Modeling and verification of insider threats using logical analysis

Kammueller, Florian and Probst, Christian (2016) Modeling and verification of insider threats using logical analysis. IEEE Systems Journal . ISSN 1932-8184 (Accepted/In press)

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Abstract

In this paper we combine formal modeling and analysis of infrastructures of organisations with sociological explanation to provide a framework for insider threat analysis. We use the Higher Order Logic proof assistant Isabelle/HOL to support this framework.
In the formal model, we exhibit and use a common trick from the formal verification of security protocols showing that it is applicable to insider threats. We introduce briefly a three step process of social explanation illustrating that it can be applied fruitfully to the characterisation of insider threats. We introduce the Insider theory constructed in Isabelle that implements this process of social
explanation. To validate that the social explanation is generally useful for the analysis of insider threats and to demonstrate our framework, we model and verify the insider threat patterns Entitled Independent and Ambitious Leader in our Isabelle/HOL framework.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > School of Science and Technology > Computer Science
Item ID: 15189
Useful Links:
Depositing User: Florian Kammueller
Date Deposited: 23 Apr 2015 10:30
Last Modified: 13 Oct 2016 14:33
URI: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/15189

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