cho Hyunyi (2000:307), and Chén Xiāoping 陳曉平 (2002:25).
Ru-based collectivism (See also A-K). Triandis (1989:517) pointed out on the basis of evidence from his survey that the distinction between the primary and secondary groups is more significant in determining ‘social behaviour’ in a collectivistic culture than in an individualistic culture. Drawing on strict definitions of individual, relational, and collective selves in social psychological research, such perceptions of in-group and out-group differentiation are characteristics of the collective self, but not of the relational self (according to the professional usage in social psychology).\(^6\) Admittedly, the post-traditional Ruist cultural design is collectivist-oriented based on this evidence.\(^7\)

However, the boundaries between the small self and the great self in PTRIC contexts are ambiguous and variable.\(^8\) The delimitations of primary groups and secondary groups can be quite flexible, varying according to situation-orientation,\(^9\) utility-orientation,\(^10\) or ‘opportunism’ (la Barre 1946b:381).\(^11\) This complexity is also manifest in discussions of the meaning of the term guanxi 關係 (‘connection and network’), the

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\(^7\) Or more precisely speaking, the context of the post-traditional Ruism cultural design tends to activate the collective self. According to important findings of recent research in social psychology (Sedikides and Brewer 2001; Chen, Serena and Andersen 2008; Sedikides et al. 2011), individual self, relational self, and collective self co-exist in a person’s self-concept, and the different forms of self are activated by different contexts. However, the three different selves do not contribute to a person equivalently, depending on the motivations shaping the self-concept. The findings of another study disclose that ‘the individual self has a motivational status elevated above that of the relational and (especially) collective self … This type of self (the individual self) … sits closer to the motivational core of being human’ (Sedikides et al. 2011:104f.).


\(^9\) Han Kueihsiang 韓貴香 (p. Hán Guìxiāng) and Li Meichih 李美枝 (p. Lǐ Měizhī) (2011:11). It is notable that Francis L. K. Hsu (1953:11, eo) does not attribute Chinese character of situation-orientation to the factors of ‘introversion and extroversion’. In comparing the feature of situation-orientation among Chinese to the feature of individual-orientation among Americans, he states that ‘the Chinese tends to mobilize his thought and action for the purpose of conforming to the reality, while the American tends to do so for the purpose of making the reality conform to him’.


broader and nuanced conception of modern relationships in post-traditional Chinese society. Luo Yadong (1997:44) defines the Chinese word *guanxi* in the following manner:

[It is a] concept of drawing on connections in order to secure favours in personal relations. It is an intricate and pervasive relational network which Chinese [persons] cultivate energetically, subtly, and imaginatively. It contains implicit mutual obligation[s], assurance[s] and understanding[s], and governs Chinese attitudes towards long-term social and business relationships.

I find that certain aspects of these mutually obliging relationships, especially the more harsh and demanding ones, can manifest the tendency of a RFS.\(^\text{12}\) In other words, as Suddath (2006:239, eo) points out, that when a traditional Ruist ideology of ‘*harmony* and *unity*’ are taken as virtues in a post-traditional cultural design so that they are seen as a ‘preordained social pattern’ (Edwards 1986:44), these virtues can outweigh ‘individual liberty’ even as they define ‘*Chineseness*’.\(^\text{13}\) They become ideals of a ‘*unique individuality*’ expressed through ‘self-abnegation’ within relationships that shape a post-traditional Ruist concept of self.

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\(^{13}\) Guo Qingxiang (2006:90) highlights that in Ruism ‘*gōngzhōng*’ 「公忠」 (loyalty to the public) is always the eventual appeal in solving the conflicts between the individual and society and thus the individual benefit and development of personality are damaged.
Appendix O

A Brief Criticism of Moltmann’s ‘Christian Universalism’

While this is not the place to go into an extended and detailed discussion of all related issues about universalism due to the limitation of space, a brief criticism of Moltmann’s ‘Christian universalism’ is provided here for reference. First of all, it is notable to point out that Moltmann’s position is unlike others supporting general universalism because his ‘Christian universalism’ supports the important truths of *sola gratia* (grace alone), *solus Christus* (Christ alone), and *sola fide* (faith alone).¹ Nevertheless, he rejects some other Christian doctrines and the historical reality of humans’ resistance to God’s will, based on his own theologically ideal picture of God. For example, by arguing for the implied universalistic teachings in some biblical verses, he (1996:240–43, eo) seems to make intentionally ambiguous or unacceptable the teachings and warnings of ‘double outcome of judgment’² in the Bible. I argue that these verses about God’s final judgment at Jesus Christ’s second coming (mainly in Revelation), especially the dire consequence of hell and ‘eternal judgment’ (Hebrews 6:2), ‘eternal punishment’ (Matthew 25:46), ‘eternal chains’ (Jude:6), ‘eternal fire’ (Matthew 18:8), and ‘eternal destruction’ (2 Thessalonians 1:9), are more straightforward and unequivocal than those ambiguous verses he claims about universal salvation.³ Does every human being escape the hell of eternal fire? Will only a single outcome of the Last Judgment happen as he (1996:243) claims? On the one hand, he stresses that God establishes justice and righteousness and puts the unrighteous

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¹ These are three of the five *solae* summarized as the basic beliefs of the Protestant Reformation (Helopoulos 2017:5). The other two are *sola Scriptura* (Scripture alone) and *soli Deo gloria* (the glory of God alone). See also Stephen J. Wellum (2015a:6; 2015b:79).

² Double outcome of judgment denotes the two outcomes of the Last Judgment: ‘believers into heavenly bliss’ and ‘unbelievers into the torments of hell’ (Moltmann 1996:236).

³ See also the arguments for a double outcome of the Last Judgment in Scripture by both Emil Brunner (1946 quoted in Moltmann 1996:239) and Gerhard Ebeling (1979 quoted in ibid.).
right (ibid.:243-4). On the other hand, he tends to argue that universal salvation is not related to ‘the outcome of history’ and the ‘inevitable actuality of redemption’ but ‘God’s salvific intention’ and ‘the possibility of redemption’ (ibid.:243). Is universalism only about possibility and God’s intention? If the answer is positive, then the possibility of double outcome does exist. However, Moltmann unequivocally denies the possibility of double outcome (ibid.:255). If God’s Judgment definitely ‘puts [all] things to rights’ as he claims (ibid.), are those biblical claims and their horrible descriptions only a paper tiger coined merely for posing a threat to the unwilling? Besides, throughout human histories, there have been billions of people who passed away without accepting the ‘crucified God’ as their redeemer. Where did they go and where are they now? I do not find Moltmann’s account of ‘Christian universalism’ to be convincing, especially on the basis of these biblical claims. Moltmann (1996:241–46) admits that his universalism is based on ‘theological argument’ or ‘decision’ (ibid.:241-2) rather than on biblical grounds because ‘universal salvation and a double outcome of judgment are … both well attested biblically’ (ibid.:241). This approach does not look like his usual theological method as introduced in C6S2.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin Languages or Phonetic Transcriptions</th>
<th>Chinese Characters, Hebrew, or Greek</th>
<th>English Equivalent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>addressive</td>
<td>快活的</td>
<td>the adjective form of address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventus</td>
<td>快活地</td>
<td>the present of what is still to come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advaita</td>
<td>快活的</td>
<td>a Vedantic doctrine that is associated especially with the Indian philosopher Shankara (c.788–820)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>analogia relationis</strong></td>
<td>關係論</td>
<td>analogy of relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anatman</td>
<td>關係論</td>
<td>no-self or no-soul illusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avidya</td>
<td>把自我收起來</td>
<td>to close up my own self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>bá zìwǒ shōuqǐlái</strong></td>
<td>自我收穫</td>
<td>kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>basileia</td>
<td>被貶抑</td>
<td>to be demeaned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèi biānzi jī</td>
<td>被貶抑</td>
<td>to be ignored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèi hūlūé</td>
<td>被忽略</td>
<td>to be viewed by others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèi rèn kàn de</td>
<td>被忽略</td>
<td>to be eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèi xiāomí</td>
<td>被消弭</td>
<td>to be oppressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèi yāyì</td>
<td>被壓抑</td>
<td>to be suppressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèi yǎzhī xiāowò</td>
<td>被壓制</td>
<td>betraying ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèizū</td>
<td>被背</td>
<td>unfilial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>būxiào</td>
<td>被背</td>
<td>Zen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’an (p. chán)</td>
<td>背</td>
<td>energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ch’i (p. qǐ)</td>
<td>氣</td>
<td>the private-to-public priority of loves or the differentiated loves of association</td>
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<tr>
<td>chàdēng de āi</td>
<td>差等的愛</td>
<td>surpassing the immanence</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>chāoyuè nēizài</strong></td>
<td>超越內在</td>
<td>transcending the externality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chāoyuè wáizài</td>
<td>超越外在</td>
<td>surpass or transcend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chāoyuè</td>
<td>超越</td>
<td>the differential mode of association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chàxù géjú</td>
<td>差序格局</td>
<td>eliminated completely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chèdǐ xiāochū</td>
<td>差泥消</td>
<td>sincerity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chéng</td>
<td>誠</td>
<td>become a hypocrite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chéngwéi wèi jūnzi</td>
<td>成為偽君子</td>
<td>the silent majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chénmò de dàduōshū</td>
<td>沉默的大多數</td>
<td>silencing the self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chénmò zìwǒ</td>
<td>沉默自我</td>
<td>ability of intellectual intuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chih tè chih-chüeh (p. zhi de zhíjué)</td>
<td>智的直覺</td>
<td>wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chih (p. zhi)</td>
<td>智</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chineseness</td>
<td></td>
<td>the quality or state of being Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chónggū de jiāzhí</td>
<td>崇古的價值取向</td>
<td>past time orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qùxiàng</td>
<td></td>
<td>tradition and modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chuántōng yǔ xiàndài</td>
<td>傳統與現代</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin Languages or Phonetic Transcriptions</td>
<td>Chinese Characters, Hebrew, or Greek</td>
<td>English Equivalent</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chūrén tóudì</td>
<td>出人頭地</td>
<td>to become honoured and distinguished among others, or to excel the common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>vocabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cìhuì</td>
<td>詞彙</td>
<td>reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circumincessio</td>
<td></td>
<td>the state of being closed able to be completed in the presence of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closedness</td>
<td></td>
<td>new creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>completable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>coram Deo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creatio originalis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creation nova</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dài … miànjù</td>
<td>戴 … 面具</td>
<td>wear a mask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dàrén</td>
<td>大人</td>
<td>the great person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dàtǐ</td>
<td>大體</td>
<td>the great body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dátóng shìjiè</td>
<td>大同世界</td>
<td>the stateless world of the great unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dàwǒ</td>
<td>大我</td>
<td>the great self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demut</td>
<td></td>
<td>likeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dengism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deng Xiaoqing (邓小平) Theory of series of political and economic ideologies. the … thief … of virtue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a single human being who can be divided, in contrast to individual who cannot be divided divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dé zhī zéi</td>
<td>德之賊</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>dividual</td>
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<tr>
<td>divisa</td>
<td>地位倫理</td>
<td>status ethics</td>
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<td>diwèi lúnli</td>
<td>地位倫理</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>doxa</td>
<td>δόξα</td>
<td>glory</td>
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<tr>
<td>dominum terraec</td>
<td></td>
<td>being lord of the land</td>
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<td>dōngyà héxīn jiàzhí</td>
<td>東亞核心價值</td>
<td>East Asian core values</td>
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<td>dynamis</td>
<td>δύναμις</td>
<td>potentiality</td>
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<tr>
<td>eikona</td>
<td>εἰκόνα</td>
<td>image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>embeddual</td>
<td></td>
<td>an individual person who is always embedded in his/her own communal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>enclosedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experienceability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fàn xiào zhūyì</td>
<td>泛孝主義</td>
<td>pan-filialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fàndàodé zhūyì de shèhuì</td>
<td>泛道德主義的社會</td>
<td>pan-moralistic society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futurum</td>
<td></td>
<td>the future of what has already come</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Latin Languages or Phonetic Transcriptions | Chinese Characters, Hebrew, or Greek | English Equivalent
--- | --- | ---
ge rén ... bèi zhēngfā diào | 個人 ... 被蒸發掉 | the individual person evaporates individual self
gejǐ | 個己 | individual person
gérén | 個人 | glory of God the glory of God is human the quality or state of being Godforsaken public morals
gloria Dei | 光榮歸主 | the public and private form into one body or ‘a balance of public and private (De Bary’s translation)’ loyalty to the public the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
Gottfaffenheit der gottgeschaffenen Welt | 光榮耀祖 | the public and private form into one body or ‘a balance of public and private (De Bary’s translation)’ loyalty to the public the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
guānxì qǔxiàng | 關係取向 | ‘connections and networks’ (Tu Weiming’s translation) the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
guānxì zhǔyì | 關係主義 | the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
guānxì | 關係 | ‘connections and networks’ (Tu Weiming’s translation) the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
hàipà quánwēi | 害怕權威 | the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
hèxié | 和諧 | the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
hèyī | 合一 | the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
hikikomori | 急性社會退縮症 | the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
homoiōsis | ὁμοιότης | the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
hsiang-yüan (p. xiāngyuán) | 鄉愿 | the openness of God to the world God has created glorifying and illuminating the ancestors relationship-determinism, other orientation, or familistic orientation relationism, emphasizing the social human practices and the context of individual’s transaction and mutual relations the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities the fear of authorities
hsin (p. xīn) | 心 | heart
hsūeh tso-jen (p. xué zuòrén) | 學做人 | learning to be human
hù lài | 互賴 | interdependent
imago Christi | 形象基督 | image of Christ
imago Dei | 形象上帝 | image of God
imago mammonis | 形象瑪門 | image of Mammon
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin Languages or Phonetic Transcriptions</th>
<th>Chinese Characters, Hebrew, or Greek</th>
<th>English Equivalent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>imago per conformitatem gratiae</td>
<td>仁</td>
<td>benevolence or humaneness</td>
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<td>imago per similitudinem gloriae</td>
<td>jianzheng</td>
<td>the employment of remonstrance</td>
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<td>imago satanae</td>
<td>jiachu ... ziwō</td>
<td>to surrender my own self</td>
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<td>jinxiaodao</td>
<td>fulfilling filial piety</td>
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<tr>
<td>in re</td>
<td>jinxing</td>
<td>the complete realization of human nature</td>
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<td>in se</td>
<td>jiquan</td>
<td>totalitarianism</td>
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<td>in spe</td>
<td>jizu</td>
<td>worshiping ancestors</td>
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<td>juexcé lunli</td>
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<td>indivisa</td>
<td>jünzirengé</td>
<td>the noble human’s personality</td>
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<tr>
<td>jen (p. rēn)</td>
<td>jünzi</td>
<td>noble human or profound person</td>
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<td>jiànzhèng</td>
<td>justitia originalis</td>
<td>original justice</td>
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<td>jixiaodao</td>
<td>klēronomos</td>
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<td>kōngxing</td>
<td>emptiness</td>
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<td>lí yuè wénhuá</td>
<td>the ritual and music culture</td>
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<td>lí</td>
<td>the reality known as the principle</td>
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<td>lí</td>
<td>rituals or the rules of propriety</td>
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<tr>
<td>jixi</td>
<td>lian</td>
<td>face or mask</td>
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<tr>
<td>jinxing</td>
<td>liàngmiànxing</td>
<td>double-facedness</td>
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<td>jinxing</td>
<td>liángshào zhichá</td>
<td>few in quantity and less in quality</td>
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<td>liángzhī xitōng</td>
<td>self-conscious value system</td>
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<td>lianmiàn</td>
<td>face, mask, or external prestige</td>
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<td>lijiào</td>
<td>Ruist code of ethics</td>
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<td>lixiāng ziwō</td>
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<td>méiyǒu ziwǒ</td>
<td>沒有自我</td>
<td>there is no self</td>
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<td>metamorphoomai</td>
<td>μεταμορφόμαι</td>
<td>be changed in form, be transformed</td>
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<td>metamorphoumētha</td>
<td>μεταμορφούμεθα</td>
<td>being transformed</td>
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<td>面子</td>
<td>face or transformed</td>
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<td>mínjiān de xiaochuàntōng</td>
<td>民間的小傳統</td>
<td>the small folk tradition</td>
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<td>móhúhuà</td>
<td>模糊化</td>
<td>to be undistinguishable form</td>
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<td>μορφή</td>
<td>sageliness within and</td>
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<td>nàshèng wàiwáng</td>
<td>內聖外王</td>
<td>kinglyness without</td>
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<td>naturaliter religiosa</td>
<td>在內超越</td>
<td>religious nature</td>
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<td>nàzài chāoyuē</td>
<td>内在超越</td>
<td>immanent transcendence</td>
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<td>涅槃</td>
<td>nirvana</td>
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<td>扭曲原来的我</td>
<td>distort the original I</td>
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<td>pa (p. bà)</td>
<td>霸</td>
<td>the works outside the Trinity</td>
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<td>pao (p. bào)</td>
<td>報</td>
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<td>πρόσωπον</td>
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<td>屈天以從人</td>
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<td>the differential mode of</td>
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<td>benevolence</td>
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<td>humanist spirit</td>
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<td>仁義道德</td>
<td>morality of benevolence and righteousness</td>
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<td>róng wéi yītǐ</td>
<td>融為一體</td>
<td>fusing into one</td>
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<td>儒</td>
<td>Teachings of the Literati</td>
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<td>儒家精神的大傳統</td>
<td>the great tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit</td>
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<td>儒學</td>
<td>the scholarship of Literati</td>
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<td>三綱</td>
<td>the three bounds of dyadic relationships</td>
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<td>sǎngshī zìwǒ</td>
<td>喪失自我</td>
<td>lose the self</td>
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<td>Sànjiāo</td>
<td>三教</td>
<td>Three Teachings</td>
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<td>神</td>
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<td>role ethics</td>
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<td>聖人</td>
<td>sage</td>
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<td>ecological consciousness</td>
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<td>Shèng-Wáng Shùn</td>
<td>聖王舜</td>
<td>Sage-King Shun</td>
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<td>shen-jen (p. shénrén)</td>
<td>神人</td>
<td>a spiritual being</td>
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<td>慎獨</td>
<td>self-watchfulness when alone, vigilant solitariness</td>
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<td>shénxué de shìcún céngmiàn</td>
<td>神學的實存層面</td>
<td>the existential dimension of theology</td>
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<td>shèqún</td>
<td>社群</td>
<td>community</td>
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<td>shì zìwǒ … yīnérbùzhāng</td>
<td>使自我 … 隱而不彰</td>
<td>to make the self implicit yet unclear</td>
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<td>shírán</td>
<td>實然</td>
<td>the reality or intends in one’s heart</td>
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<td>shùnzhòng xīnlǐ</td>
<td>順眾心理</td>
<td>conformist mentality</td>
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<td>shūtú tóngguī</td>
<td>殊途同歸</td>
<td>different roads leading to the same goal</td>
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<td>siduān</td>
<td>四端</td>
<td>the four germinations of the four basic human feelings</td>
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<td>四書五經</td>
<td>likeness</td>
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<td>Sishū Wūjīng</td>
<td>四書五經</td>
<td>the state of being situated</td>
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<td>situatedness</td>
<td>私慾橫流</td>
<td>cross-flowing lusts</td>
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<td>私慾橫流</td>
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<td>the glory of God alone</td>
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<td>soli Deo gloria</td>
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<td>Christ alone</td>
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<td>solus Christus</td>
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<td>summorphos</td>
<td>σύμμορφος</td>
<td>having the same form, sharing the likeness</td>
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<td>sugkleronomos</td>
<td>συγκλερονόμος</td>
<td>joint-heirs or co-heirs with Christ</td>
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<td>tä búshi rén</td>
<td>他不是人</td>
<td>he is not a rén (human)</td>
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<td>tázài shijìè</td>
<td>它在世界</td>
<td>believing the existence of the other world</td>
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<td>te (p. dé)</td>
<td>德</td>
<td>virtue</td>
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<td>telos</td>
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<td>an ultimate object or aim</td>
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<td>theosis</td>
<td></td>
<td>humankind’s eschatological becoming-one-with-God</td>
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<td>threeness</td>
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<td>the quality or state of being three in number, often employed to denote the Triune God in Christianity</td>
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<td>tiān rén bù yī</td>
<td>天人不一</td>
<td>the disparity between Heaven and humans</td>
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<td>tiāndìrén sānhéyī</td>
<td>天地人三合一</td>
<td>a trinity among Heaven, Earth and humanity</td>
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<td>天命</td>
<td>the mandate of Heaven</td>
</tr>
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<td>tiānrén héyī</td>
<td>天人合一</td>
<td>the complete unity between humanity and Heaven</td>
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<td>กสามคน</td>
<td>three persons</td>
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<td>หนึ่ง</td>
<td>image</td>
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<td>หนึ่ง</td>
<td>one substance</td>
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<td>the state of being uprooted</td>
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<td>the adjective form of utilitarianism</td>
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<td>out-group members</td>
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<td>外在超越</td>
<td>external transcendence</td>
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<td>為己之學</td>
<td>learning for the sake of the self</td>
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<td>grammar</td>
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<td>cultural prototypes</td>
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<td>文化中華</td>
<td>cultural Chinese</td>
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<td>文化—心理結構</td>
<td>cultural-psychological structure</td>
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<td>文明對話</td>
<td>dialogue among civilizations</td>
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<td>wǒ</td>
<td>我</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
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<td>wú</td>
<td>無</td>
<td>non-being</td>
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<td>wǚlún</td>
<td>五倫</td>
<td>five dyadic relationships</td>
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<td>illusion</td>
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<td>wúwéi</td>
<td>無為</td>
<td>inaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wúwǒ</td>
<td>無我</td>
<td>no-self or no-soul or selfless</td>
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<tr>
<td>xiàng</td>
<td>想</td>
<td>would like, wants, or intends</td>
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<td>xiānghù gàn tōng</td>
<td>相互感通</td>
<td>reciprocal perceiving and connecting</td>
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<td>xiànsí shìjiè</td>
<td>現實世界</td>
<td>the real world</td>
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<td>xiáorén</td>
<td>小人</td>
<td>the small person</td>
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<td>xiáoshùn</td>
<td>孝順</td>
<td>filial piety</td>
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<td>xiáotí</td>
<td>小體</td>
<td>the small body</td>
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<td>xiáowǒ</td>
<td>小我</td>
<td>the small self</td>
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<td>性本善</td>
<td>the intrinsic goodness of human nature</td>
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<td>性惡說</td>
<td>the badness of human nature</td>
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<td>Western learning</td>
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<td>meaningless to construct prostration inside with hypocrisy outside</td>
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<td>虛脫外在</td>
<td>pressure</td>
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<td>passive resistance</td>
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<td>yánɡfènɡ yínwěi</td>
<td>陽奉陰違</td>
<td>to oppress my own self</td>
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<td>壓迫自己</td>
<td>righteousness</td>
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<tr>
<td>yīlì</td>
<td>儀禮</td>
<td>commenting system</td>
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<tr>
<td>yílùn xìtǒng</td>
<td>議論系統</td>
<td>concealing the faults of others and praising their good points</td>
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<tr>
<td>yīn è yánɡ shàn</td>
<td>隱惡揚善</td>
<td>should</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yīnggāi</td>
<td>應該</td>
<td>the oughts prescribed for the one’s social role</td>
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<tr>
<td>yīngrán</td>
<td>應然</td>
<td>yin</td>
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<tr>
<td>yǐn</td>
<td>陰</td>
<td>ego</td>
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<tr>
<td>yǐwǒ</td>
<td>一我</td>
<td>being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yǒu</td>
<td>有</td>
<td>taking action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yǒuwéi</td>
<td>有為</td>
<td>life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psuchē</td>
<td>ψψυχη</td>
<td>to be effaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>záoshǐ mòshā</td>
<td>遭抹殺</td>
<td>the Creator</td>
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<tr>
<td>záowúzhě</td>
<td>造物者</td>
<td>the tradition of the Way expressed in politicized Ruism</td>
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<tr>
<td>zhēngzhīhuà rújiā de dàotǒng</td>
<td>政治化儒家的道統</td>
<td>true person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zhēnrén</td>
<td>真人</td>
<td>real, true, authentic, genuine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zhēnshí de</td>
<td>真實的</td>
<td>actual self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zhēnshí zìwǒ</td>
<td>真實自我</td>
<td>real self</td>
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<tr>
<td>zhēnwǒ</td>
<td>真我</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Languages or Phonetic Transcriptions</td>
<td>Chinese Characters, Hebrew, or Greek</td>
<td>English Equivalent</td>
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<td>zhīchéng</td>
<td>至誠</td>
<td>absolute sincerity</td>
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<td>zhīchī jínhū yǒng</td>
<td>知恥近乎勇</td>
<td>knowing shame is the beginning of courage</td>
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<tr>
<td>zhōngyōng zhī dào</td>
<td>中庸之道</td>
<td>keeping to the middle way to be viewed by ourselves</td>
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<tr>
<td>zījī kàn zījī</td>
<td>自己看自己</td>
<td>in-group members</td>
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<tr>
<td>zījī rēn</td>
<td>自己人</td>
<td>myself</td>
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<tr>
<td>zījī</td>
<td>自己</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>zījuē zhòngzū</td>
<td>自覺重組</td>
<td>reorganization of self-awareness</td>
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<td>zīsī</td>
<td>自私</td>
<td>selfishness</td>
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<tr>
<td>zīwō de tuisuō</td>
<td>自我的退縮</td>
<td>shrinking back or withdrawal of the self</td>
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<td>zīwō guānzhào</td>
<td>自我觀照</td>
<td>self-contemplation</td>
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<tr>
<td>zīwō yāsuō</td>
<td>自我壓縮</td>
<td>the self to be diminished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zīwō</td>
<td>自我</td>
<td>self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zōnghé</td>
<td>總合</td>
<td>summation</td>
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<td>zuìè</td>
<td>罪惡</td>
<td>evils</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zukunft</td>
<td></td>
<td>the present of what is still to come</td>
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<tr>
<td>zuòjiàn zījī</td>
<td>作踐自己</td>
<td>to humiliate my own self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zuòrén chénggōng</td>
<td>做人成功</td>
<td>success in being somebody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zuòrén</td>
<td>做人</td>
<td>being human</td>
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<tr>
<td>zuòwàng</td>
<td>坐忘</td>
<td>sitting in oblivion</td>
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