An overview of analysis of security standards for authentication in distributed systems.
Gemikonakli, Orhan and Eneh, Agozie (2005) An overview of analysis of security standards for authentication in distributed systems. In: Proceedings : and the proceedings of workshops: WIS '05, MSVVEIS '05, NLUCS '05, IWUC '05, WOSIS '05, CSAC '05, PRIS '05, WSMDEIS '05 and DCEIS '05 ; Miami, U.S.A., May 24 - 28, 2005. Weghorn, Hans, ed. INSTICC, Setúbal. ISBN 9789728865245
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In this paper, we present our analysis of the leading standards for authentication in distributed systems in order to illustrate the extensibility of a finite proof system initially adopted by  but could only be illustrated with Woo and Lam protocol. Our inference rule proved that Kerberos version 5 remains vulnerable in scenarios of an attacker having unlimited communication and computational power especially in a single broadcast network. This vulnerability can aid a masquerade participating in the protocol. We also prove the possibility of a masquerade attack when an intruder participates in the SAML protocol. Though our inference rule, as part of our pre-emptive protocol tool still in early stages of development, may show some analytical difficulties, it has the potential to reveal subtle flaws that may not be detected by rules of the same family.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Research Areas:||A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer and Communications Engineering
A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science > SensoLab group
|Depositing User:||Repository team|
|Date Deposited:||02 Apr 2009 12:41|
|Last Modified:||13 Oct 2016 14:13|
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