MAKING ENEMIES: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PERSONALITY PROFILING OF IDEOLOGICAL ADVERSARIES

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD in Psychoanalysis, awarded by Middlesex University.

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SUBMISSION DATE:

March 2016
ABSTRACT

Focusing in particular on a psychoanalytic understanding of terrorism and adversarial political leaders, this thesis undertakes the textual analyses of significant individual profiles and the key texts reflecting psychoanalytic personality pathology profiling. The thesis situates the methodology of this normative, clinically oriented paradigm within the psychobiographic tradition of applied psychoanalysis and critiques the medico-scientific validity of ‘at a distance’ pathologising profiles.

The thesis presents its own analytic tools such as ‘clinical parallelism’, where a determinist ahistorical schema of a parallel clinical case is superimposed onto the psychobiographical subject. Arguing that it represents a paradigm shift in psychobiography, a methodological distinction is made between the characterological, traditionally Freudian subject of psychobiography, who is developed by the speculative reconstruction of childhood relationships. This is in contradistinction from a more object relational personological subject who is mainly inferred from adult behaviour. The distinction is emphasised throughout the thesis, and introduced through the wartime psychoanalytic profiles of Hitler.

The origins and early history of the overarching discipline of psychobiography including a critique of Freud’s only dedicated psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci are explored. This demonstrates that the flaws which surfaced early on in the psychobiographic project are still apparent in modern personality pathology profiling. Political personality profiling is then situated within the context of post War American psychoanalysis and its relationship to American political culture, and there is an exploration of the ethical dilemmas particularly in respect of the Barry Goldwater affair, which have ensued.

Predicated in particular, on the notion of early disturbed or traumatogenic object relating leading to narcissistic and paranoid functioning in adult life, the thesis examines how psychoanalytic theories are adapted in the pathologising discourse. There is a critique of the way psychoanalytic conceptualisations are integrated with ideological imperatives most notably by the principal protagonist of the thesis, Jerrold Post and the personality pathology theorists’ analysis of terrorist ‘pathology’.

The thesis concludes by arguing that the elision of psychoanalysis with the Western hegemonic and normative ideological position of the personality pathology paradigm represents an inherent bias. This risks through for example Nancy Kobrin’s cultural psychobiographic analysis of suicide terrorism, alienating in particular Islam, and undermines the perception of psychoanalysis as a universal discipline.
OBJECTIVES

1. To critically investigate the historical context of psychobiography within psychoanalysis, its methodology and precepts.

2. To show that normative interpretations of psychoanalytic concepts are deployed in adversarial political personality profiles, with the intention of constructing pathological subjects out of ideological adversaries.

3. To argue that the ‘at a distance’ technique deployed in personality pathology profiling cannot replicate the clinical context of psychoanalysis, and thus have neither diagnostic validity nor predictive efficacy.

4. To critique the taken for granted assumptions of personality pathology theory, in the psychoanalytic discourse of terrorism.

The thesis has as its overarching research question:

‘Can evidence be provided that psychoanalysis has been deployed for the ideologically determined personality pathologising of the leaderships of adversarial political regimes or those adversarial groups labelled as terrorist?’

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the following contribution: Debbie Howes, Catherine Geoghegan, Geraldine Day and Edward Day for their tolerance, encouragement and love; my supervisors Professor Antonia Bifulco and Dr Anne Worthington for their academic support and guidance.
## CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT**....................................................................................................................................... 2

**OBJECTIVES** .................................................................................................................................. 3

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .................................................................................................................. 3

1 The Ideological Context ......................................................................................................................... 9

2 The Assimilation of Psychoanalysis in American Culture ................................................................. 11

CHAPTER ONE: ....................................................................................................................................... 14

**SETTIN THE SCENE** ......................................................................................................................... 14

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 15

2 Chapter Structure and Summaries ..................................................................................................... 15

3 Key Concepts Defined ....................................................................................................................... 20

4 Psychobiography as Case History in Applied Psychoanalysis ................................................................ 24

5 Developing the Psychoanalytic Narrative of the Subject ..................................................................... 26

6 Flaws Inherent in the Psychobiographic Method .................................................................................. 29

7 Countertransference and Psychobiographic Bias .................................................................................. 33

8 Clinical Neutrality and Scientific Validity in Psychobiography .......................................................... 37

9 Identification and the Power to Label .................................................................................................. 40

10 Evidential Limitations in Psychobiographic Analyses ....................................................................... 43

11 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 47

CHAPTER TWO: ....................................................................................................................................... 48

**METHODS** ......................................................................................................................................... 48

1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 49

2 Collecting Evidence ............................................................................................................................ 49

3 Ethics .................................................................................................................................................. 52

4 Clinical Parallelism ............................................................................................................................. 53

5 A Differentiation between Personality and Character in Psychobiography ...................................... 56

6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 61

CHAPTER THREE: .................................................................................................................................. 63

**THE EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE PSYCHOBIOGRAPHIC PROJECT** .................................................. 63

1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 64

2 Freud’s Early Psychobiographic Musings ............................................................................................. 64

3 Isidor Sadger and the Pathography Debate ......................................................................................... 68

4 *Leonardo*, Freud’s First Dedicated Psychobiography ......................................................................... 72
INTRODUCTION
1 The Ideological Context

‘The cause is not the cause ... individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism’

‘political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit’
(Post, 1998, p 25, emphasis in the original).

‘To succeed in achieving its espoused cause would threaten the goal of survival ... Terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being’
(Post, 1998, p 38, emphasis in the original).

‘for the paranoid individual seeking a “legitimate” channel for his aggression, the terrorist group provides an ideal venue. Because terrorists bring their personalities with them when they enter the group, the same personality distortions that led to their conflict and isolation in society will express themselves in the group’
(Post, 1986, p 223).

In constituting the pathological terrorist subject, Jerrold Post’s statements above represent the key ‘ideological’ tenets of the ‘personality pathology’ theory of terrorism. As the leading proponent of this personality pathology paradigm and the principle protagonist of this thesis, Post’s personality pathology model is inherently predicated on the presumption that terrorists are a distinct psychologically classifiable group. As such, they have a uniform psychological functioning or ‘psycho-logic’ (Post, 1998, p 25). The central hypothesis of the personality pathology theory of terrorism is then, that terrorists are driven by internal psychological forces and thus not motivated ‘to achieve instrumental (e.g. political or economic) goals but rather rationalize violent acts that they are compelled to commit’ (Post, 2000, p 172).
Exploiting the psychoanalytic theories of early object relating from principally Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg, Post and the mainstream of personality pathology theorists argue that terrorism reflects not simply group pathology, but an accumulation of individually pathological group members. Similarly, as Shmuel Erlich points out, the individual terrorist in the ‘currently widely held psychoanalytic stance is clearly expressed in this formulation that mistreatment, delinquency, and disregard for others stem from faulty or traumatogenic early object relations’ (Erlich, 2003, p 148).

The terrorist group is seen in personality pathology theory as providing a home for these narcissistically injured paranoid individuals, with the group’s functioning then reflecting their paranoid pathology. Attempting compromise with terrorists would be ineffectual, because that would threaten their psychological raison d’être of perpetuating terrorist violence (Post, 1986; Post, 1998). So that for Kernberg, the ‘only effective way to deal with terrorism is to control and defeat it’, echoed by former US Vice President Dick Cheney who tells Fox News in January 2006 ‘[w]e don’t negotiate with terrorists. I think you have to destroy them’, (Kernberg, 2003, p 964; Newsmax, NewsMax.com Wires, January the 20th, 2006).

Recognition of a negotiable existential casus belli is counterproductive to a narrative in which the conceptualisation of terrorism is framed in terms of unconscious motivations existing within the terrorist himself. The thesis argument is that a taken for granted, hegemonic, normative ‘Western’ perspective, has enlisted psychoanalytic conceptualisations in support of one side in explaining politico/ideological conflicts. As Raymond Corrado argues, political terrorists are then seen as engaging ‘in gratuitous violence, which reveals psychopathological rather than socio-political’ causes (Corrado, 1981, p 295). The policy consequences are that if terrorists are pathological, ‘their political demands can be ignored and the strategic focus will be overwhelmingly a military response. If terrorists are political idealists, then it raises the possibility that complex political and social issues must be addressed by governmental policy’ (ibid, p 293).

At the present time, the Western preoccupation is with the rise of Islamic State or ISIS. Pretending Graeme Wood believes, that ISIS ‘isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to
counter it’ (Wood, 2015, p 6). Despite what are seen as his sincere intentions according to Jason Burke, President Barack Obama, repeats the same mistakes as the Bush administration post 9/11 in that President Obama’s ‘administration would “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, described the enemy as “a terrorist organisation, pure and simple” (Jason Burke, The Guardian, 19th of August, 2015). This is far from the case believes Burke, because ‘ISIS is a hybrid of insurgency, separatism, terrorism and criminality, with deep roots in its immediate local environment, in broader regional conflicts and in geopolitical battles’ (Burke, 2105).

The tenor of the post 9/11 American institutional discourse of terrorism reflected explanations in terms of an essentially ahistorical personality pathology paradigm. American spokesmen both official and unofficial showed according to Charles Townshend, ‘a marked reluctance to accept the fairly well-established view that Osama bin Laden’s primary casus belli against the USA was the defilement of Saudi Arabia by the presence of US troops. Instead they preferred more abstract explanations of the attacks rooted in envy or hostility’ (Townshend, 2002, p 9). The attractiveness of ascribing these ‘abstract’ explanations rooted in the personality rather than political strategy of their adversary is a reflection this thesis proposes, of an evolved American cultural sensibility to psychoanalytic commentary. Through the 1920’s and 30’s in America, psychoanalytic thought ‘quickly became firmly embedded in the nation’s cultural firmament’, and indeed remains, ‘a valuable lens by which to view the American idea and experience’ (Samuel, 2013, pp xi, xii). Both the institutional and the American public sphere, is then, readily amenable to a psychoanalytic perspective.

2 The Assimilation of Psychoanalysis in American Culture.

The reputation and acceptance of psychoanalysis in America, was further enhanced during the Second World War. There was for example a wide spread belief in the efficacy of psychoanalytic techniques for dealing with the psychological casualties of war (Hale, 1995; Burnham, 1978; Hale 2000). Professional pressures in Europe had historically consigned psychoanalysis, to practice principally in private (Wallerstein, 2002; Hale, 1995). Although there were many prominent lay psychoanalytic practitioners among the émigré community, and a burgeoning training programme for lay psychotherapy, post War American psychoanalysis was
itself medically dominated. In Post War USA bolstered by the intellectual talent of the European émigrés psychoanalysts as Nathan Hale writes, ‘gradually came to dominate psychiatric instruction in medical schools and schools of social work. By the mid-1960s, 58% of the chairmen of departments of psychiatry were psychoanalysts. Closely reflecting this general proportion, 6 out of 10 chairman at top medical schools were analysts or had had analytic training’ (Hale, 2000, p 82).

Consequently, in the US, psychoanalytic conceptions predominated in treating a much wider range of mental illnesses and disorders (Hale, 1995; Wallerstein 2002). In 1954 both the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Psychiatric Association jointly condemned ‘the practice of psychotherapy by any but trained physicians’ (Hale, 2000, p 84). This did give psychoanalysis an aura of scientific respectability, and with less emphasis on sexuality it was, argues Hale, a more ‘severe personal discipline’ which would morph into ‘the “pure” American version of psychoanalysis whose ultimate outcome was normalcy and happiness’ (Hale, 1995, p 277; Hale, 2000; Milton et al, 2004; Burnham, 1978). The analyst as either psychiatrist or psychoanalyst, the two terms were in the public perception seen as broadly synonymous at the time, was regarded as ‘warmly sympathetic, understanding, charismatic, and possessed of uncanny insight’ (Hale, 1995, p 278). Thus, psychoanalysis in American medical practice had become ‘comfortable and paternalistic, reconciled with conventional values’ (Milton et al, 2004, p 63; Hale, 2000).

With psychiatrists in this Post War period almost uniformly psychoanalytically oriented, psychoanalysis was part of a dominant new intellectual milieu, particularly influential according to Burnham, because they ‘represented scientists who were sensitive to the values of other intellectuals who shared the intellectuals’ concern with preserving Western civilization’ (Burnham, 1978 p 55; Hale 2000). Psychoanalysts were becoming the arbiters of the new normative, and inevitably the stereotypically down to earth but scientifically expert psychoanalytic practitioners were sought out for comment by the media (Hale, 1995). Indeed these analysts positively enjoyed, ‘being in the limelight’ and displaying their expertise (Slovenko, 2000, p 112; Hale, 1995). Thus evolved, the now accepted modern practice, of giving psychoanalytic clinically diagnostic opinion for public consumption, ‘at a distance’.
Modern personality pathology theorists reflect, the thesis argues a normative, particularly American hegemonic ideology. This has wider implications than the discourse of terrorism, both in the political sphere and within the discipline of psychoanalysis. This particular normative perspective of personality pathology informs an *a priori* clinical analytic stance when investigating phenomena such as terrorism. Thus, ideological determinations become intrinsically implicated in proposed psychoanalytic conceptualisations of those phenomena. These conceptualisations are then incorporated into the wider discourse of psychoanalysis, risking the identification of psychoanalysis with a particular normative political position. The key claim of the research undertaken here is to demonstrate that the subject constituted by personality pathology theorists, is actually an ideological rather than a psychoanalytic construct. A clinical essentially ahistorical notion of psychic functioning is applied in order to promote a particular normative and ideological discourse.
CHAPTER ONE:

SETTING THE SCENE
1 Introduction.

This chapter outlines the research structure relating it to the psychoanalytic theory, clinical practice, historical background and contemporary functioning of the personality pathology discourse. The key concepts of the thesis are defined and a pathologising discourse will be identified as a distinct and evolving paradigm within the applied psychoanalytic tradition of psychobiography. The mode of thinking about and describing a subject ‘at a distance’, is part of a tradition wherein psychoanalysis applies its concepts outside of the therapeutic context.

The validity of clinical psychoanalytic methods such as countertransference interpretation and clinical neutrality as it is applied outside of this therapeutic context will be critiqued. Mindful of the contingent historical factors which influence the direction of a discourse, the research will examine the seminal works in the psychobiographic project and these works are listed and contextualised in relation to their research themes.

2 Chapter Structure and Summaries.

This section sets out the organisation of the thesis by summarising each chapter as it develops the themes and objectives investigated in the research.

Introduction

The introduction sets out the general political context of the thesis, introduces the personality pathology paradigm of terrorism and establishes the status of psychoanalytic thinking in modern American culture.

Chapter One: Setting the Scene

In Chapter One the key concepts of the thesis are defined, in particular that of the applied psychoanalytic discipline of psychobiography. The status and validity of ‘therapeutic’ psychoanalytic techniques such as clinical neutrality and the analyst’s countertransference interpretation, as resources in clinical psychobiography, are critiqued.
The facsimile clinical encounter or pathography is introduced as the basis of personality pathology profiling, arguing that it inherently medicalises the subject. With the psychobiographical narrative based around conceptual themes of psychic functioning, psychobiographic data is not a simple accretion of historical facts, but a process of interpretation relating to meaning in the psychobiographer’s own subjectivity.

**Chapter Two: Methods.**

The methodology employed in this thesis is outlined and differentiated from historical research. The evidence adduced involves testing the original sources utilised by personality pathology theorists, biographical evidence, and the psychoanalytic conceptualisations and theoretical arguments deployed in the pathologising discourse. The key psychobiographies and texts examined in detail are outlined in relation to the research themes developed through them.

The chapter outlines the newly derived concept of ‘clinical parallelism’ one of the main methodological tools used in this research for analysing psychobiographic technique. In order to compensate for the lack of an actual therapeutic client, the clinical psychobiographic enquiry takes another ‘similar’ known subject or situation, and the ‘at a distance’ analysis then mirrors the developmental trajectory or analytic outcome of the actual case history. Thus, a determinist ahistorical schema of a parallel clinical case is superimposed onto the psychobiographical subject.

A further distinction is made between two basic psychoanalytic conceptualisations of subjectivity deployed in psychobiography and provides a method of differentiating them. Thus, the functioning of the characterological subject is intrapsychic, and the acquired character layers are understood through the Oedipal relationships and libidinal development. The personological subject, is inter-psychic and understood by reference to pre-oedipal oral phase particularly traumatic object relating, and also reflects the immutable inherited personality aspects or core self.

**Chapter Three: The Early Beginnings of the Psychobiographic Project.**
From Freud’s early musings which began the psychobiographic project, Chapter Three charts and critiques the early development of psychoanalytic thinking applied ‘at a distance’ to the understanding of both the artist and his art. Literary works were taken by Freud as analysable closed systems, with the product of the artist’s imagination taken as a comprehensive and indeed complete psychic formation.

Freud had intended his psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci to be a template for a more holistic approach, devised in order to counter the pathographies of psychoanalytic colleagues such as Isidor Sadger. Freud’s Leonardo would represent the characterological approach to psychobiography. Sadger’s pathographic methodology was predicated on uncovering on the twin themes of innate personality coupled with childhood sexuality. This directly presages the twin track genetic predisposition coupled with childhood trauma approach of the modern personological profiling of personality pathology theory.

Although Freud had originally declared that psychoanalysis must not be employed as a weapon of aggression, his later pathographic psychobiography of the World War One American President Woodrow Wilson was regarded as an outright character assassination, which opened the way for the application of psychoanalysis to politics.


This chapter compares and critiques two wartime psychobiographies of Adolf Hitler, Walter Langer’s A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler: His Life and Legend (1943) and Henry Murray’s Analysis of the personality of Adolf Hitler: With Predictions of His Future and Suggestions for Dealing With Him Now and After Germany’s Surrender (1943), reputedly the first modern political personality pathology profiling. Jerrold Post was to use Langer’s psychoanalytic study of Adolf Hitler as the template for his own CIA political profiling unit. This study utilises a traditionally Freudian characterological analysis, seeking to build up a comprehensive developmental picture of Hitler’s childhood. A second contrasting profile which later emerged from Murray inferred early narcissistic trauma from Hitler’s adult functioning. The thesis then draws a distinction between
Chapter Five: The Modern Context of Political Profiling.

In an era defined by Cold War paranoia, this chapter examines the discourse of adversarial psychoanalytic political profiling within the context of Post War American psychoanalysis. It traces the evolution of the public and media oriented psychological profiling of individuals ‘at a distance’. With increasing public scrutiny, reputations could be defamed by virtue of psychological diagnoses. Such diagnoses were similarly manipulated to meet public expectations as in the psychiatric profile of Lee Harvey Oswald by Renatus Hartogs, or politically exploited, as in the smearing of Daniel Ellsberg by the Richard Nixon administration.

The research explores how American psychiatry resolved the ethically contentious issue of psychoanalytically analysing a subject without consent, brought to a head through the furore over the politically motivated psychological denigration of US presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. The chapter relates Jerrold Post’s ongoing influence in the US/Israeli anti-terrorist and security matrix, and discusses the role of the ‘psychoanalytic expert’ in the public and institutional sphere.

Chapter Six: The Theory Behind Jerrold Post’s Personological Profiling.

The personality pathology theory of modern adversarial political personological profiling, encompasses chiefly ‘self psychological’ and ‘object relational’ perspectives. In particular, this includes the notion of an early disturbed or traumatogenic object relating, leading to narcissistic and paranoid functioning in adult life. The psychoanalytic conceptualisations deployed by Post (2004; 2006b) are principally the notion of ego identity and identity crisis (Erik Erikson), paranoid splitting and projection (Melanie Klein), malignant narcissism and borderline functioning (Otto Kernberg), the self object in the leader follower narcissistic transference relationship (Heinz Kohut) and group paranoia and paranoid leadership (Wilfred Bion).
‘At a distance’ diagnoses of narcissistic pathology are made according to an essentially ahistorical normative conception of the individual. These individual diagnoses are then extrapolated onto wider cohorts as the pathological basis of paranoid group functioning. The thesis follows through these theoretical strands in relation to Post’s adaptations of them, arguing that there is necessarily a mismatch between the normatively applied theoretical model and a complex and messy existential reality.

The putative success of the Camp David profiles of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, gave Post and his CIA profiling unit a great deal of kudos and the authority of expertise in government circles. The research contrasts Post’s benign profile of Anwar Sadat, with his pathography of Saddam Hussein within their contemporary political contexts. As well as influencing the US Congressional vote during the 1990 Gulf Crisis, Post was also closely involved with US intelligence circles in the run up to 2003 Iraq War, arguing that Saddam’s ‘malignantly narcissistic personality’ would make it impossible for him to ever give up his weapons of mass destruction (Post 2003). The thesis critiques his evolving profiling strategy.

**Chapter Seven: Psychoanalytic Cultural Critiques and Ideological Polemics.**

As opposed to the analysis of individuals which may then be extrapolated to wider cohorts, Chapter Seven concerns bespoke cultural psychobiography such as Nancy Kobrin’s analysis of Islamic culture. This form of analysis relies for its validity more on its resonance to the particular culture rather than the clinical expertise of the analyst or exact consonance with psychoanalytic theory which may be quite loosely adapted. The chapter describes how certain psychoanalysts integrate a psychoanalytic sensibility with ideological imperatives, in order to construct a pathologising discourse of terrorism. The thesis shows how Post’s notion of the ‘threat of success’ which he states determines the repetition compulsion of figures such as Yasser Arafat and the PLO, reflects a normative ideological position of psychic rather than existential cause of terrorism. Becoming part of the literature, these reified ideological assumptions are then re-adduced as evidence determining clinically oriented psychoanalytic assumptions of terrorism.
The difficulties of the psychoanalytic analyses of non Western cultures are examined, and how psychoanalysis may be deployed in open cultural polemics, particularly in respect of a denigration of Islamic societies. The thesis argues that it is a category error to ascribe developmental psychic trajectories for individuals engaged in a contingent activity such as terrorism, which is an indeterminate notion anyway. Such ascriptions are merely labelling exercises undertaken by the psychoanalyst as expert, and collective group motivation is erroneously re-adduced as the psychic trajectory of the individuals in that group.

Adherence to a collective phantasy rather than the acting out of an individual fantasy script is argued as the distinguishing feature of the terrorist as opposed to for example, the serial killer. A psychoanalytic explanation for the psychic conditioning to brutality which allows otherwise psychologically healthy individuals to commit acts of terrorism, is offered.

**Conclusion**

The concluding argument of the thesis is that the elision of psychoanalysis with the Western hegemonic and normative ideological position of the personality pathologists represents a risk of alienating in particular Islam, and undermines the perception of psychoanalysis as a universal discipline. The Conclusion focuses on the flaws identified in the personality pathology paradigm which facilitate the ideological bias argued by the thesis. The themes and evidence produced by this research are summarised, demonstrating that the modern discourse of psychoanalytic adversarial profiling is contingent upon a series of complex events and relationships. It is argued that the psychoanalytic cultural critique of the individual in a terrorist group need not necessarily pathologise that individual.

**3 Key Concepts Defined.**

Modern psychological profiling derives from attempts ‘to conduct personality assessments of political leaders “at a distance”’, and the methodology deployed by personality pathology theorists is termed in this thesis as the clinical ‘at a distance’ profile (Horgan, 2002-3, p 3; Goleman, 1991; Brainard, 2011; Carey, 2011).
Political ‘at a distance’ profiling derived from the applied psychoanalysis of pathographic or clinical/medical psychological analysis, an early variant of the psychobiographic project. Applied psychoanalysis is itself a notion broadly defined according to Eric Nuetzel, as the ‘use of psychoanalytic ideas in the study of human activities outside the purview of the psychoanalytic consulting room’ (Nuetzel, 2003, p 396). Psychoanalysis is not merely the pre-eminent paradigm within psychobiography but the discipline is effectively a branch of ‘applied psychoanalysis’. As such, psychobiography has institutional recognition, and this relationship, is at the core of the thesis.

Given the right circumstances the American Psychiatric Association (APA) ‘Task Force on Psychohistory’ states that, ‘a psychoanalytically- trained psychiatrist (or other professional in human behavior) can come to a rather reliable estimate of the principal motivational forces, the more significant personal conflicts, and the basic psychological adaptive measures of his subject’ (Hoffling et al, 1976, p 4). The uncovering of these motivational forces are indeed the espoused the basis, and effectively the definition of, the psychobiographic project.

Within the field of psychobiography, there is a great deal of methodological and terminological overlap, with the terms psychobiography and psychohistory being used somewhat interchangeably in the literature (Runyan, 1984; Hofling et al, 1976). Psychobiography, the thesis takes to be the motivational analysis of an individual. Psychohistory may refer to an older usage for an individual’s psychic history or as representing the application of psychoanalytic concepts to a wider historical or cultural sphere (Runyan, 1984; Hofling et al, 1976). For clarity, this thesis will use only the term psychobiography throughout, taking it to reflect a psychoanalytic biography of an individual but also the psychoanalytic appraisal of a social context. The term profiling is used in the context of this thesis, to describe the psychobiographic process being applied to a designated living subject for a specific agenda, rather than psychobiography undertaken from intellectual curiosity.

In any event, ‘at a distance’ clinical profiling, psychobiography and psychohistory, all derive from the same historical origin, all rely on the same epistemological resources and basic methodology in order as Peter Lowenberg puts it, to ‘reconstruct, or re-create in their minds, the life of their subjects’ (Lowenberg,
Specifically, clinical ‘at a distance’ adversarial political profiles are as this thesis defines them: **clinically oriented analyses undertaken without having conducted a personal interview and without the consent or even the knowledge of the subject in order to gain a psychological advantage over that subject within particular set of circumstances or in order to publicly present an adverse image of that subject.** These profiles are undertaken either under the auspices of or, in support of a normative institutional position.

There is then, an inherently normative imperative, that is to say an acceptance of the socially dominant regulatory regime, the thesis contends, for analysts privileging ‘personality pathology’ attributions, to portray radical or revolutionary groups including those who may employ terrorism as a tactic, as being inherently problematic from a psychoanalytic perspective. The ‘tendency among analysts is’ as K. R. Eissler puts it, ‘to look at a patient engaging in revolutionary activities or believing in revolutionary persuasion as acting out’ (Eissler, 2002, p132).

As a corollary of these subjects being outside of the analyst’s ideological and normative value system, there is a commensurate corollary to pathologise, that is to say, **regard those groups and indeed the individuals within them as being psychologically abnormal.** Ideology is understood in this thesis as defined by Erik Erikson, to be ‘an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and the individual sense of identity’ (Erikson, 1972, p 20).

Psychoanalysis itself, this thesis contends, becomes part of a politico-ideological discourse in pathologising those individuals who take up arms against this normative establishment or politico/socially dominant class. This is a class or establishment, of which the American psychoanalyst is regarded as an integral part. A prominent exemplar of the psychoanalyst in the service of government (the CIA), Post was instrumental in furthering a psychoanalytic perspective in the profiling of political leadership.

For the methodology of his CIA profiling unit, Post adapted what he terms the ‘clinical case study to mental illness’ (Post, 2006a, p 52). Designed to replicate the context of the clinical encounter, the thesis proposes that these pathographic ‘at a distance’ profiles reflect distinctly ‘diagnostic’ analyses of their subjects, with the
consequent presumption of some form of individual pathology to investigate. The thesis proposes that in order to compensate for the lack of an actual therapeutic client, the clinical psychobiographic enquiry takes another ‘similar’ known subject or situation and the ‘at a distance’ analysis mirrors the developmental trajectory or analytic process and outcome of an actual case history.

Although personality is a somewhat amorphous notion, Gordon Allport gives a reasonably succinct definition of personality, as the ‘dynamic organization within the individual of the psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behaviour and thought’ (Allport, 1961, p 28). When that characteristic behaviour and thought is deemed to be psychologically outside of the norm, it constitutes some form of personality pathology. The personality pathology theorists engaged in modern adversarial profiling rely principally upon a synthesis of psychoanalytic ‘self psychology’ and ‘object relational’ perspectives, and along with genetic determinants, the notion of early disturbed object relating leading to narcissistic and paranoid pathological functioning in adult life.

The functioning of a characterological subject evolves intrapsychically, and is understood through his Oedipal relationships and libidinal development. This subject has an acquired psychic formation, disturbances of which tend to the neuroses. The characterological subject in psychobiography is developed by the speculative reconstruction of childhood relationships. The personological subject, as it is understood in this thesis is constituted through inter-psychic relationships. This personological subject is influenced by the pre-oedipal oral phase, particularly early traumatic object relating, and the immutable hereditary aspects or core self. Psychic disturbances of this personality formation tend to the psychoses. The personological subject in psychobiography is mainly the thesis proposes, inferred from adult behaviour.

The ‘traumatogenic quality’ of disturbed object relating to early care givers particularly the mother, depends according to Werner Bohleber, on whether

‘an intensive relationship has developed between the child and object. The object relationship itself acquires a traumatic quality ... it is not primarily the child’s injuries from physical force that produce a traumatic disorder; rather, the most intensely pathogenic element is mistreatment or abuse by
the person whose protection and care is needed ... The greater the trauma, the more severe is not only the damage to the internal object relationship, but also the breakdown in the protective, stabilizing internal communication between self – and object – representations’ (Bohleber, 2007, p 339).

Such traumatogenic experiences form a component of personality, as a “mechanism of narcissistic protection”, representing ‘a stable, more or less rigid, organization of the libidinal economy of the person; it is at the same time submitted to the pressures of the drives and to social constraints, to gratifying or traumatic experiences, and to the repetitions or defenses that they give rise to’ (Dadoun, 2005, p 271).

Although not a specifically designated grouping, the major protagonists of this thesis would reasonably be recognised as what Marc Sageman terms personality pathology theorists and the subject which they constitute is in the context of this thesis, a personological one (Sageman, 2004, p 83). Although this notion of personality pathology theory inherently privileges the role of the individual, it does by extension also propose the particularity of a group ‘personality’ in determining psychic functioning. The group is seen as a reflection of the leader’s psyche, particularly in charismatic leadership.

The concept of charismatic leadership is deployed comprehensively by Post, who takes Weber’s notion of charismatic authority ‘as a personal authority deriving from “devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him”’ (Post, 2015, p 72; Weber, 1922). Post is at pains to point out that charismatic authority is a two way relationship, and that charismatic leaders ‘are at heart the creation of their followers’ (Post, 2015, p 72). As opposed to the purely clinical context of the case history, psychobiographic profiling is intrinsically linked to its social, indeed ideological, context.

4 Psychobiography as Case History in Applied Psychoanalysis.
Psychobiography did derive ostensibly as a form of substitute case history outside of the consulting room, and was later ‘applied’ as a form of psychoanalytic enquiry in its own right. From the inception of the Freudian project, the goal of ‘applied’ psychoanalysis was, according to Fritz Schmidl, ‘to emphasize that literature, mythology, etc could be demonstrated to confirm Freud’s theories, notably the Oedipus Complex’ (Schmidl, 1972, p 404). There is a traditionalist view though which contends that true psychoanalysis is found only in the clinical therapeutic context, and that only data derived from there should serve as the empirical basis for all psychoanalytic propositions (Esman, 1998). As a corollary, according to Esman, it is only in the clinical context ‘that these propositions can be tested for their validity. The interchange between analyst and patient is, in this view, akin to a laboratory situation’ (Esman, 1998, p 741).

The notion of the therapeutic context as being akin to the scientifically controlled environment or closed system, for scientifically testing hypotheses is inherently problematised, because of the intimate and private nature of the clinical encounter. There are also too many external factors which impinge, with Susan Budd a practising independent psychotherapist doubting the possibility of a ‘full and clear statement of case material which will let us decide whether the theory which was used to decipher the clinical facts was adequate or not’ (Budd, 1997, p 31).

Case material is never then simply a ‘true’ and unexpurgated reflection of the clinical encounter. As a stylised record of treatment, a case history may be produced for therapeutic supervision or more formally and publicly according to Budd, ‘in order to support a theoretical argument or demonstrate a process’ (Budd, 1997, p 31). Indeed the essential quandary of the case history is how to put into the ‘public domain’, that which is inherently intimate and private, within a culturally acceptable format.

Similarly, in being a culturally situated practice, psychoanalytic thinking ‘is affected by general intellectual shifts’, as with changing psychoanalytic notions of whether homosexuality is to be regarded as a perversion for example (Budd, 1997, p 31, p 38). Similarly, changing psychoanalytic attitudes regarding women reflect societal change rather than clinical discoveries. A substantial school of thought as Esman has it argues that ‘clinical facts’ may themselves be somewhat ethereal, ‘constantly changing, ever elusive, intersubjectively or socially constructed’
(Esman, 1998, p 746). From an epistemological perspective, clinical ‘discoveries’ are almost invariably already theory laden, and theory is inevitably imbued with observations from applied psychoanalysis. Indeed, as Schmidl points out, that ‘[i]n almost every instance where Freud wrote about a subject outside of psychoanalysis proper, he made significant contributions to psychoanalysis itself’ (Schmidl, 1972, p 403).

Commentators such as Esman argue, then, that there is no absolute distinction between clinical and applied psychoanalysis, pointing out that in his The Interpretation of Dreams Freud had used his own dreams as data, not data acquired in the clinical encounter (Esman, 1998; Freud, 2001/1900, S.E. IV; Freud, 2001/1900, S.E. V). Similarly, Freud had made theoretical observations concerning the unconscious roots of paranoia derived from the story of Schreiber and his first thoughts on narcissism are found in his Leonardo (Freud, 2001/1911, S.E. XII; Freud, 2001/1910 S.E. XI). Just as ‘cultural phenomena served to illustrate or reinforce Freud’s nascent ideas about individual and social psychology’, so too ‘the published clinical cases were intended to serve this end’ (Esman, 1998, p 743). Freud believed that long before he was aware of him, ‘a little Hans would come who would be so fond of his mother that he would be bound to feel afraid of his father because of it’ (Freud, 2001/1905, S.E. X, p 42). The extrapolation of such Oedipal relationships are, a central and recurring theme in psychobiography.

5 Developing the Psychoanalytic Narrative of the Subject.

In his Young Man Luther, Erik Erikson describes Luther’s supposed relationship to his mother:

‘A big gap exists here, which only conjecture could fill. But instead of conjecturing half-heartedly, I will state, as a clinician’s judgment, that nobody could speak and sing as Luther did if his mother’s voice had not sung to him of some heaven; that nobody could be as torn between his masculine and feminine sides, nor have such a range of both, who did not at one time feel that he was like his mother; but also, that nobody could discuss women and marriage in the way he often did who had not been
deeply disappointed by his mother - and had become loath to succumb the way she did to the father, to fate’

(Erikson, 1958, p 69).

What Erikson is doing is moving from a presumed characteristic of Luther’s, to the ‘inferential reconstruction of essential data about the latter’s family environment. We have here, instead of the legitimate confirmation of an outline whose essential shape is already traced, the creation of a quasi-arbitrary drawing’ (Friedländer, 1978, 27). The principle defect of employing clinical methodology in psychobiography is then that its findings are to rest ultimately on the therapist’s own intuition (Elms, 1994).

A psychobiography reflects the analyst’s own and current perception of his subject, and he analyses’ biographical data in terms of that perception. The psychobiographical narrative is then organised around themes or overarching metaphors reflecting that perception such as Mahatma Gandhi’s celibacy symbolic of his pacifism or Barry Goldwater’s paranoid warmongering which are seen as emblematic of his paranoid psychic functioning. For psychoanalysis ‘at a distance’, it is the initial view or a priori perception of the subject which is critical.

Indeed that an original clinical intuition or diagnosis influences the subsequent perception of the subject, is well established by research (Langer and Abelson, 1974). In their own 1974 experiment on the effect of ‘labels on clinicians’ judgement’, Langer and Abelson recorded the evaluations of psychoanalysts who viewed the same interview but with half believing the subject to be a patient and half a job applicant. Their findings were that ‘[w]hen the interviewee was labelled “patient,” he was described as significantly more disturbed than he was when he was labelled “job applicant”’ (Langer and Abelson, 1974, p 4). Those analysts believing the subject to be a job interviewee saw a “candid and innovative”; “ordinary, straightforward”; “upstanding middle-class-citizen type” whereas those who believed they were viewing a patient, found someone “frightened of his own aggressive impulses” with “considerable hostility, repressed or channelled” (ibid, p 8). Similarly, the ‘job’ group found the subject “fairly realistic” whereas the ‘patient’ group found his “outlook not based on realities of the ‘objective world’” (Langer and Abelson, 1974, p 8).
In his study of undercover ‘pseudopatients’ in a psychiatric hospital, David Rosenhan found that the original diagnostic labelling was the key determinant on how a subject was viewed by the medical staff (Rosenhan, 1973). How the patient’s language was interpreted, took on an entirely different meaning for example, as it would have been ascribed if it were known that the man was “normal” (Rosenhan, 1973-2012, p 5).

Commensurate with what he has decided as his subject’s personality theme, the psychobiographer is searching for a hook upon which to hang his theory, a chink of insight to help prise open the personality, as William Schultz describes, it a ‘koan (i.e., in the Zen tradition, a paradoxical, elusive phrase or episode requiring for its solution a leap to another level of understanding)’ (Schultz, 2005, p 8). So that apart from the rare instances of, for example, Erikson’s comprehensive biographies of Luther (Erikson, 1958) and Gandhi (Erikson, 1993/1970), the psychobiographic focus is much narrower than that of a standard biography, or of historical research in general. Psychobiography as Schultz points out tends to target ‘one facet of a life at a time, a more or less discrete episode or event or action’ (Schultz, 2005, p 9). This leads to a different basis for the accumulation of knowledge in history and psychobiography, and thus each discipline has differential perspective on the same epistemological resources.

Data in psychobiography ‘only gradually begins to take on meaning and consistency in the light of given hypotheses’, in a process ‘not unlike the methodological technique of the psychoanalyst in his work with the history and meaning of his patient’s life’ (Meissner, 2003, p 184). What distinguishes the psychobiographer’s process in Meissner’s view is that psychobiographic data does not exist as historical fact per se. Data only exists in relation to the psychobiographer’s interpretation of it, and ‘[s]ubstantiating the claims of psychological interpretation requires a distinctly different method, and therein lies the difference between biography and psychobiography’ (Meissner, 2003, p 186).

In psychobiography, there is not an accretion of knowledge on the unfolding ontological topic, because psychobiographic taxonomy is by theoretical orientation and conceptual agenda. So that Erikson’s Young Man Luther (1958) rather than being classed in Renaissance or religious history is seen as illuminating for
example an ego psychological perspective on identity crisis. Scholars then engage with the work on the basis of its psychoanalytic and not historical salience. Even where there is a corpus of psychobiographic work on a particular individual, as notably on Adolf Hitler, they do not inherently build on each other. Rather, in what this thesis terms as Walter Langer’s characterological as opposed to Henry Murray’s personological profile, they are competing psychoanalytic conceptualisations of Hitler’s psyche (Langer, 1943; Murray, 1943). However, both the Langer and Murray profiles emphasize the pathology of their subject, and the thesis argues that this is not incidental to the obviously egregious Hitler, but represents a pathologising discourse within psychobiography.

6 Flaws Inherent in the Psychobiographic Method.

The pathologising discourse stands or falls this thesis argues, on its particular and specific evidence and method, rather than simply relying on the probity of the theoretical concepts deployed. As an established tradition within psychoanalysis, psychobiography has an extended corpus of works including scholarly critiques on its methodology. This research will extend this by identifying a distinct personality pathology strand within psychobiography, as represented in particular by the clinical ‘at a distance’ adversarial political profile.


These psychobiographic critiques have been synthesised and systematised in, what is intended as a form of methodological best practice by Schultz, in his Handbook of Psychobiography (2005). Schultz stipulates that psychobiographies should be cogent, having basic interpretative persuasion, and that the narrative structure should let ‘conclusions follow naturally from an array of data’ (Schultz, 2005, p 7). Indeed Freud (2001/1910, S.E. XI) had argued that psychobiographical
data should be collected iteratively, rather than drawing conclusions from a single mass of data.

There should be a *data convergence* from as many and varied sources as possible and that the evidence should be logically sound, ergo free from self contradiction, and show as Schultz terms it, *consistency* with other psychic knowledge and be able to withstand falsification (Schultz, 2005). Primarily though, Schultz advocates what he terms ‘sudden coherence’, because the ‘best interpretations make the initially incoherent cohere. Mystery’s elucidation is psychobiography’s most salutary aim’ (Schultz, 2005, p 7). Whilst mystery’s elucidation is the principled aim of the psychobiographic project it will be argued in this thesis, that there is a strain within psychobiography which gives primacy to a purely ideological representation of the subject. In doing so, these particular psychobiographies reflect a number of the methodological flaws identified within the psychobiographic project generally.

Psychobiographic ‘reconstruction’ consists in the inventing of ‘psychological facts inferentially for which no direct evidence exists. Often resorted to in the absence of verifiable data about childhood history’ (Schultz, 2005, p 10). Known as the ‘critical period fallacy’, an attempt is made to construct the study of an individual’s life, around a presumed key period such as childhood (Runyan, 1984, p 209). Similarly, an incident in the subject’s life, perhaps simply by virtue of its being well documented, is given undue significance, in a reductive flaw known as ‘eventism’. This episode is then taken as ‘not only the prototype of his behaviour but the turning point in his life from which all subsequent events and work are derived’ (Runyan, 1984, p 209, emphasis in the original).

There is also a form of *post hoc* fallacy where the putative symptomology is traced back to a known childhood event, but this is done without ever being able to validate whether that event was psychically significant for the subject, or whether it had acquired significance simply by virtue of being documented. Again, due to the often paucity of psychobiographic data, the mere fact that the event is known, often determines that it is given psychic significance, or more particularly, that it has psychic resonance for the psychobiographer’s purposes. An inherent psychobiographic focus on the significance given to childhood development, where childhood if documented at all, is usually of the least well known period of the
individual’s life. Milton Lomask regards this as representing a flaw in itself, which he terms as ‘simplism’ (Lomask, 1987, p 131).

The general flaw of ‘reductionism’ as a criticism of psychobiography per se, explains ‘adult character and behavior exclusively in terms of early childhood experience while neglecting later formative processes and influences’, (Schultz, 2005, p 10). The tendency is also known after Erikson as ‘orinology’, with Erikson in particular criticising the reductionism of analyses predicated specifically on childhood trauma that he describes as ‘traumatology’, precisely the method deployed by personality pathology theorists in the pathologising discourse (Erikson, 1993/1970; Runyan, 1984).

The general lack of adequate biographic evidence is a problem inherent in the psychobiographic project. This leads to the tendency of inferring or indeed ‘reconstructing’ childhood development and other aspects of the subject’s life. Or similarly by making a clinical diagnosis and then taking childhood development as symptomology, a method known as pathography. Such reconstruction is needed in psychobiography, because the preeminent role of childhood in determining adult psychic functioning is axiomatic in psychoanalysis. However, David Stannard argues that, psychoanalysis does not establish reliable connections between childhood experiences and adult personality, and that the ‘best modern research now firmly indicates that there are no psychological structures established in early childhood that are sufficiently resilient to survive into adulthood without constant environmental support’ (Stannard, 1980, p 150, emphasis in the original).

Indeed the overarching argument, of which Stannard is a prominent exponent, is that, as there is no scientific proof of the efficacy of psychoanalytic therapy, and that as psychoanalytic theory is logically flawed, so ‘goes the essential underpinning of psychohistorical explanation’ (Stannard, 1980, p 58). Stannard’s argument is that psychobiography is invalidated per se, because of the lack of scientific evidence for its propositions. However, there will always be aspects of psychoanalysis’ object of enquiry, which are simply not be amenable to strictly scientific appraisal and validation, whether or not one accepts psychoanalysis as a science (Meyerhof, 1969; Friedländer, 1978).
Using psychoanalytic propositions in general, in order to reconstruct from adult behaviour to supposed childhood experiences, Stannard regards as a function of the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy. Added to what Stannard sees as this dubious presumption of causation following childhood events, is the indeterminacy of interpretation, where ‘in the absence of objective and verified data analysts are free to emphasize one aspect of psychoanalytic theory and deemphasize another’ (Stannard, 1980, p 36).

If psychoanalytic propositions are invalid in reconstructing childhood experiences, even in the clinical context, as Stannard argues, discussion of their application to psychobiography would simply be moot. However, if one does accept the validity of psychoanalytic propositions, the application of a diagnostic clinical methodology to the psychobiographic project, is nonetheless problematic. The practice is known as pathography, the combating of which had been Freud’s principle reason for undertaking his *Leonardo*. Schultz describes pathography as ‘[p]sychobiography by diagnosis, or reducing the complex whole of personality to static psychopathological categories and/or symptoms’ (Schultz, 2005, p 10). This thesis contends that pathography is the key technique in the clinical psychobiographies of the pathologising discourse.

By undertaking what George Makari describes as the ‘medical and psychiatric evaluation’ of historical figures, psychiatrist Paul Möbius as early as 1870, was undertaking a ‘pathographic’ form of analysis (Makari, 2008, p 167). Actually terming his method as ‘pathography’, everybody was according to Möbius, ‘pathological to a certain degree’ (Möbius quoted in Schiller, 1982, p 80; Möbius, 1909). This was itself a notion which had been explored as Johan Schioldann argues, with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and ‘their reflections on genius and its possible association to insanity’ (Schioldann, 2003, p 303).

In psychoanalysis itself, ‘the portions of the theory which deal with psychopathology are the portions which are most developed’ (Anderson, 1981, p 456). Extrapolating the clinical/therapeutic to psychobiography tends to be albeit by default reductionist and somewhat ‘one-sided’, because the psychobiographer’s inherent tendency is to ‘overemphasizes the subject’s psychological difficulties’ (Anderson, 1981, p 456). In any event, as Elms expresses it, clinical data is in itself ‘basically pathographic in orientation’ (Elms, 1994, p 13).
Pathography represents an attempt to impose an identifiable clinical framework onto the subject’s life, the medicalised or clinical psychological narrative of a subject. Adversarial clinical ‘at a distance’ personality profiling, is as this thesis argues, a form of pathographic enquiry which seeks the scientific validation through psychoanalysis, of an ideological position. The role of the clinician is then, the thesis argues, fundamentally different in ‘at a distance’ profiling, from that of the therapeutic setting.

7 Countertransference and Psychobiographic Bias.

One ‘methodological point truly unique to clinical work’, is in Erikson’s view, ‘the disposition of the clinician’s “mixed” feelings, his emotions and opinions. The evidence is not “all in” if he does not succeed in using his own emotional responses during a clinical encounter as an evidential source and as a guide in intervention, instead of putting them aside with a spurious claim to unassailable objectivity’ (Erikson, 1959, p 93). The deep subjective involvement of the psychobiographic researcher is for Lowenberg, a qualitative difference between general history and psychohistory (Lowenberg, 1983).

Indeed one of the putative clinical techniques deployed in psychobiography in order to compensate for the lack of existential evidence, is the deployment of the analyst’s own countertransference reactions as evidence. The claim is that the psychobiographic ‘encounter’ as a facsimile clinical encounter, is replete with a transference relationship. The argument of this thesis is that as the subject takes absolutely no part in the process, there can be no relationship, what is occurring in the analyst’s head is simply a metaphor for a relationship.

Assessing the validity of using a form of clinical transference relationship in psychobiography, Stannard argues that:

‘As a therapeutic technique it requires the existence of a living subject, one willing and able to actively participate in the effort to reach awareness of the allegedly repressed impulses or forgotten traumatic events (and their unique interpretations) that are said to underlie the symptoms in question. This
active participation - necessarily involving, it is claimed, transference feelings onto the person of the analyst - is essential to the cooperative process of giving insight, overcoming resistances, “making the unconscious conscious”, and eventually effecting a cure. The fact that this is patently and by simple definition impossible when dealing with the scattered literary remains of a long-dead (and therefore, needless to say, inactive and non-participating) subject has led many - most notably good psychoanalytically trained clinicians – to dismiss out of hand as what Freud himself called “wild” psychoanalysis’

(Stannard, 1980, p vii).

Even in psychoanalytic terms, the lack of a direct response from the subject makes a transference relationship essentially untenable, and psychobiography as a concept, is essentially “wild” psychoanalysis’ (Stannard, 1980). The argument is that the impossibility of a transference relationship, effectively the therapeutic context, means that psychobiography has no validity per se (ibid).

However, whether or not there is a transference relationship in psychobiography does not depend on the validity of psychoanalytic concepts, or the efficacy of psychoanalysis as therapy. The psychobiographer is not seeking to effect a ‘cure’. The psychobiographer is seeking to understand and has feelings towards his subject, and so there is ipso facto, some form of transference relationship. A transference relationship, albeit one-sided, does exist between the psychobiographer and his data, which may give a valid and unique psychoanalytic insight into the psychobiographer’s version of the subject, and may also promote a wider psychoanalytic understanding. The argument of this thesis is that, the transference relationship in psychobiography is something entirely other than a facsimile clinical case. Psychobiography does not have clinical validity without the participation of a willing subject, but should not be assessed in those terms.

However, when psychoanalysts in general terms as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, refer to the ‘unqualified use of the term “transference”’ it is ‘transference during treatment.’

Classically, the transference is acknowledged to be the terrain on which all the basic problems of a given analysis play themselves out: the establishment,
modalities, interpretation and resolution of the transference are in fact what define the cure’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p 455, emphasis in the original).

Freud had come across the notion of ‘transference’ whilst working in conjunction with his early collaborator Joseph Breuer. In their 1895 work *Studies in Hysteria*, Freud notes that if the ‘relation of the patient to the physician is disturbed, her cooperativeness fails too; when the physician tries to investigate the next pathological idea, the patient is held up by an intervening consciousness of the complaints against the physician that have been accumulating in her’ (Freud and Breuer, 1986, p 389).

Although there are a number of differing perspectives on the concept, countertransference is broadly taken as the ‘whole of the analyst’s unconscious reactions to the individual analysand especially to the analysand’s own transference’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p 92). Although Freud did not actually have much to say on the subject of countertransference, in his 1910 paper *Future Prospects of Psycho-Analysis*, he has it that, ‘we have become aware of the “counter-transference”, which arises in him as a result of the patient’s influence on his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that he shall recognize this counter-transference in himself and overcome it’ (Freud, 1910, XI, pp 144).

In arguing that there is an ‘at a distance’ transference relationship, the psychobiographic matrix incorporates, according to Manfred Kets De Vries, the interaction between ‘the researcher, the subject, the data and the audience’, so that ‘after a sufficient immersion, the subject starts “talking” to the researcher and evokes certain responses - that is, countertransference reactions’ (Kets De Vries, 1990, p 427). These ‘certain responses’ or ‘countertransference reactions’, are with the psychobiographer’s data and not his subject. The “talking” is metaphor not facsimile. Whatever analytic technique is employed, it cannot compensate for flaws or lack in the data, but may actually compound those flaws through an analytic rationalisation of them. In the therapeutic transference relationship, it is the patient’s feelings which are redirected or transferred onto the analyst. In psychobiography, this relationship is at all times a function of the projection back on himself of the psychobiographer’s own responses or countertransference towards his data.
Notwithstanding arguments over scientific validity, and the disagreement between the various psychoanalytic schools in respect of its therapeutic value, the analyst’s countertransference in psychobiography this thesis argues, seeks to make subjectivity into a virtue in order to simply mitigate an amalgam of inherent biases. Interpreting through the prism of the analyst’s own theoretical and ideological position is known as ‘intuition bias’, and with ‘confirmation bias’, information is interpreted to confirm the existing beliefs. Where after an event has occurred there arises a belief that it was ‘known’ that this eventuality was inevitably going happen, before the event actually took place is known as ‘hindsight bias’. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in the case of Renatus Hartogs, the psychobiographer may actively discount prior information or evidence, in favour of an interpretation commensurate with a teleological trajectory towards his current perception of the subject.

The psychobiographer obviously relies on historical and biographical sources, but it would need to be his intuition and interpretation which turned this material into clinical data. A statement from a subject need not then be taken by the psychobiographer as transparent, as it may be regarded for example as a ‘reaction formation’, conveying the opposite of a true belief. This purely subjective assessment may lead to a bias where an unfavourable attitude towards the subject is seen as a legitimate clinically interpretable countertransference reaction on the part of the analyst. This in turn may be treated as actual evidence in his analysis, with the ‘perceptive’ researcher using his countertransference as another data source for validating inferences (Kets De Vries (1990).

Reified speculations or retrodictions from these inferences become part of a particular profile, and then in turn form part of the accredited literature. So that in formulating theories or indeed as part of a diagnostic evaluation, what were originally speculative inferences become part of the supportive evidence. What was actually flimsy evidence now appears more plausible because it relates to earlier ‘findings’, although these findings were originally only reified speculations in themselves. Later commentators proceed ‘as if’ the contentions were given facts and therefore re-present/represent them, without any of the original caveats. With successive authors uncritically using these reified speculations as cited fact, an entire corpus of wholly spurious evidence becomes extant in the literature. There is
then an inbuilt bias concerning the subject, in the literature, instead of an \textit{a priori} position of clinical neutrality.

### 8 Clinical Neutrality and Scientific Validity in Psychobiography.

In the clinical therapeutic context, the notion of clinical neutrality is designed to counter any inherent analyst bias. In his discussion paper on the topic, Jay Greenberg (2012/1986) argues that in taking analytic neutrality as a goal, the ‘analyst should try to create an atmosphere in which respect for all aspects of the patient’s personality’ is regarded. Contrarily, the neutrality of the researcher, who ‘by the nature of his task is indifferent to the wellbeing of his subject’ is very different from that of the ‘healer’ (Greenberg, 2012/1986, p 4, p 2). In respect of neutrality, by their very natures, the therapeutic approach is necessarily at odds with the psychobiographical research approach. Clearly, it is possible to incorporate particular clinical insights into psychobiography, but not as the thesis seeks to show, to incorporate a wholesale clinical/therapeutic methodology into psychobiography.

In acknowledging that there are caveats to the deployment of psychoanalytic techniques generally in biography, Anderson calls for full credit to be prominently afforded at the outset to the accomplishments of the subject, because ‘it is exceedingly difficult for a psychobiographer to prevent his inner concerns and conflicts from causing him to make distorted psychological interpretations’ (Anderson, 1981, p 465). In similar vein, Paul Roazen proposes that a measure of scepticism should be built into the psychobiographical project, because despite the propensity for psychoanalytic concepts being used for moral purposes, the ‘more Freud’s claims as a neutral scientist are taken credulously’ the more the likelihood increases ‘that psychoanalytic ideas will be turned in a partisan direction’ (Roazen, 1987, p 589). With psychobiographers, and certainly clinical profilers, assuming a mantle of scientific authority, the issue of the clinical neutrality or scientific validity of psychoanalysis necessarily impacts on the credibility of the psychobiographic project.

Clinical psychoanalysis does not readily lend itself to the ‘scientific’ verification or validation of prognostic outcomes, which are actually part of the shifting inter-
subjective and iterative relationship between analyst and patient. Because it is always dealing with what is effectively ‘work in progress’, in psychoanalysis it is not possible to ‘know exactly the initial conditions of the system (what Freud calls “the constitutional factor”)’ (Ward and Zarate, 2000, p 31). Militating against the possibility of predictive validation as expressed by Ward and Zarate is the normal push and pull of life’s exigencies, and because of ‘the many interactions between the parts of the system we are studying’ (Ward and Zarate, 2000, p 31). It would be impossible to assess what particular behavioural change was due strictly to a psychoanalytic intervention (Ward and Zarate, 2000).

The clinical context is highly nuanced, completely individual and as such inherently unpredictable, and although not an absolute guarantee, the ongoing interaction with the patient is the principal precaution against theoretical bias in clinical interventions. The particularity of the individual subject should be constantly referenced in the clinical encounter, and that as an analyst Patrick Casement constantly asks himself, “[i]s the patient’s individuality being respected and preserved, or overlooked and intruded upon?” ... It is a tragedy if this comes to be limited to a process nearer to that of “cloning”, whereby the patient comes to be “formed in the image” of the analyst and his theoretical orientation’ (Casement, 2002, p 25).

This effect of ‘cloning’ which is problematic in the clinical context evolves as an actual method in psychobiography. A ‘similar’ known subject or situation is effectively cloned ‘at a distance’ by mirroring the developmental trajectory or analytic outcome of the actual clinical case history. In this process which the thesis terms ‘clinical parallelism’, without any feedback at all from the subject, once the ‘analysis’ is in a groove whatever the direction, there is no method of correction, as all evidence is viewed in terms of the analytic groove. The psychobiographic subject is ‘predicted’ in terms of the narrative account of a similar clinical case. The clinician looks to case history material as a guide to possible interventions in therapy so as to influence the outcome. The psychobiographer looks to case history material in order to choose a plausible outcome. The clinical case history is the story of a treatment, whereas a psychobiography is the treatment of that story.

Scientists according to Elms, are in the business of prediction predicated on numerical values, but because ‘humans aren’t precisely predictable, the numbers
usually involve calculations of statistical probability’ (Elms, 1994, p 12). As individual personalities are not divisible into statistically analyzable compartments, these statistical calculations may describe lives in general terms, but never uniquely represent any actual, particular individual. This is why the psychobiographer needs to pick a particular story even if it is a composite one, to reflect his subject.

In personal analysis, there may be some measure of testing or manipulating variables such as suggesting alternative interpretations to a patient, but scientific propositions which require the manipulation of variables cannot be evaluated in psychobiography, because there is no interaction with the subject. Again, the psychobiographer cannot proffer such variables at each stage of his subject’s development because his analysis is based on a narrative theme leading teleologically to the current psychic functioning of his subject. Otherwise, he would be interminably revising his own analysis. He must pick a story which he believes reflects his subject, and then justify it.

Psychoanalytic theory evolved principally from inductive enquiry, Runyan pointing out that ‘the theories of Freud, Jung, Otto Rank, and Wilhelm Reich were based in important ways on interpretations of themselves, which were then put forward as more general theories of human personality’ (Runyan, 1984, pp 8-9). There are according to Budd, general pattern theories concerning for example human sexuality, and a case historical or ‘linear and causal account of a particular individual, of great depth and complexity, but seen in terms of his or herself, where no attempt is made to see how typical or atypical he or she is, whether and why other people show similar consequences from similar childhood events, and so on’ (Budd, 1997, p 36).

Through the technique of clinical parallelism, the particularity of an individual case history is converted into if not a wholly generalisable formulation, then at least one reflecting another particular ‘parallel’ individual psychic trajectory. The argument of the thesis is that the idiosyncratic nature of the human encounter in the therapeutic context makes such paralleling highly problematic, there being either universally accepted general conditions, or psychic developments unique to an individual.
Adherence to a theory is integral to demonstrating the internal consistency ergo validity of the clinical profiler’s method and conclusions. The profiler or psychobiographer is therefore obliged or inclined, to adapt the evidence to his theory. Whereas in the clinical encounter the clinician adapts his theory to the patient and to his particular circumstances, the psychobiographer relies on coherence to his theory and an acceptance of his expertise in order to validate his conclusions. Indeed, it is the acknowledgement of this clinical expertise, which gives psychoanalytic profiling its status, and allows the psychoanalytic expert to construct the pathological subject position.

9 Identification and the Power to Label.

From Michel Foucault’s perspective according to Sarah Mills, ‘[p]sychoanalysis described a wide range of subject positions which individuals inhabit precariously, sometimes wilfully adopting particular subject roles and sometimes finding themselves being cast into certain roles because of their past developmental history or because of the actions of others’ (Mills, 1997, p 34). Psychoanalysis was in Foucauldian terms, according to Milchman and Rosenberg, ‘a mode of thinking that creates the binary opposition between normality and pathology. This dividing practice which to use a Foucauldian trope, is dangerous because it judges “individuals” (normal) as “outsiders” (pathological)’, with the labelling decision ‘having been arrogated by the expert, the psychoanalyst’ (Milchman and Rosenberg, 2013, p 2). In the personality pathology discourse, the subject position constructed, was that of the pathological ‘Other’.

Much of Foucault’s writing is concerned with the interconnection between power and knowledge, with discourses creating ‘[e]ffectiveness in the order of power, as well as productivity in the order of knowledge’ (Foucault, 2000, 102). Knowledge relates to power within a particular location, ‘is produced within a shared social context and within definite historical circumstances. Discourse is made up, then, of rules of conduct, established texts and institutions’ (Smith, 1998, p 254). Thus, knowledge for Foucault, is produced and maintained by, and to serve, the interests of particular groups or institutions. Through Post’s professional and institutional standing, his personality pathology paradigm is part of a discursive matrix of knowledge and power, and ‘psychoanalysis as a discursive formation allows the
possibility of psychoanalytic subject positions’ in constructing power relationships (Barker, 1998, p 7).

In one such relationship, Freud had, Foucault argues, ‘exploited the structure that enveloped the medical personage: he amplified its thaumaturgical [wonderworking] virtues, preparing for its omnipotence a quasi-divine status ... in the doctor’s hands; he created the psychoanalytic situation where, by an inspired short-circuit, alienation becomes disalienating because, in the doctor, it becomes a subject’ (Foucault, 1991, p 165). The otherwise alienated, can engage with the discourse through the utterances of the doctor, the medical expert.

In a discourse such as this medico-scientific one, sanctioned statements are those ‘utterances which have some institutional force and which are thus validated by some form of authority’ (Mills, 1997, p 61). In this historical context, the medico-scientific expert, Post’s, personality pathology paradigm, carries the institutional force of sanctioned statements, which ‘have a profound influence on the way that individuals act and think’ (ibid, p 62). As discourses are in themselves constitutive, once the ‘pathological subject’ has been constructed through these sanctioned statements, he becomes part of a further discursive strategy of power (Kendall and Wickham, 2000; Foucault, 1980; Mills, 1999; Hall, 2001).

The discursive strategy of power produces material effect, so that whether the terrorist for example, is actually pathological or not, he is dealt with as if he were (Foucault, 2000; Hall, 2001). The medico-scientific credibility of psychoanalytic labelling, and the institutional ability to set the terms of the debate, is the essence of power in the personality pathology discourse. The discursive strategy of pathology labelling, constitutes a subject as a pathological terrorist, and puts him outside of the norm. The corollary, as Corrado represents it, is that establishment power elites are exculpated for their part in any conflict, and the exclusion of these pathologised subjects, facilitates repressive policies towards not only the terrorists, but also their espoused causes (Corrado, 1981; Crenshaw, 1986; Horgan, 2006).

The idea of labelling, lends itself intrinsically to the notion of identification and as an ideological corollary, to the notion of propaganda in constituting the subject. From a psychoanalytic perspective, Ernst Kris employs the conceptual tool of identification as Freud had expounded it in his Group Psychology and analysis of
The term propaganda Kris uses in the ‘widest sense of communication from authority ... with the assumption that in every society some means of social control of this nature exist, which establish contact between the responsible leaders and the community’ (Kris, 1943, pp 381-382).

The positive nature of identification cannot then be taken for granted, and propaganda schemas are deployed by both authoritarian and democratic states and focusing on the relationship to their respective leaderships (Kris, 1943; Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII). Freud states that identification is ‘the original form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego’ (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, pp 7-8). The underlying process, was that ‘the mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional common quality; and we may suspect that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader’ (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 108).

For Freud the superego was a self-reflective independent agency of the ego, with conscience as one ‘of its functions and that self-observation, which is an essential preliminary to the judging activity of conscience, is another of them’ (Freud, 2001/1933, S.E. XXII, p 60). In the course of development, the superego in Freud’s schema, ‘also takes on the influences of those who have stepped onto the place of parents – educators, teachers, people chosen as ideal models’ (ibid, p 64).

Identification in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes should take place in the ‘superego’, whereas in democratic propaganda, there is an even distribution, of ‘identification in the superego’ and ‘ego identification’ (Kris, 1943, p 396). According to Kris, in democratic societies the art connoisseur as the expert or ideal model is essential to the creation of an aesthetic illusion, where messages are always mediated and interpreted (Kris, 1943). Within democratic societies, the sense of continuity with the elite or establishment is provided by the connoisseurs/experts, who function ‘as intermediaries between the communication emanating from a representative leadership and the people’ (Kris, 1943, p 399).

The argument of the thesis is that Post and the other personality pathology theorists represent a superego function of the modern state, reflecting a normative,
hegemonic establishment. Intellectual propaganda is the mediating ‘soft’ power of the expert, reflecting through their diagnoses the normative power in determining those who are within or without the pale, the pathological subject. Power accrues from the sense of oneness attaching to the expert such as Post. The expert shares with his audience, and telling them effectively, what they wish to hear. It is as Erik Erikson has it, that the sense of ego identity ‘is the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and continuity prepared in the past are matched by the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others’ (Erikson, 1963/1950, p 261). The thesis seeks to challenge assumptions based on this conformity of interests, in particular through a rigorous examination of the evidence, presented by such experts.

10 Evidential Limitations in Psychobiographic Analyses.

E. Victor Wolfenstein sought to demonstrate through the evidence of particular case studies, that individuals although involved in the contingent activity of revolution, could be labelled with particular personality formations, based on developmental trajectories. Wolfenstein’s argument is that a perceived oppositionalism of the revolutionary personality, is predicated on an unresolved Oedipus complex (Wolfenstein, 1967).

The notion of the Oedipus complex may however, the thesis contends, be deployed in either an individual or a cultural context. In individual terms, the Oedipus complex plays according to Laplanche and Pontalis, ‘a fundamental part in the structuring of the personality, and in the orientation of human desire.

Psycho-analysis makes it the major axis of reference for psychopathology, and attempts to identify the particular modes of its presentation and resolution which characterise each pathological type’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 283). As the principle originator of individual neurosis, it is the primary source for therapeutic investigation. Having an Oedipus complex as an adult implies then, that there were issues unresolved from childhood.

From a cultural perspective it is in Freudian terms the Oedipus ‘conflict’ which is the genesis of the superego and of social functioning. Freud denotes this group or cultural manifestation of the Oedipus complex:
‘the father of prehistoric times was undoubtedly terrible, and an extreme amount of aggressiveness may be attributed to him ... We cannot get away from the assumption that man’s sense of guilt springs from the Oedipus complex and was acquired at the killing of the father by the brothers banded together. On that occasion an act of aggression was not suppressed but carried out’

(Freud, 2001/1930, S.E. XXI, p 131).

Freud believed that each member of the group, when within that group resolved an analogous Oedipus complex with the leadership. Transforming group hatred and aggression against an analogous paternal authority into loyalty and devotion to the leader is not then a resolution of the member’s particular childhood Oedipus crisis with his actual father. It is a cultural rather than individual determination, with any ensuing neuroses deriving from group rather than individual psychic processes, indeed the group itself acts as an irrational individual. In the view of this thesis, an actual contingent revolution would be a group reaction, not a collection of revolutionary personalities acting as a group.

Taking his definition of a revolutionary as someone who actually takes part in a revolution, Wolfenstein argues that the contingent revolutionary Mahatma Gandhi’s ‘revolutionary personality’ derived from his Oedipus complex (Wolfenstein, 1967, p 87). The sixteen year old Gandhi had left his father’s deathbed and was having sexual relations with his heavily pregnant wife as his father actually died, and their child had died soon after birth (Wolfenstein, 1967). Thus, sexual activity had led to ‘death - and, one would surmise, in Gandhi’s mind it had led to the death of his father as well. One aspect of the Oedipal fantasy is that the son desires the elimination of the father and in adolescence feels that his developing sexual potency will be the instrument of that desire’ (Wolfenstein, 1967, p 87).

Gandhi spent the rest of his life seeking to assuage this burden of guilt through ‘sexual abstinence and by the nursing of others’, and refusing ‘simply to submit, to give in and admit his guilt ... he continued to assert his independence, his right to manhood and the prerogatives of men, but in a strange and disguised form. Passive resistance (or nonviolent action), that peculiar contradiction in terms, was the indirect expression of almost overwhelming guilt - and vigorous self-assertion’
Gandhi’s sexual abstinence, political trajectory and philosophy of passive resistance is then linked to an Oedipus complex of ambivalence and guilt towards the father unresolved in adolescence, deriving out of that traumatic deathbed Oedipal event. The particular nature of Gandhi’s Oedipal development is then central to Wolfenstein’s entire analysis of Gandhi.

Recently published letters to the German Jewish architect Hermann Kallenbach reveal that Gandhi had had a homosexual or, at least homoerotic relationship with Kallenbach, a ‘lifetime bachelor, gymnast, and body builder’ (Lelyveld, 2011, p 88). In one letter disclosed by Joseph Lelyveld and written from London in 1909, Gandhi ‘writes: “Your portrait (the only one) stands on my mantelpiece in the bedroom. The mantelpiece is opposite to the bed.” Cotton wool and Vaseline, he then says, “are a constant reminder.” The point, he goes on, “is to show to you and me how completely you have taken possession of my body. This is slavery with a vengeance”’ (ibid, p 89). Whether this reflects an actual physical consummation of their relationship is not critical psychoanalytically, because as Freud points out, ‘[w]hat decides whether we describe someone as an invert [homosexual] is not his actual behaviour, but his emotional attitude’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 87).

A homosexual may have, in Freud’s conceptualisation a particular form of the Oedipal complex. The genesis of male homosexuality as expressed in Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), is in a large class of cases that:

‘A young man has been unusually long and intensely fixated upon his mother in the sense of the Oedipus complex. But at last, after the end of puberty, the time comes for exchanging his mother for some other sexual object. Things take a sudden turn: the young man does not abandon his mother, but identifies himself with her; he transforms himself into her, and now looks about for objects which can replace his ego for him, and on which he can bestow such love and care as he has experienced from his mother’

(Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 108).

The feminine side of Gandhi’s nature that Wolfenstein sees as being at the heart of Gandhi’s strategy of passive resistance, would then have to be reconsidered in
terms of a possible Oedipus complex predicated on a mother fixation, rather than Oedipal guilt over the death of the father.

Wolfenstein's analysis of the revolutionary had been deploying Erikson's notion of the life cycle, in particular the identity crisis of adolescence and young adulthood, but only from the perspective of Oedipal conflict. Erikson himself had a much broader conceptualisation, claiming that 'the revolutions of our day attempt to solve and also to exploit the deep need of youth to redefine its identity in an industrialized world' (Erikson, 1963/1950, p 263). For his own estimation of Gandhi, Erikson sees as critical 'the decades in South Africa during which he developed the revolutionary technique of militant nonviolence' (Erikson, 1993/1970, p 1, emphasis in the original). Erikson does as with Wolfenstein, take the guilt arising out of Gandhi's leaving of his father's deathbed, which

'clinical theory would suggest, must be heir to the Oedipus conflict. In Gandhi's case, the "feminine" service to his father would have served to deny the boyish wish to replace the (aging) father in the possession of the (young) mother and the youthful intention to outdo him as a leader in later life. Thus the pattern would be set for a style of leadership which can defeat a superior adversary only nonviolently and with the express intent of saving him as well as those whom he oppressed'


Whilst embarking on this feminised non violent revolutionary response to the Oedipal guilt of the conflict with his father, with only a two line mention of Kallenbach, Erikson is similarly unaware that at this critical phase of Gandhi's radicalisation, he was engaged in the very least, a homoerotic relationship. Psychobiography cannot simply accrue and adapt such dissonant information. In historical research, the Kallenbach letters would otherwise simply have further developed the already complex character of Gandhi. If the theoretical basis of a psychobiography or psychoanalytic profile predicated on a particular personality schema is undermined, so too is the general thrust of the whole psychobiography or profile. The analyses of both Wolfenstein and Erikson are plausible, clinically and theoretically sound, and may well be right. However, a possibly homosexual
Gandhi is a substantively different person with a more prosaic rationale for apparent heterosexual celibacy, than the one they have analysed.

11 Conclusion.

The structure of the thesis including a chapter summary has been outlined and the principle concepts of the thesis defined. The intention of this thesis is to unpack the personality pathology paradigm, the principal psychoanalytic explanation for the phenomenon of terrorism and designated tyrants. From the necessarily fragmentary evidence that psychoanalysis has at its disposal, there is according to Runyan, a 'heuristic value of leading investigators to explore a range of hypotheses that might not otherwise have occurred to them' (Runyan, 1984, p 221). Relying for their validity on theoretical consonance and the expertise of the analyst, psychobiographies go beyond heuristic hypotheses, proposing a holistic psychic account of their subject.

Creating a coherent developmental trajectory or life narrative to explain past behaviour does not necessarily translate into any facility for prediction, and exposes flaws in the psychobiographic project. The adoption of a clinical psychoanalytic process known as pathography, without the safeguards of therapeutic neutrality has the effect of inherently pathologising the subject. Without direct input from the subject, psychoanalytic evidence is insufficient and artificially reconstructing this evidence leads to biases which skew the analysis. Attempts at compensating for this skewing effect, such as examining analyst countertransference reactions simply reinforces, the thesis argues, the analyst’s agenda. The next chapter details the method of enquiry used in this thesis.
CHAPTER TWO:

METHODS
1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the methods designed to unpack what is identified as a pathologising discourse, a distinct paradigm within the psychoanalytic discipline of psychobiography. The basic assumption behind clinical psychobiographic analysis is that subjects can be psychoanalysed ‘at a distance’ without the benefit of the subject’s physical presence, speech and ability to interact.

My methodology relies on the detailed analyses of psychobiographic texts and critiques, whilst emphasising the contingency of their socio-historical context. Data collection is informed by the need to test the original sources utilised by personality pathology theorists. This then involves collecting not only psychobiographic and indeed biographical evidence, but also critiquing the psychoanalytic conceptualisations and theoretical arguments deployed in the pathologising discourse.

Describing the thesis concept of clinical parallelism, the chapter outlines how in order to compensate for the lack of an actual therapeutic client the clinical psychobiographic enquiry, takes another ‘similar’ known subject or situation. The ‘at a distance’ analysis then mirrors the developmental trajectory or analytic outcome of the actual case history. Similarly, devised as a methodological tool for this thesis is the distinction between personological and characterological profiling which is demonstrated in this chapter.

2 Collecting Evidence.

One of the principle methods employed in this study is the detailed and critical reading of key texts with the aim of problematising certain ‘taken for granted’ assumptions upon which personality pathology theory is predicated. The psychoanalytic concepts upon which these ‘taken for granted’ assumptions are based are explicated and their deployment critiqued. The choice of data is in the first instance influenced by the evidence adduced by the personality pathology theorists whose conclusions are being contested. The personal pathology theorist’s source materials and their deployment of them are researched and critiqued, and theoretical arguments and counter arguments from other commentators are then
presented. The psychoanalytic concepts deployed along with their specific implications as tools in the discourse are similarly presented as data. Data is then collected in support of hypotheses and themes deriving from the critique, rather than a data set collected and hypotheses inductively adduced from it.

The material from which data has been selected and evidence has been adduced in this research includes: newspaper articles, magazine pieces, TV programmes, published private letters, journal articles, books, commission reports, political speeches, court transcripts, government e-mails, submissions to US Congressional Committees, biographies and psychobiographies, published intelligence profiles, published intelligence position papers, and sundry reports from bodies such as the APA Task Force on Psychohistory.

Material that was once publicly and widely deployed to influence the discourse is not necessarily now readily accessible. Because data collection in this research is deductively determined by hypothesised themes rather than hypotheses inductively deriving from a collected data set, certain texts are critical to the understanding of a particular theme. As identified, one of the key texts in the discourse of adversarial political profiling is the 1964 September/October issue of Fact magazine. This particular Fact issue was notorious for the psychoanalytic traducing of US Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, with 1,189 psychiatrists declaring some, in extremely uncomplimentary terms, that Goldwater was psychologically unfit to be President.

Upheld on appeal to the US Supreme Court, Goldwater successfully sued Fact magazine for defamation, which is perhaps why this particular issue is no longer generally available. Indeed researching at the British Library the Keeper of Journals was able to confirm that there was no database to which the British Library had either access or information in order to obtain this magazine. This Fact magazine issue is however critical to an understanding of the ethical background of the modern pathologising discourse, and after several years of searching, a copy was eventually acquired privately for the research.

The research trail may equally have blind alleys, as was the case with Jerrold Post who had been retained as an expert witness by the US Justice Department in the 1997 trial of Omar Rezaq. Making his role in the trial the subject of a 2000
paper ‘Terrorist on Trial: The Context of Political Crime’ and sundry book chapters, with Post considering it important to counteract what he saw as the defence attempt to put ‘Israel on trial. They were aided in their endeavor by a remarkably one-sided portrayal of the Arab-Israeli struggle by a Middle East scholar, who depicted the Arab world in general, and the Palestinian people in particular, as victims of Israeli aggression’ (Post, 2000, p 176). It was his own task, ‘to provide a sense-making explanation for the jury of how an individual who was sane could commit such a bloody atrocity’, and ‘that it was important to convey to the jury’, how bloody and professional Rezaq’s Palestinian terror group was (Post, 2007, pp 16, 22; Post, 2000).

After a great deal of investigation through the British Library, the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Library, the New York Court Reporters and eventually a page by page search through the entire transcript of the month long trial, no trace could be found of Post’s evidence. Fortuitously, the mystery was solved much later when analysing Post’s testimony in another trial. In the case of the USA v bin Laden et al, where United States Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald in seeking to undermine Post’s testimony, refers to the article on Rezaq. Fitzgerald puts it to Post that, ‘[i]s it not a fact that you did not actually testify in front of the jury in that case’ (USA v Bin Laden et al, 2001, Trial Transcript Day 70, 8339). Post replies that ‘I indicated that I was assisting the prosecution. I did not indicate I testified in the article’ (USA v Bin Laden et al, 2001, Trial Transcript Day 70, 8340). However, if Post was assisting the prosecution by providing ‘sense-making for the jury’, he could surely not have done this without testifying in front of them.

Some lines of enquiry however, remained completely unresolved as in the series of Cabinet Office emails concerning preparations for the infamous ‘dodgy dossier’ presented to the press by Alistair Campbell¹, ‘Iraq - its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’ (2003) in the run up to the 2003 Iraq War. In a preparatory email Cabinet Office official, Daniel Pruce, comments on the 2002 ‘Draft Dossier (J Scarlett² Version of 10 Sept)’ to Campbell:

¹ Campbell was Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Director of Communications in 2003.
² John Scarlett was head of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the run up to the 2003 Iraq War.
‘I think we need to personalise the dossier onto Saddam as much as possible - for example by replacing references to Iraq with references to Saddam, - in similar vein I think we need a device to convey that he is a bad and unstable man.

The section on Saddam’s Iraq (pp 9-11) could be expanded into a psychological profile and presented as such’

(Daniel Pruce, email to Alistair Campbell included in email from Pruce to Clare Sumner, of the 14th of August, 2003).

This is though exactly what Post had provided for the Americans in his November 2002 profile entitled “Saddam is Iraq; Iraq is Saddam” (Post and Baram, 2002). How Pruce’s suggestion was received at cabinet level, would then reflect a senior British governmental perspective on the pathologising discourse. A Freedom of Information (FOI) request for the emails following on in the chain was though turned down by the Cabinet Office, as was an appeal against the decision. As Pruce had been on secondment from the Foreign Office Intelligence Unit, FOI requests were also made there for any profile on Saddam or intelligence report from Post. After an extended search, the Foreign Office could find no trace of either.

3 Ethics

Ethical permission for the project was granted by the University Psychology Department Ethics Committee. Given that the materials used are secondary sources which are in the public domain, there was considered to be, no immediate ethical sensitivity in respect of the data collection method. Critical research will probably at some stage at least implicitly, involve criticism of perhaps leading figures in a discourse. It should also be noted that even secondary research in psychobiography will necessarily at some stage concern discussion of the intimate details of known individuals, some of whom may be living subjects. Moreover, research that relates prominently to terrorism will also have political implications and affect perhaps delicate sensibilities not least those of the victims. Indeed, one of the aims of the research is to examine the effects on individuals and groups when applying psychoanalysis to biography or terrorism. From the outset, the
ambition of the research has been to act with the utmost sensitivity to the subjects and fairness towards the protagonists of the discourse being researched.

4 Clinical Parallelism.

The notion of ‘clinical parallelism’ was perhaps more properly a finding than a method of the thesis. There is direct evidence for clinical parallelism in only a small number of cases, most notably in Freud’s *Leonardo* (1910), and Volkan’s (2007) discussion of his analysand, ‘Gary’. However, that the process was possibly and I would propose probably in operation, was a consideration when examining all of the cases, but not claimed specifically, without there being a direct reference to it. Because, in clinical psychobiography, whether retrodicting the psychic development of an individual, or more particularly predicting the future behaviour of the subject in political profiling, some form of behavioural template is required. Just as Freud used his patients to guide his musings on artistic figures, psychobiographers use actual or archetypal clinical characters as parallel ‘analysands’, in their ‘at a distance’ clinical analyses.

In developing his ‘at a distance’ adversarial political personality profiles, effectively pathographies, Post draws on the ‘clinical case study methodology, also known as the anamnesis [preliminary medical history from the patient’s perspective]’ (Post, 2003b, p 70). In the context of the clinical encounter according to Erik Erikson, the patient normally has a complaint and recognisable symptoms, and the clinician medical or therapeutic attempts ‘an anamnesis, an etiological reconstruction of the disturbance, and an examination … evaluating the evidence and in arriving at diagnostic and prognostic inferences (which are really the clinical form of a prediction) … A clinical prediction takes its clues from the complaint, the symptoms, and the anamnesis’ (Erikson, 1959, p 74, my emphasis).

Psychoanalysis concerns itself with predictions only, maintains David Rapaport, in respect of ‘clinical psychoanalysis and Psychiatry’ (Rapaport, 1960, p 17). As such, the ‘problem of prognosis has three facets: the prognosis for treatment by the psychoanalytic method, the prognosis for “spontaneous remission,” and the prognosis for treatment by modified psychoanalysis or other therapy’ (ibid). Apart from a spontaneous remission, it is the interaction between clinician and patient
which is critical to the outcome, ergo prediction. The success of the prognosis is an estimation of the efficacy of that interaction. The clinician necessarily then engages with the patient and their subsequent meetings form the case history, which is essentially, according to Erikson, the process of verifying or contradicting the efficacy of therapeutic predictions (Erikson, 1959).

All clinical encounters, in Erikson’s view, contain an essential core, that of a contract between an individual in need of help who agrees to give his information in confidence, and another in possession of professional methods, who agrees to help (Erikson, 1959). It is inherent in the therapeutic or clinical situation that the subject is in some way troubled. In order to properly simulate the prognostic/predictive clinical methodology, there must necessarily be some form of complaint or maladaptive behaviour in order to investigate as a form of clinical entrée. Therefore, in clinical psychobiography or pathography, subjects are inherently if albeit unwittingly problematised or ‘medicalised’. There is, however, no corresponding therapeutic process to either, confirm or disconfirm the putative diagnosis or predictions, whose outcomes the analyst would otherwise be influencing in the course of the therapy.

At the outset of a psychobiographic investigation incorporating the clinical or pathographic approach, symptoms are inferred and the subject quite cursorily ‘diagnosed’. There then follows a search through the subject’s archives or biographical information, in order to construct a facsimile ‘anamnesis’ in place of the patient’s own account of the history of his putative ‘complaint’. The particular evidence adduced by the pathographer is designed to make the subject one with his putative ‘complaint’. From disparate life experiences, a cohesive life narrative with normally just one or two themes is constructed, which is commensurate with the original ‘diagnosis’. The pathographer then seeks to identify a trajectory in the individual’s life course which would correspond to the clinical prognosis. In order to demonstrate a predictable trajectory, the subject’s symptomology is ‘paralleled’ with seemingly analogous clinical characteristics of an actual case history. Ergo this technique of ‘clinical parallelism’ is inherently psychically determinist.

The notion of clinical parallelism is distinct from the clinical concept of parallel process, which takes place within the therapeutic process itself. Parallel process occurs when events in a client’s life appear to mirror that of the analyst, in such
cases as Michael Formica has it, 'as a therapist, you can do two things: you can allow your own issues to get the best of you and get drawn into your client’s spin - very messy - or you can use your own process to benefit the client, and your client’s process to propel your own. That’s parallel process, and it’s a powerful tool that benefits everyone when employed judiciously. It is a teacher, a guide and a mentor' (Michael Formica, *Psychology Today*, the 7th of January, 2009).

Analysts involved in supervision also observed, according to McNeil and Worthen, that the ‘transference of the therapist and the countertransference of the supervisor within the supervisory session appeared to parallel what was happening in the therapy session between client and therapist’ (McNeil and Worthen, 1989, p 329). Parallel processes of either type, are still iterative processes of transference relationships. ‘Clinical parallelism’ is employed in order to replace the iterative process.

In the early Freudian project, clinical material was seen as Susan Budd points out, as being organisable ‘in terms of a general psychic pattern - this patient was orphaned early, or this one was excessively anally stimulated, and therefore the mental apparatus would have been affected in an ultimately predictable manner’ (Budd, 1997, p 32). Character defences or unconscious fantasies deriving from these early experiences could then be determined irrespective of their context. However, although Freud had originally envisioned such a psychically deterministic schema, he had, as Milton et al portray his position, ‘gradually reached the standpoint of contemporary psychoanalysis: that there are no specific or consistent determinants of specific neurotic problems ... Although very adverse childhood situations will mostly have adverse effects, the precise nature of the effects cannot be predicted, as there are so many variables in human life’ (Milton et al, 2004, p 81).

Arguing that it is just such a determinist schema which gives the experienced, clinically-informed biographer his analytic edge, Volkan illustrates his own method of ‘clinical parallelism’, by describing the analytic process of one of his actual analysands (Gary) and relating it to the facsimile analytic process employed in his psychobiography of Kemal Atatürk (Volkan, 2007). Although conceding that the issue is problematic, Volkan argues that data gathered as part of the therapeutic process from ‘transference, transferences neurosis and therapeutic enactments’
can in part be replaced ‘by the self-observations of the writer regarding his or her own feelings, fantasies and perceptions about the subject’ (Volkan, 2007, p 7). This effectively institutes countertransference as psychobiographical data.

Once all the available material data including any ‘diaries, documents, interviews, political philosophies, the subject’s actions and artistic productions, and any relevant films or audio material’ has been collected, Volkan believes that along with the analyst’s ‘counter-transference, insights from actual psychoanalytic patients with similar life stories can be used to guide the author in making formulations about the inner world of the subject’ (Volkan, 2007, p 7; Volkan in Gehrie, 1992). In the clinical context, according to Volkan, ‘psychoanalysts depend on their own fantasized meanings in interpreting what their patients communicate’ as in psychobiography, but without of course, the possibility of testing for validity (Volkan, 2007, p 6).

Within the therapeutic context and indeed the transference relationship itself as Patrick Casement sees it, ‘there is a tendency to experience a feeling of deja vu when there are elements of similarity between a current clinical situation and others before it. This can prompt a therapist to respond to new clinical phenomena with a false sense of recognition, drawing upon established formulations for interpretation’ (Casement, 2002, p 9). Indeed the reason that Freud felt constrained to attempt his ill-starred clinical reconstruction of Leonardo Da Vinci’s youth was because, as Peter Gay points out, he had ‘recently encountered his likeness’, in a neurotic patient that he had been treating (Gay, 1998, p 271). Again, clinical parallelism ensures grooving into a used parallel track, but not necessarily that the track is going in the right direction.

5 **A Differentiation between Personality and Character in Psychobiography.**

The thesis proposes a differential schema as a method for analysing psychobiography, and is deployed throughout the thesis to explicate the determining characteristics of the personality pathology model of profiling. The argument is that modern personality pathology profiling is part of a distinct paradigm shift in psychobiography. The manner in which modern personality pathology is conceptualised is distinguished from an earlier more traditional
Freudian focus on problematic libidinal character development as the genesis of neurosis. This distinction is key to the theorisation of modern clinical ‘at a distance’ profiling and by extension significant to the psychobiographic project in general.

For Post, the ‘term personality connotes a systematic pattern of functioning that is consistent over a range of behaviors and over time. In the political personality profile, we attempt to characterize the core political personality, identifying the deeply ingrained patterns that are coherent and accordingly have powerful predictive implications’ (Post, 2006a, p 69, emphasis in the original). Post has it that he seeks ‘to identify the characteristic pattern of ego defenses, for it is this repetitive manner of mediating between the subject’s internal and external worlds that is at the heart of personality, the basis of the structure of character’ (ibid, p 78). Personality is seen to be the basis of character but without distinguishing them as separate concepts, with Post taking the terms as being either interchangeable or in the least complementary, and that is indeed the general usage (Post, 2006a; Lowenberg1983).

Personality in this thesis is taken to represent the immutable aspects of the individual, a ‘core self’ disturbances of which would tend towards the psychoses. Character, reflects the developed acquired moral layer of the self, prone to neurotic disturbance. Following this formulation as Leo Bartemeier writes, the ‘neurotic character does not suffer from a constitutional defect. It ensues as a result of a psychological mismanagement of the primary family relationships’ (Bartemeier, 1970, p 331). What early personality theorists, Henry Murray\(^3\) and Clyde Kluckholn refer to as ‘constitutional determinants’, are critical (Murray and Kluckholn, 1953). The personality of an individual according to Murray and Kluckholn ‘is the product of inherited dispositions and environmental experiences. These experiences occur within the field of his physical, biological, and social environment, all of which are modified by the culture of his group. Similarities of life experience and heredity will tend to produce similar personality characteristics in different individuals, whether in the same society or in different societies’ (Murray and Kluckholn, 1953; Murray, 1938). This is then an individual personality irrespective of national or cultural character.

\(^3\) Henry Murray actually coined the term personology.
In employing the more modern psychoanalytic theories around object relations, self-psychology and ego psychology, there is no need to have as Lowenberg points out, an ‘instinctual theory of love and aggression as libido theory does’ (Lowenberg, 1983, p 30). Both ego psychology and personality analyses are according to Lowenberg, ‘based on the evidence of adult behavior. They do not require reconstruction of infantile experience or reductions to origin - the behavior and patterns of accommodating to the world exist in adulthood and the evidence is historical’ (Lowenberg, 1983, p 20). Whilst from an object relations perspective ‘individuals relate as they have learned to, or were programmed to, according to the unconscious fantasies of infancy’, and these fantasises are also inferred from their manifestations in later life (ibid).

There is no need in a personological schema for arcane speculation about childhood development and relationships. Childhood trauma for example, can simply be inferred on the basis of current psychic functioning or rather what this analysis will show as being the ideological perception of that psychic functioning. Less involved and convoluted, this methodology consequently tends to be more reductive and restrictive, with necessarily only a limited number of supposedly ‘predictable’ psychic trajectories. This notion of a distinction between characterological and personological profiling reflects not only a key finding of this research, but a new analytic tool in comparative psychobiography.

As will be demonstrated by example throughout the thesis, there tends to be either an Oedipal characterological orientation or a pre-Oedipal personological emphasis, in psychobiographic analyses. The personological relates to the origins of pathological conditions which lead to the psychoses, and characterological relating to unconscious generally sexual orients conflicts of the developmental phases, which may lead to neuroses. Personological functioning is more inter psychic rather than intra psychic due to the emphasis on traumatogenic early object relating in the pr-Oedipal (mainly oral) phase. Freud describes his conceptualisation of the oral phase ‘as the earliest recognizable sexual organization the so-called “cannibalistic” or “oral” phase, during which the original attachment of sexual excitation to the nutritional instinct still dominates the scene’ (Freud, 1918, S.E. XVII, p 106). As such it is the most basic and primitive phase of psychic development.
The personological focus is likewise on the more primitive ego defence mechanisms of splitting and projection. The notion of ‘splitting the unconscious’ was apparent in the work of Freud and his early collaborator, Joseph Breuer (Freud, 1910, XI, p 22; Freud and Breuer, 1986/1893-1895). In Melanie Klein’s schema, the first few months of the child are seen as containing an ‘innate conflict between love and hate and the ensuing anxieties. However, coexisting with this division there appear to be various processes of splitting, such as fragmenting the ego and its objects, whereby a dispersal of the destructive impulses is achieved’ (Klein, 1987, pp 216-217). Projection although a regular psychic feature, was for Freud the ‘most striking characteristic of symptom-formation in paranoia ... An internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain kind of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception’ (Freud, 1911, XII, p 66).

As the distinction between a characterological and personological approach is a particular conceptualisation of this thesis for the purpose of psychobiographic analysis, there is no extant specific reference in the literature describing this distinction. A general distinction is given by Charles Ryecroft explaining that ‘personality types’ in the psychoanalytic literature, are in fact discussed ‘under the heading of character’ (Ryecroft, 1995, p 129). There are then two subsections: ‘Clinical character types are labelled by reference to the psychiatric condition to which they are inferred to be analogous or which they most resemble, hence hysterical, obsessional, phobic, schizoid, depressive, manic characters’ whereas; ‘Developmental character types are labelled by reference to the stage of libidinal development from which the characteristics are inferred to derive; hence oral, anal, phallic, genital characters’ (Ryecroft, 1995, p 129). Ryecroft’s formulation reflects the thesis distinction in that characterological refers to the developmentally acquired psychic layers of the individual, and the personological emphasis is more concerned with trauma.

Laplanche and Pontalis acknowledge that there ‘is a psycho-analytically orientated characterology which correlates different character types either with the major psychoneurotic conditions (speaking of obsessional, phobic, paranoiac characters and so on) or else with the various stages of libidinal development (which are said to correspond to oral, anal, urethral, phallic-narcissistic and genital
character types—sometimes reclassified in terms of the major opposition between genital and pre-genital characters)’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p 67).

Anal characteristics, for example, are developmental, learned through the family. The anal character’s drastic training of his children leading to character traits as Ayla Demir points out, ‘such as conservatism, avarice (greed), pedantry (a person who pays attention to detail or rules and is excessively concerned with formalism and precision), miserliness, and the desire to discipline others as one was disciplined oneself, are passed on from generation to generation’ (Demir, 2014 p 12). These may not be appealing and somewhat neurotic character traits and determine how the individual reacts with the world in particular his politics, but they do not preclude him from carrying on normal relations.

In the paranoid personality, splits will have first occurred in the oral phase of early infancy. The breast is seen as both all good when giving and all bad when the mother has been withholding. As Melanie Klein has it, in the rage of an ‘oral-sadistic relation to her mother’s breast’ the baby seeks to eliminate the obstacle to pleasure (Klein, 1987/1955, p 50). A derivative of this rage is in Kernberg’s schema, chronic hatred. This hatred justifies itself as revenge, and ‘[p]aranoid fears of retaliation also are usually unavoidable accompaniments of intense hatred, so that paranoid features, a wish for revenge, and sadism go hand in hand’ (Otto Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 3). Trauma is a catalyst, so that ‘the actual experience of sadistic behavior of a needed, inescapable object instantaneously shapes the rage reaction into the hatred of the sadistic object’ (ibid, p 4).

Core character or, in this thesis, personality formations such as paranoiac, are then distinguished from character traits such as anal, acquired during the development phase. Similarly, a distinction is made between genital, and pre-genital, chiefly oral phase characters. Whether they are variously referring to personality or character type, in respect of this critique, Laplanche and Pontalis, and Rycroft who compile such classifications, are acknowledging the potential for a taxonomic psychoanalytic distinction between ‘character’ as reflecting an acquired psychic condition, and ‘personality’ as representing the basic structure of the psyche and this the thesis argues, is how they are deployed in psychobiographic analyses.
6 Conclusion.

The principle methodology of this thesis entails the critical reading of the texts and psychobiographies implicated in what has been identified as the pathologising discourse. The type of data adduced as evidence in the thesis and the manner in which it was collected have been described. The major themes of the pathologising discourse have been identified with reference to their key texts. The thesis has devised the analytic tool of clinical parallelism, in order to identify the clinical trajectory employed by psychobiographers by way of referencing similar or ‘parallel’ diagnostic cases. This renders the psychobiographic subject amenable to a ‘clinical prediction’ of his psychic development and future behaviour in particular for adversarial profiling. The thesis argued that this essentially determinist psychobiographic schema could not reflect the iterative clinical process between analyst and analysand.

Similarly, the thesis proposes a method of grouping psychobiographies, principally in order to identify the particular characteristics of the personality pathology paradigm. As opposed to what the thesis describes as a ‘characterological’ perspective which relates to psychobiographies based on traditional Freudian developmental phases, the personality pathology paradigm which is encompassed by a ‘personological’ perspective is based on early particularly traumatic, pre-Oedipal object relating. This distinction is then used as a method for exploring the psychoanalytic concepts deployed in adversarial profiling in order to distinguish them for what the thesis claims are actually their ideological determinations.

From the earliest days of psychoanalysis there has been a distinction made in psychobiography between a more holistic developmental analysis and a purely clinical notion, focusing on heredity and combined with a mainly traumatogenic monocausal explanation. The next chapter outlines these early and indeed formative attempts at psychobiography including Freud’s characterological psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci and the early personological pathographies of Isidor Sadger.
CHAPTER THREE:

THE EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE PSYCHOBIOGRAPHIC PROJECT
1 Introduction.

This chapter traces the origins and early development of the psychobiographic project. Psychobiography in Freud’s conceptualisation of it was intended to be a holistic and systematic motivational approach to a subject’s entire life, in contradistinction to the extant medicalised clinical psychoanalytic strand of psychobiography which focused exclusively on the pathological aspects of the individual (Freud, 1910, S.E. XI; Elms, 1994). These medicalised psychobiographic accounts, known as pathographies, provide (according to the argument of this critique), the methodological basis for the discourse of modern ‘at a distance’ political profiles.

The chapter critiques Freud’s *Leonardo* his only dedicated psychobiography, which would represent what the thesis describes as the the characterological approach to psychobiography. Whereas, Isidor Sadger’s pathographic methodology predicated on uncovering the twin themes of innate personality coupled with childhood sexuality, directly presages the twin track genetic predisposition coupled with childhood trauma approach of the modern personological profiling of personality pathology theory.

Although Freud had originally declared that psychoanalysis must not be employed as a weapon of aggression, his later pathographic psychobiography of Woodrow Wilson⁴ was regarded as an outright character assassination. This study opened the way for the application of psychoanalysis to politics. So that from the inception of the psychobiographic project, it is possible to trace the genesis of the methodological, epistemological and ethical controversies, still informing and resonating in the current psychobiographic debate.

2 Freud’s Early Psychobiographic Musings.

At early meetings of what would later become Freud’s Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Freud who had the only substantial catalogue of cases, ‘encouraged members’ efforts at psychohistory (Elms, 2003, p 67). The material gained from free association is, as Freud describes it, the ore from which the ‘precious metal’ of

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⁴ Wilson was U.S. President during World War One and the subsequent Versailles Treaty.
psychoanalysis is extracted from the patient, and necessarily requires personal contact with that patient (Freud, S.E. XI, 1909, p 32). From the earliest days of psychoanalysis, Freud had used biographical and other cultural material for inspiration, as with his formulation of the Oedipus complex or elucidation, as in the notion of sublimation in his Leonardo (Freud, 1900, S.E. IV; Freud, 1910, S.E. XI).

Having been intrigued by viewing a performance of Sophocles’ Greek tragedy ‘Oedipus Rex’ on the 15th of October 1897 Freud writes to his friend Wilhelm Fleiss, that ‘[e]veryone in the audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy’ (Freud in Masson, 1985, p 272). At the time, Freud had been suffering as Wilson and Zarate express it, ‘an inhibiting intellectual paralysis ... He was on the verge of a nervous breakdown’ after the death of his father in 1896 (Wilson and Zarate, 2003, p 128). His theoretical musings on what would become the Oedipus complex were further crystallized on viewing a production of Hamlet with Freud continuing in his letter to Fleiss:

‘I am not thinking of Shakespeare’s conscious intention, but believe, rather, that a real event stimulated the poet to his representation, in that his unconscious understood the unconscious of his hero .... the torment he suffers from the obscure memory that he himself had contemplated the same deed against his father out of passion for his mother ... His conscience is his unconscious sense of guilt. And is not his sexual alienation in his conversation with Ophelia typically hysterical? And his rejection of the instinct that seeks to beget children? And, finally, his transferral of the deed from his own father to Ophelia’s? And does he not in the end, in the same marvellous way as my hysterical patients, bring down punishment on himself by suffering the same fate as his father of being poisoned by the same rival?’

(Freud’s letter to Fleiss of the 15th of October 1897, Masson, 1985, pp 272, 273).

Again in the same letter, he confides to Fleiss, ‘I have found, in my own case too, being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood’ (Freud’s letter to Fleiss of the 15th of October
Shakespeare’s artistic product is taken then as a reflection of Shakespeare’s own unconscious, from which Freud is theorising a generalisable developmental phenomenon. In comparing or mirroring Hamlet’s behaviour to that of his hysterical patients, in particular one suffering as was Freud, ‘with a severe reaction to the loss of his father’ he is initiating what this thesis terms ‘clinical parallelism’, as form of methodological tool for substantiating a narrative in psychobiography (Wilson and Zarate, 2003, p 128).

Further, Freud is also intimating a parallel chain of transferences encompassing what had been his own severe reaction to his father’s death, which Richard Osborne describes as repressed feelings of ‘rivalry, jealousy, ambition and resentment - returned to him as remorse, shame, impotence and inhibition’ (Osborne, 1993, p 31). This is then reflected by the putatively ‘real’ experience of Shakespeare, who in turn has Hamlet transferring his Oedipal rage to Ophelia’s father. Thus Freud believed that his unconscious understood Shakespeare’s unconscious as a form of countertransference, just as Shakespeare’s unconscious understood the unconscious of Hamlet.

Through the examination of his literary product, the psychobiographer Freud believed, could enter into the mind of an author. The biographical subject becoming known in this way could then be understood psychically, with reference to clinical experience with a patient, that is to say ‘clinical parallelism’. This notion is predicated on the assumption that the subject is himself being authentic and what is written about him actually reflects real events in the subject’s life. As was the case with Shakespeare and the ‘evidence’ of Hamlet, that his fiction represented a truth in the author.

Continuing to use works of literature to explicate psychoanalytic concepts and despite what Mark Gerhie argues are ‘the considerable shortcomings when compared to Freud’s clinical method’, his approach in The Delusion and the Dreams in Jensen’s “Gradiva”, would become ‘set as a kind of “template” for method in applied psychoanalysis’ (Gehrie, 1992, p 239; Freud, S.E. IX, 1907). Despite Freud’s constant acknowledgements that the characters were the creation of the author, Gehrie points out that throughout the study, Freud ‘proceeds with his “analysis” of Gradiva as if it were psychoanalytic data, i.e., treating the story narrative like associations from a patient on the couch’, that ‘[i]n effect, it served as
permission to apply analytic theories to all sorts of data from disparate sources without many of the careful controls that are ordinarily exercised by analysts in the clinical situation' (Gehrie, 1992, p 239, my emphasis).

What Gehrie is critiquing, is only problematic if the analytic techniques being applied, aspire to actual clinical validity. The use of ‘disparate sources’ was in Freud’s view actually a positive attribute, because with the open access to such material, the reader could make up his own mind on the efficacy of an interpretation based on the same information as the analyst, as opposed to the necessarily filtered access to clinical data (Gehrie, 1992, p 239; Freud, S.E. IX, 1907). However, fully alerted to the possibility of a ‘complete caricature of an interpretation’, Freud also notes the ease with which ‘to find what one is looking for and what is occupying one’s own mind’ (Freud, S.E. IX, 1907, p 91). This is a disarmingly honest admission by Freud, but being aware does not preclude such flaws. Indeed, it is the contention of this thesis that such flaws reflect the very basis of ideologically determined personality pathology profiling. The object of the exercise was though for Freud, to arrive at the same place psychoanalytically as the author, who has arrived there intuitively (Freud, S.E. IX, 1907).

In awe of great artists, Freud believed, according to John Mack, that they were able to intuitively create a closed system, a complete and internally consistent psychic model, drawing on ‘sources not yet opened up for science’ (Freud, 1907, S.E. IX, p 8; Mack, 1971; Falk 1985). As such, Freud felt comfortable in applying the methods of psychoanalysis in relating to the behaviour, dreams and fantasies of the central character in Gradiva, Norbert Hanold. In the process of Hanold’s transferring his unnatural attachment from the sculpted relief of a young girl to a real woman, Freud found features in the development of Hanold’s psychic world consistent with his own theory of neurosis and clinical work. These were the emergence of childhood memories and the operation of repression, among other psychic mechanisms (Mack, 1971; Freud, S.E. IX, 1907).

The dénouement of the novel as for Hanold’s psyche follows as Lucille Dooley describes it, the ‘psychoanalytic method of catharsis for his restoration to sane and normal life’ (Dooley, 1916, p 365). Although Jensen knew nothing of psychoanalytic processes, he brings a buried memory to the consciousness of the heroine, a fact which enhances rather than invalidates Freud’s interpretation according to Dooley.
The author’s processes have a ‘completeness that is not always possible in a study from real life’ (ibid). Indeed, it would be difficult to obtain such psychobiographic completeness, anywhere but in a work of fiction.

Literary texts were approached by Freud, according to Francis Baudry, as ‘organic, live and real’, but these works are not the ‘barely modified case studies’ that Freud took them to be (Baudry, 1984, p 552). Freud was then disappointed in his expectation of such writers as necessarily providing psychological clues for the actions of their characters, later realising that works of art were not designed for this purpose (Falk, 985). Neither can a literary work be taken uncritically, as representing the psychic reality of the author. The essential difficulty arising at the inception of the psychobiographical project was the lack of a clear mechanism for objectively linking a psychoanalytic truth, to the particular and existential biographical ‘truth’, presented in the artist’s product.

3 Isidor Sadger and the Pathography Debate.

An early disciple of Freud, Sadger had been a pioneer of the pathographic methodology which is now employed in the view of this thesis, by modern ‘at a distance’ clinical profilers. Even prior to joining the Vienna Circle, Sadger, as Makari points out, was already writing pathographies predicated on Paul Möbius’ psychiatric/medical notion of degenerative heredity (Jones in Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI; Makari, 2008; Schioldann, 2003). With the initial interest in ‘uncovering the pathological elements in the personalities of creative men’, certain artists were labelled as Mack writes, “degeneres superieurs” but degenerates nevertheless (Mack, 1971, 145). So that Freud and the other members of the Vienna Circle, were particularly worried about a public backlash because beloved cultural heroes, in Sadger’s hands, were being turned into degenerates (Nunberg and Federn, 1962).

In the heated discussions that followed the presentation of Sadger’s paper on the popular novelist Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, Sadger retorts to hostile colleagues: ‘pathographies purely out of medical interest, not for the purpose of throwing light on the process of artistic creation, which, by the way, remains unexplained even by psychoanalytic interpretation’ (Sadger quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 267). The method of examining artistic works to gain insight into the personality
of the subject and of the processes of artistic creativity as espoused by Freud, was regarded by Sadger as nothing more than what literary historians did, but ‘augmented by the key which Freud has put in our hands’ (Sadger quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 267).

It is not Sadger argues, ‘possible accurately to deduce a poet’s real experiences from his works because there is nothing to distinguish the real from the illusory; one does not know where truth ends and poetic imagination begins. Therefore, the approach from a poet’s work is unreliable’ (Sadger quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 258). This thesis has some sympathy for Sadger’s perspective here. Psychobiographies, although conforming to a standard more exacting than ordinary biographic insight, cannot have a higher evidential status than literary criticism, because no matter how insightful the psychobiography, it will always be predicated on insufficient or insufficiently reliable psychoanalytically valid data. The circular paradox of the psychobiographic project is that in seeking to find the psychic truth of the subject, it would be essential to know that subject’s psychic reality. However, before being able to clinically interpret the psychic reality of the subject in order to uncover the psychic ‘truth’ of the subject, the psychobiographer has already inferred the psychic ‘truth’ in order to ‘reconstruct’ a psychic ‘reality’, which he then ‘interprets’ to demonstrate the psychic ‘truth’, which he has inferred.

In the debate over Sadger’s pathography of Meyer, Freud was particularly scathing, noting that ‘Sadger has a rigidly established way of working. That is, he uses a two-sided scheme: hereditary tainting and modern erotic psychology. [All of] life is then viewed in the light of this scheme’ (Freud quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 257). Dismissing this approach, Freud argues that ‘Sadger’s investigation has not clarified anything for him. The enigma of this personality remains unsolved. But there is altogether no need to write such pathographies. The theories can only be harmed and not one iota is gained for the understanding of the subject’ (Freud quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 257).

Coupled with Sadger’s reductionist interpretation of the role of heredity, his analysis of Meyer’s supposed unrequited love for his mother, was regarded as somewhat crude and simplistic, and it was the subject of a great deal of criticism from other members of the Vienna Circle (Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907). Wilhelm Stekel maintaining for example that, ‘Sadger has a formula with which he
wants to explain the psychology of all writers [literally: “poetic souls”]; but the matter is not that simple. This is surface psychology’ (Stekel quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, pp 255-56). This does in fact represent an underlying flaw of personality pathology profiling in ascribing an underlying psychology or teleological psychic trajectory to a whole contingent category such as the ‘terrorist’, which this thesis will argue is in fact a category error.

The pathographic methodology, as represented by Sadger, was seen by Freud as an exercise in confirming an original ‘diagnosis’. A preconceived idea of a particular psychological facet of the subject which ‘should’ be found, invariably is found and then focused on, at the expense of taking a more holistic view of that subject. Indeed in respect of Sadger’s stereotyped psychosexual focus, Freud had felt obliged to openly distance himself from Sadger’s view of Meyer, telling his lifelong friend the Swiss Protestant pastor the Reverend Oskar Pfister, that it was Sadger, not he, who had denounced Meyer’s mother and sister as sexual objects (Freud in Meng and Freud 1963/1910). Although as Mack points out, there were actually ‘few psychoanalytic concepts available ... beyond the vicissitudes of infantile sexuality, available to apply to the limited data’ (Mack, 1971, p 145).

Sadger does propose a symptomology of ‘character defect’ which he terms ‘hereditary neurosis’ and ‘hereditary psychosis’ (Sadger in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 22). This reflects formulations of borderline personality disorder as deployed in modern personality pathology theory. Sadger’s ‘borderlines’ have the same defining lack of a sense of self and identity, ‘a disinclination to any permanent connection with one’s own self’ (Sadger in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 184). Starting in puberty the mood swings of ‘deep melancholia alternating with exuberant cheerfulness’, and ‘a yearning to die which may become intensified to the point of suicide’ (ibid). They are impulsive lacking a ‘sense of orderliness (for instance, in money matters and the like)’ (ibid). These individuals are incapable of remaining ‘faithful to one passion’ or one person and as such are ‘poor husbands’ for example (ibid). As well as in the sexual sphere, they have ‘an abnormal desire for certain stimulants (alcohol, tobacco, coffee)’ (ibid). They demonstrate ‘[e]xcessive emotionality and impressionability’, and their narcissistic ‘vanity, pride, self-assertion are pronounced’ (Sadger in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 185).
The two sided schema of a Sadger personality pathography is now deployed comprehensively in adversarial personality pathology profiling, except that the vicissitudes of infantile sexuality have been replaced by the vicissitudes of unempathetic parenting and childhood trauma, along with those hereditary and ‘borderline’ personality traits. The methodology also neatly reflects the circular retrodictions of modern clinical personality pathology profiling, wherein otherwise innocuous events take on a malign connotation but only in reference to the original ideologically driven speculative diagnosis, which are then adduced as evidence to affirm the self same diagnosis.

Freud denounces this tendency in pathography of identifying characteristics as being pathological which, were so commonly found as to render them diagnostically meaningless. As such, Freud also berates Stekel, whose ‘analytic method is too radical; everything in Grillparzer [Stekel’s biographical subject] can be found in every neurotic, as well as in normal persons’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967, p 9). Simply as a function of the pathographic methodology, what might have been regarded normal is arbitrarily adduced as being pathological.

Often no childhood material exists at all, a problem Sadger faced in his pathography of Heinrich von Kleist. Undaunted, Sadger reasons ‘by analogy, and from result to cause, we may say that Kleist must have had the commonly found worship of his mother, and jealousy of his brothers, sisters, and father’ (Sadger in Dooley, 1916, p 385). When deploying this determinist methodology of ‘clinical parallelism’, the tendency is to reify what are really inferential speculations about conditions existing in childhood, which are predicated on perceptions of the subject as an adult. As with arbitrarily ascribed diagnostic symptoms, these inferences are then further represented as actual evidence upon which to posit further speculations. These new speculations in their turn are then deployed to validate the original interpretations of the adult subject, in the same form of circular retrodiction.

Sadger’s pathography of Kleist was intrinsically linked to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century discourse of homosexuality, with Sadger regularly publishing his texts, as Bertrand Vichyn points out, in ‘magazines dedicated to the medico-legal defense of homosexuality’ (Vichyn, 2005-2012, p 4). The aetiology that Sadger developed from his analyses, focused on the role of the strong mother and
the weak or absent father, with his homosexual patients frequently recovering memories of a ‘precocious love for a woman, most often the mother’ (ibid). Sadger claimed that his aim was to cure homosexuals of their perversion, indeed his homosexual patients were obliged to ‘certify’ that even if they did not face legal sanction, that they would undergo his treatment and ‘admit that they possibly already had experienced some feeling for the opposite sex’ (Vichyn, 2005-2012, p 4).

For many years thought to have been lost, in his biography of Freud, Sadger (who had by then become estranged from him), assuages some of the chagrin of the spurned (Dundes, 2005; Sadger, 2005/1930). Freud is painted as a martinet envious of his own disciples and Sadger, who according to Vichyn (2005/2012), introduced the concept of narcissism into psychoanalysis, sees this as a key facet of Freud’s personality, a theme that would become central in modern personality profiling. Indeed, it is the proposition of this thesis that the Sadger pathographies were the origin of modern personological profiling.

4 Leonardo, Freud’s First Dedicated Psychobiography.

Freud’s psychobiography Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood (2001/1910, S.E. XI), would become the template for future (particularly characterological) psychobiographies. Freud believed that although not giving a definitive representation of the subject, clinical techniques could be employed for an understanding of that subject. It was Freud’s psychobiographical process and in particular, that he had had an agenda, which would critically affect the development of psychobiography and by extension the pathologising discourse.

In undertaking his Leonardo, Freud had been acutely aware that ‘readers today find all pathography unpalatable’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 130). In wanting to make a clean break with the relentless negativity of the Sadger style of pathography, Freud’s intention in Leonardo was a more holistic, systematic and motivational conception of psychobiography (Elms, 1994). If the normal processes of psychoanalytic enquiry were applied successfully to psychobiography, the behaviour of a personality in the course of his life could be explained, according to Freud, ‘in terms of the combined operation of constitution and fate, of internal
forces and external powers. Where such an undertaking does not provide any certain results - and this is perhaps so in Leonardo’s case - the blame rests not with the faulty or inadequate methods of psycho-analysis, but with the uncertainty and fragmentary nature of the material relating to him’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 135). This is in the view of this thesis, somewhat disingenuous on Freud’s part. If the material is insufficient, then so necessarily will be the analysis, ergo the psychobiographic process itself should have more limited aims accommodating the fact the data will never fulfil psychoanalytic requirements.

There are limitations of psychobiographic enquiry, (indeed of psychoanalysis itself), that Freud points to which have resonance for modern profiling. The method was firstly not designed ‘to make us understand how inevitable it was that the person concerned should have turned out in the way he did and in no other way’ (Freud, XI, 1910, p 135). Secondly, Freud argues that the nature and direction of psychic repression could not be generalised. For Leonardo according to Freud, it ‘is probable that another person would not have succeeded in withdrawing the major portion of his libido from repression by sublimating it into a craving for knowledge’ (Freud, XI, 1910, pp 135-136). Modern profilers however, point to generalised circumstances in order to explain the personality formations of their subjects, without explication as to why any number of others experiencing the same circumstances did not share the same psychic reactions.

The aim in Leonardo, as Freud describes it, was to ‘explain the inhibitions in Leonardo’s sexual life and in his artistic activity’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 131). For his motivational analysis, Freud’s maxim was to ‘first inquire into the man’s sexual life in order, on that basis, to understand the peculiarities of his character’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 339). To that end, Freud focused on what he regarded as the unusual resolution of Leonardo’s Oedipus complex, which resulted in the strong identification with his mother, leading to the determining speculation that Leonardo was a passive homosexual.

Homosexuality as per of Freud’s formulations in his Leonardo, occurred when a ‘boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her place, identifies himself with her, and takes his own person as a model in whose likeness he chooses the new objects of his love. In this way he has become a
homosexual. What he has in fact done is to slip back to auto-erotism: for the boys whom he now loves as he grows up are after all only substitutive figures and revivals of himself in childhood - boys whom he loves in the way in which his mother loved him when he was a child. He finds the objects of his love along the path of narcissism, as we say'

(Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 100).

*Leonardo* contains, according to Ernest Jones, Freud's first published use of the term narcissism as he elaborated on Sadger's themes for his own exploration of Leonardo's homosexuality (Jones in Freud, 1910, S.E. XI). This early psychobiographic exploration of 'narcissism' reflects a theme which now dominates modern adversarial personality pathology profiling.

The illegitimate child Leonardo, Freud proposed, having been raised without a father during the first years of his life, became the object of obsessive love from his mother, which excited his own precocious sexuality. This was not only responsible for his homosexuality but inhibited his artistic career. Because Leonardo had never experienced repressive paternal authority, his scientific curiosity still flourished (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI). This form of analysis demonstrates what Saul Friedländer (1978) argues is a two stage psychobiographical process. Firstly, formulate a general principle such as 'the relation between a fixation on the mother and homosexuality, or between the absence of the father and the development of scientific curiosity', and secondly 'the application of these general principles to the particular case of Leonardo da Vinci' (Friedländer, 1978, p 21).

Although such a formulation is characteristic of scientific explanations in general, in psychohistory it equates to what Friedländer terms a 'double approximation', leaving the psychobiographer lacking the wherewithal to 'affirm that the known elements of the particular case coincide exactly with the necessary conditions of the general rule' (Friedländer, 1978, p 21). This was further complicated in the case of Leonardo, there being no clinical experience according to Friedländer, establishing a link between 'paternal authority and intellectual audacity' (ibid).
There is, accepts Friedländer, clinical experience of a relationship between homosexuality and a fixation on the mother. Whether there was a more intense attachment to the mother in Leonardo’s case can only be conjecture, so that to the ‘indeterminacy of the particular context is thus added to the imprecision of the general rule, whence the existence of a double "as if"’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 22). Effectively then, Freud’s inferences are not strictly evidence based and thus can only be regarded as general speculations, along with any number of other equally plausible conjectures. Although Freud believes that it is sufficient to be arguing from what he regards as established theory, the general likelihood of these inferences being accurate or at least reasonable, is intrinsically linked to how closely they do align with the available data.

In respect of Leonardo’s supposed passive homosexuality, Freud writes that, ‘on the basis of all we know about him, it seems out of the question that he should have been active in sexual matters. Probably, he is to be regarded as an inhibited homosexual, or one who is homosexual in thought only. He did select young and handsome pupils, but there is nothing at all to signify that he had any direct sexual relations with them’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 339). Except of course that the known evidence, as Michael White (2001) points out, is of Leonardo being charged with homosexual intercourse and surrounding himself with pretty young boys throughout his life. This would suggest that Leonardo at least gave himself the opportunity and aroused the suspicion of actual sexual activity.

Whether predicated on Freud’s idealisation of Leonardo, or an intention to explicate the psychoanalytic notion of sublimation, that Leonardo did not act on any homosexual impulses is central to Freud’s theoretical exposition of Leonardo’s character. Thus in ascribing Leonardo’s creativity as a function of his sublimation of the sexual urge, Freud eschews the external evidence arguing that ‘it is irrelevant to our purpose whether the charge [of committing homosexual acts] brought against the young Leonardo was justified or not. What decides whether we describe someone as an invert is not his actual behaviour, but his emotional attitude’ (Freud, S.E. XI, p 87). This reflects the argument that psychobiographic evidence is not the same as evidence in general history, where it would be adduced if historically validated. In psychobiography, evidence is adduced or discounted in relation to its internal validity in respect of the diagnostic imperative of the profiler’s psychoanalytic theory, or indeed ideological perspective.
External validity then is seen as of secondary importance to a putative theoretically derived ‘internal’ psychological validity. Internal validity, as Elms puts Freud’s position, ‘refers to how well a new piece of biographical data fits with what we already know about the subject’s internal psychological processes or structure’ (Elms, 2003, p 72). So that Freud argues for example that, '[w]hen anyone has, like Leonardo, escaped being intimidated by his father during his earliest childhood, and has in his researches cast away the fetters of authority, it would be in the sharpest contradiction to our expectation if we found that he had remained a believer and had been unable to escape from dogmatic religion’ (Freud, S.E. XI, p 123). Here though, that charges of apostasy were brought against Leonardo is prayed in aid of externally validating Freud’s contention, because it is consistent with his internal analysis.

The selective use or presentation of evidence may be an inevitable corollary of the subjective nature of the psychobiographical process, where the emotional response or countertransference reaction to the subject, is critical. Freud identified with Leonardo argues Elms, and he ‘increased his sense of identification by endowing Leonardo erroneously with some of Freud’s own characteristics’ (Elms, 1994, p 39). In the years before he wrote Leonardo, according to Peter Gay (1998) Freud had been preoccupied by his repressed homosexual feelings for his friend Fleiss. This may reflect Freud’s contention that Leonardo’s genius was in part attributable to his repressed or in the least, not acted upon homosexuality. Similarly, Freud’s contention of Leonardo’s irreligiousness may have more to do with the fact that Freud himself had been ‘a consistent and militant atheist since his school days, mocking God and religion’ (Gay, 1998, p 525).

The views that Freud espouses through his hero Leonardo also reflected discursive positions in the wider and then more problematic19th century discourses of homosexuality and secularism. Freud’s espousal of secularism touched on a conflict which at its peak, according to Clark and Kaiser, ‘touched virtually every sphere of social life’ (Clark and Kaiser, 2003). Although Freud would vary his view on homosexuality, it was influential in the discourse particularly as expressed in a 1935 letter to an American mother:
‘Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation; it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it to be a variation of the sexual function, produced by a certain arrest of sexual development. Many highly respectable individuals of ancient and modern times have been homosexuals, several of the greatest men among them. (Plato, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, etc)’

(Freud, 1935).

5 The Clinical Significance of Leonardo’s ‘Vulture’ Fantasy.

Freud gives clinical primacy indeed effectively predicates his analysis, upon a remark that Leonardo makes in one of his scientific essays, that ‘[i]n my earliest recollection of childhood, it seems to me as though a vulture had flown down to me, opened my mouth with his tail, and several times beaten it to and fro between my lips’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 340). The presumption that Freud makes is that this was an infantile sexual fantasy, transmuted by what must have been Leonardo’s adult awareness of Egyptian mythology, linking mother with vulture (ibid). However, in the translation that Freud relied upon, the Italian word ‘nibbio’ meaning kite, had actually been mistranslated as vulture (Jones in Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI; Esman, 1998; Elms, 1994; Bergman, 1973).

Jones gives a somewhat arcane explication of the etymological roots of Freud’s error, arguing that the mistranslation does not wholly invalidate Freud’s study of Leonardo, as ‘the main body of Freud’s study is unaffected by his mistake: the detailed construction of Leonardo’s emotional life from his earliest years, the account of the conflict between his artistic and his scientific impulses, the deep analysis of his psychosexual history’ (Jones in Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 62). Freud’s analysis, whatever bird it was, is not contradicted, but merely robbed of one corroborating piece of evidence. Indeed, if the vulture phantasy were simply a heuristic psychoanalytic speculation, Jones’ view would be quite legitimate. In Freud’s Leonardo however, it represents the key piece in the anamnesis for making his diagnostic analysis.
The internal validity of Freud’s clinical argument is fatally undermined, as the specifically ‘vulture’ fantasy is inextricably linked to Freud’s key psychoanalytic contention that Leonardo had a mother fixation. This mother fixation in turn predisposes his homosexuality, with the nature of Leonardo’s sexuality determining not only his character, but critically impacting his scientific and artistic output. The fact that Leonardo could never finish his later works was due in Freud’s view to the ‘stigma of infantilism, and renders it probable to us that his investigations actually go back to these matters, to his first fixation onto the mother’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 343). Indeed, that if psychoanalytic notions of childhood themselves are correct as Freud puts it, ‘then it follows that the fact which the vulture phantasy confirms, namely that Leonardo spent the first years of his life alone with his mother, will have been of decisive influence in the formation of his inner life’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 92).

Aside from the issue of mistranslation, Freud’s reliance on the vulture fantasy represented, as Martin Bergman claims, a basic methodological challenge to psychobiography (Bergman, 1973). In the therapeutic context, childhood memories are frequently ‘puzzling until illuminated by free association or through an interpretation of transference behavior’ (Bergman, 1973, p 835). Leonardo’s ‘vulture’ memory was, ‘a screen memory unique to the artist. In order to understand it, Freud made the historically important decision to draw upon the technique of interpretation of symbols’ (ibid). Questioning the reliability of interpretations based solely on symbols, Bergman argues that ‘symbols are overdetermined and their meaning is less constant and less universal than Freud assumed. Clinical experience has taught us that to interpret dreams through symbols alone, is often to miss their personal and therefore their crucial meaning’ (Bergman, 1973, p 835).

Convinced of the clinical validity of his findings in respect of the vulture fantasy, Gay (1998) recounts how Freud in a letter to Carl Gustav Jung first announced his solution to the Leonardo mystery. Freud had encountered a neurotic patient who, though without his genius, resembled Leonardo. This was reason why Freud ‘was so confident that he could reconstruct Leonardo’s virtually undocumented youngest years: the vulture fantasy was, for him, heavily laden with clinical associations ... He had no doubt that Leonardo’s recollection represented at once the passive homosexual sucking on a penis and the infant blissfully sucking at its
mother’s breast’ (Gay, 1998, p 271). Thus, Freud had arrived at a certain analytic determination of Leonardo’s vulture fantasy, adduced to internally validate a hunch based on the analysis of a current patient, as a prime exemplar of ‘clinical parallelism’.

The psychobiographic method must necessarily proceed though from some form of preliminary assumptions, it is inherent in the very process of choosing a subject. Freud’s contention that Leonardo was a passive homosexual was adduced as an inference by virtue of its resonance to his original assumption, for which he was then seeking psychological consonance. So, Freud’s circular inference was that Leonardo had fixated on his mother in early childhood due to the inferred absence of his father, an absence reasonably inferred because it fitted with the inference of Leonardo’s passive homosexuality. This was validated by the ‘vulture’ fantasy, in turn being interpreted as such because of Leonardo’s passive homosexuality, which demonstrated a mother fixation inferred from a hunch of Leonardo’s homosexual orientation. Once initiated by the psychoanalytic hunch, these circular chains of inference take on a momentum of their own, with contradictory evidence not being accommodated iteratively but discarded as flawed by virtue of not fitting in with the ‘evidence’ adduced in the inferential chain.

In his *Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays* (2001/1939, S.E. XXIII), Freud instigates an inferential momentum by boldly declaiming that ‘[t]he fact remains that there is only one answer to the question of where the Jews derived the custom of circumcision from - namely, from Egypt’ (Freud, 2001/1939, S.E. XXIII, pp 26-27). Nonetheless Freud acknowledges that he his dealing ‘autocratically and arbitrarily with Biblical tradition - bringing it up to confirm my views when it suits me and unhesitatingly rejecting it when it contradicts me - I am exposing myself to serious methodological criticism and weakening the convincing force of my arguments’ (Freud, 2001/1939, S.E. XXIII, note 2, p 27). This is a tactic which this critique claims as a recurring theme in adversarial profiling, deployed in order to incite a chain of speculation in the hope, as in Freud’s case, ‘that I shall find some degree of justification later on, when I come upon the track of these secret motives’ (Freud, 2001/1939, S.E. XXIII, note 2, p 27).

Once a weight of inferential evidence has been accrued to the initial speculation, data is interpreted and causation retrodicted in order to validate it. Then initial
hunch, psychoanalytic intuition or expert judgement, becomes part of the evidential chain, literally proving itself. Even Freud’s most strongly promulgated inferences according to Gay (1998) were always accepted only provisional. This had made his perseverance with his vulture theory somewhat puzzling. Gay writes that, ‘while it is exceedingly probable that the mistranslation making a vulture out of a kite had been called to Freud’s attention, he never corrected it. Throughout his long career as a psychoanalytic theorist, Freud proved himself ready to revise far more important, long-held theories. But not his “Leonardo”’ (Gay, 1998, pp 273-274).

Along with his identification with Leonardo, Elms (1994) argues that Freud’s own existential crisis may be responsible for some of the ill judged speculation in Leonardo. Freud’s arguments may have been linked to his ‘growing anxieties about Jung’s religious mysticism and about the inadequacy of Jung or any other psychoanalyst to become Freud’s successor. Freud was further disappointed with the general public’s failure to give psychoanalysis its due, and he was becoming increasingly worried about how his age, ill health, and death would affect the psychoanalytic movement, beyond the issue of finding a successor’ (Elms, 1994, p 49). Indeed, Gay hypothesises that Freud’s staunch adherence to his Leonardo, was a ‘reminder to Jung that Freud was not inclined to compromise on the inflammatory and divisive issue of the libido. In this embattled decade, the making of polemical points, whether directed at open adversaries or at wavering supporters, was never far from the center of Freud’s intentions’ (Gay, 1998, p 274).

6 Introducing Psychoanalytic Concepts into Historical Research.

After its publication, analysts according to Mack, ‘seem to have been restrained by Freud’s warning in the Leonardo biography regarding the problems of lack of evidence and the dangers of subjectivity in such studies, and by the obvious shortcomings of the Leonardo work itself, rather than stimulated to undertake similar follies on their own initiative’ (Mack, 1971, p 149). There was however, no shortage of crude psychobiographic imitators delighting, as Mack expresses it, in the ammunition afforded by misapplied Freudian concepts in order to ‘attack the subject under the pretense of providing greater understanding’ (ibid, p 148). In his 1957 presidential address to the American Historical Association, William Langer has it that although Freud was able to ask important and innovative questions
concerning Leonardo’s personality, that the novelty of his essay along with its startling conclusions ‘had much to do with precipitating the flood of psychoanalytic or, better, pseudo-psychoanalytic biographical writing during the 1920’s. Almost all of this was of such a low order - ill-informed, sensational, scandalizing - that it brought the entire Freudian approach into disrepute’ (Langer, 1958, p 287).

It is this evaluation and reconstruction in terms of a clinical methodology with Freud’s Leonardo as a prototype that argues Manfred Kets De Vries (1990), which sets the psychobiographical project apart from the more traditional historical approaches. Before the introduction of Freudian concepts according to Kets De Vries, historical portraits were mostly either descriptive or chronological, with historians failing to ‘understand the irrational sides of their subjects. Common sense, intuition, or empathy seemed insufficient for uncovering motives and explaining human action’ (Kets De Vries, 1990, p 424).

Early Freudians, as Friedländer (1978) argues, had been parochial, focusing on instinctual traits, stages of adaptation, and the universally determined character of psychic conflicts from which no one was exempt. Translated to psychobiography, Runyan identifies the criticism of taking an essentially parochial theory, ‘developed to explain the behavior of neurotic middle- and upper-class Viennese at the turn of the twentieth century’, as if it were transhistorical, transcultural, scientifically based clinically proven data (Runyan, 1984, pp 214-15). Psychobiography can provide, as Robert Wallerstein writes, ‘some major illuminations from a psychoanalytic perspective. But the risk of a massive reductionism to infantile trauma and unresolved childhood oedipal issues as the totality of the psychological insights offered in the particular person in history is a grave one’ (Wallerstein, 1988, pp 160-161).

There was according to Robert Jay Lifton, an implicit assumption in classical psychoanalysis, of a larger historical universe which was ‘nothing but a manifestation of the projections or emanations of the individual psyche’ (Lifton, 1974, p 23, emphasis in the original). Within this essentially ahistorical framework Freud, influenced by both German historicism and Judeo-Christian millennialism, regarded the singular ‘Event’, as being historically determining (Lifton, 1974, p 25). So that, for example, the re-enactment of the primeval murder of the father, the genesis of Jewish history as depicted in Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, is seen
at the same time as both an historical though mythical event (Lifton, 1974; Freud, 20011939, S.E. XXIII). It also pertains to the individual psyche as a product of the Oedipus complex, taken argues Lifton ‘as the ultimate source of these decisive occurrences. Indeed, one could view Freud’s overall historical method as a kind of apologia for the Oedipal Event’ (Lifton, 1974, p 25).

Freud had in general focused ‘upon individual psychopathology as existing more or less apart from history’, as in not being a reflection of history (Lifton, 1974, p 26; Carlson, 1978). *Leonardo* had presaged, in Lifton’s view, the ahistorical ‘idea of interpreting the outcomes of major historical events as expressions of the individual psychopathology of a particular national leader’, again a notion very much taken up later in personological personality pathology profiling as in Post’s “Saddam is Iraq; Iraq is Saddam” (Lifton, 1974, p 26; Post and Baram, 2002).

Freud’s ‘prehistorical paradigm’ represents, according to Lifton, the encounter between father and sons enveloping ‘indiscriminately the individual and the undifferentiated collectivity’, and with the ‘individual-psychopathological model it is the aberration of a specific individual which is writ large’ predestined by ‘repetition compulsion’ (Lifton, 1974, , pp 25, 26, emphasis in the original). So that although this biologically determinist ahistoricism would be superseded in Freud’s own thinking, in modern ‘at a distance’ clinical profiling, personality pathology theorists continue to predicate their discursive analyses such as Post’s analysis of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, on the notion that the personality of the leader, inherently reflects through a narcissistic transference relationship, the psyche of his group and of the phenomenon itself (Post, 2003; 2004; Volkan, 1998). Thus, pathological leaders and their groups are ineluctably destined to repeat their maladaptive behaviour and will, according to Post, unconsciously sabotage their chances of success in order to perpetuate this behaviour (Post, 1987; Post, 1998). Similarly, notwithstanding any particular cultural or ideological inferences, Post’s concept of the ‘threat of success’, is the thesis argues, essentially an ahistorical notion with which to label a recalcitrant adversary (Post, 1987, 1998).

7 The Cultural Perspective in Psychobiography.
Psychobiography argues Stannard, is itself ahistorical and that, 'is its ultimate failing. Perhaps the single most important achievement of modern historical thinking has been the growing recognition on the part of the historian that life in the past was marked by a fundamental social and cognitive differentness from that prevailing in our own time’ (Stannard, 1980, p 151). However, the tools of the present can only be used to investigate the past, and we cannot gainsay our cognitive ability. In that sense, historical enquiry is no less ahistorical than psychobiography. A more inclusive perspective of psychobiography is as James Anderson puts it, that ‘psychological, economic, and cultural explanations, are generally not competing; rather, they point to “coexisting or corresponding processes”’ (Anderson, 1981, p 458). Indeed, countering the argument of ahistoricism, Elms (2003) maintains that in his *Leonardo*, Freud had actually promulgated the notion of relating his subject to the people of his own era and culture, in order to determine whether his subject’s behaviour was either, relatively normal or deviant.

Unique or unusual behaviour as viewed through the prism of another era and culture may actually have been merely mundane, in their time and place. Elms notes for example, that Freud highlights the psychological significance of Leonardo’s noted inability to finish paintings, which it had been argued, reflected the practice of other great artists at the time such as Michelangelo. However, contemporary sources emphasize ‘Leonardo’s notorious inability to finish his works’. Freud contextualised Leonardo’s behaviour and was able to demonstrate that this ‘behavior was indeed rather unusual and therefore revealed more about Leonardo’s psyche than about his society’ (Elms, 2003 p 73).

Freud’s *Leonardo* would appear, then, to also presage the more culturally oriented psychoanalytic psychobiographies. Progressing from what he regards as classical psychoanalysis with the arrival of what Friedländer terms psychoanalytic culturalists, more socio-cultural and eclectic theoretical perspectives have been adopted in psychobiography (Friedländer, 1978). Modern anthropology does ‘not put into question the universality of the Oedipus complex as such, but only the universality of the specific Oedipal relations that exist in the Western family’ (ibid, p 20). Thus in Friedlander’s view, this gives psychoanalysis the theoretical basis, along with sufficient information on their institutions and mores, for the psychobiographical study of other cultures. Although particularly exemplified by
Erikson’s notion of the life cycle, few psychoanalysts, Friedländer maintains, would deny the crucial influence of socio-cultural factors on the elaboration of the family practices that determine the development of the child as he goes through the stages of instinctual maturation’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 19; Erikson, 1963; Erikson; 1968).

Reductive simplifications as Runyan (1984) has it, constrain a narrative to an unnatural order inconsistent with actual lived experience. Although such accounts may be inconsistent with actual lived experience, they may lend the narrative artistic purpose, and indeed Freud’s work was sometimes itself on the cusp of art and science. Of his Moses for example, Freud confides to his old friend Arnold Zweig that he had originally entitled it ‘The Man Moses, a historical novel’ (Freud, S. in Freud, E., 1970/1934, p 91; Freud, 2001/1939 S.E. XXIII). Freud’s dilemma, Hans Meyerhof believes, was ‘that, though trying to be a pure scientist, he always came up with results that read as if they were literature’ (Meyerhof, 1962, p 13). Summing up the effect of this dilemma László Halász writes, that the ‘reader of Freud’s Leonardo has two contradictory attitudes simultaneously: a willing suspension of his/her disbelief, as is usual with a literary work; and maintenance of his/her doubts about anything that is not factually correct or testable, as is usual with a scientific work’ (Halász, 2003, p 7).

In hoping to dissuade Zweig from writing a biography of the then not long deceased philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, Freud writes;

‘I am much more clearly conscious of my inclinations against the project than the reasons for it. But no doubt it will not matter what I say.

The poetic urge, if it’s strong enough, will prove itself stronger. It seems to me that we touch here on the problem of poetic licence versus historical truth. I know my feelings on this point are thoroughly conservative. Where there is an unbridgeable gap in history and biography, the writer can step in and try to guess how it all happened. In an uninhabited country he may be allowed to establish the creatures of his imagination. Even when the historical facts are known but sufficiently remote and removed from common knowledge, he can disregard them …

Now when it is a question of someone so near to us in time and whose influence is still as active as Friedrich Nietzsche’s, a description of his character and his destiny should aim at the same result as a portrait does -
that is to say, however the conception may be elaborated the main stress should fall on the resemblance. And since the subject cannot sit for the portrait, one has first to collect so much material about him that it only needs to be supplemented with a sympathetic understanding.

(Freud’s letter to Zweig 12th of May, 1934, Freud, E., 1970, pp 77-78).

There is a key distinction which Freud makes then, between the poetic license readily afforded in the explanations of distant figures, with the need for not only fullness and accuracy but also empathy, when dealing with contemporaries. A psychobiography should not construct or reconstruct absent material, but rather provide a ‘sympathetic understanding’ for what was actually known. Similarly, although Freud advocated the use of psychoanalysis as an investigative method for the legal profession, he balked at providing an analysis without the fullest of information (Slovenko, 2000). In 1924, the *Chicago Tribune* offered Freud a substantial sum of money in order to diagnose the notorious murderers Leopold and Loeb. Declining Freud commented, that “I would say that I cannot be supposed to be prepared to provide an expert opinion about persons and a deed when I have only newspaper reports to go on and have no opportunity to make a personal examination” (Freud quoted in Slovenko, 2000, p 105). This is exactly though, the premise and indeed type of data upon which the expert opinion of modern clinical ‘at a distance’ political profiling is based.

8 **Freud’s Study of Woodrow Wilson, the First Political Psychobiography.**

Whilst Freud did not directly address contemporary social developments (Adorno, 1973), its traces were inscribed on the minutiae of his individual subjects. With particular types of individual affliction reflecting current socioeconomic conditions, Freud’s evolving work then necessarily reflected historical trends (ibid). Notwithstanding their clinical and theoretical essence, Freud’s post 1918 works also had according Daniel Pick, ‘an immediate political purchase on contemporary mass politics and the demagogic role of Fascist leaders’ (Pick, 2012, p 141). In his *Group Psychology And The Analysis Of The Ego* for example, although Freud doesn’t name individuals or movements, he describes the ‘spiral into fascism’ (Pick, 2012, p 141; Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII).
In his *Group Psychology* Freud does make specific reference to what he saw as the libidinal betrayal of the ‘fantastic promises’ as represented by the ‘American President’s Fourteen Points’ (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 95). It was not until Freud’s psychobiography of this same American President Woodrow Wilson, co-authored by William C. Bullitt, that Freud would deal fully with contemporary political issues relating to a recently deceased personality (Freud and Bullitt, 1967). It is ironic, then, as Gay points out, that it was in a criticism of another somewhat scurrilous psychoanalytically inspired biography of Wilson by William Bayard Hale that Freud enunciated the dictum; ‘psychoanalysis should never be used as a weapon in literary or political polemics’ (Freud quoted in Gay, 1985, p 140).

Wilson was intensely disliked as Paul Roazen (2006) amongst others points out, by both Freud and Bullitt. Bullitt was himself a very senior American diplomat, a former American ambassador to both the Soviet Union and France (Solms, 2006). The animosity of Bullitt one of Freud’s analysand’s, derived as Roazen has it, from the disavowal by Wilson for his mission to Soviet Russia at the time of the Versailles Treaty. Making it very clear in his introduction to the psychobiography, Freud’s animus was derived from the sense of betrayal he felt at the failed promise of Wilson’s supposed divinely inspired idealism (Freud 1967).

With the perceived abrogation of America’s diplomatic authority, the Versailles proceedings were dictated writes George Prochnik, by the ‘machinations of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, who then set about imposing economically crippling terms’, that were to blight the futures of both Germany and Freud’s beloved Austria (Prochnik, 2007, p 2). In his introduction to the Wilson biography, Freud writes, that the ‘figure of the American President, as it rose above the horizon of Europeans, was from the beginning unsympathetic to me, and that this aversion increased in the course of years the more I learned about him and the more severely we suffered from the consequences of his intrusion into our destiny. With increasing acquaintance it was not difficult to find good reasons to support this antipathy’ (Freud, 1967, pp 3-4).

Freud has it that Wilson’s childhood development was dictated by a domineering father. Wilson's libido was dominated by his feminine side and as such, Freud was ‘obliged’ to ‘conclude that a considerable portion of his libido must have found
storage in aggressive activity toward his father ... nearly all the unusual features of Wilson’s character were developed from the repressions, identifications and sublimations which his ego employed in its attempt to reconcile his aggressive activity toward his father with his overwhelming passivity to his father’ (Freud, 1967, p 8).

An original manuscript including passages not found in the published book was discovered by Roazen as Mark Solms (2006) recounts, whilst searching amongst Bullitt’s papers. Containing Freud’s general theoretical introduction to psychoanalysis for the book, it also included an unpublished excerpt postulating a profound link between Christianity and latent homosexuality (Solms, 2006; Schatzman, 2005). If the passive attitude towards a father as exhibited by Wilson, does not find direct expression, it will argues Freud, ‘find that expression by identifying with Jesus Christ’ (Solms, 2006, p 1292). Christ had fulfilled the powerful and contradictory wishes of being completely passive and subservient, ergo feminine in relation to the father. Christ was according to Freud, ‘completely masculine, powerful and authoritative like the father. By humbly submitting to the will of God the Father, by surrendering to total femininity, Christ was able to become God Himself, the ultimate goal of masculinity’ (Freud quoted in Solms, 2006, p 1293).

The analogy with Christ is used as Solms puts it, to deal with the Oedipal problem of the ‘relationship with the father’ (Solms, 2006, p 1293). In Wilson’s case Freud argued, a ‘considerable portion of the human race had to suffer for the overwhelming love which the Reverend Joseph Ruggles Wilson had inspired in his son’ (Freud 1967, p 23). This disturbed Oedipal relationship in Freud’s view, was one with which Wilson struggled his entire life, and led eventually to his moral collapse at Versailles, where his fawning feminine side dominated (Freud, 1967).

Just as Freud infers irreligiousness to his hero Leonardo, he puts religiosity at the core of his antipathy to his anti-hero Wilson. This animosity not only towards religion but to Wilson, is reflected in his view that, ‘I do not know how to avoid the conclusion that a man who is capable of taking the illusions of religion so literally and is so sure of a special personal intimacy with the Almighty is unfitted for relations with ordinary children of men’ (Freud, 1967, p 4). Wilson’s ‘saviour complex’ as Freud expresses it, was the ‘inevitable conclusion in his unconscious
during his first years; if his father was God, he himself was God’s only beloved son, Jesus Christ’ (Freud, 1967, p 10). Once again, in conflating his antipathy to religion with his attitude or countertransference towards his biographic subject, it is Freud’s anticlerical discourse which appears to dictate his perceptions, his putative analytic hunches.

9 The Controversy over Freud’s Involvement in the Wilson ‘Pathography’.

Although acknowledging his antipathy, Freud had originally been chary of openly even commenting on Wilson, expressing that, “I may be possibly kept back by the consideration that Mr. Wilson is a living personality and not a product of poetical phantasy as the fair Gradiva was” (Freud quoted in Gay, 1998, p 555). With Wilson dead, although not as long dead as Nietzsche had been for Zweig, Freud eschews his former reticence. Justifying his involvement, Freud argues that when an important public figure such as Wilson was dead, ‘he becomes by common consent a proper subject for biography and previous limitations no longer exist. The question of a period of post-mortem immunity from biographical study might then arise, but such a question has rarely been raised’ (Freud, 1967, p 5). Although the question of a proper lapse of time had of course been raised by Freud himself, when arguing against Zweig’s proposed biography of Nietzsche (Freud in Freud, E., 1970/1934).

In terms of a political discourse, the legacy of an individual may still have political traction and influence long after they have left office or even died. Wilson’s internationalist legacy was symbolically potent, and as Kendrick Clements remarks, ‘Richard Nixon recognized the power of Wilson’s legacy when he returned Wilson’s desk to the Oval Office in 1969’ (Clements, 2015, p2). Protecting a political legacy may be more emotive than protecting the reputation of the living subject, of paramount importance for relatives and friends and indeed political associates. Wilson died in 1924 and although the manuscript was typed in final form by 1932, Erik Erikson points out that Freud and Bullitt agreed to hold back on publishing until after the death of Wilson’s widow and in the event, the book was not actually published until after Bullitt’s death a year later in 1967 (Erikson, 2011; Gay 1998; Solms, 2006).
The study is relentlessly negative towards ‘Little Tommy Wilson’ as Freud refers to him. In adult life, Wilson ‘found it difficult to maintain friendly relations with men of superior intellect or position, and preferred to surround himself with women or inferiors’ (Freud, 1967, p 10). Very problematically then, Freud has it that ‘we must attack the misconception that we have written this book with a secret purpose to prove that Wilson was a pathological character, an abnormal man, in order to undermine in this roundabout way esteem for his achievements. No! That is not our intention’ (Freud and Bullitt, 1967, p 5).

Undermining Wilson was the clear intention of the book, which as Weinstein et al describe as a ‘biased application of a simplistic and distorted version of psychoanalytic theory, is not regarded by either historians or psychoanalysts as a scholarly contribution’ (Weinstein et al, 1978, p 585). As such, it was not only disowned by Freud’s family but as Solms puts it, by ‘just about every Freud scholar qualified to express an opinion on the matter’ (Solms, 2006, p 1263). Indeed Erikson was acutely aware of the damage the book would do to the entire Freudian project, in that the ‘chestnut of “Freudulance” will be warmed over and over’ (Erikson and Hofstadter, 2011/1967, p 2). Erikson is at pains to point out then what he claims as the study’s glaring incongruities with Freud’s style, and that ‘it is not at all certain which parts of the body of this book, if any, were written by Sigmund Freud himself’ (ibid).

Hinting that his involvement was indeed limited, in referring to the Wilson biography Freud writes to his friend Zweig, that ‘I am once again writing an introduction for something someone else is doing I must not say what it is, but it too is an analysis and at the same time very much a matter of contemporary interest, almost political’ (Freud’s letter to Zweig of the 7th of December, 1930 in Freud, E., 1970, p 25). As Freud’s original contribution had been lost apart from his introduction to the manuscript, Erikson maintains that the book could only reasonably be attributed to Bullitt (Erikson, 2011). However, Freud makes the position quite clear in his introduction. Bullitt, who of course knew Wilson personally, had as Freud writes, ‘prepared a digest of data on Wilson’s childhood and youth. For the analytic part we are both equally responsible; it has been written by us working together’ (Freud, 1967, p 5).
Notwithstanding the reservations of Erikson et al over Freud’s involvement, there is some consensus according to Solms, that the text in its manner and rhetoric are Bullitt’s but the ideas and particularly the general part containing the excluded original material were Freud’s. In any event as Mack summarises, ‘Freud cannot be absolved of all responsibility for its authorship or for the failure to edit or curtail the work’ (Mack, 1971, p 149) Freud, ‘whose life was devoted to the understanding and tolerance of the complexity of human psychology, found his work being misused to oversimplify and reduce human motive to banality and, wittingly or unwittingly, had taken part in one such study himself’ (Mack, 1971, p 149).

Whatever his motives ‘Freud’s personality profile of Wilson concentrated on the leader’s gift for self-deception, as well as his inexhaustible well of hidden hatred’, effectively opening the way, according to Anthony Elliott, ‘for the application of psychoanalysis to politics’ (Elliott, 2002, p 2). It is somewhat unfortunate that this politico/psychoanalytic template should have been such an invective. It showed that psychoanalytic concepts could be deployed not only diagnostically but also aggressively in a political context, which is the basic premise of modern adversarial political ‘at a distance’ pathology profiling.

10 Conclusion.

Psychobiography as a blend of art and science in progress, gives a window onto the human condition in accessible form. Although incorporating insights which make it interesting, meaningful and relevant to that human condition, it can never feasibly acquire sufficient or appropriate data for a clinical explanation of any particular individual ‘at a distance’. The critique in this chapter has shown that psychobiographic neutrality as a concept has been historically and inherently unachievable, because wider discourses are inevitably implicated in the psychobiographic project. Such was the case with the discourse of homosexuality in Sadger’s pathographies, coupled with an anticlerical discourse by Freud, in both Leonardo and the study of Woodrow Wilson.

In spite of his errors and the subsequent abuse of his psychobiographic process, modern scholars of Leonardo according to White (2001), still acknowledge their debt to Freud’s insights in Leonardo. Even if Freud’s speculations were not
clinically reliable, in his *Leonardo* he did discuss as Elms points out, ‘basic psychological processes that might help to explain other variants in developmental patterns, not only the specific version that Leonardo had presumably experienced’ (Elms, 2003, p 70).

By their very nature, psychological let alone pathographic studies of political leaders are contentious. Whilst declaring his antipathy for Wilson at the outset, Freud can still ask ‘the reader not to reject the work which follows as a product of prejudice. Although it did not originate without the participation of strong emotions, those emotions underwent a thorough subjugation. And I can promise the same for William C. Bullitt, as whose collaborator I appear in this book’ (Freud, 1967, p 4-5). There is no reason to doubt Freud’s sincerity but this in itself is problematic. This reflects the misguided belief that it is possible for a wholly objective clinical-scientific psychobiographical analysis. Rather than the psychic truth of Leonardo or Wilson, they are the psychic truths of Freud’s *Leonardo* and Woodrow Wilson which are very particular to Freud.

The analysis of works of art or distant historical figures does afford the possibility of psychoanalytic insight, without the ethical dilemmas involved in seeking to inscribe unverifiable psychic ‘truths’ on unwitting living subjects. The next chapter describes the first institutional deployment of psychoanalysis as a ‘weapon’, with moral prohibitions suspended in the war against Hitler. This leads to the development of ‘at a distance’ political profiling and this thesis argues, the divergence between characterological and personological approaches becomes apparent.
CHAPTER FOUR:

WHAT MAKES HITLER 'TICK'? : PROFILING THE ENEMY
1 Introduction.

This chapter critiques the methodologies of two psychoanalytic profiles of Adolf Hitler undertaken at the behest of the American intelligence services during World War Two. As well as an impetus for innovation, war tends to have a suppressing effect on moral inhibitions and Freud’s admonition against the use of psychoanalysis as a weapon, became more honoured in the breach. The Wartime profiles were then a catalyst for the adversarial possibilities of psychoanalysis opened up by Freud’s clearly antagonistic psychoanalytic profile of Woodrow Wilson, and the exigencies of war.

Undertaken in 1943 and envisioned as a full scale facsimile clinical analysis, the first of these profiles Walter Langer’s study of Adolf Hitler, is a seminal event in the political profiling project. The study gave Jerrold Post the inspiration for his dedicated CIA personality profiling unit, referring to Langer’s analysis of Hitler as the ‘Holy Grail of profiling’ (Post, BBC2, 25/11/2005). Although not believed to have been acted upon during the War, Post describes the Langer study as the ‘prototype of the psychodynamically oriented clinically informed assessment of a foreign leader at a distance, it is of great importance, for it was to become the model of subsequent endeavors in support of government policy’ (Post, 2006a, p 50, my emphasis).

The second profile critiqued in this chapter is a memorandum prepared secretly by Langer’s colleague, Henry Murray. As opposed to Langer’s more traditionally Freudian characterological analysis, which seeks to build up a comprehensive developmental picture of Hitler’s childhood, Murray’s inference of diagnostic categories from Hitler’s adult functioning was the first modern personological personality pathology profile. Incorporating precursor notions to those later theorised by Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg, Murray’s profile of Hitler demonstrates that there was a paradigm within psychobiography already shifting towards personological profiling.

A major contention of the thesis explored in this chapter is that the distinction between characterological and personological profiling reflects more than the evolving deployment of newer psychoanalytic conceptualisations; rather, it represents a distinct paradigm shift. In this chapter, the thesis will seek to
demonstrate by way of a detailed critique and comparison of the Langer and Murray profiles, that these conceptualisations represent two entirely different approaches to profiling, the personological and the characterological.

2 Background to and Personnel of the Langer Study.

Walter Langer was the younger brother of William Langer the chief of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), wartime forerunner of the CIA. Analysed by Anna Freud, Walter had been in Vienna at the time of the Anschluss studying psychoanalysis, and had ‘seen the Nazi machine in action - pogroms, wholesale arrests, regimentation, etc. - and had been exposed to the Nazi propaganda apparatus for a long period of time’ (Langer, 1972, pp 18-19; Waggoner, New York Times, the 7th of April, 1994). As well as treating those psychologically damaged by war, psychoanalysts were employed in the Allied intelligence services, and the psychic make up of Hitler was clearly of particular interest. William Langer had specifically, according to Pick (2012), made the case for employing his psychoanalyst younger brother. The head of what Susan Cavin describes as the elitist and very clubbable OSS, the then Colonel, ‘Wild Bill’ Donavon, approached Walter with a view to employing psychoanalytic techniques in psychological warfare (Pick, 2012; Cavin, 2008; Langer, 1972).

In Walter Langer’s Post War account, he describes Donavon as being very receptive to psychoanalytic ideas, and Langer had been set the task of adapting clinical insight with a view to overcoming the widespread discontent for a possible draft in the US. The patriotic fervour following Pearl Harbour had however, made this particular work contemporaneously redundant (Langer, 1972). Although still on staff as a freelance consultant, Langer was kept kicking his heels until in the spring of 1943 when Donavon in Langer’s account of the meeting, asks Langer what he made of Hitler as he’d been over there and seen ‘him and his outfit operating. You must have some idea about what is going on” (Langer, 1972, p 19). What was needed as Donavon addressed it, was a realistic appraisal of Hitler and the situation in Germany, and that “most of all, we want to know as much as possible about his psychological make-up - the things that make him tick. In addition, we ought to know what he might do if things begin to go against him. Do
you suppose you could come up with something along these lines?’” (Donavon quoted in Langer, 1972, p 19, my emphasis).

Langer then set about putting together a study team and although he doesn’t name them in his 1972 bestselling book, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*, Langer actually had three distinguished collaborators: Professor Henry Murray of the Harvard Psychological Clinic, Dr. Bertram D. Lewin of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Dr. Ernst Kris from the New School for Social Research (Langer, 1943; Langer, 1972). As the OSS’s chief psychologist, Murray was presumably the senior figure in the group, although it was Langer who was approached to lead the Hitler study. One of the group, as Langer has it, was unable to make the meetings in New York [Kris and Bertram were both actually based in New York] and although he promised to participate in writing, ‘[u]nfortunately, not a word was ever received from him’ (Langer, 1972, p 27). In fact, Murray had secretly prepared his own memorandum for which Pick believes Langer never forgave him, and that the ‘mistrust and resentment between themselves complicated and soured their inquiries (Pick, 2012, p 132).

Also, something of a shadow figure in the endeavour is Carl Gustav Jung, who had first introduced Murray to psychoanalysis (Allpsych, 2011). Jung’s insights on Hitler’s putative feminine side are deployed by Langer (1943), and Murray consulted Jung on numerous occasions throughout the War (Cavin, 2008). Jung’s view of Hitler was that he had a tremendous mother complex which meant he would ‘be under the domination either of a woman or of an idea’, reflecting his ideological passion for Germany (Jung in Knickerbocker, 1939, p 129).

Particular mention should be made of the psychoanalytic study of Hitler undertaken by W.H.D. Vernon under the supervision of Murray and G.W.Allport, before the United States entered the War (Vernon 1941; Murray, 1943; Cavin 2008). This study is arguably the core thematic analysis forming the substantive ‘case history’ for both the Langer and Murray studies, with Murray reproducing it in full within his own memorandum.

The main theme of Vernon’s analysis, was that Hitler’s motivating force was his attempt to resolve his inner conflicts by projecting them onto the external world, just as in his ‘childish interpretation of sexual congress the father attacks,
strangles, and infects the mother, so the Jew, international Jewish Capital, etc., encircle and restrict Germany, threaten and attack her and infect her with impurities of blood’ (Vernon, 1941, p 78-79). Vernon posits a paranoid split in Hitler’s personality structure predicated upon the particular nature of his Oedipal conflict. Regarded as particularly significant, Hitler’s putative witnessing of the primal scene, Vernon outlines Hitler’s repressed sexuality, the symbolic equivalence he makes between his mother and Germany and his syphilophobic anti-Semitism (Vernon, 1941).

3 Langer’s Motivational Analysis and Methodology.

After a survey of their raw material, the Langer team ‘in conjunction with our knowledge of Hitler’s actions as reported in the news’, agreed a diagnosis that Hitler ‘was, in all probability, a neurotic psychopath’ (Langer, 1972, p 26). Sorting ‘the wheat from the chaff’ of this material Langer explains, would be impossible without such a ‘diagnosis as a point of orientation’ for data evaluation, and a higher probability rating, was given to information which could, most ‘easily be fitted into this general clinical category’ (ibid). The Langer group then, argues Hans Gatzke, ‘judged the reliability of their sources by the way they fitted the group’s preconceived image of Hitler’ (Gatzke, 1973, p 397).

As with Freud’s Leonardo, evidence was to be accepted or rejected on the basis of internal clinical validity, effectively on whether it confirmed the diagnosis. Providing a diagnostic ‘point of orientation’, becomes the basis for a confirmatory bias in reviewing the subsequent material, and with only confirmatory evidence being sought and then adduced, ipso facto the cursory diagnosis is confirmed. Along with personal interviews conducted with informants who had fled Nazi Germany, the study’s data would be material preselected by their small psychoanalytically trained research team, which would then be sifted and discussed by the analysts (Langer, 1972). Indeed in relation to their clinical methodology, they would make ‘full use of the psychic processes that take place outside the field of consciousness’, and as Langer describes it, ‘unconsciously evaluate its significance and relate it to what is already known’ (Langer, 1972, p28). In other words, they were relying on their intuition and or countertransference responses.
Although Langer does not give the theoretical basis for any of his conjectures, his diagnosis of Hitler as a neurotic psychopath appears to correspond to Freud's formulation of the neurotic type of 'criminal from a sense of guilt' found in the 1916 paper 'Some Character Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work' (Freud, S.E. XIV, 2001/1916). A paradoxical sense of guilt exists before the crime to which it became attached, and indeed the crime is committed because of the sense of guilt. Analysis invariably uncovered claims Freud, that 'this obscure sense of guilt derived from the Oedipus complex and was a reaction to the two great criminal intentions of killing the father and having sexual relations with the mother' (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1916, pp 332-333). As described by Leo Bartemeier, such neurotics are 'driven by an unseen fate, - a compulsive force - a demoniacal impulse' and this impulsion to gain relief by doing that which was forbidden meant as Freud puts it, that the 'sense of guilt was at least attached to something' (Bartemeier, 1970, p 330; Freud, S.E. XIV, 2001/1916, p 332).

Hitler was striving for psychological adjustment, and there was Langer believed, 'a definite moral component in his character no matter how deeply it may be buried or how seriously it has been distorted' (Langer, 1943, pp 127-128). Hitler's particular sense of guilt Langer argues, was provoked by his putative perversion, itself attributable to the nature of his Oedipus conflict, in particular from having witnessed the 'primal scene'. Hitler's crimes actually gave him a sense of relief, because as Langer is at pains to point out, that as opposed to amoral brutes such as Goering, '[u]nquestionably Hitler has suffered severe guilt reactions' (ibid, p 138).

As material on Hitler's early life was scant, Langer proposed that Hitler's own artistic output could be adduced as evidence of 'conscious processes which are symbolically related to his own problems. The examples he chooses for purposes of illustration almost always contain elements from his own earlier experiences which were instrumental in cultivating the view he is expounding' (Langer, 1943, p 147). Given that these examples are themselves in lieu of Hitler's biographical material, there is no way that Langer can test the validity of his hypothesis against actual biographical material. That Hitler was referring to actual events in his childhood can only be pure speculation, and cannot in any way be relied upon as evidence biographical or otherwise.
The validity of this method of ‘clinical parallelism’ Langer claimed was in the
efficacy of deploying the wealth of knowledge derived from applying psychoanalytic
techniques, reflecting the team’s cumulative clinical experience in dealing with
patients presenting with difficulties similar to Hitler’s (Langer 1972). The Langer
team, are not however, treating Hitler they are searching their case histories for
patients with similar presenting histories or parallel narratives. In this instance,
utilising the technique of clinical parallelism, allowed the Langer team to ‘evaluate
conflicting information, check deductions concerning what probably happened, or
to fill in gaps where no information is available. It may be possible with the help of
all these sources of information to reconstruct the outstanding events in his early
life which have determined his present behavior and character structure’ (Langer,
1943, p 148).

This is not the searching for clinical material in order to assess an intervention
strategy, but looking for a similar fuller parallel anamnesis or patient background
in order to conjecture what Hitler’s back story would have been. The parallel
accounts becoming part of the Hitler case history as conjectures, are then reified to
clinical inferences. The Langer team surmised for example, that Hitler’s mother
Klara must have lavished excessive love and affection on him, because she had
already lost three children before Hitler had been born (Langer, 1943, p 160). The
frail child Adolf would have formed ‘a strong libidinal attachment’ to his mother,
and was as a result over protected and spoilt (Langer, 1943, p 160). Intimate
activity would then have been condoned which would have been disapproved of by
Hitler’s father Alois, who was seen as a brutal intruder into the young Adolph’s
‘paradise’ with his mother (Langer, 1943).

4 Hitler and the Primal Scene.

Hitler’s ‘artistic’ output in particular his 1929 political treatise Mein Kampf,
would similarly be presented as case history material, with Langer and his
collaborators assessing its validity from the perspective of their own therapeutic
experience and accumulated clinical research. They would then reverse engineer to
reveal the putative clinical symptoms that Hitler would have presented with, had he
been a patient.
The resentment of a brutish father coupled with an increasing libidinal attachment to his mother Langer surmises, served to develop Hitler’s Oedipus complex to an extraordinary extent. As hatred for his father increased the ‘more dependent he became upon the affection and love of his mother, and the more he loved his mother the more afraid he became of his father’s vengeance should his secret be discovered. Under these circumstances, little boys frequently fantasy about ways and means of ridding the environment of the intruder. There is reason to suppose that this also happened in Hitler’s early life’

(Langer, 1943, p 161).

Langer further conjectures that, ‘it would seem from the evidence that his aggressive fantasies towards the father reached such a point that he became afraid of the possibility of retaliation if his secret desires were discovered. The retaliation he probably feared was that his father would castrate him or injure his genital capacity in some way - a fear which is later expressed in substitute form in his syphilophobia’ (Langer, 1943, p 181). There is however, no obvious ‘evidence’ that Hitler had aggressive fantasies towards his father, because as Saul Friedländer points out, that although the known facts can be related in various ways ‘[w]hat we cannot know is how Hitler experienced the events we know, and what fantasies they evoked in him’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 48, emphasis in the original). But these conjectures and fantasies are constituted by Langer as known facts in his analysis of Hitler.

Proceeding with his inferential schema, Langer believed that intensifying Hitler’s antagonistic feelings towards his father, was ‘the fact that as a child he must have discovered his parents during intercourse. An examination of the data makes this conclusion almost inescapable and from our knowledge of his father’s character and past history it is not at all improbable’ (Langer, 1943, p162, my emphasis). This witnessing of the primal scene is regarded by Langer as the crucial event in Hitler’s psychic development, and it was the ‘hysteric re-living of this experience which played an important part in shaping his future destinies’ (Langer, 1943, p 162). The significance of witnessing parental intercourse or the ‘primal scene’ for young children, according to Freud, was that
they inevitably regard the sexual act as a sort of ill-treatment or act of subjugation: they view it, that is, in a sadistic sense. Psycho-analysis also shows us that an impression of this kind in early childhood contributes a great deal towards a predisposition to a subsequent sadistic displacement of the sexual aim. Furthermore, children are much concerned with the problem of what sexual intercourse - or, as they put it, being married - consists in: and they usually seek a solution of the mystery in some common activity concerned with the function of micturition or defaecation

(Freud, 2001/1905, S.E. VII, p 196).

In constructing a clinically congruent account, Langer insists that Hitler must have actually witnessed rather than fantasised the ‘primal scene’, seemingly in order to justify the severity of Hitler’s conversion hysteria (Langer, 1943). The principle psychoanalytic aspects of witnessing the primal scene which reflect the leitmotif of Langer’s analysis, are described by Laplanche and Pontalis who write, that ‘the act of coitus is understood by the child as an aggression by the father in a sado-masochistic relationship; secondly, the scene gives rise to sexual excitation in the child while at the same time providing a basis for castration anxiety; thirdly, the child interprets what is going on, within the framework of an infantile sexual theory, as anal coitus’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 335). Here then is the sado-masochism that Langer posits at the core of Hitler’s character; the castration anxiety that determined Hitler’s Oedipal hatred of his father and thus symbolically of Germany’s enemies; the syphilophobia that he relates to Hitler’s anti-Semitism; and the anally voyeuristic coprophilia as the essence of Hitler’s perversion (Langer, 1943; Vernon, 1943/1941).

With the primal scene as central to his analysis, Langer looks for corroborating evidence of it. Langer adduces it from a passage in Mein Kampf which alludes to a drunken and brutal attack by the father on the mother of a three year old boy (Langer, 1943). As in the Mein Kampf passage, there were also five children in Hitler’s family so that ‘we begin to suspect that in this passage Hitler is, in all probability, describing conditions in his own home as a child’ (ibid, p 150). Although sordid and notwithstanding a much milder possible interpretation of the German than Langer uses, it seems farfetched Gatzke argues, to regard it as a sexual scene. Hitler famously secretive about his early life, gives no indication that
the passage was intended to be autobiographical (Gatzke, 1973). Nor ‘does the grim picture painted there agree with what we now know about Hitler’s far from dismal childhood’, Hitler’s text in Gatzke’s view, reads more like a clichéd contemporary anti-urban novel (Gatze, 1973, p 397).

The thesis argument is that the psychobiographer’s relationship countertransference or otherwise, is not with his subject but with his data. Langer sees the young Hitler peering out from the pages of *Mein Kampf*, but for Erik Erikson this is not a disguised version of Hitler’s actual childhood. Rather, it is the deliberate attempt to create a propaganda myth blending ‘historical fact and significant fiction in such a way that it “rings true” to an area or an era, causing pious wonderment and burning ambition’ (Erikson, 1963/1950, pp 327-328). In any event, it is clearly not the corroborative data which makes Langer’s contention or ‘fact’ as he has it, of Hitler’s having witnessed the primal scene, an ‘almost inescapable’ conclusion (Langer, 1943, p 162).

In spite of his using other speculative expressions such as ‘not at all improbable’, Langer proceeds as if Hitler’s witnessing of the primal scene was a confirmed piece of data on which to base further inferences (Langer, 1943, p 62). The now reified speculation affirms that, ‘[b]eing a spectator to this early scene had many repercussions’, including ‘the *fact* that he felt that his mother had betrayed him in submitting to his father’ (Langer, 1943, p 62, my emphasis). This again is a feature of modern personality pathology profiling, where the narrative continues as if the reified speculations and their chains of inferences were verified facts. These are then used as the basis for further inferences, and with their constant recycling in other texts these reified inferences, become a corpus of data from which later authors further theorise.

5 The Coprophilic Perversion at the Core of Hitler’s Personality.

The Hitler family doctor Eduard Bloch, describes Hitler’s mother Klara as being ‘an exemplary housekeeper’, which for Langer would constitute evidence of Klara Hitler’s ‘excessive cleanliness and tidiness’ (Langer, 1943 pp 158, 179, my emphasis). From this inferred ‘excessive cleanliness’, Langer further infers that Klara would also have ‘employed rather stringent measures during the toilet
training period of her children’ (Langer, 1943, p 179). Along the inferential chain of such strict toilet training, would be that it left ‘a residual tension in this area and is regarded by the child as a severe frustration which arouses feelings of hostility. This facilitates an alliance with his infantile aggression which finds an avenue for expression through anal activities and fantasies. These usually center around soiling, humiliation and destruction, and form the basis of a sadistic character’ (Langer, 1943, p 179).

When Hitler’s Oedipus complex was reaching its fullest intensity, it was further aggravated by his mother’s pregnancy which, in ‘addition to accentuating his hatred for his father and estranging him from his mother, we can assume that this event at this particular time served to generate an abnormal curiosity in him’ (Langer, 1943, p 181). It was thus that Hitler would have adhered to a childhood belief that babies were born via the anus. The desire to verify this fact for himself was seen as the basis of Hitler’s putative perversion (Langer, 1943).

Hitler’s perversion is seen by Langer as a compromise position, ‘between psychotic tendencies to eat faeces and drink urine on the one hand, and to live a normal socially adjusted life on the other. The compromise is not, however, satisfactory to either side of his nature and the struggle between these two diverse tendencies continues to rage unconsciously’ (Langer, 1943, p 190). Shunning intimate relationships in order to control these despised urges and with a fear of genital sex, Hitler had translated these conflicts into symbolic form (Langer, 1943). Hitler’s severe guilt reactions to this coprophilic perversion Langer believed, had a recognizable influence on his conscious life by externalising his inner struggles, manifested in his ruthless purging of the German race.

Describing the mechanics of this perverted practice, Langer cites a second hand account from Otto Strasser, who supposedly heard it from Hitler’s niece and former lover Geli Raubel. Geli is said to have ‘stressed the fact that it was of the utmost importance to him that she squat over him in such a way that he could see everything’ (Langer, 1943, p 186). Interviewed by Langer in person, Strasser was a prominent Nazi who claimed to have been intimate with Geli before Hitler reputedly drove her to suicide in 1931 (Langer, 1943). Strasser, whose elder brother Gregor had been murdered on Hitler’s orders, had fled Germany becoming, as Gatzke points out, an ardent opponent of Hitler. According to historian Richard Ovary,
Strasser is a very dubious witness, with really no way of knowing whether his account was just ‘one of those titillating rumours which people spread about Hitler. Add all the stuff about Hitler’s homosexuality and so on and sexual perversions, this was a kind of libel if you like, which was more widespread in the 1930’s perhaps than we might realise’ (Ovary, BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005).

Strasser’s is the key piece of witness evidence for the Langer study, with the analytic strands being reversed engineered to accommodate it. Would for example, Klara Hitler’s good housekeeping simply have gone unremarked rather than becoming a vital inferential link in the analysis, if Langer had not come across Strasser’s scatological hearsay evidence? Langer ignores, in Gatzke’s view, ‘equally “reliable” accounts of other possible perversions’ of Hitler, or as others ‘believe that his sex life is perfectly normal but restricted’ (Gatzke, 1973, pp 399, 400). Indeed, according to Gatzke, ‘nothing new has come to light to confirm the account of his masochistic perversion, and from what we know about his relations with Eva Braun they may have been more nearly normal than assumed’ (Gatzke, 1973, p 400; Orlow 1974).

Eva Braun is mentioned in the Langer study and that there was talk of marriage after the War, but Langer claims that their affair, ‘was not exclusive’ (Langer, 1943, p 83). Langer then seems to have simply discounted her in his schema. In fact, the Nazis were able to exercise considerable control over the presentation of Hitler’s public image and they ensured, for example, as Halmburger and Brauburger have it, that Eva Braun never appeared in public with Hitler (Halmburger and Brauburger, 2001). The outward representation of Hitler’s sexuality was dictated by the political requirements of Nazi ideology, and that Hitler was not to be seen to have romantic liaisons (let alone that he should marry), was as Jung analyses it, a function of the symbolic myth that Hitler was wedded to Germany (Jung in Knickerbocker, 1939). Indeed, this celibate façade of Hitler’s was a key facet of Nazi propaganda and according to Jung, an essential if not subliminal feature of his attraction to German women (Jung in Knickerbocker, 1939).

6 Hitler’s Syphilophobia and Ideological Anti-Semitism.
As Hitler’s perversion developed and became more disgusting to his ego, it was, Langer maintains, ‘disowned and projected upon the Jew’, who ‘became a symbol of everything which Hitler hated in himself’, as his inner conflicts became transposed onto the racial and national conflicts in the outside world (Langer, 1943, p 209). Giving voice to Hitler’s inner struggle, Langer’s narrative declares; “My perversion is a parasite which sucks my life-blood and if I am to become great I must rid myself of this pestilence.” When we see the connection between his sexual perversion and anti-Semitism, we can understand another aspect of his constant linking of syphilis with the Jew. These are the things which destroy nations and civilizations as a perversion destroys an individual (Langer, 1943, p 210).

Along with this schema of symbolic equivalences Langer presents as a diagnostic corollary Hitler’s own syphilophobia as deriving from the castration anxiety resulting from the psychic conflict with his father in an extreme Oedipus complex, which was seen as the psychic impetus of his ideology. A work conceived before Hitler came to power, in The Mass Psychology of Fascism, psychoanalytic theorist Wilhelm Reich writes that the ‘irrational fear of syphilis constitutes one of the major sources of National Socialism’s political views and its anti-Semitism. It follows, then, that racial purity, that is to say, purity of blood is something worth striving for and fighting for with every available means’ (Reich, 1970/1933, p 116, emphasis in the original).

Syphilophobia and its link to anti-Semitism was then by no means particular to Hitler, but was already a key facet of right-wing German ideology. Paraphrasing leading Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, an early Nazi party member who in 1920 was already writing anti-Semitic tracts such as The Tracks of the Jew Through the Ages and Immorality in the Talmud, Reich puts it that the “intuitive mysticism of existential phenomena”, “rise and fall of peoples”, “blood poisoning”, “Jewish world plague”, are all part and parcel of the same line, which begins with “fight of the blood” and ends with the bloody terror against the “Jewish materialism” of Marx and the genocide of the Jews’ (Reich, 1970/1933, p 117-118; Atkinson, 2000). Reich himself gives a culturalist, if sexually idiosyncratic, explication of the Nazi phenomenon. In denouncing Rosenberg, Reich declares that ‘the core of the fascist race theory is a mortal fear of natural sexuality and of its orgasm function’, and that the “creed of the soul” and its “purity” is the creed of asexuality, of “sexual
purity”. Basically, it is a symptom of the sexual repression and sexual shyness brought about by a patriarchal authoritarian society’ (Reich, 1970/1933, p 118).

In his own colourful evocation, Langer describes Hitler’s transformation from wallowing in the scatological mire of Vienna to being the anti-Semitic catalyst for the eschatological destiny of the German people. Langer’s discourse of individual personal pathology never got to grips, however, as did Reich’s orgasmic societal account, with the teleological imperatives of Nazi ideology. Whatever Hitler’s role, ‘the final solution’ was developed by Nazi ideologues and meticulously operationalised by Nazi bureaucrats, at least tacitly acquiesced in by a wider society. The ‘Wannsee Protocol’ that the bureaucrats developed reflected the generalised fusion of ideological absurdity and the banality of a bureaucratic evil, which had its own manic momentum.

Clare Spark argues that the perspective of the Langer study is further complicated by the prevailing anti-Semitic attitude of America’s establishment elite. In conjecturing that Hitler may have had Jewish blood, Langer was unduly fascinated with the speculation that Hitler may have inherited Jewish ancestry from the famous Rothschild’s (Spark, 1999). Maria Anna Schicklgruber, Alois Hitler’s mother had been a maid in the Rothschild household when she became pregnant with Alois (ibid). Hitler’s seemingly divinely inspired character transformation could be explained in that ‘the cunning, commanding Rothschild genes have asserted themselves over the fawning and coprophageous ghetto hippie Jewish ones displayed in the meek, defeated, forgiving, ignoble, feminized, Christ’ (Spark, 1999, p 126).

Langer makes a number of references to Hitler’s Jewish appearance and to Jewish friendships in his Vienna days. From the hypothesis of Hitler’s Jewish blood, ‘much of Adolph’s later behaviour could be explained in rather easy terms on this basis’ (Langer, 1943, p 96). Langer is signalling his belief that Hitler’s ‘Jewishness accounted for astonishing feats of statesmanship and duplicity’ (Spark, 1999, p 123-124). Langer betrays an internalised anti-Semitic stereotype which had subverted, according to Spark, his ‘attempt at “a realistic appraisal of the German situation”’ (Spark, 1999, p 119).
Erikson, for example, was unconvinced that anti-Semitism was the all pervasive signature of Hitler’s persona (Erikson, 1942; Erikson, 1950). Hitler’s horror of Jewry as ‘an “emasculating germ”’ represented ‘less than 1 per cent of his nation of 70 million - is clothed in the imagery of phobia; he describes the danger emanating from it as a weakening infection and a dirtying contamination, syphilophobia is the least psychiatry can properly diagnose in his case. But here again, it is hard to say where personal symptom ends and shrewd propaganda begins’ (Erikson, 1950, p 341).

An elitist liberal democratic hegemonic establishment with an inherent fear of subversion along with its anti-Semitism had been, for Spark, the actual impetus for Langer’s psychological determination of Hitler (Spark, 1999). Indeed as to the elitism, Cavin points out that the OSS was known ‘as “Oh So Social” because its ranks were filled with upper class old boys and society girls. In a period that spanned only four years (1941-1945), the O.S.S. and Office of Wartime Information (OWI) tapped the rising, fleeing and falling stars of the American and European academy’ (Cavin, 2008, p 1). The ‘fleeing’ part of the academy was almost exclusively Jewish, one of whom, was Langer’s colleague, Ernst Kris. The presence of this son of a Jewish lawyer from Vienna would suggest that there was at least an accommodation between the elitists and the Jews on Langer’s team.

7 The Theoretical Distinction between the Langer and Murray Approaches.

At the time of his cooption onto the Langer team, Murray was already a well established, indeed pioneering figure, in personality research. From his theoretical perspective, an individual was according to Murray, the culturally modified product of genetics and environmental experience, which would apply universally across different societies (Murray 1938; Murray and Kluckholn, 1953). The key theoretical distinction between Murray and Langer was then, that whereas Langer’s more traditional emphasis was on Hitler’s acquired character attributes, Murray’s emphasis was personological, with its correspondent ‘constitutional determinants’.

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5 Murray was head of the psychology department at Harvard University, and had developed the widely used Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) for uncovering distinct personality types.
In his account of Hitler’s personality, Murray describes 'Hitler’s high idealego, his pride, his dominance and aggression, and his more or less successful repression of the superego – indicate that his personality structure corresponds to that of Counteractive Narcism. The implication of this term is that the manifest traits and symptoms of Hitler’s personality represent a reaction formation to underlying feelings of wounded self-esteem' (Murray, 1943, p 185). Coupled with core hereditary determinants, Hitler’s personality structure was determined by a psychic wounding leading to what Murray refers to as counteractive narcissism. This formulation contains many of the features of what Otto Kernberg would later theorise as malignant narcissism. This reflects the core personological personality pathology paradigm, before the theories of Kernberg and Heinz Kohut were available for deployment in psychobiography.

Narcissistic wounding reflecting repressed childhood trauma manifests itself in the drive for counteractive aggression or counteractive narcissism and revenge (Murray, 1943). Murray’s notion of counteractive narcissism encompasses a grandiose persona intent on ‘self-display; extravagant demands for attention and applause; vainglory’ (Murray, 1943, p 186). There is a compulsive criminality in this personality, whereby he belittles others but suppresses his conscience in order to exert revenge for imagined belittling which he cannot tolerate (Murray, 1943).

Although Murray, as with Langer, regards Hitler’s contentious witnessing of the primal scene as the pivotal moment in Hitler’s psychic life, he does not interpret it as Langer does, as being the repression of awakened sexuality and betrayal by his mother (Murray, 1943; Langer, 1943). Rather, the severe shock of witnessing the primal scene resulting in a metaphorical blinding is regarded by Murray as crystallising the animus of Hitler towards his brutal father, the traumatic moment at which Hitler’s very self is narcissistically wounded (Murray, 1943).

The psychic energy for narcissistic aggression is triggered in Hitler only much later in life, when a somewhat similar stimulus occurred as in the subjugation and humiliation of his German motherland, his narcissistic wounding reactivated by his now literal blinding in the trenches of World War One (Murray, 1943; Cornell University Law Library, 2012). Not the return of the repressed as an underlying symbolic equivalence as in Langer’s account, but the existential trigger provoking an underlying personality formation into activity. The primal trauma suffered at the
hands of his father had distorted Hitler’s psychic life and selfhood, and Murray relates this to Hitler’s ensuing paranoid orientation, boundless pursuit of power for himself and Germany, his total lack of conscience and his unconstrained aggression in pursuit of power (Murray, 1943).

Murray’s view was that Hitler was largely in control of his complexes and citing Erikson, that he could ‘exploit his hysteria’, thus functioning as it were in a borderline state between hysteria and schizophrenia, effectively as a borderline personality (Murray, 1943, p 25; Erikson, 1942, p 476). Again, the identification of what would become known as borderline traits in particular paranoid projection identified by Murray, are presently deployed as one of the major diagnostic elements that political personality pathology theorists seek to attribute to their (in particular, terrorist), subjects (Kernberg 1975; Post, 2004).

The mechanism of paranoid projection as a way of maintaining self esteem writes Murray,

‘occurs so constantly in Hitler that it is possible to get a very good idea of the repudiated portions of his own personality by noticing what he condemns in others - treachery, lying, corruption, war-mongering, etc. This mechanism would have had more disastrous consequences for his sanity if he had not gained some governance over it by consciously adopting (as good political strategy) the practice of blaming his opponents’

(Murray, 1943, pp 13-14).

Although also recognising paranoid projection as Hitler’s principal defence mechanism, Langer goes on to incorporate this defence mechanism into his schema of symbolic transference. Langer diagnoses Hitler as neurotic. Neurosis defined by Laplanche and Pontalis, is a ‘psychogenic affection in which the symptoms are the symbolic expression of a psychical conflict whose origins lie in the subject’s childhood history; these symptoms constitute compromises between wish and defence’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 266). Whereas, Hitler is seen by Murray as a psychotic, whose ‘paranoid insanity’ exhibited ‘at one time or another all of the classical symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia: hypersensitivity, panics of anxiety, irrational jealousy, delusions of persecution, delusions of omnipotence and
messiahship’ (Murray, 1943, p 14). These include many of the features that would constitute Kernberg’s conceptualisation of malignant narcissism (Kernberg, 1989).

Langer’s adherence to the early Freudian emphasis on Hitler’s hysteria as representing a conversion symptom for neurosis is then at odds with Murray’s more modern formulation, of a counteractive or malignant form of narcissism. The dynamic evolution of such narcissism degrades the autocrat as Seliktar and Dutter have it, ‘into the realm of delusions and fantasies, which, concomitantly, lead to an almost complete detachment from reality’ (Seliktar and Dutter, 2009, p 286). Indeed Murray predicted that Hitler would eventually succumb to an insanity which was being staved off by an ‘insociation ... responsible for the maintenance of Hitler’s partial sanity, despite the presence of neurotic and psychotic trends’ (Murray, 1943, p 216). It was this insociation he had with the German nation and of his being in the company of likeminded men, that had Murray believed, in some way psychologically grounded Hitler (Murray, 1943). Although according to Langer, Hitler did have characteristics which bordered on the schizophrenic and that ‘faced with defeat his psychological structure may collapse and leave him at the mercy of his unconscious forces. The possibilities of such an outcome diminish as he becomes older’ (Langer, 1943, p 246).

From Murray’s personological perspective, Hitler’s insanity was inevitable in time, whereas from Langer’s characterological viewpoint it became less likely as time went by. That Hitler succeeded in remaining within the community of men by making a reality of his fantasies, both Murray and Langer agree. Whether Hitler sought to evade reality either through psychic mania or in neurotic fantasy, he had managed to remain on a more or less even keel by distorting reality itself, the Third Reich being an exercise in fantasy and madness in its own right.

8 The ‘Prediction’ of Hitler’s Suicide.

Langer’s enduring claim to fame, is as Walter Waggoner in his New York Times obituary puts it, that his ‘prophetic psychological study of Hitler ... predicted Hitler’s suicide’ (Walter Waggoner, New York Times, the 10th of July, 1981). Similarly, the legend has come down that ‘Langer successfully predicted that Hitler would choose to take his own life rather than face capture’ (Horgan, 2002-2003, p
In his own analysis of the Langer study, Post claims the suicide ‘prediction’ as ‘an uncanny psychoanalytic intuition’. (Post, BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005c). It was an emblematic triumph for the deployment of psychoanalysis in the nascent psychological profiling project and as such, Langer has gone into folklore.

In 1943, Hitler’s committing suicide was one of eight options that Langer and Murray consider. Langer’s assessment being that as not only had Hitler already made several suicide attempts and has ‘threatened to commit suicide, but from what we know of his psychology this is the most plausible outcome’ (Langer, 1943, p 247). Both Murray and Langer concur that Hitler’s ‘would not be a simple suicide. He has too much of the dramatic for that and since immortality is one of his dominant motives we can imagine that he would stage the most dramatic and effective death scene he could possibly think of’ (Langer, 1943, pp 247-248; Murray 1943). Having ‘vowed that he would commit suicide if his plans miscarried’ Hitler would do so in ‘the most dramatic manner’ and he might for example Murray speculates, retreat to the Berghof and throw himself off the parapet, or even dynamite the whole mountain (Murray, 1943, p 32).

In his modern slant on Langer’s study, the notion of the empty self, according to Post is built up of a compensatory grandiose messianic façade. When that façade is shattered, it becomes ‘totally intolerable, and this is really I believe what Langer was conjecturing. That if his dream of total glory of total power were to fail and that façade of grandiosity was to shatter underneath this, an empty self would emerge and this was intolerable for Hitler and he had to kill himself rather than be confronted with this total shame and total humiliation’ (Post, BBC 2, 25/11/2005c). Except of course, that Langer’s prediction was that if Hitler was going to commit suicide, he would not skulk away humiliated, but would do so publicly as a grand dramatic gesture in order to enhance his reputation.

Elsewhere in his own profile of Hitler, Post describes Hitler as exemplifying the charismatic, destructive paranoid personality, whose ‘personal psychology externalized through paranoid dynamics to the national scene’ (Robbins and Post, 1997, p 276). It is rare, in Post’s view, ‘for a paranoid to commit suicide’ (Robbins and Post, 1997, p 79). With the ‘intolerable burden’ of being under attack by an internal persecutor, the paranoid projects the ‘internal persecutor onto an outside presence against which he must defend himself’ (Robbins and Post, 1997, p 79).
There is, for Post, a theoretical quandary of a paranoid Hitler not only committing suicide, but in the advocacy Langer’s seminal profile, this suicide becoming the teleological inevitability for a narcissistically wounded Hitler (Post, BBC 2, 25/11/2005c).

Such post hoc rationalising and reassessment is an inherent feature of modern profiling, because psychoanalysis is not designed for such prediction. At the time, the principle concern for both Langer and Murray then, was that a dramatic Hitler suicide would secure his need for immortality, and achieving his bond with the German people through death (Murray, 1943; Langer 1943). Hitler knew according to Langer, ‘how to bind the people to him and if he cannot have the bond in life he will certainly do his utmost to achieve it in death’ (Langer, 1943, p 248). A dramatic Hitler suicide, ‘would be extremely undesirable from our point of view because if it is cleverly done it would establish the Hitler legend so firmly in the minds of the German people that it might take generations to eradicate it’ (Langer, 1943, p 248). A dramatic Hitler suicide would actually ensure the continuing drama of Hitlerism, and galvanise the war effort of the German people.

Hitler did not commit suicide when it was obvious that his plans had miscarried, but stuck it out to the bitter end with the Russians just yards from his bunker. Hitler’s suicide did not then affect the course of a war, which was already lost. An actually defeated Hitler, as opposed to one against whom the tide had turned, by this time manifested all the indicators of a suicide risk (Cheng et al, 2000). Suicide, rather than face capture by the Russians, would have been a readily predictable outcome anyway.

One of the other options considered by both Langer and Murray was that of Hitler being assassinated. One possibility that intrigued both analysts was that this might be undertaken by a Jew, even perhaps at Hitler’s own behest. Indeed, Murray added Judas betraying Christ to a number of apocalyptic metaphors, wherein Hitler could then ‘die in the belief that his fellow countrymen would rise in their wrath and massacre every remaining Jew in Germany’ (Murray, 1943, p 30). Thus, suicide by Jew would ensure Hitler’s ultimate vengeance. Langer believed that if the assassin were a Jew, ‘this would convince the German people of Hitler’s infallibility and strengthen the fanaticism of the German troops and people. Needless to say, it would be followed by the complete extermination of all Jews in Germany and the
occupied countries’ (Langer, 1943, p 246). It is significant to note that both Murray’s dramatic and Langer’s chillingly matter of fact ‘needless to say’ comment is to a genocide which would take place after Hitler’s death.

9 Post and a Modern Re-Appraisal of the Langer Study.

Essential to an understanding of Hitler, according to Post, is an appreciation of the effect of the void created in childhood by what ‘we’ve come to call the wounded self’ (BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005). This wounding Post infers from Langer’s account of the sadistic brutality of Hitler’s father, Alois (ibid). This conceptualisation of the wounded self is taken from the much later ‘self psychology’ of Heinz Kohut, a notion not mentioned in Langer’s traditionally Freudian study. Such psychic or narcissistic wounding is, however a central theme of Murray’s personological profile and theoretically prefiguring Kohut (Post in BBC 2, 25/11/2005c; Kohut, 2009/1971; Murray, 1943).

The act of being subject to his perversion and being sexually humiliated by a woman represented, for Post, the ‘unmasked wish to surrender, capitulate, to be seen as a weak man, against which, Hitler was forcefully quarrelling psychologically. And its power, the power of the will was central for him. This was a highly potent powerful leader, but underneath that, underneath that was this man who was desperately weak and desperately afraid and afraid of, yet seeking submission and capitulation’ (Post in BBC 2, 25/11/2005c). Rather than reflecting Langer’s analysis, this estimation resembles Murray’s analysis, whose view it was that Hitler had a ‘relatively weak character (ego structure); his great strength comes from an emotional complex which drives him periodically’ (Murray, 1943, p 24).

The magnitude of Hitler’s ego weakness, according to Post, led to a psychological drive to overcome it, and so he ‘developed a compensatory messianic self. Again, that’s the surface picture on top of this empty self this wounded self from that rather cruel childhood’ (Post in BBC 2, 25/11/2005c; Robbins and Post, 1997). Far from resulting from a cruel childhood, Hitler’s ‘Messiah complex’ Langer believed, derived from his being spoiled by his mother (Langer, 1943). Although accepting that he cannot offer a theoretical explanation for it, Langer believed that the fact of Hitler’s mother, being half the age of his father, was critical, because ‘in such cases
there is a strong tendency to believe that their father is not their real father and to ascribe their birth to some kind of supernatural conception’ (Langer, 1943, p 173). This sense of being a ‘chosen one’ in Langer’s schema, also relates to Hitler’s morbid fear of death, and the fact that he had survived his numerous tribulations (Langer 1943).

Effectively then, Post has represented his own notion of Hitler’s Messiah complex as deriving from the brutality of Hitler’s traumatic childhood, as being what Langer had been surmising. Whereas, Langer is actually quite clear in expressing Hitler’s Messiah complex as a rationalisation of the near mystical manner in which he has from childhood been favoured, and thus survived and prevailed. Again, according to Post Hitler was carrying within him this ‘messianic self concept, where it was history had written his role to be the most important leader in the world. When evidence started coming back that was undeniable that this was not to be, that the tide had turned, this was quite shattering for him. Because don’t forget that Messianic self concept was the compensatory overlay where the profound void within’ (Post in BBC 2, 25/11/2005c). At Hitler’s core, in Langer’s schema, was not a void but rather a psychic conflict deriving from sexual perversion. Far from crumpling, Hitler had always been bolstered in his Messianic self image by the fact that he had overcome numerous tribulations always coming through as a stronger character (Langer, 1943).

Both Langer and Murray are credited with ‘counterintuitively’ predicting that Hitler would be seen less frequently as the war went against Germany (BBC 2, 25/11/2005c). In the summary of his conclusions, Murray notes of Hitler, that there ‘is some evidence that his mental powers have been deteriorating since last November 1942. Only once or twice has he appeared before his people to enlighten or encourage them’ (Murray, 1943, p 29). Corresponding with the disastrous and pivotal Battle of Stalingrad, the increasing infrequency of Hitler’s public appearances and the impairment of his mental powers was then established fully a year before the autumn of 1943, when both reports were published. In such circumstances, it would actually have been ‘counterintuitive’ to predict that Hitler would now start appearing more frequently. Nazi ideology, as Kris (1943) had outlined, was predicated on the Hitler myth and Aryan triumphalism, so that in propaganda terms it would have been counterproductive to associate Hitler with relentlessly adverse news.
Hitler, obsessed with health, was visibly failing physically as well psychologically. This may have been from the cocktail of drugs provided by his physician Dr. Theodore Morrel, or even, that he may well have been suffering from a form of Parkinson’s disease (Waite, 1977; Redlich, 1998). Whatever actually ailed Hitler, both Langer and Murray were well aware at the time, that Hitler was failing.

Shedding a more contemporary therapeutic light, Richard Ryder writes that, ‘in the modern world, Adolf might seek psychological treatment, at least for his occasional slight depressions and his fears of impotence. If so, what would a psychiatrist make of him? I think a competent professional would give him the diagnostic label of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) with mild Bipolar Disorder (Cyclothymia)’ (Ryder, 2009, p 89).

10 A Culturally Oriented Psychobiographic Perspective of Hitler.

The background conceit of the two studies was that the War was still in the balance at the time of writing. These supposed intelligence reports were tasked to examine only one scenario: Germany’s impending defeat. There are, any number of other scenarios, in which the Allies assessing their options, would need to have to known if Hitler’s obvious psychological decline was irreversible or whether he would recover if Germany’s fortunes improved. There is, then, no discussion of policy options, only an assessment of the effect on Hitler of Germany beginning to lose the War. The conclusion Langer came to was that in all likelihood Hitler would withdraw to the symbolic womb of his Bavarian retreat, where he would probably kill himself or in Murray’s view, go insane.

In his perception of Hitler’s ideological position, Langer says that ‘his judgments are based wholly on emotional factors and are then clothed with an intellectual argument’ (Langer, 1943, p 117). Both of these psychological profiles underplayed the ideological currents within which Hitler’s strategic thinking was formulated. Neither the Langer nor Murray reports reflect what David Faber regards as the ideological centrality of the concept of Lebensraum, or the strength and effect of Hitler’s own ideological commitment to it (Faber, 2008). Hitler’s ideological trilogy from which he never wavered was represented according to Phillip Blood, by three fundamental abstractions, the ‘race for space and space for race, purified by a
perpetual state of war’ (Blood, 2006, xiii). Hitler’s ambition was, ‘to bequeath German “living space” (Lebensraum), a concept not conjured up by him and incorrectly assumed to mean only the acquisition of territory. Hitler’s Lebensraum was about German existence, in its broadest meaning, in a Germanic world’ (Blood, 2006, xiii).

Although citing Erikson’s analysis of Hitler’s relationship to the German people, Murray similarly fails to pursue Erikson’s notion that ‘German space concepts, inner disunity, encirclement, and lebenraum seem vague and often insincere to the non-German. He does not realize that in Germany these words carry a conviction far beyond that of ordinary logic’ (Erikson, 1942, p 483, emphasis in the original). Hitler’s ideological commitment had popular resonance, as he not only touted the lure of military conquest, but also promised a nation with burning spiritual ambition, ‘a victory of race consciousness over the “bacterial” invasion of foreign aesthetics and ethics within the German mind. His aim was not only the eternal obliteration of Germany’s military defeat in the first World War, but also a complete purge of the corrupt foreign values which had invaded German culture’ (Erikson, 1950, p 348).

For Jung, Hitler was answering a call from a nation which itself had a Messiah complex intensified by defeat in World War One. On the back of this, the Nazis ideologically transformed Germany with their cult of Hitler (Jung in Knickerbocker, 1939). There was then an historical conceptualisation of national destiny to which Hitler was attuned. This is underplayed by the clinical orientation of personality pathology profiling which is predicated on a certain ahistoric psychic determinism. In their more culturally-oriented psychobiographic analyses, both Erikson and Jung can envisage Hitler reacting to the zeitgeist rather than solely his own psychic impulsions.

Indeed, amidst the general euphoria of the signing of the Munich Agreement, Jung was still able to predict that Hitler would simply disregard it because the imperative of his ideological goal was to the East and Russia (Jung in Knickerbocker, 1939). Even in the autumn of 1943 with all the information filtering through about the treatment of the Jews in occupied Europe, Langer’s and Murray’s respective analyses of Hitler still did not lead them to anticipate perhaps the most profound signifier of the War, the Holocaust. Whereas, Reich had
pronounced the genocide of the Jews as the teleological inevitability of Nazi ideology before Hitler even came to power (Reich, 1939).

Langer had been tasked, as Pick points out, to produce a ‘piece of intelligence’ demonstrating ‘how far a clinical reading of Hitler could go beyond the banal observations of non-specialists’ (Pick, 2012, pp 128, 144, emphasis in the original). Indeed, it was Langer’s later belief that if a study such as his had been available much earlier ‘there might not have been a Munich’ (Langer, 1972, p 32). That Hitler was an odd character was, according to Ovary, already well known, and rumours concerning his sexuality were both lurid and rife (Ovary, BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005). So would clinically attesting these rumours have served policy makers better than the more culturally oriented understanding of an ideologically driven Hitler and his attachment to the semi-mystical notion of Lebensraum, which Erikson and Jung argued (Jung, 1939; Erikson, 1942)?

11 Conclusion.

The argument of this chapter has been that in their clinical pathographic profiling, Langer and Murray move the emphasis away from the historical contingencies and ideological currents which determine both the possibilities and constraints in the trajectory of their subject Hitler. Through Post’s adoption of its methodology for his CIA unit, the Langer study would become the template for modern clinical ‘at a distance’ adversarial political profiling.

The unique and distinctive contribution of Langer was in the view of this thesis, in clinically adapting Strasser’s problematic hearsay evidence concerning Hitler’s coprophilic viewing habits, to a diagnostic strand which was seen as determining Hitler’s political and ideological rationale (Langer, 1943). It is its diagnostic basis which gives Langer’s findings, ergo predictions, their clinical validity, and Hitler’s coprophilic perversion is critical. Otherwise, the Langer analysis simply reflects the general themes extant in the literature, in particular, the Vernon ‘Case History’ used by both Langer and Murray.
Similarly, the relationship of Hitler’s personality to the German people in projecting out these fantasies and their unconscious assimilation by them, were already being explored psychoanalytically. Jung in a 1938 radio broadcast analysed Hitler’s siren voice as ‘nothing other than his unconscious into which the German people have projected their own selves’ (Jung quoted in Cavin, 2008, p 7). In 1942, Erikson describes Hitler’s ‘imagery, common and monomaniac as it seems, reflects a typical aspect of German fantasy life’ (Erikson, 1942, p 488).

I argue that the Langer and Murray profiles represent two different theoretical approaches in psychobiography. Langer’s characterological analysis is predicated on the unfolding of Hitler’s Oedipus complex and his childhood and sexual development and relies on speculative chains of inference. Murray takes the more direct personological approach inferring Hitler’s personality from his perceived adult psychic functioning. Childhood trauma leads to an aggressively narcissistic Hitler who pursues his own ends regardless of the consequences. Langer’s Hitler is a neurotic conflicted soul with the two tendencies of his character, one moral one and one psychotic at war with each other. Murray’s Hitler is effectively a one dimensional borderline psychopath who is only temporarily staving off psychosis because he has the political power to make his fantasies an existential reality.

The underlying imperative that Post took from the Langer study to his dedicated CIA profiling unit is that ‘you can’t deter optimally a leader you don’t understand, and to relegate be it a Hitler or Joseph Stalin and or a Saddam Hussein to a crazy evil madman, really degrades our capacity to deal with them optimally because we’re not pushing them. What makes them tick?’ (Post, BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005c, my emphasis).

With the increasing influence of psychoanalysis in America after World War Two, what made politicians and indeed public figures ‘tick’, would become a preoccupation of not only Post at an institutional level but also of particularly American psychoanalysis in general. After the Second World War, psychoanalysis became more deeply implicated in American culture and now living public figures were increasing put under a public psychoanalytic gaze. The next chapter describes how psychoanalytic analyses ‘at a distance’ became integrated into American political culture and the ethical consequences for American psychiatry and psychoanalysis.
CHAPTER FIVE:

THE MODERN CONTEXT OF POLITICAL PROFILING
1 Introduction.

This chapter traces the impact of 'at a distance' psychoanalytic analyses in post-war American political culture. In post-war America, 'analysts', that is to say psychoanalysts and psychiatrists practicing psychoanalysis, had become, the new 'sages and critics of the social weal' (Mack, 1971, p 157). As such, they found themselves drawn into a more active participation in public life. Within this normative context, they began to indentify more readily with other individuals in the institutional domain, becoming 'like other members of the establishment' (ibid). Indeed a psychoanalytic interest in political leaders could be seen as in part, a function of the inherent narcissism of interest in people like themselves (Mack, 1971).

The conventional wisdom of the day, 'suggested that the psychiatrist had become the priest or authority figure in American culture within a new secularism' (Burnham, 1978, p 6). Carol Kahn Strauss similarly opines that psychoanalysis was 'almost the new religion of capitalism', with the increasing influence of psychoanalysis contemporaneous with major changes that were taking place in American culture (Kahn Strauss, 2010). An ongoing concern of these analysts was the damage that could be wrought by the mentally ill, in particular paranoid leaders (Mack, 1971), a concern newly heightened by the murderous capacity of the nuclear age. This chapter will seek to show how psychoanalysis itself became implicated in a climate of American political paranoia.

This paranoia was also played out in the public sphere of psychoanalysis, and the chapter critiques the resolution of the ethical issues which were brought to a head through the furore over the politically motivated psychological denigration of US presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater. The chapter relates Jerrold Post’s ongoing influence in the US/Israeli anti-terrorist and security matrix, and discusses the role of the 'psychoanalytic expert' in the public and institutional sphere.

2 Psychological Wellbeing in the American Political Establishment.
Despite the obvious danger posed by pathological or indeed mentally ill leaders, Mack (1971) believed that there were important caveats to the direct institutional engagement of analysts as monitors of psychological wellbeing, from within the establishment. How does the analyst, questions Mack, 'remain above the suspicion of using his knowledge and authority to influence policy? Or, conversely, how does he himself remain uninfluenced by the pressures and political purposes of those who surround the leader’ (Mack, 1971, p 159)? Indeed Mack’s reservations, as this critique seeks to demonstrate, were extremely apposite. From their hegemonic position, institutionally engaged analysts were able to dictate what was sayable in the discourse, by determining who was to be labelled as paranoid or otherwise pathological. As establishment figures themselves, they were deploying psychoanalytic concepts as a function of what was now their own normative discourse.

Expanding on his thesis, Mack prays in aid the psychoanalytically trained social scientist Arnold Rogow’s 1963 psychobiography of James Forrestal. In the case of Forrestal, it was in fact difficult ‘to distinguish between political positions and policies which were an exaggeration of a “tough” conservative stance of military preparedness combined with an understandable suspiciousness of Russia, from attitudes and actions that reflected his paranoid illness’ (Mack, 1971, p 158). Indeed as in Forrestal’s case, a paranoid leader’s views might well ‘correspond to the fears and political purposes of large groups of people both within and without the government’ (ibid).

What was seen as an exaggerated American emphasis on military planning was related to Forrestal’s supposedly delusional focus on a communist conspiracy (Mack, 1971). There was the further danger of those, not actually clinically ill, acting out similar psychic conflicts in pursuance of political office. It was then, seen as critical to take measures in order to identify them also (ibid). Diagnostic criteria are then deployed in order to assess individuals supposedly displaying symptoms of pathology similar to those suffering clinical illness. The stigmatising effect of mental illness or pathology permeates every aspect of the individual, influencing every perception of him and his achievements (Akashah and Tennant, 1980).

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6 Forrestal was the first US Secretary for defence and the highest ranking American leader to commit suicide.
Something of a maverick, Forrestal’s ideas were at odds with the post-war liberal intellectual milieu and Akashah and Tennant believe that Forrestal’s supposed pathology was exploited politically. In treatment following what appeared to be a suicide attempt, Forrestal was diagnosed as having a depression akin to severe battle fatigue and the diagnosis was used by the Russians to cast doubt on American foreign policy making in general. Forrestal’s career was reinterpreted ‘by Americans as well as Russians as merely symptoms of his alleged illness’ (Akashah and Tennant, 1980, p 89).

Akashah and Tennant list Rogow’s interpretations of Forrestal’s behaviour which supposedly and retrospectively demonstrated or retrodicted Forrestal’s paranoid functioning, without the influence of a pathological diagnosis. Thus they give alternative explanations for his behaviour. For example, one of the symptoms Rogow had used in determining Forrestal’s paranoia was that he believed he was being followed (Akashah and Tennant, 1980, p 89). Having controversially opposed the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, as Akashah and Tennant point out, he was actually being followed by the US secret services and probably by Israeli agents, who were definitely tailing his staff (ibid).

Shrill attacks were levelled against Forrestal by sections of the media whilst he was in office, although there was some belated acceptance that Forrestal had been hectored ‘with innuendos and false accusations’ (Akashah and Tennant, 1980, p 91). It is a democratic deficit if a pathological labelling keeps such ‘holders of unconventional but possible valuable ideas from being heard’ (Akashah and Tennant, 1980, p 92).

3 Renatus Hartogs and the ‘Schizoid’ Lee Harvey Oswald.

In the aftermath of the November 22nd 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the American media sought the expertise of the comforting and avuncular psychiatry represented by figures such as Renatus Hartogs. A leading émigré psychoanalytic psychiatrist working at New York City’s juvenile reformatory the Youth House, Hartogs was frequently interviewed when sensational murders occurred, Hartogs readily assured the public that it was actually the perpetrator
and not they who was paranoid, and determined to outrage them from motives of his own personal grandiosity (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a; Donald Jackson, *Life*, 21st of February 1964; Warren Commission, 1964).

In his public diagnosis of Oswald’s personality formation, Hartogs would base his analysis upon the perception of the public persona, of the now putatively pathological adult subject. In this instance and unusually, there was actual clinical evidence of childhood psychological functioning available in order to attest or falsify these analytic inferences. Almost incredibly and unbeknownst to Hartogs at the time, the evidence was from a diagnosis made by Hartogs himself, when the young Oswald had been referred by juvenile court to the Youth House in New York.

Shortly after Oswald’s own assassination at the hands of Jack Ruby, a confidential psychiatric report had been released to the FBI by Judge Florence Kelley. The *New York Post* on November 30th, 1963 cited from the Hartogs report that, Oswald had had a ‘psychiatric and truancy record in the Bronx’ (Greg Parker, *Scribd.com*, the 7th of February, 2008). The article continued that it was “learned from other sources that the psychiatric report recommended young Oswald - then only 13 - for commitment” ... this recommendation was though “turned down by the court” adding that “the probation report found schizophrenic tendencies and said that Oswald was “potentially dangerous”” (Greg Parker, *Scribd.com*, the 7th of February, 2008).

Seemingly vindicating Hartogs’ made-for-TV analysis, there was further leaking from the law enforcement team investigating the assassination. As reported by Donald Jackson reported for *Life* magazine that a ‘diagnosis of incipient schizophrenia was made, based on the boy’s detachment from the world and pathological changes in his value system. His outlook on life had strongly paranoid overtones. The immediate and long range consequences of these features, in addition to his inability to verbalize hostility, led to an additional diagnosis: “potential dangerousness”’ (Donald Jackson, *Life*, 21st of February, 1964, p 72). It was not fully clear in the reporting however, what was now coming from authoritative sources, or what might have been rehashed from other sources such as Hartogs’ own later opining.
The upshot was that Hartogs believed that he recognised the phrasing of ‘incipient schizophrenic’ and ‘potentially dangerous’ as being his own. He also remembered that he was actually the psychiatrist who had made the original clinical diagnosis of Oswald, and that it was a ‘fantastic’ coincidence as he would later tell the Warren Commission set up to investigate the assassination, that he had been asked for his views on TV before knowing Oswald’s identity (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 7). Hartogs would go on to state publicly that he was not surprised that Oswald had been arrested, as ‘psychologically’, he had ‘all the qualifications of being a potential assassin’ (Hartogs quoted by Donald Jackson, Life, 21st of February, 1964, p 72).

To the Warren Commission Hartogs testified that Oswald had ‘definite traits of dangerousness. In other words, this child had a potential for explosive, aggressive, assaultive acting out which was rather unusual to find in a child who was sent to Youth House on such a mild charge as truancy from school’ (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 4). Hartogs had therefore recommended that Oswald be institutionalised immediately. Whilst giving his testimony under oath to the Warren Commission, Hartogs was handed a copy of his actual report which he hadn’t seen in the intervening eleven years. Under cross examination from the attorney for the Commission Walter Liebeler, Hartogs somewhat ruefully accepted that it ‘contradicts my recollection’ (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 9).

What Hartogs had actually recommended, was that rather than being institutionalised immediately, Oswald ‘should be placed on probation under the condition that he seek help and guidance through contact with a child guidance clinic, where he should be treated preferably by a male psychiatrist who could substitute, to a certain degree at least, for the lack of father figure. At the same time, his mother should be urged to seek psychotherapeutic guidance through contact with a family agency’ (Hartogs, 1953, p 3). The tenor and substance of these recommendations if not wholly in response to, were certainly attuned to the attitude of the judge, who had in the first instance referred Oswald to the Youth House for reports, on the relatively minor issue of truancy. Because in 1953, the judge had been chiefly concerned by the fact that Oswald was being brought up by a single mother, particularly one who was ‘selfinvolved and conflicted’ (Hartogs, 1953, p 2; Hartogs and Freeman, 1965).
What seems to have caused the initial confusion arising out of Judge Kelley’s 1963 press release was the wording of Hartogs’ diagnosis that, ‘Lee has to be diagnosed as “personality pattern disturbance with schizoid features and passive-aggressive tendencies”’ (Hartogs, 1953, p 2). Schizoid features are characterised ‘by a long-standing pattern of detachment from social relationships ... the typical “loner”’, who reacts ‘passively to adverse circumstances’ (Psych Central, 1992-2012). Passive-aggressive individuals ‘appear to comply or act appropriately, but actually negatively and passively resist’ and are resentful, stubborn, ‘[a]rgumentative, sulky, and hostile especially towards authority figures’ (Langone Medical Center, 2011).

The term schizoid has changed its usage over time, and the possible confusion in the press is summed up by the entry in the American Heritage Medical Dictionary definition: ‘1. Of, relating to, or having a personality marked by extreme shyness, seclusiveness, and an inability to form close friendships or social relationships. 2. Schizophrenic. No longer in scientific use’ (Free Dictionary, 2012). Although the second definition may still have been current in a well-thumbed newsroom medical dictionary at the time, Hartogs’ diagnosis is clearly not referring to Oswald as an actual schizophrenic, but rather delineating Oswald’s solitary and sulky character as the reason for his truanting.

Out of context and by a process of misinterpretation akin to Chinese whispers, the Hartogs’ report conclusions, and indeed Hartogs own later position are transmogrified. Hartogs’ report was that ‘[n]o finding of neurological impairment or psychotic mental changes could be made. Lee has to be diagnosed as “personality pattern disturbance with schizoid features and passive - aggressive tendencies”’ (Hartogs, 1953, p 2). The Warren Commission could find no mention of Hartog’s later claim of ‘strongly paranoid overtones’ (Warren Commission, 1964, p 379). In his testimony to the Warren Commission, Hartogs was asked to explain why he later diagnosed a ‘severe personality disturbance’, that Oswald was ‘a potential assassin, potentially dangerous ... insipient schizophrenic’ (Liebeler cross examination of Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 8).

Counsel for the Commission Wesley Liebeler similarly put it to Hartogs that there was actually nothing in the report to indicate potential violence (Liebeler
cross examination of Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a). Hartogs replied that although it wasn’t mentioned in the report, he had ‘implied it by the diagnosis of passive-aggressive’ (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 9). Passive-aggressive, according to Hartogs, indicated a ‘passive retiring surface façade, under which the child hides considerable hostility of various degrees ... usually in a passive-aggressive individual the aggressiveness can be triggered off and provoked in stress situations or if he nourishes his hate and his hostility for considerable length of time so that the passive surface façade all of a sudden explodes’ (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 9, p 10).

There was evidence submitted to the Warren Commission which very much supported Hartogs’ original contention of Oswald as the archetypal passive-aggressive loner. Although not recognised as psychiatrically distinct, the passive aggressive disorder represents unexpressed anger and hostility, and is a chronic condition. Passivity, is its manifestation, it is not the cover for an incipient but suppressed violent aggression ready to explode (Langone Medical Center, 2011). From his time in the U.S. marines, for example, the Warren Commission took testimony that Oswald manifested his feelings ‘about authority by baiting his officers’, and ‘that Oswald’s extreme personal sloppiness in the Marine Corps “fitted into a general personality pattern of his: to do whatever was not wanted of him, a recalcitrant trend in his personality”’ (Warren Commission, 1964, p 385). This reflects the passive aggressive symptomology of ‘“deliberate inefficiency - purposefully performing in an incompetent manner” (Langone Medical Center, 2011). Oswald according to evidence submitted to the Warren Commission, “seemed to be a person who would go out of his way to get into trouble” and then used the “special treatment” he received as an example of the way in which he was being picked on and “as a means of getting or attempting to get sympathy”’ (Warren Commission, 1964, p 386).

Although Hartogs may have unwittingly resolved on the extreme volte face from his original analysis, the more subtle revision of profiles to accommodate contradictory new evidence within a theoretical schema would become a standard retrodictory functioning of the profiling process. Despite Hartogs’ tortuous retrodictory justification under oath, the Warren Commission’s unequivocal assessment was that ‘[c]ontrary to reports that appeared after the assassination,
the psychiatric examination did not indicate that Lee Oswald was a potential assassin, potentially dangerous, that "his outlook on life had strongly paranoid overtones" or that he should be institutionalized' (Warren Commission, 1964, p 379).

4 Hartogs the Accidental Profiler

Hartogs' later psychoanalytic profile of Oswald incorporates both a characterological developmental analysis, and a personological determination of narcissistic personality pathology predicated on pre-Oedipal trauma. Co-authored by journalist Lucy Freeman, Hartogs' book was actually based on evidence submitted to the Warren Commission. Hartogs claimed that he 'would describe Lee Harvey Oswald at the time I saw him as being potentially explosive. I suggested that he receive psychiatric treatment so that his inner violence - what might be called his silent rage - would not later erupt and cause harm. I handed in my recommendation, hoping it would be carried out' (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965, p 11). Even accepting Hartogs' idiosyncratic understanding of what is implied by the phrase 'passive-aggressive tendencies', it is still a very revisionist interpretation of his original report (Hartogs, 1953).

The unempathetic parenting of Oswald's mother is referred to in Hartogs original report and he posits a personological notion of early developmental trauma brought about by inadequate parenting as affecting the personality. Theorists such as Heinz Kohut (1971) and Otto Kernberg (1975) would later incorporate such notions into their formulations of narcissistic injury and narcissistic rage. The two year old Oswald, according to Hartogs, also suffered the physical and psychological trauma of being beaten by two child minders. This was compounded in the child, by a sense that

'his mother has abandoned him because she is angry at him, and he may feel a murderous rage at her for deserting him. He may show his fury by screaming at whoever takes care of him. Or else he may turn his anger inward, becoming depressed as he hates himself for not being able to cope with what he believes to be his mother's forsaking him'
Merging his original diagnostic formulation, Hartogs also posits a form of characterological sexually deterministic analysis predicated on Oswald’s putative castration anxiety, alongside the solitary or schizoid features which he notes in his original report. As there was difficulty for Oswald in controlling ‘his aggressive and sexual desires, any physical contact, with either male or female, would be dangerous’ (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965, p 95). With his delusions of grandeur and thwarted psychosexual development, in killing Kennedy Oswald was displacing the Oedipal hatred of his fantasised all powerful dead father, killing the all powerful presidential ‘father figure’ (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965, p 259). Oswald also demonstrated according to Hartogs, a pre-Oedipal hatred of his mother. This again reflects the theorisation of primitive oral rage that Kernberg would later propose along with narcissistic grandiosity, as the dominant features of his borderline personality formation. This is a concept regularly deployed in personality pathology profiling.

In adapting and subsuming his own early clinical assessment, and making a very particular analysis of evidence submitted to the Warren Commission, Hartogs has effectively retrodicted what this thesis typifies as a modern personality pathology profile, predicated on childhood trauma and narcissistic rage. The inherent paradox in such an analysis is that it is only when the deed is done, that it is it retrospectively possible to say that this was ‘predictable’. There are however, many individuals with similar backgrounds, who do not go on to become pathological let alone assassins. Any number of innocent people with these backgrounds, could then, become unnecessarily and indeed unfairly suspect.

This form of analysis is then, inherently retrodictive, rather than predictive, and as Hartogs demonstrates that it is always possible to superimpose a determination of narcissistic personality pathology, onto even previously contra-indicated clinical diagnoses. Similarly, in his report, Hartogs analysis quite accurately describes how Oswald’s passive aggressive, schizoid personality would actually develop as an adult. Despite later claims to the contrary, he does not predict Oswald’s future violent notoriety, nor can personality pathology theory in general terms, predict the contingent trajectory of a subject. Hartogs, as Jerrold Post would later do with his profile of Osama bin Laden, sought to fulfil the role of public analyst by redirecting
paranoid projections and effecting, a form of public therapeutic holding. With albeit
the unwitting revision of his own diagnosis, Hartogs deploys a key element in the
‘at a distance’ profiling process of ‘confirmatory bias’, as he selectively adduces any
evidence he can adapt to his current position.

As a form of hindsight bias, Hartogs, constructs a new causal narrative
predicated on the belief that he had known that Oswald would turn out to be an
assassin, rather than on the a priori objectivity of his original report (Satel, 2004).
The power of the current persona of the individual to influence the first impression
or countertransference, is the basis for ‘at a distance’ diagnoses.
Psychobiographical data is then retrofitted, to accommodate the current perception.
Here it is poignantly and indeed tellingly demonstrated, because in doing so,
Hartogs denies the evidence of his own original and, in my estimation quite
competent, analysis.

5 Barry Goldwater: The Anti-Establishment Presidential Candidate.

Facing Democratic President Lyndon Johnson in the 1964 US presidential
election was the right-wing Republican senator from Arizona Barry Goldwater.
Something of an establishment outsider at that time, Goldwater represented a
right-wing reaction to the then dominant liberal intellectual and establishment
milieu, who, were particularly exercised by Goldwater’s espousal of the deployment
of nuclear weapons in Vietnam (Spartacus Educational, 2012). Although he lost the
general election by a landslide, Goldwater did succeed in wresting the Republican
Party away from its liberal East Coast power nexus, which was to pave the way for
the ultimate success of Ronald Reagan (Bart Barnes, Washington Post, Saturday,

Many analysts, both psychoanalytic and psychiatric, were part of the liberal
intellectual milieu highly antipathetic to Goldwater. It was however, to the horror of
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) that a large number of its members,
were prepared to give politically motivated ‘at a distance’ clinical diagnoses of
Goldwater. The APA President and medical directors, wrote to Fact magazine, the
publisher of these psychoanalytic/psychiatric polemics that, “By attaching the
stigma of extreme political partisanship to the psychiatric profession as a whole in
In the 1964 presidential campaign, Goldwater’s blunt speaking had served to alarm the American public. At the Republican Convention itself, although Goldwater was actually paraphrasing Cicero, his now oft quoted sentiment that “extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice and . . . moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue” caused according to Barnes, a similar furore (Bart Barnes, Washington Post, Saturday, 30th of May, 1998). In the febrile election atmosphere, the liberal wing of his own party had already branded him as Goldwater himself later recalled, a ‘fascist, a racist, a trigger-happy warmonger, a nuclear madman and the candidate who couldn’t win’ (ibid).

6 ‘Psychiatrists use Curse Words’: Slander by Diagnosis.

Dr Karl Menninger’s aphorism above refers to the phenomenon that as Ralph Slovenko expresses it, ‘labels used by psychiatrists have replaced curse words in common discourse and are now used to stigmatize’ (Slovenko, 2000, p 111). Technical phrases such as psychotic or psychopath no longer simply reflect psychiatric illness but are pejorative terms for a despised ‘Other’ (Slovenko, 2000). Fact magazine in its much discussed edition featuring Goldwater, published a sample of the views of the 2417 psychiatrists who responded to a survey question asking, ‘Do you believe Barry Goldwater is psychologically fit to serve as President of the United States?’ (Fact magazine, September-October, 1964). 657 had responded that Goldwater was fit, 571 said that they had insufficient information to respond and the rest gave Fact its front cover of, ‘1,189 Psychiatrists Say Goldwater Is Unfit To Be President’ (Fact magazine, September-October, 1964).
These 1,189 psychiatrists were then, prepared to make adverse clinical appraisals taking political posturing at face value, and ratcheting up the feverish electoral tension. One anonymous contributor included what would become something of a standard adversarial personality pathology profile:

‘authoritarian, megalomanic, grandiose, basically narcissistic characters with a warped, highly personal sense of reality, with significant unresolved problems with their personal and sexual identity, whose over simple solutions to complex problems symbolize an infantile, magical manner of thinking and feeling, and who, in part as a result of glaring failure to look into and understand themselves and their own motives, tend to project what are at root their own inner problems onto persons and events outside themselves. The extreme example of this was, of course, Hitler, whose paranoid and megaloid delusions were tragic attempts to compensate for his profound inner sense of worthlessness and impotence. He projected his own guilt and blame onto the Jews. Goldwater projects them similarly onto the “Communist conspiracy” and “Eastern liberal interests.” Life has, for such persons, little meaning unless they can “identify” some organized plot by someone or some group directed against them. Their paranoid thinking is thus abundantly evident’ (Fact magazine, 1964, p 41).

Dr Randolph Leigh Jr. warned that he was ‘highly fearful of Senator Goldwater’s casually precipitating us into an all-out atomic war. His public utterances strongly suggest the megalomania of a paranoid personality ... as dangerous as a time-bomb with a short fuse’ (Randolph Leigh, in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 30). Dr Chester W. Johnson Jr.’s assessment was that ‘Goldwater has the same pathological make-up as Hitler, Castro, Stalin and other known schizophrenic leaders’ (Chester Johnson, in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 26). Johnson’s reasons being twofold, ‘(1) Logical or scientific or truthful analysis of his statements is completely impossible. His words are double-talk! (2) His statements and actions show distinct persecution feelings’ (Chester Johnson, in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 26). Dr Johnson’s analysis was based on statements that he himself regarded as impossible to analyse.
Notwithstanding, addressing the issue that there were too few personal details on Goldwater to constitute the clinical evidence required for making a diagnosis of paranoia, Dr Eugene V. Resnick asked, ‘would it have been impossible to make this diagnosis of Hitler and Stalin before their careers (and their illnesses) came into full bloom!’ (Eugene Resnick in *Fact* magazine, September-October, 1964, p 29).

Of Goldwater’s conservatism, Dr Alfred Berl has it that, Goldwater ‘feels genuinely a part of these frustrated and malcontented “conservatives.” They reflect his own paranoid and omnipotent tendencies … He projects his failures onto the public, as was characteristic of dictators in the ‘30s and ‘40s’ (Alfred Berl in *Fact* magazine, September-October, 1964 p 26). In respect of Goldwater’s perceived illiberalism, supervising psychiatrist Max Dahl was ‘tempted to call' Goldwater a “frustrated Jew.” Sure enough he was eulogized by an insincere orator as “the peddler’s grandson,” and he himself has on occasion declared that he is proud of his ancestry. It is, however, abundantly clear to me that he has never forgiven his father for being a Jew … To add the final touch, he espoused the cause of extremist groups who violently hate not only the Jews but also Negroes and Catholics’ (Max Dahl, in *Fact* magazine, September-October, 1964, pp 33-34).

Diodato Villemena thought Goldwater’s rejection of change may ‘reflect a threat by a father-image, namely, someone who is stronger than he is, more masculine and more cultured’ (Diodato Villamena, in *Fact* magazine, 1964, p 30). For the most part Goldwater took the critiques as part of the rough and tumble of politics, but this strand of analysis questioning his ancestry and masculinity would prove most personally troubling for him. For one anonymous contributor,

‘[d]escriptions of his early life that I have read indicate to me that his mother assumed the masculine role in his family background. My impression was that she was domineering and considerably lacking in her ability to provide affection and interest in her children. The picture, therefore, is of a domineering, emasculating mother and a somewhat withdrawn, passive, narcissistic father. It would appear that Barry had a stronger identification with his mother than with his father. This would provide a fertile background for sado-masochistic temperament, such as is seen in paranoid states’
Upheld on appeal, Goldwater won his libel suit against *Fact* and its publisher Ralph Ginsburg, despite the fact as *Time* magazine reported that, the American ‘Supreme Court has made it extremely difficult for such persons to win a libel suit. To avoid stifling the free-speech right to criticize government leaders’ (*Time* magazine, Friday, May 17th, 1968; *Justia.com*, 2012). It had been in particular, the ‘masculinity slur’ according to *Time*, which had worried Goldwater who said that, “I come from a family that has pride in family, pride in ancestors.” He also felt that people in the street were thinking, “There goes that queer, there goes that homosexual, or there goes that man who is afraid of his masculinity” (ibid).

Even in the Goldwater issue of *Fact*, there had been concerns raised about a conflation of psychoanalytic conceptualisations and techniques with political machinations. Lawrence Friedman writes that, ‘I must emphasize to you that a cornerstone of Freud’s teaching was that psychoanalysis should be used only for understanding and therapy, never as a weapon. The temptation to do so is great, and because it frequently is so used does not make it right’ (Lawrence Friedman in *Fact* magazine, September-October, 1964, p 59). Categorical in his opposition to Goldwater, Friedman declared though that he would attack his ideas and political orientation, not his psychology (Lawrence Friedman, in *Fact* magazine, September-October,1964). Clinically Friedman argued, such long range diagnoses without examining the ‘patient firsthand’ were inherently insufficient for ‘making a diagnosis or prognosis of future behaviour’ (Lawrence Friedman, in *Fact* magazine, September-October,1964, p 59).

Apart from those psychiatrists who thought Goldwater was psychologically fit or even psychologically fitter that his opponent Johnson, who might of course have been displaying an equal and opposite political bias, were a number who pointed out that psychological problems need not necessarily affect fitness to govern anyway. As Joseph Schacter M.D. had it, although he disapproved of and indeed found Goldwater frightening, he could not ‘honestly say he is psychologically unfit to serve as President ... I don’t believe emotional disorder in the past or even the diagnosis of schizophrenia is prima facie evidence of unfitness to govern ... Abraham Lincoln was repeatedly subject to severe depressions. It is conceivable to
me that a compensated schizophrenic could be a brightly creative administrator’ (Joseph Schacter in *Fact* magazine, September-October, 1964, p 38).

After an illustrious thirty year career in the US Senate, Goldwater, was as Barnes describes him, ‘the Grand Old Man of the Republican Party and one of the nation’s most respected exponents of conservatism’ (Bart Barnes, *Washington Post*, Saturday, May 30th, 1998). Despite his seemingly unambiguously right wing platform, Goldwater’s ideology was actually more nuanced, as seemingly was his character. He was mindful of his own workers welfare, but was against federal welfare programmes. He ‘ended racial segregation in his family department stores, and he was instrumental in ending it in Phoenix schools and restaurants and in the Arizona National Guard’ (ibid). Interestingly however, he ‘voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act’ (ibid). Goldwater’s peculiarly American rationale was that he considered the Civil Rights Act ‘unconstitutional’ (ibid).

This uncompromising legalism was why this arch conservative could seemingly contrarily support ‘gay rights’, arguing that “[t]he big thing is to make this country, along with every other country in the world with a few exceptions, quit discriminating against people just because they’re gay,” he said. “You don’t have to agree with it, but they have a constitutional right to be gay. And that’s what brings me into it” (Bart Barnes, *Washington Post*, 30th of May, 1998). Similarly, against later taunts of liberalism from the ‘socially conservative’ neoconservative Christian Right alliance, Goldwater retorted, that “A lot of so-called conservatives today don’t know what the word means,” he told the Los Angeles Times in a 1994 interview. “They think I’ve turned liberal because I believe a woman has a right to an abortion. That’s a decision that’s up to the pregnant woman, not up to the pope or some do-gooders or the religious right. It’s not a conservative issue at all” (Bart Barnes, *Washington Post*, 30th of May, 1998).

The ‘Goldwater imbroglio’ was considered a very black day for American psychiatry, and led the APA to draft ‘Section 7.3 of its *Principles of Medical Ethics With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry*, which became known as the Goldwater Rule’ (Mark Moran, *Psychiatric News*, Friday 17th of October, 2008; Post, 2002a; Pinsker, *Psychiatric News*, the 3rd of August 2007; Hoffling et al, 1976);

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7 Goldwater would later become chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Friedman, *The New York Times*, the 23rd of May 2011; Mayer, *Psychology Today*, the 2nd of August 2009). The rule stipulates, that it ‘is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement’ (Mark Moran, *Psychiatric News*, 17th of October, 2008). The 1976 APA Task Force on Psychohistory would later spell out that this ruling explicitly covered psychoanalytic profiles and psychobiographies undertaken by psychiatrists (Hofling et al, 1976).

7 President Richard Nixon Directs the Burglary of a Psychoanalyst.

President Richard Nixon’s administration was robustly alive to the potential of deploying the intimate revelations of psychoanalytic enquiry for political purposes. A somewhat paranoid Nixon himself believed that he was ‘up against an enemy, a conspiracy’ (Richard Nixon quoted in Wells, 2001, p 467). Nixon had according to Tom Wells, fixated on Daniel Ellsberg a senior policy advisor on the Vietnam War to both Secretaries State Robert McNamara and Henry Kissinger. Ellsberg had in fact leaked the so called ‘Pentagon Papers’ which revealed the true nature and extent of American involvement in Vietnam (Nixon quoted in *BBC 4*, 21st of February 2010). Tasked by Nixon to ‘convict the son of a bitch in the press’, a secret White House Special Investigations Unit had been formed which became known to history as the ‘Plumbers’. The ‘Plumbers’ were later responsible for organising the infamous ‘Watergate’ burglary, which would eventually lead to the resignation of Nixon (Wells, 2001; Linder 2011).

In early August 1971 Egil Krogh, National Security Council staff member David Young, former FBI agent G. Gordon Liddy and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt met to plan the ‘first-rate criminal conspiracy ... that led inexorably to Watergate and its subsequent cover-up’ (Egil Krogh, *The New York Times*, 30th of June 2007). The ‘Plumbers’ had decided to break into the office of Ellsberg’s psychoanalyst, Lewis Fielding. It was the two burglars used, Bernhard Barker and Eugenio Martinez who were later arrested inside the ‘Watergate’ offices of the Democratic National Committee in June 1972 (Linder, 2011).

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Krogh was the deputy assistant to President Nixon.
The Fielding break-in had been deemed necessary because a previous psychological profile of Ellsberg prepared by CIA psychiatrists had proven inadequate for the nefarious purposes of the ‘Plumbers’. The plan was, according to Krogh, to break into Fielding’s office in order to get a “mother lode” of information about Mr. Ellsberg’s mental state, to discredit him’ (Egil Krogh, *The New York Times*, 30th of June 2007). Ellsberg would then be smeared by leaking the profile to the press. Ellsberg’s former wife Carol had named Fielding to the FBI, and director J. Edgar Hoover had ordered that Fielding be interviewed. When FBI agents attempted to interview Fielding, the psychoanalyst not only turned them down but as Wells claims, ‘he refused to even acknowledge that Ellsberg had been his patient’ (ibid, p 9). The idea mooted that the FBI might then undertake the burglary as a special operation, was discounted by the ‘Plumbers’ on the grounds that ‘Hoover might later use it as “leverage” against Nixon’ (Egil Krogh, *The New York Times*, 30th of June 2007).

Hunt, who was in charge of the operation (although Nixon took a keen interest personally), was in particular hoping for discussions of ‘Dr. Ellsberg’s oedipal conflicts or castration fears’ (Wells, 2001, p 11; BBC 4, 24th of February 2010; Omestad, 1994). The-would be smearers were very encouraged by Ellsberg’s ‘indiscretion about sexual matters and seemingly rich sex life’ (Wells, 2001, p 5). Indeed Ellsberg’s supposed predilection for foreign women Hunt thought particularly suspicious, and he was keen to find evidence of a *ménage a trois* with two women (Wells, 2001). Illuminating from another perspective as Wells recounts, G. Gordon Liddy conveyed to Dr. Bernard Malloy who had been covertly tasked with undertaking the profile, that he had information from a ‘neutral source ... that the bedroom of the subject’s California oceanfront former home contained an extraordinary amount of mirrors’ (Wells, 2001, p 5).

Malloy had explained the ‘inadequacy’ of their first profile on an insufficiency of data, particularly on Ellsberg’s youth. The CIA psychiatrists were though according to Wells, ‘skittish’ about producing a second profile, not only because it might be misconstrued as deriving from a doctor-patient therapeutic relationship, but because ‘studying U.S. citizen violated the CIA’s charter’ (Wells, 2001, p 11). This was in contravention as Thomas Omestad points out, of the CIA’s ‘ban on its engaging in domestic activities’ (Omestad, 1994, p 110). Indeed Malloy confided to

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9 Malloy was head of the CIA psychiatrists unit.
‘a CIA official that his worries did not involve “professional ethics” but legal issues; he desired “that the Agency’s connection with this matter must never surface”’ (Wells, 2001, p 488). The issue for the psychiatrists was then the illegality of investigating an American citizen, rather than any professional ethical concerns that might have constrained them from smearing the unwitting subject of their diagnosis.

In Wells’ view, the CIA profilers ‘discussions of Ellsberg’s narcissistic rage and need for appreciation are largely on the mark’ (Wells, 2001, p 492). Although the ascription of individualistic narcissistic rage against authority would become the lynchpin of modern personological adversarial profiling, the CIA psychiatrists’ formulation was disregarded by the ‘Plumbers’, who had been expecting a more traditional Freudian characterological profile. A more characterological profile would necessarily have included intimate psychoanalytic speculation and a discussion of Ellsberg’s sexuality. This was more readily amenable to be edited for an unsophisticated tabloid smear, rather than a personological profile to be used in undermining an ideological position.

Ellsberg was in fact prosecuted over the ‘Pentagon Tapes’, facing a possible 115 years imprisonment if convicted (BBC 4, 21st of February 2010). However, a memo from the Watergate prosecutor Earl Silbert detailing the burglary of Fielding’s office became known to presiding Judge Mathew Byrne, and although he had been offered the directorship of the FBI by the White House in order not to, he granted a motion to dismiss, on the grounds that “the bizarre events have incurably infected the prosecution of this case” (Judge Byrne quoted in Linder, 2011, p 11).

8 Jerrold Post: The Ethics of Political Profiling

In response to the ongoing disquiet over psychobiographic issues in general, the 1976 APA Task Force produced a report entitled ‘The Psychiatrist as Psychohistorian’ (Hoffling et al, 1976). The Task Force formally recognised that the advent of a psychoanalytic understanding of the preconscious and unconscious, was instrumental in providing psychiatrists, and indeed other psychoanalytically trained professionals, with an internally consistent motivational psychology as a critical adjunct to the study of history in general and biography in particular
(Hoffling et al., 1976). The Task Force averred that although the opinions given in the Goldwater issue of *Fact* were in their capacity as psychiatrists, they ‘had no scientific or medical validity whatsoever’ (Hoffling et al., 1976, p 2). Valid opinions could only be given on the basis of a confidential clinical examination, and that the same consideration applied in the case of psychoanalytic profiling. The Task Force concluded then that it was basically unethical for a psychiatrist to do a ‘psychoprofile of a living person ... without written informed consent of the subject’ (Hoffling et al., 1976, p 13).

It would not necessarily be, the Task Force maintained, ‘unethical for a psychiatrist to produce confidential profiles in the service of the national interest’ (Hoffling et al., 1976, p 13). They cautioned however, about the professional ‘risks involved in profiling living persons, and most especially fellow citizens’ (ibid). So that despite a seemingly total ban on psychoprofiling without consent, there was no ethical objection ‘to producing for the confidential use of government officials psychobiographies or profiles of significant international figures whose personality formation needs to be understood to carry out national policy more effectively’ (Hoffling et al., p 12).

There was always the danger of confidential or secret documents being leaked, but for the Task Force, this did ‘not seem particularly significant in relation to a Hitler or a Stalin or, in general, to extranationalists who impinge on the national interest’ (ibid, pp 12-13). Effectively then, there was an exclusion for albeit the incidentally or accidentally publicly available diagnoses of foreigners, deemed to impinge on the US national interest. This was an ethically inconsistent and readily exploitable compromise.

Following from this, there is now an ongoing debate in the American psychiatric community as to whether the ‘Goldwater Rule’ should be amended in order to formalise and confirm the ethical validity of publicly disseminating profiles of America’s adversaries (*Psychiatric News*, May 18th 2007; Henry Pinsker, *Psychiatric News*, August the 3rd 2007; John Mayer in *Psychology Today*, 2nd of August 2009). Professor of psychiatry Richard Friedman argues for the regularisation of this exception to the ‘Goldwater Rule’, in allowing for the psychobiographic profiling by psychiatrists of foreign leaders such as Muammar el-Qaddafi, (whom Friedman

Whether such a diagnosis is correct or useful, Friedman has ‘no idea, but it is ethically defensible’ (Richard Friedman, *New York Times*, 23rd of May 2011). It is deemed ethically justifiable because Qaddafi was perceived as a ‘national threat’ (Richard Friedman, *New York Times*, 23rd of May 2011). The perspective on informing the public of this diagnosis, and the putative consequences, are viewed solely from the normative and hegemonic position of the perceived American national interest. Effectively then, anybody perceived by the analyst as a threat to the USA, has no ethical rights against defamatory analyses even if they have no conceptual or factual use or validity.

For Jerrold Post, the constraints of the ‘Goldwater Rule’ are, in any event, ‘a masterpiece of internal contradiction’ (Post, 2002a, p 636). Because, in other parts of the section, psychiatrists are “encouraged to serve society by advising and consulting with the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the government”, and that they “may interpret and share with the public their expertise in the various psychosocial issues that may affect mental health and illness” (Post, 2002a, p 636). Indeed, Post sees his role in the public discourse of terrorism, for example, as assuaging public anxiety over any psychic culpability. Extolling his analysis of bin Laden, Post has had ‘confirmation from senior government officials and senior psychiatrists that this has made a positive contribution to a traumatized nation and, was, in effect, an exercise of “responsibility to participate in activities contributing to an improved community”’ (Post, 2002a).

It would not of course, be feasible for Post in his adversarial profiling, to gain the authorisation required by the Goldwater Rule, from subjects over whom he was either seeking to gain an advantage or publicly denigrate as ideological adversaries. Believing that the public dissemination of his profiles served the ‘national interest’, Post instances his study of Saddam Hussein asserting that the ‘president of the US Institute of Peace cited the profile as a “contribution of the highest order to the national welfare.” It assuredly was a career high point’ (Post, 2002a, p 637).
Post’s 1990 Saddam profile was subject to a complaint under the ‘Goldwater Rule’. The perennial defence Post makes is, that he presents political psychology not professional psychiatric opinions. The sentiment of the APA is that ‘there is no way in the ordinary course of events that the public can distinguish between a professional opinion and a citizen’s opinion if the citizen happens to be a psychiatrist’ (APA President-elect Joseph English, quoted in Slovenko, 2000, p104). Indeed, Post’s defence had been summarily dismissed by a member of the APA Ethics Committee reviewing the complaint against him, on the grounds that, the reason his opinion was ‘sought is that you are a psychiatrist. So willy-nilly, any opinion you offer is a psychiatric opinion’ (Post, 2002a, p 644).

Post received his postgraduate training in psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and the National Institute for Mental Health, and is now Professor of Psychiatry at George Washington University. Evolving out of a 1965 pilot programme based in the CIA’s Psychiatric Staff, Post had founded and led for twenty one years what he refers to as a psychodynamically informed CIA political profiling unit, The Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (CAPPB) (Post, 2004). This unit had been initiated specifically to undertake clinically oriented analyses of America’s potential adversaries. According to Thomas Omestad, ‘Post himself was viewed as a tough bureaucratic infighter and promoter of his craft’ (Omestad, 1994, p 111; Post, 2006b; Post, 2004; Post 2005a).

Whilst head of this CIA unit, Post had also been tasked by the US government ‘to use the same techniques in trying to understand psychology at a distance, when the epidemic of terrorism began in the early 1970s, to begin studies of the psychology of terrorism. This was the first government enterprise in this area’ (Evidence of Post in USA v Usama Bin Laden et al, Southern District of New York, 27th of June, 2001, 8312-8313; my emphasis). Indeed Post would become a very prominent academic expert on the psychology terrorism, and a leading proponent of the personality pathology paradigm (Sageman, 2004). In this role, Post briefs the US government, presents papers to the US Congress and the United Nations, and organises and chairs international conferences (Post, 2005a, Post, 2005b).

Post is a very distinguished and influential figure in American public life at the nexus of psychoanalysis and academic psychiatry and has received recognition and plaudits at the highest levels in American institutional life. Post’s professional
standing and indeed personal integrity are not questioned in this thesis. Post for example, very decently testified as an expert witness on behalf of a Khalfan Mohamed who was facing the death penalty, arising out of a conviction in the trial of ‘Usama bin Laden et al’ for the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam (USA v Usama Bin Laden et al, Southern District of New York, 27th of June, 2001, 8324). Risking his professional reputation, Post’s expert standing was severely tested under cross examination by public prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald (ibid). Post has received hate mail for simply discussing the motivations of terrorists (Hough, 2003).

American social scientists, Post maintains, ‘generally had no reservations concerning working for their government during the Second World War but were deeply alienated during the Vietnam war. The national security researcher in Israel in recent years may be in a position akin to American scholars in the 1940s’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1988, p 504). The perceived existential threat to Israel and latterly the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ has created a certain 1940’s atmosphere. In what appears to be a closely integrated American and Israeli security research community, there is a nexus of influence, of which the psychoanalytic psychobiographer Post, is very much a part. Post, as Criminal Justice Professor Adam Lankford points out, is ‘one of the key figures the US government relies upon to develop its homeland security’ (Lankford, 2013, p 35).

Along with the US Military, Post briefs ‘the Israel military leadership on current concepts of counter-terrorism’ (Post, 2005e). Post collaborated with two former Israeli Defence Force intelligence officers for the book, *Yasser Arafat – psychological profile and strategic Analysis* (Kimhi, Even and Post, 2001). Of his collaborators, Shmuel Even is, according to the *Institute for National Security Studies*, retired as a Colonel from the IDF Intelligence Branch (INSS, 2015), and Shaul Kimhi went on to become an ‘Advisor and lecturer to Israel’s national security system regarding political psychology issues’ (Kimhi, 2015).

In 2002 along with Ehud Sprinzak10, Post undertook research in Israel on incarcerated Palestinian terrorists. This research was funded by the Smith Richardson Foundation ‘a major financier of neoconservatism’ (IPS, 2009). A consultant to Israel’s ministry of Internal Security, Sprinzak was an advisor to

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10 Sprinzak was a founding dean of the University Interdisciplinary Center, in Herzliya, Israel.
former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and had a ‘central role in Rabin’s decision-making process’ (IDC, 2015).

Amatzia Baram, Post’s collaborator on the 2003 profile of Saddam Hussein, is Professor Emeritus in the Department of the History of the Middle East and Director of the Centre for Iraq Studies at the Israeli University of Haifa (GIS, 2015). Baram, since 1980, has ‘been advising the Israeli government and since 1986 also the US government (during the Reagan, Bush, Clinton and Bush administrations) about Iraq and the Gulf’ (ibid). In 2008-2009 Anat Berko was a visiting professor at Post’s George Washington University and in 2009 co-authored a paper with Post, ‘Talking with Terrorists’. Retired as a Lieutenant Colonel after twenty five years in the Israeli Defence Force, Berko is a ‘member of both Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Team and Israel’s National Security Council, and serves as an advisor to senior government officials’ (Israeli Speakers, 2015).

As well as being a sought after commentator, Berko ‘conducts counter-terrorism lectures for NATO, and before Congress, the State Department, the FBI and the military forces, and for a multitude of universities throughout the United States and elsewhere’ (Israeli Speakers, 2015). Handpicked by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Berko, whose ideology ‘dovetails perfectly with the prime minister’s’, won a seat to the Israeli Parliament the Knesset as member of Netanyahu’s Likud Party in 2015 (Raphael Ahren, Times of Israel, 11th of March 2015).

On his retirement from the CIA, Post had become Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs, and Director of the Political Psychology Programme, at George Washington University. His twenty one years in the CIA would necessarily afford him not only a great deal of experience in dealing with policy makers, but innumerable and ongoing contacts with them. Loch Johnson points out that the CIA particularly encouraged the ‘growth of closer personal ties between analysts and policymakers’, and that ‘[t]his “personal chemistry” may be the most important aspect of the entire intelligence cycle’ (Johnson, 1989, p 98).

The CIA has an established history of operating within American academia. Citing the findings of the Church committee’s 1976 report on the CIA, Johnson has
it that 'academicians (including administrators, faculty members, and students) carried out an assortment of intelligence-related activities. Among other things, they authored books and articles based on research financed by the CIA; spotted and assessed individuals for Agency use; served as “access agents” to make introductions between the CIA and potential agents or employees (foreign and American); and provided information to the Agency, both with and without prior instructions' (Johnson, 1989, p 158).

The CIA is prohibited from carrying out covert action, psychological warfare or propaganda within the United States (Johnson, 1989; Wells, 2001). It has, according to Johnson, 'an ally outside the government who is not so shy: the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), an interest group supportive of the intelligence community. Its domestic propaganda operations can be entirely overt. Publications that strike the fancy of its board, for instance, are purchased in bulk and distributed to opinion leaders throughout the United States and abroad. While the objective remains the same for both the CIA and AFIO’ (Johnson, 1989, p 24). Former CIA officer, AFIO member and Professor of Political Science Robert Robins, was at one time the CIA contact at Tulane University (Berenofsky, 2004; AFIO, Weekly Intelligence Notes18-02, the 6th of May 2002). Robins is Post’s collaborator on the 1997 book Political Paranoia which is discussed throughout this thesis (Robins and Post, 1997).

Post has, then, extensive insight into the relationship on security matters (particularly in relation to terrorism), between government and academia. In a paper co-written with Raphael Ezekiel, (although not explicitly referring to himself), Post nonetheless sums up what is his own situation. As Post describes it, the 'sojourn in the corridors of government for the national security policy scholar is an extremely valuable experience. Not only does he learn the constraints of the policy world, but he also becomes schooled in the discourse of communication. For the academic to bring to government the capacity for responding to a current need while relating the immediate crisis to a more comprehensive perspective is of immeasurable value to all parties' (Post and Ezekiel, 1988, p 507). It is the perceived immediacy of a topic which differentiates the academic from the policy maker. As Post describes it, 'when academicians make the journey to the corridors of government, they quickly find themselves with a foreshortened time perspective,
needing to get results, to “solve” the terrorist problem’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, p 504).

Academic consultants such as Post occupy a space between academia and government proper. Post is not only Associate Director for Safety and Security, at ‘The George Washington Aviation Institute’, but also edits and contributes to publications for the United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center. In Post’s academic field, there is something of a synergy with government perspectives. Although tailored for their particular audiences, essentially the same material will be reproduced in Post’s papers which may appear in learned journals, government and military publications, as book chapters in his own popular books or edited collections, the countless magazine and newspaper coverage of that material, and the extraordinary amount of personal appearances that Post makes. It was during the eight months after 9/11 that Post came into his own, with ‘approximately 350 interviews by electronic and print media concerning, terrorism, Osama bin laden, and suicidal terrorism’ (Post, 2005a)

In terms of the personality pathology discourse, Post effectively synthesises the academic, the governmental and the popular. The role of an expert such as himself, as Post sees it, ‘remains clearly anchored in the academy but is able to draw on his expertise to assist the policy maker confronting crises as well as long-range problems ... The academic consultant must be able to respond in such a way as to assist the policy maker in dealing with his real-world problems. He must be able to demonstrate an understanding of the policymaker’s needs and be able to see the world through his eyes’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, p 508). Although being in the academy, such a consultant needs to be amenable to the discursive subject position of the government policy maker.

Post accepts that scholars who are opposed to government policy cannot in conscience cooperate with it. For some (which would necessarily include Post), in national security matters ‘there is a clear identity between the scholars and the government, and full cooperation is natural and desirable’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, p 504). Similarly, perhaps also explaining why Post remains so well informed on issues not necessarily in the public domain, is the commensurate expectation where the ‘government official, on the other hand, cannot expect the consultant to
be fully useful without providing him with a context of substantive information and policy constraints’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, p 508).

Expressing the view that there was actually ‘more armchair psychiatry than critics can stomach’ in contravention of the ‘Goldwater Rule’, Curtis Brainard singles out a particular Post media blitz. Post had been a ‘busy man since fighting began in Libya in late February, appearing in numerous articles speculating about Qaddafi’s mental state’ (Brainard, Columbia Journalism Review, the 30th of March 2011). Along with Fox News sandwiching Post’s views between comments that Qaddafi was amongst other things, ‘nuts’, and ‘Post told a Public Radio International and WNYC show that Qaddafi has “borderline personality” disorder - but the show did not mention, let alone explain, the caveats that come with such an assessment’ (ibid; Jerrold Post, Foreign Policy, the 15th of March 2011). Once in the public arena, diagnoses become part of that public discourse and are manipulated according to the dictates of that discourse.

Although Post claims that any assessment of his is not a ‘definitive clinical diagnosis’, coming from a professor of psychiatry it is taken as being scientific, clinically informed and authoritative, and is deployed as such in the personality pathology discourse. In respect of Post’s Qaddafi profile, Brainard argues that the ‘statement that Qaddafi’s insanity diagnosis is “admittedly non-clinical” is a weak disclaimer and totally inadequate given the forceful charges that follow’ (Brainard, Columbia Journalism Review, the 30th of March 2011). Simply by choice of subject, such clinical profiling becomes part of an ideological discourse, and the tenor of the clinical analysis and how it is perceived is dependent upon the subject’s position in the discourse.

9 Conclusion.

In the post-war American media age, public commentary including the ‘professional’ psychiatric assessments of individuals, became ubiquitous and popular. Psychoanalytic profiles reflect the personal or ideological position of the profiler and what he seeks to achieve in the discourse, irrespective of previously adduced evidence. This was the case with Renatus Hartogs, who re-imagined his own diagnostic findings seemingly in order to fit with the new popular
understanding of Lee Harvey Oswald’s personality (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965). After a number of scandals, principally the psychoanalytic traducing by psychiatrists of US presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, serious reservations were raised over the ethical status of profiling individuals who do not willingly submit to analysis.

In spite of the furore over the Goldwater fiasco, the public psychoanalytic profiling of individuals had gradually become entrenched in American culture. Through the invocation of being in the ‘national interest’, the ‘Goldwater Rule’ was ethically discounted in the case of the adversarial other by American psychiatry. The thesis introduced the career of the preeminent figure in the nexus of psychoanalysis, academia and the US/Israeli security and counter-intelligence establishment, Jerrold Post. The psychoanalytic conceptualisations and Post’s deployment of them in the personality pathology discourse are described in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SIX:

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY BEHIND JERROLD POST'S PERSONOLOGICAL PROFILING.
1 Introduction.

From ‘ego psychology’ through ‘object relations’ and ‘self psychology’, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how these newer psychoanalytic theories are deployed in the modern, personological profiling of the pathologising discourse, and in particular through the adaptations of the principal protagonist of the thesis, Jerrold Post. The chapter follows through these theoretical strands and Post’s adaptations of them, arguing that there is necessarily a mismatch between the normatively applied theoretical model and a complex and messy existential reality.

Post’s personality pathology assessments, however psychoanalytically consonant, it is argued, cannot be reductively transposed onto complex contingent circumstances. The chapter seeks to demonstrate how Post adapts a distinct strand in psychobiography, relating to the turn to narcissism and early traumatogenic object relating which the thesis has termed personological. Theories which in the clinical context, have brought relief to those with what were otherwise little understood and clinically marginalised narcissistic complaints, are now being deployed to marginalise those outside of the normative, hegemonic ambit of an ideological discourse.

The Camp David profiles of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin undertaken by Post and his CIA profiling unit were highly regarded in government circles. The chapter contrasts Post’s benign profile of Anwar Sadat, with his pathography of the adversarial Saddam Hussein. Post was extremely influential during the US Congressional vote during the 1990 Gulf Crisis, and was also closely involved with US intelligence circles in the run up to 2003 Iraq War. Post had however, wrongly predicted Saddam would quit Kuwait in 1991 and subsequently, that his malignant narcissism ensured that he would not rid himself of his weapons of mass destruction. The chapter critiques Post’s evolving strategy of rationalising these flawed predictions.

2 Modern Conceptual Developments of the Pathologising Discourse.

Post War American psychoanalysis was ‘dominated by Viennese-American ego psychology’, a precursor for the personological paradigm in psychobiography (Hale,
2000, p 84). In theoretical terms, this represented a shift in focus from strictly uncovering repressed unconscious content, to those defence mechanisms deployed by the ego in order to keep that content unconscious (Freud, 2001/1923, S.E. XIX; Freud, 2001/1926, S.E. XX; Freud, A., 1948/1936; Hartmann, 1961/1939; Wallerstein, 2002). In ego psychology, the ego is seen as being fully in control, so that for Anna Freud, the ‘proper field for our observation is always the ego’ (Freud, A., 1948/1936, p 6).

According to this notion, the ego provides the psychic mechanism for the gradual separation from the original oneness with the mother, and the ego defences are developed to deal with the vicissitudes of life (Freud, A., 1948/1936). These ego defences in Anna Freud’s schema include ‘regression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, and reversal’ with a further ego defence of ‘sublimation or displacement of instinctual aims’ which is related to normal rather than neurotic functioning (Freud, A., 1948/1936, p 47). Although these mechanisms reflect the normal psychic functioning of protecting against the stresses of life, when they become exaggerated they may develop into neuroses. ‘At a distance’ personality profiling is predicated on the premise that there are clinically identifiable, distinguishable and individual characteristic ego defences which, as Post writes, mediate ‘between inner drives and the external world, each of which has its own cognitive, affective, and interpersonal style’ (Post, 2006c, p 78). Essential for the efficacy of Post’s profiling is that an individual’s typical ego responses may be predicted.

In seeking to resolve the dialectic antagonism between the inner and outer worlds, Heinz Hartmann posited a conflict free domain, a middle ground between psychoanalysis as ‘a liberationist social and political theory’ and ‘a drive-based psychology that viewed social problems as inherently psychological absolving social structures of all responsibility’ (Makari, 2008, p 447; Hartmann, 1961). The central notion in Hartmann’s schema was that ‘[n]ot every adaptation to the environment, or every learning and maturational process, is a conflict’, and that there was in fact a ‘con
cflict-free ego sphere’, for that ensemble of functions which at any given time exert their effects outside the region of mental conflict’ (Hartmann, 1961, pp 8-9, emphasis in the original; Hartmann, 1964).
Post adapts Hartmann’s concept of a mediating conflict free ego sphere to encompass a ‘conflict-free leadership sphere: the more psychologically healthy the individual leader is, the greater the scope of political decisions that he can make that are free from personality distortion’ (Post, 2004, p 21). With the emphasis on adaptation to society, Post’s psychologically healthy leaders could be seen as those who follow the normative prescriptions of conformity, and those outside of this particular consensus, representing by default, some form of pathologically functioning ‘Otherness’.

American ego psychology was given a more enhanced social dimension through Erik Erikson’s notion of ‘identity’, which encompassed the stages of development for the entire life cycle (Hale, 2000; Erikson, 1968). In this socially integrative notion of identity, ‘the fate of childhood identifications, in turn, depends on the Child’s satisfactory interaction with trustworthy representatives of a meaningful hierarchy of roles as provided by the generations living together in some form of family’ (Erikson, 1968, p 159). The mother must then communicate to the baby that he ‘may trust her, the world, and - himself. Only a relatively “whole” society can vouchsafe to the infant, through the mother, an inner conviction that all the diffuse somatic experiences and all the confusing social cues of early life can be accommodated in a sense of continuity and sameness which gradually unites the inner and outer worlds’ (Erikson, 1968, p 82).

The focus on the progressive development of the individual from birth through to death, conceptualised by Erikson, is also seen as important to the development of a more integrative psychobiographical approach, because of its emphasis on later stages in life such as adolescence and not just infancy (Lowenberg, 1983). There is in this conceptualisation, the possibility of tracing a continuity of psychosocial identity ‘between one’s personal, family, ethnic, and national past and one’s current role and interaction with the present’ (Lowenberg, 1983, p 24). However, this notion of a ‘whole’ society begs the wider question of what constitutes a psychologically sound cultural environment, and more importantly, who decides what that is.

A culture relevant conceptualisation of ego psychology does at least address the essential problem of ahistoricity in traditional Freudian drive theory (Lowenberg, 1983). The developmental changes in identity formation of the individual could now
be linked to changes in the dominant identity formation in a particular society, and at a given time (ibid). So that Erikson's 'great man' in history paradigm, as exemplified by his psychobiographies of Luther and Gandhi, is an attempt to demonstrate that the leader seeks to resolve his 'demonic intrapsychic conflicts' which, as rooted in his own historical period, effects the 'great collectivity of his contemporaries, as well as subsequent generations' (Lifton, 1974, p 36; Erikson, 1958; Lowenberg, 1983).

Post describes the period of transition in young adulthood when psychological and political identification consolidates, as having lasting consequences for political behaviour (Post, 2004). Many revolutionary leaders 'experienced social upheaval during their adolescence. They found social sanction for their own age-related drive to be independent of authority, often crystallizing hyperindependence and resistance to authority as permanent character features' (Post, 2004, p 24).

In adapting Erikson conceptualisation, it is from the conflicts of late adolescence and young adulthood that the individual in Post's schema acquires a revolutionary nature as a character trait (Post, 2004). However, in adapting Kernberg and Kohut's focus on the effects of early traumatogenic object relating, Post posits that the narcissistic personality organisations of these revolutionaries developed in childhood and adolescence, as a result of being 'damaged early in life by inadequate parenting, especially by the mother' (Post, 2004, p 27). This thesis proposes that the personality organisations typified by narcissistic injury resulting from childhood trauma need not be fortuitously commensurate with a character trait acquired from an identity crisis in adolescence. In fact, character traits may be seemingly contrary to personality formations.

3 Object Relations and Adapting the Kleinian Notion of Paranoia.

The object relational notion of paranoia was of a developing psyche in relation to others in the early environment of the child. Clinically, with modifications by later theorists such as Otto Kernberg, Klein's notions of splitting and projective identification were also being applied to the understanding borderline personalities. Indeed, for the psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personalities in the United
States, Kernberg had ‘tried to integrate British object relations theories with American ego psychology’ (Kernberg and Siniscalo, 2013/2001, p 7).

One of the key differences from both classic Freudian theory and ego psychology was Klein’s notion of a range of differentiated object relations in the first months of life. By contrast, Freudian theory as Anna Freud describes it, ‘allows at this period only for the crudest rudiments of object relationships and sees life governed by the desire for instinct gratification, in which perception of the object is only achieved slowly’ (A. Freud quoted in Couch, 1995, p12). As there is no direct evidence from the infant’s early phantasy, it must then, be ‘inferred from circumstantial evidence collected in later periods of childhood. That means that the inferences drawn from the later material are necessarily influenced by the theoretical views held by the various analysts’ (ibid). The premise of the thesis being that for the personality pathology theorists, the choice theory is itself influenced by the ideological agenda of the analyst.

An intrinsic link between paranoia and narcissism had been established by Freud, writing that ‘in paranoia the liberated libido becomes attached to the ego, and is used for the aggrandizement of the ego. A return is thus made to the stage of narcissism (known to us from the development of the libido), in which a person’s only sexual object is his own ego. On the basis of this clinical evidence we can suppose that paranoids have brought along with them a fixation at the stage of narcissism’ (Freud, 2001/1911, XII, p 72, emphasis in the original). Essential to his own concept of narcissism, Kernberg asserts that, a

‘particular theoretical position has been distinguished by my belief that the characteristics specific to patients with narcissistic personality disorders reflect a pathologic narcissism that differs from both ordinary adult narcissism and fixation at or regression to normal infantile narcissism. Pathologic narcissism reflects libidinal investment not in a normal integrated self-structure but in a pathologic self-structure’

(Kernberg, 1989, p 723).

The notion underlying Klein’s conceptualisation of paranoia, is the anxiety which ‘arises from the operation of the death instinct within the organism, is felt as fear of
annihilation (death) and takes the form of fear of persecution’ (Klein, 1987/1946, p 179). In Klein’s concept of paranoia,

‘the characteristic defences are chiefly aimed at annihilating the “persecutors”, while anxiety on the ego’s account occupies a prominent place in the picture. As the ego becomes more fully organized, the internalized imagos will approximate more closely to reality and the ego will identify itself more fully with “good” objects. The dread of persecution, which was at first felt on the ego’s account, now relates to the good object as well and from now on preservation of the good object is regarded as synonymous with the survival of the ego ... Paranoid anxiety lest the objects sadistically destroyed should themselves be a source of poison and danger inside the subject’s body causes him, in spite of the vehemence of his oral sadistic onslaughts, at the same time to be profoundly mistrustful of them while yet incorporating them’

(Klein, 1987/1935, p 118).

Aggression and destructiveness in the Kleinian schema are at the core of psychic functioning, with the ego defence mechanisms of splitting and projective identification establishing ‘the prototype of aggressive object relation’ (Klein, 1987/1946, p 183). Kernberg further theorises ‘projective identification’ as a key element of his borderline personality syndrome, where borderlines ‘have to control the object in order to prevent it from attacking them under the influence of the (projected) aggressive impulses; they have to attack and control the object before (as they fear) they themselves are attacked and destroyed. In summary, projective identification is characterized by the lack of differentiation between self and object in that particular area, by continuing to experience the impulse as well as the fear of that impulse while the projection is active, and by the need to control the external object’ (Kernberg, 1975, p 31).

The mechanism of projection is central to Klein’s formulation of the paranoid-schizoid position, wherein parts of the self are split off and projected onto another person, and where the other person feels this projection and reacts, is a projective identification. Following Klein, Kernberg has it that envy arises from the need to spoil and destroy the object despite its being needed for survival and thus an object
of love. Envy thus becomes ‘a major manifestation of human aggression’ linked to hatred, a derivative of the affect of rage (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 3). In the psychoanalytic sense projection as Laplanche and Pontalis define it, is the ‘operation whereby qualities, feelings or even ‘objects’, which the subject refuses to recognise or rejects in himself are expelled from the self and located in another person or thing. Projection so understood is a defence of very primitive origin which may be seen at work especially in paranoia’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 349). Envy was deeply implicated in the Kleinian notion of ‘projective identification, which then represents the forced entry into another person in order to destroy their best attributes’ (Hinshelwood, 1998, p 179).

Klein refers first to the ‘paranoid position, which extends over the first three or four months of life and is characterized by persecutory anxiety and splitting processes. Later on, in 1946 when I reformulated my views on the first three or four months of life, I called this stage (making use of a suggestion of Fairbairn’s) the paranoid-schizoid position, and, in working out its significance, sought to co-ordinate my findings about splitting, projection, persecution and idealization’ (Klein, 1987/1955, p 53). Such mental states are seen as playing an important role throughout life, with the unorganized self and object split into good and bad in the paranoid-schizoid position.

The pathological nature of the paranoid aspect of splitting is further theorised in the work of Kernberg, who has it that the splitting ‘mechanism is normally used only in an early stage of ego development during the first year of life, and rapidly is replaced by higher level defensive operations of the ego which center around repression and related mechanisms such as reaction formation, isolation, and undoing, all of which protect the ego from intrapsychic conflicts by means of the rejection of a drive derivative or its ideational representation, or both, from the conscious ego’ (Kernberg, 1975, p 25). Pathological conditions arise when this mechanism persists, and ‘splitting protects the ego from conflicts by means of the dissociation or active maintaining a part of introjections and identifications of strongly conflictual nature, namely, those libidinally determined from those aggressively determined, without regard to the access to consciousness’ (ibid, p 26).

An ongoing Kleinian emphasis on drives such as the ‘death instinct’ is argued to be essentially ahistorical because if ‘war was fundamentally drive-based and
neurotic, then social injustice, nationalism, militarism, racism, economic turmoil, corruption, and a host of other factors were all irrelevant' (Makari, 2008, p 448). Unable to temper their innate aggression, criminality was for Klein inborn and as Makari notes, is 'only marginally affected by matters such as degrading surroundings' (ibid, p 446). This normative notion is particularly important to modern personality pathology theorists in respect of terrorism where it is regarded as criminality, wherein the terrorist is deemed as being inherently pathological, rather than ideological in orientation.

One of Freud’s insights, had been that although there were criminals who acted out of a sense of guilt and broke the law in order to be punished, there were also ‘those who commit crimes without any sense of guilt, who have either developed no moral inhibitions or who, in their conflict with society, consider themselves justified in their action’ (Freud, XIV, 2001/1916, p 333). The issue, however, is whether terrorists could be regarded simply as criminals succumbing to this masochistic need for punishment or more nearly, in Freudian terms, were they those who defied the law but were neither amoral nor neurotic, because of perceiving themselves to be in a justified conflict with society.

The ascription of criminality is then critical. If the psychobiographic analyst explains his subject in terms of a normative notion of criminality, he ipso facto pathologises him. However, if he believes that the subject is sincere in his beliefs, the subject would transcend normal pathological attributions of criminality. A determination of pathology further depends then on whether the analyst believes that a particular conflict with society is justifiable, because it would need to be justifiable in order to be a rational and sincere decision to take part in it. Effectively then, the decision to pathologise is an ideological one, with, paraphrasing the ubiquitous aphorism, that ‘one man’s pathological, is another man’s normal’.

4 Heinz Kohut and the Turn to Narcissism.

Mirroring the growing American theoretical interest in Klein and object relations had been a line of development in clinical psychoanalysis. The population of potential psychoanalytic patients had widened from the traditionally private outpatient neurotic to include the hospitalised psychotic. The change, as Arthur
Couch viewed it, ‘from Classical to “modern” was the “widening scope of analysis”, referring to the fact that the population of potential patients has changed from mainly neurotic ones to more patients with narcissistic, borderline, perverse, or psychotic personalities’ (Couch, 1995, p 14).

American analysts were increasingly prepared to treat such patients, despite the more traditional view as represented by figures such as Anna Freud that the ‘psychoanalytic understanding of these severe disorders has far outstripped our capacity to help them by analytic therapy’ (Couch, 1995, p 14). Indeed Anna Freud remained ‘pessimistic about unmodified psychoanalysis of such patients with severe early deprivations in development, with resultant ego defects and lack of structuralization’ (ibid; Freud, 2001/1937, S.E. XXIII; Hale, 2000).

A more phenomenological approach was emerging ‘out of an effort to treat patients who were not responding to ego psychology therapies constructed around the analysis of psychological defenses’ (Mclean, 2007, p 41; Mollon, 2002a). Also, the perceived failure of classical psychoanalysis to apprehend the particular suffering of the modern clinical patient brought about a shift in focus from individuals suffering disturbances of sexual repression and self-control, to those suffering difficulty in interpersonal relationships and dissociative disorders. An emphasis on “narcissistic affects”, such as shame and self-consciousness’, would ‘inherently direct attention to phenomenology’ (Mollon, 2002a, p 3).

What Wallerstein terms the ‘hegemony of the ego psychology paradigm in America’ was not effectively challenged until the advent of Kohut’s self psychology (Wallerstein, 2002, p 146). The emphasis of self psychology is on the complex interrelationship of the psychic world of the subject as it creates itself and the social connectedness that it forms. Intrinsic to this conceptualisation is the ‘embedded theory of narcissism’, a critical adjunct to the modern psychobiographic project in general, and more particularly, this thesis proposes, for the personological approach (Kets De Vries, 1990, p 426; Kohut, 2009/1971).

The schema of normal development was, for Kohut, that the ‘equilibrium of primary narcissism is disturbed by the unavoidable shortcomings of maternal care, but the child replaces the previous perfection (a) by establishing a grandiose and exhibitionistic image of the self: the grandiose self; and (b) by giving over the
previous perfection to an admired, omnipotent (transitional) self-object: the idealized parent imago’ (Kohut, 2009/1971, p 25, emphasis in the original). The ‘self object’ in Kohut’s conceptualisation is neatly summarised by Mclean, as consisting ‘of the developing child plus each of those people who give the child the abilities to maintain self structure and firmness and a sense of cohesion and steadiness ... the infant is unaware that they are not part of his - or herself and that they are providing functions the infant will later learn to do on his or her own as these functions are incorporated into his or her psychic structure’ (Mclean, 2007, p 41; Kohut, 2009/1971).

With the self at the centre of its own psychological universe, and narcissism an inherent feature in everyone, the quest to build and maintain self-esteem through the use of self objects develops as a life ambition (Kohut, 2009/1971). Kohut summarises the influence on mature psychological organisation of what he conceptualises as the two major derivatives of original narcissism. Under favourable circumstances ‘the neutralized forces emanating from the narcissistic self (the narcissistic needs of the personality and its ambitions) become gradually integrated into the web of our ego as a healthy enjoyment of our own activities and successes and as an adaptively useful sense of disappointment tinged with anger and shame over our failures and shortcomings’ (Kohut, 1966, p 254).

Shame predominates ‘when the ego is unable to provide a proper discharge for the exhibitionistic demands of the narcissistic self. Indeed, in almost all clinically significant instances of shame propensity, the personality is characterized by a defective idealization of the superego and by a concentration of the narcissistic libido upon the narcissistic self; and it is therefore the ambitious, success-driven person with a poorly integrated grandiose self-concept and intense exhibitionistic-narcissistic tensions who is most prone to experience shame’ (Kohut, 1966, p 254). In contrast to Kernberg, who believes all narcissism to be pathological, Kohut is positing the possibility of a continuum from what he regards as normal infantile narcissism through to pathological narcissism. Pathology for Kohut only arises with the failure of the early self object, with individuals then seeking in their adult lives to gratify their missing childhood self object needs (Kohut 2009/1971).

In normal development, the adult achieves a healthy narcissism reflecting a self confident self-esteem (Kohut 2009/1971). If the individual has not achieved a solid
grandiose self and idealised parent imago, he may suffer from a narcissistic pathology either borderline or psychotic (Tonkin and Fine, 1985; Kohut, 2009/1971). The ‘idealized parental imago image - the image of a perfect other with whom one could totally merge, and who would be a source of endless strength, perfect kindness, and unlimited power’, would ‘be subjected to disappointing comparisons to the actual parent’ (Saltzman, 1998).

Narcissistic pathology arises according to Kohut, from arrested normal narcissistic development due to a deficit in the child’s interpersonal interactions, or from a parental lack of empathy in the early developmental and transitional period (Kohut, 2009/1971). So that Kohut’s conception of analytic therapy was an attempt to compensate for the failure of early parenting which led according to Hale, to ‘self-deficits’ which were normally narcissistic wounds (Hale, 2000, p 94; Akhtar and Anderson, 1982; Tonkin and Fine, 1985; Kets De Vries, 1990; Mclean, 2007).

5 The Traumatic Triggering of Narcissistic Pathology.

In asserting the relationship between narcissism and early object relating, Klein has it that ‘auto-erotism and narcissism include the love for and relation with the internalized good object which in phantasy forms part of the loved body and self. It is to this internalized object that in auto-erotic gratification and narcissistic states a withdrawal takes place. Concurrently, from birth onwards, a relation to objects, primarily the mother (her breast) is present’ (Klein, 1987/1952, pp 204-205, emphasis in the original).

In her 1955 paper ‘Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States’, Klein outlines her analytic and theoretical breakthrough in the case of ‘Erna’, forming what this critique suggests as being the basis for the later theoretical adaptations of narcissistic pathology deployed in modern personality pathology profiling (Klein, 1987/1955). Through Erna’s analysis Klein learned a good deal as she describes it ‘about the phantasies and impulses underlying paranoid and manic-depressive anxieties. For I came to understand the oral and anal nature of her introjection processes and the situations of internal persecution they engendered. I also became more aware of the ways in which internal
persecutions influence, by means of projection, the relation to external objects. The intensity of her envy and hatred unmistakably showed its derivation from the oral-sadistic relation to her mother’s breast, and was interwoven with the beginnings of her Oedipus complex.’

(Klein, 1987/1955, pp 49-50)

Following Klein, Kernberg suggests, that this rage derives from the effort to eliminate a source of irritation and pain that the baby first experiences at the mother’s breast. Developmentally, the baby seeks to eliminate the obstacle to gratification, the bad object, and to make it suffer, to dominate and control it in order to avoid fears of persecution from it (Kernberg, 2013/1996). Hatred, in Kernberg’s schema, is structured in form and chronic, and is a derivative of rage which justifies itself as revenge. Thus ‘[p]aranoid fears of retaliation also are usually unavoidable accompaniments of intense hatred, so that paranoid features, a wish for revenge, and sadism go hand in hand’ (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 3). Trauma is seen as the catalysing agent, and ‘the actual experience of sadistic behavior of a needed, inescapable object instantaneously shapes the rage reaction into the hatred of the sadistic object’ (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 4).

The principal theoretical underpinning of modern adversarial personality profiling is, this thesis argues, Kernberg’s notion that the ‘intense activation of aggression’ is not only physiological but that ‘[m]ost importantly, traumatic experiences, such as intense and chronic pain, physical and sexual abuse, as well as severe pathology in early object relations would operate through the activation of aggressive affects determining the predominance of overall aggression over libidinal striving, resulting in conditions of severe psychopathology’ (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 2). The key aim of clinical ‘at a distance’, adversarial political profiling is then, to indentify the traumatic experience which has activated the underlying inferred psychopathological formation, a psychopathology which this thesis claims is actually ideologically determined.

Although rather than a narcissistic continuum, narcissism in Kernberg’s formulation is always and only pathological, he does propose a continuum from the better functioning narcissist, ‘to severe narcissistic personality disorders with overt borderline functioning, that is, with generalized lack of impulse control, of anxiety
tolerance and of sublimatory channeling, the intensity of aggression mounts, reaching a maximum in the syndrome of malignant narcissism’ (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 3). Primitive splitting operations persist when ‘hatred overwhelmingly dominates an unconscious world of internalized object relations’ and ‘results in a borderline personality organization’ incorporating ‘ego-syntonic hatred, sadism and vengefulness’ (ibid, p 5).

As Kernberg focuses on the regressive potential of the primitive division of the world into idealised and persecutory segments, notwithstanding healthy early socialisation, there remains a readiness always of splitting the world into cultural stereotypes. Thus, the “paranoid” polarity of ideologies that constitutes the concrete and grave threat to social life, and that may powerfully push a society into regressive group and mass phenomena that foster social violence’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 963). Whereas the self psychology of Kohut argues for a separate line of healthy narcissistic personality development, Kernberg as Post writes, ‘believes that the narcissistic personality develops only in response to psychological damage inflicted early in the course of development, and hence is always a pathological development ... I find the psychogenetic formulations of Kernberg more congenial’ (Post, 2004, p 189).

Following Kernberg’s formulation (and significant for adversarial profiling), in his schema, Post need only identify clinical narcissism or more properly the ‘at a distance’ equivalent, that is, traits resembling the syndrome of narcissism. Following the circular logic, once pathology has been ascribed, Post can infer childhood trauma as causality, because the narcissism has been ‘identified’. This conceptualisation, is effectively a template for Post’s pathologising of America’s ideological adversaries.

6 Borderline Functioning.

The notion of a borderline personality with mild schizophrenia on the borderline between neurosis and psychosis was first formulated in the 1930’s by Adolf Stern (Stern, 1938). Analysts both psychoanalytic and psychiatric, began looking at personality disorders in patients whose social relations were problematic. As such, patients suffered from ‘overloads of aggression, anger, and distrust’, and the
analysts also looked at character neuroses which ‘included repeated and compulsive self-defeating behavior patterns’ (Hale, 2000, p 88).

Both Kernberg and Kohut agree, according to Tonkin and Fine, that there is a continuum from the neurotic to the psychotic, and that it represents oral rather than Oedipal conflict, because pathology of the oral phase involves more primitive and undifferentiated adaptations (Tonkin and Fine; Kohut 2009/1971; Kernberg; 1975). Kohut regarded a borderline syndrome as being distinct from narcissistic personality disorders, whereas Kernberg defines ‘narcissistic personality disorder as a variety of borderline personality disorder’, with both theorists having commensurate differential treatment postures (Adler, 1980, p 46).

There may then be a borderline continuum as Adler posits, from seriously regressed individuals to those with a more stable narcissistic disorder (Adler, 1981; Akhtar and Anderson, 1982). Splitting and active dissociation are the central defence mechanisms of narcissistic and borderline disorders, however the narcissistic person ‘shows better impulse control and greater anxiety tolerance than the borderline person. Self-mutilation and persistent overt rage, often seen in the borderline personality, are not features of the narcissistic disorder’ (Akhtar and Anderson, 1982, p18; Mollon 2002a; Kennedy and Charles, 1990).

Emphasising ego functions and describing the defensive dynamics which underscore conflict and aggression, there are vicious circles

‘involving projection of aggression and reintrojection of aggressively determined object and self images are probably a major factor in the development of both psychosis and borderline personality organization. In the psychoses their main effect is regressive refusion of self and object images; in the case of the borderline personality organization, what predominates is not refusion between self and object images, but an intensification and pathological fixation of splitting processes’

(Kernberg, 1975, p 27, emphasis in the original).

The borderline personality disavows his rage and aggressive impulses through denial, along with the other ego defences of idealisation and projection, projective
identification, omnipotence and devaluation. It is however, splitting which is the 'essential defensive operation of the borderline personality organization which underlies all the others which follow (ibid, p 29). Empirical support for diagnostic thresholds according to Bateman and Fonagy, is 'problematic at best as it is impossible to distinguish clearly between “normal” and “abnormal” personalities’ (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004, p 2). Only when “when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause significant functional impairments or subjective distress do they constitute personality disorders”’ (ibid).

In support of his notion of the prevalence of narcissistic borderline functioning amongst terrorists, Post cites the research of Lorenz Bollinger, suggesting that the ‘terrorists he interviewed demonstrated a feature characteristic of individuals with narcissistic and borderline personalities - splitting. He found they had split off the de-valued parts of themselves and projected them onto the establishment which then became the target of their violent aggression’ (Post, 1987, p 308; Bayer-Katte et al, 1982). As opposed to a generalised condition, Bollinger actually believed, that the '[s]witchpoints in the pathway to becoming a terrorist or not can only be determined through individual reconstruction of psychosocial dynamics' (Bollinger, 1985, p 388). Post, however, argues that '[t]hroughout the broad spectrum of terrorist groups, no matter how diverse their causes, the absolutist rhetoric of terrorism is remarkably similar. The absolutist rhetoric of terrorism is characterised by splitting. Splitting is an important psychological characteristic of the borderline personality, a personality disorder which is disproportionately represented in the terrorist population’ (Post, 1987, p 311).

Again, for Bollinger, an individual 'does not become a terrorist as a result of any primary single cause (e.g. genetic predisposition, sociopathy or labeling) but rather in the course of a psychosocial interaction process consisting of failing attempts of conflict resolution’ (Bollinger, 1985, p 387). In acknowledging their splitting and projection, Bollinger was reflecting what he saw as the current ‘groupthink’ of the individuals that he interviewed. What Post is doing, effectively, is reflecting the inherent them and us mentality of the group in conflict, which sees the other as all bad, and extrapolating this as an individual developmental trajectory and representing an individual pathology.
Bollinger was a member of a much larger 1981 social scientific study led by Wanda von Bayer-Katte (1982) (and commissioned by the West German Ministry of the Interior), of 250 West German terrorists chiefly from the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF). Another member of the study group, Herbert Jäger, ‘found no common pattern in attitudes towards violence, neither ambivalence or attraction among the West German terrorists. Some individuals reported a strong prior aversion to aggression’, so that attitudes were dependent not on underlying aggression but rather on later ‘individual socialization’ (Crenshaw, 1986, p 387; Jäger et al, 1982).

With such a homogeneous group as these West German terrorists, results involving ‘different findings by members of the same team have particular importance for a conceptual debate about the reliability and validity of analyses’ (Horgan, 2006, p 54). Similarly, the research suffered as Horgan has it, from a number of methodological flaws, particularly as it had been commissioned by the West German Ministry of the Interior, effectively the terrorist’s enemy. Most of the terrorists were unwilling to meet the researchers, who also suffered a lack of cooperation from local authorities. As the research interviews were conducted by social scientists, they did not have the status of privileged communication and so the researchers could have been subpoenaed to give evidence against their interview subjects (Horgan, 2006).

The remarkable homogeneity amongst the terrorists was because they grew out the West German radical student and squatter movements. They led a communal life in which members were mainly known to each other and where recruitment was by networking (Horgan, 2006; Townsend, 2011). An explosives expert who ‘graduated’ from Berlin’s notorious squat ‘Kommune I’ but later defected, Michael Baumann, says that ‘with me it all began with rock music and long hair ... In my case, in Berlin, it was like this [in the 1960s]: if you let your hair grow long you suddenly were in the position the blacks are in the United States’ (Baumann quoted in Kellen, 1998, p 54; Townsend, 2011).

A ‘them and us’ dichotomy, which is inherent in the subject position of terrorist or indeed counter-culturalist, is clearly amenable to being portrayed as splitting from and projecting onto, the ‘Other’. There were, according to Kellen, many disaffected young people in Post War West Germany and a large student and

\[11\] Also known as the Baader, Meinhof Gang.
squatter countercultural movement had evolved (Kellen, 1998; Haynal et al., 1983). However, that they were disaffected does not necessarily imply that they were narcissistically damaged, again it is only the normative assumption from the fact of their being either countercultural or terrorists. Leading a clandestine hunted life would probably tend to lead to the manifestation of neurotic symptoms, indeed some justifiable paranoia. As Kernberg points out, only a careful diagnostic examination would be able to reveal an underlying borderline organisation, because individual neurotic symptoms are not ‘pathognomonic’ in themselves, therefore needing a convergence of symptoms in order indicate borderline functioning (Kernberg, 1975, p 9).

Even if this convergence were demonstrated, it is further problematised as Gretty Mirdal points out, in that terrorists are generally only identified after they have spent a long ‘period of affiliation to a segregated group’ (Mirdal, 2013/2006, p 7). As such it would not be possible to tell whether the ‘so-called narcissistic traits that can be observed in some terrorists … are the cause or the result of belonging to a fundamentalistic, fanatical or otherwise terrorist organisations’ (ibid). Clearly early ‘dispositions’ will influence development and exert a ‘certain bias onto pathway decisions’, but there are, according to Bollinger, ‘independent causal contingencies on the various steps of the terrorist career’ (Bollinger, 1985, p 388). Bollinger is at pains to point out that he believes that there is no teleological individual progression determined by a generalisable psychic propensity for terrorism, that ‘[t]here is no straight causal sequence between primary conditions and subsequent terrorist behavior’ (ibid).

7 Jerrold Post’s Conceptualisation of Political Narcissism.

Citing Freud’s 1914 paper ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ Post conceptualises psychosis as being the total narcissistic withdrawal into the self. The psychological energy of so-called ‘lone terrorists’ such as the Unabomber Ted Kaczynski or the mass killer Anders Breivik, normally ‘invested in the world of people, the world of objects, is redirected and totally absorbed into the self’ (Post, 2015, p 8; Freud, 2001/1914, S.E. XIV). Narcissism ‘reflects a return of the libido into the ego. Freud observed that for both psychotic disorders and neuroses, there was an excess of libidinal investment in the self and insufficient attachment or psychological
investment (cathexis) in others (objects)” (Post, 1993, p 101). With primary narcissism ‘being a natural phase of early psychosexual development’, this secondary narcissism reflected an ‘imbalance of the self versus other’ (ibid).

As it relates to his own political psychobiographical perspective, Post defines the characteristics of narcissism as being

‘concerned with high ambition and self-confidence, to possess high self estimates to the point of dreams of glory, a need to be considered special, a tendency to be so self-absorbed as to have difficulty sustaining mutual relationships, and to also possess the fragility underlying this grandiose façade, so that when the grandiose internal dreams of glory are shattered, overwhelming shame results’

(Post, 2015, p 15).

When the narcissistic defences are breached, emotions are so overwhelming that the terror of meaninglessness impels such individuals to ‘create compensatory delusions’ (Post, 2015, p 9). Despite the narcissist’s total investment in the self, there is an inner sense of ‘inferiority, unworthiness, and unlovability’ and ‘paranoid feelings of narcissistic grandiosity and persecution’ designed to overcome this (Post, 2015, p 10). Indeed paranoia may be considered as a ‘primitive form of narcissistic pathology’ (ibid). With narcissistic entitlement inevitably leading to disappointment and disillusionment, this in turn produces a retaliatory rage, ‘strongly associated with the frustration of narcissistic entitlement and insatiable narcissistic needs’ (Post, 2015, p10).

There exists ‘a primitive psychological state characterized by a split between the idealized good loving object and the bad persecuting object’, as described by Klein’s ‘paranoid schizoid’ formulation, and is deployed by Robert Robins and Post, as an underlying theme of their ascriptions of paranoid group functioning (Robins and Post, 1997, p 77). The paranoiac’s projection results from a Kleinian perspective, in attacking others not out of a conscious but an unconscious irrational need, with effectively a permanent state of war needed to fulfil individual psychic needs, quite apart from exigent circumstances or causality (Makari, 2008).
Following Kohut, Post argues that the ‘target of aggression, the persecutor, is the individual or group which is associated with a flaw in a “narcissistically perceived reality.” This is particularly the case when there are significant paranoid features, so that the wounded narcissist’s tendency is to blame others for his disappointment’ (Post, 1993, p 114). The projective identification with a perceived persecutor in Klein’s theory of aggressive object relating is particularly helpful in explaining an ‘unprovoked’ fear and hatred, independent of any external causality. The primary antagonist in a conflict need not then have been provoked, because the aggression may derive from within his individual psyche (Robins and Post, 1997). Terrorists in Post’s schema, pursue violent aggression in order to assuage inner psychic deficits rather than as a result of genuine existential grievances (Post, 1986; Post, 1998).

A child relieves the distress of the aggressive hatred within himself, which in Robins and Post’s view of Klein’s schema, means ‘splitting off and projecting the bad part - the internal persecutor - outward, onto other persons or objects, and retaining the good parts inside, idealizing them. Thus, the loving, nurturing part becomes the foundation of the idealized self-concept, while the negative destructive feelings are disowned and projected outward, onto strangers or groups’ (Robins and Post, 1997, p 77, emphasis in the original). Projection is for Robins and Post, the ‘sine qua non of paranoia’, with the paranoid outlook ranging from the entirely normal to the severely psychopathological (ibid, p 76).

Progressing this from a political personality perspective, Robins and Post believe that the resulting persecutory and grandiose states are particularly significant, with suspicion the defining characteristic of the paranoid who searches endlessly for hidden meanings (Robins and Post, 1997). Again following Klein, paranoids rely on the ‘primitive psychological defenses of denial, distortion, and projection ... afraid of their own aggression, paranoids defend against their rage by viewing themselves as the victims of persecutors’ (ibid, p 14). The paranoid’s grandiose facade hides his feelings of inferiority, insecurity, insignificance and inadequacy, shielding his fragile ego, and when reality shatters this grandiose, the resulting shame, hurt, and rage at no longer being special, is again a manifestation ‘of narcissistic entitlement’ (Robins and Post, 1997, pp 16-17).
In their explication of group paranoia, Robins and Post incorporate Wilfred
Bion’s notion of basic assumption groups, which extends Klein’s theory of
projection (Robins and Post, 1997). Basic assumptions in Bion’s schema are
‘adumbrated by three formulations, dependence, pairing, and fighting or flight ...
each basic assumption contains features that correspond so closely with extremely
primitive part objects that sooner or later psychotic anxiety, appertaining to these
primitive relationships, is released’ (Bion, 1961, p 187-188). In a group which is
‘dominated by the basic assumption of unity for purposes of fight or flight ... the
existence of an enemy the first requisite of this kind of group. If you can only fight
or run away you must find something to fight or run away from’ (Bion, 2004/1962,
p 67).

The task of finding this ‘something’ falls to the leader, who ‘is usually a man or a
woman with marked paranoid trends; perhaps if the presence of an enemy is not
immediately obvious to the group, the next best thing is for the group to choose a
leader to whom it is’ (Bion, 2004/1962, p 67). Taking Bion’s view of group paranoia
as being the manifestation of the leader’s pathology, Robins and Post see it as
representing the ‘victory of the psychopathic leader over other healthier forms of
group development’ (Robins and Post, 1997, p 85). More than this Robins and Post
claim that the paranoid leader is also something of a creation of the group, which
especially under traumatic circumstances may be amenable to only just such a
leader who diagnoses their problems and along with the group, identifies or creates
external enemies.

These groups then display an even greater suspiciousness and hostility than
their individual members, because groups otherwise act to contain and inhibit
what would be psychotic in an individual. The group members subsume their
individuality and surrender to the leader, because ‘[b]elonging to the mass
movement is much more important than the movement’s ethos. The cause is not
the cause. The espoused cause of the movement is the rationale for joining, but the
underlying need is to belong’ (Robins and Post, 1997, p 96, emphasis in the
original). Robins and Post’s argument here, which is strongly disputed in this
critique, is that movements or indeed terrorist organisations exist not to further an
ideology, but simply to fulfil the psychological needs of their members.
Directly disputing Post, groups such as the IRA, Hamas or al Qaeda are in no way, argues Frost, ‘social clubs that exist solely to provide an outlet for their members’ aggressive drives’ (Frost, 2005, p 45). If Post’s argument that the aim of the terrorist group was simply to perpetuate itself as an outlet for the psychic aggression of its members were to be applied consistently, ‘almost any group or institution could be seen as existing merely to serve its members psychological needs, with its overt functions taking a somewhat distant second place’ (ibid). Indeed from the functional perspective of anthropology, it would correspond to the always blurry distinction between what Monaghan and Just describe as the ‘manifest and latent’ roles fulfilled by an organisation (Monaghan and Just, 2000, p 59). In the reverse of Post’s argument, the thesis contends that the impetus for joining a group is initially ideological, but that the group then naturally fulfils a number of psychological functions, by virtue of its being a group.

8 The ‘Grandiose Self’ of the Narcissistic Leader.

With their extreme egocentricity, sense of entitlement and omnipotence, individuals with significant narcissistic personality traits are, according to Post, ‘inevitably drawn to the world of politics’ (Post, 2015, p 11). Unlike the sociopath however, the narcissist does have a conscience, but it is a flexible one which adapts to circumstances (Post, 2015). As such, there is both an overt and a covert aspect to the narcissist’s personality, where an ‘overt picture of haughty grandiosity overlies feelings of inferiority; the overt picture of zealous morality overlies a corruptible conscience’ (Post, 1993, p 105). In developing his theory of the political narcissist, Post relies principally on the theories Kohut for the charismatic leader follower relationship. For the effect of more extreme narcissistic pathology, Post follows Kernberg’s notion of malignant narcissism.

Both Kernberg and Kohut, according to Post, address the issue of primitive narcissism in a similar fashion. In the early stage of this primary narcissism, the infant experiences the external world, including the mother, as being part of him. With the frustrations of reality, the child begins to differentiate himself from the external world, but two psychological mechanisms develop in order to restore the sense of completeness. An ideal or grandiose self in which the child is made to feel highly valued and special, is engendered through the loving and admiring
'mirroring' response of the mother, and this treasured position is maintained through 'splitting' (Post, 1993). The very young child who is unable to tolerate the bad aspects of himself and his environment and to integrate them with the good ones into a realistic whole, 'splits the good and the bad into the “me” and the “not me.” By rejecting all aspects of himself which do not fit his ideal or grandiose self, the child attempts to maintain it' (Post, 1993, p106).

In relation to this grandiose self, there is as Post points out, a major theoretical distinction between Kohut and Kernberg, with Kohut believing that it ‘reflects the fixation of an archaic “normal” primitive self, the basis for his positing a healthy line of narcissistic development. In contrast, Kernberg believes the grandiose self is always pathological, differing from normal infantile narcissism in that the internalized object images are pathological' (Post, 1993, p106).

The second mechanism by which the child restores his former psychological completeness is, for Kernberg, the attachment to an 'ideal object' or in Kohut’s formulation, deriving particularly from the father, an ‘idealized parental imago’ (Post, 1993, p 108). Following Kohut’s formulation as more amenable to his own leader-follower conceptualisation, Post notes if that during this ‘critical developmental period the child’s emerging self-concept is damaged’, it leads to what Kohut describes as the injured self or what Post himself describes as the wounded self (Post, 1993, p 108). During this crucial period any major trauma and loss ‘damages the very foundation of the child’s subsequent personality development, leading to the wounded self, craving the mirroring and adulation of which he was deprived’ (Post, 2015, p 18). Such psychic injury or wounding may occur, for example, when children are rejected by cold or uncaring mothers, or conversely a special form of rejection by the overprotection of the ‘intrusive narcissistic mother’ (Post, 1993, p 108).

Forming the basis of Post’s conceptualisation of the narcissistic leader, the first personality type deriving from this narcissistic injury is the 'mirror-hungry personality' (Post, 1993, p 108). Critical to Kohut’s self psychology, as Post describes it, is that due to the disturbance of interpersonal relations, the ‘primary function of individuals in the narcissist’s personal surround is to shore up his or her self-esteem, to provide reassurance for the fragile self. The significant other serves, in Kohut’s terms, as a selfobject. The selfobject completes the famished self
of the narcissist’ (Post, 2015, p 14; emphasis in the original). Individuals, whose
grandiose self craves confirmatory admiration in order to counteract their inner
sense of worthlessness and lack of self-esteem are however, never fully satisfied
with the responses in this ‘mirroring self-object relationship’ (Post, 1993, p 108;
emphasis in the original). The narcissist uses the objectified individuals in his
interpersonal relationships to shore up his self-esteem, and for the narcissistic
leader, a ‘group of sycophantic advisors can in effect become a selfobject’ (ibid, p
109).

The terrorist group may thus perform this function Johnson and Feldman in
their Kohutian formulation, cite the small enigmatic, but media vaunted American
terrorist group, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), infamous for the
kidnapping and subsequent recruitment of heiress Patty Hearst (Johnson and
Feldman, 1992). In the disintegration and anxiety that follows when selfobjects fail
to fulfil their function of maintaining the self, traditional beliefs are cast aside in a
narcissistic rage, and the terrorist organisation serves as an alternative self-object
providing ‘an empathetic matrix around which partial or temporary cohesion takes
place’ (Johnson and Feldman, 1992, p 298). Terrorism becomes ‘a symbol of the
self’s anger at unempathetic responses from other self-objects’ (ibid, p 299).

Inadequate personalities suffering self pathology are seen as being attracted to
terrorism in order to bolster self esteem, and are led by charismatic individuals
such as the SLA’s Nancy Ling Perry (Johnson and Feldman, 1992). Perry used her
leadership in order to offset her own self doubts, with terrorist activity providing
according to Johnson and Feldman, a ‘source of cohesion that offsets the
fragmentation of the damaged self’ (ibid, p 301). As with the highly vulnerable
personalities of ‘the SLA, individual deficits were countered by the collective
strength and cohesion of the group’ (Johnson and Feldman, 1992, p 301). In
similar Kohutian terms, Peter Olsson argues that the terrorist is in fact regressing
to the pre-differentiation phase where these early self-objects are parental imagos,
supplying a narcissistic transitional function of self esteem (Olsson, 1988).

9 The ‘Ideal-hungry Personality’ of the Follower.
The ‘ideal-hungry personality’ of the ‘follower’, with a narcissistically wounded self, is the complementary of the ‘mirror-hungry personality’ of the leader (Post, 1993; Post, 2015). What Post describes as Kohut’s elegant formulation of the ‘mirroring and idealizing transferences’ along with an ‘elaboration of narcissistic transference’, is critical to his own conceptualisation of the charismatic leader-follower relationship (Post, 2015, 74). Closely followed in Post’s schema, there are as presented in Kohut and Ernst Wolf’s formulation, ‘behavioural patterns and the injured self’ in which

‘ideal-hungry personalities are forever in search of others whom they can admire for their prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or moral stature. They can experience themselves as worthwhile only so long as they can relate to selfobjects to whom they can look up … Again, in some instances, such relationships last a long time and are genuinely sustaining to both individuals involved. In most cases, however, the inner void cannot forever be filled by these means. The ideal-hungry feels the persistence of the structural defect and, as a consequence of this awareness, he begins to look for - and, of course, he inevitably finds - some realistic defects in his God. The search for new idealizable selfobjects is then continued, always with the hope that the next great figure to whom the ideal-hungry attaches himself will not disappoint him’


Similarly, regarding it as a significant contribution to the understanding of the societal aspects of narcissism, Post cites Christopher Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism (1079). In a critique of what he sees as modern narcissistic individualism, Lasch argues that ‘[e]very age develops its own peculiar form of pathology, which expresses in exaggerated form its underlying character structure’, and in Post War America, this was a narcissistic pathology (Lasch, 1991/1979, p 41). As authority figures in modern society lose their credibility, ‘the superego in individuals increasingly fantasies about his parents – fantasies charged with sadistic rage - rather than from internalised ego ideals formed by a later experience of loved and respected models for social conduct’ (ibid, p 12).
Individuals possessing a weak sense of self in need of constant validation, such as, according Lasch, Susan Stern of the American ‘Weatherman’ terrorist group, whose association with important people ‘made her feel important. “I felt I was part of a vast network of intense, exciting and brilliant people.” When the leaders she idealized disappointed her, as they always did, she looked for new heroes to take their place, hoping to warm herself in their “brilliance” and to overcome her feeling of insignificance’ (Lasch, 1991/1979, p 7). The Weathermen, ‘derived not so much from an older revolutionary tradition as from the turmoil and narcissistic anguish of contemporary America’ (ibid, p 8). Locating the psychology of Weathermen terrorism as a situated phenomenon, Lasch argues that it reflected the prevalent clinically identifiable pathology of narcissism in modern particularly American society (Lasch, 1991/1979).

Notwithstanding specific cultural factors, the ideal hungry individual is particularly attracted by the strength and certainty of the mirror hungry narcissist, in particular the charismatic leader (Post, 1993). There is a ‘psychological makeup and responses of individuals susceptible to charismatic leadership - the lock of the follower for the key of the leader’ (Post, 2015, 73). Indeed, Post believes that there is a disproportionate focus on the ‘magnetism of the leader, failing to make the fundamental observations that all leaders - especially charismatic leaders - are at heart the creation of their followers’ (Post, 2015, p 72).

Although not necessary for charismatic leadership, a paranoid conviction can in fact be an asset, but according to Post, when actual paranoia and charisma are linked, they have been responsible for the most violent excesses in history. Post links the rhetorical charisma of Hitler to Osama bin Laden’s rhetoric of emphasising that the ‘polarity is between good and evil, between children of God and the people of Satan’ (Post, 2015, p 76). The externalising rhetoric of the terrorist group is particularly attractive to narcissistically wounded individuals with a paranoid orientation (Post, 1986). With the mechanism of splitting critical for engendering a group ethos, “‘they” (the establishment) are responsible for society’s (and our) failures, not only is it not immoral to strike out violently against them, but doing so is a moral imperative’ (Post, 1993, p 116). There is then according to Post, an overwhelming psychological attractiveness to terrorism for ‘alienated and marginal individuals who tend to externalize the source of their own failures - for
the narcissistically wounded “ideal-hungry” individuals described by Kohut’ (Post, 2015, p 81).

The terrorist ‘groups draw their membership from marginal, isolated, and inadequate individuals from troubled families, so that for many, belonging to the terrorist group is the first time they have truly belonged to any group’ (Post, 1986, p 211, emphasis in the original). The analysis that terrorists were marginalised individual’s acting out their individual pathologies, was originally conceptualised in order to explain the modern era of terrorism emblematically ushered in, according to Post, ‘by the radical Palestinian seizure of the Israeli Olympic village during the 1972 Munich Olympics’ (Post, 2004, p 126).

Post’s later collaborative research would find rather, that for young Palestinians, joining the insurgency was actually a normative response. One of Post et al’s ‘terrorist’ interviewees had it that, ‘enlistment was for me the done thing …in a way, it can be compared to a young Israeli from a nationalist Zionist family who wants to fulfil himself through army service’ (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p 182). Indeed, when they are in the insurgency such ‘terrorists are socialised like soldiers to attack the enemy, bringing into question whether a pathologising diagnosis can be used in an instance where a culture sanctions the killings’ (Post in Hough, 2003, p 821). Assaf Moghadam points out that ‘popular support for suicide bombings among Palestinians reached an all-time high, with over 70% of Palestinians expressing their support for such attacks’ (Moghadam, 2003, p 76).

Extensive meta research data is summed up by Andrew Silke that, ‘the best of the empirical work does not suggest, and never has suggested, that terrorists possess a distinct personality or that their psychology is somehow deviant from that of “normal” people’ (Silke, 2003a, p 32; Corrado, 1981; Crenshaw, 1990; Sageman, 2004; Horgan, 2006). With the evidence on ‘Palestinian terrorism’ not readily amenable to his conceptualisation, Post (1986, 1998, 2007) cites a somewhat anomalous finding in Robert Clark’s paper on Basque terrorism, ‘Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members’ (1983). Clark’s very rudimentary indeed questionable statistics show that only 8% of the population of the Basque country are of mixed Spanish-Basque heritage, whilst some 40% of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) appear to be of mixed heritage (Clark, 1983). The offspring of these families, (although not described as such in Cark’s
paper), ‘are treated as half-breeds and reviled ... suggesting they are sociologically marginal’ (Post, 1998 p 29). Extrapolating to the wider cohort of terrorists, Post has it, then, that as ‘outcasts’ belonging

‘on the margins of society, they try to “out Basque the Basques.” They exaggerate their political identity in order to achieve a psychosocial identity.

I am suggesting then that a strong need to belong is a feature terrorists around the world share in common, however disparate their ideological causes. Moreover, underlying the need to belong is an incomplete or fragmented psychosocial identity, so that the only way the member feels reasonably complete is in relationship to the group; belonging to the group becomes an important component of the member’s self-concept. Indeed, belonging to the group for many is the most important component, the linchpin of psychosocial identity’


Clark’s own analysis of his findings are on the contrary, that it was from ‘traditional Basque culture that individual etarras [ETA members] derive their emotional strength, the unusual mixture of social, cultural, and psychological forces that sustains them in the midst of a constantly failing guerrilla war’ (Clark, 1983, p 448). That even as they become more committed to the terrorist group, relationships with friends and family ‘paradoxically become even more important in a sort of symbolic sense’, and that ‘it becomes even more important for them to know that their cultural origins are still intact, awaiting their return when and if they leave the struggle’ (ibid, p 447). Indeed, Clark found that it was particularly important for ETA members to be able to ‘seek refuge and solace (as well as material support) from among those whom they love and cherish. Etarras are not alienated persons; they are, on the contrary, deeply embedded in the culture whose rights they fight to defend’ (Clark, 1983, p 424). The seemingly taken for granted assumptions of terrorist alienation and marginality as the basis of a psychoanalytic conceptualisation of terrorism is, the thesis argues, actually an ideological construct.

10 Charismatically Led Religious Cults as Model for Terrorist Groups.
Extrapolating onto the wider terrorist cohort, Post believes that the study of ‘charismatic religious groups provide confirmation for the hypothesis that narcissistically wounded individuals are especially attracted to charismatic leader-follower relationships’ (Post, 2015, p 80). Taking the example of the mass suicide of the cult followers of the Reverend Jim Jones in their People’s Temple settlement in Jonestown Guyana, Post describes the ‘narcissistically wounded individuals’ whose psychological qualities rendered them ‘susceptible to the force of the charismatic leader and lead to collective regression’ (Post, 2004, p 188).

Similarly, Post references members of the Reverend Moon’s Unification Church as being ‘particularly important for the question of the capacity of terrorists to commit antisocial acts’ because ‘the more isolated and unaffiliated the new members, the more likely they were to hold assiduously – and unquestioningly - to their group membership, because it provided the members’ sole definition of themselves, their sole source of support’ (Post, 1998, p 34). With terrorists, ‘the greater the relief the new cult recruits felt on joining, the greater the likelihood they would engage in acts that violated the mores to which they had been socialized’ (Post, 1998, p 35).

The problem with an analysis of terrorism predicated on the psychology of cults is that there are actually only limited points of valence between them and organised terrorist groups. The 9/11 attackers in Post’s narrative had been inspired by bin Laden and ‘uncritically accepted the direction of the destructive charismatic leader’ (Post, 2004, p 5). But in contradistinction to Post’s narrative and indeed his proposition of authoritarian charismatically led terrorism, the ‘Hamburg cell’ chiefly responsible for the 9/11 attack had become ‘independently of any contact with bin Laden, committed to violence in the name of radical Islam’ (Burke, 2004, p 237).

The ‘Hamburg Cell’ was one of a number of autonomous though linked ‘groups who allied themselves with bin Laden during the 1990s to access resources to allow them to execute plans that they had developed on their own’ (Burke, 2004, p 237). Marc Sageman in particular has challenged Post’s notion of bin Laden as the charismatic leader having a history of violence, and is uncritically followed by the group (Sageman, 2004, p 90). This was certainly not true of the global Salafi jihad which, according to Sageman, ‘prominently features local initiative and
decentralized decisionmaking. Bin Laden had no history of violence before joining the jihad ... the leadership style in al Qaeda is not an authoritarian one. There is no consolidation of decision-making in its leader’ (Sageman, 2004, p 90).

Al Qaeda is, Post concedes, unlike ‘other charismatically led terrorist organisations’ in that it would survive perfectly well without its charismatic leader (Post, 2004, p 9; Jerrold Post, The Los Angeles Times, December the 9th, 2001b). In an attempt to reconcile this theoretical quandary, Post’s position is that after 9/11, ‘bin Laden continued to maintain symbolic leadership control over the organization’ (Post, 2007, p 221, my emphasis). Bin Laden was either a symbolic leader or he was in control, either a figurehead or running the organisation. Notwithstanding Post’s somewhat ambiguous analysis, it would still mean that the then most prominent world terrorist organisation would be atypical of the formulation, despite Post’s adducing bin Laden and Al Qaeda as the principle and archetypal evidence for his theory.

Similarly, in challenging Post’s diagnosis of bin Laden’s grandiose and indeed malignant narcissism, Sageman regards one of the most attractive features about bin Laden as being ‘specifically his lack of narcissism, his humility, which impresses his followers and admirers - especially because he had the means to live luxuriously and chose to give up that lifestyle to live simply, among his mujahedin. His statements are also self-deprecating rather than grandiose. The only trauma in his childhood is the fact that his father died when he was around ten. Otherwise, he lived the privileged life of a prince’ (Sageman, 2004, p 86). Indeed as Sageman points out, the other leaders of Al Qaeda had similarly trouble free childhoods, their only trauma being perhaps arrest in early adulthood, ‘too late to cause the type of narcissistic wound described by Kernberg and Kohut’ (Sageman, 2004, p 86).

Neither did bin Laden have any particular personal ambition according to Abdel Bari Atwan, who has conducted personal interviews with him (Atwan, 2007). Although wishing to re-establish the Muslim caliphate, bin Laden did not wish to become and was in fact excluded by Islamic prophecy, from becoming caliph (ibid). Life for bin Laden was designed as a test ‘by the Creator to examine his faith, steadfastness and obedience’ (Atwan, 2007, p 56). Whilst bin Laden’s asceticism and eschewing of a life of considerable wealth to live under constant stress and
deprivation and discouraging any personality cult around him, does not according to Frost, necessarily preclude Post’s diagnosis of malignant narcissism, it certainly does not support such a diagnosis.

If bin Laden was not particularly narcissistic, then a lock and key narcissistic transference with his followers is also problematised. If the followers are not necessarily narcissistically injured either, and bin Laden appears to deliberately eschew any narcissistic transference, it could be that he was actually an iconic figure admired by idealists rather than thralls. Such a demonising political discourse as Post’s may in any event be a political miscalculation, because a more realistic appraisal of terrorists as frequently ‘intelligent, psychologically healthy idealists only makes them more dangerous not less’ (Frost, 2005, p 44).

11 The Temporarily Overwhelmed Follower of the Charismatic Leader.

Although narcissistic transferences occur, according to Post, in all ‘charismatic leader-follower relationships, and in some charismatic leader-follower relationships are crucial determinants’, he believes that they are more prevalent at certain historical moments (Post, 2004, p 191). Pointing out that at such times, apart from those always willing core followers of charismatic leaders, who are ideal-hungry narcissistically injured personalities themselves, Post argues that ‘otherwise mature and psychologically healthy individuals may temporarily come to feel overwhelmed and in need of a strong and self-assured leader’ (ibid, p 196).

When the historical moment passes,

’so too does the need. Few would omit Winston Churchill from the pantheon of charismatic leaders ... During the crisis, Churchill’s virtues were exalted and idealized. But when it passed and the need for a strong leader abated, how quickly the British people demystified the previously revered Churchill, focused on his leadership faults, and cast him out of office ... just as the object of individual veneration is inevitably dethroned as his worshippers achieve psychological maturity, so too the idealized leader will be discarded when the moment of historical need passes, as evidenced by the rise and fall of Winston Churchill’.
This particular narrative would seem to reflect Post’s own ideological discourse of democratic individualism and autonomy. The heroic wartime leader Churchill’s losing of the 1945 general election is presented as the archetypal and democratic normalisation of the temporary narcissistic transference between charismatic leader and needy followers. After the traumatic circumstances of war, these inherently healthy followers reassert their individual autonomy by breaking the spell of the charismatic leader, whose sole function was to see them through this existential and indeed psychic trauma.

Post’s political narrative is somewhat reductive reflecting an Americanocentric political discourse in which general elections are more nearly leadership contests. The British political system in which the executive is drawn from the legislature is necessarily a contest between political parties particularly in this less media intense Post War era. When the election took place in May 1945, Churchill had an exceptional 83% personal approval rating in the polls, but had neglected according to Paul Addison, not only domestic politics but also his Conservative Party interests, whilst conducting the War. The Labour Party had tuned into the national mood for social reform, campaigning on ‘full employment, social security and the issue which, according to the opinion polls, was most important in the minds of voters – housing’ (Addison, 2011, p 3).

Again, although Labour won a parliamentary landslide, due to the vagaries of the electoral system, they did so by achieving just over half of the electoral vote and Churchill, who had in fact restored the patriotic credibility of the Conservative Party from the tarnish of appeasement, is thought, according to Addison, to have mitigated the potential scale defeat. Critically, Churchill retained leadership of his party. Even accepting Post’s psychological account of Churchill’s rise and fall in 1945, it would have meant that almost half the British people had remained psychologically overwhelmed by the trauma of war and were still in narcissistic transference with Churchill.

If only a very small proportion of the electorate had changed their vote, then the whole nation, in Post’s reductive analysis would have remained psychologically
immature. Indeed, in 1951 the British electorate decided that the Conservatives were more likely to end post War austerity and they won the election with their leader Churchill once again becoming Prime Minister, the British people having seemingly forgotten the ‘demystified’ Churchill’s leadership flaws (Addison, 2011; Post, 2004). Deploying a reductive conceptualisation of psychoanalytic theory imposes a correspondingly reductive narrative schema on otherwise complex events, as does viewing the psychology of leadership through the prism of another political culture.

12 Destructive and Reparative Charismatic Leaders.

Following Volkan, Post argues that there is a distinction between ‘destructive’ and ‘reparative’ charismatic leaders (Post, 2015). Two leaders with the same psychic deficits can then produce completely differing existential outcomes. Post compares ‘the destructive charismatic as exemplified by Hitler’, with the reparative leadership of Kemal Atatürk which catalysed the ‘reshaping of society in a highly positive and creative fashion’ (Post, 2004, p 198). In his study of Atatürk, Volkan demonstrates ‘that the narcissistically wounded mirror-hungry leader, in projecting his intrapsychic splits on society, may be a force for healing. Such leaders seek a sense of wholeness through establishing a special relationship with their ideal-hungry followers. As they try to heal their own narcissistic wounds through the vehicle of leadership, they may indeed be resolving splits in a wounded society’ (Post, 2004, p 198).

Little was known of Kemal Atatürk’s formative years, except that all ‘three of the previous children born to his parents died at an early age’, and Volkan thus infers that Atatürk was brought up in a house of mourning (Volkan, 2007, p 8; Volkan and Iskowitz, 1984). Because of this, his mother anxious after the loss of the children may have viewed Kemal as a replacement (Volkan, 2007). From his clinical experience, ergo as a form of ‘clinical parallelism’, Volkan proposes that ‘[a]s mother and child interact, what the mother “deposited” in the child, and her perception of him or her as a replacement or link, enters into the child’s own developing identity’ and as well as fearing for him, a ‘mother feels that the surviving child is special, but ‘at the same time may also be distant and unngiving as she struggles to deal with the previous losses the child embodies’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8).
Psychoanalysts have observed, Volkan asserts, ‘that the child in such a relationship in turn may have fantasies of saving the mother from grief ... the child or later an adult may become, through sublimating his or her original wish, truly concerned with the well being of the mother or, more likely, of her symbolic representation’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8). Volkan has it that they had ‘entertained the notion that young Mustafa [Atatürk], as a living link to his dead siblings, may have had early unconscious savior fantasies’, perhaps ‘the foundation of his later strivings to become the savior of his country’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8, emphasis in the original; Volkan and Iskowitz, 1984).

A chain of theorised inferences assessing Atatürk’s personality and his psychological makeup supposedly predicated upon clinical experience, is constructed from the one known fact, that three of Atatürk’s siblings, had died at an early age. Based on this, Volkan further infers a psychologically distant relationship of Atatürk with his mother. This inference then becomes the psychic ‘fact’ behind what Volkan proposes as Atatürk’s self sufficiency, the root of his wishing to save Turkey, the impetus for his joining the army, and that his repeated behaviour in respect of examining and examinations was a symbol of this interpsychic separation from his mother (Volkan, 2007).

Such clinical parallelism was also the methodology of Walter Langer’s (1943) Wartime study of Hitler which similarly encompassed the filling in of the lacunae in biographical information with ‘knowledge gained from clinical experience in dealing with individuals of a similar type’ (Langer, 1943, p 1). Coincidentally then, Adolf Hitler had similarly lost three siblings before he was born, indeed, there were a number of parallels in the backgrounds of the two men. Both were the sons of fathers who were customs officials and devout mothers who intended religious schools for them, both were ideological nationalists who were born outside of their linguistic heartland in polyglot empires, both joined the army as a means of escape and both were deemed by Langer and Volkan to have had ‘saviour complexes’.

From Langer’s clinical experience, he took the exact opposite perspective from Volkan’s hypothesised distant relationship between Atatürk and his mother. On

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12 The original psychobiography The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography (1984), was co-authored with Norman Iskowitz.
Langer’s narrative track of clinical parallelism, he believed that Hitler’s mother Klara because of having lost her previous three children, would on the contrary actually cater to Hitler’s ‘whims, even to the point of spoiling him, and that she was over-protective in her attitude towards him. We may assume that during the first five-years of Adolph’s life, he was the apple of his mother’s eye and that she lavished affection on him’ (Langer, 1943, pp 159-160).

In contradistinction to Volkan’s clinical analysis that a mother having previously lost three children soon after birth, would tend to be ‘distant and ungiving’, Langer's clinical analysis had been that a mother in the same situation would actually bestow excessive love, and in Hitler’s case that there had formed ‘a strong libidinal attachment between mother and son’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8; Langer, 1943, p 160). Langer and his team had further inferred that “[u]nconsciously, all the emotions he had once felt for his mother became transferred to Germany' and that through Hitler’s symbolic transference of affect, his saviour fantasy was also that of saving his mother/Germany but from the brutality of the father, and despite his mother having betrayed him through her sexual acquiescence to the father (Langer, 1943, p 164).

The hypothesised symbolic relationship of Atatürk and his mother however, implies the basis for a psychic formation of altruism. The early ‘fantasies of saving the mother from grief’ become ‘through sublimating his or her original wish, truly concerned with the well being of the mother or, more likely, of her symbolic representation’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8). Whereas, the symbolism deriving out of Hitler’s relationship to his mother was based on vengeful narcissism even illicit sex, in a degraded and unhealthy relationship of existential closeness to the point of incest. Atatürk however, is the saviour of his nation as a consequence of psychic reparation with an emotionally distant mother.

Biography is an unconscious vehicle, Avner Falk believes, for reflecting the biographer’s own emotional narrative and the processes of projection and of identification which may be empathetic or pathological (Falk, 1985). Freud, as Elms points out, had warned equally to avoid ‘pathographizing the psychobiographical subject and avoid idealizing the psychobiographical subject’ (Elms, 2003, p 42, emphasis in the original; Freud, S.E. XI, 1910). In Volkan’s analysis, there is a
seamless link from Atatürk’s Oedipal relationship to his mother through to adult
greatness, in his hagiographic narrative of secular sainthood (Volkan, 2007).

That the pathographic style of analysis may then be used to denigrate or to
idealise the subject, is summed up in Joyce Carol Oates acerbic phrase, that
pathography is ‘hagiography’s diminished and often prurient twin’ (Joyce Oates,
characteristics is inherent in clinical or pathographic analyses, but can be simply
disavowed or indeed, as with Volkan’s analysis of Atatürk, converted into a virtue.
There is no unfolding process of discovering inner psychic reality, because the
determination of pathology and its effects is already a function of the profiler’s
emotional countertransference and or reflecting an ideological discourse.

13 Jerrold Post and Task-Oriented Personality Profiling.

What had greatly enhanced the reputation of Post and his CAPPB
psychodynamically oriented political profiling unit was the profiling of the leaders
Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel, for the 1978 Camp David
peace negotiation. Post and his unit had been tasked to undertake the profiles by
President Jimmy Carter who had presided, and they were much lauded by him
(Post, 1979; Post, 2006b; Omestad, 1994; Emily Eakin, *The New York Times*, 29th
June, 2002). Indeed Omestad quotes former CIA ‘director Stansfield Turner, “Post’s
profiles of Begin and Sadat pleased Carter. That created a demand to continue
doing that”’ (Omestad, 1994, p 111).

In the profile of Begin for example, Post emphasised the ‘oppositionism and
rigidity in his personality’ and the unflinching steadfastness of his belief in ‘Israel’s
historic entitlement to the land of Israel’, but that he was prepared to compromise
outside of this ideological core (Post, 2006a, pp 54, 58). Already a military dictator
who would become ever more repressive, Sadat was given a political psychological
profile which would uncannily resemble Post’s later profile of Saddam Hussein,
minus what would be Saddam’s distinguishing diagnosis of malignant narcissism
(Post, 2006a; Post 1990; Post, 2006b; Ibiblio.org, 2012).

13 Begin was the Israeli Prime Minister and former leader of the Irgun terrorist group.
Sadat and Saddam were seen by Post as being preoccupied with their role in history. Sadat identified himself with the Pharaohs and Saddam with Saladin or Nebuchadnezzar, both seeing themselves as great as the pre-eminent leaders in the Arab World. Both had Messiah complexes but were goal oriented and tactical pragmatists (Post, 1979; Post, 2006b; Post, 1990). Similarly, Sadat and Saddam according to Post both had grandiose personalities, totally identifying themselves with their nations (Post, 2006a). During the Camp David process, Sadat’s grandiosity magnified exponentially, referring for example to Egypt’s economy, as ‘my economy’ (Post, 2006a, p 57). Just as in Saddam’s mind ‘the destiny of Saddam and Iraq are one and indistinguishable’ (Post, 1990, p 4). Both men revelled in the limelight and when Sadat ‘became the object of intense media attention ... it was an explosion of narcissistic supplies, and his extreme self-confidence was magnified to grandiose extremes’ (Post, 2006a, p 57).

Saddam’s narcissistic, grandiose façade masked an underlying insecurity, being at the ‘very center of international attention, his appetite for glory has been stimulated all the more. The glory-seeking Saddam will not easily yield the spotlight of international attention’ (Post, 1990, p 6). Sadat’s anger at negative assessments from his advisors ‘led to a shrinkage of his leadership circle to sycophants who only told Sadat what he wanted to hear’ (Post, 2006a, p 57). Saddam’s ‘sycophantic leadership circle’ was cowed by his brutality (Post, 1990, p 4). For Sadat, this meant that he was ‘increasingly out of touch with political reality’ (Post, 2006a, p 57). Likewise, Saddam ‘is often politically out of touch with reality’ (Post, 1990, p 4).

Both men were prepared to use aggression in pursuit of their goals, Saddam against Iran and Sadat had been a ‘hero in the Arab world for his willingness and initial success in attacking Israel’ (Post, 1990; Post, 2006a). For this instrumental use of aggression, Saddam was conceptualised as having the syndrome of malignant narcissism ‘the personality configuration of the destructive charismatic’ (Post, 1990, p 5). Whereas Sadat’s personality, in Post’s somewhat more benign appraisal was ‘the Barbara Walters Syndrome’ (Post, 2006a, p 57). In Post’s estimation, Sadat’s grandiose personality allowed him to see the ‘big picture’ and develop ‘his innovative foreign policy’, which was obviously advantageous to the interests of the US and Israel, whereas Saddam’s horizons were still parochial.

14 Waters was a famous American television journalist who had interviewed Sadat.
although seen as stretching as far as threatening Israel (Post, 2006a, p 56; Post and Baram, 2003a).

The Camp David profiles are straightforward political psychologies designed for understanding and working empathy, so that the ‘grandiosity’ of Sadat, is reduced to just an amiable metaphor, as the ‘Barbara Walters Syndrome’ (Post, 1979, p 4). However, Saddam is ‘diagnosed’ as demonstrating a ‘malignant narcissism’, in what is very much the pathography of a perceived adversary of America and Israel (Post, 1990; Post, 2006a).

As a postscript, in his profile entitled ‘Sadat’s Nobel Prize Complex’, Post reflected on Sadat’s grandiosity which he felt could be a negotiating leverage for Carter. An intuitively and deceptively simple strategy then suggested itself, that of acceding to Begin’s ideological bottom line whilst making Sadat look good. Begin gained peace, security and kept control over the biblical lands of Israel, and Sadat got the Nobel Prize that he craved (Post, 2006a). The result of Camp David was then in Edward Said’s view, that Sadat became ‘effectively removed from any serious role outside Egypt (the treaty totally isolated him from the Arab world)’ (Said, 1979, p 227). On October 6th 1981, Sadat was assassinated by Muslim Brotherhood offshoots Islamic Jihad and Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya, condemning him for apostasy and for ‘the peace treaty he’d signed with Israel’ (Tristam, 2012, p 2).

14 The Malignant Narcissist as Political Leader.

Citing Volkan’s observation that the narcissistic leader may take advantage of his power by restructuring his reality, he can then, according to Post, sustain his grandiose self-image through the devaluation or even elimination of anyone threatening his fragile self-esteem (Post, 1993). Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin used rage to intimidate their subordinates, whilst Saddam Hussein’s penchant was for killing advisors who criticized him (ibid). What the narcissistic leader says or does is calculated for effect, with his only stable belief being the ‘centrality of the self. What is good for him is good for his country’ (Post, 1993, p 110; emphasis in the original). The narcissist leader genuinely believes he and his country are one and the same (Post, 1993). For Saddam ‘he and Iraq were one and indistinguishable,
and the concept of an Iraq without his leadership was inconceivable for the Iraqi president’ (Post, 1993, p 111).

Post had posited his personality pathology schema of Saddam the malignant narcissist in his 1990 profile presented to the House Armed Services Committee of the US Congress. The Israeli historian Baram\textsuperscript{15} unearthed the remarkable corroborating information about Saddam’s earliest years (Post, 1993; Post and Baram, 2003; Post, 2013). Eight months pregnant with Saddam and destitute after the death of her husband, Saddam’s mother ‘attempted suicide. A Jewish family saved her. Then she tried to abort herself of Saddam, but was again prevented from doing this by her Jewish benefactors. After Saddam was born, on April 28, 1937, his mother did not wish to see him’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 164). Only Baram appears to have had access to the source, which was a Jewish family said to be living anonymously in Israel (WorldNetDaily, 4th of March 2003; Tamar Miller and Tamar Morad, The Boston Globe, the 27th of October, 2002).

Following this single source of evidence, the origins of Saddam’s wounded self could argue Post, be traced back to the womb as his mother attempted to abort the future Saddam:

‘It is difficult to imagine a more traumatic early childhood. The first years of life are of crucial importance to developing healthy self-esteem and confidence, a reflection of the adoration of the mother for her newborn. Saddam was deprived of this “mirroring.” Most individuals so wounded would be deeply scarred, unable to function effectively as adults ...

To put the above into psychoanalytic perspective, using the self psychology framework of Heinz Kohut, Saddam had experienced major traumas during his earlier years, producing a profoundly wounded self, with major damage to his self-esteem’

(Post, 2013, p 479).

The development of a pathological ‘grandiose self’ is, as Post describes Kernberg’s formulation, that of extreme grandiosity, ‘associated with primitive and defective superego formation’, leading to the formation of a dangerous personality

\textsuperscript{15} Baram was Post’s co-author in the 2003 profile ‘Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam’.
disorder, ‘malignant narcissism’ (Post, 1993, p 114). The components which make up Kernberg’s syndrome of malignant narcissism, as Post ascribes them to Saddam, are a ‘grandiose narcissism with such extreme self-absorption that there is an incapacity to empathize with the pain or suffering of others’, a ‘defective superego or conscience’ along with an unconstrained ego syntonic aggression for his own purposes, and a paranoid outlook which justifies this boundless aggression (Post, 1993, p 114).

When the grandiose façade is narcissistically wounded, it triggers, according to Post, an intense narcissistic rage and a need for revenge, with the target of that aggression as the narcissistically perceived persecutor. The narcissist’s rage is then self righteous and entitled, but underlying the rage is the shame and humiliation over the perceived wrong which is assuaged by revenge. Post posits the possibility that Saddam’s ‘motive in invading Kuwait involved retaliation for the diplomatic “back of the hand” Kuwait dealt to Saddam, refusing even to discuss his grievances over territorial and economic disputes’ (Post, 1993, p 114).

The ‘primary loyalty of narcissists is to themselves’, and as an indicator of Saddam’s malignant narcissism, Post had maintained that there was ‘no evidence he is constrained by conscience; his only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein’ (Post, 1990, p 5). Post would subsequently, in reconciliation of his failed 1990 prediction that Saddam would withdraw from Kuwait, remark that, ‘Saddam had, in effect, painted himself into a corner’, becoming so ‘absolutist in his commitment to the Palestinian cause, to not yielding even partially over Kuwait until there was justice for the Palestinian people’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 182). It was then ‘extremely difficult for him to reverse himself without being dishonored’ (ibid; Post, 1990). Staying loyal out of a sense of honour seems perfectly reasonable, but whatever way Saddam’s motives are construed for such loyalty, he did remain loyal to the Palestinians.

Indeed, in the view of Saddam’s biographers such as Cockburn and Cockburn (1999), loyalty was intrinsic to Saddam’s emotional and cultural matrix. That Saddam particularly relied on the reciprocal loyalty of ‘his halfbrothers - Barzan, Sabawi, and Watban - and his cousins, like Ali Hassan al-Majid, to stock the senior ranks of his regime argue that his inner family was always tightly knit against the outside world, whatever its inner tensions’ (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999, p 68). From a cultural perspective, the ‘strength of Saddam’s family and clan connections
matter because he was born into a tribal society. He has maintained many of its characteristics throughout his life. It was a world of intense loyalties within the clan, but cruel and hostile to outsiders’ (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999, p 68; Claypool, 1993).

A failure to take such cultural factors into account is according to Richard Omestad, not only a complaint about Post’s profile, but is seen as an enduring deficiency of profiling in general. Indeed Omestad points to Volkan, who considered ‘that some of Hussein’s traits - typed by Post as “malignant narcissism” - could reflect instead the characteristics of Arab nationalism’ (Omestad, 1994, p 119). Although Post claims to mitigate this cultural deficit by involving regional specialists, if they have the same ideological perspective, any particular cultural awareness will simply be reconciled within the discursive imperative. From a pragmatic perspective, the high level Israeli analyst Ami Ayolon summarises it that, “there is no rational answer” to Saddam’s thinking, as “he thinks in another way. If we look at him through Western eyes, with Western values, he is impossible to comprehend” (Ami Ayolon, quoted in, Seliktar and Dutter, 2009, p 283).

As opposed to Post’s personological perspective, this reflects the argument that Saddam’s sense of loyalty was characterological, that is, a differential character trait derived developmentally within the family. Indeed, Post’s 2003 co-author Baram, points out that, Saddam “is also very loyal and remembers favors - even from a Jew.” A Baghdadi Jewish merchant now living in Israel told Baram of languishing in jail for ten years until Saddam, touring the prison to inspect “the daily catch,” recognized him as a man who had given him spare change in his street-kid days, and set him free’ (Tamar Miller and Tamar Morad, The Boston Globe, the 27th of October, 2002).

This issue particularly problematises the more reductive focus of personality pathology profiling and emphasises a personological versus characterological distinction which is identified by this thesis. Individuals may possess character traits which are seemingly contrary to their putative ‘core’ personality. Thus, it is in practical terms impossible to accommodate character nuances theoretically or ideologically in a profile or a psychobiography, predicated on a particular personological personality pathology schema. The behaviour of an individual may appear completely contrary to a putative personality organisation, but be perfectly
consistent with a differential character trait. So that Saddam Hussein cannot in Post’s schema, be a malignant narcissist loyal only to himself and show loyalty to others.

As commensurate with his diagnosis, Post unreservedly accepts a traumatic infancy for Saddam and a failure to bond with his mother, ignoring a biographical strand that ‘Saddam’s bond with his mother Sabha was particularly deep ... Throughout her life, Saddam would visit Sabha as often as he could. When she died in 1982, Saddam commissioned a huge tomb for her in Tikrit, commemorating her as the Mother of Militants’ (Balaghi, 2006, p 3). Objectively verifiable accounts become elusive as events of Saddam’s early life merge with his politically constructed persona, wherein much was ‘made of his modest origins and his struggles as a young, orphaned peasant boy. Saddam’s peasant upbringing was used to humanize his political rhetoric and reflect his empathy for the struggling common man’ (Balaghi, 2006, p 2).

Any number of contradictory but plausible childhood scenarios could have been etched for Saddam. Cockburn and Cockburn argue that the picture of a deprived childhood was one later painted by Saddam, but that this was again subverted by his critics who ‘stressed early traumas to prove that he came from a dysfunctional family’ (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999, p 68).

There are wholly negative biographies of Saddam, in particular that of Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi’s 1991 Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (1991). Although Post doesn’t actually cite his sources, his profile of Saddam Hussein is linked by being narrated in the same manner, with the same evidence base, the same factual errors and skewed interpretations, with both accounts striving ‘to present the worst possible interpretation of Hussein’s actions throughout his career’ (Ghadban, 1992, p 785; Karsh and Rautsi, 2002/1991; Post and Baram, 2003). This is not to say that Karsh and Rautsi, and indeed Post, are wrong, but to emphasise that notwithstanding the conceptual theory or clinical expertise the psychobiographer brings to his analysis, his relationship is with his data source, not his subject.

15 Saddam Hussein and the Evolution of a Profile.
It was on the strength of his 1990 profile of Saddam extensively featured in the media, that Post had been invited to testify before the US congressional House Armed Services Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, both of which were holding hearings on the 1990 Gulf crisis (Omestad, 1994; Post, 1990). Indeed, both Omestad and Emily Eakin of the *New York Times* report accounts that ‘the psychological profile of Saddam Hussein that Dr. Post presented to members of Congress in 1990 was what convinced previously reluctant lawmakers to support the Persian Gulf war’ (Emily Eakin, *The New York Times*, 29th June, 2002; Omestad, 1994).

In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Post claimed that, ‘decision makers’ were being misled ‘into believing he [Saddam] is unpredictable when in fact he is not’ (Post, 1990, pp 1). Indeed, if aggression were to prove counterproductive, Saddam ‘has shown a pattern of reversing his course’ with ‘a remarkable capacity to find face saving justification’ (Post, 1990, pp 4, 6). What particularly struck readers, was the ‘focus on Hussein’s rapid reversal ... Most saw Post’s profile as strengthening the case for believing that Hussein would again back down at the last moment. Of course, he did not’ (Omestad, 1991, p 113).

In a 2013 reassessment of the flawed assessment of the 1990 profile Post writes that, ‘it was emphasized that Saddam considered himself a “revolutionary pragmatist” and that he had in the past reversed himself. But there were two conditions that had to be satisfied for Saddam to reverse himself and withdraw from Kuwait: he must be able to save face, and he must be assured that his power would be preserved. As the deadline approached, George H. W. Bush, at a press conference, pounded on the table as he declared: “There will be no face saving!” The story leaked from a general (who was subsequently forced to retire) concerning contingency plans to eliminate Saddam and effect a regime change. Thus the two conditions necessary to permit Saddam to reverse himself were not met’ (Post, 2013, p 480).

President George H.W. Bush had given his press conference on the 30th November 1990, with Post giving his address to the House Armed Services Committee on the 5th and the Foreign Affairs Committee on 12th December (George H.W. Bush, Presidential News Conference 30th November, 1990; Post, 1990). Any
claim that the profile was overtaken by these subsequent events is undermined because the events had actually occurred prior.

Again, in his 2003 justification of the failed prediction, Post had it that ‘Saddam may well have heard President Bush’s Western words of intent through a Middle Eastern filter and calculated that he was bluffing. It is also possible he downgraded the magnitude of the threat, likening the threatened response to the characteristic Arab hyperbole’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 181). In 2003, Post is arguing that Saddam did not change his course because he believed that his regime was perfectly safe in thinking that President Bush was bluffing, and in 2013 Post is arguing that he did not change his course believing that he was in mortal danger because there were definite plans to effect a regime change.

In the run up to the 2003 conflict, it was ‘through Jerrold Post, [that] we do more or less know what the Bush administration expects of Saddam Hussein’ (Julian Borger, The Guardian, Thursday the 14th of November, 2002; Post and Baram, 2003). The BBC similarly reported that; ‘Now US Government officials are calling on Dr Post to guide them in their decisions as they engage Iraq in a high-rolling game of cat and mouse, which could be the difference between war or peace’ (BBC News, 15th November 2002).

Saddam’s motivating impetus in the 2003 crisis was according to Post, ‘a psychological template of compensatory grandiosity, as if to vow, “Never again, never again shall I submit to superior force.” This was the developmental psychological path Saddam followed’ (Post and Baram, 2003a, p 164). For Saddam ‘to be understood to have nuclear weapons, and WMD in general, was considered important. Major leaders have major league weapons. Moreover, for a person with tremendous insecurities as Saddam, these weapons can offer security that cannot be matched by any other’ (Post and Baram, 2003a, p 209).

As Borger recounts, Saddam would ‘never give up his arsenal of mass destruction, which Post says are essential to his self-image as a world class leader. “Big boys have big toys,” as he puts it. “Without the weapons, he’s nothing.”’ (Post reported by Julian Borger, The Guardian, 14th of November 2002). Saddam threatens ‘Israel with annihilation (“I shall burn half of Israel”), unthinkable without weapons of mass destruction. There is every reason to believe that, if
Saddam ever had nuclear weapons to match those of Israel, he would have been rattling them and offering every Arab and Islamic State that would request his protection the Iraqi nuclear umbrella’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 209). Saddam would not hesitate to ‘order the use of chemical and biological weapons against the invading troops and against Israel’ (Post reported by Julian Borger, The Guardian, 14th of November, 2002).

Baram, Post’s co-author in the 2003 profile, would later admit to journalist Orly Hapern, that ‘[i]f I knew then what I know today, I would not have recommended going to war, because Saddam was far less dangerous than I thought’ (Orly Halpern, forward.com, January the 5th 2007). From an Arab perspective at the time, the Middle East commentator Adel Darwish, believed that it was not a preoccupation with Saladin and Nebuchadnezzar but rather Saddam’s obsession with the central character and storyline of The Godfather, ‘on which he modelled many of his tactical moves later’ (Adel Darwish, Middle East Analyst, 6th of December, 2002). Based on this insight, Darwish has it that ‘[c]ontrary to Dr Post’s assessment, Saddam will give up his war toys. There is a realistic possibility that Hans Blix [the UN weapons inspector] would, genuinely, report in February that he has found nothing suspicious’ (ibid).

Rather than Post’s claim that Saddam could not face the humiliation [of giving up his WMD], in line with the ‘live to fight another day tactics’ of the ‘Godfather’, a sanctions compliant Saddam ‘might come out deranged, and weakened, humiliated but still very much in control of Iraq’ (Adel Darwish, Middle East Analyst, 6th of December, 2002). As opposed to what the thesis argues was Post’s ideologically predicated assessment of a narcissistic Saddam who could not face humiliation, Darwish proposes that Saddam would readily suffer such narcissistic injuries to his ego, in order to remain in power.

In the 2013 reassessment of the flawed 2003 profile, Post argues that one of the principal reasons given by President George W Bush for the 2003 war was that ‘Saddam was developing a nuclear capability and would endanger the United States by providing a weapon of mass destruction to terrorists’ (Post, 2013, p 481). The discursive ploy of this reassessment is that Saddam would not make such a weapon available to terrorists, because ‘analysis based on his political personality profile made clear that this was inconceivable. Saddam was a prudent
decisionmaker, with a fixed address, and would never give up control of a nuclear weapon. He knew that if the provenance of such a weapon were traced back to Iraq, his country would be incinerated’ (Post, 2013, p 481, my emphasis). Post’s retrospective prediction or hindsight bias stemming from the 2003 profile has become that, Saddam would never give up control of his WMD. Post’s position is that the rational Saddam would not risk incineration by allowing a third party to use his WMD. However, Post also posits that the same Saddam, would be prepared to offer a nuclear umbrella to all and sundry third parties and attempt to destroy Israel himself, with the then certainty, rather than risk, of incineration.

In a later postscript to his 2003 profile Post had said, that ‘[i]t was thought that Saddam would not go down to the last flaming bunker if he had a way out, but that he could have been extremely dangerous and might have stopped at nothing if he was backed into a corner, if he believed his very survival as a world-class political actor was threatened. It was believed that Saddam could have responded with unrestrained aggression, ordering the use of whatever weapons and resources were at his disposal, in what would surely be a tragic and bloody final act’, that whatever else, he “will not go gentle into that good night” (Post and Baram, 2003, p 216; Post, 2006d, p 365). Going gently into the good night is exactly what Saddam did do, and he was later found hiding in a hole in the ground.

16 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the principle psychoanalytic theories underlying personological, adversarial ‘at a distance’ profiling, most notably deployed by Jerrold Post. There was description of how object relations infused by an ahistorical Kleinian notion of paranoia became influential in American psychoanalysis. This was a critical formulation for personality theorists, because determined by the ego defences of splitting and projection, group paranoia, hatred and aggression could be explained as being unprovoked by external causation.

Paranoid projections were described as the psychic mechanism underlying the grandiose façade of narcissistic leaders. These leaders in Wilfred Bion’s conceptualisation reflect back the paranoid wishes of their followers in seeking out enemies. The clinical developments in Post War America, representing the turn to narcissism inherent in Heinz Kohut’s phenomenological self psychology were
outlined. Pathological functioning due to the deficits in the interpersonal relationships of early childhood resulting in narcissistic injury was, the thesis argued, a universal in the subject formation of personological, personality pathology profiling.

The seemingly 'successful' profiles of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin had given Post a measure of institutional authority. The notoriety of his profile of Saddam Hussein had brought a number of psychoanalytic concepts, in particular paranoid functioning and the notion of malignant narcissism, to public attention. The thesis argues that psychoanalytic diagnoses such as Post’s pathologising of Saddam Hussein are effectively deployed as scientific validation of political/ideological positions. The next chapter seeks to demonstrate how psychoanalysis may be integrated with a particular ideological stance and then deployed in open polemics.
CHAPTER SEVEN:

PSYCHO-CULTURAL CRITIQUES AND IDEOLOGICAL POLEMICS.
1 Introduction.

This chapter focuses on a critique of the way psychoanalysts who have adopted a personality pathology approach, elide ideological imperatives with culturally oriented psychoanalytic/psycho-cultural, analyses. Individual psychic trauma is extrapolated to a group and indeed culture wide level. Jerrold Post argues that the inherently obstructive personality of Yasser Arafat reflects a wilful Palestinian refusal to come to terms with reality thus perpetuating terrorism. Nancy Kobrin argues that the envy deriving out of this unrealistic world view, coupled with degenerate child rearing practices, makes the Arab, and indeed Muslim world in general, prone to terrorism.

The chapter makes the argument that to attribute a personality formation much less a particular developmental trajectory for an imperfectly definable political concept such as the ‘terrorist’ is a category error. As such, the evidence adduced in support of any particular conceptualisation of such a terrorist personality or culture will necessarily be flawed. Unlike individual psychobiography where an analysis may be theoretically and clinically sound, irrespective of the existential evidence, cultural psychobiography is bespoke and relies firmly on its cultural authenticity. Thus, bespoke cultural evidence is then critiqued in some detail.

Flawed evidence the chapter will demonstrate, nonetheless becomes part of the accepted psychoanalytic literature. In turn, this ‘evidence’ becomes the basis for further speculation, thus proving itself as a circular argument. Becoming part of the literature, these reified ideological assumptions are then re-adduced as evidence determining clinically oriented psychoanalytic assumptions of terrorism. The difficulties of the psychoanalytic analyses of non-western cultures are examined, and how psychoanalysis may be deployed in open cultural polemics, particularly in respect of a denigration of Islamic societies. In their analyses, Vamik Volkan (1997) argues that, terrorist leaders exhibit the same pathological formation of malignant narcissism as serial killers, and Kobrin (2010), takes the psychology of Al Qaeda as reflecting that of a serial killer.

The serial killer, it is posited by this thesis, does have a discernible personality formation and that it corresponds with personality pathology ascriptions. What
distinguishes the serial killer from terrorist multiple killers, is their particular fantasy constellations. The serial killer has an individual fantasy script whereas the terrorist is part of a collective phantasy or ideology. In this way, otherwise psychologically ‘normal’ individuals may adhere to a violent revolutionary ideology. Whilst part of a revolutionary group, these otherwise normal individuals may commit acts of terrorism, and the thesis discusses a psychoanalytic understanding of the psychic mechanisms such as brutalising socialisation and depersonalisation, which may facilitate this.

2 A Psychoanalytic Discourse of Political Terrorism.

A normative psychoanalytic paradigm of terrorism is that having suffered early traumatic psychic injuries and split off their cultural idealisations, individuals adopt fundamentalist ideologies deliberately antagonistic to the dominant establishment group or culture and then regress into the violence represented by terrorism (Kernberg, 2003). Rejected and traumatised themselves, the leadership of the terrorist group often present with the ‘syndrome of malignant narcissism, individuals stemming from an elitist class within which they felt rejected or traumatized’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 958). These leaders then gather their followers from the ‘disadvantaged or traumatized social group’ (ibid).

The thesis argument is that Otto Kernberg conflates what may actually be a rational cause of conflict arising from a group being disadvantaged and traumatised, with a narcissistic pathology. As a result, the disadvantaged, traumatised group is regarded as turning to terrorism because of pathology and not their cause. The conflict itself is then seen as a pathological response by the group and terrorism as the manifestation of this pathology. The cause itself is then discounted as being irrational and motivated by internal pathological psychic drivers rather than a legitimate or in any event existential, *casus belli*.

The influential book *Terrorism: How the West can Win* (1986), edited by future Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, reflects the US and Israeli governmental positions on terrorist motivation. The root cause of terrorism according to Netanyahu, resided ‘not in grievances but in a disposition toward unbridled violence. This can be traced to a world view which asserts that certain
ideological and religious goals justify, indeed demand, the shedding of all moral inhibitions. In this context, the observation that the root cause of terrorism is terrorists is more than a tautology’ (Netanyahu, 1986b, p 204; my Italics). Post has it that the ‘cause is not the cause’ of terrorism, and his similarly tautological aphorism is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism’ (Post, 1998, p 35, emphasis in the original).

Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat is diagnosed by Post as having an inherently obstructive ‘one-dimensional personality’ as a ‘result of an exclusive preoccupation with the Palestinian issue which is expressed in a narrow perspective on a range of subjects (Kimhi, Even and Post, 2001, p 26). Arafat’s personality formation is ascribed as having a number of ‘characteristic features of the paranoid personality ... the borderline personality ... the narcissistic personality’ (Kimhi, Even and Post, 2001, pp 25, 26). The nature of both the individual leader’s and his group’s collective psyche, meant that the Palestinian people were doomed to repeated and wilful self-inflicted psychic failure and political defeat (Post, 1986; Post, 1998).

This in turn, Post argued, needed an enemy to blame, and that enemy was Israel. As blame had found its outlet in terrorism, this then became an end it itself. The continuing “unity of purpose” of Palestinian terrorism finds ‘its roots in one person: Yasser Arafat ... who provided the “sense making”, unifying explanation for their difficulties’ (Post, 2007b, p 29). The deep seated intergenerational psychopolitics of hatred amongst Palestinian terrorists inspired ‘by the model of Yasser Arafat, argue for continuation of Palestinian/Israeli hatred and perpetuation of the violent struggle’ (Post, 2007b, p 37).

The perpetuation of the Palestinian/Israeli struggle was determined by the psychology of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Arafat, because ‘[i]t[j]o succeed in achieving its espoused cause would threaten the goal of survival’ (Post, 1998, p 38). Whenever the possibility of achieving ‘a partial territorial solution to the Palestinian problem’, which would have meant divesting himself of his radical left wing, Arafat yielded to the ‘radical left, who were committed to winning their struggle through violence. The espoused cause – a Palestinian homeland - did not seem to be the PLO’s primary goal’ (Post, 1998, pp 37-38).
A ‘partial territorial solution’ may not have been ideologically acceptable to the Palestinian people, and that it might not have been politically possible for Arafat to divest himself of his left wing. In Post’s analysis, there is a firm correspondence between a normative, indeed hegemonic value judgement of the PLO’s political rationale, and his diagnosis of Arafat’s supposedly pathological and obstructive personality. The continued Palestinian struggle is reduced, in Post’s ahistorical notion of the ‘threat of success’, to the simple mechanism of a repetition compulsion (Post, 1998, p 37). Freud notes of repetition compulsion, that there are people ‘in whose lives the same reactions are perpetually being repeated uncorrected, to their own detriment, or others who seem to be pursued by a relentless fate, though closer investigation teaches us that they are unwittingly bringing this fate on themselves. In such cases we attribute a ‘Daemonic’ character to the compulsion to repeat’ (Freud, 2001/1933, XXII, pp 106-107).

Politically this repeated ‘Daemonic’ sabotaging of one’s own interests is seen, as former Israeli Foreign Minister Aba Eban famously put it, that the ‘Palestinians never miss a chance to miss a chance’ (Aba Eban, quoted by Carlo Strenger, The Guardian, 30th of December, 2008). The repetition in this case continuing terrorism becomes the goal in itself. Following Post, Vamik Volkan similarly argues that, ‘faced with the opportunity to negotiate a settlement with a target group, a terrorist may increase his demands and intensify his violence’ (Volkan, 1998, p 163). Similarly, ‘when Israelis and Palestinians were making genuine progress toward peaceful coexistence, Hamas engineered a series of suicide bomb attacks in Israel. For Hamas, terrorism is an end in itself’ (ibid, p 160).

Netanyahu, according to his own ideological discourse of terrorism, writes that the ‘terrorist objective, of course, is not negotiation but capitulation’ (Netanyahu, 1986b, pp 201-2). Failing to deal with terrorism militarily, ‘usually increases terrorist action to a point where terrorist action becomes so outrageous that the society threatened by it reacts strongly, and usually manages to defeat terrorism. Efforts to compromise with terrorist organizations usually fail: at the bottom, compromise and conciliation are anathema to the terrorists because they threaten the very basis of their ideological commitment’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 964). Kernberg contends that the terrorist cannot be reasoned with, citing how, in the ‘pseudo-rationality of the terrorist, Volkan has explored how, behind the imperviousness to ordinary logic, one typically finds an ideology that permits no questioning and,
tested regarding its internal logic, reveals both an underlying confusion as well as the total inability to negotiate that confusion rationally’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 957).

As the peace processes, of South Africa and Northern Ireland demonstrate, and as was known to Kernberg at the time of writing, terrorists can compromise and conciliate. Their ideological commitment is to a cause, not simply or solely the perpetuation of a struggle. Kernberg is again conflating an ideological with a psychological rationale, and his analysis reflects the political position of governments which have no intention of negotiating with what they designate as terrorists.

Netanyahu’s position is an outright denial that terrorism results from ‘certain “root causes,” such as poverty, political oppression, denial of national aspirations, etc. But terrorism is not an automatic result of anything. It is a choice, an evil choice’ (Netanyahu, 1986b, p 203). At the core of Post’s psychic schema, the individual unable to face his own inadequacies chooses terrorism, because he ‘needs a target to blame and attack for his own inner weaknesses and inadequacies.

Such individuals find the polarizing, absolutist rhetoric of terrorism extremely attractive. “It’s not us - it’s them. They are the cause of our problems” provides a psychologically satisfying explanation for what has gone wrong in their lives’ (Post, 2004, p 129). The premise of the personality pathology theory of terrorism is that whatever the socio-political conditions, terrorism is deemed to be a ‘pathological’ ergo evil, choice of the individual.

3 The Ideological Determinants and Clinical Psychoanalytic Theorisation.

Psychoanalytic theorists such as Salman Akhtar evolve clinical psychoanalytic adaptations from what is essentially ideological personality pathology perspective. As the terrorist organization in this formulation is established on the principle of the externalization and perpetuation of one’s own victimhood, it inherently cannot, ‘afford to succeed in its surface agenda. If the group were to succeed, it would no longer be needed. Its projectively buttressed identity would collapse and the pain of its own suffering would insist on being recognized
and psychically metabolized. Because the terrorist leader cannot tolerate such a depressive crisis, he unconsciously aims for the impossible.\textsuperscript{1,13} The resulting failure to achieve the officially stated goal is unconsciously desired because it facilitates the continued externalization of the victimized aspects of the individual and group self.

(Akhtar\textsuperscript{16}, 1999, p 352).

Along with incorporating Post’s (1998) notion of the threat of success, Akhtar’s understanding of victimisation has been taken from Volkan’s analysis in \textit{Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism} (1998/1997). In turn taken from political psychologist Jeanne Knutson’s unpublished research, Volkan claims that Knutson had conducted hundreds of interviews with an unknown number of Northern Irish terrorist leaders, and that they had ‘all been victims of terror themselves, all had experienced violations of their personal boundaries themselves’ (Volkan, 1998/1997, p 160). Volkan does not give any reference for this claim nor does he include Knutson in his bibliography. Elsewhere Knutson’s extensive published research does lead her to conclude that the catalyst for taking up a terrorist identity, was ‘a severe life disappointment (or series of disappointments) which dramatically shifts the balance of expectations away from other available identities’ (Knutson, 1981, p 115). Such disappointments include the ‘disregard of a husband’, and ‘failure of the entrance examinations’ to university (ibid). Knutson is not talking about violent traumas, early traumatogenic object relating or particular developmental trajectories but about the ongoing exigencies in life.

Volkan claims that the personal identity problems of terrorist leaders, begin during their developmental years, such that ‘[m]any experience violations of their personal boundaries in the form of beatings by parents, incest, or other such events’ (Volkan, 1998/1997, p161). These findings are from CSMHI (The Center for the Study of the Mind and Human Interaction) an organisation founded by Volkan, and are simply a repeat of the same unsupported proposition, made in his article ‘The Psychodynamics of Ethnic Terrorism’ (1995) (co-authored with Max Harris). Again, without giving a reference or being included in his bibliography (although on

a related topic in a 1995 article Volkan refers to a ‘personal communication’), Volkan cites Katherine Kennedy, an ‘international relations specialist’, as interviewing twenty three Northern Irish ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’ who had all ‘experienced traumas in their formative years’ (Volkan, 1998/1997, p 161; Volkan and Harris, 1995).

Also presented as an evidence backed conceptualisation, although again only deriving from claims in the same 1995 article co-authored with Harris, Volkan has it that ‘childhood victimization, of course, need not be physical; it can include being abandoned by a mother at an early age, disappointment over being let down by loved ones, a deep sense of personal failure following parental divorce, or rejection by peer groups … Their reactions to these personal traumas later dovetail with their victimization by an enemy group’ (Volkan, 1998/1997, p 161; my italics). This notion of ‘dovetailing’ creates the discursive impression that these actually disparate and uncorroborated findings form part of an integrated research narrative, incorporating all of the ‘research subjects’.

Taking Volkan’s discursive conflation as the actual body of Knutson’s evidence, Timothy Gallimore states that

‘Jeanne Knutson found that “all had been victims of terror themselves, all had experienced violations of their personal boundaries that damaged or destroyed their faith in personal safety” (Volkan, 1998/1997, p 160). These violations occurred in beatings or abandonment by parents, parental divorce, and incest or other sexual abuse, and rejection by peer groups. The common element among all these terrorists was the experience of personal trauma during their formative years’

(Gallimore, 2004, p 78).

Developing from this, Gallimore continues that

‘the terrorist personality appears to develop from a painful and dysfunctional childhood in which the individual forms personality and identity disorders. The terrorist responds to his personal identity problems and attempts to strengthen his troubled internal sense of self by seeking power to hurt and
by expressing an entitlement to power. These psychologically damaged individuals seek power and sanction for their violent actions through membership in groups and organizations that give them a sense of shared identity in an attempt to replace their flawed personal identity’

(Gallimore, 2004, p 78).

Volkan’s conflation of two separate but only putative ‘findings’ of experiencing different ‘violations of personal boundaries’ with his own observations, is now synthesised as Gallimore’s clinical hypothesis’. By the time the discursive conflation reaches Tod Schneider, it has become ‘Jeanne Knutson interviewed hundreds of Northern Ireland terrorist leaders and found they had all been brutalized in their childhoods, often by their parents’ (Schneider, 2002, p 27).

Most of the major players in a terrorist organization are, then, according to Akhtar:

‘themselves, deeply traumatized individuals. As children, they suffered chronic physical abuse and profound emotional humiliation. The “safety feeling,” which is necessary for healthy psychic growth, was thus violated. They grew up mistrusting others, loathing passivity, and dreading the recurrence of a violation of their psychophysical boundaries. “At the base, this intense anxiety over future loss is driven by the semiconscious inner knowledge that passivity ensures victimization.”[Volkan, 1997] To eliminate this fear, such individuals feel the need to “kill off” their view of themselves as victims. One way to accomplish this is to turn passivity into activity, masochism into sadism, and victimhood into victimizing others. Hatred and violent tendencies toward others thus develop. Devaluing others buttresses fragile self-esteem. The resulting “malignant narcissism” [Kernberg, 1984] renders mute the voice of reason and morality. Sociopathic behavior and outright cruelty are thus justified. The narrowed cognition characteristic of paranoid mentality, along with a thin patina of political rationalization, gives a gloss of logic to the entire psychic organization’

Representing a concise and abstracted (ergo, seemingly apolitical) psychoanalytic analysis, Akhtar’s conceptualisation of terrorism is recycled as the psychoanalytic discourse of terrorism. For example, in elucidating ‘the psychoanalytic dimension’ of terrorism, Michiko Shimokobe cites Akhtar that, ‘[a]ccording to recent psychoanalytic insight into terrorism ... terrorists are deeply traumatized individuals who have “suffered chronic physical abuse and profound emotional humiliation” (Akhtar 90). Their strongest emotional feeling is not their retrospective psychological pain but the perspective fear that they might lose something essential to their physical and psychological identities. Passivity is what they loath most ... Terrorists are victimized beforehand and they attempt to turn their helpless passivity into a terrorizing activity’ (Shimokobe, 2013, p 9). Shimokobe’s presentation gives an ongoing synthesising clinical abstraction of this ideological, indeed politically grounded, pathologising discourse.

One of the principle contentions of the personality pathology paradigm was predicated on Kernberg’s theorisation of the traumatic genesis of borderline personality and malignant narcissism. Post and Volkan17, whose training ‘reflects the theoretical perspectives of Otto Kernberg’, infer such trauma on the basis of Kernberg’s theorisation (Post, 2013, p 482). It is ironic then that in citing Post and Volkan, Kernberg completes the circularity of the personality pathology argument. Post and Volkan make the presumption of particularly childhood trauma, and then Kernberg in his exposition of terrorism takes this presumption as actual evidence, stating that the ‘literature on the personality features of individual terrorists frequently describes a history of severe trauma, a sense of inferiority or abandonment in infancy and childhood compensated later on by an aggressive self-affirmation and the transformation of a sense of victimization into an ideologically rationalized passion for sadistic revenge as the redress of earlier grievances. (Post, 2001; Volkan, 2001a, 2001b)’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 957).

4 Psychoanalysts and Overt Ideological Polemics.

Inherent to Kernberg’s adaptation of the pathologising discourse is the notion that ‘the development of normal ego identity’ is dependent on an essentially ‘liberal’ social system (Kernberg, 2003, p 959). The current violent reaction against Western

17 Volkan was trained at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute.
hegemony by militant Islam is, according to Robins and Post, ‘embraced by a significant section of the Muslim political community. There are many reasons for this readiness to use violence, and a paranoid worldview is one of them’ (Robins and Post, 1997, p 158). Following Robins and Post’s contention that humiliating defeat by the Jews was seen by many devout Muslims as a punishment from God, Joseph Berke and Stanley Schneider posit that the ‘Muslim way of life turned into sullen resentment, and then shattering rage, both narcissistic and nationalistic’ (Berke and Schneider, 2006, p 1; Robins and Post, 1997).

This reflects a strand of cultural psychobiographic analyses which argues that there is a propensity, indeed the inevitability for terrorism embedded within the Muslim psyche. One significant cultural analysis promoting this view is from Kobrin, a psychoanalyst and psychohistorian trained at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis and a U.S counterterrorism ‘expert’ whose work has been used by the U.S. military since 2002 ‘in the war on terrorism’ (Kobrin, 2010, p xxi; Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin - Israel/LinkedIn, 2014a). Kobrin is a fellow of the American Center for Democracy (ACD) which ‘is dedicated to exposing and monitoring non-traditional threats to U.S. political and economic freedoms and its national security from within and without ... [ACD identifies] strategies used by radical regimes and movements to subvert America’s Judeo-Christian values, Constitutional rights and political and economic systems’ (ACD, 2015).

Under the aegis of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), fuses ‘intelligence and operational analysis that support planning and operations from tactical through strategic levels’ (JIEDDO, LinkedIn, 08/04/2015). Its reports include intelligence on the ‘social networks that may provide insight into how insurgent groups communicate and relate to their members, and other technical and cultural phenomena’ (McLean and Goodrich, 2008, p i). Included in such material for Report 21 was a symposium on ‘Child Suicide Bombers’ organised by Jamie Glazov for Frontpagemag.com on the 11th of April, 2008. Described as a ‘psycho-analyst, Arabist, and counter-terrorism expert’, the lead speaker was Kobrin (Jamie Glazov Frontpagemag.com, 11th of April, 2008, p 53).

Arab Muslim culture as a whole, in Kobrin’s overarching psycho-cultural analysis, is seen as deploying the primitive ego defences of splitting and projection.
The mass rallies of Hamas or Hezbollah are ‘of enraged males and the absence of females, it is a literal and concrete representation of displaced rage from their early childhoods outwards on to an enemy, yet the true enemy has been the war within themselves all along. They learn to project outwards and thereby never have to assume responsibility’ (Kobrin, 2008, p 60).

Kobrin’s psycho-cultural adaptation relies on a core of what the thesis has identified as personological psychobiography. This relates problematic personality development to primitive pre-Oedipal rage, and deploying the ego defences of splitting and projection in order to compensate for deficits in early object relating. To alleviate the urges and desires which become unbearable, the suicide bomber according to Kobrin employs

‘the unconscious defense mechanism of dual protective identification: the split-off bad and unwanted parts of the self are projected on to the hated, evil other in a reciprocal way, recycling an unending hatred and violence with moments of perverse pleasure in the sadomasochistic glue of traumatic bonding. What one hates most about ones self is split off, projected on to the other, and uncannily not recognized. Then the other is attacked over it. The murderous rage against the other is thus really against the other of the self, which has been disavowed, or ones persecutory internal objects. The dynamic harks back to a specific dimension of the first relationship in life with the mother - namely, the early maternal fusion. Melanie Klein described the paranoid-schizoid experiences of the infant vacillating between eros and violence as well as between merger and separation. Today we speak in terms of maternal attachment problems - especially those that are disorganized and chaotic - about a kind of traumatic bonding’

(Kobrin, 2010, p 58).

Personality is ‘essentially “set in cement” by age three’, so that in ‘not developing empathy, usually something that occurs between the mother and the baby in their relational bond’, the inclination toward violence is also ‘in place developmentally by age three’ (Kobrin, interview with Reza Akhlaghi in Foreign Policy Association, February the 22nd, 2014, p 2).
Echoing Post’s notion of the polarizing rhetoric of terrorism, Kobrin argues that for Islam, there is the ‘problem of “contraction,” black and white polarizing thinking, which runs throughout the Koran, the Hadith, and the Sira. This ‘ideological’ splitting makes it nearly impossible to establish balance, to achieve moderation’ (Kobrin, 2008, p 55). With the home taken as representing a microcosm of society in Kobrin’s schema, in a ‘dysfunctional family, which is not egalitarian, you will have a dysfunctional society. Why is this so? I state that its citizens do not develop the requisite “psychological” infrastructure for a democracy. To wit, the Arab spring failed’ (Kobrin, 2008, p 55).

As proposed by Kobrin’s colleague and fellow psychohistorian and therapist Joanie Lachkar, the development of ‘Muslim sons is in sharp contrast to our sons in the West. Healthy development occurs when the son is allowed the space and time to bond with the material object mother and later moves away and separates from her by use of transitional objects and the transitional space ... he merely seeks to triumphantly overcome his pre-oedipal issues by seeking his own male identity’ (Lachkar, 2008, p 59). Whereas in ‘psychodynamic terms’ as Lachkar puts it, Muslim children have ‘part object functions, not being children to be loved or cherished, but to be used/misused/abused as a cultural self serving object (as are the mothers and women)’ (Lachkar, 2008, p 56).

Healthy psychological development is seen as a function of Western child rearing practices, and Muslim culture pathologised by reference to them. In Muslim society according to Kobrin, ‘[e]ven their child rearing practices are imbued with group thinking rather than focusing on the individual needs necessary for healthy child development’ (Kobrin, interview with Reza Akhlaghi in Foreign Policy Association, February the 22nd, 2014). As the third member of the symposium Post’s collaborator Anat Berko, argues, that ‘[i]n a society where the individual is not valued, there is no place for his “I” or “myself”’ (Berko, 2008, p 62; Post and Berko, 2009).

These all enveloping pathological societal influences mean according Lachkar, that ‘Arabs have striking similarities to borderline personality disorders. Indeed, they exhibit many of the same traits, states and characteristics - including such defences as victimization, self-sacrifice, bonding with pain, shame, self-destruction. This is not a far cry from borderline patients in clinical practice who when feeling
betrayed or abandoned will spend the rest of their lives getting even, getting back or retaliating. Revenge becomes a more pervasive force than life itself. The reference is to a group of people who collectively not only feel deprived but become the deprivation - enacting the same traumatic experience again and again (Lachkar, 2008, 63). This description reflects the notion of terrorist repetition compulsion, designated by Post as the ‘threat of success’ (Post, 1986).

Writing on the 2014 Israeli operation in Gaza, Kobrin says, ‘our troops in Gaza must tediously and dangerously dismantle the tunnels. We are forced once again to deal with Hamas’ shit. But what Hamas doesn’t get, is that, we understand their tragic infantile behavior. This gives us a special psychological “protective” edge which is complementary to and synergistic with our military Protective Edge’ (Nancy Kobrin, The Times of Israel, 21st of July, 2014b). The psychoanalytic determination of ‘Hamas’ shit’ is that its needs are ‘considered “dirty” like feces. It makes one feel impure and hence extremely anxious. They must split off and project their dirty feelings into the other. Hamas misuses the tunnel as an object’ (ibid). As such, the ‘terrorist tunnel is more than just a tactical tool. It is also an object which links back to childhood deprivation’ (Nancy Kobrin, The Times of Israel, 21st of July, 2014b). She goes on to state, as ‘my colleague Joan Lachkar, PhD put it: “Hamas bonds to us through their anus not through their hearts. Whatever they do, it all turns out to be shit. We then see the shit and hence the shame”’

5 Nancy Kobrin’s Cultural Psychobiography of Islam.

In introducing Kobrin’s then forthcoming book the Sheik’s New Clothes: the Psychoanalytic Roots of Islamic Suicide Terrorism, psychotherapist Phyllis Chesler sums up Kobrin’s description of Muslim culture, as a ‘barbarous family and clan dynamics in which children, both boys and girls, are routinely orally and analy raped by male relatives; infant males are sometimes sadistically over-stimulated by being masturbated’ (Phyllis Chesler, FrontPageMag.com, the 3rd of May 2004). Following Chesler’s article in Frontpage, ‘the U.S. Army requested to read the manuscript’, and Kobrin gave permission for them to use it in their psychological, ‘psyops’ operations (Kobrin, 2010, p xx1).
In support of her critique Kobrin states that Volkan ‘has repeatedly asserted that in Arab Muslim culture, there is a socialized need to hate and have an enemy, and it is learned behavior in the home’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 10). Although Volkan does describe the process of a Muslim child externalising his hatred onto pigs as a representation of a Christian other, he is in the same passage at pains to compare this for example, to Christian Armenians refusing Muslim Azerbaijani blood (Volkan, 1998/1997). Seeking to explicate an apolitical psychoanalytic process of establishing formal enemies, Volkan draws a line from the first problematic circumstance of an unresponsive mother to the neonate, through to stranger anxiety, and progressing to ethnic enmity (Volkan, 1998/1997).

‘Islamic suicide terrorism against Jews and crusaders’, in Kobrin’s critique, represents a socially sanctioned outlet for a concrete explosion of repressed sexual desire in a paranoid manipulation of religion (Kobrin, 2010, p 34) This in turn ‘defends against infantile self-hatred by projecting on its murder victims’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 38). Referring explicitly to Post, Kobrin argues that shame and humiliation are ‘the key emotional experiences for the individual and the group that have been at the center of psychohistory’s discussion concerning the repetition of childhood traumatic experience under the guise of political violence. It has been noted that terrorists attach to their charismatic leader and participate in a paranoid delusion, thus alleviating their persecutory anxieties through political violence’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 57; Robins and Post, 1997).

In misrepresenting him, Kobrin has particularised Volkan’s actually general notion, to specifically Islamic cultural practices in explaining ‘Islamic terrorists’, who have a ‘need to hate and the need to have enemies - needs stemming from the externalization of the hatreds developed through blaming and shaming child-rearing practices, learned in early childhood, while these nascent terrorists were “embedded” in their families’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 20). The Islamic terrorist’s objective is ‘to acquire honor by terrifying others into fearing that they will be shamed and humiliated. The matter is further complicated by the fact that honor is a matter of gender and sex so that child-rearing practices revolve around the concrete, physical sex of the child - namely, his or her genitalia’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 21).

Kobrin’s psycho-cultural explanation of Islam as a bespoke psychoanalytic a critique, depends explicitly for its validity on being an accurate representation of
Islamic cultural practices. The general psychobiographical premise is that particular cultures, cultural practices and familial relationships will tend to produce the prevalence of a certain character formation. This is exemplified by Erik Erikson’s contention that the nature of the German character was amenable to the message of Hitler, as a corollary of particular German child rearing practices, principally the vicissitudes of German adolescence (Erikson, 1942; Erikson, 1963/1950). Kobrin’s psychoanalytic conceptualisation thus depends on demonstrating the sexually aberrant childrearing practices which she claims are common to Arab/Muslim culture, particularly in respect of the boy child’s genitals.

Citing as one of her sources S.J. Breiner (1990), Kobrin draws attention to an intimate Egyptian practice of mothers preparing the child’s foreskin for the ceremony of circumcision, which may take place any time before maturity (Kobrin, 2010). Breiner’s source, Patai and DeAtkine, accepting though that ‘this particular custom may be a local development’ amongst the ‘fellahin of Upper Egypt’, and so not evidence of sexual practices throughout the Arab world (Patai and DeAtkine, 1973, p 33). Notwithstanding, Patai and DeAtkine claimed that the ‘association of the mother, and hence women in general, with erotic pleasure is something that Arab male infants in general experience and that predisposes them to accept the stereotype of the woman as primarily a sexual object and a creature who cannot resist temptation’ (Patai and DeAtkine, 1973, p 33). An interesting if dubious cultural mitigation is provided by another of Kobrin’s sources, Edwardes and Masters the Cradle of Erotica (1964), which explains that ‘Muslims do it to retract the prepuce, but because the Jewish infant is already circumcised (since eight days after birth) this motive has no meaning to the Jews. They do it merely because it is superexciting to the suckling’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 250).

Patai and DeAtkine’s account is in any event controversial and contested. Brian Whitaker18 claiming that the book is problematically sourced and openly racist. It is nonetheless widely used as the ‘the bible on Arab behaviour for the US military’ and American ‘neoconservatives’ (Brian Whitaker, The Guardian, 24th of May 2004). American journalist Seymour Hersh actually revived interest in the book by linking Patai and DeAtkine’s notion of Arab shame and humiliation deriving from sexual taboos as underlying the abuses perpetrated by US soldiers on Arab prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, 24th of May 2004).

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18 Whitaker is the Arabist former Middle East Editor of the Guardian.
Notwithstanding, Kobrin continues that the Arab boy is therefore 'overstimulated, enraged, trapped, and fearful of not being able to control his sexual urges. Allen Edwardes and Robert E. L. Masters also reported how the family may masturbate the infant’s penis for hours at a time in order to "increase its size and strengthen it" (Kobrin, 2010, p 17). Edwardes and Masters are actually quoting from a 1933 book by German Orientalist Bernhard Stern, who has it that the ‘Arab distinguishes himself through the display of a powerful glans penis. I have been told that from childhood on they rub the penis energetically to increase its size and strengthen it’ (Stern cited in Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 40). The activity was from ‘childhood on’ not infancy, no mention of it being a group activity and nothing more than a second hand traveller’s tale anyway.

Kobrin’s notion of the group masturbation of infants does appear in Edwardes and Masters account but not as an Islamic cultural practice, stating that ‘[a]ctive masturbation is aroused in many male infants among North African Jews by their mothers, nurses, older sisters, and other attending females who pacify and soothe the displeased baby by tickling his genitals. This method of becalming is not only common but may indeed be considered quite customary ... Seeing that he enjoys it, they fondle his genitals repeatedly. This is not always a casual tickling of the testicles, but a steady stimulation of the penis’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 249). If the cultural practices being adduced as evidence for a specific psycho-cultural critique belong to another culture, then they cannot be adduced as valid evidence for the culture being critiqued and pathologised. They would either, reflect more general (ergo non-pathological) cross-cultural practices or possibly in Kobrin’s terms, point to an underlying source of pathology in that other culture.

Kobrin adduces further evidence from Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, having it that the ‘French-trained Tunisian psychoanalyst who is also a Muslim, emphasizes the common occurrence of pederasty, mutual masturbation fellatio, and anal intercourse during childhood in Arab Muslim culture. For example, the word hammam, referring to the hot waters of the public bathhouse, is slang for sex because seven - to fourteen-year-old boys go to the baths with their mothers and sisters’

Bouhdiba is though talking about a somewhat different conceptualisation of the hammam, not slang for sex with minors, but a popular metaphor linking eroticism with cleansing (Bouhdiba, 2004).

As Bouhdiba explains,

‘[i]n many Arab countries, “going to the hammam” quite simply means “making love”, since going to the hammam is part of the process of removing the impurity consequent on the sexual act; and since the hammam, by virtue of the various forms of cleansing practised there, is also a preparation for the sexual act, it can be said that the hammam is both conclusion and preparation for the work of the flesh. The hammam is the epilogue of the flesh and the prologue of prayer. The practices of the hammam are pre- and post-sexual practices. Purification and sexuality are linked’

(Bouhdiba, 2004, p 165).

The hammam in Bouhdiba’s critique is part of a cultural cleansing ritual, an ancillary function as synecdoche, purification not paedophilia. Bathing and the sexual stimulation of minors is detailed by Edwardes and Masters, but again as a Jewish practice. According to Edwardes and Masters, Jewish ‘orthodox children [up to five years old] are ordinarily bathed once or twice a day, morning and/or evening, their naked bodies are continuously exposed to the wanton handling of lustful females. Without exception, washing and drying of the genitals induce repeated erections; and all during the bath the stripling’s penis is flipped and frictionized until he has an orgasm or two’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 251).

Kobrin again cites Breiner, who ‘noted how common it was in ancient Egypt for wet nurses and nurses to introduce children to sexual activity and “to play and suck on the male child’s genitals so that little boys would have stronger erections. This activity was known as “playing with the sweet finger” or “little finger.” Genital manipulation by others continues to this day’ (Kobrin, 2010, pp 16-17). Breiner’s source for this particular practice Norman Mailer’s novel, Ancient Evenings (1983)
as is also Kobrin’s claim that such genital manipulation continues into modern times (Breiner, 1990; Kobrin, 2010).

Mailer’s novel is actually set exclusively in ancient Egypt with no mention of modern day practices, and Mailer does not give a bibliography or cite any sources. As a source then, Mailer is somewhat problematic, with Mark Hooper arguing that he runs ‘roughshod over historical detail with cheerful abandon’ (Mark Hooper, theguardian.com, the 8th of January, 2008). The practice does, however, appear in Edwardes and Masters, but is again a Jewish custom whereby ‘[m]ale infants are masturbated almost every day and night by their female nurses. This is especially the case in orthodox and rabbinical families, who hire “outside” women to perform the necessary services’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 250).

Another Arab Muslim sexual practice, according to Kobrin, ‘involves older males in the clan targeting young boys for anal intercourse, with the latter forced to play out the passive “female” role’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 20). However, the evidence adduced for this once again derives from Breiner’s study of ancient Egypt, where decidedly pre-Islamic soldiers believed that ‘if you had anal sex with a man, this would alter that man into a woman for that period of time, thus making the man who mounted stronger’ (Breiner, 1990, p 25). Breiner’s is in any event a comparative study of ancient child abuse, and he argues that in terms ‘of child abuse among the ancients, the Egyptians were not major offenders’ (ibid, p 192).

The illogicality of linking the contingency of terrorism, even the particularity of suicide terrorism, to a psychoanalytic and psychosexual developmental analysis, is inadvertently demonstrated from the same polemical position as Kobrin’s, published again in FrontPage Magazine. In explaining why Muslim converts ‘engage in terrorism at a higher rate than Muslims’, Daniel Greenfield argues that it relates to the ‘four reasons for the rise of the Muslim Suicide Convert. Muslim converts are gullible, fanatical, suicidal and expendable’ (Daniel Greenfield, FrontPage Magazine, the 2nd of January, 2014).

Muslims ‘have learned to make the necessary compromises with their fanatical religion that make their lives livable ... The Muslim Suicide Convert seeks an uncompromising purity. He rejects the compromises that Muslims have learned to make over the centuries’ (Daniel Greenfield, FrontPage Magazine, 2nd of January,
2014). The propensity for suicide terrorism does not, in Greenfield’s analysis, reside in cultural practices, but at the intersection of the anomie and alienation of Western culture and the strictures of a more rigorous Eastern theology. Suicide terrorism is a contingent anomaly, not a teleological psychic trajectory, socially determined or otherwise.

6 Normative Conceptualisations of Ego Development.

Although democracy as an ideology in the view of Kernberg, ‘cannot aspire to the dynamic force of totalitarian fundamentalism’, the ‘education of the individual within a tolerant social system may provide for the development of normal ego identity and an integrated, autonomous system of morality’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 959, my emphasis). Thus, the possession of a ‘normal ego identity’ is conflated with a normative Western democratic discourse. From a normative Western perspective, these other cultures would inevitably exhibit some aberrant psychological functioning, if merely by dint of being outside of that Western norm. Such normative positioning is already a criticism levelled at psychoanalysis as a discipline, with non-Western cultures ‘bunched more at the neurotic end of the spectrum’, as measured against a normative Western yardstick (Kakar, 1985, p 441).

In practical terms, as Freud points out, ‘for an individual neurosis we take as our starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to be “normal”. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background could exist’ (Freud, 1930, S.E. XXI, p 144). Erich Fromm proposes a formulation which would generally accommodate cultural differentiation without a commensurate pathologising of the individual, in that there is

‘an important difference between individual and social mental illness, which suggests a differentiation between two concepts: that of defect, and that of neurosis. If a person fails to attain freedom, spontaneity, a genuine expression of self, he may be considered to have a severe defect, provided we assume that freedom and spontaneity are the objective goals to be attained by every human being. If such a goal is not attained by the majority of
members of any given society, we deal with the phenomenon of socially patterned defect. The individual shares it with many others; he is not aware of it as a defect, and his security is not threatened by the experience of being different, of being an outcast, as it were. What he may have lost in richness and in a genuine feeling of happiness, is made up by the security of fitting in with the rest of mankind - as he knows them. As a matter of fact, his very defect may have been raised to a virtue by his culture, and thus may give him an enhanced feeling of achievement’

(Fromm, 1944, pp 5-6).

Individuals who thrive in cultures which privilege conformity and obedience over ‘freedom and spontaneity’ can then, from a Western normative perspective, be deemed part of a socially defective community, but not individually neurotic members of it.

Fromm’s perspective still privileges his own conception of the good life as a societal yardstick. Similarly, if the evidence had been there, it would in principle have accommodated Kobrin’s notion of Arab/Muslim society as being somehow defective. Notwithstanding, taking Kobrin’s psycho-cultural analysis of an overarching Arab/Muslim societal pathology, it would be even harder to explain why such a tiny minority do turn to terrorism, and still not answer why those particular individuals and not any of the much larger majority.

7 Developmental Ascriptions for Contingent Categories.

Although terrorising an enemy group is an ancient tactic, the nomenclature of terrorism derives from the ‘terror’ of the French revolution, and it was given its modern form when anarchists first started using dynamite (Townshend, 2011). What was a discernible tactic is now used more as a political concept, so that defining terrorism has become idiosyncratic, inherently reflecting the agenda of the definer, his ideology and his power to label.

Definitions of terrorism according Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill (2005), inevitably reflect overlapping and competing agendas. The net effect of the distinction between
the FBI and US State Department definitions, as Tom O’Connor (2011) points out, is that exactly the same incident may be classified as terrorist by one branch of government and not by another. In examining the seven major US governmental definitions, Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill find that ‘virtually any action can be defined as terrorism, or can be excluded from the definition, depending on the desired result’ (Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill, 2005, p 71; O’Connor, 2011). Whether a group is designated as terrorist or not is a contingent political decision. So that although subsequently reinstated to the list of banned terrorist groups, in 1997 US Secretary of State Madeline Albright had excluded both the IRA and the PLO which was ‘because of their roles in the then-pending peace talks in Northern Ireland and Israel, respectively’ (Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill, 2005, p 72).

The thesis argues that some of the basic assumptions behind psychoanalytic profiling, psychobiography or indeed psychoanalytic concepts deployed in attribute labelling, actually constitute in philosophical terms, a category error or mistake. The category error consists in attaching an individual teleological psychic development or personality formation to a contingent eventuality such as a revolution. Or, of attaching a specific psychology to a nebulous generic category such as terrorism/terrorist which may be either a mind set or a tactic, and whose definition depends on a variable politico-moral determination.

Category errors go beyond, as Jack Meiland explains, ‘simple error or ordinary mistakes, as when one attributes a property to a thing which that thing could have but does not have, since category mistakes involve attributions of properties ... to things ... that those things cannot have’ (Meiland, 2001, p 123). In his advocacy of this concept introduced by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle, Mark Lindner gives the example of ‘[t]wo citizens who pay taxes belong to the same category but the average taxpayer does not. As long as the citizens continue to misconstrue the “average taxpayer” they will think of him as some peculiarly ghostly additional taxpayer’ (Lindner, 2015). The ‘average taxpayer’, ‘the terrorist’ or ‘the revolutionary’ are notional concepts, and whilst it is possible to imbue them with characteristics moral or otherwise, the characteristics are similarly notional, ideologically determined and simply cannot be re-adduced to represent the contingent reality or personality formation of any particular individual who pays tax, commits an act of terrorism or takes part in a revolution.
Neumann and Smith contend that ‘an objective appreciation of terrorism as a strategic phenomenon has been undermined largely by mixing up terrorism as a coherent description of a particular tactic – the use of violence to instil fear for political ends – with a moral judgement on the actor’s method’s and objectives. Once a descriptive term becomes wrapped into judgemental connotations, any hope of an effective meaning has been lost. The conceptual confusion leads to the classic category mistake embodied in the much-cited phrase, “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist”. Logically you can actually be both without contradiction’ (Neumann and Smith, 2008, p 13).

It is quite possible, and this thesis believes right, to pass a negative moral judgement on acts of terrorism. The ‘freedom fighter’ who employs terrorist tactics is a terrorist even if you agree with his cause. It is not a category error; it is a simple if deliberate mistake not to include him in the category of terrorist. The distinction between them is synthetic and ideological as they are not being attributed with characteristics which they cannot both possess. They could both be categorised together as revolutionaries. To ascribe a personality formation to what is an ideological label, not an actual individual, is a category error. It is again possible to imagine a psychoanalytically derived terrorist personality, conjuring up the notion of the transcendental psychological attributes of a terroriser, without his necessarily being party to an actual ‘terrorist’ campaign.

Concerning what this thesis terms as the contingent, Erich Fromm describes as behavioural, having it that

‘[q]uite obviously the revolutionary character is not a person who participates in revolutions. This is exactly the point of difference between behavior [contingency] and character [personality] in the Freudian dynamic sense. Anyone can, for a number of reasons, participate in a revolution regardless of what he feels, provided he acts for the revolution. But the fact that he acts as a revolutionary tells us little about his character [personality]’

(Fromm, 1963, p 154).

It is not the province of psychoanalysis to create an essentially spurious notion of the ‘terrorist personality’, from ideologically defined individuals. The personality
pathology discourse is used to distance the normative and hegemonic as moral, from the pathologised ‘Other’, rather than from the terrorist act which may actually be perpetrated by friend or foe, state or enemy of the state. The power of the personality pathology discourse is then in switching the focus from the grievances which give rise to terrorism, or in diverting attention away from terrorist acts committed by their own normative establishment or allies, because terrorism has become the province the ‘terrorist personality’, the pathological ‘Other’.

In his paper, ‘The Relevance of Psychoanalysis to an understanding of Terrorism’, Stuart Twemlow builds on his expertise in dispute resolution. Through a clinical account of terrorism as encompassing notions of family dynamics, shame, humiliation, and narcissistic grandiosity and rage, Twemlow equates terrorism with for example, bullying, the ‘terrorizing’ of analysts by borderline, violent or paranoid patients, apocalyptic cults, and disaffected middle class American school shooters whom he identifies with young Palestinians insurgents (Twemlow, 2005).

This inclusive, transcendental ‘psychoanalytic’ perception of the ‘terrorist’, does ‘scant justice to Irish, Basque and Palestinian families’ and their ‘terrorist’ groups which ‘have practical and limited territorial aims’ (Friedman, 2005, pp 964, 965). There is a distinct difference then, between a psychoanalytic notion of a ‘terrorist’ personality and a psychoanalytic explanation of the contingency of terrorist acts.

The proper enquiry for psychoanalysis, irrespective of the normative status or ideological positioning of the subject involved, the examination of the overarching psychic mechanisms which facilitate individuals, whether insurgents or indeed counterinsurgents, to commit heinous acts of terror. From a subject position outside of the traditional normative Western ambit, Leopold Nosek20 argues, that, from a psychoanalytic perspective, ‘terrorism is a label - an improper term for reflection’ (Nosek, 2003, p 32).

Regarding the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’, ‘nothing allows us to talk, as analysts, with an alleged scientific expertise about ideological issues. On the other hand, terms like terror, horror, uncanny, sinister are within the traditional scope of our reflection’ (Nosek, 2003, p 33). A psychoanalytic view of ‘terror’, is a very different concept from the logically absurd ascription of ‘terrorist’, to a developmental

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20 Nosek was the former President of the Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of São Paulo.
personality formation of a subject who has an ideologically designated and contingently determined involvement in the category of ‘terrorism’, which defies a exact definition anyway.

The tenor of the institutional establishment and particularly the normative American discourse of terrorism, as Lisa Stampnitzky argues, is continually ‘hybridized by the moral discourse of the public sphere, in which terrorism is conceived as a problem of evil and pathology’ (Stampnitzky, 2013, p 13). This is because commentators such as Post and Kernberg conflate the scientific/psychiatric with normative prescriptions based on what are actually ideologically determined psychoanalytic conceptualisations. Credible causes or legitimate grievances may then be discredited as a result of this medico-scientific labelling of pathology.

8 A Collective Phantasy as Opposed to Individual Fantasy.

For Kobrin, Al Qaeda’s group ‘psyche shares a striking similarity to that of a regular serial killer’ (Kobrin, 2010, pp 97, 96). Whereas for Robert Pape, in his comprehensive study of suicide terrorism ‘The Chicago Project’, ‘the organisation’s [Al Qaeda’s] strategic logic has been to compel Western combat forces to leave the Arabian Peninsula’ (Pape, 2006, p 29). There are specific contingent goals for suicide terrorism campaigns, in particular the establishment of some form of self-determination. The main findings of his research are that rather than reflecting an individual psychic impulsion, suicide terrorism is ‘more likely when a national community is: occupied by a foreign power; the foreign power is of a different religion; the foreign power is a democracy; and ordinary violence has not produced concessions’ (Pape, 2008, p 275).

Organisations such as Al Qaeda have a contingent, existential strategic logic to their activities. Serial killing does reflect a transcendental psychic impulsion, and analysable developmental trajectory. With the serial killer according to Akhtar, ‘major sectors of their psyche have become dehumanized, and it is the “instinctualized” (i.e. psychosomatically anchored, tension-reducing, cyclical, and repetitive) extrusion of this dehumanized core via its induction in others that forms
the central dynamics of serial murder’, whereas ‘dehumanization in terrorist violence is largely a matter of strategy’ (Akhtar, 2003, pp 238, 139).

For Jack Douglas, one the originator’s of the FBI’s serial killer study, ‘[p]robably the most crucial single factor in the development of a serial rapist or killer is the role of fantasy’ (Douglas and Olshaker, 1997, p 114). In sexually oriented serial killing, perverse primary phantasies become manifest through conscious fantasies, so that the ‘contents of the clearly conscious phantasies of perverts (which in favourable circumstances can be transformed into manifest behaviour)’ (Freud, 2001/1905, S.E. VII, pp164-165). Although as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, Freud’s intention tended towards demonstrating the analogous constituents of conscious and unconscious ‘phantasies’, they point to Susan Isaacs useful distinction of denoting ‘fantasy’ as being conscious, and ‘phantasy’ as the “the primary content of unconscious mental processes” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 318).

There are discernible levels of interacting fantasy organisation, Duncan Cartwright argues, where for example ‘it is usually the case that in perverse or sadistic violence, conscious violent fantasies are clearly present and, in different ways, contribute to conscious actions of the offender. In this case the distinction between fantasy as a sublimatory activity and unconscious phantasy collapses, and what is usually destructive, but unconscious, becomes permissible in the conscious mind’ (Cartwright, 2002, p 49).

Freud’s earlier writings on violence and murder appear to emphasize, as Cartwright sees it, ‘oedipal phantasies as being prominent in acts of violence’, with other writers linking such violence to ‘castrating or mutilating phantasies originally directed at parents. Others have argued that violent encounters have their roots in fearful phantasies of sexual inadequacy that expose the individual in a shameful way’ (Cartwright, 2002, p 50). The phantasies around the maternal object however, are of feeling engulfed or attacked, provoking a self preservative violence in a desperate desire for separateness (Cartwright, 2002). The mother, as in the FBI studies, has been found to be an almost universally domineering character in the childhoods of serial killers, and the father normally weak or absent (Douglas and Olshaker, 1997; Hazelwood and Michaud, 2001). Indeed the serial killer is often
symbolically killing his mother over and over, sometimes until he screws himself up to do the actual killing of the mother.

This childhood trauma, the genesis of the original phantasy constellation, which does reflect the early traumatic object relating of the personality pathology thesis, is hidden behind the distortions of conscious fantasy. In individual violence as reflected in serial killing, the phantasy constellation moves from that deriving from the unconscious and repressed, to a very specific and idiosyncratic conscious fantasy script (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973). Terrorist killing does not rely on this idiosyncratic personal fantasy script, because as Cartwright points out, although group or socially sanctioned violence is ‘clearly worked out many times consciously, it is different in the sense that these actions do not necessarily stem from unconscious mental structures. Gang members or soldiers may fantasize many times about how they would respond when threatened or under attack, but their actions may not necessarily be linked to unconscious phantasy’ (Cartwright, 2002, p 49). These exigent fantasies are not keenly evolving fantasy scripts, but a way of mentalising and diminishing apprehension.

Freud believed certain primal phantasies to be common to all humans, that they are hereditary or phylogenetic phantasies of origins. There is an innate conception even in the infant, ‘a hardly definable knowledge, something as it were preparatory to an understanding’, which is analogous to ‘the far-reaching instinctive knowledge of animals’ (Freud, 2001/1918, XVII, p 120). Following on from an innate sensibility to a phantasy of origin, culturally derived myths of origin, acting as primal phantasies are transposed as nationalist ideologies, particularly as Volkan believes, predicated on ancient trauma (Volkan, 1998/1997).

The thesis proposes a distinction in that terrorism is violence predicated on a collective phantasy or in this context, a nationalist ideology, as opposed to the serial killer, whose malignant narcissism (resulting from individual trauma), is acted out in his idiosyncratic fantasy script. Except in symbolic terms victims are incidental in terrorist violence, and it is not the violence itself which the focus of the fantasy, but self-evidently the terror that they create in the survivors. So that even if it is an individual trauma which propels the subject into the group, any idiosyncratic fantasy formation would need to be subsumed within this primal or
ideological phantasy, such as a creation myth embedded within the national psyche.

The phenomenon of the self radicalised 'lone wolf terrorist' may seemingly bridge the conceptual gap, between perhaps marginalised, traumatised narcissistically wounded individuals, which would reflect a serial killer, and ideological terrorist. The lone wolf is by definition acting alone, but as Bakker and de Graaf argue, the definition of 'lone wolf terrorism has to be extended to include individuals that are inspired by a certain group but who are not under the orders of any other person, group or network' (Bakker and de Graaf, 2011). However, although some will clearly take their inspiration from particular causes, the 'lone wolf terrorist' is nonetheless acting out his own personal rage. As a corollary, it is the act of terror itself and his own personal gratification from it, which is the focus of his fantasy, rather than any instrumental effect which he may not even live to see. The 'lone wolf terrorist' may espouse an ideology, and although perhaps reflecting a particular zeitgeist, his terrorism is not externally contingent. The lone wolf decides how, where, when and against whom he will strike.

This is critical because it is an inherent presumption of personality pathology theorists that the terrorist group is amenable to these psychologically damaged personalities, and designed to meet their psychological needs. This may be true of an overarching ideology for a self-radicalising individual, but serious terrorist groups function as disciplined organisations that select their members to meet their organisational requirements and their group ethos. Belonging to a group is more than sharing an ideology or even supporting a group’s agenda over the internet. The lone wolf terrorist is by definition not part of a group.

In his depiction of the notorious 1993 IRA ‘Shankill Bombing’, Andrew Silke describes Thomas Begley one of the IRA bombers who was killed in commission of the act. Begley ‘was described by neighbors as a shy and polite man. Others were less complimentary in their descriptions of the young bomber. Some expressed surprise that the IRA had allowed Begley to join their ranks - in their views he was an unpopular thug held in low regard in the area. As one source put it: “I never thought I’d see the day when the IRA used people like him”’ (Silke, 2003c, p 50). This exemplifies very poignantly that terrorist organisations have reputations
within the communities from which they gain their succour, who they have in their organisation reflects on them.

For ETA members, there was a lengthy process of initiation intrinsically linked to adolescent rites of passage peculiar to Basque culture. The process of recruitment was very protracted, and as Robert Clark’s research found, that far from being particularly psychologically vulnerable, ‘many potential etarras resist for months or even years before yielding to the call to join’ (Clark, 1983, p 436). Even from the perspective of movements which accept unsolicited volunteers such as the IRA, the recruitment process is similarly protracted, due to the evaluation of the candidate’s usefulness to the organisation and checking the *bone fides* of his ideological commitment and background (Horgan, 2006). Indeed the IRA in the 1980s, ‘turned away far more people than it actually accepted into its ranks’, deliberately limiting its size (Silke, 2003a p 46; Horgan, 2006).

Citing a Northern Irish terrorist leader, Horgan describes how the truly psychopathic killer would ‘stand out like a sore thumb’, and be weeded out as a threat to organisational security (Horgan, 2006, p 5). The danger, is then, that the literature on terrorism which overwhelmingly demonstrates the relative normality of terrorists is skewed because ‘some exceptions to the rule of terrorists as “normal” can be (and are) pointed to as a means of supporting a more significant position’ (Horgan, 2006, p 69). Given that contingent terrorists do not have the same psychic makeup as psychopathic killers, and that political violence for vengeance or in defence of individual or national identity may be a moral or even psychologically valid response, ‘terrorism as an activity is most certainly abnormal’ (Silke, 2003a, p 33). If the personality pathology model of terrorism is rejected, are there psychoanalytic explanations for these otherwise ‘normal’ moral individuals committing abnormal (ergo ‘pathological’), indeed immoral acts of terrorism?

9 The Ideological Exploitation of the ‘Inclination to Aggression’.

If those labelled terrorist, as Mirdal argues, are ‘neither insane, inhuman or abnormal’ and their cause credible, then it follows that it is likely to be the psychological processes operating within the terrorist group, that promotes and sanctions such abnormal or pathological behaviour (Mirdal, 2013/2006, p 10;
Silke, 2003a; Horgan 2006; Sageman, 2004). The inherent psychic functioning which demarcates the serial killer; depersonalisation, devaluation and dehumanisation, may be inculcated through group conditioning processes into otherwise ‘normal’ individuals, allowing them to commit acts which would otherwise contravene their moral codes.

Although a derivative of the ‘death wish’, Freud saw the ‘inclination to aggression as an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man’ (Freud, 2001/1930 [1929], S.E. XXI, p 122). No instinct could operate in isolation but must be alloyed with another in order to achieve its aim (Freud, 2001/1933, S.E. XXII). The satisfaction of destructive impulses may be facilitated by their fusion with other impulses of an ideological kind as with for example, the Spanish Inquisition or the Crusades, ‘where idealistic motives served only as an excuse for the destructive appetites’ (Freud, 2001/1933, S.E. XXII, p 210). What Freud is arguing is that aggression as a general disposition in man is exploited by ideological commitment to a group or cause, not the result of aberrant individual psychology. It would thus be an exploitation of the same human disposition, for a terrorist group, as for the crusaders against terrorism.

At the individual interface of aggression, dehumanization is one of the facilitating processes, as Bernard et al express it, which lessens the emotional turmoil caused by the stresses of ‘inner conflict and external threat’ by decreasing the sense of personal individuality (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 103). Dehumanisation as a process results from the misperception of the humanity of others, and ranges from viewing them en bloc as “subhuman” or “bad human” (a long-familiar component of group prejudice) to viewing them as “nonhuman,” as though they were inanimate items or “dispensable supplies.” As such, their maltreatment or even their destruction may be carried out or acquiesced in with relative freedom from the restraints of conscience or feelings of brotherhood’ (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 102).

Similarly, the composite ego defence of depersonalisation relies on mechanisms of unconscious denial and repression, along with the ‘isolation of affect, and compartmentalization’ (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 103, p 103). Although as Paul Denis points out, the concept of depersonalisation is not dealt with directly by Freud, in psychoanalytic terms “‘depersonalization” refers to the appearance of
subjective impressions of change affecting the person or the surrounding world. Their intensity varies, ranging from a simple feeling of dizziness to painful feelings of physical transformation, from the fleeting feeling of estrangement to the impression that the world has become unrecognizable, dead, or uninhabited’ (Denis, 2005, p 393).

This estrangement or walling off of psychological elements would account for the sense of psychological immunity needed to facilitate the committing of terrorist outrages. For most people, according to Bernard et al, the ‘advocacy of or participation in the wholesale slaughter and maiming of their fellow human beings is checked by opposing feelings of guilt, shame, or horror. Immunity from these feelings may be gained however, by a self-automatizing detachment from a sense of personal responsibility for the outcome of such actions, thereby making them easier to carry out’ (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 113, emphasis in the original). These are individual psychic processes explaining the propensity to terrorist violence, which exist independently of the personality development of the subject. This supports the thesis argument that there is no particular terrorist personality formation, rather that there is a contingent psychic process, particularly promoted in a group context, which facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism.

10 The Psychic Conditioning for Brutality.

In the process of group functioning, there is for Freud following Gustav Le Bon’s original notion, a sentiment of numerical invincibility, giving a sense of collective psychological immunity allowing the individual, to

‘throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The apparently new characteristics which he then displays are in fact the manifestation of his unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition. We can find no difficulty in understanding the disappearance of conscience or of a sense of responsibility in these circumstances. It has long been our contention that “social anxiety” is the essence of what is called conscience’

(Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 74).
This is a revival, in Freud’s view, of the instincts of the ‘primal horde. Just as primitive man survives potentially in every individual’ (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 123). For Freud, without social restraints any individual irrespective of a particular personality formation or even natural propensity would be capable of committing a terrorist atrocity.

The group itself, lacks emotional restraint, cannot tolerate moderation or delay, shows regression to more primitive mental activity, and works out its emotional excesses in the form of action (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII). The notion of deindividuation, where individuals lose their sense of themselves in the anonymity of the crowd, further inhibits restraint. A heightened sense of deindividuation occurred according to Silke when terrorists wore disguises, so that more serious injury was inflicted, more victims were attacked at the scene, and threatened after the attacks (Silke, 2003b).

The psychic processes that lead to depersonalised terrorism are the same whether the individual acts on behalf of a state security service or for an anti-state insurgency. In his psychoanalytic study of Nazi war criminals Licensed Mass Murder, Henry Dicks, sought for a nexus which would incorporate as terrorists, groups such as the ‘inquisitors of the Holy Office’ (Dicks, 1972, p 18). In his study, Dicks seeks to understand not only ‘how a proportion of German males had become motivated to cross the threshold of being considered for terrorist roles’, but how ‘the “practice” of officially sanctioned terrorism may meet the needs and stresses of these people’ (Dicks, 1972, p 87).

Although questioning the ethological and anthropological validity of Freud’s notion of the ‘primal horde’, Dicks nonetheless believes ‘Freud’s classical study of regression inherent in group behaviour and dynamics is still the best theoretical model for explaining the phenomena of certain affiliative groups animated by aggressive intent resulting from social despair’ (Dicks, 1972, p 256). So that with a couple of dubious exceptions, Dicks records that none of the SS killers which he analysed ‘would have been likely to become “common murderers” in normal conditions’ (ibid, p 253). The instigatory triggering of their psychic anesthetisation was not ‘a sudden, solitary experience, but a process extending over time, shared

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21 Dicks was a psychiatrist and member of the Tavistock Clinic whose wartime experience included the medical care of Rudolf Hess.
with team mates in a facilitating group setting’ (Dicks, 1972, p 253). Dicks cites in particular Stanley Milgram's research in relation to understanding individual in his *Obedience to Authority* (2005/1974). Becoming a terrorist is a process and 'not usually something that happens quickly or easily' (Silke, 2003a, p 35).

In a later edition of his seminal study on obedience to authority, Milgram similarly refers back to Dick's analysis, as substantiating his own experimental work (Milgram, 2005/1974). Milgram writes that a 'situation confronted both our experimental subject and the German subject and evoked in each a set of parallel psychological adjustments ... He [Dicks] finds clear parallels in the psychological mechanisms of his SS and Gestapo interviewees and subjects in the laboratory' (Milgram, 2005/1974, pp 176-177; Dicks, 1972). In his experiment, Milgram found that the ordinary person was prepared to dole out what he was led to believe were dangerously increasing levels of electric shock to the screams of his 'victim' (Milgram, 2005/1974). Milgram argues that this was 'out of a sense of obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject - and not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies' (Milgram, 2005/1974, p 7). The aggression, albeit reluctant, was operationalised by institutional authority, along with Milgram's subjects' willingness to obey that authority (Milgram, 2005/1974).

The same ego defences used as justifications, were observed in both sets of research and Milgram was able, in Dick's estimation, to

'identify the nascence of a need to devalue the victim: many of his subjects did so as a consequence (or I would say as a guilt projection) of acting against the suffering person. Common comments in the post-experimental interviews were "He was so stupid and stubborn he deserved to get shocked". We recognize the same tendency' amongst SS subjects 'to justify one's own action by pointing to the disobedience or viciousness of the victims who are felt as “only to have themselves to blame”’

(Dicks, 1972, p 262, emphasis in the original).

What both Dick's and Milgram are arguing, then, is not the propensity for violence of an authoritarian personality but the propensity for authority to mould the ordinary individual towards violence. Once within the system of authority, the
individual ‘no longer responds with his own moral sentiments to the ordered action. “His moral concern shifts to the plane of worrying how well or badly he manages to fulfil the expectations the authority has of him.” From this arises the dehumanization of the attitude towards the job which assumes the tyranny of a system’ (Dicks, 1972, p 262).

In the military system, cohesion depends not only on a preparedness to obey but also on the integration of individuals into the group. If the individual soldier is further bonded within the much smaller circle of his comrades, the probability of his participation in killing is, according to Dave Grossman, significantly increased (Grossman, 1996). Even within a conventional military organisation, this aspect may be exploited or subverted, as the

‘authority is protected from the trauma of, and responsibility for, killing because others do the dirty work. The killer can rationalize that the responsibility really belongs to the authority and that his guilt is diffused among everyone who stands beside him and pulls the trigger with him. This diffusion of responsibility and group absolution of guilt is the basic psychological leverage that makes all firing squads and most atrocity situations function’


There is, then, an unholy conflation of the psychic distance of authority with the psychic intimacy of camaraderie, to murderous effect.

Implicit in the group affiliation process of Dicks’ SS killers were manic psychic defence mechanisms characterised by an increasing and brutalising repression: the individual gradually became governed by his distrust and hatred (Dicks, 1972). The defences of splitting, projective identification, denial, idealisation and omnipotent control, in their Kleinian conceptualisation, are as Dicks argues, gradually integrated into the adult character. In the restructuring of their ego defences, there was a ‘planned brutalization or breaking down of the psychic boundaries guarding against the break-through of the murderous death constellation’ (Dicks, 1972, p 259).
This process does not rely on the personality pathology theory determinant of trauma or deficient object relations suffered in early childhood, but focuses on developmentally acquired psychic defences. The brutalising indoctrination process also provides an alternative psychoanalytic formulation, to account for how otherwise psychologically healthy individuals can carry out punishment beatings and terrorist killings. By extension, it also explains why their confreres and their communities can either actively support or tacitly acquiesce in such brutality (Dicks, 1972; Milgram, 2005/1974). It is not just a particular personality type but anyone can, as Mirdal points out, 'under circumstances of extreme fear, stress and pressure commit acts of terror and violence against defenceless persons' (Mirdal, 2013/2006, p 10).

11 Conclusion.

Taking principally the rise of ‘Arab’ terrorism, the chapter demonstrated how psychoanalysts whether wittingly or not, devise cultural analyses which correspond to political imperatives. There was a critique including a detailed examination of the evidence adduced, to show how a psychoanalytic sensibility may be attached to wider cultural discourses and polemics. It was demonstrated, that Kobrin’s psycho-cultural analysis of Islam, sought merely to add a psychoanalytic element to a cultural and ideological polemic that was based on flawed cultural evidence of degenerate child rearing practices in the Muslim world. Such evidence would be inherently inadequate to sustain her psychobiographical conceptualisation of a terrorist personality or indeed culture. Assigning a specific personality formation to an indeterminate political concept is, in any event, a category error. The chapter demonstrated that this flawed evidence nonetheless becomes part of the accepted psychoanalytic literature, having supposedly ‘proved’ itself as a circular argument.

It was argued that adherence to a collective phantasy, rather than acting out an individual fantasy script, is the feature distinguishing the terrorist multiple killer from the serial killer. Thus, otherwise psychologically ‘normal’ individuals may adhere to a violent revolutionary ideology, and whilst part of a revolutionary group, may commit acts of terrorism. A psychoanalytic explanation of the psychic mechanisms (including depersonalisation and the social conditioning to brutality),
which allows psychologically healthy individuals to commit acts of terrorism, was given.

It is my contention that particularly in personological psychobiography, that pathologising is a function of the ideological agenda of the analyst. In cultural critiques, psychoanalytic concepts are fairly malleable as there is clearly no clinical yardstick against which to validate the analyses. The effects of social trauma are readily amenable to interpretations of psychic injury as the cause of terrorist violence. Whilst there is no way of disproving this, there is no way of demonstrating a causal link either. What is the case, however, is that it neglects any culpability of the party causing the trauma for its part in the resulting terrorist violence. It is this essentially one sided-bias, which undermines the personality pathology thesis, and this argument figures large in the conclusion to this thesis.
CONCLUSION
1 Introduction.

In epitomising the notion of ‘Social Darwinism’, Herbert Spencer coined the term ‘survival of the fittest’ which was then applied to competition between social groups (Bannister, 2000). This led to Francis Galton’s eugenicist argument ‘that particular racial or social groups – usually Anglo-Saxons – were “naturally” superior to other groups’ (ibid). These groups or nations evolved by succeeding in conflicts with other nations, a notion used to justify imperial expansion. This thesis identifies a personality pathology discourse within psychoanalysis, which similarly reflects a particular normative, hegemonic, establishment position. The argument is not that this pathologising discourse is as egregious as the ultimate logic of Social Darwinism, and the stigma which still attaches in applying evolutionary theories to society. The identification with a particular ideological and contingent position is, however, inherently detrimental to the reputation and credibility of any universal discipline.

The thesis has identified a personality pathology discourse within psychoanalysis, which reflects a particular normative, hegemonic, establishment position. These psychoanalytic personality pathology theorists locate the turn to terrorism within the psyche of the ‘terrorist’. Political terrorists are then seen as engaging ‘in gratuitous violence, which reveals psychopathological rather than socio-political’ causes (Corrado, 1981, p 295). The objective of the thesis has not been to offer an alternative ideological polemic or deploy alternative psychoanalytic theories, but to demonstrate the conceptual, theoretical and clinical/technical flaws of the personality pathology project.

The predicament for psychoanalysis is that flaws inherent within the psychobiographic project are readily amenable to ideological exploitation. Just as the excesses of Social Darwinism can be refuted without the intention of undermining the theory of evolution, the personality pathology discourse can be undermined by rejecting its deployment of psychoanalysis, without it being an attack on psychoanalysis. As with Social Darwinism and evolutionary biology, with personality pathology theory, a psychoanalytic framework is being applied to a particular ideological construct. When psychoanalysts accept normative ideological ascriptions from purely within their own cultural matrix, the psychic trajectories of
the ‘Other’, whether labelled terrorist, revolutionary or even dictator, must necessarily also be ideologically not psychoanalytically determined.

As was demonstrated in the thesis, Post’s relentlessly negative portrayal of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians is ideologically commensurate with the institutional Israeli position. A Muslim student researching a psychoanalytic account of Arafat, a figure still universally revered throughout the Islamic world, may find their world view unilaterally pathologised from the normative hegemonic perspective of the personality pathology discourse. The psychoanalytic perspective as presented by figures such as Nancy Kobrin (2010) and Joanie Lachkar (2008) would be viewed not as universal discipline, but as an ideology, inherently antithetical to Islam. The argument of the thesis is that these commentators, form part of an ideologically driven discourse, within psychoanalysis.

\section{The Limitations of the Research.}

This thesis is an examination of process - the analysis of a particular discourse, the ideologically driven personality pathology approach to the psychoanalytic profiling of perceived adversaries. The hypotheses of the thesis are not, then, tested against newly derived information such as research interviews, but rely almost exclusively on the documentary evidence extant in the literature of the discursive process. The research aim was not to uncover an alternative ‘true’ paradigm. The thesis does not seek to analyse the psychological motivations of the protagonists of personality pathology theory, or seek direct ‘proof’ that their subjects are or are not pathological.

For example, it is pointed out that Nancy Kobrin (2010) has actually adduced what are described as Jewish practices as evidence but ascribed them as an Islamic ‘pathology’. The thesis does not engage in psychoanalytic speculation as to why she does this. The thesis did not seek to interview Kobrin or any of the other personality pathology theorists, nor are there interviews with their psychobiographic subjects or other ‘terrorists’. The view of this thesis is that this would simply create another polemic within the discourse, rather than the more technical unpacking of that discourse.
There is no overarching analysis of an historical development, but rather an account of the contingent circumstances which created the current discourse. The research reflects more a series of these seemingly arbitrary events that had no teleological trajectory or inevitability, but created the environment in which the personality pathology paradigm functions. As the research does not build theory from findings in an archive, original sources are the public documents of the discourse itself. So that as Jerrold Post adduces as evidence Robert Clark’s 1983 paper ‘Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members’, it is this paper which is treated as the original source. There is no attempt at researching the ‘truth’ of ETA, only an analysis of how Post (1986, 1998, 2007) has used Clark as evidence.

The field of terrorism research is now quite vast, in particular that of the psychology of terrorism. This research does not refer to this field of study other than to point out that the overwhelming weight of empirical studies find the relative psychological ‘normality’ of the terrorists studied (Silke, 2003a; Sageman, 2004; Horgan, 2006). The thesis’s view is that covering this more fully would again divert the argument away from strictly investigating the personality pathology paradigm. Also, a comparison between the personality pathology theory and other specific models of terrorism would be unfeasible. As the thesis argues that the ‘terrorist personality’ is a logical absurdity, it would mean comparing the ideological notion of terrorism as representing the desire to be a terrorist, against particular explanatory theories of the root causes of terrorism. They represent two separate categories.

As opposed to the purely notional and unfalsifiable category of an ahistorical psychic impulsion to commit acts of terrorism, there are a number of varied and particular existential causes identified in the terrorism literature. These observable contingencies are for a point of comparison outlined by John Horgan as, the

‘Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law: Failed or weak states: Rapid modernization: Extremist ideologies of a secular or religious nature: Historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, revolutions, dictatorships or occupation: Hegemony and inequality of power: Illegitimate or corrupt governments: Powerful external actors upholding illegitimate governments: Repression by foreign occupation or by colonial powers: The experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origins:
Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes: The experience of social injustice: The presence of charismatic ideological leaders’

(Horgan, 2006, p 83).

In personality pathology theory, other psychoanalytic conceptualisations such as those of Carl Gustav Jung or Jacques Lacan are not deployed at all, and only extremely rarely in psychobiography generally. Using principally Freud’s notion of an innate aggression and Henry Dick’s (1972) notion of brutalising socialisation, the thesis does offer a psychoanalytic explanation of why terrorism may be carried out by individuals who were not pathological, at least to start with. The thesis does not otherwise wish to engage in an internecine debate within psychoanalysis and be judged on this basis. One hope is for the thesis to challenge the ideological bias of the dominant psychoanalytic paradigm within its own terms of reference using its own concepts and evidence.

The objective of the thesis is to demonstrate that personality pathology theory is ideologically determined, but not to offer an alternative ideological perspective. The thesis argues that the one sided analysis of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians is biased irrespective of the validity of the psychoanalytic concepts used, but the thesis does not champion the Palestinian cause or denigrate the Israelis. The thesis argues that Post’s analysis of Saddam Hussein is problematic, not that Saddam is a good man. The argument is that any ideological bias is harmful to the reputation of psychoanalysis as a discipline.

The thesis does not challenge the personal or professional bona fides of the psychoanalytic personality theorists. If the major protagonists were simply rogue commentators with a misperception of psychoanalytic concepts, they could be summarily refuted, and there would be no real research purpose. The objective of the thesis is to undermine the pathologising discourse from an academic perspective on the basis of evidence adduced. Engaging in speculation, ideological polemic, internecine psychoanalytic debate, character assassination or indeed ‘wild analysis’, would diffuse and detract from that focus.
Similarly, there would be no weight to the thesis if psychoanalysis did not have a wider social influence. A full enquiry into the role of psychoanalysis and particularly American society would be beyond the scope of this thesis. The influence of psychoanalysis is inferred at the confluence of specific examples, particularly as described in the modern context of public psychobiography. As Emily Eakin of the *New York Times* reported, ‘the psychological profile of Saddam Hussein that Dr. Post presented to members of Congress in 1990 was what convinced previously reluctant lawmakers to support the Persian Gulf war’ (Emily Eakin, *The New York Times*, 29th June, 2002; Omestad, 1994). With the US Senate majority for war being just five, only three would have had to have had their minds changed by Post, to potentially change the course of history. Even if those lawmakers could be asked, there is no actual way of telling what really decided them. What is possible, however, is to infer is that psychoanalytic perspectives were taken into account at such momentous times. Whether Post actually influenced the vote or not, the perception that he did is part of the discourse, and thus discursively creates its own influence. Whatever the precise nature of the direct influence, psychoanalysis is, in the US, clearly part of an establishment matrix.

With his background, Post is the quintessential link between the academy and policy makers. Post neatly sums up the influence of experts, such as himself, and by extension, that of his psychoanalytic perspective:

“To influence the public’s or the government’s perception of a problem by one’s writings ... The writings of serious students of social reality can, over time, lead members of a society - at all levels - to see an issue that was not seen before or to see an issue in a new fashion. Members of the policy community who have never met the writer in question, and may indeed not have read the book or article in question, will find themselves crafting policy answers that fit a situation that has been defined for them by the author. In effect, the policy community will absorb from the culture the definitions and interpretations that now have become “obvious,” “self-evident,” and “matter of fact.” Thus, if one does have impact, it can be significant. One will be framing the question and building the context in which the policy choices are made. No one is more powerful than the person who frames the question and - over time - academic scholars who make their thinking accessible
through their words to the government community can create the lenses through which the public and the government construe reality’

(Post and Ezekiel, 1988, p 508).

When policy makers call on experts such as Post, they will have a certain expectation of the form of information that they will receive, and how that information will be used to their advantage. Arguably, the decision to present a subject as pathological has already been made, in the decision to consult Post.

3 The Overarching Flaws Inherent in the Psychobiographic Project.

Simply deciding on a psychoanalytic analysis, whether it is of an individual or a group, inherently focuses on any putative ‘pathological’ functioning. Choosing or not choosing a particular subject is then a value laden decision in itself.

Because of its generally more limited historical scope, psychobiography tends to be reductive. Pathography as the clinically determined aspect of psychobiography reduces a complex life to the representation of a diagnosis. Emphasis on personality determination presents a simplistic view of complex socio-historical events.

As with psychoanalysis in general, psychobiographic interpretations are not readily falsifiable. The lack of psychobiographic evidence particularly in respect of the subject’s childhood means that similarly unfalsifiable psychic trajectories are constructed. Even contradictory evidence may not falsify psychobiographic analyses as it may be discounted as not being psychically significant or representing for example, a reaction formation.

There are, any number of possible interpretations of the same material, let alone possible selection criteria for data. As there is no objective means of validating any particular interpretation, within their own terms even obviously biased analyses may be perfectly feasible and consonant with psychoanalytic conceptualisations.
Psychoanalytic concepts that allow inference from adult behaviour, as in what the thesis has termed personological profiling, allows for a circular argument to pathologise from an *a priori* ideological position. Evidence can be selectively chosen commensurate with an ideological position, and an appropriate psychoanalytic concept deployed. For example, as terrorism is deemed pathological, an event in childhood may be inferred as traumatic, as that explains the adult pathology which in circular fashion will be deemed to have been caused by that same traumatic event in childhood.

Without the presence of a willing subject to analyse, the psychobiographer’s analysis has no interpretative validation. The analysis is then wholly predicated on one side of the ‘encounter’, reliant on the expertise of the psychobiographer, which will inherently validate his own position. Speculation is initially presented as expert intuition, then further as inference in the analysis and finally reified as evidence upon which to build further inference.

Reified inferences which are flawed or based on faulty evidence nonetheless become established in the literature. This is the case with the generally accepted psychoanalytic premise that terrorism arises out of marginality, and that individual terrorists have all suffered early traumatic experiences.

Methods designed to counteract bias such as the analysis of countertransference reaction similarly rely on the subjectivity of the analyst. Although the intrinsic virtue of a psychoanalytic analysis is that it may produce counterintuitive and indeed subjective findings, psychobiography seeks validation through conceptual and narrative coherence. Instead of being complex and contradictory, the subject is represented as a function of a particular one dimensional personality formation, as with Saddam Hussein the ‘malignant narcissist’.

Similarly, the psychobiographer may base his psychic trajectory on a parallel analytic case, which this thesis has termed clinical parallelism, in order to give his analysis a narrative unity. Although this means that the analysis is clinically coherent, the psychobiographic subject is then determined by another individual’s clinical narrative. This is then outside of the subject’s context, effectively an ahistorical analysis.
Psychoanalysis is a retrodictive rather predictive discipline. Expecting a psychoanalytic profile to predict the future behaviour of an individual or a group, is outside of its capacity, and also places an exaggerated emphasis on the influence of personality over any externally contingent or social forces. In the clinical context, the therapist is expected to influence the perception that the subject has of himself, in psychobiography, the psychobiographer seeks to influence the perception of the subject by others.

4 Bias and Personality Pathology Theory.

A basic premise of the therapeutic relationship is that the analyst seeks to ameliorate the condition of his patient. In adversarial personality pathology profiling the situation is reversed, the subject is a perceived enemy. Bias in this respect would appear understandable, indeed, it is expected. Singling out Post and Kobrin, two of the principal protagonists of this thesis, David Lotto believes that ‘the prevalence of this “pot calling the kettle black” genre of American psychohistory is that all Americans have been bombarded, from their first history lessons in elementary school through what is presented in the mainstream media, with material that is viewed from an American exceptionalism perspective’ (Lotto, 2012, p 278). When ‘Americans write and speak about psychopathology, unpleasant psychodynamics, or harmful child-rearing practices of “terrorists,” “Islamic Fundamentalists,” or any of the many groups, countries, or individual leaders who have been designated as enemies of this nation, they are vulnerable to bias primarily because of their identifications with the group which is said to be threatened by these enemies’ (Lotto, 2012, p 278).

The principle objective of the thesis has been to identify this bias as a pathologising discourse, representing a distinct paradigm within the psychoanalytic discipline of psychobiography. It was demonstrated that there was a developmental strand of personological pathologising from the early pathographies of Freud’s Vienna Circle in particular those of Isidor Sadger, through to the modern ‘at a distance’ political profiling of ideological adversaries. It was shown that the pathologising discourse was always determined by the ideological position, the agenda personal or political of the profiler. Ideological positions, are whether intentionally or not, then elided as psychoanalytic determinations. It is impossible
in such analyses to differentiate the psychoanalytic from the ideological, and that the acceptance of such analyses inherently involves an acceptance of the ideological position. In his psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci, the analytic ‘expectations’ of the atheist Freud, was that Leonardo would have escaped ‘from dogmatic religion’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 123).

As opposed to the accumulation of evidence for the chronological dénouement of an historical narrative, psychobiography is essentially ahistorical. Psychobiography and more particularly its pathographic form, begins with an interpretation or diagnosis and works back to find justificatory evidence. This clinical method of investigation in psychobiography is also inherently predicated on there being a clinical problem to investigate which inevitably tends to pathologise its subject. Evidence is accrued incrementally in historical research and interpretations may be refined to accommodate any new contradictory evidence. As psychobiography is predicated on an initial interpretation and based on a theoretical schema, the thesis proposed that evolving evidence contradictory to a clinical evaluation completely undermines the analysis. This was poignantly demonstrated with the discovering of homoerotic letters which problematised Victor Wolfenstein’s (1967) Oedipal analysis of Gandhi.

The thesis similarly identified that the wider findings of group or cultural analyses were being re-adduced as individual psychobiographic explanations. Terrorist groups may for example collectively exhibit the splitting and projection of borderline functioning, but this does not mean that the group is then made up of borderline individuals. Similarly, an Oedipal explanation of group or social conflict, does not signify that the individuals involved in that conflict are acting out problematic Oedipus complexes due to actual conflict with their parents. Indeed, this thesis makes the claim that to attribute individual developmental trajectories to individuals involved in contingent conflict, such as revolution or terrorism, represents a category error.

Inherent in the very choice of the psychobiographical subject is some form of agenda. The thesis demonstrated that in the modern clinical ‘at a distance’ political profiles, diagnoses of pathology are ideologically rather than clinically determined. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq were given practically identical Post (Post, 1979; Post, 1991). The diagnostic determination of
putative ally Sadat’s ‘grandiose narcissism’ was assessed, however, as an amiable ‘Barbara Walters syndrome’, whereas for the ideological adversary Saddam, the diagnosis was the seriously pathological syndrome of ‘malignant narcissism’.

The psychoanalytic concepts deployed in the modern ‘at a distance’ personality pathology profiles of Post et al., are chiefly the object relational theories of Melanie Klein, the ego psychology of Eric Erikson, the self psychology of Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg’s notions of malignant narcissism and borderline functioning. There are obvious evidential implications of ascribing pathology on the basis of theories mainly predicated on pre-Oedipal deficits and trauma in the acquisition of the self. As the requisite pre-Oedipal evidence could not normally come from the subject, the trauma that instigated later psychic deficits would necessarily need to be inferred from adult behaviour. It was then the analyst’s current perspective on his subject, rather than on any necessary evidence, which would determine the presentation of the subject’s psychic trajectory.

This form of personality assessment or as the thesis describes it, personological profiling, represents a more modern strand in psychobiography. This contrasts with what the thesis argued were traditional Freudian psychobiographies. What the thesis describes as characterological profiling, are predicated on the subject’s childhood history, sexual development and Oedipus complex. Ipso facto, characterological profiles necessitate delving as far as is known, into the individual’s childhood in order to explicate the relationship between early developmental stages and character formation. Characterological profiles offer the possibility of a more developed and nuanced profile, but frequently become embroiled in convoluted arcane and ultimately unsatisfactory speculations. The thesis argued that personological and characterological profiling represent two distinct strands within psychobiography, and presents this as a new analytic model for assessing psychobiographies.

Although psychoanalytic concepts can accommodate notions of terror and the terroriser, the thesis argued that psychoanalytic ascriptions of pathology could not be adduced for individuals in the particular contingent circumstance of terrorism. Whilst the terrorist is a somewhat nebulous and ill defined concept, psychoanalytic notions as deployed by the FBI for example, are a critical analytic tool for the motivational analysis in the psychic developmental trajectories of serial killers. In
discussing the reasons why the motivational model for serial killers could not be applied to terrorists, the thesis proposed that a distinction could be made between the collective intergenerational phantasies or ideologies which motivated terrorists, and the individual fantasy scripts which serial killers acted out.

An individual trauma which propels the subject into the group, and any idiosyncratic fantasy formation, would need to be subsumed within this primal phantasy and he would have to act at the behest of his group leaders. The phenomenon of the ‘lone wolf terrorist’ may seemingly bridge the conceptualisations of marginalised, traumatised, narcissistically wounded individuals who may also be killers, and ideological terrorism. But the ‘lone wolf’ is not a contingent subject, he decides how, where and when he will strike, and although he may be espousing a wider ideology, the act derives from his own psychic impulsion. The lone wolf is nearer not only to the serial killer, but also to a more transcendental psychoanalytic notion of a terroriser. The error, this thesis argues, is in attributing his psychic functioning to the wider cohort of contingent ‘terrorists’.

The thesis has argued that designating a specific ‘terrorist personality’ is logically flawed, a category error. An individual may be a terrorist leader at one stage in his career, and later as with Nelson Mandela, a Nobel Peace laureate. The same psychic development and personality formation would then have to explain both opposing aspects of this career, rendering it meaningless. Similarly, according to the Global Terrorism Index, of the ‘17,958 people who died in terrorist attacks in 2013, 82 percent were in one of five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria’ (Gilsinan, 2014). These are countries distinguished by having ongoing large scale conflicts. If terrorism were not simply a tactic employed in these conflicts, those countries would have to have developmentally accumulated an inordinate number of terrorist personalities prior to those conflicts.

Very large, although geographically circumscribed organisations, may be designated by various countries but not others, whole or in part, as terrorist. These include Hamas, which forms the democratically elected government of Gaza, and Hezbollah which has ministers in the Lebanese unity government. In order to function in the mainstream of political life, these organisations would necessarily contain a variety of personalities. Contrarily, Post claims that terrorists are
personalities on the margins of society, but even the research that he took this inference from (Clark, 1983), showed that the ETA terrorists were actually well integrated into their communities. Similarly, Kobrin’s proposition that the terrorist personality was an inevitable corollary of Islamic child rearing practices was shown to rely on wholly distorted evidence.

The overarching deficit in the psychobiographic project is the lack of a willing subject in person, and the thesis critiqued the methods employed in psychobiography to compensate for this. In a clinical analysis, from the patient’s story or anamnesis and his speech in the therapeutic encounter, the analyst makes his inferences and interpretations. For the psychobiographer, there is though no way of testing these inferences or interpretations, he can only make a presumption of how the psychobiographic subject would react. Reflecting the need to validate these presumptions, the thesis has identified a clinically derived psychobiographic method deployed as a form of facsimile analytic process, which has been termed ‘clinical parallelism’.

Because the psychobiographer is not looking for a guide to make interventions in an ongoing treatment, he seeks something to explain a possible psychic trajectory for an already decided narrative. He needs a linear spine on which to frame that narrative. Taking a parallel narrative avoids choosing between hundreds of possible inferences, and the comparison of an actual case and how it unfolded gives credibility to the account. Otherwise, it would appear as a wholly arbitrary choice of inferences. The intrinsic virtue of psychoanalysis is, however, in teasing out the counterintuitive and uniqueness of an individual. This conflict of approaches leads to the essential dilemma of the psychobiographic project. In order to be clinically validated, the analysis must meet known objective criteria, such as a resolved case history or therapeutic encounter but that obviates against its being a unique and bespoke psychoanalytic enquiry.

The case histories of actual patients may then be taken as reflecting the psychic trajectories of biographical subjects, notably by Freud in his Leonardo (2001/1910). Similarly, the method of enquiring into his subject may be paralleled by a clinical case, as with Volkan and his patient Gary for his analysis of Kemal Atatürk. In attempting to simulate the clinical context without direct subject involvement, this practice of clinical parallelism leads, the thesis argued, to an ahistorical psychically
determinist prognostic or predictive trajectory, that of the unfolding pathology of pathographic analyses.

As a corollary of the clinical parallelism deployed in the ‘at a distance’ clinical profiling of the pathologising discourse, subjects are necessarily ‘medicalised’. Prediction is then a form of prognostic trajectory determined by an analyst’s intuition or countertransference, which the thesis argues, is actually the analyst’s ideological position. In absence of the spontaneous corroborative iterative interaction with the subject, if contrary material is later uncovered, it is either theoretically rejected or reconciled by altering and subsuming it within the overarching ideological discourse. Indeed, such was the case with the extraordinary example of Renatus Hartogs, who re-imagined his own diagnostic findings, in order to fit with the new popular perception of Lee Harvey Oswald as a presidential assassin (Hartogs, 1953; Hartogs and Freeman, 1965). Hartogs had effectively recreated Oswald as an entirely different personality.

5 Psychobiography as a Personal Construct and a More Holistic Approach.

As a psychobiography is something of an intuited and interpreted personal construct of the analyst, the psychobiographic subject should, in the view of this thesis, be clearly demarcated as the creation of the psychobiographer. A basic problem of the psychobiographic project is in the expectation that it will find the ‘truth’ of the subject. No matter how insightful the analysis, there will always be lacunae in the clinical data, and no theoretical conceptualisation, clinical technique, ‘clinical parallelism’, or otherwise, can compensate for this. The discovery years after his death of Gandhi’s homoerotic correspondence had effectively made Gandhi a different psychic subject from the one analysed by Erikson (1993/1970). Erikson’s analysis is still insightful, but it’s not the truth of Gandhi, it is the truth of ‘Erikson’s Gandhi’.

William McKinley Runyan (1984) famously took thirteen of the most prominent psychodynamic theories of the time as to why Vincent Van Gogh had cut off his ear. Runyan proposed and demonstrated a number of criteria for assessing their relative validity, arguing that psychobiography could be evaluated against the ‘full range of available relevant evidence’ (Runyan, 1984, p 47). In the view of this
thesis, Runyan misses the point, because all of the explanations were valid within their own terms. The merit of a particular psychobiography, this thesis believes, should be assessed within its own terms because it will always lack or subjectively underplay some form of evidence. Instead of trying to assess a nebulous notion of capturing the ‘truth’ of its subject, the assessment would be on the consonance with its own evidence, how does this fit with a psychoanalytic understanding of the subject (i.e. the subject as a data set), and its resonance for the reader.

This would then lead full circle back to the original psychobiographic objectives of Freud’s Vienna Circle that of appraising psychoanalytic concepts in lieu of actual case histories, by reference to familiar figures both literary and historical. Indeed, this thesis would see no theoretical distinction between analysing historical, contemporary or literary figures. The distinction would clearly be in the existential consequences for living subjects.

A psychobiography would effectively be a psychoanalytic discussion paper normally of a particular aspect of the subject’s psyche, and the wider context of psychobiography would be a psychoanalytically informed cultural critique. Interestingly, the most exhaustive recent art historical research comes to the view that Vincent’s artistic companion Paul ‘Gauguin, a fencing ace, most likely sliced off the ear with his sword during a fight, and the two artists agreed to hush up the truth’ (Angelique Chrisafis, The Guardian, 4th of May, 2009). In this scenario, the thirteen explanations as to why Vincent cut off his ear would then have no external validity. They would, however, still be interesting and valid psychoanalytic perspectives on why someone such as Vincent, might have done something as traumatic as cutting off his ear.

As the thesis has argued, a psychobiography is an integrated narrative with a teleological conclusion, not an historical work in progress. It has a trajectory predicated on its theoretical and ideological conception of the subject. The very narrative unity of a profile may create an inflated sense of understanding of the subject. This may not only overestimate the subject’s personality coherence, but also the material real world significance of that individual in a complex socio-historical context. Similarly, creating a coherent developmental trajectory to explain past behaviour does not necessarily translate into any facility for prediction. Clinical profiles may scientise evil and give a window of comprehension on perhaps
otherwise incomprehensible cruelty, but as a corollary they may also give scientific credibility and legitimacy to the demonization of their subject, by validating what is actually an ideologically driven pathologising discourse.

It is possible, then, to present an ideological rather than a psychoanalytic analysis, by only analysing one side of a conflict. Yasser Arafat and the PLO are collectively designated by Post as authors of their own misfortune, caught in a repetition compulsion, always sabotaging their own prospects. A more holistic psychoanalytic perspective of such a conflict would also entail a differential ideological perspective. In her own psychoanalytic assessment of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Linda Robinson believes that the problem is one of memory and forgetting. Each side becomes indifferent to the other’s pain through ‘an over-determined preoccupation with their own suffering’ (Robinson, 2003, p 155). Israel has dissociated its anguished memory of being stateless which ‘allows it to oppress another whose wishes mirror its own’ (ibid). Whilst the Palestinian yearning for a state has resulted in ‘terrorizing killing and maiming Israelis’ (Robinson, 2003, p 155). In turn, Arafat becomes ‘the debased other onto whom some Israelis can project despised and disowned qualities, and thus can feel superior’ (ibid).

Finding psychic deficits on both sides of a conflict, whilst it may seemingly even out obvious bias, still inherently pathologises what might be a legitimate struggle for one or indeed both parties to the conflict, and by extension the participants. There is, particularly in clinically oriented psychoanalytic analyses of those labelled as terrorist, a presumption of pathology. What is needed, this thesis argues, is a body of psychoanalytic research that does not make this pathologising presumption. Based on interview material and so not part of the research methodology, this author’s perspective is put forward in a paper to be published in the Journal of Terrorism Research (Geoghegan, 2016, in press). Instead of acting out an individual narcissistic injury through the terrorist group, the individuals in that group may actually be rational actors seeking to assuage the narcissistic injuries inflicted upon a whole culture. These individuals are not themselves narcissistically injured, traumatised and marginalised, but rather, those group members who have a greatly heightened sense of belonging. They take it upon themselves to carry the burden of the narcissistically injured culture as a function of their own identities, actively seeking to lance a festering national wound.
The trauma to the nation in effect becomes a narcissistic aspect of the collective ego, and it is clung to as a badge of honour reflecting a sense of national identification. Thus, the object introjected is the sense of loss transmuted onto the individual ego in a narcissistic identification. This may be the humiliation of the Great Irish Famine, the demeaning effects of apartheid in South Africa or the shame of French defeat in 1940. There is ambivalence between loving one’s country and humiliation at its defeat, a narcissistic wound manifesting as a cultural stain on both the national and individual psyche.

The mourning for an ambivalently loved object gives rise, in Klein’s schema, for a concern to put matters right which she terms reparation (Klein, 1987/1946). There is a psychic need to take upon themselves the reparations needed to grieve, and thus resolve, the mourning process. This may be mourning for the loss of national liberty or pride, for example. Particular individuals, who identify more intensely with their country or culture, feel the weight of this national melancholia bearing down on them, more acutely than others. The reparative process for them involves restoring the obsessively mourned object and thus shoring up their individual psyches, by joining a ‘resistance’ movement in order to heal the national wound.

Although the personality pathology model is the dominant psychoanalytic paradigm in explaining political violence, there is no particular reason in psychoanalysis, why either social upheaval or individual participation in it should be regarded as normatively pathological. The culture-wide melancholia induced by national trauma reflects a universal nationalist aspiration, so that individuals acting upon that sentiment could not, in Freud’s terms, be regarded as individually pathological. For an individual neurosis, Freud explains, ‘we take as our starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to “normal”. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background could exist’ (Freud, 2001/ 1930, XXI, p 144).

If anything, revolutionary activity is part of an evolutionary process; there are ‘victors and vanquished who turn into masters and slaves. The justice of the community then becomes an expression of the unequal degrees of power…the oppressed members of the group make constant efforts to obtain more power…from unequal justice to justice for all…a solution by violence, ending in the
establishment of a fresh rule of law’ (Freud, 2001/1933, XXII, p 206).

Decolonization as a process was, in Frantz Fanon’s view, a necessarily violent
phenomenon. The ‘native discovers reality and transforms it into a pattern of his
customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom’ (Fanon,

The conflicts arising were exploited by the superpowers to extend their spheres
of influence, irrespective of the particular merits of the regimes they either
supported or opposed (Fanon, 2001/1963). It is authoritarian regimes themselves,
Nancy Caro Hollander argues, that split the world ‘into good and evil - Western
Civilization vs. “subversion;” the projection of everything bad onto a hated object
(the “subversive”) with the consequent need to control it for fear of being controlled
by it’ (Caro Hollander, 2006, p 4). Revolutionary violence would then derive from
the resultant trauma, deprivation and frustration, with ‘groups seeking a radical
change in the social order, often based on attitudes of love, concern, and
responsibility for others’ (Caro Hollander, 2006, p 3).

Psychoanalysis as a depth psychology should be able to eschew
political/ideological considerations in respect of the justice (or otherwise) of a
particular cause or any consequent moral opprobrium over the tactics employed
(i.e. terrorism). However irrational or morally reprehensible any particular side of a
conflict might appear the individual response to it may be otherwise psychically
quite rational, and within the context, morally recognisable. If the subject position
of the analyst is not a strictly normative and establishment one, as it is with
personality pathology theorists, there is the possibility of taking a psychoanalytic
perspective that does not ideologically create the ‘pathological’ adversary.
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