FINANCIAL CRIME AFTER THE CRISIS IN THE UK

CRIMEN FINANCIADO TRAS LA CRISIS EN EL REINO UNIDO

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ABSTRACT

Financial crime is a large area of political and social enquiry and includes a variety of illicit conducts that need to be isolated and addressed as discrete offences. Financial operations, however, may cause harm even when they do not possess a criminal nature, as events relating to the 2008 bank crisis have shown. This paper is concerned with both typologies, namely with illicit and licit harmful behaviour adopted by financial actors. In the first section, the paper focuses on the measures proposed or adopted in response to the 2008 crisis in the UK. This is followed by the presentation...
of a number of recent cases proving that, despite recent regulatory efforts, large loopholes are still present which allow forms of financial crime to thrive.

**KEYWORDS:** Discrete crimes, Money laundering, Proposals, Types, Cases.

**RESUMEN**

Delitos financieros es una gran área de investigación política y social e incluyen una variedad de conductas ilícitas que deben ser aisladas y tratadas como delitos discretos. Las operaciones financieras, sin embargo, pueden causar daño aun cuando no poseen carácter penal, como han demostrado los acontecimientos relacionados con la crisis bancaria de 2008. Este artículo se refiere a dos tipologías; es decir, con comportamientos nocivos ilícitos y licita adoptada por los actores financieros. En la primera sección, el trabajo se centra en las medidas propuestas o adoptado en respuesta a la crisis de 2008 en el Reino Unido. Esto es seguido por la presentación de una serie de casos recientes demuestra que, a pesar de los recientes esfuerzos regulatorios, grandes lagunas todavía presentes que permiten formas de delitos financieros para prosperar.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** Delitos discretos, Lavado de dinero, Propuestas, Tipos, Casos.

**HOT MONEY**

Stricter regulations aiming to unearth hidden (furtive or hot) money are usually embedded in the assumption that the bulk of this money is drug-related, namely part of the proceeds of criminal organizations. In reality, amongst the various operations contributing to the international volume of hot money, consideration should be given to tax evasion, illegal exportation of capital by entrepreneurs operating in hidden economies, international bribes and movements of finances from developing countries benefiting from international aids. The last portion includes money which is not spent or invested locally, but returns to the developed countries as illegally exported capital. This money is often deposited in the very banks that acted as intermediaries for the aids given (Ruggiero, 2015; Money Laundering Bulletin, 2014).

Regulations in this area, while attempting to hit on conventional criminal groups, appear to be inspired by the necessity to leave other actors untouched. In brief, regulations mainly address organised crime while ignoring white collar crime, and there is a danger that, were such regulations too strict, they would produce the unintended consequence of hampering the latter as well. We can therefore argue that, while organised criminals and white collar offenders, in this specific arena, commit the same violations and often use the same techniques, their treatment is differentiated. The following outline of the measures proposed and/or introduced in response to the 2008 financial crisis sets the scene for an understanding of how this differentiated treatment is likely to take shape.

**PREVENTING FUTURE CRISES?**

As mentioned at the beginning, not all financial activities can be labelled as criminal, although they may be socially harmful. Responses to the crisis, one would assume, should be capable of tackling both criminal and non-criminal harmful activities carried
out in the financial sphere. Let us see, in the broad summary below, how the authorities formulated their responses.

**The basel committee**

The primary international forum for the co-ordination of financial regulation is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, based at the Bank for International Settlements – the so-called central bankers’ bank (Martin, 2013). In Basel, regulatory weapons to mitigate financial hazard have been designed in the past, such as rules requiring banks to keep a specified quantity of cash or highly liquid securities in their portfolios. This requirement has the function of a tax, in the sense that it imposes a cost on banks that decide to act in an adventurous manner. It is like the tax some would like to impose on polluting industries. However, in the financial sphere all rules are extremely difficult to enforce, because they are normally non-binding rules. Moreover, some commentators would endorse the argument that all regulatory measures, particularly those making banking operations more costly, have a perverse effect. If banks are required to raise capital as a form of guarantee to avoid future crashes, the argument goes, the cost they incur will make the crush even worse. This will mean scarcity of liquidity, therefore a restriction in the ability of banks to give loans. And of course, loans and other forms of credit given to entrepreneurs are essential for the economic recovery. So, the paradox of regulatory measures in response to the crisis is that they exacerbate the crisis (ibid).

In December 2009, the Basel Committee reiterated that banks had entered the crisis with too little capital and poor efficiency. Harmonising the capital reserves, monitoring standards of bank liquidity and establishing a ‘leverage ratio’ were among the suggestions made. The issue of assessing and predicting risk in financial operations was also raised.

The document released by the Basel Committee made some commentators observe that it is not enough to ‘tighten a screw here and put in a new nail there’: the entire ship of banking regulation needs a thorough overhaul (Hellwig, 2010). Moreover, the regulatory community was accused of sticking to a tradition of discussing among bureaucratic cognoscenti, without even trying to explain to the public at large the effects that the new measures were expected to produce.

As for the proposed measures oriented toward prediction of risk, these were deemed ineffective, because risk cannot be reliably measured.

**Managers directive**

In July 2011, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe issued an ‘Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’. The Directive regulates EU managers who deal with hedge funds and private equity funds, it establishes general operating conditions and limits to leverage, while calling for transparency and stricter supervision. It also fixes a ceiling for remunerations and bonuses for bankers and brokers, while requiring the appointment of independent risk managers and

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1 In finance, leverage is a general term for any technique to multiply gains. Most often this involves buying more of an asset by using borrowed funds. The belief is that the income from the asset will exceed the cost of borrowing. As the 2008 crisis demonstrates, this involves the risk that borrowing will be larger than the income from the asset, causing loss or even collapse.
evaluators. Although EU countries were expected to turn the provisions of the Directive into national legislation, as of April 2014, 16 member states had failed to do so. Asset managers employed in the UK regard the Directive as an obstacle to competition and, in their opinion, will reduce the number of overseas agents operating in the EU.

**Regulatory bodies**

Discussions following the immediate aftermath of the crisis indicated that reform had to focus on the relationship between governments and independent regulatory bodies. Design faults in the administrative and regulatory machinery were detected. As a remedy, suggestions were put forward to set up committees formed of politicians and professional economists, with a view to exercising overall control over business conduct, on the one hand, and over systemic issues, on the other (Goodhart, 2008). Regulation, however, does not affect shadow banking, which in fact ends up attracting an increasing number of traders who feel that the restraints prevents them from operating.

**Cross-border consequences**

Due to short-sightedness, the crisis was initially regarded as affecting individual countries, therefore, its cross-border consequences were almost totally neglected. Bailing out banks was perceived as a domestic issue and it remained unknown how the loss burden arising from transnational institutions might be handled. Only later were international changes invoked, through a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on cooperation for cross-border financial stability, prompting the joint action of supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the European Union countries (Praet and Nguyen, 2008). The Financial Stability Forum took the lead in the process, recommending stricter monitoring of liquidity and risk and the enhancement of transparency. However, such recommendations were accompanied by an underlying belief in the disciplinary role of markets, thus displaying an implicit scepticism towards the very measures suggested. Authorities were asked to investigate whether adding new requirements to adaptive market practices would be advisable or might end up being redundant. Market practices, in brief, were and are still deemed ‘adaptive’ and self-disciplined, irrespective of the damage caused.

The type of transparency advocated was linked to the capacity of public authorities to gather information, assess liquidity and appraise performance. Transparency, therefore, did not entail stricter institutional control, but rather the possibility of quantifying losses and covering them with public funds. This appears to be the only acceptable state intervention tolerated by financial institutions. The network established by the Financial Stability Forum was therefore required to gather data around financial practices, ‘encourage mutual exchange of information that are necessary for the proper execution of the mandate of each institution’ (ibid: 371). The rescue operations made it clear what the mandate of governments had to be. Due to the global dimension of the crisis, authorities in all the countries involved were asked to cooperate to resolve the crisis situation. The case of Greece shows how third countries were expected to contribute to the solution of the crisis. Greece had been helped by international authorities to forge its public accounts, and because the crush
affected all, the country was forced to bear the brunt of unprecedented austerity measures.

Internationalisation of finance meant that all national bond markets were affected, and in countries such as Ireland and Spain domestic taxpayers found themselves footing the bill for bank recapitalisation that benefited foreign bondholders. In sum, responses to the crisis, at least in Europe, took the form of austerity packages producing further increases in unemployment and growing public unrest (Calhoun and Derluguiian, 2001; Turner, 2013).

‘When, on 31 January 2011, Anglo-Irish Bank – which had been recapitalised to the tune of 25.3 billion euros by Irish taxpayers – repaid in full and on schedule a 750 million euro bond to its investors, the distribution of risk under the new regime of sovereign credit support for banks was on stark display. The total cuts to welfare spending in that year’s Irish budget amounted to a little over the same amount’ (Martin, 2013: 238).

In the past, it was acceptable that ordinary citizens helped bond-holders, because almost everybody, through pension and mutual funds, was a bond-holder. But with the growing polarisation of wealth, an elite has taken shape which detains large quantities of assets and then, when in trouble, expects to be bailed out by those who detain little.

In brief, the need for, and the form of public intervention were and still are taken as an undisputable given. The principles enunciated by the Forum reaffirmed ‘the primacy of private sector solutions’, but ‘when a strictly private-sector solution cannot be found, public funds have to be mobilised’ (Praet and Nguyen, 2008: 372). Authorities, by intervening, do not have to rescue those harmed by the financial crisis, but simply attempt to strengthen market players’ confidence. Finally, it was felt that public intervention could not be restrained through ex-ante rules, but had to remain ‘open’ to contingent necessities emerging by future crises. With this, state intervention in support of financial markets was not only definitively ratified, but all qualitative and quantitative limits to that intervention were lifted. Rescue operations carried out with public resources, on the other hand, were encouraged by the awareness that the financial crisis was noticeably more acute in countries where the supervision of banks was carried out by an independent agency rather than by the central bank.

**Regulating Europe**

‘A crisis is a terrible thing to waste’, goes the motto, meaning of course that errors committed in the past can bring to more efficient arrangements. Not so in the UK, where ‘light touch’ regulation is still preferred, and where reform finds an impervious terrain, showing how the conflicting interests of EU member states are significant (Begg, 2009). Regulating the activities of financial intermediaries, for example, is problematic for the EU because of the clashes between national sensitivities. Disagreements are hard to avoid as to how best reach a coherent approach to cross-border risks and burden-sharing. ‘The UK has sought to avoid a dominant role for EU bodies in supervision which could pose a competitive threat to the City of London’ (ibid: 1121). The new European System of Financial Supervisors outflanks the problem by granting an enhanced role to national supervisors. No changes in this specific area can therefore be recorded.
The situation is compounded by the pace and creativity of financial innovation, which forces regulation to chase developments rather than prevent, let alone cause them. This notwithstanding, the willingness to act on the part of the European Central Bank may be genuine. In a statement released by its President in 2009, the opportunity for an important institutional change was pointed out, along with the necessity to adapt the supervisory framework to the new financial landscape. Faced with the considerable increase in European financial integration observed in recent years: ‘The ECB/Eurosystem stands ready to accept any additional responsibilities that the member states may wish to assign to us in accordance with the Treaty’ (Trichet, 2009: 15)

The operations of individual financial intermediaries, for example, are regulated at the domestic level, but operators at the same time enjoy a EU metaphorical passport of sort: once they are authorised in one member state, they are entitled to do business in others. Changing the rules in this respect amounts to interfering with both domestic and European legislation. A further problem arises from the fact that the euro area and the EU have different forms and intensity of membership, so that the interplay between monetary policy and financial regulation is complicated and ‘raises questions about which institution should take the lead at EU level’ (ibid: 1114).

A further issue affecting European integration is that, as we have seen, ultimately taxpayers bear the risk of financial market failures. Because taxpayers are national, not European subjects, it is at the national level that austerity measures are designed as a result. Yet, financial operations involve a number of countries simultaneously, hence the unfair situation in which those nations burdened with cuts and penalties find themselves. For instance, the collapse of a British bank may lead to calls on taxpayers from other member states to foot the bill, but the negative reaction on the part of non-British nationals can be easily predicted. For this reason, authorities designing new regulations hesitate and fail to take action, thus exacerbating risk for future failings.

The Volcker rule

In early 2009, President Obama appointed an Economic Recovery Advisory Board, chaired by Paul Volcker, a former Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The Board was tasked with making proposals for the reform of the financial sector. In the UK, the newly-formed coalition government, in June 2010, created an Independent Commission on Banking under the leadership of the eminent Oxford economist Sir John Vickers. The Volcker and the Vickers groups had slightly differing views, but ended up recommending similar policies, specifically the separation of banking activities into distinct sectors. A line was drawn between client-oriented and proprietary banking, retail and wholesale markets. The Volcker rule is understood as a ban on proprietary trading by commercial banks. Volcker argued that banks engaged in high-risk speculation were damaging the entire system and that the growing use of derivatives had to be halted. As of February 2013, the rule had not yet been implemented, and the US Congress discussed an amended, weaker version, therefore proposing the reduction rather than prohibition of hedge fund ownership by banks (Goldstein, 2014). It was found later that the Volcker rule, in the new version, was having little effect on their profits. European Union countries have also discussed the rule, reaching the conclusion that limitations rather than a total ban on hedge funds

dealing by banks are acceptable. In both Europe and the US, however, the very discussion of the Volcker rule has caused an exodus of traders from large banks to small hedge fund dealers, thus reproducing the grey financial area that contributed to the crisis in the first place.

In the UK, the distinction between investment banks and retail banks has not marked the decline of ‘packages’, which are still available while regulators are impotent. They are underfunded and have little experience. At times they ignore what exactly they have to check or regulate. It is bankers themselves who advise clumsy regulators as to what they should look into.

The Volcker rule may be ineffective in the USA because of the proven symbiotic relationship between politicians and financiers (Prins, 2014). However, it is felt that banks in the USA are more vulnerable to political backlash than in Britain: it is more likely for the ‘bad boys’ of Wall Street to be juxtaposed to the ‘decent boys’ of Main Street than for the City of London to be seen as ‘bad or indecent’.

More radical proposals, transcending the potential impact of the Volcker rule, revolve around two opposite scenarios. The first would see the privatisation of risks, and consists of restructuring the banking system so that investors bear all potential costs, as well as all the profits (Dermine, 2013). The second would see a redesigning of the system so that all risks are socialised: in this way taxpayers enjoy the benefits but also cover the costs of possible bailouts.

The haldane doctrine

The Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, Andrew Haldane, admitted that the financial crush made ‘the riches be privatised and the rags socialised’. But it was nobody’s fault: ‘For the most part the financial crisis was not the result of individual wickedness or folly. It was not a story of pantomime villains and village idiots. Instead, the crisis reflected a failure of the entire system of financial sector governance’ (Haldane, 2013: 21). Putting events in historical perspective, he also explained that in the first half of the 19th century the business of banking was simple: the owners-managers backed the bank’s losses with their own personal finances. Shareholder funds (so-called equity capital) protected clients from loss and bank directors excluded investors who were financially weak in facing risk. Things changed with the emergence of giants embracing the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine.

‘At the start of the 20th century, the assets of the UK’s three largest banks accounted for less than 10 per cent of GDP. By 2007, that figure had risen above 200 per cent of GDP. When these institutions hit problems, a bad situation can become catastrophic. In this crisis, as in past ones, catastrophe insurance was supplied not by private creditors but by taxpayers. Only they had pockets deep enough to refloat banks with such huge assets. This story has been repeated for the better part of a century and a half; in evolutionary terms, we have had survival not of the fittest but the fattest. I call this phenomenon doom loop (ibid: 22).

In Haldane’s view, ownership and control of banks have been left in the hands of a myriad of agents and brokers taking high risk and receiving large incentives. In this situation, while the losers are easy to identify, the beneficiaries should be found among small-term investors lured into quick-profit operations. His proposals for reform hinge on reshaping risk-taking incentives on a durable basis and increasing
the equity capital of banks. Such measures would increase the banks’ capacity to absorb loss and reduce the risk they can take. The proposals of the Basel Committee mentioned above constitute, in his opinion, a significant piece of reform in this respect.

Bank governance and control, in Haldane’s argument, should be improved through increasing expertise and granting more power to risk committees. Voting rights within banks should be extended to wider groups of stakeholders, thus establishing genuine principles of democratic governance. Of course, pluralism in boards of governors comes at a cost: consensual decisions are slow to reach and action can become ineffective. But this is balanced by the benefits pluralism produces in avoiding catastrophic errors.

In his evolutionary analysis, Haldane highlighted the increasing role played by ‘economic formality’, with mathematics underpinning models, predictions and concepts being formalised to the point of shaping a theological doctrine. Businesses, in the past, would have on their boards experts in the area in which they operated. Now, he noted, all businesses, irrespective of the area, employ experts in economics and financial matters. On the contrary, it should be acknowledged that even experts have imperfect information and are surrounded by uncertainty, and economists in general should have a narrower view of themselves (Davies, 2012). Ultimately, a good leap forward was achieved in splitting up banks and diversifying their activities, with the distinction between retail and propriety institutions. As for the 2008 crisis, Haldane concluded, mistakes were made, although they were ‘honest’, not fraudulent mistakes, and anyone would have made them given how uncertain the world is.

Critics of the Haldane doctrine note that the amount of public funds spent to rescue financial firms outweighs the annual expenditure for social security and education and is almost equal the expenditure for health (MacKenzie, 2013). The Basel Committee has never been effective in enforcing rules and has been too generous to banks in establishing the amount of liquidity these were prompted to possess (Pinto, 2014). Challenging Haldane’s view that individuals and boards of governors were not to be deemed responsible for the crisis: ‘The bonus culture requires radical change, much more than the response Haldane suggest. Senior bank executives and board members should be liable to charges of negligence and reckless lending in the event of bank failure and subject to suspension. Unless we get rid of the chancers and rogues, the most determined regulation will have no effect whatsoever’ (ibid: 231).

On the other hand, little attention has been given to how ‘corporate personalities’ develop, collective intentions are shaped and practices applied. A deep analysis of such issues might definitively help apportioning blame and identifying preventative measures (Amatrudo, 2012).

**Business as usual?**

Authors remarking the lack of major prosecutions of companies or individuals after the crisis point out the influence of large financial institutions on law-making and regulation, as well as the high status of potential defendants (Pontell and Black, 2014; Rakoff, 2014). Examinations of recent transnational responses highlight how the complexity of cross-border financial linkages makes rules difficult to implement. This is due, among other things, to the persistent tensions between transnational measures and national policies. The on-going power of private actors, moreover, is said to have made regulatory responses fall short of what would be needed (Porter, 2014). However, among the concerns of agencies and individual senior operators supporting new bank
regulations are ‘cyber risks’ which may have systemic implications, the survival of the ‘too big to fail’ credo, the future low levels of interest rates caused by excessive regulation, and the growth of non-bank institutions taking on the role of financing the economy. On this last point, we have seen the fast move of intermediaries towards alternative financial firms as a response to the Volcker rule. On the prospect of declining rates of interests for investors, commentators fail to predict how this will encourage new forms of financial criminality as a way of making up for the interests lost. On ‘cyber risks’ we are uncertain whether this refers to new forms of criminality spreading in the domain of financial fraud. In brief, the concerns expressed encompass white collar as well as organised forms of conventional criminality that may be undeterred by the array of new regulations discussed and/or implemented. This section lists a series of recent episodes proving the apparent inefficacy of regulations.

**Zombie funds**

The City regulator called in lawyers to scrutinize the announcement of an investigation into 30 million pension and investment policies. The news sent shares in leading British insurers tumbling (Collinson and Osborne, 2014). The policies scrutinized were sold in the 1980s and 1990s and savers were trapped by penalty charges of 10%-12% and in some cases more than 20% if they wanted to move their money. The first two years of contribution by savers covered commissions earned by salespersons and annual charges were around 4% per year. These policies are still in use and the regulator assured financial firms that no compensation for customers would be imposed. Loss by savers is called “market value adjuster”. Customers, in brief, are trapped in funds where the annual bonuses have often fallen to zero and where they do not have access to their savings until retirement age. Regulators, on the other hand, cannot review the millions of policies individually; they cannot remove exit penalties without an ad hoc piece of legislation; they are impotent when it comes to introducing change in sales practices, and cannot apply current standard retrospectively, let alone calling for compensation of savers.

This case prompts two observations. First, investigations such as this determine a plunge in share values, therefore they are feared by firms as well as customers, with the former pointing out the damaging effects that any attempt at regulation may produce. The status quo, in this view, is less harmful than any sort of external intervention. Second, disappointment and fear by savers may lead competing firms to offer their own services, persuading people to move money out of their pension to their own schemes. Such unsolicited offers of help may hide yet more speculative or even fraudulent purposes.

**Libor interest rates**

The ‘London interbank offered rate’ (Libor) was involved in criminal activity (illegally establishing currency exchange rates) affecting more than a dozen institutions on three continents. Investors were outraged when the scale of the offence was revealed, with Barclays Bank being asked to pay £290m in penalties for moving the exchange benchmarks and thus gaining illicit profits (Ruggiero, 2013). An enquiry led to three employees being charged by the Serious Fraud Office for conspiracy to fix Libor interest rates. According to the SFO the offences took place between August 2006 and September 2010, therefore before but also well after the effects of the 2008
crisis came to light (Bowers, 2014). It is worth noting that Britain, through its own SFO only intervened when a similar initiative in the form of criminal investigation had been taken by its US counterpart, thus revealing a climate of competition among countries. Such competition, as this case shows, results in national regulators turning a blind eye to their compatriots’ financial criminality and adopting a harsh stance towards that of others.

**Co-op Bank**

This bank had a £1.5bn deficit in 2013 and was bailed out by hedge-fund investors and the wider Co-operative Group. In 2014, the Bank admitted that it needed a further £400m to balance its accounts (Armitage and Goodway, 2014). Mis-selling of pension schemes and interest-rate-hedging products were certified, as well as breaches of the Consumer Credit Act. Shareholders, largely consisting of hedge funds and institutions, will be required to foot the bill.

The Co-op Group was itself in turmoil after the resignation of its chief executive. The situation further alienated the ethical investors traditionally attracted to the Co-op Bank’s previous collective ownership structure. Some charities began looking for alternative places to bank after the hedge funds became the majority of shareholders. The Co-op Bank confirmed that it will cut 1,000 jobs from its 10,000-strong workforce and close 30 of its branches.

Cases such as this may become more frequent in the future due to the changing features and compositions of the National Audit Office. The NAO warned that a brain drain from Britain’s City watchdogs has led to their employing thousands of inexperienced staff. A report published by NAO expressed grave concerns that a third of staff at the Financial Conduct Authority have less than two years’ experience while a quarter of leavers from the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority are rated top performers. On the contrary, it would be vital for both watchdogs to attract and retain the right staff to cope with the challenges arising from the financial crisis. The report stressed the importance of effective oversight of an industry that is valued at more than £234bn. Regulated firms paid £664m in the 2013-2014 financial year to keep their regulators running, 24 per cent more than in the previous year. The increase is said to result from expensive and time-consuming investigations. Therefore, firms can claim that regulation is wasteful. Problems are compounded by the realisation by some regional directors of the astronomical level of remuneration enjoyed by top managers before and even after the crisis. But, as some commentators keep suggesting: ‘The rich deserve to be rich’ (Krugman, 2014).

**Lloyds banking group**

One of Britain’s biggest banks has cost victims of the payment protection insurance (PPI) scandal tens of millions of pounds by wrongly cutting their compensation awards. Lloyds Banking Group, which is 33 per cent owned by the taxpayer, has been cutting pay-outs to victims who were mis-sold the notorious insurance policies intended to cover loan payments if borrowers found themselves unable to work. Loans were mainly linked to property mortgages. In many cases, the fine print meant that customers could never make a claim. This is a case of a taxpayer-sponsored bank depriving taxpayers of their rightful compensation by using a loophole (Harper, 2014).
This case shows that the banking system itself is the root cause of severe
instability. More than three quarters of bank loans are linked to property and this
creates a self-fuelling boom-and-bust cycle. The availability of credit pushes up
property prices and, as prices rise, they encourage a further round of speculative
borrowing and buying – pushing prices up even more and well beyond what is
sustainable in the long term. When the bust comes, the spiral goes into reverse and
the deleveraging causes huge pain throughout the economy. The role of banks in
economic textbooks is to provide capital to entrepreneurs to build businesses. That
happens very little. We can suggest that today, the role of banks is to finance
speculation in second-hand property.

Equity returns, on the other hand, have declined since the 1990s, as money
profits are appropriated by intermediaries. Fund managers do what is good for them
and for the fund management business, and this is not always the same as what is
good for the clients. Bending or mis-interpreting rules leads to momentum
investments, which are not proven illicit as yet. But this reduces the business risk
while the client suffers from poor performance. Fund managers try to compensate for
poor returns by supporting greater incentives for management to perform – hence the
explosion of executive pay and bonuses. But far from encouraging performance,
bonuses are making management risk-averse and thereby condemning businesses to
decline (managers would not give loans to entrepreneurs). Instead, managers will
accumulate enough money to make their family secure for three generations. Short-
termism is the key.

Channel islands

The channel islands, particularly Jersey, Guernsey, Sark and the Isle of Man,
continue to play their role. Described as ‘the worst tax dodgers’, they are inaccessible
to foreign authorities engaged in investigations on tax evasion and financial fraud. In
the Isle of Man there are thousands of completely unsupervised companies whose
owners are hidden. In Guernsey and Sark it is common for local residents to act as
bogus ‘nominee’ directors for tax-dodging companies. ‘The Channel Islands make so
much money that islanders enjoy a standard of living twice higher that that on
mainland Britain. A vast service industry has sprung up, involving lawyers, solicitors,
accountants and banks’ (Christensen, 2011: 177). Money to the Channel Islands also
arrives in the form of payments to supposed suppliers servicing entrepreneurs based
on mainland UK or in other countries. In general, tax havens are regarded as
prominent features of the globalised capital market and their very existence continues
to create a ‘criminogenic environment in which illicit financial flows are easily
disguised and hidden amongst legitimate commercial transactions’ (ibid).

In the British territories there are still 3 million companies whose owners are
unknown. It is also unknown who actually lies behind trusts and foundations, due to
ownership secrecy remaining inviolable.

Office of Tony Blair

Evidence of how the borders between legitimate and illegitimate practices are
uncertain was provided by controversial news relating to the companies owned by
former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Income channelled through a complex network
of firms and partnerships controlled by Blair rose more than 40% in 2011 to more than
£12m. Of this, almost £10m was paid for ‘management services’. The money was transferred via a network of firms and financial vehicles. Accountancy experts questioned the arcane nature of the network’s finances, which makes it difficult to trace where its money is coming from or where it is being spent. Windrush Ventures is the name of the pool of companies linked to the ‘Office of Tony Blair’, but exactly what sort of ‘management services’ are provided, and how the companies generate their income, are impossible to determine. Blair has provided advice and consultancy to charitable foundations for poverty relief projects in Sierra Leone and Rwanda, creating his own Africa Governance Initiative. He has also advised heads of states and global corporations, which led to criticism for the way his private and philanthropic activities tend to merge. He has lucrative consultancy contracts with luxury goods firms and insurance companies in Switzerland, has undertaken work for the royal family of Kuwait, an investment firm in Abu Dhabi and an oil company in South Korea. Blair is taking advantage of laws allowing him to limit what his companies and partnerships are required to disclose with the result that his accounts are far from transparent (Doward, 2012).

**Glencore International**

International aid is supposed to benefit small businesses and vulnerable peoples, like for example the aid provided through the World Food Programme, whose finances consist of donations and is aimed at feeding the starving and committed to buying food from very poor farmers. However, during the 2011-12 period, more than £500m ended up in the hands of a London-listed commodities trader, Glencore International. This conglomerate, which buys up supplies from farmers and sells them on at a profit, was in that period the biggest single supplier of wheat to the WFP. ‘In the latest half-year financial results, Glencore, which previously attracted controversy for environmental breaches and accusations of dealing with rogue states, reported that revenue from agricultural products doubled to $8.8m’ (Neate, 2012). Betting on rising wheat price, lobbying for bans on exportations from some countries, taking advantage from droughts and investing in agricultural ‘products futures’ allow giant food wholesalers to capitalise on ‘inert’ donation finances and turn them into profit. As a technique of rationalization, wholesalers might well mobilise the argument that they are less corrupt and more ethical than arms producers, because they at least provide food, not weapons.

**Flash brokers**

‘Flash brokers’ manage to beat regulators through high frequency trading, which is not just regarded as risky. ‘It is a form of legalised theft, designed to allow traders to skim profits from other investors’ (Surowiecki, 2014: 37). Put simply, an investor intending to buy shares, fractions of second before hitting the enter button, may find the price of those shares higher. Orders to buy, in other words, are captured by other traders who buy the wanted shares and resell them at higher prices (Lewis, 2014).
Tesco

Giant supermarket chain Tesco was involved in an accounting scandal, having released false data on profits in order to reassure share holders and attract new investors. Huge losses were suffered by pension funds, traders, small investors and staff holding shares. At the basis of the irregular accounts was the practice to demand financial contributions from suppliers and to record these payments in a creative fashion, thus pretending a healthy financial situation while sales declined. Companies such as Tesco are not required to disclose supplier contributions in their trading statements. About £700m were wiped off the stock market value of the company, and while share holders were defrauded, annual salaries amounting to around £1m were still given to senior managers after the investigation was launched (Wood, 2014).

Barclays bank

This large bank institution was accused by a campaign group of encouraging international fraudsters through its loose security procedures. The bank allowed individuals holding unchecked international passports to open accounts and set up fraudulent businesses. One example was a multi-million pound fraud against holidaymakers who booked villas and homes in exotic resorts and transferred money through the bank, only to find that those villas or homes did not exist or were not for rent. Campaigners posing as potential investors found that Barclays staff were extremely lax when examining applications, at times only requiring a foreign driving licence as ID. Fraudsters from around the world are attracted to the bank and, after opening their accounts, they can comfortably operate from anywhere they choose (Brignall, 2014).

CONCLUSION

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, 2014) has recently expressed its optimism, documenting improving market conditions, bolstered by a combination of macroeconomic prospects and liquidity support measures from central banks. Risks, we are told, are now below those observed in the more acute phases of the crisis. In this paper, by contrast, it has been argued that many of the measures proposed to prevent future crises have been contested, amended or scrapped. When applied, their potential effect has been neutralised through the creation or expansion of areas impervious to regulation. The suggestion that banks should hold significant quantities of cash or highly liquid securities in their portfolios has been countered with the argument that higher resources would expose banks to higher loss in case of further financial crises. Despite reforms introduced in the banking sector aimed at safeguarding customers and small businesses and the separation of retail and property banks (gov.uk, 2014), debts were and remain saleable commodities, and the ‘maturity gap’ which contributed to the collapse is stationary or widening. The proposed limits for remuneration and bonuses for bankers and brokers has been met with the objection that such limits hamper competition and reduce the number of capable managers prepared to work in the financial sector. The appointment of growing numbers of regulators has been criticised for the lack of skills and professionalism the new appointees display. The notion that international financial markets need international regulatory tools was rejected because rules can only be
established nationally and can never be totally harmonised. Where new rules were implemented, financial markets witnessed an exodus of traders from large banks to small hedge fund dealers, namely to the grey areas that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, disappointment and fear on the part of savers is leading to emerging private firms to offer unsolicited help, often hiding yet more speculative or fraudulent purposes.

The lack or ineffectiveness of new regulations may also be the result of the lack of substantial organized and ideological opposition to market philosophies, whereby policies continue to be tailored around the needs of bankers rather than citizens. Licit or illicit financial operations, both causing social harm, may be destined to continue undeterred as long as those conducting them can claim that such operations benefit not themselves, but society at large. Whistleblowers such as Hervè Falciani, the employee of a Swiss bank who passed clients’ details to tax investigators and personally to Christine Lagarde, head of the International Monetary Fund, are still in danger of prosecution (The Guardian, 8 May 2013). In the UK, large corporations continue to pay derisory amounts of tax despite their gigantic profits, tax incentives are still being offered to foreign companies with a view to attracting foreign investment, and this tax competition is triggering a race to the bottom which contributes to rendering the boundaries between white collar and organised crime increasingly blurred. Large companies, in brief, continue to be the biggest ‘welfare queens’, and tax breaks, grants, loans and subsidies constitute what can be termed ‘corporate welfare’. Corporate theft and fraud continue undeterred, while pensions providers prove impervious to government threats (Tombs, 2013; Sikka, 2013). With risk operations still prevailing, and with the self-assurance of operators denying such risks, it is not just ‘waste’ being produced, but a dynamic leading to the infection of the whole financial system (Skidelsky and Skidelshy, 2012).

There is no contemporary Solon in view, that is to say there is no novel democratic arrangement supervising the financial world and making sure its operation are fair. If regulations, as suggested at the beginning of this paper, have in the past mainly addressed organised crime while leaving white collar and corporate crime untouched, the growth of financial grey areas as described above may in fact offer organised criminals novel opportunities. The claim that markets are adaptive and self-regulating accompanies a perverse process whereby regulation pushes deregulation, thus expanding the areas in which all actors, legitimate or otherwise, will be regaled with unexpected chances to engage in crime. The following example is indicative of the bleak future ahead: HSBC, Britain’s biggest bank, agreed to pay a record £1.2bn to settle allegations that it allowed terrorist organisations and drugs traffickers to move billions of dollars around the financial system (Rushe and Treanor, 2012).

REFERENCES


The Guardian, 8 May 2013 (‘HSBC man who passed clients’ details to tax investigators escapes extradition’).