Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries

Pascual-Ezama, David and Fosgaard, Toke R. and Cardenas, Juan C. and Kujal, Praveen and Veszteg, Robert and Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz and Gunia, Brian and Weichselbaumer, Doris and Hilken, Katharina and Armenak, Antinyan and Delnoij, Joyce and Proestakis, Antonis and Tira, Michael D. and Patromo, Yulius and Jaber-López, Tarek and Branas-Garza, Pablo (2015) Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 116 . pp. 379-386. ISSN 0167-2681

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Abstract

Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their
institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across sixteen countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens' honesty for our sample countries.

Item Type: Article
Keywords (uncontrolled): Honesty corruption economic experiments cultural differences
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
A. > Business School > Economics > Behavioural Economics group
Item ID: 16806
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Pablo Branas Garza
Date Deposited: 08 Jun 2015 09:16
Last Modified: 13 Oct 2016 14:35
URI: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/16806

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