New Testament Quotation at the Reader-Author Intersection: Evoking Story for Transformation

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Given that a quoting author is first a reader of a text and on the presupposition that communication is both cooperative and dialogical, this study considers quotation from a fresh perspective. Our thesis is that, in many cases, *NT quotation of the OT promotes transformation on the lifeworld/worldview level by evoking theological tradition.*

The first part of the study unpacks the elements of this hypothesis, including: intertextuality and the function of quotation; types of “context”; the author/text/reader interaction and the implied author/reader construct; textual tradition and the relationship of Story to lifeworld/worldview and theology; the evoking of Story and activation of mutual context via quotation; and the resulting transformation of lifeworld/worldview, theology and Story. The methodology we create to explore the transformational nature of quotation frames these elements within a model of communicative interaction based on speech-act theory. Our action model includes the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of the implied author as well as the illocutionary effect of understanding and the associated perlocutionary effects (responses of belief and/or action) of the implied reader. By holding the author, reader and text in creative tension, we present meaning as cooperative, thus bridging the chasm between authorial intention and reader response. We distinguish three reader roles: (i) an Independent reader ignores the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, (ii) an Analyst achieves the illocutionary response (understanding) but is either unwilling or unable to respond with an associated perlocutionary effect, and (iii) an Envisager understands the illocutionary act and also responds with an associated perlocutionary effect. Perlocution thus reveals the transformational response of the implied reader as well as the implied author’s intentions for lifeworld/worldview, Story and theology. Making a perlocutionary response associated with the illocution means that an empirical reader moves beyond understanding to transformation.

To evaluate the purposes of NT authors and readers in communicative interaction with regard to a specific quotation, we first determine the contribution of the quoted passage and its co-text to lifeworld/worldview, theology and Story and assess what it would mean to be an Envisaging reader of the quoted text. Then we determine whether the NT author uses the quotation to transform the lifeworld/worldview, theology and Story of the NT audience by evoking the theological Story-lines of the source text.

Our examples and case studies come from the OT Psalms. The first case study is the quotation of Psalm 115:1a LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13. We investigate the claim that Paul takes this verse “out of context” and we also consider the contention that Paul reads the psalm messianically. In the second case study, we examine the transformational efforts of various NT authors who quote Psalm 110:1.
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More than anyone, I am beholden to my husband, Carver, without whose support and encouragement, this study might not have been attempted much less completed.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

In addition to the Abbreviations found in *The SBL Handbook of Style*, the following are used herein:

- **JPrag** *Journal of Pragmatics*
- **MoTh** *Modern Theology*
- **NLH** *New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation*
- **PIL** *Papers in Linguistics*
- **PT** *Poetics Today*
- **QJS** *Quarterly Journal of Speech*
- **VeEc** *Verbum et Ecclesia*

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That the Jewish Scriptures (OT\(^2\)) and the New Testament (NT) are related is evidenced by the frequency with which references, and in particular quotations, from the former are found in the latter. The nature of this relationship has been much discussed. Richard Hays groups the questions that have been asked about the use of the OT into five categories, including which books and passages are quoted by NT authors and what form of the text was used, how NT exegesis relates to that of rabbinic Judaism (midrash or pesher) or to early Christian exegesis, and whether the NT authors “use the Old Testament with exegetical-theological integrity, or … rifle it for prooftexts and twist its meaning.”\(^3\) Although Hays suggested over 20 years ago that, at least with regard to Paul, these questions “have been either answered in full or played out to a dead end,”\(^4\) the question of whether the NT authors quote the OT with “exegetical-theological integrity” continues to be debated, re-fueled in part by Hays’ own literary intertextual approach.

In this regard, interesting questions concerning quotation include: the function of a particular quotation; whether the main function of quotation is to offer proof via an appeal to authority; and what role is played by the context, co-text and original meaning of a source text in a receptor text. Given that a quoting author is first a reader of a text, an issue which underlies these questions is whether the author, reader or text is the locus of “meaning.” Some discussions assume adversarial or “power” relationships between the quoted author/text, the quoting author/text and the audience of the quoting author/text.\(^5\) In some cases, these discussions are based on the premise that the quoting author uses the quoted material without regard for its original meaning.\(^6\)

\(^1\) All italic, bold and uppercase type is original to the author quoted, unless otherwise noted. Also, unless otherwise noted, all Scripture references herein are to the NRSV.

\(^2\) Our use of this term is not intended to imply anything about the canonical status of the Jewish/Hebrew Scriptures at the time of the NT writings.

\(^3\) See R. B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 9-10; quote is from p. 9. He explores Paul’s work, but his conclusions are valid for all NT authors.


\(^5\) We explore some of these in chapter 2.

\(^6\) The original impetus for this study was a comment of M. D. Hooker concerning the use of the OT by NT authors: “Often one is left exclaiming: whatever the passage from the Old Testament
Our presupposition instead is that communication, including quotation, tends to be cooperative or dialogical. Therefore, we find it profitable to consider quotation from a fresh perspective. Our thesis is that, in many cases, *NT quotation of the OT promotes transformation on the lifeworld/worldview level by evoking theological tradition.*

In each of the next four chapters, we develop various aspects of this hypothesis and, in the process, create a new methodology to explore quotation. In chapter 2, we explore intertextuality, and more specifically explicit quotation, from a functional perspective, i.e., what does quotation do? After analyzing pertinent linguistic and literary theories of quotation, we conclude that quotation does not serve primarily as a proof via an appeal to authority or to establish the primacy of the quoter in a power relationship. Rather, a key function of quotation is to evoke Story and, specifically, theological tradition. Our discussion of quotation thus raises the issues of theological tradition, the relationship between the old and new contexts of the quotation and the interaction between author and reader.

At the beginning of chapter 3, we take up the latter topic, using the construct of the implied author and reader to frame the communicative efforts of the empirical author and reader. This construct makes it possible to determine authorial intention, as revealed by the implied author, without requiring retrieval of the motivation of the empirical author. Identifying the implied reader makes it possible to determine intended reader response. Thus, determining what would be fully successful communication is independent of knowing how any empirical reader actually responds.

We then lay the groundwork for our development of the concept of Story by examining “context,” first outlining the various types of context (socio-historical and literary context plus linguistic conventions) and then presenting “mutual context” as the subset of context shared by author and reader. Quotation activates (and perhaps first creates) mutual context. Because of the foundational nature of Hays’ work, we conclude chapter 3 by interacting with his arguments concerning intertextuality and context in *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul.*

We develop the concept of theological tradition in chapter 4. After first defining “tradition,” we critique works by four ground-breaking scholars who, building to some

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1 For this, we rely on Gadamer, Stuhlmacher, R. Hays, N. T. Wright, Snodgrass, Thiselton, etc.
2 We capitalize “Story” to indicate it is not limited to narrative genre.
3 Key resources here are Booth, Chatman, Walhout, Lanser, Wolterstorff, etc.
extent on Hays’ work, have explored how a specific NT author makes use of OT tradition. After exploring narrative genre (i.e., “story”), we demonstrate that non-narrative material such as the OT Psalms has the capacity to make a substantial contribution to the tradition mediated by texts. To recognize the contribution of non-narrative material, we call this textual tradition “Story” rather than “story.”

A key next step is to develop the relationship of Story to lifeworld/worldview and theology. A lifeworld is the world in which a communicative community shares mutual context, including worldview. “Worldview” encompasses four interrelated elements: Story, symbols, praxis, and the basic questions and answers of human existence. The basic questions and answers deal with the existence and nature of a divine being and the relationship of that deity to humanity; taken together the basic questions and answers comprise “theology.” Theology not only asks questions about God and humanity’s relationship to God, it answers them with Story. Since, by our definition, those who share a lifeworld share a worldview (and vice versa), lifeworld is created, sustained and modified by Story and the theology it imparts.

With most of the “pieces” of our model in place, we conclude chapter 4 by integrating those already developed. In the case of NT quotation of the OT, the mutual context activated by the quotation of an element of Story presents theology. Therefore, in our model, quotation stands at the lifeworld intersection of Story and theology. The evoking of an element of Story via quotation has the potential to transform (realign or subvert/re-create) Story, lifeworld/worldview and the corresponding theology.

To determine what transformation is intended and how transformation is accomplished, in chapter 5 we create an “action model” of the communication of meaning based on pragmatics, specifically speech-act theory (SAT). In our action model, we include both the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts of the implied author as well as those perlocutionary effects (responses) of the implied reader associated with the illocution. In broad categories, these associated perlocutionary

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10 These scholars are Keesmaat, R. Watts, Pao and J. R. Wagner.
12 Our model has its roots in K. J. Vanhoozer’s “action model of meaning” (see Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998], 369-378).
responses are either of belief or action. Transformation occurs when communicative interaction is fully successful on both the illocutionary and perlocutionary levels.\textsuperscript{13}

By taking the innovative step of including perlocution in the communication of meaning, we are able to creatively distinguish three roles for an empirical reader: (i) the locutionary\textsuperscript{14} role of “Independent,” (ii) the illocutionary role of “Analyst” and (iii) the perlocutionary role of “Envisager.”\textsuperscript{15} In brief, an Independent reader creates new meaning using the words or phrases of the locution without regard for the original illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. An Analyst is a cooperative reader who achieves the illocutionary response of understanding (the sole illocutionary effect) but is either unwilling or unable to respond with an associated perlocutionary effect. An Envisager not only understands the illocutionary act of the implied author but also responds with an associated perlocutionary effect.\textsuperscript{16} It is the Envisaging reader who steps fully into the role of the implied reader.

Thus, incorporating the often overlooked and sometimes unhelpfully defined speech-act element of perlocution into our model and hierarchy of reader roles is critical. The intended perlocutionary response of the implied reader, as it corresponds to the perlocutionary intention of the implied author, signals the implied author’s transformative intention for Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview. Therefore, the perlocutionary response of the implied reader sets the standard for the response of the empirical reader. It is by responding at the perlocutionary level (Envisaging) that an empirical reader moves beyond understanding to transformation.\textsuperscript{17} In responding with an associated perlocutionary effect, the Envisaging reader “completes the circuit” required for successfully transformative communicative interaction.

\textsuperscript{13} Many pragmatists call perlocution “interaction” rather than “communication.” For this reason, we use “communicative interaction” to indicate that illocution and perlocution both play a role.

\textsuperscript{14} We use the term “locution” to refer to Searle’s predicating and referring acts, taken together, rather than to Austin’s locutionary act.

\textsuperscript{15} Since the construct of implied author/reader does not apply to a speech situation, in the case of NT speakers (e.g., Jesus or Peter), we name “Envisaging” those hearers who respond as an implied reader would to the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of the speaker.

\textsuperscript{16} The distinction between “Analyst” and “Envisager” is not the same as G. Steiner’s distinction between “critic” and “reader.” For Steiner, “criticism labors to transcend relation” and a “critic” is “a ‘counterstater’ and rival to the work” (“‘Critic’/‘Reader,’” \textit{NLH} 10, no. 3 [Spring 1979]: 437, http://www.jstor.org/stable/468921 [accessed June 19, 2009]). A “reader,” on the other hand, “attempts to negate the space between the text and himself. … The reader strives for fusion with the text via internalization” (443). Our “Analyst” and “Envisager” are different levels of Steiner’s “reader.”

\textsuperscript{17} Although illocutionary acts do alter the mutual context of the empirical author and reader, our primary interest is the transformation of belief and/or action that is the \textit{perlocutionary} response associated with the illocution.
Throughout chapter five, we link our action model to quotation by recognizing that a quoting speaker/author is always first a hearer/reader of the quoted speech or text and/or an intervening interpretive tradition and thus has assumed one of the reader roles vis-à-vis that text and/or interpretive tradition. A NT author may not always read the OT or an intervening interpretation as an Envisager. However, via quotation an implied NT author calls for a response of belief or action intended to transform the current Story and related theological lifeworld/worldview of the NT audience. We not only can assess what transformation is intended but also can evaluate whether a NT author read a passage of the OT as an Envisager by determining whether the theological Story-lines of that passage are evoked via the quotation.

To close chapter five, we put our action model into our Story/lifeworld framework by defining related groups of speech acts (SAs) as speech-act complexes (SACs). The illocutionary act type of the core SA of the SAC can be considered the illocutionary act type of that SAC. Other SAs in the SAC, which may be of different illocutionary act types, play a supporting role. Identifying not only the illocutionary act type of the various SAs of a SAC but also the illocutionary act type of the SAC allows us to use SAT, originally constructed at the sentence level, at the discourse level of our Story/lifeworld framework.

The final step in constructing a methodology is its use. Rather than applying our action model to one NT book or the work of one author, we take our examples from a common OT source text, the Psalms. Studying quotations from texts outside the narrative genre allows us to draw stronger conclusions concerning how quotation evokes Story and theological tradition to call for reader transformation.

Examples of NT Psalms quotations are used in the first part of this study as illustrations. In the second part, we present two case studies. We introduce these in chapter 6, where we evaluate what role the Psalms generally may have played in the lifeworld and Story of the people of Yahweh and how familiar various groups within the early Church may have been with the Psalms.

In that chapter, we also consolidate our methodological development by summarizing the steps we take in performing our case studies. Our first step is to evaluate the source text of the quotation to determine what the quoted passage, as set within its co-text, contributes to Story, theology, worldview and lifeworld via the illocution and perlocution of its speech acts as they are addressed to the implied reader
by the implied author. We also consider what can be surmised or is implied concerning the socio-historical context as well as what interpretations of that passage may have been current in the mid-1st century CE. We then determine what it would mean to be an Envisaging reader of the quoted text or an intervening interpretation.

Turning to the NT, we consider the passage containing the Psalm quotation, determining its illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions and the associated perlocutionary response of belief or action which would be made by the implied reader and therefore, by definition, the Envisaging empirical reader. We then consider what elements of the theological OT Story-line are evoked by the quotation. Putting this together, we determine (i) what role the quotation plays in the intended transformation of the existing Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview of the empirical NT audience and (ii) whether the NT author read the OT text (or interpretation) as an Envisager.

Our first case study (chapter 7) is the quotation of Psalm 115:1a LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13. Recent criticism argues that the sense in which Paul uses this verse “is so far removed from the original context as to raise questions about Paul’s reliability as an interpreter,” in other words, using our terminology, that Paul does not read the quoted passage as an Envisager. Other scholars believe Paul reads the psalm messianically. In our first case study, we use our methodology to investigate the validity of these various claims. We determine that the called-for transformation is consistent with Paul reading Psalm 115:1a LXX as an Envisager.

The second case study is the quotation of Psalm 110:1 in the Synoptic Gospels, Acts, 1 Corinthians and Hebrews. Choosing this OT passage allows us to examine the role of a single non-narrative quotation across the transformational efforts of various NT speakers/authors and audiences and to refute the claim that “most application” of Psalm 110 to Jesus “in the NT requires it to be understood in a way that would not correspond to its meaning in any OT context.”

Some caveats are necessary. First, any model offers only partial access to the truth, the truth as viewed within a particular framework and for particular purposes; and it provides orientation for a particular interpretative practice. … No model should claim to offer a comprehensive description of

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18 C. D. Stanley, *Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul* (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 100. In chapter 7, we explore other scholarship which makes similar claims.
19 We present some of this scholarship in chapter 7.
20 In some cases, a multi-layered analysis is required.
reality, and each may retain its heuristic usefulness even where anomalies and complexities are detected of which it has taken no account.\textsuperscript{22}

Other methodologies offer insight into various aspects of quotation; we do not attempt either to synthesize or to replace all other theories or models. Second, although our model sheds helpful light on NT quotation, we do not claim either that the evoking of tradition is a relevant framework for all quotation or that all NT authors in every case read the passages they quote as Envisagers. Each quotation must be evaluated on its own merits.

However, by including perlocution and especially perlocutionary effect, incorporating the construct of the implied author/reader, and considering Envisaging readers as distinct from Analysts, our model holds the author, reader and text in creative tension, transcending the false dichotomy between meaning as authorial intention versus reader response and linking quotation as the evoking of Story (textual tradition) to lifeworld/worldview transformation. This offers a new and valuable perspective on quotation and provides the opportunity to gain new insight into the purposes of NT authors and readers in communicative interaction.

PART I

DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER 2

QUOTATION

Quotation and Intertextuality

The term “intertextualité” was coined by Julia Kristeva, whose concern was “with establishing the manner in which a text is constructed out of already existent discourse. Authors do not create their texts from their own original minds, but rather compile them from pre-existent texts.”¹ For Kristeva and some who have followed her, including Roland Barthes, “text” includes all of what might be described as “culture,” covering such topics as architecture, art and “the dominant relations of production and the socio-political context.”² As Barthes describes it, text is “a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture.”³

Although we primarily use “text” in its more common linguistic sense,⁴ we agree that “the writer is a reader of texts (in the broadest sense) before s/he is a creator of texts, and therefore the work of art is inevitably shot through with references, quotations and influences of every kind.”⁵ Not only is a writer first a reader of texts, theories of intertextuality highlight the reader in other ways. Gerard Luttikhuisen helpfully notes that “intertextuality plays a significant role not only in the production of texts but also in their reception. In fact, the information of the text cannot be comprehended unless we relate it to what we remember from texts heard or read before. In other words, meaning is assigned to the text in the light of what we know from other texts.”⁶ More broadly, according to Steve Moyise, “Texts do not present themselves to

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⁴ Generally, by “text,” we mean any speech or writing. By “intertext,” we refer to any use (quotation, allusion or echo) of an earlier text.
⁵ Still and Worton, 1. For Pfister also, “der Autor immer zugleich auch Leser ist” (21).
⁶ G. Luttikhuisen, “Intertextual References in Readers’ Responses to the Apocryphon of John,” in Intertextuality in Biblical Writings: Essays in Honour of Bas van Iersel, ed. S. Draisma (Kampen: Kok, 1989), 117. “What is produced at the moment of reading is due to the cross-fertilisation of the packaged textual material (say, a book) by all the texts which the reader brings to it” (Still and Worton, 1-2).
readers as transparent packages of meaning; readers have to do something in order to interpret them. Intertextuality suggests that what they do is relate them to other intertexts, which might be actual texts or, more generally, events, cultural phenomena, or personal experiences and commitments.\(^7\) In the case of the NT, one of these “texts” is the events of the life, death, resurrection and exaltation of Jesus Christ.

The reader’s experience can have an impact on two other fronts. First, “the reader’s experience of some practice or theory unknown to the author may lead to a fresh interpretation.”\(^8\) Such “practice or theory” includes instances of intervening interpretation of a text.\(^9\) In the examples we consider of Psalms quotations in the NT, at a minimum, the original text has been interpreted by the Septuagint. In some instances, there also are Jewish interpretations in the Qumran documents and other pre-Christian sources. Plus, not only do NT authors filter their presentation of OT texts through their understanding of the Christ event, in some cases, there may be intervening NT interpretation of an OT text by other NT speakers or authors.

The second possibility is that the reader may not know every text the author knows. To avoid having to determine whether a NT hearer/reader would recognize the quoted material, we take most of our examples, including the case studies, from marked quotations, that is, “those introduced by an explicit quotation formula, such as ‘as it is written.’”\(^10\) With explicit quotation, it is certain both that the quoting author was a reader of the quoted text and/or an interpretation thereof and that the author intends the reader to understand that these words come from a source text.\(^11\)

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8 Still and Worton, 2.
9 As M. Fishbane points out, “it makes all the difference—all and not some—whether a specific traditum has been reused or annotated; or whether, on the contrary, it either contains independent reflexes of common idioms or comments which are original to the particular composition or teaching” (*Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1985], 13).
10 Stanley, *Arguing*, 47. This is the first of Stanley’s categories of quotation. His second is “those accompanied by a clear interpretive gloss (e.g., 1 Cor 15:27)” (Ibid.). This category covers 1 Cor 15:25, which we analyze in chapter 8.
Intertextuality is not an interpretive method. Rather, it is “a theory (or group of theories) concerning the production of meaning.”\textsuperscript{12} Some link it irrevocably to poststructuralism,\textsuperscript{13} although we do not adopt that perspective here since “an intertextuality that locates meaning in an infinite matrix of possible influences is unable to say anything specific about a text.”\textsuperscript{14} Rather, we find “intertextuality” helpful because it highlights “the importance of considering the relation between the new context and the old in interpreting allusion and citation.”\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, we value its focus on the role of the reader. In terms of the five types of intertextuality identified by Moyise, we are interested in the reader-oriented types, i.e., the narrative-frame, dialogical and “postmodern,”\textsuperscript{16} although our goal is to hold them in creative tension rather than considering them as discrete entities.

We have several times referred to “meaning” and its production. Before turning to quotation \textit{per se}, we want to give a brief introduction to the methodology we will develop to determine how “meaning” is produced.

\textit{The Production of Meaning}

The arguments of poststructuralists such as Kristeva and Barthes are in part a response to the structuralist insistence that stable meaning can be created and discovered.\textsuperscript{17} Thus,

\textsuperscript{13} For example, T. R. Hatina criticizes R. Hays’ use of the word “intertextuality” since it “is certainly not accompanied by a commitment to the poststructuralist framework” (“Intertextuality and Historical Criticism in New Testament Studies: Is There a Relationship?,” \textit{BibInt} 7, no. 1 [January 1999]: 36).
\textsuperscript{14} Moyise, “Intertextuality and Historical Approaches,” 457.
\textsuperscript{15} I. Paul, “The Use of the Old Testament in Revelation 12,” in Moyise, 259. R. L. Brawley points out that “by the criteria of intertextuality, … the question is no longer how faithful the repetition is to the original. Rather, a reference to an old text locates the modern interpreter in a tensive ambience of echoes between the two texts, and the question is how the two texts reverberate with each other” (\textit{Text to Text Pours Forth Speech: Voices of Scripture in Luke-Acts} [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995], 8). Space constraints mean we can only assess the impact of the quotation on the interpretation of the source text within the NT passage being analyzed.
\textsuperscript{16} See S. Moyise, “Intertextuality and Biblical Studies: A Review,” \textit{VeEc} 23, no. 2 (2002). In a later work, Moyise identifies three approaches to Paul’s quotations: intertextual, narrative and rhetorical (\textit{Paul and Scripture: Studying the New Testament Use of the Old Testament} [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010], 111-125). Herein, we do not explore interpretive techniques like midrash, which belong to Moyise’s “exegetical” type. Nor do we deal with “intertextual echo” although we believe that with modification our methodology could be used to study unmarked references such as allusion and echo. However, it would complicate our analysis to establish a process to identify such intertexts.
in any discussion of intertextuality, context and the author/reader relationship, “meaning” is a key term, which calls for careful definition. We base our definition of “meaning” on Kevin Vanhoozer’s action model, in which meaning is “a three-dimensional communicative action, with form and matter (propositional content), energy and trajectory (illocutionary force), and teleology or final purpose (perlocutionary effect).” These dimensions are elements of a single SA.

Of these elements, the last two are the most critical in our model. An illocutionary act can be classified as one of five different types (Assertive, Directive, Expressive, Commisive and Declaration), depending on the illocutionary force with which the content is presented. The sole intended illocutionary effect (response of the hearer/reader) is understanding. Illocutionary acts necessarily have perlocutionary acts associated with them. A perlocutionary act is an act of a speaker/author that correlates to a perlocutionary effect (response) of belief and/or action by the hearer/reader.

Our action model holds the three dimensions of meaning in creative tension and, at the levels of the illocution and the perlocution, gives a cooperative role to both the author and the reader in the interactive communication of meaning. We develop our action model further in chapter 5. In the remainder of this chapter, we consider theories or models of the function or purpose of quotation.

The Function of Quotation

The traditional approaches to evaluating OT quotations in the NT can be categorized according to the criteria of (i) quantity, i.e., which OT books and passages are quoted most often by which NT authors and which introductory formulae are used; (ii) “quality,” i.e. fidelity to either the MT, a version of the LXX or another source text; and (iii) interpretive method. Scholars also evaluate OT quotations on the basis of the
strength of the intertextual link (explicit quotation, allusion or “echo”)
and, recently, purpose or function.

With regard to the latter—the “why” of quotation—Christopher Stanley has
offered an intriguing proposal; he argues that “Paul wrote his letters not to lay out a set
of theological beliefs, but to motivate specific first-century Christians to believe and/or
act (or stop believing or acting) in particular ways.” He follows this with the broader
idea that “rhetorical speech is … audience-centered speech; its purpose is to promote
action on the part of the audience, not merely to communicate the ideas of a
speaker/author.” In Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s classic work on
rhetoric, they also present a general goal of argumentation as “obtaining the adherence
of the audience.” Wolfgang Motsch and Renate Pasch point out that “der Erfolg des
Sprechers, die Realisierung seines Ziels durch den Hörer, hängt vor allem dann, … wie
dem Sprecher gelingt, den Hörer positiv zu motivieren.”

Since quotations are part of an author’s persuasive effort and thus are “are meant
to affect an audience,” quotation not only reflects culture (or “lifeworld”), it changes
it. Speech and text have the potential to transform the Story they evoke and the

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20 For example, H. M. Shires divides “quotations” into three classes; the third includes unmarked
distinguishes three types of linguistic intertextuality: “Quotation, allusion, and echo may be seen as points
along a spectrum of intertextual reference, moving from the explicit to the subliminal” (Echoes, 23).
21 Stanley, Arguing, 3.
22 Ibid., 16. Stanley starts with K. Burke’s definition of rhetoric as “the use of words by human
agents to form attitudes or induce actions in other human agents” (Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives [New
York: Prentice-Hall, 1950], 41, as quoted by Stanley, Arguing, 12n8). For G. A. Kennedy also, “the
writers of the books of the New Testament had a message to convey and sought to persuade an audience
to believe it or to believe it more profoundly” (New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical
Criticism [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984], 3). However, we base our
methodology on pragmatics rather than Kennedy’s “discipline of rhetoric.”
W. Motsch (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1987), 74.
25 Stanley, Arguing, 3. Stanley notes that little is said about quotation in rhetorical theories and
that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s index lists only four references (12). Although they describe the
“normal role” of quotation as “backing up a statement with the weight of authority,” they add that in other
circumstances it can be regarded as “a figure relating to communion” with the audience (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 177). Similarly, per M. Schneider, “the decisive question for an intertextual reading” is
“Why was the citation brought in here, and what effect is thereby made possible?” (“How Does God Act?
Intertextual Readings of 1 Corinthians 10,” in Hays, Alkier, and Huizenga, 40). We argue in chapter 5
that being audience-centered and communicating authorial ideas are not mutually exclusive but are
instead two complementary aspects of meaning. Additionally, we distinguish between authorial intention
(as communicated via an author’s SAs) and authorial motive.
26 We briefly discussed “culture” above. A shared lifeworld and its corresponding worldview
“reside at a very deep level, underly ing the character and culture of an entire people” (D. K. Naugle,
lifeworld they represent and also other Stories and lifeworlds with which they interact. We discuss Story, lifeworld and worldview in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4.

Unfortunately, Stanley does not take full advantage of this promising start. Instead, he unduly narrows his focus, bypassing all theories of how quotations affect an audience other than appeal to authority. 27 Not only does he overlook other possible functions of quotation, he takes the appeal to authority to an extreme, arguing that the function of almost all quotation is to establish the primacy of the speaker in a power relationship. 28 This is a notion he takes from one of the models of quotation he examines, that of Gillian Lane-Mercier. We address this below when we consider specific theories of quotation.

For now, we note that others also find quotation to be primarily an appeal to authority. For Timothy Berkley, it is "characteristic of Paul’s use of quotations” that a quotation “serves the separate rhetorical function of a proof-text offering supporting authority for Paul’s conclusion.” 29 A. T. Hanson makes a similar argument: “One might well ask: If it is not for proof, why does Paul quote Scripture here?” 30 Jeremy Punt believes Paul “invoked (both directly and indirectly) the Scriptures of Israel as an authoritative source. … In polemical contexts, he used Scripture as a final court of appeal, since it was for him sacred—proceeding from God—and thus had ultimate authority.” 31 Concerning the Synoptic Gospels, Willard Swartley avers that “to varying degrees the authors/narrators cite specific OT texts to document the authority of the tradition. The tradition lives by the Scripture, and citation therefrom conveys authoritative word in the presentation of the narrative.” 32 In her study of Hebrews,

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27 Even where quotation is “used to illustrate or exemplify a point made by a speaker,” Stanley feels “the argument from authority is not far from the surface, since the very act of quotation implies that the source of the quotation is respected by the intended audience” (Arguing, 14).
28 According to Stanley, “even quotations that look like innocent ornamental devices can be heavily ‘power-coded’ when taken from an authoritative source, since they inevitably add an aura of respectability to the speaker/author’s pronouncements” (Arguing, 14). S. F. Sanborn believes that for Stanley “when someone quotes another passage, either it means the same identical thing it meant in the quoted text or it means something not envisioned in the original text” (review of Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul, by Christopher D. Stanley, Kerux 23, no. 2 [September 2008]:76). Since the former is impossible, Stanley concludes that a quoter uses the material of another “for his own power purposes” (Ibid.). But, as Sanborn points out, this either/or position is invalid (Ibid.).
29 T. W. Berkley, From a Broken Covenant to Circumcision of the Heart: Pauline Intertextual Exegesis in Romans 2:17-29 (Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 139.
30 A. T. Hanson, Studies in Paul’s Technique and Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 157; cf. 147.
32 Swartley, 291.
Cynthia Long Westfall argues that “quotations generally supply support material or proofs.” From the perspective of ancient rhetoric, Burton Mack takes the position that “the purpose of the citation was to show that other recognized authorities had come to the same conclusion or rendered a similar judgment on the same issue.”

However, we concur with Anthony Thiselton that “the Old Testament was not simply invoked as a ‘support’ or a ‘proof’ in the context of polemical debate for a message which had been understood independently of it.” Thomas Hatina also acknowledges that scriptural quotations have other functions than use as “proof-texts or analogies.” We combine these ideas with Stanley’s thought that quotation can help persuade an audience to believe and/or act (or stop believing or acting) in particular ways in constructing our methodology.

In the remainder of this chapter, we put a theoretical foundation under our understanding of the function of quotation by engaging with a variety of theories of quotation, some from the field of linguistics and others which take a literary approach. Of particular interest are: (i) the functions of quotation presented, and (ii) what these theories consider to be the relationship between the quoted author and audience and the quoting author (once a reader) and audience.

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35 A. C. Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 150; italics omitted. With regard to 1 Corinthians, J. P. Heil argues that “Paul’s use of scripture … does not merely inform his listeners but performs a rhetorical strategy aimed at persuading and transforming them in various ways” (*The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians* [Atlanta: SBL, 2005], 5).


37 See p. 13 and n21 above.

38 Although Stanley is to be commended for bringing scholarship from other disciplines to bear upon NT quotation, it is difficult to understand why he considers the four models he reviews in *Arguing* “the most important” theories put forward in recent years “to explain how quotations ‘work’ as part of a literary communication” (*Arguing*, 24). Two of the papers were written in 1974 and 1982. Both linguistic models he considers, the “dramaturgical” theory of linguist/semicritic A. Wierzbicka (“The Semantics of Direct and Indirect Discourse,” *PIL* 7 [1974]: 267-307) and the demonstration theory of H. H. Clark and R. J. Gerrig (*Quotations as Demonstrations,* *Language* 66, no. 4 [December 1990]: 764-805, http://www.jstor.org/stable/414729 [accessed December 6, 2012]), primarily concern conversation, not literary communication. Plus, Wierzbicka’s work is now rarely cited. A decade ago, F. Récanati described both Wierzbicka’s and Clark and Gerrig’s theories as providing “a general account of quotation as simulation” (“Open Quotation,” *Mind*, n.s., 110, no. 439 [July 2001]: 652, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093651 [accessed August 11, 2012]), but in a recent collection of papers on linguistic and philosophical aspects of quotation Wierzbicka’s work is not mentioned (see E. Brendel, J. Meibauer, and M. Steinbach, eds., *Understanding Quotation* [Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton, 2011]).
Linguistic Theories of Quotation

Much linguistic work concerning quotation has been from a semantic perspective. Semantic theories of quotations focus on three questions: (i) “In a quotation, what does the referring?,” (ii) “How do quotations refer?,” i.e., to what linguistic category do quotations belong?, and (iii) “What do quotations refer to?” Our interest is not in these semantic questions but rather in the pragmatics of quotation, that is, what quotations do. One influential pragmatic theory of quotation is the “demonstration” theory of psycholinguists Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig.

Quotation as Demonstration

For Clark and Gerrig, the author-reader relationship begins with the quoting author as hearer/reader of the quoted text; they consider quotation to be “a demonstration of what a person did in saying something.” For them, direct quotation is “non-serious,” that is, the speaker takes “responsibility only for presenting the quoted matter. … The responsibility for the depicted aspects themselves belongs to the source speaker. So with quotations speakers can partly or wholly detach themselves from what they depict.” This is similar to Anna Wierzbicka’s notion that a direct quoter is not a “samesayer” with the original speaker, i.e., the quoter does not commit to the same view as the original speaker and make the same assertion.

Even if one agrees that direct quotation is non-serious, that does not mean the source text is privileged over the receptor text. Nor is Stanley correct that Clark and

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40 Cappelen and Lepore do not include demonstration theories among the “five kinds of theories of quotation that have been central to the discussion of quotation” (“Quotation” §3) although they discuss them briefly under the topic of Mixed Quotation, i.e., a combination of direct and indirect quotation (Ibid. §4; see also their “Varieties of Quotation,” Mind, n.s., 106, no. 423 (July 1997): 429, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254459 (accessed February 23, 2013); and “Varieties of Quotation Revisited,” Belgian Journal of Linguistics 17, no. 1 (2003): 51, http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bjl.17.04cap (accessed June 12, 2012). D. Tannen’s description of direct vs. indirect quotation is helpful here: “‘Direct quotation’ is commonly understood to apply when another’s utterance is framed as dialogue in the other’s voice. … ‘Indirect quotation’ (or ‘indirect discourse’ or ‘speech’) is commonly understood to apply when another’s speech is paraphrased in the current speaker’s voice” (Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 102).
41 Clark and Gerrig, 769. They use “demonstrate” in “its everyday sense of ‘illustrate by exemplification’” rather than in its “technical linguistic sense of ‘point to’ or ‘indicate’” (764, 764n2).
42 Ibid., 792. This is different from indirect quotation or “description,” since “when speakers describe, they take responsibility for their wording” (Ibid.).
43 See Wierzbicka, 286-287. We are not convinced that direct quoters are never samesayers or that direct quotations are always non-serious. See, for example, linguists M. Johnson and E. Lepore who argue that “direct quotations are neither demonstrations nor selective depictions nor non-serious actions” (“Misrepresenting Misrepresentation,” in Brendel, Meibauer, and Steinbach, 247).
Gerrig’s theory leads to the insight that “quotations lead the audience into a mediated encounter with the original text where a second, more powerful voice speaks on behalf of the quoting author” and that, therefore, with biblical quotations, the audience is brought “into the presence of God, who is shown standing firmly on the side of the speaker.” Clark and Gerrig claim neither that the original speaker is a “more powerful voice” nor that in quotation the original speaker “speaks on behalf of the quoting author.” The latter claim leaves no room for irony, other forms of parody or subversion. It cannot accommodate quotations such as the devil’s quotation of Psalm 91:11-12 during the temptation of Jesus (Matt 4:6, Luke 4:10-11). Following Stanley here would cause one to argue that this quotation shows God to be speaking on behalf of the devil! Instead, Clark and Gerrig’s model requires the quoting author to provide sufficient context to enable his or her audience to “hear” the original text. In Matthew 4:6, the devil’s use of the psalmist’s words does not consider the relevant co-text of the source text, i.e., Psalm 91:9-10. Using terminology we expand upon in chapter 5, the devil is both reading the source text as an “Independent” and has produced a “defective” SA.

A useful feature of Clark and Gerrig’s theory for our purposes is that it implies the relevance of context by stressing the presence of the shared background required for “solidarity” in interpretation. In chapter 3, we present the existence of mutual context as critical to our model. Direct quotation activates (perhaps first creating) mutual

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44 Stanley, Arguing, 32. Nor do we agree with Stanley that Wierzbicka’s theory suggests “an author who quotes from Scripture temporarily lays aside his or her own speech and allows the biblical text to speak directly to the audience. In this way the members of the audience are enabled (in theory) to hear for themselves what the quoting author heard in an earlier encounter with the biblical text” (26). “Allowing the biblical text to speak directly to the audience” and “enabling the audience to hear what the quoting author heard” are not necessarily identical.

45 Stanley’s claim is incompatible with direct quotation as non-serious action and with a second idea he attempts to derive from Clark and Gerrig: that quotations can “insulate” a speaker “from negative reactions to certain parts of the message” (Arguing, 32). Clark and Gerrig’s examples of dissociation of responsibility are not relevant to NT quotation (cf. 792-793). Nor do they imply a quoting author can self-insulate from all quotation decisions. Certainly a quoting author is not insulated from a quotation decision that is recognized as misleading.

46 Since this quotation is a direct object clause appearing after a verb of perception, modern translators take ὅτι here to introduce direct discourse. See D. B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 454-458. But this is not an instance in which the quoter demonstrates what the original speaker did in saying something. The devil is not demonstrating what the psalmist was doing with his speech but rather is using the psalmist’s words manipulatively to tempt Jesus into disobedience.

47 “When speakers demonstrate only a snippet of an event, they tacitly assume that their addressees share the right background to interpret it the same way they do” (Clark and Gerrig, 793). We rely on Clark’s well-known work on common ground in chapter 3.
context so that hearers/readers understand a speaker/author’s communicative intent, whether or not agreement/adherence ensues.\textsuperscript{48}

Clark and Gerrig also make a link to SAT. However, they omit perlocution in their list of “the selective aspects of the referents that demonstration can depict,” which limits the value of their model for us.\textsuperscript{49}

François Récanati, who bases his arguments on Clark’s work,\textsuperscript{50} points demonstration theories in a new direction with his observation that for open quotation “the demonstration may serve a number of purposes, which can only be determined on a pragmatic basis.”\textsuperscript{51} Rather than delve into the technical distinctions between open, closed and mixed quotation, we look further into linguistic theories of quotation by exploring the work of linguist Deborah Tannen, whose research interests include discourse studies, pragmatics and sociolinguistics.

Involvement and Joint Production

An important element of Tannen’s work is “involvement,” which occurs in our model as both illocutionary and perlocutionary effect. A key involvement strategy is repetition, defined as “ways that meaning is created by the recurrence and recontextualization of words and phrases in discourse.”\textsuperscript{52} Involvement develops as repetition, which encompasses quotation, “bonds participants to the discourse and to each other, linking individual speakers in a conversation and in relationships.”\textsuperscript{53} Ultimately, quotation is “a supremely social act: by appropriating each other’s utterances, speakers are bound together in a community of words.”\textsuperscript{54} We develop the concepts of “a community of words” and of interactional relationships in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

Although Tannen argues that “even seemingly direct quotation is really ‘constructed dialogue,’ that is, primarily the creation of the speaker rather than the party

\textsuperscript{48} The word “activate” comes from G. Brown and G. Yule, \textit{Discourse Analysis} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 75. Stanley restricts solidarity to situations where both parties are familiar with the original text (cf. \textit{Arguing}, 31-32); we argue that quotation can be used to create mutual context even when the hearer/reader is not familiar with the source text.

\textsuperscript{49} Clark and Gerrig believe “most quotations depict illocutionary acts, including the propositions expressed, and treat the other acts as supportive or incidental” (779; cf. 775).


\textsuperscript{51} Récanati, “Quotation,” 665.

\textsuperscript{52} Tannen, \textit{Voices}, 9. For her, repetition is intertextuality, “the insight that meaning in language results from a complex of relationships linking items within a discourse and linking current to prior instances of language” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 61.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 132.
quoted,” in all situations, the meaning of the utterance still “resonates with association with its reported context, in keeping with Bakhtin’s sense of polyphony.” Further, since “the only way we can make sense of the world is to see the connections between things, and between present things and things we have experienced before or hear about,” for Tannen, there is a relationship—albeit perhaps not an equal partnership—between the reporting speech and its context and the reported speech and its context.

Her thoughts concerning the partnership between the speaker and listener set the stage for our discussion of the roles of the author and reader in the coming chapters:

Listening … is an active not a passive enterprise, requiring interpretation comparable to that required in speaking, and speaking entails simultaneously projecting the act of listening: In Bakhtin’s sense, all language use is dialogic. The theoretical perspective I have in mind is referred to by some as the notion that conversation is “a joint production.”

In summary, Tannen’s theory introduces us to the concepts of involvement, communicative interaction, the relationship of reported to reporting context and the role of both speaker/author and hearer/reader in “joint production.” We address these in coming chapters. Our next step, however, is to explore further the relationship between reported and reporting speech by evaluating the work of three noted professors of literature who take a literary approach to quotation.

**Literary Theories of Quotation**

**Strategies of “Humanist Imitation”**

For Thomas Greene, a work’s intertextuality is “the structural presence within it of elements from earlier works. Since a literary text that draws nothing from its predecessors is inconceivable, intertextuality is a universal literary constant.” Using Renaissance poems as examples, he outlines “four strategies of humanist imitation”:

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55 Ibid., 103. “The words have ceased to be those of the speaker to whom they are attributed, having been appropriated by the speaker who is repeating them” (105). This is similar to Sternberg’s theory (see below), although Tannen does not reference his work.

56 Ibid., 104-105.


58 Tannen, Voices, 27. This also pertains to written communication; all understanding requires “active interpretation, not passive reception” (103).

• The reproductive or sacramental “celebrates an enshrined primary text by rehearsing it liturgically”;

• The eclectic or exploitative “treats all traditions as stockpiles to be drawn upon ostensibly at random” so that in it “allusions, echoes, phrases, and images from a large number of authors jostle each other indifferently”;

• In the heuristic, having advertised “their derivation from the subtexts they carry with them,” the imitations “proceed to distance themselves from the subtexts and force us to recognize the poetic distance traversed”;

• The dialectical leaves “room for a two-way current of mutual criticism between authors and between eras.”

Hays introduces Greene’s typology in the final chapter of his seminal work *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, arguing that Greene’s “categories can be applied analogically to any text that performs intertextual reflection.” Other than Galatians, which Hays names heuristic, and a few scattered spots of eclectic reading strategy, Hays finds Paul’s intertextuality to be primarily of Greene’s “dialectical” type. This dovetails with our interest in the dialogical nature of quotation.

The other literary theories we explore focus on the locus of power in the relationship between the quoted and quoting authors.

Power in Quotation

At the heart of Meir Sternberg’s theory of quotation is that “whatever the surface similarity, the recontextualized inset structurally diverges from the original; whatever the formal autonomy conferred by directness, the inset is communicatively subordinated to the [new] frame” and “the perspectives of the global speaker and his audience are super-imposed on those of the original participants.”

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60 Ibid., 38, 39, 40 and 45, respectively.
62 Ibid., 174-178. Hays abandons his view of the eclectic category as “allusions to various texts and traditions” (173) when he calls 1 Cor 9:8-10 and Rom 10:18 eclectic because “there is no indication that Paul has wrestled seriously with the [single] texts from which the citations are drawn” (175).
63 As S. Moyise points out, various scholars describe “the interaction between the connotations” a quotation “(may) bring with it and its role or function in the new work” as “dialogical, dialectical, or intertextual” (“Quotations,” in Porter and Stanley, 28 and 28n27). For our purposes, it is not necessary to distinguish between the first two terms although “intertextual” is a broader category.
64 M. Sternberg, “Proteus in Quotation-Land: Mimesis and the Forms of Reported Discourse,” *PT* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 131, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772069 (accessed July 19, 2006). For Sternberg, all quotation involves “manifold shifts, if not reversals, of the original meaning and significance. … However accurate the wording of the quotation and however pure the quoter’s motives,
hands of quoters interested in drastic and yet unobtrusive manipulation: ironists, parodists, polemicists, not to mention subtle liars.”⁶⁵ According to Sternberg, “to quote is to mediate, to mediate is to frame, and to frame is to interfere and exploit.”⁶⁶

Stanley concludes from Sternberg’s argument both that “it is the context of quotation, not the original context, from which the audience obtains the necessary clues for interpreting the work” and that the meaning an author “expects his audience to get from the quoted material … may or may not correspond to its ‘original meaning’.”⁶⁷ We discuss context in the following chapter but point out here that although the co-text is generally important to determining the “meaning” of a text, it does not follow that the original “meaning” of a quotation plays no role in understanding the receptor text.⁶⁸

Sternberg, Tannen and Stefan Morawski (see below) are all sources for Lane-Mercier’s “power” theory.⁶⁹ Based on Tannen, Lane-Mercier argues that reported speech is “linked to a specifically pragmatic dimension centered upon the production of participatory perlocutionary effects” in the quoter’s audience.⁷⁰ However, Lane-Mercier admits she goes “beyond Tannen’s conclusions, in order to stress the fact that … the recontextualization automatically performed by the quoter is accompanied by the implicit subordination of the cited utterance.”⁷¹ For her, all quotation “represents an unavowed attempt to exert control over the other. … In sum, reported speech relies on a strategy centered on the metaphorical death of the quotee, whose utterance, apparently intact, has nonetheless been decontextualized, severed from its ‘origin’, and subsumed

tearing a piece of discourse from its original habitat and reconstructing it within a new network of relations cannot but interfere with its effect” (108).

⁶⁵ Ibid., 130, where he calls “verbatim citation … a shrewd rhetorical weapon.”
⁶⁶ Ibid., 145.
⁶⁷ Stanley, Arguing, 29 and 29n32.
⁶⁹ Stanley calls Lane-Mercier’s model “the parodic approach” because she argues that “if … one accepts the existence of a parodic space within which quotation as play is permitted to flourish, … it follows that quotation as play becomes the prototype of reported speech” (G. Lane-Mercier, “Quotation as a Discursive Strategy,” Kodikas/Code 14, no. 3/4 [1991]: 203). Her other category is proof: “The act of quoting from a text considered to be authoritative … is … equated with the performing of an act of authority or, at the very least, with a display of erudition that only the learned few possess” (201).
⁷⁰ Ibid., 204. “Quotation is to be construed as an integral component of the discourse of the quoter, designed above all to encourage listener participation” (Ibid.).
⁷¹ Ibid., 205. For Tannen, “seemingly direct quotation is … primarily the creation of the speaker rather than the party quoted” (Voices, 103); Lane-Mercier replaces “primarily” with “automatically” (204). Although Lane-Mercier notes that “whether the locus of ‘power’ be conventionally situated in the quotee or in the quoter, the presence of the other can never be entirely eradicated” [sic] (211), she acknowledges neither any authority of the quotee nor any stability of meaning.
by the utterance of the quoter.”” Quotation is thus “a discursive strategy designed to manipulate the listener and, as such, to program the listener’s response.” Like Sternberg, for Lane-Mercier, the quoter has and uses the power in quotation.

A focus on power relationships, and especially the manipulation of both the source text and the audience by the quoter, is a theme of Stanley’s work. Stanley argues that “Paul assumed a stance of social and ideological dominance/power over his intended audience, a dominance for which he claimed divine support” and that, “like other Jews,” he “believed that a quotation from the holy text should close off all debate on a subject.” For him, Lane-Mercier’s insistence that quotations are inevitably manipulative “can help us look beyond the apparent innocence of Paul’s appeals to Scripture in order to ask questions about his underlying motives.”

Others make similar arguments. Punt finds “the Scriptures functioned as the authorizing agent for Paul’s own efforts to retain his authority and power within the Corinthian church, providing the mainstay for his rhetoric of power.” For Graham Shaw, flattery is “the initial stage of manipulation. … Thus what looks like a free offer becomes a means of control. Paul dazzles his readers by the splendour of their status, and thus reconciles them to submitting to the authority of the man who has conferred it upon them.” Concerning the New Testament more broadly, J. D. H. Amador, who equates persuasion to a “power engagement,” goes so far as to aver that “there is an

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72 Lane-Mercier, 206. Hatina presents Barthes’ view of intertextuality as similar: “The entire agenda of displacing traditional structures, even if they are merely viewed as relative instead of contradictory, can be reduced to a struggle for power and authority” (Search, 31).
73 Lane-Mercier, 207; cf. 205.
74 “At the heart of the quotation process is a covert attempt by the quoting author to assert power over both the source text and the audience” (Stanley, Arguing, 34). For Mack, “early Christian rhetoric is packed with stock proofs, strategies, and references to the traditional final topics. The trick was to manipulate these in support of their own propositions. … Thus the challenge for early Christians was to (mis)use conventional modes of conviction in the attempt to articulate a new and distinctive ethos” (38).
75 Stanley, Arguing, 171. He sees it as “perhaps no accident that all of Paul’s explicit quotations appear in letters to churches in which power relationships were being contested” (36; cf. 88, 92, 122, 178, 182). For Sanborn, Stanley’s research is guided by modern rhetorical theory which posits “speakers are engaged in power relationships” rather than attempting “to discover truth and persuade others of it” (76).
76 Stanley, Arguing, 173; cf. 13, 59. For further discussion of quotation as “closing a debate,” see p. 73 below, especially n129.
77 Stanley, Arguing, 36-37. At several points, Stanley moderates Lane-Mercier’s position. For example, he notes that “not all quotations are meant to be taken seriously” (36). But he gives no clue as to how to determine which quotations are in which category.
78 Punt, “Paul,” 286.
element of violence in ‘persuasion’ as an activity of imposing one’s own ‘point of view’ upon another.”

Many scholars do not find such arguments compelling.

Brian Abasciano uses Stanley’s own words to make the strong counter-argument that if Paul “were to misuse Scripture, ‘a reader familiar with the original text would invariably have raised questions about the validity of Paul’s interpretation. Questions of this sort would have impeded rather than advanced Paul’s rhetorical purposes.”

In this regard, Stanley’s view of Paul’s audiences as irrevocably characterized by their individual initial level of familiarity with Scripture without consideration of their communal interaction is short-sighted. As J. Ross Wagner highlights, “Stanley himself curiously gives pride of place to the least competent hearers imaginable.” Not only does Stanley’s theory of audience competence presume individual rather than group reading, it is founded on a modern suspicion of expertise. Instead, in Paul’s socio-cultural context, the less informed audience would have expected the “informed” audience to have mediated Paul’s “meaning” to them. Abasciano says it well:

It is highly unlikely that Paul would aim his biblical quotations mainly at the scripturally ignorant, intentionally playing fast and loose with Scripture, when the very people who would control the reading and interpretation of Paul’s letter would have been those who by Stanley’s own admission could have assessed Paul’s interpretation and impeded his rhetorical purposes. It is far more likely that Paul would have taken special account of the scripturally learned in his audiences and attempt to craft his biblical argumentation so as to be convincing to those who were familiar with the original contexts of his quotations.

Furthermore, “power” arguments overlook the fact that “participants’ agreement may be held to play a role with respect to what is to count as being (objectively) the case when matters of right, entitlement, obligation, authority etc. are at issue. … Authority does not exist apart from its recognition by relevant social participants.”

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80 Amador, 51, 58. Shaw also believes “the oppressive use of authority derives from the determination to perpetuate a position of power which is threatened by an instability it cannot ultimately evade. … Self-perpetuating authority can defend itself from dissolution only by oppression, and the New Testament contains many examples of that ruthless self-defence at work” (17). We disagree with an understanding of “persuasion” in terms of sanctioned acts of power/violence (Amador, 299). Nor do we agree that “power is at play in every … attempt at persuasion” (Ibid., 86).


82 J. R. Wagner, Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul “In Concert” in the Letter to the Romans (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 34n121. We present a different categorization of readers in chapter 5.

83 Abasciano, 172.

OT would only be an “authority” for the former pagans among Paul’s audience to the extent they accepted it as such.

Additionally, “power is not coterminous with violence.” Elizabeth Castelli points out that Paul does not possess any special physical means to coerce people to relate to him in a certain way; and he has no state apparatus (police or military) to ensure compliance. Nor obviously would I argue that he actively coerces people against their conscious wills to place themselves in a subordinate relationship to him. Rather he is attempting to persuade them by two simultaneous means—rhetoric and personal authority.

Finally, there are strong ethical counter-arguments; a variety of scholars have pointed out that an oppressive “rhetoric of power” is inconsistent with the relationally transformative message of Scripture. For Rikk Watts, the major flaw in Stanley’s rhetorical model is … his implicit subordination of Paul’s Christ-centered and cruciform ethic to the need to impose his authority. Nothing, it seems to me, could be further from the truth. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and the language of “belief” is its focus. It is in being persuaded (cf. Acts 17:4; 18:13; 26:28; Gal 1:10; 2 Cor 5:11) that one is saved.

Watts adds that “to seek to use Scripture as a covert means of establishing his personal authority seems … totally out of character for one [Paul] who counted all such privilege as dung that he might gain Christ.”

More generally, for Clarence Walhout, “the ethical foundation of human action” lies in “the mutually dependent relationships of the self and the other.” Kathy Ehrensperger relates this to the role of Scripture:

To live in the realm of this God means to be in a relationship for which the renunciation of power in the sense of domination is constitutive. … The character of the relationship and of the dimension of authority and power within it are inseparably intertwined. … Thus, although the Scriptures are credited with

correctly notes that “all actors in a power relationship possess a critical access to agency. The ascendant figure in a power relationship does not act on the passive, subordinate figure. Although power relationships are asymmetrical, they do not render the subordinate actor without the possibility for action” (Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991], 44).
many divergent roles in the Second Temple period, to attribute to them some force of coercion or dominating power seems unwarranted and inappropriate.\textsuperscript{90}

In the NT, “power” is not “dominating power” but “transformative power.”\textsuperscript{91} Trust is a necessary component of such power: “For transformative power to be power at all, to have an effect on the ‘weaker’ agent at all, trust is constitutive of its very existence. Trust must be seen as absolutely essential to the establishment and continuation of a truly empowering relation.”\textsuperscript{92} Along with this comes “respect for the otherness of the other,” which “offers a close parallel to love (agapē) in the New Testament.”\textsuperscript{93} This is the “power” generally wielded by Jesus and the NT authors.\textsuperscript{94}

Thus, we reject the idea that either the quoted or quoting context or the author or the reader “controls” the other. Instead, we adopt a hermeneutics of cooperation. This means that even in situations where power—or the lack of it—may have a role, we deny that quoting is necessarily exploitative or that Jesus or the NT authors use quotations in deceitful manipulation. Further, we hold that applying the concept of quotation as a “power play” to any NT author is unhelpful if it leads us to question—or even to attempt to ascertain—an author’s motives.\textsuperscript{95}

In summary, although Stanley has opened a door to new approaches to the study of quotation, by taking Paul’s primary purpose in quoting as the consolidation and

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90 K. Ehrensperger, “Paul and the Authority of Scripture: A Feminist Perception,” in Porter and Stanley, 311-312. She notes that in the wake of “Max Weber’s writings about power, theories of power in the social sciences focused significantly on power as power-over someone—and more specifically on power as domination. … Domination, then, is perceived as the ability of an agent to limit the options and choices of others. The means to achieve such domination is through the exercise of force, coercion, or by securing the compliance of the subordinates” (\textit{Paul and the Dynamics of Power: Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement} [London: T&T Clark, 2007], 20).

91 According to Ehrensperger, “the aim of transformative power is to render itself obsolete by means of empowering the subordinate” (\textit{Dynamics}, 27).

92 Ibid., 29. “In order for the exercise of power to be empowering, the use of coercion, force, or violence must be ruled out” (Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 299).


94 R. Watts points out that “Paul’s discourse is not about domination precisely because his vision of transformation is predicated on exactly the opposite, namely trust. And that trust is in a God whose exercise of power is the very antithesis of domination. To suggest that Paul resorts to the very thing his whole life, often at great personal cost, repudiates, is … out of step with Paul” (“In Need”). Similarly, M. Strom argues Paul did not focus on personal power/status but rather “led his communities into a new process of framing their identities and purposes. It was a profoundly relational strategy, crafted in the moment to demonstrate what it meant to choose the well-being of others in imitation of the dying and rising of Christ” (\textit{Reframing Paul: Conversations in Grace and Community} [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000], 194). Along these lines, A. C. Thiselton believes “Paul sees his apostleship not as an instrument of power but as a call to become a transparent agency through whom the crucified and raised Christ becomes portrayed through lifestyle, thought, and utterance” (\textit{The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text} [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle, Paternoster, 2000], 45).

95 We discuss the difference between authorial intention and authorial motivation in chapter 5.
\end{flushright}
manipulation of a power position via an appeal to authority, he leaves what is beyond that door unexplored. Stanley “ignores the various rhetorical ways in which an appeal to authority can be construed, much less the other (sometimes more likely) rhetorical moves in which Paul engages (e.g. narrative posturing or world-projecting).”

To explore other moves which can be made via quotation, such as “world-projecting,” we turn to the work of philosopher Stefan Morawski.

The Maintenance of Cultural Continuity

Kristeva’s work on intertextuality was “set against the prevailing standard of literary theory,” which “stressed the autonomy of a text and … valued the originality of an author’s work as the mark of success. Evidence of influence, then, was seen as a negative factor in literary evaluation.” Similar stress on author creativity is a focus of Morawski’s work on quotation; he is dismissive of quotation in comparison with the creativity of “art.” He believes “philosophy, scholarship and all traditional institutions and their attendant ideologies submit to its [quotation’s] incursions,” while art “resists its pressure” so that the artist “proffers his OWN vision.”

Morawski defines textual quotation as “the literal reproduction of a verbal text … wherein what is reproduced forms an integral part of some work and can easily be detached from the new whole in which it is incorporated.”

Although his typology of four functions of quotation bears some similarity to Greene’s, his approach is colored

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97 In a footnote in his final chapter, Stanley mentions Morawski’s “frequently cited article” and lists Morawski’s four common reasons for quotation (*Arguing*, 173n4). But since Stanley gives no further details and offers no discussion, it is hard to understand on what basis he concludes that “obviously, this list is too broad and generic to be of much use when applied to the letters of Paul” (Ibid.).

98 B. Tanner, 6. We find “influence” in its agent-related sense, that is, “whereby people act in a causal manner on other people” (Hatina, “Intertextuality,” 38), to be helpful as we consider both the function of quotation and the communication of meaning. For discussion of the relationship of influence and intertextuality, see Hatina, “Intertextuality,” and J. Clayton and E. Rothstein, eds., *Influence and Intertextuality in Literary History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), especially the essays by Clayton and Rothstein, Clayton, T. Rajan, and S. S. Friedman.

99 S. Morawski, “The Basic Functions of Quotation,” in *Sign, Language, Culture*, ed. A. J. Greimas et al. (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 704. For him, quotation is a choice between “innovation and the duplication of canonized exemplars” and the appeal to authority is “a device for ducking independent thought” (691, 692). Although he would include OT quotation as an appeal to authority, we reject the notion that Jesus and the NT authors are “ducking independent thought” and do not characterize their use of quotation as evidence of “intellectual torpor and emotional-ritual assiduity” (692-693).

100 Ibid., 691, where he adds that quotation is “not so much separate, as separable.”
by his view of quotation and his typology lacks a function comparable to Greene’s dialectical category. Therefore, we do not use Morawski’s typology.

However, his broader view of quotation as evoking tradition is valuable. For Morawski, quotation is “a component element of the stock of culture, anchoring the present to time past.” Tradition can be not only “continued” but also “breached” via quotation. This option is particularly relevant for NT quotation where an intervening interpretation of the OT may be in view. In general, Morawski argues that

the situations which prompt literal reference to an original … can be summed up simply as MAINTENANCE OF CULTURAL CONTINUITY. It is after all striking how strictly connected quotation is with a sense of traditions. … Over and above this, the quotation is a sign of an increasingly alert discernment of questions and answers recurring in human history.

In chapter 4, we look at this from a different perspective, giving the name “theology” to certain of the “questions and answers recurring in human history” and considering quotation to play a role in posing and answering those questions.

In biblical studies, the concept of quotation functioning as a link to tradition was described over 50 years ago by J. A. E. van Dodewaard and C. H. Dodd. We conclude our discussion of quotation by evaluating their contributions and that of Lars Hartman.

Quotation as a Link to Tradition

Van Dodewaard lists three motives for quotation. The first is an appeal to a recognized authority; the second is using someone else’s engaging way of making a point. Thirdly, “il est loisible de citer un seul mot ou une seule phrase, non seulement à cause de la

101 Like Greene’s sacramental function, with Morawski’s appeal to authority, the quoter does not produce a personal opinion. Morawski’s erudite function, in which quotations “serve as evidence” (694) as the quoter endorses or rebuts the quoted author’s views (695), approximates Greene’s heuristic function. Similar to Greene’s eclectic function, Morawski’s ornament function “is an intellectual conceit which sometimes makes no pretense even of accuracy. …The quote may be taken out of context or be marginal to the author’s views” (695). However, Morawski’s stimulative-amplificatory function, in which the quoter is an “investigator” for whom quotations “act either as a kind of ‘surgical appliance’ doing duty for a part of his own argument, or as a springboard for speculations in the same vein, or finally as a reinforcement of the terms in which he poses his problem or the answer which he advances” (694), does not correspond to Greene’s dialectical type. Both Morawski’s ornament and stimulative-amplificatory functions resemble quotation as described by Sternberg, Lane-Mercier and, to a lesser extent, Tannen and Stanley, in their emphasis on the priority of the quoter. Although Stanley’s concept of an appeal to authority is not the same as Morawski’s, Stanley agrees with Morawski that there is no need for substantiation with an appeal to authority. For Stanley, the appeal to authority is the substantiation.

102 Morawski, 704.

103 With quotation considered diachronically, “there takes place a winnowing of the past,” and, at the extreme, “a quotation dredged up from the past or extracted from contemporary records embalming the past can be simply an indictment of the author cited” (Ibid., 692).

104 Ibid., 691. For him, this is a spurning of art and innovation.
signification restreinte de cette phrase ou de cet mot, mais pour évoquer du même coup tout le contexte, toute l’histoire, l’événement même, durant lequel ce mot a été prononcé.”

Taking the Gospel of Matthew as his example, van Dodewaard considers the third motive particularly applicable to both the words of Matthew and those of Jesus which Matthew reports.

Both van Dodewaard’s argument that “tout le contexte, toute l’histoire, l’événement même” is evoked with quotation and C. H. Dodd’s similar contention that with regard to certain “fundamental passages,” one of which is Psalm 110, “the total context … is in view, and is the basis of the argument” are stronger claims than we make here. Although we agree that quotation evokes tradition/Story, we do not assert that the entire context of the source text is necessarily in view. We prefer Hartman’s less rigorous suggestion that in those situations where “the tradition, common to author and reader” permitted an “evocative” function, “the context of a passage quoted or alluded to was somehow evoked in the process of communication.”

To determine what of the original context is in view, each quotation must be evaluated individually. Furthermore, like Hartman, we do not limit the evoking of context to Dodd’s “fundamental passages.” As Morawski argues, “the quotation is never dragged in … from passages which are of little significance.” Prominence is created even with unique quotations, such as Psalm 115:1 LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13; all quotations can be expected to be significant for understanding a discourse.

Hartman also makes the point that “we ought not to forget how far the OT quoted was an interpreted OT.” Every OT source text was read and interpreted by


106 Van Dodewaard, 484; C. H. Dodd, *According to the Scriptures: The Sub-Structure of New Testament Theology* (London: Nisbet, 1952), 126. Dodd feels segments from these passages were quoted “rather as pointers to the whole context than as constituting testimonies in and for themselves” (126).

107 In some cases, the immediate literary context (“co-text”) is indispensable to determining the meaning of a text. We discuss co-text and other types of context in chapter 3.


109 Morawski, 695.

110 As R. E. Ciampa notes, “Authors have ways of indicating which intertextual relationships are of particular significance for understanding their discourses. This may well be one of the key roles of citation and allusion in a discourse” (“Scriptural Language and Ideas,” in Porter and Stanley, 41n3).

111 Hartman, 135; cf. Still and Worton, 1. Even the act of recording a speech involves a measure of interpretation.
many readers in the centuries since it was originally spoken and subsequently written,
and an interpretation may be what is evoked by a NT speaker/author. Although Hartman
believes that “in spite of Qumran, Rabbinic traditions, Philo etc., … we do not know
enough to be able to tell with certainty whether or not a quotation has a special nuance
of meaning because of an interpretative tradition behind it,”112 we can at a minimum
debate the likelihood of several alternatives. This is important in our case studies.

In this regard, as we pointed out in our evaluation of Morawski’s theory, a NT
speaker/author does not always evoke tradition to agree with or revitalize it; quotation
may evoke tradition to signal a break with it (subversion).113 We discuss various types of
transformation in chapter 4. In any event, we expect the interpretation of the OT by a
NT author to reflect the intervening Christ event.

Conclusion

Our exploration of intertextuality and quotation in this chapter has established that
instead of a power-motivated appeal to authority, biblical quotation can be viewed as
evoking tradition in order to create or activate the mutual context of the author and
reader, thereby encouraging readers “to believe and/or act (or stop believing or acting)
in particular ways.”114 Therefore, important to our methodology are: a dialogical
author/reader relationship, the importance of context (and especially co-text), an
understanding of textual tradition, and the ability of quotation to support reader
transformation. In chapter 3, we explore both the author/reader relationship and the
topic of (mutual) context.

112 Hartman, 135.
113 R. B. Hays and J. B. Green also suggest that “engagement with the OT might be parodic,
repeating an old pattern or echoing ancient metaphors to signal difference at the very heart of similarity”
for Interpretation, ed. J. B. Green [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995], 229). This
would include the literary technique of irony, which may be behind the decision of both Matthew and
Luke to include the devil’s quotation of Ps 91:11-12 in their accounts of the temptation. See p. 17 above.
114 Stanley, Arguing, 3.
We have determined that quotation can evoke tradition, including literary tradition, which we call Story.\(^1\) In turn, tradition/Story is part of the mutual context of the author and reader.\(^2\) Therefore, evoking elements of Story via quotation activates\(^3\) (and perhaps first creates) aspects of mutual context. We continue our discussion of the function of quotation with a more detailed look at mutual context and its activation, beginning by clarifying what we mean by “author” and “reader.”

*Empirical and Implied Author and Reader*\(^4\)

According to Seymour Chatman, the author and reader each entail “three different personages. On the sending end are the empirical author, the implied author, and the narrator (if any); on the receiving end, the empirical audience (listener, reader, viewer), the implied audience, and the narratee” (if any).\(^5\) Chatman, who credits Wayne Booth with the concepts “implied author” and “implied reader,” presents this diagram:\(^6\)

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Narrative Text
Real Author → Implied Author → (Narrator) → (Narratee) → Implied Reader → Real Reader
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The diagram demonstrates that “only the implied author and implied reader are immanent to a narrative, the narrator and narratee are optional (parentheses). The real author and real reader are outside the narrative transaction as such, though, of course,

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\(^1\) We capitalize “Story” to indicate we do not limit literary tradition to narrative genre. We define Story further in chapter 4. Note that although our concern is primarily with the textual tradition transmitted by Scripture, we also recognize oral literature as tradition.

\(^2\) Although for convenience we refer to the “author” and “reader,” our discussion of context applies equally to a speaker and hearer. A major difference is that since a reader’s response is not as immediate, mutual context generally changes more slowly with written text.

\(^3\) J.-M. Heimerdinger gives a metaphorical explanation: “An entity is activated to the extent that it is ‘lit up’ in the consciousness of the hearer” (*Topic, Focus and Foreground in Ancient Hebrew Narratives* [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999], 129).

\(^4\) Scholars use “real,” “actual” or “historical” as well as “empirical,” and “ideal” or “model” as well as “implied.” For our purpose, these terms are interchangeable.


\(^6\) Chatman, *Story*, 151.
indispensable to it in an ultimate practical sense.” The communication of the empirical author and reader takes place “only through their implied counterparts.”

Although Chatman, Booth and others who use this model are primarily concerned with narrative criticism, the construct also has validity in non-narrative genres, including the biblical epistles and the Psalms, both of which are of concern to this study. We describe and evaluate the implied author/reader construct below and follow this with a discussion of the narrator and narratee or “listener.”

The Implied Author and Reader

Booth defines the “implied author” as the “second self” the empirical author creates in the literary work. It is the implied author “who has chosen, consciously or unconsciously (so any given reader will infer), every detail, every quality, that is found in the work or implied by its silences.” Furthermore, the implied author “is someone with whose beliefs on all subjects I must largely agree if I am to enjoy his work.”

The implied author is constructed by the empirical author and “reconstructed by the reader from the narrative.” This reconstruction may be assisted by certain literary strategies, including “the reliability or unreliability of the narrator; pacing …; the knowledge/ignorance contour …; focus …; evaluation …; the use of symbols and of allusions to things and events which occur outside the projected world; and the expression of beliefs concerning the actual world.” The implied author also can be revealed through “conventional or formulaic phrasing, genealogical catalogs, and the use of hyperbole and careful documentation” as well as “less obvious structural patterns involving beginnings and endings, uses of metaphor, symbol, and allusion, sequences of events, and chronological ordering.”

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 21.
9 See the discussion of Story as more than narrative genre in the following chapter.
12 Booth, Fiction, 137, referring to the novel.
13 Chatman, Story, 148. After selecting the audience, “the rhetor ‘must’ then construct her/his argumentative appeals with this audience in mind. In order for argumentation to take place at all, much less be effective, s/he ‘must’ adapt him/herself to the audience whom s/he has selected. In other words, the rhetor becomes a construction of the audience” (Amador, 68).
15 Walhout, “Texts,” 73.
The empirical author constructs not only the implied author but also the implied reader—"the audience presupposed by the narrative itself."\(^{16}\) The implied reader is the one “actual readers must encounter as they encounter the text. The discourse is thus addressed to a readership which it creates itself. … The historical reader must, in a sense, read ‘through’ this textual construct.”\(^ {17}\) The identity of the implied reader thus is inferred primarily from the reconstruction of the implied author.

The implied reader can “elucidate” facts suggested by the text and “discern the presence and force of irony, the meaning of metaphors, the suggestions borne by emphasis, the presence of ambiguity (double entendre).”\(^ {18}\) The implied reader “‘falls for’ the implied author’s traps; he is surprised by unexpected reversals in the discourse, led astray and brought back onto the right path by the implied author.”\(^ {19}\) Furthermore, the implied reader “can be found as much in the text’s silences as in its overt appeals.”\(^ {20}\) Where the text is silent about a fact, we infer “that members of the ‘authorial audience’ already know it” and “what the author feels no need to mention, of the values the story depends on, tells us who he thinks we are before we start to read.”\(^ {21}\)

As an example of the use of the implied author/reader construct, we consider the interpretation of Psalm 51. Although Psalm 51 is introduced as a psalm “of David” and the superscription gives details relating to David’s life, David does not need to be considered to be the empirical author of the psalm in order to understand it. Rather, we can learn a great deal about the implied author from an analysis of the text. First, there is no protestation of innocence. The psalmist has sinned and admits his guilt (vv 2-4), which leads to the penitence so movingly expressed in the psalm. Second, the psalmist understands Yahweh judges sin. In v 4c-d, the passage quoted in Romans 3:4, the psalmist acknowledges Yahweh is justified when Yahweh “speaks” and that Yahweh’s judgments are just. The psalmist’s fervent plea for Yahweh to forgive his sins implies


\(^{21}\) Booth, *Fiction*, 423. What is known of the socio-historical context can be important. An unmentioned event may not yet have occurred either in history or from the temporal perspective of the implied author (the “implied date”).
that the psalmist believes Yahweh has the ability to forgive sin and may do so even where disobedience has been great.

The psalmist presents several reasons designed to motivate Yahweh to perform the desired action of forgiveness. One is Yahweh’s own character, in particular, Yahweh’s covenant loving-kindness [חסד] and the greatness of Yahweh’s compassion [רחם]. The implicit argument is that Yahweh’s essential being includes forgiveness. In addition, the psalmist offers praise, sacrifice and correct teaching so that other sinners may also return to Yahweh (vv 13, 14c, 15b and 19). This is not a claim to Yahweh’s forgiveness but rather a commitment to being in future right relationship with Yahweh.

From this characterization of the implied author, we conclude that in this instance the implied reader understands Yahweh’s character as well as what behavior both pleases Yahweh and evidences being in right relationship with Yahweh.

The Narrator and the Listeners

All Scriptural texts not only have an implied author, they contain some narratorial presence. One generally important consideration is the reliability of the narrator. A reliable narrator “speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author’s norms).” Where the narrator is reliable, which we hold to be the case in our case study examples, understanding the narrator is a way to discover the views of the implied author.

The correspondence between the narrator and the listeners is less straightforward than the relationship between the implied author and implied reader. One category of listener is “participants,” which includes both direct addressees and side participants (those taking part but currently not directly addressed). The other category of listener is non-participants or “overhearers,” that is, those “who have no rights or responsibilities” in the conversation. Overhearers are either “bystanders,” …who are openly present but not part of the conversation” or “eavesdroppers’ … who listen in without the speaker’s awareness.”

22 Contra M. E. Tate, who argues Psalm 51 contains “no motivational appeal to God for action” (Psalms 51-100 [Dallas: Word Books, 1990], 8).
23 Booth, Fiction, 158-159. Determining that a narrator is reliable does not imply the narrative is non-fiction. In any case, our interest is not in the historical veracity of Scripture but rather in the transformation the various NT speakers/authors attempt to accomplish in their audiences.
24 We use Booth’s term (see Fiction, 423) here since it is broader than “narratee.”
25 This terminology comes from H. Clark, 14. For him, the speaker is also a participant.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
The existence of listeners of various types is a “device by which the implied author informs the real reader how to perform as implied reader.”

Therefore, in identifying the implied reader it may be helpful to analyze what types of listeners are present at the episode and discourse levels, although the implied reader may or may not be identified with the direct addressee or with any of the other listeners.

We keep this in mind as we consider the identity of the implied reader both in those Psalms passages where the direct addressee is Yahweh and in those NT passages where a speaker directly addresses one audience while the implied NT author addresses a different group. Further, although Paul’s arguments are ostensibly directed to his formerly pagan converts, we must take into account the possibility that they also may be indirectly aimed at groups of overhearers, that is, at his opponents and/or Jewish Christians.

To look ahead several chapters, it is the implied author to whom we refer in discussing the illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions of the speech acts of Scripture. Since the implied author is presented to us via the text, it is not necessary to retrieve the empirical author’s personal history or motives to understand the “authorial” speech-act intentions. The more complete the presentation of the implied author and of the Story and the “lifeworld” inhabited by the implied author, the less necessary extratextual historical reconstruction of the empirical author becomes.

Additionally, we define the terms in our action model relating to the “reader”—particularly perlocutionary effects or responses—in terms of the implied reader and an empirical reader’s relationship to the implied reader. As is true for the implied author, identifying the implied reader does not require discovering either the historical identity or the “mind” of any empirical audience.

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28 Chatman, Story, 150. Although he refers to narratees, this applies to all listeners.
30 J. R. Wagner suggests these two groups are the targets of some of Paul’s writing (Heralds, 35-36). Another possibility could be overhearers representing the Roman Empire.
31 “Positing an implied author inhibits the overhasty assumption that the reader has direct access through the fictional text to the real author’s intentions and ideology. It does not deny the existence of important connections between the text’s and the real author’s views” (S. Chatman, Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990], 76). But these connections do not include authorial motivation, which often cannot (and need not) be determined even if the empirical author’s identity is known. We discuss this further in chapter 5.
32 In a “lifeworld,” a “communicative community” shares mutual context (see chapter 4).
33 The empirical reader is “is immeasurably complex and largely unknown” (Booth, Fiction, 428). The implied author/reader construct obviates Hatina’s concern: “If the recovery of the author’s
implied reader within their literary context often does require at least certain minimal assumptions about the context. We turn to this topic next.

Context

Stanley believes “Paul often quotes from Scripture in a way that bears little evident relation to the apparent sense of the original passage” and that “we should be careful about assuming that Paul was aware of the ‘original context’ of every passage that he cites in his letters.” Further, he argues against the modern scholarly assumptions that Paul “expected his audiences to refer back to the original context of his quotations” and that his audiences would have been capable of doing so.

This raises the question of defining context. According to communication theorist Em Griffin, “context” is not simply “just a sentence, or even the situation in which the word is spoken. Context is the whole field of experience connected with an event.” It includes “the various factors one has to take into consideration together with the text in order to understand the author’s intention. Any number of circumstances or contexts might be relevant to this task: historical, linguistic, literary, canonical, sociological, and so forth.” From this, it is clear that context is a “prodigiously elastic term.” We need to be precise about how we use “context” since we want to link it to quotation and, ultimately, meaning. Thus, we employ three categories: socio-historical context, literary context ("co-text") and linguistic conventions.

Socio-Historical Context

The original socio-historical context encompasses more than the situation that brings the speaker/author and first audience together. For example, Francis Watson speaks sweepingly of the “institutional continuum (educational, ecclesial, or whatever) which functions as the comprehensive context within which author, text and readers are comprised.” Similarly, for linguist Richard Ohmann, the use of language is embedded
in the broad spectrum of historical relationships so that “to participate in discourse is to set in motion one’s whole awareness of institutions, social ties, obligations, responsibilities, manners, rituals, ceremonies.”

Locating a text within its socio-historical context can add clarity and richness to an analysis. Ben Meyer notes that “by moving from the description of the common sense of a past age to an explanatory grasp precisely pinpointing that age’s insights and oversights, values and biases, the interpreter would no longer find himself surprised by his own findings; for he would have entered, more consciously and securely than he might have thought possible, into the writer’s world of meaning.” We attempt to read both our example quotations and the Psalms from which they were taken “against the horizons of their own, particular sociohistorical environment,” and we use the socio-historical clues available to us. At a minimum, events or traditions described by or alluded to in the text are relevant elements of the socio-historical context.

However, even when “a reconstruction of the stream of life, life-world, or extra-linguistic context which surrounds a text is indispensable to understanding its meaning,” it is not sufficient for such an understanding. And, in general, full socio-historical re-construction is neither necessary nor possible. As the historical and cultural distance widens between the production/original reading and subsequent readings of the text, later readers may find it difficult to retrieve the original socio-historical context. Thus, the socio-historical context of many texts, including the

mediates the historical and/or geographical distance that separates them and brings them into a certain proximity to one another.” We discuss tradition in the following chapter.


J. Green, “Context,” 131. Historical and literary approaches “are by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, the most illuminating exegesis employs them together in a complementary fashion” (Hays and Green, 230). We do not want to neglect any tool which enriches an analysis.

Thiselton, New Horizons, 560; italics omitted. This is true especially for linguistic conventions (see below).

Q. Skinner makes this argument and also presents the potential value of knowing the social context (cf. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 [1969]: 39-49).

For Thiselton, “it would be a mistake to conclude that no understanding is possible without historical reconstruction” (New Horizons, 266). According to F. J. Moloney, “difficulties are created by the speculative reconstruction of the world behind the text (sometimes called a ‘diachronic’ analysis of the text). Recent scholarship focuses upon the world in the text (sometimes called a ‘synchronic’ analysis of the text) and how it addresses the world in front of the text” (The Gospel of Mark: A Commentary [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002], 9).
Psalms, can be established only quite broadly. A socio-historical gap can even exist between the producer of a text and his or her original audience. Such would be the case for Paul and any of his audience who came to Christianity from paganism. In that situation, quotation may have been employed as a way to bridge the gap. We discuss this below with regard to mutual context.

In general, we are less concerned with the particular historical events that led to the composition of a psalm than we are with the Story which formed and grounded the lives of the author and the original audience and is expressed through the construct of the implied author and reader. Where possible, however, we identify elements of the socio-historical context made available or assumed by the implied author in order to support our reconstruction of the implied author and reader and to determine how the text contributed to the development of Story.

Our second category of “context” is the literary setting or “co-text.”

**Literary Context (Co-Text)**

Paul Ricoeur argues cogently that “a text is more than a linear succession of sentences. It is a cumulative, holistic process.” Peter Cotterell and Max Turner define the literary context as “the contribution of all the other parts of the text to that part under immediate consideration.” The co-text can include a variety of surrounding textual segments (words, phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, pericopes, discourses, books, etc.) and their related intertexts.

Co-text is often critical to determining meaning. As Hans-Georg Gadamer reminds us, the process of “construal” of a sentence is “governed by an expectation of

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46 Many Psalms do not identify the historical situation which prompted them. Even with biblical narrative, often “both the actual author and the original situation of communication must be very tentatively reconstructed historically” (H. C. White, “Introduction: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism,” *Semeia* 41 [1988]: 11). Thus, contra G. W. Stroup, it is not always true that “Christian faith and Scripture refer to historical events” (*The Promise of Narrative Theology: Recovering the Gospel in the Church* [Atlanta: John Knox, 1981], 144).

47 This is less likely to have been the intended function of allusion or echo since in those situations the presence of material from a previous source is not highlighted.


50 P. Cotterell and M. Turner, *Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation* [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1989], 72. In our model, this includes both a SA set within a SAC as well as the relationship of a SAC to the broader discourse. (See chapter 5.)
meaning that follows from the context of what has gone before.”

In situations where the sentence or utterance is “multivocal,” it is the co-text that tells the audience which of various possible speech acts the speaker/author intends.

Unlike socio-historical context, which may be difficult to retrieve, generally some co-text is available to us. But to understand the text and its co-text requires some knowledge of the linguistic conventions which governed the creation of the implied reader by the implied author. As an element of culture, linguistic convention bridges socio-historical context and co-text and, therefore, warrants our attention.

Linguistic Conventions

Roger Fowler defines a convention as “something shared by people” and reminds us that “language is social and conventional both in its origin and in the rules which govern the practices of speaking and writing.”

Teun van Dijk also points out that “language systems are CONVENTIONAL systems. Not only do they regulate interaction, but their categories and rules have developed under the influence of the structure of interaction in society.”

Linguistic conventions are necessarily relatively stable; “we can only communicate with one another if we assume that the meanings of signs do not vary substantially from person to person and from day to day.”

An author “can write meaningfully only within the possibilities provided by the systems of conventions which define the culture.”

Literary conventions play a role in the creation of an implied author and reader. Calling literature “highly conventional,” Susan Lanser adds that “the rules and expectations governing the production and reception of a work of art are as much a part

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53 Socio-historical context plus linguistic convention forms Thiselton’s “background” (see *New Horizons*, 46), a term he takes from J. R. Searle, who defines it as “the biological and cultural resources” necessary for the speaker to form an intention (*Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 143). Since we are not interested in biological capacity and we wish to include the reader/hearer, we prefer the term “mutual context.”


56 Fowler, *Criticism*, 41.

of textual structure as the words on the page.” 58 This is true for all texts, including biblical texts, even in situations where conventions are flouted as a rhetorical device.

Literary conventions are also key to a reader’s identification of the implied author and reader. Empirical readers “bring not just their ‘personal’ attitudes and experiences to the work of art, but also sets of linguistic and historical conventions which govern the production of meaning in the text.” 59 In his study of biblical narrative, Robert Alter concludes that “a COHERENT READING of any art work … requires some detailed awareness of the grid of conventions upon which, and against which, the individual work operates.” 60 “Communicative competence” describes the situation where the author and the reader are mutually aware of and able to use the linguistic conventions that pertain to their communicative situation. 61

In addition to quotation, a linguistic convention with which we are concerned is figurative language, i.e., those expressions which “associate a concept with a pictorial or analogous representation of its meaning in order to add richness to the statement.” 62 Our interest in figurative language is primarily in metaphor, which we discuss in greater detail in the examples where it is found.

**Mutual Context and Cooperative Communication**

“Mutual context” is the shared and evolving accumulation of these three types of context. 63 It includes “an encyclopedic understanding of the shared social world (including its linguistic and rhetorical conventions) as well as the specific ‘context’ of

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59 Ibid., 54.
60 R. Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 47. For a linguist’s perspective, see G. Yule, *Pragmatics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47. According to Alter, “one of the chief difficulties we encounter as modern readers in perceiving the artistry of biblical narrative is precisely that we have lost most of the keys to the conventions out of which it was shaped” (47). Thiselton is correct that we can never become the original audience or recover “the life-world or creative vision that gave rise to the text” (“Communicative Interaction,” 201). Although these factors make it more difficult for today’s empirical reader to “find” the implied reader, that level of readership remains the standard for fully successful interactive communication. (See chapter 5).
61 See Fowler, *Criticism*, 248.
63 Lonergan links the process of history to context: “As the process advances, the context within which events are to be understood keeps enlarging. As the context enlarges, perspectives shift” (192). Gadamer puts it this way: “Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion” (303). We prefer “mutual context” to “horizon.” Although for Gadamer, “the horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (301; emphasis added), in English, the horizon is the junction of the earth and sky, that is, the *farthest* we can see. As R. W. Funk puts it, “A horizon represents the limits of a system of meaning, of a world” (*The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* [Sonoma, CA: Polebridge, 1988], 291).
the communication,” which, in turn, includes both “information constituted from the situative context … as well as the new information from the completed part of the discourse itself.”

Some mutual context is critical to communication: “No text of any kind would be comprehensible without considerable shared context and background.”

Since the individual contexts of the empirical author/speaker and reader/hearer are different and in different situations overlap to different degrees, in every situation sufficient mutual context must be available or created to permit communication.

This requires a cooperative effort from both an empirical author and reader. An empirical author must understand the intended empirical audience in order to appropriately construct the implied author and implied reader, who, by definition, share mutual context. An empirical author must make “special efforts to insure that the transmission adequately incorporate his intended meaning and that it meet in advance

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64 This is Cotterell and Turner’s description of the “Presupposition Pool” (49, cf. 90). We also incorporate into “mutual context” Turner’s thought that when “pragmatics speaks of ‘presupposition pools,’ it is not driving us back to the hidden psychology of the author or reader, but to things that are known by speaker and hearer, writer and reader, because they are conventional to the society of dialogue partners, or because they are situational elements shared by them. The content of ‘presupposition pools’ is thus a matter of what is in the public context of a speaker’s utterance, and so may be taken to count as part of the utterance meaning” (Turner, “Criticism,” 50).

65 Tannen, Voices, 37. “We assume the common knowledge of the respectively indicated world between us and our conversation partner, and we must do that in order to be able [sic] say more than one sentence per day” (S. Alkier, “New Testament Studies on the Basis of Categorical Semiotics,” in Hays, Alkier, and Huizenga, 232). See Brown and Yule for a description of the assumptions made by an author and reader in successful communication (cf. 206-207).


67 Social psychologist W. Reich believes that for pragmatics, e.g., SAT, “the structure of communicative exchanges, and that of individual communicative acts, might reflect their evolutionary-functional roots in social cooperation” (“The Cooperative Nature of Communicative Acts,” JPrag 43, no. 5 [April 2011]: 1350, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpragma.2010.10.024 [accessed September 10, 2012]). W. C. Booth correctly points out that “at every point the author depends on inferences about what his reader will likely assume or know—about both his factual knowledge and his experience of literature. And the reader depends on inferences about what the author could assume” (A Rhetoric of Irony [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974], 99-100).
the foreseeable receivers’ foreseeable problems in construing it.” More generally, the empirical author “must take account of which interpretations we are likely to put on his words; he must, in that way and for that reason, take expected audience reaction into account.” “Taking expected audience reaction into account” is a function of understanding the context within which the audience operates—social, cultural, linguistic, literary, etc. To be successful in communication, the empirical author must create an implied reader the empirical audience is capable of becoming. Regarding the biblical authors/speakers, Thiselton notes that “both Jesus and Paul, as well as the author of Luke-Acts, allow their material, vocabulary, and mode of communication to take account of the nature of the audience whom they are addressing.”

The reader also assumes responsibilities. “The intrinsically appropriate stance of the interpreter is not doubt nor scepticism nor suspicion, but goodwill, empathy, the readiness to find truth, common understanding, agreement”; the reader must approach the text with “an antecedent stance of openness, receptiveness, empathy vis-à-vis his [the author’s] word.” Taking such a stance has been variously called a hermeneutic of “consent,” “trust,” “love” or “hearing”; we call it a hermeneutic of cooperation. In

68 Meyer, Critical Realism, 19. “Nothing the writer does can be finally understood in isolation from his effort to make it all accessible to someone else—his peers, himself as imagined reader, his audience” (Booth, Fiction, 397). “Der Erfolg des Sprechers davon abhängt, ob auch der Hörer die illokutive Absicht des Sprechers versteht und ob er in der Lage ist, die gewünschte Reaktion zu vollziehen” (Motsch and Pasch, 73).

69 N. Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 199. “Speakers organize what they want to say in accordance with who they’re talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances” (Yule, 3). Motsch and Pasch also speak of “die Fähigkeit des Hörers, das fundamentale Ziel … zu realisieren” (75). See also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 19-20.

70 Thiselton, New Horizons, 273.

71 The role of a reader of a text is different from that of a hearer of speech. With speech, “the initiative lies entirely with the speaker, and the hearer may receive his or her communication involuntarily or even unwillingly. Where A writes to B about x, however, the initiative is more evenly distributed between author and reader. One chooses to read or not to read; one does not read involuntarily or against one’s will” (Watson, Text, 100).

72 Meyer, Critical Realism, 22. “An openness to be willing to listen, to see the other person’s point of view, and to be changed, characterizes any hermeneutically sensitive reading of texts” (Thiselton, New Horizons, 33).

73 See, respectively, P. Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of Scripture, trans. R. A. Harrisville (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977); R. B. Hays, “Salvation by Trust? Reading the Bible Faithfully,” ChrCent 114, no. 7 (February 26, 1997); N. T. Wright, NTPG, 32-64; K. Snodgrass, “Reading to Hear: A Hermeneutics of Hearing,” HBT 24, no. 1 (June 2002). For an overview of Stuhlmacher’s hermeneutic and its sources, including Barth and Gadamer, see R. Sohns, Verstehen als Zwiesprache: Hermeneutische Entwürfe in Exegese und Religionspädagogik (Münster: LIT, 2002), 13-85. Stuhlmacher refers to “consent” (Einverständnis) and “hearing” (Vernehmen); the latter involves “nicht bloß ein Einverständnis mit dem Text, sondern auch mit der Tradition” (Sohns, 22). This, however, is the “tradition” of the Christian church, not the OT textual tradition. Stuhlmacher also takes “Vernehmen” als Alternativbegriff zu “Verstehen” (Sohns, 20) whereas we use “understanding” to refer to the intended illocutionary effect.
the vocabulary of this study, it is important for empirical readers to be willing to think within the framework of the implied author’s lifeworld—to be addressed by the implied author and to attempt to respond as the implied reader would.

Although cooperative empirical readers must be prepared for the text to tell them something, “cooperation” is not a giving up of self or identity. Cooperative empirical readers do not transpose themselves “into the author’s mind”; rather, they try to transpose themselves “into the perspective within which he [the empirical author] has formed his views,” i.e., the perspective of the implied author. Nor does “cooperation” mean an empirical reader unquestioningly comes to live in the lifeworld presented by the text and adopts its worldview. Cooperation is not an abdication of critical thinking. The empirical reader may be either unwilling or unable to be an implied reader at the perlocutionary level. Using Stanley’s argument as his example, Watts relates cooperative yet critical reading to quotation:

It is hard to imagine those who were skeptical of Paul’s argument being as easily persuaded as Stanley suggests. Already undaunted by his personal authority—this being precisely why according to Stanley Paul must resort to Scripture—

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74 Reich refers to some recent studies in biology, evolutionary psychology and anthropology which show that “humans are an extraordinarily cooperative species” and “how deeply cooperation with conspecifics is built into human nature” (1349). W. Iser notes that every reader strives “even if unconsciously, to fit everything together in a consistent pattern” (The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett, Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978], 283).

75 See Thiselton, New Horizons, 562, although his reference is to the empirical author’s lifeworld. From a reader’s perspective, “if we fail to transpose ourselves into the historical horizon from which the traditionary text speaks, we will misunderstand the significance of what it has to say to us” (Gadamer, 302). We discuss lifeworld and worldview in the following chapter.

76 See Chatman, Story, 150. This requirement applies to all readers. Thus, “for today’s readers this construct, the implied reader, works as a system of guidelines for their reading process” (B. van Iersel, “The Sun, Moon, and Stars of Mark 13.24-25 in Greco-Roman Reading,” Bib 77, no. 1 [1996]: 86). Although van Iersel believes that “the image of the original audience is likewise no more than a construct of today’s analyst” (86), this is not the case. Rather, the implied reader is a construct of the implied author as mediated by the text. If today’s readers read cooperatively, they discover the implied reader rather than the image or mind of the original audience.

77 This comes from Gadamer, who adds that “we cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the thing if we want to understand the meaning of another. Of course this does not mean that when we listen to someone or read a book we must forget all our fore-meanings concerning the content and all our own ideas. All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text” (271). Snodgrass makes the important point that “humility is part of a hermeneutics of hearing; it seeks to know rather than professes to know” (28).

78 Gadamer, 292.

79 “When someone thinks historically, he comes to understand the meaning of what has been handed down without necessarily agreeing with it or seeing himself in it” (Ibid., 302).

80 Even if the empirical reader refuses “his projected role at some ultimate level, … such refusal does not contradict the imaginative or ‘as if’ acceptance of implied readership necessary to the elementary comprehension of the narrative” (Chatman, Story, 150).
how likely are they simply to take his word without checking to see if said citation does indeed support the view they are resisting?81

Communicative cooperation does not require that mutual context be either complete or completely activated. Only certain elements of mutual context are relevant in any given communicative situation. A reader pays attention to those elements which are highlighted in some way, such as by being explicitly quoted. By evoking one or several elements of Story via quotation, an author can create or activate mutual context.

The Activation of Mutual Context by Quotation

There are two situational possibilities for the relationship of quotation to mutual context. For those empirical authors and audiences for whom the quoted matter is part of their individual contexts, an explicit quotation activates the relevant contextual elements.82 In situations where the quoted material is not known by the audience, an explicit quotation adds that material to mutual context and simultaneously activates it. In either case, by evoking Story and thereby activating elements of mutual context, explicit quotation creates a dialog with the original text, drawing attention to its themes, or Story-lines.83 This is true even in the common situation where the quotation is not the peak of the discourse but is rather a step in the progress towards a climax or peak.84

Our final question regarding context is the extent to which mutual context is activated by quotation. In saying that explicit quotation generally activates the thematic tradition of the mutual context, we reject the notion that quotation is “atomistic,” i.e., that there is “no regard for the original context.”85 However, this does not mean that the original historical situation that called forth the source text is necessarily in view.86 If, for example, one takes Psalm 51 to have been prompted by David’s remorse over his sin with Bathsheba, as the superscription indicates, we would not consider Paul’s use of

81 Watts, “In Need.”
82 “Speakers do, of course, remind each other of knowledge which they share, in order to make that knowledge part of the activated context of discourse” (Brown and Yule, 65).
83 While not specifically mentioning quotation, Fowler argues that any “attention-catching” device potentially signals thematization (Criticism, 83).
84 Longacre finds a peak even in “hortatory” discourse, such as NT epistles, where “the struggle is to convince the hearers of the soundness of the advice and to launch them on the course of conduct advocated or to discourage them from a course of conduct which is being proscribed” (84).
85 Cf. Hatina, Search, 158. “Atomistic” quotation is evidence of “Independent” reading (see chapter 5) and is quotation as a form of play (see chapter 2).
86 S. Moyise correctly points out that “allusions and quotations are always out of context to some degree because they have been loosed from their original linguistic and historical moorings,” i.e., their socio-historical and linguistic contexts (“The Use of Analogy in Biblical Studies,” Anvil 18, no. 1 [2001]: 33-34, http://www.biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/anvil/18-1_moyise.pdf [accessed April 18, 2011]).
Psalm 51:4 in Romans 3:4 to be “atomistic” just because Paul is not concerned with the David-Bathsheba incident. Nor do we consider a quotation to be taken “out of context” simply because the NT author applies it to a new referent, such as something said or written about the Jews in the OT and now applied to the Church or about Yahweh and now applied to Jesus.\(^{87}\)

Nor is the purpose of explicit quotation always to call into the reader’s mind every detail of the literary context of the source text, especially if one considers the context to be the entire OT or even an entire psalm.\(^{88}\) Although we hold that for all explicit quotation that “some connotations or associations will carry over from previous contexts” since “if this were not the case, then the concept of quotation would be ‘sense-less’,”\(^{89}\) how much of context is in view differs in various situations. In some cases, following Clark’s notion that “contributors project the most economical evidence they think they need for current purposes,” a brief reference, particularly to an opening, peak or topic verse, may point to the broader source text.\(^{90}\) Brevity may also foster involvement.\(^{91}\) But whether an OT passage is a shorthand which evokes the literary or

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\(^{87}\) Although S. Moyise considers the opposite of “fixed meaning” to be the application of words concerning one person to a different person (cf. *Jesus and Scripture: Studying the New Testament Use of the Old Testament* [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011], 119; and “Does the NT Quote the OT Out Of Context?,” *Anvil* 11, no. 2 [1994], 138, 141), our action model does not tie meaning to a single referent. This is contra, for example, R. T. Mead, who argues that Jesus “thoroughly disregards” the historical OT situation with his allusion to Ps 62:12 in Matt 16:27, where “instead of God, the Son of man … will requite each man his activities” (“A Dissenting Opinion about Respect for Context in Old Testament Quotations,” *NTS* 10, no. 2 [January 1964]: 281). But even if ἀποδώσει in Matt 16:27 is taken to refer to the Son of Man rather than to τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ (the immediately preceding singular noun), this may be an attempt by Matthew or Jesus to identify Jesus with the “Lord” of Ps 62:12 and thereby implicitly claim divinity for Jesus.

\(^{88}\) Contra Shires, who claims “every quotation or allusion may presuppose both its immediate context and its relation to the entire Hebrew tradition” (32-33). Even if the latter statement could be demonstrated generally, in individual cases the relationship to at least some elements of the tradition would be so faint as to be, for all practical purposes, undetectable. Nor do we agree that with quotation the entire co-text “is in view, and is the basis of the argument” (Dodd, 126, with regard to certain “fundamental passages,” one of which is Ps 110). Referring to Dodd and others, P. Doble claims that “what in the text of the New Testament appear to be citations or allusions, are, in fact, markers, or signals, or headlines which call into play a larger, whole [literary] context” (“Something Greater than Solomon: An Approach to Stephen’s Speech,” in Moyise, 190-191; emphasis added). A similar overly broad claim is made by Pfister, who avers that “mit dem pointiert ausgewählten Detail wird der Gesamtkontext abgerufen, dem es entstammt, mit dem knappen Zitat wird der ganze Prätext in die neue Sinnkonstitution einbezogen” (29).

\(^{89}\) S. Moyise, *Evoking Scripture: Seeing the Old Testament in the New* [London: T&T Clark, 2008], 20. As Plett notes, “Wo keine einzige Gemeinsamkeit existiert, läßt sich keine Beziehung herstellen” (“Konstituenten,” 93). However, “Hatina has demonstrated that we should not move from this commonsense observation to much larger claims that a quotation necessarily evokes all of its surrounding context” (Moyise, *Evoking*, 20).

\(^{90}\) H. Clark, 250. Since the cost of communication includes processing time, “participants try to minimize total joint processing time. Other things being equal, the briefer the evidence, the better” (Ibid.).

\(^{91}\) According to Tannen, “the necessity of filling in unstated information has long been regarded as a crucial part of literary discourse. … This makes discourse effective because the more work readers or
socio-historical context more broadly must be considered on a case-by-case basis. We do not assume maximal context (i.e., that a quotation references all of the work quoted, the entire OT or even a specific tradition, such as the Exodus or an intervening interpretation) unless there are clear indications from the verse which contains the quotation or its co-text that more of the literary or socio-historical context is in view.\(^2\)

Furthermore, although in general, we agree with Hatina’s caution that “the literary context in which the quotation is embedded must be the final arbiter”\(^3\) and with George Savran’s similar thought that the significance of both alterations to quoted material and of verbatim repetition, “can be assessed only in light of the context in which the quotation is placed,”\(^4\) we hold to the notion of quotation as “dialogical.” By this we mean that there is a complex and dynamic relationship between the quoted text and the quoting text, such that “the context and connotations of the original are not entirely left behind, but are brought to bear (positively or negatively) in the reading of the citation or allusion.”\(^5\) Therefore, in our case studies, we examine sufficient co-text

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2 Hatina, Search, 161. In Jesus and Scripture, Moyise uses “maximalist” and “minimalist” (and “moderate”) to refer to various views concerning the accuracy with which the Gospel authors recorded Jesus’ use of Scripture (cf. 7-10).

3 Hatina, Search, 161. Although “both contexts are important,” Hatina believes one should begin with the receptor text in order to avoid “a forced transference of meaning” (2, 160). We instead begin with the source text so that we are not influenced in our reading of that text by the receptor text.

4 G. W. Savran, Telling and Retelling: Quotation in Biblical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 36. Moyise points out that although allusions and quotations “often evoke something of the old context, their meaning is now largely determined by the role and function they have in their new context” (“Use,” 34).

5 I. Paul, 258; emphasis added. For Savran, “although the quoted words take on meaning ascribed to them by their new context, they still retain some autonomy as identifiable prior direct speech, which carries within it some of the sense of its original context” (110-111). Moyise avers “it is probably best to seek the ‘meaning’ or ‘significance’ of a quotation in the interaction between the connotations it (may) bring with it and its role or function in the new work” (“Quotations,” 28). As Plett points out, “Indem der Rezipient den abwesenden Prätext-Kontext des Zitats mitvergegenwärtigt, schafft er zusätzliche Konnotationen des ihm vorliegenden Textes” (“Konstituenten,” 82). Here we disagree with C. A. Evans, who believes “the NT writers were rarely concerned with the question of what … the text originally meant” (“The Function of the Old Testament in the New,” in Introducing New Testament Interpretation, ed. S. McKnight [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989], 193). In general, we reject those “postmodern understandings of intertextuality, which … contend that later references to earlier texts interact in such a way that new meanings are produced that are completely unlinked and dislodged from the originally intended meaning of the earlier text” (G. K. Beale, A New Testament Biblical Theology: The Unfolding of the Old Testament in the New [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011], 3). Such readings are “independent” (see chapter 5). Instead, we follow R. E. Watts in assuming the NT authors “are not unaware of the original contexts and contemporary understandings of Israel’s scriptures and that these often provide hermeneutical clues as to the significance of the surrounding New Testament material” (“The Psalms in Mark’s Gospel,” in The Psalms in the New Testament, ed. S. Moyise and M. J. J. Menken [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 25).
to permit an understanding of the function of the quoted passage in the source and receptor texts and to determine what that passage contributes to Story in each case.

One example of a dialogical approach to intertextuality is that of Hays, who finds that Paul works “to bring Scripture and gospel into a mutually interpretive relation.”96 Because Hays links intertextuality and context to tradition/Story and theology as well as to the creation of meaning, we lead into chapter 4 by evaluating his seminal work, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul.*97

**Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul by Richard B. Hays**

Hays approaches “the task of interpretation … by reading the letters as literary texts shaped by complex intertextual relations with Scripture.”98 Rather than “seeing quotations and allusions as subsidiary to Paul’s main arguments, Hays sees letters like Romans, Galatians and Corinthians as an ongoing conversation with Scripture,”99 a conversation set against the backdrop of the changes in the socio-historical context brought about by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.100

Taking an inductive literary-intertextual approach, Hays considers the “rhetorical and semantic effects” of “poetic allusions.”101 Reminiscent of Lane-Mercier’s description of quotation as “play,”102 Hays claims an interest in quotation as “an act of figuration, establishing a metaphorical resonance between drama and life.”103

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97 Others of Hays’ works, including his 1983 dissertation, have also informed this study.

98 Hays, *Echoes,* xi. Israel’s Scripture is the “single great textual precursor” which created the symbolic field within which “Paul repeatedly situates his discourse” (15).


100 The impact of the Christ-event demonstrates why texts “always demand and generate new interpretation” (Hays, *Echoes,* 4).

101 Ibid., 19. Moyise notes that “what is different in Hays’s analysis is that he does not present this as yet another proof text for Paul’s gospel; rather he turns to literature and poetry to describe the subtle effects of such echoes” (*Paul,* 112). Some criticize Hays for paying too little attention to the historical-critical method. According to H. Hübner, “Seine bewußt angesprochene Abwertung der Methode gegenüber der—in der Tat unverzichtbaren!—Sensibilität bringt ihn z. T. um die Früchte seines eigenen so verheißungsvollen neuen Ansatzes” (“Intertextualität—die hermeneutische Strategie des Paulus,” *TLZ* 116, no. 12 [December 1991], 895). On the one hand, this criticism seems to demand too much from Hays’ methodology. On the other, it is not entirely accurate. Although Hays admits history is not his main interest, he acknowledges that “attention to intertextuality … compels respect for diachronic concerns” and he correctly claims his “treatment of Paul … is not ahistorical” (*Echoes,* xii).

102 See chapter 2.

103 Hays, *Echoes,* 33. Using J. Hollander’s *The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After* as a model for reading Paul’s intertextual allusions leads Hays to argue that “Paul’s citations of Scripture often function not as proofs but as tropes; they generate new meanings by linking the earlier text (Scripture) to the later (Paul’s discourse) in such a way as to produce unexpected correspondences, correspondences that suggest more than they assert” (24). He finds it “unimaginative” that commentators “ascribe to Paul’s intertextual tropes a literal assertive weight that they cannot and should not bear” (175).
However, Hays also holds to “a single key hermeneutical axiom: that there is an authentic analogy—though not a simple identity—between what the text meant and what it means.”

He believes Paul uses “the rhetorical figure of metalepsis, a device that requires the reader to interpret a citation or allusion by recalling aspects of the original context that are not explicitly quoted.” This happens at different levels.

The first level is the obvious connection between a quotation and its OT co-text. For example, with regard to Paul’s use of Psalm 51 in Romans 3, Hays believes “no reader familiar with the psalter could possibly fail to hear the resonance of the psalm’s unquoted verses with the themes of Romans 3. Rather than spelling out all the connections, Paul opts for metaphorical understatement, allowing this well-known psalm’s echoes to sound subliminally beneath the overt argument.”

Similarly, regarding Romans 15:7-13, which contains quotations from various OT texts, including Psalms 18:49 and 117:1, Hays argues that “even here … where the significance of the [OT] passages for Paul’s case is evident, we will miss important intertextual echoes if we ignore the loci from which the quotations originate.”

Craig Evans raises the question of whether Hays sufficiently considers to what extent Paul interacts with Jewish interpretive tradition. For Evans, “it would be more accurate to speak of the echoes of interpreted Scripture in the letters of Paul.”

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104 Ibid., 27.
106 Hays, Echoes, 49. He elaborates: “The point made explicitly by Paul’s citation of Ps. 51:4 is that Scripture proclaims the justice of God’s judgment. The point made implicitly is that Psalm 51 … models the appropriate human posture before this righteous God: not challenging his just sentence of condemnation but repenting and acknowledging desperate need” (50). Whether or not Hays sees these connections as intentional is unclear. On the one hand, he presents Paul as making deliberate choices; on the other, he finds “little evidence in Romans to suggest these structural parallels are deliberately crafted by Paul” (49). Also confusing is his reference to Paul’s use of Ps 51:4 in Rom 3 as adducing “a prooftext” (48). Later, he calls proofexting a “pejorative label” and describes it as the appropriation of OT language “with minimal attention to the integrity of the semiotic universe of the precursor” (175). Since these comments contradict his thoughts about the connection between this quotation and its OT co-text, it seems he uses “prooftext” somewhat injudiciously with regard to Rom 3.
107 Ibid., 71. See also Hays’ thoughts regarding Paul’s echo of Ps 97:2 LXX in Rom 1:16-17 (36). He makes a stronger argument concerning the allusion to Ps 143 in Rom 3:20, which anticipates “the next turn in the argument,” and thus bridges “paragraphs that are often read in disjunction from one another” (52). This allusion is key to Hays’ view of Rom 3:21 as “the climax of a continuous discussion that goes back at least to the beginning of the chapter, or indeed all the way back to Rom. 1:16-17” (52).
108 C. A. Evans, “Listening for Echoes of Interpreted Scripture,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 50; emphasis added. However, J. C. Beker’s criticism of Hays for not providing “a more detailed critique of the shortcomings of the pesher and midrashic methods” (“Echoes and Intertextuality: On the Role of Scripture in Paul’s Theology,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 65) is invalid. Hays argues correctly that “Paul’s own hermeneutical practices are sufficiently different from theirs [the pesherists and midrashists] to demand independent investigation” (“On the Rebound: A Response to Critiques of Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 87).
and other NT authors did not approach the Scriptures of Israel \textit{tabula rasa}; they may have been interacting with interpretations of an OT text. We consider this sometimes overlooked issue in our case studies.

Hays’ second level of connection between a quotation and its OT co-text are situations where the pertinence of the Scripture Paul adduces is not immediately evident. In some cases the logic of the quotation depends on a preexisting conceptual/theological structure, presupposed by Paul and his intended readers but not explained in the text. The convention of reading the lament psalms as prophetic anticipations of the Messiah’s suffering provides a good illustration of this phenomenon (e.g., Rom. 15:3, quoting Ps. 68:10 LXX).\footnote{Hays, \textit{Echoes}, 87.}

The weakest level of connection includes instances in which “dissonances between the sacred texts and Paul’s rendering of them” create an “undeniable gap between the ‘original sense’ of the Old Testament texts and Paul’s interpretation, even in cases where the citations are in verbatim agreement with the LXX.”\footnote{Ibid., 6. He calls some of Paul’s wording changes deliberate “manipulations” which “should not be explained away by appealing to some hypothetical textual tradition not otherwise attested or by saying that Paul was just quoting from memory” (147). Rather, Paul works to achieve a desired reading by “tinkering with the text” (67, cf. 80-81, 112-113, 147, 153, 160).}

For example, in two instances, including the citation of Psalm 19:4 in Romans 10:18, Hays finds “no indication that Paul has wrestled seriously with the texts from which the citations are drawn. He has simply appropriated their language to lend rhetorical force to his own discourse, with minimal attention to the integrity of the semiotic universe of the precursor.”\footnote{Ibid., 175. We evaluate J. R. Wagner’s arguments concerning this quotation in chapter 4.}

This example points to a tension in Hays’ understanding of Paul’s interpretive method. On one hand, Hays concludes that Paul “seems to have leaped—in moments of metaphorical insight—to intuitive apprehensions of the meanings of texts without the aid or encumbrance of systematic reflection about his own hermeneutics.”\footnote{Ibid., 161.} Only slightly more tamely, he also contends Paul believed the proper reading of Israel’s sacred texts was Paul’s own reappropriation of them and that Paul’s interpretive practice presupposes “the legitimacy of innovative readings that disclose truth previously latent in Scripture.”\footnote{Ibid., 2, 4.} Furthermore, Hays argues that “Paul’s readings of Scripture are not constrained by a historical scrupulousness about the original meaning
of the text,” and he is adamant that “for Paul, original intention is not a primary hermeneutical concern.” ¹¹⁴ Such remarks lead to James Scott’s charge that Hays presents Paul as “basically an idiosyncratic reader of the Old Testament with some Christian presuppositions and a few hermeneutical constraints.” ¹¹⁵

On the other hand, Hays acknowledges that if Paul’s readings of Scripture were predominantly of the “eclectic” type represented by the citation of Psalm 19:4 in Romans 10:18, “his discourse would lose much of its gravity.” ¹¹⁶ Rather, Hays believes Paul’s intertextuality is primarily of Greene’s “dialectical” type: “Paul’s great struggle is not a struggle to assert his own authority over Scripture; it is, rather, a dialectical struggle to maintain the integrity of his proclamation in relation to Scripture and the integrity of Scripture in relation to that proclamation, to justify his startling claims about what the God of Israel had elected to do in Jesus Christ.” ¹¹⁷ Hays adds that while Paul was “undergoing a profound disjuncture with his own religious tradition,” he “insistently sought to show that his proclamation of the gospel was grounded in the witness of Israel’s sacred texts” and that “fundamental to Paul’s whole theological project is the claim that his gospel represents the authentic fulfillment of God’s revelation to Israel.” ¹¹⁸ This dialectical perspective is the direction we take here.

A final point which deserves comment is the issue of “meaning.” Hays gives five possibilities for the “intertextual fusion that generates new meaning”: (i) Paul’s mind, (ii) the letter’s original readers, (iii) the text, (iv) any personal act of reading, and (v) a community of interpretation. ¹¹⁹ Although Hays claims the “working method” of

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 156. In addition to “intuitive” and “innovative,” other terms Hays applies in Echoes to Paul’s treatment of the OT include: “revisionary” (67, 81, 120), “casual audacity” (68), “adducing prooftexts” (68, 82, 87) “subversive” (79, 111), “outrageous” (82, 157), “whimsical” (165), “novel” (155), and “daring” (129). Not all of these seem complimentary. In many of them, quotation is presented as “play.”

¹¹⁵ J. M. Scott, “‘For as Many as are of Works of the Law are under a Curse’ (Galatians 3.10),” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 191n18.

¹¹⁶ Hays, Echoes, 175; cf. 174-178. For Hays’ apparent modification of Greene’s “eclectic” category, see chapter 2 n62.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 158-159.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 2, 60. In response to W. S. Green’s criticism (“Doing the Text’s Work for It: Richard Hays on Paul’s Use of Scripture,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 63), Hays agrees his work “might occasionally overstate the case for continuity” (“Rebound,” 93). Moyise summarizes Hays’ understanding of Paul’s theme as “God’s purpose to raise up a worldwide community of people who confess his sovereignty and manifest his justice” and argues that this theme makes continuity between Paul’s thought and the OT “more easily discernible” (The Old Testament in the New: An Introduction [London: Continuum, 2001], 135).

¹¹⁹ Hays, Echoes, 26. The last of these includes all communities of reader/interpreters subsequent to the original readers. Thus, the tradition evoked by quotation may involve the interpretation of subsequent reading communities. We discuss this in chapter 4 and the case studies.
his book is an attempt to hold all five options “together in creative tension,” in his concluding chapter he privileges reading communities as the locus of meaning since “texts have meaning only as they are read and used by communities of readers.” However, the original author and readers and the text do play a strong supporting role: “Claims about intertextual meaning effects are strongest where it can credibly be demonstrated that they occur within the literary structure of the text and that they can plausibly be ascribed to the intention of the author and the competence of the original readers.” Thus, Hays can claim, “I fail to fall in line with the currently fashionable skepticism about the stability of meaning in texts.”

Inspired by a desire to maintain Hays’ “creative tension” and his thought that “Scripture really does retain its own voice and power to challenge and shape Paul’s unfolding discourse,” in chapter 5 we develop a theory of interactive communication based in linguistic pragmatics, in which “meaning” is co-created by the author and reader through the construct of the implied author and reader as mediated by the text. We also create a typology of readers in connection with this model of meaning.

With regard to Paul’s allusion to Psalm 143:2 in Romans 3:20, Hays contends that “the psalm is not adduced as a proof for Paul’s assertion, but his assertion echoes the psalm, activating Israel’s canonical memory.” This thought bridges our move to chapter 4, in which we explore how an author uses quotation to evoke elements of textual tradition or “Story,” thus activating its “Story-lines” or theological themes.

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120 Ibid., 27. This leads D. B. Martin to ask “how Hays intends to enjoy such diverse bedfellows as E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (authorial intention), T. S. Eliot (the text itself), and Stanley Fish (community of interpretation and reader-response) all at the same time” (review of Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, by Richard B. Hays, MoTh 7, no. 3 [April 1991], 291). Martin concludes that “Hays’s rhetoric … is New Critical” (291). We do not agree with Martin’s assessment.

121 Hays, Echoes, 189. This constraint apparently does not apply to Paul, whose readings are “abidingly valid figurations” (187), despite being revisionary, subversive, outrageous, etc. (see n114). However, Hays also argues that “recognizing the metaphorical character of the intertextual relation will prevent us from literalizing or absolutizing Paul’s reading” and adds that “Paul’s own example would lead us to expect that the community, under the guidance of the Spirit, will remain open to fresh readings of the same text, through which God will continue to speak” (186-187; emphasis added). Although there is much to admire about Hays’ work, this conclusion is difficult.

122 Ibid., 28. The hermeneutical conventions of Hays’ interpretive community include the conviction that “a proposed interpretation must be justified with reference to evidence provided both by the text’s rhetorical structure and by what can be known through critical investigation about the author and original readers” (Ibid.)


124 Ibid., 83.

125 Hays, Echoes, 51. By “story” Hays means the Christ-story, which he considers the narrative substructure underlying Paul’s writings. We find an “older” level of substructure—as did Jesus and the NT authors—in the ongoing Story of God’s people as developed in the OT and interpretations thereof.
CHAPTER 4

TRADITION, STORY, LIFEWORLD AND THEOLOGY

Tradition and Story

Tradition is “anything in the heritage from the past that is delivered down to the present and can contribute to the makeup of the new ethos.”¹ It “provides for cultural continuity and cohesion by preserving the authoritative memories of the past”² and “delivers the framework—intellectual, historical, religious, hermeneutical—needed for a new event or word to be meaningful.”³ In the NT, it is the Jesus event which tradition—both the OT and intervening interpretation⁴—makes meaningful.⁵ At the same time, the Jesus event reshapes tradition as it moves into the future.⁶

In chapter 3, we argued that by evoking textual tradition or “Story,” quotation activates mutual context. In this chapter, we explore how evoking Story and activating mutual context transforms lifeworld/worldview, theology (the basic questions and answers), and, ultimately, Story itself. These relationships are not linear but rather simultaneously multi-dimensional and interwoven. Lifeworld, Story, theology and worldview are both the basis for and the outcome of human action.

We begin by examining the ground-breaking work of four scholars who take a possible function of intertextuality to be the activation of textual tradition.⁷ Our goal is to evaluate how their thoughts on quotation, intertextuality, context and tradition coincide with our developing methodology.

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² M. Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition,” in Knight, 286.
³ D. A. Knight, “Revelation through Tradition,” in Knight, 165.
⁴ This concept—although not all of the terminology—comes from J. Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Perspective (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1999), 280. We construe “intervening interpretation” quite loosely and investigate apocryphal, Qumranian and other intertestamental Jewish textual traditions in our case studies.
⁵ “Jesus’ story is told within the structure and language of Israel’s faith story. Israel’s story shapes Jesus’ story, as presented in the Synoptics. Indeed, the OT is a precondition for the Synoptics’ story of Jesus” (Swartley, 282).
⁶ See chapter 3 and the case studies.
⁷ Three of these works (Keesmaat, R. Watts and Pao) are foundational to a study of the NT use of OT tradition. We add J. R. Wagner to demonstrate that “tradition” is not limited to the Exodus/New Exodus. Although N. T. Wright’s worldview theory also is important to our model, we reserve it for our discussion of “Story” and of the connection between worldview, story/Story and theology (below).
Four Works on “Tradition”

Paul’s Use of the Exodus Tradition

Like Hays, Sylvia Keesmaat takes intertextuality as her methodological basis. As she observes, “There has been a welcome shift in the discussion in such a way that Israel’s scriptures are understood less as an ‘authority’ to which the New Testament writers were appealing and more as a major component of the symbolic world within which they were thinking.”

This aligns with our thoughts about quotation evoking tradition rather than serving a power relationship via an appeal to authority. We also agree that intertextuality can produce tension in tradition since intertextuality “both ‘disrupts’ and ‘regenerates’ a given textual tradition” and is therefore “one means by which a tradition is transformed and revivified for a new context and situation.” Her categories of tension resolution are “(1) alienation, or an abandonment of the tradition; (2) reversion, or fidelity to the tradition unchanged; and (3) transformation of the tradition.”

We create a different typology of transformation below.

Keesmaat defines tradition as “those events, stories, rituals and symbols that shape the collective identity of a community, that are passed down in a community from generation to generation and that are rooted in the foundational past of that community.”

Although we concur that “the power of a story to create a world and shape reality for people is clear,” her notion of the “foundational” past is overly narrow. For her, “the exodus tradition came to express all that was contained in Israelite historical understanding; it was the tradition, the story which embodied the past, present and future of the Israelites.” Although Jonathan Whitlock’s criticism that “at its weakest” Keesmaat’s study “becomes a prisoner of its own conceit, relating images and language back to the exodus which are better explained otherwise and thus obscuring

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9 Ibid., 51. Paul “was struggling with the question of what it meant to serve God in Jesus Christ and was doing so in fundamental continuity with the traditions and scriptures of his people, Israel. However, the invasive action of God in Jesus Christ introduced a new element into the story, an unexpected twist in the plot, which meant that Paul’s dialogue with Scripture involved a transformation and reappropriation of the tradition for the new communities which had come into being in Jesus Christ. … The tradition has been transformed in such a way that it is revivified” (233).

10 Ibid., 20; cf. 33.

11 Ibid., 17.

12 Ibid., 326. I. W. Scott places Keesmaat’s work among the recent “full-blooded treatments of Paul’s thought using narrative as a central structural feature” (*Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of Paul: Story, Experience & the Spirit* [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006], 96n3).

rather than elucidating Paul’s meaning”\textsuperscript{14} is overly harsh, it is true that she does not generally consider the possibility “that Paul could in many cases be referring to prophetic writings without consciously intending to invoke the exodus story.”\textsuperscript{15} Although Keesmaat broadens her concept of the tradition in her conclusion,\textsuperscript{16} her use of the Exodus as the structural feature behind Paul’s letters is too restrictive.

An example is Paul’s quotation of Psalm 44:22\textsuperscript{17} in Romans 8:36. This is the only explicit quotation in Romans 8:18-39, a passage to which Keesmaat devotes an entire chapter. She links the Exodus to Romans 8 on the basis of the echo she finds there of a “central lament” from Jeremiah 11:18-12:6 along with the thought she takes from Walter Brueggemann that all “subsequent laments in Israel rely upon and appeal to the paradigmatic beginnings of Exodus 2.”\textsuperscript{18} The “paradigmatic” lament is Exodus 2:23b-25, in which the Israelites “groan” under their slavery, raise a cry for help to Yahweh, who then hears, remembers the covenant and responds. But not only is this at most a proto-lament in form,\textsuperscript{19} to claim on this basis that all biblical laments refer to the Exodus is unjustified. Although Keesmaat’s thoughts about tradition and the response to tradition are helpful, we do not follow her in connecting all OT quotation to the Exodus.

Furthermore, Keesmaat not only argues that all Paul’s quotations refer to the Exodus, she posits a co-textually maximalist view of those references. For her, Paul “is evoking a whole intertextual matrix, a larger narrative world made up of the whole

\textsuperscript{14} J. Whitlock, review of \textit{Paul and His Story: (Re)Interpreting the Exodus Tradition}, by Sylvia C. Keesmaat, \textit{Review of Biblical Literature} (January 22, 2001), http://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/444_351.pdf (accessed March 2, 2011). He believes only two of the images in Rom 8:14-17 “which Keesmaat traces back to the exodus tradition … are plausibly taken from there directly. For the others the connection is a stretch.” Moyise finds Keesmaat’s argument concerning Rom 8:18-39 more compelling, since the themes she finds in this passage, namely “adoption, being led by the Spirit, crying out to God as father, suffering, inheritance and glory … are all themes associated with the exodus story. She freely admits that Israel’s story has ended in ‘an unexpected way’ and so one cannot simply stress continuity between new and old in an uncritical way. But it is the story that governs the shape of Paul’s use of the Old Testament” (”Use,” 40). However, the story Keesmaat refers to in her concluding chapter is “the basic story of the righteous God who called Abraham, promised him many descendants and the inheritance of the whole world, revealed God’s nature in the exodus and God’s faithfulness throughout Israel’s history and in the new exodus in Christ” (Keesmaat, 237; emphasis added). This Story is broader than the Exodus.

\textsuperscript{15} Whitlock.

\textsuperscript{16} See n14.

\textsuperscript{17} Keesmaat mistakenly identifies this quotation as Ps 44:2, not 44:22, on p. 130 and in the Index of References (p. 266). She discusses Ps 44:22 quite briefly and gives no explanation as to why Paul does not quote Jer 11:19a if it is Jeremiah’s lament Paul has in mind.


\textsuperscript{19} According to C. Westermann, as a Lament of the People, Ps 44 contains five elements: address, lament, confession of trust or assurance of being heard, petition and vow of praise (\textit{Praise and Lament in the Psalms}, trans. K. R. Krim and R. N. Soulen [Atlanta: John Knox, 1981], 52). Only the lament and petition elements are found in Exodus 2.
exodus story, from bondage and suffering in Egypt, to the wanderings and rebellion in the wilderness, to the inheritance of the promised land.”  Although we agree that quotation can and often does point to a broader context, we find Keesmaat’s understanding of not only quotations but even allusions and echoes as evoking “the whole world” of the text to be too sweeping. Rather, we believe that what and how much of Story is evoked by quotation must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Mark’s Use of the Isaianic New Exodus

In his ground-breaking work *Isaiah’s New Exodus in Mark*, Rikk Watts focuses on Mark’s use of the Exodus theme as transformed by Isaiah’s prophetic vision into the promise of the Isaianic New Exodus (INE). In line with our argument, he finds some OT texts are appealed to “because they invoke, within an ideologically schematised memory of Israel’s history, some aspect of Yahweh and Israel’s historical relationship to which that text bears witness.”

Watts’ methodology is based on “the relationship between a community’s founding moment and ideology’s role in maintaining social cohesion.” For Watts, ideology is not content, i.e., “what the group understands about the world”; rather, it is the “lens through which the world is understood.” Of particular interest is his proposal that ideology creates a community’s unique identity and “provides the interpretive framework through which a given community both understands and shapes its internal relations, its history and its environment; that is, ideology provides a total world view.” This is similar to our concept of worldview. However, unlike N. T. Wright,

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20 Keesmaat, 218.
21 “Texts exist in certain contexts, therefore, in alluding to or echoing a specific text the whole world of that text is evoked” (Ibid., 51).
22 “Only study of the texts in question can show the way in which the contexts interrelate” (I. Paul, 259).
23 R. E. Watts, *Isaiah’s New Exodus in Mark*, rev. ed. (1997; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000), 50. In at least one instance (the quotation of Isa 29), Hatina argues Watts mistakenly considers that the quotation “acquires its meaning from the Isaian literary context … and not Mark” (*Search*, 252). This criticism seems unfounded although admittedly Watts’ interest is not in exploring the dialogical nature of the two texts/contexts. See chapter 3 for a discussion of Hatina’s insistence that the receptor text is the final arbiter of meaning.
25 Ibid., 40. Watts does not consider “ideology” to be a pejorative term. This differs from most understandings as represented by H. F. Plett’s consideration of an “ideological” quotation as one where the “claim to authority is not questioned at all” (“Intertextualities,” in *Intertextuality*, ed. H. F. Plett [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991], 13).
26 R. Watts, *INE*, 377; cf. 36. For Watts, “the convictions and energies of the founding moment become the ‘overall’ interpretative schema for the group not only for internal interaction but also for its understanding of history, and indeed the whole world” (39).
Watts does not link worldview/ideology with theology. Since this link is critical to our model, we rely more heavily on Wright’s work (see below).

Watts’ belief that all other concerns, motifs and OT themes in Mark are “presented within the larger literary and theological theme” of the INE\(^27\) causes him to stretch the INE to cover quite a bit of territory. For him, the INE reflects the schema of the first Exodus, e.g., “deliverance, journey, and arrival in Jerusalem” as “delineated further with their attendant motifs of, for example, Yahweh as warrior and shepherd,” Yahweh as king and servant, the return of Yahweh’s actual presence, and the Messiah.\(^28\)

Watts may extend the INE theme beyond its natural boundaries in his treatment of Jesus’ use of Psalm 118:22-23 in the Parable of the Wicked Tenants (Mark 12:10-11).\(^29\) According to Watts, Psalm 118:22-23 “functions as the ‘capstone’ to the story”; he concludes that “we may have here intimations that the Markan Jesus sees himself as the one who fulfils the NE hope of Isaiah 2:2 and 56:7 (cf. 11:16).”\(^30\) But if the Psalm

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 4.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 43; cf. 80, 90, 119-120, 347. Although “Israel’s view of her history … seems … to be structured around several major events or periods: Creation, Patriarchs, Exodus-Conquest, Monarchy, Exile, Return, with the culmination to be found in some sort of expectation of a greater restoration,” Watts argues these events “tend to be described in ways which bring out their continuity with the concerns, themes, and trajectories of the founding moment” (41), that is, the Exodus. His primary interest, however, is in Isaiah’s interpretation of that founding moment. Further, despite claiming that he does not propose “that every appeal to the OT necessarily functions in this way” (51), he does not mention any Markan OT reference that functions in any other way. Even his suggestions for future research concern whether other OT motifs have “consilience” with the INE theory (388).

\(^{29}\) Another example is Mark 14:62. Since this verse is climactic in the narrative (see chapter 8), it is interesting that Watts finds only “possible” allusions to Isa 50 and 53 in the co-text (Mark 14:58, 60 and 61) (Ibid., 364).

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 344-345, 346. Space precludes us from investigating Watts’ claims that (i) Ps 118 focuses particularly “on the Temple as the goal of the eschatological new exodus” and (ii) “Mark’s unselfconscious messianic application within a new exodus framework, suggests that Psalm 118 was already understood along these lines” (“The Psalms,” 30-31; cf. 35). With regard to the latter, see B. Witherington, III, who argues that “there was early Jewish messianic interpretation of Ps. 118:25-26 referring it to the final Davideide and the redemption wrought by him” (The Gospel of Mark: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 310). J. Marcus adds that older scholars (for example, Strack-Billerbeck, Kommentar zum neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch, and Jeremias) “assert that a messianic understanding of Ps 118:26 was already present in the Judaism of Jesus’ time. This is possible, since the NT passages that use Ps 118:26 … assume rather than argue for a messianic interpretation, and other NT and early Christian passages (Mark 12:10; Acts 4:11; 1 Pet 2:7; Barn. 6:4; Acts of Peter 24) reveal a tendency to read Psalm 118 Christologically” (Mark 8-16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009], 774-775). However, Marcus concludes that “the Jewish texts cited by Jeremias et al. (b. Pesah. 118a; Pes. Rab. 31:6; Midrash Psalms; etc.) are later than the NT period and prove only that the Hallel psalms were read eschatologically, not messianically” (Ibid., 775). For Witherington, too, it is “not at all clear that we are to think the crowds understood that all this symbolized that Jesus was the Messiah; not least because Jesus is not conforming to the expectations of the warrior messianic figure of Pss. Sol. 17-18 and other early Jewish texts (b. Sanh. 98a)” (Mark, 310, referring to Mark 11:9). On the other hand, in an earlier work Marcus suggests that behind Mark’s citation of Ps 118 in Mark 12:10-11 may be “Jewish exegetical traditions interpreting the psalm as a prophecy of eschatological victory. As in 1:2-3 and 1:11, the passage would here be making use of the Old Testament picture of God coming in triumphant holy war to
quotation is the “capstone” of the parable, then Watts’ claim for a theme of the *Isaianic* New Exodus seems overstated.\(^{31}\) Although there are links to Isaiah 5 in the parable,\(^{32}\) the focus in Mark 12 on Psalm 118:22-23 implies a more basic Exodus/NE theme.\(^{33}\)

Like Keesmaat, Watts takes a maximalist view of context, arguing that the true significance of a brief and even fragmentary citation may go far beyond what might otherwise appear to be the case. Although to the untutored the citation might seem of little importance, the fact remains that to trained hearers it has considerable allusive power and thereby serves to invoke a comprehensive hermeneutical framework.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{31}\) It would be more logical to argue Mark meant to invoke the INE if he had quoted Isa 28 and not Ps 118. In Isa 28:16 LXX, the stone (λίθος/ἀκρογωνιαῖος) is laid for a foundation (θεὴέλιον) stone. But in Mark 12:10, which corresponds exactly to Ps 118:22 LXX, the “λίθον has become the κεφαλὴν γωνίας, ‘head of the corner,’ which probably refers to either a capstone that completes an arch or a capital that sits atop a column or pinnacle of the building. It is not a foundation stone” (C. A. Evans, *Mark 8:27-16:20* [Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2001], 238).


\(^{33}\) In several commentaries on Mark which use Watts’ book as a resource, this passage is not discussed with reference to the Exodus/INE. See J. R. Donahue and D. J. Harrington, *The Gospel of Mark* (Collegville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002); R. H. Stein, *Mark* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008); Marcus, *Mark*. Moloney notes only that Watts provides “a strong evaluation of the impact of the Isaianic background on 11:27-12:12” (232n86). Others who find that Ps 118 points to the Exodus do not mention the INE. Hatina, for example, notes that “several studies have convincingly documented that Mark was indebted to the story of the first exodus” (*Search*, 160, with reference especially to Swartley). L. C. Allen believes Ps 118 was incorporated into the Hallel “due to its many echoes of Exod 15” (*Psalms 101-150, Revised* [Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2002], 165; see also J. C. McCann, Jr., *A Theological Introduction to the Book of Psalms: The Psalms as Torah* [Nashville: Abingdon, 1993], 166-167). J. M. Fuhrmann believes that “by citing Exod 15:2, David recalls the communal story of God’s deliverance and salvation over Egypt at the Reed Sea and connects his personal story with the foundation story of Israel’s deliverance” (“The Use of Psalm 118:22-23 in the Parable of the Wicked Tenants,” *Proceedings: Eastern Great Lakes and Midwest Biblical Societies* 27 [2007]: 75; cf. 69, 81n52, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, accession number ATLA0001666957 [accessed July 23, 2013]).

It would have strengthened Watts’ argument if he had considered Isaiah more broadly. Fuhrmann points out that not only is Ps 118:14 an “exact quote of MT Exod 15:2,” Isa 12:2 also quotes Exod 15:2 (75). P. Constant believes that the presence “du nom divin πτ” Isa 12:2 and Exod 15:2, “jointe à la répétition d’Exod 15:2 en Ésa 12:2, atteste une influence probable du cantique d’Exode 15 sur ce psaume de louange concluant la promesse du retour de l’exil et des temps messianiques” (“Le Psaume 118 et son emploi christologique dans Luc et Actes: Une étude exégétique, littéraire et herméneutique” [PhD diss., Trinity International University, 2001], 130, cf. 65).


\(^{34}\) R. Watts, INE, 32. Watts references Jeremias, C. E. B. Cranfield, Marcus and Dodd for his argument that Mark followed a rabbinic practice and quoted “the first section of a verse while the latter unstated section is actually in mind” [INE, 135; emphasis added]. This overstates the earlier claims.
For him, citations “provide a shorthand method of referring to whole fields of meaning which themselves are located within the on-going schema of Israel’s ‘story.’”

Here, too, in some cases Watts stretches a little. For example, again with regard to the quotation of Psalm 118:22-23 in Mark 12:10b-11, Watts believes that “in the light of the messianic overtones of the immediately following verses (118:25f) as used in 11:9, Mark probably means that these verses here should recall that acclamation and likewise be messianically construed (cf. Acts 4:11; 1 Pet 2:7).” Certainly the fact that Psalm 118:25-26 was recently quoted in Mark increases the likelihood that passage may still be in mind as a nearby verse is cited. However, even if one agrees that the use of Psalm 118:25-26 in Mark 11:9 has messianic “overtones,” does this mean a reference to other verses of Psalm 118 is also necessarily messianic? We take up a similar question in our case study of the NT quotation of Psalm 110:1.

In summary, some of Watts’ thoughts about ideology/worldview are helpful. In particular, his notion that quotation highlights elements of the on-going relationship between God and God’s people is in line with our argument that a function of quotation is to evoke tradition as it is textually represented by Story and thereby to activate mutual context. However, we are not convinced either that every OT quotation in Mark

Cranfield’s source is Jeremias, so his evidence is not independent (“A Study of St Mark 1.9-11,” SJT 8 [1955]: 59). Dodd and Marcus make only the vague point that “the conjuring up of the larger context of a passage through the citation of a specific verse or two … corresponds to a method of citation found in rabbinic literature” (Marcus, Way, 199-200; cf. Dodd, 126). Jeremias’ claim is also weaker than Watts’: “In the Judaism of this period, when large parts of scripture were known off by heart, it was regularly the custom to quote only the beginning of a passage, even if its continuation were kept in mind” (New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus, trans. J. Bowden [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971], 54-55). With regard to Isa 42:1 in Matt 12:18, Jeremias states that “as so often in OT quotations, e.g., in Rabb. Literature, the continuation … is implied but not directly cited” (παῖς θεοῦ, TDNT, 5:701). None of these scholars gives a rabbinic example. Nor does the example Jeremias gives in NT Theology of the quotation of Ps 51:4b in Rom 3:4b support his claim since the source text is not the beginning of a passage or even the beginning of a verse. In sum, this argument is too slender a branch to bear the weight Watts tries to hang on it.

R. Watts, INE, 382. This appears to be his only use of “story” although he may refer to it indirectly in his two references to Dodd’s “text plots” (50, 382) and in describing “ideology’s account of the founding moment,” “ideology’s account of subsequent events,” and “Israel’s retelling of its inaugural event” (40, 42, 43). In general, his concern is icon and symbol (the “media of ideology”) along with ritual re-enactment (“symbolic revivification”) rather than story (cf. 40-46).

As Hatina queries, “Do individual terms like ‘gospel’ and broad themes like forgiveness and wilderness necessarily point to the literary context from which the quotation is borrowed? If Mark wanted to show a continuity between the exodus of Second Isaiah and Jesus’ ministry, why did he not explicitly mention the exodus or deliverance in his prologue? And why would he not quote from either Isa. 40.9, 10 or 11 since these texts express the theme of the exodus more than all the others?” (Search, 159-160).

R. Watts, INE, 346.

is a reference to the INE or that a quotation generally refers to the “whole context.” We hold instead that each quotation is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

The Isaianic New Exodus in Acts

David Pao, who references Watts’ work, also argues for understanding “scriptural statements” as pointers “toward a wider story” with which the narrative of Acts interacts. Like Watts, Pao contends that “the scriptural story which provides the hermeneutical framework for Acts is none other than the foundation story of Exodus as developed and transformed through the Isaianic corpus.” Pao, however, ventures beyond the INE, noting that “in ancient Israelite traditions, … the Exodus narrative is not understood as being entirely distinct from the Creation story; and a strict separation between the two should not be made.”

Although, as Pao correctly notes, some Psalms contain creation language, these are not the Psalms quoted in Acts. Since, by Pao’s own count, more explicit OT quotations in Acts come from the Psalms than from any other source, this raises a question as to whether Pao has truly captured the “wider story” with his amalgam of the Exodus narrative as transformed in Isaiah plus the Creation story. Somewhat ironically, Watts is among the questioners: “Since most of his [Pao’s] explicit Davidic references invoke the Psalms and as Isa. 55:3 is the only explicit Davidic reference in Isaiah 40-66 one wonders if the link with Isaiah’s new exodus is as straightforward as Pao implies.”

An example is illustrative. Pao analyzes several passages that present Jesus as “a royal figure in the line of David” and “highlight the Davidic kingdom in the restoration program in Acts.” These include the series of quotations in Paul’s speech in Acts 13:33-35, which Paul uses to describe the raising of Jesus. The first quotation is of Psalm 2:7. The second, from Isaiah 55:3, concerns God’s promises to David. The final

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40 Ibid., 5.
41 Ibid., 57. For Pao, “in the evocation of both the Exodus and Creation traditions, the concern with the creation of a new people of God is highlighted” (57; cf. 251). See Beale for an argument that the NE theme in the NT “is another metaphor for the new-creational kingdom” (NT Theology, 172). However, exploring the relationship between the NE and the new creation would take us too far afield.
42 The psalms which contain creation language are “Pss 74:12-17; 77:12-20; 89:5-37; and 114” (Pao, 57n67) and Ps 145[146]:6 (204n62). The only explicit references to Exodus events in the NT Psalms quotations are Ps 78:24 (John 6:31) and Ps 95:7-11 (Hebrews).
43 Pao lists the 20 OT (LXX) quotations in Acts (4n15). Seven Psalms are the source of six quotations, five come from Isaiah, and seven other OT books each provide one or two.
44 R. E. Watts, review of Acts and the Isaianic New Exodus, by David W. Pao, JTS, n.s., 55, no. 1 (April, 2004): 260. Similar criticism has been levied against Watts, as we discussed above.
45 Pao, 135.
quotation, from Psalm 15:10 LXX, restates the promise that Yahweh’s holy one would not see decay. Pao aptly notes that “the cluster of these three quotations, together with the explicit mention of David in vs 36, point to the significance of the David tradition for understanding the status of the exalted Christ.”

But since there is no overt mention in this quotation sequence of the INE, the link Pao attempts to create to an Isaianic motif of restoration is fragile. Not only is the book of Psalms the only identified source text, the Psalms quotations carry more of the content of Paul’s argument. The more general quotation from Isaiah 55:3d, with its reference to the promises given to David now fulfilled in Jesus, can as logically be considered to support the Psalm quotations as vice versa. And, although this passage is bookended with promises of salvation and forgiveness of sins (Acts 13:26 and 39-40), which support a restoration motif, Paul’s references are to Abraham (v 26) and David (vv 34, 36) rather than to the Exodus or INE.

Although, overall, we agree with Watts that in Acts “the connection between Davidic hopes and the specifically Isaianic version of the new exodus remains tenuous,” Pao is correct that “an emphasis on the typological use of Scripture that focuses primarily on individual figures of Israel’s past should be balanced by an approach that emphasizes the broader story in which the individuals play a part.” This is similar to our argument that quotation evokes textual tradition (Story). Although Pao does look at Story beyond the INE, we construe Story even more broadly and determine on a case-by-case basis which Story-lines are evoked by quotation.

An issue we raised previously is that scholars question whether the receptor or source text should be primary in determining the meaning of a quotation. In this regard,

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46 Ibid. Pao confusingly refers to several Psalms quotations, such as Ps 16:10 in Acts 13:35, as “Isaianic passages” (85n86). One such “Isaianic passage” (Acts 2) has no explicit quotation of Isaiah.
50 Pao, 253, 251.
Gregory Beale contends Pao wrongly believes “the NT text exercises its power over its OT source text.”\textsuperscript{51} But this criticism is not justified. Pao refers not to the power of the NT text over the OT text, but rather to the power of the OT text in its NT context to accomplish the goal of the implied author: “In the development of the identity of the early Christian movement, the appropriation of ancient Israel’s foundation story provides grounds for a claim by the early Christian community to be the true people of God in the face of other competing voices.”\textsuperscript{52} Secondly, Pao’s thought that “in any use of ‘ancient’ texts, the embedded meaning of the source text is both affirmed and qualified”\textsuperscript{53} presents both contexts as important. Pao sees the scriptural tradition as both valuable to and transformed for the current situation, in which the socio-historical context has changed, most notably by the advent of Jesus Christ. In this, Pao takes a step towards what we argue is the dialogical nature of the relationship between the OT and the receptor texts in which it is quoted. Wagner opens this door further.

Paul’s Use of the Old Testament in Romans 9-11

Building on Hays’ work in intertextuality, Ross Wagner examines Paul’s use of Isaiah in Romans 9-11 and 15. However, Wagner does not focus on the INE but instead considers the interweaving of Isaianic material with other OT material (notably from Deuteronomy and the Psalms). He emphasizes that “other scriptural voices … play a crucial role in shaping the meaning and force of Isaiah’s words in Paul’s argument.”\textsuperscript{54}

In general, Wagner finds Paul’s citations and allusions to be coherent “with the larger narrative and structural patterns found in their scriptural contexts” and considers that the gospel Paul preaches “stands in deep continuity with the witness of the biblical texts to God’s continuing faithfulness to the covenant with Israel.”\textsuperscript{55} However, he calls some of Paul’s readings of Scripture “radical” in comparison to the readings of Paul’s Jewish contemporaries.

According to Wagner, some of Paul’s “radical re-readings” emerge from one of his “fundamental interpretive strategies”: reading the OT “as testimony to the surprising

\textsuperscript{52} Pao, 5.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 251.
\textsuperscript{54} J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 352.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 11. Wagner cites Hays (Echoes, 157-158) to support this argument and refers to Keesmaat and others in the related footnote where he adds that “the view that Paul normally paid no regard to the larger context of his citations continues to live on happily in many quarters” (Heralds, 11n40). Wagner rightly calls “incredible … Stanley’s assumption that once Paul expended the labor to find and excerpt a passage, he promptly forgot all about its original setting” (25).
reversal wrought by God’s grace, in which those apparently outside the scope of God’s mercy are included among the people God has redeemed for himself.”

We consider “reversal” to be a legitimate form of continuity, and we use this concept below, along with Keesmaat’s notion of a range of possible responses to tension within tradition, in our discussion of the possible transformative goals/results of recontextualizing a source text.

Wagner’s characterization of Paul’s readings as “radical,” “stunning,” “brazen,” “scandalous,” “tendentious,” etc. or even as “misreadings” appears to support Stanley’s criticism of Paul’s quotation technique. Stanley argues that Paul’s “decision to include so many ‘brazen misreadings of Scripture’ in his letters must be judged a major rhetorical miscalculation” since it means the relation of Paul’s quotations “to the source text would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a knowledgeable reader to figure out.” One of Stanley’s examples is the quotations in Romans 10:18-21, among which is Psalm 18:5 LXX. Here, Stanley believes Wagner “has to strain … to maintain his position that Paul took seriously the context of his quotations.”

56 Ibid., 83. Wagner believes “the ‘foreignness’ of Paul’s interpretations to the original scriptural contexts of the citations is best explained, not by assuming that at the moment of writing he did not recall the wider setting of a verse he had previously copied into his notebook, but by recognizing that Paul’s gospel and mission have driven him to a radical rereading of scripture” (52). Wagner also refers to “the shocking nature” of Paul’s interpretation of Hos 2:23 and 1:10 in Rom 9:25-26 and to “strong ‘misreadings’ of this prophetic oracle” (82, 83), as well as to Paul’s “stunning” and “brazen” “misreading” of Isa 65:1-2 in Rom 10:19-21 (205, 213). At least twice, Wagner fails to put “misreading” in quotation marks (205, 211); this omission appears unintentional.

Other “radical re-readings” stem from the fact that “on the face of it, Paul’s radical claim that the Law can be divorced from the ‘works’ it commands brazenly contradicts the scriptures, certainly as they were read by most of his contemporaries” (159; cf. 154). We cannot evaluate the law-works issue here although this could prove an interesting future use of our methodology.

It is not clear against what benchmark Wagner considers Paul to “re-read” (especially as compared to his “reading”). Is it Paul’s own first reading, an amalgam of all his readings prior to his conversion, the reading of the original audience, the reading of the reading community to which Paul previously belonged or is it that of a reading community which has developed differently than the one to which he now belongs? Because of this, we avoid the idea of “re-reading” and instead develop a hierarchy of reader roles within the framework of SAT (see chapter 5).

57 Per E. G. Chazon, continuity can be “of identity or … of dissonance”; in either case, it “engages the biblical context and imports it into the new composition” (“The Use of the Bible as a Key to Meaning in Psalms from Qumran,” in Emanuel: Studies in Hebrew Bible, Septuagint, and Dead Sea Scrolls in Honor of Emanuel Tov, ed. S. M. Paul et al. [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 96).

58 By “recontextualization,” we mean using spoken or written words in a new literary context.

59 Stanley, Arguing, 56n46, adding that this poses “serious problems for Wagner’s presumption (Heralds, 36-37) that Paul expected the literate members of his congregation to retrace, approve, and explain the intricacies of his biblical argumentation to the majority who had little or no formal education and little free time to devote to the task.”

60 The other Psalm quotation among Stanley’s “notable examples” is Ps 115:1 LXX in 2 Cor 4:13, which we take up in our first case study.

Wagner concedes that

at first glance, it would appear that Paul has merely torn this sentence [Ps 18:5] from its context … and forced it to say something quite different than it does in its original setting. Paul’s interpretation would probably have struck a person who was familiar with the psalm as extremely tendentious, since it is obvious that the “voice” and “words” spoken of by the psalmist belong not to Christian missionaries, but to the “heavens.”

But Wagner argues that, to the contrary, “Psalm 18, with its cosmic celebration of God as creator, … quite appropriately answers the question [in Rom 10:18] drawn from Isaiah 40:28” and that the “citation of Psalm 18:5 implies, not just that messengers of the gospel have gone out all over the world, but more specifically that Israel, knowing the truth about God as creator and entrusted with the inestimable gift of God’s νόημα, should have been particularly receptive to the good news of God’s salvation for Jew and Gentile alike through Christ.”

In general, Wagner does not believe Paul ignores the co-text of the OT passages he quotes. Rather, he finds that the OT “texts exercise a pervasive influence on Paul’s conception of the gospel. Particularly where Paul employs the device of intertextual echo, scripture maintains its own voice over against Paul’s, continually forcing the apostle to articulate his gospel in terms that are faithful to the scriptural story of God’s election of Israel.” This leads Florian Wilk to a different criticism of Wagner’s work. Wilk calls “exceedingly questionable” Wagner’s approach of beginning “with the analysis of the Old Testament passages” and specifying “the place and function of the statement quoted by Paul in its original context in order to understand the character of the Pauline interpretation of that statement on this basis.” He also feels Wagner’s maximalist view of the relevant co-text gives undue attention to the OT context.

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56n46, 160-169. As we noted in chapter 3, Hays finds Paul’s reading in this instance to be of the eclectic type (Echoes, 175).
62 J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 185.
63 Ibid., 185, 186.
64 In his title Wagner claims Paul and Isaiah are “in concert” in Romans. This “implies harmony rather than discord” (Moyise, “Quotations,” 25).
65 J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 10, with reference to Hays’ work.
67 In this, Wagner follows Hays. As an example, see Wagner’s suggestion that in Rom 9-11, Paul “brings to fulfillment the essential story, not only of Deuteronomy 32, but of Israel’s scriptures in their entirety” (Heralds, 201). F. Wilk has also criticized Wagner on the grounds that “zudem wird die (sinnvolle) Absicht, im Sinne von Hays’ ›intertextual echoes‹ die Resonanzen der jesajanischen Kontexte im Römerbrief aufzuspüren, nur selten ausgeführt” (review of Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul “In Concert” in the Letter to the Romans, by J. Ross Wagner, TLZ 130, no. 1 [January 2005]: 50).
his part, Wilk considers context quite narrowly, arguing it is only “possible and sensible to reconstruct his [Paul’s] understanding of this context in strict orientation toward the elements that coincide with his text.”

We concur that “how Paul implemented the reading and interpretation of a section” of the OT “and whether this happened in the same way every time are questions that cannot be answered a priori.” We do not want to pre-select a mold and attempt to fit Paul or any NT author into it; we continue to hold that the extent to which the OT co-text is relevant must be determined for each NT quotation. However, Wilk’s claim that because Wagner begins his analysis with the source text he must therefore derive the meaning of the receptor text from the meaning of the source text is unjustified. Nor do we believe that a redefinition of the referent in reversal necessarily means that the original context is being ignored or bypassed.

Although Wagner’s focus is on Paul as author, he does consider Paul’s audience. Wagner identifies the “ideal reader” of Romans and considers which groups among his original audience might have filled the roles of direct addressees and overhearers. In a footnote, he acknowledges that “readers and reading communities contribute an essential element to the interpretive process” and, as we noted in chapter 2, he advocates for a “‘hermeneutic of love,’ in which we approach the task of interpretation much as we would a conversation with someone we respect and admire.” This aligns with our approach; we put the final pieces of the author/reader partnership into our model in chapter 5.

In general, Wagner’s thought that Paul finds a larger cultural “‘story’ of God’s relationship with Israel” in Isaiah, Deuteronomy, the Psalms and elsewhere in Scripture points to our understanding of the “Story” of Israel as not one particular narrative but as a richly interwoven tradition, mediated through the OT texts. The quotation of OT

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69 Ibid., 87.
70 In his review, Wilk does not take account of the possibility of reversal: “Demgemäß ist das Unternehmen, Stellung und Funktion eines Jesajawortes in seinem Kontext zu bestimmen, um diese dazu mit seiner Verwendung bei Paulus zu vergleichen, wenig sinnvoll—and das Verfahren, auf dieser Basis seine Deutung durch Paulus zu klären, verfehlt” (review of Wagner, 51).
71 See J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 35-37.
72 Ibid., 13n51.
73 Ibid., 31. We do not take any one narrative, such as the Exodus, to be the sole substructure for the non-narrative OT material. Nor do we follow Dodd in considering only a few “fundamental” OT passages to be “the substructure of all Christian theology” (Dodd, 127). Rather, we agree with K. D. Litwak: “This study does not require that every intertextual echo maps to a specific theme” (Echoes of Scripture in Luke-Acts: Telling the History of God’s People Intertextually [London: T&T Clark, 2005], ix).
texts by NT speakers/authors reflects the relationship perceived between the OT Story of Yahweh’s people and subsequent events, especially the Jesus-event. This leads us to further discussion of Story, the role of the Psalms and other non-narrative texts therein, how Story relates to theology, and how Story is transformed.

**Story and Lifeworld/Worldview**

We begin our exploration of literary tradition (Story) with a look at “story,” that is, narrative. Hays avers that we “reflect the character of the *kerygma* more faithfully by treating its elements not as atomized facts but as moments in a story.” He suggests the way to a narrative approach to Paul is via those who believe “all ordered worlds are shaped by narrative. This view is stated in its baldest and most radical form by Stephen Crites, who claims that ‘the formal quality of experience through time is inherently narrative.’”

Other scholars have noted the role of narrative in creating and sustaining personal and social identity. For example, David Horrell believes stories both “construct a sense of human identity and shape human interaction.” Joel Green argues that “narrative is central to identity formation; who we are as human beings is narratively and relationally shaped and embodied.” Of particular interest are Crites’ sacred stories, those “fundamental narrative forms” through which “men’s sense of self and world is

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74 This terminology does not imply anything about the historicity of Scripture; “Story/story” and “fiction” are not equivalent. As R. B. Hays correctly points out, “we should not be misled into supposing that the description of Paul’s gospel as ‘story’ necessarily implies that it is ‘only’ the product of human ingenuity” (*The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11*, 2nd ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Dearborn, MI: Dove Booksellers, 2002], 21).

75 Hays, *Faith*, 64. Although he is correct that “‘story’ … does not necessarily refer to an actual narrated text; it can refer to the ordered series of events which forms the basis for various possible narrations” (18), this distinction is not significant for us.

76 Ibid., 20, quoting S. Crites, “The Narrative Quality of Experience,” JAAR 39, no. 3 (September 1971): 291. N. T. Wright makes a similar claim for the value of story in epistemology: “Stories … provide a vital framework for experiencing the world” and thus “the stories which characterize the worldview itself are … located, on the map of human knowing, at a more fundamental level than explicitly formulated beliefs, including theological beliefs” (*NTPG*, 38). Wright bases his epistemological model on critical realism: “a way of describing the process of ‘knowing’ that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence ‘realism’), while also fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiraling path of *appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known* (hence ‘critical’)” (*NTPG*, 35). Although we use insights from Wright’s model (below), our concern is not epistemology but communicative interaction. Therefore, we do not explore critical realism in detail.


78 J. B. Green, “Practicing the Gospel in a Post-Critical World: The Promise of Theological Exegesis,” *JETS* 47 no. 3 (September 2004): 393-394.
created.”

Such stories project symbolic worlds, which “are not like monuments that men behold, but like dwelling-places. People live in them.”

To borrow (and slightly modify) a phrase from Brian Wicker, all humanity lives in a “Story-shaped world.”

This understanding of story leads us to the concept of lifeworld, “the world of our common experience.” According to Jürgen Habermas, “the world gains objectivity only through counting as one and the same world for a community of speaking and acting subjects. … Through this communicative practice they assure themselves at the same time of their common life-relations, of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld.” Because of its communicative focus, lifeworld is a construct which fits our methodology particularly well. In terms of our earlier discussion, the lifeworld is the world in which a “community of words” or “communicative community” shares mutual context.

How a community that shares a lifeworld perceives the world “out there” and determines how to relate to that world is its “worldview.”

David Naugle links

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However to say we “live in” Story is not to say that all texts are narrative or that the only textual tradition which undergirds lifeworld is the narrative genre. As we discuss below, our interest in textual tradition is in what we name “Story,” in which biblical narratives and non-narrative textual elements all have a place.

80 Crites, 295; emphasis added.

81 This phrase comes from the title of B. Wicker’s *The Story-Shaped World: Fiction and Metaphysics; Some Variations on a Theme* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).


83 J. Habermas, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, vol. 1 of *The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984), 12-13. See also Habermas, *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, vol. 2 of *The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1987), 113-152. We do not agree that “the different aspects of communicative action (understanding, coordination, sociation)” are “rooted in the structural components of speech acts (propositional, illocutionary, expressive)” (xxv). In particular, the third component of a SA is not “expressive” but perlocution—a dimension critical to the model we finalize in chapter 5. We also prefer communicative “interaction” to communicative “action.”

84 According to N. T. Wright, worldviews “form the grid through which humans, both individually and in social groupings, perceive all of reality” (*NTPG*, 32). For philosopher J. Olthuis: “A worldview (or vision of life) is a framework or set of fundamental beliefs through which we view the world and our calling and future in it. … It is the integrative and interpretative framework by which order
worldview back to lifeworld with his pragmatic test: “Does the worldview work? Is it livable? … Can it be applied helpfully to the most important areas of human life and experience?”

Before we consider the relationship of lifeworld to intertextuality, we must first define Story and then articulate its role in lifeworld and worldview.

“Story” versus “story”

We define “Story” as the aggregate of those elements of a communicative community’s literary tradition that help define its lifeworld and thus its worldview. With this, we broaden “Story” beyond “story” to include non-narrative literary tradition. “Story” encompasses not only narrative genre but also non-narrative speech and text, such as the Psalms and biblical epistles. It also can include intervening interpretations of a text.

Non-narrative material plays a role in Story from two related vantage points. First, there may be a narrative substructure to non-narrative literary tradition. As Crites points out, resonances of the sacred story “sound in poetic productions that seem to defy all traditional forms of storytelling.” Secondly, Paul Ricoeur identifies a critical role for non-narrative material in developing the lasting significance of stories: “Laws, and disorder are judged; it is the standard by which reality is managed and pursued; it is the set of hinges on which all our everyday thinking and doing turns” (“On Worldviews,” Christian Scholar’s Review 14, no. 2 [1985]: 155). “Since a worldview gives the terms of reference by which the world and our place in it can be structured and illumined, a worldview binds its adherents together into community. Allegiance to a common vision promotes the integration of individuals into a group” (Ibid., 156).

85 Naugle, 327.
86 This seems preferable to attempting to include all NT writing in narrative genre. E. Adams’ claim that Romans is “story” in the sense of narrative is not plausible, and his attempt to identify elements of plot, setting and characterization therein using a Greimasi scheme is awkward (“Paul’s Story of God and Creation: The Story of How God Fulfills His Purposes in Creation,” in Longenecker). Hays also flirts with this when he attempts to locate narrative structure in Galatians 4:3-6, 3:13-14 and 3:21-22 as a means of demonstrating that Paul’s theology rests on a narrative substructure (cf. Faith, chapters 3-5).
87 A people’s story is not necessarily purely narrative: materials of many kinds may be slotted into a narrative structure, and this is done in the Hebrew Bible. Thus legal materials are inserted and appear, almost entirely, as part of the Moses story. In this case they are incorporated into the narrative. Others are more loosely attached: songs and hymns of the temple and of individuals, mostly collected in the Book of Psalms but some slotted into the narratives as in Samuel, Kings and Chronicles” (Barr, 356).
88 D. L. Bock believes that “to be complete, intertextuality should continue to glance at the historical interpretive tradition behind an Old Testament text” (Proclamation from Prophecy and Pattern: Lucan Old Testament Christology [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987], 273).
89 According to J. B. Green “even those texts that do not exhibit an explicitly narrative mode of discourse—say, the latter prophets or letters—have a storied character about them” (“Scripture and Theology: Failed Experiments, Fresh Perspectives,” Int 56, no. 1 [January 2002]: 17; cf. Beale, NT Theology, 166). To use Hays’ term, “reflective discourse” can be “rooted in and shaped by a story” (or Story) without exhibiting narrative characteristics.
90 Crites, 297. Referring to Ps 42, Watson points out the common tendency to see poetry “as a communing with self for the sake of self … ignores the fact that as communicative action writing is normally directed towards others, with the intention of conveying a communicable, public meaning that evokes a definite response. This text is intended for use” (Text, 117).
prophecies, wisdom sayings, and hymns, by contributing to the full meaningfulness of biblical narratives, start the transfer from mere storytelling to the grasping of the enduring signification of the stories themselves.”

By contributing to Story, non-narratives help define lifeworld/worldview.

George Lindbeck connects non-narrative texts to lifeworld: “A habitable text need not have a primarily narrative structure” but must only “in some fashion be construable as a guide to thought and action in the encounter with changing circumstances. It must supply followable directions for coherent patterns of life in new situations.” Using our terminology, the implied author of a “habitable” text must create an implied reader whose lifeworld/worldview and related Story serve as a guide for thought and behavior. Such “habitable” texts include the Psalms.

In this regard, Arvid Kapelrud highlights the criticality of the Psalms to tradition/Story: “No investigation of Israelite traditions can be done without a discussion of the material found in the psalms. … A picture of the religion of ancient Israel is not complete, not even correct, if it does not make a comprehensive use of the psalms. There the traditions were welded together in a theological form which was directive in Israelite religion.” This leads to our next step: to explore what we mean here by “theology” and how it relates to the biblical Story, lifeworld and worldview.

**Lifeworld/Worldview, Story and Theology**

To discuss the relationships among lifeworld/worldview, Story and theology, we adapt N. T. Wright’s model in which worldview consists of four elements: the stories we tell ourselves and one another, basic questions and answers concerning human existence,

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91 P. Ricoeur, *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, trans. D. Pellauer, ed. M. I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 246; cf. 37. “God is named in diverse ways in narration that recounts the divine acts, prophecy that speaks in the divine name, prescription that designates God as the source of the imperative, wisdom that seeks God as the meaning of meaning, and the hymn that invokes God in the second person” (Ibid., 227). J. E. Goldingay adds that “nonnarrative books such as the Psalms, the Prophets, and the epistles abound in material that has taken the first step from narrative to discursive statement” (“Biblical Narrative and Systematic Theology,” in Green and Turner, *Horizons*, 134).


93 Ricoeur also speaks of “inhabiting” and “dwelling in” a text and the world it intends (cf. *Figuring*, 232-234).

94 The implied author and implied audience, by definition, share a lifeworld and worldview. With regard to the relationship of the implied author to the empirical author, Thiselton reminds us that “what is important is not our knowledge of the name and biography of an author, but that the text which the author produces is understood … as a wholeness which represents the vision of a human mind and which belongs to some larger context or life-world” (*New Horizons*, 261).

symbols, and praxis. Although Wright refers to stories as the “irreducible narrative element,” he allows room in worldview for other types of literature and, therefore, for Story. For example, he finds that “short poems and aphorisms are to worldviews what snapshots are to the story of a holiday, a childhood, a marriage.”

Wright makes explicit the connection between worldview, story (here, Story) and theology, arguing convincingly that “worldviews are … profoundly theological” since “‘worldview’ … embraces all deep-level human perceptions of reality.” In our model, theology stands at the intersection of two worldview elements: Story and the basic questions and their answers. The “basic questions” concern both the existence and attributes of a divine being, in our case Yahweh, and the relationship of Yahweh to the world. More specifically, they cover Yahweh’s character and work:

- whether or not Yahweh exists,
- if so, what Yahweh is like,
- how Yahweh relates to the world, and
- what Yahweh is doing or will do about putting the world to rights;

and also human existence:

- who are we,
- where are we,
- what is wrong, and
- what is the solution, i.e., how are we to relate to Yahweh and each other?

Not only are these questions about Yahweh and humanity’s relationship to Yahweh theological, the answers are elements of Story. The Story of Yahweh’s

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96 Cf. N. T. Wright, *NTPG*, 38. For Wright, stories are the organizing focus and “most characteristic expression of worldview”; “symbol and praxis point beyond themselves to a controlling story or set of controlling stories which invest them with wider significance” (123; cf. 45; 125).
97 Ibid., 38. For Naugle, “since people are storytelling creatures who define themselves and the cosmos in a narrative fashion, the content of a worldview seems best associated with this most relevant activity” (Naugle, 291).
98 N. T. Wright, *NTPG*, 65. He speaks primarily of “stories” or the “category” or “element” of story, by which he refers to narrative genre. Only rarely does he refer to “Story” (cf. 6).
99 Ibid., 122, 123. Theology “provides an essential ingredient in the stories that encapsulate worldviews; in the answers that are given to the fundamental worldview questions; in the symbolic world which gives the worldview cultural expression; and in the practical agenda to which the worldview gives rise” (130).
100 These questions are adapted from N. T. Wright, *NTPG*, 127, 123.
101 By construing the answers to the basic theological questions as the Story of Israel, we avoid L. T. Johnson’s criticism that Wright’s method demands “an artificial unification into a single story that he can term ‘the authentic first-century Jewish worldview’” (p. 149) (review of *The New Testament and the People of God*, by Nicholas Thomas Wright, *JBL* 113, no. 3 [Autumn 1994]: 537).
Various scholars have attempted to outline the “single story” of Israel. We evaluated several examples earlier in this chapter. Beale also outlines a very general “story” (see *NT Theology*, 116). For N. T. Wright, the OT story includes: Adam and the fall, Abraham, the descent into Egypt, the exodus rescue/ liberation under Moses’ leadership, the conquest, the period of the judges, David and the establishment of the monarchy, David’s successors and the division of the kingdom, the exile, the return from exile under
people, which is comprised of answers to the theological questions, gives rise to a certain lifeworld/worldview and determines and sustains appropriate praxis.\textsuperscript{102}

By providing answers to the basic questions, the Psalms contribute to theology.\textsuperscript{103} Therefore, the mutual context created/activated by the quotation of a psalm has a theological dimension, and the theology mediated via such a quotation is lifeworld/worldview transformative for the NT audience.\textsuperscript{104} Story and theology also are transformed. Before exploring how this happens, we need to establish the connection between lifeworld, Story and quotation as well as what we mean by “transformation.”

\textit{Evoking Story by Quotation}

Luke Timothy Johnson connects Story and lifeworld to intertextuality: “The world which the text produces is … a complex network of literary interconnections” which “create a world of metaphoric structures within which humans can live in a distinctive manner.”\textsuperscript{105} For NT authors to refer to or quote the OT is an indication that they perceive themselves as participating in a discourse that is shaped by a perception of life and the world according to the Scriptures, that is, according to a Jewish social and symbolic universe. At the center is the relationship with the one God who has committed himself in his covenant and promises to his people Israel. To refer to the Scriptures as a way of participating in a relationship is something entirely different from a so-called “use” of Scripture as prooftext or a reference to divine authority on the part of the interpreter. It could better be described as a reference to one’s foremost loyalty

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\textsuperscript{102} Zerubbabel and the high priest Joshua and also under Ezra and Nehemiah (cf. NTPG, 216). Others argue instead for one basic theme. For Hays, “Scripture is … a story about dikaiosynē theou, God’s righteousness, which is the ground of the narrative unity between law and gospel” (Echoes, 157). Harrelson finds the basic theme of the core tradition to be “Yahweh’s Promise on the Way to Consummation” (30, although, oddly, he does “not understand the core tradition to provide anything like a ‘center’ of the Old Testament, theologically viewed” [30n17]).

Here, we identify Story by its theological Story-lines and we do not limit it to one foundational narrative or central theme. Instead, all answers to the basic theological questions contribute to Story.

\textsuperscript{103} Theology is also instrumental in interpreting worldview: It “suggests certain ways of telling the story, explores certain ways of answering the questions, offers particular interpretations of the symbols, and suggests and critiques certain forms of praxis” (N. T. Wright, NTPG, 126). With quotation, however, our interest is in theology’s role in (trans)forming Story, worldview/lifeworld and praxis.

\textsuperscript{104} Since the psalms “expound a theme through repetition and poetic imagery” they provide “a medium whereby theological notions could be imparted to and remembered by the people” (J. W. Watts, \textit{Psalm and Story: Inset Hymns in Hebrew Narrative} [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992], 28, 81).

and an acknowledgement of being a response-able participant in a life and discourse rooted in the guidance of the God of Israel.\textsuperscript{106}

Quotation plays a key role in sharing Story because worlds can be accessed “through the explicit presence of expressions of previous sentences.”\textsuperscript{107} OT quotations thus evoke the story/Story the NT speakers and authors are living and into which they are now inviting (or reminding) their audiences to live.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Transformation}

Our understanding of lifeworld and of story/Story is less static than that of Habermas, for whom the lifeworld is “presupposed as unproblematic” and within which “subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding.”\textsuperscript{109} Rather, we believe that “no experience is in essence definable as ‘unproblematic’” and, further, that all “acts which gear into the everyday life-world change it.”\textsuperscript{110} However, to look ahead to the next chapter, we consider “full” transformation to involve more than a change in the mutual context of the hearer/reader.\textsuperscript{111}

Our interest is in the transformation of lifeworld/worldview, Story and theology which occurs in response to tension. This can stem from a new event, such as the Jesus-event, or another element, such as the interposition of another Story.\textsuperscript{112} Quotation is an impetus for transformation since tension is “the inevitable product of engaging more than one context.”\textsuperscript{113} Thus, whenever Story is evoked and mutual context is created and/or activated, there is the potential for transformation of the empirical audience.

We base our typology of transformation on communication theorist Walter Fisher’s categorization of the functions of stories: “(1) to give birth to—to gain

\textsuperscript{106} Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 310-311. With regard to Hays’ work, W. Green asks whether “a literary relationship between two texts necessarily imply a comparable theological one?” (62). We concur with Hays that “if the literary is not co-essential with the theological, it is at least organically fused. … Intertextual literary linkages both reflect and create theological convictions” (“Rebound,” 83).

\textsuperscript{107} Van Dijk, 229, where he refers to “certain worlds” which can be accessed only in this way.

\textsuperscript{108} As an example, for D. Neufeld, the author of 1 John “makes and shapes a world with definite ethical responsibilities, which his readers are invited to enter” (Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An Analysis of 1 John [Leiden: Brill, 1994], 4).

\textsuperscript{109} Habermas, \textit{Reason}, 70.

\textsuperscript{110} Schutz and Luckmann, 1:265, 1:272.

\textsuperscript{111} Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are correct that an unfolding argument “changes the situation of the audience, and this no matter what its reception of the arguments. … A speech does not leave the hearer the same as he was at the beginning” (491). But this is not the “transformation” we consider.

\textsuperscript{112} These are interrelated. Story is a means by which one’s own or others’ views of the world may be reinforced, modified or challenged (cf. N. T. Wright, \textit{NTPG}, 39). Wright theorizes, for example, that Paul’s “repeated use of the Old Testament is designed … to suggest new ways of reading well-known stories, and to suggest that they find a more natural climax in the Jesus-story than elsewhere” (79).

\textsuperscript{113} Moyise, \textit{Evoking}, 32.
acceptance of—ideas/images, affirmation; (2) to revitalize or to reinforce ideas/images, reaffirmation; (3) to heal or to cleanse ideas/images, purification; and (4) to undermine or to discredit ideas/images, subversion. These can be consolidated into two basic types of transformation. Fisher’s second and third categories, in which a “later experience … does not suppress and replace the earlier experience,” can be combined as “realignment.” The second type is subversion, where existing ideas are undermined. But subversion does not leave a vacuum in the socio-cultural fabric. Rather, the subverted ideas are replaced by other ideas. Subversion is irrevocably linked to affirmation or re-creation.

In the same way that reaffirmation and purification are different subtypes of realignment, there are different subtypes of subversion. In addition to “reversal,” which we discussed earlier in this chapter, another key type is “inversion,” which was frequently practiced by Israel’s classical prophets. When in Rom. 11.9-10 Paul cites imprecatory Psalms originally directed against Israel’s enemies (Pss. 69.22-23 and 35.8) and applies them against Israel herself, he has employed the hermeneutics of prophetic criticism. He has done what Isaiah did centuries earlier when the seventh-century prophet, for example, alluded to David’s great victories, implying that God would once again defeat his enemies—only this time Israel was God’s enemy (see Isa. 28.21).

Another subtype is parody, i.e., “repeating an old pattern or echoing ancient metaphors to signal difference at the very heart of similarity.” Subversion also occurs “when a particular retelling of the community’s story … challenges or transforms accepted

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116 Realignment is Fishbane’s term (see Biblical Interpretation, 409). It is a type of transformation since it generally occurs in response to some “disorder, either disparity between or disharmony within orientations. Some turmoil needs to be calmed, some order restored, some trouble resolved” (J. A. Crafton, “The Dancing of an Attitude: Burkean Rhetorical Criticism and the Biblical Interpreter,” in Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference, ed. S. E. Porter and T. H. Olbricht [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993], 436). It is not necessarily the case that “via the phenomenon of intertextuality a NT writer simply agrees with and builds on an earlier writing” (Hays and Green, 225).

118 Although Thielson believes “many narratives … found and create, rather than subvert, worlds” (New Horizons, 571), in actuality, all hearers/readers belong to a lifeworld and have a worldview. As Schutz and Luckmann point out, “the actor is ‘always already’ within society” [2:66]). Thus, subversion and creation are linked and “explicit intertextuality can carry with it both ‘disruptive’ and ‘reconstructive’ features” (D. Boyarin, “Old Wine in New Bottles: Intertextuality and Midrash,” PT 8, no. 3/4 [1987]: 541, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772567 [accessed July 16, 2010]).


120 Hays and Green, 225.
readings in the service of a revisionary vision for the community’s life.”

Such transformation may be highly beneficial. As Ben Meyer notes, the “new ascertainment … may … be welcomed as a liberation, a life-saver, a pearl of great price.”

Wright downplays subversion with his argument that in order to make sense of a story, event or datum that conflicts with one’s worldview, one generally invents a new story to explain “how the evidence for the challenging story is in fact deceptive.” For him, subversion is a slow and stubbornly resisted process. Only eventually do “some worldviews become progressively harder and harder to retain, needing more and more conspiracy theories in order to stay in place, until they (sometimes) collapse under their own weight.”

We, however, believe Story is evoked not only to support or realign lifeworld and worldview, but also to alter them more substantially—to “mediate, challenge, confront, reshape” them—and that this can happen more immediately.

Whether realignment or subversion pertains in any particular situation depends in part upon to what extent the speaker/author and audience already share a lifeworld. Watson points out that it makes a considerable difference whether this relationship to existing language and knowledge is understood in terms of repetition and supplementation on the one hand or antithesis and eclecticisn on the other. In the first case, an existing knowledge is given retrospective sanction by the gospel, which presents itself as the completion of that which already exists. … In the second case, existing knowledge is declared to consist largely in distortion and falsehood.

Thus, subversion appears to be in view in NT situations where Story is evoked via quotation for an audience whose lifeworld/worldview is dramatically different from the author’s. In such cases, “the telling of stories in the Bible has among its chief aims the subversion of the hearers’ and readers’ worldviews.” In other words, the message

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123 N. T. Wright, NTPG, 42; emphasis added. Although T. Moritz links Wright’s “spiralling path of dialogue” to “hypothesis-verification/falsification” (“Critical but Real: Reflecting on N. T. Wright’s Tools for the Task,” in Renewing Biblical Interpretation, ed. C. Bartholomew, C. Greene, and K. Möller [Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000], 179), Wright’s model of hypothesis/verification does not include falsification.
124 N. T. Wright, NTPG, 117. Although Wright acknowledges that “stories are … peculiarly good at modifying or subverting other stories and their worldviews” (40), his model calls for the subversion of worldview to be a lengthy process which is often successfully deflected.
125 Moritz, “Critical,” 186.
126 Watson, Text, 250-251.
127 Moritz, “Critical,” 179. Although N. T. Wright distinguishes “between those who share a worldview (who tell one another stories to confirm and fine-tune the worldview) and between holders of
of the NT may have been equally challenging for Jews who were not yet Christians and for Gentiles; for both groups, transformation would be of the subversion type.

**Transformation and Power**

Our argument is that OT quotation evokes theological elements of Story to invite the empirical audience (via the implied author and reader) to live into the lifeworld of the people of God as that lifeworld is redefined by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Although changes in lifeworld are most obvious in the situation of subversion, realignment also has an impact on lifeworld, worldview and Story.

But in neither case is the transformation accomplished via quotation necessarily the result of domination or manipulation. With regard to Paul, Ehrensperger points out that he “did not refer to the Scriptures in order to introduce prooftexts or to issue a final word that cannot be challenged. … For Paul, the word of God is alive, not static, and thus a word of God would never close a debate. It would serve rather to empower the debaters and thus to promote a response-able hearing by the community involved.” In other words, the interaction between author and reader generally is dialogic; communication is not a one-way street. “The Biblical text … seeks to persuade its readers to accept the depicted world as their world.” Since evoking Story calls for a transformative response of belief and/or action on the part of the audience, “telling” is not the only dimension of communication; “hearing” and “responding” are also critical elements.

Different worldviews (who tell one another stories designed to subvert one another’s positions),” he believes a “subversive” story must be “close enough to the story already believed by the hearer for a spark to jump between them” (NTPS, 45, 40). But it is hard to imagine how a “spark” could cross the vast gap from polytheism to monotheism. Such subversion is more dramatic than Wright describes.

Contra to what he sees as B. Lindars’ notion that the earliest OT use by Jesus’ followers was apologetic, D. Juel argues cogently that OT quotation clarifies “the implications of faith in Jesus for one’s relationship with Israel’s God and with the world” (Messianic Exegesis: Christological Interpretation of the Old Testament in Early Christianity [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988], 1, with reference to Lindars, New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961]).

Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 319. “Never” may be too strong a word. A potential example of Paul using Scripture to close debate is 1 Cor 11:3-16, which contains an allusion to Gen 2:18-23 (1 Cor 11:8-9) and where Paul closes the argument (1 Cor 11:16) with what may be a presumption of authority. However, Stanley finds that although Paul in 1 Cor 11 “adopts a more challenging tone,” it appears to him to be an argument which appeals “to the audience’s understanding instead of simply insisting on obedience and threatening those who hold a different view” (Arguing, 84n19). Another possible instance is 1 Cor 3:19-20; Shaw finds that in these verses “internal debate and discrimination are ruled out of order by appeals to Scripture”—in this case Job 5:13 and Ps 94:11 (67).


As Hays avers, “In depicting Paul as a thinker who lived in a ‘story-shaped world,’ I do not intend to relativize the truth-claims of his gospel, which still confront the reader with the demand for
How the transforming communicative interaction occurs is the final piece of our methodology. We use linguistic pragmatics—and especially the often-neglected SA element of perlocution—to develop an “action” model which allows us to evaluate how quotation, by evoking Story and activating mutual context, calls the audience to live into the reconfigured lifeworld of the people of Yahweh.\textsuperscript{132}

decision and commitment” (\textit{Faith}, 20). The response of the empirical reader may be negative; the lifeworld that is offered “may be inhabited or rejected” (Snodgrass, 21). We address this in chapter 5.\textsuperscript{132} This would include former pagans. As J. R. Wagner points out, it is “difficult to believe that these Gentiles who shared a common life with Jewish believers who presumably \textit{were} concerned to understand their confession of Jesus as the Christ in relation to Israel’s scriptures and traditions would have been completely unfamiliar with or uninterested in these sacred texts” (\textit{Heralds}, 34).
CHAPTER 5

COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION AND READER ROLES

Since we take communication generally to be dialogical, cooperative and transformative, our definition of communication is interactive: Communication is “an activity in which symbolic content is not merely transmitted from one source to another, but exchanged between human agents, who interact within a shared situational and/or discursive context.”\(^1\) However, although this definition tells us how communication happens, it does not tell us why. Therefore, to complete our definition of communication, we add: “for the purpose of creating meaning.”\(^2\)

Linguistic pragmatics\(^3\) forms the basis for the analytical apparatus for our model of how quotation effects transformation since recent work in this field presents meaning along the lines of our definition of communication, i.e., as “jointly construed by the speaker and the hearer.” \(^4\) Specifically, we adapt Vanhoozer’s action model of the communication of meaning, which is based on SAT,\(^5\) to (i) define “meaning,” (ii) outline three possible reader roles in communicative interaction and (iii) provide a framework for our analyses.

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2. We take this from L. R. Frey et al. who define communication as “the management of messages for the purpose of creating meaning” (Investigating Communication: An Introduction to Research Methods [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991], 28; italics omitted).
3. Linguistic pragmatics is “the subfield of linguistics that studies the use of words (and phrases and sentences) in the actual context of discourse” (A. Akmajian et al., Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication, 5th ed. [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001], 13).
4. A. Carassa and M. Colombetti, “Joint Meaning,” JPrag 41 (2009): 1852, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2009.03.005 (accessed September 10, 2012). “Joint meaning is a joint commitment of two or more subjects, who are then obligated to each other to act coherently; in other words, joint meaning entails directed obligations, rights, and entitlements” (1851). Carassa and Colombetti’s work is based on that of H. Clark, for whom “communicative acts are inherently joint acts” (Clark, 125).
The Communication of Meaning

There has been much debate over whether “meaning” (i) is to be found in authorial intention, (ii) is encoded in the text or (iii) is determined by the response of the reader. Vanhoozer’s action model holds these three loci in creative tension. He defines meaning as “a three-dimensional communicative action, with form and matter (propositional content), energy and trajectory (illocutionary force), and teleology or final purpose (perlocutionary effect).” These action model dimensions are different elements of a single SA.

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6 Cotterell and Turner identify three aspects of the human communication process: “the (two) participants and the communication” (39). Other scholars refer to the author as sender or addresser; the receptor is also called reader, receiver, audience or addressee. Although these terms are generally interchangeable, we use “author” and “reader” to align with the implied author/reader construct introduced in chapter 3. Note that Cotterell and Turner’s “competent” reader is a type of empirical reader and is not the same as the implied reader.

Corresponding to the communication process, Cotterell and Turner distinguish three “aspects” of meaning: author’s meaning, receptor’s meaning and textual meaning (39). They propose Hirsch as “perhaps the leading proponent of the theory of the determination of author’s intention” (42; see, e.g., E.D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967] and “Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted,” *Critical Inquiry* 11, no. 2 [December 1984]: 202-225, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343392 [accessed March 28, 2008]). Ricoeur and Gadamer are among those who locate “intentionality” in the text. Famously, Ricoeur adduces that “writing renders the text autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, textual meaning and psychological meaning have different destinies” (“The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in *HHS*, 139). The text is also seen as autonomous in relation to “the original audience and the discursive situation common to the interlocutors” (“A Response by Paul Ricoeur,” in *HHS*, 37). Although Ricoeur speaks of the “three aspects of the act of discourse” (i.e., the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts) as “having the same meaning” (“Function,” 135), in general, “theories of textual autonomy typically subordinate the importance of authorial intention and frequently ignore the significance of authorship altogether” (Walhout, “Texts,” 48). Fish is among the reader-response theorists who believe readers independently create meaning, while Umberto Eco and Iser more conservatively believe the text limits which reader responses are valid. We discuss “intentionality” below and we incorporate some of Eco’s thoughts into our model. Although there is much to admire about Cotterell and Turner’s model, it compartmentalizes the three aspects of meaning, which then must somehow be reconciled. To avoid this, we use Vanhoozer’s action model as a framework for our methodology.

7 See chapter 3 for our discussion of Hays’ efforts along these lines. We find Vanhoozer’s model more robust. Other scholars recognize the benefits of an action model. For Walhout, hermeneutics “must not conceive of texts simply as objects which have certain properties but also as instruments which we use to perform various kinds of actions” (“Texts,” 44). A. C. Thiselton sees an action model as a guard against radical reader-response theory: “The action model allows us to separate out different levels and dimensions of language use without necessarily opening the door to the mistaken view that the ‘meaning’ of a text is simply what any reader cares to do with it” (“Reader-Response Hermeneutics, Action Models, and the Parables of Jesus,” in Lundin, Thiselton, and Walhout, 107).

SAT takes its name from its characteristic idea that speech does something—in other words, that speech is action. Thus, according to Vanhoozer and others, what a text does is what it means. Moreover, “strictly speaking it is people, not texts, who mean things. Texts mean something only when they are used in some way by someone.” We therefore follow Vanhoozer’s suggestion: “Let us henceforth think of meaning not as something that words and texts have (meaning as noun) but rather as something people do (meaning as verb).”

In presenting meaning as a unity, our action model holds the three dimensions of meaning in creative tension, doing justice to each dimension “without missing the distinctive ways each contributes to the communication process” or privileging any dimension. Since one of the dimensions is perlocutionary effect, the effect produced in

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This has been called the “message” model, which, for some, is irrevocably connected to the flawed concept of communication as the coding and decoding of transmissions by the sender and receiver, respectively. Akmajian et al. summarize six critical shortcomings of a “code/decode” model (see 366-369). However, Jakobson’s model is not irrevocably linked to communication as coding and decoding since it “subordinates the code function to the overarching function of communication” (Vanhoozer, Meaning, 271n103). In Jakobson’s model, “code” receives no greater attention than any other element of text and much less than “message,” for example. In any event, we do not present communication as unidirectional or based on coding and decoding. Rather, our action model of communicative meaning is interactional (see below).

For this, see also T. Moritz, “Scripture and Theological Exegesis,” in The Sacred Text: Excavating the Texts, Exploring the Interpretations, and Engaging the Theologies of the Christian Scriptures, ed. M. Bird and M. Pahl (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2010), 121. He presents perlocution as “the intended response by the communicative partner” without distinguishing between associated and non-associated perlocution (see below). We disagree with Thiselton, who separates “illocutionary” SAs from “perlocutionary” SAs and says the latter “depend for their effectiveness on sheer causal (psychological or rhetorical) persuasive power” (First Epistle, 51).

When W. Iser avers that “what is important to readers, critics and authors alike, is what literature does and not what it means” (The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978], 53), he uses a concept of “meaning” that “connotes the idea of a self-contained ‘sense’ lodged within the sentences of a text” (Walhout, “Texts,” 44). Walhout suggests that instead “the proper question for hermeneutics is ‘What actions are being performed by the making and use of this text?’” (Ibid.) Alston is another who argues that “an expression’s having a certain meaning consists in its being usable to play a certain role (to do certain things) in communication” (154; italics and bold omitted).


Vanhoozer, Meaning, 202.


Here we diverge from K. J. Vanhoozer since his model “entails a view of interpretation that gives primacy to the author as communicative agent,” (Meaning, 218). Although his formulation of “a theological general hermeneutic that sought to restore certain authorial rights, especially the right to be heard” (“Imprisoned or Free? Text, Status, and Theological Interpretation in the Master/Slave Discourse of Philemon,” in Reading Scripture with the Church: Toward a Hermeneutic for Theological Interpretation, by A. K. M. Adam et al. [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 59) helpfully counters certain moves of deconstructionism, his claim that “meaning is the result of intentional (illocutionary) action” (“From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts: The Covenant of Discourse and the Discourse of the Covenant,” in After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation, ed. C. Bartholomew, C. Greene, and K. Möller [Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001], 18) is too narrow.
or by the *reader/hearer* in response to the perlocutionary act of the author/speaker, our action model, including the implied author/reader construct, explicitly recognizes the contribution of the reader/hearer to the communication of meaning.

The three dimensions of a speech act allow us to identify three possible roles for an empirical reader: (i) Independent, (ii) Analyst and (iii) Envisager.\(^\text{15}\) An Independent generates “meaning” from the locution without regard for the author/speaker’s illocutionary act, an Analyst understands the illocutionary act, and an Envisager understands the illocutionary act and also responds with the perlocutionary effect (belief and/or action) associated with the perlocutionary act. Only with perlocution does a reader move beyond understanding to adherence and lifeworld transformation.\(^\text{16}\)

To lay the groundwork to elaborate on the three reader roles, we next discuss the action model dimensions of locution (*propositional content*), illocution (*illocutionary force*) and perlocution (*perlocutionary effect*).

### Speech Acts

J. L. Austin introduced the concept of speech as action in a 1955 lecture series later published as *How to do Things with Words*, a title which identifies SAT’s main thrust—that words *do* things. One of Austin’s students, John Searle, revised and expanded Austin’s theory. Searle’s version is widely regarded today as “speech-act theory.” However, we adapt Austin’s terms *locution*, *illocution* and *perlocution* to frame our description of how words do things.\(^\text{17}\) With regard to locution, we provide a brief evaluation of Austin’s original theory in light of Searle’s subsequent work, since this and their taxonomies are arguably the points of greatest divergence between the two. With regard to perlocution, we go beyond Austin, Searle and pragmatic theories generally and consider that the entirety of perlocution contributes to meaning.

\(^\text{15}\) This concept comes from Vanhoozer (*Meaning*, 369-378), although we rename the categories and define them in SAT terms. The term “Envisager” comes from K. Callow, *Man and Message: A Guide to Meaning-Based Text Analysis* ([Dallas?]: Summer Institute of Linguistics; Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998). Although Callow uses the term to describe authorial knowledge of the empirical audience, her thought that envisaging involves “the potential for matching without inconsistency” (66) is also appropriate for the reader.

\(^\text{16}\) Although we reserve the term “understanding” for the sole intended illocutionary effect, Vanhoozer’s use points to our Envisager role: “In a broader sense, … understanding discourse goes beyond merely recognizing illocutions and includes right reception and right response” (“Imprisoned,” 72). We take the term “adherence” from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (cf. 14).

Here, we use “act” (e.g., “illocutionary act”) to describe what is done by the speaker/author and “effect” (e.g., “perlocutionary effect”) to describe the audience response. A response may be a linguistic, mental or physical act. The terms “illocution” and “perlocution” refer to the total action, i.e., that of the speaker/author together with the effect/response of the audience.

Since SATs focus on conversation, before we embark on a discussion of what words do, we must show SAT to be a viable approach to text.\(^\text{18}\)

Speech Acts and “Text” Acts

Searle considers “writing in a language” to be the performance of an illocutionary act,\(^\text{19}\) a claim that does not seem to be challenged as regards “non-literary” (i.e., nonfiction) texts. Speaking, for example, of newspaper stories, Ohmann states that in such a case “the usual rules of illocutionary action all apply.”\(^\text{20}\) However, since some parts of Scripture, including the Psalms, are “literature,”\(^\text{21}\) in order to be able to apply our methodology to such texts, we must refute the contentions of those who deny that “literary language figures among the words that do things.”\(^\text{22}\)

Mary Louise Pratt provides a decisive argument for the validity of applying SA analysis to texts: “Unless we are foolish enough to claim that people organize their oral anecdotes around patterns they learn from reading literature, we are obliged to draw the more obvious conclusion that the formal similarities between natural narrative and literary narrative derive from the fact that at some level of analysis they are utterances of the same type.”\(^\text{23}\) Furthermore, “all the problems of coherence, chronology, causality, foregrounding, plausibility, selection of detail, tense, point of view, and emotional intensity … are problems whose solutions can readily be adapted from spoken to

\(^{18}\) Since, as originally constructed, SAT does not deal with texts, authors or readers, B. Gilfillan Upton puts the cart before the horse when she argues that “because Speech Act Theory is a form of communication theory, it considers the process of the transmission of a message between the implied author and the implied audience” (Hearing Mark’s Endings: Listening to Ancient Popular Texts through Speech Act Theory [Leiden: Brill, 2006], 196). However, after demonstrating the applicability of SAT to text, we integrate the implied author/reader construct into our action model.


\(^{20}\) Ohmann, 57.

\(^{21}\) Ohmann defines “literature” as “poems, plays, novels, jokes, fairy tales, fantasies, etc.” (53). For Scripture, this would at least include psalms, hymns and parables.

\(^{22}\) S. Petrey places Austin in this category (Speech Acts and Literary Theory [New York: Routledge, 1990], 50). In part, this issue exists because “the primary question posed by the intersection of illocution and literature” is taken to be “how fiction is different from lies” (Ibid., 64-65). But, as Walhout points out “fiction is not … the same as falsehood” (“Hermeneutics,” 102).

written discourse.”

As a result, “a speech act approach to literature offers the important possibility of integrating literary discourse into the same basic model of language as all our other communicative activities.”

Some scholars do not consider SAT to be useful in analyzing texts on the basis that the writing-reading relation is not “dialog,” where “dialog” is defined as the immediate occurrence of multiple exchanges. Not only does Thiselton argue that much of Scripture originated as a record of oral discourse, we believe that dialog occurs with a single exchange. Further, both Watson and Vanhoozer recognize writing as a “technology that makes possible the extension of a particular speech-act in time and space.” Thus, time and distance do not obviate the applicability of SAT to texts; a SA approach can profitably be used to analyze biblical texts.

To apply SAT to texts, we need to clarify our terminology. Following C. K. Grant, we construe any SAT reference to the “speaker” to include “the utterer of any word or sentence, whether written or spoken, or the user of any non-verbal symbol or combination of symbols that could be translated into a word or sentence.” In the case studies, the term “speaker” refers to a participant in a verbal exchange whose speech is set out in the text. We use the term “author” with regard to the written text. We recognize that where an author quotes a speaker, each may be performing a distinct SA.

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24 Ibid., 66-67.
25 Ibid., 88.
26 P. Ricoeur argues that “dialogue is an exchange of questions and answers; there is no exchange of this sort between the writer and the reader. The writer does not respond to the reader” (“What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding,” in HHS, 146). For F. Young and D. F. Ford, with writing-reading “the text is independent of the author who no longer has control over it. … Dialogue is not possible” (Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988], 87).
27 Thiselton, New Horizons, 17. He remains “unconvinced by those who try to restrict speech-act theory to oral discourse” (2).
28 Watson, Text, 98; cf. Vanhoozer, Meaning, 214. It is also certainly true that “if oral speech-acts presuppose a state of affairs that is a matter of shared concern, the same is true of their written equivalents” (Watson, Text, 100).
29 “In the last couple of decades Christian scholars have attempted to draw upon speech act theory as either a tool for exegesis or more systemically as a tool to reconceptualise theological hermeneutics” (K. Barker, “Speech Act Theory, Dual Authorship, and Canonical Hermeneutics: Making Sense of Sensus Plenior,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 3, no. 2 [Fall 2009]: 3, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, accession number ATLA0001822220 [accessed July 29, 2102]). In the latter category, Vanhoozer and Wolterstorff are frequently mentioned. For examples of the former, see Appendix A. Of these, Tovey’s approach comes closest to our model in the areas of authorial intentionality, the role of the reader and the use of the implied author/reader construct. However, none of the exegetical studies use SAT, particularly perlocution, in the way we do. For example, we disagree with Tovey’s claims that illocutionary force “approximates to the perlocutionary effect, except that force is perhaps more within the control of the speaker than the effect” (71) and, with regard to Assertives, that “the illocutionary act is to persuade, the perlocutionary act is to convince and confirm belief” (89).
Similarly, a SAT reference to the “hearer” may “refer either to the person to whom a statement is directly addressed, as in a conversation or letter, or to … people who understand a statement not directly addressed to them.”\(^\text{31}\) The latter may be side participants to a conversation, overhearsers of a verbal exchange, the original readers of a verbal exchange in a text or later readers of a text. In the case studies, we use the term “hearer” or “listener” to refer to any participant in a verbal exchange described in the text, while the term “reader” refers to the audience of the text, even though some of the empirical audience may actually have had the text read to them.

“Locutionary” Acts

For Austin, performing “a locutionary act … is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in the traditional sense.”\(^\text{32}\) Searle, however, objects to Austin’s locating meaning in the locutionary act.\(^\text{33}\) Instead, Searle divides this SA segment into the utterance act and the propositional act.\(^\text{34}\) However, because Austin’s symmetry is so memorable, we term Searle’s utterance and propositional acts, taken together, as locutionary acts.\(^\text{35}\)

Regarding the propositional act,\(^\text{36}\) Searle names its two components “referring” and “predicating.” A referring expression is “any expression which serves to identify any thing, process, event, action, or any other kind of ‘individual’ or ‘particular’ …. Referring expressions point to particular things; they answer the questions ‘Who?’ ‘What?’ ‘Which?’”\(^\text{37}\) The predicating component “presents a certain content”\(^\text{38}\) without

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 304.

\(^{32}\) Austin, \textit{HDTW}, 109. By “the traditional sense,” Austin apparently refers to G. Frege’s linguistic theory, in which the components of meaning are “sense” and “reference” (cf. \textit{HDTW}, 93, 149). Following Austin, P. N. Campbell sites meaning in the locution and then separates meaning and force: “Meaning is a property of locutions and force a property of illocutions” (see “A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts,” \textit{OJS} 59, no. 3 [October 1973]: 287). We disagree.

\(^{33}\) Cf. J. R. Searle, “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts,” in \textit{Essays on J. L. Austin}, by I. Berlin et al. (London: Clarendon, 1973), 149. We agree with Searle that “‘saying’ something, in the full sense of ‘say’” (see Austin, \textit{HDTW}, 92) is not found in the locutionary act, and we find valid Searle’s objection to Austin’s notion of “locutionary meaning.”


\(^{35}\) Whether a NT speaker/author followed the MT, the LXX, a targum or an unknown form has occupied generations of diligent scholars. Here we investigate only those text-critical (locutionary) issues which bear on how a particular quotation communicates meaning.

\(^{36}\) The utterance act includes uttering (or writing) morphemes and sentences.

\(^{37}\) Searle, \textit{SA}, 26-27. Cotterell and Turner define “the referent of a word or expression in an utterance” as “the thing in the world which is intentionally signified by that word or expression” where “the thing in question may be an object, an event or a process” (84).
implying a particular illocutionary force. Rather, “different illocutionary acts can have a common content.”\(^{39}\) i.e., one propositional act can form the basis of a variety of illocutionary acts, depending on the illocutionary force with which it is presented. Therefore, a propositional act is only a statement or Assertive illocutionary act when it is presented with assertive (truth-valued) illocutionary force.\(^{40}\)

At the beginning of this chapter, we defined an Independent as a reader who creates meaning from the locution without considering the illocutionary act. Therefore, distinguishing the Independent reader from the Analyst requires a deeper understanding of the illocutionary act.

Illocutionary Acts and Illocutionary Force

Much of the work of SAT has focused on the second dimension of our action model of meaning, the illocutionary act, which has been described as “probably the most significant analytical tool offered by speech-act theory.”\(^{41}\) Following Austin, scholars define the illocutionary act as “doing” something via language. For example, Vanhoozer defines the illocutionary act as “what we do in saying something (e.g. greeting, promising, commanding, etc.).”\(^{42}\)

In contrast to those who consider words, propositions or locutionary acts to be the locus of meaning, Searle states meaning in the illocutionary act: “Saying

\(^{38}\) Searle, SA, 123. This term is related to the grammatical predicate. The first dimension of Vanhoozer’s action model, “propositional content,” appears to equate to Searle’s propositional act although Vanhoozer does not mention the referring component.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) “A proposition, then, is to be distinguished from an assertion or statement of it. Asserting a proposition means the speaker … is committed to its truth. … In other words, speakers can do more than one thing with the same propositions; they can assert, question, command or wish. … The illocutionary force indicator shows how the proposition is to be taken” (Vanhoozer, Meaning, 210; quoting Searle, SA, 30). M. Steinnmann, Jr. is another who points out “the propositional act—expressing a proposition—must not (as it sometimes) be confused with asserting the proposition, which is an illocutionary act… The illocutionary act … is the act of doing something with the proposition expressed. Asserting that this proposition is true is one kind of illocutionary act” (“Perlocutionary Acts and the Interpretation of Literature,” Centrum 3, no. 2 [Fall 1975]: 113).

In a later work, J. R. Searle and D. Vanderveken move away from the proposition as the content of various illocutionary acts and instead confusingly argue that “all propositions are either true or false” (Foundations of Illocutionary Logic [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 32). This conflates the preparatory conditions concerning propositional content with the sincerity condition and leads to problems first in categorizing a SA and then in determining whether it is defective and/or unsuccessful (see below). In a recent essay, F. Récanati successfully counters Searle and Vanderveken’s claim (“Content, Mode, and Self-Reference,” in John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind, ed. S. L. Tsohatzidis [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 49-63).


\(^{42}\) Vanhoozer, Meaning, 209.
Searle’s sometime collaborator Daniel Vanderveken is even more explicit; he takes as his “fundamental hypothesis” that “complete illocutionary acts (and not only propositions or truth conditions) are the primary units of literal meaning in the use and comprehension of natural languages.” Using the example of Jesus’ teaching, Richard Briggs illustrates the difference between locution and illocution: “It is the illocutionary act and not just the content of Jesus’ teaching which should occupy the interpreter, and which perhaps provides a useful step forward in understanding what Jesus is trying to do in any particular case.”

The components of the “full blown” illocutionary act are “illocutionary force and propositional content.” These two elements work together: “Predication presents a certain content, and the mode in which the content is presented is determined by the illocutionary force of the sentence.” Illocutionary force is one of the most important elements in Searle’s taxonomic system for illocutionary acts. Since his system is generally considered the “standard,” we outline it below.

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43 Searle, SA, 46; cf. Searle, “Austin”, 153. Here we disagree with Wolterstorff, who believes that “since the meaning of a sentence is identical with the propositional content of the illocutionary act that the inscription of the sentence was used to perform, we can just as well say that the goal of interpretation is to identify and grasp the propositional content of the illocutionary act. To grasp the one is to grasp the other” (“Resuscitating the Author,” in Vanhoozer, Smith, and Benson, 41).

44 D. Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, vol. 1 of Principles of Language Use (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11. A. Wagner, who uses SAT in his OT analyses, considers more broadly that “die Berücksichtigung der Handlungszusammenhänge von sprachlichen Äußerungen macht klar, daß Bedeutungsfragen nicht nur auf der Ebene der Semantik oder der Syntax liegen, sondern daß sie auch abhängen vom ‘Gebrauch’ einer Äußerung” (“Der Lobaufruf im israelitischen Hymnus als indirekter Sprechakt,” in Studien zur hebräischen Grammatik, ed. A. Wagner [Freiburg, CH: Universitätsverlag; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1997], 154). We use the adjective “lexical” to distinguish between the sense or meaning of a word or expression and the communicative meaning of a SA (see Cotterell and Turner, 164-165; cf. 145).

45 R. S. Briggs, Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation: Toward a Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 263. This is not to say that we can ignore the locution. As A. Wagner points out, “Sprechhandlungstheoretische Analysen können aber nicht an die Stelle syntaktischer Forschung treten! Ebensoles gilt für semantische Fragen, für die Lexikographie, auch sie werden nicht durch die sprechakttheoretische Untersuchung überflüssig gemacht, sondern ergänzt” (“Die Stellung der Sprachakttheorie in Hebraistik und Exegese,” in Congress Volume: Basel 2001, ed. A. Lemaire [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 73). Here we explore only those questions of the lexical meaning of words and of syntax/grammar that bear on the communication of meaning.

46 Searle, Expression, vii. It would probably be more accurate to call the second element the “propositional act.” Although Searle believes “not all illocutionary acts have a propositional content” (SA, 30), if such illocutionary acts exist, they do not interest us.

47 Searle, SA, 123. He holds it is not possible to “just refer and predicate without making an assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act” (25).

48 Searle’s typology “remains the most influential” (Y. Huang, Pragmatics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], 106) and the only taxonomy “tied to a general theory of illocutionary acts” (Bach and Harnish, 40). Petrey calls Austin’s taxonomy “complex (not to say chaotic)” (59), and except for Commissives, Searle abandons it because it has “no clear or consistent principle or set of principles” (Expression, 10; cf. Bach and Harnish, 40).
Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

Although Searle outlines “twelve significant dimensions of variation” between illocutionary acts, within his taxonomic system the most important criterion is “illocutionary force,” of which “illocutionary point/purpose” or the “essential condition” or what the utterance “counts as” is the most important element. Other important criteria include the “sincerity condition” and the satisfaction of certain preparatory conditions which the speaker “implies in the performance of the act.”

Searle identifies five basic categories of SAs: Assertives, Directives, Expressives, Commissives and Declarations. Since we use these categories to analyze the NT psalm quotations in both their OT and NT settings, we describe them briefly.

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49 Searle’s description of the illocutionary act is quite vague (see R. M. Harnish, “Speech Acts and Intentionality,” in Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle, ed. A. Burkhardt [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990], 174). We use the insights of other scholars (see below) to support our understanding of illocution.

50 See Searle, Expression, 2; SA, 66-67. For him, illocutionary force determines “what illocutionary act the speaker is performing in the utterance of the sentence” (SA, 30). Bach and Harnish also equate “force” and “illocutionary act type” (6). Vanhoozer’s description of illocutionary force as “the stance adopted by the speaker” toward the propositional content (Meaning, 210) has the advantage of not using the word “illocutionary” but does not adequately explain “stance.” Tovey incorrectly considers illocutionary force and illocutionary point as different aspects of a SA (cf. Tovey, 71).

51 The sincerity condition is “the psychological state expressed in the performance of the illocutionary act” (Searle, Expression, 5). S. L. Tsohatzidis correctly points out that, “confusingly, Searle sometimes uses the term ‘sincerity condition’ to refer both to the possession and to the mere expression of mental states (see, for example, Searle and Vanderveken 1985:22), though it is only the first usage, inaugurated in Searle 1969, that is clearly intelligible: a sincerity condition on a SA is, presumably, a condition whose non-satisfaction would make that act insincere, and what makes, for example, an assertion insincere is not that its speaker does not express a belief in the truth of its content, but rather that he does not have this expressed belief. (Indeed, since, on Searle’s later views, assertions are necessarily expressions of belief in their contents, the idea that the mere expression of such a belief would be sufficient to make any assertion sincere would have the absurd consequence that it is impossible for any assertion to ever be sincere—a consequence that Searle explicitly rejects)” (“The Gap between Speech Acts and Mental States,” in Tsohatzidis, Foundations, 232n4). Here we follow early Searle in using the term “sincerity condition” to indicate the possession of a certain psychological state.

52 Searle, SA, 65. Although every illocutionary act has an essential condition and preparatory conditions, some have “no sincerity and no propositional content conditions” (Harnish, 174). In addition to the three criteria outlined here, early Searle includes a criterion he calls “direction of fit” between the illocutionary act and the actual state of affairs in the world (see Expression, 3-4). A. Burkhardt is correct that “the ‘direction of fit’ in reality does not enrich our stock of categories, but is just another way of describing the ‘propositional content rule’” (“Speech Act Theory—The Decline of a Paradigm,” in Burkhardt, 107). Other criteria include the relationship of the illocution to the context, the strength of the illocutionary point, the role of authority and discourse relations. Many of these distinguish illocutionary acts within the taxonomic categories rather than across categories (see Searle, Expression, 3, 13). For a helpful discussion of the twelve dimensions, see J. Connor-Linton, “A Sociolinguistic Model of Successful Speech Act Construction,” in Pragmatics at Issue, ed. J. Verschueren, vol. 1 of Selected Papers of the 1987 International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 17-22, 1987 [Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1991], 98-100).

53 In context, each SA has a single illocutionary purpose/essential condition, no matter its form (contra V. S. Poythress, “Canon and Speech Act: Limitations in Speech-Act Theory, with Implications for a Putative Theory of Canonical Speech Acts,” WTJ 70, no. 2 [Fall 2008]: 344-346). For example, “Can you pass the salt?” is a request (Directive) even though its form is of an inquiry about physical
Assertives are characterized by the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the stated proposition \( p \). “The simplest test of an assertive is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia) as true or false.”\(^{54}\) The psychological state is Belief (that \( p \)).\(^{55}\)

Directives are attempts “by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. … The sincerity condition is want (or wish or desire). The propositional content is … that the hearer \( H \) does some future action \( A \).”\(^{56}\)

Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action. “The sincerity condition is Intention” and “the propositional content is always that the speaker \( S \) does some future action \( A \).”\(^{57}\)

Expressives express the “psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content,” which “ascribes some property (not necessarily an action) to either \( S \) or \( H \).”\(^{58}\) “The truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed.”\(^{59}\) Expressives cover a wide variety of “psychological states,” including thanking, congratulating, apologizing and welcoming.

Declarations are illocutions for which “the successful performance … brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality,” i.e., “the status or condition of the referred to object or objects”\(^{60}\) is altered. These are “cases where one brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist, cases where, so to speak, ‘saying makes it so.’”\(^{61}\)

Since the Psalms are prayers, it might seem they would be Expressives. But this is not the case. The majority of the Psalm passages quoted (and the SACs of which they are a part) are either Assertives or Directives. Since Assertives are particularly important in our analysis, we explain below their “tellability.”

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\(^{54}\) Searle, Expression, 13. By “it,” Searle apparently refers to the propositional act contained in an Assertive since he points out it is not the illocutionary act of stating which is true or false but the “statement-object” or proposition (“Austin,” 158-159).

\(^{55}\) Searle, Expression, 12. This corresponds to Austin’s constative (see Ibid. and also n62 below).

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 13-14.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 14.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 15, 16.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 15. We find confusing D. Vanderveken’s later notion that since “every successful performance of a speech act is an expression of mental states … any type of illocutionary act strongly commits the speaker to an expressive” (“Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory,” in Vanderveken and Kubo, 45).

\(^{60}\) Searle, Expression, 16-17.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 16.
The Tellability of Assertives

We agree with those, like Searle, who argue that making a statement (an Assertive) is truly a SA. This means that Assertives are “doing something”—often something significant. According to Pratt, some Assertives “represent states of affairs that are held to be unusual, contrary to expectations, or otherwise problematic.” In contrast to “informing” assertions, with such “tellable” Assertives a speaker is “verbally displaying a state of affairs, inviting his addressee(s) to join him in contemplating it, evaluating it, and responding to it. His point is to produce in his hearers not only belief but also an imaginative and affective involvement in the state of affairs he is representing and an evaluative stance toward it.” Similar to Tannen’s concept of involvement (see chapter 2), the communicative purpose of a tellable assertive is that “the addressee will respond affectively in the intended way, adopt the intended evaluation and interpretation, take pleasure in doing so, and generally find the whole undertaking worth it.”

With regard to Scripture, Briggs correctly points out that Assertives are tellable “in even the most apparently unpromising of biblical texts. In other words: assertion can hardly be ‘mere assertion,’ unless perhaps we were discussing some idling form of language, utterances ‘said for no conceivable reason.’”

Assertives are the only category of illocutionary acts in which the essential condition is a commitment to the truth of the propositional content. However, all SAs can be both defective and/or unsuccessful.

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62 Although Austin initially found a distinction between saying things with words (the “constative”) and doing things with words (the “performative”), he came to understand that “stating is performing an act” (HDTW, 139). Searle agrees: “Making a statement is as much performing an illocutionary act as making a promise, a bet, a warning or what have you” (Expression, 17-18).
63 Pratt, SAT, 36.
64 Ibid., 136. She finds it “ironic that speech act philosophers and linguists have been so slow to recognize the extent to which assertions and representative discourse in general are used for purposes other than informing, reminding, or displaying knowledge at exams” (149).
65 Ibid., 148. “An assertion that is both true and nonobvious will still be pointless if it has no real or supposed relation to the interests of the hearer” (134).
66 Briggs, Words, 269.
67 “Assertions … differ from (almost) all other types of speech acts in that they prima facie imply an unmistakable validity claim, a claim to truth” (J. Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. M. Cooke [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998], 74). In some situations, the illocutionary force of non-Assertives also “depends on contextual realities described by true propositions and understood by believers as part of background knowledge” (D. Clark, “Beyond Inerrancy: Speech Acts and an Evangelical View of Scripture,” in For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to Christian Theology, ed. J. K. Beilby [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 123). However, here we consider only Assertives “true” or “false”; other SAs are “sincere” or “insincere.”
68 Contra G. N. Leech, who argues that “pragmatics is concerned only with publicly conveyed meaning, and does not take account … of miscommunication” (Principles of Pragmatics [London: Longman, 1983], 35). Although we cannot concern ourselves with private or secret communications
Non-Defective and Successful Illocutionary Acts

In a defective illocutionary act, a condition “intrinsic to the notion of the action in question,” such as the sincerity condition or a preparatory condition, is not satisfied. With explicit quotation, an example of a potentially defective SA would be the implied NT author misquoting the OT. If the implied NT reader is not to take this as a deliberate alteration, such an illocutionary act would be defective. For example, some scholars argue the quotation of Psalm 68:18 in Ephesians 4:8 is defective.

A defective illocutionary act is not necessarily unsuccessful. Illocutionary act success is not defined as an absence of defects. The sole condition for illocutionary act success is that a “the hearer understands it in the way that the speaker intended it.”

Hearer understanding is both necessary and sufficient for illocutionary act success; “the fulfillment of illocutionary intentions consists in hearer understanding.”

To clarify the role of illocution in communicating meaning, we must more precisely define illocutionary intention (author) and illocutionary effect (reader).
Illocutionary Intention

For Searle, authorial intention is foundational to the meaning of an illocution: “The speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect.”

This has generated controversy. Some believe SAT falls afoul of the intentional fallacy, i.e., considering intention as bound to the author’s psychology. However, though later Searle speaks of “fundamental psychological notions such as belief, intention, and desire” and terms these “Intentional,” at no point does Searle enter the murky waters of motive in an attempt to determine why a speaker utters a certain SA. Searle takes the performance of a SA as evidence for the intention behind it, rather than looking behind the SA to discern the motives of its author. This coheres with Sternberg’s understanding of the biblical

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75 Searle, SA, 45.
76 Cf. M. Black, “Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views,” NLH 4, no. 2 (Winter 1973): 258, http://www.jstor.org/stable/468477 (accessed February 15, 2007). For the intentional fallacy, see W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and M. C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, University Paperback ed. (London: Methuen, 1970), 4. Although Booth is correct that Wimsatt and Beardsley “rule out only statements made by the author outside the work about his motives or purposes or plans or hopes for value” (Ironic, 126n13), for many, “intention” remains linked to “the psychologizing approaches of F. Schleiermacher and others and the Romanticist ideas of getting into the mind of an author so that the interpreter knows the author’s mind better than he himself or she herself did” (Snodgrass, 16). As D. Patte has noted, “The mention of ‘mind,’ ‘brain,’ and ‘mental states’ makes us cringe” since this appears to equate “intentionality” with “subjectivity” (“Speech Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis,” Semeia 41 [1988]: 95).
77 J. R. Searle, “Intentionality and Method,” The Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 11 (November 1981): 720, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026582 (accessed March 7, 2007), where he names these notions the sincerity conditions of statements, promises and desires, respectively. In this article, Searle often confusingly refers to “intentionality” rather than “Intentionality” even when not discussing Commissives. This becomes more puzzling when one compares early Searle, in which “Intention” is the sincerity condition of a Commissive (cf. Expression, 14). Here we agree with Thesleff that “there are ways of expressing intention which identify the directedness of a speech act with presupposing some psychological [sic] notion of ‘inner mental states’” (New Horizons, 59; cf. Vanhoozer, “Discourse,” 21, who refers to the “psychological sense of the term” as “planned to” and the “technical sense” as “directing their consciousness toward”). Like Briggs, we avoid adopting Searle’s “framework of intentionality and mental states,” but still find it “possible to utilise the insights of his philosophy of language” (Words, 55).
78 Unlike Castelli, who equates “author’s intent” to “the motive residing in the mind of the writer” and finds intent to be “unattainable because it involves inaccessible aspects of the author’s psychology” (120; cf. Walhout, “Hermeneutics,” 71, 100; Wolterstorff, “Resuscitating,” 37), Q. Skinner correctly avers that “an agent’s motives for writing (though not his intentions in writing) can be said to stand ‘outside’ his works, and in a contingent relationship to them, in such a way that their recovery does seem to be irrelevant to the determination of the meaning of the works” (“Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts,” NLH 3, no. 2 ([Winter 1972]: 402, http://www.jstor.org/stable/468322 [accessed August 27, 2007])). Similarly, for P. Ricoeur, “the hermeneutical task is to discern the ‘matter’ of the text (Gadamer) and not the psychology of the author” (“Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” in HHS, 111). Vanhoozer agrees “there is a difference between understanding why someone says something (a question for historians and psychologists) and what a person said—his or her speech act” (“Imprisoned,” 61n26). We concur with him: “I am not interested in recreating the inner life of the author or in reconstructing the author’s motives but in giving a description, as thick as it is correct, of the author’s Akt des Redens (speech act, discourse)” (“Discourse,” 21).
interpreter’s only concern being ‘“embodied’ or ‘objectified’ intention. … ‘Intention’ no longer figures as a psychological state consciously or unconsciously translated into words. Rather, it is a shorthand for the structure of meaning and effect supported by the conventions that the text appeals to or devises: for the sense that the language makes in terms of the communicative context as a whole.”

Nicholas Wolterstorff puts this back into SA terminology with the thought that reading a text for “authorial discourse” is not “to enter the dark world of the author’s psyche” but rather “to discover what asserting, what promising, what requesting, what commandings, are rightly to be ascribed to the author on the ground of her having set down the words that she did in the situation in which she set them down.”

Any residual concern over “intentionality” is dispelled by the use of the implied author and reader construct since this “is a tool which rescues and places in a proper perspective the concept of an intent behind the production of a literary work.” Thus, the illocutionary acts of the implied author—those “assertings,” “promisings,” “requestings,” and “commandings”—reveal to the empirical reader, via the construct of the implied reader, the implied author’s intentions.

Turner relates intention to the NT writings (specifically to Paul):

When we ask concerning authorial intention, we are not seeking information about Paul’s unexpressed psychological motivations (interesting though they may be), which may or may not have been realized. We are inquiring rather about what intentional acts he has indeed performed in and through what he has

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In a later work, Q. Skinner finds value in investigating motive: “We can … seek further corroboration for such ascriptions of intentionality by enquiring into the motives and beliefs of the agent in question” (“A Reply to My Critics,” in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. J. Tully [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988], 280; cf. 266-267). We disagree and argue below that the implied author/reader construct makes inquiry into the motives of an author unnecessary.

Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 93. Even radical reader-response theorist S. Fish recognizes SAT does not link authorial intention to motivation: “Intention, in the view of … [SA] theory, is a matter of what one takes responsibility for by performing certain conventional (speech) acts. The question of what is going on inside, the question of the ‘inward performance’ is simply bypassed; speech-act theory does not rule on it. This means that intentions are available to anyone who invokes the proper (publicly known and agreed upon) procedures, and it also means that anyone who invokes these procedures (knowing that they will be recognized as such) takes responsibility for having those intentions” (Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980], 203-204). We discuss linguistic conventions with regard to author intention/audience understanding below.

81 Tovey, 79, adding that thus “it is no longer the case that the ‘Intentional fallacy’ bulks large in literary criticism.” See also Meyer, Reality, 97-98.

82 This does not speak to the possible communicative inadequacy of an empirical author, i.e., the failure to create the appropriate implied author. However, we assume the empirical author is competent unless evidence is found to the contrary (see J. D. BeDuhn, “The Historical Assessment of Speech Acts: Clarifications of Austin and Skinner for the Study of Religions,” MTSR 14, no. 1 [2002]: 93, 95, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006802760198785 [accessed May 7, 2007]).
actually said, understood within the linguistic/cultural world in which he uttered/inscribed the words.\(^{83}\)

Turner makes it clear that not only are intentional acts performed through speech or text but that the goal is they be “understood.” “Understanding” is the intended illocutionary effect.

The Illocutionary Effect of Understanding

We argued above that the illocutionary effect of understanding is both necessary and sufficient for illocutionary act success. The questions now before us are: What do we mean by “understanding” and what makes understanding possible?

To answer the first question, we look to Bach and Harnish, who “restrict illocutionary intentions to those intentions whose fulfillment consists in nothing more than their recognition.”\(^{84}\) Thus, to “understand” means the empirical reader grasps the purport of the locutionary act and recognizes what type of illocutionary act is being performed.\(^{85}\) Since the implied reader, by definition, is of the same mind as the implied author, in our action model “understanding” involves the empirical reader discovering the implied author and implied reader and “the world which it [the text] intends to disclose,” i.e., the lifeworld.\(^{86}\) When understanding happens, mutual context is activated

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\(^{83}\) Turner, “Criticism,” 47.

\(^{84}\) Bach and Harnish, xv. This differs from Austin’s three types of illocutionary effects: “securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting a response” (HDTW, 118). Only “securing uptake,” which equates to Searle’s illocutionary effect of understanding, occurs in every instance (Ibid., 139). “Taking effect” refers to changes in social reality caused by Declarations (Ibid., 117) and is not of concern here. Austin describes “inviting a response” with an example: “Many illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel. Thus an order invites the response of obedience” (Ibid.). However, considering “inviting a response” to be an illocutionary effect of a Directive blurs the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects. Although Austin argues “we must distinguish ‘I ordered him and he obeyed’ from ‘I got him to obey’” (Ibid.), such a distinction is difficult to make or defend—and Austin does not explain how to do it. Indeed, by Austin’s definition, a Directive illocutionary act would be illocutionarily unsuccessful if the hearer does not do what is asked. Contra Austin, we consider “inviting a response” to be a perlocutionary intention and the response to be a perlocutionary effect (see below).

\(^{85}\) See, e.g., Bach and Harnish, 56. We reject Habermas’ definition of understanding [Verständigung] in which “reaching understanding is considered to be a process of reaching agreement [Einigung] among speaking and acting subjects” (Reason, 286-287; brackets original). We do not agree that the illocutionary aim is both “that the hearer understand what is said and undertake the obligations connected with the acceptance of the offer contained in the speech act” (Ibid., 293-294; emphasis added; cf. n84, where we reject Austin’s similar ideas). Reaching agreement and undertaking obligations are perlocutionary effects (see below).

\(^{86}\) Walhout, “Texts,” 47, with reference to Ricoeur. Vanhoozer also points out that “what the reader receives according to Ricoeur is not the author’s intention but the ‘world of the text’—that is, a proposed way of being-in-the-world” (“The Reader in New Testament Interpretation,” in Green, 309). In our terms, this is the lifeworld presented in/by the text.
and one becomes “immersed in conversation with a tradition and engaged in that form of life which the tradition has assumed.”

To determine what makes understanding possible, we begin with Paul Ricoeur’s thought that the “intention of being identified, acknowledged, and recognized as such by the other is part of the intention itself.” Bach and Harnish’s “Communicative Presumption” expands on this idea:

The communicative presumption is the mutual belief prevailing in a linguistic community to the effect that whenever someone says something to somebody, he intends to be performing some identifiable illocutionary act. … People … do mutually believe that speakers speak with overt intentions, and this mutual belief figures in ordinary communication situations. People do rely on others to have identifiable intentions in their utterances, and they expect others to rely on them to have such intentions.

Understanding, then, is made possible when the empirical author constructs an implied author whose illocutionary acts the empirical audience can identify. “The utterance must be made with the intention that H can find the inference route, and part of what the hearer takes into account in trying to find the route is that the utterance is made with that intention.” But the empirical reader also has a role; s/he must be willing to enter into the reading “contract.” A certain cooperation is therefore required.

The cooperative effort which underpins understanding relies in part on linguistic conventions (an element of context). Searle defines the conventions of language as those constitutive rules related to illocutionary force and the essential condition which generally have the form “X counts as Y in context C.” The existence of linguistic

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87 Stroup, 208. To the extent understanding is considered an “act,” with successful illocation we already have participation in communication, i.e., in joint action (see H. Clark, 219).

88 P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 18. This is similar to Searle’s argument (cf. n75).

89 Bach and Harnish, 12.

90 As Schutz and Luckmann remind us, “steering one’s own behavior toward anticipated interpretation by others is a basic presupposition of communicative action” (2:8).

91 Bach and Harnish, 80. Cf. Brown and Yule, 33. Like authorial intention, reader understanding is “less a mental state than something like an ability, or a competency” (Briggs, Words, 54).

92 “Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention” (J. R. Searle, “What is a Speech Act?,” in Philosophy in America, ed. M. Black [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965], 230).

93 Searle, SA, 35. Searle, who considers language to be “rule-governed intentional behavior” (SA, 16), defines “constitutive” rules as those rules which “constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules” (SA, 34). According to van Dijk, “the rules are CONVENTTIONAL in the sense of being shared by most members of a linguistic community: they KNOW these rules implicitly and are able to use them” (1).

Ours is a weaker concept of “convention” than that of Bach and Harnish (see 108-109; cf. Briggs, Words, 64). For us, “rules” can be simply practices, norms or, as P. Cotterell terms them, “regularities” (“Sociolinguistics and Biblical Interpretation,” VE 16 [1986]: 75n12; cf. Alston, 264). We
conventions common to both author and audience is critical to achieving the illocutionary effect of understanding. As Briggs puts it, “If there is any agreement on what illocutionary analysis achieves, it is that it draws together the issues of authorial (or speaker’s) intention and the audience’s understanding, by examining what conventions exist within the public domain of both the author and the audience.”

This does not mean all empirical readers will necessarily agree “about the kind of illocutionary act which is being performed in a specific utterance.” But using our action model means that disagreements about an illocutionary act are not about different understandings of the author’s motivations. Rather, they are founded in different premises about the relevant context or linguistic/literary conventions and they center on what role a particular illocutionary act plays in creating the implied author and implied reader. Such disagreements are more productive than those which concern the empirical author’s unrecoverable “mental acts.”

As we have defined reader roles, accomplishing “understanding” means the empirical reader reads as an Analyst. We conclude our discussion of illocutionary acts by distinguishing between the reader roles of Independent and Analyst.

The Reader Roles of Independent and Analyst

Based on our discussions of illocution and illocutionary success, we add to our definition of reader roles that an Independent reader does not evidence having arrived at (or possibly even attempted) the illocutionary effect of understanding. Therefore, vis-à-vis an Independent reader, the illocutionary act is unsuccessful and illocutionary

follow H. Clark in considering convention to be “a regularity … in behavior … that is common ground in a given community C … as a coordination device” (71).

Briggs, “SAT,” 764; cf. Tovey, 79. “One of the necessary conditions for understanding in any situation what it is that S in uttering utterance x must be doing to A must be some understanding of what it is that people in general, when behaving in a conventional manner, are usually doing in that society and in that situation in uttering such utterances” (Q. Skinner, “Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts,” Philosophical Quarterly 20, no. 79 [April 1970]: 133, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218084 [accessed March 28, 2008]; cf. Skinner, “Motives,” 406). This extends beyond linguistic conventions. As A. Wagner notes, “so ist z. B. die Handlungsstruktur von Äußerungen (also die Frage nach dem Zweck einer Äußerung, ob sie zu etwas aufförden soll, etwas mitteilen will, etwas ausdrücken soll usw.) bestimmt von allen Gesetzen und Gegebenheiten, die das Handeln in einer Gesellschaft insgesamt bestimmen: Kommunikationsgegebenheiten, sprachliche Konventionen, Werte, institutionelle Gegebenheiten, etc.” (“Der Lobaufruf,” 151).

Lanser, Act, 68n9.

An Independent reader is very similar to the reader described by radical reader-response theories. According to Fish, “the reader’s response is not to the meaning: it is the meaning” (3). R. Rorty believes that “a text just has whatever coherence it happened to acquire during the last roll of the hermeneutic wheel” (“The Pragmatist’s Progress,” in Interpretation and Overinterpretation by U. Eco et al., ed. S. Collini [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 97).
meaning has not been communicated.\textsuperscript{97} To claim a reader-now-author quotes “out of context” is the equivalent in our model of naming the quoting author an Independent reader of the source text.\textsuperscript{98} The way Stanley describes Paul’s use of Psalm 115:1 LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13 dovetails with calling Paul an Independent reader: “The sense in which he uses the verse is so far removed from the original context as to raise questions about Paul’s reliability as an interpreter.”\textsuperscript{99} We take up this example as a case study.

An Analyst, on the other hand, is a reader who recognizes the illocutionary intentions of the implied author and achieves the intended illocutionary effect of understanding the illocutionary act. When a reader reads as an Analyst, the illocutionary act is successful.

This does not mean that the illocutionary force of the original SA is retained in a quotation. Most quotations are Assertives, i.e., they report earlier SAs, which may have been Assertives, Commissives, Directives, etc.\textsuperscript{100} Even if the locution is replicated verbatim, the illocutionary act (and therefore the perlocutionary act) in the reporting context may be different. Further, the referent may be redefined by reversal, inversion or expansion. Thus, a quotation does not necessarily reproduce earlier meaning (as we have defined “meaning”). Our question instead is whether and, if so, how earlier meaning resonates in the new context.

We believe that in many instances of biblical quotation, the NT author evokes the OT Story, thereby activating mutual context, in support of his invitation to the NT audience to read as Envisagers and experience transformation. To describe the Envisager more precisely we must plunge into perlocution.

**Perlocutionary Acts and Effects**

The final dimension of our action model is *perlocution*, another term coined by Austin. However, he, Searle and others not only focus their efforts on illocution, they deny

\textsuperscript{97} An Independent reader may achieve understanding but choose to disregard the illocution. The result is the same as for a reader who does not understand.

\textsuperscript{98} Our characterization of a NT author as a reader of an OT text is based on the NT quotation of that text. Whether any NT authors are fully Independent OT readers is unclear. As Moyise points out concerning the “eclectic” quotation in Matt 2:15, “There is far more involved than Matthew taking a verse out of context with no interest in the original meaning” (“Out of Context,” 139).

\textsuperscript{99} Stanley, *Arguing*, 100. Stanley does not consider Paul in the interpretive role of Envisager (see below); he believes “Paul often quotes from Scripture in a way that bears little evident relation to the apparent sense of the original passage” (53).

perform the correlated perlocutionary act” (Alston, 37). Furthermore, J. Verschueren finds perlocution to be “relevant on condition that (i) we redefine perlocutionary effects in terms of the speaker’s intentions, (ii) we restrict ourselves to those intended effects which are typically associated with the speech act type involved, and (iii) we recognize that the intended typically associated effects are not necessarily achieved” (“Lexical Decomposition, Perlocutions, and Meaning Postulates” PILO 8, no. 3/4 [1975]: 353). Along these lines, in our inclusion of perlocution in meaning, we use a looser concept of convention, allow for perlocutionary intentions and consider only associated perlocutionary effects.

Some linguists refuse to include perlocution in communication because they take communication as linguistic and perlocutionary effects can be non-verbal (see Y. Gu, “The Impasse of Perlocution.” JPrag 20, no. 5 [November 1993]: 427; Bach and Harnish, 16). According to M. A. van Rees, “illocutionary acts involve the attainment of a communicative effect by producing verbal utterances with the intention of getting a listener to recognize, by recognizing that one has that intention, what particular attitude (belief, want, intention, affect) with respect to a particular state of affairs one is trying to express. Perlocutionary acts involve the attainment of an interactional effect by trying to bring about further effects on the cognitive, affective, or conative state of the listener by way of a communicative act” (“The Adequacy of Speech Act Theory for Explaining Conversational Phenomena: A Response to Some Conversation Analytical Critics,” JPrag 17, no. 1 [January 1992]: 40; bold omitted).

Although later Searle defines “speech acts proper” as illocutionary acts (see Searle and Vanderveken, 12) and restricts meaning to “speaker meaning,” (see J. R. Searle, “What is Language: Some Preliminary Remarks,” in Tsotzidis, Searle’s Philosophy, 31), he agrees that “communicating is a matter of producing certain effects on one’s hearers” (Intentionality, 165). Then, in order to sustain his argument that only illocution matters in producing meaning, he adds that “one can intend to represent something without caring at all about the effects on one’s hearers” (Ibid.). He goes so far as to aver that “one can make a statement … without even intending to get them [one’s hearers] to understand it at all” (Ibid.), a notion which seems to eliminate speaker intentionality. These are not the normal situations of communication or of intentionality and do not concern us (cf. Tilley, 16). Nor are we interested in the example of sentences uttered in solitude (Alston, 30); utterances not involving a listener are not communication.

Others who equate speech acts only with illocutionary acts include van Dijk (cf. 195) and D. Kurzon, who goes so far as to argue “perlocutionary acts … are not part of speech act theory, and as such are not part of pragmatics” (“The Speech Act Status of Incitement: Perlocutionary Acts Revisited,” JPrag 29, no. 5 [May 1998]: 595, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378216697000830 [accessed July 7, 2008]). Vanhoozer also appears to include only illocution in communication: “The
correct that “communication” and “interaction” are both “in principle part of a complete speech act and therefore must be included in an adequate theory of speech acts.” Thus, in referring to meaning as created in fully successful communicative interaction, we consider meaning to result from illocution and perlocution taken together. For both illocution and perlocution, we include acts and effects, even if the intended perlocutionary effect is non-linguistic. In our action model, “full” meaning is situated in the successful completion of the total SA.

This accords with recent thinking about pragmatics. According to social psychologist Wendelin Reich, “the problematic status of perlocutionary acts in SAT can only be rectified if we give up the assumption that speech acts are produced by speakers alone, together with the related assumption that meanings (illocutionary level) rather than effects (perlocutionary level) are all that matters.”

Our action model thus goes beyond traditional pragmatic theories—both SAT and implicature theory—in which communicating meaning is a function only of authorial intention and reader recognition (understanding). Because perlocution is a critical element of our action model and proper function of our communicative faculties, I contend, is to produce true interpretation—understanding” (Meaning, 205). However, he opens the door to perlocution as “strategic action” a few pages later in averring that “speakers and authors … are both perlocutionary and illocutionary agents. Interpreting texts is thus a matter of understanding purposive action—communicative and strategic. When I speak of communicative action in relation to texts, therefore, I am referring to the full-fledged, four-dimensional reality described by speech act theory and not only to the illocutionary dimension” (Meaning, 224-225). This last sentence corresponds to our use of perlocution.


Generally, even those who include perlocution in communicative meaning do not include the reader. Instead, they use one of two approaches: (i) the communication of meaning involves only the perlocutionary acts/intentions of the author/speaker or (ii) perlocutionary effects are attributed to the efforts of the speaker/author who, in essence, causes them. We discuss and reject causality below. An example of the former approach is H. P. Grice. He defines nonnatural (“NN”) meaning on the basis of intentional perlocutionary acts: “A meantNN something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention’” (Studies in the Way of Words [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 220). See also Verschueren, 347, and Connor-Linton, 96.

Within biblical scholarship, Watson expresses a Gricean view of meaning: “The literal sense of the biblical texts comprises (i) verbal meaning, (ii) illocutionary and perlocutionary force, and (iii) the relation to the centre. As communicative actions, the texts seek to convey a meaning in order to evoke a particular response” (Text, 123). Although he adds that “the true end of communicative action … is responsive action” (116), for him the audience’s role is passive: “Readers can only receive meaning, they cannot create it” (104). Other biblical scholars/theologians who recognize perlocutionary intentionality include Meyer (cf. Critical Realism, 22), Giffilann Upton (cf. 93) and Tovey (cf. 264).

Reich, 1352. Tilley puts it more strongly: “A theory of speech acts cannot … equate the meaning of the act performed to the illocutionary intent of the agent. That would be as flawed as a general theory of human acts which neglected the essential links between act and results or which equated the act performed to the bare intention of the agent. … Hence, part of the meaning of communicative speech acts is their perlocutionary results” (23).
because it has often been ignored or excluded, we look more closely at perlocutionary acts and effects—beginning with their relationship to illocution.

Like illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts are acts of the speaker/author. Max Black defines a perlocutionary act as “something we may do by producing an illocutionary act (e.g., persuading, getting somebody to do something, checking somebody, annoying him, etc.)”

We go further than Black in arguing that a perlocutionary act necessarily occurs in connection with an illocutionary act, that is, all illocutionary acts have intentional perlocutionary acts associated with them.

Although the full range of perlocutionary effects includes all reader responses except the illocutionary effect of understanding, in this study, our concern is associated perlocutionary effects, i.e. those the implied author intends for the implied reader which are directly and conventionally correlated with understanding the illocutionary act and recognizing its related perlocutionary act. We do not consider

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107 Contra J. E. Botha’s concept of the perlocutionary act as “sometimes … performed” (*Jesus and the Samaritan Woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42* [Leiden: Brill, 1991], 48; cf. Vorster, 111). Rather, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst point out, “Language users performing speech acts do not, in principle, do so with the sole intention of making the persons to whom they address themselves understand what speech act they are performing: rather, by means of those speech acts they hope to elicit from their listeners a particular response (verbal or otherwise)” (*SAs*, 23). Similarly, “when the listener perceives and understands the meaning (the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it. He either agrees or disagrees with it (completely or partially), augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution, and so on. … Thus, all real and integral understanding is actively responsive, and constitutes nothing other than the initial preparatory stage of a response (in whatever form it may be actualized)” (Bakhtin, 68-69).


Cohen identifies two other types of perlocution: unintentional perlocution and indirect perlocution. In the latter, the perlocution stems from the location (495-497). Indirect perlocution fits
other perlocutionary acts and effects, i.e., either unintentional perlocutionary effects or “effects or consequences of speech acts that are not brought about on the basis of understanding of an illocutionary act.”¹⁰ This means we reject Habermas’ model, since in it only non-associated perlocutionary effects are the goal of perlocutionary intention and associated perlocutionary effects are included in illocution.¹¹¹

The three-way correlation between each illocutionary act type and the associated perlocutionary act and perlocutionary effect is as follows:

- **Assertive:** that H believe that P.
- **Directive:** that H (intend to) do A.
- **Commissive:** that H believe S intends to fulfill his obligation to do A.
- **Expressive:** either (i) H believe S has the appropriate feeling or (ii) H respond with the appropriate feeling.¹¹²

This correlation between illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts and associated perlocutionary effects¹¹³ is key to our action model of meaning since it shows the intended perlocutionary effect of every SA to be transformation of beliefs or behavior.

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¹⁰ Tovey’s view when he defines “perlocutionary acts (perlocutions)” as “the intended effects that locutions are conventionally expected to have or to achieve” (71; cf. Lee, 37; and Luge, 74, 83). Our use of perlocution is narrower than that of Botha, who includes some non-associated perlocution (see 99, 104).

¹¹¹ Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, SAs, 27. See also Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity; Nottingham: Apollos, 2002), 185. We do not find helpful Burkhardt’s redefining perlocution as the “intra-illocutionary effect” or the “illocutionary point” (“SAT,” 98n117 and 98n119) or the notion that illocution is “a special type of perlocution” (Lee, 38n2).

¹¹ For Habermas, perlocutionary acts are not SAs but instead “constitute a subclass of teleological actions which must be carried out by means of speech acts, under the condition that the actor does not declare or admit to his aims as such” (Reason, 292; emphasis added. Cf. Reason, 293-294; Pragmatics, 126). Habermas considers perlocution to be strategic action, i.e., concealed action which involves exerting influence and manipulation while communicative action is “linguistically mediated interactions in which all participants pursue … only illocutionary aims” (Reason, 295).

In his later work, Habermas modifies this slightly, distinguishing three classes of perlocutionary effects (Pragmatics, 320). The first resembles associated perlocution, the second are unintentional perlocutionary effects and the third are strategic actions, which “come about only if they are not declared or if they are brought about by deceptive speech acts that merely pretend to be valid” (203). However, Habermas emphasizes “that the distinction between communicative and strategic action is not influenced by this revision” (203). Moreover, for him, “the agreement reached with the hearer, that is, the hearer’s acceptance of the speech-act offer” is “achieved solely through the performance of the illocutionary act” (202). Thus, “the illocutionary meaning of an utterance is not that the hearer should take note of S’s belief (or intention) but rather that she should come to hold the same view as S (or that she should take seriously S’s announcement)” (320). For us, this is perlocution, not illocution.

¹¹² Adapted from Bach and Harnish, 81. With texts these correlations apply to the implied reader. Although Rolf uses Searle’s title of “extra-linguistic purposes” (see Searle, Intentionality, 178), instead of “perlocution,” his similar correlation includes Declarations. We agree with him that “the so-called extra-linguistic purposes … have to be considered at all costs, if one wants to describe adequately what makes a speech act an action” (“Concept of Action,” 163).

¹¹³ Contra S. Davis, who gives promising and thanking as examples of illocutionary acts without perlocutionary purposes (47), all illocutionary acts have associated perlocution. As Alston puts it, “For every illocutionary act type there is some type of belief or action such that the intention to elicit a belief or action of that type in A normally accompanies illocutionary acts of that type” (44).
As with illocutionary intention,

discernment of what perlocutionary acts a speaker is attempting to commit requires neither direct nor inferential access to the speaker’s cognitive or affective states. This is because it may be inferred pragmatically that the speaker attempts the same perlocutions with the speech act that any rational speaker would be attempting with such an act in identical circumstances.\(^{114}\)

Therefore, perlocutionary intentions are expressed through the correlated illocutionary intentions of the implied author, and they reveal the associated perlocutionary effects (responses) of the implied reader.\(^{115}\)

Because perlocution occurs in correlation with illocution, different types of illocutionary acts have different intended perlocutionary effects. With an Assertive, for example, the intended illocutionary effect is that the hearer/reader understand the illocutionary act, that is, understand that the Act is an Assertive and also what content is presented and with what degree of force. The intended perlocutionary effect is that hearers/readers adhere to the truth of the Assertive and transform their lifeworld/worldview accordingly.\(^{116}\)

In this regard, Directives are unique. They are the only illocutionary acts “definable in terms of the intended perlocutionary effect”; in other words, the intended perlocutionary effect of a Directive is a key element of the essential condition of a Directive illocutionary act.\(^{117}\) Additionally, unlike other SAs where the intended perlocution relates to transformation of the hearer’s knowledge base or belief system, the intended perlocutionary effect of a Directive is transformation of the hearer/reader’s actions. For this reason, Directives can be particularly important.


\(^{115}\) This is what we take “understanding” a perlocutionary act to mean.

\(^{116}\) The mutual context of the speaker and hearer is altered at the illocutionary level (see chapter 4, n111) as a result both of the presentation of an illocutionary act with its preparatory and sincerity conditions and of hearer/reader understanding (see Thiselton, \textit{New Horizons}, 565; Gadamer, 570; Lee, 38n2; D. Wunderlich, “Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory,” in Searle, Kiefer, and Bierwisch, 292; T. Ward, \textit{Word and Supplement: Speech Acts, Biblical Texts, and the Sufficiency of Scripture} [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], 99; and Sbsa, 433). As Alston notes, “Just by virtue of being an act it [an illocutionary act] will have consequences” (32). But this is not the transformation which occurs with full perlocutionary act success.

\(^{117}\) Searle, \textit{SA}, 71. This refutes his contention that perlocution never plays a role in meaning.
Some illocutionary acts are indirect, i.e., their function is not evidenced by their grammar. Such illocutionary acts still have a single illocutionary force and perlocution. For example, “Blessed is he whose transgressions are forgiven, whose sins are covered” (Ps 32:1 NIV, quoted in Rom 4:7-8) is, on its surface, an Assertive. But taken within its OT co-text, and especially considering Psalm 32:5-6, it is a warning (or, minimally, a suggestion) and thus is a Directive.\(^{118}\) The intended perlocutionary effect is not audience adherence to the truth of the statement. Rather, as a Directive, the intended perlocutionary effect is the action of confession and seeking forgiveness; this is what the implied reader does upon both understanding and adhering to the warning.

Successful Perlocution and the Interactive Communication of Meaning

A SA is fully successful only when it is perlocutionarily successful. We define a successful perlocutionary act as one where the empirical reader/hearer responds with the intended perlocutionary response (belief or action) called for from the implied reader.\(^{119}\) This we term “adherence.”

Because perlocutionary acts are both intentional and direct, illocutionary success is necessary for perlocutionary success. This means that for empirical readers to make the intended perlocutionary response, they must first respond with the illocutionary effect of understanding.\(^{120}\) However, illocutionary success is not sufficient for perlocutionary success.\(^{121}\) As Gadamer points out using the example of a Directive, “The intended recipient of the order … is well able to distinguish between understanding and obeying an order. It is possible for him not to obey even when—indeed, precisely when—he has understood it.”\(^{122}\)

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\(^{118}\) See Bach and Harnish, 49, for a discussion of the “Advisories” subtype of Directive.

\(^{119}\) We follow Rolf in speaking “vom Erfolge einer Handlung” as “wenn die intendierte und die faktisch erzielte Wirkung zusammenfallen” (Sprache, 265), with the caveat that regarding perlocution we refer only to associated perlocution. Rolf adds that “wenn meine Worte jedoch nicht gehört und nicht verstanden wurden, dann läßt sich dennoch nicht sagen, ich hätte nicht gehandelt …; feststellen läßt sich lediglich, daß ich mit meiner Handlung den mit ihr verfolgten Zweck nicht erreicht habe und insofern nicht erfolgreich war” (266).

\(^{120}\) See S. Davis, 44. Although a reader/hearer who does not understand the illocution could make the appropriate perlocutionary response by chance, “accidental” perlocution does not concern us. Nor are we interested in the possible success of a non-associated perlocutionary act.

\(^{121}\) See van Eemeren and Grootendorst, SAs, 25. As K. Bach points out, “We need to distinguish the success of a speech act as an illocutionary and as a perlocutionary act” (“Pragmatics and the Philosophy of Language,” in Horn and Ward, 469).

\(^{122}\) Gadamer, 330. Cf. W. J. Houston, “What Did the Prophets Think They Were Doing? Speech Acts and Prophetic Discourse in the Old Testament,” BibInt 1, no. 2 [July 1993]: 177. This is a difficulty with Habermas’ model, in which successful illocation includes adherence (see n111).
Perlocutionary intentionality does not imply causality. Perlocution “is a joint endeavour between S and H. It involves S’s performance of speech acts and H’s performance of response-acts.”\textsuperscript{123} Perlocutionary effects are “actively produced by H, who has the claim to the agency of the effects.”\textsuperscript{124} The success of a perlocution depends on hearer cooperation.\textsuperscript{125}

In our model, neither authorial intention (even with perlocutionary intention) nor reader response is the sole determinant of communicative meaning. Although we agree the author “created and patterned the set of relations being analyzed, had a purpose in doing so, and still has a relation to the text him or herself that is important for interpretation,”\textsuperscript{126} communication is not a one-way transmittal from author to reader. Nor does the hearer/reader create meaning unilaterally; we disagree with the radical reader-response positions of theorists such as Stanley Fish and Richard Rorty\textsuperscript{127} as well as with the notion that “the autonomy of the text … hands writing over to the sole interpretation of the reader.”\textsuperscript{128} Rather, the empirical reader plays a role in the interactive

\textsuperscript{123} Gu, 422, arguing against Austin’s claim that since “mental events … are not acts,” a hearer “has no claim of agency concerning the effects produced in him.” Like Gu, Rolf argues that “kann generell festgestellt werden, daß—in analytischer Perspektive gesehen—eine Handlung und der mit ihr verfolgte Zweck beziehungsweise die mit ihr intendierte Wirkung eines ist, die erzielte Wirkung jedoch ein anderes” (“Perlokutionäre Akte,” 265). D. Marcu calls “attaching little or no importance to the role of the hearer in the perlocutionary act” a fallacy (“Perlocutions: The Achilles’ Heel of Speech Act Theory,” JPrag 32, no. 12 [November 2000]: 1726; italics omitted, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0378-2166(99)00121-6 [accessed July 4, 2008]).

\textsuperscript{124} Gu, 422; cf. Luge, 76. Similarly, P. R. Cohen and C. R. Perrault argue that “while a speaker often has performed illocutionary acts with the goal of achieving certain perlocutionary effects, the actual securing of those effects is beyond his control. Thus, it is entirely possible for a speaker to make an assertion, and for the audience to recognize the force of the utterance as an assertion and yet not be convinced” (“Elements of a Plan-Based Theory of Speech Acts,” Cognitive Science 3 [1979]: 187). P. Campbell asserts that “each party to a language or communicative act possesses language and, therefore, is not simply manipulated by others, but participates in the acts of persuading, ordering, etc.” (296). This is in contrast to the passive role allotted to the reader by Bach and Harnish: “If the hearer forms a corresponding attitude that the speaker intended him to form, the speaker has achieved a perlocutionary effect in addition to illocutionary uptake” (39, emphasis added; cf. Austin, HDTW, 121.).

\textsuperscript{125} See Kurzon, 571, 574, 575, passim.

\textsuperscript{126} Snodgrass, 19.

\textsuperscript{127} See n96. For a summary of various reader-response arguments, including Barthes’ *lisible* and *scriptible* texts and deconstructionism, see Y. Sherwood, *The Prostitute and the Prophet: Hosea’s Marriage in Literary-Theoretical Perspective* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), especially chapters 1-3. Witherington points out that even ardent reader-response theorists “like S. Fish, have been willing to object that they have been misquoted or misunderstood at times and that we must think in terms of interpretive communities which guide our reading. But no complaints about being misunderstood can be allowed to stand unless one has intended some specific meaning in the first place which was misheard or misinterpreted. And why should we need interpretive communities if the meaning simply happens between the reader and the text?” (Mark, 57).

\textsuperscript{128} Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics,” in *HHS*, 174. (See n6, this chapter). Our difficulty is with the word “sole” since, in general, Ricoeur neither unleashes the reader nor ignores the author. For example, he finds that “to interpret is to explicate the type of being-in-the-world unfolded in front of the text” (“Function,” 141) and he warns against forgetting “that a text remains a
communication of meaning first by understanding the identity of the implied reader created by the implied author and presented in the text and then, in situations of fully successful communicative interaction, by *envisaging* him or herself as that reader.

In this, there are similarities between our model and the thoughts of conservative reader-response theorist Umberto Eco. As we do, Eco uses the construct of the implied (for him, Model) reader. Similarly, he sees pragmatics as concerned not only with the phenomenon of interpretation (of signs, sentences, or texts) or of indexical expressions, but also with the “essential dependence of communication in natural languages on speaker and hearer, on linguistic context and extralinguistic context, on the availability of background knowledge, on readiness to obtain this background knowledge and on the good will of the participants in the communication act.”

Eco does not privilege the reader to the extent of considering any reading to be valid, and in his focus on the interaction of the text and the reader, he equates the intentions of the text with those of the implied author. His concept of pragmatics accords with our ideas about mutual context and author/reader cooperation.

Our action model, in which meaning is a three-dimensional communicative interaction mediated through text via the construction of the implied author and the implied reader, does not present the communication of meaning as the sole purview of *either* the author *or* the reader but of both/and. Our action model recognizes both the author and the reader as active agents in the co-creation of meaning. And it does not consider just the dimension of illocution; we see meaning as fully communicated only when the SA in its totality, including perlocution, is successful. Since successful perlocution occurs only when the empirical reader responds with the perlocutionary discourse told by somebody, said by someone to someone else about something” (*Interpretation Theory*, 18). For the empirical reader, “it is not a question of imposing upon the text our finite capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged self” (“Function,” 143). Wallhout suggests the way “to defend textual autonomy” is “to ignore authorial intention and posit the presence of an ‘implied author’” (“Texts,” 48). But we argue instead that it is via the implied author that we discover the intentions of the empirical author.

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131 According to Eco, there are “bad” readings; any interpretation is to be checked against “the text as a coherent whole” (*Limits*, 60, 149).
132 Cf. U. Eco, “Between Author and Text,” in Eco et al., 69; and Eco, *Limits*, 59. Although Eco says that “in this dialectics between the intention of the reader and the intention of the text, the intention of the empirical author has been totally disregarded” (“Between Author and Text,” 65), this reference to “intention” appears to be to authorial “motive,” which we agree is not necessary to recover.
133 Our model of communication “treats speakers and addressees as partners” (H. Clark, 132).
response (effect) intended for the implied reader by the implied author, SAs which are only understood (the illocutionary response) are not fully successful communicative interactions. This understanding of the role of the author and reader in both illocution and perlocution is the foundation of the reader role of Envisager.

The Reader as Envisager

The implied reader is an Envisager since, by definition, the implied reader responds with the illocutionary effect of understanding and also with the perlocutionary effect corresponding to the perlocutionary intention of the implied author. Therefore, for Envisaging to be accomplished empirically, there must be full communicative interaction, i.e., the SA must be both illocutionarily and perlocutionarily successful. An Envisaging empirical reader not only understands the force of the illocutionary act but also responds with the intended perlocutionary effect. Only Envisaging readers undertake the necessary transformation of beliefs/thoughts or action to “live into” or “inhabit” the lifeworld and Story presented by the implied author. What transformation is required of the Envisager can be examined on a theoretical basis, without knowing the actual response of any empirical reader or whether any particular SA has been fully successful.

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134 When empirical readers envisage themselves as the implied or “ideal” reader, they “experience the intended perlocutionary effect” (M. Steinmann, Jr., “Speech-Act Theory and Writing,” in What Writers Know: The Language, Process, and Structure of Written Discourse, ed. M. Nystrand [New York: Academic Press, 1982], 310). Since the construct of implied author/reader does not apply to conversation, we call hearers “envisaging” if they respond appropriately to a NT speaker’s illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

135 An Envisaging empirical reader does not have to form an intention to be an Envisager. It is the result that determines what role an empirical reader adopts.

136 L. Johnson avers that “if Scripture is ever again to be a living source for theology, those who practice theology must become less preoccupied with the world that produced Scripture and learn again how to live in the world Scripture produces” (“Imagining,” 165). More specifically, K. Möller concludes with regard to Psalm 101 that “in singing or praying this psalm, we, its modern readers, are ourselves making a pledge; we are committing ourselves to the behaviour the ancient psalmist thought appropriate for a king” (“Reading, Singing and Praying the Law: An Exploration of the Performative, Self-Involving, Commisive Language of Psalm 101,” in Reading the Law: Studies in Honour of Gordon J. Wenham, ed. J. G. McConville and K. Möller [New York: T&T Clark, 2007], 135-136). With regard to Directives, Gadamer notes that if the contemporary reader “really wants to understand the order,” i.e., if the order is to be perlocutionarily successful for that reader, that reader must “perform the same act as that performed by the intended recipient of the order” (330). In this regard, P. Stuhlmacher notes that “Gadamer … geht vom dem Grundsatz aus, eine wirklich werkgetreue Interpretation historischer Urkunden sie nur möglich im Horizont des Einverständnisses mit der Tradition” (Vom Verstehen des Neuen Testaments: Eine Hermeneutik, 2nd ed. [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986], 224, as quoted by Sohns, 15).

137 Contra Vorster, who argues that “perlocutionary acts are relevant for New Testament studies only in an intratextual conversational situation where the effect of an illocutionary act is given” (112). T. Polk treats “meaning” differently than we do when he adds actual reader response. For him, a text’s “ultimate meaning … is only completed in the reader’s living. How s/he responds to the summons and pursues the intended transformation become part of the work’s scope. In fact, that response becomes one
Empirical readers may have difficulty undertaking the called-for transformation. Not only is “the perlocutionary function … the least communicable,”¹³⁸ i.e., a SA has the greatest chance to be unsuccessful in the dimension of perlocution, reading cooperatively “does not foreclose critique.”¹³⁹ Hays relates this to the faithful reading of Scripture: “Is all questioning to be excluded, all critical reading banished? By no means. Asking necessary and difficult questions is not to be equated with apistia.”¹⁴⁰ In some cases, even if understanding is accomplished, the empirical reader may choose not to make the intended perlocutionary response. Even a cooperative reader may conclude that the role of Envisager must be rejected, i.e., that the world being offered is not one that can be “inhabited” with integrity or coherence.¹⁴¹ In such a case, the potential Envisager remains at the level of Analyst, someone who understands the intention of the implied author but does not respond with the intended perlocutionary effect and the requisite lifeworld transformation.

We tie Envisaging to quotation with Stanley’s thought that “Paul wrote his letters not to lay out a set of theological beliefs, but to motivate specific first-century Christians to believe and/or act (or stop believing or acting) in particular ways.”¹⁴² As Derek Tovey asks, “Is it the case that the primary intention of the Fourth Gospel is to display a state of affairs with no intention that this should have an impact on the reader which is world-changing, or action-inducing?”¹⁴³ He answers his own question: “The purpose of his [the implied author’s] narrative is so to affect their worldview that they orient their lives in accordance with what follows from accepting his assertions.”¹⁴⁴ Lifeworld/worldview and theology are transformed when reading is Envisaging.

criterion for evaluating what the text is and does, what it ultimately means” (*The Prophetic Persona: Jeremiah and the Language of the Self* [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984], 174).
¹³⁹ Meyer, *Critical Realism*, 22; cf. Vanhoozer, *Meaning*, 227. Tovey also points out that “readers are at liberty to accept or reject at all levels” (97).
¹⁴¹ For Vanhoozer, “readers must not only respond but respond responsibly. … It may be that, once having grasped the text’s intended sense, the reader will recoil in disgust” (“Reader,” 315). This reference is to the empirical reader since the implied reader always makes the response intended by the implied author. The more divergent the goals and interests of the empirical author and reader, the more difficult it may be for an empirical reader to be envisaging (see M. L. Pratt, “Ideology and Speech-Act Theory,” *PT* 7, no. 1 [1986]: 68-69, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772088 [accessed October 5, 2007]).
¹⁴² Stanley, *Arguing*, 3. This thought inspired some of our discussion of quotation in chapter 2.
¹⁴³ Tovey, 196.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 89. “The narrative is a theological display which, in setting forth the state of affairs it represents, seeks an affective response. This response is not to be at the level of aesthetic enjoyment but of belief and self-involvement in the ‘world’ which is represented in the story” (265).
As the final step in creating our methodology, we put our action model on the same linguistic level as our theological framework and the implied author/reader construct. In other words, we consider “how speech act functions are realized in larger text units” since those are the building blocks of Story.

Speech-Act Complexes

In the 1960s there was a move from the word to the sentence as the unit of communication. This is reflected in Searle’s belief that “the characteristic grammatical form of the illocutionary act is the complete sentence. ... Sentences, not words, are used to say things.” Linguistics has gone further and now operates “from the assumption that communication occurs in discourses, not in isolated or random sentences.” Although some scholars name the paragraph “the developmental unit of discourse,” because “paragraph” is a grammatical term, we instead consider the SAC to be the portion of a text which has homogeneity and cohesiveness.

The SAs in a SAC are not generally equally weighted. SAs “do not merely follow each other at the same level: ... some acts may have secondary rank with respect to others.” Our name for “the main act intended in a sequence of speech acts, such

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146 Searle, SA, 25. “The history of linguistics shows that for semantics the word was first regarded as the practical unit of communication” (J. P. Louw, “Discourse Analysis and the Greek New Testament,” BT 24, no. 1 [January 1973]: 102). Prior to Searle, “Frege pointed out ... words are the primary units of meaning of a language” (Vanderveken, 7). Austin also argued that “it appears correct to say that what ‘has meaning’ in the primary sense is the sentence” (Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock [Oxford: Clarendon, 1970], 56).
148 Longacre, 288. See also Osborne, for whom the paragraph is “the key to the thought development of biblical books” (41).
149 We adapt “speech-act complex” from van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s discussion of illocutionary act complexes (cf. SAs, 34). The notion that “homogeneity and cohesiveness” define its boundaries comes from Louw (103). In a later work, van Eemeren and Grootendorst tie these “higher textual levels” to SAT (cf. “Study,” 154).
150 Van Dijk, 216. As Chatman describes it, the various “text-types routinely operate at each other’s service” (Terms, 10).
that the other speech acts are components or auxiliary/preparatory for that act” is the *core* SA.\(^{151}\) The illocutionary act type of the core SA determines the illocutionary function of the SAC.\(^{152}\) Tellability also can be extended into SACs since it “can be meaningfully applied to utterances of more than a single sentence, utterances whose individual sentences probably represent a wide variety of speech act types.”\(^{153}\)

Whether there is a natural hierarchy of SAs in a SAC has not been proven.\(^{154}\) But Kathleen Callow and John Callow find that cohesive prominence occurs when two units are joined in a coherence relation: unless this is a purely additive relationship, it is normal for one member of the pairing to carry more impact, more cognitive weight, than the other. Thus *result* is more naturally prominent than *reason, response* than *stimulus*, and so on. … The naturally prominent elements constitute the structural core of the unit, to which the less prominent units relate.\(^{155}\)

From a SA perspective, Alessandro Ferrera argues that “the hierarchic status of a speech act in a sequence corresponds to the hierarchic status of the extra-illocutionary [i.e., perlocutionary] goal that it is meant to achieve.”\(^{156}\) This means Directives are likely to have some sort of “purposive prominence.” Therefore, in our analysis, we generally

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151 Van Dijk, 226. The core SA equates to the topic sentence of a paragraph. But “topic” has the sense of content, i.e., “what a discourse or part of it is about” (6) whereas the core SA includes not only propositional content but also illocution and perlocution.

152 Often, a “sequence of (various) speech acts as a whole has the function of a command, advice, etc.” (van Dijk, 233; cf. Brown and Yule, 233). Pratt convincingly argues that there is “a level of analysis at which utterances with a single point or purpose must be treated as single speech acts, or ‘discourse acts,’ or ‘texts,’ if we wish” (*SAT*, 141). See also Isrigler, who argues with regard to Psalm 13 that “von der Feststellung 6d her, d.h. von der Ebene des erreichten Wirkungszwecks her, erscheint die ganze Psalmbrede nachträglich als ein einzelner komplexer perlokutiver Akt” (87) and Tovey, who speaks of “the perlocutionary effect intended by the narrative [of John’s Gospel] taken as a whole” (92). Pratt, *SAT*, 141. In some cases, it is helpful to further identify the illocutionary force of the SAs and/or the SAC according to the subtypes proposed by Bach and Harnish.

153 Pratt, *SAT*, 141. In response to the questions “Was aber, wenn in einem Text aufgrund seiner Komplexität verschiedene Ilokkutionen vorkommen …. Welche Ilokkution ist dann die dominante?”, A. Wagner suggests several possibilities: “Die einen beschreiben den Weg, einen Text mit einer Äußerung gleichzusetzen und nach der dominanten zugrundeliegenden Ilokkution zu fragen. … Ein zweiter Weg, sich der Sprechakteite eines Textes zu nähern, ist es, auf die Kombination und Abfolge von Ilokkutionen einzelner Äußerungen/Sätze in Texten zu achten. … Ein weiterer Weg besteht darin, die sprachakttheoretische Dimension eines Textes nicht aus der Addition seiner Einzelleit, sondern aus der (in sich heterogenen) Gesamtheit des Textes zu gewinnen” (“Die Stellung,” 80-81). We prefer those options which recognize that individual SAs retain their illocutionary force.


consider how other SAs support any Directives in either the SAC or the related speech event.

Thiselton notes that “a speech-act, or series of speech-acts, may be able simultaneously to project narrative-worlds and assert states of affairs and transform the perceptions of readers.” This we believe is the goal of an envisaging OT reader-now-NT author who quotes an OT passage. An Envisaging NT speaker/author moves beyond understanding the message of the text to live into the world presented by the implied OT author. By subsequently quoting that passage, the envisaging NT speaker/author evokes an OT Story-line or an intervening interpretation of it in order to invite the NT audience to hear/read the recontextualized Story as Envisagers and then to live into that lifeworld and adopt its theological worldview of its Story. Because an Envisaging empirical reader responds with the intended perlocutionary effect of belief and/or action, that reader moves towards inhabiting the lifeworld presented in the text and adopting its Story and worldview.

In our two case studies, we use our methodology to explore how a particular quotation is intended to transform the Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview of the Envisaging empirical NT audience. In the next chapter, we introduce the case studies by outlining the steps of our analysis and laying some groundwork concerning the Psalms generally.

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158 Although the NT writings were no doubt crafted with certain audience characteristics in mind, we do not limit “empirical” to “original.” “Empirical” refers to all flesh-and-blood readers or potential readers. “Audience” also includes hearers within the text.
PART II

CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER 6
INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES

Our final step is to demonstrate the applicability of our methodology. In addition to the examples we have already presented from the NT Psalms quotations to illustrate various aspects of our methodology, as case studies we use our full methodology to examine two Psalms passages quoted in the NT. The first is Psalm 115:1 LXX as quoted by Paul in 2 Corinthians 4:13. The second is Psalm 110:1 [109:1 LXX] as quoted by Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, by Peter in Acts 2:34-35, by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:25, and by the author of Hebrews in Hebrews 1:13.

The Organization of the Case Studies

In each case study, we first determine the contribution of the source (OT) SAs within their SAC to Story and thus to lifeworld/ worldview and theology. In keeping with our pragmatic focus, we use Ernst Wendland’s five major Psalm functions: “petition, thanksgiving, praise, instruction and profession of trust” and his five minor functions: “repentance, remembrance, retribution, royalty, and liturgy” to establish the boundaries of the SAC which contains the quoted passage.

We next ascertain what role is played by each SA. This involves applying our action model, first discussing any critical issues of locution and then determining the illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions and desired perlocutionary response, using the construct of the implied author/reader and remembering the implied reader is not necessarily the direct addressee. As part of this analysis, we consider relevant elements, if any, of the socio-cultural context, literary conventions and the immediate and broader

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2 In Psalms passages where God is the original direct addressee, the implied reader is most likely a side participant or an overhearer.
co-text. We also evaluate what is known of any subsequent interpretations of the passage which may have been available in the NT period.

Determining illocutionary and perlocutionary intention and desired perlocutionary response allows us to identify what it would mean for an empirical hearer/reader to respond as an Envisager, i.e., a hearer/reader who understands the illocutionary acts and also responds with the perlocutionary effects associated with the perlocutionary acts. This allows us to evaluate the theological import of the SA, i.e., what answers to the basic theological questions are implied, as well as how the SA contributes to the Story of God’s people and ultimately to lifeworld and worldview.

Turning to the NT quotation, we follow the same process to determine the illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions and desired perlocutionary response of the SAC which contains the quotation. We then consider what elements of the theological OT Story-line are evoked by the quotation and what perlocutionary responses of belief and/or action would be made by the implied reader and, by definition, the Envisaging empirical reader. From this, we can ascertain both whether the NT author reads the OT as an Envisager and what transformation of lifeworld/worldview and corresponding Story is in view for those in the NT audience who read as Envisagers.

Whenever a text contains a report of direct speech, there are two levels of discourse. These are not entirely separable since what we know of the original dialog is mediated and framed by the implied author of the reporting text. Nevertheless, we must attend to both levels. This is the situation in our second case study where (i) the source text contains a quotation and (ii) the NT author recounts an episode in which either Jesus or Peter quotes the source text.

To introduce the case studies, we consider the role the Psalms may have played in the lifeworld and Story of Yahweh’s people, both ethnic Jews and God-fearers.

*The Psalms within the Jewish Lifeworld*

In their original setting the Psalms are primarily non-narrative and non-historical. In general, they do not recount events that occurred in the history of Yahweh’s relationship

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3 In each case study, we discuss which elements of co-text are relevant.

4 Although some Psalms use “Elohim” (אֱלֹהִים) to refer to the Israelite deity, the case study Psalms use “Yahweh” (יְהוָה). Where clarity is needed, we use “Yahweh.”

5 There are a few exceptions. Of the 18 historical psalms identified by Wendland (Analyzing, 48) or A. A. Anderson (“Psalms,” in *It is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture; Essays in Honour of Barnabas Lindars, SSF*, ed. D. A. Carson and H. G. M. Williamson [1988; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press], 266) only 7 (Psalms 90, 138, 108, 145, 146, 147, and 148) are ever explicitly addressed to Yahweh. Of the remaining 11, several are addressed to God, *One to the redeemer, one to the people, one to the Lord, one to the king, one to the king’s people* (Wendland, 48).
with Israel. Their connection to the Story of Israel is not via its stories. However, the Story of Yahweh and Yahweh’s people not only underpins the Psalms, the Psalms contribute to that Story in a significant way by providing answers to the basic theological questions.

On the one hand, the Psalms answer the basic theological questions about the deity: “whether there is a god, what relation this god has to the world in which we live, and what if anything this god is doing, or will do, about putting it to rights.” The Psalms define and describe what can be expected of Yahweh, presenting Yahweh as a god of righteousness and justice as well as the covenant people’s source of help and comfort in times of trouble, whether that trouble comes from external sources or results from the psalmist’s or the people’s own behavior.

On the other hand, the Psalms also provide answers to the basic theological questions of human existence (“who are we, where are we, what is wrong, and what is the solution”). The answers to these questions in the Psalms involve worship (i.e., praxis). As Watson describes it, “in the context of the covenant, it is the Book of Psalms that best represents the full range of human worship of God.” Every human emotion is included: “From anger to adulation, the various psalms cover the gamut of human emotion and response to God’s presence in the world, or lack thereof.” More than simply describing how a person or group has interacted with Yahweh in a specific situation, the Psalms call for an integrated life in relationship with Yahweh.

William Brown argues that the Psalms are “the theological center of the Old Testament. … On David’s many-stringed lyre, as it were, there can be heard almost every theological chord that resounds throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, from covenant and history to creation and wisdom.” Although some scholars have attempted to identify one major theological theme of the Psalter, it is more helpful to determine

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Press, 2008], 59), six are explicitly quoted in the NT. In three instances, Pss 78:24b, 89:20 and 95:7-11, the quoted passage references an historical event. However, these quotations do not figure in our study.

6 N. T. Wright, NTPG, 127. As McCann notes, “The Psalms are not just human words to God. They are also words about God. They teach us about God; they reveal who God is” (16).

7 N. T. Wright, NTPG, 123.

8 Watson, Text, 240.


10 W. Brown, 1. According to S. Terrien, the themes of the Psalter “are articulated together according to an unspoken architecture of theocentricity” (The Psalms: Strophic Structure and Theological Commentary [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 44).

11 Some central themes scholars argue for the Psalms include: the cult of the Covenant, the presence of Yahweh, and Yahweh as king. The first of these is Weiser’s thesis and also encompasses S. Mowinckel’s cult functional approach (The Psalms in Israel’s Worship, trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas [New
how the SACs with which we are concerned contribute to Story and then to determine whether and, if so, how the NT quotation presents those elements of Story.

To demonstrate that the Psalms inhabited the lifeworld/worldview intersection of Story, theology and praxis for the people of Yahweh at the end of the Second Temple period, we need to briefly assess the role the Psalms played.

*The Psalms in the Praxis of the First-Century People of Yahweh*

Worship and prayer were a vital part of first-century praxis in Jerusalem. There were daily sacrifices in the Temple, with special requirements for the Sabbath; other festivals were celebrated monthly or annually. The postexilic books of Chronicles and Nehemiah tell us that “in the period of the Second Temple, during the rule of the Persians, Greeks and Romans, the singing of psalms and sacred music had a privileged place among all the liturgical celebrations, sacrifices, fasts, vigils, pilgrimages, etc., in Jerusalem.” Since a goal of the Chronicler was to encourage true worship of Yahweh, the importance placed on singing Psalms and other hymns highlights proper worship praxis in the Second Temple period. Additionally, there are numerous allusions to the Psalms and psalmic language in the postexilic OT prophets, most notably in the later chapters of Isaiah and in Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi.

The Psalms appear to have been used not only in the Temple in Jerusalem but also in domestic devotional practices. Domestically, J. A. Smith believes the Psalms were sung during the Second Temple period in the Passover ritual, at weddings and...
funerals, and, based on 4 Maccabees 18:15, as part of a father’s religious instruction of his children. He concludes that “psalm singing may therefore be considered to have been a normal concomitant of the religious life of the family in the home.” Another indication that the Psalter was “the meditation book of pious groups and of private individuals” comes from the use of part of Psalm 136 in 1 Maccabees.

As regards synagogue use, Samuel Terrien claims “the book of Chronicles reflects an epoch when the Psalms were intoned not only in the temple ceremonies but also among the synagogues of the Diaspora.” Lawrence Schiffman concurs that “throughout the Second Temple period, increasing emphasis was placed on the requirement of daily prayer for all Jews. For many Jews it was the emerging synagogue that served as the locus of their prayers.” More cautiously, Lee Levine suggests first century synagogue worship was “limited to Sabbaths and holidays. Pre-70 sources speak almost exclusively about the Sabbath and in several instances, both in Berenice, to New Moon and Sukkot gatherings. Other holiday gatherings—although unattested—can reasonably be assumed.”

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18 Terrien, 20. According to L. I. Levine, “the earliest ‘hard’ evidence we have for the existence of a synagogue appears in a number of inscriptions from Ptolemaic Egypt which mention a proseuche, commencing with the third century B.C.E. To date, about twelve such inscriptions and papyri have been discovered from the Hellenistic period” (The Ancient Synagogue: The First Thousand Years [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000], 19). P. V. M. Flesher agrees the synagogue “arose in a region without access to the Temple cult (i.e., in Egypt) and in a sense comprised a substitute for it. It served as a gathering place for all Israelites—priests and commoners—where they took part in worship” (“Palestinian Synagogues before 70 C.E.: A Review of the Evidence,” in Ancient Synagogues: Historical Analysis and Archaeological Discovery, ed. D. Urman and P. V. M. Flesher [Leiden: Brill, 1995], 1:28).

We do not rely on rabbinic evidence concerning the pre-70 synagogue, following D. D. Binder, who concludes that “what probably constitutes the earliest and most reliable stratum of evidence from the rabbinic writings yields us no useful information about pre-70 synagogues” (Into the Temple Courts: The Place of the Synagogues in the Second Temple Period [Atlanta: SBL, 1999], 12).

19 L. H. Schiffman, “Foreword: The Ancient Synagogue and the History of Judaism,” in Sacred Realm: The Emergence of the Synagogue in the Ancient World, ed. S. Fine (New York: Oxford University Press; Yeshiva University Museum, 1996), xxviii. See also Maher, who believes the practice of regular daily worship grew out of sending ma ḍamādot to serve in the Temple in Jerusalem “during a particular week. On the days when the ma ḍamād was in Jerusalem the people who remained at home refrained from work, came together to worship and recited the same biblical passages from Genesis (cf. t. Ta ṣanit 4[3], 3)” (13). Levine finds “the division into ma ḍamādot was already known to the author of 1 Chronicles (24:1-18) in the fourth or third century B.C.E.” (36n64; contra L. L. Grabbe, who, without considering 1 Chronicles, believes “passages which speak of the ma ḍamādot do not occur in the pre-70 stratum of tradition” (“Synagogues in Pre-70 Palestine: A Re-assessment,” in Urman and Flesher, 1:22n20]). Levine takes a middle perspective, i.e., that “presumably, the Torah was read twice a year in the towns and villages whose local priestly courses were officiating in the Jerusalem Temple” (141).

20 Levine, 134.
Another question is the content of synagogue worship. Given the early-attested name “proseuche” (“place of prayer”), it seems safe to conclude that synagogue worship at least “consisted of prayers and Scripture reading.” Further, it is likely—although not certain—that by the late Second Temple period, those prayers included psalms. The evidence is overwhelming that the canonical psalms were important to the inhabitants of Qumran. “Among the almost nine hundred scrolls that were discovered in the Judean desert, no book is represented by more manuscripts than the book of Psalms.” That “the Psalms scrolls represent nearly 20% of biblical manuscripts found” indicates “the important place of the Psalms in the life of the community that copied and preserved them.” Additionally, 11QPs informs us that David “wrote 3,600 psalms (thlym); and songs (shir) to sing before the altar over the whole-burnt tamid offering every day, for all the days of the year, 364; and for the qorban of the Sabbaths, 52 songs; and for the qorban of the New Moons and for all the Solemn Assemblies and for the Day of Atonement, 30 songs …”. This text takes it for granted that psalms and songs formed part of the worship on weekdays, Sabbaths and feast days.

Other evidence of psalm usage (although not necessarily the canonical psalms) in connection with first-century worship is found in the NT. In the context of the gathering of the church, Paul refers in 1 Corinthians 14:15 (twice) to “singing psalms”

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21 Flesher, 1:28. According to Levine, in the Diaspora “proseuche” was a more common term to describe the institution than “synagogue,” which may “indicate a desire by Diaspora synagogues to highlight a religious dimension” (127).

22 P. W. Flint, “Psalms and Psalters in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Scripture and the Scrolls, vol. 1 of The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls: The Second Princeton Symposium of Judaism and Christian Origins, ed. J. H. Charlesworth (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006), 233. Of the 150 canonical psalms, “126 are at least partially preserved in the forty Psalms scrolls or other relevant manuscripts such as the pesharim. All the remaining twenty-four psalms were most likely included, but are now lost because of the damaged state of most of the scrolls. … The reason for this discrepancy is because the beginnings of scrolls are usually on the outside and are thus far more prone to deterioration” (234).

23 D. D. Swanson, “Qumran and the Psalms,” in Firth and Johnston, 248-249. In addition to the manuscripts that contain only Psalms, “there are seven other texts that include significant citations of the psalms” (248), including “three pesharim, 4QFlorilegium, 4QTanhumim, 4QCatena A, and 11QMelchizedek” (260). The biblical psalms were not the only prayers at Qumran; “the remains of over two hundred non-biblical prayers, psalms, and hymns … have been recovered from among the Qumran manuscripts” (Levine, 60).

24 Maher, 19, with reference to J. A. Sanders, The Psalm Scroll of Qumrân Cave 11 (11Qps) (Oxford, Clarendon, 1965), 92. We concur with Maher that the arguments for a triennial cycle for the Sabbath reading of the psalms in the pre-70 synagogue are not convincing (32; cf. McKinnon, 188-190; Grabbe, 1:24). Although synagogue worship “probably included reading of the Scriptures and the recitation of the Daily Psalm” (Maher, 13), daily use of the psalms in the synagogue is not established by documentary evidence until the eighth-century tractate Soferim (Ibid., 27).

25 Although Stanley argues that due to their great expense, “it seems highly unlikely that anyone (including Paul and the members of his churches) would have had access to a full complement of ‘Septuagint’ scrolls in the middle of the first century CE” (“Pearls,” 127), Abasciano’s counter-arguments are more convincing (see especially Abasciano, 156-161).
(ψάλλω) and in 14:26 to a “psalm” (ψαλμός). Ephesians 5:19 speaks of singing “psalms, hymns and spiritual songs among yourselves.” Other NT references to speaking or singing psalms include Romans 15:9, Colossians 3:16 and James 5:13.

From what is known of Second Temple practices, along with those of local households and probably at least the Diaspora synagogues, plus the evidence from Qumran and the NT, it appears the canonical Psalms were well-known to first century Yahweh-worshippers. N. T. Wright concludes that the Psalms were an important part of the worship and prayer life of even the “average” Jew, who “would grow up knowing the basic prayers, and a good many psalms.” The Psalms would have been known not only by the NT authors (especially Paul and Matthew, whose Jewish roots are unquestioned) but also by all observant Jews, including those in the Diaspora, and by God-fearers among the Gentiles.

We reserve our discussion of how familiar a first-century audience of Jews, God-fearers, and/or former pagans might have been with a specific Psalm for our case study examples. In both examples, it is likely that Diaspora God-fearers and even Jews were more familiar with the Septuagint translation (LXX) than the Hebrew text. We begin with Psalm 115:1 LXX [116:10 MT] as quoted by Paul in 2 Corinthians 4:13.

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26 According to E. P. Sanders, since Paul’s “view of group worship was almost certainly influenced by the synagogue services that he had attended, we may add singing to prayers and the reading and exposition of scripture as possible synagogal activities” (Judaism: Practice and Belief, 63 BCE—66 CE [London: SCM; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992], 202.

27 Although not a reference to the Psalms, Jesus speaks of those who “stand and pray [στήνω τε προσεύχεσθαι] in the synagogues [συναγωγαῖς]” (Matt 6:5). Furthermore, the NT evidence is clear that “by the first century C.E. at the very latest, readings from the Torah were accompanied by readings from the Prophets” in the synagogue context (Levine, 142, referring to Luke 4:16-21 and Acts 13:14ff.).

28 N. T. Wright, NTPG, 233.

29 Most evidence for the use of specific Psalms comes from what is known of the cultic practices of the Temple. Despite the fact that Terrien and others refer to the Psalter as “the hymn book of the second temple” (and even of the synagogue, cf. Terrien, 60), there is direct evidence for use of only a few individual Psalms.

30 According to K. H. Jobes and M. Silva, “since the New Testament authors were writing in Greek, they would naturally quote, allude to, and otherwise use the Greek version of the Hebrew Bible” (Invitation to the Septuagint [Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000], 23). Ahearne-Kroll makes the excellent point that an ancient native reader of Greek would have analyzed the Greek text of the OT in its own right rather than reading it through the lens of its MT counterpart (84). Jobes and Silva argue that “the current consensus among Septuagint scholars, with few exceptions, is that only one ‘original’ Greek translation was made of each book prior to the Christian era, and that whatever differences are found between surviving texts of the same book reflect a revision of the Greek” (45-46). For the Psalms, J. Eaton believes the LXX translation was “completed by about 200 BCE” (The Psalms: A Historical and Spiritual Commentary with an Introduction and New Translation [London: T&T Clark, 2003], 43). At the other end of the spectrum, D. M. Hay believes “scholars increasingly emphasize the fact that there was no single unified Greek translation of the Jewish scriptures in the pre-Christian era” (Glory at the Right Hand: Psalm 110 in Early Christianity [1973; repr., Atlanta: SBL, 1989], 2119). In either case, today we have multiple texts. In referring to “LXX,” “the Greek text” or, for the Hebrew, “MT,” we do not intend to imply there is only one such document.
CHAPTER 7

PSALM 115:1a LXX AS QUOTED IN 2 CORINTHIANS 4:13

In this chapter, we use our action model to study Paul’s use of Psalm 115:1a in 2 Corinthians 4:13. Although this is a “small” quotation—the only NT quotation from Psalm 115—it has been the subject of quite varied discussion. On the one hand, some scholars charge that, using our terminology, Paul reads as an Independent but presents his reading as Envisaging. According to C. K. Barrett, “Paul pays no heed to the context, but picks out the two significant words.” From another perspective, Jan Lambrecht posits that “since in the psalm the ‘speaking out’ addresses God it is rather unlikely that Paul, who changes that speaking into preaching to people, intends to refer to the broader context of that psalm (situation of need).” Stanley incorporates elements of both arguments into his forceful criticism of Paul’s handling of this quotation: “The sense in which he uses the verse is so far removed from the original context as to raise questions about Paul’s reliability as an interpreter. … In a context in which Paul’s motives were already under a cloud, this kind of observation would have given ammunition to those who argued that Paul could not be trusted.”

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1 Since 2 Corinthians is an undisputed Pauline letter, we refer to its author as “Paul.” Whether it was originally one or several letters does not affect our argument since scholars generally agree 1:1-7:4 was a single letter. For the argument that the letter was a unity from its inception, see P. E. Hughes, Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians: The English Text with Introduction, Exposition and Notes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), xxx; P. Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 16-26, 40; B. Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995), 333; and M. J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2005), xiii. Those who agree with D. M. Hay that 2 Corinthians is “a combination of Pauline letter fragments” (“The Shaping of Theology in 2 Corinthians: Convictions, Doubts, and Warrants,” in Hay, 139) include C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 9; V. P. Furnish, II Corinthians: Translated with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 35; J. Murphy-O’Connor, The Theology of the Second Letter to the Corinthians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10; and Becker (66). F. Watson’s argument that 2 Cor 1-9 was written after 2 Cor 10-13 (Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 150-151) might affect the mutual context of what are now the earlier chapters, but we are not able to explore that here.

2 All psalm references in this chapter are to the LXX unless otherwise noted.

3 Some scholars find an allusion to Ps 115:2 in Rom 3:4a. (See, for example, Hanson, Studies, 17 and Hays, Echoes, 204n33). There also may be an echo of Ps 116:3 MT in Acts 2:24.


5 J. Lambrecht, Second Corinthians (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 74.

6 Stanley, Arguing, 100-101; see also 100n7 and n8. He finds this to be an instance in which Paul “quotes verses in such a way that their relation to the source text would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a knowledgeable reader to figure out” (56n46). In a later work, Stanley repeats much of his argument verbatim but softens this criticism: “An audience that was familiar with the psalm might well have been disturbed by the discrepancy between the original sense of the words that Paul cites and
At the other end of the spectrum, Hays, Thomas Stegman, Kenneth Schenck and Douglas Campbell all have taken hold of A. T. Hanson’s notion that in 2 Corinthians 4:13, Paul reads Psalm 115:1 messianically. The first to do so was Hays, who calls this “christological ventriloquism.” For him, the passage “is greatly clarified if we see in it another instance of Christ as the praying voice in the psalm quotation.”

In addressing these varied Pauline readings, our first step is to determine what it would mean to read Psalm 115:1a or an interpretation thereof as an Envisager. Following this, we identify what audience transformation Paul encourages by evoking this OT Story-line and assess whether Paul reads this OT text as an Envisager.

Psalm 115 LXX [116:10-19 MT]

Although “in the standard ‘LXX’ text, the verse that Paul quotes is the first verse in a new psalm (Ps 115:1) rather than the midpoint as in the Hebrew (Ps 116:10),” both Psalms 116 MT and 115 LXX are Psalms of Individual Thanksgiving. They contain: (i) praise of Yahweh for Yahweh’s glorious attributes or acts of deliverance, (ii) a description of the distress experienced by Yahweh’s people and how they called upon Yahweh, (iii) a profession of trust in Yahweh or a testimony that Yahweh has responded, and (iv) an expression of thanksgiving and/or a promise to praise Yahweh.

In their OT setting, the SAs later quoted describe the psalmist’s distress and also tell us about the lifeworld/worldview of the psalmist, most notably, that the psalmist

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1 C. H. Bullock, Ps 116 MT is one of only three psalms categorized as a psalm of individual thanksgiving by Gunkel, Mowinckel, Westermann and Kraus (Encountering the Book of Psalms: A Literary and Theological Introduction [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001], 154).
2 See Wendland, Analyzing, 38-40, 58, 60.

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professes faith in Yahweh. The SAC includes an acknowledgement of the help Yahweh provided and is followed by a vow to give praise and offer thanks.

The Locution

Although there are some locutionary issues surrounding the relationship of the MT and LXX texts, since Paul quotes the LXX, we use that text to evaluate the illocution and perlocution of the source text. There are five SAs in this SAC, vv 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 and 3. For convenience, the LXX and NETS of this SAC are presented in Appendix B §1.

The Illocution

The first four SAs are Assertives. As δὲ in v 1c makes plain, they describe a series of events: believing (v 1a), then speaking (v 1b), followed by affliction (v 1c), and, finally,

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13 We discuss lifeworld/worldview and Story in greater detail below.
14 According to Skehan, Ulrich, and Flint (140), only a few letters of Ps 116:10 MT were found at Qumran (4Q96=4QPs, contains the first two letters and perhaps the last of the first word “I believe” as well as the first letter of the third word “I spoke”). Therefore, the LXX may translate a non-MT Hebrew text. If the LXX does translate the MT, two translation decisions in Ps 115:1 often result in different English renderings of the MT and LXX. This has led to comments such as: “The meaning of the Hebrew is problematic … but it is certainly not given correctly in the LXX” (Furnish, 258; cf. M. D. Hooker, “Interchange and Suffering,” in Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament. Studies Presented to G. M. Styer by the Cambridge New Testament Seminar, ed. W. Horbury and B. McNeil [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 78n11). Because this can lead to the charge that Paul chose the LXX in order to manipulate his audience, we briefly examine these possible translation decisions. The first is the translation of כִּי, the conjunction connecting vv 1a and 1b MT. Of the three common English lexical meanings for כִּי (BDB, s.v. “כִּי”) “when” (including with concessive force, “even when”) is the most common English translation of this verse. However, the LXX Psalter renders כִּי here—and only in this verse, according to L. Allen (152 note 10.c)—with the Greek διό, an “inferential conjunction” with a lexical meaning of “therefore” or “for this reason” (BDAG, s.v. “διό”). NETS gives “and so” for διό in Ps 115:1, which also is inferential.

Often this is seen as a discrepancy between the MT and LXX. But, according to B. K. Waltke and M. P. O’Connor, “a result clause can be introduced by כִּי” (An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990], 639). This correlates with an option BDB gives for כִּי as “that”; “expressing consecution.” “With the result that” gives a coherent rendering of Ps 116:10 MT and approaches the lexical meaning of “therefore” or “so” (i.e., διό). J.-H. Kraus believes that כִּי is correctly rendered with διό in Gk (Psalms 60-150: A Commentary, trans. H. C. Oswald [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989], 387). Several modern English translations do give an inferential meaning for כִּי here. NKJV and NIV render כִּי as “therefore”, NLT and NCV give “so.”

The second decision is the addition in Ps 115:1 of the conjunction δὲ prior to ἐπειδὴ. This does not correspond to a word in the MT and may have been added for clarity. It makes it impossible to read the third clause of the LXX verse as the content of the “speaking,” which is the translation decision of all the English versions listed above except NETS. We discuss this further below.

15 As a self-identified “Hebrew of Hebrews; in regard to the law, a Pharisee” (Phil 3:5 NIV), a pupil of the Pharisee Gamaliel (Acts 22:3-4), a member of the Sanhedrin and a teacher of the law (Acts 5:34), Paul would have known the Hebrew. Presumably he quotes the LXX because his Greek-speaking audience knew that translation. For this, see Binder, who finds that one of the few differences “in the reading practices of the diaspora synagogues … was the use of the Septuagint for the sacred scriptures” (402, with reference to E. Tov, “The Septuagint,” in Mikra: Text, Translation, Reading and Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, ed. M. J. Mulder, vol. 1 of The Literature of the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Talmud [Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988]).

16 Since these Assertives recount an event, they are Retrodictives (see Bach and Harnish, 44).
complaint—presumably about those causing the affliction (v 2). The final SA is a Commisive, set against the background of an unstated but assumed event, i.e., that Yahweh has delivered the psalmist (cf. v 7).

Verse 1a signals that this SAC serves as a Profession of Trust. The content of the psalmist’s “belief” (ἐπίστευσα, v 1a) is debated. Pierre Auffret construes v 1c as describing “I” (“qui étais trop humilié”) and considers that v 2 presents the content of the psalmist’s belief, i.e., “le caractère trompeur de l’homme.” But the presence of δέ in v 1c causes his argument to fail for the LXX. John Eaton considers the psalmist “believed that I should perish” based on the Hebrew verb having “not the usual sense ‘speak’, but (as in the Arabic counterpart) ‘be carried away, pass away, die.’” This also seems unlikely.

Others consider the psalmist’s “belief” to be trust that Yahweh would rescue or had rescued him. However, for the psalmist to be “speaking” of his deliverance is inconsistent with the LXX text. The presence of δέ in v 1c means both the psalmist’s troubles and Yahweh’s saving action result from (or at least follow) his speaking, which in turn is preceded by his belief/trust.

Since a Profession of Trust can concern who God is, it is more likely that Yahweh or Yahweh’s character is the object of the psalmist’s belief. For the implication

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18 Eaton, 399, where he adds that those around the psalmist are “earthly helpers” who “fail.”
19 Ibid., 400.
20 Cf. L. Allen, 155-156. Goldingay considers that the psalmist’s trust in Yahweh comes because “there was nowhere else to turn” (Psalms 90-150, 343). For T. D. Stegman, the “story” of Pss 114-115 suggests both that “the psalmist trusted in God to rescue him; and second, he has been faithful to God” so that ἐπίστευσα is used “in the sense of being faithful to doing God’s will and trusting in God to vindicate him” (“Επίστευσα, διὸ ἐλάλησα [2 Corinthians 4:13]: Paul’s Christological Reading of Psalm 115:1a LXX,” CBQ 69, no. 4 [October 2007]: 732, 733). Although the former seems possible (cf. n24 below), the latter is unlikely, and the combination of the two is overly complicated.
21 Barnett’s position is that the psalmist “believed” God had delivered him from death and therefore he “spoke” of it (241). According to R. J. Clifford, “people entrusted themselves to a particular deity on the basis of the deity’s ability to save them” and in Ps 116 MT “Yahweh, the Savior of Israel, has proved to be a saving God” (Psalms 73-150 [Nashville: Abingdon, 2003], 198).
22 We are given no information in Ps 115 as to what has prompted the psalmist’s belief in Yahweh. According to J. E. Goldingay, psalms are not tied to a socio-historical context but rather are designed to be used “as the vehicles for praise and prayer throughout the story of God’s people” (Psalms 1-41, vol. 1 of Psalms [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 25). Similarly, J. A. Grant believes the “the ahistoricity of the psalms” means “they are designed to be appropriated in the way that is most relevant to the community of believers in their setting” (“Interpreting the Psalms,” in Firth and Johnston, 112). Commonly in Psalms of Thanksgiving, the psalmist’s purpose is not “to relate what happened to him, but to testify what God has done for him” (Westermann, 109). Ps 116 MT is “more indefinite than usual” and “was deliberately framed indefinitely to cover more than one occasion for thanksgiving” (L. Allen, 153).
23 See Wendland (Analyzing, 33, 45) for a brief description of a Profession of Trust.
of v 1 to be “I believed/put my faith [in Yahweh], therefore I spoke” is more probable than “I believed [that Yahweh would rescue/had rescued me] therefore I spoke.”

The result of the psalmist’s faith was speaking (ἐλάλησα, v 1b). Since the implied content of what was “spoken” relates to the “belief” of v 1a, presumably the psalmist spoke of his faith or of Yahweh, the object of his faith. There is no basis in the LXX text for considering that the “speaking” was directed towards Yahweh since the result of speaking was the psalmist’s affliction. Thus, Stanley’s notion that the psalmist was “‘humbled’ by God” is not a valid understanding of the Greek text. The almost certain implication of v 3 is that Yahweh is the psalmist’s rescuer and not the source of his difficulty.

As to the tellability of these Assertives, the first Assertive is foundational to the discourse. Absent the faith/belief of the psalmist there would be nothing to relate; this Assertive motivates the subsequent sequence of events. As the opening phrase and the foundational thought of the psalm, the faith/belief of the psalmist is both structurally and naturally prominent. Because the second Assertive (v 1b) gives the result of the psalmist’s belief, it also has natural prominence. Thus, the first two Assertives are both tellable. Whether or not the psalmist’s speaking was considered normal, it may have been unusual for the psalmist to have been brought low or afflicted (ἐταπεινώθην σφόδρα, v 1c) by those who heard him. Even if this negative result was not unexpected, it certainly was unwelcome. This explains the tellability of the third Assertive (v 1c).

The final Assertive, v 2, describes the consequences of the situation in v 1c. Here it is clear the psalmist’s alarm (τῇ ἐκστάσει ἡου) is caused by humans since the

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24 N. T. Wright finds that the “point” of Ps 116:10 MT is “a statement of ‘faith’” and considers that the best translation of that verse in 2 Cor 4:13 may be “I kept faith, and so I spoke” (“Faith, Virtue, Justification, and the Journey to Freedom,” in Wagner, Rowe, and Grieb, 485). However, Wright does not consider the LXX text, and his suggestion seems to require that Pss 114 and 115 LXX be read together. But other than an implication that the psalmist’s faith has already weathered some trials, this alternative is not too different from what we propose here unless “keeping” faith is equated with obeying rules.

25 There is no reason to consider the “speaking” (v 1b) to have the same audience as the “saying” (v 2). Not only is this a chain of events in the Greek text but the Greek verbs are different.

26 Stanley, Arguing, 100; emphasis added. Although he is correct that v 1c is a “statement of what transpired after the ‘speaking’” (“and I was greatly humbled”), it does not follow that God humbled him (100n5). As Abasciano puts it, “The psalmist’s words are not a complaint for which God humbled him as Stanley claims. Quite to the contrary, they are an expression of faith in God despite suffering and opposition contained in a psalm of thanksgiving which does indeed breathe a spirit of praise and joy. … The fact that the psalmist grounds (δίο) his speech on faith ensures that he is not suffering God’s judgment for what he says. … This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the psalm goes on to thank and praise the Lord for deliverance, presumably from the affliction of his lying enemies and in response to his faith-filled prayer making known his wretched state” (174). Stanley’s later attempt (see “Paul’s ‘Use,’” 147) to rebut Abasciano’s argument is unconvincing.

27 Auffret agrees that “Yahvé a sorti son fidèle” (390).
psalmist voices the complaint that πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης. If the psalmist’s alarm stems from his being brought low (v 1c), the persons about whom he complains are most likely the perpetrators of his affliction.\(^{28}\) The complaint is part of the “description of distress” common to a Thanksgiving psalm. Yahweh must be its audience, since v 3 is logically understood against the background of Yahweh’s rescue (made explicit in v 7).

Although the interrogative form is somewhat unusual, v 3 is a Commissive.\(^{29}\) Yahweh’s salvific action has produced a thankful spirit in the psalmist, and the psalmist is pondering how to best express his thanksgiving. Verse 3 thus both includes “a testimony that God has indeed helped and delivered”\(^{30}\) and looks forward to the following SAC, which has the function of a vow to give praise.\(^{31}\)

This understanding of the function of the SAs of this SAC helps identify the implied author and audience. As to the implied author, faith in Yahweh led to or even impelled speech (v 1a-b). The implied author was not angry with Yahweh for not having prevented the serious negative consequences which resulted from this speaking. Nor did he lose faith in Yahweh’s providence. Rather than retaliating against his persecutors, he complained to Yahweh about those who were spreading malicious lies about him (v 2), and, ultimately, his hopes of rescue were realized. In response, the implied author expresses an attitude of thanksgiving (v 3) rather than entitlement. The implied author calls on Yahweh’s name (v 4) and gives or promises Yahweh thanks, praise and sacrifice, as well as eternal devotion (vv 7-10).

We infer the identity of the implied audience from both the construction of the implied author and other elements of the text and co-text. For the majority of the Psalm, including this SAC, the psalmist directly addresses a human audience. As the implied audience, these direct addressees understand what the psalmist has done and that these actions are appropriate for followers of Yahweh.

\(^{28}\) Since the psalmist complains that lies are being told about him, his affliction may have included the humiliation of slander. It is also likely he experienced physical suffering since he speaks of death in v 6. This combination dovetails with T. Booij’s evaluation of “the experience denoted by ‘nh’ as ‘often, perhaps always, the suffering from hard, oppressive, threatening or humiliating treatment’ (“Psalm 116,10–11: The Account of an Inner Crisis,” Bib 76, no. 3 [1995]: 390).

\(^{29}\) This is a non-rhetorical question. Whether this Commissive is a Promise or an Offer is not critical, although we favor the latter (see Bach and Harnish, 50-51).

\(^{30}\) W. S. Prinsloo makes a semantic argument that Ps 116:12 MT [115:3 LXX] should be taken as part of the next SAC, the vow of praise (“Psalm 116: Disconnected Text or Symmetrical Whole?” Bib 74, no. 1 [1993]: 80). Although Ps 115:3 is a bridge to the vow of praise, we include it in the first SAC since it includes the testimony of God’s response to the distress.
The knowledge assumed in the co-text adds information about the implied audience. They understand what “a cup of salvation” (v 4) and “a sacrifice of praise” (v 8) are as well as the importance of fulfilling one’s vows (v 9). They know who the Lord’s people are (v 9) and where “the courts of the house of the Lord” are located (v 10). In the closing verses of the Psalm, “before all his people” and “the courts of the Lord” are equated to “your midst, O Ierousalem” [NETS; emphasis added]. Taken together, the implied audience is seen to be a group of faithful Yahweh-followers united in fellowship with the implied author.32

By definition, the implied audience responds with the desired illocutionary effect of understanding. For empirical hearers/readers to read at the Analyst level, they must understand the implied author’s illocutionary act in the way the implied audience would. So to read this SAC as an Analyst, an empirical reader would understand that Yahweh’s followers are those who believe in and trust Yahweh and are willing to speak of their faith even if the consequences are unpleasant. The Analyst also understands that the faithful believe Yahweh will rescue them from their distress and that the appropriate response in those circumstances is to thank and praise Yahweh.33

To determine the Envisaging reading, we evaluate the perlocution of this SAC.

The Perlocution

The Envisaging reader enacts an appropriate perlocutionary response. The associated perlocution of an Assertive is “that H believe that P” and that of a Commissive is “that H believe S intends to fulfil his obligation to do A.”34

As regards the Assertives in this SAC, “believing that P” is more than the Envisaging reader agreeing that the psalmist’s account of the situation is factual. For the Assertives in Psalm 115:1-3, successful perlocution requires the reader to live into a lifeworld in which: (i) faith leads to or motivates speaking of one’s faith, (ii) one acknowledges that Yahweh’s lordship and preservation does not mean protection from affliction, including affliction resulting from the proclamation of faith, and (iii) one knows that Yahweh ultimately rescues and preserves Yahweh’s people.

32 The implied audience does not necessarily (and in some cases cannot) possess the exact characteristics of the original empirical audience, who were Jews in the Temple grounds in Jerusalem.
33 If we define prayer as speech addressed to God, this SAC is not a prayer, per se. “In Ps 116 … God is as much the one spoken about as the one spoken to. What this tells us is that thanksgiving and praise are features of Christian worship that are to be heard by God but especially by others” (P. D. Miller, The Way of the Lord: Essays in Old Testament Theology [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007], 212).
34 Bach and Harnish, 81.
For the Commissive, an Envisager recognizes the psalmist is obligated to “return” (ἀνταποδώσω, v 3a) something to Yahweh since Yahweh has “returned” (ἀνταπέδωκεν, v 3b) something to him and lives into the lifeworld where this is true. Potentially relevant here is Ἀλληλουία (“Praise Yahweh”) at the beginning of the Psalm. If this is a genuine request (Directive), its desired perlocutionary response would be that listeners join in worship of Yahweh. This gives a communal aspect to the requirement to give praise and thanksgiving to Yahweh for both the deliverance of the psalmist and the relationship Yahweh has initiated and maintains with Yahweh’s people. In the following SAC, the psalmist determines that to “take a cup of salvation and call on the name of the Lord,” to “sacrifice to you a sacrifice of praise,” and to “pay … vows to the Lord before all his people” satisfies the obligation of the Commissive. Thus, the recital of the psalm may not only describe the vow but may also fulfill it.

To identify the intended transformation, we recall our description of the implied audience as faithful Yahweh-followers. The Psalm appears to be a realignment of that audience’s understanding of Yahweh and the relationship they are to have with Yahweh, either by reaffirming beliefs under attack from some source or restoring a belief system which has deteriorated. This may also be subversion if the audience did not previously realize the causal connection between belief and speech or if they expected Yahweh to prevent any difficulties resulting from faith-driven speaking. The transformation of the Envisager’s belief system—and the actions that flow from it—is linked to Story, lifeworld and theology.

The Contribution of Psalm 115:1-3 to Story, Lifeworld and Theology

Psalm 115:1-3 speaks to the basic theological question of how Yahweh’s people are to relate to their god. The SAs later quoted contribute to Story the information that the

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35 The use of ἀνταπέδωκεν in v 3b raises the question of how rescue by Yahweh is a “return.” (This is not a translation issue since the Hebrew root הֵב can have the sense of “recompense” [BDB s.v., “גמל”; cf. Ps 18:21 MT]). The answer is found in the mutuality of the psalmist’s relationship with Yahweh; for both parties to have privileges and responsibilities helps make sense of the otherwise puzzling v. 6.

36 This transliterates the Hebrew imperative הַלְלוּ־יָהָה.

37 The ending of Ps 116 MT “s’impose d’en rendre grâces dans ce peuple qui est celui de l’Alliance, et d’en appeler en conséquence au Nom de Yahvé non plus seulement dans le cadre d’une détresse individuelle, mais dans ce contexte où le peuple élu peut exprimer cette Alliance dont il est l’un des partenaires” (Auffret, 394).

38 Contra M. J. Dahood’s understanding that the “whole trend” of the psalm is that “the Psalmist, placed in extreme danger and abandoned by men, did not despair, but relying on the divine promises, he pleaded for help from God and was saved” (“Two Pauline Quotations from the Old Testament,” CBQ 17, no. 1 [January 1955]: 23), the psalm’s movement is toward the response of thanksgiving and praise.
psalmist’s speaking to others of Yahweh or of faith in Yahweh was a natural result of belief and that Yahweh does not prevent trouble from occurring in the life of the faithful even under these circumstances. Further, even in a situation of distress, the believer is not to take matters into his/her own hands but to turn to Yahweh for help. Yahweh hears and responds to the complaints of the faithful and is the ultimate source of protection and rescue. The appropriate response to Yahweh’s saving acts is an attitude of thanksgiving and the offering of praise.

Understanding the contribution of this SAC to Story leads to quite profound conclusions about the relationship Yahweh’s people are to have with Yahweh and with others. The lifeworld and worldview of the Envisager incorporate these Story-lines—an Envisager agrees that the psalmist has behaved appropriately and lives his or her own relationship with Yahweh and in the world according to these precepts.

_Intervening Interpretation_

Psalm 115 has no obvious link to the narrative of Scripture. It is not a historical psalm; it makes no reference to any specific incident and has no superscription. Most do not consider it a royal psalm. However, Psalm 116 MT [Pss 114-115 LXX] is part of the Egyptian Hallel, which was sung in the Temple and probably elsewhere during Passover and perhaps also for other cultic occasions. Because Passover was “associated with Israel’s national liberation from bondage in Egypt,” the Hallel psalms may have been “linked with the hope of a future eschatological liberation and the coming of a new king.” But there is no explicit evidence for this with regard to Psalm 115 LXX and there is no indication that the psalm played any core role in NT theology.

We next evaluate the SAC which includes Paul’s quotation of Psalm 115:1a.

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40 During the first century, the Hallel was sung in the Temple while the Passover lambs were sacrificed (see Maher, 14; E. Sanders, 135; Smith, 9). Per McKinnon, it “was sung in the Temple on about eighteen days of the year: the eve of Passover, possibly the first day of Weeks, the eight days of Tabernacles and probably the eight days of Hanukkah” (164).


While Moses is referred to several times in 2 Cor 3 and the letter as a whole contains a Story-line of rescue/redemption from suffering, a link to the Exodus in 2 Cor 4:12 is very faint. In any case, unlike the psalmist, Moses’ suffering did not result from his speaking; rather, the initial suffering of the Israelites was the cause of Moses’ speaking and their later suffering followed their disobedience.
The Quotation of Psalm 115:1a in 2 Corinthians 4:13

Stanley directs some of his harshest criticism of Paul at this verbatim quotation from Psalm 115: “To an informed audience, the discrepancy of the original sense of the words and the way Paul used them in his argument would have been jarring.” Further, “the freedom with which he manipulates the biblical text to support his positions might have induced a person with a deeper knowledge of Scripture (the ‘informed audience’) to challenge or reject some of the arguments in which his quotations were embedded. … Fortunately for Paul, it appears that few people in his churches fit this description.”

Barrett and Lambrecht also argue that with this quotation Paul is, in our terminology, acting as an Independent reader rather than an Envisager. In contrast, some scholars believe Paul read this psalm messianically, i.e., that Paul took the words of the psalm as the words of Jesus. Thus, this quotation makes a good case study of our methodology.

To begin to evaluate these arguments, we assess the degree of familiarity the original empirical audience might have had with Psalm 115.

Would the Corinthian Church Have Known Psalm 115 LXX?

Some members of the Corinthian church were no doubt very familiar with the Jewish Scriptures. A devout, well-educated and prominent Jew like Crispus, the former synagogue leader (Acts 18:8, 1 Cor 1:14), would have worshipped in the Jerusalem Temple—perhaps regularly. Since it is likely that the Egyptian Hallel (Pss 113-118 MT [111-117 LXX]) was used in Temple worship at the time 2 Corinthians was written, Crispus most likely knew those Psalms. Other Diaspora Jews and even God-fearers, like Titius Justus (Acts 18:7) and Stephanas (1 Cor 16:15), probably knew the Hallel since some scholars believe it was recited in the Diaspora synagogues on a variety of festival days and during the Seder. Thus, Paul could have expected those in the

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42 All Scripture references from this point on are to 2 Corinthians unless otherwise noted.
43 Stanley, Arguing, 100.
44 Ibid., 178.
45 According to R. Martin, “2 Corinthians (at least chaps. 1–9), [was] written in the autumn of A.D. 55 or, less likely, 56, and the last four chapters a short while later” (xxxv).
46 See n40.
47 If Titius Justus is the person later referred to as “Gaius” (Rom 16:23; 1 Cor 1:14), as some argue (e.g., Barnett, 5), he remained an important part of the Corinthian church.
48 See chapter 6 concerning the use of the Psalms in intertestamental and first-century domestic devotional practices and possibly in at least the Diaspora synagogues. For some thoughts about the domestic singing of the Hallel during the Passover/Seder meal, see Smith (9-10) and Maher (14, 26). As to synagogal use, L. I. Rabinowitz, who believes the Psalms were used very little in the synagogue as late as the Talmudic period (ca. 70–500 CE), finds evidence for the recitation of the Hallel “on 18 days of the year in Palestine, and on 21 days in the Diaspora, viz., the first day(s) of Passover, Pentecost, every day
Corinthian church with synagogue ties to have known Psalm 115. Further, because the first-century churches read and studied Scripture corporately (cf. 1 Cor 14:26, Eph 5:19, Col 3:15), those in the Corinthian church without a synagogue background would have learned from those who did. Rather than trying to bypass those who had prior knowledge of the Jewish Scriptures, Paul encourages the Corinthians to submit to Stephanas’ leadership (1 Cor 16:16). Given the importance of the Hallel in Jewish worship and the way first-century churches read Scripture, if there is any OT Scripture with which Paul could have expected his entire Corinthian audience to have been familiar, it would have been a passage from a Hallel psalm like Psalm 115:1.

Knowledge of Psalm 115 appears to be an element of the mutual context of Paul and his empirical audience; this helps us identify the implied author and implied audience. We begin our analysis of the illocution of the SAC containing the quotation by taking a closer look at what else we learn about the implied author and audience from this letter—especially the segments prior to and within this SAC—as well as from a previous letter, 1 Corinthians, the contents of which would have been part of the mutual context of Paul and the original recipients of this letter.

The Implied Author and Audience

From 1 Corinthians, we learn the implied author of the Corinthian correspondence was called to be “an apostle of Christ Jesus by the will of God” (1 Cor 1:1). However, he is “the least of the apostles, unfit to be called an apostle,” because he “persecuted the church of God” (1 Cor 15:9). But by God’s grace, his life has been redirected (cf. 1 Cor 15:10) and now his calling is to preach the gospel (1 Cor 2:4-5; cf. 1 Cor 15:11), a task set him by God and Jesus Christ (1 Cor 1:17; cf. 1 Cor 3:5). This call is not based on his superior speaking abilities; he is not an eloquent or confident speaker (1 Cor 2:5).

Rather, he speaks “in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit” (1 Cor 2:12-13; cf. 1 Cor 1:17, 25-30; 2:1; 3:18-21, etc.).

In the present letter, the implied author is presented as a follower of Jesus “Christ/Messiah” (1:1, 2, 3, 5), who is also named “Lord” (1:2, 3) and “Son of God”

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49 See Abasciano, 156-169. Of the NT references to speaking/singing psalms listed in chapter 6, half have a corporate dimension.

50 On a first reading, the empirical audience would only have learned about the implied author and implied reader from what had been already presented in the letter. However, we assume multiple readings, and so we reference the remainder of the letter in some cases.

51 This is repeated verbatim in the opening verse of 2 Corinthians.
(1:19). Jesus is the climactic fulfillment of the promises of the faithful God (1:18-20). Among Paul’s “working assumptions” are that “he everywhere presupposes that God exists and acts (or has acted) in a decisive and reconciling way in Jesus, especially through his death (5:14-15, 18, 21)” and resurrection.52

The hardships Paul experienced in his ministry were so severe that “we felt that we had received the sentence of death” (1:9). In those situations, his reliance on God for strength and consolation and his trust in God for deliverance were justified (cf. 1:3-5, 8-10). He remains confident that God “will continue to rescue us” (1:10; cf. 2:14, 5:5-8).

Paul’s planned visit to Corinth (1 Cor 16:7) was painful (2:1). A subsequent visit (1:15-16) has not materialized (1:23). This “broken promise” plus the painful visit and a painful letter (2:4), along with divisions within the Corinthian church (cf. 1 Cor 1:10-11, 3:3, 11:18) and church discipline problems, have strained Paul’s relationship with the Corinthian believers and caused him emotional pain and anguish (cf. 2:4).53 Paul’s detractors54 accuse him of vacillating when he fails to make another visit (1:15-18, 23) and also of being self-aggrandizing (1:24, 3:1) and inappropriate in his handling of God’s message (2:17). In particular, since the Corinthian value system “perceived suffering and weakness as signs of failure,”55 Paul’s suffering, affliction and near-death experience (1:4-9, 4:7-11; cf. 1 Cor 4:9-17) have raised questions about his ministry and his status as an apostle.56

In addressing these pressing questions, Paul’s implied audience is not his opponents but rather the Christians in Corinth and Achaia (1:1) who are tempted to fall away from the message Paul has brought them, believing instead those who are

52 Hay, “Shaping,” 140. For others of Paul’s “working assumptions,” see Ibid., 140-141.

53 The relationships among the Corinthians also are strained (cf. 1 Cor 1:10-11, 2 Cor 2:7-8).

54 The identity of Paul’s “enemies” is debated. Furnish summarizes the three major viewpoints (48-54) and concludes they “were of Jewish background” and probably “Christian missionaries” (53). Similar conclusions are reached by M. E. Thrall, Introduction and Commentary on II Corinthians I-VII, vol. 1 of A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994); and Harris, 71. However, D. Georgi’s argument that “the adversaries in 1 Cor. were Gnostics, and those of 2 Cor. were shaped by Hellenistic-Jewish Apologetics” (The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986], 317) outruns the available evidence, as does Murphy-O’Connor’s position that the opponents are “Corinthianized” Judaizers (see Theology, 12-15). In any event, our concern is the charges against which Paul defends himself and the reasons that he does so rather than the identity or belief system of his opponents.

55 Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 316. “Paul tries to demonstrate that such experiences are inherent to life in Christ under the contextual circumstances of life under Roman rule” (Ibid.)

56 “Paul’s sufferings reveal him to be anything but ‘glorious’; therefore, his theology of ‘fulfillment’ must be questioned. Paul is the living denial of what he preaches” (Barnett, 37; cf. Hay, “Shaping,” 146; and Furnish, 277). Paul’s defense of his apostleship “deals with two issues: the relationship between suffering and ministry, and the prospect of death” (Murphy-O’Connor, Theology, 44; cf. Furnish, 277).
“peddlers [καπηλεύοντες] of God’s word” (2:17). Despite the fact that, in general, the Corinthian Christians are neither well-educated nor of high social status (cf. 1 Cor 1:26), they have become arrogant, thinking they know more than they do (1 Cor 4:18-19, 14:36), placing themselves above others (1 Cor 11:20-22, 14:26), excusing sinful behavior (1 Cor 5:1-2) and even flirting with (or more!) the worship of other gods (1 Cor 10:14). Surrounded by inhabitants of a lifeworld that is “external, if not hostile, to the story,” the former pagans seem to have not broken completely with their past. Although Paul assumes “the Corinthian church is functioning and has a general sense of Christian purpose,” the Corinthians are progressing quite slowly in faith (1 Cor 3:1-2).

The implied audience remembers Paul’s behavior when he was with them as well as his previous preaching, both in person and through written or oral messages sent via ministry colleagues. They know that Paul has been given authority or power (ἐξουσία) by Jesus and in the gospel. That this is not dominating power but rather the power to transform can be seen in his reliance on persuasion (πείθομαι, 5:11) rather than on force or coercion. Paul uses his power to build up (οἰκοδομή, 10:8) the Corinthians rather than to tear them down (καθαίρεσις, 13:10) or for personal financial gain (11:7-9; 1 Cor 9:18). At its core, the relationship of the implied audience to Paul is based on mutual faith in God and in Jesus (cf. 1:24). Paul refers to God as our father (1:2) and the father of our Lord Jesus Christ (1:3). The Corinthians understand they participate in Paul’s experience (1:7) to their benefit (1:4-6, 2:10, 4:12; cf. 1 Cor 4:10). Paul is a sacrifice for them, “the aroma of Christ to God” (2:15).

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57 Murphy-O’Connor (Theology, 8) highlights the class distinctions found in 1 Cor 1:26-28.
58 J. Hartt, “Theological Investments in Story: Some Comments on Recent Developments and Some Proposals,” in Hauerwas and Jones, 291.
59 Hay, “Shaping,” 140. Witherington’s thought that “to call Paul’s apostleship into question would be for the Corinthians to call their own Christian existence into question” and that this is what calls for Paul’s response in 2 Corinthians (Conflict, 207) is another possibility.
60 The Corinthians recognize this since they have written to Paul for guidance (1 Cor 7:1).
61 “Paul is urging, cajoling, remonstrating, using every kind of rhetorical device, to get this community both to see things his way and to conform their behavior accordingly, that is, in keeping with the gospel” (G. D. Fee, “Toward a Theology of 1 Corinthians,” in Hay, 38). Paul may not have the power to excommunicate/restore since in 1 Cor 5:2 he calls on the Corinthians to remove an errant member and in 2 Cor 2:6-8 he urges them to restore a member. If Paul does have authority to compel these actions, it may be that he instead “wants them to respond voluntarily to his discourse” (Witherington, Conflict, 358).
62 Amador finds that “Paul is genuinely interested in building up the community, both through outreach and through practices that take into account the need to address those who are spiritually weak. … It is nowhere apparent that his appeals to community benefit and his use of the spiritually weak to curb the authority of the strong in the community are appeals for his sake or for the sake of his followers. They instead appear to be genuine concern for those in the community who are at the time of the writing the most (spiritually and/or socially) disadvantaged (8.10-13; 10.24-29; 11.22)” (232).
63 See H. H. Drake Williams, “The Psalms in 1 and 2 Corinthians,” in Moyise and Menken, 173.
On a literary level, the implied audience is able to “recognize all or many of his [Paul’s] references to … [the Jewish] scriptures (and perhaps to special exegetical traditions).” 64 Although David Hay believes Paul “assumes without argument that the Jewish scriptures have continuing authority for Christians,” 65 our position is instead that Paul assumes the OT Story frames the lifeworld and worldview of the Christians in Corinth, throughout Achaia (1:1b) and everywhere (1 Cor 1:2). The broad Story underlying the letter is the Story of Yahweh and the relationship of a Yahweh-follower to Yahweh, as the character both of Yahweh and of this relationship have been further revealed through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 66

Our next step is to evaluate which theological Story-lines are particularly relevant in the first speech event of this letter, 2 Corinthians 1:8-7:16. 67

The Theological Story-Lines of 2 Corinthians 1:8-7:16

In our model, a text’s theological Story-lines are revealed by determining which basic questions about Yahweh and humanity’s relationship to Yahweh the text answers. 68 In the first speech event of 2 Corinthians, the relevant theological questions include: who Yahweh is, how Yahweh relates to the world and how Yahweh’s people are to relate to Yahweh. Several interrelated theological Story-lines emerge from exploring these questions.

First, the side-by-side presentation of Jesus Christ and God in 5:20 demonstrates that “who Yahweh is” and “how Yahweh relates to the world” are now answerable only through the lens of Jesus Messiah, the “likeness of God” (4:4; cf. 4:6). Jesus is foundational to the speech or “preaching” of the implied author and his colleagues.

64 Hay, “Shaping,” 140. Those among the empirical audience who did not have this familiarity would have learned from those who did (see above).
65 Ibid.
66 As Hays notes, “The history of God’s dealings with Israel is always read by Paul retrospectively through the lens of God’s act of reconciling the world to himself through the death of Jesus Christ” (“Rebound,” 78). From the outset of the letter, it is Messiah Jesus who is both the content of Paul’s speaking (1:19, 2:12, 4:5) and the one who makes it possible (2:17). He is the one for whom Paul and his colleagues suffer (1:5, 4:10-11), through whom they are consoled (1:5) and have confidence (3:4), and in whom both they and the Corinthians stand firm (1:21). The emphasis on Jesus Christ continues past 4:13. It is “the judgment seat of Christ” before which believers all must appear (5:10), the “love of Christ” that “urges us on” (5:14), “for him” that believers live (5:15), “in Christ” that “there is a new creation” (5:17) and through Christ that believers are reconciled to God (5:18-19).
68 See chapter 4.
Paul proclaims “Jesus Christ as Lord” (4:5; cf. 1:3) and calls himself and his colleagues “ambassadors for Christ” (5:20a). The “ambassadors” speak not only about Jesus Christ but also in him; Jesus is both the content and the ground of their message, which is given by God in God’s power (cf. 2:17; 3:4-6; 4:1, 7; 12:19).

Paul’s ministry is to proclaim that message (cf. 2:17; 4:2; 5:20). He has “laid a foundation as an expert builder” (3:10), and Christians are to hold fast to the good news he proclaimed to them (15:1-11) and the teaching he passed on to them (11:2). Ultimately, Paul is confident that God will rescue (1:10; cf. 2:14, 5:5-8), that God’s promises, of which the gift of the Spirit is a “first installment” (1:20-22), will be fulfilled, and that God has granted a new covenant, through which the Spirit brings life (3:6). Since “it is by God’s mercy that we are engaged in this ministry,” God can be expected to provide what is necessary for its success; therefore, Paul and his colleagues “do not lose heart” (4:1). This phrase is repeated in 4:16, thus book-ending this subsection of the letter with Paul’s continued ministry resolve.

At this writing, Paul is weak and suffering (4:8-10). But his apparent “lack of glory” is not, as the Corinthians assume, evidence of a defective ministry. Rather, Paul’s suffering demonstrates his solidarity with the Savior and therefore, the rightness of his message (cf. 13:3-4). Paul’s weakness reveals divine power (1:9; 3:5; 4:7; 12:8).

In the co-text immediately preceding the quotation, Paul highlights the benefits to the Corinthians of the affliction and peril he and his colleagues have experienced (v 12).

For Paul, the message matters only as a vehicle for the message. His “defence … of the integrity of his personal character and apostleship” was “dictated not by self-interest but by the necessity for protecting the church God had founded through him from forces and doctrines which were essentially inimical to the gospel committed to

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69 The implied topic of Paul’s preaching is described as: “‘the word of God’ (2:17; 4:2), ‘the gospel’ (4:4), ‘Jesus Christ as Lord’ (4:5)” (Barnett, 241).
70 Mack notes that “whereas Paul had to argue for his authority as an apostle, he never argued for the authority of the kerygma” (98).
71 Paul received some of his teaching from Jesus (1 Cor 11:23) but does not indicate the source of all his teaching (see 1 Cor 15:3-11). For his teaching topics, see 1 Cor 5:1, 6:19-20, 7:19, 10:7-8. Paul interprets “these mortal adversities … as an integral and appropriate part of true apostleship (4:7-15)” (Furnish, 277). Further, his “endurance in the sufferings of ministry” marks him “as a genuine servant of Christ, whose own sufferings are now reproduced in the ministry of the one who represents him” (Barnett, 212; cf. Furnish, 285-286). However, it goes too far to say “there is a divine purpose for apostolic suffering, namely, that Paul might testify to God’s deliverance (1:11; 4:12-15)” (Barnett, 236) or “these adversities are for the ultimate purpose of the overflowing of ‘thanksgiving to the glory of God’” (S. J. Kraftchick, “Death in Us, Life in You: The Apostolic Medium,” in Hay, 171).
72 Paul suffers on behalf of the Corinthians so they, like him, might experience the “life, or deliverance, of Jesus” (Barnett, 227). In 5:21, Paul reminds them that “God made him who had no sin to be sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God” (NIV; emphasis added).
Paul and to the spiritual welfare of those whose lives, through response to that gospel, had been transformed and set free.” The goal of Paul’s ministry is “that those to whom he came might have the ‘life’ that Christ’s death made possible for them to have.” Paul defends himself and his ministry not to preserve his own reputation (cf. 1 Cor 4:3) but rather to remove any barriers that might keep the Corinthians from trusting his message and, through it, his Lord.

Using these identifications of the implied author and audience and of some major theological Story-lines of this letter section, we turn to a more detailed analysis of the quotation and its SAC. Our goal is first to determine what transformation of the lifeworld/worldview, theology and Story of the audience is intended by Paul’s quotation of Psalm 115:1, i.e., what it would mean for Paul’s readers to be Envisagers. From this, we can assess whether Paul himself reads the OT text as an Envisager.

The Illocution of the Quotation and its Speech-Act Complex

2 Corinthians 4:13 is part of a SAC which includes vv 14 and is composed of four Assertive illocutionary acts: (i) the quotation and its introduction (v 13a), (ii) καὶ ἡμεῖς πιστεύομεν (v 13b), (iii) διὸ καὶ λαλοῦμεν (v 13c), and (iv) the reason statement (v 14). For convenience, NA and the NSRV are presented in Appendix B§2. What is the tellability of these Assertives? The first Assertive includes the quotation from Psalm 115:1a. Since ἐπίστευσα, διὸ ἐλάλησα is a marked quotation and also the first explicit OT quotation in the letter, it has rhetorical prominence. Paul uses the quotation to equate the “spirit of faith” he and his ministry colleagues possess to

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74 Hughes, xvi-xvii. Barrett’s thought that “nothing appears more powerfully in 2 Corinthians than the strength of Paul’s vocation” (32) misses the mark slightly. Nothing appears more powerfully in the letter than the importance of Paul’s message. His ministry serves the message he is called to proclaim. 75 Barnett, 238.
76 As Hay notes, “a decision against Paul implies a rejection of the Jesus and the God whose ambassador Paul is” (“Shaping,” 141; cf. 135. Also see Barnett, 301, 311). Witherington adds that “to be alienated from the agent was to be alienated from the one who sent him” (Conflict, 328; cf. 396-397).
77 Stanley puts this in his “U+” category as a quotation in “full agreement with the standard printed edition of the author’s normal Vorlage, with no significant variations in either text” (Paul, 58; cf. 216; and Furnish, 258). We find no locutionary issues in 2 Cor 4:13.
78 Contra Barnett, who believes the “the unity of vv. 13-15 is indicated by the conjunctions” (239), we agree with Lambrecht that “a division of 4:7-15 into three (unequal) parts appears to be justified: vv. 7-12, 13-14, and 15” (Second Corinthians, 76). However, as the immediately following context, we consider v 15 in our analysis.
79 Verse 14 could be considered two SAs. But it simplifies the analysis to consider it as one, and nothing is lost by doing so.
80 Identifying the subcategory of these Assertives is not critical.
81 See, e.g., Furnish, 258.
82 Stegman asks: “Does πνεῦμα refer to a human quality or to the Spirit of God?” (732). Furnish convincingly argues that these are intertwined: “Paul means to identify the Spirit of faith he has
that of the psalmist, who also experienced suffering and came close to death. This is either a new way for Paul to describe faith or a reaffirmation of previous teaching.

From the next two Assertives we learn that because Paul and his colleagues have the same spirit of faith as the psalmist, they are impelled to speak as the psalmist did. The tellability of these Assertives lies in the way they present Paul and his colleagues as successors to the psalmist in belief and subsequent speech.

Although Ralph Martin feels that “the centerpiece is the assertion, πιστεύωμεν, ‘we believe’ (v 13),” it seems more plausible that the following SA, “and so we speak” is the core. Not only does this have natural prominence as an implication, result or consequence, it aligns with how the letter has developed thus far. All of Paul’s experiences—not only the ministry success evidenced in the faith of the Corinthian believers (3:2-3) but also the persecution Paul has endured (cf. 1:3-9; 4:8-12, 16-17) and the pain and grief he and the Corinthians have suffered due to difficulties in their relationship (2:1-4)—stem from Paul’s speaking the truth of the gospel, i.e., that Jesus Christ is Lord (4:5; cf. 4:2, 4:4).

The final Assertive, v 14, stands in a causal relationship to the core SA. This Assertive is tellable in part because in it, “Paul identifies the object of faith and thus the

experienced with the same one known to the psalmist from whom he proceeds to quote. … It is preferable … to read this as a reference to the (Holy) Spirit, in and with which faith comes, as in 1 Cor 12:9; Rom 8:14-16; Gal 3:2, 5, 14; 5:5; cf. 1 Cor 2:4-5; 1 Thess 1:5-7” (258; cf. 286). We do note that nowhere else in the NT is the Holy Spirit referred to as the “spirit of faith.” There are three later uses of “spirit” in the letter (7:1, 13; 11:4) which do not refer to the Holy Spirit.

Although Moyise is correct that “it is unlikely that they [the original recipients] would know the Hebrew text,” (Paul, 107), it seems quite likely that some (many?) of them would have understood Ps 115 against the backdrop of the psalmist’s suffering since that suffering is the subject of v 1c and his rescue is alluded to in vv 3 and 7. While Paul does not explicitly quote Ps 115:1c, it is clear throughout the letter that he has been “brought very low”; he uses ταπεινός in 7:6, 10:1, and 12:21. As Murphy-O’Connor points out, the “majority of commentators have seen that to auto pneuma tês pisteōs means that Paul identifies with the faith of the psalmist. This necessarily implies that he perceived the similarity of their situations because he was still thinking of his sufferings” (“Faith and Resurrection in 2 Cor 4:13-14,” RB 95, no. 4 [October 1988]: 547; cf. Furnish, 285).

Unlike Young and Ford (64), we do not assume Paul considers David to be the psalmist. In Rom 4:6 and 11:9, Paul attributes to David two sayings from psalms with Davideic superscriptions. But Paul makes no such attribution here in quoting from a psalm with no superscription.

 According to Dahood, “of the various interpretations of the Pauline intention in quoting these words from the Psalter (Ps 116,10), that which places a relationship of cause and effect between faith and preaching seems best to fit the context” (23; see also Kruse, 108; Thrall, 338). Even Barrett, who argues that Paul uses this quotation out of context, recognizes that “Paul thinks of faith that leads to speech” (142). This is not, however, as Clifford takes it, a situation of “faith authorizing one to instruct others” (200). Nor, contra Murphy-O’Connor, is it significant that Paul uses λαλέω in 4:13 rather than κηρύσσω as in 4:5. (Murphy-O’Connor believes Paul uses λαλέω not to refer to his preaching but to what he has just said in 4:7-12; see “Faith,” 547). Not only does Paul use λαλέω regarding his ministry in 1 Cor 2:6-7, 13 and 2 Cor 2:17, 12:19, since Paul is emphasizing the similarities between himself and the psalmist, it is important that he use the same verb as Ps 115:1.

83 R. Martin, 89.
84 See Furnish, 286.
ultimate source of apostolic boldness as the God who raised [the Lord] Jesus and will raise us also with Jesus.” Paul and his colleagues see their righteous suffering in the same light as the psalmist considered his righteous suffering—a negative consequence of faith-fueled speech from which the speaker is ultimately redeemed by Yahweh. Although Paul has already lauded Yahweh for his earthly deliverance (cf. 1:10), in 4:14 he adds a broader, eternal perspective. He returns to this in 4:17 where he compares “this slight momentary affliction” to “an eternal weight of glory beyond all measure.” That Paul and his colleagues will be raised with Jesus is a link to both the immediately preceding and succeeding co-text of this SAC, especially 4:8-11 and 4:16b-5:5, as well as to earlier passages, such as 1:8-10 and 2:16. Yahweh’s rescue or deliverance, of which the resurrection of believers is the ultimate, final and eternal example, is the reason for Paul’s hope (cf. 4:1 and 4:16).

The links in 2 Corinthians 4 to Psalm 115 extend beyond this SAC. The clearest and most relevant example is the immediately following co-text, v 15. There, Paul presents the overarching purpose of his ministry as the increase of thanksgiving to the glory of God. This ties back to 1:11, where many are to give thanks because God

88 Furnish, 286. Jesus’ resurrection was a core element of Paul’s preaching (cf. 1 Cor 15:4) and, according to Shaw, “the resurrection and vindication of Jesus is the pledge of Paul’s vindication and the Corinthians’ also, so that the origin of his authority is also the source of their hope. … We see here the way in which a quite tangential text was used by the early church to indicate that Jesus’ resurrection was indeed ‘according to the Scriptures’” (104-105). We agree with his argument without agreeing that this quotation is “tangential.”

89 Furnish highlights that “courage to speak out despite adversity” is the point both in the psalm and “in 2 Cor 4:13, which (against Windsich, 147-48) does not sit loosely in its context but helps to support the statements about apostolic boldness Paul has already made (3:12; 4:1) and will make again (4:16; 5:6, 8)” (285). As K. T. Kleinknecht puts it, “In ihm [Ps 115] sieht er denselnen Geist des Glaubens wirksam, so daß er ein Entsprechungsverhältnis zwischen seiner Heilerwartung und der Rettung des leidenden Gerechten sowie zwischen seinem und dessen λαλεῖν postuliert” (Der leidende Gerechtfertigte: Die alttestamentlich-jüdische Tradition vom „leidenden Gerechten“ und ihre Rezeption bei Paulus) (Tübingen: Mohr, 1984), 261).

90 As Young and Ford correctly note, “Paul’s confidence explicitly depends upon the resurrection, as he has already indicated in 1.9, and will again in 13.4” (64). However, this does not mean “the basis and motive for Paul’s ‘speaking’ are eschatological, specifically in reference to judgment” (Barnett, 243). Paul wants the Corinthians to live a life of grace and thanksgiving now. But, in turn, that does not imply “the ‘resurrection’ of Paul in v. 14b takes place within the framework of terrestrial existence” or that Paul depicts “his arrival at Corinth as a ‘resurrection’” (Murphy-O’Connor, “Faith,” 546, 549). Rather, Paul believes both that God has rescued (ἐφηράσθη) Paul and his colleagues from death and will continue to deliver (ρύσατο) them (1:10) and that God raises (ἐγείρει) the dead (1:9) and in the future will raise (ἐγείρει) believers (4:14; cf. 4:17ff. See Hay, “Shaping,” 140).

91 Kleinknecht finds it “sehr wahrscheinlich, daß Paulus mit dem Zitat des zunächst recht unmotiviert erscheinenden Psalmwortes mehr zitiert als nur jene drei Wörter” (261).

92 Verse 15 also picks up the Story-line of 1:6 and 4:12 regarding the benefit to the Corinthians of Paul’s suffering (cf. Barrett, 143-144). “Everything,” including Paul’s ministry of speaking/preaching the Gospel and the suffering that ensues, occurs so the Corinthians may have the life faith brings, both in the present and eternally (cf. v 17). Lambrecht ably ties this together: “With v. 15 Paul both summarizes and motivates the main ideas of the first two parts. Suffering and preaching occur for the sake of the
has rescued and will continue to rescue Paul, and also to 2:14, where thanks are due to God who causes ultimate triumph for those who know Him. Thanksgiving is also the central focus of Psalm 115. Of the psalm’s ten verses, six concern giving thanks and praise, honoring vows, etc. Because Psalm 115 “is a hymn of thanksgiving for deliverance from death,” it fits Paul’s situation particularly well. Like the psalmist, Paul has been rescued by Yahweh and recognizes that thanks and praise are due to the God who sustains.

In summary, this SAC, situated immediately after Paul’s expanded description of affliction in 4:8-12 and just prior to his call to increase thanksgiving to Yahweh, ties together believing, speaking, suffering and confident hope of rescue, including future resurrection, the “eternal” rescue. These interrelated Story-lines are also those of the original psalm and especially the SAC which contains the quoted passage. With the quotation, Paul connects himself and his colleagues to the Story of the psalmist, who was compelled to speak because of his belief, subsequently experienced serious negative consequences, and was ultimately rescued by Yahweh. Yahweh’s response led the psalmist to further proclamation of his faith in and loyalty to Yahweh and to make and fulfill vows to praise. Like the psalmist, Paul and his colleagues continue in both faith and the ministry to which Yahweh has called them, despite the ensuing afflictions. They are confident that Yahweh will rescue them and will, ultimately, bring the faithful into His very presence. Using our terminology, our conclusion is that via this quotation Paul successfully evokes a key element of the Story of Yahweh’s people.

Verse 15 also connects the discussion of glory in 3:7-4:6 to 4:16-18. Although God’s glory is not mentioned in Ps 115, it is present in other Hallel psalms, including Ps 111:9, which Paul quotes in 9:9. These and other allusions Young and Ford find to the Hallel psalms lead to their conclusion that “Paul almost seems to follow themes in progression from a group of Psalms of which the core might well be particularly familiar and significant to him” (68). We cannot explore this here.

Hooker incorrectly believes Paul “is using the quotation atomistically” since the sufferings of the psalmist are described in Ps 116:1-9 MT and Paul instead uses Ps 115, which is “a psalm of deliverance” (“Interchange,” 78n11). Furnish points to a number of scholars who believe Paul has the broader Psalm in mind and notes just one, Barrett, who disagrees (285). On the one hand, we do not find it necessary to consider the broader psalm since Ps 115 does refer to the psalmist’s suffering (vv 1c, 2, 6, 7c). On the other, we do not find sustainable Young and Ford’s “almost claim” that Ps 115 “is the text of Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians” (66), which is based on this quotation and such links as ἔκτασις/ἐξέστη (Ps 115:2/2 Cor 5:13), σωτηρία/σωτηρίας (Ps 115:4/2 Cor 1:6, 6:2), and the inexact parallel δοῦλος/διάκονοι (Ps 115:7/2 Cor 6:4) (65).

Corinthians. Then, … the last purpose clause points out the ultimate aim of all apostolic activity, namely the glory of God. People are to be persuaded to be thankful. God’s free gift of the ministry should lead to giving thanks to God” (Second Corinthians, 77).
Contra Stanley, the quotation does not play “a fairly minor position in a lengthy chain of arguments that Paul brings forward to defend his ministry.” On the other hand, it also “does not serve as a proof imbued with claims to divine authority” or “serve the purpose of closing the debate, of being the final word that would allow no further discussion.” The quotation is not designed either to dominate or to manipulate. Rather, it supports the core SA by evoking a lifeworld in which Yahweh’s people, like Paul and his colleagues, continue to proclaim Yahweh’s message with boldness even though they suffer for their speaking. Suffering is not inconsistent with Paul’s apostleship; rather, it demonstrates solidarity with Yahweh’s faithful, including the psalmist, and Jesus himself.

Successful illocution requires the illocutionary response of understanding. The implied reader makes this response. Paul would have expected some of his audience, particularly those who had a background in the synagogue, to have been able to assume the role of the implied reader at this level. Since “reading and interpreting Paul’s letters was an ongoing community process in his churches,” we do not agree with Stanley that Paul was trying to mislead the informed audience. Rather, Paul would have expected the informed group to lead the way in making sure those who had come directly to faith in Christ from paganism had the necessary mutual context to understand Paul’s illocutionary intent.

Before we turn to the perlocution, we need to address the possibility raised in recent scholarship that Paul considered the psalm’s implied author to be the Messiah, and thus Jesus. A. T. Hanson was the first to argue that “Paul in all probability takes the...
verse from Ps. 116 as an utterance of the Messiah, an utterance of faith in God’s salvation. In the context of the psalm the humiliation of the psalmist so emotionally expressed would be taken as referring to the passion.”"100 Further, Hanson believes that “‘I said in my haste, All men are liars!’ is uttered by the pre-existent Messiah to God.”101 He connects Paul to Christ via “the same spirit of faith”: “If we go back to the Septuagint and read it with Paul’s eyes, there can be only one answer: Paul is claiming the same spirit of faith as Christ.”102

Hays was among the first to adopt Hanson’s argument.103 He believes it “almost surely correct, because the whole thrust of the passage depends upon a series of parallels that Paul is drawing between himself and Christ. The verses quoted here say in effect, ‘Jesus believed and spoke, and God raised him; therefore, we also believe and speak, knowing that God will raise us too along with him.’”104 Wagner, who is Hays’ former student, also tentatively adopts this viewpoint.105

Campbell is another who argues along these same lines. According to him, Paul uses “spirit” pneumatologically. It then follows that “once it has been conceded that the Holy Spirit is identifying Paul with another person, it will be difficult to resist the further implication that this must be Christ; the Spirit is, after all, for Paul the Spirit of Christ!”106 From this, he argues that Paul here takes the Messiah as the “implicit subject of the verb πιστεύω.”107 But even if the “spirit of faith” is taken to be the Holy Spirit,108 this does not necessarily identify the subject of πιστεύω as Messiah Jesus. Many of Yahweh’s faith-filled people, including David, would have been able to make this statement.

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100 Hanson, Studies, 17-18; emphasis added.
101 Ibid., 19.
102 A. T. Hanson, Paul’s Understanding of Jesus: Invention or Interpretation? ([Hull?]: University of Hull Publications, 1963), 11.
103 In a work published slightly before Hays’, Hooker tentatively connects “the same faith” in 2 Cor 4 to that of Jesus and thus connects Paul’s faith to Jesus’ faith (“Interchange,” 79). Many who have followed this line of argument take the quotation in 2 Cor 4:13 to mean Jesus possesses faith or is faithful and thus use it to argue that πιστεύω Χριστοῦ can be a subjective genitive. We cannot explore this here.
104 Hays, Faith, 152n125. Hays counts Ps 115 among the “messianic psalms” Paul interprets christologically (“Christ Prays,” 109, 108). He argues that if modern readers do not find Paul’s reading selbstverständlich, “it is because we lack the necessary hermeneutical key: that ὁ Χριστός (Rom 15:3, 7) is the true and ultimate speaker of Israel’s laments and praises” (“Christ Prays,” 109). Although we cannot fully investigate this claim, Paul’s use of Ps 115 in 2 Cor 4 does not substantiate it (see below).
105 “If the speaker of the psalm is understood to be Christ,” this quotation becomes an “example of the theme, so prominent in 2 Corinthians, that in his ministry Paul participates in ‘the death of Jesus’” (J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 314n30).
107 Ibid., 353.
108 See n82.
Schenck’s approach includes the idea that Paul’s “belief” is his expectation of a future resurrection of believers. Then, since the OT psalmist “is not speaking of resurrection, only of deliverance from trial,” he supposes instead “that Paul is reading Ps 115:1 LXX messianically in reference to Jesus’ faith in his own resurrection.”109 For Schenck, “in 4:13, Paul has the same spirit of faith that Jesus had, typified in the words of Psalm 115:1 LXX: ‘I have faith [that God will raise me from the dead]; I speak this faith.’ Paul and his coworkers also have faith [that God will raise them from the dead], and they speak accordingly.”110 But, as we argued earlier, the structure of the LXX psalm makes it unlikely that (expected) deliverance is the content of either the psalmist’s belief or speaking.111

Although Stegman also considers Paul’s reading of Psalm 115 messianic,112 contra Schenck he rejects a “principally cognitive understanding of πιστεύω in 4:13” in which the content is “that God raises the dead to life.”113 For Stegman, this

fails to recognize that the apostle has been alluding to the story of Jesus and his πίστις since 4:10. And given that Paul offers no indication of changing the subject matter here, I propose that the verb πιστεύω in 4:13 is best translated “be faithful,” understood primarily as living in constant fidelity and obedience to God and God’s will.114

However, in 4:10-12 there is no overt mention of Jesus’ πίστις and no discussion of the reason for Jesus’ death. Additionally, although Stegman is correct that Paul “makes the daring assertion that his experience of being afflicted, confused, persecuted, and humiliated is somehow connected with the story of Jesus,”115 that does not mean Paul makes a direct reference to Jesus in every instance.

In summary, the arguments that Paul reads Psalm 115 messianically are not compelling. Nor is there evidence for a messianic interpretation of the psalm prior to

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109 K. Schenck, “2 Corinthians and the Πίστις Χριστοῦ Debate,” CBQ 70 no. 3 (July 2008): 527, 528. We do disagree with Young and Ford (64) that the psalmist’s faith is in the resurrection.

110 Schenck, 533; brackets original.

111 Schenck’s conclusion hinges on the only option for Paul’s faith being “rescue from his current mission trials” (527n11; see also 528n15). These two alternatives present “faith” too narrowly.

112 Stegman regards “Paul as assuming that these words were spoken by the risen Jesus” (733n34). And, although Stegman argues that “το πνεῦμα της πίστεως… ought to be interpreted to mean ‘pneuma of faithfulness,’” like D. Campbell, he believes this reference is to the Holy Spirit (735).

113 Ibid., 734. By “principally cognitive,” Stegman refers to rendering “πιστεύω here as ‘believe,’ in the sense of having conviction or certainty” (734; cf. 733n34, where he contrasts his understanding to Hanson’s rendering of ἐπίστευσα as “Jesus believed”).

114 Ibid., 734. Interestingly, although Stegman believes that Paul “was not constrained by the original meaning of the text” (734), he argues that Paul draws on the entire LXX equivalent of Ps 116 MT, i.e., Ps 114 and 115 (733n34; cf. 738-739, 745; and Schenck, 530-532). This is in contrast to Hanson and Hays who, according to Stegman, consider only Ps 115.

115 Stegman, 729.
the writing of this letter,\textsuperscript{116} and the introductory formula “κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον” argues against the idea that Paul initiates a messianic interpretation. Although “Paul uses this precise citation formula nowhere else,”\textsuperscript{117} it in no way points to Jesus as the author of the Psalm. If Paul were reading Jesus as the subject of πιστεύω, he would more likely introduce the quotation with the formula he uses in Romans 4:18, “κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον.”

To demand exact parallels between the psalmist’s situation and Paul’s or to postulate that since Paul expected to be resurrected, he must consider the psalmist to be Jesus because Jesus was resurrected both carry co-text too far. There is no indication Paul takes this verse as a Messianic utterance or the psalm as foretelling the Messiah’s death and resurrection.

The final step in our analysis is to consider the perlocution of the SAC and to determine what transformation of the NT audience is called for and whether Paul reads the OT as an Envisager.

Perlocution and Transformation

The perlocutionary intention and desired perlocutionary effect of an Assertive illocutionary act or SAC is that the hearer/reader respond with adherence. The implied reader of the OT source text concurs that the psalmist has acted properly in speaking of his faith and agrees that Yahweh will deliver the believer from any resulting suffering. The Envisaging NT reader of 2 Corinthians 4:13-14 accepts that Paul’s belief impels his speech and that neither his ministry nor his message is negated or compromised by his suffering. Additionally, an Envisaging NT reader adheres to the notion that believers can be confident of Yahweh’s protection, and that ultimately, they, too, will be brought into Yahweh’s presence with Jesus Christ, who is the means by which they are saved.

Paul clearly reads Psalm 115 as an Envisager since the perlocutionary intention of the SAC in 2 Corinthians which includes the quotation is in alignment with the perlocutionary intention of the psalm. Paul evokes the Story of the psalmist—who believes, speaks, suffers, is rescued, and gives thanks—in order to link the Corinthians to the lifeworld of the people of Yahweh, thereby transforming (by realigning or restoring\textsuperscript{118}) the Corinthians’ attitudes towards Paul’s ministry and thus towards his message. The Corinthians’ behavior also is to be transformed; thanksgiving is to be

\textsuperscript{116} See the section “Intervening Interpretation” above.

\textsuperscript{117} Furnish, 258; cf. R. Martin, 82.

\textsuperscript{118} For those who have fallen away from faith in Jesus Christ, their current theological position would need to be subverted and their Christian faith re-created or restored.
increased to the glory of God (v 15). This, too, parallels the perlocution of the co-text of the psalmic SAC, in which thanks, praise and worship are offered to Yahweh (cf. Ps 115:4, 9, and especially 8).

With this quotation, then, Paul invites his readers to think as he does about Yahweh, the appropriate relationship a Yahweh-follower is to have with the deity, and what it means to live into one’s faith. He creates/activates mutual context by evoking the theological Story-lines of Psalm 115:1 to encourage his audience also to read as Envisagers, responding with the desired perlocutionary effect of adherence and thereby experiencing a realignment or restoration of their attitude towards Paul’s message. Ultimately, for Envisaging readers, their faith in and behavior towards Yahweh and the Lord Jesus Christ is also transformed and they join Paul in the lifeworld he inhabits.

Conclusion

As we have applied our methodology to Paul’s quotation of Psalm 115:1 in 2 Corinthians 4:13, we have determined it is neither “so far removed from the original context as to raise questions about Paul’s reliability as an interpreter” nor likely that “Paul simply ran across a set of words that sounded like a good ‘motto’ for his ministry and then copied them down (or memorized them) for later use without regard for their original context.” Rather, we have shown that, as Joseph Bonsirven observes with regard to this quotation, “S. Paul reste fidèle au sens général du texte.”

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119 The audience probably is also to take the “speaking” of the psalmist and Paul as a model. It appears in 2 Cor 9:13 that the Corinthian believers are expected, like the psalmist and Paul, to speak of their faith and its object (τῇ ὑποτάγῇ τῆς ὑποταγῆς ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ) despite the testing (δοκιμῆς) which may follow. According to Hughes, “Believing and speaking, or open confession, are in fact two essential aspects of salvation” (148, referring also to Rom 10:9f).

120 The important theological Story-line of coming into or remaining in right relationship with God and Christ is stated firmly in the Directive which arguably forms the peak of this letter segment: “we entreat you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God” (5:20b). (N. T. Wright argues convincingly that 2 Cor “5:20-21 forms the natural climax to the entire argument of the preceding three chapters” (“On Becoming the Righteousness of God: 2 Corinthians 5:21,” in Hay, 208)). The SAC which includes the quotation of Ps 115:1 supports this Directive because the Corinthians’ ability to enter into this state of reconciliation depends on their active acceptance of Paul’s message. Throughout the letter Paul defends his apostolic credentials and calls for the Corinthians to “open wide” their hearts to him (6:13)—not to mislead his audience or because he is concerned for his reputation but because he wants them to accept the truth of his message and then to act on it by being reconciled to Yahweh.

121 As Ehrensperger puts it, “The frequent references to the Scriptures in the Pauline letters thus are more than mere proof-texts or ornaments to an argument previously made; they constitute the world in which he lived and thought” (Dynamics, 6).

122 Contra Stanley, Arguing, 100. Nor is this a “power play” or an argument from authority in the sense of attempting to “anticipate and/or close off debate regarding a statement made by a speaker/author in direct speech” (Ibid., 13).

123 J. Bonsirven, Exégèse rabbinique et exégèse paulinienne (Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils, 1938), 320, adding “tout au moins tel qu’il le lisait dans la version grecque.” Bonsirven does not believe
specifically, Paul is an Envisaging reader of Psalm 115, who evokes the Story-lines and
lifeworld of that psalm to support the desired transformation of his readers’ own
lifeworld via the intended illocutionary and perlocutionary responses (of beliefs and
behaviors) that the implied author establishes for the implied reader.\textsuperscript{124}

Paul is always faithful to the OT context. He includes the quotation of Ps 68:19 in Eph 4:8 (which we
discussed in chapter 5) under the category “Divergences graves.”\textsuperscript{124} This does not imply, \textit{contra} B. Witherington, that “in all cases, a careful rereading of the Old
Testament texts Paul cites or alludes to provides a larger and clearer context in which to understand what
he is trying to say” (\textit{Paul’s Narrative Thought World: The Tapestry of Tragedy and Triumph} [Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox, 1994], 50; emphasis added). Each quotation must be examined on its own
merits.
CHAPTER 8

PSALM 110:1 AS QUOTED BY VARIOUS NT AUTHORS

Our final case study is more intricate: the quotation of all or part of Psalm 110:1 in various NT situations, including by Jesus (as quoted in Matt 22:44, Mark 12:36 and Luke 20:42-43), Peter (as quoted in Acts 2:34-35), Paul (1 Cor 15:25), and the author of Hebrews (Heb 1:13).

The conclusions of some scholars concerning the relationship of the NT quotations of Psalm 110:1 to the OT context put these quotations squarely within the purview of this study. For example, John Goldingay finds that although some verses of this psalm “are applied to Jesus, … as a whole it does not fit him, and most of its application to him in the NT requires it to be understood in a way that would not correspond to its meaning in any OT context.” More broadly, Hay claims that “apart from their sheer number, the most remarkable feature of early Christian references to Ps 110 is the wide diversity of meanings.”

As we use our methodology to evaluate these claims, we consider these specific questions:

• What does Psalm 110:1 contribute to the Story of Yahweh’s people? What would it mean to read Psalm 110:1 as an Envisager?

• Since there is little evidence for the pre-Christian interpretation of Psalm 110 (it is not, for example, attested at Qumran), what can be said about “messianic expectations” in the first century generally that may help us understand the socio-historical context of the NT quotations of Psalm 110:1?

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1 References to Ps 110 are to that MT number unless otherwise noted.
3 Goldingay, Psalms 90-150, 292.
• Is there any commonality in what the NT speakers/authors mediate to their readers/hearers in their illocutionary and perlocutionary acts? Is there any evidence of development of the OT idea(s)?

• What would it mean to read these various NT passages as an Envisager? Does evoking the OT Story promote lifeworld/worldview transformation? If so, is there any commonality to the expected perlocutionary response?

We begin by examining the OT text from a speech act (SA) perspective.

Psalm 110 [109 LXX]

Psalm 110 generally is classified as a royal psalm. “References to ‘my Lord’ (אֲדֹנִי-110:1), and the kingly diction—‘sit at my right hand’ (לִימִינִי—110:1, 5), ‘a footstool for your feet’ (םדֹה—לְרַגְלֶי), and ‘scepter’ (שֶׁבֶט)—support a royal psalm motif.” The structure of Psalm 110 is “determined by the oracular introductions of vv 1 and 4.” These verses each begin a SAC.

The Locution of Psalm 110:1-3 [109:1-3 LXX]

The SAC that is the psalm’s first oracle can be divided into five SAs: vv 1, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b. For convenience, this division is given in Appendix B§3 for the LXX, NETS and NRSV. Since all the NT authors clearly quote the LXX, we use it to evaluate the illocution and perlocution of the source text. However, because Jesus and Peter may have quoted the Hebrew OT or an Aramaic translation, we briefly discuss two locutionary issues concerning the relationship of the MT and LXX.

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5 According to Wendland, royal psalms “speak either of Israel’s earthly, human ruler—the LORD’s ‘anointed (chosen) one’—or of God as the supreme King” (Analyzing, 51). He calls royalty a minor function and lists it under the major functions of petition (lament) and praise (60). Since Ps 110 does not fit into either of these major categories (cf. Ibid., 41, 58), we stop at identifying it as a royal psalm. Bock concisely refutes the arguments against understanding Ps 110 as a royal psalm (Proclamation, 128-129). See Bullock for an explanation of why Ps 110 is to be considered a royal psalm even though it does not explicitly mention an anointed person, the king or David (178-179).

6 H. W. Bateman, Early Jewish Hermeneutics and Hebrews 1:5-13: The Impact of Early Jewish Exegesis on the Interpretation of a Significant New Testament Passage (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 175. We discuss the metaphors of the “kingly diction” below. Note Ps 110.2 has עִמּוֹ, not עִמָּהּ.

7 L. Allen, 113. The arguments he presents (113-114) for a tripartite structure are not convincing.

8 Hay dates Ps 110 LXX to “somewhere between the third and first centuries BCE” and notes it “represents the earliest known interpretation” (Glory, 21). It may reflect a non-MT Hebrew text (see Jobes and Silva, 21).

9 Another issue in v 1 is the use of εἶπεν for נְאֻם since this bypasses “the special aura of prophetic revelation” נא has elsewhere in the OT. However, “the OG represents the command to be seated as a divine oracle no less plainly than does the MT” (Hay, Glory, 21). In addition, L. Allen believes נא in v 1 would be better translated as “while” rather than “until” (i.e., εἶς) (110n1a, with reference to, among others, T. Booij, “Psalm cx: ‘Rule in the Midst of Your Foes!’,” VT 41, no. 4 [October, 1991]: 407. Cf. Clifford, 179). Allen finds “until” acceptable “with the understanding that it can mark a relative limit
The first of these is the rendering in Psalm 109:1 LXX of both ἀδρή λέον and a form of ὁ κύριος. However, ὁ κύριος and τῷ κυρίῳ μου are distinct personages; the oracle’s addressee is not presented as Yahweh or equivalent to Yahweh, i.e., divine.

The other locutionary issue is that the final two SAs (vv 3a and 3b) present serious interpretive challenges in both the MT and LXX. Over 50 years ago, Raymond Jacques Tournay noted that v 3 “a donné lieu à une foule d’interprétations et de conjectures.” Scholars seem no closer to consensus today. Hay, for example, acknowledges the Hebrew is “virtually unintelligible” but believes “the Greek distinctly describes the birth of a divine child.” This, however, takes literally language which is very likely metaphoric, given the three metaphors in vv 1-2. For others, like Ulli Roth, “die LXX-Übersetzung bietet keine messianische Interpretation dieses Verses und des Psalms 110.” Since the psalm is not present in the Qumran texts and v 3 is not quoted in the NT, it cannot be determined how this verse was read in the first century CE. Therefore, we do not consider it in our analysis.

As we have noted, vv 1-2 contain several metaphors. To bridge our discussion of the locution and illocution, our next move is to unpack these metaphors.


The governing metaphor of this SAC—the command to be seated at the right hand of Yahweh in v. 1—is more than the offer of a chair or even permission to sit in the royal

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10 R. J. Tournay, “Le Psaume cx,” RB 67 (1960): 10, noting that “les ms hébreux ne sont pas d’accord entre eux” and “le texte massorétique est obscur.”
11 Hay, Glory, 21. His thought that “the corruption of the present Hebrew text may have resulted from deliberate efforts by scribes to conceal the [messianic] meaning” (22) is quite speculative.
14 “Metaphor” is not an illocutionary category. Nor can metaphoric language be taken literally. “It is difficult to imagine how the king could have literally sat at Yhwh’s right hand, on a throne in the
presence. In the ancient Mediterranean world, the place to the right of a ruler or other important person was a location which indicated the conferring of honor and often also of authority. There are literary or pictorial references to monarchs being seated (or sometimes standing) at the right hand of a god in Egyptian, Ugaritic, and Babylonian works. The ancient Greek poets Pindar (ca. 522-443 BC) and Callimachus (ca. 305-240 BC) speak of Athena and Apollo, respectively, as sitting at the right hand of Zeus.

In addition to Psalm 110, Psalm 80:17 implores Yahweh to “let your hand be upon the one at your right hand, the one whom you made strong for yourself.” Other OT usage includes 1 Kings 2:19 and Psalm 45:9, where the king’s mother and the queen, respectively, are found at the monarch’s (not Yahweh’s) right hand.

This metaphor also appears in intertestamental literature. In addition to the king’s concubine sitting at his right hand (and removing his crown and slapping him!) in 1 Esdras 4:29-30, King Alexander clothes Jonathan in purple and seats him “at his side” in 1 Maccabees 10:62-63. This is referred to twice as honoring him (vv 64, 65) and as a sign that Jonathan was among the king’s closest friends as well as “general and governor of the province” (v 65). Since later Jewish works also use this metaphor, it seems clear that the notion of being seated at the right hand of God “would be richly meaningful to contemporary pagans and Jews.”

That the use of this metaphor in v 1 involves not only divine honor but also the conferring of worldly authority and power is made clear in v 2a, which speaks of “sending out the mighty scepter” and either predicts or proposes earthly rule by the recipient of the oracle, as well as victory in battle. This figurative reference to the rule of the king is followed by a direct reference in the parallel colon (v 2b).

temple, and it is in any case unwise to infer some literal, concrete event from a poetic colon in a prophetic oracle in a liturgical text, whose main point is metaphorical” (Goldingay, Psalms 90-150, 294). However, although as A. Burkhardt notes, “metaphorical sentences as such can be neither true nor false” (“Searle on Metaphor,” in Burkhardt, 324), an Assertive which contains a metaphor has truth-value.

15 “In the Ugaritic Baal cycle it is recorded that Kothar wa-lasis is seated on a chair at the right hand of the god” (Boojj, “Psalm cx,” 396n2). An Egyptian pictorial reference shows “Pharaoh Horemheb … seated at the right hand of the king’s god, Horus” (O. Keel, The Symbolism of the Biblical World: Ancient Near Eastern Iconography and the Book of Psalms, trans. T. J. Hallett [1978; repr. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1997], 263, fig. 353). See also Hay, Glory, 52-53.

16 Hay, Glory, 53. While no human ruler would have been considered divine in Israel, in other cultural contexts, monarchial divinity may have been presumed (cf. Kraus, Theology, 110-111, 113).

17 Only in 1 Kgs 2:19 is there mention that the honored person (the king’s mother) is seated.

18 L. Allen, 115, points to this passage as an example of the metaphor although it does not specifically mention the right hand. In pagan culture, a similar demonstration of giving honor and potential authority is found in “the pre-Islamic Arabian custom of seating the viceroy of a king at the latter’s right (the viceroy took precedence over everyone but the king himself)” (Hay, Glory, 53).

19 Hay, Glory, 58. See Keener for Greek examples of being seated at right hand as an honor in the Christian era (1:948).
The second metaphor in v 1 is of making the enemies of the addressee of the oracle his “footstool.” Here, too, “reflection of an ancient Near Eastern cultural pattern is evident: in the El Amarna letters vassals refer to themselves as the footstools of Pharaoh, while a similar promise features in an oracle from Marduk to the Assyrian king Esarhaddon.”

This situation is also represented in Egyptian iconography. Othmar Keel reproduces two Egyptian illustrations dating to the 15th century BCE, each of which shows the figures or heads of nine enemies placed as (or in) a footstool under the feet of the pharaoh or future pharaoh. In another drawing, nine bows, symbolizing the enemies’ military capacity, are placed under a pair of feet. The metaphor of serving as a footstool or being placed under the feet indicates total subjection. In the OT, the idea of enemies as/in a footstool is found only in Psalm 110. However, the concept of enemies or subjects being placed or falling under the feet of a ruler, ruling nation or Yahweh is found elsewhere, including 1 Kings 5:3 and Psalms 8:6, 45:5 and 47:3.

Booij summarizes the symbolism in Psalm 110:1-2: “The ruler sitting at YHWH’s right hand (representing honour); the enemies laid down as a footstool (submission); the staff, or ‘sceptre’, stretched out from Zion (dominion).”

Taken together, the metaphors in vv 1 and 2 indicate that a seat at the right hand of Yahweh is “a position of honor in the power structure of God,” and that the one seated there “becomes a participant in Yahweh’s strength in battle and victory” over that ruler’s—and by extension Yahweh’s—enemies. There is no doubt, however, “that God is the real king. David rules not in his own right but as vicegerent and representative, deriving

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20 L. Allen, 115; cf. Booij, “Psalm cx,” 396n3. In the Amarna letters, “the submissive city kings (as, e.g., Ammunita of Berytus) explain: ‘A stool for your feet am I!’” (Kraus, Psalms, 349).
21 Keel, 253-256, especially figs. 341 and 342. “Nine” is thought to symbolize the totality.
22 Ibid., 255, fig. 342.
23 Cf. Booij, “Psalm cx,” 396n3; Tournay, “Psaume cx,” 7; Clifford, 179. They refer to other OT texts, including Josh 10:24, Ps 18:39 and Isa 51:23, which describe submission at or by the feet of a victor or suzerain. The frequent use of this metaphor may explain why many NT quotations merge the language of Ps 8:6 with Ps 110:1. Indeed, “wherever in the NT Ps. 8:4-6 is quoted, it is interpreted in the light of Ps. 110:1” (P. Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle, Paternoster, 1993], 151).
24 Booij, “Psalm cx,” 397.
25 Kraus, Psalms, 348-349. Booij believes in v 1 “it is only YHWH who acts” (“Psalm cx,” 396). L. Allen also argues that Yahweh promises to vanquish the enemies “while the king sat … serene and secure” (115; cf. N. C. Tharel, “The Use of Psalm 110:1 in Acts 2:34-35” [ThM diss., Dallas Theological Seminary, 2008], 21). However, Booij and Allen agree that vv 2 and 3 add a different note: In “v. 2 the sovereign is given a more active part. … The staff, being stretched forth by YHWH, is nevertheless in the hand of the ruler, who is surrounded by enemies and has to maintain his dominion forcibly” (Booij, “Psalm cx,” 397; cf. Allen concerning the role of the royal army [115-116]).
authority from his divine counterpart.”26 Kingship is both an honor and a gift from Yahweh.27 Thus, “the ultimate goal of the king is to extend the reign of God. The defeat of enemies means the defeat of evil enemies in the pursuit of a positive final goal: the realization of the just and peaceful world that the Lord intends.”28 This understanding of the various metaphors helps us explore the illocution.

The Illocution of Psalm 110:1 [109:1 LXX]29

The first SA is an Assertive which reports the speech of Yahweh.30 The reported speech contains two embedded SAs. The first is a Directive (Κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου [1b: LXX])31 and the second is a Commissive (θῶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου [1c: LXX]).32 They are connected temporally (ἕως ἂν). Considering the embedded SAs together gives the reason the Assertive in v 1 is tellable: “My lord” is being granted honor and authority by Yahweh, along with the promise of victory over his enemies. These are particularly significant words from Yahweh for Yahweh’s people, and thus this situation is to be broadly proclaimed and recorded for posterity.

Of the remaining four SAs in the SAC, the second, fourth and possibly the fifth (vv 2a, 3a, 3b) are Assertives of the subclass of Predictives33 which describe how the Commissive in v 1c is to be fulfilled. The third SA (v 2b) is another Commissive, which

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26 L. Allen, 115; cf. Keel, 259. Clifford notes “Davidic kingship was rooted in the kingship of Yahweh. … The king represents the god, extending the rule of his divine patron; his enemies are the enemies of the god” (177).
28 Clifford, 180. R. Rendtorff expands on this with a look at the co-text: “It is only God himself who gives the king the rule over his enemies and who will execute judgment among the nations (vv. 5-6)” (“The Psalms of David: David in the Psalms,” in Flint and Miller, 62).
29 For the role of Ps 110 in its psalmic grouping, see B. C. Davis, “Is Psalm 110 a Messianic Psalm?” BSac 157 (April–June 2000): 168, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, accession number ATLA000913001 (accessed March 28, 2011); Clifford, 171; and Roth, 19-32. J. Kim also considers the relationship of Ps 107 and Pss 111-118 to Pss 108-110 as well as the links between Pss 108, 109 and 110 (“The Speaker and the Addressee of Ps 110 in its Literary Context” [paper presented at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Baltimore, MD, November 21, 2013]). We cannot explore this here.
30 This is probably of the subclass of Ascriptive. See Bach and Harnish, 42.
31 This Directive is probably of the subclass of Requestive (cf. Bach and Harnish, 47). If it is considered instead to be of the subclass of Requirement (Ibid.), it would be at a low level of force (i.e., enjoin), since Yahweh is not ordering the hearer to accept power and authority.
32 This Commissive could be a Promise or an Offer. The difference is that “promises are acts of obligating oneself; offers are proposals to obligate oneself” (Ibid., 50). If it is considered that in v 1b Yahweh is obligating Himself unilaterally, then this is a Promise. However, this SA could be considered an Offer if the hearer’s action of sitting is a condition for its acceptance. In this case, the expectation is that “my lord” considers this Offer desirable and will gladly and gratefully accept it.
33 Cf. Ibid., 42. Due to the textual difficulties, we do not analyze v 3 further.
either occurs contemporaneously with the fulfillment of the Commissive in the oracle or results from its fulfillment.\textsuperscript{34}

Since the invitation to be seated at the right hand of Yahweh (the Directive) is the controlling metaphor, the SA which contains it is the core SA, and the other SAs support or enhance its tellability. Here, tellability is enhanced if the Commissive in the embedded SAC in v 1 is read with the Commissive in v 4 (the immediately following co-text of our SAC) so that “forever” (ἐἰς τὸν αἰῶνα) applies to both. This would mean the Commissive in v 1 would have no temporal limit and that Yahweh’s promise to place the enemies of Israel’s ruler “under his feet” would cover all subsequent rulers anointed by Yahweh.\textsuperscript{35} The hope of the restoration of a Yahweh-anointed ruler would explain why this psalm was preserved in the editing of the Psalter long after the collapse of the Davidic dynasty when Israel had instead become the footstool of foreign rulers.\textsuperscript{36}

In evaluating the illocution, we next identify the implied author and audience on two interrelated levels: (i) the speaker/issuer and hearer of the oracle and (ii) the reporting speaker/author and audience, i.e. the author and audience of the psalm.\textsuperscript{37}

The Hebrew text identifies the implied author/speaker of the oracle as Yahweh (Hebrew יהוה, translated in the LXX as ὁ κύριος and generally in English as “the LORD”).\textsuperscript{38} Using the socio-historical context of the psalm helps us identify the direct addressee of the oracle. In the Israelite socio-historical context, the invitation to be seated at the right hand of Yahweh would be issued to an earthly ruler—Yahweh’s Anointed—upon whom honor and representative authority are being conferred.\textsuperscript{39}

Further, the psalm tells us the direct addressee has enemies, and Yahweh is promising defeat of those foes such that the oracle’s recipient will rule in their midst (v 2). There appears to be no doubt of Yahweh’s ability to confer honor and vanquish enemies.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{34} Although κατακυρίευε is in the imperative mood, the classification by Waltke and O’Connor as a figure of heterosis seems correct since “with the imperative, heterosis creates a promise or prediction to be fulfilled in the future” (572; see the NIV for this rendering).

\textsuperscript{35} Relying on “you are a priest forever” from the second oracle (v 4), Booij claims that “Psalm cx is an assurance of everlasting dominion, made to a ruler on Zion” (“Psalm cx,” 396).

\textsuperscript{36} “Although the Davidic kingship ceased with the exile,” the royal psalms were “preserved in Israel’s psalter probably because the Davidic covenant was eternal” (R. Watts, “The Psalms,” 27).

\textsuperscript{37} The NT authors create their own implied authors and audiences. We discuss this below.

\textsuperscript{38} Verse 2 clarifies the speaker’s identity since a viceroy’s public foes would be the monarch’s.

\textsuperscript{39} Because the oracle speaks of someone chosen, honored and given authority by Yahweh and for whom Yahweh fights such that the defeat of his foes is assured, it can be considered “messianic” even though the term ἰησοῦς (χριστός) is not used (See K. Möller, “Proclaiming the Reign of Christ, the Lord: The Psalms in the New Testament,” in Praying by the Book: Reading the Psalms, ed. C. Bartholomew and A. West [Carlisle: Paternoster, 2001], 163).

\textsuperscript{40} Admittedly, this is an argument from silence.
But who is this chosen one, the implied hearer of the oracle? Is it David, the Lord’s anointed (cf. Pss 18:50, 89:20), a literal “son” of David, e.g. Solomon, or a “messiah” anticipated by the psalmist who has not yet appeared to claim his throne? Before we attempt to answer this question, we must clarify some terminology. By “messiah,” we refer to someone anointed by Yahweh who brings about salvation of any kind, whether or not the term “messiah” is used to describe that person.\(^4\) If the messiah is to bring future salvation, we call that future “eschatological.” This does not necessarily refer to the end-times or the end of time.\(^4\) Rather, “eschatological” can refer to what Shemaryahu Talmon calls the “turn of times, … a profound crisis in history marked by tribulations of cosmic dimensions.”\(^4\)

To determine the identity of the implied hearer of the oracle, we look at the SAC as well as at the broader co-text. First, the direct addressee of the oracle is “my Lord” to the psalmist (v 1a). Therefore, what we learn about the implied author of the psalm helps us identify the direct addressee of the oracle and vice versa. Another element is the superscription יְהֹוָה לְדָוִד. With this, it is clear “daβ der Psalm selbst in eine enge Verbindung mit David als dem israelitischen Idealkönig und legendären Dichter der Psalmen gebracht wird.”\(^4\) However, it not clear how “David” relates to this psalm.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) Following M. F. Bird (see Are You the One Who Is to Come?: The Historical Jesus and the Messianic Question [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009], 34, 146), we do not conflate messianic expectations and eschatological expectations. Thus we disagree with Juel that overall in the NT “eschatological convictions pervade everything: the prophetic dimensions of the Scriptures are central; the present is understood as the last days and as a time of fulfilled promises (1 Corinthians 10:11; Acts 2; Matthew 1-2; Luke 1-2; etc.)” (Messianic Exegesis, 57).

\(^4\) S. Talmon, “The Concept of Māšiāḥ and Messianism in Early Judaism,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 109. The turn of times is when “the Anointed will come, not at the end of time” (109). Thus, “the New Order to be established by the anointed is not otherworldly but rather the realization of a divine plan on earth, the consummation of history in history” (112).

Beale offers several summary definitions of eschatology (NT Theology, 112-115), which he sees “not merely as the end of redemptive or cosmic history, or the goal of Israel’s hopes, or the goal of the individual saint’s hopes, but rather as an ‘already-not yet new-creational reign in Christ’” (177). This, in turn, refers to “the entire network of ideas that belong to renewal of the whole world, of Israel, and of the individual” (178).

\(^4\) Roth, 19. Although Roth points out that there are several options as to “wer mit David überhaupt gemeint ist” (Ibid.), the superscription indicates Ps 110 takes a monarchical, pre-exilic perspective and the majority opinion today is that it “is a pre-exilic royal psalm, composed for a Davidic monarchy in Jerusalem” (Hay, Glory, 19). Among scholars who “still advocate a post-exilic origin; the favorite theory … has been one supposing the psalm a piece of Hasmonean propaganda” (Ibid.). This theory is unlikely, since the Hasmoneans were not Davidides. We discuss this below. Witherington finds it implausible to date Ps 110 to the Maccabean period, “not least because it is found in early psalter collections such as the one at Qumran” (Mark, 131). For a discussion of the time frame of the psalm, see H. W. Bateman, “Psalm 110:1 and the New Testament,” BSac 149 (October-December 1992): 438-441.
One alternative is to take David as the direct addressee of the oracle. Then, since David is the psalmist’s lord, the psalmist would be a court poet or prophet. This ties into evidence in 1 Samuel 24:11 and 2 Samuel 15:21, which indicates “royal etiquette” would call for a court poet to address the king as his master or lord. Against this has been raised the argument that David could not “rightly be called a ‘priest forever after the order of Melchizedek’” (Ps 110:4). But the “order of Melchizedek” is not the Levitical order. Willem van der Meer gives a number of examples from 2 Samuel and 1 Kings which demonstrate that “in the offices of David and Solomon, a priestly, mediatiorial role is present. The king is able to function in this role because he is the head of a theocratic nation.” Although this would “not entail that the king becomes a priest in the ordinary sense of that word,” the monarchical function of service to Yahweh is similar to the description of Melchizedek as both king of (Jeru)Salem and “priest of God Most High” (Gen 14:18).

2011); and Tharel, chapter 2. See van der Meer for scholars who defend a pre-exilic context for Ps 110 generally or a Davidic context specifically (227n55).

45 For , CEV gives “by” and NETS gives “pertaining to.” Day argues that “it is impossible to suppose that ledawid in these instances is anything but an ascription of authorship” (115). However, Goldingay points out that “while lê can mean ‘of,’ it has many other meanings, mostly more common than ‘of.’ … In an expression such as ‘To the choirmaster. Of David’ (Pss. 11 and 14 RSV), ‘to’ and ‘of both represent lê, and it may seem arbitrary to translate it in these two different ways” (Psalms 1-41, 27).

30 We do not assume “of” is the only possible translation or that it denotes authorship.

46 “On the basis of the two divine oracles of vv 1, 4, it is commonly held that it was uttered by a court prophet” (L. Allen, 111; cf. Kim, 16n52). Allen (111-113) and Bateman (“Psalm 110:1,” 442-443) summarize which scholars advocate for the various proposed settings. A commonly suggested setting is a coronation ritual, but such proposals differ substantially as to the site and the era of the enthronement.

47 See L. Allen, 115.


49 Van der Meer, 229; cf. Hay, Glory, 20.

50 Van der Meer, 229. On the one hand, this is contra Eaton, who believes Ps 110:4 “appoints the king to be God’s priest for ever. … There are indications in the historical sources that the role was indeed held by David and his successors, though opposed and obscured in the records by priestly clans after the end of the monarchy” (385). At the other end of the spectrum is J. de Fraigne, for whom “ni à l’origine, ni dans son développement ultérieur, la royauté israélique n’a entraîné pour le souverain la qualité de prêtre; dès le début, les fonctions ‘sacerdotales’ étaient clairement distinctes des privilèges du roi-guerrier. Tout en n’étant nullement un ‘fonctionnaire du culte’, le roi peut être considéré comme investi d’un droit de surveillance concernant le culte” (“Peut-on parler d’un véritable sacerdoce du roi en Israël??,” in Sacra Pagina: Miscellanea Biblica Congressus Internationalis Catholicci de Re Biblica, ed. J. Coppens, A. Descamps, and É. Massaux [Gembloux: Duculot, 1959], 1:546-547). However, although David is never identified as a priest, it seems likely that H. W. Attridge (referring to 1 Sam 6:12-21; 24:25; 1 Kgs 3:4; 8:1-5, 62; 12:33) is correct that “in the pre-exilic period the high priest was definitely subservient to the king, who could himself exercise priestly functions” (The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, ed. H. Koester [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989], 97; cf. Beale, NT Theology, 72, and Kraus, Psalms, 351). According to Beale, “Solomon is depicted more than any other king, except perhaps David, to be functioning like a priest” (NT Theology, 71).
Another alternative is to consider “of David” in the sense of “by David”—in other words, to hold David to be the implied author of the Psalm. But in that case, who is the original addressee of the oracle, that is, who is David’s lord? The alternatives are the king under whom David served (Saul), or one of David’s heirs.

The psalm’s second oracle excludes King Saul from consideration. Although Saul was promised—and received—victory over his enemies and ruled over Israel (1 Sam 9:15-16, 27; 14:47-48), he was not king in Jerusalem. Further, his downfall came about when he disobeyed Yahweh by usurping priestly duties (cf. 1 Sam 13:9ff). It is therefore unlikely that David would have referred to Saul as “a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek” (v 4).

If David is the psalmist, the other possibility for the hearer of the oracle is a future anointed king or royal “messiah” of Israel whom Yahweh addresses, most likely according to Yahweh’s promise in 2 Samuel 7:16. There are two options for a messianic interpretation. First, this messiah may be an anointed king of Israel of David’s line. Herbert Bateman argues that “the most viable option is that David spoke the psalm … to Solomon when David freely handed over his kingship to Solomon (1 Kgs. 1:32-35, 43-45; 1 Chron. 28:1-8, 29:20-25).” This identification is supported by Benaiah’s prayer for Solomon’s throne to be even greater than David’s in response to David’s request that Solomon be crowned king (cf. 1 Kgs 1:37, 47-48).

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51 See Kim, 15n53, for a summary of scholars who hold to this view.
52 Even after being anointed king, “David often referred to King Saul as either ‘my lord’ ([1 Sam] 24:6, 10, 26:18) or ‘my lord the king’ (24:8; 26:17, 19)” and “he also referred to Achish of the Philistines as ‘my lord the king’ (29:8)” (Bateman, “Psalm 110:1,” 449). However, Bateman is surely correct to conclude that “neither of these men … was the recipient of Psalm 110” (Ibid.)
53 As S. E. Balentine puts it, the addressee of the oracle is “the point of union between God and his people” as both king and priest (“The Royal Psalms and the New Testament: From ‘messiah’ to ‘Messiah,’” TTE 29 [Fall 1984]: 57). This is not a description of King Saul.
54 Balentine concludes that “in Ps. 2, and throughout the royal psalms generally, Yahweh’s ‘anointed one’ (masiah) should be understood in terms of the earthly Davidic king” (58). Similarly, R. Watts argues that “most modern scholars take the addressee to be either David or his royal descendants, possibly at enthronement” (“The Psalms,” 36).
55 This prayer is made in David’s presence, although he is never said to make such a prayer, even in his final charges to Solomon (1 Kgs 2:1-9) and to Israel concerning Solomon’s rule (1 Chr 29:1, 19). Nor does David refer to Solomon as “my Lord,” and he is not listed as pledging submission to Solomon (1 Chr 29) although he may have been present. But Solomon appears to ascend the throne during David’s lifetime (1 Chr 29:22b-23a), and his royal splendor surpasses that of his father (1 Chr 29:25); his is the pinnacle of riches and honor (2 Chr 1:12). There is no reason that Waltke’s claim that “in Psalm 110:1a David, using distinctively prophetic language, foresees a King greater than himself” could not apply to Solomon (38). As Marcus points out, “the ‘shoot of Jesse,’ the ideal king descended from David in Isa 11:1-16, is not only a military conqueror but also a righteous judge filled with wisdom and understanding—qualities more usually associated with Solomon than with David” (Mark, 1120).
answered; Yahweh exalts Solomon and bestows on him “such royal majesty as had not been on any king before him in Israel” (cf. 1 Chr 29:25).

For this messiah to be a “descendant” of David would not limit the office to Solomon since the Davidic monarchy has no temporal limit: David’s house, kingdom and throne are established forever (הָלַךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל) twice in 2 Sam 7:16). As psalmist, David may consider the oracle addressed to his dynastic line and “prophesy” this.57

The second possibility is “that David addressed his messianic Lord, his divine Lord, in a directly prophetic manner,” as Derek Kidner and others have argued.58 But it seems unlikely that a psalm written from a pre-exilic perspective would have leaped history to directly prophesy an eschatological messiah,59 much less a divine one. David was Yahweh’s anointed (cf. 1 Sam 16:3; 2 Sam 2:4, Ps 89:20). The Israelites knew others had been anointed previously (e.g., King Saul and various priests) and, based on Yahweh’s promises, would have expected David’s heirs would be anointed after him.60

57 In 11QPs* 27:11 David is “considered a prophet who composed the psalms under divine inspiration”; before this, the Chronicler and Nehemiah both give “him the prophetic title ‘the Man of God’ (2 Chr 8:14; Neh 12:24, 36)” (D. Dimant, “Use and Interpretation of Mikra in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha,” in Mulder, 391n50; cf. Evans, “Praise,” 552.


59 Some, like Aloisi, find Ps 110 to be direct messianic prophecy (cf. 123) without necessarily involving a divine messiah since “just how much David understood about the nature of the Messiah is difficult to determine” (119n82). From a slightly different perspective, Roth speaks of “die Prophetie, die nicht das Kommen eines Messias, sondern die Ankunft der endzeitlichen Herrschaft Gottes verheiβt” (26). We do not find these arguments compelling. However, after the Davidic dynasty appeared to end, it seems likely the psalm was interpreted “eschatologically” in the sense of an expectation of the coming of the turn of times.

60 As did happen (1 Kgs 1:39). As J. J. M. Roberts points out, these “were not prophecies holding out hope for a distant future but oracles that gave expression to political, social, and religious expectations for the reign of a contemporary king just being installed into office” (“The Old Testament’s Contribution to Messianic Expectations,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 42). Here we disagree with J. J. Collins. Although he admits that in the OT the term “messiah” does not necessarily refer to an eschatological figure, he applies it only to “a figure who will play an authoritative role in the end time,
Linguistic evidence also argues against seeing the oracle as prophecy of a divine messiah. According to Bateman

The form “to my lord” (לַאדֹנִי) is never used elsewhere in the Old Testament as a divine reference. Also, none of the 138 forms of “my lord” (אֲדֹנִי) and none of the nine other prefixed forms of “my lord” (מַאֲדֹנִי, בִּאֲדֹנִי) is a divine reference. … Furthermore, when “my lord” (אֲדֹנִי) and ‘Lord’ (יְהוָה) are used in the same sentence, as in Psalm 110:1, “my lord” (אֲדֹנִי) always refers to an earthly lord.61

We agree with Allen that although “one respects the worthy motives of those who seek to restrict the psalm to a messianic intent from the beginning, … it hardly accords with the pattern of historical and theological development discernible in the royal psalms in general and with the ancient cultural and historical royal references within Ps 110.”62 All in all, the most probable explanation is that a court prophet composed Psalm 110 about or “for” David—perhaps “to celebrate David’s earlier conquest of Jerusalem and succession to Jebusite kingship (cf. 2 Sam 12:30).”63 However, it is likely that, beginning with Solomon’s coronation, the psalm was used “by succeeding kings in a context of national enthronement and also in any other cultic settings in which the king’s relation to Yahweh was celebrated.”64 “Like the other royal psalms, it became in the postexilic canonical Psalter a witness to the restoration of the dynasty, guaranteed by God’s ‘forever,’ and so a witness to Israel’s messianic hope.”65

This explains its attribution to David in the Synoptic Gospels and in Acts 2.66

usually the eschatological king” (The Scepter and the Star: Messianism in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls, 2nd ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010], 16) and he defines “messianism” as “the expectation of a figure who will act as God’s designated agent in the eschatological time” (“Messianism and Exegetical Tradition: The Evidence of the LXX Pentateuch,” in Knibb, 129).

61 Bateman, “Psalm 110:1,” 448, adding that 94% of the 168 forms “refer to earthly lords. The exceptions are when Joshua, Gideon, Daniel, and Zechariah addressed an angelic being as ‘my lord’” (448). Aloisi rightly notes that B. Davis’ claim that the “angelic being” addressed as אֲדֹנִי in Judg 6:13 and Josh 5:14 is later identified as Yahweh does not disprove Bateman’s argument. Davis “has not proven that the OT contains a clear text in which a person knowingly addresses Yahweh as אֲדֹנִי” (Aloisi, 118, referring to Davis, 164). Although Aloisi believes “even if Bateman’s distinction holds up, David could very well have used the term אֲדֹנִי with reference to the Messiah” (119), the question remains as to why David would ignore his immediate descendants to prophesy only an eschatological Messiah.


63 L. Allen, 113. See also Goldingay, Psalms 90-150, 291.

64 L. Allen, 113, adding that “the divine oracles of vv 1 and 4 certainly appear to belong to such a context [enthronement], but the psalm as a whole may not intend to issue them but to simply echo them (cf. 2 Sam 3:18; 5:2).”

65 L. Allen, 118. Kim avers that Ps 110 has become an “eschatological psalm in its final form in the context of the psalter” (15; cf. 18n60).

66 Kim points out that “the Synoptic Gospels and Acts clearly describe David as the speaker in Ps 110 (Mark 12:36; Matt 22:43-44; Luke 20:42-44; Acts 2:34-35)” (17). It is also possible David
In any event, in all these cases, the use in the psalm of the metaphors of sitting at the right hand and enemies as a footstool indicates that honor and authority/power have been or are to be conferred on a recipient who will rule over Yahweh’s people and whose enemies will be vanquished with Yahweh’s help. The implied audience, no matter what the situational particulars, understands these aspects of the illocution. The implied audience also knows who Yahweh is, what Yahweh’s nature is like and what Yahweh can do. More specifically, the implied reader understands that Yahweh has promised to anoint a ruler for Israel whose enemies will be defeated and will become subject to his rule. Psalm 110:1 speaks to the protection, assistance and deliverance which Yahweh provides; the implied audience expects that as a result of the work of Yahweh, “my lord” will come to rule over his foes.\(^67\)

In order to read as an Analyst (a reader who understands the illocutionary act), empirical readers must either activate these aspects of mutual context or add this Story-line to the mutual context they share with the implied author. We wrap up our discussion of Psalm 110:1 with an evaluation of the impact on lifeworld, worldview and theology of reading this SAC as an Envisager.

The Perlocution of Psalm 110:1 [109:1 LXX]

The embedded oracle contains a Directive and a Commissive illocutionary act. For a Commissive illocutionary act, the related perlocution is “that H believe S intends to fulfil his obligation to do A.”\(^68\) With regard to the Commissive in the oracle, the intended perlocutionary effect/response is that the listeners believe Yahweh has the capacity and the intention to give the direct addressee dominion over his enemies. For a Directive illocutionary act, the intended perlocution is “that H (intend to) do A.”\(^69\) Here, the intended perlocutionary effect is that the direct addressee accept the honor and anointing Yahweh offers.

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\(^67\) According to van der Meer,Limini הַשָּׁב emphasizes that v 1 speaks to “the protection which God provides” (224).

\(^68\) Bach and Harnish, 81.

\(^69\) Ibid.
Within the psalm, v 1 is an Assertive illocutionary act, for which the related perlocution is “that H believe that P.”70 The psalmist’s audience is called to believe that this report is true, i.e., that Yahweh has offered the addressee of the oracle honor, authority and power to rule and that Yahweh can and will place the enemies of that ruler in subjection. The remaining SAs of this SAC describe how this is to come about (v 2a) and the ultimate result (v 2b).

By the time of the NT, when the Davidic dynasty had not ruled Israel in centuries, an Envisaging reader of the Psalm takes a position of trust that the promises of the oracle continue past their fulfillment in David and his pre-exilic heirs. An Envisaging reader looks to the future and “forever” fulfillment of these promises. Depending on the situation of each empirical hearer/reader, to respond with the intended perlocutionary effect (the response of the implied reader), an Envisaging reader must transform (realign or subvert/re-create) their understanding of Yahweh and these promises. This transformation of the Envisager’s belief system—and the actions that flow from it—is linked to Story, lifeworld/worldview and theology.

A Summary of the Contribution of Psalm 110:1 to Story, Lifeworld and Theology

In terms of the basic theological questions and the role of this SAC in Story, Psalm 110 speaks to the question of how Yahweh relates to the world, and, in particular, the role of the monarch in relationship to Yahweh as well as the world. The SAs later quoted contribute to Story the information that Yahweh has made temporally unlimited promises regarding the honor and authority to be given to a ruler of Yahweh’s people and that Yahweh will place that ruler’s (and by extension, the people’s) enemies in submission. The Envisaging reader expects that Yahweh will fulfill these promises, and the lifeworld and worldview of such a reader incorporates these Story-lines.

Post-Exilic Interpretation of Psalm 110

Although there is no evidence to support the claim of those who believe Psalm 110:1 was direct messianic prophecy from its inception, it is possible that it was interpreted that way once the Davidic succession had collapsed.71 But there is scant evidence for

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70 Ibid.
71 Balentine believes that “by the time of Jesus it is likely that Psalm 2 and probably Psalm 110 had already come to be understood as messianic, that is as pointing to the king who would come in the future to rule as Yahweh’s anointed son” (61; cf. Marcus, Mark, 846; Way, 132-37). For M. Hengel, “Ps 8 und 110, schon in Jerusalem von der Urgemeinde als ‘messianische Hymnen’ gesungen wurden, wobei sie sich gegenseitig interpretierten und zugleich einen entscheidenden Einfluß auf die Entstehung der
intervening interpretations of Psalm 110 and even less evidence of any interpretation involving an eschatological messiah. Perhaps the most telling absence is that no part of Psalm 110 is found in any form among the Dead Sea Scrolls. Overall, we concur with Hans-Joachim Kraus that “no messianic interpretation of Psalm 110 in Jewish circles can be documented.” However, absent any consideration of Psalm 110, there were messianic expectations in Judaism at the turn of the millennium. Since this issue is important to our analysis of the NT use of Psalm 110:1, we examine it briefly below.

Messianic Expectations in the First Century

Interest in messianism remained “virtually dormant from the early fifth to the late second century BCE.” Messianic expectation experienced a resurgence in the first century BCE, although it was far from uniform. One prominent source for the"frühen Christologie ausübten” (“‘Setze dich zu meiner Rechten!’ Die Inthronisation Christi zur Rechten Gottes und Psalm 110,1,” in Le Trône de Dieu, ed. M. Philonenko [Tübingen: Mohr, 1993], 146).

We do not find any interpretive traditions that clearly either are of Ps 110 or are pre-Christian. For a discussion of some of the options that have been presented, see Appendix C.

According to P. W. Flint, Ps 110 is one of 24 canonical psalms “missing” from the forty Psalms scrolls and related manuscripts (such as the pesharim) found among the Dead Sea Scrolls (“Psalms and Psalters,” 234; cf. Kraus, Theology, 186, and Hay, Glory, 27). Flint believes the missing psalms were originally included but “are now lost due to the fragmentary state of most of the scrolls” (The Dead Sea Psalms Scrolls and the Book of Psalms [Leiden: Brill, 1997], 48). He restores “Ps 110 after 109, mainly on the basis of its Davidic superscription” since “computerized reconstruction shows the sequence 109→110 followed by 113-118 in cols. iv-vi [of 1IQPs] to be very plausible on the basis of spacing” (Psalms Scrolls, 191).

Kraus, Theology, 186. Hay attributes to Strack-Billerbeck the unsupportable conclusion that “messianic interpretation was the norm for rabbis of the first century” (Glory, 29); Aune relies on Hay to make a similar argument (409). But Hay himself claims only that “it seems fair to suppose that in the NT era a messianic interpretation of Ps 110 was current in Judaism, although we cannot know how widely it was accepted” and that “Jews shortly before and during the period of Christian origins applied the psalm variously, sometimes to a future messiah, sometimes to the heavenly vindication of a righteous sufferer (T Job), perhaps sometimes to a reigning Hasmonean king or supernatural being (the son of man, the heavenly Melchizedek)” (Glory, 30, 161).

For a helpful list of some of the studies of messianism in the intertestamental period and Second Temple Judaism, see M. Bird, 31n1.


Charlesworth credits the resurgence to “the degeneration in the Hasmonean dynasty and the claim of the final ruling Hasmoneans, especially Alexander Jannaeus, to be ‘the king,’ and … the loss of the land promised as Israel’s inheritance to the gentle and idolatrous nation Rome” (“‘From Messiahology,’” 35; cf. Oegema, 56). Similarly, I. Broer believes “dürfte dann durch den Zusammenbruch der Hasmōnadynastie … die Hoffnung auf Erneuerung der Davidsdynastie bestärkt worden sein” (“‘Versuch zur Christologie des ersten Evangeliums,” in The Four Gospels, 1992: Festschrift Frans Neirynck, ed. F. van Segbroeck et al. [Leuven: University Press; Peeters, 1992], 2:1255).

For Keener, “there was no single interpretation of messialship in the first century, but at the heart of most messianic expectation was an ultimate Davidic ruler associated with the eschatological restoration of Israel” (1:964).
expectation of a Davidic messiah is Psalms of Solomon 17 and 18, two of a collection of eighteen psalms critical of the Hasmonean rulers. In the introduction to his critical edition of the Greek text, Robert Wright calls Psalm of Solomon 17 “an extended messianic hymn describing the anticipated victory and reign of the expected redeeming king, the anointed Son of David.” The king, the Lord Messiah (or Lord’s Messiah; Ps Sol 17:32), “is to lead the pious in a rebellion against the occupying forces, in the expulsion of foreign influences, and in the displacement of the corrupt administrations of state and temple. He is to establish an independent and holy Jewish theocratic state to which foreign nations would be subordinate.” To accomplish this victory, Yahweh will undergird the Davidic king with strength (cf. Ps Sol 17:22); the king will continue to rely on Yahweh during his reign (cf. Ps Sol 17:33-34, 37-39). As with Psalm 110, in the Psalms of Solomon, the authority of the human king is derivative, that is, “the king-Messiah rules in the messianic kingdom, with authority and power given him by God.”

It is Yahweh who is the true king.84

80 R. Wright, 1. Charlesworth considers the Psalms of Solomon (along with the Similitudes of Enoch) to be “the earliest explicit use of the terminus technicus—’Messiah’ or ‘Christ’” (“From Messianology,” 24; see Appendix C regarding the dating of the Similitudes of Enoch). In addition, Ps Sol 17:23 explicitly states the Messiah is to be the “son of David,” which, according to Witherington, is the first known use of this precise phrase (Mark, 331). Thus, W. D. Davies’ idea that Pss Sol 17 and 18 may already present “the term Son of David as a standard messianic title” (“The Jewish Sources of Matthew’s Messianism,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 500) outstrips the available evidence. By the time of the NT writings, however, “the Anointed One or Messiah=Christos is the expected eschatological king from the line of David” (Marcus, Mark, 1105; cf. J. Collins, Scepter, 52).

81 The choice between these readings is not material to our analysis (cf. R. Wright, 48-49; Keener, 1:960; and the Rahlfs-Hanhart LXX).

82 R. Wright, 1. As Broer points out, “der irdische Charakter dieses Königstums ist schließlich auch in dem Stück aus PsSal 17, das ja vom Davidsohn und Messias spricht, deutlich” (2:1255; cf. Stein, 213). Although de Jonge agrees the king expected in Ps Sol 17 “is a national figure using political means and even military power,” he finds him “not a typical warrior-king, striving for the mastery of the world; the deliverance of Israel is only a means towards a greater goal, the triumph of God’s righteousness and power as manifested in His Torah, which will then be obeyed by Israel and by the nations” (“Use,” 136).

83 A. Chester, “Jewish Messianic Expectations and Mediatorial Figures and Pauline Christology,” in Paulus und das antike Judentum, ed. M. Hengel and U. Heckel (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), 28. Keener does not provide any support for his theory that “the Psalms of Solomon … probably is interpreting Ps 110:1, since the pseudepigraphic psalm goes on to identify the Messiah’s king as the ‘Lord himself’ (κύριος αὐτός, 17:46)” (1:960).

84 J. H. Charlesworth points out that in the Psalms of Solomon, it is not the Messiah, but God, who “is clearly the actor” and that Ps Sol 17 “is close to the Old Testament emphasis that God is King” (“Messianology in the Biblical Pseudepigrapha,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 31).
Not all messianic expectations involved a ruler or only a ruler. “The Hebrew word משׁיח means simply ‘anointed’. While it refers to a royal figure some thirty times in the Hebrew Bible, it can also refer to other figures, most notably the anointed High Priest.”85 The expectation of a coming leadership pair—king and high priest—is reflected in Zechariah 4:14 and in some Qumran documents.86

Although not every Qumran document that speaks of a messianic ruler refers specifically to Davidic descent,87 a number of Qumran documents do speak of a Davidic “messiah” or “anointed” one. 4QP Blessing 1:3-4 (4QpGen=4Q252-254a) appears to speak of the coming of “the Messiah of righteousness, the Shoot of David” to whom and to whose seed “has been given the Covenant of Kingship over his people for eternal generations.”88 A clearer reference is found in 4Q Florilegium (4Q174), where the single messiah is a Davidic king.89 Other texts which use metaphors such as “shoot,” “branch” or “horn” of David to refer to a Davidic messiah include 4QpIsa9

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86 “The prominence of the priesthood was more enduring than that of the Davidic line in the Second Temple period. … For most of the postexilic period, with exceptions in the times of Ezra and Nehemiah, the High Priest was sole leader in Judah” (J. Collins, Scepter, 36). But that does not mean R. A. Horsley is correct that “there was little interest in a Messiah, Davidic or otherwise, … in the diverse Palestinian Jewish literature of late Second Temple times” (“‘Messianic’ Figures and Movements in First-Century Palestine,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 295). Rather, “by the second century B.C. the idea of an ideal king who would come as ‘anointed prince’ (Dan. 9:25) began to lay the foundation for the messianic expectations which would emerge full blown in the New Testament” (Balentine, 61).

87 For example, in the two-Messiah scheme of 1QS (Rule of the Community), the “Messiah of Israel is nowhere said to be Davidic” (L. H. Schiffman, “Messianic Figures and Ideas in the Qumran Scrolls,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 120; cf. Charlesworth, “From Messianology,” 20). Furthermore, in both 1QS and 1QSa (Rule of the Congregation), “the priest is the more important” of the two messiahs (de Jonge, “Use,” 138). With regard to 4QAhA (=4Q451), Starcky concurs: “Pour notre auteur comme pour celui de la Règle de la Congrégation, le messie d’Aaron sera le messie principal” (492). “The division between priestly and political functions and their allotment to two figures may have been a critical reaction to the unifying of the Highpriesthood and the Kingdom by the Hasmonaens” (H. Lichtenberger, “Messianic Expectations and Messianic Figures During the Second Temple Period,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 13).

88 See Chester, “Expectations,” 23. Evans translates “Shoot” as “Branch” (Ancient Texts, 106). Bateman links the “covenant of royalty” in 4QpGen and ‘covenant of kings’ in Sirach 47:11” since both “emphasize the dynastic permanence of Yahweh’s covenant with David” (Hermeneutics, 161). However, Charlesworth refers to 4QPBless as an “obscure reference” (“From Messianology,” 25).

89 See Charlesworth, “From Messianology,” 26. According to Chester, 4QFlor 11 refers to the future salvific work of the “Shoot of David” (“Expectations,” 23; cf. Schiffman, “Messianic Figures,” 125), and Bateman argues that 4QFlor “applies 2 Samuel to a Davidic heir yet to come” (Hermeneutics, 159). Since “the common rabbinic epithet, ‘son of David,’ has not been found at Qumran,” M. G. Abegg and C. A. Evans find that “only the reference in 4Q174 is indisputably messianic. In this passage only is the ‘son’ of 2 Sam 7:14 identified as the ‘Branch of David,’ this figure is understood to be the fulfillment of the prophecy of Amos 9:11 (cf. 4Q174 1-3 i 12)” (“Messianic Passages in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 199; cf. Witherington, Mark, 331).
(4Q161), which is a commentary or pesher, and the Rule of War (4Q285). Overall, Mark Strauss believes the “various Cave 4 documents suggest an increase in royal-Davidic expectation in the sect’s later years (c. 4 BC to AD 68).”

James Dunn helpfully puts most of this (and more) together, averring that the hoped-for Davidic or royal messiah is so designated explicitly in the Psalms of Solomon 17 (see esp. 17:32; cf. 18:57), and Shemoneh ‘Esreh 14, and almost certainly in view in the DSS’s designation of the “messiah of Israel” (1QSa 2.12, 14, 20; also 1QS 9.11; cf. CD 12.23f.; 14.19; 19.10; 20.1). This more specific language is clearly part of a richer strain influenced both by other “messiah” references with eschatological overtones (1Sam 2:10; Pss 2:2, 89:51, 132:17; Dan 9:25-26); and by specific promises regarding the Davidic dynasty—David’s son/God’s son (2Sam 7:12-13; 4QFlor 1.10-13), the royal “branch” (Jer 23:5 and 33:15; 4QPat 3-4 and 4QFlor 1.11), and the Davidic “prince” (Ezek 34:24 and 37:25; CD 7.20, 1QSb 5.20, 1QM 5.1, 4Q161); see also Isa 11:1-2; Hag 2:23; Zech 3:8, 4, 6:12; Sir 47:11, 22; 1Mac 2:57. We may conclude that these passages must have nurtured a fairly vigorous and sustained hope of a royal messiah within several at least of the various subgroups of Israel at the time of Jesus, and that that hope was probably fairly widespread at a popular level (such being the symbolic power of kingship in most societies then and since).

John Collins sums this up well: The Messiah “is presumably a human figure, although he is endowed with the spirit of the Lord. He is expected to re-establish a dynasty, rather than rule forever himself. … But the most basic and widespread expectation in

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90 According to T. Eskola (Messiah and the Throne: Jewish Merkabah Mysticism and Early Christian Exaltation Discourse [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001], 85; cf. 132, 342), G. Vermes restores 4Q161 frgs. 8-10 iii as “[… Branch] of David who shall arise at the end of days […] God will uphold him with [the spirit of might, and will give him] a throne of glory and a crown of holiness […] [He will put a sceptre] in his hand and he shall rule over all the [nations].” Evans believes “the interpretation of Isa 10:34-11:5 in 4Q161 frgs. 7-10 iii coheres with the prophecy of 4Q285, in which the Messiah is expected to defeat Rome” (Ancient Texts, 147). However, Charlesworth accurately calls the “reference to the Branch of David which shall arise at the end of days” in 4Q161 “frustratingly brief” (“From Messianology,” 25).

91 Strauss, 43. Charlesworth’s conclusion that “statistically we must admit that messianology was not a major concern of this [Qumran] community, at least not in its early history” (“From Messianology,” 25), is based on the number of times the noun “messiah” is used and overlooks the metaphorical references of the Cave 4 documents. For a list of messianic terms (some disputed), see C. A. Evans, “Are the ‘Son’ Texts at Qumran ‘Messianic’?: Reflections on 4Q369 and Related Scrolls,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 135-136.

92 J. D. G. Dunn, “Messianic Ideas and Their Influence on the Jesus of History,” in Charlesworth Messiah, 367. Dunn’s reference is to a royal, not a divine, messiah. See also Bateman, who believes “the conceptual sense of Yahweh’s covenant to David as a perpetual covenant for David’s descendants is clearly observed in early Jewish literature (4QFlor 1:1-13; 4QpGen* 5:1-7; Sir. 47:11, 22; Pss. Sol. 17:4, 21)” (Hermeneutics, 163; cf. 203). For J. Collins, “the Dead Sea Scrolls provide evidence of the messianic interpretation of several biblical texts which were also taken as messianic prophecies in other strands of Judaism” (“Messianism,” 132). Examples are Isa 11:1-5, Num 24, Gen 49 and 2 Sam 7.
this period was for a royal, Davidic, messiah, who would restore the kingdom of Israel!”

Nowhere in Dunn’s comprehensive summary of messianic texts is there mention of Psalm 110. Psalm 110 did not meet the needs or expectations of any pre-Christian Jewish group. The Hasmoneans, who had ancestral priestly prerogatives and non-Davidic kingly pretensions, would have shied away from Psalm 110 because of its ties to David. Jewish groups who rejected Hasmonean kingship would have avoided a text that suggested the kingship and priesthood might be combined in one individual. One such group would have been the Qumran community, for whom the psalm’s heralding of one individual as both king and Melchizedekian priest would not have been compatible with the “Two Messiah” scheme. Additionally, the availability of Psalm 2 to support renewed interest in the coming of a Davidic messiah may have minimized interest in Psalm 110 in the first-century BCE. Thus, although it may be true that “there is nothing in the psalm which … Jews could not have predicated of the messiah,” there is no evidence that any group did so. To draw conclusions about a messianic interpretation of Psalm 110 in first-century Judaism is at best speculative.

Our next step is to determine what of the Story to which Psalm 110 contributes is mediated by the implied NT speakers and authors to their implied audiences. Because the NT speakers/authors themselves may contribute to the interpretive history of Psalm 110:1, we present the NT quotations of this verse in roughly the order of their occurrence. Chronologically, the first speaker is Jesus.

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94 Neither is Ps 110 included in M. Bird’s compilation of “Old Testament Texts and Messianic Interpretations” (47).
95 For R. Watts, “it might be these two factors—sitting at God’s right hand and the Melchizedekian priest-king connection—that explain the relative absence of this text in intertestamental literature” (“The Psalms,” 37).
96 Hay believes “Christians of the earliest period neglected it [Ps 110] … because they knew that its meaning (and form) were disputed and because they could find other scriptural texts to support ideas of Jesus’ divine sonship (notably Ps 2.7; 2 Sam 7.14)” (Glory, 22).
97 Ibid., 30. Similarly, although Aloisi is correct that “nothing in the text of the psalm prohibits identifying this king-priest as the Messiah” (122), no evidence indicates the king-priest was so identified. Aloisi’s contention that “a directly messianic interpretation of Psalm 110:1 seems the most viable position” (122) is based on the fact that Jesus and the NT authors take the psalm as messianic. But, given the paucity of evidence concerning any pre-Christian use of Ps 110, we believe Jesus may have been the first to highlight a messianic interpretation of the Psalm. See pp. 162-166 below for further discussion.
98 We assume the Stories of Jesus and of the Church’s founding at Pentecost were transmitted orally before being committed to writing in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, respectively, and thus formed part of the mutual context of other NT authors. See Hays for the idea that although Paul is the first to document a christological reading of Ps 110:1 (in 1 Cor 15:25-27), it is likely “he is appealing to an already established tradition” (Echoes, 84).
Psalm 110:1 as Quoted by Jesus and Reported in the Synoptic Gospels

As reported in Matthew 22:44, Mark 12:36 and Luke 20:42-43, Jesus quoted the entirety of Psalm 110:1 as part of a teaching exchange. 100

The Locution

For convenience, we present NA 27 and the NRSV translation of the SACs from each Synoptic Gospel in Appendix B§4. 101 In Luke, the SAC is composed of three SAs: (i) Jesus’ opening question concerning what the scribes say about the identity of the Messiah, (ii) the quotation of Psalm 110:1, and (iii) Jesus’ final question concerning the identity of the Messiah as both David’s son and David’s Lord. Mark’s Gospel has an additional concluding SA describing the crowd’s reaction. Matthew adds an introductory interchange between Jesus and a group of Pharisees which Jesus initiates by posing a question to the Pharisees concerning the sonship of the Messiah. The Pharisees’ response that the Messiah is the son of David makes explicit what Mark and Luke imply in their presentation of Jesus’ opening question. In each Gospel, the quotation follows the form of Psalm 109:1 LXX closely 102 and Jesus’ final question runs along the lines of “if David calls him [the Messiah] Lord, how can he be his son?”

The Illocution

In each Gospel, Jesus is the implied speaker of the episode. 103 And in each case, the first “Lord” of the quoted oracle is Yahweh and identity of the second “Lord” (the implied hearer of the oracle) is the subject of Jesus’ initial question, i.e., the Messiah.

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99 Although for convenience we refer to the authors of the Synoptic Gospels as Matthew, Mark and Luke, it is not important for our purposes to assert that people with those names were the empirical authors or to adduce historical details about the empirical authors from other writings.


101 Each gospel has different teaching before this speech event. Afterwards, Mark and Luke present the episode of the poor widow’s gift, while Matthew lists a series of “woes” against the Pharisees. Therefore, although to broaden each SAC would give a Directive SA as the climax (“Watch out for the teachers of the law” in Mark 12:38; Luke 20:46a; Matt 23:3a), it would complicate our analysis unduly. So we limit our SACs to the verses which include the quotation.

102 All three quotations omit ό” before the first κύριος and Matthew and Mark use ύστοκάτω instead of the LXX ψωκάτω, which Luke retains. Matthew and Mark appear to be influenced here by “the association between Ps. cx. 1 and Ps. viii. 7” (W. R. G. Loader, “Christ at the Right Hand—Ps. cx. 1 in the New Testament,” NTS 24, no. 2 [January 1978]: 210n1).

103 This is a double-level quotation (the NT authors quote Jesus quoting Ps 109:1 LXX). Thus, we generally present the implied author and audience at both the episode and the discourse levels.
Discerning the implied audience is more complex. In Mark’s Gospel, Jesus is teaching in the Temple (12:35a), where his interlocutors have been, variously, οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι (11:27), τίνας τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ τῶν Ἡρωδιανῶν (12:13), Σαδδουκαίοι (12:18) and εἶς τῶν γραμματέων (12:28). It is not clear whether any of these are the direct addressees of Jesus’ question in v 35 or whether he is now speaking to πολὺς ὀχλος (v 37), as is the case beginning with v 38.\(^{105}\)

In Luke’s Gospel, Jesus addresses the Davidssohnfrage πρὸς αὐτούς (20:41). The previously referenced plural audiences are scribes (vv 39-40), Sadducees (vv 27-34) and the scribes and chief priests (vv 19-26), but it seems unlikely that Jesus would direct “how can they say?” to these groups. Rather it seems that λέγουσιν (v 41) refers to the scribes and chief priests while Jesus’ question is addressed to the people (τὸν λαόν) he is teaching (20:1; cf. 20:9).\(^{106}\) This would explain why Jesus finds it necessary to tell his audience that David said this in the Book of Psalms (v 42)—the scribes, chief priests and Sadducees would have known these basics about the quoted verses.

In Matthew’s Gospel, the direct addressees are Pharisees, with a group of Jewish overhearers or side participants (the disciples and the crowd; 23:1) also present. Here also, as overhearers/side participants, these groups are to be considered in evaluating the intended illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of this SAC.

In each Gospel, the first illocutionary act of the SAC is a question, which in Mark and Luke can be rephrased as a negative Assertive:\(^{107}\) “The scribes cannot say (λέγουσιν) that the Messiah is David’s son/the son of David” (Mark 12:35, Luke 20:41).

More details are given in Matthew’s account. There Jesus begins by asking the Pharisees whose son is the Messiah (Matt 22:41). When they answer, “The son of David” (Matt 22:42), Jesus builds on their answer to ask “How is it then that David by the Spirit calls him Lord …?”

\(^{104}\) Jesus remains in the temple until 13:1a (see Moloney, 229). It may be significant that Jesus comes closer in this episode “to revealing his identity in public” than he has earlier and “not incidental that he does so in the temple, which is to say in the place where people come to encounter their God and his truth and redemption” (Witherington, Mark, 331; cf. R. Watts, “The Psalms,” 44-45).

\(^{105}\) Mark 12:35 begins καὶ ἀποκριθείς, but the question to which Jesus is responding is not given.

\(^{106}\) J. B. Green makes a similar point (The Gospel of Luke [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997], 723). Nolland points out that “most likely, … we should think of address to the People” but v 45, in which Jesus addresses the disciples in the presence of the crowd, “raises the possibility of address to the disciples in the hearing of the People” (Luke 18, 972).

\(^{107}\) G. H. Guthrie points out that many rhetorical questions are semantically equivalent to “propositions,” i.e., Assertives (The Structure of Hebrews: A Text-Linguistic Analysis, first paperback ed. [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998], 62).
In each case, the apparent expectation of the scribes and Pharisees was that the messiah was to be a descendant (“son”) of David, who, with Yahweh’s help, would restore a powerful, independent kingdom of Israel on earth. This aligns with the Psalms of Solomon and the Qumran writings which refer to a Davidic messiah as well as with the metaphoric OT references to Yahweh raising “up for David a righteous Branch” (Jer 23:5, cf. Jer 33:15; Isa 11:1; Zech 3:8, 6:12). Jesus’ question signals that this existing scribal/Pharisaic interpretation of Scripture is going to be challenged in some way.

In all three Gospels, Jesus follows his question by quoting the oracle from Psalm 110:1 as the speech of David. This report is an Assertive. As it is framed in the various Gospels, different aspects of mutual context are created/activated. For example, Luke’s direct addressee, Theophilus, whether an actual person or a way to address Gentile “God-lovers,” had received “instruction” concerning Jesus, of whom he was a follower (cf. Luke 1:1-4), but he may have been less familiar with the Story of Yahweh and Yahweh’s Anointed. This would explain why Luke includes the information that Jesus tells the audience that David said this in the Book of Psalms (Luke 20:42). As Jews, Matthew’s audience would have been aware of the presumed connection of the Psalms to David and the Jewish expectations of a messiah who would ascend David’s throne. Mark’s audience also was “familiar with both the gospel traditions and the Judaism of the first century.” However, both Mark 12:35 and Matthew 22:43 report that Jesus tells his audience that David spoke “in” or “by” (ἐν) the Holy Spirit. This is apparently a reminder of David’s prophetic role.

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108 “In view of prophecies such as these, the scribal habit of referring to the Messiah as ‘son of David’ seems reasonable” (Evans, Mark, 272). D. H. Juel considers “the view of the scribes that ‘the Christ is David’s son’ may be a shorthand substitution for the actual citation of a passage like 2Sam 7:12-14” (“The Origin of Mark’s Christology,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 454). See M. Bird, 104-107, for a discussion of how Jesus seeing himself as king of God’s kingdom is to be understood messianically.

109 Evans points out that “on the face of it, this is a curious position [for Jesus] to adopt” (Mark, 272). For him, this supports the authenticity of Mark 12:35-37 (275).

110 Based on other ancient prefaces, J. Nolland suggests Theophilus is an individual, although “a symbolic significance for the name cannot be entirely ruled out” (Luke 1–9:20 [Dallas: Word Books, 1989], 10). Mallen, however, believes Luke writes more broadly to an audience of “Hellenistic Jewish Christians and/or Hellenistic Gentile Christians” who have been “associated with the Jewish synagogue” (163). If not the direct addressees, such a group would likely be overhearers.

111 Stein, 10. He believes “the original audience of Mark consisted primarily of gentile Christians,” possibly God-fearers, “but this cannot be proven” (Ibid.). In any case, “the intended audience would have some detailed knowledge of Jewish scripture” (Ahearne-Kroll, 28).

112 “The tradition of David’s being inspired and prophetic reaches back to the ancient Scriptures themselves” (Evans, Mark, 273, with reference to 2 Sam 23:2; 11QPs* 27:2–4, 11). M. J. J. Menken equates “speaking by the Spirit” to David speaking “as a prophet” as in Acts 2:30 (“The Psalms in Matthew’s Gospel,” in Moyise and Menken, 74). See the discussion below of Acts 2.
The framings of this episode indicate that a connection between messianic expectations and Psalm 110 may not have existed prior to this quotation by Jesus. Although Hay points out that “the universal opinion of early Christians that the psalm is messianic is readily explained if Jews of that period commonly took that view,” there is no evidence any first-century Jews did so. That some background about the Psalm is given in each Gospel also argues against Donald Juel’s contention that “Jesus’ question presumes his learned audience knows that Ps 110:1 refers to the Messiah; that interpretation does not have to be argued.” Rather, it appears Jesus creates—rather than simply activating—mutual context concerning Psalm 110, using the psalm’s Story-lines to point to a new kind of messiah. It is significant that all the implied authors include Jesus’ quotation of the entirety of Psalm 109:1 LXX, thus making it clear that David’s “Lord” is both the one given honor and authority via a seat at the right hand of Yahweh and “the one linked to God’s decisive intervention” against the enemies.

115 As Nolland points out, “There is no good evidence of a messianic understanding of the psalm prior to Jesus” (*Luke 18*, 973; cf. Witherington, *Mark*, 131n138; Dodd, 110; N. T. Wright, *Jesus and the Victory of God*, vol. 2 of *Christian Origins and the Question of God* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996], 508, 508n116; and Moyise, *Writings*, 146. Moyise makes a good argument for Jesus as the originator of this speech event: “Had this dialogue been invented by the early Church, one might have expected Jesus’ identification with the figure addressed in the psalm to be more explicit” (*Jesus*, 109).
116 On the basis that “in all other NT citations of this verse the emphasis lies on the second or third part of the line,” D. Johansson objects to an “interpretation that the citation speaks of Yahweh designating one to rule” (“Kyrios in the Gospel of Mark,” *JSNT* 33, no. 1 [September 2010]: 116n61; cf. Stein, 570). But the quotation of the entire verse by all three implied authors negates this argument. Furthermore, “Mark’s readers have already been introduced” to the honor of the seat ἐκ δεξιῶν by “James and John’s ill-timed request in 10:35-40” (Evans, *Mark*, 273; cf. Matt 20:20-21) and this Story-line of Ps 110:1 is alluded to again at Jesus’ trial (see below).
117 Nolland, *Luke 18*, 971. As Watts points out, “if the significance of messianic identity was the only issue in question the first strophe of Ps. 110:1 would have sufficed” (“The Psalms,” 40; cf. Marcus, *Way*, 134). Although the identity of the enemies remains vague, Witherington’s suggestion that “the motif of combat and victory may allude to Jesus’ verbal victories over his scribal foes” (*Mark*, 333-334) seems quite tame. Marcus’ thoughts regarding Mark 8:29-30 seem relevant here. He points out that both Jesus and Peter have accepted that Jesus is the Messiah; “the point at issue is exactly how his messianic victory over the forces of evil will be accomplished. For Peter, steeped in traditional versions of Davidic messiahship, the struggle anticipated is one in which victory will be accomplished through a military assault on flesh-and-blood enemies (cf. the Qumran War Scroll). … For Jesus, however, the messianic victory will in the first instance be a cosmic one over supernatural foes (cf. 1:24; 3:23-27), and it will be achieved not by a conventional battle but by death and resurrection” (*Mark*, 614). This is contra Ahearne-Kroll, who believes that Mark denies “the epithet ‘Son of David’ for the Messiah” and thereby also “denies the association of the Messiah with the earthly, bellicose characteristics most likely evoked by this title. … In this case, the earthly, militaristic images evoked by the ‘Son of David’ are downplayed and denied, but the royal imagery is still upheld by the quotation of Ps 110:1” (164).

Jesus’ final SA is also a question: “How can he (the Messiah) be his (David’s) son if David calls him ‘Lord’?” This question also can be rephrased as an Assertive: Since David calls the Messiah “Lord,” the Messiah cannot (merely) be David’s son.\footnote{While “the most natural reading of the concluding question of Mark 12:37 is that it expects a negative answer” (Marcus, \textit{Way}, 152), the co-text makes it clear that the situation is not so simple.}

Given the broader co-text, Jesus’ question cannot be taken to imply that the Messiah was not “Son of David.”\footnote{Contra Shaw, who believes Jesus “denies the Davideic descent of the Messiah (12.35-37)” (225; cf. 191, 218); Moloney, who contends “David cannot possibly be the father of the Messiah because … a person cannot be ‘father’ of his ‘lord’” (243; cf. 243n148); and Bock, who argues that for David to call his own descendant his Lord would have been “a very unusual designation in a patriarchal culture” (\textit{Proclamation}, 183), we agree it is “highly unlikely” Jesus “is questioning the popular assumption that the Christ would be a son of David” (Watts, “The Psalms,” 39; cf. Evans, “Praise,” 563n28). Since the Synoptists “show no embarrassment in combining this episode with an affirmation of Davideic descent,” we must “leave the possibility open that from the beginning no denial of Davideic descent was intended” (Nolland, \textit{Luke I-III}, 971). Furthermore, “the scribal habit of referring to the Messiah as the ‘son of David’” does not necessarily imply “he is in some sense subordinate or inferior to David” (Evans, “Praise,” 563). For Moyise, “all that is required is the recognition that a descendant of David (the Messiah) will be greater than David, though one should not underestimate the size of that claim” (\textit{Jesus}, 109).}

All the implied authors of the Gospels have already presented Jesus as “the son of David.”\footnote{Stein makes the reasonable argument that “it would be unlikely that the early church, which took for granted that Jesus the Messiah was the Son of David, would create an account that appears to question this. The Davideic lineage of Jesus and the Messiah does not seem to have been an issue in the Jewish-Christian debates or within the Christian community” (568).}

In Matthew, this happens in the very first verse. Similarly, in Luke, the angel tells Mary that her child will receive τὸν θρόνον Δαυὶδ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ (1:32; cf. 1:69, 2:4). Jesus is addressed as “Son of David” by a blind man or men earlier in each Gospel (Mark 10:46-48, Luke 18:38-39, Matt 9:27, 20:30-31).\footnote{Nowhere in Mark’s gospel is “there a suggestion that Jesus is not the ‘Son of David’” (Juel, “Origin,” 454; cf. Stein, 569). Additionally, “Luke’s repeated emphasis on Jesus’ Davideic descent (Lk. 1.27, 32, 69; 2.4; 3.31) rules out the possibility that the question is meant to deny the messiah’s Davideic origin” (Strauss, 317; cf. 197-198).}

In each case, a
crowd hears Jesus called "Son of David" and is aware that Jesus does not challenge this title. In Matthew, Jesus’ miraculous healing of a blind mute prompts the crowd to query, “Can this be the Son of David?” (Matt 12:22-23). Later, as Jesus rides into Jerusalem, the crowd shouts “Hosanna to the Son of David!” (Matt 21:9; cf. Mark 11:9-10 where the crowd also refers to “the coming kingdom of our father David”). Thus, since Jesus never rejects the title “Son of David,” it seems likely that at the episode level also his disciples and most, if not all, the rest of his audience would have understood that Jesus considered himself the “Son of David,” whether or not they were willing to accord him that title.

The implied authors have already made it clear that Jesus also is the Messiah. Matthew and Mark refer to Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in their opening verses. In Luke, Jesus is named χριστός and also called σωτήρ and κύριος in 2:11 by the angel announcing his birth to the Bethlehem shepherds. Luke refers to the adult Jesus as χριστός in 4:41. Additionally, all the implied authors have presented the episode in which Jesus asks his disciples, “But who do you say that I am?” (Matt 16:15, Mark 8:29a, Luke 9:20). When Peter replies, “You are the Messiah [ὁ χριστός]” (Mark 8:29; cf. Matt 16:16, Luke 9:20), Jesus does not reject the title (see especially Matt 16:17). At the point of the Davidssohnfrage, Jesus has made no explicit messianic claims, at the episode

Matthew reports two incidents in which Jesus heals blind men who appeal to the “Son of David” (Matt 9:27, 20:30-31). In the first, the blind men disobey Jesus’ injunction to not tell anyone about their healing. Perhaps the news they spread (Matt 9:31) included that he did not reject the title “Son of David.”

Evans believes “rumors that Jesus was some sort of ‘son of David’ probably arose from his ministry of healing and exorcism. The association of ‘Solomon, son of David’ with healing and exorcism is attested in the Testament of Solomon, which dates to the end of the first century c.e.” (Mark, 275). But this does not fully account for the references to Jesus as son/Son of David in Matt 1:1 and Luke 2.

In the parallel account in Luke 19, there is no “Hosanna!” and no mention of David. Jesus is promised “the throne of his father David” in Luke 1:32 as part of the announcement to Mary (see n127) and Jesus’ genealogy includes “of David” (Luke 3:31; cf. Matt. 1:6). Moreover, Davies is wrong that “Son of David” never occurs in Luke; it appears in the story of the blind man (Luke 18:38, 39). However, “of all New Testament writers it is Matthew who most emphasizes that Jesus is of Davidic ancestry” (Davies, 500). Even a Gentile woman cries out to Jesus as “Lord, Son of David” in Matt 15:22.

For Juel, the “major focus” of Christian “interpretations of Israel’s Scriptures … was Jesus, the crucified and risen Messiah” (Messianic Exegesis, 1). Although “there is no attempt to identify Jesus as the ‘Lord’ of the Psalm” (Moyise, Writings, 86), M. Bird (chapter 3) gives a convincing demonstration of the weaknesses inherent in the various arguments denying Jesus’ messianic self-understanding.

Many ancient sources add υἱοῦ θεοῦ in Mark 1:1. With regard to Mark, M. Bird believes that “the whole context of Jesus’s entry [into Jerusalem]—precursors, content, sequel, result—all point in the direction of a messianic claim” (126). As “precursors,” M. Bird includes the Davidssohnfrage and also Jesus’ earlier action in the Temple (Mark 11:15-17). However, as Donahue and Harrington point out, “From the opening of the gospel, readers know that Jesus is the ‘Messiah.’ What awaits full disclosure is the kind of Messiah Jesus is” (29).

level, the disciples would have believed Jesus considered himself the Messiah.\textsuperscript{129} And if they disobeyed Jesus’ injunction to keep the messianic secret (Matt 16:20, Mark 8:30, Luke 9:21),\textsuperscript{130} others may have also heard this news.

Some argue “Psalm 110 is invoked to make the point that Jesus is not the Davidic messiah, that he stands for a different messianic hope.”\textsuperscript{131} But since the \textit{Davidssohnfrage} activates the already established mutual context of Jesus’ identity as Son of David and as Messiah, it is more likely that Jesus instead is subtly informing his audience that Davidic messiahship is not going to be what the religious experts were expecting. Jesus’ messiahship is “more than” the traditional expectations of the Davidic messiah”;\textsuperscript{132} the Messiah is “more than” the heir to the Davidic monarchy. Via the quotation of Psalm 110:1 and its metaphors, Jesus signals to his audience that what was expected of the Messiah, that is, that he would occupy David’s earthly throne, did not correspond to the full reality of Yahweh’s Messiah. As David’s Lord (κυρίῳ ἡου), the Messiah is more than David’s biological son or descendant.\textsuperscript{133} He is David’s “Lord”; his honor and authority and even his kingdom are in some way greater than David’s.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{129} In Matt 12:42 and Luke 11:31, Jesus has also made the self-reference as “someone [something] greater than Solomon.” N. T. Wright finds that “for Jesus to compare himself with Solomon, to the latter’s disadvantage, was to stake a definite messianic claim” (Jesus, 535).

\textsuperscript{130} With regard to Mark, M. Bird believes Jesus responds to Peter’s confession with an injunction to secrecy because Jesus is moving “along the thread of a different messianic story, one related to the enigmatic ‘Son of Man’” (120). We discuss this in the following section.


\textsuperscript{132} Strauss, 30; cf. J. Green, \textit{Luke}, 724; Bock, \textit{Proclamation}, 132; M. Bird, 107; Broer, 2:1254. This is substantively different from the claim that “the Jesus known to us from the New Testament simply does not fit the profile of the Davidic Messiah which was espoused by many Jews of his time” (J. H. Charlesworth, “Introduction: Messianic Ideas in Early Judaism,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 6). As Thiselton cogently argues, “It was important that an understanding of Jesus, seen in his words and in his completed work, should govern interpretations of conventional ‘messianic’ language, rather than that ready-made assumptions about the meaning of such language should govern an understanding of Jesus” (\textit{New Horizons}, 287).

\textsuperscript{133} “The challenge to this normal understanding of the Son of David (cf. Ps. Sol. 17.21) in [Mark] 12:35-37 is not that this is an incorrect understanding of Jesus Christ, but that it is an inadequate one. … The NT understanding of the person and work of Jesus does not deny that he is the Son of David (Matt. 1:1, 17, 20; 9:27; 12:23; 15:22; Luke 1:27, 32, 69; 2:4, 11; Acts 13:22-23; Rom. 1:3; 2 Tim. 2:8; Rev. 5:5; 22:16). It points out that he is this and more” (Stein, 495; cf. R. Watts, “The Psalms,” 39, and Marcus, \textit{Mark}, 848, and \textit{Way}, 145). In Luke also, “there is something bigger here than can be contained in merely Davidic categories” (Nolland, \textit{Luke} 18, 973). Witherington explains it well: “Is Jesus here repudiating the Davidic origins of Messiah, as some have suggested? This seems unlikely, since elsewhere he doesn’t repudiate the title Son of David, but he may well have repudiated certain popular early Jewish notions about the Davidic Messiah, for instance, that he would simply be a normal, though God-empowered, human being like David himself. It is best to say that Jesus is repudiating the adequacy, not the accuracy, of assessing the Messiah by means of his Davidic descent. The point is that in Jesus’ view the Messiah is more than, not other than, Son of David” (Mark, 333; cf. 52n150).

\textsuperscript{134} “Unless it was [sic] true, it would be peculiar to refer to one’s own son as greater than oneself” (Donahue and Harrington, 360) since “normal conventions would have the son showing honor to his father rather than vice versa” (J. Green, \textit{Luke}, 724; cf. D. A. Hagner, \textit{Matthew 14-28} [Dallas: Word
The tellability of this SAC stems from its contradiction of the beliefs/expectations of the legal experts (either present or referred to) and of those who rely on their expertise (the crowds). The quotation itself is tellable because it sheds new light on the relationship between David, David’s heirs and the Messiah. And, by presenting his thought that the coming Messiah would not be what was expected in the form of a question, Jesus promotes involvement in his listeners.\textsuperscript{135}

Each Gospel ends the SAC differently. Like his introduction, Luke’s ending is the briefest; he concludes with Jesus’ question (20:44) and gives no indication of the response of the audience. Mark comments that “the large crowd was listening to him with delight.” This may be the crowd’s appreciation of Jesus’ ability to confound the legal experts, rather than an affirmation of Jesus’ message. In Matthew, the audience disengages. Jesus’ audience was not able to answer (οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο ἀποκριθῆναι) the question, “nor from that day did anyone dare to ask him any more questions” (Matt 22:46).\textsuperscript{136} The implication is that the direct addressees are either unwilling to be put in a position of feeling ignorant by asking further questions or so uncomfortable with the direction Jesus’ thoughts are taking that they are unwilling to pursue this topic.\textsuperscript{137}

The second option seems quite likely. The Jewish leaders (and the crowds) could have answered Jesus’ question a number of different ways. They could have denied that the passage had anything to do with the Messiah, but they did not. If they had understood “my Lord” as a reference to David or Solomon, the Jewish leaders could have explained that the primary or perhaps exclusive referent of “my lord” was a historical king, and therefore resolved the dilemma. But they did not.\textsuperscript{138}

Although Aloisi believes “their silence conceded Jesus’ point,”\textsuperscript{139} it seems as plausible that the Jewish leaders among the direct addressees were unwilling to enter into any

\textsuperscript{135} This is not what Amador suggests is common in the NT: “The pronouncements are legitimated strictly by appeal to the assumed authority of Jesus himself” (147).

\textsuperscript{136} “Anyone” apparently did not include the disciples, since they ask Jesus theological questions in Matt 24:3 and again in 26:8. In Mark and Luke, the comment that “they no longer dared to ask him another question” (Luke 20:40; cf. Mark 12:34) concludes the episode prior to the Davidssohnfrage.

\textsuperscript{137} The religious authorities’ silence may also hearken back to their fear of the people, which each gospel has recently highlighted (Matt 21:23-27, Mark 11:27-33, Luke 20:1-8).

\textsuperscript{138} Aloisi, 120-121; cf. E. Johnson, 432-433. That “Jesus and the Jewish leaders agreed that Psalm 110:1 was a direct prophecy about the Messiah” (Aloisi, 121; cf. E. Johnson, 433) goes too far. \textsuperscript{139} Aloisi, 121. Similarly, S. J. Kistemaker contends Jesus gave “the correct interpretation and application of the psalm, which the Pharisees were unable to refute” (“Psalm 110 in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in Penny, 141; cf. J. Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Bletchley: Paternoster, 2005), 917. However, Jesus’ “interpretation and
further discussion of the Messiah that might bring into the conversation the priestly references of Psalm 110’s second oracle.

In any event, what “more than Messiah” means is left undefined by Jesus and the implied authors. Not only is the son/Lord question left unanswered, Jesus’ role/identity remains implicit. The *Davidssohnfrage* is “a provocative remark designed to open up the question of the nature of the hoped-for ultimate intervention of God in the affairs of his People” — a question which cannot “be separated from the question of Jesus’ own relationship to the fulfillment of the hoped-for kingdom of God.” At the end of this episode, these questions remain unresolved. The *Davidssohnfrage* is not a complete teaching; rather, with it Jesus initiates a transformation that continues to unfold during his trial and is subsequently moved forward by other NT authors. The Analytic reader understands both the questions which are being raised and what challenges to the existing interpretation of Story are posed by those questions. An Analytic reader also understands that the resolution of this issue remains in the future.

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Application” are at best implicit; it is unclear whether the Pharisees were unable to respond to Jesus or simply chose not to.

140 “Jesus provides no immediate resolution of the enigma he poses” (J. Green, *Luke*, 724; cf. M. Bird, 132; Witherington, *Mark*, 333). Nor do the implied authors of the gospels draw any explicit conclusions. However, according to Witherington, “The implication … seems to be that the scribes’ notion of Messiah is far too mundane. He is a much greater figure than the original David, not merely a chip off the old block. Indeed, he is a transcendent figure, exercising lordship over even David” (Ibid.).

141 Nolland, *Luke O18*, 972. As Keener points out, “Given the environment in which Jesus ministered, he had to know that his teachings about the kingdom and some of his actions would lead to speculation about his messianic character” (1:968).

142 Thus, it is premature to conclude that “the point of Jesus’ speech is evident. The messiah … must be a heavenly ruler who shall also be David’s Lord, not his son and subordinate” (Eskola, 180). The same is true for E. Johnson’s assertion regarding Mark 12:35-37 that Jesus’ “interpretation of Psalm 110:1 establishes ‘my lord’ as a reference by David to Christ as deity” (432; emphasis added; cf. Keener, 1:962, regarding Luke; and Hagner, 651, regarding Matthew). *Contra* the claim that “‘Lord’ (*kýrios*)” was “a title that at least in Jewish circles placed him on a level with the ‘Lord’ who is God” (Donahue and Harrington, 361; cf. Marcus, *Mark*, 850), “there is no basis for speaking of a ‘divine predicate’ in connection with the use of ‘lord’ in the pericope” (Nolland, *Luke 18*, 971). Even Brawley’s more restrained use of “exalted” to describe the messiah outpaces the development of Story to this point (86). It is possible, however, that Jesus’ divine sonship may be alluded to. The argument that “the emphatic placement of *oĩnnoi* in [Mark] 12:37b … implies that Jesus is the son of someone other than David” and “the logical candidate is God” (Marcus, *Way*, 141; cf. Evans, “Praise,” 564; Broer, 2:1258) would apply also to Luke’s Gospel. But along with numerous other scholars (see n119 and n133 above), we reject Marcus’ implication that this denies Jesus’ Davidic sonship.

Unfortunately, we do not have space to explore here Johansson’s thoughts about the relevance of the quotation of the Shema (Deut 6:4) in Mark 12:29 to the relationship between the *Davidssohnfrage* and Jewish monotheism (118-119). We do note that “in Mark’s eyes, … the picture of the figure enthroned at God’s right hand does not refute the statement that God is one” (Marcus, *Way*, 145). Nor can we investigate Donahue and Harrington’s interesting contention that “in the Roman empire *kýrios* was also used as a title for the emperor. And so for early Christians to proclaim Jesus as ‘Lord’ could be taken to suggest that the emperor is not” (361).
The Perlocution

The intended perlocution is a disruption of the beliefs of the implied audiences (both Jesus’ audiences and the implied readers of the Gospels) concerning the identity of the Messiah. Jesus’ questions, which do not cast doubt on a messianic hope, make it plain that the Messiah is not to be as expected, that is, the Messiah is to be more than an earthly king who would assume David’s throne.

The implied hearers at the episode level of each Gospel would be aware that a key element of the religious belief system was now in flux. A transformation of Story, lifeworld and theology has been initiated, although not completed, and mutual context is altered. The same is true at the discourse level. The implied readers of the Gospels would have understood this SAC to intend the transformation of the existing understanding of the Story of Israel’s coming messiah. In each Gospel, this SAC prepares the way for further lifeworld/worldview transformation. This is therefore a critical point in the transformation of the Story of God’s work among God’s people and in creation through Jesus Christ. The Envisaging empirical reader prepares to continue to be transformed as Story and theology evolve.143

The “Son of Man” Seated at the Right Hand of God

The Davidssohnfrage episode is not complete in itself. Whether “Jesus’ concluding question implies an answer to the problem he poses,” the “solution” continues to develop in subsequent events, beginning with Jesus’ speech before the Sanhedrin (Matt 26:64, Mark 14:62, Luke 22:69). In each Gospel, a religious authority (in Matthew and Mark, the high priest; in Luke, the Sanhedrin) asks Jesus whether he is the Messiah and Jesus’ response includes an obviously tellable Assertive (a Predictive) that his audience will see him, i.e., the “Son of Man,” seated at the right hand of (the) power (τῆς δυνάἡεως).146 Although not a marked quotation, the Gospel authors no doubt intend their “readers to see Psalm 110 in Jesus’ response.”147

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143 The same options are available to modern readers. Although not the original addressees, by choosing to read, they become side participants and can be Envisaging readers.


145 This is not a promise, since promises are “acts of obligating oneself” (Bach and Harnish, 50). That the Assertive is tellable can be seen in the reaction of the hearers, who charge blasphemy, condemn Jesus as deserving death, have him beaten and turn him over to the Roman authorities. It therefore is odd that Moloney does not include Mark 14:62 among the “significant turning points in the story” (16).

146 Luke adds τοῦ θεοῦ to τῆς δυνάἡεως, making the source of honor and messiahship explicit. A. Y. Collins’ argument that Jesus did not identify himself as the Son of Man but rather understood the one like a son of man “as a heavenly being, perhaps an angel, and associated his own teaching and
To describe “the Christ” in the query concerning Jesus’ identity, Matthew and Luke append “Son of God” and Mark includes “Son of the Blessed One” (Matt 26:63; Luke 22:67, 70; Mark 14:61).\textsuperscript{146} Earlier in each Gospel, Jesus is identified as Son of God by the narrator (Mark 1:1, Luke 3:38), an angel (Luke 1:35), the devil (Matt 4:3, 6; Luke 4:3, 9) and certain demons (Matt 8:29; Mark 3:11; Luke 4:41, 8:28). But, except for Matthew 14:43 and 16:16, this is the first time Jesus is named “Son of God” by the religious authorities or so names himself. However, \textit{contra} Marcus and Witherington, the title “Son of God” does not necessarily imply Jesus’ divinity.\textsuperscript{149} Witherington

\textsuperscript{146} T. J. Geddert, “The Use of Psalms in Mark,” \textit{Baptistische Theologie} 1, no. 2 (Autumn 2009): 116, http://www.ibts.eu/files/research/baptistic-theologies-1-2.pdf (accessed July 19, 2013), with regard to Mark. M. Bird notes that the OT “formed the interpretive grid through which the story of Jesus’ passion was interpreted, rather than comprising the creative pool from which the story was created” (75).

\textsuperscript{147} The wording differs in each case. Because “the trial scenes are regarded as historically dubious and loaded with Christian theology, and Jesus’s reply to Caiaphas is markedly different in all four Gospels … the historicity of the scene in Mark 14:61-66-64 is disputed” (M. Bird, 136). See M. Bird (137-140) for arguments in favor of the authenticity of the passage. One of the most telling is that it is Jesus’ opponents who raise the issue of Jesus’ messiahship at his trial (cf. J. Collins, \textit{Scepter} 204).

\textsuperscript{148} Marcus contends that in Mark 14:62, where “the title ‘Son of God’ is brought into close connection with Ps. 110:1, … the title is thus seen as implying commensurability with God” and Mark thereby implies Jesus’ “participation in the divine majesty” (\textit{Way}, 143, 144). Although he does admit “Mark stops short of taking such stories to their logical conclusion and calling Jesus God” (Ibid., 145), both he and Bullock feel that the declaration of Jesus as God is the “logical deduction” (Bullock, 185). D. A. Brueggemann goes further in arguing that “anyone actually claiming to be called ‘lord’ (\textit{kyrios}) with ‘right hand’ status in the heavenly throne room could fairly be claiming divinity” (“The Evangelists and the Psalms,” in Firth and Johnston, 268). All of these overreach. Similarly, although R. V. G. Tasker is correct that “Jesus seems to be saying in effect ‘I am not the kind of Messiah that you suppose Me to be, … but nevertheless I am the Messiah,’” we disagree with his conclusion that Jesus is claiming, “This exaltation will be the prelude to My coming as the divine Judge in the role depicted by Daniel” (\textit{The Gospel According to St. Matthew: An Introduction and Commentary} [Leicester: Inter-Varsity; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961], 254; cf. Witherington, \textit{Mark}, 384).

We also do not find compelling S. J. Gathercole’s argument that as early as the \textit{Davidssohnfrage} episodes, “the clear implication … is that Jesus is not so much son of David as Son of God. … The principal reason for this is that just as the Jesus of the Gospels supplies Ps. 110.1 as support for the idea that the Messiah cannot be David’s son—and therefore can lay claim to being Son of God—so also Ps. 110.3 and 4 would have been understood by the readers of the Gospels in much the same way and would have been taken to imply the preexistence of the Messiah” (\textit{The Preexistent Son: Recovering the Christologies of Matthew, Mark, and Luke} [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006], 236; cf. 294). As we have noted, Ps 110:3 (Ps 109:3 LXX) is not quoted in the NT and there is no way to know how this verse was read in the first century CE. Gathercole bases his assumption that Ps 109:3 LXX is in view in the quotation of the prior two verses on the argument that “since the Psalms were sung as part of Jewish worship, they would most likely be known as wholes: the first line cited in the Gospels would be very likely to suggest the rest of this short Psalm” (238). If Jesus or the Gospel authors had intended to evoke v 3, there would have been no reason not to include it in their quotations.

Rather, although “to be ‘Son of God’ is an exalted status and relationship to God experienced by the messiah (cf. at [Luke] 3:22; 1:26-38), … the words should be taken as no more than a synonym for
himself points out that “one source for messianic thinking about Messiah as God’s Son was Ps. 2, perhaps coupled with 2 Sam. 7:14” and these “texts do not really imply the divinity of the person in question.”

Matthew and Mark add that the Son of Man will be seen coming “on” (Matt: ἐπί) or “with” (Mark: μετά) the clouds of heaven. “Coming with the clouds of heaven” is a clear link to Daniel 7:13 and the presentation of “one like a son of man” before the Ancient of Days. Although we cannot undertake a full evaluation of Daniel 7:13, we note that a connection between the Son of Man and the Messiah has already been placed into mutual context in all three Gospels via Peter’s reference to Jesus as the Messiah and Jesus’ subsequent self-reference as the Son of Man (Matt 16:13-16, Mark 8:29-38, Luke 9:18-21). And in Matthew 24:30 and Mark 13:26, Jesus alludes to Daniel 7:13 to contrast the Son of Man with false messiahs.

Whether this comparison

‘messiah’” (Nolland, Luke 18, 1111, referring to Luke 22:70). This is supported by I. Knohl, who looks at several pre-Christian examples and concludes that in those cases “the claim to be the ‘son of God’ … was a political tool for supporting a ruler in his struggle with his enemies” (“Religion and Politics in Psalm 2,” in S. Paul et al., 726; cf. J. J. Collins, for whom a messianic reading of the “Son of God” text [4Q246] would present “the Davidean/royal messiah … as a warrior to subdue the Gentiles” (“Jesus, Messianism and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 111)). This is highly reminiscent of what is said of “my lord” in Ps 109:1c-2b LXX.

L. W. Hurtado helpfully points out that in “biblical and Jewish traditions … divine sonship did not necessarily connote divinity. In these traditions divine sonship language was applied to the divinely chosen king, the devout, righteous individual, and to Israel collectively, particularly in the Second Temple period; in these cases divine sonship connoted special favor and relationship with God” (Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 22). Witherington, Mark, 384; cf. J. Collins, “Jesus,” 110-111. Although Luke does not use “clouds” language here (which Moyise feels “makes the link with Daniel 7:13 much less explicit” [Jesus, 64]), all three Synoptics have previously referred to the Son of Man coming in the clouds (Matt 24:30 [ἐπί]; Mark 13:26 and Luke 21:27 [ἐν]). Whether there is christological significance to ἐπί vs. μετά is debated (see J. E. Goldingay, Daniel [Dallas: Word, 2002], 171, and Bock, “Blasphemy,” 76). However, since the “preposition ἐπί, ‘with,’ is variously rendered” in the versions of Dan 7:13 and “the OG has the ‘one like a son of man’ come on rather than with the clouds” (J. Collins, Daniel, 311, 8), it seems likely the gospels simply reflect different Greek readings of the OT. In any event, it is unwarranted to say that “since elsewhere it is only God who travels on the clouds … the Son of Man is portrayed as a divine being as he approaches the Ancient of Days’ throne” (Beale, NT Theology, 192; cf. Witherington, Mark, 385). Nor is Donahue and Harrington’s argument compelling that the description of “this figure … as being ‘like’ a human being suggests that it is something else—most likely an angel, probably Michael (see Dan 12:1)” (374, where they do see that “in the Markan context, … the Son of Man is Jesus”). We agree with Ahearne-Kroll that “the one like a son of man is not God, but he receives the authority to reign in the same way as God reigns” (165n81).

It is not clear whether “the figure is ascending or descending or moving horizontally” (J. Collins, Daniel, 311; cf. Marcus, Mark, 1008). Contra Goldingay (Daniel, 190), it cannot be determined that “the humanlike figure … comes unequivocally from heaven.” We know only that the one like a son of man, now certainly Jesus (see Donahue and Harrington, 27), ends up in Yahweh’s presence.

Witherington suggests “the interesting prospect that Jesus, who repeatedly identified himself as the Son of Man, read his own destiny out of some of the stories in Daniel” (Mark, 269).

Luke 21:27 contains a similar allusion to Dan 7:13 without the contrast between false messiahs and the true messiah. Bock’s argument that Luke removes the reference to Dan 7 in Luke 22 in order to “stress the present session of Jesus, not to the exclusion of the parousia, but as a guarantee of it (Luke 21.27; Acts 1.9-11; 3.19-21)” (Proclamation, 142) is not compelling.
was initiated by Jesus is uncertain. In any event, as was the case earlier in each Gospel with regard to the quotation from Psalm 110:1 as it connected the Son of David to the “more than” Messiah, in both Matthew’s and Mark’s gospels it is Jesus who links the one exalted to God’s right hand (Psalm 110:1), the Son of Man coming on/in the clouds (Dan 7:13) and the Messiah. As also was true earlier, Jesus’ self-definition as the “Son of Man” qualifies Davidic messianism but does not necessarily supersede it.

Jesus’ audience’s understanding of his identity is enhanced through this episode, and the meaning of “Messiah” is clarified for the implied readers of the Gospels. That the high priest takes Jesus’ words as blasphemy indicates that with “the quoted material from Dan 7:13 and the allusion to Ps 110:2,” Jesus is portrayed as “more than the Messiah as a merely human agent.” In Jesus’ claim to be Son of Man and in his acclaim as Son of God, the implied audiences on both levels see a clearer picture of

155 Some argue for a first-century messianic interpretation of “Son of Man” (cf. Marcus, Mark, 1007; A. Collins, “Influence,” 96). M. Bird argues that “the son of man figure of Dan. 7 … was occasionally interpreted as messianic in pockets of pre-Christian Judaism, and Jesus’s employment of the phrase taps into this background” (84; cf. his chapter 4). J. T. Pennington believes “Second Temple Judaism was already reading this text [Dan 7:13] messianically (e.g., 1 Enoch; 4 Ezra; 4Q246 2.1-10; 4Q174, 4Q252)” and that it thus “was easy for early Christianity to do the same, applied to the person of Jesus” (“Refractions of Daniel in the Gospel of Matthew,” in Thematic Studies, ed. C. A. Evans and H. D. Zacharias, vol. 1 of Early Christian Literature and Intertextuality [London: T&T Clark, 2009], 72).

We find the counter-arguments more compelling. According to Goldingay, “the grounds for identifying the humanlike figure as the Davideic anointed are circumstantial” (Daniel, 169). Aune points out that “in pre-Christian Judaism there was no concept of ‘the Son of man’ as an eschatological heavenly redeemer figure. The Jewish and Christian texts which use the Son of man designation in a titular sense all date from the last half of the first century C. E.” (410; cf. Hurtado, 19). For Hengel, “leider wissen wir nichts über die Auslegung von Ps 110 und Dan 7 in Qumran” (160). Attridge finds “the only clear case of the Jewish use of the title ‘Son of Man’ for God’s eschatological agent is the parable section of Enoch. … It remains problematic whether these passages, which are probably to be dated in the first century CE, provide any evidence for the background of the NT use of the title” (Hebrews, 73n45). Thus, J. Collins’ finding that “the two earliest Jewish interpretations of Daniel 7 had begun already in the Hasmonean period” (Scepter, 188; cf. M. Bird, 91) is speculative. Rather, Stein’s conclusion that “the title ‘Son of Man’ was almost certainly not a popular ‘messianic’ title in first-century Judaism” (281) appears correct.

156 M. Bird believes Jesus may have originated the linking of these texts (139; cf. Evans, Mark, 451). Whether Jesus’ prediction refers to the exaltation or the second coming is debated. For the former, see Aune, 422. For the latter, see J. Collins, Daniel, 307, and Bock, Proclamation, 141-142. We adopt Eskola’s position that these themes may be related since it is “logical to conclude that a heavenly dominion of Christ was considered as a necessary premise for an idea of parousia” (281).

157 For this, see Evans, Mark, 274. Whether the one like a son of man in Daniel is a symbol for or representative of faithful Israel is much debated (cf. Marcus, Way, 169, 171; Beale, NT Theology, 193; Koester, 215) but our analysis is consistent with either understanding.

158 Hagner, 800. For the idea that “the word ἐξουσίας, ‘Power,’” in Mark 14:62 may have been “suggested by LXX Ps 109:2,” see Evans, Mark, 452. For the idea that Jesus is accusing his opponents “of being Yahweh’s enemies,” see R. E. Watts, “The Psalms,” 41, and “The Lord’s House and David’s Lord: The Psalms and Mark’s Perspective on Jesus and the Temple,” BibInt 15 [2007]: 320.
what his “more than” messiahship looks like. Combining the metaphors from Psalm 110 and Daniel 7 both activates in mutual context and emphasizes the honor and authority given to the Messiah, Jesus.

The perlocutionary intent of the allusions to the core metaphor of Psalm 110:1 and to Daniel 7:13 is that the belief system of the Envisaging hearers/readers be transformed to understand the nature of the messiahship of Jesus, i.e., that he is the climactic and ultimate fulfillment of Yahweh’s promises to David and the people of Israel. In turn, this modifies the Story of the people of God and their lifeworld/worldview and theology. We see some results of this plus further development of Jesus’ identity as we move to Luke’s report of Peter’s quotation of Psalm 110:1 in Acts 2. The perlocutionary intent of the allusions to the core metaphor of Psalm 110:1 and to Daniel 7:13 is that the belief system of the Envisaging hearers/readers be transformed to understand the nature of the messiahship of Jesus, i.e., that he is the climactic and ultimate fulfillment of Yahweh’s promises to David and the people of Israel. In turn, this modifies the Story of the people of God and their lifeworld/worldview and theology. We see some results of this plus further development of Jesus’ identity as we move to Luke’s report of Peter’s quotation of Psalm 110:1 in Acts 2.

Psalm 110:1 as Quoted by Peter and Reported in Acts 2:34-35

In Acts 2:34-35, Luke reports that Peter quoted the entirety of Psalm 110:1 in his Pentecost speech (a speech event). Some scholars call this “simple Scripture proof” or “a direct prophecy fulfilled,” but we find this quotation to be a key element of the transformation of Story as it pertains to Jesus’ messiahship.

159 Contra Nolland who finds that “Jesus has stopped short of directly claiming to be the Son of Man who is to be exalted to royal dignity in heaven” (Luke 18, 1110; cf. Matthew, 1132), we believe Jesus’ words do have that import (and Nolland agrees Jesus’ “words are more than suggestive of this possibility” [Luke 18, 1110]). R. Watts points out that in “his first public affirmation of messianic identity (Mark 14:62), Jesus’ second reference to Ps. 110:1 reaffirms his divinely mandated status as the Davidic heir who shares in God’s rule” (“Lord’s House,” 320). This is not the same, however, as calling Jesus “divine” (see n149).

160 Although it is not clear that Matthew or Mark’s implied audience had familiarity with the context of Dan 7:13, Dan 7:14 is highly reminiscent of the first oracle of Ps 110 in that the one like a son of man receives from Yahweh the honor and privilege of a ruler. “The humanlike figure comes in order to be invested as king (v 14). … He is, then, a symbol for some entity given authority by God” (Goldingay, Daniel, 168; contra Roth, 58). Marcus agrees that “although the phrase ‘sitting at the right hand’ in 14:62 is most directly an allusion to Ps. 110:1, it is also consonant with the picture in Dan. 7:13-14 of the humanlike figure being presented to the Ancient of Days and made his co-regent” (Way, 165). For Witherington, “the roles assigned to the Son of Man in Dan. 7:13-14 are in fact royal roles—he will have dominion, glory, and kingship. In other words, Mark does not see Son of Man terminology as an alternative to royal phrases being used of Jesus, but as another way of putting the point about Jesus’ kingship” (Mark, 51). In addition to “enthronement with God,” M. Bird finds a second possible link in that “both Ps. 110 and Dan. 7 have to do with the subjugation of enemies” (138). Furthermore, Dan 7:14 makes it clear that the dominion of this ruler is everlasting (עלם שלטן ἐξουσία αἰώνιος), a conclusion that is also reached by reading together the two oracles of Ps 110 (see p. 146 above).

161 Although A. Collins correctly considers Mark 14:62 to be “the climax of the theme of Jesus’ identity” in Mark (“Influence,” 98; cf. Hengel, 151), Jesus’ identity continues to be developed in post-resurrection events (see below).

162 Bock attributes the former to M. Rese (Bock, Proclamation, 180; cf. 40). Similarly, according to P. Doble, in Acts 2:16-36, Peter is “portrayed quarrying scriptural material” in order “to prove that ‘Jesus is the Christ’” (“The Psalms in Luke–Acts,” in Moyise and Menken, 88). On the other hand, Bock himself considers that “a clearer presentation of a direct prophecy fulfilled could not exist. Lindars is correct to say that the exegesis here is messianic and literal” (Proclamation, 180; emphasis added; referring to Lindars, 41).
The Locution

We present NA\textsuperscript{27} and the NRSV of Acts 2:33-36 in Appendix B§5, splitting this SAC into four Assertives.\textsuperscript{163} The quotation in the third SA, vv 34b-35, reproduces Psalm 109:1 LXX verbatim.\textsuperscript{164} It is introduced by λέγει δὲ αὐτός·, where “he” is clearly David.

In the first SA (v 33), Peter introduces Jesus’ exaltation. Whether Jesus has been exalted “to” or “by” God’s right hand is not clear. Either seems possible. “To” would cohere with the metaphor presented in v 34b; “by” would mean that Peter was giving additional details as to how God raised Jesus, which is the subject of v 24.\textsuperscript{165} That different metaphors about “the right hand” can exist in close proximity is demonstrated by Psalm 110:1 and 5 and is also seen in Acts 2:25, where Peter quotes Psalm 15:8 LXX concerning God being at David’s right hand, and Acts 2:34b, where the exalted one is seated at God’s right hand.\textsuperscript{166}

The Illocution

At the episode level, Peter is the implied speaker of the Pentecost speech (Acts 2:14-40). His implied audience is devout Jews in Jerusalem for Pentecost who have witnessed either the coming of the Holy Spirit or its aftermath and are confused or doubting (Acts 2:1-13). The implied author of Acts is the implied author of Luke. In Acts, as for Luke’s Gospel, the implied audience is the Greek “Theophilus.”\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{163} M. Turner refers to the assertions of 2:33-36 as “climactic” (\textit{Power from on High: The Spirit in Israel’s Restoration and Witness in Luke-Acts} (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 267. Although one could argue this SAC begins with v 29, it is more logical to include vv 29-32 with the preceding SAC since it is in v 33 that Peter turns to Jesus’ exaltation. However, we do include elements of the entire speech event in our analysis.

\textsuperscript{164} Some LXX manuscripts omit ὁ before κύριος.


\textsuperscript{166} As Keener points out, “Since one can hardly be at another’s right hand and have that person at one’s own right hand (unless each faces the other, not the usual arrangement of thrones), the language of the ‘right hand’ is metaphor in both psalms (Pss 16:8, 11; 110:1, 5)” (1:947). His idea that the “right hand” language of Acts 2:25 (Ps 16:8) is linked by gezerah shevah with Acts 2:34 (Ps 110:1) seems unlikely since different metaphors are used in the two verses. However, there may be an implicit connection between Acts 2:34 (Ps 110:1) and the right hand language in the unquoted portion of Ps 16:11 (cf. 1:944-945).

\textsuperscript{167} See p. 161 and n110 above. If Luke’s Gentile Christian audience had been “God fearers,” as the name Theophilus implies, it is likely they would have been familiar with the Psalms. Certainly, if they had previously read Luke’s gospel, they would have encountered Ps 110.
According to Luke, Peter’s speech includes multiple quotations from and allusions to the OT. For these Assertives to be tellable at both the level of Peter’s Jewish audience and Luke’s presumably predominantly Gentile Christian audience, both Peter’s use of these OT quotations and allusions and Luke’s relating of this episode must either create or activate mutual context about Jesus. We consider both the episode and discourse levels below, beginning with the episode level.

Because this SAC occurs near the end of the speech event, it is helpful to set it within the context of Peter’s argument. At the beginning of Peter’s speech, there is a lengthy quotation from Joel which ends with the words “Then everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved” (Acts 2:21 quoting Joel 3:5 LXX). In Acts 2:25a, Peter introduces a quotation from Psalm 15:8-11 LXX with the claim that David spoke these words concerning Jesus, who has been raised by God and freed from death (cf. vv 22-24). Then in v 31, Peter again attributes Psalm 15:10 LXX to David as prophecy of the resurrection of the Messiah. Since there is no evidence that Psalm

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168 Juel believes that “the speech … represents a developed, sophisticated midrashic argument that cannot be classified as early or typical” (Messianic Exegesis, 147) and Hurtado reminds us that “we have to be very careful about reading the narratives without taking account of the author’s own literary purposes, and we should not take the speeches as records of what was said by the characters to whom they are attributed” (177). However, although Luke included the Pentecost speech in his narrative for a purpose, that does not mean that he invented that speech and attributed it to Peter. In any event, the implied audience for Peter’s speech is different from Luke’s own implied audience.

169 See chapter 4 for an analysis of Paul’s quotations of Ps 15 LXX, Ps 2 and Isa 55 in Acts 13.

170 In Ps 15 LXX, the psalmist (from the superscription, possibly David) speaks of his rescue from difficulty (vv 5-6) and of his confidence that his life will be long and prosperous thanks to Yahweh’s protection. Eaton notes that “a common interpretation is that the reference here is to deliverance from a current danger; he [the psalmist] is not to die on this occasion. This would suit the usual trend of Old Testament thought” (98).

171 Much has been written about the relationship between Ps 16 [15 LXX] and the resurrection of the Messiah. Schenck’s conclusion that “Acts 2:25-31 understands similar words in Psalm 16 (15:8-11 LXX) as Jesus’ confidence that God would raise him from the dead” (531) outstrips Peter’s claim, which concerns David’s knowledge, not Jesus’. Bock finds significant the substitution in v 31 of ἡ σοφία τουτοῦ (used in Ps 15:9 LXX and Acts 2:26b for resting in hope) for τὸν ὅσιόν σου (used in Ps 15:10 LXX and Acts 2:27b in connection with avoidance of decay). But his conclusion that “the substitution guarantees that the point of the passage is not mere spiritual translation, bodily preservation, or terminal illness, but bodily resurrection” (Proclamation, 178) is too strong. Other scholars distinguish between τὴν ψυχήν μου in Acts 2:27a (Ps 15:10a LXX) and τὸν ὅσιόν σου in Acts 2:27b (Ps 15:10b LXX). For example, Polhill believes that “‘Holy One’ could apply to David as the anointed king, but for Peter it was even more appropriate as a designation for Christ” (113; cf. I. H. Marshall, The Acts of the Apostles: An Introduction and Commentary [1980; repr., Leicester: Inter-Varsity; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 76). See D. P. Moessner (“Two Lords ‘at the Right Hand’? The Psalms and an Intertextual Reading of Peter’s Pentecost Speech (Acts 2:14-36),” in Literary Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays in Honor of Joseph B. Tyson, ed. R. P. Thompson and T. E. Phillips [Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1998], 221n7) for a list of scholars who believe Acts 2:27b=Ps 15:10b foretells Jesus’ resurrection. We consider instead that, although in Acts 2 the Psalm is “attributed to David who is understood to have a prophetic role” (Koester, 177), Litwak is correct that this does not mean David made a “straightforward prophecy of the Messiah rising from the dead” (179). We also reject Eskola’s thought that “Psalm 16 was perfectly suitable for the
15:10 LXX was considered “messianic” in or by the first century, it appears this interpretation originated with Jesus’ original followers and possibly Peter himself.

Acts 2:30 is another key element of the speech event. In it, Peter claims that David’s prophetic gift allowed him to understand that God’s promise to seat a descendant on his (David’s) throne (an allusion to Ps 132:11-12) would have fulfillment beyond David’s immediate successors. Thus, not only does Psalm 15 LXX describe David’s own situation, it would also be applicable to those of his line who, according to Yahweh’s promise, would also receive Yahweh’s anointing. This promise culminates in Messiah Jesus, for whom what was said about David in a particular situation—that he would not then be given over to the grave and would not experience decay—is true eternally.

It is this dynastic promise to David, plus the affirmation of Jesus’ resurrection (vv 24, 32), that permits the conclusion in v 33 that Jesus has been exalted to the right hand of God, from which position Jesus pours out the Holy Spirit (v 33c). To purposes of the writer, since there the exaltation terminology was connected with the idea of resurrection (163). There is no explicit “exaltation terminology” in Ps 16 and Ps 16:11c is not quoted in Acts 2.

See D. J. Williams, 52. This does not, however, require considering Ps 15:8-11 LXX to be either “some obscure text which Christians allegedly mined from the Scriptures in order to find proof for the resurrection or … a text which simply makes one point, namely that Messiah’s resurrection was already foretold by David, or both” (Moessner, 221).

In Ps 132:11-12, Yahweh’s dynastic promise concerns the succession to David’s throne, not Yahweh’s. However, “the idea that the throne is ultimately God’s is certainly correct” (Strauss, 138).

Contra Moyise, who sees Luke’s argument to be “that David could not have been speaking about himself but was speaking as a prophet” (Writings, 19), David knew he was anointed and loved by Yahweh. He also knew he would die (cf. Ps 39:13). Furthermore, to say that “David did not ascend into heaven, so he could not have been speaking of himself” as exalted to God’s right hand (Polhill, 115; cf. Bruce, 124, 127) misses the point that the seat at God’s right hand is a metaphor of being granted authority and power. As Gourgues points out, “la session à la droite n’entre pas dans la catégorie des événements historiques observables mais constitue plutôt l’expression métaphorique d’une réalité théologique” (202).

Hebrew thought “saw a close link between individuals and their descendants. The Greek [of Acts 2:30] expresses this concept quite graphically with the phrase ‘from the fruit of his loins’ (‘one of his descendants,’ NIV)” (Polhill, 114). Contra Polhill (114), Aloisi (122) and Keener (1:951), rather than speaking only of one descendant, i.e., Messiah Jesus, David’s words about Yahweh’s protection would apply to all his successors. D. Williams argues “it was of a line of kings that the psalmist wrote and not of any one king in particular, as [Ps 132] verse 12 clearly shows” (52). Rendtorff points out that in Ps 132 (alluded to in Acts 2:30), the “transition from David to his successors and back again shows the focus to be … that the name David represents the Davidic dynasty through the centuries” (63). However, if, as Marshall proposes, Ps 132 was “understood in the same way” as 4QFlorilegium, which “clearly interprets 2 Samuel 7:10-16 as a reference to the Messiah,” Peter and his hearers may have “shared a belief that the passages about David’s descendants included a reference to the Messiah in particular” (77).

“Through Jesus God fulfilled his promise to David of a kingdom without end” (Doble, “Psalms,” 117). See also Moyise, Writings, 16.


178 We agree with Eskola against Hay that the theme of Peter’s speech is “the work of the exalted Christ” rather than “the vindication implied by his exaltation” (Eskola, 173n49, quoting Hay, Glory, 72). As Bock points out, “The point of the passage is that Jesus is now doing the work of the Father while
support this point, Peter quotes all of Psalm 109:1 LXX in vv 34b-35, evoking with regard to Jesus the Story of one who received the honor, authority and power represented by a seat at Yahweh’s right hand. In v 34a, Peter leads into this quotation by re-stating a point he made in v 29: οὐ γὰρ Δαυὶδ ἀνέβη εἰς τούς οὐρανούς, thus continuing the comparison between David and Jesus that he began in v 25. Peter is contrasting David’s burial and eventual decay with Jesus’ ascension (reported in Acts 1:9) and exaltation (vv 33a and 34b).

Although Psalm 110 may not have been understood messianically prior to the Davidsohnfrage, there Jesus implicitly identified the Messiah with David’s Lord. After Jesus’ resurrection and ascension, the disciples, NT authors and early Christians would have had no doubt that Jesus’ earlier reference was to himself. In Acts 2:36, Peter makes this identification explicit: Jesus is “both Lord and Messiah” (καὶ κύριον … καὶ Χριστὸν). Furthermore, Jesus is the eternal Messiah and Lord. “In Acts, Ps 110:1 being seated at his side. Jesus now acts for the Father with his power and authority. He is the mediating dispenser of the Spirit” (Proclamation, 183).

As Jesus did in the Synoptics, Peter clearly connects Ps 110 and David. Some consider the comparison to include the suffering and vindication of Jesus and David. J. F. D. Creach finds that “in Acts 2, Peter appeals to the suffering of David in the Psalms and to God’s vindication of David to explain the suffering and resurrection of Jesus” (“The Destiny of the Righteous and the Theology of the Psalms,” in Soundings in the Theology of Psalms: Perspectives and Methods in Contemporary Scholarship, ed. R. A. Jacobson [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2011], 60-61; cf. Litwak, 179). But even if one uses the co-text of the psalm to make an argument about the suffering of Jesus, it is clear (contra Creach and perhaps also Moessner) that Jesus’ passion is not the focal issue of Peter’s speech. The ascension account in Acts 1:9 “appears to be a reflection of Dan. 7:10, 13-14” (Beale, NT Theology, 246), although Luke does not allude to the Daniel passage in his gospel.

This explains the otherwise abrupt reference to Χριστός in 2:31. As Moessner points out, “it is curious that Peter uses the term ‘the Messiah’ since χριστός occurs neither in Psalm 15 nor in his speech thus far. In fact, Acts 2:31a is the first use of χριστός in the book of Acts” (228).

In chapter 7, we saw another example of the importance to the early church of the confession “Jesus is Lord.” Some find Jesus’ lordship more important than his messiahship (see Bock, who speaks of a “christology which moves from Messiah-Servant to Lord” [Proclamation, 268]; M. Bird, 150; and Donahue and Harrington, 27, who believe the title “Lord” is superior to both “Messiah/Christ” and “Son of David”). We believe instead that “in three key texts expressing Jesus’ salvation-historical significance (Lk. 2.11; Acts 2.36; 10.36) κύριος appears together with χριστός, suggesting that the two titles are complementary (in these contexts); together they express the status and authority of Jesus” (Strauss, 27, where he adds that “Luke uses ‘Lord’ primarily as an expression of Jesus’ authority”). Further, “in Acts 2.36 ‘Christ’ and ‘Lord’ stand parallel to one another, suggesting they are integrally related in the context of Jesus’ exaltation glory. One is not subordinated to the other” (Ibid., 30).

We cannot take up here the timing of Jesus’ being “made … both Lord and Messiah” beyond noting that the angels announcing Jesus’ birth inform the shepherds ὃτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, thus negates Loader’s theory that Acts 2, where “Jesus is made Lord at the exaltation,” is a more primitive use of Ps 110:1 and that Mark 12:35ff. “is the product of later christological reflection” since in it “Jesus is Lord already on earth” (215; emphasis added). We also
becomes part of an argument according to which God’s promise to David of a ‘seed’ to sit on his throne forever (2 Sam 7:12-14, Ps 89:3-4) is fulfilled only with the installation of the risen Christ in heaven.” As is true for David and others to whom the metaphors of Psalm 110:1 would apply, Jesus reigns over the earth. However, unlike an earthly monarch, Jesus does not reign only from or over the earth. He both reigns from heaven and over heaven; “exalted to the right hand of God,” Jesus has “poured out” God’s Spirit (v 33c, a link to the quotations of Joel 3:1, 2 LXX in vv 17 and 18). And he does so eternally in his own person rather than dynastically.

“The remarkable statement in 2.33,” in which the authority of the exalted Jesus is shown to surpass that of Israel’s earthly kings, furthers the resolution of the “more than messiah” tension. We expand on this below in discussing the perlocution.

disagree with Juel’s conclusion that “it is as the enthroned ‘Lord’ that Jesus is Son of David” (“Origin,” 455). Jesus was called “Son of David” during his incarnation.

Nor can we address the question of when Jesus’ reign began or will begin. Strauss, for example believes that “Jesus begins his messianic reign already at his exaltation-enthronement” (264; cf. Keener, 1:956) while Hay argues that “in a major way Luke seems to imply that Jesus’ kingdom will begin only with the parousia (22.29-30; Acts 1.6-7)” (Glory, 71). The former argument seems more plausible.

**If Strauss, 317. Moessner believes the psalms alluded to in 2:30 all “characterize David as the Lord’s anointed whose offspring will ‘sit upon his throne’” “forever?” (228; emphasis added).**

Juel, “Origin,” 455; emphasis added. Also see Strauss, 65, and Bateman, Hermeneutics, 234.

As noted above, the allusion to Ps 132 in v 30 evokes Yahweh’s promise of an eternal dynasty.

Kraus is incorrect in saying that “David was not the one who carried out the striking command to sit at God’s right hand and to reign there” (Theology, 187). As Israel’s king, David was granted the honor and authority of the metaphoric seat at the right hand of God. And David was exalted (2 Sam 33:49, 23:1), as was Solomon (1 Chr 29:25). Nor are we convinced the identification of Jesus as David’s Lord in Acts 2 means “the dialogue in the psalm is between God and Jesus” (Moyise, Writings, 18), although Jesus would be included in the dialog as David’s descendant.

**If Matt 28:18. “For Jesus to take David’s throne in heaven … redefines the traditional Jewish expectation of Davidic rule” (Keener, 1:954; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 155; Strauss, 30). “In essence Acts 2.33 answers to the hopes of Lk. 1.32-33, and … the kingdom of God comes in greater than hitherto experienced power and presence in Israel through Jesus’ attainment of the eternal throne of David to rule over Jacob” (Turner, Power, 268). At Pentecost, “the throne and power Jesus is given … transcend even the expectations of the infancy narratives” since “Jesus now fully enters the promise to David, sits on the throne at God’s right hand, and receives Lordship over the Spirit” (Ibid., 296, 306).

**If Strauss notes that there is also a link “to the words of Jesus in Lk. 24.49 and Acts 1.4, where the pouring out of the Spirit is likewise referred to as the ‘promise of the Father’ (ἐνθαμνήσεως τοῦ πνεύματος)” (141). Turner makes the important point that “it is doubtful whether in a Jewish context a human figure exalted to God’s right hand would readily be ‘called on’ for salvation in the way implied by the association of baptism ‘in the name of Jesus Christ’ with Joel 3.5 [2.32]. The presupposition which allows this surprising claim is to be found in 2.33b, c; the one exalted at God’s right hand has ‘received the promise of the Holy Spirit’ from the Father, and himself (in God’s own place, cf. 2.17b, c) ‘pours out this which you see and hear’” (Power, 276; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 183-185). We discuss this further below.

**If Strauss, Power, 267.**

Although for Strauss, the “‘more than messiah’ … tension is resolved in Acts when Jesus is openly declared to be Lord (Acts 2.36; 10.43)” (28; cf. 18, 317; Doble, “Psalms,” 88; and Moyise, Writings, 18), we believe critical elements in resolving the tension are (i) the dynastic promise referred to in 2:30 and (ii) Jesus pouring out the Holy Spirit in 2:33, i.e., the demonstration that Jesus reigns over heaven. Whether Pao is correct that “lordship of the risen Jesus” is a theme “developed throughout the New Exodus program” (212) cannot be explored here. We do note that Mallen, who finds “the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost in Acts 2” to be “a key event … interpreted through reference to Joel 3.1-5 LXX
Building on the “more than” connections Jesus made between “messiah,” “David’s son,” and “Lord” as reported in the Synoptic Gospels, Peter combines quotations from or allusions to Joel 2 and Psalms 16, 132 and 110 to paint a more detailed picture of “this Jesus, whom you crucified” (Acts 2:36; cf. 2:23). Peter’s Story includes the synthesis of messiahship and lordship already implied by Jesus in the Davidsohnfrage. This mutual context is activated and strengthened by a quotation of Psalm 110:1, a verse Jesus quoted and alluded to earlier.

Taken with Jesus’ Predictive Assertive in the Synoptic passion narratives, Peter’s quotation of Psalm 110:1 in Acts 2 focuses on the unparalleled honor, power and authority that inures to the exalted Jesus. In his exaltation, as well as in his messiahship and lordship (v 36), Jesus is seen to be “more than” the expectation of his Jewish contemporaries. Peter calls his audience not only to understand this but to live into the lifeworld where the exalted Jesus rules on earth and in heaven forever.

In the Directive in 2:38, Peter tells his empirical audience what he wants them to do: “Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins.” The Envisaging audience will do the same. Envisaging readers will incorporate the information contained in these Assertives into their theological worldview, responding positively to the Directive to “repent and be baptized” and moving into or establishing themselves more firmly in a lifeworld in which the exalted Jesus is eternally Messiah and Lord.

Clearly, Peter’s use of Psalm 110:1 incorporates Jesus’ intervening interpretation as revealed by the Davidsohnfrage and the passion narrative as well as the subsequent events of Jesus’ death, resurrection and exaltation. But does this justify a claim that Peter’s naming Jesus “Lord” in 2:36 is an explicit ascription of divinity? Not in and of itself. The title “Lord” comes from Psalm 110:1, in which the

and the Davidic psalms” (62), makes no mention of Isaiah. Moyise adds that “Luke’s primary source for understanding Jesus is the Psalms” (Moyise, Writings, 22; cf. 39; and Doble, “Psalms,” 104, 117).

See p. 168 above.

For Tharel, “Peter’s understanding of the psalm’s language is more complete than the psalmist’s because Peter has witnessed the advent of Christ. Peter’s interpretation of the psalm, however, is not inconsistent with the psalm’s original meaning. Jesus is the ultimate Davidic king and the recipient of God’s promise” (84).

J. D. G. Dunn provides a helpful summary of scholarship on this question in “ΚΥΡΙΟΣ in Acts,” in Christology, vol. 1 of The Christ and the Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). He does not mention Bock, who finds “Lord” to be a “title which shows Jesus in his task and person to be equal with God” (Proclamation, 184; cf. Eskola, 172).
authority of the ruler is derivative. And if Peter quoted, as seems likely, the Hebrew psalm, then “the first word translated ‘Lord’ is YHWH, the name of God, and the second word is ‘adôn which can be used of human lords and masters.” From this, Marshall concludes that in vv 34-35 “it is simply the attribute of lordship which is given to Jesus; he is not equated with Yahweh.”

But if one considers the Pentecost speech as a whole at the episode level and within its literary context at the discourse level, there is other evidence which points to Jesus’ “more than” messiahship encompassing his divinity. Most immediately, as Keener points out, Jesus “is the one who pours out the Spirit (2:33; Luke 3:16), a divine role (Acts 2:17).” Additionally, the prophet Joel’s words concerning salvation for those who call on the name of the Lord (Yahweh in the original context) are applied to Jesus. Jesus is now presented as the “Lord upon whose name one must call for salvation, even as Joel envisaged one would call on God’s name.”

193 Yahweh effects Jesus’ resurrection (v 32), exalts Jesus to by His right hand and gives Jesus the Holy Spirit (v 33), invites Jesus to sit at His right hand (vv 34-35), and “makes” Jesus both Lord and Christ/Messiah (καὶ κύριον αὐτὸν καὶ χριστὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, v 36). Brawley concludes that “the Lucan appropriation of scripture is primarily theocentric” (59). Dunn believes Ps 110:1 “made clear the relationship of the two lordships: … the lordship of Jesus was a derivative lordship, but as derived from the Lord God it was in effect an expression of God’s lordship” (“ΚΥΡΙΟΣ,” 252-253). Further, that “Luke clearly thought of both God and Jesus as κύριος … does not mean that he thought of them as two equal κύριοι, or casually mixed them up, or saw them in some sophisticated pretrinitarian way as expressions of the one θεός καὶ κύριος” (Ibid., 252).

194 Marshall, 79. Turner points out that J. C. O’Neill denies that Jesus was preached as the Lord worshiped by the Jews on the basis that “the earliest Aramaic speaking community … could not fail to distinguish the two Lords in that verse [Ps 110:1]: the first was יהוה, the second אדונ. This is true for any attempt to derive Christology from Ps. 110.1 alone; but it is not clear that יהוה need necessarily mean less than יהוה, and if the earliest community had other reasons for using God-talk of Jesus it would have read the two titles as equivalents” (Power, 278n28, with reference to O’Neill, The Theology of Acts in its Historical Setting [London: SPCK, 1961, 1970], 131). Further, Hurtado believes that “Adonay was widely used as a reverential oral substitute for Yahweh by Hebrew-speaking readers of the Bible” (183) and “the Aramaic term maryah (definite form of marēḥ) was used similarly” (109). So Peter may have used one of these words twice in his quotation. If so, the LXX would translate accurately what he said.

195 Marshall, 80; cf. 25.


197 For Bock, “Jesus now mediates God’s salvation as a ‘co-regent’” (Proclamation, 264).

198 Turner, Power, 267; cf. 273. Hurtado adds that “it is surely remarkable enough to identify ‘the great and notable day of the Lord’ as the future coming of Jesus (2:20, citing Joel 2:31 [3:4 Heb.]), for in the Old Testament ‘the day of the Lord’ consistently refers to a time of God’s own special action of
At the discourse level, Luke develops Jesus’ divine identity further as Acts progresses. Notable examples include 5:31, which may echo Psalm 110:1, and where, like 2:38, “God offers Israel and others forgiveness … in Jesus’ name”; 7:55-56, which clearly alludes to Psalm 110:1; and 8:16 and 19:5, where “it is in his [Jesus’] name that those turning to God must be baptized.” Extremely significant is Acts 10:36. Although in the OT only Yahweh is referred to as “the Lord of all the earth,” in 10:36, Jesus reigns over both heaven and earth and is πάντων κύριος—“everything is now under his control.”

Another distinction between the episode and discourse levels concerns the implied reader. At the episode level, Peter’s implied readers are Jews (cf. vv 14, 22, 29, and 36). At the discourse level, Luke recounts the events of Pentecost to an implied audience who are Greek and presumably Gentile. For such an implied audience, terms like “everyone” (πᾶς ος, 2:21; οὓς, 2:39) and “all who are far away” (πᾶσιν τοῖς εἰς μακράν, 2:39) indicate that the OT promises of God as they are fulfilled by the “more than” Messiah, Jesus, were intended for the Gentiles as well as the Jews.

As a result of hearing/reading this speech event, and especially the climactic SAC that includes the quotation from Psalm 110:1, our understanding of Jesus’ “more

deliverance or judgment…. It is, however, an absolutely more stunning move still for early Christians to have taken the biblical expression that means the cultic worship of God, to ‘call upon the name of the Lord [Yahweh],’ as referring also to cultic acclamation/invocation of Jesus (Acts 2:21, citing Joel 2:32 [3:5 Heb.])” (181; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 184).

Hurtado makes the interesting point that the “crucial line from Joel cited in the Acts account of Peter’s speech (Acts 2:21), ‘Everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord shall be saved,’ is also cited … by Paul in Romans 10:13, in a context … that indicates that Paul means the biblical phrase to refer to the ritual act of ‘confessing [homologeō]’ the Lord Jesus (10:9). … This ritual use of Jesus’ name reflects an explicit identification of Jesus as an appropriate recipient of such cultic devotion” (198). We cannot explore here how the events of Pentecost, the writing of Romans and the writing of Acts are related.

200 Keener, 1:502. This injunction is also found in 2:38. Keener gives numerous other examples from other parts of Acts which point to Luke’s affirming Jesus’ divine nature (Ibid.).
201 References to וְשָׁם וְיָשָׁר appear in Jos 3:11, 13; Ps 97:5, Mic 4:13, and Zech 4:14.
202 Pao, 210n83; emphasis added. Although Pao believes the quotation from Ps 109 LXX at the end of the Pentecost speech indicates “the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus are understood as his enthronement as Lord of all” (210), in Acts 10:36 it is made explicit that Jesus is πάντων κύριος. Strauss makes the comparison to David: “While Jesus is indeed David’s son and the heir to his throne, his universal dominion and authority far exceeds that of David. He is Lord of all (Acts 10.36)” (317).
203 Peter addresses ἄνδρες Ἰουδαίοι in 2:14, ἄνδρες Ἰσραήλ in 2:22, ἄνδρες Ἰσραήλ in 2:29 and refers to οἶκος Ἰσραήλ in 2:36.
204 Moyise points out that “with Peter’s speeches in Acts 2 and 3, the issue is not so much about the difference between the Greek and Hebrew texts but the different contexts: Peter is preaching to Jews in Jerusalem and Luke is writing to Gentiles like Theophilus. … The issue … is more a debate about what Luke wanted Theophilus to deduce from these speeches. Did he want him to assume that Peter and James would have meant the same thing that he, as a Gentile, would have understood by these texts? Or was he expecting a little more sophistication; that texts that were ambiguous when quoted in Jerusalem have become clear now that the gospel has been preached to the Gentiles?” (Writings, 11-12; cf. Litwak, although he attributes the prominence given to the Gentiles in Acts 2 to Peter’s reading of Joel 3 [159]).
than’ messiahship has evolved. At the episode level, the derived authority of the exalted Jesus—eternally reigning over both earth and heaven at the right hand of God—is presented as greater than that of any earthly monarch. To the exalted Jesus also belong certain prerogatives of divinity, namely the forgiveness of sins, the gift of the Holy Spirit and the power to save. Moreover, at the discourse level, this episode promotes a fuller understanding both of Jesus’ divine identity and of the inclusion of the Gentiles in the divine promises. Thus, at both the episode and discourse levels, in adhering to these Assertives, the empirical audience transforms its theology, Story and lifeworld/worldview.

Peter’s quotation of Psalm 110:1 includes its final clause concerning the submission of all things under the feet, perhaps to warn his listeners of the perils of being numbered as among Jesus’ enemies. Although Acts 2:40 also may refer to Jesus’ enemies, this metaphor is more fully developed in 1 Corinthians 15, where Paul refers to Psalm 110:1c.

Psalm 110:1 as Quoted in 1 Corinthians 15:25

The Locution

A comparison of 1 Corinthians 15:25 and Psalm 109:1c LXX appears in Appendix B§6a, where double underlining shows matching words and single underlining indicates the same word in different forms. There are no significant locutionary issues.

205 Contra Mack’s contention that “reasons why Jews would have wanted to repent and be forgiven are not evident” (91).

206 1 Corinthians is an undisputed Pauline letter and is generally dated about 55 CE—earlier than Ephesians, Colossians or Hebrews. Although D.-A. Koch points out that, if one assumes Ps 109:1 LXX is quoted in 1 Cor 15:25 (which he does not), “es läge dann hier die früheste Verwendung dieses später häufig zitierten Textes vor” (Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus [Tübingen: Mohr, 1986], 19). Although this letter may have been written before the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, we believe oral accounts of earlier events (later recorded in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts) were part of the mutual context of Paul and those he taught. Although we follow NA27 in treating Ps 110:1 in 1 Cor 15:25 as a quotation, others do not. For this, see Hay, Glory, 36; Stanley, Paul, 206n85. Koch argues quite forcefully that “liegt in 1 Kor 15,25 überhaupt kein Zitat von Ψ 109,1b (und erst recht nicht von V 1a) vor” (244). He adds that “ein Zitat von Ψ 109,1b kann man hier nur annehmen, wenn man voraussetzt, daß Ψ 109,1 insgesamt ein im Urchristentum derart bekanntes Schriftwort war, daß Paulus dessen Kenntnis bei seinen Lesern als selbstverständlich voraussetzen konnte” (19). However, the assumption he rejects is not unreasonable, given the use of Ps 110:1 by Jesus and in Peter’s Pentecost speech. In any event, Paul “expects his audience to recognize the scriptural authority of 1 Cor 15:25, whether considered as a quotation or an allusion to Ps 110:1” (Heil, 206n4; cf. 207 for details of Paul’s adaptation).

207 Both texts contain the verb ἀναθήματι and references to enemies (ἐχθρός) and feet (πούς). In 1 Cor 15:25, the enemies are put under the feet (ὀπὸ τοὺς πόδας) rather than made a footstool (LXX ὑποπόδιον).
Appendix B§6b presents the SAC (1 Cor 15:24-28) divided into seven SAs, with NA27 and the NRSV in parallel columns.

The Illocution

“Messiah/Christ Jesus” appears eight times in 1 Corinthians 1:1-10. So, from the outset, it is clear the belief that Jesus is the Messiah forms part of the mutual context the implied author shares with his implied readers.209 By chapter 15, we know that the empirical audience is fractured (1:10-11; 3:3; 10:18), spiritually immature and immoral (3:2; 5:1, 11; 11:29-30), as well as arrogant (4:18; 5:2). The Corinthians are in danger of being diverted from the good news Paul has taught them of Messiah Jesus, in whom they have been sanctified (1:2). The goals of the implied author are for the readers to become united (καταρτίζω, 1:10) and blameless (ἀνέγκλητος, 1:10).

This SAC consists of a series of Assertives and is part of a speech event which includes all or most of 1 Corinthians 15.210 The topic of the speech event is victory over death; this SAC addresses what happens at “the end.” Many Corinthians held a Greek worldview of life after death without a resurrection of the dead (15:1-58), and thus “they failed to comprehend how an earthly body that is physical and perishable could be made suitable for a heavenly realm that is spiritual and imperishable.”211 Since the bodily resurrection of Messiah Jesus and of believers is a central concept in Paul’s lifeworld and theology, he addresses this misconception in order to restore or maintain correct belief in his readers.212

208 G. D. Fee points out that in v 28a “most MSS have a καί following τότε (=even the Son himself)” (The First Epistle to the Corinthians [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987], 746n2). The addition of καί does not alter the basic meaning of the verse.

209 J. Collins pithily puts it this way: “Jesus is called Christos, anointed, the Greek equivalent of messiah, 270 times in the Pauline corpus. If this is not ample testimony that Paul regarded Jesus as messiah, then words have no meaning” (Scepter, 2). Of course, this does not answer the question of how Paul understood the term “messiah” in connection with Jesus.

210 1 Cor 15 is one of the four speech events introduced by 1 Cor 7:1 which together comprise the last part of the letter body. Whether Paul’s summary of the gospel message in 1 Cor 15:1-11 is a separate (fifth) speech event does not bear on our discussion.


212 “There is no suggestion that Paul is here addressing cultured scoffers outside the Christian community, as Acts represents him doing at Athens. The criticism is coming from the faithful themselves, from those who have been baptized, and the implication of this is very destructive of those accounts of the earliest Christian churches which see them as resurrection creations. Here is a very early community in which certainly some elements felt able to repudiate resurrection while expecting to retain
A crucial step in determining the illocution is to identify the referents of the various third person masculine singular pronouns in the first two SAs, vv 24 and 25. The opening event is the destruction or overthrow of all earthly institutions, following which is “the end” when “he,” i.e., the Messiah, hands the kingdom over to God the Father (v 24a). In light of Psalm 110, the “he” who has accomplished the destruction (v 24b) is God the Father since, according to the psalm, Yahweh vanquishes the enemies. In v 25a, the “he” who reigns is the Messiah.213 The enemies (also described in v 24) are the Messiah’s and they are to be put under the Messiah’s feet. The “he” in v 25b who puts the enemies under the Messiah’s feet is God the Father, the agent of subjection.214

The Messiah’s reign will last until that happens. Via this metaphor of subjection under the feet, Paul evokes a Story-line of Psalm 110:1—that Yahweh has promised victory over his enemies to the one invited to sit at Yahweh’s right hand, i.e. the one who reigns (cf. Ps 110:2). As in Psalm 110, where “although the king is the actual ruler, it is God who exercises his power through the king,” in this segment of 1 Corinthians “the same idea is expressed: Jesus is the one who reigns, but God acts through Jesus.”215

Paul uses the Commissive from the oracle reported in the psalm—the fate Yahweh promises for the enemies of Yahweh’s Anointed—as the centerpiece of his argument.

The third SA, v 26, repeats the key ideas of destruction/overthrow (καταργήσῃ) and enemies (ἐχθρός) and adds to tellability the important information that the last enemy to suffer destruction is death. In the final verses of the SAC, vv 27-28, the masculine singular third person pronouns all have as referent the Messiah—“he” who is

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213 Thiselton reminds us that in 1 Cor 15 “Christ remains God’s righteous agent of salvation” (First Epistle, 1228).

214 Fee is among those who argue that Christ is the subject of θῇ in v 25. He bases his argument on two factors: (i) the “natural antecedent is the subject of the preceding ‘he must reign,’ referring to Christ,” and (ii) this verse serves to explain v 24 “where Christ is the subject of the clause ‘when he destroys all dominion, etc.’” (First Epistle, 755; cf. 754n40, 756, and Thiselton, First Epistle, 1234). Neither argument is compelling. First, Christ is not the subject of “he has destroyed” in v 24. The “natural” antecedent of καταργήσῃ is the immediately preceding noun, τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί. Second, it is more logical that the actor be the same as in the first-person Commissive reported in the psalm verse quoted, i.e., Yahweh, especially since v 25 uses the same verbiage (τίθημι, ἐγερθὼς and ὕπο τοὺς πόδας [ὑποτάξαντοι]) as Ps 110:1c. Fee acknowledges that many scholars favor the position that God is the subject of “until he has put” in 1 Cor 15:25b (First Epistle, 755n49). Two of these are Hengel (144) and Heil (207n8). Heil follows J. Holleman, who argues “there is a change of subjects, from Jesus to God, between verses 25a (δεῖ βασιλεύειν) and 25b (θῇ), where Paul quotes or refers to Ps. 110 (109):1” on the basis of v 28 in which “the Son will subject himself [sic] to ‘the one who put all things in subjection under him.’ The ‘one who put all things in subjection’ (τῷ ὑποτάξαντι) can only be God. Since God is the subject in verse 28, he must also be the subject of the same action described in verse 27 (ὑπέταξεν, ὑποτάξαντος [sic]) and 25b (θῇ)” (Heil, 207n8, quoting Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia: A Tradito-Historical Study of Paul’s Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 [Leiden: Brill, 1996], 59 and 59n4).

reigning and the one to whom the enemies are being made subject. Both references to “the one who put all things in subjection” (vv 27b, 28a) are to God the Father.

The last four SAs are connected to the first three by the repetition of ὑπὸ τοῦς πόδας in vv 25 and 27a. Additionally, a form of ὑποτάσσοσω appears six times in vv 27-28; subjection is heavily emphasized in these SAs via repetition.²¹⁶ Since ὑπὸ τοῦς πόδας and ὑποτάσσοσω also appear in Psalm 8 LXX, many consider v 27a to refer to Psalm 8:6, where it is clear that God the Father is the agent of subjection, although there is no direct mention of enemies.²¹⁷ The climactic conclusion of this SAC is v 28b: ἢ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν (v 28b).²¹⁸ This SAC is tellable because if Paul’s audience denies the resurrection of believers, they deny the ability of God to subject all things, including death, to the “more than” Messiah. In that case, God would not be all in all.²¹⁹

It is clear the Story evoked here by the quotation of Psalm 110 includes aspects of the Jesus-event. 1 Corinthians 15 assumes as mutual context the Story of the resurrection, ascension, exaltation and eternal reign of Christ; this mutual context is activated by the quotation. In 1 Corinthians 15, “every ruler and every authority and power” (v 24), including death (v 26) will be subjected to Jesus, ὁ υἱός (v 28) and Χριστός (v 23). This expanded role and authority are those equated with the Messiah’s eternal reign in and over heaven as this has evolved in events later reported by the Synoptics and Acts.²²⁰ The Analytic reader understands this.

²¹⁶ The verb in vv 24 and 26 is καταργέω (I destroy, put down, make powerless) rather than ὑποτάσσοσω (I put under, subject) which appears in vv 27-28. For J. Lambrecht, “the verb καταργέω, here in vv. 26 and 24 with the meaning ‘to destroy’, would seem to be the typically Pauline word. The other two verbs ‘to put (under his feet)’ (v. 25) and ‘to subject’ (vv. 27-28) are given by the psalms, and by themselves they do not point to destruction” (“Paul’s Christological Use of Scripture in I Cor. 15.20-28,” NTS 28, no. 4 [October 1982]: 519n24). But “destroy” in the sense of “causing something to no longer exist” (cf. BDAG, s.v. “καταργέω” §3) may not be the lexical meaning of this word in vv 24 and 26. Rather, καταργέω may have its sense of “to cause someth. to lose its power or effectiveness, … make powerless” (BDAG, s.v. “καταργέω” §2). Lambrecht himself speaks of Christ handing “over the kingdom to God after having overthrown all inimical powers” (“Use,” 505; emphasis added). This would cohere with ὑπὸ τοῦς πόδας in vv 25 and 27 and ὑποτάσσοσω in the later verses.

²¹⁷ Cf. Koch, 13 and 13n11. For B. Tanner, the connection between Pss 8 and 110 “further solidifies the claim of kingship for Christ, tying the ‘adam’ of Psalm 8 with the royal motif of Psalm 110” (64). H. Williams points out that when Pss 110:1 and 8:7 “are considered together, they provide a double grounding for the total reign of Christ over every ruler, power and authority” (171). In addition, since “his feet” in Ps 8:4 refers to the feet of “the son of man” (NASB95) and because in 1 Cor 15, “all things” are to be subjected to Christ the Son (vv 27 and 28), this passage links the Son and the Son of Man.

²¹⁸ This argument is not subordinationist. Rather, “Paul is pointing out that God is responsible for that subjection [of all things] through Christ” (Fee, First Epistle, 759). “As in 3:22-23 and 11:3, the language of the subordination of the Son to the Father is functional, referring to his ‘work’ of redemption, not ontological, referring to his being as such” (760).

²¹⁹ See Garland, 106. Thiselton points out that “the emphasis lies in πάντα” (First Epistle, 1236).

²²⁰ A. Chester argues convincingly that “the fact that Paul can assume his allusions to a citation of Ps. 110.1 will be understood in both Corinth and Rome suggests that the underlying tradition goes back
The Perlocution

The desired perlocutionary effect of an Assertive is adherence. In this case, adherence takes the form of realigning lifeworld around the reaffirmation of truths Paul previously taught (cf. 1 Cor 15:12). In broad terms, the quotation supports what Paul has taught concerning Yahweh’s nature and character and Yahweh’s relationship to Yahweh’s people and the world. Envisaging readers reaffirm the validity of Paul’s earlier teaching and reorient their worldview/lifeworld around the truths of the resurrection of believers; the subjection of all things, including death, to the Messiah; and Yahweh as “all in all.”

One or both of the metaphors of Psalm 110:1 concerning the seat at Yahweh’s right hand and the subjection of enemies under the feet are found elsewhere in the NT.221 However, their use in Hebrews can be considered their fullest development. We center our discussion on the explicit quotation in Hebrews 1:13.

Psalm 110:1 as Quoted in Hebrews 1:13

The Locution

Hebrews 1:4 begins a speech event which extends through 2:18.222 Immediately after introducing the topic of the relationship of God’s Son to the angels, the author launches into a series of seven OT (LXX) quotations,223 five of which come from five different


The metaphor of being seated at Yahweh’s right hand is found in Rom 8:34, Eph 1:20-21, Col 3:1 and 1 Pet. 3:22. Of these, only Eph 1 (v 22) alludes to the second metaphor—the placing of all things under the feet in submission. (See B. Tanner, 64-65, for a discussion of Eph 1).

For D. A. Campbell, Satan’s future subjection under the feet of Christians in Rom 16:20 “echoes both 1 Corinthians 15:25-27 and underlying messianic readings of Psalms 8 and 110 (8:6 and 110:1)” (“An Echo of Scripture in Paul, and Its Implications,” in Wagner, Rowe and Grieb, 384). However, “the inclusion of Ps. 8 among the messianic texts of the OT is disputed” (R. Gheorghita, The Role of the Septuagint in Hebrews: An Investigation of its Influence with Special Consideration to the Use of Hab 2.3-4 in Heb 10:37-38 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 143-144). Koch confirms “eine messianische Auslegung von Ps 8 ist in der jüdischen Lit. bislang überhaupt nicht nachgewiesen” (245; cf. Gheorghita, 144). Hebrews’ messianic reading of Ps 8 (see G. de Villiers, “Reflections on Creation and Humankind in Psalm 8, the Septuagint and Hebrews,” in Psalms and Hebrews: Studies in Reception, ed. D. J. Human and G. J. Steyn [New York: T&T Clark, 2010], 80), was likely developed by the early church.

222 These boundaries approximate G. Guthrie’s first “main movement,” which he titles “The Position of the Son in Relation to the Angels” (1:5-2:18) (Structure, 116).

223 “The writer of Hebrews has a remarkable knowledge of the LXX and used it exclusively” (W. L. Lane, Hebrews 1-8 [Dallas: Word Books, 1991], lxxi; cf. Ellingworth, 27). The quotations in this series are introduced with a form of λέγοντος, i.e., “as the direct speaking of God” (Lane, cxvii), which is the most common introduction in Hebrews. This reduces the likelihood of it being a “traditional collection” (contra Attridge, Hebrews, 24). For an overview of various suggestions for the hermeneutic behind the OT quotations in Hebrews, see S. Motyer, “The Psalm Quotations of Hebrews 1: A Hermeneutic-Free
Psalms. In Hebrews 1:13, Psalm 109:1b-c LXX is quoted verbatim. The SAC which includes this quotation is Hebrews 1:13-14, each verse of which is a SA. For convenience, NA and the NRSV, divided into the two SAs, are presented in Appendix B§7. There are no major issues of locution.

The Illocution

To identify the implied author and audience, we focus on this first speech event. From the reference to God having spoken τοῖς πατράσιν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις (1:1), we learn the implied author is someone who acknowledges the value of Jewish tradition, and especially prophecy. Similarly, the implied reader has “a detailed knowledge of the OT” and “assumes on the part of his audience a deep familiarity with their [sic] contents.” In v 2a, we learn that God has spoken to us (ἡμῶν) through the son (ἐν υἱῷ); thus, the implied author is a follower of Jesus Christ, as is the implied audience.

Further, the identification of Jesus as Son (of God, v 5) is part of the mutual context of the implied author and implied audience (2:9). In 2:1 the author states his purpose for writing: So “we” (ἡμᾶς) do not drift away from what we have heard. “What we have heard” includes the quotations in 1:5-13, which are part of how God has previously spoken through the prophets (1:1).

The empirical audience is experiencing “loss of confidence in the viability of their convictions. They display lack of interest in the message of salvation they had embraced (2:1–4), which formerly had given them a sense of identity as the new covenant people of God. The writer implies that they are no longer listening to the voice

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224 For the reliance of the implied author of Hebrews on the Psalms for his christology, see S. J. Kistemaker, *The Psalm Citations in the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Amsterdam: Wed. G. Van Soest, 1961), 12; Lane, cxvi; and R. N. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1999), 149. Ellingworth calls attention to the “curious fact that, of the quotations for which divine authority is specifically claimed, all but one (Je. 31[LXX 38]:33f.-Heb. 10:16f.) are from the Psalms, and none from the Torah” (38-39). However, Eskola’s notion that Hebrews “appears to be really a commentary on Psalm 110” is without warrant (Eskola, 258; cf. G. J. C. Jordaan and P. Nel, “From Priest-King to King-Priest: Psalm 110 and the Basic Structure of Hebrews,” in Human and Steyn, 230-231, 240). Eskola (258n26), Jordaan and Nel (229), Ellingworth (90, 130) and Attridge (*Hebrews*, 23n188, 46n138) all attribute the idea that Hebrews is a commentary/midrash on Ps 110 to G. Buchanan’s 1972 Anchor Bible commentary.

225 Although the title Hebrews suggests the implied author is a Jew writing to Jews, Ellingworth makes a strong case for a mixed community of readers from Jewish and Gentile backgrounds (25).

226 Lane, cxv. As we noted in chapter 7, presumably more informed empirical readers mediated their knowledge to their less-informed counterparts.

227 This is reiterated throughout the remainder of the book (cf. chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12).
of God in Scripture and preaching (2:1; 3:7b–4:13, 5:11; 12:25)." Both as a group and individually, the readers have need of this message of exhortation (13:22).

That both SAs of this SAC are Assertives is seen when we transpose them:

(v 13) God has not said to any angel, “Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet.”

(v 14) All angels are spirits in the divine service, sent to serve those who are to inherit salvation.

Taking the negative Assertive in v 13 with the positive Assertive in v 14 brackets the role of angels in the divine economy. Angels are not rulers—heavenly or earthly—but rather servants of Yahweh who minister to “those who are to inherit salvation” (1:14) in part by bringing messages (2:2).

The transposition of v 13 makes it clear that although Yahweh has not said what is quoted from Psalm 110 to an angel, Yahweh has said it to someone. From the context and especially the introductory verses, it appears it was said to the Son, through whom “in these last days he [God] has spoken to us” (1:2a). Since the verb in v 13 appears in the perfect (εἴρηκεν), there is an emphasis on the present consequences of what Yahweh previously spoke. The SAC (vv 13-14) is christological since it clarifies what is true about Jesus as compared to the angels.

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228 Lane, lxi. Apparently “the listeners had not actually fallen away, since the author can assume that they still affirmed basic Christian beliefs. For example, he does not try to convince the listeners that Jesus died and was exalted to God’s right hand, but assumes that they will grant these points as the basis for his argument (1:1-4)” (Koester, 71).

229 “For listeners who remain committed to God and Christ, Hebrews … maintains the values they already hold. For those tending to drift away from the faith, Hebrews … seeks to dissuade them from apostasy and move them toward a clearer faith commitment” (Koester, 82).

230 J. Collins points out that “angels are never anointed” (“Jesus,” 115).

231 This is also true of the quotations in v 5, which are introduced by the same phrase. Ellingworth believes “the author of Hebrews assumes that his readers would respond to the rhetorical question: ‘to which of the angels did God ever say …?’ with the answer: ‘to no angel, but to the one whom the psalmist calls “my Lord.”’ … It now emerges that his main interest in this chapter is not negatively to demote angels in his readers’ eyes, but positively to reaffirm and strengthen their existing faith in the one who is now exalted to sit at God’s right hand” (130).

232 Contra Docherty, this does not imply “the words of scripture are to be assumed to be literally true” and that “there really is conversation in heaven between the exalted Jesus and God” (181).

233 “The perfect emphasizes a decisive event in the Son’s life which has continuing ramifications. We might even say that the climax of the catena occurs with Psalm 110:1b which speaks of the Son’s present situation as well as the Son’s future expectations” (Bateman, Hermeneutics, 233; cf. Attridge, Hebrews, 61).

234 Although Ἰησοῦς and χριστός do not appear until 2:9 and 3:6, respectively, according to R. Longenecker, all six OT passages quoted in Hebrews 1:5-13 “are interpreted christologically as referring to Jesus” (156). When Motyer classifies Ps 109:1 LXX in Heb 1:13 as “certainly understood as messianic,” he is referring to “the early church,” since he agrees “the evidence that this was read messianically in Judaism is very slight” and that “it may well be that its prominent use in the New Testament derives from Jesus himself (Mk. 12:35-37 par.)” (16).
However, this does not mean “the invitation to be enthroned at God’s right hand was addressed to the Son alone.”

Verse 13 may refer to Yahweh’s offer to David and his descendants to be seated at Yahweh’s right hand. In that case, the quotation is a reminder that no angel has been offered this position of honor and authority. Under this scenario, “to which of the angels did God ever say” in v 13, which parallels the similar phrase in v 5, introduces a new argument consisting of 1:13-14 and 2:5b-9. This argument explains the relationship between the angels and David and the kings of his line, a line which culminates in the incarnate Christ.

The Assertive in v 13 is thus tellable as the introduction to an argument concerning Jesus’ non-subordination to the angels even during his earthly existence. It serves as the link between the current position of Messiah Jesus “at the right hand of the Majesty on high” (1:3) and his status during his incarnation (2:9). Although in his earthly incarnation, Jesus was made “lower than” the angels and even submitted to death (2:7, 9), his incarnation was not only temporary but was designed to serve “the descendants of Abraham” (2:16) rather than angels.

This reading makes better sense of v 14, which tells us angels are not the rulers but rather the servants of humanity, i.e., “those who are to inherit salvation.” In contrast “to the Son, who is invited to share the divine presence and splendor, angels are sent forth on a mission of assistance to those who find themselves oppressed and confused in a hostile world.”

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235 Contra Lane, 45.

236 The seating of the Son at God’s right hand (1:3) may not be the only such seating referred to by v 13 since vv 13-14 have no explicit reference to the Son, lord, messiah, Last Days, etc. Regarding v 1:5b, Ellingworth finds it “not surprising that God’s promise to David should have been understood as extending beyond Solomon to an ideal king of Davidic descent, known as the Messiah” (115).

237 For G. Guthrie, 1:5 and 1:13 form an inclusio (Structure, 77; cf. Bateman, Hermeneutics, 241). But since only the phrase “to which of the angels has God ever said” is repeated and the content of God’s speech in the two verses is quite different, Guthrie’s Parallel Introductions category (cf. Structure, 104) seems as likely. Gourgues believes “1:3 lance un développement qui vient aboutir en 1:13, lequel, après en avoir récapitulé les éléments majeurs, relance à son tour un nouveau développement” in 2:5 (94; cf. Lane, 45).

238 Cf. Lane, 46. Although we cannot explore in detail what being “made lower” might mean, Koester believes the author of Hebrews correlates being made lower “with Christ’s suffering and death” (217, referring to Heb 5:7, 12:2 and 13:12; cf. Moyise, Writings, 89). If this is the case, Heb 2:9 makes it clear that “Jesus’ suffering is not incompatible with his glory and honor” (McCann, 63).

239 According to Gheorghita, most commentators choose “the temporal sense” rather than that of degree because of “the adverbial particle vôv” in 2:8 (106; cf. Lane, 43; and Koester, 34 and 116).

240 Lane, 32. “In Hebrews 1:7 angels serve the Davidic king, and in Hebrews 1:14 that service involves serving the saints. … Thus, while waiting for the future consummation of the Son’s rule, angels serve the Son by serving the subjects of the Son” (Bateman, Hermeneutics, 235; cf. Attridge, Hebrews, 62). For Ellingworth, also, “better sense is made of the verse as a whole … if it is paraphrased as follows: ‘All these angels, as we have been showing from scripture, are subordinate to God and therefore to Christ as Son. They live to worship God in heaven, and serve him by being sent … on earthly missions for the
Messiah, being “lower than the angels” is not a matter of subjection to them. Ultimately, “all things”—presumably including angels—are “put in subjection under his feet” (Heb 2:8 NASB quoting Ps 8:6). Both the world to come and this world are subjected not to angels, but to the “more than” Messiah Jesus.

The quotation from Psalm 110:1 evokes for the implied reader the Story-lines of Yahweh giving the Anointed the honor and authority of a seat at Yahweh’s right hand and of Yahweh’s active engagement in subjecting the enemies to the rule of the eternal Messiah. These Story-lines have been refracted through the lens of the Jesus-event; only Jesus is now referred to as Messiah.

How does this SAC fit into the illocution of the speech event? William Lane argues that in Hebrews “argumentation serves exhortation. … The primary function of exhortation is to motivate the community to appropriate action.” Using our terminology, we conclude that the Assertives in 1:5-14 support the Directive in 2:1 to “pay greater attention to what we have heard, so that we do not drift away from it.” The Assertives in 2:2-4 also support this Directive. The return to exposition in 2:5, also an Assertive, looks back to 1:13 (and 1:3), thus linking the citations in 1:5-13 with those in 2:6-13 and creating discourse cohesion.
Overall, the desired perlocutionary effect of the opening chapters of Hebrews is that the audience complete the action called for by the Directive in 2:1; this will lead to transformation of the current behavior of the community.

The SAC which contains the quotation (1:13-14) is composed of Assertives recounting things that God has “said”; it therefore presents elements of the content of what “we have heard.” The desired perlocutionary effect of an Assertive is that the audience respond not only with understanding but with adherence. In order to obey the Directive, Envisaging readers must adhere to the Assertives presented in connection with the Directive, including those of the SAC in 1:13-14. Specifically, they will reaffirm their belief that the Son not only rules over the angels at the present time but was not subject to them during his incarnation. If they have abandoned that belief, they will revert to it. The Story told by Psalm 110:1, and specifically Yahweh’s granting honor and authority to Yahweh’s Anointed by offering a seat at the right hand (an honor not granted to any angel), thus becomes an important part of the theological argument for the role of the Son, Messiah Jesus, as compared to the angels.

“A Priest Forever”

Although we cannot explore the use of Psalm 110:4 in Hebrews in detail, we want to highlight its contribution to Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview. It is in the opening verses of Hebrews that the reader learns that when God’s Son “had made purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high” (1:3c). Some see an allusion to Psalm 110:1b in the second clause.\(^246\) Not to be overlooked, however, is that the Son “made purification for sins” (1:3c) points to the priestly nature of Jesus’ messiahship.\(^247\) In addition to 1:3c, allusions to Psalm 110:1 and 4 are found in Hebrews 8:1 and 10:12-13.\(^248\) These passages, taken with other quotations of and allusions to Psalm 110:1 and 4,\(^249\) triumphally present Jesus, the Son and Messiah, as not only the exalted Lord of all but also the eternal high priest and once-for-all sacrifice.

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\(^{246}\) Cf. Hay, *Glory*, 164. Hebrews follows the wording of Ps 109:1 LXX (ἐκ δεξιῶν) only in 1:13, perhaps because it is an explicit quotation. Elsewhere, “the right hand” is expressed by ἐν δεξιᾷ. Whether the author of Hebrews uses a hymn in 1:3 (see Koester, 178-179) is not material to our argument.


\(^{248}\) In Heb 10:12-13, the thought that the Messiah has offered a “single sacrifice for sins” (v 12) is linked to Ps 110:1 via two allusions to the final two clauses of that verse.

\(^{249}\) Ps 110:1 is also alluded to in Heb 12:2. There are three other direct quotations (5:6; 7:15-17, 21) of Ps 110:4 and seven allusions (5:10; 6:20; 7:3, 8, 11, 24-25, 28) (Hay, *Glory*, 165-166).
Radu Gheorghita rightly calls the development of “Christ as the High Priest, one of the theological tours de force of the epistle.” But he is not entirely correct that it was the author of Hebrews who “combined into one person the twofold office of the Messiah, the Son who was made the High Priest.” Although Hebrews is the only NT book to quote or allude to Psalm 110:4, there is evidence of a priestly function for Messiah Jesus in the co-texts of both our non-Synoptic examples of the use of Psalm 110:1 (Acts 2:21, 38-39; 1 Cor 15:3, 17).

However, as we said in our discussion of the Davidssohnfrage, the unwillingness of Jesus’ audience to engage with him concerning Psalm 110 may have been due to their discomfort with the priestly references in the second oracle. Since only Hebrews makes explicit use of Psalm 110:4, it is possible that “the connection with Psalm 110:4 was invented by the author of Hebrews.” In developing explicitly a theological connection that may have been only implicit previously, the author of Hebrews uses Psalm 110:1 and 4 in a manner congruent with their original co-texts.

**Conclusion**

Hatina suggests this query: “If the story world serves as the point of departure, what then is the cohesive feature within the story to which the quotations and allusions contribute?” Asking this question helps summarize our analyses of these quotations of Psalm 110:1 by various NT speakers/authors. First, the metaphor well-known in the

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250 Gheorghita, 145.
251 Ibid. In the Document of Damascus, “les deux ‘messies d’Aaron et d’Israël’ sont devenus l’unique ‘messie d’Aaron et d’Israël’. … Un passage tiré de la partie législative de D nous assure que le Messie sera bien le futur grand prêtre, car c’est lui qui ‘expiera (ykpr) leurs fautes’” (Starcky, 495-496).
252 Cf. Rom 8:34, which refers to the intercession of the exalted Christ and where the metaphor of a seat at the right hand is also found. If the author of Hebrews was familiar with Romans, that author is developing an existing connection (as per de Lang, 47, and contra Loader, 206; Westfall, 105; and Koester, 22). M. Bird points to a merger of the “royal and redemptive roles of Jesus” as early as Mark 8:27-9:1 (144). R. Watts looks back further—to Mark’s opening sentence—to connect Jesus with the Temple as “Lord of the house” (“Lord’s House,” 320). But this does not necessarily mean “the image of Christ as a heavenly High Priest was traditional within the early Christian community addressed by Hebrews” (Attridge, Hebrews, 102; cf. 26, 103)
253 De Lang, 48, calls this “probable.” This is contra Hengel, for whom “aufgrund der Verwandtschaft von Rö 8,34 mit verschiedenen Hebräer-Texten scheint es mir wahrscheinlich zu sein, daß die Verbindung von Ps 110,1 und 4 nicht erst auf den Verfasser dieses relativ späten Briefes zurückgeht, sondern schon wesentlich älter ist und bereits Paulus vertraut war” (130).
254 Ellingworth calls “the author’s general theological position … the opposite of atomistic exposition” (41; cf. 109, 147-148). Gheorghita adds that “current opinion now swings more towards admitting that the Author quotes from the OT with full awareness of the texts’ original contexts, evidenced in the way the quotations frequently align themselves with ideas from the passage in which they originate” (57). For him, “it seems extremely likely that … the context itself played a significant role in shaping the use of the quotations” (69).
255 Hatina, Search, 3.
ancient world of being invited to sit at the right hand of the deity, i.e., an offer of honor and authority, is either explicitly referred to or obviously part of the mutual context of all the quotations. Additionally, all the quotations explicitly reproduce Yahweh’s offer to subject the enemies as a footstool/under the feet. Both metaphors are part of the Story evoked with each quotation.

By quoting Psalm 110:1 and evoking these OT Story-lines, the implied NT speakers/authors, as Envisagers, activate or create mutual context to guide their hearers/readers in realigning or subverting/re-creating their understanding of Yahweh and Yahweh’s relationships with His people.256 However, the NT speakers/authors do not simply retell the OT Story. Story evolves. The Davidsohnfrage, Jesus’ allusion at his trial to the metaphor of the seat at the right hand, and the events of his crucifixion, resurrection and ascension all become part of mutual context and Story for other NT speakers/authors.257 In addition, the events of Pentecost, including the content of Peter’s speech, are or become part of the mutual context of the implied author and audience of Acts 2, 1 Corinthians 15 and Hebrews 1-2.258

From Jesus’ first use in the Davidsohnfrage, the quotation of Psalm 110:1 reveals Jesus as “more than” messiah and helps shed light on what it means to say that Jesus is Son of David, Messiah, Lord and Son of God.259 And, at Pentecost and after, Psalm 110:1 is a critical text in witnessing to and describing Jesus’ exaltation, providing a deeper understanding of his “more than” messiahship.260

Envisaging hearers/readers of the NT are those who realign or subvert/recreate their theological perspective and Story according to the perlocutionary intentions of the various implied NT speakers/authors. Considering the totality of these quoting texts, the implied reader understands that Messiah Jesus is seated in the position of power and authority at the right hand of God, where his enemies are being put under his feet. Jesus

256 As Dodd argues with regard to Pss 2, 8 and 110, “I believe reflection will show that the development of meaning is a living growth within the given environment, and that the doctrines associated with these passages by New Testament writers gain in depth and significance when we have regard to the original, historical intention of the psalms they cite” (133).

257 Hengel is correct that the “unsagbar kühne und zugleich anstößige Schritt” of placing the ignominiously-executed Jesus “in die Throngemeinschaft mit Gott nach Ps 110,1” must be grounded “in Lehre und Verhalten Jesus selbst” (177).

258 Koester believes “many similarities between Hebrews and the Pauline writings may result from each writer’s reliance on a common pool of early Christian ideas,” including “the use of Ps 110:1 as a principal witness to Christ’s exaltation” (56; cf. H. W. Attridge, “The Psalms in Hebrews,” in Moyise and Menken,” 197).

259 In Hebrews, references to Ps 110:4 speak to priestly elements of Jesus’ messiahship.

260 We disagree with Attridge’s claim that the “use” of Ps 110 in the Davidsohnfrage accounts is different from its “use” in Acts 2, Rom 8, 1 Cor 15, Eph 1, Col 3 (“The Psalms,” 198 and 198n4).
“pours out” the Spirit, forgives sins and is to be called on for salvation. All things, including angels and the ultimate enemy, death, are subject to him. Ultimately Envisaging readers come to live in the lifeworld established by the recontextualized Story of the people of God, in which Messiah Jesus reigns eternally over all things of earth and heaven.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The Development and Use of Our Methodology

In the first part of our study, we created a model to explore how OT quotation serves as a transformational call to live into the lifeworld of the people of God and adopt the corresponding worldview. Rejecting both the idea that either the quoted or quoting author “controls” the other and the claim that quoting is necessarily manipulative, we adopted a hermeneutics of author-reader cooperation through the medium of the text.

Our first step was to evaluate the proposed functions of quotation. Making the determination that quotation can evoke tradition led us to explore the relationship between the source and receptor contexts of a quotation and the interaction between author and reader generally. We developed the concept of “Story” (narrative plus non-narrative textual tradition) as our link between quotation and lifeworld/worldview transformation. The theological positions (basic questions and answers) of the elements of textual tradition evoked via quotation we term its “Story-lines.”

Transformation of lifeworld/worldview and Story is necessary in response to tension, such as the reinforcement or interposition of a Story via quotation. When Story is evoked and mutual context is created and/or activated, transformation is in view. Adapting communication theorist Walter Fisher’s categorization of the functions of stories, we consider transformation to be one of two basic types, realignment or subversion/re-creation.

Finally, we created an “action model” of communicative interaction based in SAT. The inclusion of not only illocution but also perlocution (in each case, both acts and effects) in our action model allows us to delineate three reader roles: the locutionary role of “Independent,” the illocutionary role of “Analyst” and the perlocutionary role of “Envisager.” Our study focuses on the Envisager, a reader who not only understands the illocutionary act but also responds with the perlocutionary effect (belief and/or action) of the implied reader corresponding to the perlocutionary act of the implied author. The intended perlocutionary response of the implied reader points to the implied author’s desired future transformation of Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview. By including perlocution, incorporating the construct of the implied author/reader, and considering Envisagers as distinct from Analysts, our action model holds the author, reader and text
in creative tension, providing a bridge across the chasm between meaning as authorial intention versus reader response. Only at the perlocutionary level is communicative interaction fully successful, i.e., does an empirical reader move beyond understanding to adherence and transformation.

In quoting, the Envisaging NT speaker/author, who is a reader of the source text, evokes the theological Story-lines of the OT Story and/or an intervening interpretive tradition in order to give guidance and direction to the potentially Envisaging empirical NT audience. Via quotation and through the implied author and reader, the NT author calls for a response of belief and/or action which is intended to realign or subvert/recreate the current Story and the related theological lifeworld/worldview of the empirical NT audience. Using our action model, we can evaluate what theological elements of Story (tradition) are evoked by a quotation, what lifeworld/worldview transformation is in view and whether the NT speaker/author read as an Envisager.

In our first case study, Paul’s quotation of Psalm 115:1a LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13, we concluded that Paul evokes the Story of the psalmist, who believes, speaks, suffers, is rescued, and gives thanks, in order to link the Corinthians to the lifeworld of the people of Yahweh and encourage a transformation of his readers’ beliefs and behaviors. Via the illocutionary and perlocutionary responses of the implied reader, an Envisaging NT reader adheres to the idea that Paul’s faith impels his speech and that neither his ministry nor his message is compromised by his suffering. Rather, Paul’s suffering demonstrates solidarity with Messiah Jesus and the truth of his message.

Additionally, Paul’s Envisaging readers adhere to the notion that all believers can be confident of Yahweh’s protection, and that ultimately, all will be brought into Yahweh’s presence with Messiah Jesus. Not only what they know but what they do is to be transformed; thanksgiving is to be increased to the glory of God. Envisaging readers join Paul, himself an Envisaging reader, in the lifeworld he inhabits.

In our second case study, we examined some purportedly divergent uses of Psalm 110:1 by NT authors, applying our methodology to see what transformation of belief or action is in view in each instance. The metaphor of being invited to sit at the right hand of the deity, i.e., an offer of honor and authority, is explicitly referred to in five of the six quotations we examined.1 Additionally, all six quotations explicitly reproduce Yahweh’s guarantee of victory via the subjection of the enemies as a

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1 If we include the allusions in the accounts of Jesus’ trial, the count rises to eight out of nine. This aspect of Ps 110:1 is part of the mutual context of 1 Cor 15:25 but is not referred to explicitly.
footstool for or under the feet.² Thus, one or both of these elements are part of the evoked Story in every instance.

In terms of the theological import, from Jesus’ first use in the Davidssohnfrage, the quotation of Psalm 110:1 substantiates and develops Jesus’ “more than” messiahship. Jesus’ speech at his trial, which has roots in the Davidssohnfrage, is part of the mutual context—along with Jesus’ crucifixion, resurrection, ascension and exaltation—when Peter evokes the Story at Pentecost. And Peter’s Pentecost speech becomes part of mutual context for the implied author and audience of Acts, 1 Corinthians 15 and Hebrews 1-2.

Although the quotation is used in a variety of settings, each NT speaker/author appears to read the OT text as an Envisager. That does not mean that by quoting Psalm 110:1, they simply retell the OT Story. The Story of the people of God now encompasses the events of the life, death, resurrection and exaltation of Messiah Jesus. As Story evolves, theology and lifeworld/worldview evolve as well. Envisaging empirical readers transform their theological perspective and Story according to the perlocutionary intention of the implied NT speakers/authors and inhabit the lifeworld in which Messiah Jesus reigns eternally over earth and heaven at the right hand of God.

Looking Ahead

As Booth laments, “since everything is in one way or another related to everything else, … to write a book at all—any book—one must rule out almost everything that is potentially interesting.”³ We have only scratched the surface of exploring NT quotation of the OT with our methodology.⁴ Investigation of other OT quotations would be profitable. There may also be value in modifying the methodology to investigate allusion or even echo.⁵ Other interesting studies would be of quotations used ironically

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² The allusions in the trial narratives do not reproduce this element.
³ Booth, Fiction, 404.
⁴ We have not, for example, considered any quotations from Johannine literature. Given the exchange between G. K. Beale (John’s Use of the Old Testament in Revelation [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998] and “Questions of Authorial Intent, Epistemology, and Presuppositions and Their Bearing on the Study of the Old Testament in the New: A Rejoinder to Steve Moyise,” IBS 21, no. 4 [1999]: 152-180) and Moyise (“Intertextuality and the Study”), our methodology might be of value there.
⁵ For allusion and echo, see Hays, Echoes. The construct of the implied author/reader obviates Wilk’s concern that “one can only assume a communicative function of scriptural connections on the basis of explicitly marked citations” (“Paul,” 85).
or in parody or punning or in which the NT author appears to read the OT as an Independent.\textsuperscript{6}

Additionally, because our methodology involves evoking Story to call readers to the transformation necessary to inhabit a lifeworld, an interesting topic to explore would be how evoking Story helps form and sustain identity.\textsuperscript{7} For the NT, this would involve investigating both how individuals become and grow as followers of Jesus and how the identity of the NT communities as the people of Yahweh is established. A natural follow-on to this would be how ethical standards are established and sustained.\textsuperscript{8} Of additional interest might be the relaxing of our implied assumption of the equality of participants to add to our model the consideration of what Pratt calls “affective relations, power relations, and the question of shared goals.”\textsuperscript{99}

Thus, the model we have developed here, which uses SAT—notably perlocution—to link quotation as the evoking of Story (textual tradition) to lifeworld/worldview transformation, may provide additional opportunities to gain insights into the purposes of NT authors and readers in communicative interaction.

\textsuperscript{6} An example would be to explore whether J. A. Fitzmyer’s four classes (“Literal or Historical,” “Modernized Texts,” “Accommodated Texts” [“wrested from its original context or modified somehow to suit the new situation”], and “Eschatological”) capture meaningful distinctions (see “The Use of Explicit Old Testament Quotations in Qumran Literature and in the New Testament,” \textit{NTS} \textbf{7} [October 1960-July 1961]: 305-330; quote is from p. 316). Other fruitful explorations would be the examples in S. Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context of His Quotations?,” in Stanley; and “How Does Paul Read Scripture?,” in Evans and Zacharias.

\textsuperscript{7} We saw in chapter 4 that many scholars (including Keesmaat, R. Watts, Pao, Horrell, J. Green, and Crites) tie tradition/story to social identity. See also Hays, \textit{Faith}, 221. M. Bird concludes that “the messianic Christology … of the early church was the central means through which it related its own claims to be the people of God in continuity with and as the \textit{climax} to Israel’s sacred traditions” (151; cf. Crafton, 437; and J. Punt, “Identity, Memory, and Scriptural Warrant: Arguing Paul’s Case,” in Stanley).

\textsuperscript{8} Hays points out that “some contemporary ethicists have emphasized the importance of stories as the medium through which character is formed and values are sustained” (\textit{Faith}, 221).

\textsuperscript{9} Pratt, “Ideology,” 67.
APPENDIX A

WORKS WHICH USE SPEECH-ACT THEORY

For the Exegesis of Biblical Texts or to Explore Religious Concepts

Donald D. Evans, whose 1963 work focused on NT speeches, was apparently the first to use SAT to analyze biblical texts or religious concepts (The Logic of Self-Involvement: A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use of Language about God as Creator [London: SCM, 1963]).

Other examples, in chronological order, are:


*On a Broader Hermeneutical/Philosophical Basis*

In addition to those sources cited or referred to in our study, Richard S. Briggs provides a helpful introduction to the work of a variety of theologians or biblical scholars who have interacted with SAT on a broader hermeneutical basis (“The Uses of Speech-Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation,” *CurBS* 9 [2001]: 229-276). Some works not included in Briggs’ essay or which have been published since 2001 include:


APPENDIX B
THE SPEECH-ACT COMPLEXES OF PSALMS 115:1-3 AND 109:1 LXX AND THEIR QUOTING NT TEXTS

1. A Comparison of Psalm 115:1-3 LXX and the NETS Translation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LXX</th>
<th>NETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀλληλούια.</td>
<td>I believed,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐπίστευσα,</td>
<td>and so I spoke;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διὸ ἐλάλησα·</td>
<td>but I was brought very low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐγὼ δὲ ἐταπεινώθην σφόδρα.</td>
<td>I said in my alarm, “Every person is a liar.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐγὼ εἶπα ἐν τῇ ἐκστάσει μου Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης.</td>
<td>What shall I return to the Lord for all he returned to me?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Quotation of Psalm 115:1 LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13-14 (NA and NRSV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NA</th>
<th>NRSV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἐχόντες δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον· ἐπίστευσα διὸ ἐλάλησα,</td>
<td>But just as we have the same spirit of faith that is in accordance with scripture — “I believed, and so I spoke” —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καὶ ἰμέως πιστεύομεν,</td>
<td>we also believe,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διὸ καὶ λαλοῦμεν,</td>
<td>and so we speak,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰσόδες ὅτι ὁ ἐγέρας τὸν κύριον ᾿Ησαῦ καὶ ἴμας σὺν ᾿Ησαῦ ἐγερεῖ καὶ παραστήσει σὺν ᾿ὑμῖν.</td>
<td>because we know that the one who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus, and will bring us with you into his presence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. A Comparison of Psalm 109:1-3 LXX and the NETS and NRSV Translations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LXX</th>
<th>NETS</th>
<th>NRSV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>τῷ Δαυῖδ ψαλμός. Εἶπεν ὁ κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ του Καθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου, ἔως ἃν θῶ τοὺς ἐν ημῖν κατακυρίευε ἐν τῶν ἐχθρῶν σου.</td>
<td>Pertaining to David. A Psalm. The Lord said to my lord, “Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ῥάβδον δυνάἡεώς σου ἐξαποστελεί κύριος ἐκ Σιὼν, καὶ κατακυρίευε ἐν μέσῳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν σου.</td>
<td>The Lord will send out from Sion your powerful rod. Rule in the midst of your foes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μετὰ σου ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τῆς δυνάμεως σου ἐν ταῖς λαμπρότητι τῶν ἀγίων·</td>
<td>So have dominion in the midst of your enemies. Your people will offer themselves willingly on the day you lead your forces on the holy mountains.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐκ γαστρός πρὸ ἐως φόρου ἐξεγέννησά σε.</td>
<td>From the womb, before the morning star, I brought you forth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Ps 115:2 LXX contains a direct self-quotiation (introduced by the Greek verb λέγω rather than the verb λαλέω as in 1b). As a result, we consider it one SA.
4. The Synoptic Texts of the Davidssohnfrage (NA²⁷ and NRSV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ἐλθεῖν δὲ αὐτούς πῶς λέγουσιν αὐτὸν κύριον τὸν κυρίον μου, ἐκ δεξιῶν μου, ἐκ δεξιῶν τῶν ποδῶν σου;</td>
<td>While Jesus was teaching in the temple, he said, “How can the scribes say that the Messiah is the son of David?”</td>
<td>Then he said to them, “How can they say that the Messiah is David’s son?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἔλεγεν διδάσκων ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ: πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ γραἡἡατεῖς ὅτι ὁ χριστὸς υἱὸς Δαυίδ ἐστιν;</td>
<td>He said to them, “How is it then that David by the Spirit calls him Lord, saying, ‘The Lord said to my Lord, “Sit at my right hand, until I put your enemies under your feet”’?”</td>
<td>For David himself says in the book of Psalms, ‘The Lord said to my Lord, “Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool.”’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς: πῶς λέγουσιν τὸν χριστὸν εἶναι Δαυὶδ υἱόν;</td>
<td>David himself, by the Holy Spirit, declared, “The Lord said to my Lord, “Sit at my right hand, until I put your enemies under your feet.””</td>
<td>David thus calls him Lord; so how can he be his son?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Εἶπεν οὖν Δαυὶδ καλεῖ αὐτὸν κύριον, πῶς υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστιν;</td>
<td>If David thus calls him Lord, how can he be his son?”</td>
<td>David thus calls him Lord; so how can he be his son?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Καὶ οὐδὲς ἐδύνατο ἀποκριθῆναι αὐτὸν λόγον οὐδὲ ἐπτύλμησεν τις ἀπ’ ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπερωτηθῆσαι αὐτόν οὐκέτι.</td>
<td>No one was able to give him an answer, nor from that day did anyone dare to ask him any more questions.</td>
<td>And the large crowd was listening to him with delight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. The Quotation of Psalm 110:1 in Peter’s Pentecost Speech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the δεξιά όν τοῦ θεοῦ υψηθείς, την τε ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου λαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός, ἐξέχεεν τοῦτο ἡ υἱή [καὶ] βλέπετε καὶ ἀκούετε.</td>
<td>{Peter said} “Being therefore exalted at {by} the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he has poured out this that you both see and hear.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὅπως δὲ αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν ὁ κύριος τῷ κύριῳ μου· κάθως ἐν δεξιά ἔχειν, ἔσσε ἐν θεῷ τοίς ἐξήθησιν σω ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου.</td>
<td>but he himself says, ‘The Lord said to my Lord, “Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool.”’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀσφαλῶς οὖν γινώσκετε πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσραὴλ ὅτι καὶ κύριον αὐτὸν καὶ χριστὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, τοῦτον τὸν Ἱησοῦν ὃν ἔστησεν καὶ ἐσταυρώσατε.</td>
<td>Therefore let the entire house of Israel know with certainty that God has made him both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus whom you crucified.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6a. A Comparison of Psalm 110:1c [109:1c LXX] and 1 Corinthians 15:25²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psalm 109:1c LXX</th>
<th>1 Corinthians 15:25 (NA²⁷)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… ὅπου ἐν θεῷ τοῖς ἐξήθησιν σω ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου.</td>
<td>… δέχετε ὅπου πάντας τοῖς ἐξήθησιν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NA²⁷</th>
<th>NRSV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 εἰτα τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδόθη τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί, ὅταν καταργηθήσεται πάντες ἀρχαὶ καὶ πάντες ἐξουσίαι καὶ δύναμες.</td>
<td>Then comes the end, when he hands over the kingdom to God the Father, after he has destroyed every ruler and every authority and power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν βασιλεύειν καθώς ὁ θεός ἐν θεῷ τοῖς πόδας αὐτοῦ.</td>
<td>For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 εἰς ταῖς διακονίαις ἐν διακονίας ἐν διακονίας ἐν διακονίας</td>
<td>The last enemy to be destroyed is death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 ὅταν δὲ εἴπῃ ὅτι πάντα ὑποτάσσεται, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐστίν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα.</td>
<td>For “God has put all things in subjection under his feet.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 ὅταν δὲ ὑποτάσσῃ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, τότε [καὶ] αὐτὸς τό εἰς ὑποτάσσεσθαι ὑπὸ τοὺς πάντας, τότε σωτηρία</td>
<td>But when it says, “All things are put in subjection,” it is plain that this does not include the one who put all things in subjection under him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 τὸν ἄγγελον τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν πάντων, τότε σωτηρία</td>
<td>When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to the one who put all things in subjection under him,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NA²⁷</th>
<th>NRSV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 πρὸς τινὰ δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐξηρεῖσθαι ποτε· κάθῳ ἐν δεξιά τοῖς ἐξήθησις σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου;</td>
<td>But to which of the angels has he {God} ever said, “Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet”?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 οὐχὶ πάντως εἰσὶν λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα εἰς διακονίαν ὑποσταλλόμενα διὰ τούς μέλλοντας κληρονομεῖς σωτηρίαν;</td>
<td>Are not all angels spirits in the divine service, sent to serve for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² The double underlined worlds are identical in each text; the single underlined words are different forms of the same word.
APPENDIX C
AN EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL PRE-CHRISTIAN MESSIANIC REFERENCES TO PSALM 110

Messianic references to Psalm 110 have been seen in the OT books of Daniel and Zechariah, as well as in 1 Maccabees, Assumption of Moses, Jubilees, Testament of Levi, Rabbi Akiba, the Similitudes of 1 Enoch and 11QMelchizedek.

As an example, Hay finds it “distinctly possible” that the author of Daniel 7 was “thinking of Ps 110:1 (the only scriptural text which explicitly speaks of someone enthroned beside God).” For Michael Rydelnik also, “Daniel 7, with its glorious vision of the Ancient of Days and the Son of Man, appears to be a reference to the seating of the messianic King at the right hand of God (Ps 110:1).” He believes that not only the book of Daniel but also the book of Zechariah provides “a clear messianic hope by relying on the words and images contained in Psalm 110. Plainly, these later writers understood Psalm 110 to refer to the Messiah of Israel.” But finding “references” to Psalm 110 in Daniel and Zechariah is far from certain. As Collins puts it, the Son of Man in Daniel “is not a Davidic messiah in any conventional sense.”

In intertestamental literature, Hay finds Hasmonean usage of Psalm 110:4 in 1 Maccabees 14:41, which refers to Simon’s appointment as “leader” (ἡγούμενον) as well as priest “forever” (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα) and is thus taken to justify the Hasmonean claims to royal as well as priestly prerogatives. However, chapters 14-16 may have been a post-70 CE addition to 1 Maccabees. In any event, it is unlikely the psalm was composed by or for the Hasmoneans, since “the psalm ascribes priesthood to a king (vs 4), whereas the Hasmoneans were priests by birth and required legitimation of their kingly office. So the psalm, while filling their propaganda needs, did not fit them exactly; it seems to have been written for other monarchs.” Roth concludes that “bleibt es eine reine Hypothese auch in 1 Makk 14,41 einen Bezug zu Ps 110 zu sehen.”

Hay also finds applications of Psalm 110 to Hasmonean rulers in Assumption of Moses 6:1; Jubilees 32:1, 36:16; and portions of Testament of Levi, including 8:3, which

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2 Rydelnik, 182.
3 Ibid., 183.
4 J. Collins, Scepter, 205.
5 Hay, Glory, 24.
6 See Tharel, 29 and 29n20.
7 Hay, Glory, 24n22; cf. de Lang, 43 and 43n1.
8 Roth, 51.
“recalls the phraseology of Psalm 110:2,” and chapter 18, which he believes contains allusions to Ps 110:1c and 110:3.9 However, Assumption of Moses and Jubilees do not allude to Psalm 110 except for a link to Melchizedek via the reference to “Most High God” in Genesis 14:18-20. And, not only are any connections in Testament of Levi extremely faint, Marinus de Jonge argues convincingly that in Testament of Levi its “Jewish and patently Christian elements are connected so closely that they cannot be separated by literary critical means.”10 Similarly, Michael Knibb avers “there is nothing in the Aramaic Levi Document that can be regarded as messianic. … It is clear that the material in T Lev 18 has been thoroughly reworked by the Christian author of the Testament of Levi.”11 Karen Jobes and Moisés Silva also believe that although the pseudepigraphic work known as Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs probably originated in the Hellenistic Judaism of the second century B.C.E., it may have also experienced Christian interpolations during its history of scribal transmission. The text is extant in only five medieval manuscripts, the earliest dating to the tenth century, making it notoriously difficult to use in LXX studies.12 Therefore, Testament of Levi also is not, for us, an authoritative source.

Hay finds other potential pre-Christian interpretations of Psalm 110 in Testament of Job 33, the Similitudes of I Enoch, and 11QMelchizedek. Although the latter is clearly pre-Christian, by Hay’s own admission, it “never plainly alludes to either the psalm or Gen 14.18-20.”13 Similarly, while James Charlesworth feels “I Enoch 37-71 antedates the Palestinian Jesus Movement”14 and others assert its value for NT studies,15 it remains “extremely tenuous to assert that anyone in pre-Christian Judaism … equated ‘sit at my right hand’ of Ps 110:1 with ‘sitting on the throne of glory’ in the Similitudes of Enoch.”16 We do not base our argument on such uncertain evidence.

9 Hay, Glory, 24-25.
11 Knibb, 13.
12 Jobes and Silva, 300.
13 Hay, Glory, 27; contra Witherington, Mark, 333; J. C. VanderKam, The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Bible (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 47; and Eskola’s minimally supported assertion that “11QMelch. may be regarded as one of the earliest examples of exploiting Psalm 110 in an apocalyptic Jewish writing” (130).
14 Charlesworth, “Messianology,” 40.
15 See M. Bird, 93-94.
16 R. Longenecker, 157n50.
As to Testament of Job 33, for Craig Keener, “one of the few obvious allusions to Ps 110 in extant non-Christian Jewish literature from before about 200 C.E. is the Testament of Job (Test. Job. 33:3), where it is applied to Job’s exaltation (in a nondivine way).”\(^\text{17}\) Although Testament of Job does refer to being seated at Yahweh’s right hand, others doubt it is pre-Christian. According to Martin Hengel, “Man kann daher nicht aufgrund von TestHiob 33 behaupten, daß die sessio ad dexteram Christi auf einer von Ps 110,1 unabhängig auch sonst in jüdischen Quellen angedeuteten Tradition beruhe. Eine solche vorchristliche jüdische Überlieferung läßt sich nicht nachweisen.”\(^\text{18}\) In any event, it is clear Job is not the messiah first-century Jews anticipated.

In general, we agree with Jobes and Silva that “in the study of the history of the messianic idea, one must be able to identify texts that were understood in this way by the Jews before the time of Jesus. This is not always easy or straightforward to do, because most of the extant manuscripts have been preserved by the Christian tradition.”\(^\text{19}\) There are some interpretations of Psalm 110:1 in rabbinic writings (notably the Babylonian Talmud and several Amoraic midrashic writings) and the Targum Psalms. Although none of these sources is dated earlier than the third century CE, some argue they report rabbinic teaching from earlier periods.\(^\text{20}\) However, it is probable these writings contain at least some reaction to Christian interpretation of the OT. For example, Evans believes the reference to David in Targum Psalm 110:1 may be “in reaction to Christian interpretation.”\(^\text{21}\) Warren Heard points to “the danger of drawing conclusions about Jewish traditions in the NT era from sources written after the destruction of Jerusalem,”\(^\text{22}\) and Harold Attridge finds that, in general, “in Jewish tradition attestations of a messianic interpretation of the text [Ps 110(109):1] are weak.”\(^\text{23}\) It is doubtful that any of these texts reflect “pure” pre-Christian Jewish interpretation.

\(^{17}\) Keener, 1:961; cf. Bateman, *Hermeneutics*, 181, who also believes Ps 110 “is at least alluded to in ... 11QMelchizedek.” For Hay, the “allusion to Ps 110.1 in T Job 33.3 seems patent,” although he does not confine its potential date to the pre-Christian era (*Glory*, 23; cf. 22).

\(^{18}\) Hengel, 180; cf. Evans, *Ancient Texts*, 42.

\(^{19}\) Jobes and Silva, 300.

\(^{20}\) See, for example, Evans, *Ancient Texts*, 197, regarding Targum Psalms, which is only known since the 11th century. Similarly, Charlesworth recognizes that the Similitudes of 1 Enoch “is extant only in Ethiopic” (“Messianology,” 39).


\(^{22}\) W. Heard, “New Testament Background,” in McKnight, 24.

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