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Sensing the Logic of Writing: Creative Writing Reimagined

A thesis submitted to Middlesex University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

This project draws attention to the ‘graphic elements’ – both written and visual – of a creative writing practice by exploring those graphic elements in both the critical component of this mixed-mode dissertation and in a series of creative artefacts. Its principle aim is to record how as a practising creative writer-researcher I have made a series of artefacts as a way of providing an opportunity for readers and researchers to explore this specific instance of theoretically-informed aesthetic experimentation. The psychophysiological researcher, Tony Bastick, having investigated expert ‘experimenters’ in Intuition: How We Think and Act (1982), identified an “intuitive method” that provides “insights” into a “creative process” that is, importantly, “preverbal”, yet not in fact visual (298–299). In this project I raise a different set of questions from those raised by ‘alphabetically’-guided ways of creating writing, as a means of continuing to learn and reinvent my own creative writing practice as mixed-mode (combining written and visual invention). My proposal is to demonstrate how a creative writer-researcher with a keen interest in the visual arts might make an original contribution to the fields of creative writing and visual arts by providing readers with an opportunity to view and examine that set of artefacts alongside a critical document that explores how the choices were made during the double creative process. My central hypothesis is that a practising creative writer-researcher is uniquely situated to identify how her or his own expanded and complexified creative writing process might work and to share that specific cross-disciplinary knowledge as the epistemic aspects of a creative writing practice draws on resonances and exchanges with other disciplines, including the visual arts. On these bases this mixed-mode submission includes a portfolio of writing within a visual arts framework together with a written critical commentary focused on issues raised by those complex practices themselves.
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The purpose of this research project, that comprises both creative and critical components, is to explore a range of written materials and complex visual registers. I propose to argue that a broad research investigation into the disciplines of science, philosophy and the arts allows a creative writer-researcher to enquire into a creative writing practice where certain visual elements and words are rendered visible by engaging in it from the perspectives established in the critical writing. The aim of this project is to investigate how a new way of writing is invented. This project offers an opportunity to peruse the contents of a creative writer’s portfolio while reading the written critical component. As will be clear from the chapters that follow, the different writing and visual art practices that provide a key focus to this research undertaking grew in tandem with each other. While the first edition of The Clara Ann Burns Story was published early during this doctoral research (2011) and is out of print, the second edition of The Clara Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011), and “pity for meat” (a recently completed series of visual and written artefacts) along with the critical writing that follows here need to be viewed as tightly connected, and the two need to be read in a va-et-vient (to and fro) movement that itself replicates the writing, reading and creative processes pursued throughout the research period.

The timing of the creative and critical processes involved in the production of this submission is vital to an understanding of my critical relationship with the so-called
'practice and theory' debates that remain central to the 'arts-practices as research' activities pursued in British and European university contexts. A widespread assumption seems to be that 'theory' and 'practice' are two distinct entities likely to produce quite different research outcomes, but this problem of naming (nominalisation) to which Melrose has drawn attention (sfmelrose.org.uk), and of sentence-production is as unhelpful in the practice-as-research context as it is hegemonic. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, something called 'theory' is located before something called 'practice', which means that 'theory' conventionally has primacy while 'practice' is necessarily secondary, whereas in fact both nouns name modes of practice. Theoretical activities are practised, whether those theoretical activities are conventionally 'creative' and/or conventionally writing-based. In the instance I have recorded in this document, one major starting-point for the research undertaking was my own published creative writing; the traditional literature-based research activity I undertook for doctoral purposes followed that early publication, and it was triggered in part by the way in which the creative manuscript was first published – i.e. without the visual materials that seemed to me to be key to it. Hence the creative issues not only preceded but equally they triggered the ways in which I investigated the theoretical and philosophical writing that I cite and report on in what follows.

Some of what I judge to be the most strikingly original products made by creative writers/visual artists – Anne Carson’s Nox (2010), Stephen Goddard’s “Anecdotes and Antidotes-Stories as Balms, Storytelling as Healing” (2003), Annette Iggulden’s “‘Silent’ Speech” (2007/2010), Tom Phillips’ A Humument (1980/2012), and Selah Saterstrom’s The Pink Institution (2004) – allow a viewer/reader to draw upon what the British typography and graphic communications researcher Michael Twyman suggested is “graphic language” and/or “verbal graphic language” (1982: 11). Twyman developed a series of binary models in an attempt to clarify the difference between “Aural” (i.e. sound) and “Visual” (i.e. graphic) language (1982: 7). But why would we want or need to do this?

For example, Iggulden in “‘Silent’ Speech” invented an art practice that she describes in these terms: “I actively manipulate the pain of my silence to sustain my speech through visual language” (2010: 73). Might it be possible to ‘move pain’ as it is felt in the body in such a way that a silent space might allow the preservation of speech through visual language? Iggulden claims
I realised that it was colour alone that was significant and which resonated with meaning. [...] When starting a work, I neither know what images may arise nor the final image that the painting itself will take. [...] These images retain their tenuous link with both verbal and visual language, for although illegible as written language, they stem from alphabetic writing, and its associations with spoken word (ibid).

Her reference to not knowing “what images might arise” and to “colour alone that [is] significant” seems to me particularly useful to my concern with “sensing the logic of writing” and “creative writing reimagined”. But rather than not knowing, I would identify an expert creative writing practice as knowing of how “images might arise” and involving a process in which “colour is significant”. I am in comparison much less certain how images stem from the alphabetic or a relationship with spoken words (although they may emerge with speaking out loud). My sense of what Iggulden means here, is that it is colour (i.e. visual, image) that she valorises; nevertheless while engaging in her creative practice she sustains a connection with spoken language, moving to and fro between verbal and visual language. I am suggesting this because Iggulden describes her creative writing/painting practice as both “discursive and figural” yet “particularly associated with the voice” (2010: 69). This is a crucial point: the attempt to make a connection between visual and spoken language when colour (image) itself does not speak. What do we know about the relationship between something that is discursive and something else that is figural? To whom can we turn? I am going to argue in what follows that my creative judgements are not guided by conventional spoken language or written language, instead from an understanding of how a particular organisation of a graphic language (e.g. shape, image, colour) arises during a “visual experience”, thus, perhaps, confirming what the French literary theorist and philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard wrote in 1971 in *Discourse, Figure* where he noted the “futile attempt to bring everything back to articulated language [...] when it is patently clear that language, at least in its poetic usage, is possessed, haunted by the figure” (2011: 246).

While all of Lyotard’s works are useful, *Discourse, Figure* (2011) in particular, provides concepts related to his sense of the differences – for an artist or a reader – between an aesthetic (creative) writing process that he might have described as *figural* and critical writing that he might have described as *discursive*. This distinction, as I proceed to discuss and demonstrate in what follows, is key to my project. Before I proceed to explore the usefulness of *Discourse, Figure* further, there are two points I would like to make: first, Lyotard seems to me to have been interested in a creative writing/inscription decision-making process at “the moment the artist’s hand frees plastic vision”, rather than how one might interpret or “read” an artefact (211-212). In particular he was interested in that artist’s “eye, and judgment, forcing the mind to take the position in front of the sensory” (212). In the case here the focus of this particular project is on how a particular series of artefacts are invented from the point of view of the artist rather than to interpret meaning of or critique of already made artefacts. Second, while Lyotard’s approach to writing in *Discourse, Figure* is to identify its essential material as *graphic*, my approach is to argue that a creative writing/inscription process is guided by what importantly is an internal (embodied) visual process and a set of highly specialised actions. As such, I am indeed arguing that the central person having a clear view of this visual process and of these specific actions is the artist and in this particular case, the artist-researcher. In other words, it is the practising artist-researcher who is in a position to identify how the seeing, doing and making of an artefact is experienced in the mind-body and to document the decision-making processes ‘discursively’. By ‘discursively’, I mean critically because such an artist-researcher has demonstrated not only an interest in engaging in aesthetic practice and testing and authenticating that practice but also in presenting an archive of the research findings, in the form of a mixed-mode portfolio, to the broader research community.

As the title *Discourse, Figure* suggests, Lyotard’s aesthetic opens to a path of reflecting on the confusion between discourse (phonetic-related) language and *figural* (colour or graphic related) language, in *whatever language this might be*. He argues, in my view, that because *discourse* is governed by phonetic (heard) experience it tends to be ruled by a certain dominant culturally accepted understanding of reality, whereas a *figure* relates predominantly to visual works of art that are seen and therefore silent, thus resisting closed linguistic structures. Lyotard associates works of art with desire, feelings, and sensations that always exceed representation. It follows that the outcome of a creative writer’s production process, whose experience as I indicated above may be significantly
visual rather than verbal (word focused), must not be mistaken as having a necessary or direct relationship with discourse. In Lyotard’s terms no matter how we might want to categorise creative inscription – as writing, illustration, poetry, or painting – it always remains figural. In other words, it is what is seen and, in critical terms, what matters is how it works.

I (the “I” of the practising artist-researcher) am going to argue that a figure is a key concept in opening up thinking about a new and different creative writing practice that is visually-led. Lyotard also called a figure a “figural space” (50). He describes a figural space as “sensory” and “provisionally ‘space of designation’ because its properties seem analogous to those of that space and contradict those of linguistic space” (ibid).

How I understand Lyotard’s “figural space” is that it relates to works of art, and in particular to a kind of understanding of writing that can encourage a creative writer to ‘sense” in the mind-body how to make an artefact by selecting and organising visual registers in an unexpected way. An outside observer, such as an art critic or historian, might argue that parts of the artefact are easily recognisable (e.g. words, lines, marks). However, a “figural space” permits aesthetic inconsistency as it troubles or even fractures the phonetic relationship between a particular set of words and stable meanings for the purpose of showing how reality can be continually tested, redesigned, and reimagined by engaging in a creative writing process. Lyotard wrote: “I need only note that reality is constituted from the imaginary” (281). That is, it has no independent existence outside of perception, and perception shifts and changes. It is from this Lyotardian use of the “imaginary” (itself a Lacanian notion) that the relationship between a “figural space” and an artist’s desire to reimagine different ways of making artefacts constitutes the force that drives a visual art-making process itself regardless of the name ascribed to it: poetic writing, painting, drawing, inscription, script, graphic signal and so forth.

In Discourse, Figure Lyotard shows his readers photocopies of what he calls illustrated artefacts while pointing out in his critical writing that a creative writing practice has never been limited to making “unillustrated” (262) phonetic (i.e. stable, signifying) artefacts. Rather, writing itself has always been an illustrative practice that allows for fluctuation between visual registers and meaning. It is this point of fluctuation between a figural space and discourse where words are understood as imitating a graphic illustration that cannot be defined or limited to a particular meaning but rather spurs questioning, complexity, non-representation and non-signification by subverting the easily identifiable. In this way creative writing, Lyotard seems to me to suggest, is an activity
that takes place in “the process, as it were, of making itself visible, that is [...] such as one can see it before looking at it [...] in other words, the [artist] made us see what seeing is” (197) (writer’s emphasis). While a creative writer may risk obscurity and economic poverty by making artefacts that are not easily identifiable to a broad audience, at the same time she or he is fulfilling a desire to bring to life new forms of writing.

I want to draw attention to the Lyotardian notion of illustration as cited above, since its usage relates to an unconventional notion of the illustrator. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2010) an illustrator is a “person who draws or creates pictures for magazines or books” (873). The preposition “for” implies that an illustrator is different from the person who creates a book or magazine. The implications of the English definition, of course, might not be what the French philosopher – Lyotard – had in mind. Antony Hudek, one of the translators of the original book, Discours, figure (along with Mary Lydon), in a paper entitled “Seeing Through Discourse, Figure” (2011) cautioned those who explore Discourse, Figure that

all Discourse, Figure could do—and it is considerable—is describe its own struggle to dwell in the abstract, floating space between discourse and figure. How to translate the book’s dé-jeu? In the language in which it writes itself—that is, each time language tries to arrest its own motion in the act of writing (parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia12/parrhesia12_hudek.pdf).

Hudek points out (above) that a Lyotardian understanding of language is not identical to generally accepted meaning. The enquiry that Hudek was struggling with in this particular case was how to translate the French writing into English, while at the same time, understanding that this particular writing of Lyotard’s is an image of something that has to be sensed rather than rationalised (or reduced to everyday English). This sensory way of understanding what writing is seems to me to be useful, because it focuses attention on the individual difference of shape and dance of the figural colour; how the details of a “figural-space” were rendered is unlikely to be available to a spectating eye. This provides the central argument for this present project.

To return to the notion of illustration, in the present context a reader might initially observe that I have chosen in the portfolio (presented to the reader/examiner) to “illustrate” a pre-existing writing, as is suggested in the OED definition above. In fact, I have explored visual registers, which constitute an aspect of my lived memory, in the present tense, for the simple reason that during my creative writing decision-making process living memories arise in my imagination as primarily visual images that the writing seeks to “illustrate”, thereby illuminate living memories and shape and punctuate
these via an intuitive method (which is part of expertise). This overcomes any sense that we might expect to find elsewhere that the visuals “illustrate” an already written text to which they are secondary – which would make me an illustrator and not a creative writer. Instead, in what follows, I am going to argue that words are positioned within the fabric of the visual “image-stuff” that pre-exists them.

My sense is that Lyotard’s enquiry aimed to explore and test how it seemed to him as a literary theorist, philosopher and writer that writing itself was made of the “image-stuff” that he argued already exists in an artist. Freud might have named the site of this already existing “image-stuff” as emerging from the “preconscious” or “unconscious”. My own argument is that a creative writing process is led by an artist’s seeing, rather than hearing (a voice in the head), and might be informed by a different set of questions from those asked of translation or interpretation, precisely because translation or interpretation always arrives after the act of writing. In these visually-led cases, I am arguing, each creative writer invents a graphic language that resists discourse (i.e. phonetic speech, rational argument, narrative, dialectic) by allowing the mind’s eye and hand to lead to a silent figural resting place, because creative thinking – in my view – involves visualising an artefact in the mind as it is emerging in reality. As Lyotard explained: “Reading is hearing, not seeing. […][The] moment the artist’s hand frees plastic vision […] one must keep at arm’s length the assumptions, interpretations, and habits of reading that we contract with the predominant use of discourse” (2011: 211-212).

In 1982, the psychophysiological researcher Tony Bastick identified what strikes me as a similar kind of process in his Intuition: How We Think and Act (1982). Here Bastick noted that preverbal is the

property […] of intuition […]. Firstly because intuitive perception and processing is speedy on many parallel modalities whereas the verbal mode is linear and slow in comparison. This ‘speedy parallel’ versus ‘slow linear’ comparison is […] the sensory quality of the knowledge of which the subject becomes aware through the intuition [that] precedes verbalization and makes its complete verbal communication impossible. It seems words only assist in the ongoing intuitive process by reason of their connotations and affective associations. They are however a means of communicating and verifying after the intuition in the later stages of the creative process (298).

As Lyotard put it in Discourse, Figure in 1971, we are looking, in creative writing, at a “mobile spacing of seeing” and “the ‘lateral’ relations of words and images” along with
“language undone” (2011: 53). I am going to argue that this kind of immediate way of knowing or “intuitive process”, that arrives before the verbal (i.e. discourse), is where an aesthetic choice is first opened up, while an “intuitive method” (Bastick 1982), that may have no need of dependence upon complex discourse, is likely to be developed on the basis of artistic experience.

Two years before Lyotard completed *Discourse, Figure*, the psychologist Rudolf Arnheim, in *Visual Thinking* (1969/1997) was interested in a visual and sensory way of making an artefact. “A person, who paints, writes, composes”, Arnheim explained, “thinks with the senses […] productive thinking in whatever area of cognition takes place in the realm of the imagery” (1997: v). What Arnheim’s book suggests, from my point of view, is that a creative writer is likely in fact to be a visual artist whose aesthetic decision-making process is guided by “the stuff of the senses” (1), “visual thinking” (80), “memory images” (84), or “imagery of thought” (118), that arise from “perceptual thinking, which I will distinguish as intuitive” (233). In a very general sense this idea of a sensory way of thinking may also shed light on what Lyotard was pointing at when he wrote that “unlike speech, writing institutes a dimension of visibility, of sensory spatiality, that will allow precisely to make visible the universe re-created” (2011: 63).

This is a key point in the account that follows, it may not be enough to think of a creative writer’s choice as informed by sounds of letters or words or sentences alone. Rather, it may be necessary to begin to think of a creative writer as a visual as well as verbal artist, who can test and experiment with different qualities, including, as I have suggested above, the texture, colour, and depth of paper (Carson 2010: 3.3-4.2). I propose in the different artefacts assembled here in this research project to allow a sympathetic reader/viewer to understand some of the implications of the complex and apparently radical scenario that I have set out in this “Introduction”.

In 1987, the British anthropologist Jack Goody pointed out that the “oral and written […] are often confused” but that historically writing “changes […] the ways in which [the human] understands the universe” (1993: ix-3). Goody argued: “The physical basis of writing is clearly the same as drawing, engraving and painting – the so-called graphic-arts” (3). If, above all, writing is in fact a graphic (from the Latin *graphicus* “picturesque”) artistic (from the Latin *artem* “practical skill”) practice, this recognition may lead us to consider the possibility that a creative writing practice could be guided – or even orchestrated – by a visual experience rendered through visual language.
In 1999 the American political scientist and visual language researcher Robert Horn suggested *visual language* is a way of writing on a computer that involves the integration of words, images and shapes. Horn argued

I define visual language as a tight and thorough integration of words, images and shapes. The emphasis is on integration. [...] Visual language is becoming widely used. [...] All computers sold these days are graphic [...]. Education for the most part, has steered people in the direction of learning verbal expression and in many cases completely ignoring the use of visual language elements. [...] I think that we are seeing a new mode of what I call “multi-modal” reading developing. Visual language communication units are both more demanding for readers and more immediately comprehensible. Because multiple levels of visuals, text, and concepts are combined, they require readers to spend a little more time in synthesis in order to come away with the full meaning of the communication. At the same time [...] [we] need to figure out how and when to integrate visual language into the curriculum [...] (1999: 1-5).

Should Horn’s observation give us pause to consider “visual language” from the context of creative writing practice-led research? I have suggested, above, that Carson, Goddard, Iggulden, Phillips, and Saterstrom’s writing practices both exemplify and demonstrate a highly professional aesthetic use of visual language in the sense that *Nox*, “Anecdotes and Antidotes- Stories as Balms, Storytelling as Healing”, “Silent’ Speech”, *Humument*, and *The Pink Institution*, put on display not only words but also images, shapes, and shades of colour. In this case, however, a key question remains: can we – how might we – understand how this kind of visual creative writing process works if most of the tools used by a literary scholar and critic traditionally come not from the visual arts themselves but from literature and language studies? Would a highly detailed first hand account – if some such thing is available – of how Carson, Goddard, Iggulden, Phillips, and Saterstrom chose to use a variety of visual registers be of interest to other creative writers and/or visual artists?

In 2013, the practising creative writer, researcher, and educator Stephanie Vanderslice proposed that creative “writers in the digital landscape must be aware of the ways in which new media changes and of their need to learn it as they see fit and accommodate to it in whatever ways that benefit their work” (2013: 139). The present mixed-mode research enquiry seeks to identify how a practising creative writer-researcher experiments and tests new and different ways of making artefacts that have only relatively recently become available on personal computers, and how this might work. It may also be of use to other creative writers who are working on computers.
Dianne Donnelly, like Vanderslice, is a practising creative writer-researcher editor, and educator, who in Key Issues In Creative Writing (2013) identified a number of changes that are occurring within the discipline of creative writing that are related to new “digital media” and how these changes differ from those that have been normalised within the mainstream traditions of educational systems. Donnelly also argued in favour of investigations into how these changes work specifically to complexify and enrich the discipline of creative writing:

As students engage in digital media, they are building new literacies that are more complex than conventional literacies. Creative writing also uses space theory in interesting ways (i.e. hyper-text, photos, maps, vlogs, wikis, music) that interfaces with textual dimensions, digital tangibles and online platforms. While digitization invites readers in at a new level, it also invites students to bring together constructions from other disciplines, welcomes disciplines to partner in unexpected ways, and positions writers to consider how the visual arts might enhance the hybridity of stories and essays through manipulations and juxtapositions of photo/videos and text. When it comes to visual methodologies […] why compartmentalize creative writing when the discipline is almost always found in spatial proximity – programmatically – to our university relations? As creative writing crosses boundaries within the university system we see more potential for new disciplinary partnerships, new relations and new ways of redefining literature (7).

Donnelly’s suggestion, above, indicates that creative writers are now “crossing boundaries” into other disciplines, particularly into the “visual arts”. This seems to me to be useful to my enquiry concerning how a creative writer in a digital age might go about exploring and discussing new and different ways of writing that lead to the making of more new kinds of artefacts than were possible before. For the purposes of the present enquiry I have cited the work of Donnelly as she reminds us that while the development of traditional ways of writing creatively may continue to be essential foundational tools used by creative writers (e.g. words, syntax, enjambment), as we move through the second decade of the 21st C. the discipline of creative writing is also opening up to research findings that are challenging traditions and allowing practising creative writer-researchers to make contributions by accounting for the ways artefacts might be made through the use of digital technologies. My central argument here is that this technological access allows a creative writer who may very well be a visual artist to bring together an array of perceptual registers that offer other researchers a more complex interaction in a particular figural space since this new interaction would embrace a multimodal approach as opposed to one that uses letters or words alone.
I propose, in what follows, to argue that these issues, introduced above, need further investigation, since creative writers are likely to continue to record and design artefacts that effectively communicate (and communicate affectively) through a close integration of words and visual elements (e.g. shapes, photographs, lines) using new modes of digital technology (see figure 1: p. 6). Therefore, I am proposing that it may be that the research findings that follow this introductory chapter may be helpful in two ways. First, by breaking down barriers that suggest that the discipline of creative writing has ever been or should be limited to a particular set of phonetic-language related registers as opposed to remaining open to a diverse array of visual and tactile materials and techniques. Second, by providing an opportunity to trace the evolution of the logic of an expert decision-making process of a creative writer-researcher through a virtual inscription of a (Deleuzian) rhizome as it moves to and fro between two main components: from the critical writing that points directly at a set of artefacts (these are designated by a number inside a parenthesis or brackets) to a creative writing practice reimagined, that discloses a language that can be perceived and processed but is not fully translatable into words.

In what follows immediately, I provide a synopsis of the three chapters that follow, together with the creative components in the portfolio: first and second editions of *The Clara Ann Burns Story* (2011) and “pity for meat” (a recently completed artefact).

Chapter 1, “Sensing A Creative Writing/Visual Art Practice-led Literature Review” introduces some of the key writings that act as guides in the explorations that follow this chapter. The focus is on writing that takes issue with the traditions of critique by showing how a creative system works through various relationships that challenge – or simply sidestep – a predominantly rationalist approach. Donnelly and Harper’s *Key Issues in Creative Writing* (2013) brings to light why creative writing practice-led research matters and this writing is linked by a kind of invisible mercurial thread to *The Sage Handbook of Digital Dissertations and Theses* (2012) edited by Andrews, Borg, Boyd Davis, Domingo and England; to Melrose’s “Disciplinary ‘Specificity’ and the Digital Submission” (2012) and to Perry’s work, including “Writing in the Dark: Exorcising the Exegesis” (1998), “History Documents, Arts Reveals: Creative Writing Research” (2010) as well as “The non-verbal and the verbal: expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” (2008); and to Goddard’s “A Correspondence Between Practices” (2010), and to Iggulden’s “Silent’ Speech” (2010). These lead, in turn, to *The Artistic Turn: A*
These practice-led writings cultivate the joy of discovering different theoretical pathways each of which is potentially pertinent to the present enquiry. From this point, the exploration of creative writing practice-led research works along wandering lines. Some lines led to dead ends such as Cixous’ *Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing* (1993), and Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* (2011) that ask different questions than the ones I set out to investigate suggesting that I reroute through other passageways. Other key documents introduced in this Literature Review include Lyotard’s *Discourse, Figure* (2011) and *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* (1998) that together explore artistic practices as sensory and emotional events rather than working within a structured set of laws or genre. This privileging of sensation led to Deleuze’s *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (2003) and Sylvester’s *Interviews With Francis Bacon* (2012), which, along with Senagala’s “Rhizogramming And Synesthetic Transformation of Designer’s Mind” (2005), together constitute unique art-practice-led focused writings, experiments, and diagrams. These pointed toward Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* (1997), Arnheim’s *Visual Thinking* (1997), Twyman’s “The graphic presentation of language” (1982), Goody’s *The Interface Between the Written and the Oral* (1993) and Horn’s “Visual Language and Converging Technologies in the Next 10 – 15 Years (and Beyond)” (2001): investigations of the graphic (non-phonetic) nature of writing itself. I also include in this chapter reference to a chance encounter with Carson’s *Nox* (2010). This led me to Freud’s “Screen Memories” (1899), Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* (1991) as well as his *The Creative Mind* (1974), and to Passerini’s “Connecting Emotions: Contributions from Cultural History” (2008), as well as Deleuze’s *Bergsonism* (1991). Finally, I cite Ulmer’s *Heuretics: The Logic of Invention* (1994), Hayles’ *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics* (1999), and Morris and Swiss’ *New Media Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories* (2006) – drawing particular attention to Noland’s chapter entitled “Digital Gestures”. These three documents seem to me to strengthen my argument regarding my shift in focus to creative digital practitioner expertise and experience, as this might be the only effective way that the complexities of creative decision-making and work processes can be identified and documented.

In Chapter 2, “Sensing the Logic of the Art of Writing and Publication” I record how some of the originating decisions were made in making the First Edition of the *Clara Ann Burns Story* (Smith 2011) and my self-editing of the Second Edition, also published in
2011. The latter involved my attempt, supported by the editor himself, to return the artefact to the visual state that was intended in the original manuscript. This chapter begins with a note to the reader that points out that I have made these published paper books available to the reader thus providing a means to move haptically, as well as visually, to and fro from creative to critical components. I am arguing that the two inform/are informed by each other. In the critical component of this chapter I use the writings of Sigmund Freud, Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Francois Lyotard as primary guides to support my case. Most importantly, this chapter points directly at a series of visual artefacts that allow a reader to move to and fro from the artefacts to the critical writing. I also point out in this chapter that some of the concepts developed by psychologists and philosophers seem to me to overlap notionally with the creative writing decision-making process that I used in editing the Second Edition of The Clara Ann Burns Story.

In Chapter 3, “A Study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process”, the aim is to provide a partial account of the creative decision-making process that I used in making “pity for meat”, a series of artefacts presented in a creative writer’s (visual art) portfolio. The idea of presenting the artefacts in a visual/creative writer’s art portfolio evolved meditatively and gradually out of the research process itself. “pity for meat” was completed only a few months before the completion of this doctoral research. In this chapter, I argue that the research activity itself allowed me to enquire into my own creative writing decisions by engaging in research, and making some of the outcome available to other researchers. In this chapter, as in the previous chapter, I begin with a note to the reader that suggests she or he peruse the artefacts while reading the critical element, moving haptically as well as visually to and fro between creative and critical components. My central argument in this chapter is that as an artist as well as researcher what drives both of these practices is the desire to experiment and investigate, as a way of learning how to reimagine a way of inventing new and different kinds of artefacts, and how a rhizomatic-creative-writing process might work through a diagram.
Chapter 1
Sensing A Creative Writing/Visual Art Practice-led Literature Review

The purpose of this literature/visual art review is to introduce the key published texts that I draw upon in the remainder of this mixed-mode thesis, as a means of setting out the exploratory path I have traced through them. Each of the following sections considers a particular text in some detail and in an order that moves relative to the general logic of the overall project. The aim is three-fold: first, to provide a backdrop that indicates why these documents are of interest to my project. Second, to specify the uses I eventually make of these writers as the research writing progresses. Third, for comparative purposes, to introduce a number of volumes of theoretical, literary, and exegetically focused writing that led me astray from my research focus as their limitations were not immediately apparent. Nevertheless, these assisted in clarifying some of my difficulties with some published material that seems to be located in what might be called the ‘literary camp’ or ‘turn’. This difficulty foreshadows my developing argument in the remainder of the dissertation. These theoretical, literary, and exegetically focused volumes are interspersed throughout this chapter after I explore some of the key aspects of the most influential volumes. My hope is that this literature/visual art review will encourage further exploration of the interrelationship between a variety of influential writers who have taken a particular interest in artistic practises, creative processes and computer technology.
A key text in the field of practice-led research in creative writing is *Key Issues In Creative Writing: New Writing Viewpoints* (2013). The editors are Diane Donnelly and Graeme Harper who are pedagogues as well as practising creative writer-researchers who teach creative writing in the United States. Donnelly and Harper collaborated in writing the introduction and the concluding chapter to this critical volume and each also wrote two chapters individually. The other contributors are practising creative writer-researchers from different parts of the world: Patrick Bizzaro, Katharine Haake, Steve Healey, Nigel McLoughlin, Indigo Perry (also known as Gaylene Perry), Mimi Thebo and Stephanie Vanderslice. The book is of particular interest to this project for three reasons. First, this text focuses on “creative writer-researchers” and “the activities and understandings of creative writers” (178-179). Second, it draws attention to creative writing-practice-led research in the doctoral context. Third, it claims that there is very little if any ‘creative writing practice-led research’ available. One of the aims of my own project is to assist in filling this gap. By ‘practice-led research’ I mean research that ascribes to the “Manifesto to the artistic-researcher” (Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas 2009: 181). The published manifesto I refer to can be found in *The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto* (Coessens, Crispin and Douglas 2009). Although Coessens and Crispin’s central focus is music, Douglas is a visual artist whose doctorate was practice-led and focused on the creative process of the artist. I return to it below for a general approach to artistic practices and as research.

The first chapter in Donnelly and Harper’s book is entitled: “Introduction: Key Issues and Global Perspective in Creative Writing”. This introductory chapter begins by drawing attention to the work of Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean who edited *Practice-led Research, Research-led Practice in the Creative Arts* (2011) that was originally published in 2009 by Edinburgh University Press (Donnelly and Harper 2013: xiii). Smith and Dean proposed: “it is pointless for creative practitioners to work within the university unless the university environment responds to them and they respond to it” (Smith and Dean 2011: 9). What might be some of the implications of this observation? According to Donnelly and Harper the discipline of creative writing is fluid and changing. They suggest that those who are teaching in the academy who are not conducting art-practice research might not recognise emerging shifts in creative writing or know how to address these shifts through their curricula and pedagogy. Not recognising is causing knowledge “gaps” in the discipline of creative writing as we move through the second decade of the 21stC. The book suggests exploring and narrowing these “gaps in understanding – with
an eye on the discipline’s future role in the academy and in the world at large” (2013: xxv).

In the introductory chapter, Donnelly and Harper also identify a list of “key issues” related to creative writing that are posed as a series of questions (xxii–xxv). These questions correspond to chapters. For example, question 6 is: “What are the key issues in creative writing as research and in creative writing research” (xxiii)? In Chapter 6, entitled “Creative Writing Research”, Harper focuses on the idea that creative writing “incorporates both creative practice and critical understanding” (104). He noted: “I am using the term ‘creative writing’ here to refer to the actions that constitute creative writing, not the material artefacts that emerge from the human activity of creative writing” (104-105). Hence, drawing attention to the embodied judgments of a creative writer-researcher during a creative process. To my developing perspective this set of observations is critical because it implies that creative writing knowledge lies in the mind-body of a practising creative writer-researcher who is likely to be emotionally invested in the creative process and to be most familiar with recent research findings related to emerging creative writing in the world. Question 9 is: “In what ways do the critical processes of research, study and theory impact creative writing pedagogies” (xxiv)? In Chapter 9, entitled “Holding On and Letting Go”, Indigo Perry proposed: “In the university creative writing courses, what we have been teaching all along is the art of balancing a delicately intuitive and entwined process of holding on and letting go” (146). Perry recognises that the discipline of creative writing has no set boundaries; and that those who teach creative writing are taking a practice-led research approach. According to Perry, a practice-led approach: “is carried out in the process of producing the creative work itself. And this leads to how we might better establish pathways for research that develop quite organically” (157). In other words, creative writing in the university in the future is likely to valorise: “intertwining theory and practice”, “the intuitive”, “knowledge”, and “the process of creating” (146-147). This links with the present creative writing practice-led approach, the details of which will become clear as the reading/viewing and investigation proceeds. Plainly, one of the most difficult areas for artistic research is epistemology, the study of knowledge itself, which, I argue in what follows, requires researchers in the field to engage appropriately with pertinent philosophical writing.

In a chapter entitled “Teaching Toward the Future” Vanderslice draws attention to emerging computer technology and how this impacts not only a creative
writer’s choice of materials and writing implements and how artefacts are made, but also
how artefacts are presented and distributed (137-145). “We must teach [creative writers]
[…] this awareness,” Vanderslice advises, “an awareness of the digital environment they
grew up in and to which they must continue to adapt as they forge careers as writers”
(139). A practising creative writer-researcher’s position as it relates to experimenting
with and testing new digital technology is another key issue in the present project.

Such key issues set out to challenge the way higher education institutions teach
creative writing by speculating on the outcomes of other creative writers’ thoughts,
feelings, methods and judgements, rather than advocating that the creative writer
research the sorts of thoughts, feelings, methods and judgments that might have been
involved in the creation of an artefact. Specifically, a creative writing practice-research
enquiry in the post-graduate or doctoral research context is most likely complex, highly
individualised, idiosyncratic and sensory-led. The first-person focus on the embodied
judgement of a particular, a named writer, clearly takes us into a field of qualitative
research, as it is outlined by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln in their Handbook of
Qualitative Research (Sage Publications 2005).

There is also an emphasis in the case made by Donnelly and Harper on taking a
broad investigatory approach to creative writing-research (xxi). This kind of approach
demands that a creative writer explore and develop her or his own creative writing
process while simultaneously developing a highly detailed critical understanding of the
specific details related to that process. In this way the creative and the critical research
investigations enrich each other, placing a creative writer-researcher in a position not
only to invent a new kind of artefact, but also to contribute to the discipline by sharing
knowledge that details how this was achieved (179).

Harper points out that creative writing practice-research findings are directly
related to how practising artists/creative writers “think, feel, and do [creative writing]
that has not been fully articulated and certainly not researched” (107). Furthermore this
kind of art-practice-led research is “located in the development of modes, methods and
ways of recording such research”, but, he also adds, “at present, we have some way to go
in doing exactly that” (115).

This text overall draws attention to the importance of making a contribution to
creative writing practice-led research by offering a ‘new point of view’. This new point
of view might emerge from a double stranded activity: by engaging in both a creative
writing practice that increases in theoretic complexity and simultaneously conducting a
broad art-practice-led research investigation in the doctoral context, since these might not be completely separate activities.

The Sage Handbook of Digital Dissertations and Theses (2012), its editors claim, has been published as a guide to advanced research in a digital age. I want to draw attention to the “Introduction” (1-11) that these researchers wrote collaboratively. Here Andrews et al (I am paraphrasing) emphasise that the relationship between the creative and critical in practice-led or practice-based research is being questioned in swiftly moving knowledge streams. They are concerned that some universities have failed to adopt their regulations and guidance in accordance with current developments. They point out that these “aspects interact with a philosophical debate about the primacy of the word and contestation of the assumption that words are essential to the validation of an activity as research” (1). They also remind their readers that “design is central to the activity of ‘writing’ a dissertation” (3), and that at “the core of the process are students and their supervisors, who need to work out, in collaboration, how to address a particular research problem” (7). As a doctoral candidate conducting supervised practice-led research in a British university I believe the term practice-led research has become generally accepted as related to the work of an artist-researcher. But can practice-led research be used by artist-researchers to remember the experience of her or his creative decision-making process as it progresses toward development? Or are all artist-researchers required to use a research model made by other researchers from different disciplines, going from a prefabricated model to building another, and back again, replicating the central order of an already made model? Might it be the case that practice-led research in the arts can suggest one means of challenging all pre-established models, thereby allowing the research project as a whole to demonstrate innovation and artistry?

In an attempt to provide a context to think about how this particular practice-led research enquiry is situated with regard to knowledge made widely available through published writing, I began this chapter by citing the work of Donnelly and Harper who have advocated a practice-led research that does not compromise the “individuality of [a creative writing practice]” (2013: 179). Given that the aims of all research that claims to be “practice-led” might not be “individuality”, for contrastive purposes I want to highlight the work of three practising creative arts researchers: Stephen Goddard, Annette Iggulden and Gaylene Perry, who each wrote a chapter in Barrett and Bolt’s
Practice as Research: Approaches to Creative Arts Enquiry (2007/2010) that is a response to her or his doctoral project that required using a creative work-plus-exegesis model advocated by Barrett and Bolt (34; 159-163; 195). But rather than utilising this widely used creative work-plus-exegesis model, I am interested in engaging in practice-led research that coheres, in part, with Harper and Donnelly’s notion of “individuality” (179); and with what Melrose, in “Disciplinary ‘Specificity’ and the Digital Submission” (2012) calls “disciplinary specificity and identity” (298). This approach, she argues, involves engaging with “modes of knowing [...] and models of intelligibility (ways of seeing, knowing and doing) that differ from those that have been normalised within [...] mainstream traditions of schooling” (299); the former are “highly individualised” (301) and are “constitutive to disciplinary practices” (303) that aim at identifying and documenting “decision-making in the creative and performing arts” (303). I draw equally on Coessens, Crispin and Douglas’ proposal (I return to Coessens et al in detail below) that research should be “done by the artist, with the artist being in control of the research questions, deciding the delineation of the subject, defining the source and target domains, all from the artist’s point of view” (2009: 20). Why am I interested in engaging with practice-led research that coheres with these notions?

Perry’s research, she reports, culminated in a novel and exegesis, nevertheless she argued against the exegesis requirement: first, in 1998 in “Writing in the Dark: Exorcising the Exegesis” (http://www.textjournal.com.au/oct98/perry.htm). This essay was published while Perry was writing a novel that she explains is “a major component of a doctoral thesis” while the “other component is a mandatory exegesis drawing upon literary theory”. In this essay one of the questions Perry asks (I am paraphrasing) is: why a doctoral candidate, whose focus is studying literature, is required to produce only exegesis, while a doctoral candidate whose focus is creative writing, is required to create both an artefact and exegesis? She also questioned the meaning of ‘exegesis’. Perry concluded that “an assessment of whether or not a compulsory exegesis can be enforced justifiably should continue”. Second, in 2007 in a chapter in Barrett and Bolt’s book (cited above) entitled “History Documents, Arts Reveals: Creative Writing As Research” (2010: 35-45) Perry points out (I return to this important argument in “Chapter 2”) that her discussions as a doctoral candidate focused on the “suggestion that the creative work could be recognised as valid research within itself, without necessarily requiring exegesis” (35). Third, and finally, in 2008 in an essay entitled “The non-verbal and verbal:
expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” (1-11) Perry argued that some of the outcomes of creative writing are “non-verbal” (the “non-verbal” is a key notion that I return to in Chapters 2 and 3) and “cannot be exegetised” (3-4). Perry’s interest in identifying an alternative approach to the creative-work-plus-exegesis model seems to me to be useful for the purposes of the present enquiry, which is to explore the issue of a practice-led enquiry that engages with “disciplinary specificity” (Melrose 2012: 303) by which I mean identifying and documenting modes of knowledge that operate during a highly individualised creative decision-making process.

Iggulden’s chapter is entitled “‘Silent’ Speech” (2010: 65-79). Here Iggulden identified what she calls “the creative practice of writing, copying the words of others, changing words into images” (77). She indicates that she used “painting and drawing materials to […] explore how material practice might advance and challenge theory” (66) and emphasised that her “work is never theory driven” (67). Iggulden is interested in what she calls “a visual experience that expresses the emotional […] lived experience” (79). She wrote: “The aims and outcomes of my practice can be explained through the words of the exegesis” (ibid). But she argues that words cannot explain what is “non-verbal” (ibid). She proposed (I am paraphrasing) that by providing different examples of what she refers to as “visual language” she has not only demonstrated how medieval nuns invented ways of seeing voices of women who have been silenced, but has also offered “images as a mode of communication” (ibid). She remarked: “I am hopeful that my findings provide a stimulus for further research by others into this little explored area” (ibid). Her reference to a “little explored area” and “research by others” seems to me to be useful to my concern for continuing to clarify why I have chosen certain notions related to practice-led research offered by other researchers, such as Donnelly and Harper, Melrose, Coessens et al, who suggest artist-researchers should focus on identifying and documenting specific creative decision-making that aspires to individuality, which perhaps implies a little explored area.

Goddard’s chapter in Barrett and Bolt is entitled “A Correspondence Between Practices” (2010: 113-121). He wrote that the primary aim of his “doctoral research was to focus on the possibilities of utilising video as a creative research practice, and the ways in which an exegesis could also function as a creative and reflexive practice” (114). Goddard explained that he “struggled with the practice-exegesis relationship from inside
the playing field” (2010: 113). For Goddard the aim of exegesis is “to present a sense of the creative decision-making process(es)” that are “usually invisible to an audience, and also somewhat invisible to the practitioner, if they remain unexamined” (119). Here the role of examining “a sense of the creative decision-making processes” seems, to Goddard, to lie in the process of exegesis itself. But my own argument, in this mixed-mode research enquiry, is that the creative work-plus-exegesis model can indeed generate insights into creative decision-making processes. Might it be the case that the exegetic model, as propounded by Goddard, perpetuates the marginalisation or erasure of specific “knowledge objects” that are operating during creative decision-making processes “in expert decision-making” (Melrose 2012: 304-305)? I am suggesting this because Goddard noted:

_Lorne Story_ both questions and adds annotations to the re-enactments and to my uncertain recollection of the original events. The meta-narrative does not provide a coherent, explanatory master narrative. It merely provides another perspective on the events surrounding my adolescent fall from grace. After the passage of more than thirty years, an un-tethered surfboard becomes a symbolic shield representing a slippery set of floating memories. […] I was attempting to trace the ways in which writing and video technologies mediated and recorded my memories, stories, annotations and analysis. To this end, I used the video camera as a form of memory detector, sweeping the shoreline for lost trinkets and fragments of memory […] to present a sense of the creative decision-making process(es) within the context of the research practice (118-119).

Iggulden indicated that

I was attempting to re-address my past. After my mother’s death I was sent photocopies of the notes she had used in her pastoral work as a missionary in Pakistan in the 1960’s. […] As I copied the already thrice-copied words (the photocopy of her hand-written copy, from the copy of ‘God’s words’ in the Bible), the ‘positive’ shapes formed by these re-writings left an image suggestive of the female body in the ‘negative’ spaces of the paintings. I had unconsciously reasserted the memory of my mother into the spaces of the words of Law that had been used to silence her. […] When starting a work, I neither know what images might arise nor the final image that the painting itself will take. […] These images retain their tenuous link with both verbal and visual language […] My intuitive dialogue with visual and verbal languages has changed or added to the meaning of the words. […] When I began thinking about the alphabet for this part of my research, memories of early school years reasserted themselves: seeing and trying to remember the shapes of the image of letters (72-74).

Meanwhile Perry pointed out that
I was attuned to the traces of my fictional characters [...] of the places that rang with their familial memories [...] both in the act of writing it and in the finished narrative [...] I began to confront my own past [...] I started to recognise that I had angry feelings towards my own mother, feelings that needed reconciling. [...] In Water’s Edge I wrote of a disappeared father [...] my own father drowned in inland water [...] it reminds me that I carry my father with me [...]. I started to think a great deal about what this process of writing was teaching me [...] I felt myself being involved with what was happening. I felt that I lived it. [...] There is much material about the creativity involved in the construction of memory [...] there are few boundaries in imagining (38-45).

It is provocative, perhaps, to observe that all three of these artist-researchers, above, have identified “memory”; yet, these artist-researchers’ use of the modifiers such as “lost”, “past”, and “disappeared”, which are affective (in the Deleuzian sense), also suggest to me that memory/remembering exists other than during a present decision-making experience. The methods identified by these writers such as using “the video camera as a form of a memory detector” or “trying to remember the shapes of the image” or “attuned to the traces of my fictional characters [...] that rang with their familial memories” seem to me to negate these artists’ vital role in memory creation that each might have otherwise understood as what she or he sees, feels, and knows while making certain choices. My contention is that “memory” rarely constitutes a major research focus in creative writing/visual art-making practices that are distinct from the products of the creative doing and making, and that if memory did constitute a major focus, then perhaps we would no longer need to propose that a video camera is a “memory detector” or that fictional characters have “familial memories” or that we are “trying to remember the shapes of the image”. I favour instead drawing on Henri Bergson’s model of “memory-images” (1991: 133), for example, or Sigmund Freud’s model of “screen memories” (1899: 202), or Jean-Francois Lyotard’s model of “memory-effects” (1998: 48) – to whose work I return.

My argument here is simple. Goddard, Iggulden, and Perry identify “memory” toward the beginning of each of their published chapters in the Bolt and Barrett collection. As I understand these published chapters, these artist-researchers are likely to have traced the general outline of a widely used creative work-plus-exegesis model that attempts to regulate knowledge on the basis of discourse (i.e. word, signifiers), rather than develop a figural process (in the Lyotardian sense) appropriate to the task they have taken on. I am suggesting this because, despite announcing an interest not only in “memory”, but also in “personalised images” (Goddard 2010: 114); “visual processes”
and in “perceptions” (Perry 2010: 43) their texts repeatedly return to “a series of interactive dialogues” (Goddard 2010: 118); to “research into words and their meaning” (Iggulden 2010: 66); and to “narrative” (Perry 2010: 38) – hence, to discourse (my emphasis), rather than remembering to prioritise what they have already identified is operating – that is, “memory”. It seems to me that perhaps the phenomenon of memory is “somewhat invisible to a practitioner” as a result of the requirement to use the creative work-plus-exegesis model – a model that forgets that the artist is not a spectator; instead he or she has direct access to knowledge specific to the decision-making process as it is perceived and experienced in the mind-body. According to Harper: “At best, an exegesis or commentary can offer some post-event notes on an event of creative writing” (2013: 112). My understanding of practice-led research is that it begins with the seeing, doing and making, and testing this experience against knowledge made widely available in published writing. The artist-researcher moves to and fro, as the doctoral project is created as a whole from the artist-researcher’s point of view and undertaking, as the artistic-research is going on, for the purpose of exploring how this works and identifying and documenting artistic development and specific expert creative decision-making as it is going on. The point is not to make the creative work first, and after it is completed “reflect upon the chronology of the research process” (Goddard 2010: 118) thereby placing the artist-researcher in the position of a spectator or art critic or analyst who typically draws attention to something that has already taken place instead of what “is taking place”.

As suggested above, I am advocating here that we practicing creative writer-researchers might find it useful to explore a range of writing, coming from a variety of fields. Some twenty years before the publication of specialist texts on practice-led research, Helene Cixous composed *Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing* (1993) and presented it as a series of critical theory-related lectures to an audience at the Wellek Library at the University of California, Irvine in the United States. According to the summary on the back cover this is a book wherein “Cixous reflects on the writing process”. A widely known and highly regarded writer and philosopher, Cixous, who is French, earned her doctoral degree in English literary studies. She developed what became known as French Feminist Literary Theory.

How does a writing process work according to Cixous?

I began to write in the regions of the unconscious […] I could write
a thesis, but the texts I wrote were never mine […] you cannot write without the power of dreams (102 – 103).

The book displays long excerpts from a few writers: the Czech Republic-born German-language writer Franz Kafka (60), the Brazilian writer Clarice Lispector (62), and the Russian writer Alexander Pushkin (92).

How did these writers go about writing according to Cixous?

The book writes itself, and if by chance the person opposite should ask what you are writing, you have nothing to say since you don’t know. Yet the book is written […]. A book that writes itself and carries you on […] even if you don’t know how it works (100).

It is the wilfully articulated “knowledge gap” identified by Harper and Donnelly, that strikes me so powerfully in Cixous’ writing. She is a researcher whose reputation is worldwide. In this book we are introduced to a handful of creative writers, with whose writing we might well already be familiar, but about the writing process she provides no insight whatsoever. Why, in this book, did Cixous choose not to explore the written work of philosophers or scientists, whose disciplines might have offered some insights into a creative writing process? She answers: “But what surprises me is the frequent distrust on the part of writers. I don’t know where this is located, whether it precedes writing […] we have in view imaginary laws we believe order the world of writing” (102). Which returns us to the original enquiry: the writing process. On the last page the book asks: “How can it be written” (156)?

What this very brief snapshot suggests is that Cixous’ Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing is narrowly focused, and the writer is ill-equipped to write on exactly what the book professes to be interested in, namely the writing process. My own project is driven by the need to identify complex writing for and from the perspective of a practising creative writer-researcher who takes a broad investigatory approach to a creative writing process while also narrowing this focus by exploring a personal experience that points to particular outcomes of a creative writing process. Perhaps we can’t ‘blame’ Cixous for these omissions: her focus on the work of a small number of other notorious writers means that, because her own creative writing is not included in her book, she cannot know, nor indicate, how the writing process of any writer involved worked. Despite the publication of her own creative work (especially dramatic writing for the Théâtre du Soleil, Paris), she was not in the position, in this book, to specify how the (creative) writing process works.
The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto (2009) is a book created collaboratively by Kathleen Coessens (a philosopher and musician), Darla Crispin (a pianist and musicologist) and Anne Douglas (a visual artist and researcher). It is primarily concerned with two issues: first, artistic research enquiries in the doctoral and post-doctoral academic settings that are conducted from the point of view of a practising artist; and second, the inadequacy of verbal and written accounts. It is in The Artistic Turn that these practising-artist-researchers announce the following “Manifesto for the artist-researcher” (that I am paraphrasing here): first, never forget that it is up to the practising artist-researcher to remember the origin of the artistic experience and the creative act; second, provide room for the artistic experience and creations; third, search for possible discourses appropriate to the artist’s experience and creations; fourth, search for hidden dimensions and different perspectives; and then, continue ...

Like a Deleuzian rhizome, that sprouts simultaneously in different directions as it establishes connections, the manifesto (cited above) assisted in setting this research project in motion. While drawing notionally from a wide range of eminent scientists’, philosophers’ and artists’ work – including Theodore Adorno, Aristotle, Henri Bergson, Leonard Bernstein, Pierre Bourdieu, John Cage, Michel de Certeau, Merce Cunningham, Gilles Deleuze, Rene Descartes, Albert Einstein, Jan Fabre, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas, Wassily Kadinsky, Alan Kaprow, Immanuel Kant, Paul Klee, Thomas Kuhn, Plato, Michael Polanyi, Rainer Maria Rilke, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Ludwig von Wittgenstein – Coessens, Crispin and Douglas theorise that “Western academia” in the decades leading up to the 21st C. has tended to valorise insular linguistically-led disciplinary research enquiries that sought to identify systematic procedures, “deterministic” protocols, and conformity to widely known theoretical models (15). The book calls for practising art-researchers to explore and document complex “specific” individuated techniques and skill-sets gained through an embodied creative experience for the purpose of making a contribution to discussions that are different than those of an art theorist (178). Immersed in the changing landscape of practice-led approach to artistic disciplines the book’s writers illuminate how artistic disciplines are best served by research, even though “more often than not a research project’s essence can only be demonstrated rather than told” (179).

This book also trumpets in a silent mercurial language a “new” (103) research approach aimed at discovering fresh and distinctive correspondences that interlink a theory with an artistic product, each of which enrich each other and allow an outside
reader/examiner a way to move back and forth in the relationship between the theoretical discourse that points to how an artefact was made, and the artefact itself. It warns: “Critics of artistic research have argued that a research culture should be measured by the results” (179) but by doing so overlook the fact that an artistic “endeavour is (and always has been) concerned with playing the tensions between freedom and constraint, determinacy and indeterminacy, power of persuasion and political power” (179-180). Furthermore, “art has become more and more central to philosophical discourse” (180) – examples of which we can find in Bergson, Lyotard, and Deleuze, among other writers, whose work I return to in some detail in the chapters below. This kind of argument from experienced creative researchers signals why in the present project I draw from a number of philosophers’ work as well as that of published scientists, language theorists and artists who have taken a particular interest in heuristic practices, as opposed to asking whether the artefact is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or how we might want to compare an artefact to another artist’s work, or how we might want to categorise it. While these are interesting questions, my own sense is that these kinds of questions are not relevant to this particular doctoral enquiry. In my view the fundamental concept is expressed in Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas’ book on p. 102:

Like the ship on the sea, the artist is always on a journey, always somewhere ‘in practice’, in movement, transforming matter so that it ‘matters’. So it is with his or her research trajectory: every search for a definitive reference point is in vain because the reference points themselves are moving, both in the case of the ship, and in that of the artistic practices. The unique conditions of life at sea—unique in each time-space context and unique to each journey—require a special set of practices and expressions peculiar to seafarers. Likewise, in making art, the outcome is rarely known; nonetheless, we organise space, time and medium, creating its possibility and using a range of skills and techniques specific to our art.

Thus suggesting that the specific movement, sensory forces, energy shifts, are embodied as an open-ended art-practice research journey unfolds.

One of the most striking and compelling chapters is: “Deterritorializing the research space: the ways of knowing art” (76–97). The term “deterritorialize” is related to a concept identified by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and French psychoanalyst Felix Guattari in 1980 in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014) that suggests knowledge has no set boundary or structure. Coessens, Crispin and Douglas make use of the term “detrerritorialize” by calling for artist-researchers in
“Manifesto for the art-researcher” to: “Deterritorialize the research space to provide room for the artist’s experience and creations in the world” (2009: 181).

The notion that a “research space” might engage with modes of “specific artistic knowledges” that according to Coessens et al, also “enables us to see the world as continuously in the process of formation and to act accordingly” (85). This suggests that artistic production is evolutionary, activity-orientated, idiosyncratic, event based, and, I would argue, body-centred. In other words, it is unlikely that an artistic strategy follows an established pathway. Rather what is required of an artist is to become a re-searcher “re-immersing oneself in the processes of searching” (91) who continually engages in an investigation of a creative process that like a “rhizome” is complex and likely to grow in a multitude of unanticipated directions. In order for a new artefact to be created or to emerge, these researchers suggest, we need a “deterritorializing space” and a “rhizomatic” method of journeying forth, as it is only through opening up to a new deterritorialized space that creative emergence can happen. The spatial analogy and metaphor of a rhizome provide a flexible epistemological model to an art-researcher, thereby inspiring the practising artist-researcher to rethink

traditional distinctions, forsaking the route-guide for the map, [as] we will engage in a critically reflective attempt to unravel the space of, and for, artistic research, eventually discovering a possible terra incognita (86).

I return to the rhizome in considerable detail in the final chapter of this dissertation.

Much of the value in the chapter related to “deterritorializing” can be gleaned from the ways it demonstrates the usefulness of artistic research that interacts with “science and art, [as these] can both accelerate and connect their divergent lines of flight and [can] generate […] [how] what might be achieved more than outweighs the difficulties and the risks enumerated here” (97).

In my view, to which I return once again in some detail below, this manifesto positions artistic research in the mind and body of the artist who experiences the creative process. It is the practising artist-researcher who continually faces the challenge to create a new artefact and to endeavour to indicate critically how an artistic research space evolves. This ‘manifesto’ also identifies a “rhizomatic” method as most useful and appropriate to interpreting how artistic-practice-led research is given life. Most of all the reader is invited to use the book to spur questions. For example: How does an artistic strategy work? If a creative production process is unpredictable what concepts might
work to assist a practising artist-researcher to explore the unforeseeable? How might an artist articulate a heuristic organisational process that is mixed-mode in terms of how it is received or might channel energetic movements? The book reminds us: “The results of artistic research are largely unknown but, through the artistic turn, its horizon is being vividly imagined” (180). The book, the artefacts presented within it and the critical research, together offer a range of potential meanings each of which has a clear significance for the present research undertaking.

A major work of a ‘non-artist-practitioner’-philosopher is Theodor Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* (2011) comprising a series of drafts (1961–1969) that were pieced together and published posthumously in 1970. The book proclaims, “that form in artworks is everything on which the hand has left its trace […] the empirical process of making” (189). The origin of the word *empirical* is from the Greek *empeirkos* “experienced”. Process (*n.*) is from the Latin *processus* “going forward”. This particular orientation signals, in part, the aim of this present enquiry – that is, to demonstrate the artist experiencing the aesthetic process through her body, wherein the hand – literally – leaves its diverse traces. Adorno was a German sociologist, philosopher, and musicologist associated with a number of writers whose work was influenced by the theories of Freud, Hegel and Marx – although his primary engagement with art was with works already made. The book is widely regarded as one of the most influential theoretical books published in the 20th C. on aesthetic theory. The book defines an artwork as “spuriously individual […]. Even Dada […]” (238). But at the same time it “destroys […] categories […]. It is evident that […] art is not the subordinating concept of its genres” (239). The idea that an artefact is individual and destroys categories and/or genres is useful to certain key aspects of the present research project. In my argument, conforming to a generic category automatically prevents the emergence of a new artistic space.

But the book also observes that “the weakness of artists [lies] in the face of the formidable concept of their object […] single-mindedly artworks devote themselves […] to the precritical, consciousness, desperate naiveté” (239). The idea that a practising art-researcher’s conscious thought is pre-critical does not help me build my case. An artist-researcher in the doctoral context needs to have access to conscious concepts even if these quickly slip through the fingers; meanwhile, any notion of expertise in a published writer’s craft seems to me to suppose that the experienced writer’s consciousness is far from “pre-critical”, far from “naïve”, however desperate.
In chapter ten, entitled “Toward a theory of the Artwork”, the book announces: “authentic works, are those that surrender themselves to the historical substance of their age without reservation” (240). Yet, in the second chapter, “Situation”, the book warns, “nothing is more damaging to theoretical knowledge of [...] art than its reduction to what it has in common with older periods” (25). These are, perhaps, contradictory claims. This admittedly brief introduction to Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory raises the issue of the validity in the present context, or not, of a historically-focused theory. It is undoubtedly extremely interesting from an art-historical perspective. Art history may very well be useful to an artist-researcher who can benefit from an awareness of other artists’ work as it evolved. However, books written by art historians – or indeed by philosophers – are rarely authored by active artists themselves; which tends to mean, as was the case with Cixou’s publication cited above, that the artist’s work is not only necessarily objectified by the historian or the philosopher, but that it emerges as already-made, with artist-biographical detail and critical interpretation added for effect. This fixed state of affairs takes us back to the “gaps in understanding”, identified above, as well as to the knowledge-questions posed by Harper: what sorts of knowledge are involved in the experience of making new work? The present research project is driven by the need to identify complex writing that can provide the sorts of insight I need from the context of an art-practice-based research approach.

At this point I propose to introduce a particular work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, which seems to me to have placed the visual arts – in the case of a practising painter - in a highly particular research position with regard to complex writing. Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: Logique De La Sensation (1981) is a two-volume set that Deleuze presented to Francis Bacon after its completion. Volume I, written by Deleuze, also includes excerpts from Interviews With Francis Bacon (Sylvester 2012). In the latter text, David Sylvester (DS) pieces together a series of nine (filmed) interviews with Francis Bacon (FB), recorded between 1962 and 1986. Sylvester’s book claims that Bacon’s answers were not edited; however, extracts from interviews “were freely interwoven, sometimes within a sentence” (2012: 202).

Before exploring the usefulness of Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation there are four primary aspects of Sylvester’s book of interest to the present project. The first is the black and white photos of Bacon’s paintings on display throughout the book’s pages in a general chronological order in relation to completion dates. The book also
includes black and white photographs that were identified as points of inspiration for Bacon and photocopies of other artists’ work. One example is that of the Spanish painter, Diego Velázquez (1599 – 1660), and his painting of Pope Innocent X. Bacon refers to this painting by answering a question related to his own Pope portraits such as “Study after Velasquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X 1953”:

FB In the Popes […] [the inspiration] comes from an obsession with the photographs that I know of Velasquez’s Pope Innocent X […] [this] opens up all sorts of feelings in areas of – I was going to say – imagination, even, in me (24-25).

Like strolling through an art gallery while reading the artist’s words, the images in the book enhance the reader’s experience, encouraging the to and fro movement between Bacon and Sylvester’s words and images of artefacts and other photographs that energised Bacon’s work.

The second aspect is that Bacon insists that his artistic process does not follow the logic of a narrative or representation. For Bacon the artist is someone whose aim is to follow her or his own ‘sense’ of how to create something strikingly original.

FB Well […] although I may use, or appear to use, traditional methods, I want those methods to work for me in a very different way to that which they have worked before or for which they were originally formed. […] [And], although I may use what’s called the techniques that have been handed down, I’m trying to make out of them something that is radically different to what those techniques have made before (107).

DS Why do you want it to be radically different?

FB Because I think my sensibility is radically different, and, if I work as closely as I can to my own sensibility, there is the possibility that the image will have a greater reality (107).

What Bacon refers to as his wanting to use “methods [that] work for me” in the discussion above might be understood, perhaps, as related to what Donnelly and Harper identified as one of the “key issues” in creative writing: “the individuality of a creative writing practice […] [And] a [creative writer’s] own sense of how creative writing happens, why it happens, and what the results are of it happening” (2013: 179). It may be that it is by exploring what seems to me to be an individual embodied “sense” or “sensibility” of how an artefact was made is where the “knowing how” to see and do creative writing is located rather than in the canon within one’s particular discipline of
art-making methods as Bacon has suggested above. Rather this information, related to already existing artefacts, forms the basis for the preparatory work from which Bacon developed his art-making methods. This may be why Donnelly and Harper argued that “beginning with the nature of creative writing and the activities and understandings of creative writers is the only way to ever get closer to an understanding of creative writing itself” (179) (writer’s emphasis).

Third, the book is a vehicle for understanding how Bacon’s work is guided by a visual, rather than verbal, language process. Bacon commented: “But I did see them, and the figure on the right is something […] I always think of that as an image […] they breed other images for me. And, of course one’s always hoping to renew them” (14). The images or “figures” (22) that Bacon has identified are of particular interest to this project because when I write creatively it is an image – not sounds of words – that inspires my decision-making process before words have a chance to strike. In addition, it is clear that Bacon took a particular interest in “chance” and “the accident” that set in motion a unique way of working that would seem to me to be free from traditional judgments and rational thought (53). “As one conditions oneself […] by working with what happens, one becomes more alive to what the accident has proposed for one” (ibid).

Harper insists that creative writing is an “eclectic activity, drawing on more than word use and compositional practices […] and is one of the most individual of university subjects” (2013: 60). If so, it might be useful for us to consider these terms: “chance” and “accident” for a moment, as these terms might be useful to a practising creative-writer researcher. Is it possible that what a painter has to say about how his or her creative process works might be of interest to a creative writer? Donnelly and Harper argued that there is “interaction between creative writing and other art forms” and that this is one of the key issues that “can be addressed […] by creative writing researchers” (178). Identifying commonality among art practices such as creative writing that is ‘performance-based’ and other inventive disciplines such as “painting, music, dance, or theatre” (Donnelly 2013: 128), according to Donnelly, may be one of the challenges of creative writing practice-led research that perhaps concerns artistic freedom to systematically use certain words or concepts ‘borrowed’ from other artistic domains. This ‘borrowing’ may be thought of as a practicing art researcher working as a *bricoleuse* (known in qualitative research as a particular type of research and mode of research) as a means of exploring creative writing both critically and creatively. While Donnelly and
Harper do not use the term *bricoleuse* they explain that what a practising creative writer-researcher does is to explore how we might improve the ways in which we develop creative writing within the academy and the many new cultural, societal and economic developments we see going on in the world at large […] [by] knowing how we might go about doing these explorations (180).

If we consider that creative writing is one of the most highly-individualised activities that involves explorations of creative practices such as painting it may be that what Bacon identified as a “graph” that Bacon explained, “you see within” (56) that Deleuze also named a “diagram” could be useful to creative writer researchers who might be eager to test and experiment with expansive creative writing spaces that can be observed, for example, in Carson’s *Nox*. I return to the notion of a Deleuzian diagram identified by Deleuze in *Francis Bacon: The Logic Of Sensation* in greater detail in the final chapter. In order to understand better how these larger creative writing spaces might work, Harper and Donnelly seem to me to be suggesting that a creative writer-researcher might want to explore methods associated with making processes that focus on non-traditional artistic methods. And it is these aspects that both Bacon and Deleuze explore in great detail, meaning that they can seem to function as insights into how we might expand the space of creative writing beyond some of the normalised traditions of creative writing, thus shedding light on how a more expansive space of creative writing/graphic production might be explored.

Last, Sylvester’s book illuminates how the question posed might itself influence an artist’s answer, providing a more general demonstration of the different status and authority of the artist and critic. For example:

DS And is it true that people have been trying to find a story in the *Crucifixion* triptych. Is there in fact any explanation of the relationship between the figures (22)?

FB No. […]

FB […] You have to abbreviate into intensity (176).

DS But you don’t just abbreviate; you also impose a certain rhythm – a distortion some might say. […]

FB Well, I feel that is a misreading of it […]

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DS I’d like to question you about a number of factual matters. They mostly have to do with your methods of working, but to begin, I’d like to try to clarify how your early life was divided between Ireland and England (184).

FB Well, I was born in Ireland, though my mother and father were both English. My father was a trainer of racehorses and we lived near the Curragh, where more or less all the trainers were concentrated. I was born in Dublin […] a house called Canny Court, near a small town called Kilcullen in County Kildare. We were there […].

We might on this evidence demonstrate that in terms of language and other modes of communication, the paintings allow Bacon to find his self-expression in a visual form that everyday language stutters and stammers to convey.

The original French version of Deleuze’s *Francis Bacon: Logique De La Sensation* (1981) Volume II – *Peintures* is comprised solely of colour photographs of Bacon’s paintings. The diptychs and triptychs are printed on paper pages that fold out so that the viewer can take in an approximation, at least, of the full effect of the viewer’s engagement with the paintings themselves. D. W. Smith’s English translation was made available in 2003. It does not include the contents of Volume II. The original two-volume edition might be thought of as the work of a philosopher who set out to find a way of engaging, as a philosopher, with the processes of art-making, as distinct from the later engagement with artistic product, such as we find in Deleuze and Guattari’s *What is Philosophy?* (1994).

Deleuze’s philosophical writing in *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* takes a specific interest in how a particular artist works. He argues, on the basis of Bacon’s own words, that an artist does not rely on a rational logic but rather makes decisions based on certain sensations that are registered in the body. Deleuze asked: “What does this act of painting consist of? Bacon defines it in this way: make random marks (lines-trait); scrub, sweep, or wipe the canvas in order to clear out locales or zones (color-patches)” (2003: 81). It is perhaps this interest in developing philosophical perceptivity about aesthetic practice that has attracted the attention of a growing number of practising artist researchers. Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas (cited above) and the Australian architect Pia Ednie-Brown in “The Texture of Diagrams” (2000) and Simon O’Sullivan in “From Stuttering and Stammering to the Diagram: Deleuze, Bacon and Contemporary Art Practice” (2008) have borrowed at least notionally from the complex concepts and terminology that is made available in the volumes of Deleuzian philosophy. O’Sullivan argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘minor literature’ as well as to Deleuze’s
concepts of ‘the figural’ and ‘the diagram’ can expand contemporary art practices (247). For some *bricolage* thinkers/qualitative researchers, exploring Deleuzian writings has set new ways of thinking in motion as to how a creative process might work as an embodied experience in a continuous state of evolution, which pays no immediate attention either to ready-made art-making theories or to art histories.

By ‘drawing’ on the Deleuzian notion of a rhizome (from Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* 1980/1987) – the practising architect and researcher Mahesh Senagala designed “Rhizogramming And A Synesthetic Transformation Of Designer’s Mind” (2005: 4-16) – a paper that itself aims to operate as a rhizome. This paper is of interest to my own project as it demonstrates how an arts researcher-practitioner might borrow from further aspects of Deleuzian philosophy. Senagala is an emerging media architect who teaches ‘innovative methods’ in the United States. Rhizogramming, he observes, “helps liberate the designer from the clutches of conscious choice that limits the mind in the early stages of […] [the] design process” (5). The paper is complex and is divided into sections that seem to flitter between traditional typed registers, a variety of concepts, and unusual environmental design sketches and drawings. Senagala explains to the reader that the sections can be read/viewed in any order or by following the “edit time” that can be located in an extended column on the left side of the document throughout the paper’s pages. Diagrammatology, rhizogram, and rhizogramming are some of the concepts that are tested. The paper also includes seven artefacts or ‘Figures’. In the seventeen-page paper, a dozen sources are cited including the work of the social theorist, writer and philosopher, Brian Massumi, whose *Parables For the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, appeared in 2002, and to whose work I will return in some detail in what follows. Massumi translated Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. It is in *A Thousand Plateaus* that Deleuze and Guattari not only introduce a rhizome (2014: 3–25) but also demonstrate how their writing is one despite its apparent adherence as well to certain academic publishing conventions. As Senagala perhaps realised, the critical research is more effective if it can demonstrate a dynamic inward visual moving point of interest that might emerge during a creative process where words perhaps falter and pause. This experience might also constitute a particular movement that expresses the presence of a non-verbally related but, nonetheless, significant meaning.
I want to include here a brief exploration of two texts of the French literary theorist and philosopher Jean-François Lyotard: *Discourse, Figure* (1971/2011) and *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* (1988/1998). I have found these two volumes, written and published around twenty years apart, particularly useful in addressing a number of issues related to creative writing processes. These books seem to me to suggest that a creative writer can explore memories, feelings, and desires as a way to experiment with new ways of writing that aim at moving beyond discourse, narrative and certain generic structures. Harper has observed that “the individual creative writer’s needs, desires, feelings and reasons as that writer undertakes creative writing […] might well be informed by an individual writer’s memory as well as by immediate sensory stimuli” (2013: 107). Such a remark may indicate an opportunity for a creative writer-researcher to explore both discursively and imaginatively an individual way of writing that tests the idea of writing as “the very stuff of inscription” (Lyotard 2011: 263), or as “graphic” (264), or as “sensory” (283), or as “memories of perceptions” (269), or as “memory-effects” (1998: 48) in relation to the outcomes of a creative writing practice.

In *Discourse, Figure* (2011, derived from his 1971 doctoral thesis) Lyotard pointed out that: “One can say that the tree is green, but saying so does not put color in the sentence. Yet color is meaning” (50). This brief reference that I include here is indicative of the playful writing of a philosopher, and suggests to me that if writing is understood as specifically related to the ‘saying’ of words alone (i.e. “sayable”) “because its properties seem analogous to those of […] linguistic space” (50) that understanding overlooks the central hypothesis in what follows which is that what a creative writer produces is often a graphic reminder of a specific space, time, shape, texture, and colour that has been experienced in the body and is experienced anew. Lyotard’s original book title, *Discours, figure*, seems to me to suggest the importance of questioning the valorisation of Discourse – i.e. “saying” – over the *figure* – i.e. “seeing” (233). This brief outline reveals some of the interest of these works to my own project: Lyotard defines certain modes and tendencies in some writing as “graphic” and/or “figural” (262-267) – that is, a predominantly visual entity, whose first appeal, even laid out on the published page, is to the human senses in general and to the eyes in particular. I see, and often touch – long before I begin to semiotise – words written, that start thereby to resonate, as though in my hearing. According to Lyotard, a “figure” is what “subverts [aural-related] discourse. Through the figure words begin to induce in our bodies (as would colors) […] a plastic space, and words as sensory things” (283). Although the book does
not actually “do” what it writes about – the book might be argued to float somewhere between discourse and figure, thus confusing “sayable” language in the philosophical and linguistic traditions with “seen” language, nevertheless the notion of the figural is useful to my present undertaking because, in Lyotardian terms, it indicates a shift in the ways of approaching and understanding language from ‘phonetic/sound’ to ‘what is seen’. *Discourse, Figure* is also useful because it explores the problem overlooking how writing itself is “the figural and the act of […] the graphic’s” (212) that is, related to colour, space, shape and line. “Here one must keep at arm’s length the assumptions, interpretations, and habits of reading”, Lyotard observed “that we contract with the predominant use of discourse […] which is why writing is continually spurned […] [and] the figure becomes […] an underperforming language at that” (212-213). Is this why Lyotard refrains from judging works of art in this text from the 1970s? He writes alongside artefacts (Plates 1-24) while borrowing notions from artists such as Paul Klee thus setting-up a relationship – a space between – within which particular sorts of observations might be developed. In other words, what constitutes the visual artefact (i.e. figural space) always expresses more than what can be said (i.e. discourse) ‘about it’. Almost two decades after *Discourse, Figure* was originally published, in 1988 in *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* Lyotard continued to explore writing that he also called “inscription”. In a chapter entitled: “*Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy*” Lyotard attempts to break down memory linked to inscription, into at least three types of “memory-effects” (1998: 48–57). I return repeatedly in what follows to the notion of memory, duration, and past experience that recurs in the present. His three types of memory-effects, observed in the context of digital technologies and the digital archive or document, are useful, I would suggest, as an attempt to understand certain sorts of image-production, rather than as an explanation that can be fully explained through discourse. I sense that this text – and I use this verb advisedly – *I sense that* these documents allows us to deal with different sorts of image-making by “opening a public space of meaning” (48).

In 1967 in *Of Grammatology*, the Algerian-born French philosopher Jacques Derrida pointed out the fact that traditions in Western thought have overlooked the consequences of valorising phonetic writing that “forbids” graphic writing that might seek to “escape semiology” (1997: 45). Graphic writing reveals what Derrida suggests is “primary”, that is, an immediately visible form of a “living memory” (37). In “Writing
Before the Letter” (1-93) Derrida asks us to question conventional understandings of writing that limit a creative practice of writing to representing sounds of words (i.e. *logos*) rather than making one or more (graphic) images. Derrida suggests that a creative writer has a responsibility to think of writing as image-making that breaks free from a Jakobsonian binary analysis of writing not only by “reforming the concept of writing” (55) but also by demonstrating a “new method” (Ixxix) of writing that allows for “non-phonetic” (non-alphabetic) registers (3).

In 1969 in *Visual Thinking* (1997), the German art and film theorist and perceptual psychologist Rudolf Arnheim took an interest in artistic processes. He observed that creative practices (including a writer’s) are guided by thinking with the “senses” (v). He argued that words alone have no meaning without a relationship to other kinds of bodily experiences such as a writer seeing shapes in the mind. One of the examples of creative thinking that Arnheim offers is his own ability to visualise walking through a forest while sitting at a desk without the aid of words (229). He suggested that a creative writing process depends on a writer’s ability to focus attention on an inner sensory experience (233). He also pointed out that an artist “operates with the vast range of imagery available through the memory […] as well as the imagination” (294). The idea that a creative process is visually-led seems to allow us to move beyond arguments that suggest that a creative writing process tends to be word and clause-led, and to open up questions as to individual actions and personal thoughts which may well seem, after Lyotard, to be figural and expansive, operating visually before even words emerge.

The typography and graphic communications researcher and pedagogue Michael Twyman, in “The graphic presentation of language” (1982), draws attention to the importance of understanding “the ‘language element’ in graphic communication” (2). The *New Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics* (1993) defines the basis of a poem as “an instance of *verbal art*, a text set in verse, bound in speech. More generally, a poem conveys heightened forms of perception, experience, meaning, or consciousness of lang. i.e. a heightened mode of discourse” (938). Twyman suggests, however, that if we continue to valorise linguistics, we thereby overlook the visual connection with writing – the visual connection (as I will argue in what follows) that lies at the source of my invention of the creative components. He reminded us in 1982 that writers have an opportunity to explore chromatic possibilities, to test electronic apparatus, handwriting,
and to remember that writing can be understood as "non-verbal" (6-8) – a negative definition to which we might prefer the positive ‘other-than verbal’.

While many writers focus on the relationship between everyday life, speech and writing, including the widely-cited W. Ong in his *Orality and Literacy: the technologizing of the word* (1982), the British social anthropologist Jack Goody laid the groundwork in *The Interface Between the Written and the Oral* (1987/1993) for the history of human writing, in which he observes that the basis for writing is “graphic art” and “non-verbal” which essentially communicates by way of “design” (3-9). The discipline of creative writing should not limit creative writers to a specific set of constraints, Goody argues, as a “lack of response to changing circumstances (indicating loose entailment) may indicate that the features with which one is dealing are of little importance as a whole” (295). According to Donnelly it is important to bear in mind that the discipline of creative writing is flexible, “practice-based” and “imaginative” and is separated from literary criticism and literary theory as creative writers focus on the exhilaration of the creative process of doing and making of art rather than the outcome (2013: 127–128). Goody observed, as it relates to the meaning of the products made by creative writers, “it might be difficult to see why or how useful information was transmitted this way” (1993: 294). In other words, creative writing practices are developed by those “who do” (294) the making of artefacts and because there “are few constraints on creative imagination”, meaning is developed (295). Goody argues that there need not be a general agreement as to the meaning of an individual writer’s work. “Or to put it another way, writing is the mechanism that permits us to change the format of our creative endeavours, the shape of our knowledge, our understanding of the world, and our activities within it” (298). Goody reminds us that creative writing research continues over a lifetime. He also suggests that it is the creative writer-researcher who is in a position to announce and convey an awareness of an evolutionary path taken since she or he creates ‘works of art’ that can take different forms.

Here I want to examine the work of a creative writer and a political scientist who seems to me to share a similar concern for how to bring words and visual images together. Like the Canadian poet, essayist, translator and professor of Classics Anne Carson in *Nox* (2010), the American political scientist Robert E. Horn in “Visual Language and Converging Technologies in the Next 10-15 Years (and Beyond)” explores the tight weaving together of words and visual images in imaginative ways. According to Horn:
“Visual language is defined by the tight integration of words and visual elements” (2001: 1). Horn pointed out that human beings “do not live by information alone. We make meaning with our entire beings: emotional, kinesthetic, somatic. Visual art has always fed the human spirit in this respect” (6).

Carson’s *Nox* (2010) seems to me to display a relatively recent example of what I sense is the outcome of a highly individualised creative way of writing that may have resulted from prolonged experimentation with compositional relationships that involve a variety of visual registers, for example: old postage stamps, photographs, dollops of paint, smudges, edges, scraps of paper, staples, lines, pencil-rubbings and words. Horn advised us in 2001 that when “words and visual elements are closely intertwined, we create something new and we augment our communal intelligence” (1). This creative way of writing that Carson demonstrates and that Horn might define as “visual language” in the sense of intertwining visual elements including words, is of special interest as in my own creative writing process I am experimenting with what I argue is a singular method of bringing together a variety of visual registers (e.g. photographs or parts of photographs, colour, line) and words. I present the specific details of these sorts of processes in the following two chapters.

From my point of view, in *Nox*, Carson’s visual registers are organised in such a way as to make a visual tapestry from what I take to be the living memory of the loss of a beloved brother. It is through personal loss that we learn the limitations of words. Carson invents a highly idiosyncratic way of writing, as an imaginative way of expressing the pain associated with a loss for which there are no adequate words. Such an emotional experience seems to me to have had a powerful impact on how the artefact was developed. What Carson provides is a grey cardboard box filled with a long folded sheet of paper that shows us scraps of evidence photocopied on to it: crumpled paper, shards of handwritten letters, torn photographs, all bits and pieces are fragments of evidence of a brother’s existence. “Today”, Horn observed “human beings work and think in fragmented ways, but visual language has the potential to integrate our existing skills to make them tremendously more effective” (1).
Carson noted in Nox: “I want to fill my elegy with lights of all kinds” (2010: 1.0). “But over the years of working on it, I came to think of translating as a room, not exactly an unknown room, where one gropes for the switch. I guess it never ends”. What Carson offers us instead are these scraps of evidence gathered in Nox. Horn noticed: “Researchers and scholars are no longer constrained by the scroll-like thinking of endless paragraphs of texts” (2001: 4). Horn argued: “Messy problems do not have straightforward solutions” and are “ambiguous” and “filled with considerable uncertainty” (ibid). Carson suggests one must handle the body of Nox carefully so as to not damage the elongated flexible accordion-like order that allows us to consider the inseparability of folding and unfolding paper parts that retain a certain attachment. Horn pointed out in 2001 that artists had already begun to create “large visual murals” (6). My hands struggled to place the outstretched Nox back into its box and this struggle caused me to make my own set of marks on it. If Horn is correct and, as the 21st C. continues to unfold, art making will continue to involve artists taking a computer and making a new visual language, then perhaps we can see a diversity of choices opening for creative writers in Nox. Perry, you may recall, suggested that “creative practice and research stretches out tendrils between creative writing and other art forms” (2008: 1).

Horn (cited above) has chosen to use the term “emotional” (from the Latin *emovere* “agitare, move out, remove”) in his effort to facilitate using computer technology that breaks away from the limitations of verbal text. A number of other writers have also taken up the notion of “emotion” leading to questions related to memory. In 1899, Sigmund Freud took up the notion of “emotion” in “Screen Memories” (202-209), in the context of psychoanalytical enquiry. The idea of “emotion” seems to be useful because instead of focusing on the human experience as “a collection of material” (202) it focuses instead on the human experience as it brings into focus a clear view of chromatic images that might have otherwise been overlooked, or forgotten, into a present experience as the image of a living memory is unfolding, and as it is powerfully felt in the body. The notion of “mental life” (209) is also important here since it seems to bring into view certain visions inside the individual human mind-body that play a “part in informing” as well as in making a “selection” (ibid). Freud seems to me to have left behind a reminder, perhaps, that an artist who is searching for images does not have to find images elsewhere, but is likely to have direct access to images, can produce images, and select certain images that are not outside the
mind-body; and furthermore, that these images may very well be strongly felt. But what do we understand about the notion of memory?

For Henri Bergson in *Matter and Memory* (1991) “memory, that is, the survival of past images, these images must constantly mingle with our perception of the present and may even take its place” (65-66). In *The Creative Mind* (1974) he also wrote of “duration which science eliminates, and which is so difficult to conceive and express, is what one feels and lives” (13). “Memory” for Bergson is “the continuity of the inner life and consequently its indivisibility, we no longer have to explain the preservation of the past, but rather its apparent abolition” (153). However, the historian Luisa Passerini in “Connecting Emotions. Contributions from Cultural History” (2008: 117-127) is interested in “the study of emotions”. This interest has emerged from “awareness” that the human life/experience is ephemeral (117). This sort of awareness, she argues “has motivated many scholars to change their vision and practice of cultural history” (117). For Passerini the notion “culture” is also important in that it is typically understood as related to “text and its connections with the world”, but she also points out that this sort of understanding of culture might not recognise the “individual” (117-118). Passerini argued that “different disciplinary approaches can be found […] [that] point to a precise choice, of studying emotions that establish connections” (118).

Similarly, Deleuze, while drawing on the work of Bergson in *Bergsonism* (1991), and while addressing the relationship between “intelligence and society”, noted: “What appears in this interval is emotion” (109-110). In what follows I am going to argue that I engage with memory that seems to me to trigger strongly felt emotions in my body as a way of seeing and knowing that is vital to my creative decision-making process that involves computer-related apparatus.


a rationale and guidelines for a specific genre—mystery—designed to do the work of schooling and popularization in a way that takes into account the new discursive and conceptual ecology interrelating orality, literacy and
videocy (7).

Ulmer looks at new approaches to learning through academic discourse made possible by students investigating the possibilities of an electronic discourse as he assumes that the new digital age and apparatus will require institutions to create new practices and a new theory of “written performance” (18).

In the “Preface” to Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (1994) Ulmer explains that this is a continuation of his earlier project that focuses on applying to academic discourse the lessons arising out of a matrix crossing French poststructuralist theory, avant-garde art experiments, and electronic media in the context of schooling (xi).

Ulmer is a pedagogue and a professor of literature, and his background is fairly solidly literary. The first chapter begins with Ulmer introducing the term heuretics (from the Greek heuretikos “inventive”) arguing that his approach is one of “artistic experimentation” (3). However, rather than operating as a practising artist he operates on the basis that literary theory “influences” creative choice (ibid). This may well limit his ability to engage with the visual aspect of a creative writing process despite uptake of his digitally-informed "logic of invention". Although he has much to say about digital technology and the development of writing what is important however in this book is his sense that affect has been left out of writing on the digital up until the late 1990s. With respect to creative decision-making, Ulmer’s exploration Bastick’s intuitive thought processes is interesting: under certain conditions they spark sudden insights or the experience of “eureka” (from the Greek heureka meaning “I found [it]”).

According to Ulmer:

Chorography as a method of invention writes directly the hyperbolic intuition known as the eureka experience. It is first of all a means for stimulating this experience, for transferring it from the living body to an apparatus, whether print or electronic, for “writing” or artificially performing intuition “outside” the organic mind and body and entrusting this process to a machine (both technological and methodological). The study of grammatology has demonstrated in detail how print favors and supports or augments an analytical mode of thought based on the fit between the properties of verbal discourse and abstract demands of logic (140).

Ulmer suggests that the intuitive process that he uses is informed by “verbal discourse”, but Bastick points out that intuition precedes verbalisation (Bastick 1982: 298). Nevertheless, Ulmer’s exploration of an intuitive method in theory and in practise helps
us to consider how psychological experience and the feelings of a creative writer who is using digital technology may play an important role in terms of decision-making. But if we wish to understand the embodied experience and the visual aspects of a creative writing process that involves using computer apparatus, we may need to involve practising creative writer-researchers whose experience might be less influenced by literary theory. I explore Ulmer’s intuitive method in detail in the chapter that follows.

I want to introduce N. Katherine Hayles’ *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics* (1999). Hayles similarly has a literary background although perhaps the “posthuman” has a few problems merging the visual with the verbal? The book begins with Hayles discussing “a nightmare” that resulted from her reading Hans Moravec’s *Mind Children: The Future of Robots and Human Intelligence* (1988). She explains that Moravec has invented “a fantasy scenario in which a robot surgeon purees the human brain in a kind of cranial liposuction, reading the information in each molecular layer as it is stripped away and transferring the information into a computer” (Hayles 1999: 1). She writes more generally about the changes to the notion and the experience of the self that she calls “posthuman”. I want to identify some of the changes that she highlighted as the posthuman self – such as embodied processes, and feedback loops – that initially seemed to fit with my hypothesis that involves memory as she refers to this book as a “rememory” (13).

Hayles cites four defining characteristics of the posthuman that she notes are changes in viewpoint: the first, “privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life” (2); the second, regards the Western tradition of believing human thought is the foundation of human identity as the by-product of “an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show” (3); the third, considers a body as a manipulable “original prosthesis” that is replaceable and interchangeable so that controlling the body “becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (ibid); and the fourth, “configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines” (ibid). Hayles suggests this is how the human being (the self) becomes *posthuman* – a cyborg. How does Hayles deal with this posthuman outlook? She explains that in the chapters that “follow [she] will show what had to be elided, suppressed, and forgotten to make information lose its body” (13). She seems to me to suggest that a practitioner using a computer can imagine hidden memories lost in the body and can use these to make certain choices that can lead to the production of
artefacts that are “rememory” (13). According to Hayles – and I am clearly interested in this perspective – “[the] feedback loops that run between technologies and perceptions, artefacts and ideas, have important implications for how historical change occurs” (14). She finds “technologies are fascinating because they make visually immediate the perception that a world of information exists parallel to the ‘real’ world” and argues that to succeed what is required is making “artefacts that could embody it and make it real” (ibid). My own sense, and the case I make in the chapters that follow and in the creative work included in this portfolio, is that computer technology provides an unprecedented opportunity for artists, scientists and literary theorists to consider creative processes. Sometimes a creative writer makes use of digital technologies with a different aim from that of a scientist or literary theorist. Hayles concludes that “we can fashion images of ourselves that accurately reflect the complex interplays that ultimately make the entire world one system” (290). While her narratives are informative it is hardly clear that she contributes much to the notion of a changed creative practitioner who enables us to see how using a computer can make images of ourselves visible, by actualising them in a creative invention.

Carrie Noland has written a chapter entitled “Digital Gestures” in Morris and Swiss’ New Media Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories (2006: 217-242). Hayles also contributed a chapter to this book, entitled “The Time of Digital Poetry: From Object To Event” (181-209), and writes ‘about’ the products made by artists as if the artefacts they make can be accounted for with her words. Hayles’ contribution is interesting as it touches on a notion of time that seems to me to be similar to that outlined by Bergson (although there is no memory-image in Hayles) and it draws attention to visual registers. But from my point of view Hayles’ objective is to position the visual within the discursive, rather than the figural, which is not useful to the position I am outlining here. However, while there are a number of writers who made contributions to this anthology, each is clearly limited by what has been called the ‘literary turn’. I was hoping this might not be the case. It has been my experience that those who identify themselves as working within the context of ‘literature’ as opposed to working as an ‘artist-researcher’ tend to focus on the outcomes of creative practises, rather than on how an individual expert artist brings an artefact into being, and reflects on the processes involved. This clearly signals my difficulties with the notion of the ‘literary’, and it foreshadows my developing argument in the remainder of the thesis.
I chose to explore Noland’s “Digital Gestures” as she has taken an interest in what she calls “this [human] body and its kinetic energies in [...] digital writing” and how this operates “in a variety of highly inventive ways” (217). Noland’s reference to “computer-based writing concerned with recalling to the user’s consciousness a memory” and “energies that drive inscription” initially seemed promising as I want to bring to the fore my specific decision-making process that involves experimenting with a computer-related apparatus that I connect with memory and certain energetic-feelings as these are experienced in my body (217-218). One of the potentially far-reaching implications of Noland’s literary analysis, pertinent to my project here, is her identification of “memory” that she seems to me to link to “kinetic energies” and “small motor movements involving only the fingers and wrist” that she also associates with the use of computer apparatus (217). However, Noland is compelled to validate her notion of digital gestures by citing the research findings of other theorists of digital writing, such as Christopher Keep, Mark Poster, and Mark Seltzer, all of whom (including Noland)²²vi persist in focusing attention on the computer keyboard instead of considering that an artist might use a digital pen and tablet.

I was hoping this would not be the case as my digital inscription practice involves the latter. Given the title of this chapter, this surprised me for two reasons: first, because digital pens and digital tablets were available in 2006²²vii when Noland’s chapter was published; and second, because Noland claims that she is interested in “animation programs [that] extend the visual experience of the verbal construct” (218). But animators commonly use a digital pen and tablet along with various computer programs. Furthermore, Noland draws attention to already made artefacts throughout this chapter (such as Jim Andrew’s “Nio” or Robert Morris’ Blind Time²²viii and attempts to identify how she recognises what the artist “seems to be attempting” (227), rather than searching for a way to advocate and/or enable the production and documentation of a specific individual expert artist’s decision-making process. Admittedly, any account of those decision-making processes may be lost. Nonetheless, Noland’s spectatorial position creates an objectifying distance between her “analysis” and the phenomenon that is being investigated (218). Could it be that this distance is why Noland identifies memory at the start of the chapter, but does not return to it? By contrast, in the case of my project here, it is the artist-researcher who is exploring the processes of experimenting with digital technology and who is immersed in this new discipline – hence, this immersion
erases the distance of objectification by having direct access to creative decision-making process.

Another notion that initially seemed promising toward the start of Noland’s chapter is her announcement of: “Pulling ‘gesture’ in the direction of movement rather than emphasis (which can be achieved by vocal inflection as well), away from rhetoric and toward dance” (ibid). But this statement is followed by her observation that she “hope[s] to restore the choreographic dimension of the word” (ibid). Noland asserts that “digital works distinguish themselves from these earlier efforts by the increased liberty of movement they accord to both entire semantic units and individual letters” (ibid). In other words, she seems still to want her notion of digital gesture to draw upon linguistic structures, whether literal or metaphoric. But what do we understand by the notion of “kinetic energy” (217)? Does it tend to manifest in semantic units or letters? Is gesture—the act, amongst other options, of indicating—connected to logos?

In 1971 Lyotard took up the notion gesture, in the context of French literary theory. He argued that “gesture is […] in opposition to linguistic signification […]: it is experienced, lived” (Lyotard 2011: 15). Moreover, in 1994 Melrose pointed out that what we know in general terms about kinetic theory, or the theory of movement, is that when a substance is heated, the atoms and molecules which make up that substance move and vibrate more violently, emitting radiation. In the bodies at work […] these ‘substances’ are multiple, immensely difficult to pin down, [and] […] as these function within the internally shifting specificities of any performance event, [therefore] must now admit to indeterminacy as its major principle: however precisely we can attempt to verbalise ‘what is going on here’, we are by definition unable to name the constituent parts of any given event, since these vary not just with spectator difference, but arguably internally (1994: 234-235).

If it is possible to link the very short synopsis of Lyotard’s description of “gesture” (above) with Melrose’s description of “kinetic theory” then one might surmise that kinetic energy and gesture are perceived in the mind-body of the artist during a performance that is not in consort with linguistic structures (i.e. linguistic signs, discourse). But Noland alleges to have identified “a kinetic body that both generates and obscures signification achieved through written signs” (219).

In the text below Coessens et al remind us:
Artistic integration, transaction and transformation are primarily non-verbal, non-explanatory. They originate in the human faculties of synaesthetic perception, non-linguistic conceptual thinking, reasoning, motor-sensory and kinaesthetic exploration; they draw upon memory, different forms of consciousness and the artist’s encounters with the outside world (2009: 116).

From the text immediately above one might conclude that kinetic energy is directly linked to an artist’s memory that is itself “non-linguistic” – or, in more positive terms, “other-than-linguistic”. This may raise questions as to the degree to which contemporary artistic culture could systematise, codify, and control the development and proliferation of various theories that valorise linguistic structures (e.g. words, text) and omit other modes (e.g. visual, felt) of enquiry. It is on the bases of these sorts of observations above I would argue that Noland’s understanding of the terms “kinetic” and “gesture” does not account for a specific logic of creative production. This may be the result of Noland’s acknowledged familiarity, in the philosophical context, primarily with the work of “Plato, Hegel, Husserl, Foucault, and Derrida” (2006: 222) instead of what I sense are, perhaps, more relevant resources: Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard, philosophers who seem to me to have taken a particular interest in exploring a creative process and how it works instead of its status as something reified, that already exists.

I want to add a very brief note here related to Noland’s citing Derrida. Like Noland, we know that Derrida also chose the word “memory” as significant to his work. But unlike Noland he asked, “what apparatus we must create in order to represent psychological writing” (1978: 199)? Derrida pointed out: “Memory, thus is not a psychological property among others; it is the very essence of the psyche” (201). This may be contrary to the case that Noland is attempting to make. Derrida seems to me to have emphasised the importance of the psychic image-stuff and noted that what would be “fruitful” is the “deconstruction of logocentrism” (230). Yet Noland is interested in what she calls “differences between discrete types of signifiers: tapping on a, i, or r” (2006: 236). Her examples here, in other words, are alphabetic, hence tightly linked to certain rules that regulate writing. These differences in focus are at the core of the present research project. I would argue it is this differentiation that lends itself to the sort of creative practice-led enquiry I am calling for here, and attempting to demonstrate. Noland asks us to view digital inscription through the lens of a literary and linguistic theory that valorises certain textual structures. Whereas I am interested in exploring digital inscription through the lens of a practice-led research investigation that is orientated
toward a particular artist-researcher’s need to experiment and investigate a specific creative decision-making process as it is experienced and perceived in the mind-body.

Noland describes digital inscription as – for example – “verbal-visual works” (231), “language in motion” (233), “the gestures the letters execute on the screen” and how these “provide an experience for the viewer” (238). But does spectating by the viewer demand knowledge of practices and processes that are required of a specific expert digital artist? What are the implications of documenting creative digital inscription processes and practises that might be incommensurate with the individual artist’s digital enquiry? From my point of view Noland’s objective is to position the visual aspects of a digital artist’s work within the discursive, rather than the figural. It seems to me that discourse does not apprehend (from the Latin apprehendere “to grasp, to take hold of”) a method of all possible modes among which the digital artist might choose. Andrews et al suggest that what might be useful is to understand the term “digital” as including “written text, but [it] may also include other modes and formats that may not be sequential” (2011: 4). They also suggest the digital may be used as a means “to explore” (ibid). But they also warn against assuming that one can interpret “the movement of meaning from non-verbal systems into words” (ibid). If it is not possible to take for granted the move from a non-verbal system into words, then how can Noland account for the experience and research trajectory of a particular artist’s making process that she has suggested is moving (gesturing) visually?

Given my account above, what seems to me remarkable about Noland’s “Digital Gesture” is that not only does it draw attention to digital inscription, but it has also offered an opportunity to accentuate the position I am fighting for. Analysing artefacts cannot measure this position, since the activity of making artefacts is action orientated and aims at the development of a highly individualised creative decision-making process that is likely to be ‘other-than’ what can be observed by engaging with the outcome of the creative process. Furthermore, the “genre” (217) noted by Noland, such as “digital poetry” (217) and “digital literature” (219), may seem to be easily validated by way of affiliation with existing literary genre or theories; but this activity of grouping together expert named artists, who may work independently to bring artefacts into being, seems to me to tend to obfuscate the individuality of an artist’s development in expert decision-making that is normally hidden from a spectator. It seems to me to follow that what is
“normally hidden” is frequently overlooked by critical and otherwise authoritative writers, as Goddard indicated above (2010: 119). If we recognise this, and if digital art-researchers who are also expert practitioners fail to document her or his creative decision-making processes, I would argue, this will contribute to the erasure of what Melrose calls “disciplinary specificity, disciplinary expertise, and performance-making processes” (2012: 305).

Where Noland seems to me to differ from the common literary response, first, is in her recognition that artists who engage in digital inscription “create verbal-visual works” (2006: 231). Second, in her suggestion that an energetic force as it is experienced in the body guides the performance of a particular artist that may involve “visual properties” (237). Nevertheless, with all of the attention she places on the digital gesture, plainly her objective is to limit those ‘gestures’ and ‘kinetic energy’ that drive a creative digital inscription practice, to replicating general linguistic-based structures. But there is another way to explore digital inscription instead of classifying an artist’s practice as if it was designed to fit into the structure of a generic category or attempting to replace the visual by assembling complex tropes or “written signs” (219). My argument is that practice-led research by an artist should focus on that particular digital practitioner’s expertise and experience – likely to be highly individualised as Coessens et al, Donnelly and Harper, and Melrose have suggested above – with the aim of documenting insights into the creative decision-making process as this is being experienced in the mind-body of the expert practitioner, throughout the whole span of artistic-research enquiry.
Chapter 2
Sensing the Logic of the Art of Writing and Publication

Note to examiner/reader:
Please begin with a copy of the first and second editions of The Clara Ann Burns Story (enclosed). The first edition was published early during this doctoral research and is out of print. A facsimile of the first edition has been provided, made from saved electronic files. I want to draw attention here to the differences between the first and the second editions of The Clara Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011). Despite the first edition having been published by Monkey Puzzle Press in Boulder, Colorado, I sensed – as did my publisher Nate Jordan – that the outcome of the editing process of the first edition did not demonstrate the overall visual presentation (i.e. line, colour) that was anticipated in the working manuscript. A comparison of the first and second editions reveals what is, in terms of the present research, this important difference. The page numbers in both the first and second edition of The Clara Ann Burns Story (TCABS) and the publication years are identical. The first edition can be easily identified, as the cover is primarily black with a single framed photograph, while the second edition’s cover displays lighter variations in colour and layers of images.

The reader of the overall research undertaking is invited to experience the overall affect and effect of the two editions. The hope is that the second edition of The Clara Ann Burns Story along with the critical writing that follows will be seen as the outcome of what creative writer-researchers do – that is, invent artefacts to open critical discussions for future possibilities within the discipline of creative writing. It has long been suggested that a creative writer’s work is guided by words, but the discipline of creative writing can no longer be easily compartmentalised, nor understood as valorising logos (from the Greek “word, speech, discourse”) over tekhnē (from the Latin “art, skill, craft in work; a system or method of making and doing”). Just as literary and ethnography theory differentiates ways of writing, a creative writer has direct insights into specific creative methods of making and doing writing that are unavailable to a spectator.

In 2008, for example, in “The non-verbal and the verbal: expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” Perry argued that there is widespread misunderstanding about what creative writers do as “predominantly about words” (3). She reminded other creative writer-researchers who understand her or his creative writing as visual to remember that if your art involves ways of revealing knowledge that are, for example, visual, and you are being asked to explain/verify/justify it verbally, then it figures that you will get frustrated and begin to fight against this, and demand that your non-verbal work be recognised for its very non-verbalness […] [and] fight for recognition of our creative work in and of itself (8).

I understand my creative writing process as the manifestation of a visual mode. My central thesis is that the visual presentation itself is the product of a visual method of creating writing as the work situates itself before the structure of apperception, thus it is not implicated in signification that others might describe as the illustrative or thematic focus of the written components. I am asking that the artefacts be considered katb’ auto. xxx Furthermore, because I did not edit the first edition and because I self-edited the second, I am asking that the second edition is valorised over the first, as it reflects the outcome of my creative writing process. As I am requesting that the artefacts be recognised as expressing themselves, the critical engagement that follows relates quite specifically to the creative writing decision-making process itself, in the context of the self-editing of the second edition of TCABS that I judge to be essential to it, as opposed to an explanation or interpretation of the artefact(s). My creative process I am going to argue is visual, thus TCABS is not the same as traditional kinds of writing that conventionally serve as its conveyance.
The knowledge and expertise of the artist, the multiple entries and exits of her or his practice, remain hidden …  

Throughout the project of this doctoral research I have become increasingly aware that the training I have received has provided me with an awareness of a vast number of writers from a variety of different research disciplines. These writers are (or have been) keenly interested in assisting in an exchange of knowledge related to the emergence of creative methods, heuristic practises, and the impact of computer (digital) technology on the activity of creative writing. In the previous chapters I have indicated that a practising creative writing-researcher’s performance (from the French *parfornir* “to do, carry out, accomplish”) sometimes involves an enquiry (from the Old French *enquerre* “ask, inquire about”) that spurs an investigation (from the Latin *investigare* “to trace out, search after”) that seeks to put to use modes, methods, and techniques borrowed from other disciplines such as literary and aesthetic theory. Recently, however, in what some have called the Computer Age a number of technological changes and inventions have begun to impact human experience; amongst other results, certain areas of creative research are now directed in significant part through creative practice itself, where that practice is experimental. Thus, the outcome is produced organically in *real-time* and is activity-based, thereby setting up a situation wherein there is an intertwining of the creative researcher’s actions, and observations of those actions, as a practising creative-researcher moves to and fro between these. Hence this kind of research maintains cohesion with certain notions, modes, experimental methods, concepts, and techniques specifically related to a particular artistic discipline and the researcher’s unique inventive individuality.
At this point my own difficulty should be clear: how to go about articulating and
archiving some of the specific details of the creative writing process that led to the
production of *The Clara Ann Burns Story* (*TCABS*) (Smith 2011) for the use of other
practising creative writer-researchers. My aim in making *TCABS* was to test a creative
writing process that involves recording memory by using computer-related apparatuses
and how this might be grasped expert-intuitively. An evaluation of the specific details of
this intuitive way of creating writing needs to be acknowledged (rather than,
dogmatically, as these matters are traditionally taught) to shed light on an unusual
creative writing process, and to inaugurate a new way of understanding how a different
(heuristic) creative writing process works, as it is likely to bring new work into being.
This kind of creative writing process is not driven by a traditional semiotic conformity
that might be associated with linguistics or theoretic consensus; rather, it follows a
singular mixed-mode pathway that seeks to extend the doing and making aspects of
creative writing that may be missing from earlier more traditional kinds of creative
writing research projects (or perhaps could not have been discussed or made as some
computer apparatus such as digital pens and digital writing tablets have only recently
become available). This project involves a simple plan: to investigate a specific creative
writing process (i.e. decision-making) that led to the publication of *TCABS* by weaving
in and out of contextualised critical discussions, borrowing certain phrases and notions
(from the Latin *notionem* “concept, conception, idea”), and threading together an
interrelationship between these phrases, notions, text boxes (for instance, see right) and a
number of images made through the use of a digital writing tablet and pen. By
undertaking this creative research project, I am arguing that the interlaced discussions
and images in this chapter come close to describing and expressing, in the complexity of
their combination, the precise *agencement*** som (or productive apparatus) of the creative
writing process I am accounting for and documenting here, which none of these
borrowed notions or images express in isolation.

From the perspective of creative writing research, the practising creative writers
Donnelly and Harper in *Key Issues In Creative Writing* (2013) concluded that creative
writing research “always returns us to the often personal actions of individuals, to their
thoughts but also to their feelings and emotions” (179). No doubt, some work will be
required to account for how the working thoughts, feelings, and emotions of a practising
creative writer-researcher guide a creative writing process. In my own case, that creative
process involved taking in-hand computer-related apparatuses that resulted in the production and publishing of more than one material artefact. The complexity of this work is revealed through reference to some of the terms Donnelly and Harper are using: they identify and emphasise “personal actions of individuals”, “their thoughts”, “feelings” and “emotions”. The stress they place on these sorts of terms comes into sharp relief in the context of the significant “technological changes” – in the technical sense (from the Latin *tekhne* “art, skill, craft in work; a system or method of making and doing”) – of recent decades. How do we combine the personal actions of a writer with “disciplinary expertise” required by technical change? Yet isn’t it “disciplinary expertise” in creative practices that has the potential to “improve the ways in which we develop creative writing in the academy [...] and how we might go about doing these explorations [...]” (180)?

From my point of view, a focus on personal actions, individual thoughts, feelings and emotions, such as I document here in the creative portfolio, indicates that perhaps a different creative writing process may have already been imagined that could actualise and realise a connection between personal actions, emotions and feelings, and new computer-related technology – as I attempt to demonstrate in the published book attached. But how would a practising creative writer-researcher more generally identify how personal actions, thoughts, feelings, and emotions might be connected to the use of new technology? Might we argue that a creative writer-researcher, who has, for a number of years, been testing and experimenting with a method of creating writing through the use of computer technology, has already mastered a particular kind of digitally-supported “disciplinary expertise” (with regard to *tekhne*)? According to Melrose in “Disciplinary ‘Specificity’ And The Digital Submission” the “expertise of professional performance practitioners whose interest is such as to direct them to the postgraduate/higher degree programme of a university, is likely already to entail complex modes of enquiry [...]” (2012: 299). In Melrose’s argument, the practitioner-researcher will tend already to have mastered the discipline, and in part her undertaking, in the research context, is to produce an informed account of her own disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) practices. The significance of specific disciplinary “expert recall” in a higher degree set-up, is that

by taking the adequate digital inscription itself of the ‘knowledge objects’ specific to expert performance-making process as external measure of the latter, the expert-practitioner post-graduate/higher degree candidate will begin to obtain an insight into the knowledge specificity of
her practice that is currently unusual in the higher degree set-up. In such an undertaking, where knowledge systems are overlaid, the one upon the other, it is likely that the performance practitioner will begin to be able to dissolve complex notions that an unreflective language use has the capacity to render monolithic (312).

Melrose’s argument, that is concerned with how we recall research and document it, suggests to me that expertise is related to a complex “knowledge object” involving a layering of knowledge practices that is internally differentiated as opposed to pre-existing externally or following a linear pathway. Nonetheless, research activity is required to be rigorous and involve editing and re-editing, and it is required to pose its questions and then to seek to answer them. This seems to me to pose a conundrum for creative writer-researchers. In her essay Melrose advised her readers that Lyotard’s observations on time, ‘memory-effects’, and digital technologies may be of interest to researchers who, in a higher degree set-up, may be looking for a basis for the selection of past data that can be grasped expert-intuitively, and exploited as such in the research outcome.

The nature of creative writing in creative writing research practices, in Donnelly and Harper’s terms, always begins with a practising creative writer’s own understanding of creative writing, as this is the “only way to ever get closer to understanding creative writing itself” (179). In my own case, in terms of TCABS, what is of interest in research terms is the issue of making a highly individualised artefact with computer-related apparatus that I am going to argue involved an intuitive method of recording (from graphy “to write or record”) memory (from the Old French record “memory”). What I am implying is that the terms “writing”, “recording”, and “memory” are interrelated not only etymologically but that this relationality can also be realised in research terms as a particular kind of creative writing practice that might be called “creative digital graphic art”, by which I mean writing creatively with computer-related apparatus for the purpose of recording memories, involving decision-making that is not limited to and by words alone.

In this chapter, where the creative writing decision-making process resulted in publication of artefacts within the doctoral research context, it might be that one could argue that expertise has been acknowledged within the wider community of creative writing and within a particular higher degree set-up. Thus, what may be useful to consider here in research terms are some of the originating impulses of a heuristic (from the Greek heuristikos “inventive”) creative writing process as it is experienced in the body of a practising creative writer-researcher.
The practising creative writer and pedagogue Katharine Haake in “To Fill with Milk: or, The Thing Itself” (2013: 79-102) maintained that part of any education in creative writing needs […] to extend beyond doing to seeing the practice itself – not just what we’re making but what we are doing when we are making it and how it might move out, into, and through the world. And we begin with language as a critical analogue of narrative, taking up, from Derrida, the long familiar (to us) idea […] [there are nothing but signs]. […] If signs are capable of producing meaning not as some transparent representations of an external reality but only in relation to each other, the same can be said of stories, and successful creative writing teaching depends, as well and at least part of the time, on preparing students to become more active agents in this larger field of literary discourse (81).

For Donnelly and Harper, however, a focus on “literary discourse” fails to display the distinguishing characteristic of the discipline of creative writing. According to Donnelly and Harper, burgeoning creative writers who are “students want access to a kind of culture capital that’s not specifically ‘literary’ but much more amorphously creative” (xiv). Plainly, for Harper (2013: 57-59), as well as for Perry (2008: 4-5), creative writing choice is not limited to words or certain kinds of writing apparatus. My own sense is that one might be able to argue that if the meaning of a particular “signifier” is dependent on use, then different creative writers may work differently as opposed to following a “familiar” path; one such ‘different work’ is likely today to employ computer-related apparatus to produce an artefact or artefacts in ways that have not yet been considered by dominant discourses of creative writing. It seems to me to follow that the artefacts produced from this kind of experimentation should be read/examined differently from traditional kinds of “literature”.

The capacity for writing itself to capture and preserve memory has engendered much debate in philosophical writing, and my argument here is to draw on philosophical writing in an attempt to engage with the conundrum noted above. The notion of inscribing (writing, graphic art) through experiments with digital technology, and its relationship with memory, calls to mind Lyotard’s *The Inhuman*, published in English in the 1990s, he writes about the nature of memory in the digital context, and suggests that memory-effects, inscribed digitally, are of a number of different types, involving different sorts of actions in the practitioner. A second writer much concerned with the relationship between writing and memories was Derrida. In his *Writing And Difference,*
and in particular the chapter entitled “Freud and the Scene of Writing” (1978: 196–231), Derrida meditated (I am paraphrasing) on the possibility of future developments in human technology, speculating on the production of a “writing machine” that would have the capacity to provide a writer with an apparatus with which to produce an “image” of the material of “memory” itself, as opposed to representing a phonetic (i.e. sign) code. Derrida projected that: “Psychical [memory] content will be represented by a text whose essence is irreducibly graphic” (199) (writer’s emphasis).

Having cited Freud’s notes on the “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad’” (1925) – the surface of which Freud imagined could be used as an “alternative” (207) for reproducing specific details of missing memory – Derrida considered how Freud’s metaphorical “mystic writing pad” could be used as a recording apparatus of living present memories as these are perceived, and how this recording might be possible in the future on the basis of the ways certain decisions are made during a writing process. I shall want to go further in the present chapter, arguing that it is in terms of this precise situation that I sense psychical memory working in a creative writing and visual process that today does not need to involve speculating on a “mystic writing pad”. However, the notion does allow us to focus today on the actual experience of a practising creative writer-researcher who is using a digital writing pad and pen – and other kinds of digital technology such as digital photography – to record memories.

Haake, writing on creative writing itself, by way of contrast, identifies “signs” that she explained, (above) produce meaning in relation to each other and that also have a relationship with “stories”. In an effort to describe this in further detail, Haake explained: “I begin not just with the idea of a story but with the idea of a story in relation to all other stories, a vast sea of stories to which students aim to add their own” (2013: 83). My approach in the present portfolio is a kind of reversal of Haake. Rather than searching for relationships between already existing stories, what I propose exploring here is a digitally-supported creative writing through a psychological and philosophical exploration of what I propose to argue, in what follows, and with graphics in mind, is the “image-stuff” of living memory as it is experienced in the body, and testing how to produce writing that is multimodal, rhizomatically-developed, that values the visual at least as much as the supposed ‘stories’ it tells. The communications researcher Dylan Yamada-Rice in “Traditional Theses and Multimodal Communication” (2012) described
multimodality as having “always existed, contemporary multimodality utilises a vast array of digital technologies, which seem to emphasize the lacking of monomodal [writing] […]” (157).

Assuming that the artefact(s) produced by a creative writer in the computer age should be read and/or perceived differently from more traditional genres of ‘literature’, perhaps we might observe that certain digital apparatuses are techno-graphic in nature, rather than ‘techno-logical’: what this makes possible, and indeed prioritises it, is figural inscription (writing) as was suggested by Lyotard in Discourse, Figure in 1971. If, as Lyotard indicated, writing, as it is being “inscribed” by an artist, wavers between “transformation” (235) – from discourse to figure – in a double gesture (i.e. words/visual patterns), then this kind of Lyotardian set-up should mean that it is possible to argue for the valorisation of the figure (visual) over discourse (verbal): a multi-modal method of writing/graphic-art production ensues, particularly when the computer apparatus and its imaginative potential is literally taken in-hand. Lyotard, according to Deleuze and Guattari, reversed the order of discourse/figure, and in so doing crushed “the signifiers as well as the signifieds, treating words as things […]” (1972/2008: 244). If we consider Lyotard’s observations related to writing/inscription in the 1980s, it might also be possible to argue that we need to ask if, in the digital age, the creative writer is someone who has the freedom to experiment not only with “doing things with words” (in the Austinian tradition, Austin 1962) but also “how to do things/how things are done, with images/figures”. Haunting Lyotard’s essays in The Inhuman is the notion that writing (inscribing) with computer technology can provide human beings with the freedom not simply to make another narrative, but rather to provide the means to explore the human experience itself in a specific body, in relation to other bodies, as the material of memories.

Before exploring Lyotard’s essay “Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy” in The Inhuman (in which he focuses on time, memory-effects and digital inscription in some detail), I want first to explore his essay entitled “Rewriting Modernity” (1998: 24-35). In this essay, while drawing from Immanuel Kant (imagination) and Freud (free floating attention), Lyotard emphasised the importance of reconsidering “traditional” understandings of writing by addressing what he meant by the term “postmodern” in his earlier work entitled The Postmodern Condition (published in the original French in 1979). In The Postmodern Condition Lyotard took as his point of interest the notion of
“knowledge”, as it relates to what he called “the grand narrative” (1984: xxiv).
According to the literary theorist Terry Eagleton in *Literary Theory* in 1983:

> Postmodernity means the end of modernity, in the sense of those grand narratives of truth, reason, science, progress and universal emancipation which are taken to characterise modern thought from the Enlightenment onwards (2010: 200).

But in “Rewriting Modernity” Lyotard argued: “Postmodernity is not a new age, but the rewriting of some of the features claimed by modernity [that promised to liberate] [...] humanity as a whole through science and technology” (1998: 34). From my point of view, Lyotard was clarifying in this essay, that the term “postmodern” (that he first used in 1979) was misunderstood by some researchers. He argued that the term “postmodern” does not signal a “new age” or the end of “modernity”. Lyotard understood that the kinds of writing that were being produced and to which he drew his attention were simply adding to narratives that already exist. He insisted that writing is “returning to the most traditional forms of narrative” (ibid). He also remarked that he found it to be “disturbing [...] there’s no longer any question of free forms given here and now to sensibility and the imagination” (ibid). In his concluding remarks, Lyotard postulated on “computer engineering” and “new technologies”, from which we might infer that computer technology would spur writers in the future to resist making traditional narratives, considering instead how to gain access to “free imagination” as new computer technology becomes more widely available (1998: 34-35). The digital age quite distinctively allows what might be called ‘meta-writing’ or ‘meta-graphic’, and as such it is likely to foster new ways of thinking about writing and images as tools for the imagination. The philosophy of technological development, and its impact on the human body and writing itself, is important throughout Lyotard’s essays in *The Inhuman* (1998), but “Logos And Techne, Or Telegraphy” (47-57) is most pertinent to the present investigation on the relationship between time (duration), memory and creating writing by using computer apparatus. I return below to Lyotard’s account of writing as it relates to memory-effects and the potential impact of computer technology on writing itself, as the implications of his analysis might lead some creative writer-researchers to re-examine positions regarding their own uptake of tools like a digital pen and writing tablet for the purpose of inscribing, inventing, archiving, and re-actualising memory.

More recently, the pioneers of creative writing and research Donnelly and Harper concluded that emotions, thoughts, and feelings are key modalities that drive the creative
writing practice along with “[huge] technological changes” that are provoking questions related to “disciplinary expertise” (2013: 180). Yet, as Donnelly and Harper noted, their own research does not go far enough. They call for creative writer-researchers who have knowledge related to creating writing by using new technology and a highly individualised ‘felt’ “as it happens” way of writing to share some vital information related to her or his expertise (180).

Perhaps some of the elusiveness of grasping the “now” of the doing and making of creative writing lies, in part, in what Perry suggested in “The non-verbal and verbal: expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” (2008), is the result of a misunderstanding of what creative writing is. According to Perry creative writing can be “seen as visual, performative, aural and tactile, and perhaps other – perhaps modes that have not yet been named” (8). As I have already pointed out above, Perry insists that we understand creative writing as not solely a matter of words. Rather, she suggested that her own creative writing practice involves the use of a “keyboard” upon which she “wrote/typed” (whereas when I edited the second edition of TCABS I held in-hand a digital pen that I moved on a digital writing tablet) during certain “moments” of a “performance” or “practise sessions” that Perry argued “were responsive to sound, movement, mood, ambience, colour, performance, thought, sensation” (4–5).

I want to turn at this point to the first and second editions of TCABS: in light of some of the introductory notions briefly set out above. I am going to argue that while the difference between the first and second edition of TCABS is primarily visual – and, therefore, the self-editing decisions plainly were not based on judgments that concern “word choice” – how I experience my creative writing process is not as a series of “moments” that can be separated from what Perry has called “Other moments of my writing […]” (5). In contrast, I imagine my creative writing process as an activity that involves a fluid inner perceptual experience. This inner embodied experience operates differently from the ways what is produced from the activity of creative writing might be perceived by an outside spectator. My creative writing process triggers the emergence of the emotions and the luminous “image-stuff” of living memory that shifts my focus and branches out in different directions; and, this imagining, triggering, shifting, and branching is not clearly definable in terms of separable “moments”. Rather, it seems to me, from the experience with which I am concerned here, that memories put on a kind of “show” that has a direct relationship with how I feel as I am watching these memories.
on a kind of “movie screen” (Smith 2011: 2). I do not propose to try to generalise here on behalf of other creative writers, but I would argue that my account represents a case in point where memory plays a significant role in writing and visual production. Because what I am watching is moving, it is not possible to stop the process and examine certain “moments”, as this would end the movement of the process itself. On the other hand, the elements, which seem to stick, and to which I return, are plainly significant, if not marked specifically in temporal terms. Plainly, I seek to mark them through digital inscription.

While this difference between my understanding of how my creative writing process works and Perry’s observations might appear inconsequential, in that Perry suggests that she can identify different “moments” during her own creative writing performances or rehearsals, I would argue that I cannot differentiate between where particular areas of significance begin or end. Circling around this difference is the notion of duration that can be linked to an intuitive method (in philosophical terms) and the expert-intuitive processes in creative writing decision-making that Melrose outlines (Melrose 2011). Indicative of that notion of duration and expert-intuition decision-making, in brief, is the formulation that how certain individual creative decisions and actions are made is on the basis of the intersection of moving images, memory, feelings and emotions, that I shall return to as I proceed to set out these research findings in the light of the changes made to published texts.

I want at this point to reiterate observations from Harper in his “Creative Writing Habitats” (2013): Harper contends (and I am paraphrasing) that creative writing is one of the most highly individualised of university disciplines that often involves recording memory and deploying emotional investments (48–60). His discussion in this particular essay focuses on the fact that, in his view, although memory, psychological responses, and emotional resources often guide a creative writer’s thoughts and actions, these aspects of creative writing have not yet been investigated by creative writer-researchers. In a revealing section of his essay, Harper opens up a number of questions related to the memory, physical, psychological, and emotional aspects of creative writing and “individual free will” (59). “All we can confidently state”, Harper offers, “is that this kind of investigation has not yet been undertaken and that recognising this absence would only be acceptable if we were entirely confident that no new knowledge will be found in undertaking this kind of work” (ibid).
The idea, from this experienced researcher in the field, that notions relating to “recording”, “psychology”, “memory”, “feelings” and “emotions” have been erased or to a great extent are absent from published academic discourses related to creative writing is, in light of the few philosophical notions I have assembled above, surprising. How might a practising creative writer-researcher go about documenting this sort of investigation that Harper indicates would be useful to others? I am arguing that it can only be achieved in mixed-mode, where the researcher is already a published writer, and that what is needed is a tightly related connection between creative writing and the critical commentary. Inscribed in these questions is my own crisis. I sense that my own crisis relates quite specifically to my own creative writing judgements that piloted certain actions, particularly those that resulted in the second edition of _TCABS_. What is at stake, in these terms, is a particular kind of seriousness of knowledge of creative decisions that I have made throughout the past five or more years of research and creative decision-making.

Along these lines, the disciplines of performing arts, philosophy, psychology and anthropology may be useful to the discipline of creative writing, not so much in evaluating the outcomes of a creative writing mode of production – as literary theory and aesthetics attempt to do – but in lending ideas to a creative writer-researcher who is working as a _bricoleuse_ and is investigating, in this specific case, what I think my body did as it moved, observed, and felt while bringing the second edition of _TCABS_ into being. This particular creative writing research takes the emergence of a new perspective seriously, as it concerns the potential connection between creative writing technological innovation and memories, emotions and making things with images as well as words.

Finally, let me conclude this introduction with a brief overview of the following thesis, presented in sections. I begin with Freud’s notion of “screen memories” that he related to emotions, feelings and childhood memories, thus suggesting what I was viewing when I was writing _TCABS_. Second, I borrow the notions of “intuition”, “memory”, “image”, and “duration” from Bergson, that he argued concern the experience of life itself in all its fluidity. I explore Bergson by comparing his intuitive method to the one identified by Ulmer. Third, I continue to explore Bergson’s intuition through Deleuze, who took a particular interest in Bergson’s work and linked intuition to emotions and creativity itself, in a manner in which I sense is intrinsic to how I experienced making _TCABS_. Fourth, I return to Lyotard’s meditations on the potential
for writers to use new technology to capture and re-actualise memory. Related side-notes and figures are also interspersed throughout, in an attempt to draw attention visually, as well as discursively, to the emergence of the *agencement* of the research document itself that is not separate from but connected with the creative writing making process in question. Last, I explore the notion of “doing things with images” through an analogy that might be thought of as deriving from speech act theory, in that the image itself can be shown, as context change, perhaps to do more than it shows. It might be possible to argue that my inclusion of certain photographs in *TCABS* can resonate, for example, with certain sorts of affective as well as informative engagements with a spectating audience.

I want to begin by borrowing the notion of “screen memories” that was coined by Freud in 1899 in his sometimes-maligned paper, “Screen Memories” (1899). Freud creates “screen memories” for himself, for the purpose of revealing insights into childhood memories. Although this investigation of memories formed the fundamental basis for subsequent theorising – such as *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) – nevertheless his “screen memories” have been largely ignored by the wider psychologist community. The United States born Professor of Psychology, David L. Smith, noted in 2000 in “The Mirror Image of the Present: Freud’s Theory Of Retrogressive Screen Memories” that he was aware of only one psychoanalytic writer who contributed to this subject (2000: 7).

As I have already indicated in the introduction, I am claiming that while making the first and the second edition of *TCABS*, I focused on watching living present memories that worked for me in that process. After all, many memories tend to use visual modalities that are highly personalised perceptions when compared with the widely used code of verbal language. I was and remain interested in studying these memories and recording them, as this process seems to me to bring to light information related to the human...
experience itself. I want to note here that I recorded the word “screen” as I was viewing a distinct memory while making the TCABS (Smith 2011: 2). That ‘innocent’ use meant that I immediately found Freud’s screen memories to be extremely useful in helping me to wrestle with the paradox of having to use words to describe the creative writing process. In 2002 Melrose called this sense of recognition by a practitioner of a notion used in theoretical writing “empirical fit” (sfmelrose.org.uk/adjustyourset/). What it underlies in this case was the fact that, in its most authentic sense for me, it was not words that came to me but visual images – thus valorising the showing to the self that triggers the writing instead of listening.

It seems as though screen memories, and some of the phrases Freud used to describe what he meant by choosing these exact words, connote similar ideas that come close to defining what I was looking at when I was engaged in the creative writing process that led to the publication of TCABS, while to a spectator (if one were to have been observing me writing using a digital pen and writing pad, as well as computer keyboard) it might have appeared that I was holding a digital pen in my right hand and making certain motions with my body, while looking at or glancing at or around a computer screen. Nevertheless, when I write creatively I am not specifically looking “at” a computer screen or the product that I am making. Nor am I paying attention to what I am doing with my hands. While I might register the experience of engaging in a creative writing practice, this always has a direct relationship to a particular memory that the activity of writing sets in motion, whether I am moving my hands or eyes or not. From my point of view, the activity of writing does not distract my attention from seeing the memory unfold, it intensifies it visually as if appearing on a “movie screen” (Smith 2011: 2). The activity of writing activates and intensifies certain emotions in the way that seeing and experiencing a loved one in a coffin might trigger certain deeply felt emotions. Images in this sense, one might argue, “do” certain things to a spectator such as triggering certain kinds of emotion or affect – that is, they have performative force. What I mean is that the experience of watching certain kinds of memories unfold and my creative writing process are inseparable, as if I am viewing a film on a large movie screen occupied by figures (in the Lyotardian and Deleuzian sense), and that seem to me to intersect with Freud’s screen memories. These appear in the form of moving, luminous, silent chromatic images that guide a creative writing process that seeks to illustrate and thereby illuminate a living memory as opposed to the visuals in TCABS “illustrating” an already written text.

The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in 1963 in The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology noted: “there is a multiplicity of modes of internal intuition: perception is not the only reflective intuitive act. In fact, an act of reflection may occur in memory, imagination, or in the Einfühlung [empathy]. The general theory of intuition therefore applies to reflection. We find there again the parallel of imagination and memory and the exceptional privilege role of perception” (1995: 135).
Freud describes screen memories as “fragmentary recollections” of early childhood that “aroused powerful emotions” and resulted in emotional feelings of “fear, shame, physical pain, etc. [resulting from] […] illnesses, death, fires, births of brothers and sisters, etc.” and are not available to all adults (1899: 202). These express highly individualised visual characteristics that are not understandable before adulthood. Screen memories do not produce the same sort of “emotional effect” when the particular memory was recorded in the body of a child, suggesting that screen memories are the “emotional effect” of what was “omitted” during a particular childhood experience but not “erased” (203). In this way, emotions would seem to have a direct correspondence with what screen memories are selected, how those memories appear visually, and how they are “recorded” (ibid).

If screen memories are focused on intensely, according to Freud, they have the potential to reveal the unfolding of visual scenes of the “most momentous turning points in your life”, and are driven by “powerful motive forces” (206). Although screen memories are the result of human hardship, nevertheless, Freud wrote: “fürsan et haec olim meminisse juvabit” (207). It is this sense of arriving at an embodied felt (sensory) understanding of the transformational effect of, for example, the memory of death, birth or illness, that, Freud argued, are extremely well remembered as highly detailed and clear images of watching oneself as an event unfolded. “Further investigation of these […] childhood memories”, Freud remarked, “taught me that they can organise in other ways and that an unsuspected wealth of meaning lies concealed behind their apparent innocence” (204). Recognition of how “memory” works, of what can only be viewed by the individual, seems to me to require some of us creative writer-researchers to begin to identify how these might be working within our own body, that might very well involve recognising aspects of the kinds of memory fragments Freud identified, and how we might be able to record these by taking in-hand new computer-related apparatus such as a digital camera, digital pen and writing pad.

Freud seems to me to have, early on in his work, identified a process by which one can gain access to “knowledge” (208) through a practice of enquiry that explores private, deeply felt, hidden inner embodied memories that are always interesting because inaccuracy of recollection [in the case of screen memories] does not play any considerable part here, in view of the high degree of sensory intensity possessed by images and the efficiency of the function of memory in the young […] that serve the purposes of the repression and replacement of objectionable or disagreeable impressions […].
[having instead] made a place for themselves in mental life - far later […] (209).

I have suggested a notional connection between Freud’s “screen memories” and the creative process I used in making TCABS that involved a method of showing how certain life-altering childhood memories can be recorded, the details of which were not known in advance. The implications of the idea of screen memories, for the discipline of creative writing, may be useful in posing a number of questions related to what informs particular judgments that might not be piloted by words. For example: How can we establish a connection with visual origins that perhaps have been brought about by personal and emotional manifestations? Could an alternative method of writing on a computer gain its grip on recording memories, preserving these, and shining a different light on unsettling individual turmoil and disturbances that perhaps might be of value, not only in the artistic sense, but also the psychological? While the practice of borrowing from Freud’s scenarios is not new, exploring and borrowing from the notion of screen memories is, at least according to David L. Smith as I have indicated above. Furthermore, according to David L. Smith, Freud himself provided a very limited number of examples of screen memories (2000: 7). Perhaps, as Freud implied, what is of interest is the powerful emotional content of childhood memories that are tacit. Yet it is possible to trigger their emergence, looking at how the colourful details of moving highly unique and affective scenes can “show” something about the human experience that appears in fragments, in non-chronological order, and shedding light on the image of the human struggle itself that can be studied. While screen memories, emotions and effect might assist in opening up a discussion in relation to the usefulness of sharing the inner visual workings of childhood memories, this also gives rise to a question that concerns where the visual image-stuff of memories – and of memories-inscribed via creative writing more generally – “comes from”.

“Comes from” is a delicate issue and a metaphor (from the Greek metaphor “a transfer”) that constitutes a challenge to many traditional ideas about how the mind and body work. Freud noted in “Screen Memories”, for example, that a wound to a face that resulted in images of blood loss and a surgeon sewing stiches into the skin resulted in the formation of a cicatrix, thus the scar itself displays visible evidence that the body itself records (preserves and/or inscribes) certain visual reminders of its wound (the body is not separate from the mind), which the body continues to carry throughout a lifetime, marking a place on the body where the body has attempted to heal, but not erase, the
mark of the wound (203). What this suggests to me is that the specific details of the visual “image-stuff” of memories, in the present scenario, is safeguarded for reproduction purposes and is already somewhere — engraved (Freud 1899: 207) in me — and that the memories come to me from me, for example from a metaphorically named sub- or un-conscious agency, and my engaging in the activity of creating writing seems to me to trigger memories. But we need something more than this, because one of the questions that Freud did not address was how memories continue to exist inside the body/mind over a lifetime, making them available for viewing or recording purposes. Thus, we must link this to a theory of time that can perhaps give us a perspective on the activity of writing that has not yet been created.

I have, above, borrowed Bergson’s notions of duration and intuition from a series of essays in The Creative Mind (1974) that were written between 1903 and 1923, to clarify my contention that the movement of an emerging creative writing process as it is experienced is fluid rather than a series of separate moments. In The Creative Mind Bergson asserts:

> Intuition doubtless admits of many degrees of intensity, and philosophy many degrees of depth; but the mind once brought back to real duration will already be alive with intuitive life and its knowledge of things will already be philosophy. Instead of discontinuity of moments replacing one another in an infinitely divided time, it will perceive the continuous fluidity of real time which flows along, indivisible. Instead of surface states covering successively some neutral stuff and maintaining with it a mysterious relationship of phenomena to substance, it will seize upon one identical change which keeps ever lengthening as in a melody where everything is becoming but where the becoming, being itself substantial, has no need of support (127).

Duration, according to Bergson, is not a series of separate moments. The ever-changing experience of life itself is not a separate series of events set side-by-side. In very simple terms (I am paraphrasing Bergson), duration and space are different. Time is continuous and space can be measured. Time must not be spatialised. Instead of thinking of time as a sequence of separate events, duration is the fluid experience of life itself. In other words, the past and the present are contemporaneous. Duration is continuously persistent, whereas space emerges with movement. Movement is distinct from the space covered. Therefore, only space, and not duration, is quantifiably measurable. Additionally, analytical Kantian-like logic is based on language (words), whereas duration (experience of life itself) cannot be grasped by the intellect. Consequently, Bergson introduces his
philosophical method of intuition. Intuition, in Bergson’s view, is what allows one to “sense” movement (change).

If we extend Bergson’s notion of duration to a creative writing process as it is experienced, it is not one-dimensional – i.e. decomposable to a series of moments that can be judged according to rules of analytical language as if one moment begins and another ends – because the experience of a creative writing process, like experience itself, is dynamic and not divisible. Duration is not a sequence along a line (past, present, future) that can be stopped at any point and examined. These are some of the reasons why it might be useful to contemplate duration further, as it relates to an intuitive creative writing method that involves recording memory. According to Bergson, intuition has a direct relationship with how the images of memories survive and are perceived. But rather than starting by investigating Bergson’s chapter “Of the Survival of Images. Memory and Mind.” in Matter and Memory (1911/1991: 133-177), I want to first approach Bergson’s notions related to memory, through the work of the writer and professor of English, Gregory Ulmer, for comparative purposes.

In Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (1994), Ulmer opened his introduction to a chapter entitled “Hypermedia” by advising his readers: “Writing as technology is a memory machine, with each apparatus finding different means to collect, store, and retrieve information outside of any one individual mind (in rituals, habits, libraries or databases)” (16). Ulmer is a pedagogue keenly interested in teaching an inventive method of writing for educational purposes that involves the use of a computer on the basis of an intuitive method. The particular kind of intuitive method that Ulmer is interested in is made possible when certain personal, environmental, and experiential conditions prevail. According to Ulmer, these conditions are the result of rehearsals that trigger a “Psychological Gesture” that can be linked to a “eureka intuition” (142), the latter of which was identified by Bastick in 1982 in Intuition: How We Think and Act. Ulmer described an inventive writer as a kind of chorographer [who] uses the mystery to guide the exercises of the Method (actively searches for or creates repetitions among the discourses of society). And these repetitions do not produce ‘grand designs’ but ‘miniaturizations’ bringing the heterogeneous items of information into order around a detail or a prop (a strange attractor) in the setting. […] Chorography as a method of invention writes directly the hyperbolic intuition known as the eureka experience. It is first of all a means of simulating the experience, for transferring it from the living body to apparatus, whether print or electronic, for ‘writing’ or artificially performing intuition ‘outside’ the organic mind and body and
entrusting this process to a machine (both technological and methodological). The study of grammatology has demonstrated in detail how print favors and supports or augments an analytical mode of thought based on the fit between the properties of verbal discourse and the abstract demands of logic (139–140).\textsuperscript{a}

Plainly, Ulmer is focused on verbal associations, possibly recalling Romain Jakobson’s work\textsuperscript{b} in the early days of structuralism, on supposedly linear and associative axes in writing. From my point of view, one of the difficulties with an associative approach to a creative writing process is that it exchanges fixed positions set side-by-side, with positions that seem to extend in space, thus forgetting that a creative writing process might not be constructed by moving forward through a linear set of words, phrases, or meanings that need to be articulated on the basis of a set of codes related to binary rather than complex logic. Donnelly, for example, understood that it is important not to “associate knowledge with certainty as traditional models might do (e.g. validation through replication), [because] the knowledge in creative writing is in the discovery that takes the writer beyond routines of writing, in the questions that arise and that are answered through the writing process” (2013: 123).

Ulmer’s intuitive method needed mentioning here in some detail, as it assisted in helping me to identify a path toward a Bergsonian intuitive method (applied less to Philosophy than to creative decision-making) that I am arguing resonates with how I experience recording living present memories. Bastick’s “intuitive method”, upon which Ulmer’s theory of a “Psychological Gesture” rests, is based on sudden flashes of insight or “Eureka” experiences (Bastick 1982: 1), suggesting certain moments when something is discovered. While Bastick notes Bergson’s intuition, Bastick’s intuition is not the same as the intuitive method that Bergson identified. The notion of developing “image-stuff” in the mind was articulated by Freud, and co-opted by the Lacanian tradition, but because Freud was so focused on the verbal cure (“the talking cure”, “chimney sweeping”) – or, to use the terms cited by Jacques Lacan in \textit{The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis} – the “more Anna provided signifiers, the more she chattered on the better it went. It was a case of the chimney sweeping treatment” (1973/1977: 157). This account suggests that the sufferer of repression has to master the transgressive “image-stuff” through verbal language, to a non-judgemental (paternalistic) other, to make progress, whereas I am making no such assertion. Recognition of what can be intuitively sensed, and what can only be thought, seems to me to be useful in identifying the activities involved in a creative writing process. In 1980 the industrial engineer Stuart E.
Dreyfus and the philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus collaboratively noted that an indicator of an expert performance is a change from analytic thought to intuitive response [that] is evident to any expert [...] controlling a complicated mechanism [...] [who] no longer needs principles, can cease to pay conscious attention to his [or her] performance and can let all the mental energy previously used in monitoring the performance go into producing almost instantaneously the appropriate perspective and its associated action (1980: 12–14).

In this way, an expert practitioner is able to work without having to focus on what sorts of actions need to be taken during the performance, but, rather, is focused on what is guiding the actions. From this it seems to me that from a perspective regarding the acquisition of certain skills in a pedagogical setting, as in Ulmer’s case, skill acquisition would certainly produce “eureka” experiences. But this would not seem to be necessarily a part of an expert’s experience, however much an observer might insist otherwise. In other words, in expert creative writing terms, decision-making logic would not need to be discursivised during the doing and production of an artefact, because discourse is not the master code.

If, in writing creatively, and focused on visual production we are dealing with an expert intuitive “method” of decision-making that is progressive, then it would seem to me to follow that an artist could systematically trigger the emergence of, for example, the “image-stuff” of screen memories, as a part of the creative writer’s expertise. According to Ulmer, however, “eureka” insights emerge out of the way memory supposedly “stores” certain information by gathering ideas into different categories and classifying these as “common feelings, feelings that are based in eccentric, subjective, idiosyncratic physiognomic perceptions” (1994: 142). The notion of storage suggests that memory is “held for future use” at certain fixed points that present thought and experience has access to. But this would mean that new categorised memory stores are constantly forming and holding certain fixed information that could potentially be quantified. According to Bergson in The Creative Mind, if change is a part of reality then it is important that we consider once again the idea that the past exists in the present because of some act of charity on the part of the present, in short – to get away from metaphor – by the intervention of a certain particular function called memory, whose role is presumed to be to preserve certain parts of the past, for which exception is made, by storing them away in a kind of box.

– This is a profound mistake (1974: 150-51)!
While Bergson’s intuitive method is not solely based on duration, he argued that many problems result from applying analytic thought to problem-solving that does not take duration into account, resulting in mistaking memory as parts of the past that are stored in “a kind of a box”.

In the chapter “Of the Survival of Images. Memory and Mind.” Bergson resolves the metaphysical dilemma of dualism that insists on separating mind/body and matter by introducing a theory of memory, that renounces the premise of stored memories on the basis of cutting the experience of life into pieces of abstract units (a little like snapshots), offering in its place temporality on the basis of an embodied experience that determines three processes: movement of pure-memory, memory-image and perception of which no one, in fact, occurs apart from the others. Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it. The memory-image, in its turn, partakes of the “pure memory,” which it begins to materialize, and of the perception in which it tends to embody itself: regarded from the latter point of view, it might be defined as a nascent perception. Lastly, pure memory, though independent in theory, manifests itself as a rule only in the colored and living image which reveals it. Symbolizing these three terms by the consecutive segments AB, BC, CD, of the same straight line AD, we may say that our thought describes this line in a single movement, which goes from A to D, and that it is impossible to say precisely, where one of the terms ends and another begins (Bergson 1908/1991: 132-133).

Bergson’s analysis of the “survival of images” suggests to me a closeness to my own claim to be watching the “image-stuff” of screen memories during the act of perceiving very special types of luminous moving memories, the details of which become clearer as these are recorded digitally, and the outcome of which aspires to be an illustration of living memory and emotion, as opposed to, for example, narratives. Building on Bergson’s intuition and duration, but also Freud’s screen memories, seems to me to allow me to go beyond everyday recollections to the extent that there is an effort involved in recording some of these. Many of the terms (e.g. intuition, duration, and memory-image) and the conclusions of Bergson’s essays influenced the Lyotardian and Deleuzian traditions.
In *The Inhuman* (1998) Lyotard explained, “as Bergson puts it, ‘shock’ [ebranlement] by shock, in the amnesiac material point, is ‘retracted’, condemned as though into a single high-frequency vibration, in perception aided by memory” (42). Deleuze and Guattari explained in *Anti-Oedipus* that they believed Bergson had shown that the living being and the world resemble each other “always in the process of becoming, developing, coming into being or advancing, and inscribing itself within a temporal dimension that is irreducible and nonclosed” (1972/2008: 96). The implications of Bergson’s revelation of experience itself as moving memory-images with which to investigate reality, however difficult it might be to describe it in words, to quantify or qualify, or how under-theorised it might be, seems to me to offer some answers to some of the questions that Donnelly and Harper asked other creative writer-researchers to investigate, and which resonate with my own concerns related to memory. While there is still the question of the relationship with memory and emotions that Freud touched on, it was Harper and Donnelly who specifically asked “how to bring together a community of people with shared interests but one which locates itself […] in the often personal actions of individuals, to their thoughts but also to their feelings and emotions” (2013: 179). I want to explore emotions in further detail to investigate the possibility that these might bring together a community of people in a shared experience (even if the emotional colour and weight of that experience is likely to be different).

In Deleuze’s *Bergsonism* (1966/1991) we find a number of observations related to Bergson’s work. Deleuze opens the first chapter entitled “Intuition as Method” with these words:

> Duration, Memory, *Elan Vital* mark the major stages of Bergson’s philosophy. This book sets out to determine, first, the relationship between these three notions and, second, the progress they involve (13).

This book also offers a means of exploring the relationship between memory, intuition, creativity, and emotion that Deleuze effectively identified as of continuing interest. He offers a number of insights, upon which a 21st C. practising creative writer-researcher might draw. If what we are now acquainted with are the personal thoughts, feelings, and emotions of a creative writer, worked on and *worked through* by that writer, then the discipline’s role is no longer to represent emotions that are preserved in an artefact, but
rather to explore an emotional investiture in a way that is affective. For Deleuze the affect

is more complex; it undoubtedly depends on the intersection of two lines [...] making way for or bringing about the insertion of one line into the other, the intersection of one line with the other (53–54).

In this sense, and I return to this notion in the chapter that follows, the affect, for Deleuze, seems to me to resemble a diagram for the productive artist. Deleuze considers the affect to be an inner experience of preparing the self to receive something of the past that he describes (quoting directly from Bergson) as “something like the focusing of a camera” (56). I have rejected the notion of the snapshot, above, as an attempt to break down the affects into wordable units, but I want to retain here the look, and of “focusing”. What seems to me to be invaluable in this aspect of Deleuzian philosophy are the implications of emotional interactions between a creative writer’s experience and that of a reader/spectator, such as those identified by Passerini (see right) that are conveyed through textual details such as flowers and photographs that Passerini considers to be emblematic of “emotional flow”, and that “would have been lost in a typed transaction” (2008: 120).

In Bergsonism, Deleuze points out that Bergson, in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1935), argued that: “The theory of the creative emotion is all the more important as it gives affectivity a status that it lacked in the preceding works” (Deleuze 1991: 134 n.34). If Bergson’s “theory of creative emotion” is significant, elevating, as it does for Deleuze, the importance of “affectivity”, how does one identify how affect is “in the work” rather than “in the writer”? If we extrapolate this notion of “creative emotion” from philosophical writing to creative writing, might we suppose that an expert creative writing process, which works through an intuited emotional investiture in us that affects us, is perhaps produced by a belief that an ability to sense “the specific mirror of
emotions”, as Passerini argued, is not expressed by “words” or by simply typing words (2008: 120)? “The most recent development”, Passerini explained, “on the frontier of new sources – new texts – no longer concerns orality, but rather visuality […]” (121). This shift away from a focus solely on words towards making “another kind of text” – if we accept it – will require a creative writer, as we move through the 21st C., to become more than a “wordsmith”. In this setup, a creative writing performance would require replacing those earlier models in which typography or words alone served as a touchtone, with the corollary that literary theory and literary emulation lose some of their established power. However, this is not to attack the use of words within the discipline of creating writing; rather, it is to loosen our understanding of the primacy of “words” in order to demonstrate that an expert intuitive creative writing process works within the body of the creative writer, and might concern knowing how to tap into an “emotional flow”, thus requiring the recording of certain kinds of registers (e.g. memories) that are not limited to typography or words.

Such a shift means we need to continue to broaden our outlook, as both Deleuze and Passerini seem to me to suggest. We need to do something more important than simply follow accepted models of “storytelling” that, according to Deleuze, oblige us to move from “one term to the other” rather than exploring ways in which “the actualization of a memory [is] useful […] as the body imitates the whole life of the mind, and [how] we [are] able with a leap to place ourselves in the pure past” (1991: 109). Deleuze effectively outlines, perhaps in terms that are too vague, how affect appears in the body as recollected images that are not connected to representation, but rather it works through an emotional experience that is “felt”. Could it be, perhaps, that emotion is, as Passerini proposed, in the “emotional flow between” or the “flow that is expressed in a different way than words” (2008: 119-120)?

I am asking this question once again here because, according to Deleuze, if we conclude that emotion can be “represented”, we are failing to notice the “potential (en puissance), the nature of emotion as pure element […] itself [is what is] generating new ideas” (1991: 110). If this is the case, where the emotional work of creative writing might “flow between” what is shown and seen and is felt but is not said – between creative writer and the reader/spectator – then we might need to broaden what can constitute the logic of a creative writing practice, recognising that perhaps some of what enters into the activity works on the basis of “felt” or “sensory” experience such as those explored by Deleuze in the 1980s in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. This is where Deleuze
explained how it is “assemblage” (i.e. *agencement*) as it is seen “which allows the eye to function like the sense of touch […] the joining together of two senses of touch and sight […] on the same plane of the surface, equally close to each other and to ourselves” (1981/2003: 99) (writer’s emphasis). From this observation, should we modestly declare, perhaps, that what is now needed in creative writing research is a new emotional “flow” or logic, or a “sensory logic”, rather than the logic of a linguistic and discursive code? This might combine visual elements such as photographs, unique handwriting, flowers, and so forth, actualised through digital inscription and analogical analysis with investigations of emotions or sensations on the one hand, and making new kinds of artefacts on the other. Such an *agencement* would focus on recognising that, in spite of the difficulty of identifying emotion or sensory experience quantitatively or qualitatively, the sensation of an emotion such as love, like the sound of music, is perhaps the vibratory surging force that is moving through living embodied experience, connecting all of us if we are willing to open ourselves up to feeling the “flow”.

I am suggesting that emotions and sensations are vibratory like music because Deleuze, in an attempt to clarify what he means by emotion in *Bergsonism*, uses an analogy, asking his reader to imagine the vibration of music expressing love felt in the body, not for a specific person, but rather a love, the quality of which is dependent upon essence rather than object (1991: 110). Deleuze continued:

> Although personal, it is not individual; transcendent, it is like the God in us. […] In short, emotion is creative (first, because it expresses the whole of creation, then because it creates the work in which it is expressed; and finally, because it communicates a little of the creativity to spectators or hearers) (110–111).

If memory is a potential “*en puissance*” (power) of emotion, of affect to communicate love, for example, multi-modal texturality through an intuitive (memory-based, in the Bergsonian sense) method of creating a “flow” of emotion that is visual instead of oral, might be useful to those of us who are interested in showing what is felt but cannot be said. While emotions may be democratised, memories are personal and visually idiosyncratic. As Passerini tells us of letters written by Jews who were killed in Auschwitz: “A few salutations such as ‘adoree’, ‘mon tout’ and ‘mon amour’ punctuate the letters, paltry scraps of loving words suffocated by the atrocity of events” (2008: 126). However, it is love that “allows people to endure current oppression and to look forward to future realities” (ibid). What I want, as a creative practitioner-researcher, to
know is this: can we creative writers use digital apparatus to capture, preserve, and show how this works?

I have borrowed a number of notions above, including Freud’s “screen memories”, Bergson’s “duration”, Dreyfus’ “expertise”, Deleuze’s “emotion” and Passerini’s “emotional flow”, to document, in part, the creative writing process that I used in making TCABS – but also a thinking through of what might be involved; still these notions do not go far enough. From some observations and arguments above, we might suppose that an expert creative writer-researcher, having experienced the creative writing process, brings with her/him what she/he is seeing, without the need to consciously run through a series of binary steps, rules or guidelines. However I would argue, rather, that that writer is completely “absorbed” in that creative process (Smith 2011: 2) while doing and making the work. Her/his ability to make certain choices, in the terms that I have set out, is inscribed in the creative writer’s possession of and ability to discern quite clearly that the creative writing process is different from the outcome. Yet Lyotard’s identification of the paradox that is experienced by an artist’s “anamnesis” (1998: 55-56) may be indicative of a creative writer’s ability to distinguish what is important, and to execute her/his own process. At the very least, such “anamnesis” would be indicative of the sense of a creative writer’s identification of “tacit” knowledge (Donnelly 2013: 125), and/or a kind of knowing that is “not translatable to a verbal mode” (Perry 2008: 4), suggesting what Melrose calls a “model of intelligibility” or “ways of seeing, knowing and doing” (2012: 299), applicable to creative writing production processes. Donnelly describes knowledge of creative writing as acquired by a creative writer through her creative writing practice itself. However, Donnelly also notes that this is “difficult to communicate in the often narrowed essential ideal of quantitative scientific analytical methods and measurable outcomes generally associated with traditional academic research” (2013: 123). This is why I am arguing that knowledge of the creative writing process can be manifested through an “expert” (Donnelly and Harper 2013: 180) intuitive creative writing process that is experienced by the creative writer but is unobservable to an outside spectator. The spectator might mistake the process for what she/he observes is the artefact – that might seem to have resulted from a series of sudden insights or “eureka” moments; and, furthermore, who might also observe that the emergence of these “eureka” moments is the leitmotif of the product rather than the emergence of a creative process.
To take these notions further, however, I want to add an observation made by Lyotard in *The Inhuman* (1998) in his enquiry related to “how time is synthesised in our thought and in our [art] practice today” (65), computer technology and what he called “memory-effects” that he characterised as opening a

public space of meaning and generates a community of users-producers […] because it is endowed with persistence by its being marked on a spatial support, conserves the sign of the past event, or rather produces it as available, presentable and reactualizable memory (48).

I sense that Lyotard’s exploration of memory-effects is useful because of his modest attempts to break down memory, linked to inscription, into at least three types of memory-effects (48-57). I want to run through Lyotard’s account, offering it as an attempt to understand certain sorts of image-production, rather than an explanation. My sense is that this will allow us to deal with different sorts of image-making and to open “a public space of meaning” (48).

Leading up to the notion of “memory-effects”, Lyotard takes his reader on a journey that necessitates meetings with the following researchers: Hubert L. Dreyfus, on an intuitive method of data selection that is not based on “pre-established codes or readability” (15); Kant, on reflective judgment “not guided by rules” (ibid); Husserl, on an intuitive “object” that can be looked at while a practitioner is choosing certain data (ibid); Bergson, on memory as a “material point” of an image (39); Leibniz on perception (ibid); and Freud, on remembering from the standpoint of “it inscribes effects without the inscription being ‘memorized’ in the form of recollection” of the past in the body (21), and renovating the past (in the form or a simulacra of the past) – for the purpose of re-presentation and reconnecting the past in the computer-realm that he links to writing (i.e. digital inscription). Memory-effects resonate with Lyotard’s philosophical disciplinary expertise, and his investigation seems to me to be useful to my own enquiry related to how a practising creative writer-researcher might be able to record the effects of living memories, as creative invention. Lyotard draws attention to the fact that an absolute “present” cannot be grasped, and that computer technology sets up a situation that allows for the “detemporalization” and “delocalization” of the simulacra of living human memories that can then be re-actualised, preserved, and made “telegraphable” for future use (49-50).

Lyotard’s memory-effects are: 1) breaching 2) scanning and 3) passing. These, he notes, correspond with three different kinds of “temporal synthesis”: habit,
remembering, and anamnesis, all of which are linked to technological (computer) inscription. The first memory-effect, breaching, surrenders actions to the sorts of habitual behavioural patterns that can be found in cultures or subcultures, in the sense of following a common selection process, that are structured by laws such as: chronology, language, genetic patterns or placing a series of elements together (e.g. ocean, water, wave). But once the selection process transfers these different elements onto a computer, this data is free from immediate space and time, and from regulation by states or rooted cultures. Thus, habits are no longer in control of enforcing how certain individuals’ acts are conducted – hence, acts of “telegraphic breaching” are made possible (51). The second, scanning, affects remembering, implying that scanning is “the intervention of a meta-agency which inscribes on itself, conserves and makes available the action-reaction pair independently of the present place and time” (ibid), in this way what was forgotten via scanning is made re-actualisable; and, furthermore, “questions the culture of habit from which it emerges” (53).

Passing, the third memory-effect, is connected with beguiling writing techniques, and requires increased amounts of energy, as there are no rules in this way of writing using computer apparatus. Lyotard offers the metaphor of Dogen’s mirror, calling on us (and, I would argue, on practising writers) to shatter the memory of traditional ways of making writing, beginning the practice again and again with a clear mirror, thus driving a continuous inventive process (55). Lyotard’s explanation of how a practitioner proceeds in the case of “passing” is derived explicitly from Freud’s psychoanalytic method of “remembering, forgetting, and working through” that informs how passing and anamnesis is attainable. However, rather than working, as did Freud, through a verbal method, or a listening analytic method that must be heard, this work is “letting work in a free-floating way what passes: the signifier, however senseless this might appear” (56). If we apply the metaphor of “passing” to TCABS it might be thought of, perhaps, as an instance in which a specific object emerged from the activity of creative writing with a new digital apparatus, that reached a fleeting point of public instantiation, but nevertheless the creative enquiry continues to drive the inventive writing process that involves taking in-hand that new digital apparatus. This continuation of breaching, remembering, and passing or “working through” is perhaps demonstrated through my doctoral project, which seeks to work these knowledge-practices through others’ knowledge engagements. In 2013, Harper asked: “How much does a certain kind of writing instrument – a computer, a pencil, mobile phone – influence the way in which I
It seems to me that Lyotard’s investigation of the kinds of decision-making processes that are perhaps involved in making an artefact, by taking in-hand new digital apparatus, can help us to explore and understand, discursively, the complexity of precisely that.

In “Towards a New Epistemology: The “Affective Turn”
A. Athanasiou
P. Hantzaroula &
K. Yannakopoulos wrote:
“A component of special importance to critical theory’s turn to affect is the commitment to theorising the performative interpellation of the subject in ways that exceed the naïve binarism of voluntarism and determinism: the subject is both formative and forming: it both embraces and resists the norms that subject it” (2009: 14).

Can an image “do more than it shows”? While my central focus in this chapter is on the creative writing process itself, rather than on how TCABs might be interpreted, I want to offer the following analogy in an attempt to understand how choosing a particular photograph might “do more than it shows”, rather than to offer an explanation of what one or more photographs shows. It might be possible to argue that my inclusion of certain photographs and images in the second edition of TCABs can resonate, for example, with certain sorts of affective, as well as informative, engagements with a spectating/readerly audience. Plainly, creative writing is considered by some creative writer-researchers to involve performance (from the Old French *parfornir* “to do, to carry out, finish, accomplish”). In 2008, for example, Perry described (and I am paraphrasing) her experience of “doing things” with dancers in a performative academic setting while

In the “Foreword to the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition” in Clifford and Marcus’ *Writing Culture: The Poetics of Politics of Ethnography* (1986/2010), under the heading “Performing Ethnography” the ethnographer Kim Fortun clarified for us that “[…] we must read texts as texts, looking at how they are put together, start, flow, and finish, noticing how footnotes, images, and textboxes are put to work, imagining […]” (2010: xii).
engaging in her creative writing practice. To use Perry’s terms: creative writing is both “verbal and non-verbal” (4). If we creative writers are "doing things with words" (Austin 1962), or “with dancers”, and we extrapolate this to visual practices in creative writing performative terms, it seems to me that we can readily talk about a creative writer "doing things with images” where things done are widely experienced. “One of the principles underlying theories of practice-led research” Perry argues, “is that practice reveals new modes of knowledge of production and performance” (8).

As I have sketched out above, I have been arguing that the images in TCABS are simulacra of living memories, or “screen memories”, that I can readily access through my expert-intuitive process that the writing itself illustrates. And I view the wording, ordered on the page, as a methodical illustration of the memories that the words punctuate. Perhaps one could argue that this “doing things with images” in the creative writing context could extend, in a performance analysis, to how a performer can “do things with certain gestures”, as Melrose argued (e.g. Melrose 2003)? When we think of film, painting, or photography, plainly visual images can make a viewer experience more than she or he sees. The issue with the visual is perhaps amply demonstrated with my own response to the image of an anonymous child on crutches (Smith 2011: 21): to include that image amongst others "does things" to and for an onlooker – i.e. it is likely to trigger certain sorts of engagements and responses in the viewer. Although one might argue that this specific image depicts a sick or ‘hurt’ female child, amongst other images of the female, that gendered image also triggers recourse to a number of ways of understanding, that include the viewer’s memories of the infliction of pain, of one kind or another, on a child. The field is relatively open, however much otherwise the image-stuff might be my own. If, in performative terms, an image can "do more than it shows", it is possible to argue that the inclusion of an image can trigger – for example – certain sorts of affective as well as informative engagement, not least when it is used in a particular context; yet the precise context of the experience, and the reader’s attitude to it, remain relatively open. Perhaps, in performative terms, it is enough to observe that, “something happens”.
Chapter 3
A Study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process

To Examiner/Reader:
“A study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process” is an exploration of the creative process that led to the emergence of “pity for meat” (enclosed, a newly completed unpublished portfolio) that is comprised of an index [i–iv], a portfolio guide [v–vi] and 62 separate artefacts [1-62]. Together these comprise a two-volume set. You are invited to explore these volumes moving to and fro. This movement should be useful as it will help to restore the visual and instrumental qualities (e.g. texture, variation, sound, depth, weight and so forth) intended. The order presented is valid from the viewpoint of a diagram or sensory logic of a practising creative writer-researcher.

H.A.S.
1. Introduction

… developed on a plane of consistency giving it a “diagrammatic” function … creative flight … a living block … an unknown landscape … opens a rhizomatic realm of possibility … a lunar landscape, with its pours, planes, matts, bright colors, whiteness … there are only inhumanities … a body that is already deterritorialized … forming strange new becomings … make rhizome everywhere, for the wonder of a nonhuman life to be created … (Deleuze and Guattari 2014: 190-191).

Donnelly in Key Issues In Creative Writing (2013), in a chapter entitled “Creative Writing Knowledge”, asked: “How might research-led practice compliment practice-led research and suggest new approaches to writing processes?” (130). The aim of this final chapter is to archive the creative writing process that manifested in the production of “pity for meat”. It arose out of a creative writing practice-led research enquiry that explores how research might suggest new approaches to creative writing processes, and bring a new understanding of an experimental method of creative writing into being. This enquiry, in general terms, seems to me to be supported by a statement made by the professor of Creativity and Poetics Nigel McLoughlin (see Donnelly et al, Key Issues in Creative Writing) who noted that “in the future [creative writing] will be much more informed by theories of how students learn and what research tells us about how the creative process works” (2013: 168). It is on these sorts of bases that I propose it is possible to argue that what a creative writing process might entail has not yet been thoroughly researched. If we are still concerned with the knowledge-status of creative writing in practice, we might have to begin by acknowledging – as McLoughlin and Donnelly seems to me to be suggesting (above) – first, that creative writing processes are unavailable to an outside spectator; and, second, that new ways of discussing creative writing processes need to be identified.

Twyman reminded us in “The graphic presentation of language” (1982) of the importance of understanding “the language element in graphic communication” (2). As I
noted in a previous chapter, *The New Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics* defines the basis of a poem “as an instance of verbal art, a text set in verse, bound in speech. More generally, a poem conveys heightened forms of perception, experience, meaning, or consciousness of lang., i.e. a heightened mode of discourse” (1993: 938). Twyman suggests that if we continue to valorise linguistics we are overlooking the “visual” or “graphic” connection with writing – a visual connection that, as I argued in the previous chapter and will continue to argue in what follows, is at the source of my invention of the creative written components of this project (1982: 7).

What follows this introduction are two simple questions that are meant to act as signposts to discussions circulating around developments in the research domain, where those discussions specifically aim at exploring creative processes and creative writing practice-led research. Recalling the words of Arnheim in *Visual Thinking* (1997) who in 1969 stressed the importance of understanding that

works of art are not the whole of art; they are only its rare peaks. […] If one looks through the literature on art education one often finds […] a tendency to treat the arts as an independent area of study and to assume that intuition and intellect, feeling and reasoning, art and science coexist but do not cooperate. […] The scientist or philosopher can urge [her or] his disciplines to beware of mere words […]. But [she or] he should not have to do this without the help of the artist, who is the expert on how one does organize a visual pattern. The artist knows the variety of forms and techniques available, and [she or] he has means of developing the imagination. [She or he] is accustomed to visualising complexity and to conceiving of phenomena and problems in visual terms (295-296).

For Arnheim, “visualising” and “feeling” are key components of artistic processes. But it was Perry who drew attention to the visual aspects of creative writing in “The non-verbal and the verbal: expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” (2008); she posed a similar argument as Arnheim’s (above) stressing the importance of what is happening during the creative act. According to Perry not all creative writing practices are informed by words: “It’s also about the practice of writing: what happened when the writer (the maker) was doing the material work of writing” (2008: 8).

Perry is one of the most eloquent creative writer-researchers contributing to creative writing practice-led research. She stresses the importance of creative writing practice-led research that focuses on the creative process itself. According to Perry, there is almost no research available connected to the specific details or far-reaching ways of doing and making creative writing (2). Perry is interested in methods of writing
that are “non-verbal or at least partially non-verbal, and [are] not translatable to a verbal mode” (4). She notes oversights that link creative writing to “traditional kinds of text-based research” (ibid). Perry collaborated with a visual artist (Annette Iggulden) and produced two artefacts that Perry describes as “not readable”, rather they function instead as an image of text, on one level – but numerous other ways […] including the material effects of the artist’s process in physically creating the work, and even the effects of my own processes in physically writing drafts of the story. The functions of the text in this collaboration are clearly complex and […] the function of the writing may be misconstrued or limited by perception of it as something that pins down meaning and structure. It’s a stymied understanding of text itself: not only of creative writing text (5).

The question she does not seem to have addressed, as yet, is the specifics of a “non-verbal” process. While she does identify that when she is writing she is responding to, for example “sounds”, “movement”, “colour”, and “sensation”, how these might be influencing her creative writing decision-making is less clear. How might the “non-verbal” be generated and adjusted in the mind and body of the creative writer before it is recorded? This is an interesting direction that I intend to explore in some detail in what follows. A “non-verbal” (or ‘other-than-verbal’) method of writing relates quite specifically with the creative writing process that led to the production of the “pity for meat” portfolio, included in this submission. I am going to argue it emerged from a “visual” and “felt” logic with which words are incommensurate. As a way of helping to demonstrate what cannot be said with words, I have presented “pity for meat” first, as well as presenting images and citing observations from other researchers in this chapter that serve the aspirations of the present doctoral enquiry by outlining the creative writing-making process I am responding to here and attempting to document.

It is crucial to understand that the creative process I am referring to is felt and seen in my body and therefore discursivisation is incommensurate with it or other-than-words. In 2001 Horn in “Visual Language and Converging Technologies in the Next 10-15 Years (and Beyond)” reminded us: “People think visually. […] [Visual] language has the potential for increasing human “bandwidth,” the capacity to take in, comprehend, and more efficiently synthesize large amounts of new information” (1). More recently, Coessens et al, in The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto (2009), reminded us that when it comes to practice-led research: “Not all results of this kind of research can indeed be expressed through words – more often than not a research project’s essence can only be
demonstrated rather than told” (179). In the previous chapter, I cited a number of researchers’ findings and used these to help archive some of the details of the creative writing process that led to the emergence of *The Clara Ann Burns Story* (Smith 2011). I described this process as not informed by words, but rather as guided by the luminous “image-stuff” that constitutes an aspect of my lived memory in the present tense; and that the creative writing process itself seeks to illustrate and thereby illuminate that lived memory; and, finally, that the visuals more directly transpose live memories, and shape and punctuate them via an intuitive method (which is part of expertise).

In that same chapter I proposed that this overcomes any sense, such as we might find elsewhere, that the visual registers are an illustration of an already written text, to which they are secondary – which would make me a jobbing illustrator. I contended that I view the word order on the page as a methodological illustration of the image-stuff that inhabits me, and that the decisions were made on the basis of how I felt about what I see. It is on these sorts of bases that I am going to argue in this chapter that the creative process that led to the production of “pity for meat” is a continuation of the creative process that I sketched out in the previous chapter (with the exception that the process no longer triggers primarily childhood memories). However, as a practising creative writer-researcher, I am continually striving to re-search, further explore, and develop my creative process, and it is the details of these particular developments that I am documenting in what follows.

To summarise what this will encompass, I will be drawing attention to how I sense what the hyphenated terms “rhizomatic-creative-writing” might suggest, and how this might be useful as we search for new ways of exploring the creative writing process. This hyphenated term is an extension of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of *rhizomatic writing*, identified by these two writers in 1980 in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980/2014: 24). This concept seems to me to be of interest, despite computer-related advancements and cultural changes that have occurred over the past three decades. My understanding of Deleuzian theory is that it emphasises the importance of the growth of concepts that can help liberate the mind (that is connected to the body) from following disciplinary rules of hierarchy and of similitude, and readjusting the focus of the body/mind toward a creative action-orientated approach to all that we do and make. This liberated approach seeks to break away from old patterns of thought and action, allowing for new possibilities to arise, and permits, for example, the emergence of an *agencement* (see, textbox, right, and the full text of John

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**Agencement** is a common French word [...], one might use the term as both the act of fixing and the arrangement itself as in the fixtures and fittings of a building or shop, or the parts of a machine” (Phillips 2006).
Phillips “Agencement/Assemblage” 2006). I am proposing that it is this liberation that lends itself to the sort of enquiry I am calling for here that concerns a practising creative writer-researcher participating in an experimental creative writing process unhinged from the paradigm of prediction for the purpose of capturing certain affective aspects of the diagram (in the Deleuzian sense) of a creative process. I return in what follows to the pertinent details. Although these specific terms “rhizomatic-creative-writing” are not given by Deleuze and Guattari, nevertheless, extending or expanding Deleuzian concepts outside of Deleuzian theory is as Deleuze and Guattari intended. These particular hyphenated terms are meant to suggest what a creative writing process might feel like, and/or what it might look like, when there is a readjusting of the focus of a practising creative writer-researcher toward suspending habits of thought in order to explore beyond common ways of writing, temporarily disabling all images of pre-established models of writing as the creative process begins. Within the domain of creative writing, I have observed that very little, if any, emphasis has been placed on revolutionising the creative writing process in a creative writer’s mind-body as she or he perceives and records inner visual and non-visual sensory phenomena and processes.

Massumi, who translated A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014), explained in “Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements” that Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term “draw”, indicates

an act of creation. What is drawn (the Body without Organs, the plane of consistency, a line of flight) does not pre-exist the act of drawing. The French word tracer captures this better: It has all of the graphic connotations of “to draw” in English, also mean to blaze a trail or open a road. “To trace” (décalquer), on the other hand, is to copy something from a model (2014: xvi).

Following in the pathway of Deleuzian theory that asks us to consider how we “have been inspired, aided, multiplied” (Deleuze and Guattari 2014: 3), “A Study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process” is an attempt to assist in restoring the power of exploring creative processes to its creators by presenting these research findings that document an experimental creative writing process. This kind of process is meant to suggest a creative writer remembering being – heterogeneously – on a journey in the middle of coming and going, so that, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari: “your loves will be like the wasp and the orchid” (25), transforming the materials of the world – computer, digital pen, paper – and wandering through diverse experiences of artistic
activity. Immersed in this milieu between what is known and not yet known, the hope is that as the future unfolds practising creative writer-researchers can freely seek the joy of exploring new realms of possibility, recording the territory of a newly imagined world with its vibrant colours, lines, and shimmering objects, so as to share the wonder of the human experience by engaging in a creative writing process that seeks to bring new forms of invention into being that are not yet named – consequently expanding the domain of creative writing, and blurring the boundaries between research and artistic production.

-graphy
“process of writing or recording”
from the Greek – graphia “write, draw, represent by lines drawn; to sce, scratch”

write: from the Old English writan “to score, outline, draw a figure of”
2. Why “rhizomatic [-creative-] writing”?

… in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models (Deleuze and Guattari 2014: 20).

_Becoming is a rhizome, […] not a tree_ (239).

_The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark_ (316).

One of the fundamental questions Donnelly and Harper asked in 2013 in _Key Issues in Creative Writing_ in the opening chapter entitled “Introduction: Key Issues and Global Perspective in Creative Writing” is:

Given this forecast and realistic understanding that we cannot continue (for the most part) to teach within the same framework as we have in the past, what is the best way to talk about creative writing practice in the academy today (xxi)?

As a practising creative-writer researcher and doctoral candidate working within the academy during the second decade of the 21st C. I share Harper and Donnelly’s concern for shifting how we discuss creative writing. As I embarked on this creative writing practice-led research enquiry, while exploring resonances of exchange between the arts, science, and philosophy, I was struck by Deleuze’s oeuvre including his collaborative work with Guattari. I am interested in their understanding of “becoming”, “process”, and “art” (see captions above). In particular, I felt that there was something crucial about the notion of a “rhizome” (1980/2014: 3–25; 328–29), as well as Deleuze’s concept of the _diagram_, which intensified my doubt about mimicking the structure of other creative writers’ work, despite the fact that so many artefacts made by other creative
writers are very much admired. As I researched these Deleuzian notions, while in the process of making what eventually became “pity for meat”, I was on the lookout for how some of the discussions and concepts circling around Deleuzian theory might possess a communicative potential that could assist creative writer-researchers by offering a different set of assumptions than traditional ways of thinking about creative writing.

I propose that it might be worthwhile to consider the notion of “rhizomatic-creative-writing”, because, if we are searching for new ways of discussing creative writing – as Donnelly and Harper seem to have indicated (above) that we should – then I am supposing that what I understand about the Deleuzian notion of “rhizomatic writing” is that, at the very least, it suggests that the experience of life is chaotic and unpredictable, and therefore we should explore different ways of writing that do not conform to fixed models of writing, as there are a multitude of different ways of creating writing. But before I characterise what I mean to suggest by drawing on the Deleuzian term “rhizomatic writing”, I want to briefly turn attention away from Deleuzian theory toward “pity for meat”. I am reminding the reader that I am referring to it throughout this discussion (and continue to in what follows, below) for demonstration purposes, similar to the ways a cartographer might have made a map for the purpose of pointing at a territory to assist in clarifying what can be shown but cannot be fully expressed through words alone.

According to Harper, there are “absences in our approach to understanding creative writing, in the past” (2013: 57); and, according to both Donnelly and Harper, an exploration of creative writing “always returns us to the often personal actions of individuals, to their thoughts but also to their feelings and emotions” (2013: 179). In the spirit of sharing what I sense is personal knowledge that draws from my own experience, I want to point out that for a number of decades I targeted developing and refining my creative writing skills by taking in-hand coloured pencils, various kinds of pens (e.g. calligraphy, fountain, ballpoint, colourful felt-tip pens), watercolour brushes (and watercolour paint), and experimented with how I might be able to move these implements on different kinds of paper (e.g. lined, sketchbook, notebook, poster board) to create a particular organisational layout. I considered how I felt about the application of colour, as well as how the shape of the marks that I made (that were not limited to alphabetic registers) should be or could be improved. However, in the academy during post-graduate creative writing training, certain demands were made: first, the creative
writing process was limited to using a computer keyboard; second, the decision-making process was limited to a particular set of English alphabetic registers; third, and finally, the creative writer must mimic the general structure of products made by well-known Western writers. While the outcome of this approach resulted in my publishing several free verse poems, I nevertheless, continued to be concerned about my perception that this systematic method of mimicking the products of other creative writers seemed to me to result in artefacts that were limited chromatically and guaranteed the erasure of any sort of distinctive individual mark made by the creative writer’s hand. This concern seems to me to be supported by the words of the academic-writing researcher Eric Borg and the art and design researcher Stephen Boyd Davis who pointed out that typewriters, in contrast to computers, “create possibilities, but also carry their own limitations, which may not be immediately apparent […] typewriters do not easily support other ways of providing information […]” (2012: 20). They suggest writing done on a typewriter or keyboard conceals the unique mark of a particular writer, consequently valorising similar “design” over “graphical information design” (ibid). In creative writing terms, for Harper: “Creative writing is such an eclectic activity, drawing on more than word use and compositional practices” (2013: 60). This position I propose is supported by several writers who developed methods of making writing that, in my view, go beyond traditional generic models of writing. For example: Carson’s presentation of Nox (2010); Perry’s introduction of her “collaborative improvisation performances with dancers” (2008: 4); and Saterstrom’s introduction of The Pink Institution (2004). I wondered about the specific details of how these writers experienced their own creative process. What did it feel like? What did it look like?

When I was given the freedom to use a digital pen and digital (writing) tablet I was able to very simply transfer the skills and techniques I had developed through many years of experimenting with colourful pencils, brushes, and pens and moving these on various kinds of paper. Like traditional writing implements a digital pen and digital (writing) tablet are extremely sensitive to pressure and subtle hand movements and the computer programs that support this apparatus I would argue greatly expand creative writing choice in terms of chromatics and recording the precise idiosyncratic hand/body movements of an artist. This led to the publication of the second edition of The Clara Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011) during the course of this doctoral research project. Following publication, rather than returning to focusing on making traditional kinds of writing, I was interested in continuing to work with a digital pen and digital tablet as well
as with other kinds of digital apparatus such as a digital camera, while focusing on the
creative writing process itself rather than the product.

I would like to ask at this point that reader/examiner please briefly glance through “pity for meat”. In Harper’s terms

creative writing draws from as many areas of human knowledge as the
creative writer requires to undertake and, most often, attempts to
complete a creative writing project, and because creative writing
combines contemporary actions as well as memory, the event of doing
creative writing as well as the creation of evidence of artefacts created
during the doing it, research in creative writing possesses a wealth of
areas of investigation (2013: 109).

As I document the decision-making that led to the contents of the portfolio that is the
outcome of a highly personalised creative process, what I notice most of all when I page
through this portfolio is that the agencement of each element is different from the next.
This sort of diversity is what is implied in the term “rhizomatic” which returns me to the
question above: Why rhizomatic [-creative-] writing? But before I return to this specific
question I want simply to propose here that reclaiming the term: handwriting (i.e. digital
handwriting or in-hand digital inscription) may be a positive way of expanding the
domain of creative writing. Perhaps there might be room for prosperous development in
this area.

In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalisim and Schizophrenia* (2014), Deleuze and Guattari
chose to title the first chapter: “Introduction: Rhizome” (2014: 3-25). But what is a
rhizome, and what use might we make of it? In botanical terms a rhizome (from the
Greek *rhizoma* “mass of tree roots”) is a subterranean root or tuber that, as it reproduces,
tends to sprout multiple unpredictable offshoots that develop into new plants. What
Deleuze and Guattari seem to me to have been interested in is that, when a rhizome
reproduces, it demonstrates for us that the world is not organised as a fixed highly
disciplined structure. Therefore, realising this, we need to explore the complexity and
heterogeneity of the world, and make maps of the world, that should also demonstrate
how our knowledge of the world, and our experience of the world, is like a rhizome (or
rhizomatic) – evolving, shifting, and changing in a chaotic unpremeditated way. Their
reference to: “an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map” (20);
“avoid[s] reverting to old procedures […] however different they may be” (23-24); and
writing that is not a “tracing of other books” (24), seems to me to be particularly useful to
my own concern for identifying a creative writing process (in the doctoral creative writing practice-led research context) that does not aim at mimicking the artefacts of other creative writers – no matter how much these are appreciated. To use Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, I sense that a creative writing process aims at “progress toward development” (24). This way of writing, they clarify, is not about making a “plot”, rather it is finding “another way of travelling and moving” and “do[ing] away with foundations” (24-25).

What I think Deleuze and Guattari might mean here – assuming that a rhizomatic way of writing might have a relationship with a creative writing process – is that “rhizomatic writing” suggests that a creative “process” of writing should not aim at “tracing” or imitating the structures used by well-known writers. Rather, each artist should develop a unique creative process through experimentation. I am suggesting this because Deleuze and Guattari noted a continual exploration of ways to “avoid reverting to the old procedures” (23). A rhizomatic-like approach to writing might be fundamental to creative writing decision-making and may allow some of us to challenge older methods that valorise traditional Western models of writing. It is my belief that the real work of creative writing is in making something that is highly individualised, in terms of the artist seeking to establish what Melrose identified as “signature practices […] [that] is practised, and tends to be im-pressed, rather than to have its own ‘thingness’ […] and [concerns] the aspiration to singularity in expert decision-making” (2012: 304–305). This suggests to me that the aim of the artist is focused on invention rather than similitude. My argument here is that a “rhizomatic [-creative-] writing” process might be fundamental in beginning to see why it could be useful to allow a creative writer to change the way writing is made. For Harper, creative writing is not “controlled elsewhere […] [it] clearly involves our individual writerly agency and, indeed, our individual free will” (2013: 59). I am going to proceed to argue that it might be useful for some of us in the creative writing practice-led research realm to identify how a rhizomatic model of intelligibility might assist in understanding the complexity of creative writing processes, particularly as it relates to creative writer-reseachers whose practices, in performative terms, Melrose suggested are “likely to be characterised by a highly individualised and often idiosyncratic processes” (2012: 301).

Recently, several writers have taken up the Deleuzian notion of a “rhizome”, and/or “rhizomatic”, in the context of creative arts practice-led enquiry. For example, in
2007, from the point of view of dance research Kim Vincs in “Rhizome/Myzone: A Case Study In Studio-Based Dance Research” noticed that we are no longer in the era of positivist, objectively verifiable research outcomes, at least in significant areas of the arts and humanities. […] This is a different cultural moment that draws on a subjective understanding of knowledge. I like to draw my understanding of this cultural moment from French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. They model knowledge as a rhizome, a web of interconnecting elements [...]. The subjectivity of the artist, itself a complex, rhizomatic web, is part of this field in which knowledge is produced (2010: 99–100).

In 2009 Coessens et al, in The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto wrote that a rhizomatic description of the domains of art and research implies dismantling the frontiers, opening the territories and deterritorializing space from the side of arts, as well as from the side of scientific research. By borrowing […] notions […] from Deleuze and Guattari […] we acknowledge the complexity of both realms, as all territories and their centres are shifting and dynamic. The idea of the artistic turn implies an explicit experience and recognition of these shifts (2009: 87).

In 2013 Robin Nelson in Practice As Research In The Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances argued:

A pedagogy in preparation for PaR doctorates requires development, and supervisors need to be educated in the processes entailed. Models must be established which not only suit arts practitioner-researchers but which also are accepted by the broader academy and applicable in cognate domains. We need to be critically reflective on the range of possible models for PaR PhDs in order to establish a rigorous equivalent to that in other HE domains. […] This book aims to convince by articulating a conceptual model and fresh approaches to rigour in PaR. It may even be that the rhizomatic model affords a new research approach appropriate to new ways of thinking in the twenty-first century (2013: 17).

Drawing on these examples, I am going to proceed to argue that if – as Donnelly and Harper have indicated (above) – the domain of creative writing is in need of new ways of discussing creative writing I am proposing that “rhizomatic-creative-writing” might be a useful imaginative metaphor to help us deal with this impasse of exploring writing from the perspective that a creative process is likely to be in a state of change, unpremeditated, and continuously forming and reforming, rather than focusing on artefacts where the outcome of the activity of creative writing has ended.

From my point of view Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a “rhizome” and “rhizomatic writing” were made precisely for artists and others who are interested in
investigating a method of making writing that leads to the development of what they call “a process that challenges all models” (2014: 20). This development would aim at enriching the artistic domain by adding to the diversity of existing artefacts and sharing knowledge related to heuristic techniques and ideas that might have been borrowed from other fields of research such as science and philosophy.

Coessens et al in *The Artistic Turn* reminded us of the need for an artistic turn […] that has emerged with a degree of urgency, not just because knowledge of making and theories of making have been long neglected in favour of more deductive, scientific ways of knowing. It has also emerged as a reaction to the degree to which modern culture is itself formulated, regimented and rationalised through science in its application, rather than in its invention (2009: 180).

The focus in *A Thousand Plateaus* is antithetical to conforming to traditional hierarchical models exemplified by Deleuze and Guattari drawing attention to the traditional disciplines such as linguistics (e.g. Chomsky), psychoanalysis (e.g. Freud) and theology (e.g. Manichean), implying that the documents produced by these writers or that religious system do not come close to representing all possible models of logic of a particular society, or culture, or images of thought, or ways of working. “Writing” they tell us “has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come” (2014: 4-5).

One of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari clarify what they mean by “rhizome” and/or “rhizomatic writing” is by asking their readers to consider Noam Chomsky’s hierarchical “tree” model (see Chomsky’s *Syntactic Structures*, 2002). In 1957, Chomsky was interested in constructing a series of linguistic models that have a tree-like structure to show how certain rules of language can be represented. What Deleuze and Guattari seem to me to be concerned with is that the structure of a “tree” serves a political function, in that if a “State” bureaucracy of a particular territory supports this kind of model, such as in educational academies, these “tree-like” structures, with single trunks and symmetrical root systems, impose a disciplinary regiment on a certain segment of a population. If we take this idea and extrapolate it, then we might ask: if knowledge is limited to a particular structure that is fixed, how then might new knowledge be produced? How can new ideas and things be invented if we are constantly aiming at replicating the general structure of existing models? What are the implications
for creative production if, in “academic culture” (2014: 24) and elsewhere, the aim is to trace the general structure of a symmetrical “tree-like” model?

What these writers seem to me to imply is that, rather than assisting in bringing new ideas, artefacts, and inventions into being, the intention of proliferating the “tree” structure is to regulate the status-quo (from the Latin “the existing state of affairs”) under the guise of cultural development, by demanding that thoughts and actions follow a set of clearly defined genealogical-like “laws” that are both binary (e.g. yes/no) and hierarchical (e.g. one, two, three). In this way creative freedom is usurped as these structures impose conformity to a certain set of disciplinary guidelines that function by monopolising and regulating organisational patterns (agencement), and limiting choice to a particular set of registers and/or pathways – thus preventing choice from deviating from the dominant models. What I think Deleuze and Guattari mean is that instead of focusing on “tree-logic”, we need to develop an image of what is giving life to a plant. In other words, what brings things like plants into being? What brings new writing into being? Rather than the “tree” model, Deleuze and Guattari use the less restrictive concept of the “rhizome” and “rhizomatic writing” which they discuss at length. They also deploy the notion of a “machine”, drawing attention to how certain mechanisms might be working in a culture by “forgetting instead of remembering”, in order to take into account how its parts are made up of individuals who take certain actions that can lead to what they call a “mobile machine, a stem for a rhizome […] [a line] of chance”(24).

As I strongly sense that my engaging in the activity that led to the production of “pity for meat” resonates with the approximate characteristics of the principles of the Deleuzian rhizome, before proceeding to explore the notion of a diagram, I want to run through a Deleuzian account of the six rhizomatic principles that Deleuze and Guattari argued assume “very diverse forms” (7), offering it as an attempt to deal with certain sorts of creative writing production, rather than an explanation. My feeling is that Deleuzian theory may not have a place in interpreting the outcome of a creative writing decision-making process (as literary criticism and theory attempted to do), but it does assist in reminding us that creative processes do not follow a systematic, determinable, step-by-step, pre-established pattern, rather emerge in unpredictable ways indicating how the world evolves in a chaotic, complex, dynamic arrangement that is continuously making connections as it does what it does and makes what it makes.
The first principle characteristic of a rhizome is “connectivity”, which is linked with the second, “heterogeneity”, that Deleuze and Guattari characterise as “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (7). They emphasise that a rhizome works as a connection in a chaotic, unorganised way, searching, as it is moving between heterogeneous things and ideas, seeking a myriad of new connections. They criticise linguistic models for being “not abstract enough” (ibid), advocating for a method of a rhizome that displaces the focus on language onto other dimensions and alternative “registers” (8). An example of an alternative register is, perhaps, their presentation of an excerpt from the score of the Italian composer Sylvano Bussoti’s “Five Pieces for Piano for David Tudor” (3). The third principle, “multiplicity”, implies the inability of a rhizome, that is itself a multiplicity, to be reduced to a single relationship between an object or subject, implying that everything is always connected to something outside of itself, but, at the same time, a particular multiplicity cannot expand without the multiplicity changing its form. The notion of multiplicity also coincides with agencement that can be linked to a “plane of consistency” (8-9). I want to note here Melrose’s argument (unpublished paper, 2012; see also Phillips 2006), that agencement “bears the signature” of the complex “logics of production, expert intuitive processes” of a particular artist or group of artists that is likely to be unavailable to an outside observer. Melrose indicates that a practising artist-researcher’s oeuvre (the body of work produced) demonstrates the evolution of a specific experimental decision-making process that continually aspires to escape “an already-existing state of being” so as to enable the invention and emergence of a new agencement. The fourth principle, “asignifying rupture”, is characterised as operating “against the oversignifying breaks separating structures or cutting across a single structure” (Deleuze and Guattari 2014: 9), indicating that writing, as I have expanded on the notion in this document, to include other visual registers, can be offered as a rhizome that is an experiment, thus no longer primarily attributable to signifying codes – provided a reader/user knows how to view it as such. They advise: “Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency” (11). The fifth principle, “cartography”, is linked to the sixth principle, which is the art process “decalcomania” that they identify thus: “a rhizome is not amenable to any structural or generative model” (12). Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly ask their readers to write, to draw experimental maps that can be continually modified, torn, drawn or mounted on a wall, conceived as a work of art, are detachable,
and most importantly have multiple entry points and exits. “But why is a model still necessary” they asked (24)?

Bringing this discussion back to creative writing, what I want to ask, as a consequence of the former question, is: if we no longer need a “model”, on what sorts of bases are specific decision-making processes made? In creative writing terms, Harper sets out a similar perspective that appears to me to resonate with Deleuzian theory in terms of noting certain political problems derived from his experience as a researcher teaching creative writing in the academy and as a practising creative writer. Harper wrote

creative writing cannot truly be taught in the way it has been taught to date and […] teachers of it need to embrace a more holistic sense of what creative writing involves – including what it involves in terms of habitat formation and reformation. As creative writers it might be we recognise that already, but that modern systems of education have worked against us fully developing such a way of teaching (2013: 60).

We practicing creative writer-researchers can begin to develop ways of sharing what it is that we do know, and what we can know, about how we experience a creative writing process, by borrowing the notion of the diagram from Deleuze, since he proposed a very interesting theory in 1981 in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, concerning “[recording] images that are already there” (2003: 71). But it was in fact other researchers who explored this notion further and, I would argue, have shed additional light as to the usefulness of a diagram, as we begin to focus on experiencing the creative process itself.

3. A diagram?

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<td><strong>dia</strong> – from the Greek “through, throughout” + <strong>graphein</strong> “write, draw”</td>
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“Rather than associate knowledge with certainty as traditional models might do (e.g. validation through replication), the knowledge in creative writing” according to Donnelly “is in the discovery that takes the writer beyond the routines of writing, in the questions that arise and that are answered through the writing process” (2013: 123). If, as Donnelly suggests, creative writing knowledge implies that a creative writing process truly aims at the work of discovery, rather than conforming to traditional models of writing; and, if already made artefacts show us the end product of a creative writing process, rather than the creative process itself, then how might a process inform a
creative writer that “takes the writer beyond the routines of writing”? What Donnelly’s “traditional models” and “validation through replication” call to my mind is Lyotard’s the grand récit (see The Postmodern Condition 1984); and The Inhuman (1998), as well as Derrida’s logocentric epoch (see Of Grammatology 1997: 4). What I mean to suggest (to reiterate an argument I have already made above) is that the inner journey of exploring the creative process in the creative writer’s mind-body might not be solely made of the stuff of verbal language. In Key Issues In Creative Writing, in what are in my view two revealing pages, Harper asks his readers repeatedly to “imagine”; also noting that “creative writing is taking place […] in the memory of the creative writer”, as well as drawing attention to those “emotional […] feelings that influenced the creative writer as the maker, the composer, the agent of the creative writing” (2013: 58-59). It might therefore be that these same two key questions can be asked when the matter of a creative writing process is raised: first, how does the creative process feel? And second, what does the creative process look like?

In the previous chapter I described how I sensed that emotions and chromatic living memory-images play an important role in my decision-making; and that I do not focus on the writing as it appears on a computer screen, rather I am looking at what appears to me to be a kind of a screen or “movie screen” (Smith 2011: 2); second, that my writing is a recording of what I see, and furthermore, that I make choices based on how I feel using an intuitive method (that according to Melrose 2011, is part of expertise). In addition, as I indicated above, The Clara Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011) emerged from an effort to allow my creative process to include digital pen and writing tablet, and to make writing that does not aim at representing traditional forms. During the creative writing process that led to what I eventually titled “pity for meat” I strove to push my process even further beyond traditional models. I started with a sense of setting the image-stuff of living memory in the present tense (that inhabit me) in motion, allowing these to dance freely in a disorganised way as if a projector that has a kaleidoscope-like lens was scrambling the memory-images so that I could make choices based on certain movements that I sensed felt “right”. I paid particular attention to where certain image-stuff was making what, in my view, were interesting connections by overlapping and shifting. The creative writing practice provides an opportunity to re-examine what I experienced (sensed in my body) but overlooked in common everyday experience. Although these fleeting free-floating ephemeral imaginings and sensations are difficult to discuss because they are other-than-verbal, the selection process I used seems somehow
close to Deleuze’s concept of the diagram that he identified in *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (2003). Rather than an agent that generates a content, the diagram signals the artist’s way of seeing and doing, and is energised and potentially productive.

A fundamental aspect of the diagram is that it refers to a visual world of an artistic process of a painter who is attempting to escape from the limitations of traditional models of art making. In Sylvester’s *Interviews With Francis Bacon* (2012), Bacon explained: “although I may use, or appear to use, traditional methods, I want those methods to work for me” (107). Using the words as well as the paintings of Bacon as a primary guide, Deleuze explores how an artist seeks not to conform to already existing ways of making an artefact, through his concept of the diagram. Two of the many ways that Deleuze describes the diagram, for example, are: “the experience” and “optical space” (2003: 81) (writer’s emphasis). A (rhizomatic) creative process, first of all, does not trace traditional models; second, it is experienced in the body; and third, and finally, from my own point of view, it is actualised in an inner optical space inhabited by felt experience: it seems to me to follow that a diagram might be a useful metaphor with which to deal with the difficulty of the paradox of having to use words to describe a creative process that is essentially seen and sensed (felt) in the body. In order to expand upon what I believe is the relevance of the diagram and the need for a balanced discussion I will be drawing from a carefully selected group of writers whose research findings seem to me to support this diagrammatic approach to exploring a creative process.

Both Deleuze and Guattari, in 1991 in *What Is Philosophy?*, attempted to directly identify how sensation works as it affects the flesh of the human body and perception by offering, for example, the following explanation as it relates to artistic decision making:

> The being of sensation, the bloc of percept and affect, will appear as the unity or reversibility of feeling and felt, their intimate intermingling like hands clasped together […] flesh gives us the being of sensation and bears the original opinion distinct from the judgement of experience–flesh of the world and flesh of the body that are exchanged […] (1994: 178).

While the phrases above are extremely useful in shedding light on the importance of perception and sensation as it is experienced in the body of an artist, it was Deleuze who studied what a particular individual artist – Francis Bacon – had to say about his own creative process in a series of interviews with David Sylvester (see David Sylvester *Interviews With Francis Bacon*, 2012). Deleuze was also concerned with what an artist can
do as opposed to focusing on what one or more artefacts might be attempting to narrate, signify, or represent. While Bacon identified in his interviews with Sylvester what he called a “graph”, which he described in his own words as

involuntary marks are much more deeply suggestive than others, and those are the moments when you feel that anything can happen [...] the marks are made, and you survey the thing like you would a sort of graph. And you see within this graph the possibilities of all types of fact being planted. This is a difficult thing; I’m expressing it badly. But you [...] suddenly see through this graph [...]. Isn’t it that one wants a thing to be as factual as possible and at the same time as deeply suggestive or deeply unlocking of areas of sensation other than simple illustration of the object that you set out to do? Isn’t that what all art is about (2012: 56)?

It was Deleuze who borrowed Bacon’s “graph” and developed the concept of the “diagram”. Working with a diagram also gives me the impression of being a “suggestive” vehicle for discussing creative decision-making that does not necessarily conform to ready-made structures – although plainly these structures remain, and may well help us organise experience for a reader or viewer. “The diagram is [...] sensation, even a coloring sensation, is ephemeral and confused, lacking duration and clarity [...] felt [...]. Only then will something emerge from the motif or diagram” (Deleuze 2003: 91-92).

The function of the diagram seems to be to focus on making certain decisions during the creative process that are not pre-mediated, thus allowing “accidents” and “mistakes” to happen: “The diagram [...] is a frenetic zone in which the hand is no longer guided by the eye [having given the eye a haptic function] [...] which appears as chance, accident, automatism, or the involuntary” (111). I would argue that it might be possible to apply the notion of a diagram to a creative writing process that relies on chance, and a kind of experimentation that seeks to free the artist’s hand and mind from traditional ways of doing and making writing. Deleuze, for example, drew attention to what he called “automatic writing, where the hand seems to be guided by a ‘foreign, imperious will’ in order to express itself in an independent way” (103). I want to note here that Deleuze deploys the notion of the “diagram” in other texts, however I sense that the “diagram” that he identified in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (2003) somehow overlaps with how I experience discoveries and decision-making in my creative process. For example, Deleuze refers to “intuition” and “rather than claiming to pass judgement, simply indicates what was not right”; he adds the idea of “the direct action on the nervous system” all of which are fundamental to my own assumptions about creative processes (88). According to Coessens et al. in The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto: “Artistic integration,
transaction and transformation are primarily nonverbal, non-explanatory” (2009: 116). If artistic processes are indeed primarily nonverbal and non-explanatory it may be that the notion of a diagram can help researchers who might be lacking words to describe the undiscovered inner-world of the artistic experience, and the actions she or he takes in this regard.

Deleuze characterised the diagram as

suddenly inserted into the head [of an artist] [...] [that triggers] the emergence of another world [...] these marks, these traits, are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative. They are no longer either significant or signifiers: they are a-signifying traits. They are traits of sensation [...] as if the hand assumed an independence, and began to be guided by other forces, making marks that no longer depend on either our will or our sight. These almost blind manual marks attest to the intrusion of another world into the visual world of figuration (2003: 82).

This description of a diagram that emerged in 1981 inspired my interest in wanting to test some of Deleuze’s and Bacon’s observations (cited above) against more recent publications related to the diagram that appears to be more widely recognised as a complex inner visual (figural) tool that an artist triggers, as the creative process begins, as a means of ridding the process of clichés, and moving between what is already known (figurative: representation, illustration, narrative), and what is not yet known (potentially another world or worlds).

In terms of creative writing practice-led research the description of the active and productive emergence of “another world” in an artist’s mind reminds me of how Perry in “Writing in the Dark: Exorcising the Exegesis” (1998) described her writing process. She identified “images and ideas flowing” and “writing before the inspiration dissipates, distorted in sleep and dreams, or lying still and letting the flow spend itself” (http://www.textjournal.com.au/oct98/perry.htm). While Perry does not identify a diagram per se, she wrote: “I was in a fertile writing period, I resorted to typing with a blank screen, unable to see my text”. Her reference to “something originating a long time ago [...] in imagination, that at first has little connection with marks on paper” and “exegesis seems distant from the processes of writing” strikes me as shedding light on how her creative writing process works visually or at least it has a strong visual component. This is the essay in which Perry argued that the mandatory exegetical model that draws “upon literary theory” that she explained is “distant from the process of
writing I just described”, may have been the reason why she wanted to “suggest possible directions for future models”. Ten years later in 2008 in “The non-verbal and the verbal: expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing”, Perry argued that creative writing can be a visual art-form and as such she suggested creative writers should “fight for recognition of our creative work in and of itself” (8). While in Perry’s terms we might not have the “verbal-language” capacity to adequately describe an artefact in discursive terms, my own sense is that the diagram might be a useful tool in the practice-research realm to explore a creative writing process that works non-verbally and visually or by what Perry (in 1998) had called “images and ideas flowing”.

The architects Ben van Berkel and Caroline Boss explained

> diagrams are best known and understood as visual tools […]. The essence of the diagrammatic technique is that it introduces into the work qualities that are unspoken, disconnected from an ideal or an ideology, random, intuitive, subjective, not bound to a linear logic – […] There are three stages to the diagram: selection, application and operation, enabling the imagination to extend to subjects outside it and draw them inside, changing itself in the process (1998).

They emphasise that they are interested in how the diagrams might be a “virtual organisation” that can assist in transforming a project during the process. In my view, one of the most interesting aspects of this description of the diagram is that it offers a new approach to creative processes that invites deviation and irregularity rather than habitual actions and aiming a priori (from the Latin “what comes first”) at a fixed outcome.

Recently O’Sullivan took an interest in the Deleuzian notion of the “diagram” in “From Stuttering and Stammering to the Diagram: Deleuze, Bacon and Contemporary Art Practice” (2008). He proposed (and I am paraphrasing) that although Deleuze explored the notion of the diagram in relation to Bacon’s paintings we might apply the diagram to other kinds of art practices that draw on the unforeseeable that “goes beyond conscious control, if only to circumnavigate the reproduction of just-more-of-the-same” (255). O’Sullivan wrote that he would be interested in a

> project to identify how specific artists incorporate this lack of control ‘into’ their practice, or simply, how they contact and somehow ‘use’ that which is outside them ‘selves’. How, for example, they might mobilise chance
O’Sullivan is interested in various kinds of artistic practices that he suggests already produce what is seen from within the body that is not represented in the outside world. When art, “really is art”, to use his terms, there must be an opposition to habits, including habits of sight, and as such this means that the practice is “is always located at the edge of things” (256) but also – as he puts it – “involve the utilisation of these glitches as points of indeterminacy that might finally allow something new, something different, to emerge” (257-258). But from this perspective, while it is extremely insightful and useful in terms of arguing that the Deleuzian diagram is applicable to a wide variety of art practices, what I am also interested in are the questions I have already posed above: what does a diagram feel like? What does it look like? How is it energised, and to what effect (that the artist recognises)?

Senagala in “Rhizogramming And Synesthetic Transformation Of Designer’s Mind” (2005: 4-17) begins by claiming: “This paper is intended to be a rhizome” (4), while at the same time showing us something he made that he calls a “rhizogram”. What is a rhizogram? In my understanding, it is a combination of a rhizome and the diagram but also what Massumi calls “biograms”. Massumi in Parables For The Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (2002) contends that

biograms are usually perceived as occupying the otherwise empty and dimensionless plane between the eyes and the objects in the world […] projected on an invisible screen […] more-than visual […] combining senses, tenses, and dimensions on a single surface (187).

One of the ways Senagala describes “rhizograms” is: “by-products of the process of diagramming” (2005: 9). He is less interested in the rhizograms (the products) and more interested in revolutionising the diagramming (processes). In his discussions he refers to the traditions of architecture placing importance on “transforming the visual perceptions of the designer through spatial, tectonic and visual exercises” (5) rather than training architects to explore temporality and sensation. His contention is that introducing traditional approaches to design processes to students is “hardly conducive to creatively exploring and generating architecture that is both viable and acknowledges the systemic complexities and the myriad interconnections between the components of the life-world system” (6). These aspects of Senagala’s theory provide a set-up for his conception of a
“diagram” that he proposes belongs to “epistemological space which allows connections to be made from the images and ideas abstracted from the world” (6).

Senagala adds:

While most of the present discussion has focused on the act of sketching, the method is applicable in any medium. The author and collaborators have carried out experiments where the rhizogramming actually begins on a computer screen, albeit with the computer’s interface completely and intentionally blurred (13).

He describes “rhizogramming” as involving a practitioner noticing what is changing, moving and fluctuating in his or her sensory field and draws, without looking at the drawing and without privileging any particular event/sensation [...] any fluctuation in the perceptual field that stimulates the senses: auditory, olfactory, haptic, and taste. [...] Thus, an element of serendipity and playfulness is introduced into the process and the clutches of conscious choice are relaxed (8).

In order to do this, he advocates developing both: “synesthetic sensibility” and “proprioception” (15). To give you an idea of what I sense Senagala means by this, let us look at the textboxes to the right, and consider what Massumi has to say about synesthetic experience and proprioception:

Call proprioception and viscerality taken together—as two complimentary dimensions of the “medium”-depth perception most directly implicated in the body’s registration of the in-betweenness of the incorporeal event—mesoperception. Mesoperception is the synesthetic sensibility: it is the medium where inputs from all five senses meet, across subsensate excitation, and become flesh together, tense and quivering. Mesoperceptive flesh functions as a corporeal transformer where one sense shades into another over the failure of each, their input translated into movement and affect. [...] Mesoperception can be called *sensation* for short (2002: 62).

For Massumi and Senagala, as for my account here, sensation is important. Might it also be important to an expert practising creative writer-researcher more generally? Senagala notes examples of “collaborative”, “rhizomatic experiments [that have been] carried out in creative writing” (2005: 16). He cautioned his readers, however, that from his point of view “collaboration does not necessarily mean that [writing] is automatically rhizomatic. A rhizome has to form relationships and connections that would link the participants, their perceptions, ideas, events, resources and actions” (ibid). Senagala’s understanding
of rhizomatic creative writing suggests to me that a creative writer who writes rhizomatically operates on the bases of “synesthetic sensibility”, engaging with “proprioception” as a means to actualise and realise future creative possibilities.

Donnelly and Harper have asked: “What might our future roles as creative writers in higher education be” (2013: 180)? I would argue that in the future increasing numbers of practising creative writer-researchers will study creative writing rhizomatically, shifting their focus away from traditional models regardless of how much these artefacts are admired, and toward the diagram (in a Deleuzian sense), that might generate a figural space of highly detailed memory-images along with associated affects. This change has the potential to liberate the perception of the creative writer, who will make decisions based on rigorous experimentation with a new apparatus and materials. She will explore ways to make artefacts that have yet to be named – that initially can only be sensed. To use Harper’s terms: “we do not yet know all that there is to know to explore; or, indeed, entirely how to explore it. […] It might well be informed by an individual writer’s memory as well as by immediate sensory stimulus” (2013: 106-107).

In adopting such an approach my argument is that practicing creative writer-researchers will need to identify and distinguish themselves as creative writing practice-led researchers and artists, clarifying that she or he has a different aim than traditional methods of writing – not to disparage traditional methods but to offer an alternative approach that allows practitioners to discuss, research and explore the evolution of her or his creative decision-making process. This will also require a shift in thinking about the creative writer and the artefacts. As I elaborated above, in the introduction to this chapter, I am interested in how future practising creative writer-researchers might freely seek the joy of exploring new possibilities, recording a newly imagined world with its vibrant colours, lines, and shimmering objects by taking in hand new digital technology such as a digital pen with the objective of sharing the wonder of the human experience by investigating the evolution of a creative writing process and moving between research and artistic realms of production. But can we find the justification to apply this rhizomatic research principle to creative writing in the university research context?

Senagala, quoted above, provides us with a process: “Rhizogramming is a synesthetic and perceptually transformative process that forms a rhizome between the designer, a set of multi-sensory perceptions of events and the design choices” (16-17). Can we rephrase this, replacing the terms “designer” and “design” with “creative writer”
and “creative writing”? I am suggesting that Senagala’s notion of rhizogramming is a useful tool for creative writers who choose: first, to experiment with new digital technology as a means to develop a different approach from the norm – in the realm of practice-led research – on the basis of a high level of skill and a priori knowledge acquired from prolonged investigation and rigorous testing; and second, to place greater importance on the individual experience in the mind-body than measuring and interpreting the results produced.

However, I want to clarify, before concluding this chapter, that while Senagala’s observations on the usefulness of the rhizome, diagram, and synesthetic “transformation” of the “mind” of a practitioner seem to me to be of interest, particularly in light of rapid computer developments and cultural shifts, the aim of my creative process is not to make “rhizograms”. While I cannot be certain of how Senagala experiences his own synesthetic and proprioceptive processes, he did suggest that it is imperative that the rhizome follows “multiple pathways” and makes diverse connections, which implies a process that is endlessly new and, in the most notable of cases, singular to the expert practitioner (Melrose 2011).

My own argument is that, by taking in-hand a digital pen in making “pity for meat”, I made decisions on what was to be recorded based on sensing connections between the “image-stuff” of specific memories as I set the creative process in motion where memories are overlapping with each other. If we recall Bergson’s imperative: “there is no perception that is not full of memories” (1991: 33) then on the bases I have outlined above and in the previous chapters I am going to argue that in making “pity for meat” I made connections between a number of living memories that are overlaid, in the present of making, with the perceptions that are singular to me: my reader may or may not want to trace these in detail, at this point, from the word map I provide here, following the page numbers provided:

blue maps [viii], orbs [1], ink cloud [2], inscription [3], wheelbarrow [4], ghostly figures [5], slaughterhouse [6], fingerprints [7], gun [8], wildflowers [9], sympathy [10], roses [11], butterflies [12], Degas [13], a butcher [14], tears of blood [15], blue [16], sprouting branch [17], silence [18], messages [19], casual conversation [20], a lace umbrella [21], dead cat [22], translucence [23], a crypt [24], the appearance of an image in the mind [25], relationships [26], breast tissue [27], stamps [28], a portrait of Mac Daily [29], friendship [30, 31], ink splatter [32],
rose [33], a kiss [34], pink [37], body parts [38], an apology [39], remembering [40], cracked cement [41], Odette [42], missing faces [43], crying bodies [44], a sycamore [45], radiant spirit [46], hope [47], records [48], erasure [49], a single gesture [50], sensations [51], Sakura [52], roots of trees [53], loss [54], the act of writing [55], an embrace [56], visible shifts [57], honey [58], invisible light [59], affection [60], a perceptual stream [61], resonances common to a body [62].

Plainly, these words do not capture what I was seeing and feeling in my body during the creative writing process of which the artefacts serve as a map. If the reader follows the word map, and traces in turn the visuals, she or he might become aware that a rhizomatic approach to creative writing has required experimenting with new materials – digital pen, writing tablet, paper – putting together a new chromatic agencement generated by memories as experiencing the world unfolds. The work that has emerged was inspired by the idea of making an unusual researcher-practitioner contribution to the discipline of creative writing that is demonstrated, rather than solely told in words. From my point of view it brings to the fore one of the most profound challenges that creative writing research must address if it is to evolve beyond rewriting and logocentrism. The challenge of this undertaking should have been apparent throughout this research enquiry: to participate in the evolution of a new way of experiencing a creative writing process – by exploring a method of recording complex living memories mixing image-stuff and broken words as these are seen and felt in the body, for the purpose of showing how creative writers can, and are, doing things with more than words.
In “Sensing the Logic of Writing: Creative Writing Reimagined”, which comprises creative and critical components, I have explored the specific details of a highly personalised creative writing process that involves using computer-apparatus to certain ends.

In the “Introduction” I noted that I would be drawing notionally on existing thought in the domains of philosophy, science, and the arts, testing to see whether elements from these other disciplines might assist in my developing a way to discuss how a new way of writing is invented and theorised. I reflect on a figural creative writing decision-making process – which then leads to the production and/or investigation of artefacts around which this project is based. I discussed how the creative and critical components might swing between a more explicit discourse in the research process, and a figural artistic process that seeks to communicate and illuminate living memories in the present tense, for the reader/viewer.

I then set out in search of terms of reference in Chapter 1, encountering the richness of the key texts that inform this research. In the following chapters these texts have assisted in my developing my own argument, which sheds light on what a ‘practice as research’ approach allows a research undertaking to do that is not available through, nor possible in, literature-based research. What this practice-led research approach has allowed me to explore – that traditional modes of research would not – has led to the arguments in Chapter 2 and 3 that indeed involve literature-based research; however, these chapters are accompanied by creative components that offer a second major engagement with the notion of practice as research itself. I have presented these two
elements in such a way as to invite the reader to move between the two, such that each element illuminates and informs the other.

In Chapter 2, I began by drawing attention to TCABS (Smith 2011). I noted that my writing triggers the luminous image-stuff of living memories that the writing itself seeks to illustrate and the words punctuate. I identified what Melrose calls an “empirical fit” (2002) between this experience and five concepts:

1) What Freud called ‘screen memories’ (1899) that I sense are re-actualised and realised in TCABS, for example on pages 1, 5, 9-10, 17, 25-26, and 56-58;
2) What Bergson identified as ‘intuition’, ‘memory-image’ and ‘duration’ (1991), none of which is plainly visible in TCABS, but which are vital to my creative writing decision-making process;
3) The way Deleuze suggested that intuition, emotions and creativity itself are linked (1991) and the emotional way of writing that Passerini identified as ‘the specific mirror of emotions’ (2008: 120). While emotions and/or affect seem to me to inform my creative decision-making process, a sympathetic reader/examiner might register what Passerini called ‘emotional flow’ in TCABS, for example, on pages 1 and 95. Passerini reminded us: “It is very difficult to speak about emotions: you cannot grasp them and pin them down, they are an elusive object” (120).
4) What Lyotard identified as ‘memory-effects’ (1998: 47-57) that he described as a way of writing with computer apparatus that “conserves the sign of the past event, or rather produces it as available, presentable and reactualizable memory” (48). It seems to me that pages 2, 4, 6, 37-38, 39, 42, 47-48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 63, 65-66, and 79-81 in TCABS are reactualised memory.
5) With what I identified as ‘doing things with images’ through an analogy derived from speech act theory: the image itself can perhaps be shown, as context changes, to do more than it shows. I suggested that it might be possible to argue that my inclusion of certain photographs in TCABS can resonate, for example, with certain sorts of affective as well as informative engagements with a spectating audience, see for example pages 21 and 23.

In Chapter 3, I began by drawing attention to “pity for meat”, which I have identified in terms of a creative writer’s portfolio. This includes: an index [i–iv], a portfolio guide [v-
In this chapter I noted that the creative process that led to the emergence of “pity for meat” is a continuation of the process identified in Chapter 2, with the exception that it no longer triggers childhood memories; and in the case looked at here in detail, the memories are set in motion as if projected on a screen from a projector with a kaleidoscope-like lens. The continuation of the process between these two artefacts leads me to suggest that what I am dealing with here is a mixed-mode research method involving creative perception and production. Thus if an examiner/reader who explores the entire portfolio, or the “index” comprised of thumbnails of the contents of the portfolio that allows for scanning multiple images quickly, she or he might be reminded of the ‘rhizomatic writing’ that Deleuze and Guattari proposed, that they have suggested might allow the deconstruction of dominant linguistic models and is in a constant state of change. I have also emphasised the usefulness of the notion of a Deleuzian ‘dia’ gram’, as an energised and productive visual tool that assists a graphic artist who engages in a rhizomatic approach to decision-making during the creative process and that is proprioceptive and synesthetic.

I propose to conclude this final chapter by suggesting that I have not only discussed a method of recording complex living memories mixing image-stuff and broken words as these are seen and felt in the body, but I have also shown – through both critical writing and documented creative writing practices – that creative writers can, and are, doing things with more than words. The movement that I have sketched out above between the creative and critical components would not have been possible through a traditional literature-based research mode. This individualised practice-led research approach has allowed me to explore the specific details of an alternative sensory logic of writing that seems to me to imply the possibility of reimagining creative writing as a significantly visual art practice, that in this instance, included drawing on memory as a similarly visual phenomenon. This visual phenomenon might well be a mode of knowledge production, conserving and making available, presentable and re-actualisable highly individualised moving chromatic images of the human experience, that perhaps would have otherwise been overlooked, or forgotten, and are felt in the body. It might be possible to speculate on the bases of the research findings presented in this project that the writing of ‘creative writing’ itself, while it draws plainly on linguistic convention and discursive tradition, equally draws on visual convention and tradition. As such, it need not be limited by the notion of story-telling or even the signifier; rather, it is a method of documenting a
specific expert creative decision-making process that is distinct from the practices of making (complex) marks with a digital apparatus – marks that might or might not resonate for one or another viewer/reader.

What are some of the implications of this enquiry? It suggests to me that we practising creative writers and visual artists should begin to work together, to learn from each other, as uniquely skilled artists who might be experimenting and testing new computer-related writing apparatuses, and who need to find new ways of investigating our practices. I suggest we consider how we can discuss a creative writing process as a graphic or figural art practice in the Lyotardian sense that is rhizomatic in the Deleuzian sense. Some might argue that Deleuze et al and Lyotard have written and been written about for years, and might point out that these theorists were, themselves, expert writers but not artists. My response, on the basis of what I have attempted to demonstrate in this research undertaking, is that they have outlined important ways of seeing, knowing and doing; yet the impact of their words for creative writing research, as I have carefully demonstrated, had not yet been realised, but needs to be – as so many commentators suggest. What seem to me to be invaluable in this aspect of Lyotardian and Deleuzian philosophy are the implications that each writer, through different processes of critical investigation, has identified affectivity as key, and in particular in terms of the interaction between a creative writer’s experience and that or those of a reader/spectator – such as those identified by Passerini. Finally, in light of the impact of computer technology, I would argue, we might want and be able to do something more significant than simply follow existing models of writing, which point surely has clear implications for teaching creative writing in the university, particularly in the set-ups specific to the Departments of Literature. We might want to consider shifting creative writing to Visual and/or Fine Arts departments, reimagining and re-imaging new ways of writing altogether.
Endnotes

i The title of the chapter as it appears in the original document: “Silent” Speech.

ii There are conflicting policies and theories about how to show possession in the case of a proper name. The extract below, for instance, seems to me to suggest a pragmatic choice based on sound and/or function of the proper name.

For example, J. Straus in The Blue Book of Grammar and Punctuation (2015) noted:

Some writers and editors add only an apostrophe to all nouns ending in s. And some add apostrophe + s to every noun, be it Hastings’s or Jones’s. […] Care must be taken to place an apostrophe outside the word in question. For instance, if talking about a pen belonging to Mr. Hastings, many people would wrongly write Mr. Hastings’ pen (his name is not Mr. Hasting). […] Another widely used technique is to write the word as we would speak it. For example, since most people saying, “Mr. Hastings’ pen” would not pronounce an added s, we would write Mr. Hastings’ pen with no added s. But most people would pronounce an added s in “Jones’s,” so we’d write it as we say it: Mr. Jones's golf clubs. This method explains the punctuation of for goodness’ sake (http://www.grammarbook.com/punctuation/apostro.asp).

For consistency purposes I am choosing to add an apostrophe to all proper names ending with s (rather than apostrophe + s) to show possession.

iii See Lyotard (2011: 54).

iv The translators of Discours, figure (Anthony Hudek and Mary Lydon) or the publisher (University of Minnesota) of Discours, Figure (2011) may or may not have considered the consequences of changing the original title from Discours, figure to Discours, Figure. From my own point of view the original title strongly suggests a hegemonic discours representing the figure.

v Lyotard wrote: “This leads us to examine […] graphics, which is even more interesting” (2011: 262).

vi Drawing attention, perhaps, to the figural aspects of writing in “Seeing Through Discourse, Figure” (http://parrhesisjournal.org/parrhesia12/parrhesia12_hudek.pdf) Antony Hudek (who translated Discourse, Figure into English) wrote:

The complexity of Lyotard’s phrasing, with its words at face value (all their possible meanings layered one on top of the other) and neologisms (“déjouer”) is indicative not only of the often perilous task that awaits any translator of Lyotard’s writing, but also of the ambiguity Lyotard invests in the proper pronoun (“s’attendre” as “waiting for each other/oneself”) and thus of the care he takes in foiling [déjouer] the grasp of the philosopher, the historian, and the biographer-critic. This evasion is playful, no doubt, but also deadly serious: un-game, déjouer. The solution Lyotard proposes to translate this elusive strategy is to translate the verb “s’attendre” in the language in which it is written, or writes itself—whatever language, presumably, this may be.

vii On subject of visual (figural) ‘art’ in Discourse, Figure (2011) Lyotard proposed:

One can say that the tree is green, but saying so does not put color [spelling as in text] in the sentence. Yet color is meaning […] unsayability of the world and a destiny of silence […] The hope of enclosing the whole object within discourse [as ‘conversation’ or ‘dialogue’] must be abandoned if this is indeed our hope—and this is what one must attack in Hegel. On the other hand, the space of designation does indeed dwell in discourse, but on this side of what it signifies, in its expression. I call it provisionally “space of designation” because its properties seem analogous to those of that space and contradict those of linguistic space. What they have in common is the figure, which I will call figural space […] offering it its object as image […] But let there be no mistake: this “interiority” of figural space in relation to discourse is not dialectical (50).

viii For some writers the figural refers to a writing that is strongly associative and not visual images. This is not what I mean here. The figural introduces into art-making visual fluctuations that resist the linear linguistic (structuralism) rules of a series of ‘signs’ (signified/signifier) by violating the linearity of linguistic structures. These are the sorts of structures that were developed by Ferdinand de Saussure in General Course in Linguistics (1916/2011). In taking a language focused perspective to creative (artistic) writing there is an attempt to replace a visual image (graphic) by assembling complex tropes. This is attempted through an associative compilation of words, recalling Romain Jakobson’s work, in the early days of structuralism, on supposedly “linear” or “associative” “axes” in writing. Both for Lyotard, as well as Deleuze and Guattari, the figural concerns cultivating affective moments in relation to the act of the artist (that are marked by an event that takes place during a particular ‘time’ that is not chronological and marks a
particular space) that resists dominant power structures, whether these are related to a prevailing language in a particular culture or political structures. Deleuze and Guattari, in *Anti-Oedipus* (2008), for example, noted:

The extreme importance of J.-F. Lyotard’s recent book is due to its position as the first generalized critique of the signifier. In its most general proposition, in fact, he shows that the signifier is overtaken toward the outside by figurative images, just as it is overtaken toward the inside by the pure figures that compose it – or, more decisively, by “the figural” that comes to short-circuit the signifier’s coded gaps, inserting itself between them, and working under the conditions of identity of their elements. […] Lyotard shows that what is *at work* in dreams is not the signifier but a figural dimension underneath, which gives rise to configurations of images that make use of words, making them flow and cutting them according to flows and points that are not linguistic and do not depend on the signifier or its regulated elements (243–44).

My own sense, from the perspective of a practising creative writer-researcher, is that Lyotard was focused on the difference between the discursive writing (dominated by language or the signifier) and creative (artistic) writing (guided by visual/figural images in the mind). For Lyotard the figural (visual) breaks the rules of language and reveals purely visual (graphic) forms that always remain open to intense desires and feelings. Lyotard seems to me to suggest that language (what is said/heard) always fails to account for what is seen and felt (emotional intensity).

I have used the term ‘sensing’, by which I mean ‘resonates for me’. The performance researcher Susan Melrose, in 2003 in “*Who Knows* – and *Who Cares* (about performance Mastery)?” (smelrose.org.uk/e-pai-2003-04/performance mastery) draws attention to “those moments when something you *sense* in your own reading of practice-writing […]. resonates for you with something you retain from expert-mixed mode practices”. In this particular document Melrose both ‘shows’ us and explains how creative research practices are characterised by research *processes* that she seems to identify as emerging from a particular creative disciplinary pursuit of knowledge that is based on a drive to continue to develop and learn.

In *Discourse, Figure* (2011) Lyotard reminded those who might object to the idea of a writer as an artist who is an illustrator of visual images (in the mind) by drawing attention to the relationship between writing and the figural (212–213). He noted: “The birth and re-birth of painting from writing” (264).

* Italics used in original document.

* By ‘fulfilling a desire’ (from the Latin *desiderare* “wish, long for, expect”) I mean an unfolding embodied ‘affective-force’ or (non-transgressive) ‘libidinal energy’ that impacts the nervous system of an artist/writer and sharpens sensation. It may be that desire is the glimmering silent figural-space that arrives before speech. In 1971 in *Discourse, Figure* Lyotard proposed: “ Desire does not speak; it does violence to the order of utterance. The violence is primordial: the imaginary fulfilment of desire consists in transgression, which repeats […]” (2011: 233). Also in 1971 in “Taking the Side of the Figural” (see *The Lyotard Reader & Guide* 2006) while drawing attention to writing that is not “read” but rather “seen” (34) Lyotard pointed out that if we are ordered to ‘hear’ words then “we deliver ourselves from the thickness of flesh, that we shut our eyes, and that we are all ears” (2006: 35). This suggests to me that Lyotard also understood that an artist who writes might valorise seeing rather than hearing. In this essay he draws attention to what “marks the history […] of Western thought” (35) suggesting there has been a purposeful overlooking of the creation of “shimmeringness” and “appearance” of “painting born from [creative] Writing” (35). In 1973 in “Painting as a Libidinal Set-up: (Genre: Improvised Speech)” (see *Lyotard Reader & Guide*) Lyotard noted: “Desire is a term borrowed from Freud. Yet in Freud’s work itself there is profound hesitation over the position and function of the term; a hesitation which is not merely circumstantial but probably decisive” (2006: 302). Freud was focused on a ‘talking cure’. In other words, Freud valorised *discourse over a figural-space*. If desire, indeed, concerns a ‘decisive-hesitation’ it may be that the ‘talking cure’ is what caused Freud’s own ‘equivocation’. In 2002 the social theorist and philosopher Brian Massumi argued: “[creative] work has to do with desire, it is not desire for something in particular: no utopia. In more ways than one, it is desire without an object. It is desire as a process, purely operative rather than object-orientated: the process of reason rejoining desire” (2002: 113). It may be the case that ‘fulfilling a desire’ is a living embodied flow of energy that is channelling the creative process itself, not the outcome of the process (i.e. artefact). Lyotard reminded us: “Here I will take desire in the second sense […] in the sense of a process, desire as productive force, as energy open to transformations […] in which it is put to work, in which it produces certain effects, in which it is transformed into something else” (Lyotard 2006: 303).

* Spelling and punctuation is as in the original document.

* Here by ‘sensed’ I mean ‘resonates for me’ but also an immediate intuitive way of knowing that arrives immediately before some sort of categorical order. In 1971 Lyotard explained that *discourse* is related to aural language that does not “partake of the sensory through its “matter”; rather it is through its figure that language will be able to measure up to the sensory” (50). In 1981 Deleuze in *Francis Bacon: The Logic Of
interested in "the interface between oral and the written which are often confused" (xi). He reminded us:

his or her personal history" (316).

Someone who "highlights the relationship between a researcher's ways of seeing and the social location of

move through the 21 published by Sage publications in 2005 in

unconscious

hours that reveal dramatic scenes from childhood in healthy adults.

"Screen Memories"

which are "latent memories" that are the trace of a [unconscious] psychic process (2005: 51). However, in

unconscious

when he moved to London as a result of Hitler's invasion of Austria. He wrote on the subject of the

unconscious

The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself " (1994: 164). However, in order for a particular 'image' to be 'sensed' what is required is a living body. It is the human body that makes art possible.

My own sense is that this early work perhaps was an effort to draw attention to the manifestation of visual images that guide a creative (artistic) process that involves writing (i.e. inscription).

This unity constitutes the very stuff of the inscription. It is written in the same space as something, else, in this case an image. Now the topical unity of writing and scene indicate that the text, having taken up a position on the same plane as the image, will submit to the strictures of that plane and betray the strictures of writing. By this simple placing of inscription, we pass from a linguistic space, that of reading, where one hears, to visual space, that of painting, where one looks (263-64).

ix Born in Moravia in 1856, Sigmund Freud moved with his family to Vienna and lived there until 1938 when he moved to London as a result of Hitler's invasion of Austria. He wrote on the subject of the unconscious in the early part of the 1900s. In a book entitled The Unconscious Freud indicated that dreams, new thoughts, and 'symptoms and compulsions in sick people' are all embedded in the unconscious all of which are "latent memories" that are the trace of a [unconscious] psychic process (2005: 51). However, in "Screen Memories" (1899) Freud was focused on memories that emerge in the conscious during waking hours that reveal dramatic scenes from childhood in healthy adults.

x For an overview of a Deleuzian rhizome see Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014: 3-25).

xi The Oxford English Dictionary defines heuristic “enabling a person to discover or learn something for themselves” (2010: 823).

xii Spelling and punctuation is as in original document.

xiii J. Kincheloe and P. McLaren in “Rethinking Critical Theory And Qualitative Research” that was published by Sage publications in 2005 in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research suggested that as we move through the 21st C. the French term bricoleur f. or bricoleur m. as it relates to qualitative research is someone who "highlights the relationship between a researcher’s ways of seeing and the social location of his or her personal history" (316).

xiv Spelling as in original document.

xv Spelling as in original document.

xvi In 1987 the British anthropologist Jack Goody in The Interface Between the Written and the Oral (1993) was interested in “the interface between oral and the written which are often confused” (xi). He reminded us:

The physical basis for writing is clearly the same as drawing, engraving and painting – the so-called graphic arts. It depends ultimately on man’s ability to manipulate tools by means of his unique hand with its opposable thumb, coordinated of course by eye, ear and brain. There is little evidence of such activities in the early phases of man’s history, during the Early and Middle Old Stone Age. But with the coming of the later Old Stone Age (the Upper Palaeolithic, c. 30,000 – 10,000 BC) we find an outburst of graphic forms in the caves of south-western France, then later on in the rock shelters of Southern Africa and much later still, on the birch bark scrolls of the Ojibway of North America.

Writing, then, has its roots in the graphic arts, in significant design. To use distinctions that sometimes overlap and are not always helpful, both the intention and the consequences of these designs can be described as either communicative or expressive. Expression can be seen as […]
Beyond the notion of a moment of recognition, when something you sense or simply the creation of the design itself.

Thus, the term graphie, I would argue, has the beauty of applying to writing and other visuals without needing to make a distinction.

Noland wrote: “Writing about cyberspace, Keep makes a similar point, insisting that the [...] fingers are gestures that define a new gestural body, one coterminal with a keyboard and screen” (2006: 220). She also cites the work of Poster where he draws attention to the keyboard (222). And she also wrote: “All writing, in short is disciplined [...] writing always involves [...] new implements, such as the electronic keyboard” (224).

In 2006 Ngoc Phan Hong Nguyen wrote in a master of computer science thesis “Note Taking and Sharing with Digital Pen and Paper”: “The field of pen-based digital [...] systems is moving fast forward [and] combines the advantages of both the paper world and the digital world” (6).

See Noland page 217 and 227.

In Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (1986/2010) the ethnographer James Clifford wrote in response to a photograph on the cover of the book:

The ethnographer is absorbed in writing – taking dictation? fleshing out an interpretation? recording an important observation? dashing off a poem? Hunched over in the heat, he has draped a wet cloth over his glasses. His expression is obscured. An interlocutor looks over his shoulder – with boredom? [...] In this image the ethnographer hovers at the edge of the frame—faceless, almost extraterrestrial, a hand that writes. It is not the usual portrait of anthropological fieldwork. [...] But in another photo, carefully posed Malinowski recorded himself writing at a table [...]. We begin, not with participant observation or with cultural texts (suitable for interpretation), but with writing, the making of texts. No longer a marginal, or occulted, dimension, writing has emerged as central to what anthropologists do both in the field and thereafter. [...] [Ethnographers] see ethnographic writing as changing, inventive [...] (1-3).


For example, Farag Moussa in “The Computer Age And The Inventor” (1998) defined “Computer Age” as: “an age which owes everything to inventors”. See online at: http://www.inventionifia.ch/computer_age_and_the_inventor.htm [retrieved December 7, 2014].

In “Real-Time Systems” (2009) the computer researcher Insup Lee defined real-time in the following terms: “System time and external physical time are the same” (3)! See online at: http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~lee/09cis480/lec-RTS-web.pdf [retrieved December 12, 2014].

Agencement is a French word that John Phillips described in “Agencement/Assemblage” (2006) as implying in the philosophical sense “specific connections with other concepts. It is, in fact, the arrangement of these connections that give the concepts their sense [...] in specific yet creative and often unpredictable ways” (108).

The English professor Gregory Ulmer in Applied Grammatology (1985) described Derrida as having partaken in “experimental (creative) writing” (x).

Heni Bergson was interested in how time (duration) is experienced. In The Creative Mind (1974) he explained that duration [is that] which science eliminates, and which is so difficult to conceive and express, is what one feels and lives. Suppose we try to find out what it is?—How would it appear to a consciousness which desired only to see it without measuring it, which would then grasp it without measuring it, which would then grasp it without stopping it, which in short, would take itself as object, and which, a spectator and actor alike, at once spontaneous and reflective, would bring ever closer together—to the point where they would coincide—the attention which is fixed, and time which passes? [...] [Finally], I believed I had found pure, unadulterated inner continuity (duration) [...] theories of space and time thus become counterparts of one another [...] Real duration was systematically avoided. Why? Science has its own reasons [...] As I examined the various doctrines it struck me that language was largely responsible for this confusion: duration is always expressed in terms of extension: the terms which designate time are borrowed from the language of space. When we evoke time, it is space which answers our call (13-14).

As Susan Melrose has written: “I use the verb “sense” advisedly - [it being something that] resonates for you with something you retain from expert mix-mode practices. I have referred to processes of sensing and resonating at this point I want to add the notion of a moment of recognition, when something you sense...
adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike an engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand’, that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The set of the ‘bricoleur’s’ means cannot therefore be defined in terms of the project (which would presuppose beside, that, as in the case of an engineer, there were, at least in theory, as many sets of tools and materials or ‘instrumental sets’, as there are different kinds of projects). It is to be defined only by the potential use or, putting this another way and in the language of the ‘bricoleur’ himself, because the elements are collected or retained on the principle that ‘they may always come in handy’. Such elements are specialized up to a point, sufficiently for the ‘bricoleur’ not to need the equipment and knowledge of all trades and professions, but not enough for each of them to have only one definite and determinate use. They each represent a set of actual and possible relations; they are ‘operators’ but they can be used for any operations of the same type (17 -18).


It was Lyotard in 1971 in Discourse, Figure (2011), who identified the “figure”. It was Deleuze and Guattari who in 1972 drew attention to the importance of Lyotard’s “figure” in Anti-Oedipus (2008: 243-244). And, it was Deleuze who borrowed Lyotard’s notion of the “figure” in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (2003).

“Perhaps this too will be a pleasure to look back on one day”.

Goddard took up the notion of “scar”, in the context of creative arts enquiry in “Anecdotes and Antidotes – Stories as Balms, Storytelling as Healing” (2003: 1-16). Here he writes about his difficulty retrieving “a hazy memory” and how he “stroked” his “scar in an attempt to re-kindle lost memories and submerged feelings about [an] accident” (3-3).

The terms “chorographer”, “chorography”, and “mystery” are terms coined by Ulmer. Since, in the arguments I am making in this thesis, these are of no direct importance, I do not unpack these terms further.


Goddard noted an interest in “recording […] the pain and impact of a scar that bears witness to an adolescent surfing fiasco”, and in using of a “scar” to “recall the memories” that he describes as: “As if my body was once again opened up for scrutiny” (2003: 4-5). This method of recalling and recording memories seems to me to overlap with Melrose’s “expert-recall” in the sense of the artist-researcher’s “own grasp of her [decision-making] ‘process’ […] [that is] a way of seeing and knowing that is vitally important to making new work” (2012: 308-309).

Lyotard here recalls Plato’s dialogues in the Meno: 81b-d; 85 d- 86 b and Phaedo: 72c-76 d – an epistemological theory – that suggests human knowledge is discovered by accessing memory.

Recently, in “Derridian dispersion and Heideggerian articulation: general tendencies in the practices that govern intelligibility” (2001) Charles Spinosa explained: “The Derridian, however, believes that, even if there are moments where habitual practices enable determinations without decisions, his arguments show that we have no grounds for attributing logical priority to them” (203). Perhaps this ‘logicality’ is a sensory one? In 1981 Deleuze suggested in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (2003) that the “logic of sensation” is very different to rational logic. How I understand what Deleuze meant by sensation is that it precedes the self and is essentially the ever-changing material “stuff” of life.

See Deleuze and Guattari’s What Is Philosophy?, in the chapter “What Is a Concept?” for a detailed discussion on concepts (1994: 15 -24). They argued, for example: “There are no simple concepts” (3).

In the “Translator’s Forward: Pleasures of Philosophy” in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014) Brian Massumi wrote: “the authors steal from other disciplines with glee, but they are more than happy to return the favour” (xxv). See also M. Foucault: Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (1977: 208).

Michael Polanyi, in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1974) argued: “Throughout this book I have tried to make this situation apparent. I have shown that into every act of knowing there...
enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his [or her] knowledge” (viii).

1 See Noam Chomsky’s *Syntactic Structures* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2002: 27).
2 See, for example: Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2014: 16) and Deleuze’s *Foucault* (2010: 37).
3 Spelling and punctuation is as in original document.
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