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Assessing Police Privatisation In The United Arab Emirates

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By

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Abstract

The growth of private security companies and the privatisation of police is a development that has been witnessed around the world in both developing and developed nations. The rapid pace of transformation in policing in the UAE potentially poses severe risks to the future of policing. Different categories of risks have been identified in connection with the transference of public functions to the private sector: regulatory, economic and social risks. In the UAE, the outsourcing of policing operations to the private security sector is significantly embedded as a key policy objective driven by a wider commitment to deliver efficient public services. While the UAE and institutions are committed to applying best practice and principles in this area, a framework to assess police privatisation was lacking. The aim of this research was to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. The theoretical basis for this research was underpinned by privatisation theory and principles of accountability and control systems. The research design employed an action research strategy gathering qualitative and quantitative data. Action research was adopted as a means for addressing organisational change and enabled the private and public sector organisations to adopt invigorated perspectives and stimulated engagement regarding organisational issues and cross-sector partnership. In terms of external controls influencing governance and accountability there were gaps when benchmarked against key dimensions identified in the literature. There was a lack of a comprehensive evaluation framework that addresses all dimensions and an absence of systematic and meaningful evaluation of programme effectiveness impacting sector stakeholders. Findings revealed a lack of democratic accountability and public engagement, market control in terms of self-regulation, regulatory limitations and limited engagement and trust between the public and private security organisations. Assessment of internal controls revealed moderate performance in terms of motivation and morale of security personnel and weaknesses in recruitment and training and organisational learning capacity. A framework was formulated contributing a holistic and integrated approach for assessing private security performance. The evaluation dimension contains key factors, such as evaluation criteria and evaluation mechanisms, with associated criteria specifying the nature of the content of the evaluation criteria, such as comprehensiveness and reflection of stakeholder priorities. A key change objective is the implementation of multi-level, multi-dimensional evaluation mechanisms, with compliance measures related to diverse evaluation mechanisms and regularity of evaluation. This framework reflects an embedded approach to assessing the performance of private security model evaluation as a reflexive social process that enables continuous reflection and emergent transformation.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The formation of the Department for Private Security Companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2002 marks a milestone in the inception of police privatisation (Celasun, 2013). In line with global trends, private security in the UAE has grown significantly and is projected to assume a major role by 2020 (Ministry of Information, 2015).

This study investigates the effectiveness of the programme of police privatisation in the specific context of private security companies licenced to provide security services to public spaces in Abu Dhabi. A key outcome is the development of a robust and comprehensive framework to evaluate the effectiveness of private securitisation in the UAE. The research context and aims and significance of this study are discussed in the following sections. The study investigates critical success and failure factors in the transference of police functions to the private sector. This thesis presents the formulation of a performance framework for assessing the effectiveness of private security companies in the UAE.

1.2 Motivation

The rationale for this study is primarily motivated by an imperative to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the UAE government’s police privatisation programme. While there is a commitment to applying best practice and principles in this area, there is an absence of a framework for comprehensively managing risks and evaluating the effectiveness of privatising police operations. This imperative is recognised at the highest level following the transfer of police operations from the public to the private sector. Many studies provide a fragmented analysis of police privatisation focused on specific dimensions or sectors and the literature overall lacks a robust comprehensive framework that enables such an evaluation. The evaluation of existing measures and a comprehensive assessment and
mitigation of risks across several dimensions is viewed as critical to realising the government's vision of a collaborative public-private police service that effectively and efficiently enforces law and order, and maintains peace and security.

1.3 Background and Context

The context of policing over the past decades, in terms of developments, restructuring and transference of functions to the private sector, is highly significant in providing broad indications of issues and risks that underpin the theoretical and practical motivation for my study. As a result of the widespread growth in outsourcing police functions and given the importance of policing to the stability and security of society, there is a significant need to evaluate the performance of outsourcing to private companies. Understanding the requirements and mechanisms which support the success of outsourcing contracts is critical to ensuring that police forces continue to deliver effective services accessible to all.

Firstly, it should be noted that the term privatisation can be viewed as a general concept that reflects several different forms. In relation to policing, the terms civilianisation and private security have been used to describe the transfer of certain police functions from the public to the private sector. For the purpose of this research, I use the terms police privatisation and private security to define services “other than public law enforcement and regulatory agencies that are engaged primarily in the prevention and investigation of crime, loss, or harm to specific individuals, organizations, or facilities” (Green 1981, cited in Cunningham et al., 1990).

The significance of the rise of private security companies and the privatisation of police is a development that has been witnessed around the world in both developing and developed nations (Bayley and Sheating, 2001; Kitchen and Rygiel 2014).
Global economic challenges have provided renewed impetus to the outsourcing of public services as deep cuts in central funding in many countries are driving the necessity for public service delivery that is more cost-effective and efficient (Plimmer and Warrell, 2012). On the one hand, police forces globally are currently challenged by stringent reductions in financial budgets (BBC, 2013; Schoen, 2013; Smith Institute, 2014). At the same time, police forces are also challenged by unprecedented demands on services requiring greater efficiencies in operations and implementation (Plimmer and Warrell, 2012). Faced with rising security threats from multiple sources, the complex evolution and growth of crime utilising new technologies, and a significant increase in illegal activities across borders, police services are acknowledging the need to maintain personnel and frontline officers, while also acquiring specialist skills (Brunger, 2012).

These factors have consequently driven many governments and police forces to privatise police services as a means to lower costs, increase operational efficiencies, release officers for frontline duties, while potentially acquiring and utilising new skills and knowledge from the private sector (Taylor and Travis, 2012; Jensen and Stonecash, 2004).

The scale of this development has been significant in some countries. Evidence has shown that 80% of US cities have outsourced selected police services and back-office processes (CivicUS, 2009), while the UK has initiated an unprecedented shift towards outsourcing public service delivery (Plimmer and Warrell, 2012). Many UK police forces now outsource a range of middle and back office functions to a significant degree and future growth is predicted to continue apace (Taylor and Travis, 2012; Burnett, 2012; Plimmer and Warrell, 2012). Notably, private security companies in some cases are adopting an increasing role in core service areas such as the investigation of crimes, the transportation of suspects and the management of intelligence (Taylor and Travis, 2012; Berg, 2011).
1.3.1 Global Police Privatisation Context

The outsourcing of police functions across the globe has grown steadily over the last twenty years encompassing not only peripheral activities but also core functions (Seven, 2002; Albertson, 2014). However, ongoing worldwide economic issues have underpinned increased momentum towards public service privatisation, as significant reductions in government funding globally motivate increased cost-effectiveness and efficiency in public services delivery (Plimmer and Worrall, 2012). On the one hand, police forces globally are currently challenged by stringent reductions in financial budgets (BBC, 2013; Schoen, 2013). In the UK alone, central funding for the police service has been reduced by 20% with further cuts to budgets planned (Smith Institute, 2014). A significant shortfall in local tax revenues in the US has entailed a reduction in local police force personnel of 7% across the country with more than half of forces reporting multiple rounds of budget cuts and front-line redundancies (Schoen, 2013). On the other hand, police forces are also challenged by unprecedented demands on services requiring greater efficiencies in operations and implementation (Plimmer and Worrall, 2012). Faced with rising security threats from multiple sources, the complex evolution and growth of crime utilising new technologies and a significant increase in illegal activities across borders, police services are acknowledging the need to maintain personnel and frontline officers while also acquiring specialist skills (Brunger, 2012). Consequently, many governments and police forces are adopting outsourcing as a means to lower costs, improve operational efficiencies, release officers for frontline duties while potentially generating and employing new skills and knowledge from the private sector (Taylor and Travis, 2012; Jensen and Stonecash, 2004).

1.3.1 UAE Police Privatisation Context

In the Middle East, public sector outsourcing is a relatively recent phenomenon; however, growth is rapidly rising with outsourcing predicted to grow in the UAE by 10% to $1.08 billion in 2016 (Sharma, 2011). This emphasises the need to evaluate and understand in this context the success
factors of outsourcing contracts. In the UAE, the outsourcing of policing operations to the private security sector is significantly embedded as a key policy objective driven by a wider commitment to deliver efficient public services and restructure government ministries (GSEC, 2007). This strategic shift in service delivery is resulting in a heightened momentum for UAE police authorities towards greater outsourcing which thus far is evidenced by the outsourcing of fire services by Abu Dhabi police, and the licensing of private sector involvement in non-core services (GSEC, 2007). Moreover, the UAE has extensively recruited former foreign police to act in diverse roles such as advisors to government ministries, providing ad hoc training and consultancy services, and community policing services (Ellinson and Sinclair, 2013). As a result, there is a growing imperative to ensure that outsourced contracts deliver services effectively and efficiently and maintain high standards across a range of critical areas.

1.4 Problem Statement

The implications of the paradigm shift in UAE policing forms the basis of this study and characterises the problem this research proposes to address. While the UAE and institution are committed to applying best practice and principles in this area, there is an absence of a framework for comprehensively evaluating and assessing the risks in privatising police operations. A key issue is fulfilling aims to integrate best practice and sustain high standards in services in the absence of an appropriate framework for training, governance, oversight and accountability. Many studies provide a fragmented analysis of police privatisation focused on specific dimensions or sectors and the literature overall lacks a robust comprehensive framework that enables such an evaluation. This imperative is recognised at the highest level following the transfer of police operations from the public to the private sector. The evaluation of existing measures and a comprehensive assessment and mitigation of risks across several dimensions is viewed as critical.
The context outlined in the previous section indicates two important points of paramount importance for this study. Firstly, it indicates an apparent acceptance of privatisation based on the growth of privatisation of police services around the world. And secondly, it demonstrates the scale and diversity of police functions being privatised. However, my initial review of the literature points to a lack of consensus regarding the role and acceptance of privatisation of the police and how and what can and should be privatised. The ostensible acceptance by governments of privatisation is based on the view that it brings efficiency and effectiveness. This is underpinned by assumptions inherent in neoliberalism and the reduced role of reliance on government regulation (Ellison and Pino 2013) and public choice theory that maximising the role of the private sector for the delivery of public services can incur cost savings (Wright 1993; Alonso et al., 2013). While the purpose of this study is not concerned with the role and merits of privatisation, the context outlined makes it more critical to test such assumptions and generate insights in relation to the effectiveness of privatisation. Underpinning this is the theoretical motivation to establish and develop an in-depth understanding of the risks and issues associated with police privatisation and to establish insights into specific critical success and failure factors that can inform valid criteria that facilitate the evaluation of the effectiveness of police privatisation programmes.

The UAE government has acknowledged the presence of potential organisational, structural and regulatory weaknesses in the private security industry (Ministry of Information, 2015). While this analysis is based on the perspective of a narrow group of officials rather than a systematic evaluation based on valid comprehensive criteria, it nevertheless indicates a critical knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of private security and different risks. Further, there is an acknowledgement in the UAE that a review of the regulatory framework is required. This leads to the question of the nature and role of legal and regulatory measures in private security services. While regulations exist in the UAE in relation to hiring criteria, on-going training and standards, and quality assurance for private security guards (UN, 2014), the extent of legal authority and powers of private security (Heath et al., 2009)
and the role of legal mechanisms in empowering private security are further issues yet to be resolved. Failure to establish appropriate regulatory measures can significantly undermine operational standards (Minnaar and Mistry, 2004). A particular challenge for the UAE in this context is the role of the state in monitoring and enforcing service standards, as to date legislation does not exist allowing the Ministry of the Interior to intervene in upholding standards in outsourcing contracts.

Moreover, international evidence suggests that the potential for a wider range of issues may possibly undermine the effectiveness of police privatisation in the UAE. Research on the UK and the US indicates strongly that there are significant shortcomings in adequate regulation of private security and police and a lack of identification and resolution with regards to issues of accountability (Bradley and Sedgewick, 2009; Brunger, 2012). In particular, regulation focuses principally on public police forces and has failed to keep pace with developments in outsourcing of police functions (Bradley and Sedgewick, 2009). Three key areas are noted as problematic involving accountability, redress and managerial oversight to monitor and evaluate operations (Rushin, 2012). This is an important finding because the absence of effective regulations after more than two decades of police privatisation may point to major challenges and complexities.

Thus the rapid pace of transformation in policing in the UAE potentially poses severe risks to the future of policing. Different categories of risks have been identified in connection with the transference of public functions to the private sector: regulatory, economic and social risks. However, in the case of the UAE, there lacks a framework for systematically identifying and evaluating risks which can ultimately undermine the effectiveness of privatisation.

The risk of damage to the government’s reputation and trust to effectively maintain security and the rule of law as a result of financial or performance failures within a privatisation initiative is a major concern (Padovani and Young 2008; Schwartz 2005). The risk rests on public sensitivity to underperformance and the expectation of government accountability for
services provided on its behalf (Strategy Unit 2002) leading to negative perceptions of government service delivery. This can constrain the ability of governments to implement their policies (Schwartz, 2005).

Financial failings represent a type of risk associated with inadequate oversights and controls (Holtfreter 2008; Schmid 2003; Schwartz 2005). High levels of financial risk can inhibit private sector partners’ capacity to maintain the agreed service delivery (Schmid, 2003). In turn, service delivery reflects another dimension of risk when providers fail to sustain appropriate performance standards. This can result in negative consequences for the public in terms of a reduction of service outcomes, lower service stability, and service delivery failure (Schmid 2003; Schwartz 2005) and the subsequent risk of litigation. Specifically, service failures or shortcomings could lead to litigious action and associated financial penalties and damages not generally demanded under remedies for public sector issues (Barrett, 2000).

Nichols (2010) emphasises the challenge of economic measurement and analysis in determining the efficacy of outsourcing police services. One dimension relates to whether performance metrics are in place for economic analysis to prove outsourcing contracts will deliver expected cost savings (Nichols, 2010). Problems can arise if contracts are poorly framed and appropriate oversight is not in place to ensure service levels are met and quality is delivered. Another difficulty pertains to the nature of policing itself emphasising qualitative aims and goals often related to social priorities. In what way these aspects can be embedded and evaluated in service contracts, frequently characterised by quantitative targets and simplistic indicators such as payment by results, represents a significant challenge for policing services (Albertson, 2014; Sukhram, 2015).

A further challenge relates to the issue of equity in access to and delivery of policing services when private services are used, as socio-economic divisions can be further polarised and reinforced in relation to police services (Bradley and Sedgwick, 2009; Juska, 2009). Mansour (2008) notes the Federal government's concern that privatisation in the UAE does not
undermine the relationship between rulers and the population by damaging social service delivery or citizen security. The perception of inequity can potentially interfere with this dynamic. Public sensitivity to underperformance and the expectation of government accountability for services provided on its behalf has been identified as key factors that can lead to negative perceptions of government service delivery (Strategy Unit 2002). This perspective presents a socio-economic viewpoint that is lacking in the literature.

These issues provides a driving perspective within this study to clearly establish dimensions of risk and impacts that need to be investigated as the basis for understanding critical success and failures that can guide future policy and improvements. An examination of the literature has revealed a bias towards economic analysis as the main approach in evaluating effectiveness. However, the challenges that have been outlined relate both to economic and social factors. This therefore motivates the research focus toward a comprehensive evaluation framework that investigates both economic and social dimensions as the basis for establishing relevant criteria to assess the effectiveness of police privatisation in the UAE. I argue for a socio-economic approach to develop a balanced and comprehensive model to reflect the diversity of theoretical and practical issues that have been identified. Importantly, the research to date on policing globally reflects a diverse range of approaches and national contexts with the particular successes and challenges identified associated with those specific contexts.

Thus the UAE approach and unique context for policing indicates a need for an evaluation framework that is appropriate to the situation in the UAE. Future policy developments to maximise the performance of the private sector and avoid potentially negative consequences associated with a range of risks requires an in-depth understanding of success and failures factors. This concern stems from numerous issues over the growth of private security; the efficacy of future expansion of private security; the scale of public revenue involved and commercial vested interests; public stakeholder worries on the economic and social effectiveness of private security; and the
lack of an evaluation framework and performance criteria. As yet there is a significant level of uncertainty regarding the specific risks that are faced and the necessary mechanisms and processes that need to be embedded and the dimensions of performance evaluation required to ensure that the private security sector plays an effective role in enforcing law and order and maintaining peace and security.

1.5 Project Aims

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. The political context is underpinned by the government’s acceptance of the role of the private sector in policing and security, and the vision of a collaborative public-private policing service. The research focus centres on the broad issue of the effectiveness of the police privatisation programme.

1.6 Research Questions

The context and research problem that has been explained gives rise to several key research questions. A review of the literature and dialogue with senior policy makers in the UAE government problem areas has led to the formulation of a central research question: How effective is private security performance and accountability; and how can private security performance and accountability be strengthened and improved? This question is divided into five sub-questions:

RQ1. What are the key characteristics of the external and internal control systems for the private security programme in Abu Dhabi?

RQ2. How effective are the controls systems implemented by the private security programme in Abu Dhabi?

RQ3. What are the critical components and mechanisms for the effective performance of private security in the UAE?

RQ4. What performance framework should be constructed for assessing the effectiveness of private security companies?
RQ5. What are the key factors for the implementation of an assessment framework to ensure effective governance, oversight and accountability in private security in the UAE?

These research questions reflect a structured and logical progression for the research problem. RQ1 is concerned with identifying and characterising the existing systems of regulation, accountability and control at macro, meso and micro level. This focus of this question is underpinned by the theoretical importance attached to this question and by practical and professional concerns. RQ2 extends this analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of existing systems and processes to identify risks, gaps and priorities from the perspective of key stakeholders. The focus of RQ3 is concerned with the construction of a holistic model that defines key components and mechanisms for the effective performance of private security in the UAE. The knowledge generated from RQ1-3 should inform policy and result in improvements to external and internal control processes that maximise accountability and performance. RQ4 focuses on identifying an appropriate performance framework including key performance dimensions, measures and indicators for evaluating effectiveness. RQ5 investigates the key factors for the implementation of an assessment framework.

1.7 Research Objectives

To address this research aim, four key objectives have been formulated:

RO1. To reflect on and evaluate the existing systems of control and performance practices within the private security programme in Abu Dhabi.
RO2. To evaluate, using quantitative and qualitative data, the effectiveness of controls systems implemented by the private security programme in Abu Dhabi.
RO3. To construct a model identifying key components and mechanisms for the effective performance of private security in the UAE.
RO4. To produce a performance framework for assessing the effectiveness of private security companies.
1.8 Scope of Research

The scope of this research is focused on both a specific geography and sector. The research centres on the investigation of police privatisation defined as the transference of any police or security functions to the private sector in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The study focuses on police and security services for public venues including shopping malls and hotels.

1.9 Researcher Biography

My name is Ahmed Saleh Mohammed Alqutbah; I am a member of the National Security Institute (UAE) and have been employed at the Private Security Business Department (PSBD) since March 2006. In 2009, I became the acting head of inspection section, then head of licensing before becoming head of the department in Sept 2015.

This study has been conceived and designed with the aim of addressing issues of accountability and governance in the private security industry of the UAE. As a senior officer involved in police privatisation, the motivation for the project results from strategic concerns in relation to the capacity of the Private Security Business Department (PSBD) to ensure adequate governance of the sector. Following the transfer of police operations from the public to the private sector, the imperative to secure appropriate governance and accountability is recognised at the highest level. The fast pace of transformation and private sector involvement in UAE policing potentially raises severe future risks. A key issue is fulfilling the aims to integrate best practice and sustain high standards in services in the absence of an appropriate framework for training, governance, oversight and accountability.

The PSBD was created with the purpose of overseeing and controlling the private security sector and improving partnership with the public sector (PSBD, 2017a). Its vision is to ensure the highest levels of safety and security for the UAE as a whole supported by the core mission to develop the capabilities of the private security sector to achieve that goal (PSBD, 2017b). Active governance and accountability is stressed by the department as key to
ensuring community safety and security and continued public confidence in private security. Thus the need is strongly acknowledged for oversight and governance to ensure the development of a private security sector that realises public benefit (PSBD, 2017a,b). Integrating those goals within the operations and structures of the department remains an on-going endeavour however. At an operational level, the department principally focuses on initial licensing and registration of private security companies and follow-up inspections concentrated on licensing compliance. This focus is reflected in the structure of the department which mainly consists of licensing sections (PSBD, 2017c). Thus the key point of governance for private security companies remains largely a one-off process focused on narrow governance dimensions. The UAE government has in turn acknowledged potential organisational, structural and regulatory weaknesses in the private security industry (Ministry of Information, 2015).

This study has also emerged from my personal motivation to develop an in-depth understanding of police privatisation issues and risks, and gain insight into the success and failure factors which can inform a framework to assess privatisation effectiveness based on governance, accountability, oversight and training. Within the UAE, there remains a critical gap in knowledge in relation to different risks and the effectiveness of private security and there is no systematic identification and evaluation of risks which could impair privatisation success and the role of private security in enforcing law and order and maintaining peace and security.

1.10 Contributions to Knowledge

It is envisaged that the findings of this study will contribute to theoretical knowledge and praxis in the management of police outsourcing to the private sector. The audience for these findings will be policymakers and practitioners engaged in the privatisation of police operations, and the improvement, risk assessment or quality assurance of police privatisation. There is further significance in framing and creating awareness of the key issues and
challenges in outsourcing in a police context and in providing guidelines that can contribute to the successful implementation of policing outsourcing.

This research can potentially enrich the theory on police outsourcing in outlining key success and failure concepts and frameworks. A key contribution will be the formulation of a comprehensive theoretical framework for evaluating the effectiveness of police privatisation. The research extends and links together theoretical concepts in police privatisation to provide an integrated and comprehensive model for evaluating the effectiveness of police privatisation initiatives. In particular, this study will present a unique contribution in respect to a holistic socio-economic model in the Arab region that can be adopted by other countries in the region with similar socio-political contexts.

1.11 Structure of Thesis

The structure of this thesis has been designed around the key components of the research process adopted in this study. This first chapter has introduced the focus and context of the research outlining the background, problem statement, aims, scope and contribution. Chapter 2 presents an overview of police privatisation and private security in the UAE. Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature and discusses police privatisation and the role of private security encompassing relevant underlying concepts, theories and principles contributing to the conceptual framework and guiding the research process. This informs the research design presented in Chapter 4 that explains and justifies the methodological approach and procedures adopted. Chapter 5 presents the results of the first exploratory stage of action research gathered from the survey and interviews. Chapter 6 outlines the findings of the second design and validation stage of action research arising from the focus groups. The key findings and implications of the results are analysed and discussed in Chapter 7. The final chapter summarises the thesis and key findings arising from the research process and discusses major recommendations, contributions, limitations, and future research opportunities.
2 Police Privatisation in the UAE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of police privatisation in the UAE and outlines the overall progress, issues, priorities and future goals. This commences with an overview of privatisation policy and development in the UAE. The remainder of this chapter describes police privatisation in the UAE and discusses key themes of performance and governance and future plans up to 2020.

2.2 Privatisation

The term privatisation has been used interchangeably in the literature with several meanings as a result of the variety of opinions on the problems affecting the public sector; from franchising and restructuring policies to solutions for the oversupply of the sector involving the private sector, the use of the term covers a range of different policies (Mansour, 2008). As a result, privatisation encompasses "a host of policies all sharing the common aim of strengthening the market and reducing the role of the public sector". (Cullis and Philip, 1998, p114). In his study of privatisation and deregulation in the UAE Ward defines various specific forms of privatisation as follows:

- An initial public offering of a vertically integrated stated owned monopoly entity
- Sale of government shares of public utilities to private investors
- Philanthropic zero-fee transfer of stated-owned companies to less wealthy nationals
- Financing and operations of infrastructure projects
- Private sector management of state-owned enterprise through management services agreement
- Contracting of services to the private sector previously carried out by public sector (Ward, 1999, p40-41)
Privatisation takes a variety of shapes and forms. The first type of privatisation is the most comprehensive; it is characterised by the sale or transfer of publicly owned assets to private ownership (Wright, 1993). The second type is possibly the most prevalent form of privatisation; it is characterised by the outsourcing of public sector functions to private companies. The main argument in favour of this approach is that it allows the state to decrease its labour costs by contracting out to the private sector a variety of activities which are commonplace and unexceptional. The rationale is that the private sector is able to perform these same functions at a lower cost as it is not constrained by the collective pay agreements reached between the state and the public sector trade unions, while at the same time the state maintains its control of how these enterprises and services are managed. But contracting functions out can potentially increase both the contractor’s regulatory burden and the state’s monitoring one, thus raising costs for both parties (Wright, 1993). A third type of privatisation is the thorough discontinuation of public services and programmes, which the private or charitable sectors are then expected to provide or administer (Wright, 1993).

Private security comprises a wide variety of services and products provided by non-state actors which aim to safeguard from crime both residential and commercial properties and lives (Forst, 2000). Within this study, private policing is widely defined as policing and security services provided by non-state actors. Private policing’s customers can be private entities, such as businesses employing private security companies to provide guards, or public entities, such as in the case of neighbourhood watch teams (Sparrow, 2014).

2.3 Demand for Privatisation in the UAE

Growth in UAE demand for private security is steadily rising evidenced by a significant ascent in the number of licensed security companies and private security guards since 2002 (Ministry of Interior, 2015; Collombier, 2011). Use of the private security sector is extensive with the number of privately guarded sites cited as approximately 28,000 in 2014 (Ministry of Interior, 2015).
The context in the UAE is characterised by a range of key factors driving demand for private security. The most significant is the extended period of economic growth experienced by the country, and forecast to rise sharply to 3.4% in 2018 (Kassem, 2017; Gulf News, 2017). A key economic policy is diversification and investment in non-oil sectors, with infrastructure and construction major foci. This has resulted in significant growth in locations requiring a level of security including critical infrastructure such as railways, ports and power installations, residential housing and public spaces such as offices, shopping malls, industrial parks and college campuses (Collombier, 2011). The surveillance implemented in these privatised spaces by private security staff is viewed as central to their efficient governance (Wakefield, 2004). Strong commercial demand in the UAE is underpinned by the requirement for licensed premises such as hotels or shopping malls to demonstrate that measures are in place which meet their security needs (Collombier, 2011).

Economic growth has further influenced the hosting of an increasing range and type of headline events including world class golf, Formula 1, and Expo 2022. Increased private security has entailed to ensure the safety and security of citizens and thousands of visitors during these events and police are increasingly routinely supported by the private sector (Bainbridge, 2017). For the government, the use of private security aligns with aims to adopt a low-key approach to visible front-line policing at major events. This is designed to extend soft power and sustain positive images while under international exposure (Mahoney, 2017). Moreover specific security expertise for critical infrastructure and major events supplied by the private sector is viewed as necessary to supplement public sector knowledge (Mahoney, 2017). For event organisers, sponsors and a range of third parties demand for private security is driven by clear legal obligations to ensure security (Bainbridge, 2017).

The key policy objective to create an efficient, effective and modernised police force through privatisation initiatives further underpins private security demand (ADWEA, 2013; Mansour, 2008). Privatisation of certain sectors of policing
has focused principally on crime prevention allowing the police to concentrate on higher level policing activities (National Media Council, 2008). Cooperation with the private security sector is perceived to enable the state to divest some responsibility for public safety and focus on strategy rather than implementation (National Media Council, 2008).

Demand is further generated through the need to counter perceived threats. Homeland security in the UAE is considered complex given its geography, natural resources and significant demographic diversity perceived to pose a potential long-term internal security concern. Moreover external threats are numerous in the context of an unstable and volatile Middle East (Ibish, 2017). Military manpower shortfalls have influenced demand as to some extent these have been addressed through the utilisation of private security firms (Ibish, 2017).

On a micro level, various factors are potentially driving demand for increased private policing among the public. Expanded construction development is resulting in significant demand for facilities management services with security services segments expected to record the most rapid CAGR by 2021 (Construction Week, 2017). The demand for private security is demonstrated by significant growth of the UAE video surveillance market, leading to its emergence as a critical market in the Middle East region (CNN, 2017). Private security demand by the public may also be influenced by perceptions among a significant minority of residents that despite some of the lowest crime rates in the world, crime is a problem and a concern in the UAE (The National, 2014).

2.4 Private Security

More specifically, private security is defined as “services other than public law enforcement and regulatory agencies that are engaged primarily in the prevention and investigation of crime, loss, or harm to specific individuals, organizations, or facilities” (Green 1981, p25). Private security generally comprises a myriad of occupations from security guards to specialised engineers and consultants, via private forensic laboratories employees and
manufacturers of security equipment (Cunningham, Strauchs, and Van Meter 1991, p2). It has been proposed that “the major purpose of private security is the [reduction of] the risk of crime by taking preventative actions; the major purpose of the public police is to deter crime by catching and punishing criminals” (Bayley and Shearing, 1996) and that while the police "emphasize the logic of justice", private security "emphasize the logic of [private property] security" (Bayley and Shearing, 1996), which would in turn logically engender an expectation of different interactions from the two types of forces with the public (Rushin, 2012).

In the UAE private security companies have increasingly been employed to provide security for a wide range of public spaces. Urban landscapes have undergone a process of transformation since the first shopping centres opened in the UK in the 1960s; a transfiguration replicated worldwide (Wakefield, 2004). This trend is evident in the UAE. The notion of ‘fortified enclave’ (Caldeira, 2000) encompasses a myriad of occurrences such as office buildings, college campuses and shopping centres (Bowers and Manzi, 2006). The increase in shopping centres and the concurrent privatisation of the associated streets, as well as the similar development of urban ‘fortified enclaves’, have been the subject of research (Davis, 1990; Kohn, 2004). In the UK, the magnitude of urban space privatisation has been such that at present spending time in areas privately controlled but accessible to the public is a routine occurrence for the majority of the population. These privatised areas can be found throughout cities and towns and include travel-enabling areas such as airports and train stations, leisure activities spaces such as shopping, culture or leisure centres, and working spaces such as office complexes and business parks (Wakefield, 2004). The surveillance strategies implemented in these privatised spaces mostly by private security staff are not just a policing approach, they are central to the efficient governance of these places. Moreover, thanks to the increasing cooperation between police forces and private security firms, the impact of these governance strategies centred on surveillance are being widely disseminated (Wakefield, 2004).
2.5 UAE Policy on Privatisation

Privatisation in the UAE has had a recent inception following its initiation over the last two decades (Celasun, 2013). To date no official government policy in relation to privatisation exists, a characteristic the nation shares with many other Gulf countries (Celasun, 2013). Nevertheless one of the main observed goals of privatisation has been to create efficient, effective and high-performing public services (ADWEA, 2013; Mansour, 2008). Privatisation is also seen as integral to creating a flexible economy through encouraging and enabling the participation of citizens and the private sector in the economic development of the country (UAE Interact, 2004). Partnering with the private sector is perceived as the most important and efficient way of compensating for the observed lack of expertise, skills, technology and human resources within the UAE to support the country’s significantly rapid growth and development (ADWEA, 2008).

The UAE has undertaken a number of significant privatisations at macro level in which state assets have been transferred to the private sector. These have mainly involved utilities sectors such as electricity and water in addition to telecommunication and public transport (Mansour, 2008). Recently over 40% of the government’s stake in public telecommunications and shipbuilding has been sold (Celasun, 2013) and it is expected that privatisation will continue to gain momentum in the UAE. Largely successful, the approaches and processes implemented in UAE macro privatisations have gained international recognition and have been emulated throughout the Gulf region (ADWEA, 2013). Mansour (2008) suggests that the government’s privatisation programme is influenced largely by the aim to ensure that social services and employment for UAE nationals are not negatively affected. For this reason a selective approach to macro privatisation has been adopted which avoids undermining these aspects focusing on sectors perceived as non-core to the interests of Emirati nationals.
2.6 Police Privatisation

The UAE has also embarked on micro level processes of privatisation characterising the nature of police privatisation in the UAE. This involves the contracting of services to the private sector previously delivered by the public sector as well as the introduction of private sector management (Mansour, 2008). Privatisation in the UAE police force is generally ad-hoc and gradual however is in alignment with commitments made in 2004 to modernise the police service (Al-Abed et al., 2008). A principal pillar of this strategy is the achievement of the best value for money underlined by maximising efficiency and effective resource use (Al-Abed et al., 2008).

In 2001 the UAE began outsourcing and privatising a number of security-related tasks which were traditionally part of the police remit. The first such tasks were traffic control, the assessment of vehicles, and the licensing of drivers (uaeinteract.com, 2001). Subsequent privatisation concerned the security of individuals, companies and organisation, such as banks and embassies, and public events (uaeinteract.com, 2001). Private sector police training services companies have also been involved in the delivery of training (Al-Abed et al., 2008).

Frequently a significant issue in Gulf country privatisations (Celasun, 2013) the UAE has attempted to strengthen the legal framework around which police privatisation is occurring. In 2002, Abu Dhabi passed the first Emirati regulation on the work and licensing of private security companies. This regulation was the basis for the subsequent Federal Private Security Law n° 37 of 2006, which has been in force throughout the UAE since 2009 (Absal, 2009). As a result of the legal framework now in place all private security companies must adhere to high operational standards and strict training and licensing of staff. The law, by setting clear conditions on security company operations has led to the exclusion of 93% of former security companies from the market due to sub-standard services (Absal, 2009).
The importance of regulation within police training is underlined by evidence indicating the potential implications of its absence. According to Giminez-Salinas (2007), in such a context private security guards can be poorly trained and professionalised, and the resulting security products can be low-quality and highly variable in standard across companies. This may have further negative impacts on reputation and public perception of the sector as a whole in addition to occasionally impeding efficient police operations. The experience of forces around the world show that a number of areas within police training can be suggested as appropriate and necessary for regulation (Rawlins and Kwon, 2015; UN, 2014; Mawby et al., 2009; Giminez-Salinas, 2007).

Notably these actions have not impeded market growth. Across the UAE the number of licensed security companies in 2011 has increased to 40, accompanied by 50,000 security guards which in terms of headcount amounts to more than the entire police staff of the federation (Collombier, 2011). In Abu Dhabi alone the number of security guards has risen from 2,500 in 2002 to almost 10,000 in 2008 (Absal, 2009), and expanding a further 176% by 2016 (Ministry of Interior, 2015). This increase could partly result from the legal requirement of companies in the UAE to ensure their internal security before being issued a license to operate. According to Collombier (2011, pg.5) licensed premises such as hotels or shopping malls for example need to prove that measures are in place which meet their security needs. As with the police staff, the majority of security company staff are non-Emirati. On the other hand, the companies operating in the sector are mostly indigenous, with only 20% foreign owned (Collombier, 2011).

On balance the evidence suggests that the sectors of policing which have been privatised concern crime prevention, rather than investigation or intervention. This implies that without resorting to increases in staff numbers Emirati police forces have been able to concentrate on improving their own operational standards.
2.6.1 Private Security in the UAE

Development of the private security sector in the UAE highlights a number of milestones over the past two decades. In 2002 the Department for Private Security Companies was established leading to significant consequences for the sector. In particular licenses were revoked from more than 200 security companies and 140,000 staff in Abu Dhabi and subject to relicensing. In 2006 the Federal Law on the operations of private security companies came into force and through this Abu Dhabi’s experience was disseminated throughout the Federation. Further developments featured the establishment of the National Security Institute in 2009 under the administration of the Ministry of Interior. Currently the private security sector in the UAE is populated by approximately 43 private security companies employing 27,622 licensed staff. By 2020 the UAE aims to become a world centre for best practice and expertise in the private security sector, and in the partnership of state and private security companies in achieving security (Ministry of Interior, 2015).

![Figure 1 Police Privatisation Timeline 2002-2015](source: Ministry of Interior, 2015)

The private security sector currently plays a significant role as partners in security with public forces. Directly supervised by the Department for Private Security companies operate throughout the country in public and private institutions such as offices and shopping centres. Police departments are routinely supported by private security companies and they are gaining...
prominence in the security of large public events such as the Abu Dhabi Formula One Grand Prix (Ministry of Interior, 2015).

Growth in the sector is steadily rising indicated by the increasing number of privately guarded sites standing at over 6,000 in 2014. Figure 2 reveals the different categories of sites guarded in Abu Dhabi totalling nearly 28,000 (Ministry of Interior, 2015).

![Figure 2 Number of Private Security Companies Sites in 2014](image)

Source: Ministry of Interior, 2015

The numbers of licensed personnel in the UAE private security sector are also high and are predicted to grow. Figure 3 shows that in 2014 almost 17,000 private security guards were employed.
2.6.1.1 Performance

The UAE private security sector is being enhanced by a growing emphasis on quality and performance through focusing on performance management and metrics, training and licensing. The industry has itself recommended the adoption of performance indicators subject to periodic monitoring by the Department for Private Security. In addition the National Security Institute provided training to 31,763 security company staff members in 2014 alone. Operational performance has been improved through the activation of operations control rooms within private security companies and the licensing of all security managers. The private security sector has been prolific in providing security feedback and recommendations for improvements. In the last eight months security companies have submitted up to 281,445 reports and recommendations.

2.6.1.2 Governance

The governance regime informing the private security sector has a number of strengths to support improvements in quality and performance. Principally there are federal laws regulating the work and operations of private security companies. A recent amendment may also grant the government broader powers in the supervision of unlicensed security managers and staff in commercial centres and other such premises. The training curriculum for
security officers can also be consistently managed to align with the needs of the sector with the possibility to control the quality of training provided by the National Security Institute. These strengths have led to international recognition for the governance of the private security sector within the UAE. The Abu Dhabi guidelines on the regulation of private security companies and their work have been presented to the United Nations and are currently being adopted internationally.

Nevertheless a number of weaknesses in governance can be detected pointing to areas for improvement. A lack of supervision on the information provided by security companies, and a lack of coordination with police departments, have been noted and point to the need to develop mechanisms to oversee the credibility of their reports. There is also a lack of staff in the central Department for Private Security which currently employs only 9 inspectors for all private security guards and sites. Necessary expansion of the training output by the National Security Institute has also been acknowledged, with estimates emphasising the need for at least twice the current level of provision.

2.6.1.3 Future Plans

The UAE has formulated a range of initiatives and objectives concerning the future structure and management of the private security sector intended to support its continued development as a well-regulated and efficient industry.

A key focus of planning proposals is administration and governance in which the aim is to enhance the supervisory role of government bodies. One principal measure is the automation of administrative and operational services within the Department for Private Security. This is envisioned to include systematisation of the management of licensing for private security companies and security consulting companies. Other objectives aim to enable the classification of private security companies through benchmarking initiatives and also to extend monitoring through regular company reports and follow-up. This is to be accompanied by investment in resources to increase monitoring
and supervisory capabilities through the appointment of 20 new inspectors and the provision of 12 new vehicles for inspection patrols.

In the near future organisational restructuring of the Department for Private Security and its departments and subsidiaries is envisioned in accordance with specific proposals. Projects will also aim at strengthening communication and the exchange of information in the industry. This is focused on enhancing the private security smart text messaging system through investment of 1.2 million Dirhams. The establishment of operations rooms in private security companies and their coordination through a central operations room is further mandated helping to improve communication with private security guards on sites.

The areas of performance management and training are provided specific objectives for the future. Measurement of the performance and capabilities of private security guards are planned to become part of the remit of the National Security Institute in coordination with the private companies. In relation to training two key measures are planned: curriculums are to be reviewed and approved on a regular basis and incorporate the latest international standards, and new officers and inspectors will undergo a robust training needs analysis.

Developing investment in the private security sector is another key planning goal. Objectives aim to ensure the expansion and efficiency of investment processes and the increase of investment opportunities through the establishment of a privatisation subsidiary or a resource development company. Approval will also be given for the establishment of consulting firms specialising in the field of assessing the activities of the private security sector to develop investment.

2.7 Evaluating Private Security in the UAE

The growth in private security in the UAE is mirrored around the world and simultaneously the absence of an evaluation framework and mechanism gives rise to concerns over the effectiveness such programmes. Globally, the trend to raise government operational efficiency through privatisation has extended
significantly to the privatisation of security (Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014). Minaar and Mistry (2004) discuss the issue of what policing services should and can be outsourced in the context of the relatively extensive and lengthy experience of the South African police force (SAPS). Schonteich (1999) argues that a shift to outsourcing of peripheral activities allows for a refocus on core police services. According to Schonteich (1999, cited in Minaar and Mistry, 2004) outsourcing has come to be perceived as an important mechanism to release police from peripheral duties in order to focus on core services. It is asserted that the imperative for outsourcing in South Africa grew out of a considerable lack of police numbers and experienced and specialised personnel. Demands for higher police standards were also a factor in addition to a concurrent parallel growth in privately contracted security forces (Minaar and Mistry, 2004). Rogers and Gravelle (2012) also emphasise the imperative for and inevitability of outsourcing in the context of the severe budgetary cutbacks which UK police forces are being forced to address.

One dimension of evaluation is emphasised in the debate surrounding the decision to outsource and the nature of policing and underscores a number of issues and potential limitations in private policing. Such considerations underline a wider debate in the outsourcing of police services in determination of the extent that services should and can be outsourced based on considerations of the need for, the value of and the appropriateness of outsourcing services. The issue of whether and what kind of police services should be outsourced forms one part of the debate. This perspective argues that certain police services may not be suitable for outsourcing emphasising the need for a service quality screening process based on evaluation (Mawby et al., 2009). Minaar and Mistry (2004) found that in some cases such as South African the crucial decision not to outsource core police services was undertaken as this was judged to be an abrogation of constitutional responsibilities, and non-core services were only judged suitable for outsourcing if they did not affect police powers to prevent and investigate crime. Therefore a limited number of police services have been selected for outsourcing according to this criterion.
Moreover, the significance of evaluating the suitability of police functions for outsourcing is addressed explicitly by Jacob (2007) who proposed a decision-making model based on Lonsdale (1999) to be utilised when police organisations are considering outsourcing police activities. The model is based on the outsourcing of non-core activities distinguished by the single criterion of whether police powers are necessary to perform the required activity effectively. This criterion implies according to Jacob (2007) a significantly wide field of possible functions and activities to outsource. The strength in Jacob’s model is in defining key dimensions that may inform evaluation of private security. Other elements of the model suggest outsourced functions can be evaluated in terms of market competition, the impact of outsourcing on core capabilities, the strategic alignment of outsourced services to core business and the ability to manage contract failure (Jacob, 2007). However, specific mechanisms and criteria for these components are not discussed.

Nevertheless, the growth of private security in the UAE and countries around the world is so advanced that the debate has shifted away from whether public force should be privatised. There is a strong focus on identifying the effectiveness of programmes and identification of types of risk and issues that should be addressed by any evaluation process. There is significant discussion in the literature of negative impacts and issues associated with private security. In spite of the growth of private security over decades to varying degrees in police forces around the world, the literature reveals significant ambiguity regarding the impacts of privatisation as a result of a shift in police functions to the private sector. A key concern is the risk of damage to the government’s reputation and legitimacy as a result of financial or performance failures within a privatisation initiative (Padovani and Young 2008; Schwartz 2005). Heath et al., (2009) suggest that although outsourcing can significantly reduce costs, considerations of accountability, sustainability and equity mean that outsourcing is complex and can have unintentional negative effects. Appendix 1 provides an overview of the themes identified in police privatisation literature.
3 Literature Review

3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a review of the literature exploring themes in police privatisation and related study areas. This review is an initial synthesis of key dimensions and issues that affect the performance of private security companies and the effectiveness of police privatisation. An examination of the literature reveals several theoretical and empirical perspectives and concepts that point to a range of significant issues underpinning the effectiveness of the privatisation of police functions. Privatisation theory and the debate surrounding neoliberalism, public choice and new public management in relation to privatisation provides valuable insights into potential risks, negative impacts and key challenges on this topic. This aligns with the problem that is the focus of this thesis in terms of the perceived risks of privatisation of police functions to the private sector. Accountability theory is revealed as a major overarching theme that is consistently addressed in studies across a range of sectors and countries.

A review of the literature identified different forms of accountability and accountability mechanisms that provide critical insight in assessing governance and oversight of police and private security functions. An examination of studies into different privatisation initiatives around the world identified a range of dimensions and factors that contribute to the conceptualisation of an assessment framework.

A review of this literature points to a wide spectrum of factors and elements that impact both positively and negatively on the success of privatisation initiatives in different areas of policing. Regulation and accountability mechanisms emerged as the dominant themes consistently debated in terms of their role, weaknesses and application in private security and privatisation contexts. This review identified strong theoretical support for a range of overlapping dimensions that can inform an evaluation framework and guide policy, including accountability, structures and roles, regulation, service quality, equity and organisational and competitive factors. Further, an important
contribution from the debate of co-ordination, governance and oversight of the private security is the classification of external and internal controls. External dimensions reveal valuable classification of performance dimensions into five areas: democratic, social, political, economic and legal. Internal control dimensions meanwhile provide an organisational and individual level perspective of the performance dimensions critical to effective governance management and oversight of private security operations. Three internal dimensions consisting of action controls, personnel controls and cultural provide an important internal framework of analysis.

This chapter reveals a knowledge gap exists in terms of a comprehensive integrated assessment framework for private security. While the themes discussed in literature contribute to a holistic framework for assessing the effectiveness of private security programmes on balance the findings were fragmented across a range of sectors and countries. Further, assessments of police or private security programmes focused on a narrow set of dimensions. A conceptual framework is derived from the literature that addresses this gap and extends and links together theoretical concepts in police privatisation to provide an integrated and comprehensive model for evaluating the effectiveness of police privatisation initiatives.

3.2 Scope of Literature

The scope of this review extended to different regions around the world: Eastern Europe, Europe, South America, North America and Asia; and different forms of police privatisation and different functions. The scope of the literature search extended to include a combination of search parameters: police privatisation, private security, regulation, accountability, evaluation, criminology, public spaces; and a range of journal and academic databases including Google scholar, Springerlink, Taylor and Francis, JSTOR, PROQUEST, SAGE. As indicated in Figure 4 approximately 700 sources were screened using the titles and abstracts to create a final shortlist of 224 studies.
This body of literature consisted of studies that had been conducted in a range of different contexts, sectors and regions focused on success and failure factors, strategies and evaluation dimensions. The adoption of a structured approach to the review of the literature has ensured that greater breadth has been possible driving search and retrieval beyond the specific subject area and network (Mallett et al., 2012). Moreover rigour and objectivity have been preserved in the structured selection of sources, minimising the potential influence of researcher bias. This is supported by a measure of methodological transparency provided in the clear and structured steps taken to search and shortlist sources (Mallett et al., 2012).
3.3 Privatisation Theory

3.3.1 Neoliberalism

A neoliberal approach is characterised by reduced state involvement, market-driven behaviour, and commodification and individualisation of services (Wright, 1993; Bradley and Chedwick 2009, Ellison and Pino, 2012). The political context is significant in providing insights into the theoretical assumptions that underpin, guide and influence government policies toward privatisation. A review of neoliberalism theory provides further issues and concerns that may need to be reflected in any evaluation framework. In the UAE, the privatisation of the police services is consistent with the neoliberal action of shifting from the state to market control. Ellison and Pino (2012) argue that while neoliberalism is described as an ideological system with principles based on the central belief that the government withdraws from all functions, in reality the state, as in the UAE, is committed to a policy agenda that dictates otherwise. This suggests a danger of significant ambiguity regarding roles and responsibilities. This tension implies an issue and highlights a dimension of risk in relation to the clarification of roles and boundaries and the significance of achieving a balance between state involvement and interference. There is evidence to suggest that government involvement is necessary to address the potential negative consequences of privatisation.

One such consequence, identified by neoliberal researchers, is based on evidence of inequalities. Members of society already disadvantaged can face greater marginalisation, as the effects of neoliberalism favour those with the means to pay for the services (Held and McGrew, 2001, p1). It is argued that the neoliberal tendency inherent in corporations focuses behaviour on cost minimisation through cheap labour that can exacerbate social inequalities resulting in high concentrations of unemployed and higher levels of predatory crime as evidenced by Neild (2002). This evidence underlines the significance of a social oriented perspective to the evaluation of privatisation. The case of South Africa provides an example of the risks of disenfranchisement and
social imbalance. Ghani and Lockhard (2008, p3) point to the sovereignty gap that has manifested as a consequence of neoliberalist actions. Their analysis suggests the state’s inability to sustain its legitimacy in delivering services that maintain public safety and security. However, while South Africa is a developing country, its experience with privatisation is unique to the country’s socio-economic and political context. A study by Jones et al. (2009) demonstrated that the political context in the UK and the Netherlands can significantly influence the reform of the police and impose limitations on the degree and scope of privatisation measures, as well as the mechanisms and processes to manage performance. The individualistic tendency of neoliberalism is argued to severely erode the ideal of public good and democratic citizenship (Ellison and Pino, 2012).

Wilson and Gallop (2013) in a discussion of the failure of the privatisation of the UK Forensic Science Service (FSS) underline the issue of appropriateness of specific police services for application of neo-liberal cost-benefit business models given the public service aims of police and forensic services (Budowle, 2011). They highlight growing divergence between the privatised business aims of the FSS and the public service aims of criminal justice which are argued to have ultimately attributed to its failure. This is supported by Corcoran (2014) who highlights that liberalised market techniques and underpinning concepts do not transfer precisely to the public sector context and in particular criminal justice. Although none of these studies provides tangible measures to underpin evaluation this suggests the importance of considering effective market structures and models which are adapted to the public service aims of the police service and criminal justice.

Soederberg et al. (2005) implies that a neoliberal position results in weakening of democratic accountability that can be evidenced in the privatisation of security services. One of the dominant themes arising in the literature concerning police privatisation is accountability (Heath et al, 2009; Albertson, 20014; Rawlins and Kwon, 2015; Rushin, 2012).
3.3.2 Public Choice Theory

Public choice theory is a further theoretical strand within literature that has been associated and debated in relation to privatisation, in turn pointing to issues and challenges in police privatisation. Scholars have noted the role of public choice theory and property rights in influencing the demand for privatisation and the evolution of New Public Management (NPM) (Bel et al., 2010; Alonso et al., 2015).

Public choice theory is an approach that is consistently identified in the literature as a primary argument for privatisation and acceptance by policymakers (Wright, 1993; Gaspariene and Vasauskaite, 2014). A central assumption of public choice theory is that individuals are rational and act according to their self-interests, and are better able to pursue their personal interests more efficiently through market exchanges than through political processes (Gaspariene and Vasauskaite, 2014; Hodge, 2000). Extending this theory to other stakeholders means that likewise government actors are focused on maximising budgets, while politician’s interest are directed towards maximising votes or political legitimacy (Hodge, 2000).

One central argument is that the withdrawal of the state and transfer of services to the private sector can result in significant cost benefits from improved efficiencies (Alonso et al., 2013). However, in the absence of strong empirical evidence supporting it, the premise that a transfer of services to the private sector can result in such immediate financial benefits is contestable. Moreover, this assumes the presence of an efficient private sector with established systems, structures, processes and expertise. The UAE is a developing country and while the government promotes excellence in the public sector, there are serious questions regarding the state of the private sector. In addition, the companies that have been licensed represent newly formed corporations that have emerged in response to the opportunity.

Somewhat paradoxically, while the deregulation and the minimisation of regulation and the associated costs are a key rationale under public choice theory, this review has identified theoretical support for the role of regulation.
Thus the implication is that while this study accepts the role of regulation, implicitly there are important questions concerning what areas should be regulated as a matter of priority and to what degree those areas should be regulated. The debate in the literature points to the importance of achieving a balance on this issue. Hodge (2000) acknowledges a limitation of public choice theory on the basis that economic motivations are not the sole primary factor. Therefore a policy that places emphasis on market efficiencies as the basis for achieving society’s goals fails to account for broader contextual factors. The lack of empirical evidence in support of the assumptions of public choice theory underscores the need to adopt a broader perspective in assessing the success of private security in the UAE.

### 3.3.3 Agency Theory

Agency theory is based on the assumption that ownership is separate from control and management of the company. Agents are contracted to act to deliver services for reward. However, the possibility of diverging interests is acknowledged that underscores the importance of monitoring due to the principle of the agent’s activities (Loveday, 2015, Hodge, 2000). In the UAE private security companies are licensed by the government. While the government have no financial stake or ownership of the private security companies a principal-agent perspective can be applied. The government contracts the private security companies to deliver security services. In line with agency theory, private companies through their agents can potentially behave in opportunistic ways according to their interests. This theory thus emphasises the need for monitoring with the implication that monitoring costs can increase.

### 3.3.4 Managerialism/New Public Management

The principles of public choice theory and institutional economics have influenced a new public management theory. The implication of this perspective is in the quantification and measurement by objectives that emphasises cost reduction, profits and revenue maximisation (Laegreid and Christensen Hodge, 2000; Ellison and Pino, 2012). A key underlying tenet is
that strong management can contribute to the achievement of economic and social goals. This theoretical perspective is evident in the UAE’s government in the increasing trend towards privatisation of police services based on management solutions.

The contrasting security perspectives, standards and performance criteria between public and private bodies that are evidenced is potentially problematic in terms of service delivery and public satisfaction (Minnaar and Mistry, 2004). Albertson (2014) suggests that contract terms should aim to reflect qualitative social goals rather than simplistic performance targets which are inappropriate for the complex social aims of criminal justice systems. Contract performance targets are acknowledged as generally crude and frequently leading to inefficiency and corruption pressures where social interests become secondary to the achieving of precise targets. Quantitative performance measures and payment by results are argued to not necessarily align with improved quality for the public good. However the study fails to outline what qualitative measures may be used or in what areas of criminal justice. In evaluating privatisation a challenge emphasised by Jones et al., (2009) relates to the fact that many aspects of police work and justice are unquantifiable. Evidence from the Netherlands is highlighted to show that quantitative and simple measures are increasingly perceived by public and policy-makers as inadequate for addressing social aims.

Another difficulty pertains to the nature of policing itself emphasising qualitative aims and goals often related to social priorities. In what way these aspects can be embedded and evaluated in service contracts, frequently characterised by quantitative targets and simplistic indicators such as payment by results, represents a significant challenge for police forces (Albertson, 2014; Sukhram, 2015). Sukram (2015) emphasises drawbacks with the payment by results (PBR) model for evaluating the success of privatisation of policing and justice services, pointing to the potential to distort incentives for service providers. The example is given of the probation service in which PBR could promote “cherry-picking” of those offenders most readily rehabilitated and inhibit working with recidivist and more difficult offenders. This suggests
that unconsidered adoption of private sector performance management measures may not be entirely compatible with the social goals of public services. Therefore understanding the meaning of service quality in the privatised policing context, the relevance of different criteria and the degree to which similar service criteria apply (Teicher et al., 2002) is therefore a significant issue which this study seeks to address within a framework for evaluation.

3.4 Privatisation of the Police

The privatisation of police services has been a significant focus of discussion and some empirical study in the literature. Key themes have centred on explaining the growing pervasion of private security in society, and the implications for policing governance and accountability and models of social control. Theories and findings from earlier privatisation literature provide key insights into changing models of policing governance and the accountability and legitimacy of private security that can inform understanding of policing privatisation issues and dimensions for evaluation. Based on empirical findings from Canada, Shearing and Stenning (1979; 1981) introduce a widely accepted explanation for the growth of private security, pointing to profound changes in property relations in the latter part of the 20th century as responsible for the growth of private security use and the unprecedented expansion of private security activities into public spaces. They identified the widespread emergence of a specific form of place referred to as “mass private property”, extensive sections of private property used as public spaces such as shopping complexes, gated communities, airports and industrial parks. Landlords of these properties were highlighted to have the legal right to control access and behaviour within their boundaries and to employ private security to do so, an approach likened to a “new feudalism” (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, p.16) and suggested to drive both a latent and actualised demand for increased use of private security. This was increased further by the perception that the needs of privately owned public spaces were not being met by public police (Shearing and Stenning, 1983).
The implications of irrevocable changes in the policing and security landscape has given rise to key underpinning theories and ideas in relation to police privatisation and governance. Shearing and Stenning (1985) contend that the ceding of large areas of public space previously under state control to the private sector has significant implication in terms of eroding assumed state monopoly over policing. This is because private security operating on mass private property is emphasised to enjoy an independence and authority far exceeding that given to public police, derived from the ordinary powers of private property owners to control access and behaviour on their property. Powers can extend as far as insistence on submitting to random searches of property or persons as a condition of entry or exit, the surrender of property, the provision of detailed personal information and constant visual or electronic surveillance while on the premises (Shearing and Stenning, 1983)

According to Johnston and Shearing (2003) the privatisation and pluralisation of policing has changed governance arrangements for security introducing a more distributed and dispersed form of governance. Drawing on core concepts of governance theory, including institutions, knowledge, resources, attitudes and practices it is suggested that citizens daily move in between different geographical spaces or nodes populated by both public and private sector institutions and experiencing diverse security regimes characterised by public and private providers, practices, and knowledge. The model explicitly diverges from the state-centric analyses of security and governance to conceptualise the post-monopoly security landscape (Johnston and Shearing, 2003).

Examining the observable shift away from monopoly models of state policing Loader and Walker (2001) provide insight into governance in a changing security landscape. It is contended that the state should remain a central actor in regulating and delivering policing while emerging as one actor among others in a pluralisation of policing forms. According to Loader (1997) it is impossible to completely depoliticise policing and transfer it to the market as it contains elements of compulsion that citizens are unable to “contract out” from and which raise issues of authority and legitimacy.
Key literature has also pointed to potential issues in governance and identified critical principles to underpin the reshaping of governance in new policing contexts. South (1987) emphasises the profit motive in private policing viewed to drive the order and social control promoted by corporations. Thus the strategies that emerge are argued to be more instrumental than morally based with questionable practices within the industry viewed as likely to be widespread (South, 1988). Spitzer and Scull (1977) further underline that profit motives are at the core of many key principals influencing security work.

Responding to these issues Loader (1997) argues that security is normatively perceived as a social good, and this should be the criteria under which security is regulated and distributed, underlining a reconfiguration of security provision that prioritises issues of equity and democratic principles. Loader (1997) highlights the potential in the commodification of security provision for inequitable distribution of security in terms of class and those able to pay for extra protection and those not able. One implication is potential resentment towards paying for public policing through taxation in addition to paying for private security. Loader and Walker (2006) thus contend that governance of the private security sector should be anchored by the state in the public interest.

Spitzer (1987) provides a Marxist perspective that points to the dangers of police privatisation if issues of equity and distribution are not considered. The privatisation of policing is accepted to have occurred under overarching and continuing state governance and control however this is not accepted as a social good but rather perceived as evidence of ongoing exploitative alliance between state and private sector that promotes selective policing biased towards power and wealth. Police privatisation is thus viewed as an enlargement of state control serving capital interests.

The literature has further considered the overall legitimacy of private security in the context of widespread growth and police privatisation. Loader and Walker (2007) point to potential issues in relation to public perception of the legitimacy of private security, highlighting that private security enjoys very little
of the cultural support and attachment, symbolic power or legitimacy enjoyed by the police and deeply embedded in political norms. It is argued that ‘the logic of market allocation offends against the social meanings that have come to be attached to security in liberal democracies’ (Loader, 1997, p.381). This is suggested to account for the investment made by the sector in legitimation activities such as incorporating former members of the police.

South (1985) in contrast provides key insights into the locus of legitimacy for private policing that is viewed not to detract from the legitimacy of the state. A core aspect is the focus on the protection of private property and the prevention of crime that are generally considered as serving the social good. As such it is argued that private security can claim some authority in terms of operating as private police with legitimacy accruing through the link with the legitimate protection of private property including mass private property such as shopping centres. Added to this is forbearance and tacit approval of the state for private security initiatives frequently as a result of financial concerns which over time is viewed to establish a de facto legitimacy for private security activities (South, 1985). South (1985) underlines however that ultimately the state acts through private security, considering that private security legitimacy is founded within state frameworks of legality, rather than “giving way” to it. However the implications of private policing on civil liberties are highlighted and a perceived need for enhancing regulatory controls through legislation and market and self-regulation is emphasised (South, 1989).

Early literature has also identified forms of social controls that can be applied within governance frameworks for private security. Loader (1997) argues the need for democratic forms of supervision and control of the private security sector that emphasise transparency and legitimate public interest in contract terms, award processes, service delivery and appropriateness of service privatisation. Public licensing and accreditation is further highlighted as a necessary condition for enabling the pluralisation of policing that supports the social good (Loader, 1997).
3.5 Accountability

The issue of accountability has been identified as particularly critical and a matter of high priority. Accountability is widely acknowledged as a fundamental principle of democratic societies and relates to the burden of responsibility borne by a civil servant for their actions and performance both individually and at an agency level. In relation to the police this implies that police forces are accountable for their crime control and law enforcement performance in addition to other service aspects and on an individual level officers have accountability for their behaviour relating to respectfulness, lawfulness and equity (National Institute of Justice, 1999).

Although public police services are strongly regulated with clear lines of accountability (Forst, 2000), many studies have highlighted critical failings to adequately regulate the private sector and determine and resolve questions around accountability (Bradley and Sedgwick, 2009; Brunger, 2012; Rushin, 2012; Zhong and Grabosky, 2009). One area of debate on accountability issues adopts an organisational perspective related to the inherent distinctions between public and private bodies. Rogers and Gravelle (2012) provide a comprehensive example of the problem arising from these differences. Private police organisations are categorised as traditional institutions that possess an inward focus towards efficiency and profit maximisation. The implication is that social goals and values may not fall within the scope of private institutions and undermines the emphasis on accountability and transparency. This is consistent with an emerging institutional perspective that emphasises the cultural distinctions between different types of organisations. Friedland and Alford (1985) point to organisational distinctions in terms of structures and patterns of behaviour, and beliefs and goals. They encompass this within the notion of institutional logics. While public policing is influenced by democratic, social and participatory logics, private policing is connected to capital logic. Private police are more concerned with the protection of private assets and prevention of crime (Rushin, 2012).
According to Rushin (2012), “understanding these differences in institutional logics is vital to making effective regulatory recommendations” (p170). However, the magnitude of this distinction is emphasised by the wide array of cultural factors that can lead to significant differences between public and private policing accountability processes. Furthermore, in the same way that contradictory practices can be evidenced between public and private police institutions, there is a significant potential for diverging practices between national cultures. This underlines the significance of this study in understanding such differences within Arabic culture, and the political and social systems of the UAE. This perspective is significant because it can provide insight into the prevalence of a range of accountability issues. Rogers and Gravelle (2012) provide several examples of failings in accountability in private policing that remain unaddressed. For instance, unlike public police organisations which are responsive to public accountability, private organisations are less likely to have established procedures to redress misconduct or standards for public engagement. This highlights issues in organisational design and culture in privatising policing that potentially undermine public engagement and transparency. This establishes the strong validity of a broad range of normative recommendations to address accountability in private policing and provide criteria for evaluating the accountability dimension in the UAE programme. Rushin (2012) proposes a number of recommendations for the regulation of private policing including accountability measures.

### 3.5.1 Dimensions of Accountability

Dixon (2000) and Rushin (2012) attempted to conceptualise dimensions of accountability and two resulting models are discussed hereby in the field of policing. Dixon’s (2000) initial case study analysis on South Africa aims to highlight the importance of accountability for both police performance relating to, for instance, the delivery of services and conduct to address police behaviour and discipline. Focusing on questions of whether and how police are accountable, Dixon (2000) identifies four dimensions: accountability
content dimension; accountability direction dimension; accountability mode dimension and accountability mechanism dimension.

In contrast to Dixon's (2000) broad classification, Rushin (2012) contributes three specific dimensions focused on: democratic accountability; after-the-fact accountability for redress; and managerial oversight. Notably there are significant overlaps and both combined provide useful insights into the types of issue to address. The work of Rushin (2012) offers a significant starting point drawing on the identification of numerous gaps in regulation arising from a robust methodological approach using content analysis of 50 state laws and coding of provisions within the statutes to develop an aggregated analysis. Rushin (2012) advances a range of recommendations for the regulation of private policing including accountability measures.

Democratic accountability is concerned with transparency regulations. In the US this dimension was found to be significantly lacking (Rushin, 2012) and is consistent with Sukram's (2012) analysis of the UK context. Sukram (2015) points to a specific need for the publication of clear financial accounts to identify private company revenues and profits from public sector work. Bradley and Sedgewick (2009) further highlight the importance of reporting requirements and accurate measurement systems as part of an adequate system of regulation.

The second dimension of accountability regulation proposed by Rushin (2012) is concerned with after-the-fact redress, in which the organisation is subject to penalties if laws or rules are infringed. There is support for this recommendation from other sources in the literature. A similar criteria is suggested by Rogers and Gravelle (2012) who emphasise the need to identify and institute appropriate channels for complaint and redress for citizens. Juska (2009) showed that lack of procedures to address citizen grievances from actions committed by private security providers in addition to lack of definition and communication to citizens were found to be significant shortcomings within Lithuanian regulation of private policing.
The third dimension of accountability proposed is managerial oversight involving ongoing monitoring and re-evaluation (Rushin, 2012). Findings from Rushin (2012) demonstrated a requirement for managerial oversight and democratic accountability that incorporates several measures: extensive and thorough reporting requirements; compulsory in-service training for senior managers; effective supervision of workers; and the formation of independent regulatory agencies for inspection and monitoring.

Dixon (2010) constructs this dimension around two main issues: the first is related to what actions and decision the police should be accountable for, and the second to the nature of the delegated powers they exercise. Compared to Rushin (2012), Dixon (2010) defines specific aspects of accountability in terms of police actions that can be evaluated. The main actions and decisions are related to the police responsibility for preventing, combating and investigating crime, maintaining public order, protecting people and property and upholding and enforcing the law. The police need to be accountable for the ways they exercise their power to use force. Dixon (2010) explains that in the South African police case their capacity and authority to use force should exclude them from impinging on people's constitutional rights. Post-apartheid goals were to develop a genuine democratic policing system in which police services are being provided effectively to community members. The new policing system implies equity, justice and minimal freedom violations. In this situation accountability represents not only how police act within the legal system but also whether they respect equity principals and treat people with respect and dignity (Dixon, 2010).

The direction dimension refers to whom police should report their actions. In doing that, Dixon (2000) distinguishes between the “ultimate source of police authority and general direction, in which accountability for its use must flow, and immediate relations of accountability, where police are involved” (Dixon, 2000, p.73). The responsibilities of police officers may differ greatly from one context to another. The general direction in a democratic system indicates that the police are accountable to the people over whom they exercise their capacity and authority to use force. Dixon (2000) further underlines that in
South Africa police efficiency is overseen by an institutional framework. This implies that the chains that link the police to other institutions and individuals are also important. Nevertheless, as the author points out, no matter if general or immediate relations are inferred, the ultimate goal is to serve the public interest as a whole and not those of specific groups.

This dimension reflects the kind of account the police have to provide and what it suggests about the relationship between the police and those to whom it must be provided (Dixon, 2000). The author identifies two types of accountability: directive relation based on hierarchical levels of superiority or subordination; and a second type of accountability relations, known as stewardship based on non-hierarchical relationship between parties. This means that the involved parties have approximately equal status and no direct authority over one another. However according to Dixon (2000), in this relationship for the police there remains a duty to report, and explain and justify decisions and action taken. The implication of this form of accountability from an assessment perspective of private security, is concerned with understanding the direction and extent to which private security companies are held accountable and to whom they report their actions to and the structures and processes.

### 3.5.2 Accountability in Private Security

The debate surrounding private policing discusses the effectiveness of private policing in relation to accountability systems and the degree to which private police are held accountable. The accountability issue raises a central question concerning how private firms will be held to account and they provide a focus for assessing the structure and practices of private policing in the UAE. In spite of these questions there is no consensus found in the literature on accountability measures and a lack of contribution in terms of a comprehensive framework or model for managing accountability in police privatisation programmes.

Although public police services are strongly regulated with clear lines of accountability (Forst, 2000) many studies have highlighted critical failings to
adequately regulate the private sector and determine and resolve questions around accountability (Bradley and Sedgwick, 2009; Brunger, 2012; Rushin, 2012; Zhong and Grabosky, 2009). Bradley and Sedgwick (2009) point to a conceptual lag between the current growth in private sector policing and perceptions which disproportionately focus on public police leading to a lack of recognition for the need to regulate and define accountability for the private sector.

The accountability issues are according Rushin (2012) significantly misunderstood and constitute a major threat to policing. He undertakes an in-depth and systematic evaluation that employs descriptive observational study of legal and regulatory issues in the United States. His analysis identified “serious concerns about accountability and regulation” (p160). It appears that even in a country where there has been a long history of police privatisation and where private police outnumber public police, regulation is a largely understudied area and there is a lack of an appropriate level of legislation and regulation (Rushin, 2012). While the findings relate to the regulation of private police in the legislation of the United States, the privatisation of police functions has been a common practice for several decades. Additionally, this study represents one of the most extensive and comprehensive evaluations of the regulation of private policing.

3.6 Accountability Mechanisms

The literature indicates that the attainment of the vision and goals of private and public police organisations is contingent on addressing accountability dimensions through a combination of external and internal accountability mechanisms. External and internal accountability mechanisms provide a further perspective for understanding the different form of controls that be applied to assess private security. The work of Lopes’ (2015) analytical modeling describes the influence of five forms of external control: trade associations, the customer, state regulation, judiciary branch and media. These external factors form an institutional environment which constrains companies to structure and align their internal control system with the public
norms. These dimensions are consistent with other studies which are identified under different labels.

3.6.1 External Accountability Mechanisms

3.6.1.1 Legal Mechanisms

Legal mechanisms imply formal legislation and regulation. Through these mechanisms the police are held accountable for their actions by courts and other bodies charged with adjudication and investigation of allegations of officers’ misconduct. These systems of accountability can be mandated by robust legislation and regulation (Robertson, 2008; Cooper 2012; Rushin 2012). Criminal and civil litigation are two areas of law addressing crime and legal punishment and the legal disputes between individuals and companies (Davis et al., 2003). This form of control imposes costs for private security companies for breaches in relation to recruitment and the conduct of their employees.

An examination of legal mechanisms in different police contexts around the world provide insights into different models of implementation and issues. In South Africa the Independent Complaints Directorate represent one example of institutional mechanism within the Police Service but due to low resources it is incapable to investigate all allegations of misconduct. In South Africa the Constitution through the Bill of Rights protects individuals and the administration of justice (Dixon, 2000). However the potential for holding the police to account before the civil courts has experienced limited exploration (Dixon, 2000). The weaknesses of this mechanism can be evidenced in the Johannesburg case which found that the effectiveness of the mechanism can be constrained due to two main reasons: firstly if legal remedies functions are underdeveloped and second, reluctance by the public to initiate actions for fear of police retribution. In one case against a major private security company only one civil claim and one criminal claim have been lodged in 12 years of the company’s history (Davis et al, 2003).
In Mexico police civil suits failed because frequently the potential lawsuits were settled before they were brought to court. New York has the most successful accountability mechanism as only three lawsuits have ever been filed (Davis et al, 2003). In Brazil, judicial controls have been introduced to hold companies liable to fines and prosecution while regulatory measures can impose further mandatory or self-controls (Lopes, 2015).

In Brazil’s case, external control by the judiciary was found to be ineffective due to certain limitations. Lopes (2015) notes that this type of control depends largely on a society’s rights awareness, the credibility of the judiciary and the litigants’ capacity to pay lawyers and produce evidence. For one of the two case-studies, judicial control was called upon for compensations for damages while in the other case for misconduct. Conversely, when the remuneration is lower than expected, there is a low structuring and alignment to public rules (Lopes, 2015).

The concept of regulation emerges in the literature as a primary mechanism for achieving control and the goals of privatisation measures. At one level this thesis is concerned with the effectiveness of the existing regulatory framework of private security in the UAE.

The significance of regulation is emphasised consistently in the literature to ensure clear definition of the roles of public and private policing. This is indicated to be important to avoid situations in which private sector services are perceived as simply extensions of public services and not regulated accordingly (Rushin, 2012; Hodge, 2000). Findings show that ad-hoc and rapid expansion of the private policing and security sector can lead to an under-regulated and highly unaccountable industry perceived as extensions of police forces rather than private corporations (Juska, 2009).

In the UK context Rogers and Gravelle (2012) asserts a degree of latitude for abuse of powers by private policing suggesting that adequate regulation is important for accountability and legitimacy. Although not outlining what form this may take, they suggest that comparable robust accountability procedures
to public police should be in place for the private sector. This is supported by Robertson (2008) who argues that individuals should be protected from abuse of powers by private non-state police actors in the same way as they are from public forces. The risks of non-regulation are exemplified by U.S evidence. Rushin (2012) found that regulation in the US tended to target limited categories of private police while leaving a significant proportion of the private policing sector unregulated.

Additionally, Cooper (2011) argues that the uncertain legal status of private policing in the U.S contributes to significant potential for violating constitutional protections where private police practices utilise evidence gathering methods not legally available to public policing. This underscores the significance of closely defining private sector legal status and accountability in privatised initiatives. Moreover, defining precise and specific regulation obviates any need to interpret regulations and inhibits organisational mediation (Rushin, 2012). It is argued that an effective and efficiently functioning regulatory structure reduces the level of regulatory uncertainty and risk (Burton, 1997; Minnaar and Mistry, 2004). In a study focusing on the widespread development of private security services in post-Communist Lithuania, Juska (2009) points to the significance of adequately developed legal frameworks in which procedural and institutional safeguards are robust. In particular it is argued that laws need to define when and what conditions pertain for the actions of private sector security and police providers to go beyond legal authority and become illegal.

A review of four countries reveals that while government regulation and policies are significant to the creation of an accountability climate they are applied in different forms in the regulation of private security sectors in Johannesburg, Mexico City, New York and Spain. Across these countries a range of mechanisms are implemented including licensing, insurance requirements, training standards and registration requirements (Davis et al. 2003).
In South Africa, specific legislation in the form of the Security Officers Act focuses on regulating security personnel. The Security Board Authority is mandated to oversee the regulation of all security officers and utilises a range of mechanisms to execute its responsibilities including company registration, owners and security guards and application screening. Minimum training conditions and standards, and also the oversight and investigation of misconduct, are assured through regulation. While there is no evidence on the effectiveness of this approach Davis et al (2003) found that the Security Board was nevertheless active in enforcing the regulations by charging nearly 1,400 personnel and companies for breaches, resulting in 713 summons over a 1 year period.

In contrast, the Mexican system was found to rarely result in criminal proceedings or even dismissals of security guards. While the legislation has been passed the responsibility for monitoring and oversight is assigned to the Ministry of Public Security. In effect this form of self-regulation, where the police are regulated to monitor their conduct may account for the low level of abuses and complaints that are upheld. For instance, misconduct and malfeasance are investigated by a board formed by police officers who may be unwilling to order disciplinary actions against fellow officers. Moreover, the accountability scheme fails to address clients, which have a strong interest in ensuring that police officers are honest, effective and respectful in dealing with members of the public (Davis et al, 2003).

The approach in New York’s state-led regulatory regime is distinctive in two ways from Mexico and Johannesburg. First, responsibility for regulating security is devolved to local government compared to the centralised model in Johannesburg and Mexico. Arguably this provides a level of flexibility and local contextualisation according to the issues and characteristics of the particular security industry. Secondly, local regulation addresses the status given to security officers. This status is obtainable through special training and licensing which exceeds minimum police officer’s standards and gives to the locally termed “peace officers” not only extra enforcement powers by the state government but also more accountability for their actions (Davis et al., 2003).
Gimenez-Salinas (2004) evidence an alternative model in Spain that combines private and public actors in the security industry within an integrated regulatory model. In order to avoid misinterpretations between service and security functions, all the permitted activities of the private sector are defined by the law. In order to obtain better efficiency and to improve accountability, the private security sector was reformed (Gimenez-Salinas, 2004). The reforms include two major elements: first, a broader redefinition of the sanction which includes illegal activities from the standpoint of corporation, personal and user and second, the reorganisation and enlargement of the control administration staff. Moreover, regulations (such as art. 137) obligate corporations to write trimester reports about performed activities, corporation accounts and certificated of validity of civil responsibility insurance. Through regulations (see Articles 143 and 144 of the LPS (RPS)) registration books that contain information about personnel, contracts signed, security measures and communications to the police forces were also imposed.

The 1992 Spanish law on private security companies’ regulation introduces crucial stipulations concerning the separation and defining relations between public and private security, in particular it provides for the creation of implementation mechanisms regarding the complementary status notion (Gimenez-salinas, 2007). The mixed commissions of coordination were instituted for the purpose of promoting and developing official and enduring cooperation and relationships between public and private security agencies (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

The case of Brazil indicates the challenge of the form of external pressure exercised by State. Firstly in terms of the state capacity to enforce these regulations (Lopez, 2015), and secondly, accountability focused solely on security personnel which are held accountable for illicit acts, but not the security companies, which are held accountable for very few misbehaviour cases. Consequently, when considering state pressure there are low incentives for alignment with public norms, as in the case of civil rights violations for which there are no costs imposed by the police, and fines
existing only for strictly regulated cases such as where security guards are caught without uniform (Lopes, 2015).

3.6.1.2 Self-regulation in Private Security

Self-regulation is a form of internal accountability mechanism that controls the officer’s behaviours. Under Lopes’ (2015) model this form of self-regulation through industry associations is classified as an external control mechanism as industry and professional associations are external entities that collectively can impose codes of conduct that can be adopted by member companies.

Self-regulation is applied differently across countries. In Spain, the rigid controls imposed on the private security industry by the law raised concerns within this fast-growing sector, but also allowed the industry to argue in favour of more flexible regulations or even self-regulation once they could demonstrate they had reached the required standards, and to introduce reforms in their administrative accountability (Gimenez-salinas, 2007). The South African model represents an effective type of self-regulation mechanism that is achieved through supervision of the personal activities (random checks, monthly meetings), punishments and rewards and internal company policies (internal controls, complaints investigation and monthly standards verification). Moreover, in order to undertake rapid action against guards involved in inappropriated behaviour, checks are made at the beginning and end of each shift (Officers check, guns, vehicles and ammunitions). In Mexico, internal requirements and guidelines involve activities such as: supervisory duties, establishment of a central administration officer, negotiations of strategies and policies in order to prevent future assaults and robberies and minimum hiring standards (Davis et al., 2003).

In Brazil, Lopes (2015) identified self-regulation in the form of trade associations that operated in two ways. Firstly, trade associations can pressure and provoke members to develop internal control systems. The second mechanism is through development by stimulating alignment behavior to the norms through awards, certification or disciplinary processes. Davis et al., (2003) identified four separate internal accountability mechanisms that
control New York officer behaviours: annual examination, performance based remuneration, close workplace monitoring and complaints investigation. In Spain’s situation, self-regulation implies the following: strict conditions for private security personnel; creation of an intermediary administration position between police administration and private sector; personnel and qualification standards control, limitation of the private security personnel functions; exposing abuses and the guarantee of equity standards and common good.

The relative effectiveness of external control various significantly. Based on Lopes’ (2015) findings trade associations have the limitation of being formed on a voluntary basis and, therefore, its pressure will act only upon the members. Findings in Brazil suggest that it may be a weak form of pressure due to the low representativeness of the security firms in trade organisations. Thus, in assessing its importance there should be understanding of the limitations existing in trade associations’ regulations and representativeness (Lopes, 2015)

3.6.1.3 Public Mechanisms

This form of accountability make the police directly responsible for their actions and decisions in front of citizens through public mechanisms such as community police forums (Dixon, 2000; UNDOC, 2011).

3.6.1.4 Political Mechanisms

Political mechanisms are introduced to ensure that police activities are monitored and evaluated based on achieving different goals. According to Dixon (2000) those mechanisms rely on the institutions of representative democracy to mediate the relationship between police and people. Further, Dixon (2000) points out that at institutional level the law does not represent an instrument which provides effective control of police decision making. This situation is created due to the open texture of the law and the impossibility of eliminating police discretion.
3.6.1.5 **Professional-managerial mechanisms**

Within professional-managerial mechanisms in order to ensure the accountability of police officers non-political state institutions are invited to play an active role. Their main function is supporting constitutional democracy and upholding basic values and principles governing public administration (Dixon, 2000, UNDOC, 2011). Through this institutional system the principals of good governance are enforced and monitored. In South Africa the managerial mechanism within SAPS was achieved through the implication on another party (civilian chief executive officer) in an attempt to inculcate the organisation with skills and values (Dixon, 2000).

Organic mechanisms are non-institutional mechanisms bringing together citizens and police officials in order to identify community problems and appropriate solutions (Dixon, 2000, UNDOC, 2011).

3.6.1.6 **Market Control**

The literature identifies accountability through the marketplace that is obtained through competition, which encourages individuals and companies to maintain high standards for products or services. Client control is a term that represents another form of market control (Lopes, 2015). Lopes (2015) found this to be the most influential factor. Client control is strongly dependent on the client’s will to remunerate the services accordingly and to companies’ interest in upholding public legitimated values. Contrary to the other external sources client control was found to bring about changes in the internal control systems of the companies. While there is no empirical evidence supporting the relationship between client and other external and internal controls, this view is consistent with public choice theory (Wright, 1993; Gasprenienea and Vasauskaite, 2014). As noted by Bayley (1985, p. 180), the greatest merit of external controls might not be instrumental but, rather, symbolic.

This accountability mechanism may have also a more functional importance, in other words, it could represent the ability to provoke effective management and internal controls (Lopes, 2015) Mexico is a case of ineffective management where the services provided by the state did not satisfy the
population’s needs. As a result of the incapacity of the government to implement and enforce efficient regulations, illegal activities increased dramatically. The market needed to shift the demand and the necessity for the private sector had increased. Spain is another example of accountability delivered through the market. In this country the market need for better services created the necessity of implementing and integrating a Private-Public System (Gimenez-salinas, 2007). This need appeared after a major increase in demand for police services complemented by an increase in unprofessional private companies (Gimenez-salinas, 2007). In New York, marketplace accountability emerged in the form of a board consisting of business owners (Davis et al, 2003) who approve and decide which operations will occur and how. This empowering allows the direct involvement of the clients in the decision making process. Disciplinary measures for misconduct and hiring conditions are established, as well, and only qualified officers are taken into consideration for future employment.

### 3.6.1.7 Media Control

The media as mechanism can exert control through scrutiny and reporting and incur reputational damage (Lopes, 2015). The media, through its pressure, can influence the enforcing of internal controls. Public opinion through the media particularly on social media can generate awareness and information about misconduct, malpractice or injustices of the private security industry that can potentially generate pressure on companies to make internal checks (Davis et al., 2003). Although the media’s role as regards accountability has only occasionally been researched, its positive impact in fostering public police accountability has been evidenced in some in-depth studies (Niederhoffer 1969; Skolnick and McCoy 1985). These insights point to the media’s capacity to foster public appetite for reforms through their reporting on the private security sector’s wrongdoings or quality of service (Davis et al., 2003).

In practice, evidence from Johannesburg and New York indicate the media is not playing an effective role because of the sparse number of publications. In Mexico the articles are not reliable as some of the stories proved to be inaccurate or never to have actually occurred (Davis et al., 2003). In Spain, the
journals focus mainly on the negative reputation of the private sector, considering the irregularities of this sector as episodes of personnel mala praxis (Gimenez-Salinas, 2004). However in recent decades this situation has improved, possibly with the increased transparency and information flow in social networking.

In Brazil, the research shows an indirect effect, acting more as an influencing factor on the client which further influences private security companies (Lopes, 2015). In the case of Brazil, it seems that this factor is restricted to serious cases of misconduct and only when people with high social status are involved. Lopes (2015) found that generally, media proves effective in respect of accountability to the public though ineffective when it comes to imposing internal control.

3.6.1.8 External Control Mechanism in Private Security

These mechanisms are reflected in the various external controls systems for private security that were identified in different countries. The specific elements of these systems and their relative impacts are outlined in the following sections. This is significant in underscoring critical dimensions that can be evaluated and explored in the UAE context in terms of assessing the effectiveness of the UAE private security programme. A review of regulation and regulatory frameworks of private security around the world is undertaken to identify existing practices, issues and concepts. In the following, regulation theory in the context of private security is examined to identify and understand key issues that may require regulation and the type of regulation that this may imply. By combining the case study research by Davis et al (2003) into three American police forces and Gimenez-salinas’s (2004) study of Spain it is possible to gain an account of the regulatory regimes implemented and their impact in regulating private security. Davis et al (2003) evidenced five types of police accountability mechanisms: Government Regulation, Accountability through the Marketplace, Criminal and Civil Litigation, Self-Regulation and Media. This study represents one of the only studies identified providing a cross-country analysis regulatory regimes in private security. The findings from the study were based on a qualitative mixed–method approach adopting
both individual and focus group interviews conducted on-site. Davis et al (2003) sampled a representative cross-section of actors including managers of the private policing firms, private security officers within the firms, local public administrators and clients. Table 3-1 provides a cross-country comparison of the regulatory and control regime applied in the four countries.
### Table 3-1 Cross-Country Summary of Accountability Mechanisms for Private Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country(s): Case scenario</th>
<th>Johannesburg Private Spaces Patrolled by Private Police</th>
<th>Mexico City Private Spaces Patrolled by Public Police</th>
<th>New York Public Spaces Patrolled by Private Police</th>
<th>Spain Integrated Private with Public Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Government Regulation** | • Companies, owners and security guards must be registered;  
     • Screening of applicants;  
     • Minimum training standards;  
     • Regulatory enforcement powers that allow to oversight and investigate misconduct. | • Low efficiency regulations;  
     • Disciplinary board form by police officers;  
     • Accountability scheme leaves out clients;  
     • Monitor police behaviour;  
     • Oversight and investigation of misconduct and malfeasance; | • Regulation is enforced by local government;  
     • Training exceeds minimum standard;  
     • Extra enforcement powers and accountability for officers are obtained through special training and license; | • Integrated Public-Private Security System;  
     • Legislation defines permitted activities;  
     • Better efficiency through sanction redefinition and staff reorganisation;  
     • Written trimester reports;  
     • Registration books are kept. |
| **Accountability through the Marketplace** | • High standards imposed though competition;  
     • Client satisfaction orientation;  
     • Potential risk minimisation. | • Illegal activities increased due to inefficient regulations;  
     • The demand increased the need for police private sector. | • Business owners board approving operations;  
     • Clients involvement in the decision making process;  
     • High hiring conditions;  
     • Defines disciplinary measures for misconduct. | • High demand for better services; |
| **Criminal and Civil Litigation** | • Underdeveloped remedies functions;  
     • Limited actions against police officers imposed by fear. | • Potential lawsuits are settled before they are brought to court. | • Successful accountability due to the scares no offences | NA |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country(s): Case scenario</th>
<th>Johannesburg</th>
<th>Mexico City</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Spaces Patrolled by Private Police</td>
<td>Private Spaces Patrolled by Public Police</td>
<td>Public Spaces Patrolled by Private Police</td>
<td>Integrated Private with Public Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Self-Regulation**      | • Supervision of the personal activities;  
                          • Disciplinary measures and rewards based on officers’ conduct and results;  
                          • Complains investigation;  
                          • Monthly standards verification  
                          • Prevention though officers checks, guns, vehicles and ammunitions. | • Supervision duties;  
                          • Establishment of a central administration officer  
                          • Prevention of assaults and robberies though negotiations of strategies and policies;  
                          • Minimum hiring standards. | • Annual examination;  
                          • Performance based remuneration;  
                          • Closed workplace monitoring;  
                          • Complaints investigation. | • More strict conditions;  
                          • Intermediary administration position between the two sectors;  
                          • Personal and qualification standards control,  
                          • Limitation of the private security personal functions;  
                          • Exposing abuses;  
                          • Guarantee of equity standards and common good. |
| **Media**                | • Ineffective role;  
                          • Sparse publications. | • Most articles based on inaccurate reports;  
                          • Mainly focus on the role of public police contracting security services. | • Minimal coverage;  
                          • Focuses on ways of improving life quality. | • Recently improved reputation of the private sector;  
                          • Irregularities were seen as episodes of personnel *mala praxis*. |
Reviewing Table 3-1, in terms of government regulations the findings indicate that this mechanism is employed in different ways including defining training, minimum training standards, registration, oversight and misconduct. The findings point to the diverse role of government regulation but no significant evidence is indicated regarding their relative effectiveness. The role of the marketplace as an accountability mechanism is evidenced with the focus on the client factor for raising standards and promoting a client-focused approach to private security implementation. In terms of criminal and civil litigation the cases provide no indication of the role of different instruments except that these mechanisms were under-developed. However, civil mechanisms are implied by the threat of civil action that was evidenced. Notably self-regulation is widely adopted in all cases with a wide range of measures implemented through the respective industry bodies.

3.6.2 Internal Control Systems

The different forms of external controls encapsulated in various regulatory mechanisms are designed to apply pressure to shape the internal control systems of private security companies. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5. The term internal controls or internal accountability systems represent organisational level measures that establish a reporting system, conduct and chain of command (UNDOC, 2011; Lopes, 2015).

The significance of assessing organisational culture is underscored by research into motivational dimensions of private security personnel. Research has attempted to elucidate the construction and restoration of self-identity in private security industry personnel; this industry sector has been shown to be a stigmatised and low-status occupation involving social, moral and physical factors scattered in various facets of the staff’s work environment (Hansen Löfstrand et al., 2016; Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999). Insights show that security officers come to terms with the negative perceptions associated with security work through their unofficial, insider occupational culture which validates the work and its raison d’être, and injects value and meaning into it through shared beliefs and standards that strengthen occupational self-esteem. Evidence
showed that multiple strategies are used by security officers to divert the disdain associated with their stigmatised work and to reframe their occupation as positive, needed and important; and these strategies appear to be mostly successful (Hansen Löfstrand et al., 2016).

A recent ethnographic case study has analysed private security officers’ occupational culture in the context of British initiatives aimed at professionalising this sector (Hansen Löfstrand et al., 2016). The data was gathered by accompanying security officers in both night and day shifts, 42 in Sweden and 38 in the UK, and recorded in thoroughly designed field notes and research diaries. In both countries, the sample comprised female and male officers, ethnic minority and majority guards, older and younger workers, as well as a range of security and patrolling experience from 20 years to 20 or more years (Hansen Löfstrand et al., 2016). The examination of the British sample’s demographic profile indicated at both research sites the existence of a hierarchical system based on ethnicity and class, also evidenced in two existing operational cultures. While the majority of those in the field security officers belonged to ethnic minorities, the higher level managers and chief executives of the security companies were white with professional backgrounds (Hansen Löfstrand et al., 2016). Similarly, the Swedish study indicated that front-line security officers had working-class, low-pay occupational backgrounds, in contrast to the company heads and managers’ backgrounds, and showed some degree of racialisation in the over-representation of ethnic minorities in the rank and file of security officers. Although Sweden and the UK have distinct regulations and laws applying to the security industry, as well as socio-political disparities, these two ethnographic studies offer comparable insights (Hansen Löfstrand et al., 2016).

This research places a focus on understanding the organisational accountability factors. Internally three types of control mechanisms were identified: action controls, personnel controls and cultural controls (Lopes, 2015). Action controls characterise the systems and processes for holding officers accountable for their behaviour based on three mechanisms: formation of communications defining acceptable and unacceptable behaviours
supervision and reward and disciplinary measures (Lopes, 2015). Each of these mechanisms was derived from an extensive document analysis process of company documents including manuals, procedures, supervision reports, personnel records and training resources. Personnel controls focus on motivating officers to undertake their duties independently to satisfactory standards. Such controls focus on recruitment and selection processes, training and adequate resourcing for the performance of private policing activities (Lopes, 2015).

**Figure 5** Analytical Model for the Study of the Private Security Company

Source: Lopes (2015, p656)

Cultural control refers to the internalisation of the values and to the incentives for peer control (Lopes, 2015) which, ultimately form the organisational culture. In line with Merchant and Van Der Stede (2007), Lopes (2015) operationalises cultural mechanisms as: codes of conduct (self-control) and team awards (peer control). These issues are consistent with perspectives from the literature stressing that solicitations for input must be sincere and that the processes leading to a decision and the decisions themselves must be fair.
The literature’ stresses that to achieve more positive perceptions of procedural justice it is important to involve staff in decision-making processes by requesting their input (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Donner et al., 2015). Donner et al., (2015) provide insight into specific considerations in organisational decision-making within police forces emphasising just procedural treatment of subordinates on the part of managers and supervisors. In a related field the social impact of defining penalties as a form of control is increasingly been evidenced. Siegel (2016) points to a proposal put forward for privately managed prisons to internalise the social costs of low or minimal prisoner education by linking inmates’ lack of progress towards or achievement of the General Educational Development Test (GED) to financial penalties. It is argued that such a system would significantly benefit released prisoners as well as society in general, whilst enabling the behaviour of private prison providers to be modified with minimal administrative cost (Siegel, 2016).

Ensuring the fulfilment of procedural justice requires the application of impartial procedures, policies and decision-making processes by police administrators, as well as effective staff training in relation to unbiased decision-making methods. Research indicates that any bias in such a system will lower staff perceptions of an organisation’s procedural justice, as it will soon be detected, and that it is critical for individuals not to fear retaliation when expressing their views and concerns to management. This latter point emphasises the crucial significance of openness and genuineness in communications between management and staff (Donner et al., 2015).

Lopes’ (2015) study provides significant insight into characterising and categorising multiple forms of internal accountability systems. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms as yet remains unverified. For instance there was no evidential support of their effectiveness in terms of structuring and alignment of the internal control system. In addition, a specific finding for instance indicated that the desired behaviours communicated through manuals of rules or penalties and awards were not realised. However, the potential impact of such measures can be found in one finding. For instance, for personnel controls even if the requirements for security guards were
minimal they were capable of excluding people with highly deviant personalities. Given this framework is specific to the context of Brazil its application for other contexts needs to be tested. This is exemplified by the central premise of Lopes’ model, that internal control systems must align to public norms and induce the internalisation of the associated principles. Lopes (2015) defines four topological configurations reflecting the degree to which internal controls systems are aligned to public norms.

### 3.7 Public-Private Relationship

The issue of collaboration and co-operation represents a further evaluatory dimension in assessing private policing. This is based on the argument that policing outsourcers should not replace or substitute public police but act complementarily due to their lack of public accountability (Minnaar and Ngoveni, 2004). There is a strong implication of the importance of co-operation. For some the debate has progressed from issues of whether police should outsource services to the challenge of demarcating responsibility and authority between police and private security providers (Minaar and Mistry, 2004).

The relationship between public and private is stressed by Parker and Hartley (2003) who emphasise the importance of maintaining a complex equilibrium between the protection of public and private commercial interests. Further, the remit of security companies is based on maximising value to its shareholders while the central role of policing is driven by national and social goals (Minnaar and Mistry, 2004). Private sector companies are oriented towards outcomes related to business performance and profit while police outcomes are geared towards success in preventing and solving crime, meaning that performance success measures for private sector companies are based on different, commercially-aligned principles (Minnaar and Mistry, 2004). The discussion on the relationship between public police and private security emphasises a symbiotic dimension. A range of benefits, issues and risks are outlined in the following discussion that may point to specific variables that can be evaluated in private security.
3.7.1 Collaboration

Various facets of public private co-operation and collaboration emerge as key elements that characterise the effectiveness of this dynamic. Research has suggested that collaboration, integration and strong trust relationships between police and private service providers are important aspects materially affecting service quality however this can often be problematic due to a lack of strategic relationships and limited interaction (Mawby et al., 2009: Forst, 2000). Several researchers in the strategic management field propound that increasing cooperation across sectors in the pursuit of the public interest has the potential to create added value by combining the capacities of private agencies and public institutions (Argawal et al., 2009; Mahoney et al., 2009). Thus the combination of the public sector’s distinguishing attributes of integrity, as well as social and environmental competence and awareness, with the private sector’s characteristic talents and abilities such as entrepreneurship, innovation, and financial and technological know-how, benefits the public services provided by private agencies (Alonso and Andrews, 2015). This positive view of cooperation was also acknowledged by private security companies, as continued collaboration was found to reinforce their legitimacy (Baker, 2002). It has been pointed out that, as private security providers cooperate with the state and partly derive their legitimacy from it, this type of privatisation need not be regarded as a withdrawal on the part of the state (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007).

However, the complexity of monitoring and the development of effective and genuine working relationships between police agencies and private security companies is affirmed by Benit-Gbaffou (2006). Despite the acknowledged benefits of close cooperation between public and private policing (Noaks, 2008), Juska (2009) draws attention to the need to design clear organisational boundaries into regulatory frameworks in order to avoid accountability issues. The findings from Lithuania show that permeable boundaries between state and private sector organisations led to situations in which public police exercised inadequate oversight over firms and generally shielded them from public accountability. Several themes emerge in the literature that provide
insights into key variables to evaluate in the relationship underlining the effectiveness of private security in the UAE. Moreover, these aspects point to potential criteria for assessing service quality within privatisation.

Noaks (2008) suggests that an important aspect to improve overall service quality and performance is the quality of collaboration and coordination between public and private sector service providers. This premise is supported by Forst (2000) who highlights that significant mutual benefits in terms of intelligence information and expertise-sharing are to be gained from improved coordination and collaboration. Mawby et al., (2009) further point to workforce integration and trustful working relationships as important in an outsourcing context where private service providers are working closely alongside police to deliver former police services. Bradley and Sedgwick (2009) suggest the importance of the establishment of a strategic relationship between police and private sector providers and industry associations. Evidence from the empirical study in New Zealand shows a lack of national strategic relationship leading, where relations existed, to ad hoc and localised arrangements which did little to improve overall service quality. In the context of an empirical study of UK policing of communities two key measures were indicated by Noaks (2008) to have a material effect on the quality of collaboration: explicit acknowledgement by public police forces of the role of private service providers supporting their legitimacy and secondly the establishment of formal channels of communication.

Evidence indicates that linkages between public and private policing can be characterised as cooperative, competitive or co-existent which could provide a foundation for assessment of service quality and public-private relationships (Jones and Newburn, 1998). Co-operative relations are perceived as actively interconnected underlined by a complementary range of service provision with private providers frequently adopting the role of junior partner. Competitive relationships involve increased acrimony and less linkages and complementariness (Jones and Newburn, 1998). Work by Rikagos (1999, 2002, cited in Noaks 2008) points to growing competitive environments in Canada in which private sector firms are increasingly demonstrating rival
positions to public police. Co-existent relations represent limited interaction or interdependence among service providers in which the public and private police are characterised as having distinct and separate services and developments. Jones and Newburn (p106) portray this model as a situation in which state power has diminished and sovereignty has fractured. Public police no longer fulfil a central organising role and independent security services have broken away. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) however acknowledge that while some fracturing has occurred in practice, police continue to hold a centralised position in service provision.

The importance and benefit of co-operation is underlined by evidence from related areas. New capacities were shown to emerge from privatised prisons that were suitably monitored by public representatives and these capabilities were crucial to a continuous system-wide service quality improvement (Cabral et al. 2013). In another case monthly multi-disciplinary meetings take place to discuss patterns of crime and strategies to manage them; they involve the South African Police Service (SAPS), the local administration, private security companies, the Rhodes University Campus Protection Unit, and other stakeholders (Baker, 2002). The existing cooperation between the SAPS and private security companies is seen as a given on the part of the police, who therefore point to the importance of considering how this cooperation is implemented. An internal report indicated that areas of cooperation could extend to many areas including prisoner transport, house alarm response, and the guarding of commercial areas and buildings, as well as the sharing of technical CCTV know-how and of data (Schonteich 1999). While SAPS is dedicated to increasing community policing, working with private security companies is emphasised, and at a local level it was viewed as invaluable support that allows the SAPS to focus on their armed robbery, rape and murder priorities (Baker, 2002).

Local interviews in Grahamstown of private security companies indicated that while specific suspect data was rarely shared, interactions took place both at formal and informal levels and that private providers felt their contributions were appreciated by SAPS and there was a good level of trust (Baker, 2002).
3.7.2 Models of Co-operation

While scholarly forecasts suggested that the institutional dominance of public policing would be reduced by the processes of globalisation, an expansion of public policing has instead been witnessed deriving from novel integrated policy models and networks collaborating on security and policing matters; a convergence of international and national security aspects that has resulted in city spaces being increasingly militarised, and in the growth of the security market, in daily life being securitised (Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014).

A distinctive and innovative policing governance model that suggests novel strategies has been proposed; this networked nodal governance perspective regards policing as a network of interwoven institutions leaving behind the traditional divides between private and public roles, spaces and agencies and cooperating for the purpose of maintaining order (Kempa et al., 1999). The resulting emphasis on policing, as opposed to the police, transforms the provision of security in a regulated web of participatory nodes each and all together having the knowledge, ability and authority to implement policing governance (Shearing, 2001). In such a case, the duty of a policing board would be to supervise the network’s development on the basis of its budgetary powers, investigative competencies, and monitoring authority on policy and regulatory implementation (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

This policing approach has the potential to increase transparency and enhance accountability through public monitoring of policing activities, as well as maintaining the distinction between public and police priorities. Such an approach would be suitable for countries with little to no regulation of the private security sector, with undefined public police security responsibilities, and with unclear boundaries between private and public security providers and their respective policing functions (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

The welfare perspective on policing governance argues against the development of a neo-liberal policing system that implies the unregulated and disorganised co-existence of public and private security agencies. The aim of the welfare policing model, as represented by the Spanish “regulated
intersection model” (Sarre and Prenzler, 2000), is to ensure cooperation and understanding between public and private security agencies through the creation of formal communication systems, and as a result promoting durable collaboration, minimising the possibility of conflict and maximising public benefit, while avoiding the abuses and illicit practices fostered by informal communication mechanisms (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

These communication systems can be severely hindered by the unevenness of the powers held by the two cooperating sides. It has thus been suggested that the police’s powers to license, monitor and discipline private security companies could be transferred to an independent forum (Sarre and Prenzler, 2000). The transferability of a knowledge-brokering function to the public police in the UK context is examined through the ‘Merryville’ case study, as well as the ways in which public police and private security interrelate and how these interconnections operate in a community (Noaks, 2008).

Relations between private and public police agencies have been classified as co-existing, competitive or cooperative (Jones and Newburn, 1998). While competitive relationships imply animosity, contrasting functions and few active links, cooperative relationships involve active connections and complementarity in the provision of services, as well as the position of ‘junior partner’ being generally assumed by the private security agencies. The co-existence model is characterised by the separate and unconnected evolutions in the private and public security sectors; it has been described as a rupture in sovereignty and a reduction in the prevalence of state power (Jones and Newburn, 1998). As a result, security services provision is fractured across a variety of commercial and not-for-profit groups, while the public police do not maintain a centralised coordinating function. The co-existence model contrasts with Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) view of public police as knowledge intermediaries playing a data centralisation and coordination role.

3.7.3 Information Sharing Systems

The relationship between public police and private security is discussed in terms of the sharing of knowledge and data. The UNODC (2014) defines
specific considerations that should be reflected in effective public and private relationships. When deciding to share data with private security companies for the purpose of strengthening societal safety and preventing crime, governments should consider the following steps:

- Detailing for the state and the private security companies what type of data can be retrieved and who has what level of access to these different types of data;
- Reinforcing the sharing of data between private and public security agencies;
- Creating secure data-sharing networks;
- Passing data protection legislation as regards the data received from private security companies;
- Enhancing public police agencies’ internal coordination to improve the data sharing with private security providers;
- Incorporating in private security providers’ codes of conduct regulations on the legitimate and ethical use of data (UNODC, 2014, p145).

Table 3-2 Relevant Crime Prevention Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant information and crimes reported</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meetings and demonstrations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour conflicts</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect identity</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical violence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes reported and investigated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication of suspect vehicles</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication of suspect persons</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery of stolen vehicles</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private personnel collaboration in detentions</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud of public finances</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal entry into Spain</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsification of money and documents</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money laundering</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Intrusismo”</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents and trademarks</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gimenez-salinas (2007, p166).
The co-ordination room enables the centralisation of information originating from private security guards operating nationwide and its utilisation for crime-prevention purposes; it also allows their requests for assistance to receive rapid and precise responses. Table 3-2 provides a listing of the types of relevant information shared between public and private sectors and underscores the importance of coordinating systems. An additional priority for the coordination room team is the development of a geographical database that merges a variety of data from private security providers and returns district-specific crime information. Although not yet fully operational, this data-processing system is already in use for bodyguards and terrorism related data (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

This is in contrast with Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) model which places the police at the centre of a network disseminating data to other organisations involved in community and location supervision and control. The police are thus viewed as risk knowledge professionals coordinating diverse information formats to respond to their own and to external organisations’ risk management requirements, while gathering data from various extrinsic sources to answer their investigative requisites. Although there exist a variety of initiatives aimed at risk monitoring and information-transfer from individuals and organisations to the police, such as community policing, domestic violence reporting and self-protection programmes, this flow of data is hindered by the right to privacy (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).

Although originally designed as a bi-directional data-sharing instrument, in practice the coordination room seems to mostly function uni-directionally, with the public police gathering information from private security providers (Gimenez-salinas, 2007). The Spanish example can become a significant data-collection model, particularly as regards activities and information outside the scope of public policing. Despite the unevenness apparent in the coordination room’s information flow, it remains bi-directional; and while the police acquire information generally hidden behind the right to privacy but provided under the private security companies’ legal obligations, the private security sector can in exchange for the information given become part of the
police’s public security priorities and benefit from the relationship (Gimenez-salinas, 2007). The coordination room is acknowledged as an effective tool allowing the police to gather, categorise and process operational information which is then disseminated in suitable formats (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).

The continuous relationship between public police forces and private security providers has resulted in the recent establishment of an integrated private/public coordination room. This novel operational tool is responsible for gathering, analysing and sharing policing information between the two sectors. In particular, it was envisaged to allow nation-wide private security companies to share operational crime and incident information with the public police, while integrating them in local crime prevention strategies. The most requested services by the public police forces included stolen vehicle checks and recovery, data on labour conflicts, information on searched suspects, and information on assistance requested by private security staff (Gimenez-salinas, 2007). While the most requested services by private security staff included data on organised crime and their procedures, as well as information on sectorial crime developments, requests for most-wanted photos, and information of issues such as new regulations (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

### 3.7.4 Joint Commissions

Evidence also indicated an eagerness towards cooperation with the SAPS on the part of private security companies’ employees, and an expectation of cooperation at the local level (Baker, 2002). In Spain, mixed commissions of coordination were instituted at both central and provincial administrative levels as provided for by law. The central commission is composed of companies’ representatives, organisations compelled to enact their own security, and impacted sector employees; it has a consultative role towards the Ministry of the Interior and is responsible for advancing public/private collaboration on security matters. Provincial commissions have a similar composition and may also include local political representatives (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

The commissions’ functions as regards promoting private/public security collaboration include:
• Recommending general development, application and coordination standards to the Ministry as concerns the private security law;

• Sharing sectorial experience within the commission and devising novel crime-fighting proposals in the private security field;

• Clarifying the security measures' implementation standards provided for in the law;

• Keeping abreast of and explaining technological innovations within the industry in view of updating current security systems;

• Suggesting cooperation standards between police forces and private security companies and their staff;

• Informing their zones of responsibility concerning crime prevention strategies;

• Examining and assessing private security staff training;

• Proposing private security legislation to the various organisations represented within the commission (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

The establishment of mixed commissions was aimed at fostering information sharing between the public and private sectors. Police decentralisation in Spain and the autonomy of the local police forces however resulted in reduced powers and decreased information sharing, and in turn affected the resolve to increase information gathering on security matters from the private sector. It is crucial for the police administration to continuously receive information on private activities, from which they would otherwise be excluded and which are strongly interrelated with public security (Gimenez-salinas, 2007).

3.7.5 Risk Dimensions

Risk in the public sector is acknowledged as more complex than in the private sector (Sundakov and Yeabsley, 1999). This is because the outcomes of risk-taking can entail significant consequences for citizens (Dobell 1989) while the additional dimension of public scrutiny means that there is less margin for failure (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). A range of risks in relation to privatisation initiatives have been identified in the literature including reputational, financial, regulatory, litigation and performance.
Regulatory risk emerges from the disposition of regulatory practices and rules in relation to privatisation. Rules determine the extent of intrinsic risk through establishing a basis for the degree of discretion within regulatory interventions. In more rule-based regimes the possibility for regulatory discretion is lowered (Schwartz, 2003). Regulation entails the maintenance of a complex equilibrium between the protection of consumer interests, those of investors in the private sector and competitor needs (Parker and Hartley, 2003). However an effective and efficiently functioning regulatory structure is acknowledged to reduce the level of regulatory uncertainty and risk (Burton, 1997).

The major potential danger of taking part in collaborative partnerships is argued to be the potential favouring of some private security clients and providers over others which is acknowledged to possibly undermine police impartiality and independence. More minor risks of public/private partnerships include imbalances in capacities and training, inadequate data sharing, and dissatisfaction over the recognition of failures and successes (Sarre and Prenzler, 2000). In some cases Wakefield (2003) finds that formal communication mechanisms between the private and public police were absent and the minimal contact between the two sectors mostly involved complaints. His evidence indicated that public police refused the possibility of collaborating with the local private security provider, in contrast to the theoretical discussions on public/private partnerships (Wakefield, 2003). In another case this rejection together with a negative view of alternative security providers was apparent in the exclusion of local private security companies from the planning of the community safety strategy, notwithstanding the promotion of partnerships across criminal justice agencies aimed at addressing community crime (Noaks, 2008). This finding is in agreement with Hauber et al.’s (1996) insights about the effects of novel social control institutions in the Netherlands. This analysis emphasises a further range of variables in relationship to representations, structures and relationships that can inform the evaluation of private security. The findings of Gimenez-salinas (2007) point to the economic benefit of public private co-operation. A change in government policy in Spain towards this focus is encapsulated in the Law of Private Security that covers all areas of private security including coordinating
systems. A change in policy toward flexible regulation for instance was found to increase the growth of the private security sector, a key political and economic objective. The significance of the country cases discussed so far is the configuration of systems according to the country political and national context. The case of Spain indicates for example exploration of the regulatory framework that had the potential to be adapted according to the different priorities. This emphasises the importance of a comprehensive assessment framework that addresses changing contexts and priorities and continuous improvement in an evolving sector.

A successful coordinated approach requires more than the establishment of local teams; local residents’ perspectives, as well as assessments of the approach’s effectiveness as also crucial (Noaks, 2008). Maximising public benefit requires the regulation of overlap between functions to avoid misuse of resources and bar misconduct (Sarre and Prenzler, 2000). The principles underpinning private security operations and public policing are inherently incompatible, quite apart from the possibilities of corruption which are particularly evident when moonlighting is allowed (Sarre and Prenzler, 2000).

According to Noaks (2008) there is a widespread misconception about existing private/public collaborations involving a uni-directional sharing of information from the private sector to the public police. Findings from empirical research indicated that, while isolated incidents might be referred to the police, there existed no active partnership (Noaks, 2008). The consequence of neglect of this situation resulted in police receiving fewer and fewer complete accounts of the local crime scene, resulting in reduced police effectiveness and lower public satisfaction. In the context of limited communication between the private and public forces, the rerouting of information towards the private security company was instrumental in the police becoming marginal players in a wide number of local residents’ lives. Consequently, the police’s function as intermediaries in and coordinators of local risk knowledge was diminished (Noaks, 2008). Input from community policing can be a significant foundation and source of legitimacy for the police force’s enforcement functions (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).
This discussion therefore indicates that the management of risk becomes the responsibility of range of agencies, while the public police coordinate risk information and hold a focal organisational function (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).

3.8 Private Security Engagement

This section sets out to explore a range of theoretical perspectives and concepts which can be applied to this study in relation to the engagement of private security personnel with the public. The section introduces the concepts of civic and police engagement and deconstructs these concepts to arrive at a model of police/private security engagement that defines key dimensions and practices underpinning trust in private policing services.

3.8.1 Civic Engagement

The concepts of civic engagement and police engagement are increasingly important concepts in modern policing. Civic engagement is a broad and encompassing term for a range of different activities and practices aimed principally at making a contribution to the wellbeing of society (Adler and Goggin, 2005).

Civic engagement has been variously defined with explanations pointing to multiple perspectives and diverse components (Hay, 2007; Raynes-Goldie and Walker 2008). Diller (2001) provides a broad interpretation defining civic engagement as any activity in which people act together to fulfil their roles as citizens. However definitions are generally less wide-ranging and highlight a number of different aspects constituting civic engagement. Several scholars emphasise a community oriented perspective (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Adler and Goggin, 2005). Civic engagement is defined as “the ways in which citizens participate in the life of a community in order to improve conditions for others or to help shape the community’s future” (Adler and Goggin, 2005). Definitions have further highlighted a collective dimension in which individuals undertake activities collectively to affect civil society (Adler and Goggin, 2005, p.237). Carpini et al., (2004) note that civic engagement can be defined in terms of
participation in public discussion and deliberation. This inclines toward a political aspect, consistent also with Adler and Goggin (2005) who assert that engagement includes elements such as political engagement and social change. Explanations of civic engagement by the United Nations promote a highly active and participatory view. The UN defines civic engagement as “a process, not an event, that closely involves people in the economic, social, cultural and political processes that affect their lives.” (UN, 1993, p.5). They elaborate that civic engagement involves participation in decision-making, eliciting contributions to development and ensuring shared benefits (UN, 2002).

The importance of civic engagement is heightened by the acknowledged decline in public involvement in traditional political institutions over recent decades, particularly among younger generations amid what is perceived as a potential crisis in citizenship (Sloam, 2014; Stoker, 2006). Civic engagement has specific significance in the UAE given the wide diversity of the population of which only 13% are UAE nationals and the remainder expatriates (WPR, 2015). Moreover the UAE has a high proportion of youth with a rapidly growing working age population (Augustine, 2014) subject to structural unemployment (Mansour, 2014). According to Mansour (2014) demographic and employment issues present a significant public policy problem with implications for national security, stability and identity. As a result there is a perceived need to ensure that all sections of the population are civically engaged for the public good.

Civic engagement with the police can create opportunities for meeting and sharing ideas with the community supporting the creation of trust and transparency (MML, 2013). Further engagement can help in the acceptance of policy and project implementations, as opportunities to express concerns and ideas can ensure policing outcomes reflective of the needs and wishes of the community and increase involvement and ownership (MML, 2013). These benefits highlight the importance of civic engagement in the UAE to support the building of trust and acceptance of policing and security activities among diverse population segments. The organisational capacity of police forces also benefits from civic engagement with the ability to utilise civically engaged
people and volunteers to their own advantage (MML, 2013). These arguments can also apply in the context of the private security sector. The UAE has emphasised the importance of this aspect within the police service and has implemented significant initiatives to recruit and train a network of police volunteers as part of community policing activities. Volunteering objectives are aimed at increasing a sense of identity and belonging within the country and the promotion of UAE values (ADP, 2015). Therefore creating channels and mechanisms through which civic engagement can be promoted and encouraged is a significant policy objective for the UAE police, emphasising the need to understand how this can be implemented successfully.

Civic engagement is generally constituted of practices such as information seeking to gain knowledge, the dissemination of information to create awareness, the promotion of dialogue and discussion, participation in community decisions, collaboration and the building of partnerships and alliances (Yang and Bergrud, 2008). These practices are reflected in an online model of civic engagement proposed by Denning (2000) who notes five distinct modes of online civic engagement: information seeking; sharing information; dialogue; co-ordinating actions, and influencing decisions. This model has been used as a basis for classifying online civic engagement in multiple studies (Warren et al., 2014; Waters et al., 2009).

Information seeking is achieved through browsing the internet and social media with the principal aim to be informed. This can frequently involve activities such as collecting information, following links and checking on others (Warren et al., 2014a). Warren et al., (2014a) highlight that such activity can assist those seeking to be civically engaged to connect to the resources available within the community.

The second dimension of information sharing is aimed at disseminating information to generate awareness (Denning, 2000). Evidence shows this frequently includes practices such as posting civic messages, promoting events on social issues, appealing for donations or calling for volunteers
achieved by posting news, links and multimedia content (Warren et al., 2014a; Warren et al., 2014b).

The internet and social media can also be used to generate dialogue, in which the internet is used to hold discussions on issues and build coalitions and communities (Warren et al., 2014a). Often this is achieved by civic engagers through interacting, sharing and conversing online with members or potential members and over time promoting the establishment of communities of followers (Bullock, 2014). For example in the policing context evidence highlights local comment and debate on the occurrence of crime in order to improve situations (Warren et al., 2014a).

Coordinating actions is stated by Denning (2000) as a further dimension of online civic engagement and encompasses activities such as scheduling. Warren et al., (2014b) point to three main coordination practices on social media including planning activities on social issues, inviting constituencies for an issues related event and confirming assistance with others on events in relation to social issues.

The final dimension of affecting decision-making relates to lobbying and advocating to influence decision-makers. This frequently involves disseminating messages to encourage others to take action in some way on social issues and pressure authorities for change (Warren et al., 2014a). Practices expressing this form can include signing online petitions, posting content that reflects a call for change, uploading videos and using social media to complain at or to authorities (Denning 2000; Warren et al., 2014a).

### 3.8.2 Police and Private Security Engagement

In contrast to civic engagement, police and private security engagement is an increasingly significant concept reflecting measures mainly from the police to connect and work with the community and enable citizens to have a voice and participate in policing and security. Under this concept the literature points to key dimensions and measures that constitute police engagement with the public and which can be similarly applied in the case of private security.
Principles of community engagement are increasingly becoming central to policing roles and underpin current approaches towards neighbourhood policing (Lister et al., 2010). Community engagement is argued to involve collaboration and partnership between organisations and communities to mobilise resources and influence systems to address community issues and on some level initiate change (CDC, 2011). Mesko and Tankebe (2014) argue that in the context of pluralised policing evaluation of public views of private security in addition to policing is critical. In the policing context a widely used definition of police engagement with communities is presented by Myhill (2006, pg.19). Police engagement is explained as a process aimed at enabling citizens and communities to participate in policing at a level of their choosing, ranging from providing information and reassurance to empowering citizens to identify and implement solutions to community issues and affect strategic priorities and decisions (Myhill, 2006; Lister et al., 2010; Lloyd and Foster, 2009). This definition is expressed in a typology of police engagement ranging from information and feedback to empowerment as shown in Figure 6 (Myhill, 2006). Based on this model a range of practices constitute police engagement.

Community policing is a key policing philosophy that stresses the involvement of local citizens in addressing local crime and social order problems (Lawrence and McCarthy, 2013). The practice of community policing focuses on key components of community partnerships, engagement and education to facilitate participation (COPS, 2007a). Partnerships may be established with a wide range of community representative organisations to address, prioritise and coordinate on issues. These may involve the establishment of joint committees and citizens councils, and community meetings, focus groups, and frequent contact, information-sharing and dialogue (Lawrence and McCarthy, 2013; COPS, 2007b).
Citizen engagement practices extend to facilitating two-way communication in which crime and public safety information is used and shared with the public, often utilising information technologies to provide timely and accessible information and enabling the public to provide tips, feedback, and communicate concerns (COPS, 2007a). Educating the community is utilised as a key tool in advanced community policing and can involve public awareness and outreach programmes adopting broad communication means such as seminars, online and multimedia content, documents and pamphlets, public service announcements, and community training (COPS, 2007b).

The importance of community engagement by police forces and private security services is highlighted by the growing and complex challenges facing policing. Issues such as globalisation, widespread large population movements, terrorism, and embedded social problems are increasingly acknowledged as beyond the capacities and scope of traditional policing (Ransley and Mazerolle, 2009). This emphasises a need for public cooperation and collaboration supporting the gathering of intelligence on issues that impact communities and to help in the design of services which are more responsive
to their needs (COP, 2013). In their role within public-private collaborations this need is also significant for the private security sector. Moreover private security guards have been described as among the most pervasive body of watchers in society with their surveillance activities acting as a form of governance within privatised urban spaces (Wakefield, 2005). This has ethical and social impacts on key issues such as privacy, emphasising the need for engagement with citizens and positive perceptions of operations (Wakefield, 2005).

Conversely, evidence shows that levels of public trust in policing in many countries and regions is steadily declining. In the UK, data from the British Crime Survey indicates a long-term trend towards falling levels of public trust to such an extent that confidence in the police has become a principal target for police performance management. It is noted that this is aimed at not just increasing public trust but also to obtain cooperation in combatting crime (Bradford and Jackson, 2011). In the Americas, evidence shows a widespread general distrust of police (Ahmad et al., 2011) while trust levels in the United States, particularly among different ethnic groups, is falling (Newport, 2014). The Middle East has traditionally been subject to low levels of trust in the police as a result of perceptions of impunity, brutality and their role as the organs of social control of authoritarian governments (Boduszynski, 2015). Although not the case in the UAE, the current regional turmoil is perceived as potentially threatening the stability of the country (Rubin, 2013) emphasising the significance of engaging with the community. The importance of community engagement by police is strengthened by the consideration that social control mechanisms have a greater role when implemented informally than when based on traditional enforcement-based policing (Myhill, 2006). A review of UK and US evidence by Myhill (2006) shows that community engagement offers significant benefits for improving the quality of relations between the community and policing services and also for reducing levels of crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour. Moreover perceptions of safety and security are increased while engagement can lead to changes in police officer attitudes and perceptions (Myhill, 2006). The UAE has focused on community engagement and policing as a significant strategy to encourage collaboration.
with the police and raise awareness of anti-social and negative behaviours (The National, 2014; ADP, 2015). This is likely to be increasingly important also for the private security sector given its growing role within UAE security strategies.

### 3.8.3 Private Security Engagement Practices

Information is one level of engagement that translates to specific practices in relation to providing information and feedback to citizens on neighbourhood crime issues, police contact information, and information about crime and disorder (Lloyd and Foster, 2009). According to Myhill (2006) information and reassurance extends to discussing and sharing information about policing and listening to concerns. This can be conducted both formally or in a more informal manner such as utilising opportunities to interact with citizens during routine patrols (Myhill, 2006). Creating awareness is another dimension of information and feedback observed by Thomson (2012) as the first step towards promoting engagement. Raising awareness is argued to be important as communities and individuals frequently lack information in relation to crime and fail to obtain a more complete understanding of the potential dangers they may confront (Thomson, 2012). Thomson (2012) identifies exploratory approaches as a further dimension of engagement through information and feedback in which communities are encouraged to have greater self-knowledge and knowledge of issues potentially as a basis for the discovery of innovative solutions. This further links to Identifying communities and their needs ensuring that engagement reflects local contexts and perspectives (Myhill, 2006).

Promoting accountability is another form of police community engagement. Monitoring and accountability involves police openness to scrutiny from the public and the active promotion of transparency permitting citizens to oversee their work and their conduct (UN, 2011). This is often accomplished through practices such as oversight by formal citizen organisations or allowing citizens to review complaints against police (Fridell, 2004). Finn (2001) highlights key ways by which citizens can participate in monitoring including investigation of
police misconduct allegations and recommending findings in addition to review of findings by internal police investigations.

A further mode of police engagement which could also be applied in the security sector is the facilitation of citizen involvement and participation in decision-making processes (Myhill, 2006). This means that communities are given the opportunities to express views prior to police and private security decisions and their input is considered before decisions are made (Tyler, 2008). This implies open and ongoing dialogue between citizens and police in which the input and participation of citizens is actively solicited to identify priorities (Myhill, 2006; Thomson, 2012). Dialogue is asserted by Thomson (2012) to be deliberative and to seek to reach consensus in relation to a particular recommendation.

Engagement is also constituted by the promotion of collaboration and partnership with the community by police and private security services. This is asserted by Myhill (2006) to relate to active participation of the community in policing. Meijer and Thaens (2013) argue that communities can be encouraged to provide information and police obtain rapid information from citizens in relation to crimes, wanted or missing persons, or critical situations. Police can assist communities to thus act as their eyes and ears (Meijer and Thaens, 2013). Another dimension of collaboration highlighted across the literature is the concept of police and communities working together to solve problems (Myhill, 2006; Thomson, 2012; Forrest et al., 2005). This is perceived to frequently involve problem-solving initiatives in which communities can be involved in any and all stages of the process from analysing the problem to responding to assessment (Forrest et al., 2005). Thomson (2012) shows evidence of US communities working together to solve community drug issues through citizen patrols and helping investigations. The idea of conflict transformation is related to problem-solving and involves the police fostering a process in which respectful listening and dialogue takes place on often divisive and sensitive topics (Thomson, 2012). Police coordination of organisations is also widely acknowledged as an important aspect for solving problems effectively (Thomson, 2012).
3.8.4 Trust in Private Security

Increasingly citizen trust in policing is highly emphasised by governments, societies and police forces given that it can help to secure public cooperation and compliance with the law and encourage citizen participation in setting priorities for local services (Bradford and Jackson, 2010). Trust is essentially an externally oriented concept acknowledged as not solely a state of mind. Cao (2015) asserts that the concept implies an awareness of potential risk or danger emerging as a result of misplacement of confidence and involving a consequence related to potential risks to an individual's welfare (Cao, 2015). To trust an individual or group therefore implies that trustors are aware of the trustee’s needs and are willing in some way to take some risk in relation to their own welfare in order to protect the interests of the trustee. Trust is also cited as evoking a feeling of security in addition to an element of reliance (Cao, 2015). Hart (1988) argues that trust differs from confidence in that it has a level of tolerance in relation to uncertainty while confidence is argued to be a more emphatic conviction grounded in logical deduction or significant evidence. Overall the literature identified a number of different and contextually specific components of trust in the police including accountability, technical competence, fairness and shared values.

Perceptions of technical competence is another widely acknowledged factor underpinning public trust in police (Bradford and Jackson, 2010; Hardin, 2002; Stoutland, 2001; Jackson et al., 2011; Jackson and Gau, 2015). This concept essentially relates to the expectation that police forces can effectively combat and are responsive to crime and other forms of disorder and can achieve certain outcomes such as detect and arrest criminals, respond quickly to emergency calls and resolve conflicts (Bradford and Jackson, 2010). This further involves beliefs as to whether the police have the knowledge and skills to enforce the law appropriately (Jackson and Gau, 2015).

The expectation of fairness and even-handed treatment by the police is also asserted widely to be an important constituent of trust (Bradford and Jackson, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Jackson and Gau, 2015). This relates to the
perception that police are essentially complying with the rule of law in treating all members of society impartially and in measured, respectful and restrained ways (Jackson and Gau, 2015). This element of trust relates principally to individual encounters with the police and is argued by Tyler (2007) to be a more important factor than technical competence in perceptions of legitimacy. Bradford and Jackson (2010) argue that a single negative incident in which an individual is treated unfairly can significantly undermine trust in the fairness of police in terms of future interactions despite continuing beliefs in the technical competence of police to combat crime and fulfil their roles.

Procedural justice can be conceptualised as another dimension of fairness acknowledging that individuals value the fairness of procedures utilised by police to arrive at an outcome (Gau, 2011, 2013; Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2003; Tyler and Huo, 2002). Procedural fairness can often be more important to trust perceptions than the fairness of the actual outcome (Thibaut and Walker, 1975) and significantly links to compliance and cooperation with the police (Tyler, 2005). Tyler (2003) identifies a key element of procedural fairness as the quality of decision-making in which officers remain neutral and exercise objective reasoning when making decisions rather than basing these on personal opinions or biases.

A third element of fairness is determined by Tyler (2005) to pertain specifically to the police role in resolving disputes and involves citizen participation in the decision-making process. Citizens are asserted to value the opportunity to express their side of the dispute before solutions are implemented and police officers which allow this are more likely to be viewed as exercising discretion fairly and in an impartial manner earning trust (Tyler, 2005).

Nix et al. (2015) points to distributive justice as a further antecedent of trust, concentrated on the acknowledged fairness of outcomes rather than the process itself. Distributive justice theories argue that citizens are more compliant towards outcomes if they perceive these as commensurate with those received by others in similar situations. This is consistent with Sarat (1977) who highlights that citizens perceive significance in the equal
distribution of justice across different groups in society. In a study by Tyler and Wakslak (2004) for example perceived racial profiling by police was found to be linked to lower levels of public support and citizens who believed that the police were conducting profiling conveyed less readiness to comply with authorities.

A further dimension of trust involves the perception that police are engaged with and committed to shared community values (Bradford and Jackson, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Jackson and Gau, 2015). Bradford and Jackson (2010) assert that this encompasses the belief that police will put the interests of the community first and make efforts to understand and represent community needs. Jackson and Sunshine (2007) express this as having “our interests at heart”. There is a further dimension to this aspect of trust in the perception that police are morally appropriate and are a visible and accessible source of moral authority (Bradford and Jackson, 2010; Jackson and Gau, 2015).

### 3.8.5 Reassurance Policing

The principle assumption of reassurance policing is that a visible police or private security presence provides formal ‘control signals’ serving to provide reassurance and indications of control (Innes et al. 2004). The vigour of the signal is argued to be reliant on the number and visibility of patrol officers. Diluted numbers in larger neighbourhoods implies that citizens have less chance overall to see them (Bennett 1991). Thus positive impacts on security feelings have not been conclusively determined.

Nevertheless once police officers are noticed in greater numbers research shows that enhanced visibility positively impacts security feelings (Crawford, 2005). This implies that the density of people traffic within shopping malls means that security guard visibility is likely to strengthen control signals. Public perceptions in terms of security or anxiety in relation to security officers are argued to be linked to the correct identification of security guard uniforms and the associated feelings of confidence, safety and reassurance they may or may not evoke (Jackson and Sunshine, 2006; Jackson and Bradford, 2009).
Rowland and Coupe (2014) stress that although visibility and familiarity of private security guards may result in higher feelings of security control signal strength is also reliant on perceptions towards the brand or regard for the private security guards. Diversification in the types of private security guards on patrol is therefore argued to offer the possibility to reinforce reassurance policing in public spaces. According to Rowland and Coupe (2014) diversification of staffing and implementation of different types of patrol officer could have a significant positive impact on shopping mall reassurance policing.

3.9 Service Quality

The question of service quality is a theme that has been debated in the literature in relation to the shift of policing functions from public to the private sector. Alonso and Andrews (2015) suggest that on the one hand, supporters of privatisation argue that private companies are motivated by market forces to offer services of a higher quality; their adversaries, on the other hand, underline that profits can potentially be given more importance than quality. A possible middle ground has been proposed based on capability and incomplete contracts theories: specifically, that private companies providing public services outperform public providers in those quality aspects that are easier to quantify and evaluate, and vice versa. Alonso and Andrews (2015) presented their findings from an analysis of panel data about quality of service in English and Welsh prisons from 1998 to 2012. It indicated that on easily measured aspects of quality, such as inmates’ activity and internment conditions, privately run prisons outperform publicly managed institutions, while the inverse is true when examining harder to measure dimensions, such as inmates’ safety and peacefulness levels.

The importance of assessment is underscored by Hart et al.’s (1997) position that privatising public services should only be undertaken when it is possible to draft contracts containing clear and detailed standards for service quality and the service includes explicit and unambiguous performance indicators. Only a small number of services might satisfy this requirement for clear and explicit
criteria, as public service agencies are mostly multi-functional and the ease of measuring their functions varies. A significant variation between private and public service providers, determined by the performance aspect being evaluated, is therefore to be expected. Additionally, service quality might also originate from abilities specific to each sector, as separate sectors have and bring different sectoral experience. In the UK several elements of imprisonment quality in English and Welsh privately and public run prisons from 1998 to 2012 were methodically analysed to assess the impact of public/private sectorial variations in performance on output measurability and on their distinctive organisational abilities (Alonso and Andrews, 2015). In recent years, doubts have been raised about the impact of privatisation on the quality of services, mainly originating from concerns about the possible large numbers of partially completed contracts to provide public services (Jensen and Stonecash 2005). The incomplete contracts model indicates that service quality is negatively affected by incentives to maximise profits, and that this is particularly true for those nearly unmeasurable aspects of quality which are also difficult to detail and thus render the monitoring of contractual obligations harder (Hart et al., 1997).

Privatisation supporters generally argue that private companies have stronger service orientation, cost-consciousness and ‘customer responsiveness’ as a result of the profit-incentive (Hodge, 2000). These viewpoints imply that the private sector, through its distinct ability, particularly its innovation capability which originates in its discernment and pursuit of new service provision opportunities, can have a positive impact on the public sector’s latent skills (Klein et al. 2010). However, studies have indicated that cost minimisation can occur at the expense of service quality. Further, despite the differences in organisational abilities between the private and public sectors, proponents of the incomplete contract theory admonish that private providers of public services might still be motivated to maximise profits at the expense of service quality. This was evidenced in the prison sector, which can occur where the quality of the prisoners’ experience of interment can be negatively affected by a company’s ability to reduce supplier costs and hire unqualified personnel (Hart et al., 1997). Nonetheless, a variation in service quality is possible
between privately and publicly managed prisons determined by the quantifiability of the performance aspect being examined and by the organisational capacities most appropriate for good performance (Alonso and Andrews, 2015).

Even though every single aspect of quality cannot be detailed in advance in a contract, it has been shown that quality increase and cost reduction can be parallel performance dimensions and motivators in private companies, although the strength of the cost reduction motivation can be such that its negative impact on quality is disregarded. One of the main arguments against prison privatisation is that cost reduction leads private companies to recruit unqualified staff, as a result weakening the prisoners’ safety and security (Hart et al., 1997). It has been argued that private contractors’ reduction of quality and costs emerge from incomplete contracts (Hart et al., 1997); known in contracting research as the “quality shading hypothesis” (Domberger and Jensen 1997). The evidence indicates that the probable outcome of prisons’ privatisation will be a decline in service quality, due to the difficulty of drafting contracts requiring the implementation of specific quality standards (Hefetz and Warner 2004). Nevertheless, although in prisons the assessment of output quality is challenging, it is also possible to imagine that some aspects of quality are easier to appraise and monitor than others, and that publicly managed prisons could be outperformed by privately managed ones on those quality aspects easier to quantify (Alonso and Andrews, 2015).

In addition, while advocates of strategic management theory underline that a closer alignment of public and private concerns can potentially engender ‘sustainable value’ from the involvement of the private sector in public services provision (Mahoney et al. 2009). Scholars have emphasised that governments contemplating public services privatisation need to critically assess if the quality of their public services will be improved by private providers (Hodge, 2000; Warner and Clifton, 2014).

Depending on how it is implemented the outsourcing of police functions can also have significant organisational impacts indicated by studies as a key
concern. Frequently undertaken with limited consultation with stakeholders and often imposed from the top down studies have shown that as a result employee engagement and commitment to change can suffer (Sukhram, 2015). Moreover employees in outsourced companies tend to experience inferior employee relations and lower equity in the employment relationship (Mawby et al., 2009). These factors could suggest the potential for inferior service delivery within the private security service sector.

Factors within the occupational culture of private security guards may also impact the delivery of quality in security services. Literature shows that occupational culture is characterised by low wages and unstable employment, long working hours and limited access to social benefits. Private security is overall considered a low status occupation and security guards often perceive an absence of social recognition and stigma. A significant feature is a distinct lack of training and overall professional development and established standards for private security guards (Terpstra, 2014; Sefalafala, and Webster, 2013; Buti, 2010; Gotbaum et al., 2005; South, 1988).

Limited empirical evidence is available on the value orientations and ethical assumptions underpinning the occupational culture of private security (Van Buuren, 2009). Some evidence suggests that private security is characterised by a robust occupational solidarity and interdependency and group loyalty that is not dissimilar to that found in police cultures (Loyens 2008). Literature has suggested that the increasing collaboration between the private security sector and the police could lead to a transfer of occupational norms in either direction (Loyens 2008; Van der Wal 2008). Terpstra (2014) found that the assumption of increasing divergence between police and private security cultures was not able to be confirmed. In comparison with police cultures, the occupational culture of private security was less distinct although a strong service orientation was noted. It is suggested that the absence of a similar culture to the police was a result in significant differences in work and working conditions.
3.10 Cost Evaluation

Nichols (2010) emphasises the challenge of economic measurement and analysis in determining the efficacy of outsourcing police services. One dimension relates to whether performance metrics are in place for economic analysis to prove outsourcing contracts will deliver expected cost savings (Nichols, 2010). A key criteria for evaluation of the success or failure of police privatisation is the costs of service delivery through the private sector (Forst, 2000). In Forst’s (2000) analysis the costs dimension relates simply to the costs of service delivery. Broad parameters for cost evaluation are suggested by Heath et al., (2010.) to include effectiveness, defined as the extent to which objectives are achieved, and efficiency identifying the degree to which these are achieved at minimum cost. Economy is another parameter perceived as the extent to which appropriate and adequate resources are obtained at minimum cost. These areas potentially provide critical areas for evaluation of the costs of privatisation initiatives. Three main types of economic analysis are generally used to evaluate the costs of service delivery within outsourced police contracts (Stockdale et al., 1999; Heath, 2010). These are cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-consequences analysis. Cost-benefit analysis can provide a comprehensive and transparent approach ensuring that all pertinent aspects are identified and are explicitly valued. This approach aims to identify in total all the effects of an intervention and to quantify in monetary terms all the costs and benefits. Analyses based on cost-effectiveness compare the monetary cost of an intervention against effects in order to assess comparative value for money against a single primary outcome. Cost-consequences analysis identifies the costs and consequences of an intervention although these are not aggregated and it is left to the decision-maker to assess the importance of these (Heath, 2010).

Further studies have analysed methods for evaluating the success of projects. Heath et al., (2010) argue for the usefulness of economic analysis in assessing outsourcing success and undertake a cost-consequences analysis of the outsourcing of officer detention roles in the UK, maintaining that cost-effectiveness analysis does not take into account wider policing outcomes.
The cost-consequences evaluation assessed outsourcing outcomes such as cost efficiency as well as achievement against project objectives e.g. level of care and release of personnel to front-line policing, finding that the method provided an integrated and systematic method for evaluating police outsourcing projects.

Tendering processes are emphasised as significant elements by Sukram (2015) materially affecting privatisation success. It is argued firstly that processes should be transparent and more importantly that bids should be priced appropriately as research showed that justice service bids were often priced too low to meet contractual and performance obligations. This is supported by Chambers (2014) who suggests that evidence from the National Audit Office shows that UK private sector justice companies prepare competitive bids which prioritise low costs over quality of service. Mawby et al., (2009) further points to the tendency for bids to be undervalued resulting in the imposition of basic working conditions and terms for contract employees.

3.11 Performance Dimensions

A research gap on performance dimensions is evident from the body of literature that has been reviewed. There is significant imbalance in addressing the performance and effectiveness of private security or the transfer of police functions to the private sector. In the majority of studies reviewed in this chapter and synthesised in Appendix 1, a narrow focus has been adopted focused on specific sectors, national context, and performance dimensions. A range of performance dimensions can be inferred from these studies to provide a framework. Hodge (2000) contributes the most comprehensive study into performance dimensions. While this work focuses broadly on performance of privatisation activities across a range of sectors it is significantly valuable in defining a broad range of categories that can be applied to all sectors including private policing. Hodge (2000) identifies specific performance assessment measures under political, democratic, economic, social and legal. The results from a review of police studies is summarised in Table 3-3 for external performance dimensions and Table 3-4 for internal
performance dimensions. The framework for external performance dimensions are based on Hodge's (2000) five dimensions. A review of the literature identifies a number of key elements and measures that have been consistently identified in the literature. Internal performance dimensions in the literature can be grouped under Lopes's (2015) internal control systems categories: action, personnel and cultural controls. Table 3-4 lists a range of elements and suggested performance measures that have been discussed in the literature. These performance dimensions combined provide both an external and internally based assessment framework.

3.12 Change and Organisational Learning

3.12.1 Change Theory

Organisational change is acknowledged to potentially imply considerable effects whether changes are apparently insignificant process alterations or significant restructuring or re-sizing. Scholars agree that the impacts of the anticipated or implemented change can be experienced by wider elements than those directly affected (Beardshaw and Palfreman, 1990).

Change theory asserts that change can depend on the openness and susceptibility of a system to change. The human context within which policing systems operate is contended to be highly uncertain given that public and government attitudes can change rapidly and significantly (Scarman, 1981; Jackson and Keys, 1984). This suggests the need for an open and responsive policing system. The concept of “degree of openness” is argued as applicable to policing systems on the basis of their inherent nature as open systems asserted to differ in response to the rate of information sharing between policing organisations and their environment (Hart, 1996).

A higher level of openness is suggested to lead to greater rates of change as open, interactive organisations are held to more easily detect external influences crossing system boundaries (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981). Thus unplanned changes can occur which may emerge from high openness levels together with a lack of sufficient environmental control. This implies the
potential for undesirable change to limited by constraining external influences and lowering impulses towards change (Hart, 1996). Consequently it is contended that the degree of openness within policing systems should account for the suitability and alignment of the diverse inputs and interactions between it and external environments (Hart, 1996). It is acknowledged however that placing limitations on the level of openness may risk the emergence of a closed system. Closed policing systems are perceived to lack responsiveness to external environmental influences and considered inconsistent with desired policing systems (Scarman, 1981; Smith et al., 1983). Closed policing systems, often found within authoritarian regimes, are observed to be resistant to environmental changes as the core focus is on organisational mission and goals only (Alderson 1979).

3.12.2 Psycho-social Change Factors

Explanations and analysis of change is argued to necessitate a holistic integrated perspective allowing consideration of psychological and social factors in addition to operational, structural and procedural elements (Hart, 1996). These factors are held to critically influence change outcomes where change processes involve the alteration of daily work procedures, processes and routines for individuals or groups (Brown, 1954; Argyle, 1972). Hart (1996) asserts that comprehensive and complete change in policing systems is possible only through integration of mechanistic and functional organisational processes with people’s reaction to them. It is contended that social, environmental and human impacts influencing open police systems will inevitably change them over time due to direct effects on existing personnel affecting their attitudes and in turn organisational cultures.

3.12.3 Resistance to Change

Staff resistance to change is acknowledged as a significant influence over change process outcomes as a result of a range of psycho-social factors. Alterations in operations are acknowledged to either have none or a negative impact where support from affected staff is lacking (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1981). The implementation of new technologies is contended to have shown
some staff refusal to adopt new skills (Hart, 1996). This emphasises that change success is achievable only when there is knowledge of the principle organisational and individual processes involved thus helping to attain organisational objectives and providing organisational benefits (Hart, 1996).

Carnall (1990) argues that resistance to change although generally viewed as a negative factor may not necessarily have unfavourable impacts as continued organisational stability and sustainability is perceived to rely on incorporation of varied needs and objectives including varying levels of change and stability. In the same vein Hart (1996) notes that resistance to change in certain situations may in fact be an organisational asset. A need is acknowledged for cultural changes to be introduced gradually where organisational stability is supported by experienced and long-serving employees. Nevertheless where organisational sustainability is reliant on responsiveness to the environment the necessity for flexible, more adaptable employees who depend less on stability is asserted (Hart, 1996).

This suggests that overcoming resistance to change is a priority for the policing system. However most working adults are argued to be impacted by a range of attitudinal phenomena in relation to change (Argyle, 1972). These are proposed to take shape in three main ways. Firstly uncertainty emerges from inadequate management communication, inability or disinclination to comprehend new requirements or instructions or circumstances inherently uncertain. This can lead to change resistance among employees badly informed of their role, responsibilities and expectations in relation to the new system. Secondly employees can be affected by lack of confidence based on lack of adequate communicate and training or further safe opportunities for experimentation. This unsureness in relation to abilities to operate new tasks, procedures or processes can result in resistance to change. Finally anxiety is amplified by these two factors and may lead to significant stress in employees (Hart, 1996).
Change confusion is proposed to result from inadequate internal communication and a lack of managerial consensus and clarity in relation to change goals and is observable in staff inability to link existing duties to the new expectations (Hart, 1996). Kast and Rosenzweig (1981) maintain that resistance to change is more likely in the case that impacted employees lack clarity on the objectives, processes and consequences. It is argued that a clear understanding and knowledge of the aims is critical to the key individuals such as line managers responsible for implementing change. Confusion and uncertainty are asserted to be inimical to change implementations as inadequate knowledge may result in negative speculation and rumour dissemination. Given that organisational change may often engender unfavourable opinions in staff, confusion is contended to amplify the spread and rapidity of change resistance (Hart, 1996).

The possibility to resolve confusion issues is proposed to involve enhanced communication and in turn improve change-related learning. The relation between confusion and learning is presented in Figure XXX drawn from Hart (1996). The figure shows an inverse relationship between learning and confusion over time. Thus increased change learning links to lower levels of confusion and potentially in decreased resistance. Confusion is also linked to lack of confidence and anxiety in which confidence increases and anxiety is lowered as confusion is also reduced. On the other hand inadequate and ineffective communication is proposed to lead to minimal levels of learning and the maintenance of resistance to change (Hart, 1996).

Employee responses as change implementations evolve and develop can also impede the successful achievement of change objectives. One individual response is tokenism avoidance asserted to result in limited superficial changes while the employee appears to be willing and engaging with the change process. This approach has the goal of persuading the group and sometimes themselves that they are implementing the necessary changes while not actually making any or a limited number (Hart, 1996). Another employee response is acknowledged to involve utilising specialism shielding methods in which an individual focuses exclusively on one single specific
issue while avoiding all others. The mechanism may generate the appearance of change while the substance is avoided. One response can be to implement a change in specialty (Hart, 1996).

Organisational responses to change resistance may exacerbate the situation. In change implementations a tendency towards a simplification defence mechanism is acknowledged which lowers and diminishes issue complexity to the extent that it becomes insignificant to all intents and purposes. Despite the good intentions to support the comprehensibility, dependability and infallibility of the changes it is argued that only marginal, superficial change may result from over-simplification, generalisation and trivialisation of the changes (Hart, 1996).

The varied human factors, their extent, in addition to the diversity of responses influencing the development of the change process over time are argued to merge into a complicated sub-system of psycho-social factors. Therefore employees’ dynamic change responses encompass the consolidation of both their response to change and its evolution (Hart, 1996). Literature has emphasised that a degree of participation and contribution to change processes may provide employees with a perception of ownership leading to some control exercised (Trist, 1968; Glen, 1975; Williams, 1994). Conversely perceptions of a low ownership level may result in varied aspects and outputs of the psycho-social sub-system appearing as resistance to change.

Hart (1996) asserts that a continuum of barriers increase complexity in the change process and their sources change as the process develops. It is acknowledged that identifying the exact nature of the psycho-social sub-system output responsible for change resistance at any particular time is unachievable however observation of behaviours associated with the differing mechanisms of resistance is suggested to support possible identification (Hart, 1996).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Dimension</th>
<th>Key Elements</th>
<th>Performance Measures</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Increased Competition</td>
<td>No. and profile of competition</td>
<td>Hodge (2000), Wilson and Gallop (2013), Robertson (2008); Rogers and Gravelle (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Rate of return/Public Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hodge (2000), Light (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher investment</td>
<td>Investment levels</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sukram (2015), Hodge (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of agency from government</td>
<td>Degree to which private security free from political influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hodge (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer technology to strategic sectors</td>
<td>Case Examples</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hodge (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Dimension</td>
<td>Key Elements</td>
<td>Performance Measures</td>
<td>Authors</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attract foreign direct investment</td>
<td>FDI in sector</td>
<td>Hodge (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Reporting Requirements and Framework; Financial Reporting</td>
<td>Rushin (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managerial Oversight</td>
<td>Effectiveness of Supervision, In-service training, independent regulation agencies</td>
<td>Lopes (2009), Rushin (2012), Keane and Bryden (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Dimension</td>
<td>Key Elements</td>
<td>Performance Measures</td>
<td>Authors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Availability and access to redress and legal channels available for complaints against private security companies</td>
<td>Hodge (2000), Zhong and Grabosky (2009), Rushim (2012), Robertson (2008), Rogers and Gravelle (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Systems</td>
<td>Key Components</td>
<td>Key Measures</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Action Controls   | Direction setting of actions and operations | • Effective Communication of Desired Behaviours  
• Improvement Plans | Keane and Bryden (2008), Lopez (2009), Merchant and Van Der Stede (2007) |
| Supervision       |                                         | • Leadership competence  
• Proactive monitoring  
| Personnel Controls| Recruitment and Selection               | • Effectiveness of recruitment and selection process | Strom et al (2010), Keane and Bryden (2008), Lopes (2009) |
| Training          |                                         | • Effectiveness of training and development                                    | Strom et al (2010), Lopes (2009), Treverton et al., (2011) |
| Resource Provision |                                         | • Monitoring of services                                                       | Lopes (2009), UNDOC (2011) |
| Cultural Controls | Codes of Conduct                        | • Internalization of the values                                                | Lopes (2009), UNDOC (2011), Kean and Bryden (2008) |
|                   | Performance management                  | • Measures defined  
• Internal Disciplinary System  
This reflects a broad scope that addresses a wide range of factors discussed in the literature. The dimensions provide a basis for assessing private security at macro-level in terms of the institutional and external stakeholders, and the organisational level in terms of the management and governance within private security companies. Finally, it provides an assessment perspective at the individual level in terms of the immediate social and physical context of security guards in the private sector. This classification enables assessment of the private sector from three distinct perspectives. A macro-level perspective of the dimensions emphasises assessment of the external context in terms of the socio-political, economic and cultural context, and social institutions that impact on the private security organisations. A meso-level view can provide an assessment of immediate institutional and the inter-organisational factors. A micro-level perspective draws on performance dimensions that impact on the social and relational context at an operational level within the organisations.

3.13 Conceptual Framework

This literature review has identified a number of consistent themes that have formed the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of privatisation of public services in the areas of policing, criminal justice and prison and probation. The theoretical perspectives reviewed can be combined to support investigation of key issues, challenges and opportunities in formulating a comprehensive evaluation framework that is applicable to the UAE context. These theories support the development of a performance evaluation framework that can be used to assess private security companies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Key Principles</th>
<th>Implications</th>
<th>Potential Performance Indicators</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal Theory</td>
<td>Economic liberalisation, reduce government spending, private sector role</td>
<td>Risk of inequality, marginalisation, weakening democratic accountability</td>
<td>Social measures</td>
<td>Teague (2012); Hodge (2000); Hughes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Theory</td>
<td>Agents assume role for principal, monitoring required</td>
<td>Cost of monitoring increases, Self-interest</td>
<td>Monitoring costs</td>
<td>Hodge (2000); Laube and Muller (2016); Loveday (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction Cost</td>
<td>Firms focused on reducing costs, exploit opportunities</td>
<td>Vertical integration supply, cost minimisation risks quality</td>
<td>Service cost reductions, Service quality satisfaction</td>
<td>Hodge (2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Privatisation theory provides valuable indication of the risks and issues in privatisation of public functions and contributes a broad basis for assessing private security growth in the UAE. This theoretical dimension provides an understanding of the implications of reduced state involvement and risk associated market-driven behaviour and commodification. Emerging from the broad theoretical implications of public choice theory, neoliberalism is supported by a focus on efficiency that is reflected in the bias in research and debate on cost and economic assessment of privatisation and the knowledge gap in terms of broader societal outcomes of equity, fairness, cohesion and trust.

This is underscored by principles of performance management and profit maximisation associated with managerialism and new public management that may potentially undermine qualitative and social assessment of private security services. Table 3-5 summarises the broad implications of these theories on performance assessment. The discussion of privatisation indicates broader motivation for privatisation than economic and efficiency reasons. As privatisation theory informs the conceptual framework of this study in terms of broad implications and issues, subsequent themes explored in this chapter contribute specific insights into dimensions of accountability and regulation control. These concepts are significant in revealing key areas, mechanisms and systems for evaluation. Moreover, the application of accountability theory in the literature has been recommended to understand dimensions of risk to equity and effectiveness.

The research on police and private security accountability provides specific perspectives on accountability dimensions and mechanisms that can guide this research in terms of the construction and implementation of a performance assessment framework. The theoretical framework depicted in Figure 7 integrates the key concepts to provide a comprehensive basis for addressing the research problem. At the core of the model performance dimensions to be assessed should reflect goals and priorities across five areas: political, democratic, social, economic and legal. At the same time these performance dimensions reflect the existence of external control components, internal control components and thirdly the dimensions of accountability. The accountability component of the model represents five core
elements that have been identified in the literature that form an overall accountability framework. This framework further posits the importance of stakeholder perspectives and goals and integration of components, which informs and is guided by the evaluation dimensions. It provides a basis for exploring and validating the elements within each dimension and their significance and role in strategic formulation and implementation of police privatisation in the UAE. Within these dimensions this review has identified a number of key elements that combine to form a criteria for evaluation.

There is consensus in the literature of the significance of evaluating private security implementation from a broader interconnected approach. This conceptual model provides a strong theoretical basis for investigating and developing an assessment framework for evaluating the effectiveness of private security in the UAE and supporting the improvement of internal and external control mechanisms and structures. In particular, the integration of
various performance dimensions and measures expands the existing knowledge in this field. It provides a basis for assessment that integrates both performance based on goals and performance based on private security activities. Specific external and internal performance components and measures established in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 respectively are based on measures identified in the literature that can be used as baseline criteria to guide research into the performance assessment of private security activities. The theoretical basis for these elements is detailed in Appendix 1.

The application of this framework addresses a knowledge gap which exists in terms of the relative effectiveness of different forms of accountability, relationships and structures and roles in the specific context of a developing Middle Eastern country private security sector working in public spaces. While there has been a large body of literature into privatisation, this is fragmented firstly across different sectors, varied implementations and models of privatisation. The key questions under each performance dimension is how effective is private security performance and accountability; and how can private security performance and accountability be strengthened and improved. Further, disparities in political visions and contexts has been identified as particularly problematic in comparing and evaluating the effectiveness of policing and private security. This has underscored a consensus in the literature on country and sector-specific research investigation.

3.14 Conclusion

This chapter presented a review of the literature focused on understanding the key theories, themes and issues concerned with the effectiveness of privatisation of policing. Studies indicate a number of common themes potentially identifying areas for evaluation and providing support for the importance of these dimensions. Nevertheless the extent and scope of the studies varies in relation to these topics. Legal aspects in terms of the accountability and legitimacy of privatised policing form a significant focus in the literature and are well-defined. In contrast few studies focus directly on the issues of service quality and how this is defined in a privatised police context.
On balance the review highlights a range of limitations and gaps in the scope, methods and context of the studies potentially undermining the ability to effectively evaluate the success of police privatisations from diverse perspectives. A key issue is the overall lack of defined and explicit measures to assess privatisation initiatives available within the literature. Few empirical studies have been conducted which provide concrete methodologies and specific variables for measurement and therefore the many criteria identified in this study are predominantly drawn from theoretical discussions or qualitative studies aiming to provide a portrait of the evolution and development of privatised police services. Furthermore many studies are limited to specific national contexts in which particular features of national markets, political and public service systems, course and development of privatisation and diverse ethos in policing may be different and potentially incongruent with other policing contexts. These aspects further impact the focus of evaluation and selection of criteria presented in the studies. Finally, a theoretical framework was proposed to guide the research of this study to address the research problem. The framework integrates a diverse range of factors drawn from the literature to contribute a holistic and integrated approach for assessing private security performance. This framework provides the foundation for the research design and process discussed in the following chapter.
4 Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The context of this research is characterised by a commitment of the researcher as a senior officer involved in the police privatisation and senior policy-makers in government to address real-world problems and objectives in the private security sector. This chapter therefore presents a discussion of the research issues, researcher’s position and the overall research approach to address the research goals of this study. The key elements of the research design are explained commencing with the underpinning ontological assumptions and discussion of the rationale and design of the action research approach adopted for this study.

4.2 Philosophical Basis for the Study

Engaging in research requires that the beliefs and assumptions underpinning the study are considered in relation to the research methodology, goals and output (James and Vinnicombe, 2002). A central debate focuses on ontological and epistemological issues concerned respectively with the nature of reality and what constitutes knowledge within it and how it is known (Crotty, 2009). Two key ontological perspectives range from perceiving reality as existing externally and independent of human thought to a subjective reality argued to primarily exist in human consciousness. Epistemological assumptions indicate a similar divergence in terms of the objective or subjective validity of knowledge with subjectivists contending that the social world cannot be studied utilising the same philosophical approaches and methods as the natural sciences. Blaikie (2009) argues for a pragmatic approach in the adoption of philosophical perspectives to appropriately address the research objectives and prevent possible incoherence.

Emerging from these philosophical perspectives are two key research philosophies of positivism and interpretivism. Positivism is based on an objective view of reality in which scientific methods are considered applicable only to observe and measure concrete external phenomena independent of
context (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Positivist methods, associated mainly with the generation of quantitative data, are nevertheless noted as unable to provide the more in-depth and nuanced understanding of the complex processes of outsourcing in the police required to identify and evaluate critical success and failure factors.

In contrast interpretivism is based on a subjectivist perspective asserting that social realities are multiple and constructed by the social actors within it (Wimmer and Dominick, 2013). Denzin and Lincoln (2005) highlight that therefore reality is incapable of being objectively observed and described and key to understanding is the meaning and interpretation ascribed by actors and the contextual factors influencing perceptions. This view aligns with this study in seeking to understand the specific perspectives and context of police forces in relation to outsourcing. Such perspectives are further interpreted by the researcher facilitated by the use of mainly qualitative methods emphasising language and concepts as the main unit of analysis (Saunders et al., 2009). This is acknowledged to generate rich and detailed data which can potentially provide a more in-depth understanding of the specific situation of police outsourcing supporting the development of a complex framework of multiple factors and mechanisms (Bryman and Bell, 2007). This philosophical position is consistent with the focus of this research in terms of understanding specific context rather than establishing generalisable and scientific inquiry.

This research adopts an interpretivist position that assumes a subjectivist perspective asserting multiple realities generated by social actors within their context (Wimmer and Dominick, 2013). The adoption of the Action Research approach reflects beliefs and assumptions underpinning the nature of this research focus. An interpretivist epistemology is consistent with an Action Research approach that represents a pragmatic emphasis in terms of the significance of engagement with different perspectives from actors within the research context. This aligns with the argument that reality is incapable of being objectively observed and described, and key to understanding is the meaning and interpretation ascribed by actors and the contextual factors influencing perceptions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). This view accords with this study in seeking to understand the specific perspectives and context of police
forces in relation to outsourcing. Such perspectives are further interpreted by the researcher’s active participation in the research process and the adoption of qualitative methods (Saunders et al., 2009).

In contrast to traditional social science focused on objectivity, Action Research is based on the ontological principle of subjectivity (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011). The different approaches to Action Research share a similar ontological and epistemological basis. Action researchers view knowledge as pluralistic and socially constructed based on a continual process of critical reflection, knowledge creation and decision-making throughout the research process (Stringer, 2013). As opposed to positivist research that invokes objectivity and a value-free standpoint as the basis of investigative credibility, Action Research can facilitate an interpretive, subjective and value-laden perspective (Stringer, 2013). Its practitioners regard objectivity as unattainable and investigations as inherently rooted in a system of values (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011). It has been argued that the particular investigative method chosen is less important than the way it is put in practice and the purpose of its use (Burns et al., 2012). The justification of an interpretive epistemological position lies with the value in generating rich and detailed data to provide a more in-depth understanding of the specific situation of police outsourcing supporting the development of a complex framework of multiple factors and mechanisms (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Further this is consistent with the principles and vision of Action Research that seeks to engender practical knowledge regarding morally valuable human goals, through a process that is both democratic and participatory in nature (Stringer, 2013). Within its wider purpose of obtaining perspectives by enabling individuals and communities to flourish, an interpretative position can facilitate endeavours to generate practical solutions to the issues people are actually concerned with (Stringer, 2013).

4.3 Research Strategy

The research design for this study is based on an Action Research strategy to investigate the organisational problem with the UAE Ministry of Interior. The justification for this approach can be found in the core elements of Action
Research and nature of the research problem that is the focus of this study. An Action Research strategy endeavours to fully engage stakeholders in a collaborative process of evaluation. Action research was adopted as a means for addressing organisational change and enabled the private and public sector organisations to adopt invigorated perspectives and stimulate engagement regarding organisational issues and cross-sector partnership. Their participation thus generates meaning for them and as a result engenders a sense of ownership, increases knowledge retention and enables learning from the evaluation to be retained by the organisation or community (Burns et al., 2012). This approach aligns significantly with the needs of the project and the research goals, as it allows a participatory, inquiry-driven and co-operative method focused on addressing specific problems or issues outlined in this proposal (Reason and Bradbury, 2008). This is consistent with the needs of the gatekeepers and sponsors of this project, who require a stakeholder based review of practices and the development of solutions. This compares with conventional approaches to evaluation often involving external assessors in gathering knowledge and learning extractively, where the resulting evaluation outcomes are often neither usefully nor accessibly fed back to the organisation or community evaluated (Cassell and Symon, 2004; McNiff and Whitehead, 2000). Due to its intense participatory nature Action Research can potentially enable accountability both upwards and downwards toward beneficiaries, participants and stakeholders (Reason and Bradbury, 2001). A further point of value is that Action Research stems from the in-depth knowledge it can generate about a community’s experience and understanding of, as well as perspectives on interventions or projects that concern it. This in-depth understanding enables assessors to reflect on the quality and validity of their work, and thus make sure that the evaluation actually concerns what they think it does (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014). This dynamic is reflected in the interactions in Figure 8. Even so, the literature stresses challenge for researchers undertaking Action Research to satisfactorily balance the needs and demands of all those involved (Townsend, 2013; Zuber-Skerrit and Perry, 2002; Coghlan and Brannick, 2014).
Thus the research reflects an emergent process whereby the findings develop and evolve throughout the course of the project. A key rationale for adopting this approach is the flexibility and responsiveness that it allows within the framework of iterative and ongoing processes of planning, exploring, reflecting, evaluating, revising and learning (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). The emphasis is on learning from experience by providing an opportunity to continually refine methods, data and interpretation on the key dimensions and mechanisms for police privatisation (Koshy et al., 2011). This is considered critical for this study given the limited understanding of privatisation success and failure factors, and the key dimensions in the UAE context which can lead to a more distilled interpretation and the consistent incorporation of new knowledge on the key processes and practices to inform strategic proposals for privatisation practice.

In the early phase of this research, the action research establishes a strong theoretical foundation based on a review of theory and evidence, in addition to the collection of primary data to identify and generate insights into problem areas. At the same time, the action research principles are consistent with my view and policy-makers' view that participants from different areas are involved...
in the process to address the federal government’s objective to implement a change management process that maximises the performance and effectiveness of the private sector. Action research is acknowledged as particularly appropriate for this task. There is an emphasis on participation and collaboration in action research that can unlock new “communicative spaces” for dialogue and development to advance (Reason and Bradbury, 2008). Furthermore, the emphasis I have placed to investigate and generate insights into social dimensions issues can be supported by the collaborative aspect of the action research process. It will allow for multiple perspectives to be obtained and there is an opportunity to draw out reflections from a wide range of actors and stakeholders at different levels and across different areas of the context under study (Koshy et al., 2011). As Carr and Kemmis (1986) note the collaborative character of action research can facilitate the resolution of social aspects preventing rational change.

4.4 Action Research Design

The term Action Research encompasses a continually evolving set of approaches with more than 25 types identified by Chandler and Torbert (2003). Three approaches are widely acknowledged within Action Research: Classical Action Research, Action Learning and Participatory Action Research (PAR). Classical Action Research is mostly used within organisational contexts; both participants and researchers collaboratively engage in the identification of issues, the generation of solutions, and the creation of knowledge through repeated planning, action taking and evaluation cycles (Stringer, 2013). Participatory Action Research, on the other hand, is generally unrelated to organisational contexts; its purpose is the democratisation of knowledge generation through the inclusion in the research process of vulnerable and marginalised communities or individuals (Stringer, 2013).

Action Learning is also mostly used in organisational contexts; it aims to facilitate individual and/or organisational learning by enabling both participants and researchers to implement changes to their practice based on knowledge learned from their experience and actions. An Action Learning approach can
be used to enable the development and implementation within an organisation of a strategy for workplace learning (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014). The purpose of such an approach is to increase the learning capacity of the participants and to improve the effectiveness of their responses to organisational problems.

The organisational context and the focus on addressing a problem within this context requires a process of learning and development by key actors towards the development of an assessment framework that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the governance, operation and accountability of private security. As illustrated in Figure 9 an integrated approach adopted in this study acknowledges the principles of both Action Research in terms of stakeholder engagement and collaboration and the Action Learning that reflects a process of organisational learning and problem solving (Stringer, 2013). The Action Learning process will enable small groups drawn from stakeholders to learn collaboratively by jointly reflecting on and considering organisational issues.
The integration with Action Research will ensure the participatory nature of the process to enable for monitoring and evaluation that facilitates learning retention, ownership of the assessment, and downward accountability, as well as generating in-depth knowledge of the context and the community. This process will enable professional practice to improve, knowledge to be generated, and the current situation to be ameliorated (Cebrián et al., 2012; Warburton, 2003). As a methodology for investigating the real world, it enables new ideas about practice to be generated in the context of private security. It relation to the government and oversight of private security it will generate novel ways of doing, thinking and relating within and without the community, and can thus engender improvements (Kemmis, 2010).

4.5 Action Research Stages

This section describes in detail the key stages to be adopted in the Action Research. Figure 10 provides an overview of three research phases of the project and the types of data and focus for each stage. Stage 1 is the exploratory stage of the research that is focused on collecting data on the existing structure and practices relating to the governance, operation and accountability of the private security sector. This will form the baseline that is used in the design and conceptualisation in Stage 2. In the second stage is the design phase that aims to gather qualitative data from key actors that facilitates a process of inquiry into the problem and the construction of solution.
A detailed research Action Research design is outlined in Figure 10. This maps the research focus at each of the three stages and details the research design for each stage. In stage 1 the Action Research is focused on gathering baseline data and insights into the existing state of governance, oversight and accountability within the private security sector. In this initial stage both quantitative and qualitative data is gathered to identify and describe the key structures, roles and processes. The conceptual framework presented in chapter 3 forms the basis for the data collection. Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 later in this section maps out the theoretical dimensions based on the conceptual framework of the types of data to be collected and methods to be employed for each type of data. The data from the first stage provides information on the existing state and baseline for all participants in the second stage to discuss and collaborate in the design process. This stage also represents a needs analysis phase because the aim is to understand specific needs from different actors across the different domains. The process will also reflect skill building and knowledge absorption aligned with the organisational problem. Different actors will collaborate on the exploratory phase to
understand the basis for the intervention and take ownership in gathering or supplying data. Information seminars and meetings will help identify knowledge and skills gaps and stimulate new thinking on performance management.

In the second stage evaluation is undertaken of the existing state with practical implications for the future state. Managers and specialist personnel will be grouped into two action learning circles focused on evaluating a specific dimension from the conceptual framework. The aim is to repeat the action learning 2 times to provide opportunities for reflection and modification and generate consensus for outcomes. Each stage of the three stages will consist of a process of planning, implementation, observation and reflection as illustrated in Figure 11. In the first stage this provides the opportunity to consider and evaluate the data being collected and develop consensus and understanding of the existing status and issues.

![Figure 11 Action Research Process](source: Author’s Own)
This will address the research problem and result in the design of a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. This discussion is focused on two interrelated areas: firstly the effectiveness of the existing state of governance, oversight and accountability; secondly, the construction of an assessment framework that ensures the effective governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. A further focus in this stage involves the use of a multi-criteria decision approach to identify and prioritise key areas for improvement. Discussion among the participants allowed the identification of the research problem. Within this process the range and size of the selected issues will be defined as well as the prioritisation of key dimensions for improvement under each of the theoretical dimensions. This will be underpinned by the potential for issues to be solved and their significance throughout the organisation. Action learning sets consisting of focus groups and interviews will enable participants to discuss the conceptual framework dimensions and identify opportunities to improve co-ordination between agencies and oversight.

The use of a participative action learning process would prove to the participants that problems can be taken control of and resolved collaboratively to develop and implement a new organisational culture of workplace learning. The initial cognitive step of the action learning process involves presenting participants with novel ideas and knowledge, as well as helping them develop new ways of thinking. The following step requires this new understanding to be absorbed and to result in behavioural changes. The Action Research and Action Learning methods employed facilitate a process of continuous deliberation and reflection that at the same time contributes to organisational change by raising awareness of the theoretical dimensions and stimulating learning and development within the research domain. The key outcomes for stage 2 are recommendations for improving the governance, oversight and accountability of the private sector, and prioritisation of performance dimensions, key criteria and framework.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Aims</th>
<th>Stage I: Exploratory Phase</th>
<th>Stage II: Design Phase</th>
<th>Stage III: Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify the key characteristics of existing external and internal control systems</td>
<td>Explore the effectiveness of control systems</td>
<td>To implement and validate assessment framework for the UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Stage I: Exploratory Phase</th>
<th>Stage II: Design Phase</th>
<th>Stage III: Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Researchers Analysis</td>
<td>Action Learning 3 x Groups</td>
<td>Participants Observation Action Learning 1 x Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Analysis</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampling</th>
<th>Stage I: Exploratory Phase</th>
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<th>Stage III: Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convenience and purposive sampling</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Stage I: Exploratory Phase</th>
<th>Stage II: Design Phase</th>
<th>Stage III: Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Department Managers, Security Guards, Clients, Senior Police Officers, Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Department Managers, Security Guards, Clients, Senior Police Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government Department Managers, Security Guards, Clients, Senior Police Officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Analysis</th>
<th>Stage I: Exploratory Phase</th>
<th>Stage II: Design Phase</th>
<th>Stage III: Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thematic Analysis</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Stage I: Exploratory Phase</th>
<th>Stage II: Design Phase</th>
<th>Stage III: Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Themes</td>
<td>Regime, Baseline, Gaps, Issues</td>
<td>Key Themes Performance Dimension, Key Criteria, Framework</td>
<td>Key Themes Validated Framework, Improvement Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12 Action Research Plan**
Stage 3 represents the implementation and validation of the framework implementing final evaluation involving assessing actual improvements on the basis of the research and organisational aims. The outcome of this stage is the implementation and validation of the framework and improvement plan. The implementation phase in this study represents a change process where key actors begin to internalise the new knowledge based on the framework. The implementation and validation phase in stage 3 is based on piloting the assessment framework and generating a policy document for the full implementation of the new framework.

The aim is to determine whether the framework is comprehensible and viable. The usefulness of the proposed framework can be evaluated in terms of whether it presents a reasonable theoretical proposition for external parties. Validation draws on input from concerned stakeholders to ascertain the usefulness of the approach and its usability in a research context. This is a dynamic process whereby discussion and feedback provide opportunity to refine and develop the model. This validation process occurs during expert interviews, focus groups and case study interviews. The model is continually revised drawing on new insights, reflections and comments to arrive at a model that is perceived as reasonable to achieve the research goal.

This piloting and validation will be achieved in three ways. Firstly, at the organisational level assessment instruments will be piloted with managers at the private security companies. This will be in the form of performance reviews of managers and security guards and team meetings to discuss the new policy. This process will be observed by the researcher to generate feedback. The new framework and recommendations will also be discussed at inter-organisational level in the form of expert discussions. In each performance domain key personnel considered experts in their policy or operational field will meet to discuss the validity of the new framework until consensus is achieved regarding the key priorities and measures. For example representatives from Abu Dhabi Police (ADP) and managers from the private sector companies will engage in expert discussions on the coordinating mechanisms, structures and key performance indicators developed within the new framework. This
intervention is repeated for all of the assessment dimensions. The final outcome will be a framework for strengthening governance, accountability and service delivery within the private security sector.

4.6 Research Model

RQ1. What are the key characteristics of the external and internal control systems for private security programme in Abu Dhabi?

RQ2. How effective are the controls systems implemented by private security programme in the Abu Dhabi?

RQ3. What are the critical components and mechanisms for the effective performance of private security in the UAE?

RQ4. What performance framework should be constructed for assessing the effectiveness of private security companies?

RQ5. What are the key factors for the implementation of an assessment framework to ensure effective governance, oversight and accountability in private security in the UAE?
External Control Dimensions

Political Dimension
- Public-Private Collaboration: Actors, Relations, Mechanisms, Type
- Communication channels,
- Public Confidence: Domestic & international public confidence
- FDI: FDI in sector

Economic Dimension
- Competition: Competitive Assessment, Strategic Vision, Absorptive Capacity
- Efficiency: Cost Analysis, Investment levels

Social
- Service Quality: Client satisfaction, Citizen satisfaction

Democratic
- Transparency: Scope and availability of company data, Reporting framework
- Managerial Oversight: Assessment of monitoring and control systems
- Public Engagement: Citizen Engagement, Media and Industry Engagement

Legal
- After-fact Accountability: Complaints procedure, Level of Complaints, Perceived fairness in complaint and redress
- Regulation: Assessment of regulatory framework

Internal Control Dimensions

Action Controls
- Direction Setting: Communication of Desired Behaviours
- Supervision: Leadership Assessment, Regularity of Performance Evaluations
- Motivation: Security Personnel Motivation

Personnel Controls
- Recruitment and Selection: Assessment of recruitment and selection processes
- Training: Assessment of organisational learning capacity
- Resource Provision: Technological and resource capacity

Cultural Controls
- Performance Management: Reward and penalty system, Assessment of Performance Management
- Codes of Conduct: Internalisation of values, Cultural assessment

Figure 13 Research Model
4.7 Research Methods

The research methods proposed align with this research philosophy. An exploratory inductive mixed-method approach, combining qualitative and quantitative data collection is proposed. This approach enables the collection of data from different sources to allow exploration of the key issues. A range of methods will be adopted to gather data and support the research process: formal and informal interviews, focus groups, participant observation and review of documents. A mixed methods approach is acknowledged as facilitating a number of advantages over traditional research designs, primarily focused on the potential to compensate for weaknesses in any one particular method (Jick, 1979). Furthermore, the rationale for this approach acknowledges the advantage of multiple methods in enabling in-depth and holistic investigation to address exploratory research objectives within highly complex multi-faceted research contexts (Gummesson, 2000). At each stage of the research process several methods are employed that were considered appropriate to gather data to address the specific research focus in that stage.

The methods employed are consistent with other studies that have investigated police privatisation or the private security sector. An examination of studies in the area of private security and policing focusing on privatisation and accountability indicates a broad range of research designs. Table 4-1 summarises the methodologies utilised across a range of studies focused on police, private security and criminal justice in the context of privatisation. Of the twenty studies half are based on secondary data: archive analysis, literature review or systematic review of previous studies. However, a case study approach has been employed predominantly in the studies examined that utilise a range of methods including document analysis, interviews, observations and survey (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007; Davis, 2003, Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014; Mawby et al., 2009; Battaglio, 2009). In all these studies the researchers appear to have placed emphasis on gathering both quantitative and qualitative data on specific contexts. Interviews were significant in drawing out in-depth experiences and knowledge from managers and senior actors (Lopes, 2015; Mayby et al., 2009; Noaks, 2008) or citizen preferences or perceptions of privatisation (Battaglio, 2009). Observations
were utilised in several studies to provide insights of private security in a natural context. Löfstrand et al. (2016) in a recent ethnographic case study analysed private security officers’ occupational culture in the context of British initiatives aimed at professionalising this industrial sector. The study’s methodology included on the one hand direct observation within two separate fieldwork locations of private security officers undertaking their functions, and on the other hand an analysis of the two security companies’ promotional publications and a number of their documents focusing on the professionalisation initiatives (Löfstrand et al., 2016). Fieldwork observations were employed to understand modi operandi and the culture of private security officers within an analysis of policing activities. Additionally, a number of group interviews and debates were undertaken involving sampled subsets of the security firms’ representatives, of security officers and of people employed within this industry (Löfstrand et al., 2016). A case study approach utilising multiple methods can provide opportunity to study a range of complex issues from across the perspective of multiple stakeholders. Swedish and British studies have focused specifically on the experience of stigma and on the strategies private security officers employ to enhance their self-esteem. An ethnographic methodology was thus adopted by both studies for its capacity to yield in-depth insights into the meanings ascribed by security guards to contextualised interactions and events, as well as an understanding of their occupational culture (Löfstrand et al., 2016; Manzo, 2012). The data thus obtained on Swedish and British private security field officers’ perspectives, attitudes and concerns, shared and individual circumstances, expectations and interpretations was comparable (Löfstrand et al., 2016). The data was gathered by accompanying security officers in both night and day shifts, 42 in Sweden and 38 in the UK, and recorded in thoroughly designed field notes and meticulous research diaries. In both countries, the sample comprised female and male officers, ethnic minority and majority guards, older and younger workers, as well as a range of security and patrolling experience from 20 to 20 or more years (Löfstrand et al., 2016). Quantitative data gather from document analysis or survey can provide insight into patterns. The examination of the British sample’s demographic profile in Löfstrand et al. (2016) indicated at both research sites the existence of a hierarchical system.
based on ethnicity and class, also evidenced in two existing operational cultures. While the majority of the field security officers belonged to ethnic minorities, the higher level managers and chief executives of the security companies were white with professional backgrounds (Löfstrand et al., 2016). Quantitative surveys found that front-line security officers had working-class, low-pay occupational backgrounds, in contrast to the company heads and managers’ backgrounds, and showed some degree of racialisation in the over-representation of ethnic minorities in the rank and file of security officers. A case study approach provided multidimensional insights into organisations, regulations and laws applying in the security industry, as well as socio-political disparities (Löfstrand et al., 2016).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Type/Method</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Analytical Procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abrahamsen and Williams (2007)</td>
<td>Private security and non-state authority</td>
<td>Case study; fieldwork visits; interviews</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertson (2014)</td>
<td>Performance management</td>
<td>Theoretical discussion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayley and Shearing (2001)</td>
<td>New structure of policing</td>
<td>Systematic review</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>Content analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley and Sedgewick (2009)</td>
<td>The increasing role of private security in New Zealand policing</td>
<td>Secondary data and document analysis</td>
<td>New Zealand security industry</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis (2003)</td>
<td>Public Accountability of Private Police</td>
<td>Case study; interviews</td>
<td>3 country case studies private sector</td>
<td>Content analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heath et al., 2006</td>
<td>Economic analysis of police outsourcing</td>
<td>Case study qualitative/quantitative; Organisational data and surveys</td>
<td>2 police detention suites</td>
<td>Quantitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heath et al., 2009</td>
<td>Issues in outsourcing police services</td>
<td>Case study qualitative/quantitative; Organisational data and surveys</td>
<td>2 police detention suites</td>
<td>Thematic analysis and descriptive statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light (2002)</td>
<td>The Effects of Privatization on Public Services</td>
<td>Archival analysis</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>Content analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Type/Method</td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Analytical Procedure</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopes (2015)</td>
<td>Private security accountability</td>
<td>Case study: semi-structured interviews, documentary data, observations</td>
<td>2 x Private Security Companies</td>
<td>Descriptive statistics; document analysis; thematic analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawby et al (2009)</td>
<td>Workforce modernization and police reform</td>
<td>Case study; Interviews; observations; document analysis; survey</td>
<td>Detention Suites</td>
<td>Qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawby et al (2009)</td>
<td>Organisational development, workforce modernization;</td>
<td>Survey, interviews</td>
<td>Detention officers</td>
<td>Quantitative/Qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noaks (2008)</td>
<td>Collaboration between police-private security</td>
<td>18 month Case study; ethnographic study; observations, survey</td>
<td>255 citizen, Interviews, 1x private security company</td>
<td>Quantitative/Qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rushin (2012)</td>
<td>Regulation of the private policing sector</td>
<td>Secondary data analysis</td>
<td>Private Police regulations U.S</td>
<td>Qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shefer (2008)</td>
<td>Prison privatisation and staff-prisoner relations</td>
<td>Literature review</td>
<td>Literature (N=60)</td>
<td>Literature review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.7.1 Interviews

This study has adopted a semi-structured interview to gather primary qualitative data from managers at the private security companies. The interviews were based on initial structure based on question items drawn from the literature review and conceptual framework. Open in-depth format was adopted throughout this process to provide maximum flexibility to allow exploration of any points arising. Semi-structured and in-depth interviews are used in qualitative research to address ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions (Saunders et al., 2009). This was important to establish a baseline and understanding of existing practise and issues. This approach can also place more emphasis on explaining the ‘why’ question and gain perspectives from security managers regarding the reasons or causes. In-depth interview is an unstructured aspect with intensive technique focused on the individual and consisting of open-ended questions designed to elicit participants’ perspectives in relation to a particular topic (Boyce and Neale, 2006). Despite their open structure interviews can be based on a selected list of themes allowing the collection of similar kinds of data from participants (King and Horrocks, 2010). The open questions and the flexibility offered for clarifying responses and probing issues which may emerge in the interview provides the means to collect rich and in-depth data on the research topic leading to insights inaccessible through more structured methods and larger sample sizes (Saunders et al., 2009). Interviews are beneficial for exploring the attitudes, beliefs, motivations and experiences of participants relating to the research questions (Malhotra and Birks, 2000) and for understanding why they may hold these perspectives (King, 2004). This enables greater insight into the underlying contextual influences and factors impacting the research topic providing a more holistic and complete view (Saunders et al., 2009). However a number of limitations are acknowledged particularly in relation to the increased potential for the introduction of researcher bias both during the interview and in interpretation of the data. Further interviews can be both expensive and time-consuming to conduct and analyse (Bryman and Bell, 2007).
4.7.2 Expert Discussions

Expert discussions are one of the four elements employed in the review stage. Expert discussions were integrated into the action learning sessions. An expert was defined as a person with in-depth knowledge of experience of the specific process in the implementation of the private security in the UAE either in terms of legal, security or licensing. This study utilises a sample of experts to access the specific knowledge and expertise they possess in their respective fields. Experts can further promote explanations and understanding arising from their subjective perspective (Van Audenhove, 2007), suggesting that an additional level of expert interpretation on beliefs, rules and relevance can be obtained. Experts are defined as consultants both domestic and international, academic experts from the academic community and expert professionals employed in different areas of the private security sector and government and legal bodies. Experts can provide a unique and informed view drawing on their involvement at the core of the generation and implementation of strategies, solutions and policies; they have privileged access to information on key actors and stakeholders and decision-making processes (Meuser and Nagel, 2009; Littig, 2008). Van Audenhove (2007) emphasises three distinct types of technique, process and explanatory expert knowledge that can potentially make a valuable contribution to this study. The first two types imply specific, explicit knowledge of technical factors and dimensions, in conjunction with information on the interactions, processes and routines that can fulfil the research goals. Littig (2011) points to expert possession of tacit knowledge in relation to norms, collective orientations and social interpretations and patterns.

This expert discussions were based on principle of Delphi method and integrated into the action learning sets. The participants in the action learning represented highly experienced and knowledge personnel including security advisors, legal and national security institute. A number of key advantages are associated with utilising a Delphi technique for this study. An important attribute is that the iterative approach allows for the “collective human intelligence capability” found among groups of experts to be exploited.
(Linstone and Turoff, 1975). Often the technique can provide expert concurrence on a given topic where none previously existed extending to the provision of guidance in domains with undefined, evolving policies and practices (Sackman, 1975; Burris, 2011). The capacity for providing a collective expert view on the most effective approaches to a developing problem is highly beneficial for this study given the emerging and dynamic character of privatisation. The lack of peer pressure provided to experts by the anonymity inherent in Delphi methods (Cole et al., 2013) allows experts to freely express their opinions and challenge entrenched assumptions embedded in agencies, stakeholder groups or accepted domain understanding (Donohue and Needham, 2009). As a result a consensus can be reached that may be representative of a wide range of interests and perspectives, strategies and solutions (Cole et al., 2013).

4.7.3 Survey

The survey method is utilised in stage one of this research to gather quantitative data from three key groups: corporate clients of the private security companies, citizens and private security guards. The security guard survey reproduced in Appendix 3 was designed to explore attitudes and perceptions of private security personnel towards their work. Issues of interest include the nature of private security guard careers and work, their job satisfaction and security personnel perceptions of their organisations and the systems that influence their work and performance. Separate surveys were also designed to measure public and client attitudes and perceptions of different aspects of private security service delivery as detailed in Appendices 4 and 5.

In the context of a security and justice development programme, the baseline gauge of progress is the local people’s perception of justice and security. The survey method provides a fast and convenient approach to obtain objective data on a range of variables from the three groups (Creswell et al., 2003). Clients and citizens can provide indication of their satisfaction of service delivery. A survey of employees of the private security companies can provide data on working practices. The data obtained through the study of a sample of
the three populations can be used to describe the existing state of private service delivery. Galliers (1992) shows that although surveys do not reveal the processes and causes underlying the phenomena studied, they provide descriptions of real world events which are reasonably accurate.

4.7.4 Action Learning Groups

Action Learning is a process involving a small group focused on addressing real world problems, learning as individuals and teams and undertaking action. It is argued to support the development of flexible, creative strategies for urgent issues (Kember, 2000). An Action Learning group method has been adopted to gather in-depth qualitative data. Action Learning groups provide the opportunity to assemble a group of selected individuals to discuss a specific topic or set of subjects (Wilkinson, 2004; Kitzinger, 2005). Using this method, a moderator facilitates informal discussion within a dynamic setting (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2013). The moderator’s guide used for these sessions is reproduced in Appendix 6. Participants represented stakeholders with interests in the private security sector from the public police, managers and guards from the private sector, licensing authority and Department for Private Security Companies. The aim is to access the similar background, concerns or experiences, so as to develop understanding of the existing state, and needs consensus regarding the performance of the private security sector (Liamputtong, 2009; Hennink, 2007).

The rationale for adopting this approach is grounded in both the flexibility of the communication process and the diversity and richness of responses that can be generated collectively (Madriz, 2003). Action Learning groups firstly provide significant flexibility to interact and engage with participants in a relatively unstructured setting (Conradson, 2005). Participants can express themselves in a less intimidating environment, in their own voice and modes of communication. This generates the opportunity to communicate and express themselves in different, more personalised ways and to share knowledge and experience in a less formal manner (Liamputtong, 2011). In turn, this allows for greater freedom to explore knowledge and understanding that may otherwise have remained hidden using more conventional methods.
(Gaiser, 2008; Kitzinger, 2005). Action Learning groups can further provide detailed, rich data in relation to the perceptions, risks, needs, processes and approaches in policing privatisation (Madriz, 2003; Stewart et al., 2009; Davidson et al., 2010). The data from Action Learning groups can be continually enriched during the process (Davidson et al., 2010). Critically, the interaction within Action Learning groups allows for ideas to develop and evolve as the setting facilitates continuous review and reflection, and provides an opportunity to revisit, clarify, and revise views, and to draw out consensus and learning on the topics under discussion (Davidson et al., 2010). Nevertheless Action Learning groups are subject to a significant limitation relating to the inhibitions created by the group context, which may mean that participants are reluctant to disclose more personal experiences or information (Hopkins, 2007). This can extend to institutional contexts, such as the workplace or, in the case of this study, a community of experts, where participants may be disinclined to express views or share personal experiences in front of other colleagues (Liamputtong, 2011). This emphasises the need for effective moderation to encourage participation and draw out reflections during the process.

4.7.5 Observation

An observation method was adopted in the final stage of validating the assessment framework. Observation has been defined as "the systematic description of events, behaviors, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989, p.79). The observation method involves watching and recording ongoing behaviour without however endeavouring to intervene or influence it (McBurney and White, 2009). Observational research is frequently adopted in social science studies and other disciplines as a tool for gathering data on processes, cultures and people in qualitative research. This is primarily because it allows the observation of the flow of behaviour within its own situation and context in contrast to the artificial and controlled settings of other methods. This can help the researcher achieve an improved understanding of the phenomenon and context and thus is suggested to provide greater ecological validity (McBurney and White, 2009). Nevertheless
there are acknowledged limitations in the incapacity to explore underlying causes of behaviours and the inability to identify if a particular observation is representative of typical behaviour (Marshall and Rossman, 1989).

4.7.6 Document Analysis

Document analysis was incorporated in the research as an additional data source for its potential to contribute important information which could not necessarily be gathered from interviews, including data on policies and strategies being implemented or developed, allocated budgets, decision-making processes and performance. An additional advantage is the comparative cost-effectiveness of documentary analysis, as most official material is now freely available on the Internet (Saunders et al., 2009). Document analysis involves the systematic review, evaluation and interpretation of documentary material to provide meaning and enable understanding and empirical knowledge of a research topic (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Analysis of documents engages similar techniques to the content analysis practised in other qualitative research methods entailing the categorisation of data under themes and codes (Saunders et al., 2009). Quantitative and qualitative data can be collected from three principal kinds of documents including public records containing data on the official and ongoing activities of an organisation and including documents such as mission statements and annual reports.

4.8 Sampling Strategy

This study adopts a convenience and purposeful sampling approach selecting key stakeholders to participate in each stage of the Action Research process. This approach was adopted for two primary reasons. Firstly, the practical considerations and time pressure in organising action research approach limited the ability achieve large samples for each of the research method adopted. Secondly, focus was placed on gathering in-depth rich data and gather perspectives and views of key actors with valuable knowledge of police privatisation in the UAE are represented (Saunders et al., 2009). A convenience approach was required to draw together professionals in the industry.
Stage 1 of the research design involved survey and interview data collection methods as shown in Appendix 2. Three separate surveys were administered to three different groups: private security personnel (n=105), clients (n=3) and the general public (n=104). Security guard personnel were sample from 5 private companies operating in Abu Dhabi operating predominantly in public spaces. The sample frame at these companies total 250 and the completed surveys represented a response rate of 42%. The response rate for members of the public was 52% of total number of participants invited to participate. The focus was to gather data quantitative exploratory data from the employees at the security guard companies, members of the public using public spaces where PSC were operating and the clients who contract the services of the PSC. Corporate clients are owners of the public space facilities (ie shopping malls) while the primary contractors are the private security companies.

Interviews with key stakeholders were also conducted involving 13 senior representatives from the UAE government, ADP, and the private security sector.

Stage 2 of this research was undertaken using Action Research in two Action Learning groups. Participants represented a cross-section of stakeholders with interests in the private security sector. Action Learning Group 1 involved 8 participants drawn from private security management and academic domains. Action Learning Group 2 involved six participants sampled from the private security sector, ADP and academia. Participants included relevant officers from the Abu Dhabi police department, managers and guards from the private security sector, and government representatives from the licensing authority and department for private security companies. Stage 3 of the research predominantly involved observation of 6 private security company participants within 3 companies. The roles of the different professional stakeholders who participated in the interviews ad expert discussions and observations are detailed in the participant list in Appendix 2.
4.9 Instrument Design

To maximise the reliability and validity of the research instrument question items were adopted from pre-existing validated measures and scales widely used in the literature. The research model for the study provided the guiding structure of the key dimensions to explore relating to external and internal accountability systems. Internal accountability and control systems were based on questions from the literature. The structure from Lopes et al (2014) was adopted and question items were formulated related to action controls (direction setting actions, motivation, supervision, evaluation); personnel controls (recruitment and selection, training, resources); and cultural controls (values, disciplinary systems, rewards system).

For the private security guards survey instrument question items were adopted and adapted from a validated instrument based on industry, experts and theoretical evidence developed by the Centre of Protection of National Infrastructure in the UK (CPNI, 2011). The scales measure security guard satisfaction and motivation assessing perceptions across a number of dimensions: job satisfaction, job fulfilment, staff engagement and role clarity, resourcing, motivation, management and supervision, team performance and the organisation’s capacity for learning and innovation. Adapted from the CPNI instrument 42 items were shortlisted to measure: resources (4 items); supervision (4 items); performance and feedback (4 items); management and supervision (4 items); organisation and team support (6 items); team identity and functioning (2 items); role clarity (4 items); staff engagement (6 items); job fulfilment (4 items), and job satisfaction (4 items). For knowledge management related and organisational learning items were drawn from validated and widely employed measures for each dimension (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Ebers and Maurer, 2014; Andersson et al., 2002) of absorptive capacity (4 items); relational embeddedness (3 items); inter-organisational trust (3 items); technological capacity (2 items), and network embeddedness (3 items).

Client and citizen surveys were based on the literature drawing question items and elements from police privatisation studies (Gimenez-Salinas, 2004; Heath
et al., 2006; Battaglio, 2009; Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014). The client survey evaluated client satisfaction with security officer and firm performance across four key areas of security officer qualities, skills, performance and firm performance. The general public survey assessed citizens’ (n=104) views in relation to private security service quality encompassing six areas focused on sample characteristics in addition to citizen perceptions and satisfaction. For the citizen survey this resulted in 16 items: Contact with security guards (3 items); citizens attitudes to security guards work (4 items); professionalism and integrity (4 items); satisfaction (3 items) and perceived relationship between private security and police (2 items). The client survey included a total of 13 items: rating of qualities (3 items); skills (3 items); guard performance (3 items) and firm performance (4 items).

Questions for action learning, expert-based discussions and semi-structured interviews were developed drawing on interview questions and issues identified in the literature including a wide range of qualitative studies (Shefer and Liebling, 2008; Heath et al., 2009; Mawby et al., 2009; Zhong and Grabosky, 2009; Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014; Sukhram, 2015).

4.10 Negotiating Access

Ordinarily research must undergo a process of communication and negotiation with gatekeepers to discuss and explain the aim and benefits of the project, arrange access and gain approval to conduct organisational research (Saunders et al., 2009). In this case the researcher conducting this study is a senior person who heads the Private Security Business Department and is in part a primary gatekeeper. This presented an ethical issue as the researcher plays a dual role as both researcher and senior professional in the industry under study and I am known by research participants. Consequently, it was acknowledged that this would potentially influence the data collection and may create pressure for participants who report to the researcher in a professional capacity or exercise decision-making powers in relation to private security companies. For some groups of research participants such as those undertaking survey and 1-1 interviews it was possible to ensure anonymity
and confidentiality by following the ethical procedures outlined in the previous section.

This issue was envisaged and key measures were undertaken. This included communicating and ensuring all participants were aware that participation was voluntary and their rights to withdraw. Third parties were used as gatekeepers in each organisation to publicise information through information communications that omitted the role of the researcher. Direct contact was minimised by participants who were made aware of the project and could decide to participate without rejecting and invitation. Organisational staff was approached through gatekeepers indirectly through internal communications supervised by key contact at each organisation. This is supplemented by online participation information. The largest group of research participants were security guards and managers at the private security companies. All security guards were be able to view the information anonymously online and they will be able to view all the information sheet, participation information and access and complete the survey and submit anonymously. To maintain anonymity not written consent is collected. Participants will be given a consent statement and give verbal approval to proceed or in the case of the online survey read the consent and proceeding confirms their consent.

In regards to recruiting for interviews and action learning group managers the same process is followed except that managers willing to participate could opt-in full knowledge that any communications and participation will remain private and confidential. Action research presents a challenge for the action learning circles (Blake, 2007). As such participant recruitment and engagement was staged so that in the early phase they were made fully aware indirectly of the project and the opportunity to participate. Information was provided to clearly explained their rights withdraw and that no identification would be recorded. There were made aware of the collective nature of action research. Once individuals for the action learning sessions indicated their interest to participate then the nature of the project was clearly explained information by online information and at the beginning of the first session. The advantage of action research strategy emphasised a problem-solving exercise where participants
had the opportunity to engage and would be encouraged to participate. Based on experience from action research Blake (2007) found that negotiating and providing time to establish guidelines aided in making participants feel more relaxed. Allocating time for discussing and clarifying the purpose of the activity aided mitigating potential anxiety. It was stressed to participants there was interest in your views and all your comments were fine whatever you have to say is fine with us. There are no right or wrong answers. Focused was placed on identifying issues and solutions and continually reinforcing the purpose of learning from each and reflecting and reviewing our ideas and learning from each other. Further, action research participants were made aware that they could withdraw their consent at any time and their contribution or views would not be utilised. By acknowledging this challenge the researcher was conscious to consistently encourage and support critical contributions, ask questions and ensure that participants offered their views voluntarily. Emphasis was placed on promoting open friendly dialogue and allowing time for participants to feel comfortable and relaxed.

4.11 Data Collection

For this study, data was gathered between March-May 2017 across the three Action Research stages employing the research methods: semi-structured interviews, survey, focus groups, document analysis and expert discussions.

In the exploratory stage data collection was focused on three surveys and semi-structured interviews. Gatekeepers in each organisation were emailed information about the surveys that was distributed to security personnel within their internal communication systems. Participants were able to view all information about the survey online including description and purpose of the research, participation information and their rights. The survey for members of the general public was conducted in person initially. Members of the public were approached directly by the researcher in public space sites where private security companies operate and invited to participate after explaining the project. They were given project information to read and subject to their verbal consent completed and submitted the five minute survey using an iPad
anonymously. All participants were able to view the information complete and submit the survey anonymously online. To maintain anonymity written consent was not collected. It was made clear that proceeding with the survey amounted to consent. SurveyMonkey a widely used survey system in industry and academia was employed to record responses. All data was securely submitted and password protected and downloaded and saved in a secure location for analysis. All interviews and action learning sessions were digitally recorded. It was explained that once recorded started no one’s full name should be used. Participants were given a consent statement and required to give verbal approval to proceed. Expert discussions were conducted as part of the action learning sessions at the end of each session. The respective experts in each field were provided opportunity to lead a discussion and provide expert insights into a specific area of private security operation.

The documentary evidence was gathered both from accessible organisational documents, such as public company reports, internal procedural documents, and organisational policies, and from confidential documents, such as employee files and records (Lopez, 2014). Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 builds on the research design in Figure 10 and maps data collection for the external and internal dimensions with the data to be collected for each method in relation to each performance dimension.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted utilising an interview guide outlined in Appendix 7 and based on the participant list in Appendix 2. The interview duration was approximately 50mins. Direct observations lasting 1 hour of one of the organisation’s strategy and 5 meeting sessions with senior managers to gauge their response and feedback to the proposed solutions arising from the action research. Participants were informed of the observation as outlined in Appendix 8. Actions learning sessions were conducted an independent facility. Sessions were organised at hotel meeting room in Abu Dhabi and lasted 4 hours excluding breaks and refreshments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Dimension</th>
<th>Sub-Dimension</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>Private Security Companies</td>
<td>• No/Profile of competition • Financial Performance • Strategic Vision • Absorptive Capacity</td>
<td>Document analysis, survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Input costs/Price levels of quality services</td>
<td>Document analysis, survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Investment levels</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Private-Public Co-operation</td>
<td>Process (Public-private co-ordination)</td>
<td>• Forms of co-operating • Types programs activities • Level of integration • Level of Trust • Communication channels • No of Public-private sector partnerships/initiatives • Information sharing mechanisms • Perceptions and Attitudes</td>
<td>Interview, survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate Employment</td>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>Employment Statistics</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attract foreign direct investment</td>
<td>Private Security Companies</td>
<td>FDI in sector</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase domestic &amp; international public confidence</td>
<td>Client, Citizen</td>
<td>Confidence Levels</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Service Quality</td>
<td>Client, Consumer</td>
<td>Service Quality Satisfaction</td>
<td>Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Prices</td>
<td>Service Prices</td>
<td>Diversity of service offering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Dimension</td>
<td>Sub-Dimension</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity and Need</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Democratic            | Transparency  | Private Security Companies | • Scope and degree of availability of private security company data: financial, complaints  
• Reporting Requirements and Framework | Document analysis |
|                       |               |                 |                                                                      |                         |
|                       | Managerial Oversight | Private security Business Department | Monitoring and control systems | Interview          |
|                       | Openness public action |                 | Treatment in public discussion | Content analysis    |
| Industry association and action | Industry associations | | • Description of industry association  
• Types of professional forums and activities  
• Scope and frequency of association initiatives/debate | Interviews            |
|                       |               |                 |                                                                      |                         |
|                       | Enhance citizen role in collective action and choices | Citizens, Media, | • Degree and diversity of citizen engagement in discussion and debate  
• Media engagement  
• Public discussion  
• Diversity of engagement measures | Content analysis    |
| Legal                 | Comprehensive framework | | • Regulatory/legal structure  
• Type and scope of regulations  
• Roles and responsibilities | Interviews, document analysis |
|                       | After-the-fact Accountability | Complaints and misconduct processes | • Complaints procedure  
• Level of Complaints  
• Perceived fairness in complaint and redress | Interviews, document analysis |
### Table 4-3 Data Collection Framework for Internal Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Systems</th>
<th>Key Components</th>
<th>Key Measures</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Controls</td>
<td>Direction setting of actions and operations</td>
<td>• Effective Communication of Desired Behaviours&lt;br&gt;• Improvement Plans</td>
<td>Communication Process</td>
<td>• Description of policy and processes and&lt;br&gt;• Perceptions and attitudes</td>
<td>Document analysis, interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>• Level of Security Personnel Motivation</td>
<td>Security Guards</td>
<td>Components of Motivation Scores:&lt;br&gt;Job satisfaction, Staff engagement, Job fulfilment, Pride in Job</td>
<td>Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>• Leadership competence&lt;br&gt;• Proactive monitoring&lt;br&gt;• Regularity of Performance Evaluations</td>
<td>Managers, Supervisors</td>
<td>Management performance:&lt;br&gt;Manager/Supervisor performance scores, Team Support score, Role clarity score</td>
<td>Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Controls</td>
<td>Recruitment and Selection</td>
<td>• Effectiveness of recruitment and selection process</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Process description</td>
<td>Interview, document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>• Effectiveness of training and development</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Training evaluation scores</td>
<td>Survey, Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource Provision</td>
<td>• Monitoring of services</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>• Equipment and environment&lt;br&gt;• Perceived adequacy</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Controls</td>
<td>Codes of Conduct</td>
<td>• Internalization of the values</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Organisation Influences;&lt;br&gt;Value and culture score, Working practice score, Organisational characteristics score, Team identity score</td>
<td>Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance management</td>
<td>• Measures defined&lt;br&gt;• Internal Disciplinary System&lt;br&gt;• Fair penalty and reward system</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Performance management score</td>
<td>Survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.12 Data Analysis

Data analysis is defined by Yin (1994) as the examination, categorisation, tabulation or recombination of the data to address the research questions. Quantitative and qualitative procedures were employed to analyse the different datasets arising from the surveys, interviews, documents, action learning and observations.

4.12.1 Thematic Analysis Procedures

The interviews were transcribed, coded, categorised and then a careful study of the categories was conducted to create themes that enabled the researcher to analyse and interpret useful findings. All data was imported into NVivo 11 which provides the option to import audio recordings of interviews, observations as well as textual data. All content was reviewed and coded using the same software. A thematic analysis procedure was adopted in this study to analyse primary and secondary data. This provides a structured and systematic method supporting the reliability and validity of the research identifying and evaluating the critical success and failure factors of the outsourcing of police functions (Cresswell, 2009). Thematic analysis is a method to identify, analyse and present patterns within the data with themes capturing important aspects of the data relating to the research question and representing a degree of patterned response or meaning within the dataset (Braun and Clarke, 2006, pg. 82). Themes can be identified both through application of a deductive, theoretical approach in which themes are identified prior to analysis or can emerge inductively from the data (Frith and Gleeson, 2004; Boyatzis, 1998). This method is asserted to provide an accessible and flexible approach to analysing qualitative data able to provide a detailed and in-depth account of the complexities inherent within police outsourcing processes and performance management (Braun and Clarke, 2006). A key advantage is the ability to usefully summarise significant features of a large data-set (Braun and Clarke, 2006), beneficial for this study given the large amount of data generated in which a range of complex factors are identified in relation to defining key elements, requirements and mechanisms for the success of police outsourcing. Thematic analysis is also an effective method
for generating unanticipated insights and drawing out similarities and differences within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This can allow new understandings of the standards and criteria contributing to the success of police outsourcing to emerge, which given the overall lack of research on this subject can inform the development of a framework and policies (Braun and Clarke, 2006) for police outsourcing.

The first phase of analysis involved organisation and familiarisation with the data, achieved through thorough and repeated reading to understand the depth and breadth of the content and search for meanings and patterns (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This ensures that no area of the data is unfamiliar and selectivity is not unconsciously applied.

The second phase undertook the initial coding of the data based on the application of themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this study an early list of themes were identified deductively prior to the thematic analysis based on a review of the literature in relation to police outsourcing. Empirical studies and theoretical literature between 2000 and 2015 were retrieved from journal publications dedicated to criminology including: *Criminal Justice Matters, Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, International Journal of Law in Context, The Police Journal, Criminology and Criminal Justice, British Journal of Criminology*, and *The Journal of Criminal Law*. These journals were selected as a result of their specific focus on criminal justice in addition to their capacity to represent practitioner and scholarly perspectives across different geographies. Articles were selected if titles pointed to a principal focus on an aspect of outsourcing or privatisation within police forces including key words such as police, privatisation, outsourcing, private sector, and private policing. In total 130 peer-reviewed articles across these journals were examined. Following a repetitive process each article was reviewed and ascribed to one or more of eight categories representing initial themes for later coding of the primary and secondary data. Strauss and Corbin (1990, pg.61) describe themes as “conceptual labels placed on discrete happenings, events, and other instances of phenomena.” Themes are therefore the classification of discrete concepts occurring when
concepts are compared and appear to relate to a similar phenomenon. Following this they are grouped together under a higher order concept termed a theme or category (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In this study the themes emerging from the literature were identified as: financial, market, quality, legal, organisational, performance management, tendering, and public service.

Following initial coding of the primary and secondary data under these themes the process was repeated to identify other potential themes or patterns emerging from the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Following exhaustive coding the analysis was refocused in a third phase to a broader level of overarching themes involving the sorting and collation of coded data under the themes identified. This process involved consideration of the different codes and in what way they may be combined to form overarching themes and subthemes. Themes were then reviewed and refined in which several themes were combined and others broken down further. Themes and subthemes were then clearly defined and named and the data within them analysed (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

4.12.2 Memoing

The analytical process was supported by writing memos within NVivo to enable categories and codes to be accurately recorded. Memoing is part of the previously described extended coding process, which facilitated analysis (Punch, 2013). The memos were referred to during the process of determining the relationships between categories and of establishing the preliminary theoretical framework. The process through which preliminary codes became focused codes and ultimately abstract categories will be described to support the validity of the Action Research approach. Memoing significantly facilitated the categorisation and analysis processes by enabling ideas appearing during the coding to be made a note of, thereby allowing their role and appropriateness to be determined at a later stage without the constraint to immediately specify their relevance within the research reflection and insights (Punch, 2013). In particular, memoing and reflection on the memos was critical in the emergence of the final categories from the focused codes, derived from the preliminary ones.
4.12.3 Quantitative Descriptive Analysis

The quantitative survey form the three surveys was imported and descriptively analysed in SPSS version 24. The aim of the analysis was to provide quantitative data of the attitudes of stakeholders across a range of dimensions. The survey data have been analysed statistically using SPSS and descriptive analysis has been undertaken and the data has been used by the focus groups to understand and discuss the issues arising from the surveys.

4.13 Ethics in Research

Moral principles and values should underpin research at all stages, from design to publication through analysis and all related activities (Burton, 2000). Non-maleficence is an all-encompassing principle acknowledged in this study aimed at protecting participants from any possible harm. This has entailed that due care and consideration in respect of the potential for harm to participants has been taken in all stages during the planning, designing, and implementation of the research and its processes. Drew et al. (2008) give a wide-ranging definition of harm comprising the possible adverse impacts research can have on participants, such as physical discomfort, and psychological stress. Although this research is not anticipated to provoke psychological distress given the non-emotionally sensitive nature of the topic nevertheless qualitative methods are asserted by Yin (2010) to underline the importance of non-maleficence due to the control they allow researchers to have throughout the recording, collection and interpretation of data. Moreover, Josselson (1996) points out how research participants can feel betrayed by a misinterpretation of the data they provide. Therefore proactive measures were taken to ensure that the data was accurately and faithfully recorded in this study through digitally recording interviews. Subsequent to transcription interview transcripts were made available to the participants in order to confirm with them their accuracy.

The principle of autonomy is closely related to that of non-maleficence; autonomy is the individual’s right to decide of their own free will which activities they shall participate in (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Thus, according to Adams (2013), autonomy implies understanding of the requirements and freedom
from coercion on the part of the individual. Bryman (2012) underlines that, for potential participants to take an informed decision, providing them with all possible information is imperative; autonomy is therefore based on the process of informed consent. In accordance with Adams (2013), this study fully disclosed its nature, purpose and methods, and provided thorough information to participants on their rights and on the risks, benefits and alternatives, as well as on their right to pose all the questions they considered necessary to making an informed decision and to withdraw at any time from the study.

Bryman and Bell (2007) emphasise the importance of the right to privacy, i.e. the preservation of anonymity and confidentiality, as a fundamental principle in ensuring non-maleficence in the process of research. According to Nagy (2005), maintaining privacy in qualitative studies such as the present one, can be a notable challenge during the collection and analysis of sensitive data. Following Saunders et al. (2009), and so as to ensure participants’ anonymity and data confidentiality, this study has implemented strict controls on access to data and concealed participants’ identities by removing all identifying details from research documents.

**4.14 Conclusion**

This chapter discussed possible approaches to this research and identified the interpretivist approach adopted as the most appropriate for achieving the key aims and objectives of this study. Underpinned by this approach, the selection of an Action Research strategy to collect predominantly qualitative data was described and justified. The research methodology for this study was developed to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability in private security in the UAE. Six key research methods are outlined and justified and the data collection procedures described. This was followed by a brief discussion of the research procedures relating to the sample population and identification succeeded by a description of the methods and techniques selected to analyse the qualitative data. Measures to strengthen the reliability and validity of the study were next outlined followed by a discussion of the ethical procedures adopted to ensure conformity of this research with ethical principles. In conclusion the chapter outlines a
systematic and robust research design to effectively examine police privatisation to provide key insight into the varying factors influencing the implementation of an assessment framework to ensure effective private security governance, oversight and accountability.
5 STAGE 1 EXPLORATORY RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the initial exploratory stage of research. This stage of the Action Research focused on gathering baseline data and insights into the existing state of governance, oversight and accountability within the private security sector. In this first stage both quantitative and qualitative data was gathered to identify and describe the key structures, roles and processes. The data from the first stage provided information on the existing state and baseline for all participants in the second stage to discuss and collaborate in the design process. This stage also represented a needs analysis phase as the aim was to understand specific needs from different actors across the different domains. Three surveys utilising participants from private security companies, clients and the general public were undertaken to collect the data in addition to a number of interviews with different stakeholders.

5.2 Survey

5.2.1 Private Security Companies
The private security company survey measured security personnel perceptions (n=105) across a number of dimensions: resourcing, motivation, management and supervision, team performance and the organisation’s capacity for learning and innovation. The descriptive results are tabulated in Appendix 9. For each dimension in Figure 14 participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agree to a number of statements. These results indicate the level of performance with 1= low and 5= high on each dimension.

Figure 14 shows that on average across the sector security personnel rated each dimension moderately. Security guards across the majority of dimensions based on these internal control factors perceived a moderate level of performance. The lowest rating was for role clarity which scored 2.7 while the highest score was for performance and feedback (3.9).
The highest score indicated moderate perceptions of regular supervisor contact and their understanding of procedures and performance targets. Staff engagement recorded a similar result of 3.78 suggesting moderate perceptions of skills development, responsibilities, and participation in decision-making. Team supervision in terms of fair and equal treatment and recognition registered a lower score of 3.77. Job fulfilment registered an average score of 3.6 indicating that participants viewed moderately that training prepared them well and they liked working for the organisation. Conversely a low average score of 2.79 was recorded for job satisfaction suggesting slight enjoyment of their work and the challenges involved. Results for role clarity including role confidence and awareness demonstrate the least positive perceptions with the lowest average score of 2.71.

Resource provision indicates a score of 3.24, the fourth lowest score recorded showing low to moderate perceptions of a safe working environment and provision and maintenance of the right equipment. Performance management
received a moderate score of 3.90 suggesting reasonably positive perceptions among participants of feedback processes and rewards for good performance. For organisation and team support a score of 3.6 indicates moderate perceptions of organisational fairness and treatment and management of poor performance. Team identity registered a low to moderate score of 3.13, indicating generally weak perceptions of regular discussions of issues and team member contribution.

The survey measured organisational learning and innovation based on four measures as shown in Table 5-1. Based on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=low, 5=high) the table shows that overall the scores were below moderate with the highest score recorded of 2.9 for Technological Capacity. This indicates low to moderate perceptions of the ability of their firm to incorporate and utilise new technological innovations. Network embeddedness registered the lowest score of 1.9 indicating a low level of organisational involvement in business and industry networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absorptive Capacity</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Capacity</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Embeddedness</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation Embeddedness</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1 Organisational Learning and Innovation Dimensions Survey

5.2.2 Client Survey

The Client Survey evaluated client satisfaction with security officer and firm performance across four key areas of security officer qualities, skills, performance and firm performance. Three clients who are the owners of the public space facilities (i.e. shopping malls) and contract the service of the private security companies. Respondents were questioned firstly for their views on the quality of the private security guards focusing on three aspects of professional appearance, motivation and reliability.
The composite scores are presented in Figure 15. This shows that on balance client satisfaction for private security firms was moderate. Satisfaction with three of the four dimensions was medium. In relation to security guard performance a moderate score of 3.3 indicates client satisfaction with responsiveness to security incidents, procedural knowledge and timeliness and completeness of security patrols. However two aspects registered below average scores of 2.8 revealing that clients were only partially satisfied with responsiveness and guards’ procedural knowledge.

For firm performance clients were partially satisfied with a rating of 2.6 addressing firm responsiveness to specific/specialised training requirements, flexibility in meeting requests for changes in staffing levels, responsiveness to concerns and issues, meeting minimum contract performance standards, commitment to quality assurance and continuous improvement and level of performance in the provision of supporting security and security-related services. Service provision received the lowest average score of 2.00 with the majority of 60% only partly satisfied and a minority not at all satisfied. Moreover a majority of clients indicated only partial satisfaction with firm commitment. In relation to firm responsiveness to specialised training requirements, staffing levels and client concerns a moderate score of 2.8 was recorded with 80% of clients expressing satisfaction.
5.2.3 General Public

The general public survey assessed citizens’ (n=104) views in relation to private security service quality encompassing six areas focused on sample characteristics in addition to citizen perceptions and satisfaction, as shown in Appendix 9. Figure 16 depicts the overall experience rating with the majority of respondents (71%) rating their overall experience as neutral, 30% positive and only 7% reporting a negative experience.

Figure 16 Overall Experience

Figure 17 Security Guard Behaviour
Figure 17 depicts public perceptions of security guard behaviour on contact. A majority of 61% reported a neutral experience, while 30% found security guards to be courteous and polite.

Figure 18 Public Performance of Performance Dimensions

The survey measured the general public's perception in terms of overall performance, professionalism and guard role. Figure 18 presents the moderate composite rating for the items measured under each of the three dimensions. Four items assessed citizen views on the professionalism and integrity of private security guards in regard to education, training, ability to handle complex situations and honesty. The composite score was 2.6, and for overall performance addressing perceived trust, honesty and safety a moderate score of 2.5 was recorded. The results suggest a lack of perceived professionalism and expertise in the private security sector by the public. Overall citizens did not endorse the private security sector as well-trained, honest, well-educated or able to handle complex situations. Figure 19 indicates lack of trust overall with 83% of respondents either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing or remaining neutral on this question. This result is neutral and indicates that on balance citizens did not distrust the private security sector. While citizens did not trust guards they did not express distrust with the security guards.
Citizen views on the relationship between private security guards and police officers were measured using two items assessing whether they do and should work together to solve crime problems. Figure 20 indicates the public were divided on this issue with 40% strongly agreeing and a majority of 44% disagreeing. In terms of the need for collaboration Figure 21 shows that the majority of 64% either agree or strongly agree on this question.
5.3 Stakeholder Interviews

5.3.1 External Assessment of Private Security Companies

In relation to assessment of the performance of private security companies by external bodies responses pointed to an absence of a formal and comprehensive framework for regular assessment. Interviewees reported that following the initial licensing evaluation procedures performed by the government department security companies are not subject to any regular mandatory monitoring or evaluation in relation to set performance criteria from any governmental or industry organisation. One-time assessment of fulfilment of licensing requirements was generally perceived by the majority of security sector and government participants as the primary point at which private security companies were assessed.

One participant from the government sector highlighted that the government had previously undertaken a benchmarking exercise of the quality, training and regulation of the private security sector with Canada and other western economies however this exercise had not since been repeated.
One government participant pointed to some relationships with external industry bodies such as the UK’s Security Industry Association (SIA) and EBSA. Sharing of information and best practices were emphasised.

Table 5-2 summarises some of the key themes emerging from the interviews in relation to external assessment.

**Table 5-2  Key Themes for External Assessment Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Positive Themes</th>
<th>Negative Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing Performance Assessment</td>
<td>• Some relationships with international industry bodies</td>
<td>• Assessment framework is not comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Once only assessment during licensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Irregular, mandatory monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Performance criteria not fully defined in all areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No evaluation of ADP and private security partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad-Hoc Inspections</td>
<td>• Inspections by ADP</td>
<td>• Inspections focus on regulatory compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Checklist of areas utilised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Satisfaction</td>
<td>• Regular government monitoring of citizen perceptions</td>
<td>• Poor awareness of government mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Informally monitored through inspections only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaints</td>
<td>• Low number of complaints</td>
<td>• Poor awareness and clear information on complaints process discouraging complaints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited recording of complaints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Complainant satisfaction not measured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cultural barriers factors between guards and public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the lack of an overall performance evaluation framework the majority of participants from government and private security sector indicated that specific if limited aspects of performance were assessed by inspectors within the ADP. Participants highlighted that there was a critical lack of evaluation of partnerships between the Abu Dhabi police and private security and their outcomes.

Compliance with operating regulations was agreed by the majority of respondents from both government and the private security sector to be the main focus of any ongoing assessment. Participants cited that this was achieved principally through the mechanism of irregular on-site inspections conducted on an ad-hoc basis with no forewarning. During these inspections assessors may, and were reported to regularly, request production of any company documents, licenses, training or financial records for scrutiny to ascertain compliance, check facilities and additionally interview management and staff in the course of inspection.

Multiple participants noted that inspections are underpinned by a checklist of areas to be evaluated during the inspection. These are mainly focused on ensuring compliance with a range of operating regulations such as licensing compliance and adequate facilities.

However there existed a difference in view from government participants who cited regular monitoring of citizen perceptions in relation to private security companies and the sector itself.

We have questionnaires every three months, so we can ask them what do you think of a particular company, or private security companies in general (GOV 1).

A key motivation was ascertaining the level of belief citizens had that security guards could protect them. In contrast no formal mechanism for monitoring of citizen perceptions, trust and confidence in the private security sector by the government was acknowledged to exist among security sector participants suggesting a lack of awareness of these surveys and their results. The only
monitoring they did perceive was the monitoring of client perceptions. This was characterised as informally undertaken by the ADP inspectorate through inspection of a company’s client feedback forms, satisfaction and client complaints. Multiple participants highlighted that this was sometimes an element of inspections.

...they are looking at the client...and they are looking at complaints from the clients, and feedback, and they also take that into consideration in monitoring the performance of the companies (PSC2).

Several participants highlighted the overall low level of complaints against private security services. However this was not perceived as necessarily indicating a positive outcome.

One participant suggested that the low number of complaints resulted from the absence of clear information on how to make a complaint. They stressed that low awareness of the existing complaints process could discourage citizens from making a complaint or giving feedback.

Another participant highlighted that there was no system in place to measure complainant satisfaction with the process and therefore it was unknown what barriers were in place and how effective it was. The point was made that problems were resolved in an ad-hoc manner and often not recorded.

One security sector participant highlighted that with the majority of guards originating in India and Asia there were potentially cultural factors in terms of the ability of guards to effectively engage and respond to face-face issues.

Goldsmith (1990) suggests in the policing context that citizens may be least likely to complain when public confidence in the police is low and therefore where there is most need to systematically collect and analyse complaints.
5.3.2 Government Goals

Government participants indicated that several goals were envisioned for the private security sector. Employment was cited by as a specific objective in terms of creating a vibrant sector with enlarged employment opportunities.

Government participants also highlighted the desire for a private security sector capable of attracting foreign interest and direct investment as part of wider aims to diversify the economy. Foreign funding and expertise was perceived as significant for helping to raise standards and best practices across the sector.

A key aim was the projection of a strong security image for tourists and international business underlined by several government participants. This was perceived to go hand in hand with private security sector participation in achieving wider security goals and supporting the police effectively.

However, strong consensus was indicated among government participants in relation to a lack of clarity and accountability for the achievement of government objectives. Participants indicated a complete absence of monitoring and evaluation processes leading to a significant lack of awareness of progress towards goals.

One government participant revealed that a key government objective for the private security sector was to obtain perceived critical information from security guards.

"we want to share the guards’ information with government people…and they are carrying very good, an incredible amount of information to the government, to the CID, because we are connecting with the different departments (GOV1)."

Government participants also highlighted that collaboration with the private security sector supported the core government objective of community safety. They commented: “profit is not important, the key objective is safety” (GOV1).

Utilisation of private security sector resources to fulfil ever greater public roles was also highlighted as fulfilling key state objectives.
Let the private security companies do some jobs of the security services, for example we have Formula 1…we don’t need in future to show policemen with guns, so why not let the private security companies in? (GOV1).

5.3.3 Public-Private Co-operation

Significant consensus from participants in both sectors was evident on the importance and benefits of collaboration and partnership between Abu Dhabi police and private security personnel.

There is recognition from both sides however that there are some flaws with the nature of communication and the structure of cooperation between private companies and the police. Partnerships were acknowledged as infrequent and predominantly created to provide solutions to single problems only. Several participants emphasised that partnerships had generally continued with limited focus and had failed to evolve to adopting a broader, multipurpose mission involving issues such as crime trends and public safety. The interdependence of law enforcement and private security in this field is apparent at the local, national, and international levels. Table 5-3 summarises the key themes noted in relation to public-private cooperation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Positive Themes</th>
<th>Negative Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>• Clearly assigned roles within ADP</td>
<td>• Infrequent partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strong awareness of assigned officer in private sector</td>
<td>• Limited focus aimed at addressing single issues only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Face-face meetings highly effective</td>
<td>• Lack of structure for facilitating collaboration and coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>• Adoption of social media by ADP to share critical real time information</td>
<td>• Information is mainly unidirectional from private security-ADP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greater integration of systems to facilitate information sharing and information flows</td>
<td>• Focused on low-level security operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Focused on low-level security operations</td>
<td>• Lack of face-to-face communication undermines tacit knowledge sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>• Formal information sharing mechanisms established for crime data</td>
<td>• Predominantly reactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High frequency of information sharing</td>
<td>• Lack of frequent opportunities for broader information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Real-time information</td>
<td>• Personal info and experiences of security are untapped due to lack of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Effective, simple information-sharing system directs information rapidly to the relevant officers</td>
<td>• Lack of systems to access different types of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lapse of monthly meetings loss of vital channel of communication and engagement</td>
<td>• Decline in government support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>• Benefits for private security sector from contacts including learning</td>
<td>• Losing opportunities to obtain continuous support and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Information sharing not perceived as a priority or key partnership activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Relational Factors | • Strong commitment expressed to making partnership work | • Absence of appropriate structures, strategies and arrangements for information and knowledge sharing  
• Lack of awareness of private security capabilities and potential to support ADP  
• Distrust of private security abilities, professionalism and training constraining overall collaboration  
• Contrast in national cultures between mainly Emirati ADP and private security sector  
• Organisational and professional culture differences challenge ADP acceptance of partnerships  
• Reluctance to approach ADP to request information or share knowledge  
• Reluctance to share sensitive information with private security |
|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Resourcing        | • Perception of high costs and resources to maintain partnerships  
• Absence of dedicated partnership resources | • Potential benefits for private security ADP technology implementation |
| Technology        | • Potential benefits for private security ADP technology implementation | • Current technologies are inadequate for promoting collaboration and information sharing  
• Lack of mechanisms for immediate information exchange in relation to all security threats  
• New security technologies expensive to acquire and implement |
5.3.3.1 Structure

The majority of participants agreed that there were clearly assigned roles within the ADP for collaboration and information-sharing with private security companies. Participants indicated strong awareness that each private security firm was assigned a particular police officer or inspector. One participant highlighted that these fulfilled a dual role of both liaison and oversight of the firms. Most security industry participants cited satisfaction with the effectiveness of the system.

However participants emphasised the overall lack of structures in place for facilitating collaboration and coordination between Abu Dhabi police and private security personnel. A number of participants cited a failure to hold regular meetings that could enable information sharing and face-to-face communication.

While role and responsibilities were in place within ADP for liaising with private security there was some tension noted among participants when discussing the frequency and types of opportunity for communications. Monthly meetings constituted the key mechanism for engagement between the industry and key government officials. Security sector participants in particular had highly positive perceptions of these meetings, citing the ability to raise critical industry issues with relevant officials.

*You could put something on the agenda, means I can see what is my main problems, or any initiatives, …and we gather all together to develop, to listen to each other, to see what is the problems (PSC1).*

However, the lack of continuity of such meetings which had ceased over the past year was noted by multiple participants who expressed their belief that this was a loss of a vital channel of communication and engagement with the public sector and police.
5.3.3.2 Communication

All communication was focused on ensuring the flow of information which was perceived among most security sector participants as predominantly unidirectional from private security firms to the ADP. This takes the form of real-time operational information and daily security reports in addition to submission of weekly security reports.

Nevertheless some communication from the ADP to private security firms was noted by multiple participants. However, this communication was informational primarily focused on current, daily security operations.

"Sometimes they are sharing with us information they think can be helpful or necessary...it is about the security itself. But we have limited communication in terms of regular dialogue about issues or to have opportunity to discuss concerns (PSC1)."

Few structured opportunities for communication in either direction were noted:

"There are not enough structured meetings between private security personnel and representatives of the police. I think to build trust, we should debrief each other about issues and share information (PSC4)."

Emphasis was placed by several participants on the importance of continuous communication of the vision and goals of the partnership by the leaders involved not only to their respective organisations but also to key external stakeholders and the wider public.

Interviewees also highlighted a lack of emphasis on face-to-face communication and perceived that possibly there was limited value placed by the ADP on this mode of communication. Another respondent explained that where there is a relationship, information usually is one way: "We are asked for information and we supply that information. In instances where there is contact and communication it is very brief and direct" (PSC4).

Several participants highlighted the usage of the WhatsApp messenger service between the police and security companies to share both critical real
time operational information and also provide group information to companies about events such as the Formula 1 event or what to do in the case of accidents or emergencies. One participant highlighted the usefulness of the information for operations and also for security guard learning.

Participants in both the public and private sector cited a growing trend towards integration of systems to facilitate information sharing and information flows. Government participants highlighted that private security control rooms were soon to be connected with ADP control rooms for efficient information flows.

5.3.3.3 Information Sharing

Challenges and issues relating to information sharing and learning from each other was a major area of discussion within the interviews. The participants were in agreement for the most part information sharing was not proactive but reactive in real-time focused on incidents and crime information.

These existed within the communication protocols discussed earlier. Information sharing mechanisms and processes were discussed in terms of knowledge sharing and learning which gave rise to several issues in the action learning groups.

Participants indicated awareness of potential difficulties in getting police officers to share their implicit knowledge with the private sector given that this knowledge was essentially perceived as a personal asset with value in relation to their status within the force and career development.

The majority of participants noted the existence of formal mechanisms embedded in regulation for information sharing between the private security industry and the ADP. Two principal information sharing mechanisms were indicated by multiple participants as key involving daily and weekly contact between the private companies and police force. However issues were raised by participants in relation to lack of frequency and structure for wider information sharing.
We do have initiatives, measures and some events where there are opportunities but there is a lack of structure and roles for sharing information between private security sector companies and Abu Dhabi police (GOV1).

Moreover several participants pointed to issues in terms of accessing different types of knowledge among the partners.

The current situation lacks a knowledgebase for private security companies that can be accessed by police. At the same time the private security companies should have access to information on security issues and priorities from the Abu Dhabi Police (ADP1).

Another participant perceived that support from government and police to enhance the private security sector had previously been a greater priority however they alluded to a recent decrease in such activity.

Now there is not much exploration from the police side...before the government and the police were very much active in order to enhance the private security sector...there were lots of proximities, and they were really helping the private security sector to perform according to their plan, but I don’t know what happened (PSC2).

Participants agreed on the effectiveness and simplicity of the new 24/7 system in which important security information was relayed immediately and directly to a single control room source who evaluated the information and passed it on to relevant police officers. Several participants considered this to be a more efficient process as it obviated the need for the information to pass through multiple layers and potentially be lost. Participants highlighted the requirement for the delivery of weekly security reports by security managers to ADP liaison officers.

5.3.3.4 Evaluation

A major gap emerging from the interviews is in identifying what information private security companies can and should collect and share, how often action and information can be shared (real-time) and how it can be shared.
Many cited a lack of contact between private security personnel and the police to enable relationships to be built. The government and the ADP acknowledged the role of private security to support the police.

Private security personnel provide extra resources and eyes on the ground however if we don’t work with them closely then we are losing an opportunity to get continuous support and intelligence (ADP1).

Participant responses on the nature of collaboration and information sharing suggests that ADP are showing signs of utilising the resources and opportunities provided by the presence of private security personnel on the ground to act as their “eyes and ears” to improve the level of security overall. However representatives from the security sector pointed to slow and cumbersome decision-making processes and a level of risk aversion within the ADP which meant that the benefits which could arise from collaboration often never materialised. Participants noted that few attempts were made to engage in the sharing or leveraging of resources between ADP and private security companies.

Multiple private sector representatives noted that collaboration had a positive impact on their guards.

...while contact with different police units is limited, I do know that the experiences we have had are hugely beneficial and our staff learn a lot from those contacts (PSC4).

Significant emphasis was placed by participants on the absence of appropriate structures, strategies and arrangements for collaboration and knowledge sharing between ADP and the private security sector. Several participants noted that information sharing was not perceived as a priority or key partnership activity.

We don't have an overarching knowledge management strategy or strategy for collaborating and coordinating between the police and the private security companies. In the public sector there is a major commitment and a lot of awareness about the importance of knowledge management. However this is not pushed out and reflected in the private security sector. It's important to think about
best practices and the strategies to be shared and accessed by private security companies (PSC3).

The opportunity costs of a lack of formal processes for information sharing were highlighted by another participant:

There has to be a framework that clearly outlines what information can be shared and how it can be shared. Security guards in the private sector have a lot of tacit knowledge that can be really important for the police however under the current system there is no way of capturing and sharing knowledge (PSC1).

Participants cited that there was a significant lack of awareness in the Abu Dhabi police in relation to what private security services could offer.

We're not sure how we can support each other and get all the benefits for working together. It’s definitely lack of awareness on both sides (PSC2).

Significant consensus was observable in relation to the potential usefulness of collaboration between ADP and private security personnel.

The security situation is very complex and the position of private security companies working in public spaces means they can help to identify security risks (ADP1).

Limited effort was noted from the Abu Dhabi police towards engaging with the private security sector and enlarging the pool of potential partners with whom to collaborate.

5.3.3.5 Relational Factors

Respondents from the private security companies indicated that the relationship with the police was not particularly strong. Firstly one participant explained that they did not have a regular sure signature contact with the police unless there is an incident requested to provide information.

It was suggested by multiple participants that currently there was an element of distrust between Abu Dhabi police and private security services in terms of the level of professionalism and training that private security personnel represented. Participants from both sides alluded to an unfavourable
perception towards private security companies. This was perceived to lead to a lack of trust and collaboration at street level between police and private security services.

One participant also highlighted that on occasion security firms were trusted with secret information that could not be shared with other companies: “…but we have to build that trust and that takes time” (PSC2). Another respondent from the private security sector suggested that there were occasional perceptions that ADP were uninterested in addressing the concerns of the private security sector in relation to certain types of crime and that security officers were held in low regard.

One challenge from my experience is that the police have a negative image of the abilities in the private security sector and that kind of holds back cooperation (PSC3).

The failure to maximise the relationship between Abu Dhabi police and private security services was highlighted by a number of participants. Emphasis was placed by participants from the ADP on perceptions of low pay and training and the transience and high turnover within the private sector.

Concern was noted by several participants about the difference between the culture not only between private and public but in national cultures. Abu Dhabi police is made up of Emirate citizens in contrast to the private security companies who are predominantly from other national cultures including India. This can affect every aspect of how public and private police can work together.

Several participants alluded to potential cultural issues for approaches to information-sharing: “for sure private sector companies are very hesitant to approach official police units to request information or share knowledge” (PSC1).

A further key theme to emerge was the challenge between the different cultures in terms of the UAE population, ADP and the private security sector that presented diverse issues. One participant highlighted that not only a range of different national cultures were involved but also the organisational
and professional cultures of the ADP in addition to those of the private security companies. A number of participants drew attention to potential issues for collaboration and information-sharing in terms of acceptance of partnerships with the private security sector within ADP’s internal organisational culture. According to one member: “there is a lack of willingness for private sector companies and the police to work together. I think this is to do with the big differences in culture” (ADP1).

Trust in private security was a further theme identified in relation to the sharing of information between Abu Dhabi police and the private security sector and a number of issues were cited. One participant highlighted that not only the police but also the public have legitimate concerns for the sharing of personal and sensitive information and in some cases classified information. A further factor emerged in relation to the professionalism and training of private security personnel.

Significant support from ADP and private sector organisational leaders and a commitment to making partnership work was emphasised. The view was also expressed by some participants that commitment and trust from both entities was crucial to establishing and maintaining a successful partnership. However it was indicated that few partnerships were initiated by the private sector.

There are a number of factors limiting this including application of new technology, trust, having somebody take the lead and providing clear roles and structure to the whole process. These are vital (PSC4).

One participant cited that more engagement with private security by ADP would be desirable including dedicated officers to support the building of partnerships.

5.3.3.6 Resourcing

Participants pointed to the costs and resources involved in maintaining partnerships and in some cases there were perceptions that the planning, time and expense involved was significant and given their operational demands were often not balanced against the benefits.
Issues in relation to the resources needed to establish successful partnerships between ADP and private security were noted by participants: “A major factor is that we’re not allocating any resources for collaborative for cooperative work so probably they will not improve” (PSC2).

Another participant cited a significant absence of resources and support allocated to building partnerships and a lack of understanding of what would be the most effective resources for ensuring successful partnership outcomes.

5.3.3.7 Technology

Many participants highlighted that a range of electronic methods exist for Abu Dhabi police to potentially easily both share and collect information from private security personnel. One participant cited that Abu Dhabi police and private security need to keep pace with a range of different technologies for the prevention and solving of crime. They suggested that partnerships could provide a channel for sharing information on diverse technologies including intrusion protection, alarm systems, RFID tagging and integrated access control management in addition to higher level technologies such as behaviour and object recognition software, interactive audio surveillance, and gunshot recognition technology.

However there was significant consensus among participants that current technologies were inadequate for promoting and enabling collaboration and information sharing between ADP and private security companies:

*There is a big gap in information technology adoption for sharing information between private security sector companies and Abu Dhabi police (ADP1).*

One participant further explained that systems challenged even intra-organisational information sharing:

*The existing IT systems in our organisation don’t really enable or allow for information sharing easily within the organisation and externally with organisations. It is not easy to share or collaborate (PSC4).*
Another participant highlighted the lack of mechanisms for real-time and immediate information exchange in relation to crime and public safety threats: “I don't believe the information system or technology facilitates sharing of information about all hazards, crimes, or potential terrorist threats” (PSC1).

Another participant remarked:

It is a great concern that with increases in terrorist attacks in public spaces that the private security companies do not have greater relationship with the police. We need to have a more structured and frequent planning and training for all sorts of different scenarios so that private security and police have a responsive and supportive prevention (GOV1).

Participants also cited that new security technologies are often expensive and require significant time and resources to acquire and implement, train staff to use and maintain.

Multiple participants drew attention to the potential benefits for private security of the implementation of technologies by Abu Dhabi police. One highlighted that modern crime analysis and mapping technologies allows the timely sharing of specific information. Another emphasised the shift to intelligence-led policing had changed the way that Abu Dhabi police collected, analysed and shared information that often emerged from a range of sources.

5.3.4 Effectiveness of the Regulatory Framework

Views on the effectiveness of the existing regulatory framework were varied and ranged from general satisfaction to strong dissatisfaction with certain elements. One security industry participant stated their overall satisfaction while acknowledging gaps and the need for improvement in certain areas.

In relation to the regulatory changes that have occurred in the industry one participant had highly positive perceptions. They highlighted the example of acknowledged improvement in training standards through the regulatory requirement for security personnel to receive training through the National Security Institute. This participant also positively perceived the requirement for
different categories of licences for security guards working in different security areas including a new event licence to support the police in providing security for public events such as Formula 1. Table 5-4 summarises the key themes emerging from the interviews in relation to current regulatory effectiveness.

Table 5-4 Key Themes Regulatory Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Positive Themes</th>
<th>Negative Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Licensing Procedures</td>
<td>• Improvement in training standards through mandatory training from the National Security Institute &lt;br&gt; • Licensing regulations and processes enforce standards across the industry &lt;br&gt; • Higher standard of security personnel in comparison with other Emirates and GCC</td>
<td>• Gaps in licensing procedures such as recruitment and selection processes &lt;br&gt; • Lengthy licensing procedures incurring significant company expenses &lt;br&gt; • Significant inflexibility in personnel licensing regime &lt;br&gt; • Potential loss of clients and inability to fulfil client expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>• Government committed to promoting competition</td>
<td>• Perceived unfair competition from government &lt;br&gt; • Price competition undermines investment in recruitment and for training and quality provision &lt;br&gt; • Lack of cooperation, knowledge and information sharing between private security companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Weak external network ties with external contacts &lt;br&gt; • Lack of opportunity to learn and share information from external experts &lt;br&gt; • Focus on meeting minimum standards and requirements &lt;br&gt; • Licensing criteria does not specify standards or measures for innovation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
5.3.4.1 Licensing Procedures

The majority of participants perceived that licensing procedures for security personnel were effective in providing clear licensing regulations and processes which ensured and enforced standards across the industry. One participant cited: “In Abu Dhabi there are certain standards for all private security administrations and there are certain regulations which we follow” (PSC2).

Several participants cited the need to fulfil specific and rigorous training, education and physical standards. This involved training courses provided through and approved by the National Security Institute in addition to the requirement for security guards to sit an exam and undertake fitness and physical tests. Language requirements for English were cited by another participant.

However one participant pointed to lengthy licensing procedures which meant that guards he had recruited were effectively lodged and fed for sixty days at company expense prior to obtaining licences for work.

Another participant highlighted perceived higher standards of security personnel in ADP as compared to those in other Emirates and across the GCC as a result of the standards for security personnel required by the licensing procedures. They noted “high standard guards and high training” (PSC1) and additionally cited a positive implication for security personnel salaries which were generally higher than those across the GCC.

One government participant pointed to a perceived need to tighten recruitment and selection procedures to include higher educational standards.

Maybe we need to change our regulations to increase our standards, when we license the companies, we don’t ask if the guards graduated from good schools for example (GOV1).

5.3.4.2 Flexibility of Licensing Regulation

A key issue on which significant consensus was observed across both the private security and public sector participants was the inflexibility of regulation
in relation to licensing of security personnel. Participants noted that current regulations mandate that a security guard, following acquisition of a general security licence, has to apply for a separate licence to work in different areas or types of security such as hotel or hospital security. Once a licence is obtained for that category no other can be obtained meaning that a security guard working in one area of security cannot be deployed in another. Responses from security sector participants emphasised significant difficulties on multiple operational fronts citing increased commercial pressures, cost implications and inability to fulfil client contracts and expectations.

One participant highlighted that it was simply impossible for them financially or in terms of resources to maintain a pool of security personnel large enough to be able to cover multiple security categories adequately. They stated: “I can’t have surplus people in my pool of bank licensed people” (PSC2).

Another cited significant utilisation of management time and more restricted holidays and downtime for security guards, stating that: “it creates a lot of conflicts in operations” (PSC4).

Several security sector participants highlighted actual and potential loss of clients as a result of not being able to fulfil client expectations. One participant gave the example of a bank client who had requested emergency personnel coverage due to a failing alarm system that the company was unable to cover as they did not have the amount of bank licensed personnel available. They further highlighted bureaucratic issues in obtaining dispensation to cover the emergency from governmental sources which they perceived as a fairly arbitrary decision.

The majority of security sector participants highlighted that this aspect of licensing regulation was something that they would like to see change. Several participants suggested that security personnel should be allowed to hold multiple licences providing much-needed flexibility in staffing to uphold client requests and also enabling cost reduction.
One license, one individual, that needs to be changed…the companies should be able to send a person that has three or four license categories… it is hard for us to manage, all these licence barriers (PSC2).

Government participants indicated that they were aware of this problem. One government participant noted: “I think we should give flexibility to the companies to move the guards to different areas or different categories” (GOV1).

All participants were aware of the regulatory requirement to share information on a daily basis with ADP. Information is sent to centralised 24/7 control rooms which then relay the information on to police. The nature of the information shared with the ADP was noted by multiple participants to be wide-ranging but principally focused on daily security operations. Participants expressed the belief that anything in relation to security or emergency should immediately be reported to police.

5.3.4.3 Unfair Competition

One government participant alluded to potential competition issues in relation to private security companies and the future involvement of the government in owning and managing security companies. Multiple private security sector participants alluded to disequilibrium in the competitive landscape.

I am not certain the competitive situation is effective overall at the moment: price competition seems to be the key factor that drives the provision. So we recruit the cheapest labour and we minimise investment and budget for training (PSC4).

Another participant drew attention to an absence of collaboration within the sector:

There is a lack of cooperation between the private security companies. I think it is important that we share knowledge and information that may help security and safety of the public in all areas. There is no existing structure that allows this so the culture right now promotes the individual approach (PSC1).
One participant noted the competitive pressures that companies not fulfilling licensing regulations placed on those companies in compliance, remarking that:

> it affects the rules, it affects the companies who are following the rules, who are following everything...we find a lot of problems (PSC3).

### 5.3.4.4 Innovation

One issue cited by participants was the concern that private security companies failed to seek input from external sources that could result in innovations and enhanced working practices.

> My major concern is that the private security companies focus on cost and that means meeting the minimum standards and requirements to deliver their contract (GOV1).

One security sector participant pointed to a lack of professional events and activities to learn about innovation:

> We don't have a lot of activities, conferences or seminars we can learn and share information from outside or international experts. There isn't enough action in this area especially considering the risk environment and so many different types of threats and development of new technologies and approaches (PSC3).

A government participant noted that licensing criteria failed to include any specific criteria, standards or measures in relation to innovation.

### 5.3.5 Private Security Company Operations

Interviewees were questioned on internal control mechanisms within the companies security company operations and responses were analysed in relation to performance management, training and development and recruitment and selection. The key themes under these areas are indicated in Table 5-5.

All private security managers indicated the existence within their firms of systems and processes for managing security guard performance and training and development. Multiple participants indicated that the systems cited went
beyond those required to fulfil licensing regulations. However particular systems varied in the extent to which they were applied within firms and several participants indicated that processes and systems were still evolving.

### Table 5-5 Key Themes in Private Security Company Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Positive Themes</th>
<th>Negative Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>• Some performance management embedded within company control systems</td>
<td>• Divergence in practices between companies and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emphasis on client feedback in performance measurement</td>
<td>• PM focus solely on supervision, control and reporting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• PM focus solely on supervision, control and reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and Development</td>
<td>• Training and development often driven by client needs</td>
<td>• Lack of professional qualifications and professional bodies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Annual refreshment of skills</td>
<td>• Limited training collaboration between ADP and private security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Site specific training</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment and Selection</td>
<td>• Face-to-face recruitment processes in candidate's own country</td>
<td>• Negative perception of private security recruitment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Checks and vetting procedures to ensure fitness for role</td>
<td>• High staff turnover leading to loss of experience and expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Significant use of part-time and temporary staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Recruiting personnel lacking in experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.3.5.1.1 Performance Management

The majority of security sector participants emphasised that performance management and appraisal systems were embedded to some degree within company control systems. However the perception of performance management and the elements applied varied considerably among participants.

One participant framed the performance management activities in his organisation primarily in terms of control and supervision. Limited emphasis was placed on personal review of individual security guard performance but rather on layers of supervision and reporting:
We have layers of supervision in place, in addition to the client supervision on site, we have bottom level supervision, plus the client relation offices supervision, plus the branch manager role supervision, the layer that reaches down and to corporate is really functioning… if there are any issues senior management are there to supervise or to put an improvement team in action (PSC2).

They also pointed to the effectiveness of their reporting activities and cited:

The outcomes of that process may be reported to the CEO from time to time, so all the facts of the performance monitoring review are there, going by the senior management team (PSC2).

Several other participants noted the implementation of security personnel performance appraisals within performance management systems. These were conducted regularly through the year either on a three monthly or six monthly basis. One participant underlined that regular feedback was given to guards: “yes of course…following performance review he will be told what he needs to improve” (PSC3).

One participant cited the recent introduction of key performance indicators for security guard personnel accompanied by three monthly reviews. They also highlighted monthly awards based on client feedback and structured promotion opportunities for high performing security guards.

Several participants placed emphasis on client feedback either in appraisal of security guard performance or monitoring overall firm performance. One participant asserted that shortly the company was to introduce a client feedback form for every guard to be reviewed and monitored. Another participant cited that they have a frequent client satisfaction survey.

5.3.5.1.2 Training and Development

The majority of participants in the security sector evidence training and development of security personnel in addition to that required by licensing regulations, and several participants noted the influence of clients in this respect.
Multiple managers emphasised that training for all security guards was provided on an annual basis, focused primarily on refreshment of skills following the training mandated to fulfil licensing requirements.

One participant cited consistent training of security personnel to ensure skills were kept up to date and expanded. Courses included a broad range of skills including customer service training. A prime motivation for keeping training up to date was cited to be the voluntary disclosure of training to clients.

> for some guards, we provide extra training in things like quality, first aid, customer service …we are not obligated but we are doing it, always at the request of the client (PSC3).

Several participants emphasised that site specific preparation and training was provided to security guard personnel before they began working on any site. One security sector manager noted that following a site survey, personnel are given a pack containing a specific job specification and a guide to the standard security operating procedures for the site, previously agreed with the client.

Multiple participants drew attention to the benefits of collaboration with ADP in terms of training and development. One participant noted the potential to access specialist knowledge:

> I think we might be missing an opportunity because Abu Dhabi police has special expertise and knowledge and the private security companies should be developing expertise and knowledge that can be shared with the police. The best solution is that these two organisations support each other with training and access to resources (GOV1).

Another participant noted the importance of scenario planning and training collaboration for crime prevention and public safety:

> It is of great concern in relation to increases in terrorist attacks in public spaces that the private security companies do not have a greater relationship with the police. We need to have more structured and frequent planning and training for all sorts of different scenarios so that private security and police are responsive and support prevention (PSC4).
A major theme cited by many participants was a perceived lack of professional certification or qualifications, standards and professional bodies within the private security sector.

### 5.3.5.1.3 Recruitment and Selection

Clear distinction between the views of private security participants and non-sector participants was evident in relation to the effectiveness of private sector recruitment and selection procedures. The majority of security sector participants perceived that their recruitment and selection processes were effective.

Several participants emphasised that steps were taken to ensure that security personnel recruited from overseas were not exploited in any way as this was perceived as a problem within the industry. One participant noted that unlike other firms they did not charge a fee for recruitment from the guards.

Multiple participants highlighted that recruitment took place face-to-face in a candidate’s country where the background, skills and experience of prospective recruits were also checked prior to hiring and travel.

> we recruit overseas, we are going to their country, we interview the guards to see what is his experience, what has he done before, where has he worked before, his police record…and fitness test (PSC3).

A contrasting view was evident among both government and police interviewees who expressed concerns in relation to a number of recruitment issues. The sector was perceived to experience high staff turnover leading to a loss of experience and investment in human resources in the sector. This was also argued to in turn result in elevated personnel recruitment costs which were considered to be disadvantageous for companies. One police participant cited their awareness of the toll this took on security personnel who had to work harder to make up for the shortfall in numbers. The sector was also acknowledged to make significant use of part-time and temporary staff as a result.
Another major factor in the negative perception of private security recruitment processes is a strong concern that private security companies recruit personnel that are lacking in experience in this field. One police officer noted that from his experience many guards’ previous roles were in the restaurant industry or working as hotel staff.

### 5.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented the results from the first exploratory phase of research. A number of key themes emerged from the results based on the surveys and interviews undertaken. These include the current state of private security performance assessment and related mechanisms, government goals, public-private cooperation, effectiveness of the regulatory framework and private security sector operations. These results formed the basis for discussion in the Action Learning groups in the subsequent Action Research phase.
6 STAGE 2 DESIGN AND VALIDATION

6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the second design stage of the research. This stage of the Action Research undertook a contextual analysis that was necessary to inform understanding of needs and issues in the design, planning and implementation of an assessment framework. The assessment process aimed to address a comprehensive range of factors and to engage a broad range of stakeholders and to extend beyond a narrow operational focus to include broader social, economic and political dimensions. This design phase builds on the previous exploratory analysis to form the basis for identifying priorities.

6.2 Participants
Participants in the action learning groups in this stage of research represented a cross-section of stakeholders with interests in the private security sector. They included relevant officers from the Abu Dhabi police department, managers and guards from the private security sector, and government representatives from the licensing authority and department for private security companies.

6.3 Evaluation Framework
The results from the exploratory phase confirmed the expectations of the action learning group. There was a lack of a comprehensive evaluation framework that addresses all dimensions. According to the group, the evaluation criteria should inform the design of evaluations and consider the specific context of privatisation and the security sector. For some participation was felt to be a particular issue as they perceived a lack of adequate stakeholder contribution.

The researcher facilitated the process of learning by sharing knowledge of the theoretical framework. Based on the key dimensions for evaluation external mechanisms (political, economic, democratic, social and legal) and internal
control systems it was evident that there was an absence of previous successful evaluations that could be drawn upon to support current efforts. A key lesson was felt to be the consideration of broader issues in evaluation.

_We need do need ensure not only that we consider multiple areas but we need to ensure that we implement appropriate mechanisms and processes (ALG1)._  

One view advanced was that the challenges for evaluation faced currently provided valuable lessons for ongoing evaluation efforts. The issue was raised that establishing an evaluation framework was hampered by limited data availability and collection and an absence of overall strategy or management.

Participants drew attention to the importance of early survey knowledge of the baseline against which subsequent progress could be measured. The surveys implemented in the design phase were cited as the minimum type of intervention to ensure that information is gathered from different stakeholders.

_As the private security programme is relatively new it is important to generate good feedback on all areas from all stakeholders so that we can identify and shape a strong sector (ALG2)._  

This is consistent with the literature that highlights minimal measurement and evaluation of the private security sector privatisations and reform. Hermsmeyer (2010) emphasises that there is an absence of systematic and meaningful evaluation of programme effectiveness impacting sector stakeholders.

All participants conceded that external mechanisms and monitoring generate external perspectives on successes and challenges. Emphasis was placed on creation of an all-encompassing performance evaluation framework to evaluate both the advantages and weaknesses of differing types of privatisation for different types of services and the groups involved and in differing contexts.

When participants were invited to discuss how evaluation of privatisation could be established successfully there was strong consensus on several factors.
Strong agreement was apparent in relation to the need for clarity and purpose within evaluation measures. A majority of participants expressed concern over the lack of clarity over goals that emerged from the interviews.

One participant explained:

..while we have clearly established the purpose of evaluations the fact that the vision was a general vision without specific focus is a key factor..(ALG4).

This led to consensus by the group that every programme is different and has its own context and for evaluations to be effective it should address key priorities even if those priorities are based on a single stakeholder.

We need to tailor the evaluation to the needs and priorities for the UAE private security programme. Focus on necessary priorities, necessary measures at necessary times. While a comprehensive framework is desirable it has to be balanced with the challenges and issues and resources (ALG3).

This led to further discussion and process of learning. The results from the exploratory phase led to the formulation of several key priorities that all present agreed would be consistent with all stakeholder needs including the Abu Dhabi Police, the government, private security companies and the public. These included:

- The need to ensure a high degree of professionalism
- Improve recruitment and selection
- Improve information and knowledge sharing
- Improve collaboration between the police and the private security sector

These priorities were formulated to address the key issues and weaknesses identified in the exploratory phase. Participants stressed that such priorities would be subject to change depending on the prevailing context. A consensus view was that higher level indicators should be broken down into more specific and measureable aspects, with key performance measures divided into sub-measures.
This should be subject to continuous review and adjustment. We should not focus only on purpose and critical issues but on the methods we use to evaluate (ALG2).

Different participants in the group offered a range of requirements they believed necessary for the success of independent oversight mechanisms. In contrast others expressed support for a system by the government department that would be able to gain political commitment and mobilise resources as well as draw easily on the views of different stakeholders:

the government has strong credibility and influence and this is an important advantage. Independence is not an issue at the moment as there is government commitment to develop a strong private security sector. Under this situation it is the most viable strategy (ALG1).

This is supported by another view in the group on the importance of political commitment while another view stated that a clear mandate was key to success. In terms of local ownership and participation it was agreed that beneficiaries and external stakeholders should be included in the design and implementation of evaluations as their input was felt to be critical.

there is goodwill from the government that we have an inclusive approach, that is reflected in this session where we have participants from all the main stakeholders (ALG2).

There was general consensus on the need for sufficient financial and human resources and engagement with both police and the citizens. Many participants agreed that the success of evaluations depends on the incorporation of adequate time and resources to collect data and review programmes. More resources were felt could have been dedicated to evaluation of the private security programme in Abu Dhabi and moreover that it was necessary to ensure that they evaluated more widely and that there was support for this process.

Several themes emerged to support the design of an evaluation framework for the UAE. Firstly, evaluation teams should adopt a more diverse team profile including members with broader expertise outside of the security sector. Secondly, there was agreement on the idea that evaluation metrics should
focus on outcomes rather than activities although the point was made that the pace set should be realistic in the context of current institutional capacities. A further point was made that evaluation implementation should be staged to allow for capacity building on both sides. A supporting suggestion was the development of indicators to measure progress towards building capacity. A reward perspective was emphasised based on the view was that there should be financial incentive elements within evaluation processes with performance payments linked to the achievement of specific indicators.

One key point made in relation to the structure of evaluation frameworks focused on geographical coverage. It was argued that it was critical to ensure local priorities were represented across the seven emirates if a national framework was adopted. The possibility for cost savings within a national structure was a further contributory point.

6.4 Government Goals

The action learning group emphasised their awareness of the government’s emphasis on the role of private security to support the goal of public safety and security. Thus the government objectives in relation to the private security sector are principally focused on social goals in terms of public safety and security. There was consensus that the UAE was in a unique geo-political situation and faced numerous security threats and that the country’s economy and tourism development was contingent on a high public perception of safety.

However, a key issue was a critical lack of knowledge on the achievement of government objectives in relation to image, employment and foreign direct investment (FDI) for the private security sector.

During the action learning group all participants developed a more balanced awareness of the government’s goals to generate employment, increase foreign direct investment, diversify the economy through the private sector and create an innovative and competitive sector that develops specialist expertise for Abu Dhabi.
There was consensus that these goals were not widely communicated or formally stated and disseminated. There was agreement in the group to one comment:

*I think we can see that the government objectives are clear but we need to ensure that we that they are reflected in the evaluation goals and mechanisms so that the private security sector addresses these objectives (ALG5).*

The feedback from the exploratory interviews was noted by some participants in relation to the hidden value that potentially existed with security guards in terms of their knowledge and experience. The government’s goal to have close operations between the private and public sector reflect this point.

This session provided insight into the importance of continuity of government goals. There was wide recognition that the government at the inception of the private security programme had identified valid objectives but that there was a disconnect in implementing measures to achieve these and the absence of an evaluation framework that reflected these goals.

The action learning group pointed to a number of solutions focusing on the collection of crucial data to measure and evaluate the realisation of goals. One participant highlighted that measures needed to be implemented to monitor and assess the level of employment and employment patterns. There was support for one participant’s view that:

*the UAE government has invested heavily and continues to invest in the latest technologies and this should give us an advantage to create competitive private security services and create employment opportunities for young people in UAE (ALG2).*

Another example cited demonstrated the need to link operational practices to such goals and to address cultural factors:

*To achieve this we need to address the issue with the perception that those working in the private sector are foreign workers and we need to address the image that this is low-skilled sector. Emirates citizens will not enter this area (ALG1).*
6.5 Public Confidence

The group confirmed that there was no systematic monitoring of public confidence in the private security sector.

*I am sure we have our views about this and certainly if the perception is same as the police then I think we have to address this issue as there is scope to improve this (ALG4).*

The results from the public satisfaction survey were presented and discussed and there was agreement that the results were moderate and indicated lack of public confidence in private security.

Further, the survey was based on UAE citizens and there was agreement that there was no understanding of international confidence not only from tourists but also from the business sector. The government goal of maintaining high public confidence both domestic and international in private security was a further point of discussion. A government representative noted that:

*We are aware that the perception of the public towards the private security is different to that of the public police. We want to ensure that there is a consistent view of security and it is important that any negative perceptions do not affect the perception of Abu Dhabi Police who have an excellent reputation (ALG2).*

The results from the exploratory phase indicated a moderate level of satisfaction overall with private security and significant scope to boost perceptions of professionalism and confidence. A key issue raised in the interviews was the perceived lack of formal monitoring of citizen perceptions, trust and confidence in private security. One participant suggested that increased monitoring of public perceptions would be helpful especially if more feedback were provided to the companies themselves.

*I think more visibility of the police alongside private security personnel in the shopping malls can help to improve the image of private security personnel. If the public can see that the police are working together and supporting private security it can make a big difference for confidence (ALG4).*
However government and police representatives emphasised the importance of first building trust and relations between the private security sector and the police to work towards such initiatives. According to one participant: “the private sector needs to develop a higher level of training and professionalism before we can implement such approaches” (ALG2).

### 6.6 Public-Private Relationship

The action learning group discussed the existing structures and processes for private security and police co-operation. A number of solutions were presented to address a range of issues revealed by the exploratory data.

The government’s emphasis on public-private co-operation represents a further control dimension. The government representative conveyed the political commitment for this measure explaining that this was necessary in order for private security to support effectively the Abu Dhabi Police.

> We need effective co-ordination so that we draw on the advantages of both sectors and provide accountability for private security to the police. It remains a major area of development and we need to explore solutions in terms of structures and mechanisms to enable this (ALG5).

Participants advised that the ADP should give serious consideration to engaging in private sector partnerships not only at a local but also regional level. Regional scope in terms of a region-wide partnership was perceived as potentially critical as many crimes and threats were cited as cross-border and multijurisdictional.

> We have to do considerably more to encourage security guards at all levels to collaborate and share information but this is not happening because we don’t have a formal structure or strategy that links the private sector with the police (ALG6).

One participant pointed to the importance of leaders or facilitators for championing partnership between ADP and private security companies. It was acknowledged that leaders could emerge from either the public or private sector and there was no reason why private companies could not initiate
partnership. However, there was acknowledgement that the government could play a key role to fund administration costs with establishing partnerships.

The limited contact between the private security companies and absence of formal and informal communication processes clearly undermines this vision. Regional co-operation between private security and police has not been effective. The action learning phase stimulated debate and wide discussion about the ways and potential benefits of collaboration that was not being realised. One issue identified was the weak strength of relationship between the private security sector and ADP. The group acknowledged from the public survey results that the public perceived a lack of co-operation between private and public police and the public believed that this should improve.

Strong consensus was observable in relation to the need for clear identification of roles and responsibilities. A particular point made was that everyone involved needed to know who was responsible for performing and resourcing evaluation and at what level this was to be carried out in terms of inputs, outputs or outcomes. One participant noted: “We should define the purpose, structure and key processes and then evaluate their effectiveness in future” (ALG1).

Despite this acknowledgement of the existing state, the potential benefits of early and frequent collaboration were emphasised by multiple participants.

We should establish a wide range of opportunities to promote and increase contact between the police and the private security sector to address this issue. I think increasing the regularity of contact events can help to build trust and respect and promote communication (ALG3).

6.6.1 Develop Trust and Closer Working Relations

The group alluded to the need to achieve a level of trust and acceptance between the ADP police and the private sector before any partnerships could be productive. One key point expressed was the need for partnerships to be mutually beneficial and involve meaningful information exchange.
One participant alluded to the need for greater frequency of contact to build trust:

*I think there will be opportunity to develop confidence and trust in private security if we have more contact. More opportunities for private security personnel and Abu Dhabi police to interact and work together can increase understanding and trust (ALG5).*

Closer working relations to create trust was also highlighted in another view:

*If we are working more closely with the police for sure that would facilitate greater trust in the private security companies and at the same time create more awareness on how private security companies be an important source of information (ALG3).*

The importance of early measures towards cooperation was stressed by multiple members:

*Private security services in the United Arab Emirates can generate expertise and specialisms that can support the police force if effectively supported. Early co-operation can be more effective (ALG4).*

Another view cited:

*The earlier and more often the private sector engages their public sector counterparts, the sooner a trusting relationship can be developed, enabling the processes of intelligence exchange and crisis response to be more easily addressed. Trust between entities builds collaboration on training, planning, and responding to a range of situations that could have an impact on business operations or public safety (ALG1).*

A significant issue was the lack of contact between private security personnel and the police to enable relationships to be built and maximised. However increased opportunities for contact were viewed on both sides as benefitting the creation of trust through which effective collaboration and information-sharing could be established.

One participant noted the importance of support by private security company leadership for the development of contacts within Abu Dhabi to share critical risk information and learn about new security practices.
Negative perceptions of private security from the ADP in terms of their professionalism and training were also acknowledged. One participant expressed the view that continuous emphasis on partnership missions and goals could help to overturn that perception.

6.6.2 Communication

Despite awareness of the availability of tools for communication such as newsletters or email to facilitate public-private information-sharing partnership participants cited that these were not currently being used or maximised. Several security sector participants highlighted that the flow of information was crucial to any partnership with the ADP and to levels of participation and support. Text messaging and an informative and active website were two communication channels cited that participants perceived could be useful and effective for communication and information-sharing.

The second area of debate centred on the communication between the police and private security and a number of approaches were evaluated and proposed by participants.

*There should be more structured meetings between private security personnel and representatives of the police. I think these are important to build trust, debrief each other about issues and share information (ALG6).*

The group further highlighted issues in relation to the sharing of confidential information. One participant cited that a level of trust between ADP and private security personnel needed to be developed before sensitive information could be shared.

Formal processes were emphasised to facilitate the sharing of different types of information and confidential data:

*We are conscious of not overstepping boundaries but this issue can be addressed by ensuring we have formal mechanisms for communication for different purposes (ALG1).*
The need to delineate key roles in this process was highlighted in another view:

*It is important that we have good structure for communication and for sharing information. This is something we can improve by creating a policy that defines key roles for co-ordinator and simple agenda and schedule of events including the regular meetings (ALG4).*

There was consensus for this view and agreement towards continuity to ensure that stakeholders met on a regular basis and many participants pointed to the success of this approach before it was discontinued.

6.6.3 Information Sharing

There was significant discussion about the nature and effectiveness of communications relating to the issues identified in existing systems and processes. The central focus of such discussions were the relationship between the police and the private security and communications with the public.

A key issue that received widespread consensus was the need for more detail in the crime information shared with the private security sector. General dissatisfaction was expressed that the lack of detail on the nature of the crimes mapped by police hindered the ability to support crime prevention measures. There was general agreement that the crime information sent to private security should be more detailed in relation to the types of crimes committed to enable more effective support towards crime prevention.

There was consensus in the group that in terms of implementing necessary changes the industry approach can be useful to develop capacities and skills and strategies for engaging with the public and developing best practices. There was consensus that this dimension can be evaluated in terms of how frequently and effectively private companies engage with the public.
6.6.4 Collaboration

The notion of collaboration was proposed by the researcher based on the lack of co-operation between the public and private sector. Participants representing the private security expressed significant interest in increasing opportunities for collaboration.

*I think there should be opportunities for secondment for personnel from the private security companies to have some experience or contact with police operations. It would also be useful for police personnel to be seconded and have opportunity to experience private security operations. I think then both sides can understand each other's position and this will make it more effective to share information (ALG3).*

The group were asked what they would improve in terms of collaboration and improving the working relationship between public and private sector. One member highlighted the importance of a closer face-to-face relationship between security company managers and police liaison officers.

*they can meet weekly or monthly, the manager can report on his job that month, any issues, and they can listen to the manager’s initiatives, his ideas, and pick up valuable information (ALG6).*

Another idea was to increase engagement and improve performance evaluation and performance: "... award things like best security manager of the month, best security guard, best company of the month" (ALG4).

6.6.5 Resources

Another issue related to the dedication of resources to support collaboration and partnerships. One participant highlighted that this should be remedied:

*We have a lot of time constraints but at the very least there should be resources allowed for easy communication between the private sector and police (ALG1).*

Another issue related to the critical lack of evaluation of partnerships between ADP and private security companies. One participant noted that private security services able to be accurately and economically monitored provided much better candidates for partnership and privatisation.
In terms of improving the working relationship one security participant suggested that the police could find further ways to exploit the unique position and location of private security services within the community remarking: “we are witnesses to a lot of issues, and also a lot of crime from social...we can illuminate a lot of issues from the community” (ALG5).

6.7 Competition and Financial Efficiency

Financial efficiency was argued by private sector participants as a factor that impacts on the client and public satisfaction with service quality: “we have focus on cost and low pricing that can affect service quality” (ALG6).

Competition was a further theme that received significant focus during the action learning group. Presented with the results from the exploratory data the group acknowledged that the competitive situation could be improved significantly. Firstly there were factors to address creating a barrier to competition in terms of government involvement.

We were aware of this but while we think there is legitimacy for the government to operate in the same domain, it is possible that this creates unfair competition (ALG2).

They suggested that regulation needed to be planned in order to avoid unfair competition in tendering processes.

the fees of the government companies ...because when they apply for the tenders the fees of the government companies will be less than the private security companies, so maybe we put in regulations (ALG1).

Another participant indicated that this was possibly due to the government wish to guarantee performance in certain areas and that there was significant scope for this to issue be resolved.

[by] implementing new measures to improve standards and professionalism and improving collaboration between the private sector and ADP. Both these strategies if implemented and monitored can provide the government with confidence to cease bidding for contracts against private security companies (ALG2).
The measure of innovation and indication of competitive capability indicated from the surveys in terms of absorptive capacity and organisational learning was agreed to be an issue:

not strong and there is much work that can be done by the private security and its partners to improve their capabilities. If private security companies have minimal contacts with external organisations regionally and internationally then they limit their ability to access new information and opportunities to innovate (ALG4).

Another view noted the need to evaluate organisational learning capacity:

if we want to promote high standards and excellence and innovation in this sector then we need to improve knowledge sharing and organisational learning. Firstly, we must help the industry achieve this and secondly we must measure absorptive capacity (ALG3).

There was greater familiarity about the importance of absorptive capacity and this formed part of the learning process in terms of the different dimensions of organisational learning and awareness of difference between network, relation and technology embeddedness and how these could be measured and used as indicators of the degree private security companies could identify, assimilate, transform, and apply valuable external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).

A key issue alluded to was the lack of input from external sources that could result in innovations and enhanced working practices. One view recommended:

It is important for private security companies to have a very broad network of contacts and partners locally, regionally, nationally and internationally so that they can get information about new threats, technologies and new practices and innovations that they can implement in their own operations (ALG2).

There was growing realisation over the 2 sessions that this issue was significant and would severely impede the development of the sector to implement high standards that would enable it to truly support the government and the ADP to deal with growing security threats.
The action learning group discussed issues related to the financial efficiency and sustainability of the sector. Sharing the different perspectives provided an indication of the strategy and measures under this dimension. Participants from the licensing team explained the licensing process pointed to the government setting minimum cost levels for services. This generated cost competition between private security companies and in effect the government sets the price levels and this from the perspective of the private companies did not account for the real cost of service delivery: “It is inevitable that companies attempt to maintain profitable margins and severe cost pressure will impact on standards and performance” (ALG5).

In terms of financial efficiency it was evident that this aspect was not possible to establish for the private security programme in terms of the licensing body and private security operations.

To support efficiency we have to conduct financial evaluation and develop pricing levels that are based on operational factors rather than government budget levels (ALG3).

One view emphasised the need for appropriate structures for financial efficiency:

We need the private sector to have the right structure to enable them to develop economies of scale and invest in specialisms. And we need to understand the optimal level of providers in this market (ALG1).

A participant from the licensing department indicated that:

I can foresee a cost implication purely by improving the evaluation framework as we will have a greater number of companies to assess and evaluate and so there is a good point for optimising the number of providers from my view (ALG2).

6.8 Stakeholder Engagement

The accountability of private security to different stakeholders was a key theme discussed within the action learning session. There was consensus on the importance of engaging with the public for different reasons and for the private sector to be accountable not only to the licensing body and the ADP but to the public stakeholders. In one view collaboration and partnership with
the public should be a key underlying principle for private security service engagement.

All present in the group emphasised that major improvements should be implemented in this, but that the main challenge related to the specific mechanisms to implement. The group firstly addressed communication with the public. There was agreement in relation to view that: “this is a complicated thing as we need to firstly determine the purpose of our communication and what and how we want to engage with the public” (ALG6).

A member of the Abu Dhabi Police (ADP) explained:

we have many communications with the public that provide much information about all areas of police operations. But all these communications are official from the ADP and do not represent the private security (ALG1).

This view was supported by a private security manager who explained that:

it is correct there is no information about the private security companies and the sector overall does not engage directly with the public. Some private companies have website and Facebook presence that are not updated and provide limited information (ALG4).

The session enabled a greater awareness of the lack of structure or process to enable diverse engagement with the public that stimulated debate on the appropriate strategy and changes needed that would enable citizens and representative organisations to directly or indirectly participate in ensuring accountability. Public engagement was identified as important. The issues centred on the mechanisms and the degree of engagement. There was strong consensus to ensure feedback mechanisms to inform the public what is being done.

6.8.1 Type of Engagement

There was strong agreement that the private security sector should be more visible and proactive in their public engagement efforts. The point was made
that increased engagement could help to persuade the public of the importance placed on community interests and addressing community needs.

There was general consensus that the government needed to have a good understanding of what citizens perceive security guards currently do and what they would like them to do in order to effectively consult with citizens. The group revealed a lack of stakeholder engagement strategy in respect to the public: “We need to understand to what degree citizens are aware of the existence of specific accountability procedures” (ALG3).

Several benefits were debated associated with improving engagement with the public that received strong consensus. There was general agreement among security sector participants that engagement with the public was important in the face of growing complexity in the security environment. One participant highlighted that intelligence gathering from the community could help in understanding the issues that impact on them and support the design of more responsive services.

Another participant made the point that engagement was important for improving trust and confidence in private security services and that could help to obtain their cooperation in combatting security issues and crime. Information and feedback to the community was noted as a key engagement principle for the sector that could help to reassure the public and build trust and confidence. One view suggested that feedback content should focus on relevant crime issues and contact information.

6.8.2 Engagement Mechanisms

Different mechanisms were proposed for engaging with the public with suggestions including polls and surveys and with information collection improved to provide quantitative data to offer rapid and easy collection and comparison of public satisfaction and views about the private sector. One view in relation to public engagement highlighted the need to educate the public on how they might use information to engage effectively. It was further proposed
that more informal mechanisms would help to bridge barriers than more enforcement-based mechanisms.

There was strong consensus among participants that the public were generally unaware of how the private security sector was performing. It was widely felt that more detailed information in the public domain would support public knowledge of sector performance. The point was made that more information could help the public to hold private security to account. Another suggestion related to the potential for increased public engagement on neighbourhood crime and safety issues.

6.8.3 Social Media Strategy

The role of social media was widely discussed as a key engagement strategy. There was significant knowledge exchanges and the session ended with an overall increase in the understanding of the role, opportunities and issues of social media for engaging the public.

There was broad acknowledgement that the UAE had a high adoption of social media amongst the population and it was identified as a cost-effective way of connecting and engaging with the sector and the public.

Social media could be a key channel for interaction with multiple stakeholders including the sector and citizens to support greater understanding of needs and access important feedback and ideas. It was further suggested that the young demographic of the UAE highlights the potential for using social media to effectively reach its target audience.

One view advocated that engagement with the public through social media was an opportunity to promote the accountability of the private security sector. In particular engagement was proposed to more effectively allow for citizen complaints to be communicated and addressed. The point was made that visible and proactive resolution of complaints and misconduct issues could enhance public trust and confidence:
Social media can be one of the most flexible and effective ways for us to communicate and inform the public about private security operations. But we need to establish a framework, guidelines and train our staff to effectively communicate and engage with the public (ALG5).

However, strong consensus pointed to challenges related to limited knowledge in the UAE and private security sector in relation to the effective deployment of ICT and social media tools to build trust and drive public engagement. One police participant acknowledged that where communication through social media was implemented by ADP it was mainly restricted to a uni-directional dissemination of news and information. This was perceived as extensive and significantly more detailed than frequently required. How to promote greater bi-directional interaction and dialogue with the public to enhance security for mutual benefit was perceived as a key challenge by many participants.

Furthermore, while private security companies can increase their presence on social media, there was caution expressed towards addressing an issue connected with the ADP. A representative from the ADP explained that:

*We have strong presence in social media, but there is a project to research effectiveness of police social media strategy. One issue we have is lack of engagement from public even though we share lots of information in social media. I think the private sector can learn from the results from this research (ALG1).*

6.8.4 Media Content

The type and volume of information conveyed was a subject for debate in the group sessions. A strong view was that the public should not be given too much information or this could be counter-productive if limited practical benefits were perceived. It was argued that balance was important between becoming more transparent and causing information overload.

Another view put forward was the need for balance and selectivity in the information and feedback provided so that only relevant or critical items were shared. One view acknowledged the importance of the media in strengthening accountability in the private security sector, through providing information to the public and as a result subjecting the sector to some scrutiny. It was
suggested that social media could provide more flexibility and scope for non-Emirati actors to feel free to voice their views and any criticisms they may have as opposed to more formal or face-to-face contexts. The point was further made that a degree of anonymity in the process or forum where debate takes place could help to facilitate a more open expression of views and ideas.

Widespread consensus existed that social media could be an effective tool and should be employed to enhance community engagement initiatives. However improving the knowledge and expertise available within the sector was considered to be critical to support the implementation of effective social media engagement strategies.

Another view suggested that the sector should adopt openness to scrutiny and enabling transparency as guiding principles for engaging with citizens enabling them to see more easily the work private security does and how they do it.

6.9 Regulation

The action learning sessions stimulated positive information sharing about the effectiveness of existing regulation of the private sector and key changes and solutions for improving the governance and oversight of the sector.

The inflexibility of the licensing system with both operational and financial implications for security companies was a key issue highlighted in the interviews. The majority of security sector participants highlighted that this aspect of licensing regulation was something that they would like to see change. Several participants suggested that security personnel should be allowed to hold multiple licences providing much-needed flexibility in staffing to uphold client requests and also enabling cost reduction. One participant stated:

One license, one individual, that needs to be changed…the companies should be able to send a person that has three or four license categories… it is hard for us to manage, all these licence barriers. This is something that can be simplified (ALG6).
Government participants indicated their agreement with this issue and solution. “The design of licensing should give flexibility to the companies to move the guards to different areas or different categories” (ALG2).

A key issue raised in the interviews related to enforcement of regulation. One participant emphasised that those found not to be fulfilling licensing regulations should be punished more severely with fines. This sentiment was echoed by a government participant, who remarked:

some areas we need to be more tough...because now the fines are very small. If the system is weak in terms of accountability for this issue then it can be abused and moreover if we fail to impose appropriate penalties then we reinforce this culture (ALG2).

There is significant emphasis placed on self-regulation on areas related to training, certification and co-operation. Group participants emphasised that government regulation should be minimised for two reasons. There was significant support for the view that: “This sector is still a young sector and we need opportunity to shape and develop standards in a flexible way” (ALG1).

Secondly, another participant emphasised the role of industry to raise standards explaining that:

we have yet to establish professional institutions or industry forum which will have better understanding and be closer to the issue and make important changes (ALG4).

Emphasis was placed on regulating training and recruitment with support for a partnership approach between the industry and licensing department to specify minimum training and education requirements.

The need to give time to refine and improve the licensing framework and standards was emphasised. The need to minimise bureaucracy and maximise opportunities for self-regulation was stressed: “With the appropriate indicators and licensing criteria we can ensure new companies are rigorously assessed and then ensure continuous monitoring” (ALG2). This project has generated more awareness of how different mechanisms can be implemented to create an effective governance and regulatory regime.
Making public-private sector partnerships and security mandatory should provide good impetus and a basic minimum framework that indicates structures and responsibilities (ALG2).

6.9.1 Industry Association

There was strong support for the view that external control mechanisms in the form of industry forums or professional associations were critically lacking. Many participants expressed the view that this dearth of professional outlets limited opportunities for seminars, talks, standards and certification, collaboration and networking.

One view suggested that industry forums could be important channels for the recognition of achievements and performance within the sector. Another point made related to the potential for industry forums to contribute to the formation of appropriate and common standards for the industry.

Another participant argued that forums and professional associations were necessary and important sources for seminars, conferences, standards and networking. It was broadly felt that the establishment of such institutions could support the wider sharing and dissemination of key industry information that could help to enhance the overall performance of the sector. Another suggestion was that industry forums could promote discussion among senior industry members.

6.9.1.1 Complaints Procedure

The low level of complaints could be a possible indication of a number of factors. One government participant raised the issue that internal mechanisms of control may not be adequate, as citizens often perceive a closing of ranks within the sector and beyond.

Participants suggested a number of actions and measures that could be undertaken to address the issues identified in the complaints process.

One key issue identified was a significant knowledge gap resulting from the lack of measurement of complainant satisfaction with the process. Consensus
was evident on the need to collect information and obtain greater understanding and knowledge of citizen’s perspectives of private security services and complaints. Alluding to recording and monitoring, there was widespread agreement that complaints needed to be logged and recorded to support analysis. One proposal made was that companies should create and maintain a database to document complaints and more informal expressions of dissatisfaction to discover and monitor trends which can be addressed.

There was significant consensus that the complaints system should be improved towards greater simplicity and transparency. Awareness, easy access and clear information was considered critical so that citizens knew how to make a complaint and what to expect. Confidentiality and openness to complaints and feedback was stressed. One view advocated much greater communication of company feedback and complaints handling processes which it was felt could convince the public that their feedback would be taken seriously.

Clear consensus was evident on the need to improve the provision of diverse and anonymous opportunities for making a complaint. One view suggested that citizens should be provided means to contact companies quickly and easily. Another point made was that company websites could be enhanced to include electronic forms for making complaints. This was argued to afford companies the opportunity to respond to feedback continuously and allow them to act when negative trends arise. Another suggestion made stressed that the public may be more comfortable complaining to an independent body or number.

In relation to follow-up on complaints one view highlighted the need for prompt contact with complainants to try and resolve issues. Another highlighted that actions should be directed towards ensuring that hard to reach groups were represented in complaints processes suggesting collaboration with community organisations and openness to resolving and monitoring complaints using a variety of methods. One proposal advanced involved mystery testing of services similar to mystery shopping in order to learn from the results. Another
view advocated that private security companies should discover and learn from best practices in customer services suggesting that services should be benchmarked in different ways.

6.10 Internal Control Mechanisms
The action learning group was presented a glossary of internal control dimensions and the survey results from the private security company survey that assessed organisational level dimensions for evaluating organisational culture. The survey results for performance and motivational measures were discussed utilising three sets of results in relation to three types of control mechanisms: action controls, personnel controls and cultural controls. Action controls characterise the systems and processes for holding officers accountable for their behaviour based on three mechanisms: formation of communications defining acceptable and unacceptable behaviours, supervision and reward and disciplinary measures. Personnel controls focus on motivating officers to undertake their duties independently to satisfactory standards. Such controls focus on recruitment and selection processes, training and adequate resourcing for the performance of private policing activities. Cultural control refers to the internalisation of the values and the incentives for peer control and relate to codes of conduct (self-control) and team awards (peer control).

6.10.1 Action Controls
The results from the private security survey indicated moderate levels to below moderate for security guard motivational dimensions. This was identified as an issue that required some discussion. While job fulfilment and staff engagement were moderate job satisfaction and role clarity were less than satisfactory: “The results indicated that we are not in a position of excellence operating at moderate” (ALG6). A member of the group explains that: “it is critical that security guards have a high level of satisfaction overall in their positions” (ALG3).

I think there are much opportunities to increase job satisfaction. A lot of staff are recruited from low skilled areas and from other
Another member agreed that there is a good need for internal training and development and also that they needed to think about effective rewards and a development programme that could increase staff satisfaction. There was agreement that there was no consistent standards or certifications from the industry that staff could work towards.

Engagement is critical for changes to be successful and there was agreement that highly motivated security guards can impact positively on performance, attitudes and behaviours. The future growth and development was agreed to be undermined if personnel were not utilised to their full potential. The group agreed that:

> We are losing opportunity to develop, innovate and expand to provide integrated security services to Abu Dhabi and other emirates and other regions to counter terrorist threats and cybercrimes… [we need] to explore and develop expertise across different layers of security (ALG2).

Strong consensus focused on the need for security personnel to deliver consistently to a high standard and to be highly responsive in crisis situations. The case of marauding terror incidents in France, UK and Sweden in 2017 were all cited as examples of the vigilance and responsive that is required of all security personnel. However, their ability to work under demanding and stressful situations and respond professionally and responsively was called into question. Recruitment and training culture is the key factor that needs to be improved as a matter of priority. One view noted:

> There is now significant knowledge and awareness that of the security threats that are imminent. In the shopping malls and public spaces in the Abu Dhabi occurrence is low yet the impact can be devastating. It is vital that security personnel are highly attentive and vigilant (ALG1).

Another view highlighted:

> The working culture can have major impact on personnel perceptions that can affect their motivation and operational performance. We need to create a better culture even with the
cost challenges to raise standards and ensure they are clear and communicated (ALG3).

One participant highlighted the importance of awareness at any supervisory level of the impact their behaviour had on organisational culture and thus on security guard behaviour. Strong agreement was evident on the key role of leadership in promoting ethical behaviour. Corporate narratives disseminating examples of positive guard behaviour and which helped to encourage public confidence in private security were felt to be important from leaders in providing guidance for security guard behaviour.

6.10.2 Personnel Controls

In relation to recruitment processes one government participant cited the major concern that recruitment of inexperienced personnel impacted the integration of external knowledge and experience into the private sector.

One police participant alluded to the possibility that the private security sector could potentially pose risks to citizens. Low perceptions of security guard quality were highlighted perceived to result from overriding sector focus on financial rather than quality concerns. Reluctance on the behalf of customers to pay for services often mandated by insurance companies was reinforced by the low reputation of the sector.

The point was argued that any improvement in private security accountability needed to encompass the reinforcement of competence and capacities within existing accountability mechanisms both internal and external in addition to introducing new or independent structures.

In relation to improving training to enhance the perceived low level of professionalism and training one participant remarked:

Retired or retired ex-police officers should be recruited into private security companies. This is a good opportunity to give private security personnel knowledge and information and create more trust (ALG1).
One participant noted that improvement in standards and training could lead to more willingness on behalf of the ADP to engage in collaboration and partnership with the private security sector.

Strong acknowledgement was made by multiple participants of the benefits for both organisations in terms of collaboration over training.

*I think there should be opportunities for secondment for personnel from the private security companies to have some experience or contact with police operations. It would also be useful for police personnel to be seconded and have opportunity to experience private security operations. I think then both sides can understand each other’s position and this will make it more effective to share information (ALG4).*

Significant value was placed by security sector participants on training delivered as a result of partnership with ADP. One participant noted that improved training would be a key motivation for undertaking and sustaining partnerships.

Another participant noted that Abu Dhabi police should be able to provide more training to private security on key areas such as tourist safety, crime patterns such as thefts as well as crime scene protection and surveillance.

Consensus centred on the need for a comprehensive level of basic training to ensure that all private security guards possessed a minimum level of skills whether obliged by licensing conditions or not. One view proposed that requirements for comprehensive basic training should be included and clearly defined within any quality or evaluation criteria. Another view stressed the importance of ensuring continuous training for security guards, suggesting that guards may also feel more committed and motivated if they were provided with ongoing training and also if training was linked to career progression. The view was also expressed that experienced staff should be recruited and their years of experience in similar roles monitored.
6.10.3 Cultural Controls

There was some discussion regarding the results relating to organisational learning and innovation. The initial part of the debate involved the researcher acting as a facilitator to explain and familiarise the group with concepts related to absorptive capacity, network embeddedness and relational embeddedness as well as technological capacity. This was consistent with the action learning process and after the session there was a greater understanding amongst the whole team regarding some of the key dimensions of organisational learning and innovation.

In the case of security companies absorptive capacity refers to their ability to identify, assimilate and apply external knowledge for commercial purposes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The ability to identify and apply new knowledge is linked to a firm’s external networks and their network embeddedness, which refers to their position in the structure of their network which can provide it with increased informational benefits. Their relational embeddedness indicates the range, quality, depth and density of private security company ties and relations within their external networks (Garcia-Morales et al., 2007). Their technological capacity is viewed in similar terms to their absorptive capacity but more specifically refers to their ability to absorb technological knowledge and their internal technological capabilities (Bittencourt and Giglio, 2013).

In terms of relational embeddedness there was support for the view that:

*I cannot say that we are very close to colleagues in external organisations. Even though we communicate regularly the information is one way and it does not help us to develop any closeness (ALG6).*

Each of the private security companies and licensing department and the police units were agreed to operate independently apart from the one-way flow of information to the police.

In terms of inter-organisational trust the group there was honesty that there was not a high level of trust nor at the same time little trust indicating
significant scope for improvement. It is evident from the focus groups that any discussions of trust were very sensitive. Members from the different stakeholder groups were very hesitant to criticise or discuss in detail trust related issues. The lack of comments or examples of high-level trust was still a notable factor that indicated significant scope to improve relations and promote trust between the various stakeholders.

In terms or network embeddedness:

We don't have a high level of contact with other companies and the private companies, or international companies or academic institutions or research. This is a major weakness because it limits knowledge sharing opportunities for us to develop (ALG3).

The reason cited was funding.

A private security representative explained that: “the contract is highly competitive and it requires resources for us to be able to dedicate time to enable networking and to contact and to discuss” (ALG5).

The group agreed that there is opportunity for collaborative projects so that:

all the private security companies can share the costs along with the government and the police so that we can have an industry body that promotes networking and creates opportunities to increase contact regionally and internationally and with relevant institutions (ALG4).

In terms of technological capacity predominantly private security companies indicated that their systems are mainly traditional and transaction oriented systems. All members indicated that the government and the police were committed to investing in technologies to combat crime.

The action learning groups discussed the results from the private security survey which developed into a learning process with discussion on the concepts of absorptive capacity and organisational learning and knowledge management and the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge management. Learning was often perceived to take place informally through
constant and regular interaction with colleagues and other members in the
network. One participant cited how learning was often unconscious until
recalled at a later time.

6.11 Evaluation Framework and Change Agenda

The action research process of exploratory research and design and validation
stages resulted culminated identified key evaluation and change priorities for
governance and accountability police privatisation based on the issues,
themes and solutions identified. Table 6-1 outlines core dimensions, key
factors, evaluation criteria, change objectives and compliance measures to
support assessment of the private security sector and governance and
accountability. Six core dimensions are identified which contribute to a holistic
framework of assessment: evaluation; public-private co-ordination; public
engagement; legal; security company operations and competition. The
evaluation dimension contains key factors such as evaluation criteria and
evaluation mechanisms with associated criteria specifying the nature of the
content of the evaluation criteria such as comprehensiveness and reflection of
stakeholder priorities. A key change objective is the implementation of multi-
level, multi-dimension evaluation mechanisms, with compliance measures
related to diverse evaluation mechanisms and regularity of evaluation.
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<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Key Factors</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Change Objectives</th>
<th>Compliance Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Evaluation Criteria</td>
<td>Does the criteria reflect comprehensive set of dimensions?</td>
<td>Validate and sign-approve for evaluation indicators</td>
<td>Comprehensive set of evaluation indicators</td>
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<td>Do evaluation criteria reflect stakeholder priorities?</td>
<td>Provide feedback and review</td>
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<td>Establish qualitative and quantitative measures</td>
<td>Establish qualitative and quantitative measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Mechanisms</td>
<td>Are multiple mechanisms implemented?</td>
<td>Implement multi-level multi-dimension evaluation mechanisms</td>
<td>Diverse evaluation mechanisms</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Are performance dimensions effectively monitored and recorded?</td>
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<td>Regularity of evaluation</td>
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<td>Enforcement and Inspection</td>
<td>Need to ensure regular</td>
<td>Need to ensure regular monitoring</td>
<td>Review inspection cycles</td>
<td>No and frequency of inspection cycles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public-Private Co-ordination</td>
<td>Goals and Leadership</td>
<td>Do goals reflect all stakeholder needs?</td>
<td>Government to initiate top-down approach with plan to handover to public-private</td>
<td>Goal clarity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do goals reflect key priorities?</td>
<td>ownership</td>
<td>% Goals and objectives achieved</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent do outputs meet goals?</td>
<td>Develop goals and measures</td>
<td>Success-failures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mechanisms and Structures</td>
<td>Are effective structures clearly defined, with key roles?</td>
<td>Select and train strong leaders and facilitators</td>
<td>Profile of facilitators</td>
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<td>Resources</td>
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<td>Working Groups for specific projects/issues</td>
<td>Clear compelling mandate</td>
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<td>Quarterly Meetings</td>
<td>Agreed rules and guidelines for informal-formal</td>
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<td>processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Effective modes of communication between police and private security</td>
<td>Establish working group to evaluate current practices Face-face and virtual communications</td>
<td>Number and types of regular communication</td>
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<td>Trust</td>
<td>High trust between police and private security</td>
<td>Generate varied opportunities for members to meet face-to-face to develop trust</td>
<td>Frequency and type of interactions Trust Surveys Measure Relational Embeddedness</td>
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<td>Prioritise the development of trust on both sides</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Introduce security clearance and background checks for each private security staff member in every company</td>
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<td>Central co-ordinating body should look for and promote groups with strong homogeneity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Establish working group to evaluate effectiveness of information sharing</td>
<td>Clear Mandate and Statistics on information sharing: type and frequency of exchanges Organisational learning measures</td>
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<td>Establish key objectives or information sharing</td>
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<td>Implement formal and informal mechanisms</td>
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<td>Develop measures for inter-organisational knowledge sharing</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Establish both explicit and implicit information sharing practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Sustainable resourcing to support partnership activities</td>
<td>Government support to fund partnership administration costs</td>
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<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Key Factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Engagement</td>
<td>High Public Confidence and Satisfaction</td>
<td>Improve dialogue with citizens</td>
<td>Develop engagement strategy Establish multiple forums for feedback and dialogue: social media, opinion surveys, satisfaction surveys Implement social media monitoring for continuous feedback</td>
<td>Measures of public satisfaction, public confidence (domestic and international), level and type of engagement Responsiveness, consistency, credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Self-regulation</td>
<td>Are forms of self-regulation being effectively implemented to enhance governance and accountability?</td>
<td>Working group of multi-stakeholder to establish voluntary principles Formation of industry association Formation of code of conduct</td>
<td>Satisfaction surveys Document successes/failures Benchmarking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complainant Satisfaction Complainant Statistics</td>
<td>Increase awareness and transparency of feedback and complaint process</td>
<td>Investigate low complaint statistics Recording and monitoring Increase aware of complain process Evaluate accessibility, confidentiality and awareness of complain process</td>
<td>Measure complainant satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Company Operations</td>
<td>Improve Recruitment and Selection</td>
<td>Are high standards of recruitment and selection are being implemented</td>
<td>Define and standardise recruitment criteria Improve pre-screening Continuing professional education Certification Minimum recruitment and training requirements</td>
<td>Average number of years Experience of new recruits Full-time staff ratios Dedicated staff select and recruit security guards? Screening procedures</td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
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<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training and Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>Training and education standards</td>
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<td>Benchmarking Specialized training  □ Information sharing Evidence of CPD Basic Training Specialised training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve Professionalism and Performance of Security Guards</td>
<td>Ensure security guards are effectively engaged and motivated</td>
<td>Embedded guard Job satisfaction and engagement in evaluation criteria Workshops and seminars linking with professional body</td>
<td></td>
<td>Benchmarking key measures Completeness operational plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Unfair Competition</td>
<td>Improvement capacity of the private sector to deliver quality, innovative products</td>
<td>Develop competitive indicators Attractive investment climate and business environment Knowledge networks and other soft ways of dealing with the issue of competitiveness Define quality criteria for licensing</td>
<td>Benchmarking indicators Number and type of Quality criteria under each category. □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Learning and Innovation</td>
<td>Creating and sharing knowledge</td>
<td>Increase external partnerships and linkages regional, national and international Create opportunities for diverse information and knowledge sharing across diverse actors including</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluate industry and firm learning practices Survey number and type of activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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6.12 Conclusion

This chapter presented the results from the second design and evaluation phase of research. A number of key themes emerged from the results based on data collected from the focus groups. These include the evaluation framework, government goals, public confidence, public-private relationship, financial efficiency, stakeholder engagement, industry bodies, regulation and internal control mechanisms. These results formed the basis for discussion in the Action Learning groups in the subsequent Action Research phase.
7 Discussion of Action Research

7.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters presented the results from two phases of action research. Chapter 5 presented the exploratory research phase aiming to characterise the existing state of governance, oversight and accountability within the private security sector. Chapter 7 presented the results of the second design stage of the research. This stage of the Action Research facilitated contextual analysis which informed an understanding of the needs and issues in the design, planning and implementation of an assessment framework. A key outcome of this phase was the formulation of a comprehensive multifaceted evaluation framework that identified key factors, criteria, change interventions and performance indicators.

This chapter provides a discussion and analysis of the key dimensions and analyses the key findings in relation to internal and external control mechanisms, structures and performance dimensions that form the theoretical framework.

7.2 Evaluation Framework
The findings support the broad consensus in the literature that privatisation of policing is typified by weaknesses and deficiencies in governance and accountability. The findings highlight a distinct lack of utilisation of any formal performance measurement framework or criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the private security sector by government bodies. This suggests that key areas related to the performance of private security services, such as cost evaluation and accountability, considered critical in the literature for successful privatisation outcomes (Rushin, 2012; Rogers and Gravelle, 2012; Heath et al., 2010) are not being addressed in terms of monitoring and control. This is consistent with Nichols (2010) who highlights the challenge of economic measurement and analysis in determining the efficacy of outsourcing police services. A key dimension is whether performance metrics are in place for economic analysis to prove outsourcing
contracts will deliver expected cost savings (Nichols, 2010). Although government participants acknowledged public safety rather than cost savings to be a primary government objective, Heath et al.’s (2010) broad parameters for cost evaluation include effectiveness, defined as the extent to which objectives are achieved, and efficiency, identifying the degree to which these are achieved at minimum cost. A lack of cost evaluation therefore implies that important criteria for assessing overall effectiveness and efficiency in the private security sector are being underutilised.

Accountability is considered a critical priority area in the literature, as inadequate mechanisms for accountability and transparency in the private security sector can undermine citizen perceptions and legitimacy (Rushin, 2012; Brunger, 2012; Bradley and Sedgwick, 2009; Zhong and Grabosky, 2009). The findings suggest that issues of how private security will be held to account within the UAE’s overall provision of policing and security services remain unresolved. However, the lack of a framework for evaluating or managing private security accountability conforms with the literature. There is limited consensus on accountability measures and few comprehensive models for assessing this aspect in this context. Various authors have highlighted significant failings in accountability models for private security services (Rogers and Gravelle, 2012; Rushin, 2012; Brunger, 2012). This could be as a result of what Bradley and Sedgwick (2009) highlight is a conceptual lag between private security sector growth and accountability mechanisms focused disproportionately on public policing leading to a lack of recognition for the need to regulate and define accountability for the private sector.

Despite the lack of an overall performance evaluation framework, specific if limited aspects of performance were assessed by government bodies. This included the utilisation of ad-hoc inspections to principally monitor the regulatory compliance performance of private security companies. This practice accords with what Rushin (2012) proposes as the third dimension of accountability focused on managerial oversight involving ongoing monitoring and re-evaluation. This adopts extensive and thorough reporting requirements on behalf of managers and independent agencies for inspection and
monitoring (Rushin, 2012). However, findings in this study pointed to a reduced level of evaluation in comparison with these requirements. Although inspections are conducted by ADP, this falls short of inspection by an independent regulatory agency. Inspections are irregular and to an extent informal focusing mainly on inspecting low-level regulatory compliance such as salary payments and licensing compliance. This suggests that ADP, unlike a regulatory agency, may not adequately comprehend the specific oversight and accountability issues and mechanisms which the literature suggests are necessary for effective monitoring and evaluation processes. The most judicious approach to the possibility of privatisation is to utilise a contextualised performance evaluation framework step by step (Cannadi and Dollery, 2005).

7.3 Government Goals

Government objectives in relation to the private security sector are principally focused on social goals in terms of public safety and security. This diverges from neoliberal, public choice and NPM theories which emphasise key economic aims of cost benefits and improved efficiencies, and maximising budgets and revenues (Alonso et al., 2013; Ellison and Pino, 2012; Hodge, 2000).

An emergent finding is the significance of ensuring comprehensive articulation and communication of government objectives. The action research was significant in facilitating clarification of the key objectives of the government for the private security programme and the realisation of gaps in awareness and understanding. It was evident that despite some understanding of government goals, an initial critical lack of awareness and clarity in relation to overall objectives was revealed in addition to a lack of accountability for their achievement. The action groups showed a development of a greater awareness of government goals in relation to generating employment, increasing foreign direct investment, diversifying the economy through the private sector and creating an innovative and competitive sector that develops specialist expertise.
Results from the action learning group highlighted a disconnect between government objectives and the implementation of measures to attain these, and further the absence of monitoring and evaluation processes leading to a significant lack of awareness of progress towards goals. A key implication arising from the findings is the necessity for government goals to be embedded in any evaluation framework. This needs to be underpinned by the collection of critical data to measure and evaluate the achievement of goals, and the vertical integration of goals to operational practices at all levels.

7.4 Public Confidence

Findings showed that no mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of citizen perceptions and satisfaction with private security sector performance were being implemented in the UAE. Citizen surveys evaluating perceptions of private security have begun to be implemented regularly four times a year by government bodies; nevertheless, these are not conducted within a structure designed to maximise survey outcomes to improve services and accountability. There is no evidence that these are embedded within an overall framework for evaluation. Communication of the results to private security companies was minimal with responses indicating a non-formalised and inconsistent communication approach.

Public satisfaction is argued by Telstra (2008) to be a critical measure of the perceived legitimacy of policing and security privatisation policies. The absence of public monitoring was acknowledged by the group as a key factor that limited awareness of public perceptions. According to the literature the effectiveness of the private security sector is intrinsically linked to positive public perceptions. Therefore a disconnect with public perception undermines the private security sector, the government and police to respond to issues, gain valuable insights and meet expectations of perceptions. This was seen to lead to less effective service delivery and lower citizen respect, thus underlining the significance of gathering and analysing information on citizen attitudes and confidence in private security. Results from the citizen survey in this study indicated overall neutral perceptions of experiences with private
security guards. However, it should be noted that the survey was conducted with people that had only recently experienced private security service and relies on a cross-sectional rather than longitudinal perspective. Findings further indicated an overall lack of trust in private security. This result could be explained by the perception of low levels of professionalism among private security guards. Foreign labour may well be viewed as low-waged and low-skilled hence a resulting lack of trust. Language barriers may further constrain projections of professionalism and lower the amount of contact and engagement with the public. Increased contact between private security and the police and public is likely to support the creation and building of trust. According to van Steden and Nalla (2010), the amount of personal experiences and contacts with police officers, either public or private, is the most significant predictor of individual perceptions.

Failure to account for the public view represents an opportunity cost in terms of improving service delivery and can undermine the sustainability of private security sector. Private security companies are therefore deprived of an important source of information for enhancing services and accountability. This has important implications, as citizen satisfaction is linked to legitimacy and increased public confidence (Prizzia, 2003), an explicit government objective.

This finding positively aligns with a range of literature highlighting the importance of identifying and including citizen perceptions in a coordinated approach to privatisation (Noaks, 2008), service improvement (Sukhram, 2015) and accountability (Davis et al., 2003) in police privatisations. Minaar and Mistry (2004) underline the importance of monitoring citizen perceptions, as contract requirements are shown to be potentially problematic in terms of ensuring client satisfaction. Furthermore, citizen perceptions in terms of trust and belief in the private security sector to protect them are also cited as a key factor underpinning the achievement of private security government objectives to fulfil ever greater public roles in collaboration with police.

Reflecting on this issue, a number of solutions were suggested within the action learning groups. Increased monitoring of public perceptions was
emphasised in conjunction with the provision of feedback to the companies themselves. This finding suggests the importance of establishing diverse mechanisms for different levels of engagement. This is consistent with Myhill (2006) who suggests public engagement is a process aimed at enabling citizens and communities to participate in policing at a level of their choosing, ranging from providing information and reassurance to empowering citizens to identify and implement solutions to community issues and affect strategic priorities and decisions (Myhill, 2006; Lister et al., 2010; Lloyd and Foster, 2009). The concept of procedural justice (Tyler (2003) is useful in giving insight into control systems and the interaction between the private security sector and the public, addressed in terms of feedback from the public and monitoring of complaints.

The principal mechanism proposed to assess public perceptions, the questionnaire survey, is consistent with literature in this area which emphasises the efficacy and accuracy of this method for evaluating citizen views and satisfaction (Donner et al., 2015; Keane and Bryden, 2008; Prizzia, 2003). The literature emphasises that citizen surveys constitute part of a participative model of citizen engagement and provide mechanisms for indirect or direct participation in ensuring accountability (World Bank, 2004).

In terms of increasing citizen satisfaction and confidence as a key outcome, increased visibility of the partnership between police and private security, especially in public spaces, was also suggested to support citizen confidence in private security. Community policing could play a key role here in that if there is visibly greater collaboration between police and private security, the good reputation enjoyed by the police can improve attitudes towards private security. This would thus enhance confidence and satisfaction, and could help to support citizen confidence in the technical competence of private security guards, which the literature acknowledges is a significant factor underpinning public trust and confidence in policing (Bradford and Jackson, 2010; Hardin, 2002; Stoutland, 2001; Jackson et al., 2011; Jackson and Gau, 2015). Nevertheless, the importance of first building trust and relations between the private security sector and the police to work towards such initiatives was
underlined. Citizens recognised the significance of the public-private relationship and their level of confidence appears to be influenced significantly by the degree to which the private security company and police are mutually supportive. The literature suggests that the adoption of community policing and engagement practices by private security companies may have positive effects on citizen perceptions and civic engagement (Myhill, 2006; Thomson, 2012; Forrest et al., 2005). The practice of community policing focuses on key components of community partnerships, engagement and education to facilitate participation (COPS, 2007b) and may involve community meetings, focus groups, and frequent contact, information-sharing and dialogue (Lawrence and McCarthy, 2013; COPS, 2007a). Citizen engagement practices can enable two-way communication in which crime and public safety information is used and shared with the public, often utilising information technologies to provide timely and accessible information and enabling the public to provide tips, feedback, and communicate concerns (COPS, 2007a).

7.5 Public-Private Relationship

The UAE has been continually expanding the role of the private sector in policing and transferring greater roles and responsibilities to the private security sector. A key finding is the critical importance attached to ensuring the development in tandem of the public-private relationship, considered paramount and integral to the success of the private security initiative. This is consistent with arguments by Minaar and Ngoveni (2004) that policing outsourcers should not replace or substitute public police, but act complementarily due to their lack of public accountability. The transference of functions and roles to the private security sector is not perceived to imply detachment of the police force from public policing. Findings suggested that there needs to be a mechanism established early in the privatisation programme to ensure that there is no disconnect between policing concerns and that there is diffusion of policing priorities into the private security sector (Minaar and Ngoveni, 2004). This will only occur effectively if the appropriate relationships, structures and mechanisms are in place. There is recognition of
the silo effect with the risk that the private sector can increasingly operate in an isolated manner focused on its own domains.

The literature focuses on the value and paramount importance of the relationship between the public police and private security sector. Parker and Hartley (2003) emphasise this relationship as central to maintaining a complex equilibrium between the protection of public and private commercial interests. Noaks (2008) argues that the quality of relationship between public and private sector service providers is of key importance in improving overall service quality and performance.

The implementation of appropriate structures with clear goals, roles and processes is a critical factor for effective partnership between the police and the private security. Evaluation criteria should define facilitators and forms of communication and engagement. In a developing and expanding context, emphasis was placed on establishing structures and processes in the early phases to maximise trust and confidence. The development of a partnership was acknowledged to require a continual process of review and reflection that can be supported by comprehensive evaluation and feedback mechanisms. A number of key success factors and themes emerged in relation to developing successful public-private relationships: trust and closer working relations; communication; information-sharing and collaboration.

The formation of appropriate structures was viewed as a key gap and critical consideration that can facilitate strong working relations. However, trust between Abu Dhabi police and the private security services emerged as a vital component in developing a successful and productive public private relationship. Trust was viewed as decisive in overcoming challenges in relation to national, organisational, and professional cultural differences and collaboration and information sharing. This aligns with the literature suggesting that collaboration, integration and strong trust relationships between police and private security providers are key aspects materially affecting service quality (Mawby et al., 2009; Noaks, 2008; Forst, 2000). Wakefield (2003) shows that a lack of trust can lead to refusal to collaborate with the private security sector by public police. Mawby et al. (2009) highlight trustful working relationships as critical in an outsourcing context where private service
providers are working closely alongside police to deliver former police services.

The absence of mechanisms to build and promote trust was identified, which could inhibit significantly the effectiveness of any partnerships between the private security sector and the police. A significant issue was the lack of contact between private security personnel and the police to enable relationships to be built and maximised. Emphasis on regular engagement and contact was shown to have diminished on the public side calling into question the continuity and prioritisation of relationship-building and collaboration. This may reflect a key issue in terms of negative perceptions of the professionalism of private security guards by Abu Dhabi Police which may be mitigated by increased contacts and personal experiences (van Steden and Nalla, 2010).

This is despite the clear value the private security sector placed on these activities for imparting information and raising awareness of industry issues, forging closer relationships and overcoming barriers. Baker (2002) highlights that private security companies perceived continued collaboration as reinforcing their legitimacy. The findings revealed a range of negative impacts from the lack of mechanisms for promoting trust between the sectors. Negative perceptions are a key issue given the increasing evolution in the UAE, in line with global trends, towards the delegation of some social regulatory functions to the private security sector (van Steden, 2007; Button, 2003; Jones and Newburn, 1998). One theme was the negative perception from Abu Dhabi Police in relation to security guard quality, professionalism and training. This is consistent with the literature suggesting that a lack of strategic relationships and limited interaction inhibits trust and closer working relationships (Mawby et al., 2009: Forst, 2000). Wakefield (2003) finds that in the absence of formal communication mechanisms and minimal contact between private security and public police, contact between the two sectors mostly focuses on complaints.

The need for mechanisms to foster and generate trust between police and private security to develop closer working relationships was highlighted in the action groups. One key strategy suggested was the provision of increased opportunities for regular contact viewed on both sides as benefitting the creation of trust through which effective collaboration and information-sharing
could be established. The frequency of contact emerges as a critical factor that can foster and deepen understanding between parties.

The importance of support by private security company leadership for the development of contacts within Abu Dhabi Police to share critical information and learning was also emphasised. This is consistent with Gunther et al. (2004) who highlight the significance of regular contact and leadership to support closer work and cooperation between police and private security services. They emphasise that respect and trust develop along with cooperation, information sharing and consistency.

Monitoring or evaluation processes focusing on the development of effective working relationships between ADP and private security companies were identified as a critical success factor for the development of trust and closer relations. Juska (2009) highlights the need to design clear organisational boundaries into regulatory frameworks to avoid accountability issues, indicating that permeable boundaries can result in situations where public police exercise inadequate oversight over firms and may shield them from public accountability. A clear success factor cited for the development of trustful working relationships was the existing emphasis on clearly assigned roles within the ADP for collaboration and information-sharing with private security companies.

This concurs with evidence from Bradley and Sedgwick (2009) showing a lack of national strategic relationship attributed to failure to define key goals and roles. This was indicated to lead, where relations existed, to ad hoc and localised arrangements which did little to improve overall service quality. The implication that emerged from the action research was a lack of accountability for different issues. Research has highlighted that a lack of strategic relationships and limited interaction can hamper collaboration, integration and strong trust relationships with negative effects on service quality (Mawby et al., 2009; Noaks, 2008; Forst, 2000). Forst (2000) highlights that significant mutual benefits, in terms of intelligence information and expertise-sharing, are to be gained from improved coordination and collaboration.
One finding highlighted the existence of cultural tensions between ADP and the private security sector with potentially negative impacts on collaboration and communication. This can be attributed at least in part to the distinctive and complex UAE private sector context characterised by significant diversity of nationalities and accompanied by perceptions of foreign workers as low paid and low skilled. There are thus significant differences in national and organisational cultures between the police and private security which may generate reluctance on the part of the police to collaborate. The national culture between the public and private security contrasts significantly. While Abu Dhabi police and related government organisations comprise of indigenous personnel, the private security companies at all levels have diverse national cultures. Secondly, there is a contrast between public and private organisational cultures. This creates challenges in terms of fostering shared understanding and relations that promote trust. The UAE is a highly traditional and hierarchical society where power is retained in the higher hierarchical levels. Subordinates are deferential to figures of authority and expect to be told what to do and generally there is limited participation in decision-making or solicitation of subordinates’ views (Hofstede, 2016). The difficulty was cited for non-UAE citizens to be open and share their views, or comment on practices, unless it was within their remit or they had been invited to do so. Consequently, partnership strategies need to account for the cultural context and adopt strategies that address contextual factors. There is significant implication for ensuring that liaison personnel have strong interpersonal and cultural skills.

A key finding related to the direction of information sharing and data flows, which responses showed was predominantly, though not exclusively, unidirectional originating from private security towards the ADP.

There was dependency on a central conduit of information sharing based on information links into the control centre. However, this creates a significant barrier in terms of access to knowledge that impedes the flow of information and knowledge from police to private security. This accords with Gimenez-Salinas (2007) who highlight that despite its potential as a bi-directional data-
sharing instrument, in practice central coordination rooms mostly function unidirectionally, with the public police gathering information from private security providers (Gimenez-Salinas, 2007). This implies a position of “junior partner” on the part of security companies, which Jones and Newburn (1998) highlight are frequently assumed in cooperative relationships between private security and police. However, Sarre and Prenzler (2000) emphasise potential dangers in the imbalance, suggesting that communication systems can be severely hindered by the unevenness of the powers held by the two cooperating sides.

This contrasts with the theoretical model proposed by Ericson and Haggerty (1997) which places the police at the centre of a network disseminating data to other organisations involved in community and location supervision and control. Findings pointed however to limited formal scope or provision for private security personnel to request information from ADP. Gimenez-salinas (2007) shows that private security staff have significant information needs indicating that the most requested information services included data on organised crime and their procedures, in addition to information on sectorial crime developments and issues such as new regulations. The implication is that evaluation should be utilised to provide continuous review and reflection of modes of communication that facilitate exchanges appropriate to both parties’ needs and allowing for both formal and informal communications for different purposes. The bi-directionality that was evidenced focused on open communication with the public, or with the police occasionally using social media technologies and other channels to disseminate important operational and security information to private security partners.

A lack of opportunities for informal knowledge-flows means police and private security do not benefit from complimentary knowledge and information that would provide police with different forms of intelligence. While dependency on centralised technologically-driven information systems generates consistency in communication of specific events, it fails to provide interpersonal opportunities to explore tacit knowledge and share experiences that are stored mentally in private security officers or police. The transfer of tacit effective knowledge was viewed as a major lost opportunity. New knowledge can be
created as a result of effective dialogue between security personnel and police officers.

Explicit knowledge is codified knowledge disseminated in systematic formal language, and expressed and secured in formal records including databases, policy documents, guides and archives. In contrast, tacit knowledge is acknowledged to be more personal in nature challenging formalisation and communication (Nonaka, 1994). Tacit knowledge is argued to be located in the situational understanding of individuals and built through shared experience and is critically based in involvement, action and commitment in a specific context (Nonaka, 1996). Al-Serhan (2010) finds that, in the context of the UAE, trust was the most critical issue inhibiting knowledge sharing. This was attributed to cultural attitudes. Skok and Tahir (2010) further highlight that trust is a significant impediment to knowledge-sharing in the Arab national culture. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) explain that strong ties can help to ameliorate cultural differences between organisations.

The nature of police and private security work means that while there are clear guidelines from the Abu Dhabi Police that guide certain aspects of private security activities, highly contextual situational events generate significant primary information acquired during the course of private security personnel activities. This information may relate to discussions with the public, colleagues or observations that may not be transferred. According to Nonaka (1994), in uncertain environments, continuous dialogue is vital in order to generate new insights between tacit and explicit knowledge. While explicit knowledge is codified and captured within existing systems, there is a gap in the relation dimension that can help unlock and access individual contextual insights accumulated by private security personnel. The action research process has pointed to a lack of opportunities to generate tacit knowledge that has been acknowledged. Therefore the evaluation criteria proposed emphasise shared experiences and creating opportunities for personal interactions between the police and private security personnel. Thus this research process emphasises the importance of ensuring that the evaluation
regime accounts for the effectiveness of information and knowledge sharing of different types of knowledge.

The findings showed that information-sharing between the ADP and the private security sector can be mandated by regulatory requirements. The benefit of this is a relatively high level of information-sharing between ADP and the private security sector within formal communication systems. Gimenez-salinas (2007) emphasises that the existence of formal communication systems between public and private security agencies can promote durable collaboration, minimise the possibility of conflict and maximise public benefit.

However, this was characterised as highly operationally-driven where increasingly private security services are acting as the “eyes and ears” of police in key locations and neighbourhoods. This practice in the UAE can be argued to mark a shift towards theoretical perspectives which emphasise policing, as opposed to the police, transforming security provision into a regulated web of participatory nodes having the knowledge, ability and authority to implement policing governance (Shearing, 2001).

Findings also indicated significant increased emphasis on the integration of information systems and processes between the private security sector and ADP. Private security control rooms are currently in the process of being integrated with ADP control rooms to further facilitate immediacy and effective management of the information shared by private security companies on a daily basis. The move towards integration of control room systems is consistent with evidence from Gimenez-salinas (2007) showing similar trends in a European context. This was acknowledged to enable the centralisation of information originating from private security guards operating nationwide and its utilisation for crime-prevention purposes, as well as allowing their requests for assistance to receive rapid and precise responses. The findings also accord with the UN’s (2014) recommendations on data-sharing with private security companies, emphasising reinforcement and the creation of secure data-sharing networks.
Nevertheless, no mention was made of how confidential information was shared with security companies or kept secure despite the fact that occasionally security firms were cited to be trusted with secret information. The UN (2014) guidelines highlight the critical importance of implementing data protection legislation and incorporating regulations for private security provider and codes of conduct on the legitimate and ethical use of data. This suggests a significant gap in practice and evaluation in this area.

The cultural differences both in terms of national differences and organisational culture between Abu Dhabi Police and the private security companies emerged as a key issue that potentially constrains information sharing. Theory identifies distance between parties including organisational, physical, cultural distance and distance in knowledge base as influencing the quality of knowledge sharing relationships (Battistella et al., 2016; Cummings and Teng, 2003). Similar social norms in terms of the expected conduct or practices of groups or individuals in specific circumstances are held to facilitate the knowledge-sharing relationship (Battistella et al., 2016). However, Abu Dhabi Police is a public sector organisation composed predominantly of emirate citizens and private security companies are composed of diverse nationalities.

7.6 Stakeholder Engagement Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives

There was strong consensus on the significance of ensuring the evaluation framework accounted for broad stakeholder engagement. The accountability of the private security to different stakeholders was a key theme discussed within the action learning session. This is consistent with international multi-stakeholder initiatives in the private security industry. Typified by the joint engagement of both public and private stakeholders, these have generally involved a range of key actors including governments, industry associations, private companies and non-governmental organisations (Richemond-Barak, 2014).
The design of evaluation criteria should be based on international best practice. Notable examples to date include the Voluntary Principles (2000), the Montreux Document (2008) and the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) (2010). The latter was composed following lengthy multi-stakeholder consultation and deliberation and includes commitments to high standards of professional conduct, human rights and effective governance (ICoCA, 2017). The action research group were aware of international standards that represented an opportunity to rapidly address gaps by adopting standards. The principal aim of the ICoC was to establish standards proposing an explicit set of widely acknowledged principles for the private security sector and also advancing a basis to render those principles into relevant standards, governance and oversight mechanisms. Standards relate to areas such as the use of force, recruitment and subcontracting (Richemond-Barak, 2014). In addition to private companies, the ICoC promotes the engagement of civil society organisations and government. These standards can form part of the criteria for evaluation.

7.7 Competition and Financial Efficiency

The evaluation of the competitiveness and the competitive culture of the private security environment emerged as a critical factor to sustain the growth and development of the sector to achieve the key objectives. The gap identified in this area was viewed as a significant impediment to promoting efficiency and innovation in private security that undermines the sector’s ability to contribute to the country’s employment objective. The literature across a range of different geographies shows that the private security sector can experience significant entrepreneurship inadequacies as a consequence of underperforming companies (Van Steden and Nalla, 2010). This is evidenced by a key negative impact cited by action learning groups that existing contracts provided no incentive for long-term investment and resulted in high perceived financial risks that inhibited investment and growth.

A major focus by private security companies was on cost minimisation and pricing pressures that undermined the sector’s ability to invest in training and
development. There has been substantial comparative research into the efficiency of the public and private sectors. It is generally assumed that efficiency is enhanced by the increased competition that private sector participation in public sector infrastructure provision brings (Wiltshire, 1992). An expansion in competition is also assumed to improve resource allocation due to the impetus towards profit maximisation and cost minimisation weighing on the private sector (Cannadi and Dollery, 2005). Where competition within the market is seen as a driver towards efficiency in production and costs (Hughes, 1998), the lack of cost evaluation made it difficult to assess economic and competitive performance of private security companies in the UAE. This finding is consistent with criteria proposed by Hodge (2000) for evaluation of the economic situation and of performance addressing elements such as financial performance and economic efficiency. Such criteria can be extended to address the importance of reward and incentives emphasised by King and Pitchford (1998) to promote competition among UAE companies and cited as a key factor to stimulate competitive impetus.

A key finding from this study relates to the potential for the government to create unfair competition in directly competing with the private sector. It was shown that this potentially undermined competitive commitment and created strong perceptions of unfair advantage and resentment from the private security sector toward the government. In addition, this can undermine the willingness of private companies to fully co-operate with government and police which they may view as competitors rather than strategic partners. The rationale for the government to deliver private contracts was emphasised as a risk management approach to ensure minimum standards in a developing sector. By ensuring a strong evaluation regime and promoting interventions to strengthen accountability, the government can explore strategies to withdraw from competing directly with private companies for contracts.

### 7.8 Internal Control Mechanisms

Findings on the effectiveness of internal control systems identified key factors and issues that should be reflected in evaluation and change criteria to enhance the accountability of the private security sector. In the current study,
three types of control derived from the literature were focused on in the exploratory research and guided the design phase of the action research. The exploratory data provided insights and benchmarking of the internal culture of private security companies as the basis for identifying critical factors. The key factors and solutions were determined in the action research. A central finding from this study is that beyond the initial licensing phase there was little evidence of monitoring and oversight of internal controls.

The findings from the exploratory action research point to significant scope to enhance the motivation of security personnel in the sector, as well as recruitment and development and performance management. The evidence pointed to gaps in performance in terms of action controls that address communication, codes of conduct, supervision, rewards and disciplinary measures (Lopes, 2015). The survey results indicated that leadership, supervision and reward could be enhanced to maximise performance. It was acknowledged during the design phase that the motivation of the security personnel was a critical factor for improving security levels and developing the performance and overall professionalism of the industry. In terms of personnel controls, negative perceptions on the professionalism and image of private security indicate significant gaps and scope for improvement in this area. Critically, the action research group acknowledged that the evaluation framework was not sufficiently comprehensive to enable oversight by the licensing body of internal controls implemented by private security companies. Potential issues related to the recruitment practices and the competency of the existing workforce were identified through the action research process triangulating data from the public survey, corporate clients and interviews with the Abu Dhabi police representatives and private security executives.

This action research provides an insight into the relationship between external controls systems and internal control systems. External controls may comprise a range of external influences in the form of regulation, media or market controls that may shape internal control and the overall culture of private security companies. Cultural control refers to the internalisation of the values and to the incentives for peer control (Lopes, 2015), which ultimately form the
organisational culture. In line with Merchant and Van Der Stede (2007), Lopes (2015) operationalises cultural mechanisms as codes of conduct (self-control) and team awards (peer control).

The findings indicated that the evaluation framework owned by the Department of Private Security Companies should incorporate multiple dimensions related to internal accountability systems. The evaluation framework can additionally provide a basis for assessing the appropriateness and effectiveness of external controls systems.

7.9 Self-regulation

Two major themes emerging from the action research are the role and nature of self-regulation and industry associations to enhance accountability. The literature suggests that implementing a licensing regime within the private security sector does not resolve all sector problems. The level of training continues to be perceived as insufficient, employment practices can still be questionable and scope remains for regulatory non-compliance (Marsden, 2011).

There was acknowledgement of the potential benefits of self-regulation by the action group. Self-regulation can also have positive impacts on competition through the capacity to develop and preserve industry-wide standards which promote an equalised competitive environment with limited barriers to entry (OECD, 2015). The literature shows that self-regulation does have acknowledged strengths and weaknesses (Richemond-Barak, 2014; Engle, 2009) which in the context of the UAE will need to be tested and evaluated over time.

There was strong support from the action research group for self-regulation. Participants expressed their belief that self-regulation provides opportunity to learn and mature voluntary codes of conduct. Examples in the literature show that weakness or inefficiency associated with voluntary and non-binding regulatory regimes is not inevitable (Richemond-Barak, 2014). Further, this
provides a basis for which codes can be incorporated into law (Richemond-Barak, 2014; Gupta and Lad, 1983). However, self-regulation is argued to have significant inherent value beyond the capacity for it to become law.

There was acknowledgement that, promoted by the government, self-regulation could be an efficient and less costly option to improve regulation and rapidly address gaps. In the current action research, participants expressed the need for a model led by the government. This is consistent with the concept of co-operative or co-regulation that involves cooperation between the regulator and regulated on the formation and implementation of regulations. Government involvement is described as common within self-regulatory schemes, although varying in level across different contexts, and it may even play diverse roles external to the co-regulatory frameworks (OECD, 2015). Given that privatisation may weaken government influence, it is considered important to recognise the tension that exists between maintenance of government control and the freedom provided by the marketplace to regulate itself and fast-track development through change. This suggests that self-regulation should be an incremental process essentially implemented through trial and error.

Increasingly self-regulation is shown to incorporate elements of individual guard accountability. Richemond-Barak (2014) argues that only individual accountability offers the incentives needed for private security employees to comply with relevant standards.

Self-regulation is noted to offer increased flexibility, and is associated with more rapid and appropriate industry responses to the need to modify and adapt regulations in a complex and changeable marketplace than available through frequently cumbersome and slow government regulatory processes (Engle, 2009). This is acknowledged to have a strong impact at cross-border level where there is significant complexity and challenge in harmonising regulatory solutions (Van der Zeijden and Van der Horst, 2008). The self-regulatory process is also suggested to support the introduction of future government regulation if needed for consumer protection. Private sector actors
also have the opportunity to influence the shape of proposed regulations (Williams, 2004).

Self-regulation was also acknowledged as an external control mechanism that is capable of facilitated broad engagement. According to the ICoC (2012), there is also scope for engaging particular non-state actors in a more inclusive regulatory process which in turn would emphasise the greater transparency necessary for improved compliance (Richemond-Barak, 2014). The ICoC is argued to be based on the notion of “soft law” in contrast to earlier regulatory regimes based mainly on “hard law”. Richemond-Barak (2014) argues that the framework provides a means to assess the advantages of self-regulation, identify the desired amount of government involvement and delimit the reach of accountability schemes.

A soft approach to accountability in the UAE can be underpinned by a comprehensive system of benchmarking that was proposed to be integrated into the evaluation framework for private security. In placing emphasis on a self-regulatory model, an imperative was placed on ensuring a progressive evaluation framework to assess the effectiveness of self-regulation in enhancing accountability. Research focused on self-regulation has also underlined its cost-effectiveness and limited onerousness in comparison with government regulatory models no matter the level of state involvement (Bartle and Vass, 2005; Ministry of Consumer Affairs, 2005). Self-regulation has been shown to be more effective than more formal governance mechanisms in particular circumstances and where the aim is to influence the conduct of non-state actors (Richemond-Barak, 2014). To safeguard thorough compliance with industry standards, a bottom-up strategy focused on individual employees is proposed. This is argued to support the generation of direct and positive incentives through individual accountability for wrong behaviour.

7.10 Industry Association

The emergent solution placed emphasis on the formation of an industry association with the support of the government. The industry is considered to
be in a significant position to lead self-regulation initiatives; however, success is reliant on the sanctioning regime applied. The literature points to the application of sanctions beyond the principal sanctions used of suspension or dismissal of non-compliant personnel (Richemond-Barak, 2014). Industry associations are perceived to have adopted an increasing role in expanding and encouraging self-regulation. This is argued to be having an important effect as such bodies are acknowledged to be in an unrivalled position to set baseline standards, train and develop, establish common norms and generate peer pressure.

A key theme from the action research design process is the role of an industry body to foster best practices, promote organisational learning, innovation and excellence in the sector. This is shown to advance the internalisation of those norms across the industry (Richemond-Barak, 2014). Association participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives has also contributed significantly towards effective self-regulation. The OECD (2015) states that self-regulatory groups may be entirely responsible for developing self-regulatory mechanisms, overseeing compliance and safeguarding enforcement, or they may collaborate with other stakeholders including government bodies in a co-regulatory capacity.

The importance of ensuring an effective evaluation framework is further underpinned by perceived risks from government stakeholders of weak voluntary standards and accountability. This concern is consistent with industry experience indicating that a disorganised voluntary and non-binding regulatory regime can negatively impact the moral and legal industry operational environment (Haufler, 2013).

One area of concern is in the development of robust and effective codes of conduct. Company codes of conduct are a third level of internalisation of controls and frequently integrate the principles expressed in multi-stakeholder initiatives and promoted by industry association views. The assumption of codes of conduct and wider involvement in multi-stakeholder initiatives is indicated to have allowed the private security sector to adopt a position as an
agent of regulation (Richemond-Barak, 2014). However, it has been argued that potentially codes of conduct are superficial facades with limited impact on the behaviour of industry members (Gunningham and Rees, 1997).

The evaluation framework can ensure that self-regulatory initiatives produce tangible results progress. The impact of company codes can be developed over time. Earlier codes are acknowledged to have focused principally on standards and best practices; however, more current codes of conduct have also started to incorporate internal and external mechanisms with the purpose of securing compliance (Richemond-Barak, 2014). Company codes of conduct have also been adapted and modified to integrate industry developments including the introduction of the ICoC. A more recent trend is the outsourcing of compliance monitoring to third party organisations (Richemond-Barak, 2014).

Measuring the impacts of such regimes therefore assumes considerable importance; however, measurement is acknowledged to be highly complex (Haufler, 2013). In relation to the ICoC, benchmarks developed by international governance scholars have mainly been implemented to evaluate the outcome of evolving regulatory regimes (Richemond-Barak, 2014). Benchmarks are contended to offer greater accuracy and precision in evaluating the outcomes of self-regulation than most other assessment methods (Richemond-Barak, 2014). Further, benchmarks are considered necessary for evaluating the achievement of the basic objectives of self-regulatory schemes (Richemond-Barak, 2014). One significant area suggested for empirical measurement is violations occurring before and after the introduction of self-regulation. However, this is acknowledged to provide an incomplete view of the impact of self-regulation on compliance, without providing understanding of the types of violations occurring and how they have been addressed. The single measure also fails to address key questions such as identifying the causal relationship (if any exists) between self-regulation and behaviour change (Richemond-Barak, 2014).
7.11 Evaluation as Learning Process

A key emergent theme is the notion of evaluation as learning process. The action research process has identified key issues and critical factors which have culminated in an evaluation framework that defines key factors, evaluation criteria, change objectives and compliance measures. It was envisaged that change interventions under each dimension focus on addressing key issues to enhance the governance and accountability of private security. The evaluation dimensions and criteria are subject to a continuous process of review and adjustment. A key evaluation dimension addresses effective communication and engagement with stakeholders that is underpinned by data collection information and collaboration that both enables transparency and accountability, and organisational learning.

The intensity of the connections between collaborating organisations is indicated by literature to have a significant effect on knowledge transfer with strong ties leading to greater transfer and sharing of knowledge (Battistella et al., 2016; Hansen and Lovas, 2004; Sukoco, 2016). This is suggested to result from increased opportunities for knowledge sharing and the generation of trust and cooperation (Battistella et al., 2016). The cultural context in the UAE creates a significant imperative for continuous change and organisational learning to bridge the different national cultures. Hierarchical societies such as the UAE are shown to have lower levels of information sharing and employee consultation, while the avoidance of risk and uncertainty in a society is associated with lower incentives for generating new ideas. High tendency towards masculine traits is indicated to limit collaboration. These factors are contended to minimise rather than encourage innovation (Arundel et al., 2015). In contrast, high levels of individualism and low power distance in a society are suggested to encourage novelty-seeking and innovative activities and a workplace environment in which employees have more responsibility for developing innovative solutions (Kaasa, 2013).

Innovation could also be challenged by factors in the public sector environment. Regulatory requirements are acknowledged to frequently
constrain opportunities for innovation in public service delivery (Borins, 2006; Mulgan and Albury, 2003; Koch and Hauknes, 2005). The significant bureaucracy and red tape, avoidance of risk-taking and resistance to change associated with the public sector may also lead to organisational cultures non-receptive to innovative ideas (Boyne, 2002; Osborne and Brown, 2011; Potts, 2009). Battistella et al. (2016) highlight that information and knowledge sharing relationships are strongly influenced by trust, intensity of connection and distance between the parties.

These factors highlight the significance of ensuring an evaluation framework that emphasises a continuous evaluation process and addresses trust between all parties in the relationship between the ADP and the private security sector. This is a key issue that the literature has repeatedly shown is the single most constraining factor for knowledge and information sharing (Asrar-ul-Haq and Anwar, 2016; Debowski, 2006; Marsick and Watkins, 2003; Steyn and Kahn, 2008; Chua and Lam, 2005; Easterby-Smith, 2008; Dodgson, 1993).

There was clear emphasis from the action learning process for the development of an evaluation framework that was informed by a process of review and reflection based through closers relations and communication with key stakeholders. The dissemination of tacit knowledge from members of an organisation to others is argued to necessitate a process of socialisation into each other’s organisational culture and practices, which in turn involves acquiring knowledge of organisational norms, and adapting and aligning behaviour (Jablin, 1987). Granovetter (1973) highlights that strong ties are distinguished by frequent interactions and a high degree of reciprocity and intimacy. Frequent interactions are noted to facilitate greater knowledge acquisition allowing opportunity for questions and fuller explanations (Uzzi, 1997). This is supported by Inkpen and Tsang (2005) who found that face-to-face communication promotes greater intensity of relations encouraging mutually beneficial behaviours.
7.12 Towards a Framework for Evaluation

The principal findings of this study inform the development of an assessment framework for police privatisation. It is evident that the existing state of private security both in terms of the evaluation framework and the management and governance of private security companies is in flux. The development of the assessment framework represents the integration of critical structures and processes to enhance the way that the private security programme in the UAE is evaluated.

This study adopted an action research design to facilitate dialogue and design among practitioners. This reflects an information sharing and learning process by analysing the situation and identifying measures and key changes. Action research facilitated a reflective process that consisted of understanding the process and context. Critically where tensions existed at the early phase of the action learning cycle, the process of continuous communication and dialogue on key issues in a collaborative approach emphasised critical changes that were necessary. This process unlocked and reflected the potential for an emergent dynamic approach by facilitating group level interaction and promoting significant knowledge exchange and consensus on key issues and solutions that informed a change agenda. Private security companies face dilemmas in relation to trust and reputation on two key fronts of public perception and the police perception of weak professionalism. This is a common issue and a shared problem, because on the one hand it undermines the industry’s legitimacy and constrains its growth. On the other hand, it represents an opportunity cost for the government and the police in terms of maximising this resource to achieve its broader goals. Thus the co-ordinating structures represent a major evaluative dimension in terms of the partnership relationship between the police and the private security companies.

Table 6-1 in chapter 6 details the evaluation and change priorities for governance and accountability of police privatisation that emerged from the action research process. As indicated in Figure 22, the evaluation framework is based on priorities representing a balance of factors across performance di-
dimensions outlined in the conceptual framework for this study: political, economic, social and democratic dimensions and incorporated media, legal, market, and client control measures for the police privatisation context in the UAE.

The framework presented in Figure 23 provides a novel theoretical view of a reflexive emergent evaluation approach. The proposed framework represents a dynamic and highly reflexive design that facilitates continuous communication and feedback and supports continuous change. The framework depicts an interconnected dynamic evaluation process with multiple dimensions and multiple actors continuously monitoring, learning, evaluating and changing. This represents a reflexive emergent process.

Figure 22 Key Inputs to Evaluation Framework
Figure 23 Reflexive Assessment Framework for Police Privatisation

The upper part of the framework broadly represents the initial phase of the action research stage that is necessary. The strategic plan and the performance dimensions form the basis for validating the evaluation criteria. During the ac-

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tion research, the strategic vision and goals were employed to reflect on the extant evaluation framework and criteria. The performance dimensions represent a holistic multidimensional approach to developing the evaluation framework. The performance dimensions reflect political, economic, social, legal and democratic factors that guide the formulation of control measures, indicators and outcomes as illustrated in Figure 22. This contributes a holistic guide for action researchers or practitioners to effectively evaluate governance and accountability in private security.

The participatory process ensures both awareness and ownership goals that were identified as lacking in the existing system. This formed the basis for identifying control measures, outcomes and indicators around each issue. The initial phase generates the baseline revealing gaps both in terms of the evaluation criteria and processes and the key performance issues and barriers to address. This primary phase stimulates change in terms of the governance and accountability of the private security sector, and change of the evaluation approach. The private security programme exists currently as a closed system that is largely disconnected from its environment. The absorptive capacity and learning culture suggests a disconnect from any feedback from the environment. The dynamic context of security both private and public requires much more embedded and continuous mechanisms for ensuring individuals understand their context. This needs to be reflected in an evaluation framework that enhances organisational capabilities for learning and collaboration.

Evaluation of the private sector is posited as a network of individuals and organisations in continuous dialogue and communication. Stakeholder involvement in the evaluation process is a vital component not only in providing control information on performance dimensions but for engaging in collaborating, sharing ideas and feedback. The term evaluation network is employed to represent the social dimension of the evaluation process. This element is vital and recognises the complexity and the challenges of the context. The rapidly changing and volatile security context of the UAE requires a continuous process of transformation to address issues across all performance dimensions. The integration of a reflexive element in the
evaluation process supports traditional process evaluation. It facilitates change and improvement in both the evaluation regime and the control measures. A social network view is placed within the model based on the importance acknowledged to promote and establish diverse ties with stakeholders. This enhances the reflexivity of the network and the overall capability of the network to interact and engage in many ways to contribute to incremental improvement of processes.

The flow of knowledge within this network and the access to knowledge is critical based on both formal and informal sharing of tacit and explicit knowledge. The social network dimension emphasised in this study stresses informal feedback mechanisms and injects a flexible and responsive component to the evaluative process. Social media was cited as a critical mechanism to support this process to enhance inclusiveness and transparency and to widen engagement with all participants on different issues. Social media therefore represents an enabling mechanism to develop formal and informal spaces online for knowledge exchange and feedback. Further, it supports inclusiveness and transparency in organisational strategy processes through enlarging engagement with participants and the content of strategies. The emergence of novel internal capabilities is required by all organisations to structurally assimilate feedback into the organisation. Arising from the increased adoption of social media within the organisation, potential was identified for promoting emergent feedback loops based on new forms of feedback and interactions. This component can be characterised either as managed or unmoderated and formal or informal to facilitate dialogue and knowledge exchange to support evaluation and change. The role of balancing informal and formal structures is particularly critical.

In terms of frequency, the framework emphasises a structured evaluation cycle based on formal periodic evaluation and continuous feedback.

The feedback loops emphasise the significance of continuous feedback into the network to maximise reflection and provide opportunities to adapt. This emerged from the collective realisation that if operating as solely a periodic
process there would be a lack of momentum and continuity needed to remain responsive and achieve the necessary changes.

Control information is gathered and simultaneous feedback and reflection is facilitated through flexible and diverse formal and informal mechanisms. This is critical to ensure momentum and the sharing of control information that can shape change. A key finding from the action research process is that sharing this information stimulates action and enhances their ability to take action. A core element of this process is the linkage to stakeholders based on proactive two-way communication that is critical to maximise reflexivity from different perspectives. The action research process, by including key actors, revealed a broad range of issues and needs both in terms of the evaluation framework and processes and the extant state of the private security programme. These provide the basis for learning new lessons. The reflexive dimension ensures a learning process that occurred during the action research process based on continuing inquiry.

By applying the lens of different control dimensions, key issues and needs were identified lending evidence for the conceptualising of an emergent and reflexive assessment culture to continuously enhance governance and accountability in the private security sector. The evaluation framework is an object of change in itself. It is continually refined to address strategic changing priorities and needs and ensures holistic information gathering and alignment of evaluation criteria and mechanisms in line with the industry context. It is vital, as evidenced from the findings, to ensure that control information is accessible across different performance dimensions. In this way, the evaluation process shapes the monitoring and feedback structures and processes that in turn shape the control systems and enhance standards continually. This was possible due to the involvement of senior personnel and key stakeholders within the police, government ministries and private security companies. Participants were invested in the action learning process and were keen to contribute. Private security, police and government participants all felt that their contribution was meaningful and valuable. The learning allowed for increased understanding from private and public sector participants on the best
way a situation or problem can be addressed. Leaders from government, police and private security became more aware of the importance of organisational learning and the significance of enabling it for ongoing organisational sustainability and growth.

Rather than viewed in its component parts, the action research process supported a holistic view of police privatisation. This provided the basis for the most effective course of action for the organisations embedded in an enlarged perspective. The process enabled the identification of private security business challenges and needs, the collection of data to discover gaps and establish the underlying causes, the analysis of data for determining necessary actions, priorities and critical interventions, and the creation of a project plan. A more in-depth understanding of the issues involved was developed.

Trust was identified as a critical component and this is reflected in the frequency and nature of interactions that the framework posits. The quality of this relationship is a vital dimension requiring to be both evaluated and continuously enhanced. This is highly challenging given the cultural distance between Emiratis in the police and the diversity of foreign nationalities in the private security companies. This factor was identified as critical to ensure free flowing knowledge exchange and collective learning.

The action research process involved change agents on both sides who channelled feedback and delegation, and who assumed key responsibilities and information in order to effectively communicate data. Participants were open to making change as they emerged with an improved understanding of their role in generating and implementing change. Trusted agents within each of the stakeholders were recognised as key facilitators to share information, develop relations and promote change. There are notably tensions in the relationship between the police and private security companies. This underscores the importance of trust facilitating interactions. The emphasis placed on self-regulation reinforces the significance of self-organising processes that are driven by experimentation, learning and new perspectives. Champions within the system can promote dialogue and knowledge transfer.
The dynamic and responsive nature of such mechanisms supports the emergent cycles for strategy development for the sector. The feedback loop connects outcomes of the evaluation and change process with the strategic planning process. The dynamic evaluation process can be viewed as an emergent strategic tool that develops the dynamic capabilities of the sector. The framework therefore adopts a more open system for evaluation that is continuous and inclusive. There is limited debate in the literature on emergent change strategies for police privatisation. The findings from this action research underscore the limitations of deliberate planned strategy and identified two significant issues that can be inferred. Firstly, that the development of the privatisation strategy focused on a top-down approach that was conceptualised by change strategists in the government and the police. Secondly, mechanisms were not implemented to ensure feedback loop. Implementation of deliberate planned strategy was based on top-down strategy development built on government strategic objectives. This was underpinned by narrow evaluation criteria that focused on specific key criteria during the licensing phase. Thus while the initial stage provided impetus for forming initial structures and processes for the private security sector in Abu Dhabi there lacked a process of communication and dialogue that was critical to ensuring continuous transformation towards an optimal model. While a top-down strategic plan was valuable in establishing the vision, there was a subsequent disconnect that undermined the momentum for change.

The components for the change agenda were driven by issues identified in both internal and external control dimensions and the necessity to respond to such issues. Yet without the reflexive process brought about by the action research, these elements for change could not have been planned using a top-down approach. This reflexivity applies to the evaluation framework and criteria in order to ensure that the evaluation process is both the focus of change and at the same time identifies continuous change. Management of the private security companies and of leaders of the external organisations would need to exhibit leadership in sustaining a continual process of learning and development that is directed towards the change priorities identified.
A further evaluation dimension addresses the control factors in this industry with key findings focusing on introducing a dynamic but flexible regulatory regime. Organisational and regulatory configurations represent further dimensions of this model. At the organisational level, design and evaluation of partnership structures, roles and processes are vital. The regulatory environment provides the external control dimension. This study shows that self-regulation through an industry forum or body has critical benefits in terms of speed, flexibility and knowledge distance in terms of understanding and responding to issues and needs. This component is vital to maintain the momentum of continuous change and provide a culture of reflection. The industry can exert controls on private security performance through formal and informal processes to ensure high level recruitment and training through common standards and promote external linkages and knowledge transfer through the development of best practices. The primary factor emphasising this dimension is the security context. A dynamic changing environment necessitates a highly responsive emergent approach to regulation. A formal planned system of legal regulation may take years of consultation and implementation that may eventually become obsolete in a rapidly changing context.

A key mechanism revealed in this research is the importance of embedding learning into planning and evaluation processes. This is a critical component of the model that emphasises the need identified by practitioners to develop capabilities continuously. This study provides a cross-sectional view of the organisational situation external environment. Connecting timely evaluation and monitoring, that are inclusive and multidimensional, to the planning ensures that learning opportunities are identified. This in turn supports a dynamic and emergent strategy approach that draws on collective perspectives and knowledge to better understand the issues and needs that can enhance governance and accountability. Similarly, the evaluation criteria in the framework and the mechanisms for evaluation are emergent elements rather than a rigid set of criteria. The benefit is that the evaluation criteria reflect the priorities and needs identified across different domains.
Moreover it is acknowledged that the change agenda will be implemented in the context of certain limitations. Fiscal constraints will make the change objectives difficult to implement and inevitably some of these objectives will be prioritised. Implementation will require a new structure of co-operation between stakeholders and development of trust between police and the private sector. There is further political challenge in terms of tensions in relinquishing some influence to the private sector and to stakeholders.

7.13 Conclusion

This chapter provided a discussion and analysis of the findings and an evaluation framework arising from the action research process. The discussion was structured according to key themes in relation to external and internal controls. The findings from the action research underscored the importance of comprehensive evaluation to ensure that a balanced multidimensional approach could be conducted that reflected broad stakeholder goals. The discussion explored two key areas. Firstly, the nature of the evaluation framework and mechanisms that were critical to ensure effective governance and oversight of private security operations. The second strand of discussion placed solutions and change interventions in the context of the literature and discussed the relative merits of key factors and processes that were advocated to account for democratic, political, economic and social dimensions that would enhance accountability of the sector. The evaluation framework reflects the key priorities based on the existing issues and challenges identified by the action research team and addresses key problems critical to ensuring the growth and sustainability of the private security sector. This action process validated the significance of dimensions of accountability situated in the theoretical framework. Evaluation feedback is embedded diversely and continually reflected across the different control measures. The evaluation of private security needs to assess the issues in relation to the broader environment and the stakeholders relative to one another. The framework depicts an interconnected dynamic evaluation process with multiple dimensions and multiple actors continuously monitoring, learning, evaluating and changing. A cross-cutting theme is the importance of broad stakeholder
engagement and feedback and data collection underscored by appropriate indicators. Evaluation was modelled as a reflexive and emergent process that influenced change based on continuous dialogue feedback.
8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction
Private security in the UAE has grown significantly and is projected to assume a major role by 2020 underpinned by the government’s vision of a collaborative public-private police service. The implications of this paradigm shift in UAE policing forms the basis of this study. A critical issue is the absence of any framework for comprehensively evaluating and assessing the risks in privatising police operations.

The primary aim of this research was to investigate the effectiveness of the programme of police privatisation in the specific context of licenced private security companies in Abu Dhabi. The central questions underpinning this study are how effective is private security performance and accountability, and how can these critical elements be strengthened and improved? A key outcome was the development of a robust and comprehensive framework to evaluate the effectiveness of private securitisation in the UAE.

Five research sub-questions focussed on the characteristics and effectiveness of external and internal control systems in the private security programme; the critical components and mechanisms for the effective performance of private security in the UAE; what performance framework should be constructed for assessing the effectiveness of private security companies, and the key factors for the implementation of an assessment framework to ensure effective governance, oversight and accountability in private security in the UAE.

This study adopted an Action Research strategy to investigate the organisational problem with the Ministry of Interior. An Action Research strategy endeavours to fully engage stakeholders in a collaborative process of evaluation. The emphasis is on learning from experience by providing an opportunity to continually refine methods, data and interpretation on the key dimensions and mechanisms for police privatisation.
8.2 Summary of Key Findings
The action research process centred on evaluating the effectiveness of external and internal control mechanisms for the private security programme in Abu Dhabi. The research analysed democratic, political, social and economic factors, performance dimensions, and external and internal control dimensions. This summary addresses the five central research questions.

- What are the key characteristics of the external and internal control systems for the private security programme in Abu Dhabi?

In terms of external controls influencing governance and accountability, there were gaps when benchmarked against key dimensions identified in the literature. There was a lack of a comprehensive evaluation framework that addresses all dimensions and an absence of systematic and meaningful evaluation of programme effectiveness impacting sector stakeholders. A majority of participants expressed concern with the lack of clarity over goals.

Despite the lack of an overall performance evaluation framework, specific if limited aspects of performance were assessed by a single government body. Assessments are performed during initial licensing stages followed by ad-hoc inspections focused on monitoring of regulatory compliance performance.

It was evident that despite some understanding of government goals an initial critical lack of awareness and clarity in relation to overall objectives was revealed in addition to a lack of accountability for their achievement.

In terms of democratic accountability, there is a lack of public engagement by the private security sector. No systematic monitoring and evaluation of citizen perceptions and satisfaction is being implemented in the UAE and there is limited data collection to support transparency and accountability.

Limited engagement and partnership exists between the public and private security sectors. Partnerships are infrequent and there is an absence of appropriate structures, strategies and arrangements for collaboration,
information and knowledge sharing. A lack of mechanisms to build and promote trust was identified that could significantly inhibit the effectiveness of any partnerships between the private security sector and the police.

Unfair competition was identified in the competitive landscape in relation to private security companies and future government involvement in owning and managing security companies.

The regulatory regime is varied with success in some areas and weaknesses in others providing impediments for the private security sector to fulfil both private and public objectives. Regulatory changes in licensing procedures mandate training standards and provide clear licensing regulations and processes in some domains. A key limitation of the licensing system is the inability to enable flexible changes in operational and financial domains. Enforcement of regulations and punishment of violations was not found to be sufficiently forceful.

There was strong support for the view that external control mechanisms in the form of industry forums or professional associations were critically lacking. Many participants expressed the view that this dearth of professional outlets limited opportunities for seminars, talks, standards and certification, collaboration and networking.

The issues and problems that emerged are consistent with the problems found in other contexts and cultures around the world suggesting the universal nature of the issues identified.

- How effective are the controls systems implemented by the private security programme in Abu Dhabi?

Internal controls in terms of private security sector performance management, training and development, and recruitment and selection were moderate or lower. Security personnel job satisfaction was less than satisfactory and staff engagement was moderate. Findings point to significant scope to enhance
motivational dimensions of security personnel. Performance management and appraisal systems were embedded to some degree within company control systems, however they were variously applied. Recruitment and training culture was identified as the key factor that needs to be improved as a matter of priority. A major theme was a perceived lack of professional certification or qualifications, standards and professional bodies within the private security sector.

In terms of organisational controls, private security companies exhibited low to moderate capacity for organisational learning and innovation. Firms’ ability to incorporate and utilise technological innovations was low to moderate with minimal network and relational embeddedness. A low level of organisational involvement in business and industry networks and collaborative partnerships currently prevails.

- What are the critical components and mechanisms for the effective performance of private security in the UAE?

A number of key components and mechanisms were identified as critical for enhancing the governance and accountability of private security companies.

Government oversight should incorporate the objective of promoting effective partnership between private security companies and the Abu Dhabi Police. Public-private sector partnerships and security should be legally mandated. The government can play a key role to fund administration costs in relation to establishing partnerships. Monitoring or evaluation processes focusing on the development of effective working relationships between ADP and private security companies were identified as critical success factors for the development of trust and closer relations.

The action groups highlighted the need to achieve a level of trust and acceptance between ADP and the private sector before any partnerships could be productive. A key factor was the requirement for mechanisms to foster and develop trust between the two sides to develop closer working relationships.
Emphasis was placed on regular engagement and contact to ensure continuity and prioritisation of relationship-building and collaboration.

The implementation of appropriate structures with clear goals, roles and processes is a critical factor for effective partnership between the police and private security. Strong consensus was observable in relation to the need for clear identification of roles and responsibilities. A key measure should be to develop leaders or facilitators for championing partnership between ADP and private security companies.

Information sharing and data flows are predominantly uni-directional originating from private security towards the ADP. Therefore evaluation criteria should emphasise shared experiences and creating opportunities for personal interactions between the police and private security personnel. The implication is that evaluation should be utilised to provide continuous review and reflection of modes of communication that facilitate communications that are appropriate to both parties’ needs and allows for both formal and informal communications for different purposes.

Government oversight focusing on measures for enhancing competitiveness and financial efficiency is a critical factor for industry development vital to enhancing public security and achieving key goals. Financial evaluation and the development of pricing levels that are based on operational factors rather than government budget levels are critical.

In terms of legal-regulatory mechanisms, self-regulation was advocated as a core mechanism due to key perceived benefits of self-regulation. Self-regulation offers increased flexibility, and more rapid and appropriate industry responses to modify and adapt regulations than government regulatory processes. Promoted by the government, self-regulation was acknowledged as an efficient and less costly option to improve regulation and rapidly address gaps.
A key theme is the role of an industry body to foster best practice, promote organisational learning, innovation and excellence in the sector. Emphasis was placed on regulating training and recruitment with support for a partnership approach between the industry and the licensing department to specify minimum training and education requirements.

There was consensus on the importance of engaging with the public for different reasons and for the private sector to be accountable also to public stakeholders. Greater visibility and proactivity in their public engagement efforts is required. There was strong consensus to ensure feedback mechanisms to inform the public on what is being done. Different mechanisms emphasised for engaging with the public include polls and surveys while information collection should be improved to provide quantitative data to offer rapid and easy collection and comparison of public satisfaction and views on the private sector. Lack of public awareness of private security sector performance should be ameliorated by more detailed information in the public domain. Social media could be a key channel for interaction with multiple stakeholders including the sector and citizens to support greater understanding of needs and access important feedback and ideas.

• What performance framework should be constructed for assessing the effectiveness of private security companies?

The process of exploratory research, design and validation resulted in the formulation of a comprehensive evaluation framework based on the issues, themes and solutions identified. The framework outlines core dimensions, key factors, evaluation criteria, change objectives and compliance measures to support assessment of the private security sector and governance and accountability. Six core dimensions are identified which contribute to a holistic framework of assessment: evaluation; public-private co-ordination; public engagement; legal; security company operations and competition. The evaluation dimension contains key factors such as evaluation criteria and evaluation mechanisms with associated criteria specifying the nature of the content of the evaluation criteria such as comprehensiveness and reflection of
stakeholder priorities. A key change objective is the implementation of multi-level, multi-dimension evaluation mechanisms, with compliance measures related to diverse evaluation mechanisms and regularity of evaluation. There was strong consensus on the significance of ensuring that the evaluation framework accounted for broad stakeholder engagement.

Self-regulation was also acknowledged as an external control mechanism that is capable of facilitating broad engagement. Industry associations are perceived to have adopted an increasing role in expanding and encouraging self-regulation. A soft approach to accountability in the UAE can be underpinned by a comprehensive system of benchmarking integrated into the evaluation framework for private security. In placing emphasis on a self-regulatory model an imperative is placed on ensuring a progressive evaluation framework to assess the effectiveness of self-regulation in enhancing accountability.

Key factors and issues identified should be reflected in evaluation and change criteria to enhance the accountability of the private security sector. The evidence pointed to gaps in performance in terms of action controls that address communications, codes of conduct, supervision, and reward and disciplinary measures.

Negative perceptions on the professionalism and image of private security indicate significant gaps and scope for improvement in this area. The evaluation framework should be sufficiently comprehensive to enable oversight by the licensing body of internal controls implemented by private security companies.

- What are the key factors for the implementation of an assessment framework to ensure effective governance, oversight and accountability in private security in the UAE?

The action research informed the design of an assessment framework based on a reflexive emergent evaluation approach. The framework characterizes a
dynamic and highly reflexive design that facilitates continuous communication and feedback and supports continuous change. The framework emphasises an interconnected dynamic evaluation process with multiple dimensions and multiple actors continuously monitoring, learning, evaluating and changing. A key emergent theme is the notion of evaluation as a learning process. This emphasises continuous processes of learning, feedback, data collection and analysis. It is envisaged that change interventions under each dimension focus on addressing key issues to enhance the governance and accountability of private security. A key evaluation dimension addresses effective communication and engagement with stakeholders that is underpinned by data collection information and collaboration that both enable transparency and accountability, and organisational learning.

Emphasis was placed on designing evaluation criteria based on international best practice including the Voluntary Principles (2000), the Montreaux Document (2008) and the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) (2010). Evaluation criteria should define facilitators and forms of communication and engagement.

Appropriate indicators and licensing criteria are emphasised for new companies to be rigorously assessed and then ensure continuous monitoring. Different mechanisms can be implemented to create an effective governance and regulatory regime.

8.3 Recommendations
A range of recommendations based on the findings are proposed to support the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE.

Key to achieving this is the implementation of multi-level, multi-dimension evaluation mechanisms. The comprehensive utilisation of a broad range of perspectives is underlined to strengthen legitimacy in evaluations and results. Medium and longer term assessments are emphasised which should evaluate
the effects of service delivery on security, safety, and development, and impact on pre-existing risks.

Comprehensive and accurate evaluation and monitoring should consolidate both quantitative and qualitative data collection and indicators. Quantitative data has the advantage of easier collection and comparison; however, the inclusion of qualitative data helps to clarify key dimensions and issues.

In the context of public services, benchmarking can be understood and applied with reference to two key dimensions or perspectives. The first dimension views benchmarking in terms of a process conducted for purposes of the evaluation and/or the continuous improvement of services. The second dimension highlights either results- or process-oriented approaches. Benchmarking in all forms is acknowledged to contain some balance of these dimensions representing a general interpretation of the main direction of the benchmarking exercise. Process-oriented approaches can emphasise the initiation and consolidation of continuous improvement in addition to evaluation that be can be international in scale. More results-oriented approaches can be used to comprehensively evaluate the aims and results of current services and programmes and sustain continuous improvement.

An engagement strategy should be developed for private security sector engagement with the public. Multiple forums for feedback and dialogue should be provided and social media monitoring for continuous feedback. Key stakeholder interviews and focus groups should make an effort to include women as they are frequently neglected in such initiatives forming a hard to reach grouping. External partnerships and linkages should be increased regionally, nationally and internationally creating opportunities for diverse information and knowledge sharing across diverse actors.

Time and resources should be dedicated to refining and enhancing the licensing framework focusing on self-regulation and minimising bureaucracy. Appropriate licensing criteria and indicators should be included to ensure rigorous assessment of new companies to be followed by continuous
monitoring. Greater awareness of the implementation of different mechanisms to build an effective governance regime is stressed.

Cultural factors affecting interaction between private security companies, police and the public should be acknowledged and managed realistically to establish appropriate processes and measures for implementing change. Strong leaders and facilitators should be selected and trained and cross-cultural training provided. The development of trust should be prioritised on both sides. Varied opportunities should be generated for ADP and private security personnel to meet face-to-face to develop trust. A working group should be established to evaluate current public/private partnership and communication practices. Government support to fund partnership administration costs should be provided.

The explicit and implicit knowledge of private security guards should be captured in a coherent way and made accessible to Abu Dhabi police. Similarly, security companies should be able to access information on key ADP security priorities and issues.

The UAE government could add value and minimise economic constraints to private security sector participation in policing and security privatisation by underwriting the costs of administration. This could serve as a major incentive for the private sector to actively participate.

Development and ongoing oversight of recognised standards across the security training industry should be implemented. This includes the necessity of approval for training institutions and the courses provided from security industry supervisory bodies. Standards should also include the provision of specific guidance on curricula and subject coverage and minimum knowledge and skills needed for all security personnel (UN, 2014), and should emphasise programmes specifically relevant to the private security industry, such as the role of private security in supporting crime prevention and community safety and the legitimate use of force (UN, 2014). State regulation should support the professionalisation of the sector through implementation of an appropriate
mechanism for gaining professional qualifications. This should enable personnel to obtain acceptable licensing or certification from competent organisations, as well as ensuring continual updating and ongoing professional development. Training should be comprehensively monitored in terms of hours of training received on-the-job by type of officer and their position.

8.4 Contribution

This study provides a range of specific contributions to the theory and practice of the privatisation of policing functions. Critical research gaps exist in this area as the literature provides a fragmented analysis of police privatisation focused on specific dimensions or sectors.

One key contribution is the introduction of a holistic, multi-criteria and multidimensional evaluation framework for private security in the UAE. The literature lacks a multi-dimensional approach in terms of a robust comprehensive framework for assessing policing privatisations that encompasses critical aspects identified as key to privatisation effectiveness. The evaluation framework integrates a range of performance dimensions to be assessed reflecting goals and priorities across five key areas: political, democratic, social, economic and legal. These performance dimensions further reflect the existence of external control components, internal control components and the dimensions of accountability. The integration of various performance dimensions and measures expand the existing knowledge in this field. Further, the framework is the first of its kind in the context of the Middle East.

This framework further posits the importance of stakeholder perspectives and goals and the integration of components, which informs and is guided by the evaluation dimensions. It provides a basis for exploring and validating the elements within each dimension and their significance and role in the strategic formulation and implementation of police privatisation in the UAE.
The study further contributes new knowledge of the critical success factors for effective governance, oversight and accountability within the private security sector in the UAE. These can inform valid criteria that facilitate the evaluation of the effectiveness of police privatisation programmes. Trust and closer working relations, collaboration, communication and information-sharing are identified as key. The findings also provide new knowledge on the critical mechanisms and processes that need to be embedded for sustaining and achieving the objectives of police privatisation and the effective performance of private security.

This study contributes an Action Research approach which has enabled the provision of specific insights into the challenges and issues in police privatisations and the private security sector in the UAE.

8.5 Limitations and Future Research

The findings of this study provide a useful framework for evaluation of the success of the privatisation of policing and security functions. However, a number of limitations are acknowledged in relation to this research. In line with action research methodology which seeks to explore and resolve problems within a specific setting (Stringer, 2013), this study focuses on one single case involving a unique national context, one Emirate and one specific sector exploring the issues inherent in that unique setting. This limits the ability to generalise the findings more broadly to other UAE privatisation implementations within different sectors, Emirates or even within other national settings. However, it is proposed that generalisability was not a key objective of this research which was to engage with problem solving in a particular context.

A further limitation is associated with action research and the predominant use of qualitative data to generate the findings. Qualitative data from focus groups and in-depth interviews requires significant interpretation on the part of the researcher and is thus subject to the risk of researcher bias which could influence the results. Rapoport (1970) notes the risk in action research that the researcher can become overly-involved in the situation or drawn into
organisational politics. This is cited as a particular challenge for the action researcher who is also an organisational member.

While the study provided the opportunity to obtain in-depth insights and understanding from a range of different voices and perspectives at different levels, these perspectives were unique to individual actors in that particular sphere experiencing their own contexts and realities. The resulting complexity and variation could limit or dilute the findings due to a miscellany of perspectives.

Future research could focus on evaluating the effectiveness of different forms of soft regulation and control mechanisms. Longitudinal analysis may be usefully employed to evaluate the impacts of different mechanisms. For example, future research could focus on the impact of industry associations on enhancing standards and accountability over time. Further research is needed to explore the relationship and collaboration between public police and private security sector and the appropriate structures and processes to support partnership. From a stakeholder perspective, future research could focus on public attitudes to private security practices and their effect on trust and confidence. In terms of public engagement, future research should be conducted on the role of social media to promote different forms of engagement and accountability and build trust between police, private security and the public.


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Appendices

Appendix 1 Mapping of Themes in Police Privatisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Theme, argument</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Issues/Measures</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heath et al 2009</td>
<td>Issues in outsourcing police services</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Diversity, Efficiency &amp; Effectiveness, Accountability</td>
<td>Outsourcing can deliver cost savings but issues of equity and sustainability, and accountability are critical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilson and Gallop (2013)</td>
<td>Decline of the UK Forensic Science Service under neo-liberal policies</td>
<td>Forensic</td>
<td>Neoliberalism, marketisation</td>
<td>Market; structural and competition distortions; Quality; quality performance of private sector; lack of standards; lowest price at expense of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawby et al (2009)</td>
<td>Organisational development, workforce modernization, inertia, market and professional models</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Staff morale and equity; service levels</td>
<td>Workforce modernization can result in efficient teams; potential risks of low morale and equity from fragmented structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shefer and Liebling (2008)</td>
<td>Prison privatisation and staff-prisoner relationships</td>
<td>Organisational culture, staff attitudes, staff–prisoner relationships, quality</td>
<td>Relationships appear to be better in some private prisons than in the public sector; informal regimes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Theme, argument</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Issues/Measures</td>
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<td>Bayley and Shearing (2001)</td>
<td>New structure of policing</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Police structures, providers, role of government</td>
<td>Research gaps in understanding structures, impacts and roles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heath et al 2006</td>
<td>Economic analysis of police outsourcing</td>
<td>Police detention suites</td>
<td>Cost, cost impacts</td>
<td>Costing analysis combined with qualitative can be used to perform effective evaluation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>White (2014)</td>
<td>The extent of change in public service logic for police forces under significant outsourcing</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Market; logic of public good vs logic of the market</td>
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<td>Zhong and Grabosky (2009)</td>
<td>Examines the significant pluralisation of policing in China over the past three decades</td>
<td>Policing; frontline and security Integrated public/private</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Financial; sources of public funding for private sector Legal; protection from abuse of powers</td>
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<td>Sukhram (2015)</td>
<td>Severe cuts combined with justice system marketisation is leading to systemic failures</td>
<td>Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>Systemic failures associated with privatisation</td>
<td>Organisational; top-down change; employee engagement and participation; Legal; measures of accountability and transparency in private sector ; Market; level of competition to drive innovations and efficiencies; Performance management; payment by results could distort incentives for providers; Quality; quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Theme, argument</td>
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<td>Issues/Measures</td>
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<td>Rushim (2012)</td>
<td>The lack of regulation of the private policing sector</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Legal; protection from abuse of powers</td>
<td>Legal; accountability has 3 dimensions: after-the-fact accountability for redress; managerial oversight; democratic accountability; Legal; specific and precise regulation to avoid organisational interpretation/mediation; Legal; accountability includes proper supervision of workers</td>
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<td>Rogers and Gravelle (2012)</td>
<td>Accountability issues of private sector involvement in public policing</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Legal mechanisms</td>
<td>Legal; private sector agencies need to have same accountability measures as public police; Legal; channels available for complaints against private security companies</td>
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<td>Robertson (2008)</td>
<td>Legal regulation in relation to privatisation of police services</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Regulatory mechanisms</td>
<td>Legal; regulation needs to cover improper use of powers in the same way as public police forces</td>
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<td>Noaks (2008)</td>
<td>The potential for collaboration and partnership between police and private security in a residential setting</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Co-ordinating mechanisms</td>
<td>Quality; active collaboration and coordination between public and private to improve overall service quality; explicit acknowledgement of private sector role formal channels of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Theme, argument</td>
<td>Sector</td>
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<td>Jones et al., (2009)</td>
<td>Differences in policies and practices of the UK and Netherlands in relation to</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Performance management</td>
<td>Perceived usefulness of quantitative and basic measures of performance and police work;</td>
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<td>police outsourcing</td>
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<td>Treverton et al.,</td>
<td>The broad and dynamically-changing threats facing public and private policing</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Performance management</td>
<td>Capacity to address complex threats; continuous training and development of skills and experience</td>
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<td>(2011)</td>
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<td>Forst (2000)</td>
<td>The nature and effects of civilianisation on policing</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Performance assessment</td>
<td>Civilianisation can be assessed in terms of effects on five critical policing dimensions: effectiveness, cost, equity, choice, and legitimacy</td>
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<td>Chambers (2014)</td>
<td>Performance failings of outsourced services within the UK criminal justice system</td>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>Tendering; meeting performance</td>
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<td>and contractual obligations</td>
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<td>Brunger (2012)</td>
<td>The implications of proposals to expand civilianisation in UK police forces</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
<td>Quality; has privatisation led to</td>
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<td>improved quality of service?</td>
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<td>Legal; who are private firms</td>
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<td>accountable to</td>
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<td>Bradley and Sedgewick</td>
<td>The increasing role of private security in New Zealand policing</td>
<td>Policing; frontline</td>
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<td>(2009)</td>
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<td>Public service; inequity of</td>
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<td>provision for poorer residents</td>
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<td>Legal; inadequate and outmoded</td>
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<td>Albertson (2014)</td>
<td>Reflecting social goals in outsourcing contracts and performance incentives</td>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>Social goals and performance</td>
<td>Performance management; quantitative performance measures and payment by results will not lead to improved quality of public good</td>
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<td>Public service; contracts should reflect social goals rather than simplistic targets</td>
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## Appendix 2 Participant List

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 1 - Exploratory</strong></td>
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<td>Survey (x3)</td>
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<td>Senior Management</td>
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<td>Operations, Abu Dhabi Police</td>
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<td>Legal Division, Abu Dhabi Police</td>
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<td>Department for Private Security</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
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<td>Business, Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td><strong>Stage 2 - Design</strong></td>
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<td>Action Learning Group 3</td>
<td>Private Security Companies (5)</td>
<td>Private Security Guard</td>
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<td><strong>Stage 3 - Implementation</strong></td>
<td>As above – emailed final framework</td>
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<td>Private Security Company 3</td>
<td>Managers</td>
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</table>

**Client** – The client is the owner of the public space facilities (ie Shopping malls) and contract the service of the PSC

- **General Public** – Members of the public who have visited public spaces
Appendix 3 Private Security Company Survey

Private Security Company Survey

Online

Dear Respondent,

I am a PhD student at Middlesex University. The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. This research will be used to develop an evaluation framework that can be used to improve the effectiveness of private security companies in the UAE.

Completing the survey takes approximately 20-30 minutes. The risks involved in participating are minimal, and you are free to withdraw at any moment if you are concerned about your safety and wellbeing.

There are no direct benefits to you as a participant, although the study’s findings may help improve understanding of the effectiveness of Private Security in Abu Dhabi that will help guide organisational development and improvement of all organisations involved in this area.

I must mention that your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any point in the process without prejudice. There are no known risks in participating and incentives are not offered. Your participation will be completely anonymous. Your privacy and the confidentiality of your data will be protected at all times. Your consent to take part in this research should not compromise your legal rights should something go wrong.

What will happen to your information?
In accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998, all information provided for and in the course of this study is confidential. All data and study results will be processed and presented anonymously. The information will be stored securely.
at all times and will only be used for the purpose of this study. It will then be disposed of securely.

Thank you

Consent

1. I confirm my agreement to participate in the above stated research project. I also confirm that I have read the Participant Information Sheet and comprehend fully my involvement in this research. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.

2. I fully understand that I can opt to end my participation in this project at anytime for any reason with recourse.

3. I have been informed that all information is retained confidentially and that appropriate measures will be followed to protect my privacy.

4. I am aware that I may ask questions at any stage of the research process before during and after the data collection.

5. I consent that any data I provide may be used for the purpose of this research as communicated to me, and that the research is undertaken in compliance with Data Protection legislation.

Proceeding with the survey is viewed as consent for your participation.
Survey Questions

Five point scale 1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly Disagree

Resources
1. I get the right equipment/ clothing for the work I need to do
2. Working conditions allow security tasks to be carried out properly
3. Equipment/Clothing is not well maintained
4. The organisation has created a safe working environment

Supervision
5. When I do well, my team leader/manager recognises this
6. Everyone is treated equally
7. Poor performance is dealt with consistently across all staff
8. When mistakes are made they are dealt with fairly

Performance and Feedback
9. There is a process for providing feedback on my work performance
10. I have the opportunity to discuss feedback on my work performance
11. My organisation rewards good performance
12. There is good communication here about changes to security

Management/Supervisor Behaviour and Performance
13. I am not aware of our overall performance targets
14. I understand why all of our various procedures are in place
15. I see my team leader everyday
16. I am not encouraged in my work by praise, thanks or other recognition

Organisation and Team Support
17. When I do well, my team leader/manager recognises this
18. Poor performance is dealt with consistently across all staff
19. There is a process for providing feedback on my work performance
20. The organisation tries to be fair in its actions towards employees
21. I am confident that if I propose an idea to improve security it will be taken seriously
22. There is good communication here about changes to security

**Team Identity and Functioning**

23. Our team meets together regularly to discuss work issues
24. Everyone in the team plays an active part in delivering effective security

**Role Clarity**

25. I am clear how my work contributes to the overall security of my location and its users
26. I am aware of correct working practices
27. I am confident in reporting possible threats to security
28. I am confident that I am fully aware of current security threats

**Staff Engagement**

29. I am given a wide range of different tasks to do in my job
30. I am developing new skills
31. I have the opportunity for promotion
32. I have the right level of responsibility for me
33. There is opportunity for me to participate in decision making where it affects my work
34. Everyone gets involved in reviews of procedures

**Job Fulfilment**

35. I do not like working for this current organisation
36. I believe that overall my team is not performing well
37. My training did not prepare me for this job
38. Members of the public do not think my job is important
Job Satisfaction

39. If I could, I would leave my job within the next 12 months
40. I enjoy the work I do
41. I enjoy the challenges this job provides
42. I enjoy working as a security officer

Absorptive Capacity

43. The members of my team have the ability to use existing knowledge
44. The members of my team have the ability to recognize the value of new knowledge
45. The members of my team have the ability to combine their knowledge with the specialties of others
46. The members of my team have the ability to integrate various opinions from the team members

Relational Embeddedness

47. External relational embeddedness/Inter-organizational tie strength
48. Our employees and their colleagues at external organisations are very close to each other
49. Our employees and their colleagues at external organisations communicate very often with each other.

Inter-organizational Trust

50. Our employees and their colleagues at external organisations can always trust that each other would decide and act professionally and competently.
51. Our employees and their colleagues at external organisations can always trust that each would receive necessary and reliable information and advice.
52. Our employees and their colleagues at external organisations can always trust that each would keep the promises they make.
Technological Capacity

53. Our IT infrastructure is viewed as:
   - A utility providing the basic IT services at minimum cost
   - Emerging as driven by the requirements of the current business strategy
     Driven by the requirements of the current business strategy
   - Emerging as a resource to enable fast response to changes in the marketplace

54. Our primary systems are [ options ]
   - Traditional office support (e.g., e-mail, accounting, word processing, legacy systems)
   - Transaction-oriented (e.g., back office support)
   - Business process enablers (IT supports business process change)
   - Business process drivers (IT is a catalyst for business process change)
   - Business strategy enablers/drivers (IT is a catalyst for changes in the business strategy)
   - N/A or don’t know

Network Embeddedness

Five point scale 1 =Strongly agree 5 = Strongly Disagree

55. Our company has a high level of face-to-face contacts with other companies
56. Our company has a high level of other types of contact with other companies
57. Our company has a high number of ongoing collaboration projects with local universities and research institutions, customers and suppliers in local market
Citizen Survey

Online
Survey Questions

Demographic characteristics

1. Age
2. Gender

Contact with private security guards

3. Reason for contact
   1 = Needed information
   2 = Information/help offered by security guard
   3 = Remark from security guard about conduct
   4 = Other

4. Type of experience
   1 = Positive
   2 = Negative
   3 = Neutral

5. Security guard behaviour
   1 = Courteous/polite
   2 = Impolite/rude
   3 = Neutral

Citizens’ views on private security guard work

Five point scale 1 = Strongly Disagree 5 = Strongly Agree

6. Security guards run a high risk of getting injured in the course of their work
7. Security work is paid well
8. Security work is stressful
9. Security work is complex

Citizens’ views on the professionalism and integrity of private security guard

Five point scale 1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly Disagree

10. Security guards are well educated
11. Security guards are well trained
12. Security guards, in general, are able to handle complex situations
13. Security guards are generally honest
Citizen satisfaction with private security guards

Five point scale 1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly Disagree

14. I feel safe when I see security guards around
15. Generally, I am satisfied with the way security guards conduct themselves
16. Citizens can generally trust security guards to protect their lives and properties

Relationship between private security guards and police officers

Five point scale 1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly Disagree

17. Security guards and police officers often work together in solving crime problems
18. Security guards and police officers should work together
Appendix 5 Client Survey

Client Survey

Online
Client Survey Questions

Rating Scale

Not at all Satisfied,” “Partly Satisfied,” “Satisfied,” “More than Satisfied,” “Very Satisfied,” numbering 1 to 5 as an interval scale.

Client Rating of Contract Security Officers’ Qualities

1. Professional appearance
2. Motivation
3. Reliability

Client Rating of Contract Security Officers’ Skills

4. Security competency
5. Communication
6. Problem-solving skills

Client Rating of Contract Security Officers’ Performance

7. Speed of response to security incidents
8. Procedural Knowledge
9. Timeliness and completeness of security patrols

Client Rating of Security Firm Performance

10. Overall Responsive to:
   - Responsiveness to specific/specialized training requirements
   - Flexibility in meeting requests for changes in staffing levels
   - Responsiveness to your concerns, questions, or requests

11. Meeting minimum contract performance standards
12. Commitment to quality assurance and continuous improvement
13. Level of performance in the provision of supporting security and security-related services
Appendix 6 Action Learning Set Guide

Welcome

Thank you for agreeing to meet with me. My name is Ahmed Saleh Al Qutbah and I am conducting research for the Doctor of Philosophy at Middlesex University in the UK.

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. This research will be used to development evaluation framework that can used to improve the effectiveness of the private security companies in the UAE.

We will treat your answers as confidential. We will not include your names or any other information that could identify you in any reports we write.

Before I start do you have any questions about this study?
1. Welcome  Welcome. I want to thank you for coming today. My name is Ahmed Saleh Al Qutbah and I will be the facilitator for today’s group discussion. I also the researcher conducting research for the Doctor of Philosophy at Middlesex University in the UK.

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. This research will be used to development evaluation framework that can used to improve the effectiveness of the private security companies in the UAE. We invited you to take part in this group discussion because you are representatives in key organisations related private security in the UAE.

2. Guidelines  Before we begin, I would like to review a few guide rules for the discussion.

a. I am going to ask you a number of questions; we do not have to go in any strict order; however we encourage everyone to participate in the discussion.

We ask that only one person speaks at a time.

Feel free to treat this as a discussion and respond to what others are saying, whether you agree or disagree. We’re interested in your views and all your comments are fine whatever you have to say is fine with us. There are no right or wrong answers. We require your views drawing on your own personal experience.

This discussion is an “action learning set” and the purpose is for us to learn from each and reflect and review our ideas and learning from each other.

b. Please respect each other’s opinions and answers.

c. You need not answer a particular question if you don’t want to.

d. All your answers are strictly confidential and we will simply use first names and we additionally ask that each of you respect the privacy of everyone in the room and not share or repeat what is said here in any way that could identify anyone in this room.

f. We are digitally recording the discussion today, however once we start recording we will not use anyone’s full name and we ask that you do the same. Is everyone OK with this session being digitally recorded?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Introductions (5 minutes)</th>
<th>I’d like to go around the table starting on my right and have each person introduce him or herself. Please tell us your first name only. If you wish to inform us about your area of expertise to the group, this entirely voluntary, however I think you have all met before.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Goal 2 mins</td>
<td>Discuss Goal - our goal today is evaluate the existing assessment structures and processes for evaluating private security and move toward to an improved evaluation or assessment framework for private security in the UAE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. Action Learning Discussion 1 (20 minutes) | **Topic #1– Survey Results**  
The first thing that we’d like for you to discuss is the results from data we have from 3 surveys. I will provide a summary of the key results.  
[POWERPOINT SHOWING DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS FROM SURVEYS]  
To begin with can you tell us your views on these results |
| 6. Action Learning Discussion 2 (30 minutes) | **Topic #2– Assessment Dimensions and Criteria**  
I would like to build a picture of the areas of private security programme that are assessed. How are different areas evaluated?  
Probe  
- What criteria are used?  
- How effective are these?  
- Can you describe any mechanisms that you use to evaluate your areas operation? |
| 7. Action Learning Discussion 3 (20 minutes) | **Topic #3– Public Trust**  
How do you think citizens rate private security service in terms of trust, confidence and effectiveness?  
Probe |
| 8. Action Learning Discussion 4 (20 minutes) | **Topic #4– Public-Private Co-operation**  
What is existing structure for public-private co-operation?  
**Probe**  
- What is the relationship between the private security  
- How far the operations of the private security integrated with police?  
- Are jurisdictions clear or overlapping? Is there any co-ordination or regulation?  
- What are the key mechanisms communication and sharing information? How effective is this structure? |
| 9. Action Learning Discussion 5 (20 minutes) | **Topic #5– Stakeholder Engagement**  
In what ways does your organisation engage with different stakeholders engaged?  
**Probe**  
- Key mechanisms, frequency, scope  
- Effectiveness  
- How can members of the public engage with the private security and express their concerns?  
- Are citizens aware of the existence of specific accountability procedures? |
| 10. Action Learning Discussion 6 (20 minutes) | **Topic #6 Regulation**  
Do you think the existing regulatory framework is adequate for the private security sector?  
**Probe**  
- Any perceived gaps?  
- Are the mandates, roles and responsibilities of different providers clear and distinct?  
- Effectiveness of existing measures? |
| 11. Action Learning Discussion 7 (20 minutes) | **Topic #7 Accountability**  
Can you describe the availability and access to information about the complaints procedure for private security companies?  
**Probe:** |
12. Action Learning Discussion 8 (20 minutes)

**Topic #8 Initial Solution**

Based on this first session, I’d like to summarise the suggestions and recommendations and assess the level of consensus for different ideas.

This forms the initial framework for this first session.

13. Final thoughts (5 minutes)

Those were all of the questions that I wanted to ask.

Does anyone have any final thoughts about how assessment of private security can be improved?

14. Thank you

Thank you for coming today and for sharing your views with us. We hope you enjoyed the discussion today.
Appendix 7 Interview Guide

Welcome

Thank you for agreeing to meet with me. My name is Ahmed Saleh Al Qutbah and I am conducting research for the Doctor of Philosophy at Middlesex University in the UK.

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. This research will be used to development evaluation framework that can used to improve the effectiveness of the private security companies in the UAE.

The interview will take between 30-45mins. We will treat your answers as confidential. We will not include your names or any other information that could identify you in any reports we write.

Before I start do you have any questions about this study?
# Interview Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Interview Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Can you indicate to what degree government objectives are being achieved in relation to private security programme?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Probe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. How do you think citizens rate private security service in terms of trust, confidence and effectiveness?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probe</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who monitors public confidence in private security company? Is this effective?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How can trust/confidence be improve/ensured?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How about level of confidence and trust international community on private security in Abu Dhabi?</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Can you describe any mechanisms that you use to evaluate your areas operation?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Probe</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• What are the existing criteria?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Key Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Priorities, critical factors</td>
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<td>18. What is existing structure for public-private co-operation?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Probe</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• What is the relationship between the private security</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How far the operations of the private security integrated with police?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Are jurisdictions clear or overlapping? Is there any co-ordination or regulation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What are the key mechanisms communication and sharing information? How effective is this structure?</td>
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<td>Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is confidential info shared? Are there any regulations or codes of conduct I relation to this?</td>
<td>PSC  GOV  ADP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. In what ways does your organisation engage with different stakeholders engaged?</td>
<td>☐  ☐  ☐</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Probe</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Key mechanisms, frequency, scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Effectiveness</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How can members of the public engage with the private security and express their concerns?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Are citizens aware of the existence of specific accountability procedures?</td>
<td>☐  ☐  ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probe</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency of administrative decisions for different stakeholders i.e. basic fact and figures, procedures and policies?</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Do you think the existing regulatory framework is adequate for the private security sector?</td>
<td>☐  ☐</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Probe</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Any perceived gaps?</td>
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<td>• Are the mandates, roles and responsibilities of different providers clear and distinct?</td>
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<td>• Effectiveness of existing measures?</td>
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<td>22. Can you describe the availability and access to information about the complaints procedure for private security companies?</td>
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<td><strong>Probe:</strong></td>
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<td>• How complaints procedures communicated?</td>
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<td>• Recording and monitoring?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Follow-up on complaints?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Areas for improvements, key issues, challenge?</td>
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<td>23. Can you describe your systems processes in relation to management of security guards</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
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<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruitment and Selection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and Development</td>
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## Appendix 8 Observation Guide

| 24. Welcome | Thank you for agreeing to observe your meeting. My name is Ahmed Saleh Al Qutbah and I am conducting research for the Doctor of Philosophy at Middlesex University in the UK. The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the effectiveness of governance, oversight and accountability of private security in the UAE. This research will be used to development evaluation framework that can used to improve the effectiveness of the private security companies in the UAE. I will simply observe and record your comments. I will not ask any questions. We will treat the contents of your meeting as confidential. We will not include your names or any other information that could identify you in any reports we write. Before you start do you have any questions? |
| 25. Guidelines | We are digitally recording the discussion today, however once we start recording we will not use anyone’s full name and we ask that you do the same. Is everyone OK with this session being digitally recorded? [OBTAIN FINAL VERBAL CONSENT TO TAPE RECORD DISCUSSION. IF A PARTICIPANT DECIDES THAT S/HE DOES NOT WANT] Please conduct your meeting as you normally would. I will not interrupt or ask any questions We will not include your names or any other information that could identify you in any reports we write. We will destroy the notes and digital recordings after we complete our study and publish the results. Does anyone have any questions before we start? |
| 26. Record 30MINS | [START RECORDING] [END RECORDING] |
| 27. Thank you | Thank you for allowing me to observe your meeting. Again we will not include your names or any other information that could identify you in any reports we write. We will destroy the notes and digital recordings after we complete our study and publish the results. |
## Appendix 9 Survey Results

### Descriptive Statistics Client Survey

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<th>Service Area</th>
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<th>Maximum</th>
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### Descriptive Statistics Private Company Survey

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### Descriptive Statistics General Public Survey

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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
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</thead>
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### Security Guard Behaviour

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<th>Frequency</th>
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### Type of Experience

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