Towards formal analysis of insider threats for auctions

Kammueller, Florian, Kerber, Manfred and Probst, Christian (2016) Towards formal analysis of insider threats for auctions. In: ACM-CCS Workshop on Management of Security of Insider Threats, 28 Oct 2016, Vienna, Austria. (doi:10.1145/2995959.2995963)

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This paper brings together the world of insider threats and auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine supported modelling and verification techniques is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combination of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Keywords (uncontrolled): auctions, formal methods, insider threat
Research Areas: A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science > Foundations of Computing group
Item ID: 20560
Notes on copyright: © 2016 ACM. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was published in Proceedings of the 8th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats (MIST '16),
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Depositing User: Florian Kammueller
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2016 11:16
Last Modified: 02 Jun 2019 00:52

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