Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: theory and experimental evidence

Benito-Ostolaza, Juan M. and Branas-Garza, Pablo and Hernández, Penélope and Sanchis-Llopis, Juan A. (2015) Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 57 . pp. 134-147. ISSN 2214-8043

PDF - Final accepted version (with author's formatting) Restricted to Repository staff and depositor only until 1 August 2018. Download (650kB) | Request a copy

Abstract

In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and obtain the striking result of full segregation in most of the cases. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies is notably reduced when the cost of moving is high, but it is not affected when it is low, relative to the baseline with costless moving. We also find that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects relative of a baseline model where moving is costless.

Actions (login required)

Edit Item