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CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION, CRIME CONTROL

AND

POLITICAL ACTION

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This thesis outlines the emergence of victimology as a major sub-discipline within criminology. Its growth is traced to intellectual debates and problematics in the history of criminology, and the interactions with wider political and social currents. Chapter I provides an overview of literature in victimology, its scope and areas of theory and research. Chapter II examines the context of the 'discovery of criminal victimisation' by the President's Crime Commission, 1967, and the linking of state intervention in crime and poverty in the reformism of the Johnson Administration. Victimology's growth is linked to the 'data revolution' in criminal justice and the state funding of victimisation surveys through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Chapter III analyses the alliance between social science and social democracy, and Chapter IV deals with the alliance of criminologists and social reformism in relation to the political history of crime statistics. The latter's problems are assessed in relation to the 'dark figure' of crime, and the roles of police and victims. The chapter also evaluates the claims that victimisation surveys are a superior method of counting crime. Chapter V examines the orientation towards victims in social democratic, right-wing and radical criminologies. Chapter VI traces the intellectual and political backgrounds of the Merseyside and Islington Crime Surveys, including the debates within the Labour Party on policing and crime, and the alliance between radical reformists and left-realistic criminologists. Chapter VII describes the design of a draft questionnaire for the Islington Crime Survey and offers a critical comparison of the questionnaires for the final Islington and Merseyside questionnaires and those used in other surveys. Chapter VIII summarizes the themes and findings of this thesis and comments upon the theoretical methodological and policy issues for the development of a radical victimology.
The origins of this thesis came initially from three quite different directions. Firstly, students to whom I taught criminology (policemen, probation officers, social workers, teachers, and members of the general public) constantly bemoaned the fact that offender-centred mainstream approaches, and the state-centred nature of radical approaches, both seemed to miss the point of the problem of crime—that its impact on victims, communities, and society was demonstrably damaging. As a result of this (admittedly intimidating) encouragement, I started to incorporate into my courses material on patterns of victimisation, offenders perceptions of victims, and the victim in the criminal justice system. As I delved into the field of victimology, I realised that as a student of deviance and criminology I had been denied access to crucially important facts and theoretical perspectives concerning the realities of crime as a social problem. Later, as a 'radical criminologist' and teacher I was denying them to myself and to others. At that time (the late 1970s), Jock Young, and also the group around the journal Crime and Social Justice were publishing material which initiated the left-realist perspective in radical criminology. Thirdly, and relatedly, it seemed to me that victimology, both in its approach to the qualification of aspects of the crime problem, and in its eclectic approach to theory, offered the potential for enriching radical criminology, especially in rescuing it from its almost exclusive orientation to the structural and ideological analysis of crime, law, and law enforcement, as well as its denial of criminal victimisation as a source of personal and social harm. This work is then intended as a contribution to the ongoing development of the emerging left-realist perspective—a perspective whose great strength is its openness to a broad spectrum of theoretical ideas in criminology, the social sciences and philosophy. A particular virtue of left-realism is its re-assessment of the value of quantitative methods in informing knowledge, theory and practice. This thesis examines both theoretical and empirical currents in victimology and assesses them with regard to their potential contribution to a radical realist victimology.

Alan J. Phipps.

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Alan J. Phipps.

DEDICATION

John Oro Lemon
1940 - 1980
VIETNAMOLOGY: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

CHAPTER I
1.1. Introduction:

In this opening chapter it is my intention to survey the available literature in the field of victimology. I will begin by looking at the various attempts to define victimology and to delimit its subject area, and then go on to examine the debate on the relationship of victimology to criminology. I will then outline the debate around victimology's central concept - victim precipitation. In succeeding sections I will give an overview of the findings of various surveys of criminal victimisation in relation to the extent, distribution and impact of victimisation. I will also draw on the findings and theory concerning the 'fear of crime', and critically discuss these in the light of evidence for the differential impact of victimisation. Further sections will deal with the place of the crime victim in the law and in the operations of the criminal justice system, and the availability of services for victims of crime.

1.2. What is 'Victimology'?:

The field of studies which have become known as victimology, its foci, scope, and purposes, have been defined and outlined in various ways. Emilio Viano (1974; 1976) has defined 'victimology' as the "study of the victim". He notes that in recent times criminology has shifted its interest from the offender to the crime itself:

"... not only as a legal entity but as a complex situation reflecting the interaction between different actors and the cultural norms and expectations of society; as the product of intricate interplay of emotional, rational, incidental and situational factors."

(1976 p.xiii).

Viano emphasises the concern of victimology with the dynamics of crime at the immediate and societal levels. He notes also that the concept of victim appears among the most ancient ones of humanity, inextricably connected with the idea and practice of 'sacrifice', and emerging in all mythologies and religious systems.

Attempts to delimit the field of victimology often begin with the attempt to precisely define the terms 'victim', and 'victimisation'.

- 2 -
Many of the attempts range widely, admitting all those who are on the receiving end of acts and situations, intentional or accidental, which result in harm. Some writers devote much space and effort to these conceptual issues, arguing for tighter definitions and cautioning against the concepts becoming devoid of meaning through being applied too universally.

In the work of Mendelsohn (1947; 1963; 1974; 1976) there is a pronounced attempt to have victimology recognised as a discipline quite separate from criminology, and to extend empirical and theoretical work to the victims of accidents and hazards. There is no need, he maintains, to reduce the scope of victimology to the victim of crime (1974 p.25.) for the discipline ought to be able equally to examine 'victim determining environments' and dynamics, as well as 'the danger complex', a notion which goes beyond the scope of 'criminal victimisation'. Mendelsohn is almost alone in his definition of the scope of victimology, and has even proposed a new concept-victimity—which is meant to distinguish his idea from that of those mainly concerned with victims of crime. (1974 p.25.)

Other definitions tend to focus on the notion of 'victim-offender dynamics' and also 'the victim-offender relationship'. Thus Schafer (1977.a. p.3.) and Drapkin and Viano (1974,a.) both refer to this aspect, the latter writers adding that victimology is:

"... that branch of criminology which primarily studies the victims of crime and everything that is connected with such a victim."

(ibid p.2.)

Still other definitions stress that victimology is concerned with promoting understanding of the etiology of crime, and that the conclusions emerging from examining the victim's role in criminal acts, may lead to a re-examination, in legal and conceptual terms, of the traditional concept of 'responsibility'. Schafer (1968; 1977.a.) has coined the term "functional responsibility" to denote the 'blame' or 'contribution to the act' which may be said to result either from the victim's behaviour, or else from his various physical and psychological characteristics. There is an important connection between this philosophical concern on the part of Schafer and the concept of 'victim precipitation' which, until recently
disowned by some victimologists, was the major concept within victimology.

Ziegenhagen (1977) sees the problem of precisely defining the 'victim' as allied to the traditional (and apparently insoluble) problem of who is, and who is not, the 'criminal'. Legal-process definitions (i.e. in which victim status is in some sense proved) have their advantages if adopted by victimologists, for the subject of study has then been defined by "some explicit procedure".

"When the definition of the criminal and the victim is broadened, this advantage is lost, though there is the theoretical benefit of a less biased selection process."

(1977 p.6.)

But on the other hand . . . . .

"Who is to determine whether a crime has been committed? How is the identity of the perpetrator to be known, and what process shall be employed to determine his guilt or lack of it? The same questions exist for the victim. Are the injured parties themselves to determine that a crime has been committed and that they are victims of a crime?"

( Ibid p.6-7).

Similar doubts and problems are raised by Sēparovic (1974). So far victimology has related exclusively to the victim of crime. But from a legal point of view the victim may be specific (e.g. a person, a corporation), or a non-specific abstraction (the peace, public health). Also, the criminological definition is insufficient, since there are non-crime victims (of accidents etc.) There are actual and potential victims, known and unknown (non-reporting) victims, simulating (false) victims, victims of attempts, and others. (1974 p.16). Toby (1964) also claims that there are "victim constituencies", who are, for example, friends and relatives, or persons who closely identify with and themselves fear the victims plight. Sutherland (1949) maintains that "the public" is always the direct or indirect victim of crime, and Quinney (1972) poses the
question as to why victim status is not conferred upon victims of police force, war, the correctional system, and oppression.

Thus it would appear that victimology may be experiencing similar definitional and paradigm problems similar to those arising at various stages of the history of criminology. But, if we cannot be completely certain about the precise boundaries of victimology, we can at least glean from the literature some clues as to the purposes of the enterprise.

Drapkin and Viano (1974.b.) stress that victimology, as with all advances in scientific understanding, begins at every level with speculative method as a main tool. Scientific reasoning is an interaction between two episodes of thought - one imaginative, the other critical. Thus theory and evidence must combine to produce new areas of sound knowledge. They seem to hold to an idea of 'grounded theory' for victimology and caution against critical reason alone, worshipping at the altar of statistics, and pragmatic ecleticism (1974.b. p.xiv). As they see it, the tasks of victimology centre not only around embellishment of crime causation theory, but also championing the rights of victims of crime. This is to be accomplished for example, through the dissemination of knowledge about victims, to counter the "conspiracy of silence on the subject" (presumably both in criminology and in social policy); to promote legislation to compensate (violent) crime victims; to challenge the victimisation of the weak by the strong, and to promote a particular value, namely opposition to harmful and victimising aspects of a technological and materialistic era controlled by . . .

" . . . economic rules, competitive antagonism, and blatant aggressiveness among human beings; a world torn by bitterness and hatred, where the right of force prevails rather than the force of right . . . a world that lives dangerously without trying to avoid unnecessary victimisation. In this world, all kinds of alienation become the natural and frequent outcome. "


Mendelsohn (1974) also maintains that the major task for victimology is to strive for practical results (e.g. the setting up of crisis centres and victim clinics) and all other efforts to combat the sources of victimity. Schafer (1968; 1977.a.) gives equal weight to the explanatory
goals of the subject, and to the implications of knowledge in the field to the issue of compensation and restitution to victims of crime.

Another attempt to define the concerns and objectives of victimology has come from Dadrian (1976). This author is important in that he is representative of contemporary attempts in victimology to define its particular focus in terms of:

"... the study of the social processes through which individuals and groups are maltreated in such a way that social problems are created. Thus (victimology) has two integral areas of concern: the social context in which victimisation occurs, and the social consequences of such victimisation."

(1976 p.40).

The term social context here refers to cultural values and institutional arrangements through which unequal statuses and roles are imposed on individuals and groups. It also refers to pressures resulting from deprivations, crises, conflicts, labelling and structural imbalances in the social system.

"Victimology seeks to understand and analyse the conditions and processes ... in which certain types of people, certain social categories emerge as prominent and recurrent victims ... it correlates such victims to corresponding types of perpetrators in the framework of social structure and symbolic interaction ... its central objectives consist of developing and codifying a reliable and reasonably accurate body of knowledge, relating to stable and changing attributes of concepts of victim, and to its socio-cultural underpinnings. To the degree to which a society feels threatened by the magnitude of certain forms of victimisation, and presses for remedies, to that degree the task of advancing to levels of prediction and control may be viewed as the ultimate of objectives."

(ibid p.41).

So then, Dadrian is stressing both knowledge for understanding and for utility. To an extent he is prepared to see the task of understanding
victimisation in wider and more sophisticated sociological terms than the earlier victimologists. The ease with which knowledge is held to have practical utility, in which the "is" quickly becomes followed by the "ought", is fairly characteristic of work in victimology. In this sense, it may be noted that victimologists apparently feel less constrained to make explicit value judgements than have most offender-centred criminologists.

The problem remains, however, that victimology has certainly not seen the development of a 'sociology of criminal victimisation.' In fact that work which passes for "theoretical victimology" tends to have a very narrow focus and conceptual basis. The level of analysis for theoretical work is almost always the social psychology of the victim-offender relationship, or else a further re-working of the concept of victim-precipitation (see below).

Drapkin and Viano's text (1974.b.) subtitled Theoretical Issues in Victimology, contains papers divided into consideration of the following areas: the notion of victimology, victims' typology. Most papers deal with narrow and circumscribed areas of work, but none could be described as addressing structural issues. Ziegenhagen's Victims, Crime and Social Control, (1977) attempts an analysis of the emerging place of victims in the law, but does not extend this to a structural analysis. Weis' paper On theory and politics of victimology (1978), though criticizing victimology's lack of theoretical background, equally does not attempt a structural analysis, but extends the concepts of labelling theory to victimisation and notes that "social approval of victimisation" is an integral part of how victims become selected. The level of analysis is once more, however, the small group or dyad. Fattah's (1979) review of theoretical developments in victimology, devotes most space to victim precipitation and related ideas.

The proceedings of the First World Congress of Victimology, held in 1980, (Viano 1980) contains only a handful of theoretical papers, in contrast to a mass on policy issues. The papers on domestic violence, for instance are almost all small-scale descriptive studies or else related to the delivery of services.

The book-length analysis of data from the American National Crime
Survey (see below) by Hindelang et al. (1978) concludes with a chapter entitled: Towards a theory of personal criminal victimisation. Basing their conclusions on the data base for those variables most associated with risk of criminal victimisation, the authors construct a model in which "exposure to risk" is the crucial variable. This is held to have predictive value and, indeed would be invaluable for policy-makers concerned with the control of crime through situational preventive measures. What it does not do is to attempt a theory of the wider social origins of victimisation.

1.3. The origins of victimology and its relationship to criminology:

In the development of victim-centred study and research, much has been written about the relationship of the 'new' subject of victimology to the wider concerns of the parent discipline - criminology. As earlier mentioned, Mendlesohn has always favoured a distinct separation. His contemporary and co-founder of the subject, Von Hentig, whose works are outlined below, does not seem to have used the term 'victimology' at all as a label for the viewpoints he was promoting. His main work on victims (1948) was one of twelve chapters in a text on general matters pertaining to crime causation, and clearly he saw the study of offender-victim relationships as a necessary addition to the total approach of criminology.

The general sense of the writings in general and theoretical victimology, is that a semi-independent status is favoured within the discipline. It is argued by most that studies of victims, offenders, the criminal justice system, policing, legislation, should be seen as part of a holistic approach to the study of crime as a complex social and human phenomenon.

According to Anttila (1974) victim-centred research is useful because of its "informational value." It has brought new perspectives to criminology, set new research targets, and offered a new kind of balance. It has had various effects upon criminal justice policy and increased awareness about the costs of crime to victims, and thus has the potential to promote re-assessment of the gravity of offences.

The limitations and risks of victim-centred research are that it
may merely switch the individualistic focus of criminological enquiry from offender to victim, without incorporating 'general situational factors', by which he seems to mean social conditions and arrangements. Further, there may be an over-emphasis upon crimes which have a ready victim (a person) as against crimes having abstract victims (business firms, government) and those that are apparently 'victimless'.

For Goppinger (1974) the criminologically relevant aspects of victimology are victim-offender exchangeability, leisure time behaviour and the inter-relationship of victims and offender's environments. Victimology must be an empirical and practically oriented, but he sees victimology as developing quite separately.

According to Nagel (1963 p.13.) "classical etiological criminology" is so one-sided a science, being concerned with the delinquent only, that a need for a special consideration of the victim is fully justified. Once victimology has restored the balance, the need for it will disappear. Criminology ought to be re-defined as the 'criminology of relationships', not just of victim-offender relationships but of all relationships associated with crime. Victimology also helps us to understand facts related to causes and cures of crime; it can help us in the "readaptation of the delinquent" as well as allowing us to give better aid to victims.

Referring to the concerns of criminology as informed by victimological knowledge, Parsonage (1979) has suggested (a) the development of reliable crime and victimisation data, (b) attention to characteristics of special types of offenders and victims and (c) assessment and development of strategies to deal with the social and personal effects of crime and victimisation.

Finally, Herman Mannheim (1965 p.672) comments that it is a fundamental error of the victimology enthusiasts in that they arbitrarily confine criminology to the study of the criminal. Victimology's claim to the victim is arbitrary and exaggerated and it should not aspire to separate status. Criminology however, would be incomplete without the proper study of the victim and, although this has been done in an unsystematic way up to now, criminology is well placed in its present methods to achieve much to clarify the role of the victim.
Traced chronologically, the origins of the attempt to make the study of the victim a discreet specialism, date from the 1940's. The works of Von Hentig (1941; 1948) and Mendelsohn (1947) together with a later paper by Ellenberger (1954), are usually cited as those which first established victimology; they are, as it were, its seminal works, and helped lay claim for victimology as a relatively independant sub-discipline of criminology. These works, and an outline of the field of victimology were referred to in two important papers published in Excerpta Criminologica in 1963 (Mendelsohn 1963; Nagel 1963).

In comparison to the volume of texts and studies now being produced, the 1960's saw very few studies in victimology. That decade did however see the publication of a limited amount of very important statements and studies, for example Sellin and Wolfgang's The Measurement of Delinquency (1964) which contained the Sellin-Wolfgang Victim Typology. Wolfgang's studies of criminal homicide (1957; 1958) utilised the concept of victim precipitation, and seem to have influenced many British studies of homicide (e.g. West 1965; Morris and Blom-Cooper 1964). A British study of child victims of sex offenders (Gibbens and Prince 1963) and a similar study by the Langley Porter Clinic in California (1954) are among the works which utilised a victim-centred dynamic approach. The works of Amir on rape (1967; 1971) must also be mentioned among those which pioneered the study of offences in terms of interactions and relationships.

In the intervening decades between the foundation of victimology and its large-scale re-emergence in the 1970's, two further trends in criminological work were helping to sow the seeds of the revival. Firstly there was the ongoing debate about the 'dark figure' of crime. Results of self-reports studies and victimisation surveys continually indicated that offence rates and victimisation rates far exceeded official estimates (e.g. Hood and Sparks 1970). Secondly, in the United States, Ennis' summaries of the National Opinion Research Centre victimisation surveys (Ennis 1967.a.; 1967.b.), and the extensive National Crime Survey results, which I will describe below produced new sets of data and suggestive areas for future research and theoretical speculation in victimology.

All of these works emphasised what they saw as the importance of studying the 'criminal-victim relationship' as a contribution to a full
understanding of the nature of the particular acts and of crime causation. For the early victimologists the 'victim' seems to represent a neglected variable in the study of criminal behaviour. Indeed, as noted earlier, the relationship of the sub-discipline to criminology has always been a critical one. Victimologists have always been keen to point out that the offender-centred bias of criminology has resulted in a partial and one-sided understanding of crime. Basically the victim, his characteristics and behaviour, and the ways in which these interplay with the characteristics and behaviour of the offender (in dynamic fashion), may be seen as "determinants" in the "functional interplay of causitive elements" in the production of crime. (Schafer 1977.a).

Thus, the task of victimology has been, from its inception, to direct attention away from the sole concern with the offender as an abstracted actor, himself acted upon and determined by sets of 'causes', towards a wider context in which the criminal act is conceived of as an outcome of human interaction and of dynamic inter-relationships.

In a recent review of victimology, Fattah (1979) notes that it has strongly affirmed its presence as an integral part of criminology. It has developed from a narrowly-focused "victimology of the act" to a "victimology of action". Originally the study of specific crimes such as homicide, rape and burglary. Recently, however, it has become more concerned with applied aspects of the field, such as the provision of legal and welfare services for victims. A number of factors, Fattah maintains, have contributed to this development, not least the unmistakable swing to the right in North American and European politics, which has elevated the victim of crime to the centre of the conservative debate on law and order.

Secondly, one of the effects of feminism and its many studies of sexual and physical assault upon women, has highlighted the plight of a previously unrecognised group of victims, and has also set up crisis centres for their assistance. Thirdly, there has been a general decline in more traditional types of research in criminology, in favour of a shift to applied research in criminal justice. This shift has been facilitated - particularly in the United States - by the availability of new funds for research of a practical and evaluative nature.
Fattah also contends that the past two decades have seen a move from a "static criminology" to a "dynamic victimology". In the former he includes the earlier stages of victimology for, he says, most theories whether attempting to define causation or association, offer only static explanations. Victim-centred research, like offender-centred criminology, has tended to explain acts with reference to the characteristics of individuals, to the complete neglect of situational factors in actualising or triggering criminal behaviour.

The study of victims, their relationships, interactions with the victimisers, and other associational factors, in addition to their characteristics, seemed to offer great promise for transforming etiological criminology from the static, one-sided study of the qualities and attributes of the offender into a dynamic, situational approach that views criminal behaviour as the outcome of dynamic processes of interaction. In a sense then, victimology offered the promise of integration, and a multi-faceted approach to crime. This, Fattah concludes, remains a largely unfulfilled promise.

Weis (1978) addresses this problem when he criticizes victimology's lack of theoretical background. The real problem is not, as most authors stress, that the subject area has not been clearly defined, but that the definitional debates have been conceived too narrowly.

" 'Science and study of victims' is a meaningless translation of this artificial Graeco-Latin compound 'victimology', as long as neither the term victim nor the sources and processes of becoming a victim have been defined, nor the groups or institutions have been identified that enjoy the definitional power for labelling someone a victim and for providing for the consequences of such a label. "

( Ibid p.182).

Weis, like Dadrian, is conscious of the fact that victimology has operated within a narrow theoretical framework. It has moved from the dyadic level of the offender-victim relationship towards some acknowledgement of the part played by the network of relationships and situational (presumably immediate environmental) factors, but seems incapable
of developing a theory of victimisation which incorporates the influence of structural and ideological factors. Weis is in favour of a victimology which goes beyond legalistic and commonsense definitions of victims, to one which includes the study of the victims of wider social processes and the normal functioning of social and economic arrangements, and he cites the problem of pollution as a case in point.

We may see therefore that victimology is still undergoing continual internal debates concerning its definition of itself, and its precise relationship to criminology. It is also engaged in an ongoing attempt to define its area of study, and the central concept of 'victim'. I shall comment more fully on these developmental aspects in the conclusion to this chapter; but, it is firstly necessary to trace the origins of victimology and its orientations to date.

Hans Von Hentig is usually cited as the founder of victimology, and indeed his work has had a profound influence on the direction of research. In considering his writings one is struck by the similarities in the style and content of his analysis to the 'criminal anthropology', 'social ecology' and 'moral physics' of an earlier age of criminology. Humanity is seen as composed of a number of different 'psychological types'; the social environment is seen as a sort of test tube in which the 'elements' exist in a set of inter-dependent relationships reminiscent of those outlined by Park (1936). Furthermore, Hentig's analyses are supported by anecdotal illustrations of 'cases', and by tables which rest uncritically upon official statistics. Nevertheless, these works are informative at the conceptual level, and have provided a set of statements which have been elaborated in empirical and theoretical victimology, and have proved particularly influential in the consideration of violent and sexual victimisation. Let us now move on to his central ideas. In one of his earliest statements he contends that . . .

"We are want to regard crime as an occurrence which falls upon the victim without his aid or co-operation."

(1941 p.45).
In other words, criminologists have regarded the victim as a passive and random target for the offender. There are, he says, many cases in which this seems to be true, when there sometimes seems to be little or no inter-action between offender and victim. There are also cases where the relations are "slight and general", as when one's possession of money contributes to one's being robbed, or when "prettiness or youth are contributing factors in criminal assaults" (ibid). However, in other cases we may observe "a real mutuality", "a reciprocal operation" at work.

"When these elements meet, it is likely that a novel compound is set up in the world of human relations, explosive and big with ruinous conflicts... There is probably a corresponding relation among beasts of prey and preyed creatures in the animal world."

(ibid).

In Chapter XII of his book *The Criminal and his Victim* (1948), Hentig considers "the contribution of the victim to the genesis of crime". Using such phrases as "the duet frame of crime" and the "doer-sufferer relationship", he outlines the problems of the neglect of the victim role in criminology and also in the criminal laws. In most crimes (i.e. in which there is are real, as opposed to "fictitious" victims such as the state, order, and health) there are always two partners: the perpetrator and the victim. The criminal codes conceive these relationships in mechanical terms. A purse is snatched, bodily harm is done...

"Yet experience tells us that... the relationships between the perpetrator and victim are much more intricate than the rough distinctions of criminal law."

(1948 p.383).

The victim is crucial, in the eyes of the criminal law, in the process of definition of an act as a crime (for consent more often turns an act into the opposite) but it does not recognise that the "socio-logical and psychological quality of the situation may be completely different" (p.384) and that, in these terms, the victim may assume the role of a determinant.
I maintain that many criminal deeds are more indicative of a subject-object relation than of the perpetrator alone. There is a defined mutuality of some sort. In a sense the victim shapes and molds the criminal." (p.384).

This is a most important statement in two respects. Firstly, Von Hentig redefined the study of criminal acts in terms of a set of interactions. It is normally assumed that the victim plays no active part in the process which leads to a crime being committed. Criminology's sole focus is upon the offender's prior motivations and the antecedent circumstances which gave rise to them. Von Hentig contended that a criminal act was an outcome of a process which involved two sets of motivations and related actions - those of the victim and those of the perpetrator. His contribution to the study of crime is therefore the insight that victimisation is somehow dependent upon the victim's physical behaviour, cognitive and perceptual orientations, and moreover his or her personal characteristics; for these may serve to draw the victimisation event towards them.

He refers to thirteen different 'types' - "general classes" of victims and "psychological types". These are the young; females; the old; the mentally defective and deranged; immigrants, minorities and dull normals; the depressed; the acquisitive; the wanton; the lonesome and heartbroken; the tormentor; and blocked, exempted and fighting victims. These are categories of persons whose characteristics render them more likely to victimisation - they are 'natural' victims. (op.cit.) Thus, Hentig lays the ground for a social psychology of the criminal act which invites analysis and speculation going beyond the ambit of offender-centred criminology.

There is a second respect in which his work extends the boundaries of the study of criminal acts. His contentions have implications for the criminal law, especially in relation to traditional conceptions of responsibility. In Hentig's formulation the victim is also seen to have some responsibility for the criminal outcomes of certain dynamic inter-relationships. Thus, early victimologists from Hentig onwards continually challenged the predominant idea that the victim was 'innocent'. As the criminal law recognises degrees of culpability in
the offender, so victimologists argued for the recognition of degrees of contributory 'guilt' on the part of victims. This assertion became enshrined in the concept of 'victim precipitation', which I will examine below.

Much of early victimology is concerned with the quest for classifications of types of victim. Sometimes the typology is related to the nature of the victimising offence, other attempts utilizes notion of 'psychological type'; some relate to the general and personal characteristics of the victims, others combine criteria. Von Hentig as we have seen, constructed a typology based upon the susceptibility of certain categories of people to exploitation, or else who contributed to their victimisation through their own folly.

Mendelsohn (1956, as cited in Schafer 1977.a.) classifies victims according to their culpability; the "completely innocent victims;" those with "minor guilt"; the victim who is equally guilty with the offender, and the "voluntary victim"; "victims more guilty than the offenders"; the "victim who is guilty alone"; the "simulating" or "imaginary" victim.

Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) offer five categories of victimisation: "primary victimisation" where there is a personal or individual victim, who is directly assaulted or injured, or who has property stolen; "secondary victimisation" in which the 'victim' is a commercial establishment; "tertiary victimisation" which excludes the first two categories, and refers to the victimisation of the community at large, public order, or the state; "mutual victimisation", in which the participants engage in mutually consensual acts; and, "no victimisation", by which the authors mean mainly juvenile acts such as truancy.

Later attempts in this tradition include that of Fattah (1967 as cited in Silverman 1974) who offers five victim categories: non-participating; latent or predisposed; provocative; participating; and false, victims. Sellin and Wolfgang (1964 as cited in Silverman 1974) also offer five categories: primary, secondary, tertiary, mutual victimisation, and "no victimisation". These are generally founded upon the sociological and psychological traits of the victims.
Silverman (1974) has surveyed and compared victim typologies in the literature of victimology and offer criteria which they feel a typology should meet. It should be exhaustive; categories should be mutually exclusive; it should be useful in empirical work regardless of data which are available. Hentig's categories are found to be neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, and the psychological types do not lend themselves to most types of sociological data.

Mendelsohn's typology accordingly, utilizes the criterion of 'guilt', a term which is not adequately defined. Further he deals with personal victims only and fails to be exhaustive. Fattah's categories are mutually exclusive but not exhaustive, and are only usable with crimes against the person. Of the four typologies reviewed, Silverman considers only that offered by Sellin and Wolfgang as fitting all the criteria proposed. Although he offers a number of ways of modifying this model, he claims that "the typology is a flexible instrument that may be molded to specific research needs". (1974 p.63).

Finally, Schafer (1977a) offers his own typology which consists of seven categories: unrelated victims; provocative, precipitative, biologically weak, socially weak, self-victimising, and political victims. The author here tries to produce a typology which is in line with Silverman's criteria, and there is an attempt to define the categories with precision. However, Schafer's main purpose in doing so is to . . .

" . . . assess the victim's responsibility, this concept may operationally cover the pivotal issue in the criminal-victim relationship that, after all, is the critical of understanding and judging crime. This typology is based on the idea of who is responsible for what and to what extent . . ." (ibid. p.45).

Thus, to use Schafer's own terms, and in line with his own debt to Von Hentig the task of victimology is two-fold; to "understand" the etiology of the victimisation event, and to "judge" the event from the point of view of the apportionment of blame.
The construction of typologies - either of victims or of victimisation - has become unfashionable in contemporary victimology, and this is linked I think, to the decline in the acceptability and use of the concept of victim precipitation. However, as I shall argue in my final chapter there is no reason why carefully constructed typologies should not aid us in a theory to explain the extent and distribution of victimisation determined structurally and ideologically, as well as guiding us towards an understanding of victimisation at the situational and inter-personal level of analysis.

Before moving on to examine victim precipitation - the concept which emerged directly from this thinking - it would perhaps be useful to offer some thoughts concerning the sociology of early victimologists' knowledge. When one looks for the intellectual sources of their perspective, three formative trends emerge - positivism, psycho-analysis, and Roman Law.

We can confidently, I think, classify the founders of victimology as positivists. Their concern to establish a 'science of criminal-victim relationships', is really an enlargement of the project of positivistic criminology - to precisely detail the variables most closely associated with criminal behaviour. Their concern to add the behaviour and characteristics of the victim into the general formula, seems to me to be no more than a desire to establish the importance of missing variables. But, in so doing, early victimologists move towards achieving something which many criminologists have aspired towards, namely a criminology which is multi- and inter-disciplinary.

Certainly, Von Hentig was steeped in a tradition of positivist criminology - incorporating insights from biology, depth psychology, and ecological sociology - which seems an almost quaint throwback to the nineteenth century Italian School. The highly deterministic view of human nature, and the notion of actors existing and interacting within a milieu of numerous causative factors, leads to an almost exclusive concentration upon the micro-level of the analysis of the origins of discreet events - assaults, thefts, frauds, and so on. Victimisation is viewed as an almost inevitable feature of human relationships, especially those relationships characterised by personal or social pathology,
or else in which one or more partners is affected by the traits combativeness or acquisitiveness. One can, I think, detect a view of human nature which is profoundly pessimistic, and in which the drive towards exploitation is inherent.

This last point is perhaps explained by the fact that the middle-European intellectual tradition from which Von Hentig and very many of the heirs to his perspective came, was considerably permeated by the influence of psycho-analytic thought and the depth psychologies which are derived from it. In these theoretical traditions human nature has an innate propensity for selfish and negative actions. Also human relationships are seen somewhat in terms of unconscious determinants towards mutual exploitation, and even towards self-harm. Actors relate outside of any understanding of the psycho-dynamics of these determinants. Thus, in the psycho-analytic analysis of murder, the account is often given in terms of the distorted nature of the victim-perpetrator relationship, and the contribution made by the victim to his or her fate. The relationships are held to be complex, to operate mainly at the intra-psychic level, and to require an analysis which goes beyond the scope of sociological observation and the classicist assumptions of the criminal law.

A further point is that victimologists such as Von Hentig and Schafer were both lawyers who received their training in Germany and Hungary respectively. Both countries had legal systems founded in Roman Law, whose procedures are more inquisitorial than those of legal systems based on Anglo-Saxon law, and which also accord a more central place to the victim in criminal proceedings and considerably more oriented towards the principle of restitution.

This therefore means that consideration of the role of the victim is crucial in deciding the sentence. Also, the victim in Roman Law systems continues to be conceived as an actual person with legally
determined rights and claims, rather than an abstraction without rights, as is the case in Anglo-Saxon systems. In the light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that European criminologists should have seen the victim as a valid as well as crucial subject of study.

The two countries in which victimology has most flourished, the United States and Israel, are those to which mid-European victimologists emigrated and re-established their tradition. The leading criminologist Marvin Wolfgang travelled the same route and came from the same background. His work on homicide (1957; 1958), and on violence (Wolfgang and Ferracutti 1967), as well as that on the measurement of crime (Sellin and Wolfgang op.cit.), and his recent arguments for a victim-centred criminology (Wolfgang and Singer 1978), are all considerably influenced by the intellectual tradition which I have just outlined. Hermann Mannheim, who emigrated to England, was also of this tradition, but disavowed the search for a separate victimology. Even so, his Comparative Criminology (1965) was the first British textbook to give the subject lengthy and sympathetic treatment.

1.4. The concept of victim precipitation:

A discipline such as victimology, whose concerns and subject matter are so diverse, will naturally be dealing with a large number of conceptual areas and problems. Some of these concepts it shares with the parent discipline - criminology, and with the other social sciences and behavioural sciences. But, new disciplines generate concepts of their own, and in this section I want to survey literature which has dealt with the concept of \textit{Victim Precipitation}.

As noted above, early victimology was overwhelmingly concerned with the criminal act as an outcome of dynamic interaction and the personal and situational variables therein. Early victim typologies were concerned to categorise participants in crime in terms of their 'responsibility', or 'culpability'; in other words the 'blame' which could be judged to attach to the actions of the victim in bringing the outcome upon themselves, or the unwitting contribution they made to the event. Just as the criminal and civil law divides blame or guilt into levels, as determined by the amount of 'intent' or 'negligence',
so these writers were concerned to show that victims' behaviour and characteristics could be instrumental in drawing the victimisation event towards them. Sometimes victims were morally blameworthy in that they 'willed' their fate, or 'provoked' the offender, or became victims in their attempts to victimise others, or else did these things unconsciously. Sometimes the element of moral blame was relatively absent, but still the behaviour of the victim could be seen to have contributed to the act - for example they were in 'bad' districts after dark, or they caused the offender to misunderstand their intentions; equally, characteristics of the victims may have predisposed them to greater risk - for example being young, female or black, and thus in certain social environments being perceived as a deserving, easy or weak targets, or else whose victimisation would not lead to difficult consequences.

The term "functional responsibility", which was coined by Schafer (1968; 1977.a.) makes more explicitly clear the element of the attribution of blame, which is implicit in the over-lapping concept of victim precipitation. It is concerned with the victim's role and "accountable links in the chain of causes" ... "often the victim's negligence, precipitative action, or provocation contributes to the genesis or performance of a crime" ... "this is the victim's functional responsibility" (1977.a. p.161.) Schafer's arguments concerning the "responsibility" of victims is couched in the terminology and style of the perennial debate in theoretical criminology about the "responsibility" of the offender. (see Schafer 1977.b.; Glaser 1977).

One of the first empirical studies to utilize the concept of victim precipitation was Wolfgang's (1957) study of factors in criminal homicide in Philadelphia. Using information from police files on 588 homicides, he designated 26%, or 150 homicides as victim precipitation cases. The definition of victim precipitation used in his study included the following elements: the victim is a direct, positive precipitator in the crime, his role in the homicide drama to be the first to use physical force against the subsequent slayer, with a deadly weapon or blow.

In some studies of homicide, the purpose of which is to contribute
to the debate about the deterrent effect of capital punishment, the concept of victim precipitation is often implicitly used when presenting facts about the situational variables and relationships in homicides. Thus, Morris and Blom-Cooper (1979 p. 10.) estimate that in homicides in the U.K. in the period 1957-77, "family killings could be identified definitely in between at least one-third and one-half of the total" with other close relationships within and without the family, between offender and victim, contributing a further 10-15%.

Amir's studies of rape (1967; 1971) also utilized the victim precipitation concept and defined it in the following way:

"... those rape cases in which the victims actually - or so it was interpreted by the offender - agreed to sexual relations but retracted before the actual act or did not resist strongly enough when the suggestion was made by the offenders."

It also applies to situations in which...

"... the victim enters vulnerable situations charged with sexuality especially when she used what could be interpreted as indecent language and gestures or makes what could be taken as an invitation to sexual relation." (1967 p. 652).

More recently, Amir and a co-worker (Nelson and Amir 1975) studied "hitch-hike victims of rape" and noted various victim precipitation elements in the case of women hitch-hikers. As well as their being perceived by potential offenders as persons of "loose morals", other precipitative factors also obtain. In 82% of the rapes studied the victim was hitch-hiking by herself. In 62% of cases she initiated the contact which lead to rape; in other ways the victims often through their deportment and attire, may have conveyed a particular image to the offender.

Use of the victim precipitation concept and the considerable set of normative and value assumptions underlying it, have come under

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criticism from numerous writers in criminology as well as from within victimology itself (e.g. Weis and Weis 1975) and especially from feminists. Clearly, those using the victim precipitation concept are seen as "blaming the victim" in both explicit and implicit moral senses. Carol Smart (1976 p.107.) has reviewed and criticised various studies and has been concerned to show "the presence and acceptance of culturally based, common-sense understandings of ... rape in traditional criminological theories and perspectives" ... and which have overlooked the way in which sexual deviation may be interpreted as mere extensions of cultural attitudes towards sexuality in general and women in particular.

More stinging criticism of the victim precipitation concept and of Amir's work in particular, comes from Clark and Lewis (1977) in which they state:

"Amir's unquestioning acceptance of the male perspective is not unique; it is a widespread feature of a male-dominated society. But when this general bias is carried into the social sciences, it becomes an academic endorsement of the rapist's point of view, and an excuse for blaming rape upon the victims."

(cited in Fattah 1979)

Implicit in the search for the precise characteristics of, and inter-relations between, victim and offender is the desire to show that victims generally initiate their own victimisation, implying that by avoiding certain situations, some individuals can avoid victimisation. (Franklin and Franklin 1976; Teevan 1979). Ryan (1971) refers to the phenomenon of "blaming the victim", not only of criminal harms, but social harms such as poverty and disease, as part of a cultural assumption that society (and God) is just, and that victims of all kinds 'bring down' their fates upon themselves.

Lynn Curtis (1974 pp.603-4) has analysed the records of police departments in the U.S. on serious violent crime. She concludes that victim precipitation is not uncommon in homicide and aggravated assault, less frequent in robbery, and least relevant in forcible rape. She
also argues that definitions of victim precipitation are somewhat con­stricted and contain limited scope for proper analysis of situations. As one expands the sphere of conceptual relevance beyond situationally circumscribed definitions and encompasses the moral demand-system of any society or sub-group within it, other theoretical alternatives unfold. Criminologists should be turning these concepts and assumptions inside-out. What does victim precipitation mean, she asks, if American blacks - the casualties of institutional racism - pass their victim-identity on to others through violence? To the extent that these crimes encourage further repression, which in turn leads to further violent crime as a contra-cultural measure, government repression might be seen as a precipitator also. (p.603-4).

Curtis, in making these most important points, is somewhat unique among criminologists writing about victimisation. She seeks - although in an unelaborated way - to link together criminal victimisation with what I refer to in Chapters II onwards as social victimisation; those harms which emanate from the normal social and economic relations of capitalism.

Further detailed criticism of this concept and its use has come from Silverman (1974,b.). This author is concerned with the precision and utility of victimological concepts. Victim precipitation is a concept charged with the values and perceptions of those who apply it. The assumption of "victim responsibility" is challenged in that the logical extension of accompanying arguments is that the attractive woman should 'dress-down' to avoid responsibility for being raped; equally, how do we know that a man who is burgled is really not responsible for his victimisation - how many locks should he have before we absolve him from all guilt? The range of victim precipitation definitions has been wide and no precise agreement on its meanings is possible on the basis of them. With the exception of homicide, no operational definition has been used (e.g. Wolfgang 1957).

"... the measures used in the past have been highly unreliable for they are highly dependent on a researcher's interpretation rather than on fixed criteria."

(Silverman 1974,b. p.104)
The author goes on to explicitly criticize what he sees as the psychologism of the concept, in that its users almost seem to assume the existence of a "victimisation wish", albeit of an unconscious nature. But victimology is wrong in its insistence upon an exclusively victim-centre approach. As he persuasively asserts:

"The offender is the one who really consciously or unconsciously interprets events that are precipitating. Thus far in the research it has been the researcher who has been doing the interpretation with little or no regard to the offender's actual perception."

(ibid p.106).

So then, he seems to be suggesting that victimology has turned offender-centred positivistic criminology on its head only to produce yet another partial and one-sided perspective. There is clearly too little research into offenders' perceptions in general in criminology and almost no work in victimology on offenders' perceptions of victims. Hermann Mannheim (1965) has cited Sykes and Matza's (1957) work on 'techniques of neutralisation' as a useful work in this respect; the five techniques - denial of responsibility, denial of the victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeals to higher loyalties, are seen as strategies for loosening the "moral bind of the law".

Other relevant work includes that of Landau (1974) in which he examines violent offenders, property offenders, fraud and forgery offenders, and sex offenders in relation to a number of questions relating to their perceptions of the victim.

Landau was interested to find out - the reasons given for committing the offence; perceptions of suffering caused to the victim, to himself, and to the respective families; the offender's guilt feelings in contrast to "blaming the victim"; and willingness to compensate the victim. This study of 104 offenders, interviewed while serving prison sentences in three Israeli prisons, addressed a wide range of questions and produced some quite detailed findings. In summary, the author finds that violent offenders in most cases admit causing suffering to the victim but perceive the victim as in large measure responsible for the offence. Property offenders mostly claim that the victim was not caused suffering and perceive
themselves as completely guilty. Fraud and forgery offenders maintain perceptions similar to the latter group; finally, sex offenders mostly deny causing suffering to victims, and tend to perceive victims as totally or partially responsible for the offences.

Addressing himself to the victim precipitation question, Landau claims that in the case of violent and sex offences his findings suggest that, "in spite of the actual contribution of the victim, in these offences the offender finds himself in a state of strong self-concept distress" (p.152). The contention is that, on the basis of equity theory in social psychology (in which it is assumed that one of the psychological consequences of doing harm is self-concept distress), the derogation of the victim leads to restored "psychological equity between themselves and the victim" (ibid).

Finally, Silverman (1974) offers his own definition of victim precipitation, which incorporates the notion of 'offender preception':

"Victim precipitation occurs when the offender's action in committing or beginning to commit a crime is imitated after and directly related to, an action (be it physical or verbal, conscious or unconscious) on the part of the victim. The offender perceives the victim's behaviour as a facilitating action (including temptation, invitation) to the commission of the crime. The action of the victim might be said to have triggered the offender's behaviour."

( ibid. p.107).

The crucial problem with attempts to reformulate the victim precipitation concept, I would argue, is that it is too exclusively event-centred, in that the cause-effect relationships surrounding the event are seen to emanate solely from within the victim-offender interaction itself. There is an urgent need to relate offenders' and victims' perceptions, behaviours, and vocabularies of motive to wider issues, including socioeconomic relation (of class, gender, race and so on) and to ideological factors such as the socially labelled characteristics of the victim and the situation. I shall return to this problem in my proposals for a socialist victimology in the final chapter.
A final aspect of the victim precipitation controversy - perhaps its central problem is the question of the implied or sometimes explicitly assumed 'responsibility' of the victim, in full or in part, for the commission of criminal events. We have here almost a mirror-image of the perennial debates concerning the 'responsibility' of the offender. In his review of developments in theoretical victimology, Fattah has expressed the view that much criticism of the concept is prompted by a failure to grasp...

"...the subtle distinction between the behaviouristic concept of victim precipitation as used in etiological studies of crime for explanatory purposes and the legalistic concept of victim provocation used in criminal courts for the sake of determining the criminal responsibility of the accused...

(Fattah op.cit. p.201).

In other words, Fattah feels that such a distinction is necessary and possible; that issues of description and of moral judgement can be held separately. That such a proposal can be put forward seems on the one hand to point to the continuing strength of the long-standing trend in victimology towards originating a social psychology of victim-offender relationships and criminal events, in which 'facts' and 'values' would not overlap. My own view is that the fact-value problem can no more easily be overcome in victimology than in criminology or any of the other social sciences. This problem is associated with that of the relationship of victimology, its theoretical orientation and practices, to dominant ideologies, and this question must be resolved if victimology is to ever transcend its presently static state.

There is therefore another sense in which Fattah's comments must be approached; namely, that there is as much a need for a fully developed victimology to develop a theory of situational variables giving rise to criminal harms as there is to develop a theory of their structural origins. This is a further point to which I shall return in the final chapter.

1.5. Surveys of criminal victimisation:

So far, I have given an overview of the development of theories and
concepts in victimology. However, on turning our attention to the total literature of this discipline, it becomes clear that by far the greater proportion is given over to the discussion of the various sample surveys of victimisation, their methods, results, and to a limited extent the implications of their findings for the development of theory. In Chapters II and III below, I will be tracing the political and ideological origins of these surveys, and in Chapter IV will be discussing their methodological procedures and problems. What I will offer here is a summary of findings in terms of their contribution to knowledge of the extent and distribution of criminal victimisation.

The use of sample surveys in the social sciences, aimed at covering some hidden aspects of quantifiable social trends is not new; but, it is only in the last two decades that this method has been used to investigate various dimensions of crime as a social problem. This omission has much to do with the sociology of knowledge in positivist criminology, most especially the unquestioning usage of judicial and police statistics. Although the earliest recorded survey took place in Aarhus, Denmark in 1720, and there have been other small-scale surveys in Britain, Europe, and the United States up to the early 1960's, (Dussich 1978), large-scale surveys of victimisation did not start to be come widely used until the late 1960's.

A significant turn of events came with the publication in 1967 of the Report of the U.S. President's Crime Commission. The Commission initiated the first national survey of crime victimisation. The National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) of the University of Chicago, surveyed 10,000 households containing 33,000 eligible persons, in order to determine if any household member had been victimised, if the offence had been reported to the police, as well as various attitudes and perceptions concerning crime and policing. (Argana 1975). Further surveys of selected high and medium crime rate areas of various American cities followed, and the results indicated that the actual amount of crime in the U.S.A. was much greater than that reported in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) of the U.S. Police Departments, as collated by the F.B.I. since 1931.

In 1970 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the U.S. Department of Justice began developing plans for a continuous
victimisation survey of household and businesses on a nation-wide scale. Funds for this huge undertaking were made available under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

The national surveys, and the surveys of large U.S. cities, conducted since 1973, are collectively known as the National Crime Survey (NCS). The national survey is updated each year and the summary results for 1981 were published recently (U.S. Department of Justice 1983a), and include estimations of national victimisation rates based on a survey 126,000 people in 60,000 households. The focus of the national survey is now entirely upon personal and household victimisation. The National Crime Panel has conducted two major surveys of large U.S. cities, Criminal Victimisation Surveys in Thirteen American Cities (U.S. Department of Justice 1975) and Criminal Victimisation Surveys in Eight American Cities (U.S. Department of Justice 1976). The latter has been extensively summarised and analysed by Hindelang (1976) and by Hindelang et al. (1978). Four further NCS reports worthy of note are a study of crimes against persons in urban, suburban and rural areas; a study of rape victimisation in twenty-six cities; a study of losses from household burglaries; a study of violence among friends and relatives. (U.S. Department of Justice 1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1980b). The extent of the material disseminated by the U.S. Department of Justice, confirm that victimisation surveys are a major industry with a budget of millions of dollars per annum, and employing thousands of people.

More recently, the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice, has published a number of periodic reports on selected aspects of the problem of criminal victimisation drawn from the National Crime Survey results. These include Violent Crime By Strangers (1982), Households Touched by Crime 1983 (1984.a.), and The Economic Cost of Crime to Victims (1984.b.).

Major surveys have also been conducted in Canada - the ongoing Canadian Urban Victimisation Survey (Ministry of the Solicitor General 1983; 1984) - in which 61,000 people in seven cities are interviewed on an annual basis.

In Britain, the Home Office now conducts a national victimisation survey, known as the British Crime Survey (BCS) at about two-year
intervals (Hough and Mayhew 1983; 1985). Following on the American pattern reports on selected topics and drawing on the main survey data are now published at regular intervals, including Victims of Crime: the dimensions of risk (Gottfredson 1984), and Fear of Crime in England and Wales (Maxfield 1984). There has also been a trend towards surveys of victimisation in selected urban areas; these include the Midlands Crime Survey (Farrington and Dowds 1983), the Merseyside Crime Survey (Kinsey 1984), and the survey being conducted in the London Borough of Islington (Maclean 1984). There have also been a number of small-scale surveys of violence against women (Hanmer and Saunders 1984) and rape (Hall 1985), and racial harassment (Home Office 1981; Greater London Council Police Committee 1984).

A massive amount of empirical data on criminal victimisation is therefore available to victimologists - more to date, according to one commentator, than could adequately be analysed by the entire criminological community within the next decade (Sparks 1981). It is most certainly true that efforts in the direction of these surveys have been made disproportionately to, and at the expense of, qualitative work on victimisation and theoretical work. It is also the case that the availability of this data is not being used in the main, to inform the development of victim services or theories of victimisation. However, the rather abstractly empirical nature of much work on victimisation, has generated important findings which throw light upon victimisation as a social phenomenon and which highlight some important areas for further quantitative and qualitative research.

In general, surveys of victimisation are aimed at establishing the following facts about crime within given national or local population areas, by the administration of a questionnaire in face-to-face situations or by telephone, to a stratified sample of persons or household. On the basis of the results, calculations are made in order to arrive at estimates for the population area as a whole. The central problematic which is addressed is the 'dark figure' of unreported crime. It is possible to arrive at an estimate for the 'true extent' of crime, by offence, where previously the only information had been available in compilations of statistics of 'crimes known to the police'. Thus, the uncovering of unreported crime also raises questions as to the various situational factors, attitudes and perceptions associated
with the reporting and non-reporting behaviour of victims.

Such surveys are also aimed at establishing various personal and situational factors which correlate highly with the risk of criminal victimisation, such as class, income, age, race, gender, housing type, and behaviour patterns. They also seek out public perceptions of the extent and seriousness of crime, the risk and fear of victimisation, as well as perceptions of police performance and experiences of policing methods. They also may be used to determine the economic, psychological, behavioural and attitudinal impact of crime and the fear of crime, as well as the needs of victims. In the case of personal crimes - mainly of an assaultive type - there may be an attempt to establish the characteristics of the offender as well as the nature of the victim-offender relationship.

The NORC survey, conducted for the U.S. President's Crime Commission (Ennis 1967a; 1967b) incorporated most of the above elements and set the pattern for the more elaborate design of the National Crime Survey (NCS) and the subsequent British Crime Survey. Among its findings were that almost 20% of households surveyed were victimised at least once during the target year of 1964. In general there was found to be twice as much major crime reported by survey victims than appeared in UCR figures for that year, higher rates being shown for all offences except homicide and auto-theft. Discrepancies between survey and UCR figures ranged from four times greater for rape, to little or no difference in the case of some minor offences. Property crimes accounted for 95% of reported victimisations. Estimates were made of the monetary loss involved in property crimes (at 1965 figures) and also found that white victims had a lower median loss than black victims. Central cities produce more violent crime than non-metropolitan communities; suburban respondents reported more theft and vandalism. As one moves from city centre, through suburban to smaller towns and rural areas, crime rates decline, but much more drastically for crimes against the person than property crimes. Metropolitan centres have a five times greater reporting rate for violent crime than other areas, two-times greater for property crimes. About 40% of serious assaults took place in victim's homes; 45% of all serious crimes against persons are committed by someone familiar to the victim.

At all levels of income, blacks had higher rates of victimisation
for serious crimes against the person than whites. For whites, burglary rates decline as income rises, but car thefts and larcenies rise. For blacks, trends seem to mirror those of whites, except that burglaries rise with income (reflecting perhaps the residential segregation of middle-class blacks). For minor crimes the survey found strong evidence of under-reporting of victimisation by blacks (perhaps reflecting sub-cultural differences in definition of events as crimes and distrust of the police). In the lower income groups blacks were more likely than whites to be victims of serious crimes against the person. In higher income groups blacks were slightly more likely to be victims of serious assaults and much more likely to suffer property loss.

The findings of the NCS have tended to confirm the patterns found in the NORC survey, but have added new detail as well as broadening the scope of knowledge. In the report for 1981, it is estimated that 41.5 million victimisations were incurred by individuals across the United States. Rape, robbery and assault made up 16% of these, whereas thefts of personal or household property made up 63%, the remaining 21% included motor vehicle thefts and residential burglaries. The victimisation rate, per 1000 population age 12 and over, were for violent crimes 35, for thefts - 85, for household crime - 121 per 1000 household. (U.S. Department of Justice 1984a p.3).

Some interesting data is available for changes in victimisation rates in the years covered by the NCS. For instance, in the period 1973-1981, the rate for violent crime increased by 9%, that for personal theft declined by 7%, and for crimes against household the rate also fell. The interesting aspect of these figures lies in the comparison with the police statistics (UCR). For 1971-81, total serious crime recorded by the police increased by 39%; violent offences increased by 44% (U.S. Department Of Justice 1984b. p.9).

Although there are serious problems of overall comparability in that NCS and UCR measure different offences - for example NCS does not measure crimes against businesses or homicides - it is notable that for personal crimes such as assault the NCS shows an 8% increase (1973-81), whilst the UCR (1971-81) show an increase of 57%; for rape the NCS shows no increase at all whilst the UCR show a 74% increase! (ibid).
These findings have exceptionally highlighted the central role of victims and witnesses in the functioning of the criminal justice system, for the relatively low rate at which crime is reported to the police accounts for much of the discrepancy in comparable NCS-UCR rates. For, although the UCR show much greater rates of increase in crime, the NCS shows a much greater volume of personal and household victimisation. In general, slightly less than half of all victimisations reported to NCS interviewers, had not been reported to the police.

The reporting rates vary by type of crime and the sex and age of the victim. In 1981, the rate for reporting to the police was higher for violent crimes - 47%, than for crimes of theft - 27%. Female victims were more likely to report violent crimes than males - 52% as opposed to 44%. Older victims were more likely to report than younger victims for all types of crime. There did not however, seem to be any variation in the reporting rates for violent offences on lines of race.

The higher income groups also had a higher reporting rate for household crimes, than the lower income groups, and homeowners were more likely to report household crimes than renters. Lastly, roughly half of all crimes by strangers and non-strangers were reported - 49% and 44% respectively.

The reasons given for non-reporting vary by the type of crime, but three types of answer - that the matter was "private" or "personal", that "nothing could be done", that the matter was "not important enough", tend to predominate over answers such as "fear of reprisal", and "too inconvenient". Confusingly, the category "all other reasons" has a higher response rate than the answers just mentioned. (ibid. pp.24-25).

The original Crime Commission surveys showed for the first time that criminal victimisation was unevely distributed across sub-groups of the population, and indeed most subsequent surveys have confirmed this feature of crime as a social problem. The NCS data have consistently shown that the victims of crime are more often men than women, that younger people are more likely than older people to be victims, that blacks are more likely to be victims of violent crime than members of other racial groups, that violent crime rates are higher for lower income people, and that theft rates are highest for people with low annual incomes - under 3000 dollars, and for those with high incomes -
25,000 dollars.

One of the most interesting findings relates to racial differences in rates for violent crime. For instance, blacks have a rate of 17 per 1000 population whilst that for Hispanics is 12, and that for whites only 6. Other racial groups, including Asians and American Indians have a rate of 10 per 1000. Blacks and Hispanics also have higher rates for residential burglary (134 and 104) compared with 83 for white households. (ibid p.20).

Furthermore, it is found that the residents of larger cities have higher rates than those of suburbs or rural areas; the victimisation rate increased with the size of the city's population. Unemployed persons and those at school have higher rates of victimisation than retired, house-keeping, employed persons, or those unable to work. Lastly, the rates for violent and property crimes increase steadily as persons' number of years in formal education increases. (ibid. p.19). On this last point, it is suspected that an "education effect" is operant in interviewees' perceptions or recall of events and which leads to those with lower levels of education reporting less to survey interviewers. (Sparks 1982).

In fact, many of the findings of the NCS and other surveys may well be effected by a host of biases and other methodological problems. These will be discussed in full in Chapter IV.

Another important finding of the NCS, deals with the relationship between victims and offenders. In terms of race, it is found that 72% of the violent crimes against whites were committed by whites, and that 81% of violent crimes against blacks were committed by blacks. Thus violent victimisation is markedly intra-racial in character. Other findings relate to victimisation by strangers and non-strangers.

During 1973-79 men were victimised by violent strangers at an annual rate of 29 per 1000, whereas the rate for women was 11 per 1000. Blacks were almost twice as likely as whites to be robbed by strangers. The overall chance of becoming a victim of violent crime by strangers decreases with age, although the rate for robbery does not decline as fast as that for assault. It has often been observed that the fact that older people are often unable to go outside their homes, or else delib-
erately restrict their activities because of their fear of crime, 'artificially' lowers their rate for street crime, and that the risk of robbery for those who remain active, is the same as that for those in other age groups. Detailed analysis of British Crime Survey results has, however, shown that those elderly people who do go out frequently, are still less frequently victimised. (Clarke et al. 1985).

Women are much more vulnerable to assaults by acquaintances and relatives than are men. Two-thirds of all assaults on divorced or separated women were committed by non-strangers. Half of all assaults on women who had never been married, and 40% of assaults on married women were committed by non-strangers. More than half of all assaults on women, but only a third of those on men were committed by non-strangers. (ibid. p. 21).

The report of the first British Crime Survey (BCS) was published in 1983; this dealt with the year 1981, and used a sample of 11,000 people in England and Wales, and 5000 in Scotland. A second survey was conducted in early 1984 relating to 1983; this was based on a sample of 11,000 in England and Wales only. (Hough and Mayhew 1983; 1985).

The BCS has confirmed the findings of previous surveys, particularly the NCS, with regard to the "dark figure", the uneven distribution of victimisation, and various aspects of victims' reporting and non-reporting behaviour. The first survey found, on the basis of its estimates, there to be about 6 million incidents of theft, 2½ million incidents of criminal damage, half a million incidents involving some sort of violence, a further 1½ million incidents of common assault, and about a million incidents involving threatening behaviour. (Hough and Mayhew 1983 p. 7). For those offences for which comparison with the Criminal Statistics for 1981 was possible, the survey found a considerably greater number of incidents than those recorded by the police. The survey indicated twice as many burglaries as were recorded, almost five times as much wounding, twelve times as much theft from the person, and thirteen times as much criminal damage.

Taking crimes of violence together (sexual offences, wounding, and robbery) there were about five times as many incidents as were recorded.
The overall ratio of incidents of personal and household crimes to those recorded was one in four. (ibid. p.10).

The rate at which crimes were reported to the police varied with the offence; the rate for motor vehicle theft was 95%, whereas that for burglary was 66%, vandalism 22%. In all the reporting rate for household offences was just under 50%. Within personal offences the rate for robbery was 47%, but for sexual offences only 28%. There was an overall reporting rate for personal offences of just over 36%. (ibid. p.11). In the second report, the overall reporting rate, for all personal and household offences as 38%.

Interestingly, the BCS has checked a proportion of those incidents reported to its interviewers as having been notified to the police, and has found a marked discrepancy between crimes reported and those recorded by the police as crimes. Only about two-thirds of reported property crimes, for instance, were recorded by the police. Also, many reported offences do not end up being recorded in the offence categories suggested by the victims' descriptions to the BCS. (Hough and Mayhew 1985 p.11). Thus the BCS has highlighted an additional area of police practice which contributes to the unreliability of official crime statistics.

The completion of two British surveys, permits the tentative comparison of 1981 to 1983 figures, and further between the percentage changes found for selected offence types and the percentage changes for the identical period, found in police statistics.

Table 1. Offences in England and Wales 1981,1983 : a comparison between BCS and notifiable offences recorded by the police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>% change 1981-83 based on BCS estimates</th>
<th>% change in recorded offences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>+ 9</td>
<td>+ 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from a motor vehicle</td>
<td>+ 7</td>
<td>+ 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary in a dwelling</td>
<td>+ 21</td>
<td>+ 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of a motor vehicle</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle theft</td>
<td>+ 34</td>
<td>+ 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft in a dwelling</td>
<td>+ 2</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from person/robbery</td>
<td>+ 9</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 10</td>
<td>+ 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source : Hough and Mayhew 1985; derived from Table 2 p.15).
Clearly, reliable comparisons between changes BCS and police figures will not be possible until the survey has been completed for more annual periods. In which case the BCS might move towards being a more accurate indicator of the extent of crime and of overall changes and between offence groups.

The report of the second survey deals in some detail with the decision on the part of victims, to report offences to the police. Victims who did not notify the police most often gave as their reason the triviality of the incident (55%). In 16% of cases victims felt that the police would be unable to do anything, and in 10% of cases the matter was felt to be not one for the police. These are in line with survey results from other countries. (ibid. p.19). In victims' decisions to notify the police of offences, the reasons given were balanced between personal gain and the felt obligation to report. Overall, the most important factor influencing victims' decisions either way, was the perceived seriousness of the offence. However, many offences perceived as serious do go unreported, and many reported crimes were not rated as serious.

Additionally, people from non-manual household were more inclined to report property crimes to the police, and older people, the well educated, and those with favourable attitudes to the police were more likely to report. (ibid. pp.23-25). Some interesting, though not unexpected results emerge concerning the distribution of the risk of victimisation. These tend to confirm the trends found in the NCS, that the risk of personal victimisation decreased with age and that men are more often victims than women. Household victimisation is highly associated with housing type and location. The risks of burglary, for instance, are much higher in the inner city, and higher for flats than houses, and for local authority properties than for those which are owner-occupied. However, in marked contrast to the NCS, the first BCS found no tendency for burglary rates to be associated with the victims' social class. (Hough and Mayhew 1983 p.19).

With regard to robbery, risk was found to be associated with residence in the inner city. There were twice as many victims aged
under 45 as over, and twice as many male victims than female. For theft from the person, the same associations held except for gender - most victims were females who experienced the attempted or successful snatching of their hand-bags. (ibid p.17).

The victims of assaults were disproportionately males under 30 years of age. Other associated factors were being single, widowed, or divorced, spending several evening a week out, drinking heavily and being involved in the assault of others. Some relationships between assault victims and their assailants were also found. Victims knew their assailants in a third of cases and were "husbands, relative, lovers or ex-lovers" in a sixth of cases. (ibid pp.20-21).

A further finding of both the American and British surveys concerns the phenomenon of 'multiple victimisation'. The distribution of victimisation in any chosen sample is skewed dramatically. Most respondents report no incidents at all, a few report one, and a very small number report several. Therefore expressions of average victimisation rates will be inflated by the repetitive victimisation of a few. In the first BCS data, 68% of respondents reported no victimisations, nearly 18% reported one, and just over 2% reported six or more incidents (Gottfredson op.cit. p.41).

This phenomenon further adds to the problem of the unequal distribution of victimisation between different sections of the population. Not only is it the case that victimisation rates vary according to age, social class, gender, race and area of residence, but also rates vary within those categories. This fact has an important bearing upon the discussion of the fear of crime, and the impact of crime, with which I will deal below.

Another notable British survey, is that carried out in 1980-82 by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), the relationships between the Metropolitan Police and the public in London. The findings are based on a sample of 2,420 people, and include data on experiences of victimisations. In all 27% said that they had been the victims of one or more crime in the previous twelve months. For instant 6% had been burgled, 6% had had a vehicle stole, 10% had suffered some kind of personal theft, 8% criminal damage, and 4% had been attacked or assaulted (Smith and Gray 1985 p.52). Experience with victimisation
was higher for men (32%) than for women (24%). Also, the rate was highest among those aged 20-24, closely followed by those aged 25-44, with the lowest rate being for those aged 60 years and over. The rate is also substantially higher among males aged 15-19.

The rate was found to be lower for Asians than for other ethnic groups, but about the same for white people, West Indians, and other non-whites. However, among the age groups 15-24, and 25-44, the rate for whites is higher than that for West Indians. Within each ethnic group, the rate is higher for men than for women, and this difference is particularly marked in the Asian group.

Rates of victimisation are much higher in inner city areas than in outer London, and this contrast is especially marked for West Indians. Also, there is no evidence to support the idea that white people living in areas of high ethnic concentration are more likely to be the victims of crime in general, even though they are more likely than whites in other areas to be the victims of theft from the person. In contrast to this, however, a higher proportion of West Indians than whites are the victims of this crime. (ibid. pp.55-56).

The survey found a strong and consistent tendency for the rate of victimisation to be higher in the upper than in the lower socio economic groups; this is particularly striking with regard to damage to property, and the rates for crimes against the person and are roughly similar. However, among unemployed persons the rates for burglary, theft from the person and physical attack, are higher than for persons in full time employment. (ibid. p.57-58).

About 52% of victimisations mentioned had been reported to the police. There were no differences in the reporting rates of ethnic groups in the survey. Even though West Indians were shown to have less confidence in the police, they were as likely as other groups to call them when victimised. Older people were about twice as likely as younger ones to report incidents; young West Indians were as likely as young whites to report, although each reported only about 37% of incidents. (ibid. p.70).

In addition to the BCS and the PSI survey of Londoners, there have
been two local victimisation surveys completed in Britain in the past few years. For the Midlands Crime Survey, about 3000 people aged 16 or over were interviewed - 1000 each in Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire. One aim, in addition to gaining the usual categories of information central to such surveys, was to explain the higher rate of crime in Nottinghamshire in comparison to the two other counties. (Farrington and Dowds op.cit.). The methodology and findings of this survey will be discussed in Chapter IV below.

The first report of the Merseyside Crime Survey (MCS) was published in 1984. This relates to the year August 1983 to July 1984, and was based on a sample of 3,500 people, living in five districts of the county chosen for their dissimilarity in terms of social composition, housing type, and social problems. (Kinsey op.cit.). The survey was designed to allow some comparability of the data with police statistics, as well as with that the first BCS. The findings in relation to the estimated extent of crime in Merseyside showed that, for personal crimes the rates were not significantly higher than for other urban areas of England and Wales. For 1981, the BCS had shown rates, per 1000 population, of 4.2 robberies and 9.8 woundings; the rates for Merseyside for 1983-84 were higher for robbery (6.00 per 1000), but lower for woundings (9.4 per 1000). There were, however, significant differences in relation to household crimes, Merseyside having substantially higher rates for burglary (126.9 vs 41.0 per 1000), and for other household theft (116.5 vs 83.5 per 1000), as well as for vandalism (266.9 vs 149.4 per 1000).

There were also interesting findings with regard to the recording of offences by the police. The average rate for the police recording personal crimes was higher in Merseyside than in England and Wales generally - almost 22% compared with 14%. For household offences the average rates were identical.

Comparisons were also made between the MCS and BCS rates of reporting of offences by victims. The average rate for all personal crimes were 41% in Merseyside, and 39% in England and Wales as a whole. Within those figures however, is concealed a significant difference in the respective rates for the reporting of robbery - 72% in the MCS, as opposed to 47% in the BCS. The overall rates for all household crimes were only slightly higher in Merseyside (52% vs. 49%).
Whereas about 32% of BCS respondents reported at least one incident of victimisation to interviewers, 44% did so in Merseyside. When these were analysed for the characteristics of the victims, a similar pattern emerges to that in previous surveys. Men under 30 years were most at risk, and women over 50 years were least so. Violent personal victimisation was heavily concentrated among younger men.

The results of the MCS also allow comparison of victimisation rates between different residential areas of the county. In general the highest rates both of single and multiple incidents, were suffered by residents of rooming-house districts (57%), and those districts with a very high proportion of the population living in the poorest local authority accommodation (45%). The lowest rates were for an affluent suburban area (34%). Inter-area differences in the rate for burglary and attempts, was particularly marked, with a contrast of 25% reporting this offence in one poorer area, in comparison to 3% in another more affluent area. (ibid. pp.2-16).

A notable feature of the MCS as a victimisation study, is the attention which it pays to public experiences and perceptions of policing. It found that a majority of calls from the public on police time are related to crime-related or 'public order', rather than being 'service calls' regarding other issues. This is in contrast to the findings of the BCS, which showed service calls to far outnumber others. About one half of respondents who initiated contact with the police said they were "very satisfied" with the way the officer treated them, nearly a quarter said they were "a bit dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied". Results varied across types of area, with residents of council estates more often expressing dissatisfaction at the way in which 999 calls were handled, than residents of more affluent areas. Of victims who reported offences, one in four expressed some dissatisfaction, but 31% said they were "very dissatisfied". The main reasons given for dissatisfaction were "inaction of failure to help" (45%), and "poor follow-up" (18%). A "bad attitude" on the part of the officer was mentioned by 11% of respondents. (ibid. p.26-29).

Findings concerning public perceptions of policing included that a quarter of respondents felt that the police "did not have a good understanding of the problems of the area", whereas more than half
thought they did. However, there were significantly more people in poorer areas who felt there was a lack of police understanding than in more affluent areas; men under the age of 30 years were in general those most likely to respond negatively, with men and women over 50 years responding most positively (ibid. p.35). On public perceptions of policing priorities and operational styles, it was found that there were a large majority (79%) in favour of an increase in the number of foot patrols. Desire for more foot patrols increased with the level of anxiety about crime and its perceived prevalence. (ibid. p.37).

A majority of respondents thought that priority should be given to policing tasks which were directly related to crime - immediate emergency response, crime investigation, and deterrent presence on the streets. Also, it was generally felt that the police should give priority to offences such as street robbery, sexual assaults on women, burglary, hard drug abuse, and drunk driving, in contrast to offences such as prostitution and shoplifting. (ibid. p.46).

These types of findings are important, for it is known that the rate at which crimes are reported to the police is affected by specific experiences of policing. The speed police respond to calls for assistance is particularly important with regard to the subsequent reporting behaviour of victims and witnesses.

1.6. The fear and impact of victimisation:

Since their inception, victimisation surveys have, in addition to the types of information on experiences with crime, sought to discover the attitudes and perceptions of respondents in relation to crime, policing and a range of criminal justice issues. One of the issues given some priority is that of the different levels of the "fear of crime", within populations, especially as these levels compare with the differential risks of victimisation. One of the most common observations and conclusions based on survey data, has been that those who have most fear of crime are those whose statistical chances of falling victim to it are smallest. Thus, it has been commonly asserted that although women and older people have the lowest rates for all types of victimisation, their level of fear is highest. Conversely, males and younger people, who have the highest rates of victimisation (especially for violent personal crimes) are those whom surveys consistently find to be least fearful.
Other findings on the fear-risk issue include the conclusion, from the American NCS, that fear of being out alone at night in one's neighbourhood is positively correlated with rates of personal robbery when cities are the unit of analysis, but that this relationship does not hold up well for crimes such as assault, burglary, and theft. The strongest predictor of fear of crime in numerous studies is gender — women are consistently more fearful than men; this is followed by age, with the fearfulness of older persons dramatically increasing at age 60 years and above. (Baumer 1978).

The fear of crime is also shown to be a predominantly urban phenomenon. In the first BCS report, the following table is produced, showing fears for personal safety "walking alone in this area after dark."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inner cities</th>
<th>Other large city areas</th>
<th>Other areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-60</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61+</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61+</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hough and Mayhew 1983 Table 4, p.23.

These results are confirmation of the tendency for women to express much more fear for personal safety than men, for older persons to be more afraid than younger persons and for fear to increase across the dimensions of age and gender as we move from rural to suburban and on to urban areas, with fear being especially high in the inner city.

Until recently surveys have looked at fear of crime solely in terms of fearfulness generated by going out at night after dark. More recently, in the second BCS and in the MCS, questions have related to how safe
people feel in their own homes and also about whether, when they are out, they fear their homes will be burgled.

Much of the debate surrounding the "fear of crime" issue, has previously centred on the 'rationality' or 'irrationality' of levels of fear in relation to objective levels of risk. Thus it is often glibly assumed that the high levels of fearfulness of women and older people, and sometimes of people living in low crime rate areas, are irrational in that their personal estimations of risk of victimisation are faulty, or that their fear is disproportionate to the risks.

The method used in the report of the first BCS, of expressing risk in terms of average chances of victimisation over time, is a case in point. We are told that:

"... a 'statistically average' person aged 16 or over can expect a robbery every five centuries... an assault resulting in injury once every century... a burglary in the home once every 40 years."

(Hough and Mayhew 1983 p.15).

Although the authors acknowledge the artificiality of such presentations, the notions of 'average risk' and 'rational calculation of risk' and 'proportionate anxiety' run deep in the discussion of the fear of crime. Left-wing writers seeking to minimise the risks of personal crime and believing much fear to be irrational, have often recourse to this type of argument (c.f. Harman 1982; and Chapter V below). The device may be compared to the 'gee-whiz' crime rate graphs of the popular press and the F.B.I.'s crime clocks which present crimes as occurring, for example, "every 1½ minutes", which have a precisely opposite goal. (see Clark 1970).

Certain authors have questioned the unspoken assumptions of the fear of crime debate, and have sought to clarify precisely what 'fear' entails and to broaden the conceptual framework in order to make sense of 'fear' in terms of other aspects of the social environment and personal existence. Garofalo and Laub (1978) ask the question:
Is 'fear of crime' simply the fear of crime? By this we mean: Does what researchers and theorists have been measuring and conceptualising as the fear of crime have a simple correspondence with immediate citizen fears about being personally victimised in specific types of criminal act?

(p. 243.)

They find for the following reasons, that the answer is a negative one. Firstly, surveys have found that respondents - even the residents of quite high crime rate areas - believe that crime is worse elsewhere, either in the country as a whole or in other neighbourhoods, than in their own localities. If attitudes called the 'fear of crime' stemmed from actual fear about victimisation, the authors say, one would expect the threat of crime to be perceived as immediate rather than distant or abstract. Secondly, city residents appear to be more afraid of the threat from strangers to the neighbourhood rather than their fellow residents, from whom they are likely to be most at risk.

In the report of the second BCS we find the following information on fear of personal and burglary offences:

Table 3. Worry about burglary, mugging and rape, by age and sex: percent feeling "very worried".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Being Burgled</th>
<th>Being Mugged</th>
<th>Being Raped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 60</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 +</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WOMEN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 +</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hough and Mayhew 1985: adapted from Table 7 p.35.
These results do not show (with the exception of rape) the pronounced age-effect found in Table 2, above, and in other surveys. They do however underline quite high levels of fearfulness as expressed in answer to survey questions.

The MCS also found quite high levels of expressed "anxiety" about crime. It was found that 39% of respondents "worried a lot" about crime in general; 35% worried a lot about burglary and vandalism to the home, and 22% worried a lot about street crime - robbery or assault by strangers. The greatest levels of anxiety about street and household crime were expressed by those living in council estates and inner-city areas. Women expressed far higher levels of anxiety than men, older people were more worried than younger people. (Kinsey 1984 p.17-24).

Writers have also noted that the fear of crime generally gives rise to two types of behavioural response - avoidance and personal precautions aimed at protecting oneself from crimes against the person, and protection measures aimed at protecting one's home and property. In the first BCS, Gottfredson found the tendency for avoidance behaviours, especially refraining from going out alone at night, to be strongly related to expressions of personal fear, and for the taking of special property protection measures to be strongly related to expressed fears of burglary. (op.cit. pp.29-34). In Merseyside, Kinsey found that nearly half (46%) of women aged 50 years and over, said they always avoided going out at night. (op.cit. p.23).

In the PSI report (Smith and Gray op.cit. pp.28-34) about 47% said they sometimes feared for their safety when out after dark, and 41% thought that women were seriously at risk. Women had a much greater fear for their safety than men (70% vs.20%), and older people are more afraid than younger ones; 57% of those aged 60 or over said that they sometimes feared for their safety. West Indians were much less likely than other ethnic groups to worry about the safety of the streets. Only 28% of this group, compared to 48% of whites and 52% of Asians said they worried about themselves going out at night. Even among the older age group of those aged 45 and over, only 24% of West Indians as opposed to 49% of whites mentioned such fears. The fears of whites, both for themselves and others, were
considerably more marked among those who lived in areas of higher ethnic minority concentration, although it is not certain that it is the presence of minorities alone which makes them feel unsafe.

The authors conclude that 'fear of crime' is not quite the same as fear of actual victimisation, but is a more diffuse set of fears linked to fears about other personal, social and situational problems. Thus they regard 'fear of crime' as being closely linked to concern about the 'quality of life' as related to objective and subjective measures of such things as 'community'. Much of the problem arises from the specific framing of questions about fear of crime. Usually, they are asked in the context of a host of other questions about crime only. When respondents are asked about their general concerns about their neighbourhood, they usually mention crime in the context of other environmental and wider social problems, and then not as frequently as those other problems. (ibid. pp.248-251; Hough and Mayhew 1985 pp.40-41).

Gottfredson (op.cit. p.3), as part of his examination of the data from the first BCS, engages in a clarification of the concept of 'fear' in relation to crime. At one level, he says, it is possible to distinguish between fear as an emotional response to threat when, for instance, a person is confronted by the possibility of an immediate assault. This may be distinguished from the fear of someone who anticipates the possibility of a risky situation, for instance thinking about the danger posed to oneself whilst walking home from the pub late at night. He, like Garofalo and Laub, distinguishes fear of immediate attack from more general concern, and again from worry about the safety of others such as family members.

What seems clear from much recent work on fear in relation to risk is that on closer examination, the fear of crime seems much more rational that at first sight, even on the part of those groups who have relatively low average victimisation rates.

Another way of looking at fear of crime is to ask exactly what fears are conjured by imagining being a victim of crime. It is reasonable to suppose, for instance, that for people who have a fear of being assaulted or robbed in the street, their anticipatory fear relates not only to the unpleasantness of the imagined event, but also of the consequences
of that event in terms of injury, incapacitation, loss of money, loss of feelings of status, self-esteem, and personal security and safety. In support of this we may cite the findings of the first BCS (Gottfredson op.cit. p.7) that fear of crime was strongly associated with experience of previous victimisation; this tendency was very marked for street crime and burglary. Equally, we might well say that fears of sexual assault, burglary, and other property crimes such as theft and vandalism, also certainly contain this component. It is at this point that the question of the fear of crime - more accurately here, the fear of specific types of victimisation - cannot be adequately separated from what is known about the unequal distribution of criminal victimisation, and the impact of victimisation and fear.

We know from the results of the American NCS, and from the Merseyside Crime Survey, that working-class people on lower incomes suffer disproportionately from personal and household crime. The NCS data for 1980 show that the economic impact of victimisation from crimes involving money hits the poor most heavily. The average loss from such a crime was about 180 dollars for victims with a family income of less than 6000 dollars per annum, and 340 dollars for those with annual incomes above 25,000 dollars. The burden of such crimes expressed as a proportion of family income decreased with increasing family income. (U.S. Department of Justice 1983b p.22). The BCS is rather unhelpful in respect of the financial burden of property crime which is borne by victims in different income groups, preferring to present figures in terms of average net losses for different offences, and also in estimates for total losses on a national scale. (Hough and Mayhew 1985 pp.27-29).

Another aspect of the problem of the inequalities impact of victimisation concerns the question of the resources which an individual or household have at their disposal in order to cushion the impact of victimisation. According to the British Insurance Association (1981) for instance, only 25% of households have any contents insurance, and many of those who do only half to two-thirds of adequate replacement cover. The experience of the National Association of Victims Support Schemes is that the lower the income of a burgled household, the less likely it is that they will be adequately insured or insured at all. A particular problem for low income victims of crime in private or local authority rented accommodation, relates to theft from fuel meters, wherein the victim becomes responsible for the contents as well as the
repair or replacement of the meter. (NAVSS 1984).

Equally, those with lower incomes are less likely to be able to move away from localities and estates which have high crime rates, leaving many of the most vulnerable sections of the community virtually marooned and left to take what avoidance and defensive precautions they can.

Those on low incomes are then, not only more likely to be the victims of household property crimes, but when victimised suffer disproportionate loss, which is further less likely to be compensated through insurance. In fact, as we also know, less victimisation of lower income groups is reported to the police and non-insurance is likely to be a contributory factor in this.

The most important element of the inequality of victimisation is its compounding effect. That is, the capacity of victimisation to highlight and exacerbate other personal and social problems. In my own research on the work of a victims support scheme in North-West England, I found many cases in which burglaries and meter thefts, or the theft of a purse with the week's housekeeping money, had made worse the already bad financial situation of families or individuals on low incomes or dependent on state benefits. In other cases a burglary or street robbery had precipitated a breakdown in a barely adequate ability to cope with multiple financial and personal problems. (Phipps 1981b).

However, the question of the impact of crime and the related question of the fear of the consequences of impact of victimisation, cannot be confined to the discussion of purely financial loss. Research on the wider impact of crime has revealed that a victimisation event may impact in a number of different ways.

Bard and Sangrey (1970) in a review of research, show that for victims of violence and sexual assault there is an emotional and psychological impact which expresses itself in terms of feelings of guilt, shame, and rage akin to the experience of bereavement. Victims often report feelings of personal violation and continually questioning what they have done to deserve their fate. Additionally, victims often experience a compounding effect similar to that which affects victims of property
crimes; they report not being able to cope with quite ordinary aspects of daily life, of having their relationships with relatives impaired, of developing a fear of strangers, and of an often overwhelming loss of self-confidence. In my own research there is a case of a burly building worker in his forties, who was attacked by some youths. Although not badly physically injured, he felt that he had failed to adequately defend himself, even though he had always believed himself to be "someone who can take care of himself". His confidence was so shattered that he applied to the council for a transfer to another area and spent much time away from work on sick leave. (Phipps op. cit).

Research has shown that the experience of burglary is one in which the psychological impact is often grave. Although basically an offence against property, victims' reactions often seem marked even though the financial loss may be small and the damage negligible. In research conducted by Maguire (1980; 1982), found that being burgled was often accompanied by initial reactions of shock, anger, upset, fear and confusion; only 17% of his sample of 322 victims had experienced "no strong reaction" with 20% suffering "acute distress", and for a further 19% the impact was considerable. Four to ten weeks after the event, 65% of victims said that it was still having a lasting effect on their lives, varying from nightmares and sleeplessness, fear of leaving the house empty, or of being in the house, being suspicious of neighbours and others.

Clearly, being a victim of burglary brings reactions similar to violent victimisation, and many reported a sense of personal violation. For others the 'violation' was of their personal space or their personal sense of security and well-being; still others resorted to extra home security measures, or reported that they had "lost faith in human nature." (1982 pp.122-134). Maguire also found that vulnerability to the adverse impact of burglary varies considerably according to social category. Thus (1980 p.268) he shows that whereas women in general were more vulnerable than men, working class women, those living alone, those divorced or widowed, and those over 60 years, had progressively higher rates of vulnerability. Thus victimisation has a potentially more serious effect upon, and is more likely to compound the other difficulties of those women who are working class, socially isolated, and aged (c.f. Waller and Ikihiro 1978). Indeed the con-
clusion which we can draw from all research which shows the differential, as opposed to the 'average' impact of victimisation, is that the level of impact is itself associated with social powerlessness and vulnerability. If this is the case, then the higher levels of fear of women and older people appear to be rational in terms of their calculation of the impact which a future incident might have on their lives. Levels of fear are positively correlated with levels of vulnerability to adverse impacts. (c.f. Haward 1979).

On the basis of unofficial surveys conducted by women's organisations, the victimisation rate for women from violence and sexual assault, is far in excess of the rates derived from statistics of police-recorded crime or from larger-scale victimisation surveys. (Hanmer and Saunders op.cit; Hall op.cit). On the basis of these results concerning the frequency with which women in particular areas are confronted with potential or actual violence in public places, their fear is neither ill-founded in terms of risk nor of their levels of vulnerability. When one adds to this the evidence for the extent of hidden violent and sexual victimisation within the home (Pizzey 1974; Wilson 1983; Hall 1984), then a connection between victimisation, fear and powerlessness becomes more apparent.

Older people are also often thought to have an 'irrational' level of fear of crime. However, older people are often affected by declining health and impaired mobility, as well as by low income. As such, they would calculate that being the victim of an assault or robbery might have a devastating effect upon their physical and psychological well-being. Equally, the fact that many older people are tied to their accommodation, probably accentuates the feeling that their identity and security is tied to their 'little corner of the world'. The experience of burglary would mean that they would be highly likely to meet the offender face-to-face, whereas very few younger victims do so. (Maguire 1982). Also, burglary would symbolise their lack of security in their almost sole physical domain.

Finally, several authors have placed stress on the symbolic impact of crime and the fear of victimisation; in other words its capacity to act as a metaphor for the 'decline of order, values and community'.
John Conklin (1975) speaks in terms of crime as being both a realistic threat and a symbol of the breakdown of social order. Crime, he says, generates suspicion and distrust, thereby weakening the social fabric of a community. It leads people to avoid others, and take measures which erect barriers between residents. Diminishing social interaction and reduced natural surveillance and informal crime control are thereby weakened so that the crime rate may further increase. When they turn to the police for protection and the police fail them, they become less willing to report crime. This diminishes the probability that offenders will be apprehended and, as the risk to offenders decreases, so they may become more willing to commit crimes. (ibid p.25; p.248-9).

This particular viewpoint in which crime is seen as creating the impact and conditions for its own proliferation is also shared by James Q. Wilson (1975; Wilson and Kelling 1982), whose position is examined in detail in Chapter V below.

The decline of community as both a consequence and cause of crime is also starkly presented by Paul Harrison (1983 pp.339-45) in his in-deptch study of life in the inner-city area of Hackney, London. The prevalence of crime and the fear and experience of victimisation creates, he says, conditions of oppression and fear made all the worse because the threat (of burglary and street robbery) is diffuse and hidden and may strike with frightening speed and ferocity. The community also suffers and is diminished by crime, driving away business and the wearing down of all public amenities by the constancy of major and minor theft and damage. The climate of fear gives rise to a defensive egotism of survival, in which everyone looks after themselves.

"Crime itself, when it passes a certain threshold, helps to break down even further all the social mechanisms that used to control it. Like a parasitic life form, crime fosters the very conditions for its own survival. It becomes one of the most potent factors in community disintegration, weakening all efforts at community organisation, turning neighbour against neighbour, young against old,"
white against black. The collapse of community control leads, of necessity, to a heavy presence of police in the inner city and this, with equal inevitability, has sparked off even wider outbreaks of disorder and violence."

(ibid p.245.).

1.7. Studies of special victim categories:

Evidence from victimisation surveys and from special studies of the fear of crime, therefore seems to indicate that the young, males, whites and persons with relatively high incomes have less chance of victimisation from a range of offences and are generally less fearful of crime. However women (Riger et al. 1979) and older persons (Forston 1977) have greater fear of victimisation and its impact. Personal crimes such as burglary and assaults seem to have worse psychological effects upon women and older persons (Maguire 1980; 1982), and lead to greater changes in life-style, behaviour and attitudes towards strangers and attitudes towards penal measures. The data relating to these issues do not always permit firm and lasting conclusions about this complex of issues, even when broken down and analysed by victim category and offence category, and it is generally agreed that much further work needs to be done. (Sparks 1982).

A survey of topics in the literature of victimology reveals great interest in groups who, although not having the highest statistical chances of victimisation, may be considered to be especially 'vulnerable' or 'prone' to certain types of victimisation in certain situations. Thus women, older persons and children have always received a bulk of the attention given to special victim categories, with a smaller number of studies of juveniles (e.g. Friedman 1976), policemen (e.g. Chapman 1976), offenders (e.g. Wolfgang 1978; Newman 1975), inmates of penal institutions (e.g. Drapkin and Viano 1975 b.; Viano 1976), racial and ethnic minorities (Scott 1976; U.S. Department of Justice 1980 c.), homosexuals (Sagarin and MacNamara 1975; Harry 1982), prostitutes (James 1978), the victims of white-collar crime (Geis 1975), and the police use of deadly force (Brenner and Kravitz 1979). Violent and traumatic personal offences, such as rape, robbery, assault, have received far more attention than non-violent property crimes. At
particular points in time on special victim group will receive more attention from victimologists than others. Thus a recent set of abstracts prepared by the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, includes references to more papers and texts in the area of the victimisation of elderly persons than on all of the other aforementioned special victim categories put together! A recent NCJRS bibliography (1977) on crime against the elderly cites 140 references written in the period 1972-77.

Teevan (1979) is of the opinion that we are here in the realm of the 'sociology of criminologist's knowledge' - why do we study certain things and neglect or avoid others? How do some phenomena become defined as social problems while others remain 'unproblematic'? He answers these questions by suggesting that we respond to issues because they are defined within the field, for various reasons, as 'more interesting or relevant', or because interest groups representing the victim group are instrumental in getting their group's problems generally known; books are written, demonstrations and conferences are held, media attention is forthcoming and later (rather than sooner) criminologists themselves become interested. Teevan urges that we examine these processes carefully - firstly those by which social problems 'emerge'; secondly, those by which the professional involvement of academic criminologists is engaged.

In terms of the politics of victimisation, we might suggest that the attention given to rape owes much to that issue being made a public concern through the activities of the Women's Movement. The natural history of the 'social problem of child abuse' has been charted by Parton (1979) in terms of the emerging professional interest of paediatricians, social workers and others, working through the NSPCC and various influential study groups (also Phofl 1977). The attention gained by the victimisation of the elderly has not been traced in this fashion, but growing victimisation of elderly persons in the U.S., the new interests in social gerontology attendant upon the changing age-structure of Western populations, and the work of interest groups such as the Grey Panthers, as well as growing political and media concern with the issue, may be cited as important influences.
Conversely, we must of course ask why the victimisation of blacks and other minorities, although demonstrated to be more frequent, receives little attention within victimology. Why has the criminal victimisation of powerless groups such as prostitutes, homosexuals, American Indians, or the Palestinians received so little attention? Why does the victimisation of some relatively powerless groups such as prison inmates, receive more publicity and attention than the issue of criminal victimisation generally? Why should the U.S. Department of Justice recently decide to publish a special report on Hispanic victims (1980.o.) in preference to a report on the victimisation of blacks or other minorities?

The answers to these questions need not be offered here, although it is clear that several problems associated with topic choice within victimology must be solved through further study.

Although the above 'sociology of knowledge' questions are important in determining how research targets become selected, these cannot be completely divorced from questions about the explanatory frameworks, concepts and theories which are brought to bear in the quest for understanding. Much of the research into special victim categories, utilizes 'abstract' empirical methods in which hypotheses are tested and measured with great care, but little or no theoretical generalisation and speculation is present concerning wider structural considerations (e.g. class conflict and economic domination; the repression and exploitation of certain social groups within the framework of social institutions). There is a trend, however, on the part of certain criminologists and victimologists to understand victimisation in socio-economic and structural terms. Thus the work of many writers on rape and violence against women seek to understand those phenomena in terms of the economic and social subjugation of women - in victimological terms, their 'proneness' derives from their social powerlessness rather than either personal characteristics such as 'weakness', or purely situational variables such as those 'charged with sexuality', (e.g. Smart 1976; Schwendingers 1983).

Takagi (1979) in a similar vein, seeks to explain the higher rates for minority groups of 'death by police intervention' in terms of institutionalised racism and class domination, although he contends that 'labelling' and 'definitions of situations' are important at the level of micro-analysis. The British groups Radical Alternatives to Prison,
Women in Prison (1983) and Inquest (1983) - a group which campaigns around the issue of deaths in custody - all employ an analysis in which the propensity for social control agencies to victimise their charges, is examined in terms of the concepts of powerlessness, repressive justice and institutional secrecy.

It is not out of place to mention here sociological approaches to harm and victimisation which are situated largely outside of the fields of criminology and victimology. In this respect we may include the considerable literature on child abuse and neglect. Many writers have departed from the pathology model of this type of victimisation and have sought to show the connections between the institutionalised and legitimised use of force in child-rearing, and the occasioning of harm to children which is defined as the illegitimate use of force.

J. and E. Newson (1976) present evidence of the extent of routinised day-to-day aggression between mothers and their 700 seven-year old children in Nottingham. They present these events in an interaction framework of a struggle for power and control by both parties. Smacks and slaps were common, with punishment with instruments being less common. About 11% of parents interviewed smacked their children for deliberate procrastination; 56% smacked for explicit refusals to obey instructions. Although smacking was more widespread, 22% of the children had received corporal punishment via some implement; a further 5% had been threatened with corporal punishment. Commenting upon similar findings for the United States, Gil (1973 p. 54) comments that against the background of considerable public support for the use of applied force in child-rearing, "it should surprise no-one that extreme incidents occur from time-to-time in the course of 'normal' child-rearing practices." Nor should we be surprised if child abuse occurs disproportionately among groups in the population suffering the highest levels of social disadvantage.

Similarly, Dailey (1979) contends that "parental power breeds violence against children", and Marx (1976) conceives of the parent-child violent interaction as sometimes stemming from the parent's desire to control and coerce the child through the use of "applied pressure to conform". At other times the parent's violence takes the
form of a symbolic appeal to the victim to become involved in the parents social and situation problems.

The strand running through this work would seem to be the desire to show that victimisation arises not from 'pathological' elements but more often from quite normative patterns of relationship and behaviour. The perspectives and tools used by authors such as Marx could certainly lay an important theoretical basis for the development of a critical social theory of victimisation.

1.8. The victim in the criminal justice system:

Stephen Schafer (1977.a.) has surveyed the development of the rights and roles of the victim through different historical periods, which he characterises as the periods of the "golden age of the victim", the "decline of the victim", and the "revival of the victim". The "golden age" refers to the historical period before the rise of the nation-state, and before the rise of centralised criminal justice systems. The basis of "primitive" and early Western law, he says, was personal reparation by the offender, or his family, to the victim.

"When political institutions were largely based on kinship ties and tribal organisation, and when there was an absence of a central authority to determine guilt and the type of punishment, some forms of revenge, blood-feud, vendetta, or pecuniary compensation were common practices".

(1977a. p.6).

Social control was in the hands of the victim, or potential victim, who combined the roles of law-maker, prosecutor, judge and executioner. Punishment was largely aimed at deterrence and compensation, and mirrored the struggle for survival; it took the form of "ruthless retaliation and aggressively acquired compensation" for wrongs and harms. In the ancient world many "codes" relating to wrongs and retaliations blurred the present-day distinction between "criminal harms" on the one hand, and "civil wrongs" or "torts", on the other. The ancient concept of 'restitution' was based upon a firm notion of like-for-like retaliation as in the Mosaic Law of an "eye for an eye". According to Schafer it was not until the end of the Middle Ages that the concept of 'restitution'
was closely related to that of 'punishment' and was temporarily included in the Penal Law. This heralded in a further development by which the growth of centralised social organisation was accompanied by the greater codification of procedures for settling disputes and wrongs without recourse to the cycle of "perpetual vendetta". Thus he notes that in the Arabian world of the period, tribes outside the cities usually adhered strictly to the blood-feud, but tribes in the cities "found it necessary to practice compensation for offence against the person in order to prevent the socially disintegrating effects of the blood-feud". (ibid p.11).

In the Europe of the Middle Ages, "composition" combined punishment with compensation, but it was applied to "personal wrongs" rather than "public crimes". In Schafer's view the penal law in this period was one relating to "torts" rather than "crimes". The rights of the victim to revenge and compensation were recognised, but the embryonic state acted as 'intermediary', punishing the offender and ensuring compensation to the victim by itself seising goods and lands.

The "decline of the victim", his rights in law and role in social control, accompanied the rise of the dual power of the feudal barons and the Church (through the ecclesiastical courts). These two powerful entities to a large extent appropriated the traditional rights of the victim of wrongs. They exacted a double vengeance upon the offender, by forfeiting his property to themselves instead of the victim, and then punishing the offender by imprisonment, mutilation or execution. From this time onwards the notion of the victim in criminal law began to take on a more abstract meaning, the 'victim' of criminal wrongs became the rights and authority of these ascendant forces, the barons and the clergy. With the development of the legal system over the next few centuries, there was witnessed the increasing distinction between "crimes" and "torts", and also the evolution of a new role for the victim in the criminal courts. The decline of the victim's personal importance and the concern for his personal rights and needs, did not mean that he was placed entirely outside criminal procedure, but that his participation was reduced to an evaluation of the wrong that had been done to him. The extent of the harm done was related to the seriousness with which the crime was viewed, but this estimation was then translated into a determination of the severity of the sentence to be imposed, rather than as previously,
the compensation to be exacted.

These issues are also examined by Eser (1966) in his lengthy and detailed analysis of the principle of "harm" in the concept of crime. Harm, he says, consists in the impairment of certain legally recognised interests and acquires a certain gravity and quality in terms of the specific interests which it opposes. (p.346). The decline of the victim, and to a great extent the rise of victimless offences, owes itself to the redefinitions of the nature of harm in the historical development of the legal system. It has arisen in criminal justice that crime is a breach of law, and that "such violation of a penal provision is a form of harm to the public which stands behind the law". Also, criminal harm is seen as a material wrong in that, in addition to the mere breach of law, an object has been injured which the provision is designed to protect.

In Anglo-American jurisprudence the "breach of law" criterion is held to be most important, with the "material wrong" criterion made secondary though intimately connected to it. In English legal history there has been the abstraction of crime into a breach of law, so that the legal order itself, as represented by "the king's peace" or "order", or latterly the "common good" or "society", are held to be the victims of criminal harms.

The contentions of Schafer and Eser are then that the modern state has appropriated "victim status" at the expense of the real victim (as a person or other entity); that the conception of harm in criminal law is related more to the 'harm' perceived to be done to the statutes themselves and to the 'social order' as this might be seen to be embodied in some notion of the "common good". The extension of these ideas may have implications for our understanding of the part which the victim and conceptions of the victim, play in the formulation of law and in law enforcement. To what extent, for instance, are some victim constituencies perceived as having interests overlapping with those of "social order", whilst the interests of other, less powerful constituencies are not?

Similar views are expressed by the Norwegian criminologist, Nils Christie (1978) who speaks in terms of conflicts between individuals,
and within communities, as having been "stolen" by the state and criminal justice system, as well as by bureaucrats and experts. In the process whereby the state is regarded as the victim of crime, the real victim is disinherited and rendered a powerless bystander with few rights. Christie favours the movement towards a "victim-centred" criminal court system, in addition to a greater emphasis upon de-professionalised informal systems for conflict resolution at the level of the local community. (ibid. pp.241-3).

Schafer's final period, of the "revival of the victim", is that of the last twenty-five years, in which great dissatisfaction has been voiced about the type of treatment which victims receive at the hands of the legal system, and the rise of campaigns and legislation aimed at bringing back into the criminal justice system, a recognition of the victim's personal rights and needs.

Victimology has always had a strong and avowed policy orientation. Writers in this tradition, from Von Hentig and Mendelsohn to the present time, have argued strongly for the implications of their findings for patterns of policing, crime prevention, various aspects of the criminal process, and for legal and therapeutic interventions to secure a "better deal" for victims of crime. Victimology has generated a large literature on compensation, restitution, and treatment programmes for crime victims, and the major readers (e.g. Drapkin and Viano 1974.a.; 1975.a.; 1975.b.; Viano 1976; Galaway and Hudson 1981), contain numerous papers on these issues, and the journal Victimology has devoted a whole issue to papers on compensation. (1980).

The promotion and evaluation of state-sponsored compensation schemes, mainly for the victims of violent crime, has been a major concern in the literature. Victim compensation programmes are the means by which the government assumes responsibility for providing financial assistance to 'innocent' citizens injured as a result of a crime incident.

Although as early as the 19th century legal theorists such as Jeremy Betham and later the Italian criminoologist Garofalo, suggested that society bore a responsibility to assist crime victims when it failed in its obligation to protect individuals from criminal harms, it was not
until the 1950's that penal reformers such as Margery Fry revived the issue (Carrow 1980). Such reformers extended the concept of the social contract - the idea that the state had a duty to defend those who kept their side of this bargain. In Britain, as well as in some Commonwealth countries, victim compensation was seen as a necessary extension, not so much of the scope of the legal system, but of the concept of 'national insurance' and of the welfare state's 'safety net' for those in special need.

Laws to compensate victims of violent crime were passed in New Zealand (1963), in Great Britain (1964), in California (1965), and 36 other states in the U.S. up to 1982 (McGillis and Smith 1983); most Australian states and Canadian provinces also operate such schemes. (Norquay and Weiler 1981).

In addition to the 'social contract' argument, in which the crime victim has been held to be the "forgotten person of the Criminal Justice System" (McDonald 1976) or even the "victim of the criminal justice system" (Lynch 1976), other arguments in favour of victim compensation have cited widespread public support for such schemes, and the alleviation of the victims alienation from the system. Thus the results forthcoming from the 'proper' treatment of victims, not only by the courts and the legal process, but also by the police, government departments, and social work agencies, backed by adequate financial compensation for injury, are held to smooth the more efficient operation of a system which depends so much upon the active as well as consensual support of individuals.

If, the argument goes, victims, witnesses and others perceive that the system is 'fair' and 'just' and that those who support it and actively assist it are not themselves penalised, then more crime will be reported by victims and witnesses, witnesses will be more likely to go to the aid of victims and policemen; witnesses and victims will be more likely to prosecute and give evidence, and generally reduced alienation and disaffection will derive countless other, immediately less tangible benefits to the system and to society (e.g. Carrow 1980; Schafer 1977.a.).

Literature involved with evaluation of victims' role in the judicial system, as opposed to that dealing with more philosophical and theoretical issues, can be sub-divided in the following way. Firstly, there are those
studies which look at police-victim interactions and the effects of victims' perceptions of, and attitudes towards the police. (Hood and Sparks 1970; Parks 1970; 1976; Poister 1978; Horley 1982). Secondly, there are studies which examine aspects of the victim's role in court procedure (e.g. Tartaglione 1975; Schembri 1976; Christie 1978; Shapland 1984) and in the judicial sentencing process (Landy and Aronson 1969; Denno and Cramer 1876; Williams 1976). Other studies have looked at effect of victim compensation legislation on conviction rates (Silverman and Doerner 1979) and the position in the justice system of victims of separate offence categories - rape (Holstrom and Burgess 1975); wife-battering (Wolfe 1979); other violence (Miers 1978); and even the wrongfully accused (Shichor 1975).

A small body of literature has emerged around the issue of the prevention and treatment of criminal victimisation. Carrow (op.cit) Dussich (1976) and Salasin (1984), have looked at the design and efficacy of 'service models' for programmes to help victims with the personal impact of victimisation. Much attention has been paid to special programmes to aid the victim of rape (Adleman 1976; Hilberman 1977; McCombie 1980) and some to the child victims of sexual assault (Towell 1976), as well as the victim of robbery (Cohn 1974).

Victimologists have devoted a considerable degree of attention to consideration of offender restitution to victims as a correctional alternative to imprisonment. This idea is seen as a necessary corollary to that of 'compensation', in that offender restitution mainly concerns property offences, whereas state compensation schemes are exclusively designed to benefit the victims of violent crime. Secondly, offender restitution is held to have additional benefits in that it contributes to the rehabilitation of the offender by making him aware of the suffering he has caused, and of the impact of crimes, it provides real benefits to the victim, and possibly contributes towards 'reconciliation', it is cheaper and more effective than imprisonment. (see Jacob 1970; Goldstein 1974; Hudson and Galaway 1975; Hudson et.al.1975; Wright 1982).

Various authors have recently made very strong criticisms of the operation of victim compensation schemes and the legislation upon which they are based. David Miers (1978) has compared the operations of the
schemes both in Ontario and Britain. Primarily, he and other authors (especially MacNamara and Sullivan 1973; Wright 1977) have pointed to the ways in which compensation has a very low take-up; in 1975-76 the British Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarded £6.4 million to only 13,500 applicants although nearly 80,000 violent crimes were known to the police. Also, most schemes operate on the principle that any 'precipitation' of the offence on the part of the victim, leads to reduction or cancellation of any award; victims of domestic violence cannot claim, partly because of the 'precipitation' principle, and partly because the assailant must not be able to benefit from any award made. Furthermore, 'way of life' clauses in legislation disqualify any whose occupation or life-style expose them to a high risk of violence; and, lastly only victims of violence are covered even in spite of the evidence of loss and trauma stemming from non-violent personal victimisation.

1.9. Services for victims of crime:

There is, as we have seen above, a body of literature concerning the impact of crime on victims, and this has revealed an area of suffering and need which is only just beginning to be recognised. When a crime is committed the burden of the consequences is usually borne by the victims or their families. Whereas crime has differential impacts, so victims will have different levels of personal and financial resources or the availability of help from within the family or wider social network. Victims of crime are one of the few groups in need whose needs are not met by the agencies of the welfare state, although a small proportion of victims of violence are financially compensated by state schemes.

The main state agency with which victims come into contact is the police. Therefore, the findings of surveys (such as the MCS) on victims experiences with the police are of particular importance; for if criminal victimisation may be regarded as a social problem in its own right, then the nature of police-victim interactions - including police response to calls for assistance, police behaviour at the scene of the crime and subsequently, is ripe for detailed investigation.
In fact, very little research has been undertaken which examines the detailed interactions between victims of crime and the police. An exception is the work of John Howley (1982) who conducted a survey of 65 victims of house burglary; he also carried out 18 semi-structured depth interviews with uniformed and C.I.D. officers who were regularly in contact with crime victims, and group discussions with a total of 105 officers of all ranks.

Among his findings were that there was a misfit between victims' stated expectations of the behaviour of officers before and after initial contact, and officers' own perceptions of those expectations. Response time, for instance, was not the most important victim expectation; a constantly expressed need on the part of victims was for caring, supportive personal contact and for officers to express sympathy and to make enquiries of neighbours, to take fingerprints and so on. Victims also expected to be kept informed of the progress of investigations. Most of the victims expressed satisfaction with officers at the scene of the crime, and their recollections were mostly about officers' attitudes. Less satisfaction was expressed about the investigation stage and information feedback.

Police perceptions of victims of burglary often contained beliefs that the police were only called to verify insurance claims. They also felt that many of the attitudes and lack of action of which victims complained, arose directly from the pressure of work which investigating officers face. Officers believed that better-off victims were more likely to report offences, and got a better standard of service than working-class victims, mainly because of their capacity to make articulate complaints.

The main source of help to crime victims in Britain comes in the form of victims support schemes. Each scheme is run by a full or part-time co-ordinator with a team of trained volunteers. Referrals are made directly from the local police station to the scheme who then send a volunteer to visit the victim with offers of help, advice, and support. This may include emotional support, help with damage and organising repairs, accompanying the victim to hospital or to court, helping with insurance or compensation claims, helping with form filling and dealing
with state bureaucracies. The type of intervention is based upon the "crisis intervention" principle, and is not intended to be prolonged.

The first scheme started in Bristol in 1972, but now there are over 240 schemes affiliated to the National Association of Victim Support Schemes. In 1983-84, schemes received 100,000 referrals by the police. Schemes are therefore able to help only a fraction of victims of personal and household crimes, and a number of factors contribute to this. Because of the inadequacy of funding (see Hillard 1985; and discussion in Chapter V below) schemes can operate only a partial service. The 42,000 people helped by schemes in 1982, must be contrasted with the 556,000 reported crimes by private citizens in 1981. (NAVSS 1983 p.9.). Secondly, schemes are almost entirely dependent upon police referral; this means that victims of unreported crime are not referred, and refer themselves in only tiny numbers. Another consequence of dependency upon police referral is that inevitable selection mechanisms operate at a number of different levels of the police bureaucracy. Some chief constables are more enthusiastic for the work of the schemes than others and this tends to affect formal and informal procedures of referral. Police officers in some areas must carry victim support scheme publicity to give to victims, but give it to some victims rather than others. It has been noted that schemes receive a disproportionate number of burglary referrals in comparison to assault referrals, and also that elderly female victims are referred with great frequency, some schemes receiving victims in this category alone. Thus police perceptions of the differential impact of victimisation, and notions of 'deserving' victims, and perceptions of need and available support all come into play in the referral process (Phipps 1981, a.). There is a marked tendency, for instance, for younger victims and ethnic minority victims not be referred in very great numbers (NAVSS 1982; 1983; 1984).

In addition to victim support schemes, other voluntary agencies supply help, including citizens' advice bureaux and law centres. (Williams 1983). Rape crisis centres and refuges for female and child victims of violence also operate on small budgets and are particularly important as a source of aid for victims of unreported crime. (e.g. Rape Crisis Centre 1984).
In general, the area of victim support has received little attention from researchers in Britain. However, a recent study by Maguire and Corbett (1987) has made a systematic evaluation of eight schemes in England and Wales.

In terms of the proportion of the population covered, voluntary services for victims of crime in Britain are more extensive than in any other country (NAVSS 1983). In the United States, the National Organisation for Victim Assistance (NOVA) acts as a political pressure group for crime victims, and promotes models of statutory and voluntary service. Development of such services is however very uneven, and in many states very wanting. The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982) has recommended federal, state and local funding for the promotion of compensation and victim/witness assistance services. By 1986, 21 states had passed major legislative packages to provide funds for services to crime victims. (U.S. Department of Justice 1986).

1.10 Conclusion:

The scope of victimology, and the literature which has emerged from this sub-discipline and related work in criminology - especially since the early 1970's, is therefore quite vast. Victimology derived its main impetus from the sharpening debates within criminology in the 1960's, concerning the latter's relevance and potential to solve the problems of crime. These internal debates interacted with the crisis of order maintenance and consensus which affected the capitalist state in America in that period. Victimology, its methods, findings and the new perspectives on the crime problem to which it has given birth, has contributed substantially to the re-making of criminology as a discipline, allowing it to address as far broader range of criminal justice and crime control issues than has been possible in the past. It has contributed to what Jock Young (1986) has called the drift to "administrative criminology" - that which is concerned with the operation and efficiency of the system - policing, courts, corrections - and with crime prevention and community involvement, rather than the traditional concern with the search for etiology.

The predominant orientation of victimologists towards empiricism and administrative problems, and the glaring absence of any attempt
to build a theory to explain the structural or cultural sources of victimisation, is the impression with which one is left at the end of a review of the relevant literature.

I shall now go on, in the next chapter, to trace the social and political origins of victimology, with special reference to its contribution to what I will call the 'discovery of criminal victimisation'.
CHAPTER II

THE DISCOVERY OF CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
2.1. Introduction:

I have illustrated in the previous chapter the emergence of victimology as a distinct sub-discipline within the mainstream of criminology. The emergence of new, systematic areas of study and concern do not arise in isolation, and my task now is to begin to explain the 'discovery of criminal victimisation', by tracing the roots of that discovery in concrete social, economic and political processes and ideologies. In so doing, it is my hope to establish an understanding of the relationship between this 'discovery' and the operations of the state, the criminal justice system, and other forces in the maintenance of order, legitimacy and control.

In this chapter I shall give an account of the content of the U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1965-67), in the social and political contexts of the "war on poverty". I shall then go on to how the new concern for criminal victimisation occupied a central place in both social democratic and conservative accounts of the crime problem. This new concern for victimisation can be argued to have marked a shift in emphasis in thinking about crime, its causes and effects.

The description and analysis contained in this chapter is in preparation for a discussion in Chapter III below, of the complex interplay between the political philosophies of liberalism, pluralism, social democracy, and conservatism as these have bearing upon growing state intervention in the problems raised by crime in the 1960's.

I shall show that various groups in American society in the 1960's, in ways quite different from one another, began to conceive the crime problem in terms of its impact on victims. Within this general trend, three major strands may be discerned. One set of interests, particularly that represented by politicians of the "law and order" lobby, presented the victim as a symbol or metaphor - law-abiding citizens victimised both by evil individuals and by the failure of law enforcement agencies, courts and the corrections system to protect them. It also seems clear that throughout the 1960's much concern about victimisation was felt by the inhabitants of middle - and working-class urban areas and the racial ghettos. The concern manifested itself in two related ways; firstly,
in a form which was capable of being harnessed by both media and politicians as support for a "tougher criminal justice system" and, secondly, in a form in which criminal victimisation was conceived as part of the more generalised phenomena of social inequality and injustice in such areas as income, housing, welfare, employment and education. This second form found its expression through the activities of class, community, and minority group organisations, who campaigned both for greater political and economic equality, and for the prevention of crime.

The third major perspective on criminal victimisation which I will locate, is that of the predominantly social democratic interventionism of those Democratic Party politicians and administrators who saw crime as a failure of, or as an indication of the pressing need for, "social engineering" of social conditions to eliminate the evils of crime and victimisation - themselves resulting from the implicit failures of American society to provide a "fair deal" for all citizens. This emerging concern with victimisation can be seen somewhat in terms of a coincidence of interest between the social democrat wing of the Democratic Party and its black and white working-class constituencies as represented by organised labour, civil rights activism and grass roots pressure groups.

However, as I hope to show, the "social engineering" perspective on crime, and the reformism of the early and mid-1960's, contained within it uncomfortably side-by-side, the promise of a fairer society controlled from below, and the promise of a centralised and strong Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement system, controlled increasingly from above.

2.2. The Social and Political Context of the "War on Crime"

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice was established in July 1965 by President Lyndon B. Johnson with wide terms of reference to investigate all aspects of the crime problem and the operation of the Criminal Justice System. By the time the Commission began its enquiries crime had become firmly established in the public consciousness as a social problem of major proportions and for which urgent solutions had to be sought. Crime had been high on the political and media agenda since the 1950's, when great attention
was turned upon it, particularly by sociological criminologists, investigative journalists, civic and community groups and law enforce-
ment officials. In the Presidential election of 1960, the major
candidates, Kennedy and Nixon, thrust issues of crime and criminal
justice to the fore, thereby initiating a tradition in which, in every
presidential election since (with the exception of the Carter-Ford
contest of 1976) these issues have overshadowed others. (White 1965;
1969). The particular ideological thrust, however, in the way the
crime problem was presented by Democratic Party spokesmen, was an evil
which arose out of a host of other social evils such as poverty, un-
employment, poor education and the criminogenic nature of the cultural
context of slum life. Although crime was by no means seen as exclusive-
ly a problem of the slum or the ghetto, it was in the inner-city that
the problem appeared most sharply and most intransigently. More over
crime, as indicated earlier, became a focus for the other ills of the
city. The city was assailed by 'constellations' of problems which,
although each had its distinctive characteristics, were inter-related
in important ways. Crime in the ghetto was the focus because in
political terms, the demands for action on it came ever more strongly
from 'public opinion' (especially white middle and working-class con-
stituencies) but also increasingly from within the ghettos themselves.
Ghetto dwellers, as the results of the President's Commission enquiries
were later to show, were not only disproportionately involved in crime
and delinquency, but were disproportionately the victims of crime.
The spokesmen for these areas also saw the levels of crime (especially
juvenile crime) as resulting from two sets of related factors - the
brutalising features of slum life and poverty, and the lack of
opportunity for access to the mainstream of American social and economic
life.

Recognition of the strength and persistance of calls from the
poorest and most powerless sections of American society in the 1950's
and 1960's, for more protection and better policing, for less police
corruption and more democratic control of the police, as well as for
a "tougher" and more punitive criminal justice system, is central to
our understanding of the context and form of the President's Commission
enquiry and the directions taken by Criminal Justice policy in the
period since it reported.

Whereas it might be argued that the Democratic Party's stand on
crime was 'sociological' or even 'multi-casual' in essence, that taken by the Republican Party (and by the American Independent Party of Wallace in 1968) had much less to say about social causes than about the need for a strong system of law enforcement, criminal justice and punishment. Both political stances did however, start to take in the 1960's, a form in which victimisation became the central issue; it both emphasised the harm done by criminal acts to individuals, communities and to social life in general. In one stance, that of the social reformists of the Democratic Party, the solutions lay in primary prevention by eradicating the social causes through positive intervention on the part of the federal government; but as I hope to show, this optimism gave way in the later Johnson years (and in the Nixon era) to a heavier reliance upon more openly repressive criminal justice measures. In the stance taken by the right wing of the Republican party, the victims and potential victims of crime can only be effectively protected by a criminal justice system which is "victim-centred", which incapacitates the law breaker and which truly deters the potential lawbreaker by the certainty of apprehension and swift and certain punishment.

The report of the President's Commission portrays a welding together of the presuppositions of both stances. The emphasis in social policy and expenditure terms is explicitly upon increasing the power and effectiveness of law enforcement, the criminal process and corrections. In this chapter I wish to elaborate these points but next I shall look at the problem of crime as it was perceived in the 1960's.

Crime has always been seen as a serious problem for American cities, but in the immediate post-war world the focus was upon the involvement in large numbers of young people in delinquent acts. The increases in the level of gang delinquency in the 1950's became a focus for media attention and popular concern. An important feature of youthful involvement in crime is that it frequently brings into sharp relief the institutions which are charged with the successful socialisation and social control of the child - the family, school, and community. By the 1950's sociology and sociological analysis of urban life had already reached a wide constituency including those professionals concerned with political power and policy implementation. Sociology had an important role to play in describing the social world, partic-
ularly through the use of social statistics, social surveys and ethnographic methods; but sociologists also interpreted the world, arguing in terms of cause-and-effect relationships and processes which were not only observable, but which also lent themselves to various types of action to ameliorate or pre-empt social problems.

Writing about the growth in importance of sociological perspectives on crime, Richard Quinney (1974 p.22) notes that such perspectives emerged in the early twentieth century in a context of rapid social changes. The phenomena of urbanisation, immigration, population growth, and social and geographical mobility, were some of the dynamics which faced American scholars in that period. Since much criminal behaviour occurred among the groups most affected by these changes, it was reasonable to investigate the social causes of crime. Additionally, quoting Leon Radzinowicz, Quinney stresses the optimistic belief of Americans in "remediable social forces." The sociological perspective on crime became intrinsically linked to a newly emerging thought system - a "liberal" social philosophy compounding pragmatism, institutionalism, behaviourism, legal realism, and the "new history". All of these new ideas had in common a relativism which suggested that ideas and events only have meaning in relation to their context. This trend made possible the study of crime in terms of social causation rather than in terms of individual differences.

The basic optimism which underpinned and informed these ideas was significantly influenced by positivism and in particular by a form of sociological determinism. If human conduct was moulded and shaped by the conditions of social existence, then it seemed to follow that human conduct could be altered and shaped by the judicious alteration of those conditions. As earlier indicated, sociological description and theory seemed to represent a basis for the "social engineering" implicit in most American policy for solving social problems from the 1930's onwards. A much fuller discussion of the role of the social scientists in the process is undertaken in Chapter III.

2.3. The Growth of Inequality in Post-War America

I have noted earlier that the crime problem, addressed throughout the 1960's by politicians, reformers and public opinion alike, was the
problem as it existed in the cities. The slum areas and the racial ghettos were identified as a sort of criminogenic core from which the problem sprang. This perception of the problem had been conditioned in earlier times, as early as the post-Civil War period and more recently in the 1930's, when the sociological criminology of the Chicago school highlighted the social conditions of poverty and the cultural features of "lower-class life" as the prime causes of delinquency. Once the problem was defined and described, the 1950's and 1960's saw a process of increasing federal government attempts to intervene in and eradicate the perceived causes. The sociological perspectives of the 1950's had been tremendously influential but perhaps none more so than Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin's theory of delinquency - their so-called "opportunity theory". Building upon Robert Merton's theory of Anomie and Social Structure, it argued essentially that delinquency was a response to frustration. (Cloward and Ohlin 1960).

Society held up for emulation middle class ideals, but it systematically denied to millions of lower-class young people any access to the opportunity structure of the society by the inadequacy of education and employment chances, by racial discrimination and a combination of factors influenced by poverty and the disorganisation of slum life. Thus the strategies which seemed logically to flow from such a theory involved measures which would enhance the economic and educational opportunities of the poor. To attack crime and delinquency it was necessary to attack the conditions of inequality by which they were generated. (ibid: especially p.86; p.211).

That inequalities were becoming more sharp in the "affluent society" of the period was demonstrated by a number of studies which made clear the persistence of poverty and other social problems and which also showed them to be concentrated disproportionately among urban blacks (e.g. Harrington 1962; Moynihan 1965). Black migration from the rural South to the industrial North had begun even before the civil war, but in the mid 20th century it increased substantially. In just one decade, 1950-1960, 1.4 million blacks left the South. By 1960 half of the blacks in America's six cities having the largest black population, had been born elsewhere, chiefly in the South. (Marris and
"Racial inequality acquired a physical dimension, as the newcomers crowded into the dilapidated ghettos of the centre city, while the middle-class white population settled into the suburbs. In ten years, the central cities of the twelve largest metropolitan areas lost over two million white residents and gained just under two million non-whites, who by 1960 accounted for more than a quarter of their citizens."

(Piven and Cloward 1971 p.223-4).

In the same period, the suburbs added only minutely to the number of their black residents. The resulting concentration in the ghetto maintained by racial discrimination in housing and jobs, and also by economic inequalities in wage levels and unemployment rates, created what has been termed a "super-exploited" sector of the American working class. (Platt 1978).

In the years following the Korean War, the economy was marked by periodic recessions and rising unemployment which occurred at the same time as the great migration. Those black workers who did find jobs found them at meagre wages; others found sporadic employment or else endured long-term unemployment. In the 1960's most affluent year, 1963, nearly 30% of black men were unemployed at some time during that year, one half of whom were out of work for fifteen weeks or more. (Piven and Cloward op.cit. p.224). Blacks were thus especially victimised by declining economic growth and expanding unemployment. Between 1950-1955 real gross national product increased at an annual rate of 4.7%, but in 1955-1959 had declined to 2.3%. Unemployment increased in 1953-1959 from 3.5% to 5.5%. Blue-collar workers, from whose ranks black workers were largely drawn, suffered more sharply than the average.

In 1940 black unemployment was 20% higher than among whites; by 1963 it was 112% higher. The situation for black teenagers was even more serious. In the same period, income disparities between black and
white workers continued to be sharp and actually stood at about 52% in 1963. (ibid).

In these inequalities many writers and commentators located the symptoms of serious social disorder. Not only might the frustrations arising from such injustices cause disorder, but in the ghettos the normal institutions of control were failing. Piven and Cloward further note that . . .

"High labour demand might have eased the disorder in the cities and thus modified the strain towards disorder, for the occupational role has been the main agency of social control throughout history."

(ibid).

The tendency for a larger than normal proportion of black households to be without a father - 23% in 1960 - also became a cause for concern. The Moynihan Report (1965 p. 447) made much of the connection between this phenomenon and black delinquency, and located it firmly as a factor which propelled black children towards social failure and law-breaking.

The contemporary commentaries upon social disorder are of particular relevance to our discussion here. The 1960's saw not only increasing urban crime of a traditional nature, but also a number of serious ghetto riots which were clearly insurrectional in character, and in which there are almost seemed to represent a convergence between crime and social rebellion. As Piven and Cloward observed, the previously internecine and intra-racial character of ghetto crime started to spill over into white society. The black gangs who had previously fought each other now attacked whites on the streets. Professional representatives of white society - teachers, social workers, policemen, firemen and soldiers, were attacked with greater frequency. Policing the ghetto became increasingly difficult and dangerous.

"The main conclusion to be drawn from the disorder of the 1960's is that the old patterns of servile conformity were shattered; the
trauma and anger of an oppressed people not only had been released, but had been turned against the social structure. Disorder, in short, had become at least partly politicised.

(ibid. p.227).

Politicised disorder was only part of the political response of the ghetto dwellers of black America to the adversity of their situation. Between 1955 and 1965, the movement for civil rights had campaigned vigorously for those rights apparently guaranteed by the American Constitution. This campaigning contained a great deal of political lobbying within the traditions of institutional politics, but also contained an element of civil disobedience which was easy to read, in the context of the times, as "social disorder". The legislative results of the campaigns were the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965; these attacked the political and social base of the "caste system" of the old Confederate States, but did nothing for the poor blacks of Northern cities. What it did do, however, was to contribute to a process of politicisation of urban blacks.

2.4. Civil Disorder and Crime: political responses and imperatives:

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen a continual increase in the growth of the "interventionist state." The non-interventionist ideologies which informed the state's role in the early stages of industrial capitalism, gave way in the late 1800's to a 'reluctant collectivism' and increased state regulation of the economic sphere. In the twentieth century this aspect of the state's role has intensified, and the state itself has become an economic force in its own right. More importantly perhaps for the purposes of this analysis, the state in the period of late capitalist development has progressively increased its direct involvement in the social sphere and has particularly sought to regulate those social consequences of capitalist development which have been seen to threaten and disrupt the orderly development of production and market relations.

The American national state apparatus - the federal government - has been slower to engage in interventionism in the social sphere than
its European counterparts, preferring to leave the solution of the social problems of poverty, urban blight and the rest, to market forces or to state and local government, whilst funding relevant programmes through the grant-in-aid system. The doctrine of "states' rights" and a presidential edict of the 1850's, provided effective political impediments to direct federal involvement until the years of Roosevelt's "New Deal" of the 1930's. Acts of Congress aimed at ameliorating major social problems, and providing the funding for such efforts became part of the defined role of the national legislature at that time. The mass unemployment and poverty, serious labour unrest, and the then recent Russian Revolution, prompted consciousness of the urgent need for social reforms which would integrate those sectors of the American workforce which were the primary victims of the decline in industrial output and employment.

It was, however, the "affluent" 1960's which saw the bulk of social legislation passed. Of the nineteen major pieces of social legislation enacted since 1930, over half has been passed since 1960. (Jones 1971 p.548). Included in these latter Acts is all the legislation except housing, intended to deal with the inter-related problems of poverty, education, and crime. (ibid p.573). The contradictions and disorders of American society were sharper in the 1960's and, as has been pointed out by a number of writers, social legislation tends to be enacted in an atmosphere of crisis.

"Much of current welfare legislation is predicated on the assumption that unless the relationship between abundance and work - a relationship upset by automation - is redressed, persons not needed by the economy, symbolised by urban black youth, will overturn the established social structure."

(ibid, p.567).

The growth of the interventionist state is prompted not only by (fears of) serious disorder, but also by the fact that the problem is national in scope, producing political lobbying and media attention. American governments must satisfy not only powerful interests but also less powerful interests as represented by "voting blocks" - urban blacks,
urban and suburban whites, rural and small town interests and so forth. Lastly, when state and local governments appear unwilling or unable to act or to provide finance, then federal intervention is sometimes enforced, sometimes sought, by the states and cities themselves.

The 1960's has been called the decade of the "welfare explosion" and the "war on poverty". The 1950's saw an increase, but President Johnson's "Great Society" saw a massive accelleration, in the number of families in both the North and South being added to the welfare roles. Whereas these roles only increased by 15% in the 1950's, the period 1960-1969 saw nearly 800,000 families added, an increase of 107%. (Piven and Cloward 1971 p.183-4). Also, fully 71% of the huge welfare increase of the 1960's took place in the four years after 1964. (ibid. p.187). But, as Piven and Cloward point out, relief-giving does not simply increase because economic deprivation spreads; rather they maintain that the "welfare explosion" was a "political response to political disorder." (ibid. p.198). In order for the federal government to effect the massive expansion in welfare payments it had to engage state and local governments to force them to abandon their practices of rigorously restricting eligibility.

"... city government was defined as a major impediment by many federal officials, an obstacle to be hurdled or circumvented if federal funds were to reach blacks. The problem was solved by diverting a large proportion of the new funds to a host of inter-mediaries, including private social agencies, universities and new ghetto agencies created for the purpose as well as imposing specific guide lines for the use of those monies that were in fact funnelled through established municipal agencies."

(ibid. p262).

The federal strategy, as Piven and Cloward indicate, included the establishment of a direct relationship between the national government and the ghettos, a relationship in which both state and local governments were undercut. The problem which presented itself was that many northern states were controlled by the Republican party, and in the South the ruling Democrats could hardly be expected to co-operate in the implementation of new programmes to help the black poor. City
governments were circumvented too, even in many cities which Democrats traditionally ruled. The drastic action involved in the circumvention of the usual power bases probably bears witness to the concern felt by the national Democratic leaders over black disorder and potential disorder in the cities and the failure of the urban political machinery to deal with it. (ibid. p.262).

Blacks were given control over some of the new agencies and programmes, and they became the device with which the federal government attempted to prod municipal agencies into doing more for blacks. White politicians in the cities responded vigorously; they had traditionally depended upon distribution of the bulk of services to their traditional white constituents in order to maintain power. The strategy upset the balance of political power in the cities in a fundamental way.

Deference to "citizen participation" is important in legitimising governmental action in the United States, but the "Great Society" programmes it is said, "went beyond the customary rituals of legitimation." (ibid. p.266). Direct funding actually meant that the programmes could use monies for overt political and agitational activity. They set up 'store-front' offices to advise people of their rights and encouraged such actions as picketing of municipal and private welfare agencies in order to concede more to blacks.

The stimulus in political terms was three-fold. Firstly, the fear of social unrest was a real one, thus the preparedness to alter the flow and dynamics of traditional American political machinations. Secondly, there was a strong caucus within the Democratic party both at grassroots level and in key positions in federal agencies, which embraced a mixture of radical pluralism and social democratic political philosophy. This theory of politics and of social justice particularly overlapped with the sociological theories of 'anomie' and 'opportunity' and also with the strict 'constitutionalist' approach to civil rights then embraced by the Supreme Court. (Barker and Barker 1975; Inciardi and Haas 1978). Thirdly, the processes involved included the battle for black votes. The traditional allegiance of southern black voters to the Republican party was substantially altered in the Kennedy-Nixon contest of 1960. With the continual migration of blacks to the cities into
situations in which they were dispossessed by the white-dominated Republican power structure, the conditions for their permanent defection to the 'party of civil rights and social justice' appeared to be ripe.

But, in the precarious balance of American electoral politics, with the re-election of congressmen every two years, the gaining of black votes had to be balanced against the possible alienation of the traditional allegiance of the white working class.

I shall now go on to examine the patterns of, and rationales for, the federal intervention in the cities and, in particular, its strategy of a combined attack on juvenile delinquency and those social ills from which it was believed to spring.

2.5. Juvenile Delinquency, Community Action and Federal Intervention in the Cities

As indicated previously, the 1960's under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, saw a new and radical departure from usual practices and policies in response to pressing social problems. Policy on social problems under the 1950's administrations of Truman and Eisenhower had been fundamentally non-interventionist. Those Acts which were passed by the Congress, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, and the Social Security Act of 1956, tended either to be political gestures, or else so inadequately funded that they failed significantly to affect the nature of the problems they were meant to address. In essence the belief was that the conditions of 'affluence' and 'growth' in the U.S. economy would permeate downwards to affect and integrate the poor. As the 1950's drew to a close, those economic and political doctrines which justified conscious government inaction seemed less and less plausible. (Marris and Rein 1967 p.13).

The problem of increasing levels of juvenile delinquency in the United States was one of the first in which the federal government established the new relationships with state and local government referred to above. The new national government strategy involved the direct involvement of community and class organisations in programmes designed to tackle problems "at the roots" and on "street level".
In the 1940's and 1950's these groups came to articulate the problems of the ghettos and especially saw delinquency, in both its mundane and its spectacular forms, as indicative of the strains and deprivations affecting the young urban poor. Delinquency was held to point the urgent need for better schools, welfare and community programmes, housing, youth projects and a number of attempts to redress the problem through policies of "positive discrimination". In New York for instance, local, mostly private, social agencies had become particularly concerned about the numerous fighting gangs roaming the neighbourhoods of the Lower East Side. (Piven 1971 p.597). Settlement houses and church groups had attempted to deal with the problem by sponsoring recreation and counselling projects and by organising a "community alert" to warn of gang trouble.

A Youth Board was created in the late 1940's to do "street work" with delinquency-prone youths, as well as to provide services in group work, family counselling, and community organisations. Also in the late 1950's the Henry Street Settlement in the Lower East Side began to seek funding for a comprehensive programme for the neighbourhoods which would make use of all that was known in social work and social science theory about helping children and families and more specifically to reach and redress the underlying causes of gang delinquency. (Marris and Rein op.cit. p.13).

Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, authors of the influential "opportunity theory" of delinquency, became closely involved in the movements and helped develop a research and action programme. With funding forthcoming from the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Mental Health, and the City of New York, the programme - entitled Mobilisation for Youth (MFY) - was established in 1958. By the time that President Kennedy established his President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime in mid 1961, MFY was fully functioning and funded from a number of sources, and controlled by a variety of participating local bodies.

Marris and Rein report that the Kennedy family had had a long-standing interest in problems of youth (presumably through Joseph Kennedy's philanthropy). Also, the new President was eager to give expression to his campaign slogan of a "New Frontier" in a series of
innovative programmes. Robert Kennedy, the new Attorney-General and David Hackett, a member of the campaign staff, were given the task of developing "a new Federal initiative against delinquency." The particular style which it was clear this initiative would take - the direct injection of vast funds to ameliorate the specific problems of ghetto areas - immediately alienated the controlling bureaucracies of the cities. The writers add . . .

"The President was shocked to discover how inflexible bureaucracies could be, and it was characteristic of his administrative style to place an independent intelligence paralleling the establishment, in a strategic position to forge new ideas without administrative constraint." (ibid. p.20).

What is being referred to here is the intransigence of state and local government which both precipitated and excused the beginnings of a major incursion of the Federal government into persistent social problems which were traditionally defined as outside of its legitimate jurisdiction. It was clear to the Kennedys, and to others in the liberal Democratic hierarchy, that delinquency (a pressing public issue) was directly attributable to conditions of poverty, unemployment and racial discrimination. If the state and city governments would not act, because of their fear of a political backlash, then the Federal government must find the means to circumvent their power.

The President's Committee was chaired by the Attorney-General and comprised liberal and social democratic politicians and Lloyd Ohlin, who was then with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The committee was a "cabinet pressure group", with a clear mandate for proposals for reform. The President also created, for the same purposes, an auxiliary Citizen's Advisory Council of "recognised authorities on delinquency."

At the same time, new delinquency legislation was drafted. The bill provided for grants for states and communities for combating delinquency, but it significantly noted that delinquency was closely
related with unemployment and low educational attainment. Delinquency occurred disproportionately among school-drop-outs, unemployed youth, and those from deprived families. The prevention and control of delinquency required co-ordinated efforts to resist it. Moreover, the President's Committee, as spokesman for the new legislation, toured the major cities to outline their view of the inter-relatedness of delinquency and other social problems, and to search out innovative programmes in delinquency control, education and work-training which were worthy of support and would mark the coming of the "New Frontier."

The Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offences Control Act of 1961 authorised the expenditure of 10 million dollars for grants to youth development projects, and, by the end of 1964, seventeen community action agencies were receiving federal funds. Of these agencies, Mobilisation for Youth was that most favoured by the President's Committee. What particularly appealed to them was the manner in which MFY was a collaboration of seemingly diverse groups and interest - neighbourhood groups, local government, federal government, private agencies and the Social Work Department of Columbia University. (Piven op.cit. p.603). To this collaboration, the different constituents brought a variety of structures, programmes and goals, some of which were contradictory. Whereas the administration and various federal agencies may have seen the project largely in terms of a "social engineering" perspective, the local community groups saw it as a means of getting federal funds to address the ills of their social, economic and physical environments. Also various professional groups - teachers, social workers and others also embraced their own perspectives.

The strategy of the federal government, once it had perceived MFY in this way, was to forge and encourage collaboration. Thus, in the early stages of the project the organisations involved reached from the federal government itself to the local neighbourhood and included both public and private groups in what Piven has called a form of "creative federalism." (ibid. p.600). But very soon, the federal government began to intervene increasingly in the patterns of service to the ghetto. The principle device was to be federal funds.

"... federal money was dangled before local groups and meted out through an elaborate process of accommodation in which programmes
were broadened, diffused, and altered to meet the terms of political trading.

... the various parties to the dealing were obviously not equal partners. As each grant was negotiated, federal conditions were imposed ... and ... the federal agencies continued to exert the dominant influence. Moreover the national administration dispersed its money through mechanisms that promoted collaboration, while easing the way for federal intervention.

(ibid. p.60)."

To ensure the co-operation of the local bodies, the federal government required that a structure be formed in MFY which actually incorporated the groups whose support was needed. Additionally, it made use of the consensus among professional groups on the desirability of the "social engineering" approach to problems. This consensus buttressed the federal political strategy, providing continual academic and expert reinforcement for the social-causation view of the delinquency.

Thus MFY has been seen as an important vehicle through which the interventions of the national state in social problems solutions were worked out. The complex nature of lobby and pressure group politics in the United States necessitated the creation of new strategies and devices for effecting intervention and also new federal bodies for furthering those ends. The President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, and its various allies, had an important part to play. On the one hand, it had circumvent the traditional political power of local and state government; on the other, it had to also compete with powerful federal funding agencies such as the National Institute for Mental Health and also private funders such as the Ford Foundation. Additionally, there was a need to be seen to be doing something directly for urban blacks. To a certain extent the basis for the involvement of grass-roots and class organisations already existed, if only in the rhetoric of American "participatory democracy." But it has been noted that the perspectives on problems embraced by the Kennedy administration, welfare professionals and academics alike, called for "a comprehensive, rationalistic approach to policy making" (ibid. p.603, emphasising "theory, rational planning and evaluative research." (Marris and Rein op.cit.p.225).
Also, Marris and Rein observe, the role of community-level groups was seen as central to federal strategy from the very beginning. Each community suffered from a range of similar problems, but each suffered them in different objective and dynamic ways. Each community was to work out a conceptual framework from which the goals and methods of action were to derive. Each proposal was to be justified by reference to a rational analysis of the nature of the problem. Community groups would be important in helping to identify the nature and sources of discontents. In the early stages they would also be given the authority and funds to put policies into operation. Eventually, however, a combination of political maneuvering and the manipulation of funds would lead to effective power being denied.

In the case of MFY the experience followed the following course. Firstly, the federal government courted and effectively co-opted the community groups. The considerable overlap between the two groups' analyses of the roots of the problems of delinquency, led to a special relationship being established and nurtured. The federal government saw "community action" as an important means of affecting problems "at the roots", and also as a means of circumventing the traditional power structure of city politics which had effectively blocked large-scale social welfare approaches to the problems of the urban poor.

However, a serious political backlash was experienced, not only from white voters, but also from state and local governments demanding, as the legally elected administrative forces, to be allowed themselves to fund programmes and exercise what they claimed to be legitimate control over the expenditure of public funds.

The federal government was faced with a number of complex dilemmas. It had tried to push "maximum feasible participation of the poor" in both delinquency and poverty programmes. Not only did this arouse considerable political opposition, but also from the perspective of ongoing "scientific evaluation" of the programmes, it emerged that social conditions were not truly being affected by local re-training schemes, and the programmes' encouragement of political action by the poor did not succeed in altering the policies of the agencies and bureaucracies which were their targets. The interventionist strategies involved in the community action approach, had as far as the federal
government were concerned, largely failed.

In commenting on the poverty programme, in which the Kennedy and Johnson administrations used strategies similar to those in the field of the delinquency projects, Marris and Rein note that it was eventually realised that . . .

"only the cabinet nationally, and the mayors locally were powerful enough to co-ordinate the resources needed. Hence it still faced the inherent conflict of a simultaneous commitment to two different conceptions of democratic accountability. From whom were the projects to take their lead, elected government or those they serve?"

(ibid. p.215).

The answer to this question is largely that the programmes did little to give more power to urban blacks. At best, power relations in the city were re-shuffled into a set of relationships in which power was not wrested from city hall by the poor, but it was significantly usurped by the growing power of new interventionist federal structures.

The lesson of the delinquency and poverty programmes, as the above authors conclude, is that . . .

"... no reform movement in American society can hope to supplant the conflicts of interests from which the policy evolves. It can only act as advocate, not as judge."

(ibid. p.230).

In the United States the conflicts of interest were not merely those of special interest groups, but the need of the national state to reconcile those conflicts which potentially or actually result in civil and economic disruption or civil disorder. In so doing the state took on a manipulative function. It was faced with both violent and non-violent action in protest against social ills. Pressure for social reform came both from the liberal middle classes, as well as from community and class organisations. Widespread deviancy and crime in
the ghettos both highlighted the urgency of the situation and also gave rise to formidable and concerted pressure for a law-and-order solution— one which would "solve" the manifest problems of crime and rioting through a repressive law-enforcement and justice system.

In the Johnson years massive amounts of federal money were being spent on attempts at a social welfare solution to the "problem of the ghetto"— attempts which were failing to stem the tide of black political activism and the attendant convergence of crime and rebellion.

It is certainly against the background of the failures of social reform that two important Presidential enquiries of the mid-1960's began their deliberations— The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (the Crime Commission), and the National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders (the Riot Commission).

In both enquiries an implicit commitment to the rhetoric of social reformism and to "opportunity theory" and sociological crime-causation theories, is evident. The shift in emphasis however is patently towards the law-and-order solution. Social science theories of crime-causation, urbanism, human behaviour, policing, justice and corrections, come to have as important a part to play in this shift in emphasis as they had in previous welfare oriented strategies. Also, as I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, 'victimisation becomes the major theme of consideration. Precisely what this concept meant and how it was utilised by the various constituencies are issues which I shall now go on to examine.

2.6. The President's Commission and the Discovery of Criminal Victimisation:

The Crime Commission was set up by President Johnson in July 1965 with wide terms of reference to investigate the causes of crime, delinquency and other forms of social deviancy, and also to examine the functioning and effectiveness of the whole of the system of law enforcement, courts and correctional institutions. It was set up against a background of increasing crime and the fear of crime in the cities, and in the wake of the first ghetto disturbances. Crime in America was becoming a major political issue in which social welfare-oriented theories and solutions, and those theories positing more classicist
models of the origins and solutions to crime, were becoming increasingly polarised and manifest in public debate.

After nearly two years of deliberation and evidence, the commission finally published its report in February 1967. In its introduction it quickly established the problem of crime as it appeared: its opening sentence says . . .

"There is much crime in America, more than ever is reported, far more than ever is solved, far too much for the health of the nation. Every American knows that."

(President's Commission 1967 p.1).

The health of the nation was held to be at risk, but so too were the health, well-being, and security of its citizens. The report continues . . .

"Every American is, in a sense a victim of crime. Violence and theft have not only injured, often irreparably, hundreds and thousands of citizens, but have directly affected every one. Some people have been compelled to uproot themselves and find new homes. Some have been afraid to use public streets and parks."

(ibid.).

But more than this, victimisation and fear of victimisation have lead to an increasing disaffection on the part of citizens with state and society over protection from these hazards.

"Some have become distrustful of the Government's ability, or even desire, to protect them. Some have lapsed into the attitude that criminal behaviour is normal human behaviour and consequently have become indifferent to it, or have adopted it as a good way to get ahead in life."

(ibid.).

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Additionally, crime has lead to hostility to those perceived to be its main perpetrators - adolescents, blacks, drug addicts, college students and political activists. Police departments who fail to solve crimes, courts which pass lenient sentences or make decisions restricting police activities, 'soft' corrections and parole boards - all of these are blamed, says the Report, for the crime problem.

The authors are quick to point out, however, that the "underlying problems are the ones which the criminal justice system can do little about." These are identified as - the unruliness of youth, widespread drug addiction, the pursuit of the dollar by any available means, and the "existence of much poverty in a wealthy society." In fact, unless society takes concerted action to change the general conditions and attitudes that are associated with crime, no improvements in law enforcement and court procedures would be much avail. The Report continually returns to the theme that crime has its roots in adverse social conditions and that a "national concerted effort" is required to eliminate both the roots and the phenomenon itself.

The two striking facts about crime, the Report says, are that most crimes are committed in cities and are committed by boys and young men between the ages of 15 and 24 years, with the peak ages for arrest being 15 and 16 years. Addressing the problem of youthful crime, the Report remarks that this sector of the population is growing more numerous, and would seem to be more crime-prone. But social conditions of poverty and neglect are seen a primarily to blame, because youth crime has continued to increase even in those cities which had, in recent years, made "marked improvements in police efficiency and correctional resourcefulness." The commission identified the weakening of parental authority, at all levels of society. Those social institutions central to the socialisation of children - families, schools, churches - are failing "to give young people the motivation to live moral lives." The failure of children to receive proper love and guidance, leads to a situation where the young are "unprepared to cope with the many ambiguities and lacks that they find in the community." (ibid. p.5).

These factors are associated with racial discrimination, bad housing,
commercial exploitation, and the gap between promise and fulfillment in American society. Poor educational provision and attainment lead to a further contraction of employment opportunities. Although youth is sorely discontented in the suburbs, campuses, as well as the slums, it is in the slums that youth often express this discontent criminally.

"So do older people. It is not hard to understand why. The conditions of life there, economic and social, conspire to make crime not only easy to engage it but easy to invest justifications for."

(ibid. p.6).

Importantly, for the purposes of this analysis, the Report notes that the conditions of life in cities and in particular in the slums, have the capacity adversely to affect human relationships. In the "abrasive" and "impersonal" atmosphere of the city, people are likely to live their lives unnoticed, unrespected, and with their hopes unfulfilled. In the ghettos, where racial minorities are sequestered with little hope of escape, there are people who are declared by the law to be equal but are prevented from improving their circumstances and who suffer extraordinary strains on their respect for the law and society.

It is such people with whom the criminal justice system preponderantly deals. Society, through the criminal justice system, insists that individuals are responsible for their actions, but has not devised the means for ensuring that all its members have the ability to assume responsibility.

"It has let too many of them grow up untaught, unmotivated, unwanted. The criminal justice system has a great potential for dealing with individual instances of crime, but is not designed to eliminate the conditions in which most crime breeds."

(ibid.).

In this the criminal justice system needs help ...
"Warring on poverty, inadequate housing and unemployment is warring on crime. A civil rights law is a law against crime. Money for schools is money against crime. Medical, psychiatric, and family counseling services are services against crime... every effort to improve life in America's "inner cities" is an effort against crime. A community's most enduring protection against crime is to right the wrongs and cure the illnesses that tempt men to harm their neighbours."

( Ibid. )

Students of criminology have little difficulty in locating the direct influence of anomie theory, "opportunity theory" and social disorganisation theory, in the Report's analysis. Such a direct influence, as we have seen, had manifested itself in most academic and social policy orientations towards issues of crime and related social problems for most of the period since World War II. The slant of the analysis informed by these theories, became in the Crime Commission's Report, more sensitively attuned to the consequences and impact of criminal victimisation at a number of levels than had been the case in earlier reports and studies.

As I noted much earlier, the Crime Commission gave birth to, and institutionalised support for, the large-scale victimisation survey. The whole tenor of that part of the report dealing with the nature, extent and causes of crime, is marked by the desire to understand the specific variable relating to offence and victimisation patterns. The Commission received much guidance to show the 'human cost' of crime, but also to show that victimisation, as with offending, is disproportionately concentrated in the ghetto. Evidence from victimisation surveys seemed to underline what observers of the ghettos had been saying for many decades, ghetto dwellers not only suffer worse social conditions and greatest infringements of human rights, but also the greatest insecurities associated with violent and economic victimisation.

The concern expressed for issues of harm, economic loss, fear and social dislocation resulting from the crime problem, has in the Report a
number of related aspects. Criminal victimisation is not only seen as socially and personally injurious, but the role of the crime victim, the potential victim, and also of witnesses to crime, are given a central place in the analysis not only of the present failures of the criminal justice system, but also in the improvements which must be made. Some of these aspects will be dealt with further on, but in brief they concern such dimensions as the contribution which victims' prior behaviour makes to the commission of crime; the primary role of the victim as reporter of crime; the dependence of the system upon public, especially victim, co-operation are also considered.

The Crime Commission's over-riding concern is with issues of consensus and legitimacy. Its Report identifies several areas in which crime both results from a decline in these elements, and in its turn contributes to a further erosion. The potential and actual victims of crime, seem for the Commission to epitomise these issues, and it is concerned in its many recommendations to forge a new consensus but presumably one which is based more firmly upon conceptions of "justice" and "fairness" in society as well as "efficiency" in the criminal justice system. As noted earlier; they saw that the failures of the system were located both in the structure and operation of the system and in wider social issues.

The Commission had at its disposal a great deal of statistical and survey data on crime and victimisation. In addition to data from the Uniform Crime Reports, which are collected annually on a nationwide basis and collated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Commission also sponsored a number of studies of criminal victimisation and the demographic factors associated with it. The National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) of the University of Chicago surveyed 10,000 households to determine if any member had been victimised, if the crime had been reported to the police and, if not, why not. (Ennis 1967). More detailed surveys were undertaken in high and medium crime rate precincts of Washington D.C., Chicago and Boston by the Bureau of Social Science Research of Washington and the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan. (Argana 1975).

The Commission concerned itself in the main with those crimes which were held mostly to concern Americans - those which affect public safety
"at home, work and in the street." As such the Report considers in its analysis the seven offences which are grouped together in the Uniform Crime Reports to form the F.B.I.'s Index of serious crimes. Interestingly, these are all offences, both violent and non-violent, which have personal victims, as opposed to those offences which are "victimless" or else have an abstract or corporate victim. The seven Index crimes are willful homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny over 50 dollars and motor vehicle theft. The table below shows the number of each of these offences in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 1965.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index Offence</th>
<th>No. Recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>9,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>22,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>118,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>206,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>1,173,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>762,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>486,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,780,015</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In its comparison of the UCR reports for the years 1933-1965, the Commission noted that rates for all serious offences had increased steadily since the end of World War II. In respect of violent offences the Report claims that the 1933-65 period had been one of "sharply divergent trends." Also although the nation's population had increased by 47% since 1940, violent offences had increased much faster. The rates per 100,000 population tripled for forcible rape and doubled for aggravated assault; willful homicide had decreased to 70% of its 1933 peak, while robbery had fluctuated from a 1933 high, a low during World War II to a point where it was 20% above its post-war level. (ibid. p.23).

Property crimes had increased much more sharply than the crimes of violence; the rate for larceny of 50 dollars and over showing the sharpest increase of all Index offences - it had increased to more than 550% of its 1933 level. The burglary rate had nearly doubled, whereas
auto theft had seen uneven development to a point where it was almost the same as that in 1933.

From these and other official data the Commission concluded that both the total number of crimes and the rates per 100,000 population were increasing in an alarming and pervasive way.

"Crime always seems to be increasing, never going down. Up 9% this year, 10 the next, and the Commission's surveys have shown that there is a great deal more crime than the office statistics show."

(Ibid. p.24).

Indeed the NORC Survey, referred to earlier, revealed information about the inaccuracy of the UCR figures, which although this perhaps did not surprise criminologist, it caused a sensation in the media and became an immediate political issue. (Clark 1970).

The NORC Survey showed that the actual amount of crime in the United States was several times that reported in the UCR. As the table below shows, the amount of personal injury crime reported to NORC was almost twice the UCR rate, and that there is almost twice as much individual property crime. Forcible rapes were 3 1/2 times the reported rate, burglaries three times, aggravated assaults and larcenies over 50 dollars more than double, and robbery 50% greater. Only vehicle theft was lower in the NORC survey than in the UCR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index Crimes</th>
<th>NORC 1965-66</th>
<th>UCR for Individuals 1965</th>
<th>UCR for Individuals &amp; Organisations 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilful Homicide</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>218.3</td>
<td>106.6</td>
<td>106.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>949.1</td>
<td>299.8</td>
<td>605.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (over $50)</td>
<td>606.5</td>
<td>267.4</td>
<td>393.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>206.2</td>
<td>226.0</td>
<td>251.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Violence</td>
<td>357.8</td>
<td>184.7</td>
<td>184.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Property</td>
<td>1,761.8</td>
<td>793.0</td>
<td>1,294.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: President's Commission p.21).
The surveys in Washington, Boston, and Chicago also showed the disparity between reported and unreported amounts of crime. In Washington, for instance for certain specific offences against individuals, the number of offences reported to the survey per 1,000 residents aged 18 years or over, ranged from 3 to 10 times more than the number contained in the police statistics for the city.

The aspect of these findings which particularly concerned the Commission was that of victims' tendency for non-reporting of offences committed against them. The NORC Survey asked respondents why, if appropriate, they had not reported offences to the police.

In the case of robbery, for instance, 35% of offences were not reported; 27% of non-reporters gave as their reason that their definition of the matter as private, or else they did not wish to harm the offender; 45% felt that the police would be ineffective or would not want to be bothered. In the case of burglaries, 42% went unreported; 30% felt the offence a private matter, 63% cite police ineffectiveness. The definition of the matter as private, or the ineffectiveness of the police were given as the main reasons for non-reporting for all offences. (ibid. p.22).

The Commission also concerned itself with the demographic variables associated with crime, including density and size of population, composition with regard to age, race and sex and the economic situation and moves of the population. As the Report states . . .

"One of the most fully documented facts about crime is that the common serious crimes which people worry about most - murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault and burglary - happen most often in the slums of large cities. Study after study in city after city in all regions of the country have traced the variations in the rates for these crimes. The results with monotonous regularity, show that the offences, the offenders and the victims, are found most frequently in the poorest
and most deteriorated and socially disorganised areas of the cities. "

(ibid. p.35).

Furthermore, it is the poorest social conditions and other factors associated with "social disorganisation" which correlate most highly with the most serious offences.

"Burglary, robbery and serious assaults occur in areas characterised by low income, physical deterioration, dependency, racial and ethnic concentrations, broken homes, working mothers, low levels of educational and vocational skill, high unemployment, high proportions of single males, overcrowded and substandard housing, high rates of tuberculosis and infant mortality, low rates of home ownership or single family dwellings, mixed land use, and high population density. "

(ibid. p.35).

In an analysis based upon and indeed citing the work of Shaw and McKay in Chicago in the 1930’s, the Report suggests strongly that it is not only that slum and ghetto residents are brutalised by their conditions of life, but also that they are involved in a process of transition, between the rural existences from which they have emerged, and the mainstream of American society. But this transition is effectively held up by processes of discrimination and unemployment and indeed the Commission suggests that much of everyday crime in the slums "is a blind reaction to the conditions of slum living." (ibid. p.37).

Questions regarding the demographic variables associated with crime further emerged for the Commission from the NORC victimisation survey. It found that rather striking variations in the risk of victimisation appeared among different sectors of the population. The highest levels of victimisation occurred in the lower income groups when all Index offences except homicide were considered. The risks of victimisation from burglary, robbery, and forcible rape, were concentrated in the
lowest income group and decreased steadily at higher income levels. The picture was more erratic for aggravated assault, larceny and vehicle theft. Also, victimisation increases sharply in the highest income group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victimisation by Income</th>
<th>(rates per 100,000 population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offences</td>
<td>0 - 2,999 Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>1,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (over $50)</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Respondents</td>
<td>(5,232)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: ibid. p.39).

The NORC survey data also showed that non-whites were victimised disproportionately by all Index crimes, except larceny of 50 dollars or over.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victimisation by Race</th>
<th>(Rates per 100,000 population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFENCES</td>
<td>WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (over $50)</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: ibid. p.39).

At all levels blacks had higher rates of victimisation for serious crimes against the person than whites, for whites, burglary rates declined as income rose, for blacks, trends mirrored those of whites,
except that burglaries rose with income (reflecting perhaps the residential segregation of middle-class blacks). For minor crimes the survey found strong evidence of under-reporting of victimisation of blacks (perhaps reflecting subcultural differences in definition of events as crimes). In the lower income groups blacks were more likely than whites to be victims of serious crimes against the person. In the higher income groups blacks were slightly more likely to be victims of serious assaults and much more likely to suffer property loss.

The results also show male rates for most crimes to be higher for whites than for blacks (with some evidence of under-reporting by blacks). Males of all races aged 30-39 years reported most serious victimisation. Females of all races aged 20-29 reported most serious victimisation.

Additionally, the Commission found that most offences - victimisation relationships were intra-racial rather than inter-racial. Whites were most likely to be victimised by white offenders; blacks by black offenders. Indeed the demographic characteristics of offenders have been shown to be very close to those of victims, in a number of studies of personal crime.

The discovery of the disproportionately high levels of victimisation in the slums and ghettos, was paralleled by findings relating to fear of victimisation and feelings of personal security and safety. The Commission had been created largely because of the evidence not only of increasing crime, but also of an increasing concern in the population as a whole. Based on the results of opinion polls, most urban Americans felt that crime was the most serious social issue. Surveys undertaken for the Commission, however, established that the residents of inner-city areas were considerably more fearful than residents of other areas and that black respondents were more fearful than whites. Thus, in the NORC Survey, the following table is to be found.
How safe do you feel waiting in your neighbourhood after dark?  
(Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>NON-WHITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Safe</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Safe</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Unsafe</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Safe</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>(4,628)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(7,495)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ennis op.cit p.73).

Not only were blacks more concerned about personal safety than whites but they had to expose themselves more often to risk, being required more often than whites to make necessary journey on foot after dark.

Similar issues of crime and insecurity were taken up by the Riot Commission two years after the Crime Commission's Report. The following table showed the incidence of Index crimes against persons and property per 100,000 residents in five Chicago police districts in 1965. Taking one high income all-white district at the edge of the city core, and two predominantly white districts, one with mainly lower middle income and low income household, the table shows the rates as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Income White District</th>
<th>Low Middle Income White District</th>
<th>Mixed High and Low Income Black District</th>
<th>Very Low Income Black District No.1</th>
<th>Very Low Income Black District No.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Index Crimes against persons</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Index Crimes against property</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>2,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolmen Assigned</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder 1968 p.267).
These data suggested the great extent of variation in crime rates between the neighbourhoods. These variations are much larger for crimes against persons than for crimes against property. They also have something to suggest about levels of policing. The presence of more policemen per 100,000 residents do not offset high rates in certain parts of the city. Later on, however, the Riot Commission noted that police practices in black neighbourhoods were at variance with those in white areas. (ibid. p.299). Blanket policing through the use of "aggressive preventative patrols" and "stop and frisk" tactics lead to greater arrest rates but also to greater abuse of citizens through the use of "alley justice" - violence against suspects with no further action. The Riot Commission also found a widespread belief in the existence of police brutality and great strength of feeling that "ghetto neighbourhoods are not given adequate police protection." The police were believed to maintain much less rigorous standards of enforcement in the ghetto, tolerating their activities such as drug-trafficking, prostitution and street violence that they would not tolerate elsewhere. The police were also believed to treat complaints and calls for help from black areas much less urgently than for the white areas.

Both the Crime and Riot Commissions found evidence to support both charges. The Riot Commission, for example, quoted the results of study in Cleveland in which they found that the police took almost four times as long to respond to calls from a black district concerning robbery than for the district where response was next lowest. The response time for some other crimes was at least twice as long. (ibid. p.309).

A NORC poll of attitude towards the police (for the Crime Commission) found the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORC POLL : Affirmative Answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do Police do &quot;excellent&quot; job?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are Police &quot;almost all honest?&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: President's Commission p.99).
Finally, on the question of the criminal victimisation of ghetto residents, the Riot Commission concludes that most of the crime in the ghetto is committed by a small minority of residents and the principle victims are other residents of those areas.

"As a result, the majority of law abiding citizens who live in disadvantaged Negro areas face much higher probabilities of being victimised than residents of most higher-income areas, including almost all suburbs.

... Thus, crime not only creates an atmosphere of insecurity and fear throughout Negro neighbourhoods but causes continuing attrition of the relationship between Negro residents and the police. This bears a direct relationship to civil disorder."

(Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. p.268).

What then were the solutions posed to these problems? As we have seen the Crime Riot Commission Reports identify crime and disorder as major problems of increasing proportions. The problems are presented in terms of the harm done to social order and to individuals and their communities. Fear of crime is shown to be widespread, but the chances of victimisation vary enormously according to the characteristic of individuals and neighbourhoods.

Implicitly accepting the predominant sociological theories of crime causation, the Crime Commission located the causes of crime in poverty, unemployment, and other adverse social conditions. It extends this analysis, in the spirit of these theories, to see these conditions creating cultural atmospheres which lead to the decline of the quality of inter-personal relationships. These processes are seen as leading in the ghettos to two related sets of circumstances; firstly, there is internecine crime in which the oppressed victimise the oppressed. Secondly, and more disturbingly for white society, there emerges a new somewhat politicised variety of criminal behaviour, which is partially political rebellion and partially a racially motivated move towards the victimisation of whites outside the ghetto area.
There is little question that during this period social disorder in the form of riots became seen as an indicator of what was wrong with the structure of American society, and for all sectors of the American political establishment the riots were regarded as a portent of what was to come if some effective action was not taken.

At the time when the Crime and Riot Commissions were established, it was beginning to emerge that the Great Society programmes of direct intervention by federal government in the solution of social problems, were failing to prevent rising levels of crime and delinquency. These programmes had also failed after all, to forstal the riots!

It is in the face of this dilemma the import of the Commissions' findings and recommendations start to take on a form of reasoning in which social justice and order are seen as inextricably linked. On the one hand the federal government must continue its commitment to fighting crime at its roots in social conditions, but at the same time it must reform the components of the criminal justice system. Whereas the Great Society programmes represented the incursion of national state in the direct attempts to solve social problems, the terms of reference, endeavours and proposals of the Crime Commission represented a parallel attempt by the federal government to directly intervene in and control the activities of the criminal justice system.
CHAPTER III

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, STATE INTERVENTION, 
AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS.
3.1. Introduction:

How then can we make sense of the tangle of political philosophies and imperatives which form the background to the developments in American Criminal Justice in the 1960's? It is important to state that the 'discovery of criminal victimisation', discussed in the previous chapter, and the concerns and strategies arising from concern with that issue, cannot be understood in isolation from other aspects of criminal justice. What we witness is an attempt by national government to rationalise and systematise an unwieldy and inefficient system, but in this attempt to reform the criminal justice system are necessarily reflected the world views of politicians and those social scientists whose works informed the debates. These world views interacted with the 'realities' and 'necessities' which presented themselves - the urgency of the search for renewed 'domestic tranquillity', the social and economic impacts of the war in Vietnam, and other facets of social conflict and crisis which were described earlier.

It may also perhaps be fruitful, in attempting to make sense of these complexities and interactions, to discuss the developments so far outlined in the light of the inter-play between political philosophies. In the following section I shall discuss at length the tendencies inherent in democratic pluralism as they contribute to the understanding of American social democracy, reformism, and state intervention. This will be followed by an examination of the contribution and participation of social scientists (particularly sociological criminologists) in these processes.

3.2. Pluralism, Liberalism and Social Democratic Consciousness

According to the analysis made by Robert Paul Wolff (1965), democratic pluralism, in both its descriptive and prescriptive forms, grew out of nineteenth century attacks on the methodological individualism of the classical liberal tradition. In the latter, political society is, or ought to be, an association of self-determining individuals who concert their wills and collect their powers in the state for mutually self-interested ends. The state is the locus of supreme power and authority, and its commands are legitimised by a democratic process of decision and control. This ensures participation of the governed in the making of the laws to which they submit.
Centrally, the theory is one of the relationship between the individual and the sovereign state, with other associations being accorded secondary importance. Confusingly, some liberal theorists counsel minimum state interference with private individuals and associations, while others argue for active state intervention. (ibid. p.13).

Wolff argues that classical liberalism, born of the pre-industrial era, was quickly recognised to be an inadequate description of the industrial society which emerged in the nineteenth century. The enfranchisement of the adult populations of great nation-states, and the development of an elaborate private industrial system, gave rise to a new 'pluralistic' structure within the political framework of representative government. This trend undercut the notion of 'direct democracy' wherein, in the views of Rousseau and Locke, the state was to confront the citizen directly, as both servant and master.

The size and organisation of the modern state, the complexity of institutional and associational relationships, and the rise of an intermediating bureaucracies, says Wolff, destroy any possibility of classical liberal democracy. As a standard by which to judge the great industrial democracies, liberal democracy suffers from the greatest possible failing - the irrelevance which attends the progressively greater divergence of the realities of industrial society from the main tenets of the theory.

In addition to these factors, three others - historically more specific to the American experience - have combined to produce a characteristic form known as pluralism. Firstly, there is the federal structure of American government, in which a hierarchy of local government structures interposed itself between the individual and the supreme power of the state. The eighteenth century debates concerning the unification of the States, display not only that the United States was to be a union of associational and political communities rather than of individuals, but also that the emerging constitution was meant to represent a series of compromises between diverse and competing interest.

A second factor which shaped the characters of American pluralistic
democracy, is the "oft-cited penchant for dealing with social problems by means of voluntary associations." Thus there is a tradition in which "a remarkable variety of needs are met in America by private and voluntary institutions." (ibid. p.17-18). In order to clarify the relationship of the government to this network of private associations, it is necessary to observe that while some groups perform their functions and achieve their goals directly, others are organised as pressure groups to influence national or local government to achieve their ends. All groups engage in an intensity of institutionalised political lobbying which is not matched in other political systems.

The third factor cited by Wolff is the great ethnic and religious diversity of the American nation, brought about by three hundred years of immigration.

"The ethnic and religious communities in American society encountered one another through the pluralistic mechanisms of politics and private associations which already existed... The religious and ethnic groups entered the political system at the precinct, city, or county level, using the unified mass of their voting populations as a weight to be thrown on the political scales."

( ibid. p.21).

Any analysis of social and political policy as it affects American cities, must take into consideration the considerable influence of ethnic and religious pressure groups and special interest lobbies, especially in view of the abilities of some to 'deliver votes', in return for a voice in the legislative administrative and fiscal processes.

In turning to examine pluralist views of the role of the state in relation to diverse social interests, Wolff presents two principal theories of this relationship. The first, or 'referee' theory, asserts that the role of the central government is to lay down ground rules for conflict and competition, and employ its power to make sure that no major interest abuses its influence or gains an unchecked dominance in some area of social life. The most obvious instance is the economic
sphere, where firms compete for markets and labour competes with capital. But, according to this theory, a similar competition takes place among interests in the social sphere, between the various religious and ethnic groups, public and private education, and so on.

In the second, or 'vector sum' theory, Congress is seen as the focal point of pressures which are exerted by interest groups throughout society, either by way of the two major parties or through the political lobbies. The laws merely reflect their shaping by manifold forces brought to bear on the legislators. As the strength and direction of private interests alters, there is a corresponding alteration in the composition and activity of the interest groups.

Therefore, in the fragments of the descriptive account offered by the theory of pluralistic democracy, America is a complex interlocking of ethnic, religious, racial, regional, and economic groups, whose members pursue their diverse interests through the medium of private associations, which in turn are co-ordinated, regulated, contained, encouraged, and guided by a federal system of representative democracy. Individual citizens confront the central government, and one another, through the intermediation of the voluntary and involuntary groups to which they belong. In this way, pluralist democracy stands in contrast to classical democracy on the liberal model, and in comparing the former with the relations between classes in feudal society, Wolff comments that the guiding principle is not 'one man - one vote', but rather 'every legitimate group its share.' Scarce resources, and rights and liberties should not be distributed according to the relative numbers or might of groups, but upon the principle of distributive justice.

Pluralism, though, is not merely a set of descriptions of the operation of democracies, but contains also a set of prescriptive statements about what ought to exist. Democracy, as earlier mentioned, should ideally be a matter of direct participation and pressure by citizens to secure their individual and collective interests - rather as in the Jeffersonian vision of a democracy of small farmers and businessmen, living within stone's-throw of their legislature. The burgeoning complexities of the industrial state render this situation
increasing less likely. Decisions will be taken, whether by democratic means or not; thus a system in which there is little real participation, save for the occasional ritualistic and cynical casting of votes at election time, is in danger of losing its real democratic features in favour of rule by economic and political elites. The answer which pluralism poses, is to find a way of ensuring maximum participation by all interested parties in the 'democratic process'.

Pluralism is thus presented "as a useful means for preserving some measure of democracy under the unpromising conditions of mass industrial society". A pluralistic society is natural and good and an end to be sought in itself. The theory offers not only a model of the state and of democratic politics, but also of the nature of human personality and group functioning. Human personality is dependent upon the social group of which it is a significant member. The influence of society upon the individual is primarily positive, formative and supportive. Social inheritance, rather than seen as something to be cast off, should be seen as central to man's nature. Man, as a social animal, owes his loyalty primarily to the group, and to the state only in so far as his rights and interests are secured in that relationship!

The politician, furthermore, is presented by pluralists as a type of middleman in the power transactions of the society. He absorbs the pressures brought to bear upon him by his organised constituents on the basis of their relative voting strength, and then goes onto the floor of Congress to work out legislative compromises with his colleagues, who have been equally affected. The end result is legislation which is a compromise between the different interests. Individuals are then free in that they participate, at least partially, in the framing of the laws to which they submit.

In the prescriptive past of pluralist theory there also lies an important commentary upon the issues of 'deviancy', 'tolerance of diversity', 'freedom', 'equality' and 'justice'.

Wolff notes that in each of its two variants - the liberal-individualist, and group process theories, there is associated a theory of tolerance. In the former tolerance "is equated with acceptance of
individual idiosyncracy and interpersonal conflict". (ibid, p34).

Citing John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty, Wolff sees liberal pluralism as viewing the realm of private behaviour as a sanctuary into which the state and society should not interfere. Mill distinguishes between the private and public realms of action and, in the latter, groups of individuals may combine to engage in public-regarding actions. Even in this public sphere, society ought to interfere with the individual only for the purpose of advancing the welfare of society as a whole. This qualification of the general liberal principle has become increasingly problematic as the state has continued to intervene in ever more areas, not only of the public sphere, but also has proceeded to intervene in the areas of private morality and 'victimless' deviance.

In their analysis of the concept of 'permissiveness' in relation to the social legislation in the Britain of the 1960's, Greenwood and Young remark that Mill's position on liberty and state interventionism takes no account "moral indignation" as a force leading to restriction of personal freedoms to behave in diverse ways; nor does it take into account the role of an interventimist state, which must preside over the allocation of reward and punishment, and which will intervene if sacred institutions are seen to be challenged. The liberal rhetoric of interventionism, they maintain, contradicts with its desire to maintain 'nature' and 'just' order of the mixed economy and of existing institutions - "its espousal of freedom falters at these parameters". (1980 p.156-7).

This recurring problem for a liberal theory of democracy, is also taken up by Wolff. In the context of American society he sees the problem of toleration versus intervention as one which has been, partially at least, addressed by a particular dynamic in later, democratic pluralist, variants of liberalism.

"Democratic pluralism, as it developed in the context of American life and politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, purports to achieve just the required union of 'liberal' principles and 'conservative' sociology. "

(Wolff op.cit. p.45).

To the theory of democratic pluralism, classical liberalism brought
a particular notion of the relationship between personality and society and the concept of 'individualism'. The specific contribution of conservative philosophy is the..."fundamental insight that man is a social being", and the concomitant concept of 'community'.

Thus, in respect of the issue of 'tolerance versus intervention', the modern state is mindful of the potentially negative and harmful aspects of what Mill called 'liberty'. In the work of Durkheim, for instance, there is an examination of the conditions in which the social integration of individual and group life may break down in sometimes dramatic ways. The loosening of the constraints of traditional and group values creates, in some individuals, a condition of lawlessness and individualism ('Anomie') in which the outcome is potentially disastrous for both the individual and the society.

In the conservative current in the philosophy of state interventionism, therefore, intervention in Mill's public and private spheres, becomes a necessity dictated by the realisation that consensus and integration - in other words conformity and maximum participation in group life - are the joint guarantors of individual and social well-being. In one part of the democratic pluralist dialectic - the traditional conservative current - the existence of social order is a necessary precondition for social justice.

In the liberal current in state interventionism, Mill's arguments advanced in defence of the individual's right to differ from the surrounding society are taken over as arguments for the social group to differ from other social groups. It is concerned more with the ways in which diverse groups and interest can be fused with political obligation, and how these groups - existing outside, or on the periphery of the consensus - can be integrated more perfectly into the social system. But, here we find a statement which is the opposite of the conservative belief in the particular relationship of 'order' and 'justice'; it is that social justice is a necessary precondition for social order. There is then, a commitment in democratic pluralism to the psychologically and socially desirable forces of social integration which traditionally liberalism tends to weaken.
We may see therefore, the modern state, having defined for itself a role as 'arbiter' or 'referee', striving to solve the economic and social contradictions posed by the nature of capitalist production. In one particular historical period, economic and political imperatives may dictate that the promotion of social order can best be served by interventionism in both economic and social spheres. In another period the same imperatives, together with philosophical re-conceptualisations of the problems, may dictate that the role of the state is to ensure the general conditions (e.g. 'control of the money supply'; 'perfect competition') by which social integration may be achieved without radical state interventionism and high levels of social investment. (see especially Barker 1978).

The contrasts in emphasis between these two trends in democratic pluralism are well put by Charles A. Reich in his comparisons of "Consciousness I" and "Consciousness II". The former is concerned with a profoundly optimistic image of man and his relation to the state, identical with that presented by classical liberal philosophers. In a spirit close to that of Wolff, Reich notes that Consciousness I proved unable to change with the changing realities of America. It still tends to see America in terms of the idyll of small towns, farms and communities. It believes the "American Dream" still to be possible, and its analysis cannot incorporate the reality of the power and predominance of organisations over individuals in the twentieth century.

Most characteristic of Consciousness I is its moralism. It insisted in the nineteenth century, as it still does today, on seeing the ills of industrial capitalism, not for what they are - the subordination of 'human needs' to 'system needs' - but as essentially moral problems.

"If a given number of automobiles are crowded on to a highway there will be a predictable number of accidents. The moral approach tries to deal with this as a question of individual-driver responsibility. It stresses safe driving and criminal penalties. Yet reduction of the accident rate is demonstrably a problem in engineering. Similarly, urban
crime is seen as a moral and law-enforcement problem, although crime is a product of identifiable environmental factors. The moralistic approach to public welfare is similar. Over and over again Consciousness I sought scapegoats rather than face the forces of industrialism directly."

(Reich 1970 p.39).

By contrast the features of Reich's Consciousness II are recognisable in the philosophy of state interventionism to which we have already referred. Consciousness II, originating with the leaders of the New Deal and with "a new breed of industrial and labour leaders of the 1930's and 1940's", came about as a result of the catastrophic failure of Consciousness I - grotesque inequality, unemployment, economic recession. It represents a turn away from individualism towards a philosophy which favours the general subordination of 'individual rights' to 'the common good'. Consciousness II unites a broad spectrum of American opinion in political, business and intellectual life. It is the consciousness of the liberalism of the Democratic Party and the reformism of the 1960's.

"Consciousness II believes that the present American crisis can be solved by a greater commitment of individuals to the public interest, more social responsibility by private business, and, above all, by more affirmative government action - regulation, planning, more of a welfare state, better and more rational administration and management." (ibid. p.61-62).

Consciousness II is deeply committed to reform. Much of this reform is directed at redressing the ills resulting from Consciousness I - prejudice, discrimination, poverty. It believes confidently in the possibility of social progress. In a passage which seems adequately to capture the spirit of the Kennedy-Johnson years, and to some extent the Carter years, Reich says . . .
"Confront the men of Consciousness II with any list of evils and the response is cheerfulness: they know what measures can be taken, they see signs of improvement, and they compare the present favourably with the evils of the past which have been overcome. Even today they still believe that America's problems can be solved by pushing ahead with material progress, equality, a greater public commitment to social welfare, to rebuilding cities and to revised domestic priorities."

(Albid. p. 64).

Although there exists different positions and emphases within Consciousness II, the commitment to a central role for the state is the central theme. For Reich, however, there is in addition to the nominal liberalism of Consciousness II, a potential which is deeply repressive. It welcomes every point of view and tolerates every idea, but it wants everything expressed through proper channels and procedures; it wants no interference with rationalities, nor disruption of orderly processes. 'Freedom' must not destroy the underlying order that enables all types of freedom to flourish in orderly fashion. (ibid. p. 65). It is, furthermore, profoundly anti-populist, and largely anti-democratic in its tendency to subordinate the rights and needs of individuals and groups to the state and to the business organisation. Consciousness II came into existence, Reich says, as a response to the realities of organisation and technology. It pushed these values to a conclusion which gave us the American corporate state.

Reich traces the emergence of the liberalism and interventionism of Consciousness II to the New Deal era. The great transformations of nineteenth century industrialisation had resulted in consequences which were profoundly harmful, actually or potentially so, to the stability of the social and economic system. These consequences represented a challenge which resulted in attempts to preserve basic values and structures. Most reform legislation, Reich says, represents efforts to protect the system and its members from the harshest effects of industrialism. The erosion of the social and physical environment, and the growth of unregulated private control over the economic and social spheres was continuing at an accelerating rate; major social problems and the threat of serious internal strife created the context in which
reformism grew.

The basic prescription, according to Reich, was simply that economic power, where it is most severely abused, must be subjected to "the public interest". The government would keep a paternalistic eye on the consequences of the economic system - when these got too bad it would apply regulation, although 'self-regulation' was always to be preferred. Reich characterises this outlook, as we noted above, as essentially "moralistic"; and this "moralism" he sees as central to the "public interest" philosophy which underpinned the policies of the Roosevelt administrations.

Basically, Roosevelt believed it was essential to save capitalism from itself. In his 1933 Inaugural Speech he described the chaos of the Depression as stemming the "stubbornness and incompetence" of the "rulers of the exchange in mankind's goods", who know only "the rules of a generation of self-seekers". There should be an end to the abuse of the American people's "sacred trust" on the part of bankers and businessmen. Americans must recognise their "interdependence on each other", they must "not merely take but give as well", and go forward as a "trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline"; all this would make possible a national leadership "which aims at a larger good". (Roosevelt 1933 cited in Reich ibid. p.44).

In his 1937 Inaugral, Roosevelt summed up the themes of his programme as follows: "We must find practical controls over blind economic forces and blindly selfish men . . .", issues of the "common welfare" cannot be left to the "winds of chance and the hurricanes of disaster. . ." the federal government had begun"to bring private autocratic powers into their proper subordination to the public's government . . ."; "heed less self-interest is "bad morals" in the long run "economic morality pays". (Roosevelt 1937 : cited in Reich ibid. p.44-5).

The New Deal, we shall further examine below, resulted in a realignment of progressive liberal and radical forces which continues to give the operation of the American political system, and particularly American reformism, its distinctive character. The New Deal was

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was ideologically mixed and highly pragmatic and contained, according to Reich's analysis, four main aspects: (a) Regulatory Measures - new legislation and special federal agencies sought to regulate 'abuses of economic power' in such areas as competition, investment, pricing; (b) Balancing of Power - organised labour was co-opted as a 'balance to business power', through 'consultation' and 'involvement'; (c) Security and Welfare - safety net was to be placed under the casualties of the competitive struggle; (d) Radical Programmes - the federal government began an involvement in large scale economic and social investment, by which it sought to solve unemployment, and other social ills through the 'rational' use of resources, and the maximum utilisation of science and technology in the productive process. Programmes also sought to create a meritocracy through the combatting of irrational forms of prejudice and discrimination. Importantly, for the purposes of the present chapter, the New Deal can be seen, in furtherance of the joint objectives of economic rationalisation and social integration, a new public state approximately in size and power the existing private sector. For each piece of regulatory legislation, a large specialised federal government agency was established, and at the same time the executive and administrative departments of the government were greatly expanded.

Additionally during the New Deal era, the Supreme Court began its trend - continued up through the 1960's - of allowing government sweeping new constitutional authority, in place of the traditional doctrine of expressly limited powers.

In summarising the place of the New Deal developments in the growth of the American Corporate State, Reich says that originally individuals lost power to private organisations. What the reforms did was to take some of that lost power and turn it over to 'public' organisations - government, labour unions and farmers' groups. Nothing came back to the people. If anything, the public organisations gained greater power over individuals than the private organisations had held previously (ibid. p.49). The liberals of Consciousness II were primarily concerned with 'order', rather than conceptions of 'liberty'.

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An examination of pluralism in the American context necessitates some evaluation of the theory at its descriptive level. Does pluralism in fact present us with an accurate account of the distribution and exercise of power in its various forms?

In his critique of the pluralistic basis of the labelling theory of social deviance and social reaction, Frank Pearce finds that the central assumptions of the theory are that the United States is a society of great diversity of cultures and interest, fractured into cogeries of hundreds of small special interest groups within completely overlapping memberships, widely different power bases and a multitude of techniques for exercising techniques salient to them. More systematically, pluralists believe that there are no power elites, for power is widely distributed throughout communities, and their main focus is the influences exerted on the taking of 'important decisions'. The institutionalised channels of decision-making are the proper area for study; and, the power system is 'slack' in allowing for social change. Pluralism consists in asking such questions as - 'Who rules and for whom?' (Pearce 1976 p.40).

On closer examination, however, the problem of pluralism is precisely the questions which it does not raise, and the levels of description and analysis which are not incorporated into their view of the world. Pluralism does not take into account sources of 'power (such as corporate power) which may be argued to be pervasive in socio-economic and political spheres, but which are not reducible merely to the cut-and-thrust of 'lobby politics'. The raising of those questions and the resultant analysis are precluded because pluralism is not a wide enough theoretical system to embrace them. According to Pearce, corporate capital has continually consolidated its power, in the twentieth century, over national and local political processes.

Radical pluralism, which has emerged to remedy the deficiencies in traditional pluralist descriptions of political realities, has sought to show empirically that the 'major decisions' in American cities, have always been made in such a way that corporate interest are not threatened. Radical pluralists, says Pearce,
"... share with their conservative counterparts a belief that society is made up of plurality of different groups with different interests; they differ, however, in their recognition that not all such groups benefit from the workings of the system." 

(ibid. p.41).

In the field of deviancy theory Howard Becker (1963) is a foremost representative of the view that power, and especially the power to make and enforce rules and laws, is unequally distributed between competing groups. Those groups "whose social position gives them weapons of power are best able to enforce their rules". (ibid. p.17-18).

The 'discoveries' of radical pluralism would seem to be of interest to us in two ways. Firstly, as Pearce notes, the recognition that society works in irrational and unjust ways calls into question the taken-for-granted picture of the social world of liberal pluralism. Secondly, it has resulted in the radical branch of pluralism becoming intimately involved in reviving the theory's (latterly dormant) prescriptive element.

As Wolff remarks in the essay cited above, pluralism's once accurate account of American society ...

"... once constructed ... becomes frozen, and when changes take place of economic or social grouping, they tend not to be acknowledged because they deviate from that picture."

(Wolff op.cit. p.49).

Furthermore, the theory has been responsible for a "conservative falsifying of social reality" in which the plight of disadvantaged groups which do not fit into the institutional setting of American politics, simply do not appear. Pluralism tends to perpetuate inequality by ignoring rather than justifying it. Once, however, pluralists acknowledge the existence of groups whose interests are not usually weighed in the balance, then their own theory required them to call for an alteration in the system. (ibid. p.51).
If it can be demonstrated that the poor, blacks, or migrant workers are genuine groups, then the legitimacy of their claims must be acknowledged, for pluralism is "a philosophy of equality and justice". (ibid. p.52).

It is never completely clear, in the theory of pluralism, how claims achieve legitimacy, and Wolff notes that an interest can move with bewildering speed from beyond-to within-the-pale. He cites the example of the sudden legitimisation of the problem of poverty in the early 1960's. Tens of millions of Americans were left behind, in the post-war years, by sustained economic growth. The facts were discussed, known, and published, but for decades were greeted with silence or disbelief. Suddenly, as Wolff describes it, poverty was 'discovered' by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

The explanation, which Wolff forwards for such rapid shifts, lies in the "logic of pluralism", according to which every legitimate social group has a right to a voice in the making of policy and a share in society's benefits. There would seem to be then, some imperative by which policy urged by a particular group should receive attention. But, a policy or principle has no claim if it lacks 'legitimate representation'. On the plateau, as it were, of American politics are all the competing interests which have representation within the political establishment; in the deep valleys all around are groups struggling to climb onto the plateau. In the end, however, no group ever gets all that it wants, and no legitimate group ever goes away completely frustrated.

Viewed from the perspective of this 'vector sum' analysis of changing power relations, it would almost seem as if social problems are 'discovered' or policies implemented solely because of good political organisation (through media campaigns etc.), or because of the pioneering activities of investigative reporters or social researchers. Although we can concede that these things have an important part to play at one level - the more highly visible political level - there is not sufficient attention given to more pervasive interests, over and above the immediate lobbies, whose interests inform the direction taken by particular social policies and their implementation.
The account of social change contained in both varieties of pluralism does not consider the interplay between political and economic imperatives, neither in explaining the emergence or recognition of social problem areas, nor in the decisions which lead to state intervention or its absence.

What then were the particular imperatives which informed the "war on poverty" in its various aspects in the 1960's, and which form a backdrop to our analysis of concomitant new ways of viewing crime?

In order to satisfactorily answer this question, it is necessary to engage in some examination of the peculiar alliances between various political ideologies in the American context, also, it will be necessary to shed some light upon the political and economic constraints within which these alliances have functioned.

It will be clear perhaps from the previous discussion, that the theory of pluralism contains within it not only a conception of the relationship between the individual, intermediate groups, and the state, but also a set of prescriptions concerning the rights and claims of legitimate groups within the society. The spirit of pluralism, all the way back to de Tocqueville, has been concerned with the problem of too much power being concentrated in the hands of elites and of the state; equally, there has been a trend in which concern is constantly felt regarding the emergence of the "tyranny of the majority". In other words, the functioning of a pluralistic democracy may lead, in some instances, to the rights and claims of legitimate groups from being recognised and realised. If such becomes the case, then the democratic nature, and legitimacy, of the political system is called into question. Indeed, more than this, if legitimate claims cannot be realised, then the legitimacy of the system itself, its institutions and its government, may also be called into question.

It is at this point that we can again take up Reich's contrasting of Consciousness I and Consciousness II. The former seems to coincide with the laissez-faire liberalism which Wolff has described as of declining relevance for confronting the realities of advanced industrial capitalism. Its doctrine of minimum state interference in private and
corporate affairs has been replaced by a form of consciousness in which state interference and intervention at all levels is seen as essential to the very survival of social economic institutions.

In respect of the social problems generated by the nature of the contradictions of the capitalist system of production, liberalism, in its twentieth-century guise, has come increasingly less to resemble the liberalism of Mill, de Tocqueville, and Bentham. This is so in two main respects; firstly, twentieth century liberalism is committed to the containment and control of social problems through the institutions of the welfare-state; secondly, it is committed to the growth of the state as a political and economic force in its own right, and to the evolution of institutional tools (the various agencies of the state) through which the regulation of affairs at every level is maintained.

Governments of the twentieth century, beginning with the Germany of Bismark, the Liberal governments of Lloyd George and others in Britain, and Roosevelt's New Deal in America, have been characterised by the growth of state interventionism. But, the liberalism of reform has in each national instance, incorporated (or co-opted) a set of programmes and perspectives which we know as social democracy.

A major commentator on the role of social democracy in American politics, is Michael Harrington, in his two books, Socialism and The Twilight of Capitalism (Harrington 1972; 1976). Social democracy is an ideology which contains elements of socialist thought which have, in the terms used by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto (1848), been co-opted by a part of the bourgeoisie which "want to remedy social grievances in order to secure the stability of bourgeois society". They want to have the existing society but without the revolutionary, transforming elements. The function of this 'socialism' they go on, is not the abolition of bourgeois relations of production, but "administrative improvements, which can go forward on the basis of this mode of production", which alter nothing in the relationship of capital and labour, "but in the best case lessen the cost of bourgeois domination and reduce its public budget." (cited in Harrington 1976 p.208).

Social democracy is interested in the socialisation of social
problems and in the regulation of conflicts (included those at work in the competitive market); but, it is not interested in the socialisation of the means of production as implied in the programmes of 'utopian' and 'scientific' socialists.

In Socialism, Harrington argues that whereas this "bourgeois socialism" found its European expression through the social democratic parties which replaced the reforming liberal parties, the social democracy of the American experience took on quite a different form. Because of the exceptional nature of American capitalism, "the socialist impulse" which is inherent in social democracy, "expressed itself in bourgeois rhetoric". (Harrington 1972 p.110-111).

Quoting Samuel Gompers, Harrington believes these exceptional elements in the development of American capitalism to be ... "the absence of feudalism ..., greater class mobility ..., a higher standard of living, ..., the right to vote for all male citizens, as well as the greater social democracy". (ibid.). These exceptional aspects are "so obvious that political foes can agree on them". Historically, America has "a social democratic tradition which ... never learned to pronounce its own name". America's political and social development contained within it "a mass social democracy which is invisible because ... its socialistic aims are phrased in capitalist rhetoric." Paradoxically, the very favourable conditions in which nineteenth century American capitalism arose, gave rise also to political (even socialistic) working-class movements.

Whereas in Europe the worker had the status of a political outcast - and his formal exclusion from the political process forced him into a solidarity which expressed itself in socialism - the existence of universal suffrage in America caused non-working class parties to try to co-opt and absorb the workers' demands at a very early moment in the nation's history. The trend towards working class socialist organisations was also paralleled by utopian socialism, "entrepreneurial radicalism", populism and the farmers' lobby. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, however, the "brutal triumph of industrial capitalism began to force America out of its agrarian reveries".
The origins of American state interventionism (in the economy) date from the first two decades of the twentieth century, in which there was a greater acceptance by the labour movement for federal government action. The labour movement increasingly allied itself with pragmatic, progressive politicians whose programmes prepared the way for Roosevelt's New Deal.

The history of the American labour movement during this century has been one of a number of political shifts designed to realise its predominantly socialist aims. In the early part of the century the alliance was with the Socialist Party of Eugene Debs, and the Progressive Party. With the subsequent decline of American Socialism and in the constituency of all socialist parties, a lasting alliance was formed between these and the Democrats during the New Deal period, which still forms an enduring feature of American politics.

The turn to Roosevelt during the depression, writes Harrington, marked the beginning of a mass social democratic movement in the United States. This is effectively a coalition of diverse political positions committed to welfare statism and the control of the 'excesses' and 'abuses' of the free-enterprise system. The coalition includes groups organised to secure working class interests:

"There is in the United States today a class political movement of workers which seeks to democratise many of the specific economic powers of capital but does not denounce capitalism itself. It champions... the political economy of the working class, but not socialism. And its impact is roughly analogous to that of the social democratic parties of Europe."

(Harrington 1972 p.251).

Harrington is thus describing a constituency which is, for the main part, made up of politically active labour unions and of other working class pressure groups, which operates - with some considerable effect - within the established Democratic Party. A formally pro-capitalist party, committed to social reformism, contains within it a major force which is itself "formally pro-capitalist and ambiguously anti-socialist". (ibid.).
Originally a party of 'WASP' and rural interests, the Democratic Party, quickly achieved, in the early 1920's, a new constituency among immigrants from Europe, and other groups with the burgeoning industrial urban centres, including displaced migrants from rural areas. In the Presidential election of 1928, although it was the loser, the Democratic Party's vote in the cities had doubled. As Harrington puts it ... 

"The working class had become Americanised and proletarianised; the cities were turning into a political force."

(ibid. p.257).

From 1932 onwards - a date which marks the formal end to organised labour's opposition to state intervention - and the near collapse of capitalism in the mid-1930's, with 25% unemployment and the collapse of the Socialist Party as an electoral alternative, the New Deal saw a social democratic alliance of Liberal-Labour forces. For all its historic importance, however, Roosevelt's administration did not have the coherent policy of state interventionism which has often been claimed for it.

"The goal of the Roosevelt administration had been to use federal power as a means of restoring the health of the private economy."

(ibid. p.264).

Furthermore ... 

"It was not until the administration of John F. Kennedy that the government employed Keynesian state interventionism in a carefully planned way ... Now the unions and some of their intellectual and civil rights allies, were profoundly modifying this formula by insisting that state interventionism also reorder the basic economic priorities of the society and favour the social rather than the free-enterprise system."

(ibid.).
At the 1965 Conventions of the AFL-CIO, a full range of demands for state intervention, in the economic and social spheres, was adopted. Included were demands for a 50% increase in Social Security; a massive programme to rebuild the cities; a national health-care programme; a peacetime "G.I.Bill"; a resources conservation policy. Instead of concentrating upon its traditionally exclusive concern with unfettered "collective bargaining", and its suspicions of any government action

"... the AFL-CIO was now making overall economic planning central to its concerns."

(Harrington 1972 p.265).

Labour was becoming collectively critical of the social consequences of the "actions taken by corporate managements, self-perpetuating or chosen by and responsible to a few large stockholders." They can have more impact, the 1965 Convention maintained, on the lives of Americans than the decisions of democratically elected government.

Throughout the 1960's the unions were doing more than passing resolutions, they were busy building - within the Democratic Party - a political apparatus which was a party in all but name.

"Throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations... the union political organisations and lobbies were the strongest single force for progressive social legislation in Washington. In terms of actual political pressure on issues like poverty, racism and social security, the labour contingent did infinitely more than the middle-class intellectuals and churchmen who so often dismissed the unions with contempt..."

(ibid. p.266 emphasis added).

It has been noted by Mike Davis (1980a; 1980b) - in an analysis of American labour and the Democratic Party similar to that of Harrington - that the black urban working class (increasing greatly in terms of numbers) played a very important part in organised labour's pressures for social reformism. Like the European immigrants before them, this newly radicalised sector of the working class were "dazzled by the
sights and smell of a banquet in which they were never allowed to participate." Occupationally frozen in unskilled in semi-hereditary unskilled and menial slots, they threw off the passivity of the past in order to demand their share of the benefits of affluence. (Davis 1980b, p.46). The political influence of the AFL-CIO reached an apogee under Johnson's "Great Society" - riding on the coat-tails of the Civil Rights Movement.

"The militancy of blacks created the political conditions for a renewal of social reform for the first time since the late 1940's, and also catalysed a dramatic surge in unionism in the public sector. "

(ibid. p.84).

It could be argued that state intervention in social problem areas, during the Kennedy and Johnson years - the so called 'Age of Reform' - was informed by a number of different political philosophies. The political pragmatism of those Presidents and their highest advisers in the Democratic Party, gave rise to a number of responses. The "wars" against crime and poverty - which it has been argued, were seen as intimately linked - incorporated elements of an attempt to give limited power to working-class and ethnic groups, in the acknowledgement that crime was nurtured in conditions of both poverty and powerlessness. This was, as it were, American social democracy's shortlived radical - pluralist moment.

Also, reflecting a conservative commitment to the basic structures and institutions of capitalism, we find an equally deep commitment to a strong system of law enforcement and corrections. No longer, however, was the repression of crime to be the sole responsibility of the state apparatus of control. The newer 'law and order' rhetoric of Robert Kennedy, Ramsey Clark, and Lyndon Johnson - elaborated and refined in the pages of the President's Commission Report - held up a new justice system through which the ramparts of the classical liberal 'social contract' could be manned by all law-abiding members of the 'Great Society'.

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As many commentators on the "Age of Reform" have observed, the measures which American governments actually undertook in order to reduce poverty and ameliorate harsh social conditions were of limited effectiveness. Richard Polenberg (1980 p.204-207) has commented that although the various pieces of reforming legislation pumped billions of dollars into Medicare, Equal Opportunities, the Poverty Programme and so on, the net effect was (from 1964 - 1967) to lift 4.7 million individuals above a poverty line; an achievement which many scholars regarded as set at an unrealistically low level. The war on poverty, says Polenberg, produced a gradual incremental advance, but not the unconditional surrender and spectacular victory which Johnson had promised (ibid. p.202). The escalation of the war in Vietnam made more and more insistent demands upon the federal budget, leading Johnson to edge away from the commitment to the anti-poverty programme:

"The Office of Economic Opportunity found itself on a treadmill, fighting a losing battle each year to stay in place. The OEO expected to spend 3.5 billion dollars on its second year but received just half that amount, and the next year its budget was sliced to 1.5 billion dollars."

(ibid. p.204).

Although this and other key agencies and programmes were out in the period 1964-1967, total federal outlays rose substantially from 13.4 billion to 23.9 billion dollars - a paradoxical situation which led to a conservative republican critic of the anti-poverty programme to refer to it as "the greatest boondoggle since bread and circuses in the days of the ancient Roman empire - when the republic fell." (Sen. Dirksen cited in Polenberg ibid.).

Michael Harrington (1976 p.210) goes much further in his criticisms of the failures of American social democracy to solve the problems of poverty. State interventionism - at least a hundred years old - very far from 'transforming' capitalism, has led to a situation in which the basic capitalist structures persist through the most extraordinary permutations. Even in the United States there had traditionally been a limited welcoming of the possibilities of friendly state interventionism. State interventionism was always seen - as the German Marxist Kautsky had
put it - in terms of a quest for the end of class struggle, and the introduction of social peace by a strong state which stands above and is independent of class interests.

But, the notion of the state as an independent arbiter has always been a questionable one. In the context of twentieth century America, Harrington sees the developments much more in terms of a gradual interpenetration of state and corporate interest. The entire Progressive Era at the turn of the century, he writes, was a triumph of a "political capitalism" in which government and business joined together. Furthermore this was a period in which, he contends, "capitalism was centralising, cartelising and intertwining with the government". (ibid. p.212). It was still capitalism, but it opened up the theoretical possibility that the total political control of the economy could lead to a new form of society.

In a passage which is couched in terms of a debate with the theorists of the "end of ideology", Harrington holds that statism, or the statification of capitalism, is "a mechanism for the perpetuation of class domination rather than its transformation" (ibid.). Even in an economy in which the state takes an increasing hand - the planned economy - the profit motive still plays a crucial role.

"When the government intervenes into an economy dominated by private corporation to promote the common good, those corporations will normally be the prime beneficiaries of that intervention. The planners may be liberals, or even socialists, but they will not be able to carry out politics which run counter to the crucial institutions of the society unless they have the support of a determined mass movement willing to fight for structural change."

Furthermore . . .

". . . the normal tendency of the welfare state, . . . is to follow the old capitalist priorities in a new sophisticated way."

(ibid. p.222-3).

The macro-economic planning of the welfare state, follows capitalist
priorities. The government, and the 'societal goals' which it articulates, is subordinated to private purpose. An illustration of this principle is provided by Harrington with reference to federal housing policy. The issues of urban decay, overcrowding, and atrocious living conditions, were of course central to reasoning about the connection between poverty and crime. However, over a period of three decades, "the government helped to build ten million units for the better-off and 650,000 units of low-cost housing for the poor."

Housing policy for the poor, as a Council of Economic Advisors report for 1969 had shown, is usually "highly unprofitable"; in fact, the demolition of low-income homes to make room for business and high-income families is the "most profitable investment". (ibid. p.224).

What, Harrington asks, were the Council referring to as "profitable" in the context?

"It could not possibly have been referring to a social conception of increased benefits since the process, that it was describing had exacted a high public cost in crime, welfare expenses and, above all, wrecked human lives."

(ibid. p.225 emphasis added).

The Council was of course talking about the private profit criterion, and it had been one which the government had adhered to in its housing investment programme. The billions of dollars assigned to high-income housing would, it had been assumed, "trickle down" to the poor. In reality the central cities were turned into devastated regions; the system of benefits for the wealthy had led to one of psychic desperation for the poor.

Federal policies had helped transform the class and racial composition of the cities in a way that made them helpless to deal with a crisis subsidised by Washington. In the case of New York city, for instance, that meant a vast increase in the numbers of those whom the society had made more desperate as well as an equally vast exodus of more stable families.
This sort of development cannot be explained, Harrington concludes, if we assume, as do the "post-industrial" theorists, that there are scientifically trained new men making decisions according to a new calculus. It can only really be grasped if it is realised that a hidden agenda behind all of the various federal policies (from agriculture, housing and highways); the agenda is one of making government choices conform to, and promote, corporate capitalist priorities. These corporate interest control both the Republican and the Democratic Party. This of course continued to be so throughout the years in question. Organisations representing large-scale business are most influential in both social and economic policy areas.

According to Harrington macro-economic policy is pro-corporate in two basic ways. Firstly it stimulates private investment and thereby allows executives to determine what form public expenditure will take. Instead of direct outlays for health, mass communications, education, and the like, there are tax cuts that allow the private sector to build and sell without reference to social usefulness. Secondly, the benefits of public expenditures are assigned in inverse proportion to need, with the largest benefits going to the rich. (Harrington 1976 p.233).

Furthermore, Harrington directly rejects an aspect of the thesis of Piven and Cloward (1971 cited in chapter II above) which holds that the level of conflict in America - particularly urban crime and the Civil Rights and Black power movements - stimulated reform of the social structure. In actual fact, the anti-poverty programme of the 1960's can be seen as the cause, not the effect, of militant politics on the part of the poor and of the struggles between racial and ethnic groups within the world of poverty itself. (ibid.p.305).

But in another respect Harrington holds the Piven-Cloward thesis to be correct. To a certain extent the welfare state does represent the reluctant concessions of the ruling class in the face of the challenges presented by both political action and social dis-integration. The history of the welfare state - of welfare capitalism - contains a dialectic element which Piven and Cloward have only partially glimpsed. It is an arena of struggle, in which gains may be made by the working class; but it is also an arena that is "normally and systematically
biased in favour of the powers that be ..." (ibid. p.306).

This dialectic is present in the period under consideration. Washington had, in the post-war period, funded a massive internal migration, without thought of social consequence but in obedience to the logic of corporate priorities. Both crime and political action by working-class groups, both of which stem from the social consequences of these economic priorities, generated a dynamic in which more conscious and rational types of intervention were necessitated. The phenomena (crime, poverty, alcoholism and so on) and the social policy responses to them, may be seen to be inter-penetrating parts of the same process.

The "Age of Reform" was a product of diverse forces, and a locus of a number of different effects and responses to some contradictory aspects of American capitalist development at a certain historical point in time. Sustained economic growth since the end of World War II had produced great social changes and amidst relative affluence there continued to exist large proportions of the population in a structurally produced immiseration.

From 1953 to 1960 the GNP grew at 2.1% annually - and from 1961 to 1965 at 4.5% annually. Unemployment fell from 7% in 1961 to 4.5% in 1965. The purchasing power of workers, controlled for inflation, increased 4% from 1955 to 1960, but by 13% from 1961 to 1965. At the same time corporate profits ballooned under Kennedy and Johnson by almost 67%. Furthermore, a series of planned budget deficits, it was argued, would stimulate economic growth and in this vein Johnson enacted in 1964 a 13.5 billion dollar tax cut. (Polenberg 1980 p.174).

"The pivotal brick in this structure was considerably less reformist in shape and dimension than the one that was rejected: increased expenditure in social welfare programmes."

( ibid. ).

Social problems persist even though the state intervene to control them. Radical pluralists such as James A. Jones (1971 p.584-7) attribute
this persistence to the fact that once created, problem-solving bureaucracies tend to function in ways which benefit their appointees and a middle-class constituency. Although there is continual pressure from the middle class to "do something" about the lot of the poor (for their values do not condone the systematic repression of others), reformers are urged to do so in ways which do not disturb "in any fundamental way the basic institutions and processes of the society" (ibid. p.586). Indeed the middle class, which Jones sees as originating pressure for social change, is deeply fearful of a transfer of political power to "lower-class collectivities"; they will support a change in the personalities of lower-class individuals, but will not support "any meaningful structural change" in order to solve a social problem!

In Jones' analysis, the failure of the Great Society programmes may be attributed to the failure of the government to muster a sufficient consensus in support of carrying the programme forward. But, such an analysis systematically omits the role of the logic of capitalism — in other words the ways in which, as Marx would say, the social relations of production permeate the logic of social policy and intervention.

3.3. Social Science and the Welfare State

I have then outlined the complexities of the political and philosophical currents which informed thinking about the existence of poverty and crime, and the growth of state interventionism in relation to economic and social problems. It is now necessary to turn to the question of the location of social scientists — and especially sociological criminologists — in the state's attempts to directly regulate relations in the social sphere. In other words, we need to understand the relationship between social science and social democracy.

In his recent historical account of social democracy, Adam Przeworski (1980 p.46) has argued that in the nineteenth century non-revolutionary socialists and social democrats had envisioned a 'social revolution' which would transform the irrational and unjust features of capitalism. The source of many social evils was traced to the private ownership of the means of production. What was desired, as made clear in Harrington's analysis above, was the regulation rather
than the abolition of capitalist production and of the social relations generated by them. Of foremost importance to the growth of social democracy as an ideological and practical force was its alignment in the 1930's with Keynesian economic theory.

Social democrats, particularly in Europe, soon discovered in Keynes' ideas after the appearance of his *General Theory*, something they urgently needed - a distinct policy for administering capitalist economics.

"The Keynesian revolution - and this is what it was - provided social democrats with a goal and hence the justification of their governmental role and simultaneously transformed the ideological significance of distributive policies that favoured the working class. From the passive victim of economic cycles, the state became transformed almost over-night into an institution by which society could regulate crises to maintain fully employment."

(ibid. p.51).

This Keynesian turn is further credited with leading social democrats to develop a full-fledged ideology of a "welfare state". Keynesianism contains an essential ideological thrust which could be argued to fit well into the spirit of optimism and rationalism which pervades social democratic thinking. The regulatory activities of the state, says Przeworski, are based upon the belief that capitalists can be induced to allocate resources in a manner desired by citizens and expressed at the polls. The basic notion is that in a capitalist democracy resources are allocated by two mechanisms: the 'market', in which the weight of preferences of decision-makers is proportional to the resources they control, and the state, in which the weight of preference is distributed equally to persons as citizens.

"The essence of contemporary social democracy is the conviction that the market can be directed to those allocations of any good, public or
private, that are preferred by citizens and that by gradually rationalising the economy the state can turn capitalists into private functionaries of the public without altering the juridicial status of private property."

(ibid. p.54).

Social democracy is thus characterised a political will which stems from these under-currents of optimism, and from a commitment to what Piven (1971) has termed "adaptive rationalism". In the economic sphere this makes use of theories, models and devices which are the product of the application of reason to the complexities of the natural and social universes. In the social sphere - the sphere of social problems and social order, there is a commitment to programmes which are based around the rhetoric of "justice", "fairness" and "reform", and which in certain historical periods are seen as facilitating the integration of disaffected and dispossessed groups into the mainstream of social and economic life.

This basic optimism is assisted greatly by the philosophy of positivism which in its sociological varieties presents human nature as essentially molded by cultural and environmental circumstances, and which also contains the promise of the possibility of the "engineering" of behaviour through the application of social scientific knowledge. (Quinney 1971; Piven 1971).

Writing just before the advent of the "Age of Reform", C. Wright Mills (1959), writes of the potential of social science in regard to state bureaucracies. Since the late nineteenth century American social science had been directly linked with reform movements and with betterment activities. The transformative potential of social science was however co-opted into academic specialities on the one hand, and on the other into more specific and institutional welfare activities.

In the United States, Mills notes, liberalism has been the political common denominator of virtually all social study as well as the source of virtually all public rhetoric and ideology. As in the liberalism of classical economics, and in its applications to the social sphere,
"the idea of balance or equilibrium is clung to mightily" (ibid. p.85). As well as its concern for problems of order through, social science has derived from liberalism (although in more diffuse ways) the tendency towards 'pluralistic causation', that is the notion that social phenomena must have a great number of minute causes. This approach, says Mills, is quite serviceable to a liberal politics of piece-meal reform. This he terms liberal practicality; its basic characteristic is that it approaches the study and reform of the social world in fragmented ways. Liberal practicality does however have two major trends - an older version in which the social scientist is closely aligned with reform movements, and a more recent version in which it is more concerned with the administration of social services in a welfare state. (ibid. p.92).

The 1960's saw a revival of the very "reforming push" which Mills noted was lamentably absent at his time of writing. However, the relationship of the theorising and activities of social scientists in relation to the welfare state remains problematic.

Gouldner (1970) in writing about this issue makes much of sociology as a carrier of utilitarian culture. The principle of utility emerged as a dominant social standard in the eighteenth century, arising first in the realm of economies and then permeating social thought. Gouldner speaks of "knowledge" as an all purpose utility in middle-class society - second only to money.

"In order to appraise consequences one must know them; in order to control consequences one must employ technology and science. Therefore, in a utilitarian culture knowledge and science are shaped by strongly instrumental conceptions."

(ibid. p.69).

Gouldner further seems to suggest that there is in the middle class some tension between the demands arising from these two "all purpose utilities". One would expect a commitment to economic utility to conflict with moral commitments and values; but, bourgeois utilitarianism has a strong leaning towards questions of "conscience", "morality", and
"right". In fact although propertied sections of the middle class tend to emphasise the importance of money, the educated and professional sections are more likely to stress the knowledge and education that will produce it.

"Middle class culture thus embodied tensions between property and utility, as well as between morality and utility."

(ibid. p. 72).

What is clearly being referred to here is the contrast within the bourgeoisie which Harrington, and Reich, also stress. There is a part of the bourgeoisie (represented historically by social democracy) which emphasises the necessity of orderly and rational economic and social relations. It stresses the crucial importance of managing or engineering the economy, and this consciousness has increasingly extended towards the necessity to manage and engineer social relations and human behaviour. Social order itself is seen as dependent upon the well-being of the people - a "just society". The state's contribution to the well-being of individuals has become the standard of its political legitimacy.

"The utilitarian had no obligations to a state that did not protect his interests and, correspondingly, believed that the political loyalty of other strata would be undermined when their well-being was neglected. It was similarly assumed that political loyalty could be instrumentally generated or mobilised by aid provided through the state. In short bourgeois utilitarianism was consistent with the assumptions of the Welfare State to whose development it contributed."

(ibid. p. 73).

Thus, it could be asserted that Keynesian economics, with its emphasis upon the role of the state in regulating the economy, its emphasis upon the primary importance of investment as the key to the generation of further wealth, is an extension of the utilitarian principle. What is important about Keynesianism as a social phenomenon is that it represents a sort of official marriage of intellectual and
political rationalism for the development of the welfare state.

Commenting upon this in the context of the "Age of Reform", Polenberg makes the following observation.

"The conviction that growth was man-made had an intoxicating effect of social reformers... (it was) believed that economic planning was 'rapidly approaching the status of an applied science'. It did not seem unreasonable to suppose that John Maynard Keynes's "General Theory" explained as much about the laws of the market place as Isaac Newton's "Mathematical Principles" did about the laws of gravity."

(op.cit. p.175).

Economic Keynesianism gave birth to a social Keynesianism which ought not to be thought of as separate. For it was the annual growth in GNP and the resultant surplus, which would guarantee the government almost infinite means to solve social problems through a programme of massive social investment.

In the American context, sociological functionalism proved itself a natural ally of state interventionism. The paradox, as Gouldner notes, lies in the fact that although always concerned with social problems, functionalism had traditionally accorded little importance to the role of the state. As the most optimistic of all social theories, functionalism had stressed evolution towards ever better sets of social arrangements which would produce the gradual redress of social dysfunctions.

After World War II, American functionalism began to give more explicit support for the welfare state. According to Gouldner this inversion of the long-held conception the role of government and the state was made possibly partly by "something embedded at a deep level of its infrastructure"...
"... Functionalism, like Positivism, has had an abiding conservative disposition to respect and accommodate to the 'powers that be' and thus to accommodate to the state power, whatever its ideological and social character."

(Gouldner op.cit. p.344).

The growth of the welfare state has given rise to an increase in state power throughout its bureaucratic apparatus. Sociology has been tied into these developments through the vastly increased levels of fundings for the social sciences in general. The social sciences have thus become increasingly "a well-financed technological basis for the Welfare State's efforts to solve the problems of its industrial society". (ibid. p.345). There has been a vast demand for applied social science - the policy-oriented use of social science by governments, both for welfare and warfare purposes.

The level of this funding was truly phenomenal. In 1962 the federal government spent £118 million in support of social science research. In 1963 £139 million, and in 1964 £200 million was spent. In the space of three years federal expenditures alone increased by seventy per cent. (O.E.C.D. 1966 - cited ibid.).

These levels of investment are surely evidence of the state's commitment to social science as policy science. Also revealed is the apparent faith in the ability of the social sciences to lay bare the intricacies of social causation and to assist the state's administrators to design and operate interventionist social policies. It is Gouldner's view that functionalism is undergoing a transformation into a sociological version of Keynesianism.

As such, functionalism has had to re-write many of its previous assumptions about the nature of the social system. Not only is the state (as we have seen above) now accorded a more central role in society, it is accorded such a role because of the perceived need to manage and correct certain 'imbalances' inherent in the system, and will not go away of their own accord as part of the evolutionary
dynamics of a 'self-maintaining social system'. In short, the state must concern itself particularly with problems of order which threaten the very survival of the system itself. In the context of the period about which Gouldner is writing, we can assume that the 'crisis in the cities' and particular manifestations such as the riots and the high levels of violent crime, provided just such a challenge to the fundamental optimism of, particularly Parsonian, functionalism.

Certain social changes and pressures are therefore instrumental in promoting change in theories and in the styles in which the social sciences operate. These pressures also have certain other tendencies. Firstly, they are aimed at acquiring technological resources to facilitate planned and deliberate change in social conditions. They are thus committed to social reform. Secondly, this commitment must also be justified; for, in the context of ideologies, there remain constant forms of opposition to state (explicitly federal) interventionism and the high levels of public expenditure and taxation which this entails.

"The state, therefore, does not only require a social science that can facilitate planned intervention . . . ; it also requires social science to serve as a rhetoric, to persuade resistant or undecided segments of the society that such problems do, indeed, exist and are of dangerous proportions."

(ibid. p.350).

Once the state has committed itself to intervention, the state acquires a vested interest in the uncovering of the nature of the problems with which it has chosen to deal. As part of this process, social science must also therefore be able to demonstrate that previous types of state or private action or inaction, have been inadequate for dealing with social problems. Elites formerly in charge of these arrangements are thus replaced by the national state. There is, therefore, a tendency to favour evaluation researches - studies which analyse the effectiveness and expose the ineffectiveness of the elites. The state thus needs research which will "unmask" its competitors; the role of social science is to supply "a kind of limitedly critical research". (ibid.).
Gouldner's remarks enable us to locate the relationship described above as existing between theories in sociology and criminology on the one hand, and the social democratic wing of the Democratic Party on the other. Such theories not only uncovered the partial nature of the social causes of crime and delinquency, but they also provided a source of rhetoric for reformist politicians. This rhetoric, as we have seen especially in the writings and speeches of Ramsey Clark, drew strongly upon a notion of rationality and social justice based in the logic of social scientific pragmatism and empiricism.

The evidence on the extent and patterns of criminal victimisation available to the Crime Commission and the Riot Commission, is important in its implicit evaluative statements concerning the effectiveness of particular 'elites'. Firstly, the largely autonomous, under-funded, under-trained, and often overtly racist city police forces are shown to be ineffective and partial in the fight against crime. Secondly, city governments are (again implicitly) seen to be responsible for the 'psychic desperation' of afflicting ghetto communities, and thus for resultant intra- and inter-racial victimisation and other dehumanising aspects of city life.

It is clear that a marriage had been effected between social science and reformism by the mid-1960's. This relationship in respect of the problems of the criminal justice system, was shown to be rather under-developed. There were a number of different ways in which as a social bureaucracy, the criminal justice system had been more resistant to federal interference than other social bureaucracies. There was however, on the part of Lyndon Johnson, Ramsey Clark and others, a clear desire and political will to reform the system, which was at that time controlled by largely autonomous local and state agencies. In the reform of criminal justice, the technical and social sciences were to play a key role at all levels.

In two important chapters of its Report, chapter 11 on "Science and Technology", and chapter 12 - "Research - an instrument for reform", the Crime Commission outlined the core of its proposed overhaul of the
criminal justice system. In short, the tools of science, technology and research are seen as formidable "weapons in the armoury of the war against crime". Whereas a "scientific and technological revolution" had in recent decades so radically impacted upon the areas of business and defence, this revolution had had "surprisingly little impact upon the criminal justice system". (President's Commission Report 1967 p.245). In an age where government and business have established special relationships with the scientific-technological community, in order to gain "objective analyses of possible consequences of their actions", public officials responsible for administering the criminal law have almost no relationship with the scientific-technological community at all. (ibid.).

In the application and use of the latest technological innovations, criminal justice was held to compare very poorly with such areas as medicine and defence, and in terms of the level of technology then in use, "could have been equipped 30 or 40 years ago as well as they are today". (ibid.). The Report found that in 1965 the Justice Department was the only Cabinet department with no share of the annual 15 billion dollar research budget. Of its own budget, the criminal justice system spent only 1% on research, compared with 3% in industry and 15% in the Defence department.

The Crime Commission's Task Force on Science and Technology gave special attention to the use of the resources of science and technology which might be used to "solve the problems of crime" - computer technology, information systems, communications engineering, and systems analysis. These resources were held to offer the "greatest unrealised potentials for systemwide improvement, with special reference to police operations. (ibid.).

Specific recommendations of the Task Force included a compilation of field data examining relationships between police patrol operations and apprehension of offenders; a proposal for improving police responsiveness at minimum cost a programme for reducing police radio congestion; a research and development programme for semiautomatic fingerprint recognition; studies examining possible alternative alarm systems, non-lethal weapons and other technological innovations for
police operations. Additionally applied technology could help reduce congestion in the operations of the courts; programmed learning techniques would help in the rehabilitation of young offenders; the application of statistical techniques would routinely be used to predict and evaluate the impact of treatment of offenders; innovation would establish reliable anti-theft gadgets for cars; detailed systems analysis of the criminal justice system at all levels would expose weaknesses and improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness; and lastly, a national research and development programme would be established.

Although science and technology could, theoretically, provide devices which would almost eradicate some forms of crime, the Report stresses the need to balance issues of cost effectiveness with issues of efficacy. But the most important problem is to determine the cost effectiveness and efficacy of various applications and new methods of working.

The theme which runs very strongly through the total Report, but more especially through the chapters here under consideration, is the perceived need for quantitative research. "Virtually all the efforts of the Commission", the Report states, "have been hampered by the pervasive lack of adequate objective information about crime and the possible effects of various techniques of crime control". (ibid. p.247). Quantitative methods were seen to have considerable potential in many areas, including arrest rates, judicial statistics - the relationship of sentencing to future behaviour, and the field of police operations - especially in relation to the details of situations confronting policemen in their daily duties.

Among the very detailed catalogue of recommendations made in this part of the Report, the use of computer and information processing systems is given special place. Information - formalised and utilisable knowledge - is seen as the vital tool of the system, without which it is doomed to amateur and haphazard functioning. Technology - as the application of scientific knowledge - provides the promise of better things. Once more a spirit of optimism is evident in the confidence of the Commission that, given the adequate levels of investment and the political will to beat crime through a 'national effort', such an effort
would be more than re-paid.

What the Commission in essence proposed was a data revolution, the key to which lay in the deviation of statistics to a primary place in the hierarchy of the operations of the criminal justice bureaucracy. In fact, the increasing bureaucratisation and centralisation of criminal justice is the implicit and inevitable feature of the system's proposed revolution. At numerous points the Report lays stress upon the notion of a "national strategy" to defeat crime; by "national" we must read - in the context of the American state - "federal". In the same way that the "war on poverty" was elevated (by embracing the same view of the realities of the development of the national state in relation to social problems as those of the Crime Commission's members) to a national/federal arena requiring national/federal solutions, so then the reform of criminal justice and the "war on crime", must be a crusade - already initiated by the Federal Government - but furthermore funded and controlled by them.

The joint themes of the need for a data revolution and for federal funding and control combine in the recommendation for a National Criminal Justice Statistics Centre of the Department of Justice, to be responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of two basic kinds of data.

"Those characterising criminal careers, derived from carefully drawn samples of anonymous offenders. Those on crime and the system's response to it, as reported by the criminal justice agencies at all levels."

(ibid. p.269).

The Centre would act as a clearing-house for all statistics related to the crime problem, such as costs of crime, census data, and victimisation surveys. It would work in co-operation with the F.B.I.'s Uniform Crime Reports Section, The Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, The Federal Bureau of Prisons, and other related statistics collecting agencies. It would combine all this information into an integrated picture of crime and criminal justice. The need for centralisation is obvious.
"The Federal Government should take the initiative in organising and sustaining a science and technology research and development programme. Whether it be equipment development, field experimentation, data collections, or analytical studies, the limited budgets of individual state and local criminal justice agencies cannot provide the necessary investment... the results will be of nationwide benefit. Thus the Federal Government should support a major science and technology research and development programme relating to all areas of criminal justice."

(ibid.).

The importance of research efforts of all kinds, and the necessity for their institutionalisation as part of the criminal justice bureaucracy, is further stressed in chapter 12 of the Report. In the area of criminal justice problems "the greatest need is the need to know" (ibid. p.273). The startling advances in biology and other physical sciences, the application of exploration, discovery and knowledge in shaping and controlling the physical environment, in protecting America's health, in furthering national security, are all products of an "intellectual revolution" from which the criminal justice system is yet to benefit. Yet, there is no other comparable problem which receives so much effort and attention matched by so little knowledge upon which to base any evaluation.

Although research "will never provide the final answers" to the crime problem, it can provide data crucial to making informed policy judgements. The Commission's own victimisation surveys are held up as an example of this general point, as are its surveys of police-community relations.

Problems arising out of the fragmentation and antonomy of the system's thousands of agencies (including 12,000 separate police departments) are broached in the Report's comments concerning the resistance of agencies to admit research personnel; this tendency is seen as part of the generally "inertia" of the criminal justice system and the urgent need for reform of its organisation and operations. The Commission
particularly recommends that criminal justice agencies should develop their own research units, staffed by specialists and liaising with academic and other experts. It also favours the promotion, on a large scale, of research in independent institutes, backed by both federal and private funds. An institute of criminology is also proposed. Finally, the Report recommends the foundation of an independent National Foundation for Criminal Research.

3.4. Conclusion: the "new federalism" and the LEAA:

In the wake of the impact of the Crime Commission's Report, the Johnson administration quickly drafted and sent to Congress a new "Crime Bill". This was initially entitled the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act 1967. Its passage through Congress was largely influenced by the events of 1967 and 1968 - riots in one hundred cities, two assassinations, and Johnson's announcement that he would not seek the Democratic re-nomination. Additionally, the level of public and media attention to the fear of crime ensured that the issue of "crime on the streets" was the most pressing for all Congressmen intent upon political survival.

The President's Commission had recommended (a) upgrading of policing and police methods, (b) the revision of court systems, (c) a general improvement in corrections, and (d) a large injection of monies for law enforcement and the amelioration of poverty. Johnson's Bill provided money for three key areas - police training and education, investigative technology and evaluative research, and correction.

However, almost as soon as the Bill began to be debated it attracted considerable opposition from Republicans and conservative Democrats. Not only was the Bill held to not go far enough in the effort to suppress crime, it also contained a number of clear proposals for the direct interference of the federal government in policing. Again, as with the "war on poverty" the key to federal control was to be the centralised control of funding. In short, as Ramsey Clark had contrived, federal funding for training and for operational expenditures would be withheld from police departments who failed to meet a number of criteria of progress. Included in these were stipulations about the nature and type
of training, progress towards the development of good police-community relations, and the racial integration of police departments in a way representative of the make-up of the police district.

A conservative backlash against the Bill was led by Senator John McClellan, a segregationalist Democrat of Arkansas, and Roman Hruska, right-wing Republican of Nebraska. The political manoeuvering which marked the eventual passage of the Bill, is extremely complicated and is treated to a book-length description by Richard Harris (1969). I will here summarise the developments which are important for the present analysis.

Firstly, the Administration's original Bill (S.917) became, with various revisions, Title I of a new Bill entitled - the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968. Then was added Title II which sought to repeal certain key Supreme Court decisions which guaranteed certain rights of defendants in criminal trials. Finally, Title III - the so-called "bugging bill", proposed to legalise the interception of telephone calls between persons suspected of being engaged in or planning criminal acts. Let us now briefly look at the nature of the conservative opposition to the Johnson Bill, and the philosophical positions informing the proposals in Titles I and II.

The proposals of Title I, as we have seen, provided, among other things, for greater centralised control and funding of local and state policing. This movement was particularly resisted by the advocates of "states' rights"; traditionally, police power is the most jealously guarded of all state and local rights. Conservative opposition was based partially on traditional federalist principles, but perhaps is more to be seen as a manifestation of the traditional social role of political conservatism - as a force mobilising reaction against the erosion of localised and customary forms for social relations and control. Opposition to the power of "Washington" and "big government" was contemporaneously a major element in the Nixon campaign. In the terms of that campaign the "New Federalism" (Harris 1970 pp.175) meant that far from taking powers away from state and local government, the role of the federal government was to strengthen the latters' powers, by providing a system of block grants the manner of the expenditure of
which was entirely a matter for the recipients. The achievement of the
block grant system, instead of the Administration's proposal for the
dispensing of funds only to "approved programmes", was a particularly
important success for the conservative caucus.

Title I of the original Bill also provided for the creation of the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). This was envisaged
by the drafters as federal agency, allied to the Justice Department,
and a major element in the thrust of federal intervention in the criminal
justice system. Ironically, the emasculation of its planned might
threatened to come from two sources. Firstly, the Johnson Administration,
experiencing considerable budgetary difficulties due to the escalating
cost of the war, began to think again about levels of LEAA funding.
Title I had proposed the spending of $50 million in 1969, with $300
million to be spent in each of the three following fiscal years. The
conservative caucus, uncharacteristically perhaps, proposed even greater
levels, including a vote of an extra $50 million in the first year to
be earmarked for block grants to states for 'anti-riot' equipment rather
than for upgrading law enforcement practice in general.

The provisions of McClellan's Title II are equally illustrative of
the ideological cleavages between conservatives and social democrats
in relation to their respective visions of the relationship between
order and justice.

In essence Title II attempted to legislatively overturn two Supreme
Court 'landmark' decisions: Mallory vs. United States 1957; and Miranda
vs. Arizona 1966. These decisions specifically referred to the rights
of suspects in respect of police interrogation methods, ruling suspects
confessions to be inadmissible as evidence at a trial if it could be
shown that these were given without the suspect having full access to
and awareness of his constitutional rights, and if the procedures
offended against "due process" principles.

In the 1960's, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren,
announced a number of decisions in accordances with what has been termed
a "strict constitutionalist" interpretation of the rights of suspects
and the accused. (Barker and Barker 1976; Inciardi and Haas 1978). The
liberal majority on the Warren Court emphasised a "due process model" of crime control (Packer 1969). This classical liberal model, which is consistent with social democratic notions of the need to ensure social justice in order to secure social order, requires that state power in the criminal process be severely limited. Furthermore, only a system which is seen to be fair impartial and just is capable of resisting the tendency of modern states to drift towards centralisation and despotism.

In common with these underlying principles the Court's decisions had come down in favour of the rights of defendants in cases relating to the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination; the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, speedy trial, confrontation of hostile witnesses and to compulsory processes for obtaining witnesses; and, the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.

In the minds of the conservatives in Congress, as in the rhetoric of Nixon's campaign, these decisions were held to unduly 'tie the hands of law enforcement officers', to be symptomatic of the increasing 'softness' of courts and the government towards criminals, and in general to unduly favour the offender and unduly put at risk the potential and actual victims of crime (Carrington 1975).

Title II therefore provided that in a criminal prosecution "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if voluntarily given". Also, in federal courts, a confession was not inadmissible solely because of delays in committal as long as the trial judge ruled that the confession had been given voluntarily.

The particular strategy of the leaving of these decisions to lower court judges rather than to the dictates of the Supreme Court reflects the conservative view, one shared by many legal scholars (c.f. Cox 1968; Funston 1977), that the Warren Court was a reformist arm of the federal government. The unprecedented, and probably unconstitutional, repeal of Supreme Court decisions by legislation, and the subsequent packing of the Court, by Nixon, with non-constitutionalist nominees, further reflects the preferences of conservatives for state power unfettered by the restrictions imposed by classical liberal principles.
It also underlines the remarks made earlier in this chapter, and in Chapter II, concerning the conservative view that order must take precedence over considerations of 'rights' and 'justice'. In this respect the provisions of Title III providing for the right of the police to 'bug' suspects, in spite of the traditional view that such methods offended against First Amendment guarantees of right to privacy and protection from government trespass, further serves to illuminate conservative thinking about crime control.

The Act was finally passed by Congress on June 5th 1968, after an acrimonious debate in which liberal Democrats made speech after speech condemning it as unconstitutional, unlikely to do anything about the crime problem, and as putting America on the road to the police state which the authors of the Constitution had explicitly sought to prevent. At the final count, excluding those who had for various reasons absented themselves, only seventeen members of the House of Representatives, and only four members of the Senate actually voted against. As Richard Harris (1969) put it "1968 was a bad year to be seen to vote against 'safe streets'." Declaring that it contained "more good than bad", President Johnson, after some prevarication, finally signed the Act into law - the day before it would have passed into law without his approval.

The passing of the Act, in a form highly unsatisfactory to Johnson and Clark, cannot be counted as a complete defeat for social democratic aspirations. The establishment of the LEAA did mark a significant advance, together with other changes in the structure of criminal justice practice and policy, in the power of the federal government in these areas. The Justice Department, within whose ambit the LEAA operated, emerged considerably strengthened and rationalised. But, as McLaughlan (1975) has argued the direction which has been taken has borne little resemblance to the ideas, espoused by the President's Commission and by Johnson and Clark, of an attack on crime through fighting poverty as well as strengthening and legitimising criminal justice. Rather, the trend has been towards patterns of policy and expenditure which are biased against the powerless sections of the working class.

It has been similarly shown that LEAA block grants were used, in
period of the Nixon presidencies, disproportionately for 'anit-riot' equipment. In its first annual report, for 1969, the LEAA claimed that 22.5% of its expenditures were used for riot gear, as opposed to only 3.5% for research. (Harris 1970 p.178). According to Goulden (1970 p.138) minute dabs of LEAA cash went to courts, corrections and juvenile delinquency programmes, whilst 59.3 cents of each dollar spent went to police operations in 1969 - 51 cents in 1970. One of the main beneficiaries of LEAA money, according to Goulden, and McLaughlan, has been the electronics industry through its contribution to the technological rationalisation of law enforcement.

Silver (1974 p.136) has made the point that the LEAA has been a major source of the legitimation of "blue power". Policemen, he says, have used professionalisation (so much advocated by Ramsey Clark) first as a shield against political control, secondly as a cloak with which to insulate themselves from public scrutiny, and further as a sword to influence public acceptance of their particular conceptions of law and order.

Lastly McLaughlan (op.cit.) has sought to show that these developments in the role of the LEAA have moved beyond the rhetoric of social democratic ideology towards the realities of a more repressive system of criminal justice. The latter's function, in the 1970's, has been to police problematic social relations generated by the fiscal crisis of the state through the creation of a "social-industrial" complex. The state has sponsored the regulation of social, economic, and political problems through the direct involvement of technocratic industries in criminal justice. Despite the levels of state expenditure on criminal justice operations (increasing four times between 1965 and 1974) the crime rate continued to rise steadily (New York Times. 1982).

"Beyond the rhetoric of justice, due process, and civil rights, the modern U.S. criminal justice system is far more than a bureaucracy designed to implement bourgeois legal sanctions. It is a repressive component of a developing state social-industrial complex which further attempts to expand and rationalise the economic and political dominance of monopoly capital."

(McLaughlan op.cit. p.15).
The essential point is that crime control policy - in practice - responds only partially to philosophical orientations to crime and justice. In reality, parties and administrations are subject in the sphere of the social contradictions of capitalism to imperatives and constraints analogous to those which they face with ever-increasing urgency in the economic sphere; and, the two spheres overlap in many different ways. The capitalist state has at the top of its agenda the problem of securing economic and social order.

In so doing criminal justice has a central part to play, most especially in periods of economic and ideological crisis, when the problem of disorder, in its many forms, becomes sharper. Criminal justice is part of what James O'Connor (1973) has called the "social expenses" of the state, those projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony and also to fulfill the state's "legitimization function". Whereas social capital is expended in the promotion of industry and profit, the social expenses of the state are not directly productive, for they produce no surplus value. Welfare and criminal justice are the primary forms of the state's social expenses, and are aimed at regulating class struggle, repressing action against the existing order. They are also, however, part of the process of maintaining consensus, especially among the most disadvantaged sections of society. (Quinney 1980).

The capitalist state finds itself in the midst of an irresolvable contradiction in that is goal of promoting consensus and legitimacy is continually frustrated by the highly visible inequalities and social problems generated by the disorderliness of capitalist market relations.

As Richard Quinney (op.cit. pp133-9) observes, the state forms an alliance with the monopoly sector of the economy, the continued growth of which increasingly depends upon the ability of the state to police social relations. A "social industrial complex" has appeared, involving industry in the planning, production and operation of state programmes, especially in the area of criminal justice. Its involvement generates surplus value and also the social expenses necessary to secure order.

The LEAA is seen from this perspective as an essentially innovative
state bureaucracy in which the role of the state in securing social order and its role in promoting economic order and efficiency are more closely related than previously.

The 'discovery of criminal victimisation' and the arguments to which it gave rise - concerning the various solutions - may also be seen to be affected by the dilemmas of the capitalist state.

However, as we shall see in Chapter VII below, the social democratic orientation to crime control contains two related sides. Firstly, the idea that crime arises from injustice and inequality, leads logically to social policies aimed at preventing crime. Secondly, more direct and repressive forms of crime control are also sought. Thus in the Report of the Crime Commission calls for the expansion of expenditures on poverty, housing and other social investments, are followed by a design for a vastly expanded state criminal justice bureaucracy whose main mission is the reform and rationalisation of the criminal justice system at all levels.

One part of this mission was to produce a system in which policing, courts, corrections, are 'fair' to the poorer members of society - that criminal justice is equally distributed. But, criminal justice must also be 'effective'; in social democratic rhetoric 'effectiveness' and 'fairness' are seen as inseparable. There remains therefore, the great contradiction whereby those sections of society who suffer most from criminal victimisation, are also those who are the most often arrested and imprisoned. (Centre for Research on Criminal Justice 1977 p.51).

Thus, the LEAA, created out of the double-edged logic of social democratic crime control theory, presented an appropriate means for the furtherance of conservative crime control policy under Nixon. It would be difficult to argue however, that the course of the development of LEAA or of crime control policy, would have been substantially different had Humphrey's Democrats been victorious in 1968.
Political History and Attitude

CHAPTER IV

THE MEASUREMENT OF CRIME
4.1. **Introduction**

I have so far traced the political and philosophical currents underlying the social democratic orientation to state intervention in social problems, and the alliance which social democracy has struck with the social sciences. In this chapter I will focus on a specific aspect of this alliance - namely the quantification of crime by official agencies and criminologists. The earlier sections trace the historical development of criminal statistics in the United States and Britain in the context of the growth of industrial capitalism and of state bureaucracies charged with the control of crime. The history presented is therefore a political history, which seeks to show the increasing concern for more reliable statistics of crime is informed both by aspects of the dilemmas faced by the state in its attempts to control crime, and the ongoing debates with criminology on the 'dark figure' of crime. This chapter also consists of an overview of the methodological problems of **official crime statistics**, in preparation for a discussion (in section 4.6. ) of the advantages and disadvantages of sample surveys of criminal victimisation.

4.2. **The Historical Development of Criminal Statistics**

The first quarter of the nineteenth saw, for a number of reasons located in social and intellectual history, the emergence of large scale attempts to apply the 'laws' of mathematics, probability, and statistics to the understanding of a variety of social phenomena. The idea of such reasoning being applied to the social world, as opposed to the natural world, had its origins in Britain, in the works of John Graunt (1620 - 1674) and William Petty (1623 - 1685). Both of these writers promoted the collection of social statistics and carried out analyses of the early bills of mortality (Wiles 1974 p.174).

Petty had called more specifically for the collection of information relating to crime, including the numbers of people concerned, 'the number of corporal sufferings and persons imprisoned for crimes, to know the measure of vice and sin in the nation', (quoted in Sellin and Wolfgang 1964 p.7). This concern with statistics as a guide to the 'moral health' of the nation, was related to his belief that such data would form the basis of a "political arithmetick" which would assist in
the making of public policy. Petty's sincere hope was that the then dominance of more abstract intellectual arguments about the nature of government, might be replaced by this "political arithmetic", which would express itself in terms of "numbers, weights or measures", and using only arguments of sense, based on the consideration of observable and quantifiable causes. (Wiles op.cit. p.175).

Petty's approach presaged the development a century later, of a pragmatism in relation to social problems and policy which was to dominate the political economy of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These developments in though occurred in the context of the new and highly visible social problems generated by the massive transformation brought about by the shifts from the more orderly relations of feudalism, to the more chaotic relations of agrarian and industrial capitalism.

As Paul Wiles has suggested, nowhere was the influence of fact-gathering to aid policy of more paramount importance than in the area of crime. Crime and its attendant conditions of poverty, drunkenness and vice, were "a cancer of moral depravity disfiguring the otherwise triumphant face of Britain's new industrial success" and which were seen to threaten the overthrow of the whole political and social structure.

"Coaxed on by a desire to remove a dysfunction in a social machine which seemed historically almost unbelievable in the speed of its progress, driven on by a fear that the problem might burst out into revolutionary insurrection, the need to correct the situation by a careful empirical charting of its nature became of central concern. "

(ibid. p.175).

The measurement of the demographic features of birth and mortality had begun in England and other European countries in the seventeenth century. Knowledge of the structure and changes of population was steadily increasing and statistical methods of interpretation were being refined by relating them to mathematics in general and to the
theory of probability in particular (Radzinowicz 1966 p.31).

The importance and weight being given to the collection of statistical data focused attention on the currently inadequate means of collecting such data. As early as 1778, Jeremy Bentham proposed that there should be regular periodic returns on criminals. These, he said, would be of excellent use in furnishing data for the legislator to work upon.

"They will form altogether a kind of political barometer, by which the effect of every legislative operation relative to the subject may be indicated and made palpable. It is not till lately that legislators have thought of providing themselves with these necessary documents. They may be compared with the bills of mortality published annually in London; indicating the moral health of the country (but a little more accurately, it is hoped) as these latter do the physical."

(Bentham 1978; quoted in Sellin and Wolfgang op.cit p.8).

It is interesting to note that, for Bentham, statistics were to be seen both as a tool for enumerating social phenomena, and for evaluating the impact of government intervention, for it is the extent to which methods of data collection fulfill or fail to fulfill these two related functions, which has been central to the debates on social statistics from that time to this.

During the nineteenth century, the study of the 'moral health' of nations, and the means of gauging it through the use of statistics occupied the minds of many social observers and led to the development of a branch of vital and social statistics which became known as "moral statistics". (Ibid. p.8).

It was in fact in France that the first criminal statistics were compiled. In 1827 there appeared the first volume of the General Account of the Administration of Criminal Justice in France. This contained statistics on the incidence of crimes and various details of offenders and punishments for the years 1825 - 27. The preface noted
that over a period of years these statistics would "assist in determining
the circumstances which co-operate in increasing or diminishing the
number of crimes" and would ensure "that the first symptoms of ... evil would be shown with precision" (quoted ibid. p.8).

Perhaps the most important figures in the development of "moral
statistics" were the Belgian astronomer and mathematician Adolphe
Quetelet (1796 - 1874), and the French lawyer Michel Guerry (1802 -
1866). Working independently, they used the French statistics as a
source for the first analytical and correlational studies of criminality.
Both concluded that crime was rooted in discernable social causes, and
thus Quetelet's "social physics" and Guerry's "moral statistical analysis"
laid the foundations for a form of sociological positivism in crimin-
ology.

In exploring the incidence of crime in relation to demographic
variables and in making regional comparisons, two things emerge from
the annual figures. Firstly, the annual totals remained much the same,
and secondly a stark regularity was shown in the contributions to those
totals made by various sections of the population living under various
social conditions. It was the work especially of Quetelet which brought
these regularities to light and which formed the basis for the search
for the social causes of crime, and which combined to transform the
seemingly haphazard, accidental mass of isolated transgressions into a
significant reflection of social conditions.

"For the first time in the history
of human thought crime came to be viewed as a social fact primarily
moulded by that very environment
of which it is an integral part.
Never before had such persuasive
evidence been forthcoming that
"Society carried within itself,
in some sense, the seeds of all
the crimes which are going to be
committed, together with facilities
necessary for their development." 

(Quetelet : Physique Sociale
1869 - quoted in Redzinowicz
op.cit. p.34-35).
The work of Quetelet and Guerry marks the transition from classicist to determinist thinking about crime. Evidence accumulated concerning the regularity and consistency of crime rates, suicide rates, and even marriage rates, were held to show that the "moral" characteristics of populations were of the order of physical facts, thus establishing a supposed link between physical and social "laws".

Rather than ascribe these findings to evidence of a "divine order" of things social, as had the German demographer Johann Sussmilch (1707 - 1767) for instance, Quetelet and Guerry attributed them to the formative action of social conditions at different times and places. (Landau and Lazarsfield 1968 p.247-57).

Their discoveries also marked a shift, as they saw it, from "metaphysical" conceptions of man and society as held by previous thinkers, to a moral statistical analysis of "real men, placed in precisely determined conditions" . . . and which to appreciate "from the moral point of view, the exterior facts of human nature in such and such a country at such and such a time" (Guerry 1854 quoted in Radzinowicz op.cit. pp.35-36).

Both Marx and Engles were considerably influenced by the methods of the moral statisticians. Marx (1853) for instance, juxtaposes the statistics for executions of criminals on the one hand, with murders and deaths by suicide on the other, in order to demonstrate a correlation between the two sets of phenomena, and to highlight the principle of social causation. He approvingly cites Quetelet's work and its apparent ability to generate predictions of future rates of crime, and also the insight that the patterning of social phenomena may be likened to that of events in the physical world.

Quetelet's reasoning obviously had implications for the doctrine of 'free will'. If the number of crimes and criminals could be foretold in advance, then what scope was there left for individual choice? According to Radzinowicz, both Quetelet and Guerry were at pains to avoid any shift from the position that trends in crime were determined by social factors, to the position that the behaviour of individuals was so determined. Quetelet explicitly claimed that man's free will
prevents the easy prediction of individual actions or outcomes from overall trends. But, the effects of man's free will is constricted within very narrow limits, and itself "plays within social phenomena the role of an accidental cause" (ibid. p.37). According to Guerry, average results are concerned with a class of individuals taken as a mass, and not with individuals within the mass taken singly. It is impossible to predict the future behaviour of a particular individual; "in accordance with our intimate feelings", he added, "the principle of the perfect independence of human choice" is basically confirmed. (ibid.).

These viewpoints on the interpretation and implications of moral statistics, are further elaborated in the two key principles of Quetelet's work. Firstly, "causes are proportional to the effects caused by them". This generalisation from the known relationships of the natural world can be applied man's moral and intellectual qualities. Secondly, large numbers are necessary to reach reliable statistical conclusions.

It is important to dwell for a time on the place ascribed to the concepts of determinism and free will in the writings of the nineteenth century positivists such as Quetelet, Comte and Mill. Firstly, not only were they the founding fathers of sociology as a "science of morality", whose aim it was to lay bare the material factors and laws of social existence; but also, each subscribed to a view that social determinants of individual and collective action could be altered through meliorative legislation and the broad sweep of social policy. An understanding of the interpenetration of notions of determinism and indeterminism emerging in their work, is essential to our understanding of the functions and purposes of social statistics in the management of social order.

Quetelet's philosophy of science, for instance, contained the view that the objective, physical and social world, could be described, with varying degrees of accuracy, by general laws. He was a determinist in the sense of treating complete explanation as a goal to be approached, and chance as representing forces not yet presently understood. He did not, however, believe that explanation could be treated in a mechanistic
fashion, nor that complete explanation could ever be achieved. The laws he sought were not totally invariant, but changed gradually, within limits. Accordingly it was necessary to distinguish social forces from the ordinary forces of mechanics - for these social forces, "under the influence of human will, were modified and progressively changed their direction and intensity". (Quetelet 1869, quoted in McDonald 1976 p.265).

These laws which Quetelet saw as the task of science to discover, at no time implied a determinism at the individual level. However, "free will" effaced itself and stayed without sensible effect when the observations were extended to large numbers of individuals; also, "the moral causes which leave their trace on social phenomena then are inherent in the nation and not in the individuals". (ibid.).

In the case of criminals, the regularity of the patterns occurring to Quetelet - the constancy in the "budget" of crimes - convinced him that the causes lay in social organisation, that "unhappy condition of the human species". Society holds within itself the germs of all the crimes which are committed. Each social state supposes then a certain number and a certain order of crimes that result from social organisation. But Quetelet is essentially optimistic about the possibility of...

"I... improving men, of modifying their institutions, their habits, the state of their instructions and, in general, all that acts on their manner of being"

Also

"... I am far from concluding that men can do nothing for his improvement. I believe... that he possesses a moral force capable of modifying the laws which concern him; but this force acts only in the slowest manner, in that the causes which influence the social system are not susceptible to any brisk alteration."

(ibid. p.266).

This type of optimistic belief in the perfectability of man and society has, as I have noted in the previous chapter, been central to
positivism as a social philosophy, and to the political philosophies to which it became aligned.

McDonald also examines Comte's more conservative variant of positivism. Although he was committed to the methodology of the natural sciences in his writings about society, his notion of "social physics" and his "religion of humanity", contained both elements of determinism and indeterminism. In the slogan "Order and Progress" he expressed his belief that both were possible and inevitable.

In Mill's summary of Comte's position, he claims that . . .

"we have no absolute knowledge of anything, but phenomena; and our knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of productions of any fact, but only its relation to other facts . . . The constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent are termed their laws. The laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final are unknown and inscrutable to us."

(Mill quoted in McDonald op. cit. p.263-4).

Laws then are, for Comte, descriptive devices. His notion of causality was not of a 'hard determinism', but the making of inferences when certain conditions were met. Phenomena were to be explained in terms of objective, material conditions. Comte's human beings were, McDonald maintains, moral individuals capable of making choices. Although constrained by biological make-up and physical facts, human choice could still affect the social world. The laws governing human conduct were more flexible than those regulating the natural world, due to the capacity of human beings to grow and change. Comte saw knowledge as a means to an end, to be put to use in the bettering of humanity. His concern for education, and his "religion of humanity", are also manifestations of his own essentially optimistic view.

The importance of Comte lies in two different aspects of his work.
Firstly, his positive philosophy is representative of a trend in positivism's general programme - the application of science to the regeneration of humanity. This was to be achieved through the "naturalisation" of mind and society in opposition to theological and metaphysical thought. In this process the methods of the natural sciences - observation, experiment, comparison - would be the essential tools for laying-bare the realities behind the appearances of social life. (Martindale 1960 p.56-65). The statistical study of social phenomena are held to aid in the investigation of the "laws of action and reaction of the different parts of the social system." (Comte 1896 p.126).

Secondly, Comte's work may be seen to represent a synthesis of two contrasting intellectual traditions - a liberal and reformist programme for the reorganisation of society according to scientific principles, and an idealistic and conservative programme with its organic conceptions of society and history, opposed to planned social change. (Martindale op. cit. p.62). The particular point of convergence of these traditions in his work lies in the notion that the natural and social sciences can contribute to social order through the promotion of understanding and of judicious intervention.

Comte saw his 'social physics' as proposing not only the "positive study of the laws and order of progress", but also as offering "the only rational basis for satisfying the needs of society." (Comte op. cit. p.126). An analogous correspondence was to be found here - in the relationship of understanding to action, of "the theory and the practice" - to that relationship which exists "between biological science and the arts which relate to it - the medical art especially". (Ibid.).

According to Anthony Giddens, Comte's positivism preserves the theme of progress, but undercuts the radicalism of Enlightenment philosophy. 'Progress' and 'order', are more than reconciled; the one becomes dependent on the other. The progress of man achieves an equilibrium in such a way, in the view of Comte and his contemporaries, that the speed of development can be enhanced or retarded by active human intervention, and has the character of an autonomous force for betterment. (Giddens 1977 p.31-32).

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In his sketch for an intellectual and conceptual history of the development of social statistics in the nineteenth century, Ian Hacking, (1983) notes that there was considerable rivalry between different schools of sociology in Europe concerning the different roles which should be assigned to statistics. In the early 1830's Comte had produced his sociology as a 'social mechanics' or a 'social physics', but was wary of the primary concern with statistical methods. Quetelet, in the very same period, took the title 'sociology' for his new 'statistical science of mankind'. In Hacking's view, Quetelet triumphed over Comte; the former organised world statistical congresses, and was instrumental in founding the statistical section of the British Association in 1833. Later, as a propagandist for statistical work and through his fundamental role in preparing the Belgian census of 1840, which was to stand as an international model, Quetelet had convinced the world that Gauss' bell-shaped 'law of errors' was precisely the type of law for the distribution of human, social and biological traits. Today, Hacking says, we see an enormously influential body of modern sociological though which takes for granted that social laws will be cast in statistical form. (ibid. p.16; p.20).

The particular rendering in France of statistics as a 'moral science', and which characterises the work of Durkheim in the latter part of the century, included the idea of a science of deviancy, of criminals, court convictions, suicides, prostitution, divorce. Whereas Quetelet established the new 'science of morality' in Europe and Britain, Walter Willcox (1861 - 1944) was to play a dominant role in its establishment in the United States. Here the concern for the establishment of such a science is traceable to the Puritans of seventeenth-century New England. (c.f. Erikson 1966).

Very close parallels may be drawn between the nineteenth century concern with statistics of physical health and those relating to moral health. The pre-occupation with medical statistics was enlarged into the 'medical analogy', whereby the notions of the 'social' and the 'physical' were conflated in complex ways. To the nineteenth century positivists, the events of the social world and the natural world could be ascribed to similar sets of laws. These laws, from which such meta-concepts as 'morality' were derived, could be applied equally to
distinguish normal and pathological states in the 'body politic' as in the biological realm.

Following the work of Foucault, Hacking links the emergence of 'moral science' with the new bureaucratic power which arises in the nineteenth century. In the strategic development of medicine and law there occurs a new 'biopolitics' - a concern with bodies and their control through comprehensive measures, statistical assessments and interventions which are aimed at the body politic - the social body. There subsequently emerges in the history of the new capitalist states, parallel to the growth of state interventionism, an "assurential technology" which has to do with providing a stable social order through the progressive extension of social policy based upon firm knowledge of material conditions.

Hacking is however, careful to stress that the emergence of statistical methods and their institutionalisation in the operations of the great state bureaucracies, ought not be seen entirely in terms of the progressive control of the working class. The assumption, commonly made, that state interventionism bolstered by a positivistic, statistical form of sociology with its deterministic denial of the importance of free and conscious action, was related solely to repressive control is, in Hacking's view, a distortion of the "internal history" of statistical sociology - the history of a body of ideas interacting with external social circumstances.

Hacking argues that a mere subscription to the idea of determinism, would leave no logical space for a theory of social intervention. As we know, social policy with regard to social problems - in the 19th as in the 20th century - was underpinned by joint considerations of control (as containment), and of the belief in the susceptibility of human behaviour to the benign and malign influence of moral and physical environments. Statistics allowed both the possibility of intervention in a contingent social universe, and also a way of "taming chance" through the use of such devices as probability theory. The term which Hacking prefers is "indeterminism" - the orientation towards conquering determining and constraining forces, firstly through the accumulation of knowledge, and then through deliberate intervention.
The mid-19th century sees, according to his view, a "metaphysical revolution". The strict determinism in which events were seen as pre-determined (either by supernatural or analogous physical and 'inexorable laws') gave way under the weight of a sheer "avalanche of numbers", to a viewpoint which held that the determining effect of laws governing physical and human relations could be circumvented or harnessed. The 'laws of probability' for instance, became reconceived as "subjective, relative in part to our knowledge and in part to our ignorance of underlying causes" and also...

"...we might say that the central fact is the taming of chance; where in 1800 chance had been nothing real, at the end of the century it was something 'real' precisely because one had found the form of laws that were to govern chance."

(ibid., p.18).

The view of social statisticians by the late century had converged with the sociological positivism of Comte and his paraphrased dictum that 'to know, or see, is to be able to foresee, is to be able to predict.' Social statisticians and social reformers came to believe that it was possible to reorganise the boundary conditions under which the population was governed by statistical laws, so that self-consciousness action could itself come to affect what was previously thought to be an inevitable process of historical development. Characteristically, however, it was the facts of deviancy, poverty, and 'les misérables' which would be among those things most altered by the intervention of state bureaucracies.

Hacking finds that the intellectual history of the developing use of statistics in the 19th century, was part of a discourse whose direction was considerably shaped by the nature of the material conditions in which it took place. Using the metaphor of a scientific revolution, he notes a number of associated paradoxes.

Firstly, knowledge is enlarged by the quantification of the social world; things previously mysterious are laid bare and made accessible to reason - but there is always a cost. The Galilean and Newtonian worlds of lawful certainty were significantly challenged. The definition
of determinism was having constantly to be revised. But each new
definition created a new family of problems.

"This is a common pattern in the
history of thought; an idea
becomes sharply formulated, and
even named, . . . at exactly the
moment when it is being put
under pressure."

( ibid. p. 23).

The nature of his pressure relates both to the internal (intellectual) and external (material) histories of statistics. In the former
case new knowledge challenges old orthodoxes; in the second case there
is pressure for statistics to have social relevance, to have 'utility'
and 'value'. The 'avalanche of numbers' is at least part of the result
of industrialisation and the attendant movement and concentration of
large numbers of persons. There was almost always a perfectly good
reason for the vast majority of new countings, many of which were re-
quired by the numerous government enquiries, select committees, and
the almost insatiable demands for statistical information on the part
of the new and expanding state bureaucracies. The greater the inter-
tentions of the state, the greater the need for data. The broader the
expansion of state power the more numerous the opportunities for the
co-option of the natural and social sciences. Statistics had the ad-
vantage that it was seen to present the chaotic social world and show it
as orderly and 'lawful' (in whatever sense) and also that it cut across
the disciplines in a manner which made the social engineering potential
of those disciplines more incorporable into the state bureaucracy, itself
becoming a 'bureaucracy of statistics'.

"The bureaucracy of statistics imposes
not just by creating administrative
rulings but by determining class-
ifications within which people must
think of themselves and of the actions
which are open to them. The hallmark
of indeterminism is that cliché, in-
formation and control. The less the
determinism, the more the possibilities
for constraint."

( ibid. p. 26).

An earlier writer (Douglas 1971 p. 42-60) has also developed the
theme of information as a dimension of the official attempts to control social problems. The statistical approach, he says, has become paradigmatic in the social sciences. Mathematical counting had its appeal in the order which it revealed in the social and moral phenomena observed.

Two developments led to the emergence in the 19th century of official statistics on deviance; firstly, the spread of quantitative ideas to human phenomena; and secondly, the rise of systems of "moral accounting" in western bureaucracies. This moral accounting was an offshoot of economic accounting in terms of the social meanings and values allotted to the units counted. This fusion of economic management and moral management is the hallmark of the modern state. Douglas continually stresses the moral nature of the meanings implied in social accounting and their place in the "political arithmetic" of social policy.

"From their very beginnings official statistics were policy oriented and determined by the political goals of (the) officials."

( Ibid. p. 49).

This arithmetic related not only to quantities of deviance, but also to the performance of official agencies. Thus official statistics were, from their early inception, a source for an ongoing evaluation of state interventionism, as much as trade figures were taken as a barometer of fiscal policy. In both the economic and social spheres, the new rationality is that of knowledge and results.

Moral accounting also contains a number of epistemological assumptions which are still the focus for acrimony and debate in the social sciences. These include the view, says Douglas, that human actions are "absolute categories" or "typifications" which present little problem of quantification (classification, enumeration, measurement) which are seen to be "discrete, continuous phenomena" and which will reveal themselves in their array of classifications upon observation (Ibid. p. 58-59).

As the same author has remarked elsewhere...
"Enumeration has now become cornerstone of knowledge. Though this epistemological assumption (that something is only known once it is counted) was first applied in the natural sciences, it has come to dominate Western man's thought concerning human affairs as well."

(Douglas 1967 p.163).

4.3. The Origins of Official Statistics on Crime

The birthplace of official criminal statistics is France, where the systematic collection of judicial statistics was begun in 1825-27. It was believed that these would assist the government in determining the social conditions having an influence upon increased and decreases in the number of crimes. (Sellin and Wolfgang 1964 p.8). This initiative was soon imitated in other European countries and in England, and by the end of the century, most of the problems which now occupy the minds of those interested in improved measures of crime, had been discussed by researchers anxious to know the relationship between official counts and the real numbers and rates of crime.

Some writers were content to rely upon figures relating to convictions, on the assumption that these were at least accurate reflections of the real state of affairs. Others held the view that these figures as well as those relating to 'known offences' were, in a sense, only a proof of inferior policing or of inadequate reporting by the population. Whereas some researchers were interested in the statistics from the point of view of their potential as a 'barometer of morality' others were engaged in the use for the more qualitative purposes of gauging rates and distributions of criminal behaviour, or of arriving at calculations of the seriousness of offences, and the relationship between these and punishments. (ibid. p.9-10).

The particular problems of unreported or undiscovered crimes, the question of which series of data on which to base measurements, the matter of the qualitative weighting of different offences, all of these problems occupied the minds of nineteenth century criminologists. Although many of the leading European criminal statisticians were
thoroughly aware of the limitations of judicial criminal statistics, and of the deficiencies of collection procedures, they nevertheless either accepted them or defended them for want of anything better. The main reason for the holding of this viewpoint appears to be that criminal statistics originated as a means of portraying the work of strictly judicial agencies, in countries where the investigation of crime was entrusted to those agencies rather than the police. Consequently it was accepted as axiomatic that the extent and trends of criminality could safely be inferred from their data. (ibid. p.12).

Thus there grew up an exceedingly legalistic definition of crime, in which it was assumed that only those with legal training could assign correct descriptive labels. In most countries criminal statistics dealt only with offences resulting in convictions. Inferences about criminality had to be based on statistics of offenders - where these were compiled - and had to ignore information about offences which had been subject to judicial investigation but had, for whatever reason, never led to a conviction. Although offences known to the police were acknowledged as a possible source of criminal statistics, the prevailing view rejected them as having little value as long as their objective nature had yet to be determined by a court. Before the First World War it was uncommon to find any national crime statistics which included this information.

There were, however, a number of notable attempts on the part of scholars to promote the idea that the data for offences known to the police formed the best basis for estimates of the extent of crime. In 1853, Frederic Hill (1803-1896), inspector of prisons in Scotland wrote that in order to render the statistics of crime of real value, a register was required of "actual offences committed" without reference to subsequent adjudication, for the purpose of determining crime in different time periods and geographical regions, and as a gauge of the efficiency of the police. In 1867, von Mayr (1841-1925) published a study of Bavarian criminality based on crimes known to the police. (ibid. p.14).

(i) The developments of criminal statistics in Britain:

Official statistics on prisoners were first published in Britain under the English Penitentiary Bill of 1778 which provided for regular
statistical returns on prisoners in individual penal institutions, but regular and systematic compilations only began in the early nineteenth century with the publication of the first general consensu.

In the Parliamentary Papers of 1840 there appeared returns on prisoners and related judicial statistics relating to conviction, acquittal and discharge. This system of publication, variously refined, extended and improved continued for most of the century. (Mannheim 1965 p. 99-102).

In 1895, however, the whole system was drastically revised in accordance with a report of a Departmental Committee published as an appendix to Judicial Statistics in 1893. This report recommended the complete separation of criminal and civil statistics; the transfer of certain tables on prisoners to the Annual Reports of the Prison Commissioners; the compilation of tables for calendar years; and, the abolition of tables using such terms as 'suspicous character', or 'known thief'. The report also made an important step in the direction of establishing a 'crime rate' in recommending that wherever possible the proportions to population should be given. Attention was drawn to the great improvements in the collection of crime statistics being made in France, Germany and Italy, and urged that these should always be carefully studied by the Statistical Branch of the Home Office.

In addition the report urged that the Introductions to the annual volumes should contain commentaries and interpretations of the statistical tables following. In 1899 and 1905, for instance, the Introductions contained information on the geographical distribution of crime; in 1908 on the statistical relation between strikes and increases in crime; in 1929, on industrial depression; in 1929 and 1930, on differences in crime between the North and South of England; in 1932 and 1938, on the statistical results of different methods of penal treat-

Tables showing crimes known to the police were included in the Judicial Statistics for England and Wales for the first time in 1857. (Sellin and Wolfgang op. cit. p. 18). As late as 1924 however the Intro-
duction to the Criminal Statistics — as they were now called — showed that crimes known to the police were not yet accepted as superior for the purposes of estimating the national volume of crime. Although
Claiming that "the figures of persons tried for indictable offences are usually considered to be the best index to the annual fluctuations of crime . . .", it added that "trustworthy conclusions as to the increase or decrease of crime cannot be based upon figures of persons convicted or of persons imprisoned". (quoted op.cit. p.48). By 1928, however, the Criminal Statistics for that year relied heavily on crimes known to the police in its discussion of the nature of changes in criminality; in 1930 the statement appeared that, "in these introductions, the number of crimes known to the police is now regarded as the best index to the volume of crime." The volume for 1931, however, gives equal weight to the figures of crimes known to the police and to the statistics of persons prosecuted, but by 1933 it was thought that offences of violence against the person and sex offences, as given by the police statistics, could be regarded "as a reliable indication." (ibid.).

By the late 1930's, crimes known to the police had largely been accepted by official compilers and interpreters of criminal statistics, and also by most leading British criminologists, as the best available index of the volume of crime (ibid. p.19). In 1946, the annual volume assumed their present format, beginning with offences known to the police, and proceeding to tables for offence groups, showing the trends of various offences between different years. As Hough and Mayhew have commented:

"... offences recorded by the police slowly won the day as the primary measure - so much so, in fact, that it now seems strange that the annual number of convictions or the size of the prison population could ever have been used to measure crime."


The next important development was the publication of the Report of the Departmental Committee on Criminal Statistics - the Parks Report (1967). This was produced at a time when the criminological community were engaged in active internal debate (see 4.4 below) on the problems of accuracy and validity of statistics of 'crimes reported to the police'. This was also a period in which developments in America
towards supplementing such statistics with surveys of victimisation were beginning to affect the thinking of British policy makers, especially through the work of Leslie Wilkins (1965; 1967), who was at that time on secondment to the Home Office.

The Report thus reflects many aspects of the "new thinking" on criminal statistics. It was particularly concerned at the problem of unreported crime, which tended to make the official statistics of dubious value for research purposes, and for use by legislators, and for law enforcement and the treatment of offenders (ibid. p.6-7). Apart from the rationalising of classifications of offences, it was also felt to be useful to keep data on the characteristics of offenders, and to develop an index of crime. (see 4.4. below). Relatedly, statistics should include information on the circumstances of offences, so that like classifications could be distinguished in terms of seriousness and type. Also, no information was available which is relevant to "the causation, prevention and detection of crime.

Although the Report did not go so far as to recommend surveys of victimisation, it does propose that detailed information be recorded for offences reported to the police and those offences cleared up. This would include the sex and age of the victim, the extent of injury or loss of property, and the relationship between the offender and victim. It was further proposed that a new standard crime report form should enable such information to be routinely collected. (ibid. p.16; p.22).

Despite all this, the form of official statistics on crime did not change substantially until the advent of the British Crime Survey (see 4.6 below). The annual publication Criminal Statistics now contains information from that survey in the context of cautioning the reader on the shortcomings of police-recorded crime statistics.

(ii) Criminal statistics in the United States - a political history:

The statistical enumeration of crimes in the United States has a long but uneven history dating back to colonial times. The first rudimentary criminal statistics were generally of a purely local nature, drawn from the records of city and town jails and from district and county courts. According to James Tienard (1976 p.173), such
statistics - although often no more than unsophisticated head-counting exercises - had from the very beginning some importance for the planning of social control mechanisms in pre-revolutionary America. Statistical compilations often had, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an important impact upon emerging criminal justice policy and legislation.

In the nineteenth century the most systematic enumerations were produced in those emerging urban centres which had organised police forces. In 1845, the organisation of a formal police department in New York City, initiated one of the earliest uniform bases for the regular collection of criminal statistics. Although these data were limited to arrests, they provided the Chief of Police and the City government with indices of crime upon which were based budgetary appropriations and manpower deployment (ibid. p.179). Boston, among other cities, also produced arrest reports annually from 1849; and while municipal jurisdictions were compiling data on crime, attempts were also being made to produce them on state and national levels. The first states to produce crime statistics were New York, Massachusetts, and Maine; Inciardi claims that these developments were significantly influenced by the work of European scholars such as Quetelet (ibid. p.180). In New York, for instance, and statute of 1829 - the same year as the publication of Quetelet's Recherches Statistiques - made it the duty of court clerks to forward the results of cases to the secretary of state. (ibid. p.182).

Such state judicial statistics were generally incomplete and of dubious value. A later development, beginning in Massachusetts in 1834, was the collection of data on prisoners; these too were intermittently collected and unreliable.

Although federal criminal statistics historically began with the census of 1880, enumerations of prisoners referred to as "statistics" of crime appeared in the census volumes for 1850, 1860 and 1870. These national statistics were then mainly prison statistics rather than crime statistics. The main problem of the collection of national crime statistics in the United States relates, then as now, to the fact that there are in effect fifty state criminal justice jurisdictions,
plus a federal jurisdiction. Also, there is no one body of criminal law or procedure that relates to the United States as a whole. (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975 p.407).

According to Michael Maltz (1977 p.33), federal attention to crime statistics began in 1870 with the passing of legislation creating the Department of Justice. This law provided for an annual report by the Attorney General to Congress on the statistics of crime committed against federal and state laws. This provision was greeted with indifference by the police establishment, and fell into almost immediate disuse. The probable reason for this attitude seems to have been partially the desire of chiefs of police to control their own statistics, and also for the states to resist the usurping power of the federal government in matters of criminal justice. At the 1871 convention of the National Police Association - the forerunner of the International Association of Chief of Police (IACP) - resolutions were adopted calling for the compilation of crime statistics for police use.

The uniform collection of crime statistics on a national basis, however, received its most significant stimulus by the IACP in 1927, and it is from this date that the contemporary history of American crime statistics really begins. In that year a committee was set up by the annual conference in order to work towards uniform crime reporting. It would seem that from its very inception the debate was couched in terms familiar to us today. The committee was particularly concerned with propensity of newspapers to manufacture "crime waves", increasing public alarm and decreasing public confidence in the police. After wrestling with considerable problems of standardising state-by-state statistics, the committee produced its final report in 1929 in the form of a manual containing a set of guidelines to police departments on data compilation.

In June 1930, Congress authorised the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect and compile - with the voluntary co-operation of the IACP - nationwide data on crime. The first bulletin of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) was published in 1930 on a monthly basis at first, then quarterly until 1944, semi-annually until 1957, and annually since 1958. (Quinney and Siderman 1977 p.99).
In the account presented by Maltz of the origins of the Uniform Crime Reports, there is considerable emphasis upon the interplay between the IACP and the federal government. From their inception, the UCR have been a political instrument whose control has been the subject of considerable conflict between different branches and agencies of the state. This conflict manifested itself in the late nineteenth century, as we have seen above, with a refusal by police chiefs to participate in federal crime data collection. In the late 1920's the very creation of the IACP's Committee on Uniform Crime Records took place against a background of further federal and congressional attempts to compel police departments to deliver crime data. In addition to this the American criminologist community, through the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, had adopted a policy as early as 1909 favouring the adoption of police-generated crime statistics for index purposes, but calling explicitly for their collection by the Census Bureau - a non Criminal Justice agency of the federal government. Similar resolutions were adopted by the American Prison Association in 1924, and in the same year the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (The Wickersham Commission) began its deliberations, and which were anticipated to be leading to strong recommendations for the mandatory collection of crime statistics by the states. (Maltz op.cit. p.35). As such, the developments within the IACP can be seen to be a pre-emption of such action.

The eventual IACP report, Uniform Crime Reporting, specifically called for the record system to be housed in the Department of Justice, where it would be assured that responsibility for the collection, analysis and publication of the statistics would be the responsibility of the FBI, whose director, J. Edgar Hoover, was on the expert advisory committee for the IACP's Committee on Uniform Crime Reports. (Ibid. p.36).

The IACP began collecting UCR data in January 1930. Although it had no statutory authority to do so the FBI began collecting the data almost immediately. Congress ratified this action retrospectively by an Act of June 1930. Ten months later a Report of Criminal Statistics was published by the Wickersham Commission in which it was emphatically
stated that for the purposes of checking the performance of different criminal justice agencies, it was important that the compiling and publication of criminal statistics should not be confined to any bureau or agency which is engaged in administering the criminal law. It takes but little experience of such statistics, the Report held, "in order to convince that a serious abuse exists in compiling them as a basis for requesting appropriations or for justifying the existence of or urging expanded powers and equipment for the agency in question." (quoted in ibid, p.36).

The UCR programme was entirely voluntary, and the Federal government were unwilling to compel police departments to deliver to the Census Bureau even though this was recommended by Wickersham. According to Watters, had J. Edgar Hoover not been so closely allied to the IACP, it is doubtful if the Bureau of Investigation - being a federal agency - would have been sufficiently trusted to oversee the whole enterprise.

Collecting and analysing the crime data furnished by the police departments was only part of the FBI's responsibility for the programme; calculating and publicising the resulting crime rates were also its functions. As we have seen, a major impetus for the creation of the UCR was the need to control the information about crime and police performance reaching the press.

In the first year of the programme's existence there was, of course, no standard against which to check a police department's reported crime rate, nor was there any provision for checking on the data's accuracy or completeness. Yet by November 1930 the FBI was issuing press releases depicting trends in crime rates; all this before one year's data had been received and while the number and type of reporting jurisdictions still varied from month to month.

The Wickersham Commission's Report on Criminal Statistics was extremely critical of these practices, and subsequent UCR Reports contained variously worded qualifications concerning the reliability of the data in the light of problems of interpretation and collection. However, as Watters asserts, these disclaimers have never been more than perfunctory. The FBI has never expressed any criticism of newspapers that assume the data to be valid and has never made any attempt to
determine how accurate the UCR data really are. Although the Bureau has taken pains, for example through internal audit, to insure the accuracy of data recorded, there has been no attempt to assess their degree of accuracy. (Ibid. p.39).

A continually controversial aspect of the UCR is its particular method of presenting conclusions on the volume of crime in the United States. Seven crimes were originally designated, on the basis of their seriousness and frequency, to compose the Uniform Crime Reports Crime Index. These are murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Arson was added by congressional mandate in 1978. These crimes are collectively known as the Index Offences. The Crime Index is a single number obtained by adding together all the reported incidents of all of these crimes. Its year-to-year fluctuations are still used to measure trends in the volume of crime.

There are two important features of the Index; firstly, if more than one Index offence occurs during a single incident, only the most serious is reported in the UCR and included in the Crime Index total. Arson is an exception to this rule in that it is always recorded even if other Index offences are committed in the same incident. Secondly, the UCR uses standardised definitions of criminal offences, in order to try to overcome the problem of different legal definitions in the fifty-one jurisdictions covered. (U.S. Department of Justice 1981 p.1-3).

In addition to numerous charges of bias and under-reporting, the UCR has also come in for much criticism of its particular presentation of those statistics which it has at its disposal. The rule by which only the most serious Index offence is recorded leads, of course, to the under-recording of very many offences that do appear in police reports. But the UCR Index also contributes to a form of over-reporting. In this respect the use of the Crime Index as an assumed 'barometer' of the volume of crime in America has been criticised largely on the grounds that this is an unweighted index, in that in the annual collective presentation as a single number, crimes of vastly different levels of legal seriousness contribute equally to the picture. Thus,
for example, an increase in reported and recorded motor vehicle thefts would have the same impact on the Index figure as an equivalent increase in the number of murders, rapes or incidents of larceny. It has often been suggested that a weighted index should be substituted, and which would give a more accurate picture of the frequency of known crimes at various levels of gravity. The one usually preferred is the Sellin-Wolfgang Index (Walker 1971 pp.69-75; Nettler 1978 pp.58-61).

In 1969, for instance, Normandeau compared robberies known to the police in Philadelphia in the seven years 1960-1966 as diagrammed by the UCR, and by the (weighted) Sellin-Wolfgang Index. The latter weights robberies according to the harm inflicted on the victim whereas the UCR Index does not. The Philadelphia rate increased by 22% over the seven years as measured by the UCR Index, but only by 16% when measured by the Sellin-Wolfgang index. In one period (1960-1962) within this overall time-span, the UCR Index shows an increase in the robbery rate while the Sellin-Wolfgang Index shows a decrease, (cited in Nettler op.cit. p.60-61).

At this point it is useful to refer to the role of criminologists in these developments. As we saw above, American criminologists had specifically argued for crime statistics to be collected by a federal agency unconnected with law enforcement. It is a perennial source of frustration to criminologists that - in contrast to most other social scientists - the collection of the data upon which they most depend for purposes of the building and testing of theories, is outside of their control, and seriously tainted by bias and other deficiencies. It is therefore possible to read the internal debates within criminology, as they blossomed in the 1920's and 1930's, in terms of an attempt to gain control of data on crime. An alliance with the federal governments analogous to that forged through the Johnson Crime Commission, was cemented through the medium of the Wickersham Commission.

Thorsten Sellin is of particular importance here. Throughout the 1930's he developed critical ideas on criminal statistics which were to influence a later generation of criminologists whose work would, in the 1960's, again highlight the issues of the unreliability and in-
appropriateness of police statistics for criminological purposes. Sellin's concern was two-fold. Firstly, he was concerned that police collected data was assailed by problems of reactivity. He laid down in 1934, the following dictum:

"... the value of a crime for index purposes decreased as the distance from the crime itself in terms of procedure increases."

(quoted in ibid. p.34).

Secondly, he was concerned for there to be established an index of crime - weighted in terms of seriousness - which would enable more accurate comparison of rates for crimes to be compared overtime. In his view (correctly as it turned out) the UCR Index would fail to do this.

The work of Edwin Sutherland in the 1940's, is also important in this respect. Basically Sutherland was at pains to show that data on crime collected by criminologists could be superior to police statistics. This was particularly the case with white-collar and corporate crime, which had a very low reporting rate and in which considerations of power and bias seriously affected recording and detection. The essential point was that the findings of informal collection procedures actually led, as he saw it, to the reconsideration of quite basic criminological propositions, especially in relation to the social class distribution of criminal behaviour and thus of theories based on notions pathology and social disorganisation. (Sutherland 1949). Both Sellin and Sutherland held that 'non-scientists' should not be permitted to fix the boundaries of the scientific study of crime. Criminologists fight for control over data in this period, was however lost to the traditionalistic and legalistic approach exemplified in the views of Paul Tappan (1947).

The tendency in Sellin's and Sutherland's work, which Tappan accurately perceived and bitterly opposed, was a criminological re-definition of crime beyond the strict boundaries of legal definitions and police procedures. He held that the only persons and acts which could legitimately be studied by criminologists were those which had been adjudicated by courts of law. There was indeed present in the emerging social democratic criminology in the 1930's and 1940's, a very potent tendency to link crime with injurious social conditions and to demonstrate
a link between crime and injustice. But research was necessarily based on small-scale studies. The possibility of a national data base, designed by social scientists to meet the requirements of their own constructs, was as yet an unattainable prize.

American criminologists' long-standing obsession with the problem of data has stemmed not only from their failure to control its production, but also from the high political profile accorded to crime, and which the stage-managed misuse of crime statistics has helped to create. Two authors have dealt with this phenomenon in particular detail. Fred Graham (1969) has charted the use of crime statistics in the 1960's, to promote public panics about crime. At that time the FBI continually asserted the existence of an ever increasing "crime wave"; this assertion was particularly marked in relation to violent crime. It is Graham's view that J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI was personally responsible for the manufacture of the crime wave through the device of "digging into the reservoir of unreported crimes" (ibid. p.486). This policy had two related aims; firstly to provide a basis for claims for increases in police manpower, technology and finance; secondly, to implicitly promote a conservative perspective on crime, which was oriented to the principles of social defence and retributivism, and which was fundamentally opposed to the predominating social democratic vision of crime as emergent from social injustice and the defendant's rights decisions of the Supreme Court. Indeed, Hoover's strategic use of statistics can be seen as a form of "political witchcraft" aimed at discrediting the criminal justice policies of Johnson and Clark. (ibid. p.493).

Ramsey Clark (1970) himself engaged in an attempt to translate criminologists objections to Hoover, into readily understandable political statements. He sought to show how fluctuations in reporting and recording practices influenced the statistics, how violent crime was only a small fraction of the total volume, how most of such crimes (40%) were "violent potential" rather than actually violent, and how the odds against violent victimisation were "one in 145,000 per day" (ibid. pp.44-55). The conflation of this 'realism' with exhortations that crime is born of racism and poverty, in the context of the times, sealed his own political fate!
The use of crime statistics as a political device is by no means confined to the United States. At various times British police forces have also engaged in the manipulation of statistics through the selective enforcement of certain laws, or else the creative interpretation of statistical trends for political ends. A notable recent case in point is the press release issued by the Metropolitan Police in early 1983, which contained information about the perceptions on the part of victims of violent street crimes, or the racial characteristics of their assailant. These purported to show that out of 19,258 cases of mugging (robbery and violent theft) in London in 1982, 10,960 were carried out by blacks, 5,262 by whites, 534 by gangs of more than one race, and 2,502 in which the victim was unable to say (Guardian 1983).

Lea and Young (1984) have criticised these particular types of presentation in the following way. Firstly, the statistics focus on one type of crime out of many, and which accounts for only 3% of all reported serious crime. Secondly, many of the crimes included are of an amateurish and minor nature. Thirdly, the category 'robbery and violent theft' is one which blends with other offence categories such as 'theft of personal property' and, by allocating from the latter to the former, inflated figures can result. Fourthly, they ignore the fact that 'mugging' is a very indistinct category and that only one-third of all robbery and violent theft fit the conventional notion of it. Fifthly, such presentations ignore the ethnic origins of the victims of such crimes, and feed the illusion that black crime is predatory on whites; whereas, most crime is intra-racial and intra-class. Sixthly, they do not allow for the fact that such statistics are themselves in part a function of police prejudices.

One might add to these objections that the police statistics - and the media and political commentaries which are based upon them - assume that these statistics are a mirror of the reality of crime. In fact, it is well known from surveys of victimisation that 'crimes known to the police' and appearing in their statistics, represent only a proportion of those actually committed.

Susan Smith (1982), in an analysis of similar race-coded statistics published by the police in 1982, has argued that they conceal many
different aspects of the reality of street crimes. The media have the
tendency to highlight those aspects which are deemed most newsworthy
and, inevitably focus on the criminality of the black population. She
also argues that political motives lie behind such exercises, not only
on the part of media and right-wing politicians, but also the police
themselves. In the context of the 1932 figures, these included the
promotion of a law and order campaign as an election issue for the
Conservative Party, the discrediting of the policies of a much crit-
icised 'liberal' Home Secretary, and the strengthening of the political
hand of police departments against the incursions of police committees,
in the form of criticisms of policing policies, especially in respect
of the black community.

Thus, as Dickson (1968) has argued, bureaucracies necessarily act
as political units. In their search for greater autonomy of operation,
compete for funds and seek to enhance their corporate power, bureau-
cracies often seek to alter the political and economic environments
within which they are forced to operate. Police bureaucracies would
seem to exemplify this process and indeed, one of the main means which
they have at their disposal, is to creatively conjure images of a
particular part of the institutional environment - the nature of the
crime problem - in order to further their interests.

4.4. Criminology and the "dark figure" of crime:

I have so far sketched the history of criminal statistics with
regard to their political and epistemological background. I have also
described these developments in terms of the interplay between crimin-
ologists, the federal government and the police, in the context of the
prevailing crisis of legitimacy and order. I will now go on to describe
the debates within criminology on the "dark figure" of crime, and the
heightened attention to the role of victims in the production of crime
statistics, which was an impetus towards the foundation of victimisation
surveys. I will then conclude with an overview of the methodological
advantages and problems of such surveys.

The problem of the "dark figure" of crime has often been submerged
for long periods of time during which judicial and police statistics

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have been tacitly assumed by criminologists to be the best or even the "least worse" basis for generalisation. Even someone as astute as Quetelet, although observing that "the sum of crimes committed will probably continue unknown", asserted that there existed a constant ratio between adjudicated and hidden criminality. (Sellin and Wolfgang op.cit. p.26). Indeed, in the one hundred or more years since that time, many similar acts of faith have been uttered.

At certain points in time, however, the underlying sense of unease which this problem causes, blossoms into open debate. As we noted earlier in this chapter, the period leading up to the Wickersham Commission and the contemporaneous creation of Uniform Crime Reports, was characterised by considerable debate within the criminological community concerning the need for crime data to be collected by social scientists. Also, as Sellin and Wolfgang detailedly record, numerous papers emerged in the 1930's through to the 1950's which sought to couch these problems of measurement in terms of what was eventually to become a criminological obsession - the "dark figure" of hidden crime.

Although there were frequent references made to the problem in American journals during the 1930's and 1940's, serious attempts to study it empirically were few; it was in fact in Europe that more serious attention was given to this. A study by Meyer in 1941 in Germany, which incidently seems to have been the first to use the term "dark number", hypothesised on the basis of an analysis of trends in police statistics that an unsatisfactory ratio existed between reported and unreported crimes.

In the 1950's also a number of studies, including one by the United Nations in 1957, concluded that a considerable amount of crime remained hidden. Most of these studies did however conclude that "it may be assumed that under normal conditions the number of offences reported bears a reasonably constant relation to ... total criminality." (United Nations : Survey of Social Statistics - quoted ibid. p.40).

The pace of the debate on the "dark figure" from the 1830's to the end of the 1950's, bears little comparison to its volume and intensity in the 1960's. An important stimulus was the emergence of the
new deviancy theory as a challenge to the dominant criminological paradigm of sociological positivism. New deviancy theorists such as Howard Becker (1963) thrust definitional problems to the fore, and inaugurated a trend wherein the processes by which acts become defined as deviant, and specific groups and individuals become labelled a deviant, were viewed as more urgent problems for analysis than the factors which were assumed to propel them into deviant behaviour. Becker stated quite explicitly that social and legal norms reflect the definitions and interests of powerful groups in society, and that these rules are applied more to some groups than to others. The police are more likely to intervene against working-class people and blacks, who also get further in the legal process than their middle-class and white counterparts. The implications are this argument for the criminal and judicial statistics were obvious; they were to be taken more as a reflection of processes of definition and the differential enforcement of the law, rather than of the 'true' existence of criminal behaviour. (ibid. pp.12-14).

These arguments received their most eloquent and influential statement in the form of a paper by Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963). They contended that the study of deviance has given rise to three lines of enquiry by social scientists - the explanation of variations in rates of deviancy in various parts of the population; why some individuals within a social group become deviant while others do not; and, the behaviour systems and culture of deviant groups. However, researchers have failed to make a distinction between the various factors which produce units of deviant behaviour, and the organisational activities which produce rates of deviant behaviour. They are particularly critical of Robert Merton, whose theory of anomie and social structure was organised around the problem of explaining the apparent higher rates of deviant behaviour at the lower end of society. Merton had argued against the use of official statistics because they are collected by agencies whose purposes do not coincide with those of sociologists, and urged the latter to collect their own more reliable and appropriately organised data.

Kitsuse and Cicourel observe that most sociologists, including
Merton, use official data, with a few words of caution as to their interpretation, on the assumption that they bear some relation to 'real' phenomena and 'real' rates. The bones of contention continued to be the joint problems of accuracy of counting, and the appropriate organisation to match operational concepts. Sociologists had not viewed the definitions of deviance or the organisational processes involved in the production of official statistics as particularly problematic. The authors argue firstly that sociologists should focus on:

"... the categories applied by the personnel of the rate-producing social system to identify classify and record behaviour as deviant."

(ibid. p.136).

Additionally, the behaviours which result in the classification of individuals in a given deviant category are not necessarily similar. Also, the statistics are better to be viewed in terms of a standing record of the processing of individuals by a particular agency, rather than as indices of the incidence of certain forms of behaviour.

This paper may be seen to have contributed in two fundamentally important ways to criminological orientations to criminal statistics. Firstly, it cast grave doubts in the minds of some that official statistics could ever have anything useful to tell us about deviance. Indeed they state that even if a 'perfect' counting system were in operation, this would not overcome the definitional problem of ambiguity and discretion which affect all counting procedures. As such their position has given rise, among new deviance theorists and subsequently among radical criminologists, to a belief that all attempts to quantify crime and deviance are false enterprises (see discussion in Chapter VII below).

Secondly, their observations can be argued, paradoxically, to have influenced positivist criminologists in the direction of the search for a more accurate system for counting crime. For new deviance theorists the main focus of enquiry has been upon the activity of rate-producing bureaucrats - especially the police, and positivists have become progressively more sensitised to this. Indeed, as I have argued in Chapters II and III above, surveys of victimisation were conceived
partially in terms of the evaluation of policing methods, and this aspect has recently become more emphasised. But, as we shall see, the focus of attention has enlarged to include the behavioural and definitional activities of victims.

The notion that the "dark figure" is a phenomenon to be taken extremely seriously and whose dimensions may have far-reaching implications for all criminological work - as well as for crime control policies - is now well enshrined. Data from successive victimisation surveys continue to confirm two facts; firstly, that the "dark figure" is, for some types of offences, very high in comparison to recorded offences; secondly, that the main source of information about crime is the victims themselves. I will deal with these points separately.

In the United States the National Crime Survey (NCS) has found that 39% of all crimes of theft and 47% of all violent crimes were reported in 1981. Variations within those overall rates include a 67% rate for robbery causing injury, 39% for simple assaults, 51% of burglaries and 87% of vehicle thefts. (U.S. Department of Justice 1983a p.47; p.70).

In the first British Crime Survey (BCS) the levels of unreported crime varied from an average of 42% for household offences and 36% for personal offences. Within those rates there was marked variation by offence - 66% for burglary, 22% for vandalism, 39% for wounding, and 47% for robbery, with the rate for vehicle theft being 95%. (Hough and Mayhew 1983 p.11).

There is, therefore, considerable evidence for the existence of a very large body of unrecorded crime. Let us now look at the explanations and research findings which shed light upon the shortcomings of official crime statistics. Some of those criticisms stress the technical and organisational sources of error, and other criticisms - often articulated by the same authors - attempt to locate the sources of those errors against a background of competing interests and ideologies. I will concentrate firstly upon the relationship between the
shape of crime statistics and rates of criminality, and aspects of the organisational behaviour of the police.

Leslie Wilkins (1967) makes the point that the production of crime statistics ought to be viewed as a sequential process which moves through a number of definite stages:

1. An event occurs, which could be interpreted as a crime.
2. It, or its consequence, is observed by the victim or another person.
3. The victim or observer notify the police, or the police come to know about the event as a result of their own activities.
4. The police decide whether the reported action is to be considered a crime and, if so, how it should be classified.
5. Sometimes this description is reviewed at another point in the police hierarchy.
6. The police decide which legal category of crime is appropriate.
7. The statistics are made public.

Various extraneous variables may enter at any of the stages. In relation to stage 2, the victim's or witnesses decision to report, or not to report the event, is of central importance, and this may be linked in all sorts of ways which I will discuss later, with problems of the definition of situations and behaviour. In relation to stage 3 must be considered the action which individual policemen or law enforcement agencies as organisations take when confronted with public complaints or calls for assistance, and indeed when confronted with crimes which they themselves discover. Also, at stage 4, the police make decisions as to whether to label an event as a crime, and to classify it in a particular way; these decisions are necessarily affected by organisational and other imperatives and constraints. Finally, when the outcome of these processes become made public, the results themselves become verified in terms of "trends" and "rates" and may be used in various ways which may in turn affect the statistical production process.
According to Wiles (1971 p.186), for instance, the practical application of the criminal law depends on bureaucratically organised agencies charged with its enforcement, and it is of course from the information which these agencies generate that criminal statistics are compiled. The scope of the data will be bounded by the scope of the agencies' activities, and will above all else be a record of the day-to-day activities of the agency concerned. What criminal statistics record therefore is not a direct transcription of the social reality of crime, but a fraction of that reality through the various organisational processes involved in the collection and recording of data. As such, in order to understand the meaning of criminal statistics, we must have a detailed knowledge of the agencies involved in the collection process, and how they relate to, and are influenced by, the wider social structure.

It is necessary, says Wiles, to examine the process by which an event becomes recorded as a crime. Certain facets of organisational culture will in itself place limitations upon the nature of the statistics, and the nature of the information recorded will be constrained by certain decision making processes. Policy changes relating to the work of the police will affect not only the nature of their work, but inevitably the nature of the information gathered. Criminal statistics are based on data collected not by agencies designed to collect that information, but by agencies designed to enforce the law. The statistics which result are part of the attempt to achieve that goal. (Ibid. p.188).

Box (1971 p.169-174) takes this idea further in noting the organisational vicissitudes of policing which are instrumental in the production of the particular shape of crime statistics and rates. Full enforcement of the law does not, and of course cannot exist. Thus, the law must be enforced in a partial fashion which reflects a multitude of political and organisational constraints and imperatives, and the policy-based and situation-based decisions which arise from these. The use of discretion and other aspects of processing in patrolling, responding to complaints, detection work, arresting and prosecuting and so on, have a marked effect upon official crime statistics.
As of yet, there is no actual representation of this document in plain text format. The content appears to be a dense block of text, possibly related to scientific or technical topics, which makes it challenging to transcribe accurately without proper context or tools for image analysis. If you have access to a more readable form of this document, please provide it for a more accurate transcription.
will have a partial effect of constraining the police from full law-
enforcement. The symbiotic relationship which might be set up with
organised crime in the United States, or the delicate relationship
which exists between the police and social work agencies in Britain,
over the response to such things as spouse and child abuse, under-age
sex, incest, and substance abuse, serve as examples of this set of
constraints.

Fourthly, the police are constrained by interpretational issues,
most notably the differential definition of the legal status of be-
avour, on the part of sections of society.

Fifthly, policemen are constrained in their work by ideological
and theoretical considerations. The decision making processes in-
herent in police work are informed by political ideologies, moral
values, beliefs about the causes of criminal behaviour, and stereo-
typical conceptions of criminals.

Finally, all policemen, like other employees, have occupational
and career worries. Physical threats or the fear of them, may
occasionally lead to non-enforcement, and factors associated with the
largely mundane nature of police work - such as boredom, lethargy and
so on, are all factors which must be considered in the understanding
of the 'socially constructed' nature of crime statistics.

The organising principle governing the performance of police work
is then, according to Box, the maintenance of a precarious balance
between rewards and costs. Out of all the considerations listed above,
therefore, the police take decisions calculated to maximise rewards
and minimise costs. This particular viewpoint is in accord with those
of a majority of criminologists, and this chorus of agreement can be
held to be responsible for successful demands which have been made for
crime statistics generated by alternative bureaucracies and sources.

According to Pidcock and Roche, organisational problems exert a
most direct influence upon pattern of surveillance, observation and
detection:

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"... operational organisations such as the police or courts choose not to observe more than they can process with given resources, and they selectively screen observations to fit organisational goals, strategy, and tactics."

(1967 p.9).

This particular aspect of the problem of the official crime statistics has been investigated by numerous authors and these investigated have mostly chosen to distinguish between "proactive" and "reactive" facets of policing and the resultant production of statistics.

A study of Chicago by Reiss (1974 : cited in Hindelang and Gottfredson 1976) for instance, shows that about 95% of criminal incidents become known to the police through complaints from victims, compared with only 5% which emerged in the course of proactive policing. In Britain, similar studies have tended to show a remarkable congruence in demonstrating the pervasive influence of the public upon the nature of police work, with only about 15% of crimes discovered by the police themselves (Burrows 1982 p.12-13) as against 85% being reported to them by victims or their associates, organisations or witnesses. More recently, the second BCS found that 94% of crimes known to the police had been reported to them by members of the public, and the police themselves were at the scene of the crime in only 3% of cases. (Hough and Mayhew 1985 p.19). In the PSI London survey, fully 99% of known crime was reported by the public (Smith and Gray op.cit. p.76).

As Donald Black has observed:

"In routine police work the handling of crime is in large part the handling of complaints. Policemen see more victims than criminals."

(1977 p.77).

Proactively produced crime rates are nearly always rates of arrest rather than rates of known criminal acts, whereas the most important variable in "crime known to the police", is the volume of complaints
from citizens. Nevertheless, rates of known crimes do not perfectly reflect the volume of these complaints. A complaint is itself subject to a process by which it is given office status in a formal written report before it can enter the police statistics. The BCS has, for instance, found a marked discrepancy between the number of crimes reported and the number actually recorded by the police. (Hough and Mayhew op.cit., p.11). In a study conducted by Black (op.cit.) police patrol officers wrote official reports in only 64% of the 554 crime situations where a complainant, but no suspect, was present in a field setting. The decision to give or withhold official recognition of a crime was held to be an outcome of face-to-face interaction in the situation rather than a programmed police response to a legal or bureaucratic formula. Black considered that the probability of an official report emerging from a police-complainant encounter was influenced by a number of conditions.

Firstly, the legal seriousness of the alleged crime was important in that reports were written for 72% of the felonies, but for only 53% of the misdemeanours. Even though the probability of a report increased with the seriousness of the offence, it is noteworthy, says Black, that so many offenders unknowingly receive a pardon of sorts! Subsequent investigation can only occur when a report is forwarded to the detective division for further processing, which may include the possibility of an arrest and conviction.

Secondly, Black considers that the preferences of the complainant - whether or not he wishes the police to proceed against a suspect - also exerts an influence in that the police are highly dependent upon citizens to assist them in structuring situational reality. Complainants have some power to direct the invocation of the law and to assist in discrimination between both situations and categories of law-breaker.

Thirdly, the greater the relational distance between the complainant and the offender, the greater the likelihood of official recognition. The police are more likely to respond to a request for formal action if the offender is a stranger, than if he is a friend, a neighbour, or a member of the complainant's family. A more general consequence of this pattern of police behaviour, is therefore, that "the criminal law give
priority to the protection of strangers from strangers while it leaves vulnerable intimates to intimates". (ibid. p.740).

Fourthly, the probability of an official report is lowest in situations when the complainant is antagonistic to the police in a face-to-face encounter. Less than one-third of disrespectful complainants saw their wishes actualised in a crime report. Black does however note that findings concerning levels of complainant deference and legal outcomes are complicated by the fact that in most studies of this aspect, including his own, contain no information about police behaviour towards the citizen, which may provoke a certain degree of deference.

Lastly, Black concluded that the race of complainants did not independently relate to the production of official crime rates, but that the police gave preferential treatment to white collar complainants in felony situations (ibid. p.744). Furthermore, evidence of discrimination was discovered in the data relating to intra-class and inter-class crime. The police were more likely to take action in situations where blue-collar persons commit felonies against white-collar persons, whilst being comparatively lenient in the investigation of felonies committed by one blue-collar person against another (ibid. p.745).

Some recent works by British authors have also shed some light on the reactivity and proactivity of policing, and also the related questions of how crimes, reported or discovered, come to be included or excluded from official crime statistics.

Bottomley and Coleman (1981), in their observations of the operations of an unnamed English regional force, note that certain processes mediate between calls for assistance and other complaints, and the decision to take action. In their study of 'criming' and 'no criming', they discovered that a practice existed known as 'cuffing', in which incidents which would normally be the subject of a formal crime report, are not initially put down on paper for official record. This was a traditional strategic practice which was subject, in Box's terms, to considerations of "costs and rewards".

At the level of an individual officer, the incentives for 'cuffing' may include the saving of unwelcome paper work, or that the offence
was 'held over' until a future time when it might be used to put pressure on an offender or a potential informant. In some instances an offence might be temporarily 'cuffed' to prevent it being handed 'on a plate' by a uniformed officer to the CID and credited to the record of the latter. (Ibid. p.22). This practice does entail some risk for the officer in discipline and career terms. There was some agreement among senior officers that the practice had declined in recent times due to such innovations as the computer-storage of records and the possibility that a victim or an insurance company may later enquire about a 'cuffed' offence. In any case, to the extent that the practice survives, along with other discretionary practices, the implications for the crime rate, and indeed the clear-up rate, are obvious.

The problem of 'cuffing' which is an unofficial yet partially tolerated practice, has to be considered against the background of numerous political and organisational filters of a more enshrined and official nature. Gwynn Nettler (1978 p.55-56) has noted that although crime reporting manuals for the police in the United States and Canada are fairly explicit in the instructions regarding the 'founding' and 'unfounding' of reported offences, their interpretation in practice involves the use of a great deal of discretion. Very little research has been done to establish the consistency with which official counting rules are applied. While we do not know how reliably accounts are maintained in different jurisdictions, we do know that the proportion of crimes 'unfounded' varies with the type of crime; in the United States, for instance, this amounts to about 4% of all serious offences. Within this figure we find that 2% of larceny complaints and 1% of complaints of rape are officially discounted.

In England and Wales in 1978, the extent of official 'unfounding' or writing off complaints as 'no crime', was 3% of all reported crimes. Regional variations were marked and ranged from a low of 1% in some counties, to as high as 7-8% in others. Very few consistent patterns emerge from these variations, except that all six English metropolitan forces recorded almost identical proportions of 'no crime', at a slightly below the national average rate of 2.6% to 2.8% (Bottomley and Coleman op. cit. p.63-64). In the authors' own jurisdiction, 11%
of all reports were written off, including 30% of cycle thefts, 19% of criminal damage, and 17% of personal violence, to just 6% of burglaries.

The authors conclude that the critical stage in terms of this dimension of the assembling of the crime statistics, is not the relatively open and formalised stage between the filing of the crime report and the 'no-crime' decision, but the one highlighted by Black — the preceding 'low visibility' stage of police-public interaction — for without an official crime report in the first place there would be no recording of the crime.

They found that there were several circumstances which might affect the 'no crime' decision, at one or other of the above stages; citizens mistakes or false reports, failure to meet the requirements of legal or statistical categorisation, various practical constraint of the criminal justice system — including refusal of victims to prosecute and lack of evidence, the wishes of the complainant, and the exercise of discretion and operational stereotypes — including expectations of likely community responses to police action or inaction. The authors also cite the work of Sparks et.al. (1977) in London, and McCabe and Sutcliffe (1978) in Lancashire and The Thames Valley as demonstrating that the circumstances surrounding 'no crime' in their own research seem confirmed nationally, despite important differences in local practices.

In an important study of robbery in Chicago, based on NCS and UCR data, Block and Block (1980) found that a "funnel model" is applicable to describe the transition from incident occurrence, to notification of the police, to initial recording, and on to "founding". About 50% of incidents were reported to the police; of these 73% were initially recorded; of these 79% were finally "founded". The overall probability that an incident would make the transition to "founding" (and entry in the police statistics) was 29%. The transitional path varied according to whether the robbery was an attempt or was completed, whether weapons were used, and whether injury to the victim occurred.

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A similar model is used by Chambers and Millar (1983) in their research on police practices in the recording of reported sexual assaults in Scotland. The authors trace the process of transition of 196 complaints of sexual assault from incident logging to crime recording, to the writing of a crime report (the stage at which the police conclude that a crime has been committed and will result in an investigation being made), and on to subsequent judicial stages. About 22% of complaints (44 cases) were "no-crime" at the police stage, it being decided that 20 complaints were "groundless" and in 24 cases the complaint was withdrawn.

The importance of the transition from victim reporting to police reporting, is underlined by a finding of the Midlands Crime Survey (Farrington and Dohds 1983). It was concluded that two-thirds of the marked differences in the crime rates between the three counties surveyed could be accounted for in terms of differences in police recording practices. This was especially so in relation to the counting of offences "taken into consideration", attributed to offenders charged with another offence, and the varying recording rates for offences of very little seriousness.

According to Wesley Skogan (1976 b. p.110) police departments act as political and organizational filters through which citizen complaints must pass before becoming part of the official crime count. Offences reported to the police can be shifted from one statistical category to another, they can be 'downgraded', or they can be ignored. All these activities can occur at various levels within the organization, from the individual policemen to the top administrators of police departments. The focus of most research in this area has, however, tended to remain the situational activities of uniformed police patrolmen, with relatively less attention being paid to the activities of detectives. Very little work by comparison has focused upon the operational decisions of senior police administrators even though it is often conceded in studies of patrolmen that important sources of pressure to pay differential attention to certain categories of crime do in reality percolate down from the highest levels through the middle-management strata of departments.
Given the stormy origins and political history of American crime statistics, it is probably not surprising to find many authors referring to this factor, although evidence from research studies of high-level manipulation of the content of crime statistics is rare compared to the attention which has been paid to their manipulation through certain types of misleading and politically loaded presentation.

Skogan has noted that top police administrators have to be especially sensitive to "political winds", which usually carry the message that crime rates should be kept low. Thus police chiefs and their subordinates often have a vested interest in the suppression of crime data. This desire to show the effectiveness of the department has to be balanced against certain organisational demands for increased resources - manpower, equipment, money - leading to the tendency for more crime to be officially recorded in order to demonstrate organisational needs.

Whatever the pressures for the manipulation of statistics by American police departments, and at whatever level in the hierarchy they might occur, Skogan has assembled impressive evidence of the outcome of that manipulation. He cites the Crime Commission's documentation of the effects of professionalism and internal reform upon police statistics. When reformers take office, crime rates often rise, only to level off as the new order becomes established. The longer-term rise in police professionalism is also held to be responsible for apparent increases in the crime rate. Professional departments are more interested in data collection and record keeping, and use these to allocate resources and evaluate personnel. Professionalism also implies a great formality in the disposal of complaints, which should increase the proportion of police-citizen encounters resulting in written reports.

Also, by means of an analysis of crime rates in twenty-six cities, Skogan has shown that when police rates for burglary and robbery are compared with data on citizen reporting drawn from the National Crime Survey, then the following conclusions may be drawn. The ratio of police recorded offences to citizen reports claimed by informants to
the NCS, shows a significant amount of under-recording. The scores of
those departments having the highest and lowest ratios of recorded to
reported burglaries, and robberies fit the stereotypes of those
agencies. At the top, Washington D.C. and St. Louis are vigorously
professional departments; at the bottom, Philadelphia and Milwaukee
"produce notoriously unbelievable crime reports each year". (ibid.
p.112). Skogan also finds strong positive correlations between re-
cording rates for robbery and the extent of departmental resources of
manpower and expenditure. He concludes:

"The discrepancy between the
survey crime rate and the
police figures is fraught with
consequences, for the community
and for the police - when
departments encourage the col-
lection of more accurate stat-
istics, they suffer as a result."

Also:

"One of the strongest effects
of complete recording is that
it decreases the clearance
rate for robbery and burglary."

( ibid. p.116).

4.5. Criminal Statistics and the Role of Victims:

We have noted that modern policing is almost entirely reactive,
in that the majority of known offences become known to police depart-
ments through information and calls for help from victims or persons
acting on their behalf or else witnesses to crime. Since the time
of the first victimisation surveys conducted for the Johnson Crime
Commission (e.g. Ennis 1967) it has become a well established fact
that the behaviour of victims is the most important determinant of the
shape of criminal statistics, and that the organisational behaviour
of the police must be understood as interacting with the individual
and collective behaviour of victims in important ways.

The victim of crime has been referred to as the "initiator of the
criminal justice process". The victim's decision whether or not to
report the victimisation to the police is an important control on the
input to the system. For most traditionally serious crimes, the victim serves as the "gatekeeper of the criminal justice system". (Hindelang and Gottfredson 1967 p.57-8).

While the impact of victim reporting behaviour is clear, the criminal justice system in its turn, may have a considerable impact both on victims and on the public at large. A number of aspects of the operation of the criminal justice system may thereby have an important impact upon the behaviour of actual and potential victims. The relationship between the two will be mediated by perceptual and attitudinal processes. Thus, general perceptions of the "crime problem" and levels of "fear of crime", public attitudes towards the processing of convicted offenders, perceptions of police performance, attitudes towards the police and experiences of police conduct, and numerous other less specific socio-cultural factors varying between different segments of the population will all, in complex and unclear ways, eventually be reflected in official trends and rates of crime.

A great deal has been written about the reasons why persons who believe that a crime has been committed against them may decide to invoke the criminal justice system by reporting the alleged crime to the police, or else decide not to do this. Firstly there are many factors associated with the problematic ways in which victims may define, or fail to define, an incident which has happened to them, as a crime. Secondly, the self-defined victim may, for a range of broadly utilitarian reasons, assess the probable costs and benefits of notifying the police. Such considerations may include the possibility of reprisal, shaming or excessive demands upon time, in comparison to such benefits as insurance, compensation, freedom from future victimisation, and other less tangible satisfactions. Thirdly, it may also be that the victim's reporting behaviour is influenced by more general attitudes to, and knowledge and opinion about law, the police and social control, as well as conceptions about such things as social obligations and duties.

On the basis of an analysis of data from the National Crime Survey, Skogan has concluded that:
"... the primary determinant of most reporting and non-reporting is the seriousness of the offence. Individual attributes such as race, sex, income and (although it did account for something) age are secondary in importance to the nature of the incident itself. In both the national and city data, the controlling factors were the amount of financial loss involved in a crime, whether force was used, whether a weapon was employed, the extent of physical injury and whether the assailant was a stranger. Factors such as invasion of one's home or being threatened with death have a major impact on crime reporting." (1976 p.108).

He also claims that variations in aggregate levels of reporting between the twenty-six cities surveyed, can be reliably accounted for by variations in the factors mentioned in the above quotation. One of the strongest relationships to be found, however, reflects the racial fears on the part of whites about black crime. Although the majority of black crime involves black victims, the rate at which whites reported crimes to the police was higher in cities where blacks were more likely to be involved in offending. The reporting rate for black victims was not significantly affected by this factor. Even when the author controlled for the racial composition of the cities concerned, the proportion of white victimisations involving black offenders continues to dependently affect the reporting practices of whites.

In a study by Schneider (1976 pp.143-145) minor property crimes were found to be reported by victims who are more trusting of the police, who live in areas where the police enjoy good relationships with the community, who are more integrated into the community, and who have participated in more community crime prevention activities. With moderately serious property crimes such the same correlation between variables is found, except that the victim's perception of the likelihood of the offender's apprehension by the police becomes an important factor. Also, if the crime is committed by a stranger, it is more apt
to be reported. Highly serious property crimes are more likely to be reported by victims who trust the police, believe the police will be able to catch the offender, have lived in the area for a longer time, have insured their property, and who believe that the crime was committed by a stranger. At all levels of seriousness, the reporting of personal (assaultive) crimes was significantly influenced by all the attitudinal factors associated with the property offences, with the belief that the court will punish the offender emerging as an additionally important factor. (ibid. p.146).

In another piece of research, Schneider and her co-workers concluded that the level of integration of the victim into the community — as judged by the respondent's understanding of local issues — was a stronger predictor of reporting for personal crimes than any other — including the seriousness of the offence. Persons who feel isolated or alienated from their community are not as apt to report crimes. (Schneider, Buscoart and Wilson 1976 p.109).

A large amount of research having a bearing upon the reporting and non-reporting of victimisation has been concerned with an assumed circular relationship between citizens' evaluation of the police, various aspects of police performance, and the likelihood of crime reporting. It has often been argued that victims and witnesses will be more likely to report crimes if they have a positive evaluation of the police, if their personal experiences with the police are judged favourably. Therefore, the rationale for the introduction of new community-based styles of policing, of securing citizen involvement in crime prevention programmes, and the improvement of certain aspects of service-delivery (including the quality and timing of responses to calls for assistance), includes the belief that these will lead to higher levels of reporting and other kinds of co-operation from the public. Conversely, low levels of reporting are often held to be, in certain circumstances, indicative of unfavourable attitudes and evaluations and lower expectations, all of which may then be further depressed by poor police performance, leading to further reduced levels of co-operation and reporting.

Studies of levels of public satisfaction with police performance have tended to centre around the matter of police response. The
aspects of this would seem to be important. Firstly, there is the question of the time taken by police patrols to arrive at the scene of an alleged crime; secondly, there is the question of how the police behave as part of that response, and how this is perceived by members of the public involved.

Some studies (e.g. Parks 1976 p.101) have demonstrated that the relationship between citizen evaluations is quite complex, in that when citizens were satisfied with police response, their evaluations were unrelated to their experience. When, however, citizens were dissatisfied with their police contact, they were much more likely to give their local police unfavourable evaluations. The speed of response to calls for assistance together with the action taken in the situation were found to substantially relate to citizen satisfaction. Research by Percy (1980 p.85) on the other hand has shown that levels of satisfaction are related not to actual response time, but to the relationship between this and expected response time.

In the British context, studies have also found a strong relationship between police response and public satisfaction. Eklon and Heal (1982), for instance, note that only about 2% of telephone calls to the police are judged to involve a serious matter and to require a fast response. The vast majority of public calls to the police are so-called "service calls" involving a wide variety of requests for information and action on a large number of issues including issues of "nuisance". This is in contrast to the Merseyside Crime Survey (MCS) finding that the majority of contacts with the police initiated by members of the public concern crime. (Kinsey 1984 p.25). Callers are seeking, say Eklon and Heal, reassurance or authoritative sympathy, a sense of fighting back against uncontrollable events or transferring responsibility for their problem. Despite the diversity of issues common features emerged. Most callers expected the police response to their request to take the form of a visit from a uniformed patrol officer within a short space of time. The officers were expected to behave in a "proper" way, including interviewing, taking statements, securing premises and restoring order. (ibid. p.59).

The British research throwing most light upon attitudinal factors

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σημειώσεις για την επανάληψη του ελληνικού φυσικού και την επίσημη προσέγγιση της χρήσης του ελληνικού και της ισπανικής γλώσσας. 

"Θα πρέπει να λες ότι τα ξένα λόγια δεν μπορούν να μεταφραστούν με την ίδια ομοσπονδική της ισπανικής γλώσσας. Κάθε λόγιο έχει ένα διαφορετικό σημασία και χρήση στην ισπανική γλώσσα.

Αυτό που συμβαίνει με τα ξένα λόγια είναι ότι δεν μπορούν να μεταφραστούν με την ίδια ομοσπονδική της ισπανικής γλώσσας. Κάθε λόγιο έχει ένα διαφορετικό σημασία και χρήση στην ισπανική γλώσσα."

(89-16-49, 17 Φεβρουαρίου 2023)
that the police spend too much time on irrelevant matters. (Ibid. p.135-6).

The implications of the findings in these studies of victim behaviour, and of victim-police interactions, for the understanding of trends and rates of reported crime, are obvious. A change in the proportion of victims who report incidents to the police can produce changes in the official crime rate, even though the actual volume of crime may not change at all. The impact of such things as new operational policies or of the sensitisation of the public consciousness to certain types of offender or offence, and more private and situational cost-benefit judgements on the part of the victim, may all sensitively affect the rate of reported crime.

It has been pointed out by Schmiler (1976 p.142-3) that despite the amount of research evidence for non-reporting, the meaning of non-reporting has not been dealt with extensively. We do not know, he says, whether the phenomenon is one of major importance in understanding the nature of crime and the criminal justice system, or whether it is an interesting, but relatively unimportant phenomenon. In one respect, the victim may be seen as an "initial screening mechanism" to separate serious crimes from less important ones, thus saving the limited resources of law enforcement and the courts from complete swamping. On the other hand:

"... if non-reporting is due to a lack of trust in the police, fear of retaliation or other perceptual factors, then "screening" by victims exacerbates the inequitable distribution of police services to the public. That is, alienated segments of society, and persons who do not trust the criminal justice system, will be less likely to report crimes and, therefore, will not receive their fair share of the services provided by the criminal justice system."

(Ibid. p.143).

The author bases these remarks on her examination of a victimisation survey in Portland, Oregon, in 1974. The questionnaire and sample were designed specifically to meet local evaluation needs. There was concern not only to estimate the extent of unreported crimes, but also to evaluate
the impact of a neighbourhood property marking initiative, and improvements to street lighting. Schneider is also concerned to know, as the above quotation suggests, what reporting and non-reporting behaviour suggest about the perceptions of members of the public, with reference to crime, the fear of crime, and relationships with the police.

Her analysis of the results of the survey reveals - as might have been expected - that the seriousness of the offence greatly influences reporting decisions. Her concern, however, is not confined to this issue, but to whether or not reporting decisions are based on attitudes towards the criminal justice system, rather than on the nature of the offence. She found, for instance, that minor property crimes are more apt to be reported by victims who are more trusting of the police, who live in an area where the police enjoy good relations with the community, who are more integrated into the community, and who have participated in community crime prevention activities.

Decisions to report moderately serious property crimes correlated with the independent variables in much the same way. However, the victim's perception of whether the police will be able to catch the offender was more important for moderately serious offences than for minor ones. And, when the crime is quite serious, this becomes one of the most important variables. The most serious property crimes were found to be more apt to be reported by victims who a). trust the police, b). believe the police will catch the offender, c). have lived in the area for a longer time, d). have insured their property, and e). believe that the crime was committed by a stranger.

For personal crimes - as with less serious property crimes - the author found attitudinal items to be quite important. Trust in the police, the belief in the police's effectiveness, and the victim's ability to understand the nature of local issues (an indicator of community integration) were all relatively important in victim decisions to report crimes.

A particularly interesting finding was that persons participating in anti-burglary activities - such as property marking, crime-prevention sticker display and neighbourhood meetings, were more apt to report burglaries to the police than were non-participants. On this finding, Schneider sounds a cautionary note. One must consider the possibility, she says, that people who tend to report crimes might be more likely to
participate in such programmes in the first place. She concludes, however, that self-selection does not entirely explain the difference in reporting percentages, and that evidence remains for the impact of the programmes themselves.

It would therefore seem to be strongly established that attitudinal variables, and other dimensions of the meaning systems within which victims of crime operate, are of profound importance in the search for a more complete understanding of the role of victims in the construction of statistics on crime. In this search, criminologists should continually refine their methods of inquiry, and do so in such a way that takes into account the importance of wider social, situational, and personal variables. Having so far given an overview of the history and development of criminal statistics, and having surveyed the various debates and studies concerning the deficiencies of official measures of crime, it is time to move on to consider the alternatives.

I now propose to examine the claims that sample surveys of criminal victimisation offer a superior method for counting crime, and for measuring the numerous factors associated with offences and resultant victimisation. I will be concentrating especially upon the methodological problems of victimisation surveys. This will be in preparation for my account in Chapter VII of the design of a pilot questionnaire for the Islington Crime Survey, and for my evaluation of the final questionnaires used in the Islington and Merseyside crime surveys.

4.6. Surveys of criminal victimisation: a "least worst" measure of crime?

As we have seen in the above discussion, official crime statistics provide a highly unsatisfactory means of measuring the total amount of crime, and the rates for different offences. It seems that with the exception of crimes of theft of, or theft from, motor vehicles, and possibly homicide, the total number of offences recorded falls far short of the hypothetical total which might be assumed to actually exist.

The major sources of error, as we have seen, consist in the areas of definition of acts as infractions of criminal laws by victims, policemen, and others; the organisational behaviour and decision making of police; and, most importantly, the decisions taken by victims and witnesses, once they define an event as a crime, to report or not report
the event to the police. Criminal statistics, especially as judged by some critics, have been seen as having more to tell us about the re-fracting processes inherent in the activities of police bureaucracies than about the real nature of the phenomena which they purport to quantify.

According to Biderman and Reiss (1967 p.1.), contending arguments about criminal statistics fall into two types. "Realists" are those who are critical of the statistics of official agencies, but for whom there remains the belief in the possibility of vastly improved data collection techniques. For some purposes, they maintain, one may be able to use agency-collected data, but the more official agencies may try to 'tighten-up' collection procedures, the more these may be subverted by their employees. It is likely to be necessary, therefore, to create data-collection bodies which are completely independent of official agencies.

In terms of the history of these debates, one can trace a movement among criminologists from reliance upon judicial statistics (for convictions), towards a greater reliance upon police statistics. The subsequent desire to base the measurement of crime upon sample surveys of the population, is but the latest shift in the search for the greater completeness which it is believed will result from methods which move us closer to the commission of the criminal event itself.

By contrast, "institutionists" emphasise that crime can have valid meaning only in terms of organisational responses to it (ibid p.1.). The views of new deviancy theorists (as outlined in Section 4.4. above) fall squarely into this category. Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) would qualify as "radical institutionists", in that the organisational errors which the "realists" so dearly wish to circumvent, are irrelevant to them. Differential sensitivity to events merely reflects the biased perspectives of whoever is doing the collecting. Thus the independent data of the "realists" are seen as equally distorted by institutional biases. (ibid p.10.).

It is important here to clarify the positions of twentieth-century criminologists with regard to these definitions of "realism" and "institutionism". In the 1930's, "realism" was most notably present in the works of Thorsten Sellin and Edwin Sutherland (see 4.3. (ii) above).
In the previous century Quetelet had given birth to a tremendous faith in the power of quantitative methods to generate data on crime which would be expressed in a constant ratio to some assumed actual number of crimes committed. Quetelet's optimism was carried on in the work of Sellin and his co-workers and pupils and have been passed down to those - like Biderman, Reiss, Wolfgang and others, who championed the victimisation survey as a means of achieving ever greater approximations of a 'true' crime count.

It is also important to avoid confusion with regard to the ways in which the terms "realist" and "institutionist" may be applied to contemporary trends within criminology. The criticisms of official crime statistics which developed from new deviancy theory - a form of "institutionism" - may be detected in the work of the 'left idealist' criminologists which I discuss below. The views on statistics expressed in the work of 'left realist' criminologists, with which I shall also deal in subsequent chapters, make them "realists" in the eyes of Biderman and Reiss, especially in light of their optimism with regard to the potential of victimisation surveys for counting and revealing dimensions of the crime problem. It is, however, essential to avoid any confusion in the use of the term "realist" as used by Biderman and Reiss, and the term "left-realist" as used to define a particular orientation in radical criminology. For the remainder of this chapter it is the former sense in which the term will be used.

How then might we assess the value of these two positions - one optimistic, one extremely pessimistic - in relation to the quantification of crime? The real problem with the "institutionist" position, I would argue, is that it is based on the assumption that most of the activities of the police are pro-active; that is that most of the police activity which may eventually lead to the recording of events as crimes, depends entirely upon prior decisions on such things as the deployment of manpower and higher-echelon decisions concerning 'crack-downs' on certain types of offence, or certain types of person. In my view, this argument may be shown to be substantially correct in the case of those offences which are 'victimless', or where at least the offences do not routinely lead to complaints by those involved. Thus, in the case of prostitution, the illegal public activities of gay men, the possession or sale of illegal drugs, and so on, it is possible to argue that the recording rates do constitute what Kitsuse and Cicourel (op.cit. p.139) call "social facts par excellence". In other words, they are objects of study in their own right, without resource to the assumption that they are connected to the "real" rates of deviance.

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Close examination of the ways in which information about crime becomes available to the police, both as included in direct studies of police behaviour and recording methods and in evidence from victimisation surveys, tells us that most policing is 'reactive'; that is, in response to reports or calls for help from members of the public. This means that the ability of the police bureaucracy to create or sculpt the statistics for victim-reported crimes such as theft, robbery, vandalism, and burglary is limited, though not completely so, by such considerations legal obligations and the need to maintain public confidence. It is true, as studies cited in this chapter have shown, that the police do systematically interfere with reports, submitting them to an organisational filtering process. Their ability to interfere and distort is further limited by the social power of the complainant. Thus it is likely that in less affluent areas there are more cases of police failure to respond to calls, or to disregard or 'unfound' reports, especially at the lower end of the spectrum of 'seriousness'.

In reality therefore, the politics of official statistics extends to the power relationships between police and complainants, and is not confined to the whimsical moralism or opportunism of policy-making senior officers, nor of the on-the-spot decisions and prejudices of the lower ranks. Even in the case of 'victimless' offences, police decisions to intervene are often affected by collective complaints from within the communities affected, as has been the case with "kerb-crawling", public prostitution, and dealing in hard drugs, in Britain in recent times.

The widespread use and acceptance of victimisation surveys is the most recent example of the continual search by "realists" for more satisfactory means of counting crime. In the context of criminology in Britain, the work of writers such as Richard Sparks has been particularly important in high-lighting the problems of official criminal statistics, and in the promotion of the victimisation survey as a superior method for collecting data on crime. Key Issues in Criminology (Hood and Sparks 1970) was the first British text book to give an extensive account of the finding of American victimisation surveys linking these to the findings of the handful of British work of the 1960's, on the problem on unreported crime. The authors also discuss the methodological problems of such surveys, and conclude with a cautious optimism characteristic of the "realist" position.
The publication of *Surveying Victims* (Sparks et al. 1977) was a really most important landmark in the development of "realist" orientations towards criminal statistics in Britain. The book was based upon a study of criminal victimisation in three inner-city areas of London - Brixton, Hackney and Kensington - and the findings supported Sparks' general case for the need for victimisation surveys in Britain. Most importantly, perhaps, the study was primarily intended to test the adequacy and deficiencies of aspects of the methodology of the surveys. As such, the book acquainted British criminologists with the methods and their inherent problems, but also was successful in convincing them that solutions to these problems could be found, and that the data generated could have enormous implications for numerous policy areas.

Although the "realists" accept that chasing the 'true' volume of crime is like chasing a mirage, they seem to proceed as if this goal were attainable. Victimisation surveys would seem to be based quite strongly on the assumption that the systematic layers of bias which affect the police statistics, can be peeled aside. However, as one author has recently remarked, with not a little understatement:

"Victimisation studies bring in their train perhaps almost as many questions about their accuracy and validity as do other ways of measuring crime."

(Shapland 1984 p.199).

I will now go on to look at victimisation surveys and the extent to which they might be regarded as a significant advance in the quest for what has been cynically termed - a "least worst measure of crime". (Levine et al. 1980 p.50f). I will look at the criticisms which have been specifically levelled at the National Crime Survey and the British Crime Survey, and also discuss a more general list of the methodological problems of victimisation surveys.

The sample survey of victims of crime is a well established method for estimating the incidence in populations of crimes in which the victims are individuals or households comprising several individuals. This technique typically involves asking a sample of the general public

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about crimes which may have been committed against them in some preceding period, such as six months or a year. The major purpose of victimisation surveys is to provide a more accurate estimate of the true extent of crime than that provided by the official crime statistics; in other words this is a device which holds the promise of finally laying bare the "dark figure" of crime. There is, however, an important difference between this technique and other measures of crime, in as much as victimisation surveys usually attempt to discover not only the extent of crime, but are usually also designed to yield information on a wide variety of factors which are associated with crime and victimisation. Such information includes the characteristics of the situation in which the offences occurred, the demographic characteristics of the victims, the impact of victimisation upon attitudes and behaviour, the extent of the fear of crime in comparison to the extent of victimisation, and other factors such as attitudes towards the police.

Potentially then, these surveys can become a most important data source to aid criminologists in testing long-held assumptions about the nature of crime in society, and which have hitherto been largely unquestioningly based upon other less reliable data sources. They also have the potential to generate entirely new questions about the nature, impact and definition of crime. Similarly, the surveys have the potential for, and have to some extent succeeded in, producing a much broader focus for study than the narrow traditional focus upon the officially processed offender. It has been argued by numerous writers that these surveys mark a shift from an "offender-centred" to a "victim-centred" focus for criminology (e.g. Anttila 1974 p.5.) or towards an "administrative criminology" which addresses broad areas of policy. (Young 1986). Various writers have also argued that information from such surveys points to the existence of crime victims as the "forgotten people" of the criminal justice system (Wm. McDonald 1976) and alerts us to their special needs (Garofalo 1981; Sparks 1981).

But, whatever the uses and potentials of these surveys may be, they are no longer in their infancy and have become an integral part of criminological practice - although their precise impact on criminological thinking and theorising is in some question.

The first surveys were carried out on behalf of the 1967 U.S. President's Crime Commission. (Biderman 1967; Reiss 1967; Ennis 1967).
The Ennis survey (the results are described in Chapter II above) was by far the largest - using nearly ten thousand respondents - and has been the one mostly widely cited and copied. Although the Report of the President's Commission made much of the surveys and also provided the original institutional support for their development, most of the Report's conclusions were actually based on data from the UCR. However, as a result of the creation of the Statistics Division of the LEAA in 1970, a programme of nation-wide and city-level surveys of victimisation, known collectively as the National Crime Survey, as found in 1972.

 Originally the programme consisted of four components - a national household survey, a number of city-level household surveys, a national commercial survey, and some city-level commercial surveys. Of these, the first is the most important and the only one still in existence.

 Six crimes are measured in the NCS - rape, robbery, assault, household burglary, personal and household larceny, and motor vehicle theft. As with the UCR, the NCS counts attempts as well as successfully completed crimes. (U.S. Department of Justice 1984 p.1.).

 The NCS is a panel survey. During each six-month period since 1972, surveyors have interviewed one person aged 12 years and over in each of 60,000 households about the experiences with crime of all members of the household (aged 12 years and over). The total number of individuals covered is 135,000 every six months. The sample is chosen by a lengthy process known as stratified multi-stage cluster sampling. Each household stays in the NCS for three years and thus is interviewed seven times. At the end of the three year period each household is replaced by a new one; this process is an ongoing one in which households are continually being added to and leaving the survey.

 At each interview, persons residing in each household are asked about incidents involving victimisation which might have happened to them in the previous six months. Data from the first interview is not used in the survey, but are used to "bound" the second interview; that is, they are used to establish a reference point which will prevent duplicate reporting in the second interview, of incidents that happened before the second interview. The second interview, from which data are used, serves to "bound" the third, and so on until the seventh interview is completed. (Sparks 1984 p.13.).
The NCS has produced a massive amount of data and some well-known substantive findings (overviewed in Chapter I and elsewhere above) and is estimated to have cost 10 million dollars per year in the period 1972-1977 (ibid p.15). According to Sparks, no criminological work on this scale has ever been done - with the possible exception of the background work for the Wickersham and Johnson crime commissions; also that the NCS has produced more data on criminal victimisation in the United States than could adequately be analysed by the entire criminological community within the next decade! (ibid p.11).

The British Crime Survey, conducted in 1982 and 1984, is a national survey of a representative sample of 11,000 people aged 16 years and over living in private households in 238 of the 552 electoral constituencies in England and Wales. Inner city areas were oversampled in order to 'catch' a greater number of more serious offences. Six main topics were covered by the survey and these were distributed throughout three parts of the questionnaire: the main (or screening) questionnaire; the victim form; and the follow-up questionnaire. In addition to asking respondents about their experiences with a range of personal and household crimes (chosen for comparability with the Criminal Statistics), respondents were asked about their lifestyles, fears and perceptions of crime, crime prevention practices, police contacts, and self-reported offending. The design is very close to that of the NCS and most victimisation surveys, an increasing number of which are being conducted in localities of Britain (see Chapter I section 2.5 above) and in Europe and elsewhere (see Block 1984), adhere quite closely to the NCS model. There are numerous methodological problems for such surveys. I will deal with these separately and conclude with an assessment of their contribution to knowledge in criminology.

The first problem of the surveys concerns their huge cost. In order to 'catch' sufficient numbers of criminal events - which have a relatively low rate of occurrence - it is necessary to sample a much larger proportion of the population than would be the case in surveys of other social phenomena. There is an inevitable need to balance costs against accuracy, and therefore it is not only sample size which must be considered, but also the composition of the sample in terms of the demographic characteristics sub-groups in the population. The NCS sample covers 0.08% of the American population over 12 years of age - a proportionate sample size which was copied by the BCS. (Sparks 1982
In all, less than 10% of persons sampled in victimisation surveys mention a criminal incident of any kind as having happened to them in the relevant time period. It is therefore necessary to have a large sample in order to generate enough data which will lend itself adequately to statistical analysis. Another consideration giving rise to the need for a very large sample, is that the distribution of victimisation is known to be extremely 'skewed', with many people having no experience of crime, a small number with one experience, and a small fraction with many experiences - the so-called 'multiple' or 'series' victims. Also, victimisation is 'skewed' between groups on the basis of age, race, gender and residence. It is therefore necessary not only to stratify the sample, but also to over-sample some groups - particularly if they are thought to suffer higher rates of victimisation, but their small numbers in the population, or their lack of clear identification in sampling frames, make it unlikely that they will be included in sufficient numbers in simple random samples. All of these questions affect the precision with which researchers are able to calculate the estimates for the victimisation experiences of the population as a whole, and of groups within it. (ibid p.81).

Since the beginning, the data generated by victimisation surveys have been used for purposes of comparison with the data of official crime statistics, and I will firstly look at the problem inherent in the comparison of UCR with NCS data.

The six types of crime now gathered by the NCS are compatible and comparable with UCR Index crimes; these are rape, robbery, assault, household burglary, personal and household larceny, and motor vehicle theft. From 1973-1976 robberies and burglaries of business establishments were also counted. The NCS is more ambitious than the UCR in that it also counts crimes which have not been reported to the police, and so therefore can be said to provide a 'better' count of such crimes. The NCS does not, however, now measure any crimes against business, or state agencies; it neither measures 'victimless' crime nor of course homicide; neither does the NCS measure crimes against persons under 12 years of age. (U.S. Department of Justice 1981).

In a comparison of UCR and NCS rates over time, Nelson (1979) showed that the rates were strongly related for motor-vehicle theft and robbery.
with a weapon; moderately related for burglary; weakly related for robbery without a weapon; and were independent, or even negatively related, for aggravated assault, simple assault, and rape. He concludes that ecological correlates of personal assaultive crime may be methodological artifacts, and that we cannot be sure which measure of crime, the UCR or the NCS, is closer to a "true or ideal measure of personal crime". (ibid p.26). In contrast, the high correlation between crimes involving theft suggests that inferences about ecological correlates can be made from either set of data. However, because UCR rates exist for nearly every city in the United States, whereas only 26 cities were included in the NCS data, he argues that the UCR data should be used to analyse the ecological correlates of theft crime.

Sparks (1982 pp 89-92) is also strongly in favour of comparing the two; even though they do not cover precisely similar universes, he claims that adjustments for purposes of calculation can easily be made. He argues that although some caution should be used in making comparisons of levels of crime as measured by the two, it is possible to place some confidence in comparisons of trends over time. This is especially important, he says, because of the fact that the NCS is measuring, and making estimates of, the rates for the non-reporting of crime. A measure of the estimated major differences between the two sets of data remains a possibility.

In considering comparisons between BCS and data from Criminal Statistics (CS), the following points can be made. Firstly, the BCS, like the NCS covers a different universe. Arguably the BCS universe is more congruent with the CS universe than is the BCS to the UCR - 238 of the 552 constituencies in England and Wales were included. Secondly, as with the NCS, crimes against businesses, institutional targets, and 'victimless' crimes were excluded; also, crimes against persons aged under 16 years were excluded from the BCS. (Hough and Mayhew 1983 p.37). In the first survey, ten offence groups were held to be comparable with CS offences - vandalism; theft from a motor vehicle; burglary in a dwelling; theft of a motor vehicle; bicycle theft; theft in a dwelling; theft from the person; wounding; robbery; and sexual offences. (ibid pp. 45-49). However, in the second survey, wounding was excluded (Hough and Mayhew 1985 pp. 85-89). There is some difficulty in general in the comparability of assaultive crimes without theft between survey and police data, in that many minor types
of assault which may be reported to surveys, are not regarded as 'notifiable' offences by the police, and would not therefore turn up in CS data were they reported.

Given that the surveys are constructed to give a 'truer' picture of the volume of victimisation in a population, it is particularly important that the information collected in the interview situation is of a high level of reliability and validity. There are numerous factors which may affect, therefore, the reporting or non-reporting of events to survey interviewers.

A particular problem with the NCS concerns its status as a panel survey. A panel design has several advantages including the fact that once a household is selected, it stays in the survey for 3½ years, thus cutting down on the costs and other problems of selection of the sample. It also gives the advantage of being able to allow comparison overtime on the effects of victimisation on subsequent behaviour and attitudes, as well as providing a record of changes of the responsiveness of interviewees to survey interviewers overtime.

A panel design has inherent problems also. Firstly, there is the quite amazing fact than in the six months that separate any two successive interviews, about 15% of the selected households have moved address. Of those households that remain, about 5% of the members change due to death, marriage or removal. This means that the bounding effect built into the panel design does not apply to one in seven of interviews carried out, thus slightly inflating survey estimates of victimisation. (Sparks 1982 p.85). Secondly, there is the problem of time-in-sample bias, in which respondents who have been in the sample for a longer time are less likely to report events than those who are relatively new to NCS. One possible explanation is the phenomenon of "respondent exhaustion", by which respondents become less co-operative as time goes on, because of the time-consuming consequences of admitting to victimisation. More recently, there has been an attempt to offset this difficulty by having equal numbers of persons in the sample who have been interviewed 1, 2 . . . . 7 times. It is not known, though, how sub-groups in the population (e.g. blacks or the elderly) are affected by this problem. (Sparks 1981 p.34).

Another specific feature of the NCS is the increasing proportion of
interviews which are now conducted by telephone - it is presently 25%.

Results show that the data from telephone interviews include a lower rate of reported victimisations than in the face-to-face interviews. (Sparks 1982 p.78). A factor akin to that of the mode of the interview is the length of the interview itself, and the question of 'interviewee exhaustion'. Questionnaires which are aimed at ascertaining whether victimisation has occurred, lead on to a further questionnaire in which the details of each event are recorded. It may well be that respondents perceive that mentioning an event will involve them in further loss of time and perhaps having to 're-live' the details of a traumatic event.

This problem is a perennial one for those doing survey research, but is particularly pronounced in victimisation surveys. It has been suggested also that those respondents who are most susceptible to fatigue and impatience in interview situations are also those most likely to suffer higher rates of victimisation. (Skogan 1981 p.16).

Under-reporting to interviewers is thought to fall into two types - true forgetting, in which events simply are not recalled in response to questions or prompts; and failure to report for other reasons. A method for checking the extent of under-reporting in a sample is the use of a "reverse record check" in which survey responses are compared with independent validating data, such as the record of a reported offence in police files. In a number of such checks, including the various Bureau of the Census pre-tests for the NCS (ibid. p.17), and in the work of Sparks (1977) in London, considerable numbers of such incidents were not mentioned. The proportions of known offences not mentioned vary from study to study, and by type of crime. Incidents such as burglary and robbery were generally the most likely to be mentioned, with about 90 per cent being captured by interviewers. Less serious thefts, incidents of vandalism, and some assaults were less likely to be mentioned. All evidence points to the conclusion that the likelihood of reporting decays with time and that surveys should attempt to concentrate on relatively short and recent time periods. The results of several studies show that incidents which have previously been reported to the police are those which are most likely to be reported to surveys. In general terms the amount of time between an incident's occurrence and the survey interview is the most important factor. (Sparks 1981 p.27).

Thus, from this point of view the six month recall period of the NCS, is likely to give rise to less problems than the 12 month recall period of the BCS and most other surveys.
One reason for under-reporting to the surveys is similar to that for non-reporting of crimes to the police — namely that for some groups in the population more than others, certain types of incident are simply not defined by individuals as "crime", and that consequently these are not recalled. A most interesting NCS finding is that black respondents consistently report less minor assault than white respondents, and this result is thought to reflect the two groups' different cultural definitions of events constituting "assaults". Similarly, reporting of assaults seems to be subject to an "education effect" in as much as the amount of assault reported increases with respondents' level of education, again signifying that definition of acts of "violence" is affected by wider aspects of world view and experience. (Sparks 1982 pp.72-73). Not all failures to mention victimisation events are, however, due to failures of memory — nor to definitional factors — but to affective ones such as shame and embarrassment. These may particularly affect the reporting of incidents of sexual assault and also incidents involving victimisation by a family member or other non-stranger.

The issue of temporal "telescoping" has also received much attention. This is the tendency on the part of respondents to bring an event in time closer to the date of the interview. This is known as "forward telescoping" and occurs in all surveys which require respondents to recall events occurring in a given time period; in general, the more salient the event the more likely for it to be brought forward in time. One explanation for the marked tendency for "forward external telescoping" on the part of respondents in the victimisation survey, relates to its 'demand characteristics'. In other words, if a lengthy incident screen produces a long string of "no" responses, the respondent may feel that the interviewer is disappointed, and the temptation may be to offer a familiar but 'out-of-bounds' incident. A related phenomenon, "forward internal telescoping" also operates within the reference period for the interview, but this does not present so great a problem (Skogan 1981 p.19).

One technique which is frequently used to limit the possibility of forward external telescoping is the "bounding" of the reference period. The NCS bounds each of its six month reference periods by the previous interview, and this is another advantage of the ongoing panel survey. In 'one-off' surveys reference periods may be bounded by establishing that salient event which took place in the respondent's life (Birthdays,
family events, holidays, sickness), at the beginning of the period or at intervals throughout it. This technique was used by Sparks and others (1977) on the basis that studies had shown that unbounded recall yields substantially higher reports of events, and that this clearly indicates a problem of over-reporting for the reference period. The BCS and other recent British surveys have not opted to use this method.

In addition to the problems of recall and "telescoping", surveys also suffer from respondents' deliberate withholding of information. As mentioned above, interviewees may simply not wish to mention an incident because of its unhappy associations or because of the cost in time of doing so. Also, the decision to mention an event may depend upon the skill of the interviewer in probing for information which may be defined as a crime. Additionally, it is known from NCS reverse record checks that the relationship of victim and offender (as recorded by the police) will play an essential part in reporting it to an interviewer. In the San Jose methods test, incidents in which the victim and offender were related were mentioned in only 22% of cases, in contrast to 76% of cases in which the offender was a stranger. (Skogan op.cit. p.16).

Clearly, interview situations associated with victimisation surveys will be affected by the behaviour of interviewers, and this brings two factors into play. Firstly, knowledge of the impact of crime on victims, assures us that victimisation is attended by all manner of sensitivities of which the interviewer may not be aware. Apart from the survey by Sparks and others, and that being conducted in the London Borough of Islington, there is little acknowledgement in the general literature on the surveys of the importance of special training programmes for interviewers which might alert them to these sensitivities and develop their skill in helping respondents to overcome recall problems. An exception to this general rule is the work conducted by Russell (1982) on rape and attempted rape in the United States.

In the Sparks survey, pre-test results show that reporting rates are relatively high, including 67% of the 45 rape victims mentioned the incident. This result, when taken in comparison to the results of other surveys, might be taken as an argument in favour of interviewer training. A second issue is that of the 'matching' of interviewers and interviewees along the lines of gender, race and age in order to assess the effects
on the response rate, especially for assaultive crimes where the offender is a non-stranger; again, as judged from the literature, this is clearly not an issue, even though disparity in reporting rates to different individual interviewers is recognised. (see Skogan op.cit. p.28).

Lastly, it has been found that there are marked problems of recall for those who have been subject to 'series victimisation', that is victims of several criminal incidents of the same type occurring within the survey reference period. There is a problem in counting these incidents, as the respondent may have to guess the number of times an incident occurred, and will not be able to remember the details and point of occurrence of each event. The NCS defines incidents as a series if three or more similar events are involved. Interviewers are instructed to record the season in which the events occurred and the estimated number involved, and then to try to obtain details of about the last incident in the series. (Sparks 1982 p.67). Similarly, in the BCS, incidents were treated as a series if they were all of a very similar type, done under the same circumstances and "probably committed by the same person (s)". They were counted up to a limit of five incidents, with full details taken for the last event. (Hough and Mayhew 1985 p.81). Given the skewed nature of victimisation, and the special problem of the concentration of recurring victimisation with a fraction of the population, series victimisation presents a formidable challenge for surveys of victims and highlights some of their limitations in regard to counting and gathering certain types of data on crime.

The area of under-reporting to surveys which has given rise to much debate and controversy, concerns the victimisation of women. I mean here two related things; firstly the under-reporting of sexual and non-sexual assaults by strangers; secondly, the under-reporting of sexual and non-sexual assaults by non-strangers, which may include 'series' victimisation as defined above.

The BCS found (as we saw in Chapter I above) that women mentioned far fewer assaults than did men. Taking all categories of (non-sexual) assault together, 80% of such incidents were mentioned by males. The victims, two-thirds of whom were aged 25 or under, knew their assailants in a third of all cases and were "husbands, relatives, lovers or ex-lovers in a sixth of cases". (Hough and Mayhew 1983 p.20). Assaults occurred more often in pubs, clubs and other places of entertainment,
followed by the workplace, and lastly by the home. The results showed a very low rate for rape and other sexual offences. In fact, no rapes, and only one attempt were uncovered. This was thought to reflect the rarity of sexual attacks by strangers. However, in relation to assaults by non-strangers the report on the first survey adds that:

"A small minority (10%) of assault victims were women who had been assaulted by their present or previous husbands or boyfriends. This proportion may well be an underestimate. Many such victims may be unprepared to report incidents of this nature to an interviewer; they may not feel that assaults of this sort fall into the survey's scope, or they may feel embarrassment or shame. Indeed, their assailant may be in the same room at the time of interview."

(ibid. p.21).

In the wake of the first survey, these results and the assumptions built into the report's commentary were attacked by feminists and apparently undermined by the results of independent surveys of women's victimisation. An important feature of the surveys conducted by women's groups or by feminist researchers, is that the definitions which they employ of 'violence' and 'sexual assault', are rather broader than those of victimisation surveys such as the BCS. The latter, for purposes of comparability with official statistics, strive to emulate strict legal categories of offence and specific definitions within these categories; it is in fact common to have a fraction of victim reports to surveys "founded" or "unfounded" (see section 4.4. above) by police officers in order to judge the closeness of such reports to the legal definitions.

Feminist research is based upon a double-edged critique of victimisation surveys. Firstly, the criminalisation of specific forms of the victimisation of women, reflects the dominance - historically and contemporaneously - of patriarchal values in the law. Legal categories are based upon predominantly male notions of threat, vulnerability and notions of personal and property rights. Secondly, feminists are exceedingly critical of the male assumptions underpinning the structure and conduct of survey research.

In relation to the first aspect of the critique, Betsy Sanko (1983) notes that the assumed under-reporting of assaults in the BCS, must be
contrasted with the quite high level of willingness of its female respondents to report fear and concern. She argues that this *reported* fear and concern is actually based on the *unreported* experiences of the woman concerned. In the earlier parts of the interview they are asked about their fears, but in the latter sections either the interviewer's description of the types of incident they are being asked to mention do not fit their own specific experiences, or else they do not mention experiences for other more widely acknowledged reasons. Thus, a large amount of "women-defined instances of violence" are lost but have, paradoxically, contributed to another section of the survey's findings. Women report high levels of fear because they experience events which they define as "violent" or "threatening", even though these may not constitute crimes. They also know of or see such events happening to other women.

These conclusions are followed through in the work of Hanmer and Saunders (1984) in their report of a survey of the attitudes and experiences of 129 women living in an area of Leeds. Addressing the problem of definition of criminal violence they write:

"... the type of aggression, the main organising principle for the criminal justice system's categorisation of crimes against the person, is not the major principle used by the women interviewed... (they) classed as threatening, violent or sexually harassing situations that fell outside the criminal law as well as within it." (ibid p.32).

The types of incident which the respondents found disturbing were attempted pick-ups in the street, being followed, being on the receiving end of obscenities, and a host of other events which would be defined as harassment. Some forms, like specific verbal threats, obscene telephone calls, and indecent exposures, are illegal; but many of the incidents mentioned are on the borderline of legality, or else not illegal at all. An important finding of this study is that events were judged by women as threatening on the basis that "the greater the uncertainty about the outcome the more terrifying the encounter." (ibid p.33). Thus most of the encounters were feared for their violent potential rather than for the actuality of "violence" in legal terms.
Of the 129 women in the sample, 25% reported having received "threats." 15% had been victims of "violence," and 60% reported "sexual harassment." Also, the women reported having witnessed 70 incidents occurring to other women. (ibid. p.32-33). Although the definitions used are broad, and the questionnaire design may be open to criticism, the survey does highlight a deficiency of victimisation surveys. This is that the latter in seeking to correct the deficiencies of official statistics as counts of crime, adhere to strictly legal categories of victimisation which do not always correspond with those events which are deemed by respondents to be harmful or threatening. An analogy would be the persistent over-charging by traders in a locality for goods and services; these events may be mentioned as harmful, but they would not be counted as forms of victimisation.

In a further small-scale study conducted by Scottish Women's Aid (1983), 100 women were asked if they had suffered violence or abuse from a man with whom they had lived or had a relationship; 87% had been "pushed or shoved," and 61% had been "hit or punched." Asked if they considered themselves to be "a battered or abused woman," 16% said they did, and 77% that they did not. However, of the women who did not consider themselves to be battered or abused, many reported being on the receiving end of "humiliations," "ridicule," criticised for "having friends or interests," or "criticised sexually." Most women who had been hit or punched, also experienced the other forms of abuse.

Once more, although there are some problems with question design and sampling, the study underlines the tendency for women respondents to mention more violence to independent surveys conducted by women, and for respondents to be willing to mention varieties of victimisation falling outside of legal boundaries.

In a more substantial study conducted in London by Women Against Rape (Hall 1985), 17% of the 1,236 respondents reported having been raped, 31% had been sexually assaulted, and 20% had been victims of attempted rape. (ibid. p.33). No reference period for the victimisations was specified in the questionnaire, as the purpose was to capture women's experiences back to their earliest ages. The survey also uncovered 60 reports of rape in a formal marriage, and 50 cases of rape in a common law marriage, - events which are not currently classified as crimes.
MacLean (1985 pp. 390-91) has criticised Hall's research on the basis of sample representativeness. Hall had claimed that her sample was "fairly representative" of London women by comparison with data from the 1981 census. According to MacLean, a comparison of the two sets of data using a standardised statistical test, reveals that the sample differed from the population as measured on the census to a degree which cannot be considered to be representative, on a number of variables, at the 95% confidence interval. MacLean does however conclude that the use of the respondents' lifetimes as the reference period for the research is important for expanding the conceptual armoury of victimisation research. For instance, one in five of Hall's respondents reported being raped or sexually assaulted as children or teenagers. This finding highlights a major reason for the under-reported values for such offences on the BCS. Because the target for the latter was people aged over 16 years, and because the period of study was the immediately preceding year, most of the women in the BCS sample would have passed beyond the mode of the risk curve.

Perhaps as a result of the above findings, and the weight of criticism of under-counting of sexual offences in the BCS, certain screen questions about sexual attack were changed in the second BCS, aimed at reducing the reticence of victims to mention incidents to interviewers. These changes resulted in 19 cases being reported from 6,000 women. (Hough and Mayhew 1985 pp. 9-11). On the basis of this the BCS estimate for the number of such offences in the population at large was revised from 33,000 to 71,000 - a marked, though unreliable, increase of 115% between the two sweeps of the survey. (ibid. p.14).

The estimate for rape remains low. Each sweep uncovered only one attempted rape. Without adding extra comment the authors maintain that:

"On the basis of the number of rapes recorded by the police alone (1,300 in 1983), the BCS should uncover on average one rape or attempt every third or fourth sweep. Making the assumption that only one in ten rapes are recorded, each sweep should uncover three such offences; and if one in fifty rapes gets into police records, each sweep should uncover fifteen."

(ibid. p.11).
It is difficult to determine whether they are saying that, on the basis of their results, they simply do not believe that the rate is as high as is claimed by feminist researchers, whether they are acknowledging that there are difficulties at the level of BCS methodology in capturing more incidents, or conceding that the sample survey is simply a very poor device for estimating the extent of such offences.

The answer to these questions may be that the size of the samples used by surveys is too small, or that the problem resides in the wording of the questions, or in response bias and interview techniques. The position of Hilary Graham (1983) on the strengths and weaknesses of the survey method in researching aspects of women's lives and experiences is worth considering at length.

Firstly, she argues that sexism surfaces within the conceptual apparatus of sociology. Theory and methodology are constructed within the framework of a male social universe, which utilises a man-made language in which significant aspects of women's lives become "not merely unspoken but unspeakable". (ibid p.135). Shattering the silence of women in relation to their lives has been a major commitment of feminist researchers, and the data collection methods which have most been chosen have been qualitative. Quantitative research has been seen to represent a male style of knowing, adopting an active but impersonal stance, whereas qualitative research is seen to operate within a different paradigm, and a female way of knowing which adopts a more personal approach, seeking out 'soft' data about the private world through categories unlikely to lend themselves to quantification and statistical analysis.

This wholesale adoption of qualitative methods, says Graham, thus reinforces the very divisions which feminists are seeking to destroy. Recently, feminist researchers have turned to the social survey, "the method which provides the empirical base for mainstream masculinist sociology". (ibid p.137); they have typically preferred its more qualitative variants, as these are seen as establishing an intimate and non-hierarchical relationship with respondents in which the interviewer came to be regarded as a friend rather than just a data-gatherer. The problem remains that however informal the questionnaire or friendly the interviewer, the survey method may itself eclipse the "self-understanding
of the female subject." (ibid).

Secondly, she notes that the survey method has its origins in the nineteenth century, and that its principles matched the ethos and needs of an emerging industrial capitalism. These principles continue to inform the survey approach and can be stated as follows.

Surveys deal with social units - individuals, households, streets, and these are assumed to be single and complete. This principle - individualism - has two faults; when households are the unit of analysis it is forgotten that these are made up of individuals with varying characteristics; when the individual is taken as the unit, he or she is torn out of their social context and made to appear in a sample of one person to be compared to other samples of one person. This tendency is exaggerated in the sample survey as opposed to a census, since samples have a greater tendency to exclude groups and processes of which individuals are a part. This principle also assumes that characteristics such as race, class or gender are treated not as dimensions of social structure, but as properties of individuals. It similarly assumes that attitudes and behaviours are personal characteristics, rather than ways individuals define their relationship to their social situation.

These problems are particularly acute when women are the focus of study. Women's welfare and identity appear to be particularly closely locked into those social processes which the survey method closes off from analysis. Although quantitative methods do collect much useful data on the subordination of women, they tap the impact of gender relations, as etched into personal experience, rather than the structure of those relations - including the power relations and political economy of family life.

Surveys are also based on the understanding that individuals can be treated as equivalent units. This principle of equivalence tends to lead to the assumption of formal equality, whereas people experience their lives within a stratified and unequal social structure. This problem is compounded by the ignoring by researchers of the categories of sexual stratification.

A further assumption of surveys, is that units and their outputs
have an object form. In other words, that social phenomena have an existence separate from the social relations in which they are embedded. Importantly, the principle implies that experiences can be verbalised, for what cannot be verbalised cannot be recorded or studied. It assumes a society in which all actions are rational and speakable in the "man-made language of the public domain"; whereas, Graham asserts, women communicate their personal experiences through an oral culture untapped by social scientists. (ibid. p.143). Furthermore, surveys provide snapshot pictures of reality which are assumed to be sufficiently ordered and permanent to enable generalisations to be made across social contexts and across time, and that material elicited in one social context - an interview - is representative of the range of responses an individual makes in others.

The principle of measurement, so central to the survey method, is a highly problematic one. It presumes the precise definition of phenomena on experiences, which may be taken to be highly ambiguous. Classification systems are used which have an unproven relationship to the real world. The survey rests upon implicit common-sense assumptions about the respondent and about the researcher's own views of everyday life. With reference to women, Graham uses the example of research into women's labour, which researchers have sought to measure when it is sold through the market place, but have ignored when performed within the private domain. Women, she says, are positioned at the intersection of two social worlds - the public and the private - and appear to have an ambiguous relation to the systems of measurement which characterise capitalism and the social sciences which have developed within it. (ibid. p.145). Graham concludes that the survey method has important uses for drawing back the curtains on women's lives, but that it must not be employed uncritically.

There are several points made by Graham which are relevant to the under-reporting of sexual offences and other forms of victimisation defined as such by women. I would conclude that the problem exists both in the structure and principles of the survey method itself, and in certain procedural or practical problems inherent in the method. This does not mean that the method is completely inappropriate, nor that the practical problems - such as question wording and the nature of the interview encounter - cannot be partially overcome. Hanmer and Saunders, for
instance, include a useful description and reflexive account of the
difficulties encountered in the establishment of the interviewer-
interviewee relationship and how these were overcome. Such an account
is rarely included in reports of social surveys, and is almost entirely
absent from reports of victimisation surveys. (op.cit. pp. 13-29).

There are two major points of importance of feminist research in
victimology. Firstly, research into rape, attempted rape, and sexual
assault tends to sharply highlight those traditional problems in counting
offences of any type - as "institutionists" continually remind us. The
central problem is that of the definition and demarcation of offences.
Whether one is using the definitional categories of the criminal law,
or else some other 'objective' standard, problems of human evaluation
remain. Thus, at the level of the researcher, numerous decisions must
be made - in the area of question wording, coding and categorisation
- which will have an inevitable bearing upon the final results. Addition­
ally, the subjective understandings and definitions used by respondents
will also present a formidable hurdle in any attempt to quantify
(however approximately) any aspect of personal or social reality.

There is a second point of importance - namely that feminist re­
searchers have exercised greater courage in their approach to method­
ological and conceptual issues in the area of victimisation. They have
most often refused to be bound entirely by legal categories of sexual
and violent victimisation, and have contributed substantially to the
quantification of non-criminalised harms. They have, moreover, succeeded
in attaining greater theoretical completeness than other victimologists
in that they have given consideration in their analyses to the micro
level of analysis - the specific dynamics of victimisation events, and
have related these to the intermediate level of the processing of these
events by the police and other social agencies. They have also sought
to relate these two levels to the macro level of the state, social
institutions and capitalist/patriarchal social relations.

The importance of Graham's objections to aspects of the survey method,
is that they have relevance not only for the understanding of the capacity
of surveys to uncover the extent of women's victimisation, but also the
victimisation of racial and ethnic minorities. The PSI survey (Smith and
Gray 1985 p. 275) for instance, found no difference overall, in the
victimisation rate of West Indians and white people in London. There
is, however, a well-documented tendency in the NCS (see Sparks 1982
p.72-73) for blacks and persons of lower levels of formal education to
report less violent victimisation than other groups. Undeniably, the
ethno-centrism informing the assumptions underpinning the concepts and
methods of sociology, and other factors such as the relationship between
black respondents and white interviewer, in addition to the "speakability"
of experiences in relation to the preordained recording categories of
surveys, would all be of relevance here.

Racially motivated attacks and harassment are examples of phen-
omena which victimisation surveys have ignored as distinct categories,
within the overall context of the differential victimisation rates of
racial groups. Such incidents, mainly committed by white offenders
against Asian victims, are widespread in certain areas of British cities.
The criminal incidents vary in seriousness from insulting words and
slogan writing, through to criminal damage, and violence against the
person and arson which have led to numerous deaths. (e.g. Ballantyne
1985). The omission of racially motivated incidents as survey categories
stems from a number of sources. The criminal law does not specifically
refer to racially motivated crime, except in as much as a racial dis-
crimination and incitement to racial hatred are outlawed. Also, there
is a very marked reluctance on the part of the police to regard an
incident as racially motivated, even where the evidence seems strong,
and there are numerous institutional pressures which militate against
the recognition of racially motivated crime as a specific problem. Thus,
the BCS and NCS do not seek to collect data on this issue, and those
victimisation surveys which do attempt to, such as the Merseyside and
Islington surveys have arisen from quite different political priorities.

That data on racially motivated crime can be enumerated is evidenced
by the Home Office (1981) study - Racial Attacks. This defined a 'racial
incident' as :

"... an incident, or alleged
offence by a person or persons
of one racial group against a
person or persons or property of
another racial group, where there
are indications of a racial motive."

(ibid. p.7).
Thirteen study areas were chosen, and special incident forms were completed by police officers for every inter-racial incident reported to them; 2,650 forms involving 2,851 victims, completed in a two month period, were analysed. In all, in only 25% of cases was there "strong evidence" (10%) or "some indication" (15%) of racial motive. Looked at proportionately, the incidence of victimisation was much higher for the ethnic minority population. The rate for Asians was 50 times that for white people, and the rate for people of West Indian or African origin was over 36 times that for white people. (ibid. p.11).

An analysis of Metropolitan Police statistics on racial harassment for the period May to December 1982, was carried out by a panel of enquiry set up by the police committee of the Greater London Council. (G.L.C. 1984). This revealed 1,346 incidents, a high proportion of which involved violence against the person (37%), and criminal damage (36%). In 62% of all incidents, the victims were of Asian origin, in 20% they were white, and 12% Afro-Caribbean. (ibid. p.5). The inquiry cited various dissatisfactions with police practice in relation to these offences, and noted the under-reporting of incidents by ethnic minority communities, because of a widely-held lack of confidence in the police's willingness or ability to help. (ibid. p.6).

There would seem to be several respects in which racially motivated victimisation, both in its strictly criminal and non-criminalised forms, could be investigated by use of the survey method. Some findings on the racial abuse and racially motivated sexual assault of women of African and Asian descent, emerged from the survey work of Women Against Rape (Hall op.cit. pp.47-53). Over half of the respondents who were immigrants or black said they had been verbally abused because of their race or nationality; over a quarter considered they had been assaulted because of their race or nationality; in over a quarter of the cases of verbal abuse or physical assault, the abuse or assault was of a sexual nature; 7% of black or immigrant women considered they had been sexually assaulted because of their race or nationality. (ibid. pp.48-9).

The criticisms which Graham levels at the survey method do not, in my view, apply only when women and members of minority groups are the subjects of research. Although it is the case that the presence of
gender bias and ethnocentrism will distort more seriously the social reality and experiences of those groups, there is an important sense in which the principles of individualism, equivalence, objectivism, and measurement, built into survey methodology, contribute to a failure to adequately portray the experiences of all classes of respondent. Firstly, social surveys were designed for counting - to contribute to the "avalanche of numbers" necessary to the growth of capitalist enterprises and state bureaucracies. (Hacking 1981). The problems associated with the classification of units, events, attitudes, behaviour, and the other stuff of surveys, are formidable - but to the "realist", not insurmountable. Secondly, and relatedly, surveys are primarily concerned with the aggregative (or individual) dimension of analysis, and thereby fail to establish social links between those observed and the social processes in which individuals are enmeshed. (Smith 1975 p.287). Thirdly, the survey is a poor method for the gathering of qualitative data which might give an insight into the subjectivity of the respondent's experiences and definitions.

In conclusion to this section, we can say that surveys of criminal victimisation are designed and executed with three predominant aims in mind. Firstly, to provide a more accurate measurement of the extent of crimes in different categories; including the distribution of victimisation between social groups; secondly, to provide description and measurement of a host of factors associated with the commission of crime; thirdly, to measure various dimensions of the impact of crime upon victims and the community. The section began with the question of whether these surveys can be held to represent a "least worst measure of crime".

In one sense the answer must be a qualified affirmative. Our qualification must firstly refer to the methodological questions and problems which I have detailed, and whether one considers oneself to be a "realist" or "institutionalist" in relation to these. Our qualification must secondly refer to the question of what aspect of crime one is hoping to measure. It is my view that the traditional concern of "realists" with the extent of unrecorded crime, has been rightly extended and redefined to become a concern for the measurement of a very wide range of factors associated with crime and victimisation. For administrative
criminologists these new concerns have caused the surveys themselves to be re-defined as instruments for elucidating theoretical questions and for informing the making of criminal justice policy.

For radical criminologists and feminists the role of surveys continues to be one of the measurement of the extent and distribution of victimisation, though its definitions may move beyond the boundaries set by the criminal law. But, for radicals and feminists, the issues finally addressed by these efforts at more accurate measurement, are those of the impact of victimisation, its relationship to other social problems and arrangements, and also increasingly the question of policing priorities, and other policy areas bearing on services to victims and the prevention of victimisation.
CHAPTER V

IMAGES OF CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN
THREE CRIMINOLOGIES: social democratic,
right-wing, and radical
5.1. Introduction:

In this present chapter, I will be looking in some detail at the images of criminal victimisation, both explicit and implicit, which may be discerned from a reading of three traditions within criminology. I have termed these three criminologies — social democratic criminology; right-wing criminology; and, radical criminology. These broad trends each incorporate an historically developed paradigm with the discipline of criminology, and a particular political philosophy. Each trend consists of a body of theory relating to the nature and causes of crime, as well as prescriptions for ameliorating the crime problem through criminal justice policy and wider social policy. Each of the trends discussed also find a natural (and sometimes an unnatural) ally in a certain political tradition. Thus, criminology and political philosophies of social order and social policy may be seen in an historical sense, to develop interactively. A more reflexive reading of work within certain schools of criminology always reveals the presence of assumptions about human nature and social order, the role of the state, the relationship between state and individual and so forth — the stuff of political philosophy. In turn, in confronting the 'realities' of crime and criminal justice, in the translation of both the deeper structures and immediate imperatives of political philosophy into policy, political traditions have drawn upon or made direct use of styles of criminological theorising and research, as part of the rhetoric informing political intervention.

What we are referring to here is a complex interchange between perceived problems, theory, research and intervention, which Ian Hacking (1981 - see Chapter IV above) has referred to as the internal and external histories of a discipline. The internal debates forming the history of paradigm positions within criminology are situated within the context of economic and social transformation, and within broader ideological debates concerning what should be 'society's response to crime'.

This chapter attempts to identify images of criminal victimisation in these three criminologies. Specifically, I wish to identify references to the 'victim of crime', and where these might figure in theoretical frameworks. For instance, does the notion of 'harm' — to individuals or to social order — receive explicit attention? To what extent is a theoretical tradition focused upon the offender, upon the victim, or upon the state? To what extent does the tradition attempt to account for
processes of victimisation as opposed to processes of becoming criminal? What answer does the tradition give to the question - 'who is the victim'? The answers to these questions will be related to the types of consciousness within which each tradition functions. I will now go on to consider each in turn.

5.2. Social Democratic Criminology:

In outlining the various aspects of the social democratic image of criminal victimisation, it is firstly necessary to re-assert some elements of the arguments which have been developed so far. The history of the development of victimology and the political and philosophical background to its development, is a neglected facet of the development of social democratic criminology as a whole. I intend to draw upon those parts of the above chapters (I - IV) which make a contribution to our understanding of the orientation of social democratic criminologists and politicians to the issue of criminal victimisation, and then go on to evaluate the relevant theoretical and practical implications.

In Chapter I it was pointed out that the historical development of social democratic criminology had been concerned with a primary focus of attention upon the offender, to the extent that the study of the victim and the state have been largely neglected. Thus, in almost all of the work which criminologists engaged in up until comparatively recent times, the main purpose was to lay bare the etiology of criminal behaviour through the application of methods derived from the natural sciences.

The philosophical system which has most closely informed the development of social democratic criminology has been positivism, and the offender-centred nature of the discipline can be traced in large part to some trends within positivistic consciousness. The first of these is positivism's specific view of human nature and the origins of behaviour. Man is held to be fundamentally constrained and acted upon by circumstances outside of his control. The intensity of this determinism has of course varied according to whether biological, psychological, or environmental variables have been stressed. The offender has been viewed as the locus of various motivations, forces and circumstances which lead directly or indirectly to criminal behaviour.
A second trend within positivism is the concept of pathology; the offender is viewed as assailed by impaired rationality, and crime itself is regarded as a set of responses highlighting that irrationality. Thus the offender has sometimes been held to be biologically or psychologically abnormal, to be incapable of acting rationally because of faulty socialisation, or else existing in objectively abnormal circumstances which give rise to behaviours which are at once irrational but which are, paradoxically, normative.

Thirdly, positivism tends towards the view that the proper role of the social scientist, as scientist, is to identify causes and remedies in relation to social problems. This tendency rests in a view of social order and a definition of problems, as reflecting a consensus which corresponds to the needs of the social system. These three central trends have given rise to an orientation which we refer to as 'offender-centred', and which I will now examine more closely.

Firstly, the concentration upon the offender has been - as we have observed - paralleled by the failure of mainstream criminology to consider the victim in any but the most peripheral ways. The search for causes, either within the criminal or within his milieu, has led to a tradition of study in which the victim of crime is regarded as merely incidental. Psychological criminologists have abstracted personal variables and have omitted situational variables. However, as victimologists operating in the social-psychological mould continually assert, individual criminal behaviour cannot usefully be separated out from the dynamic context in which it takes place. This type of extrusion has been a major feature of positivist criminology, which far from being the study of crime is more justly seen as the study of the criminal.

The 'denial of the victim', although directly related to the offender-centred focus of positivist criminology, is also indirectly related to its image of social order and its conception of its own role as a policy science. In this respect it is perhaps the case that its offender-centredness is part of a wider order-centredness. What I mean here is that the main purpose of criminology has been a desire to overcome the threat of crime to social order as broadly conceived. It has clearly not been motivated by a desire to understand and eradicate victimisation, or the harmful impact of crime upon its individual targets.
Therefore, we might say that the denial of the victim is but an aspect of the narrow focus of positivist criminology. The neglect of the study of such things as the historical and contemporary role of the state in relation to crime control, processes of law creation and criminalisation, and the nature of policing, stem from the absence of a broader theoretical framework which would have permitted a thorough and wide-ranging examination of the complexity of class interests served by the operation of the criminal justice system in capitalist society. Equally, it seems to me, such an examination would have necessitated the incorporation of a victim-orientation into the analysis.

This would pose basic questions as to the conception of 'harm' which informs the criminalisation of behaviour and the assumptions underlying the conceptions of 'victim' in the law, and the effective position and treatment of the victim in the judicial process. It would also examine the social relations of policing, with special reference to the extent to which policing is organised around the needs of individuals and neighbourhoods, or those of corporate interests or the more abstract interests of 'order'. As a 'science of crime' it would be interested in processes by which people become victims at a number of different levels - the micro level or level of group dynamics, as well as at the intermediate and macro-levels of social environments, institutions, and the social structure.

Positivist criminology is not, however, entirely without a conception of the 'victim' or of 'victimisation'. Indeed it operates with a notion of 'offender-as-victim' - a victim variously, of biology, personality disorder, poor parenting, under-socialisation, poverty, blocked opportunity or criminogenic environments. In the hard determinism of the psychological tradition of clinical criminology, this notion of victimisation is strongly implicit. The offender cannot help - and most probably does not desire - his abnormal motivations; thus, the individual treatment model is directly construed as helping the 'victim' - the deviant individual.

In the sociological version of positivist criminology the idea of crime as resulting from what I shall call 'social victimisation', has been paramount since its inception in the early nineteenth century. The works of early sociological criminologists in the period from 1850-1930,
which stressed the helplessness of (particularly younger) offenders in the face of moral and socio-economic pressures, became firmly wedded to the salvationist interventions of charitable organisations, and later to the emerging state crime-control bureaucracies. The twentieth-century wedding of sociological positivism in criminology and social-democratic politics, as described in Chapters II and III, also has its origins in the nineteenth century and is significantly rooted in their joint concern with social victimisation. For criminologists the emphasis of this concern is towards explanatory systems which lend themselves to intervention. For the politicians the emphasis is more intimately associated with a specific understanding of the relationship between 'social justice' and 'order'.

For the social democrat it is the creation and maintenance of social justice which guarantees the smooth operation and ultimate survival of social order. Social justice and order are seen as inextricably linked. This belief derives quite strongly from classicist notions of legally-derived justice (stressing liberty and equality), as enlarged to include a notion of social justice - a justice which is enshrined not only in law, but in a consciously created set of social arrangements. This goes beyond the legally-derived justice of liberalism - which rests in a conception of 'natural', 'inalienable' rights delivered and guaranteed by legislation. In other words, social democrats attempt to arrive at a better fit between legal and substantive equality.

For social democrats then, social victimisation - the continued existence of substantive inequality - involves two related sets of consequences. Firstly, relative deprivation and immiseration - as measured against contemporary standards of social justice; secondly, the declining quality of personal and social relationships encouraging feelings of discontent and injustice which may spill over into criminal behaviour. Thus, their traditional commitment to reform has always had two goals - the establishment of greater social justice and the assurance of a greater degree of tranquility in the form of reduced levels of crime and disorder.

The writings of social democratic politicians on crime control forever lay stress on this connection. President Johnson's Crime Commission (1967), for instance, believed that crime could be reduced if a number of objectives were fulfilled. Society must seek to prevent crime
before it occurs by ensuring social and economic justice; the criminal justice system must develop better techniques for reacting to crime and dealing with offenders. The injustices of the system must be eliminated in order to win the co-operation and respect of all citizens. What was envisaged was a new intervention by federal government in the operations of a mostly localised system of law enforcement, courts and corrections, and a massive new monetary investment in order to achieve co-ordination and rationalisation. Research and technology, as we saw in Chapter III, were elevated to a central position in the system, in order to provide continuous data to aid in the effective application of crime control techniques.

Inherent in this notion of a joint attack on crime through the merging of social policy and criminal justice policy, is the collapsing of the two categories of victimisation. In the social democratic vision of the Crime Commission, conceptions of social victimisation and criminal victimisation became merged.

This merging is epitomised in the rhetoric of President Johnson and Attorney-General Ramsey Clark. To them victimisation was largely seen in terms of the lack of fairness, justice and civil rights accorded in practice to the American poor, and the factors which produced crime would not be reduced until these basic issues were dealt with. Clark's writings contain the most forthright exposition of this viewpoint. In his *Crime in America* (1970) p.11 he observes that:

"In every major city in the United States you will find that two-thirds of the arrests take place among only about two per cent of the population. Where is that area in every city? Well, it's in the same place where infant mortality is four times higher than in the city as a whole; where the death rate is 25 per cent higher; where life expectancy is ten years shorter; where common communicable diseases with the potential of physical and mental damage are six and eight and ten times more frequent; where alcoholism and drug addiction are prevalent to a degree for transcending that of the rest of the city; where education is poorest - the oldest school building, the most crowded and turbulent schoolrooms, the fewest certified teachers, the highest rate of dropouts; where the
average formal schooling is four to six years less than for the city as a whole. Sixty per cent of the children in Watts in 1965 lived with only one, or neither of the parents."

President Johnson himself also regularly articulated such views in his many speeches on crime and civil disorders. In July 1967, in a national address on the problem of the ghetto riots he said:

"The only genuine, long range solution for what has happened lies in an attack mounted at every level upon the conditions which breed despair and violence. All of us know what these conditions are: ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions not because we are frightened by conflict but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America..."

(cited in Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968 p.xv.).

But, the social democratic concern for crime control does not merely rest in philosophical notions of justice, whether socially or legally derived. The perennial problem of crime control in the management of capitalist social relations is usually, and certainly was in the 1960's, rooted in very pragmatic and urgent political imperatives. It is at this point that their particular image of crime and social justice begins to falter. There are a number of contradictory elements affecting both theory and practice, and I will now explore these.

Firstly, the rhetoric concerning a crime-free society based on 'equality' and 'justice' is continually interwoven with arguments for a "strong but fair" criminal justice system as a necessary corollary to such a society.

This is found in Johnson's speeches, for instance in the assertion that "respect for law is a condition upon which the whole social order depends." (cited in Lonaker 1967 p.43). Similarly, Clark's view of poverty as the "mother of crime" is accompanied by the belief that the
police, courts and prison systems should be effective and fair in order to earn the respect and support of all classes. The Crime Commission's Report represented a point of convergence of all these positions, but in the unfolding of its views, it moves swiftly from calls for social justice reform to calls for criminal justice reform. And, as we saw in Chapter III above, the creation of the LEAA after 1968, as a major new state crime-control bureaucracy, was not about the promotion of social justice, but the development of an increasingly repressive system of criminal justice.

In this, victimology played an essential role. It uncovered criminal victimisation as a major form of social injustice, and this contributed to the part of the equation concerned with social justice, in as much as criminal victimisation was shown to be directly associated with social disadvantage. It also generated large amounts of data of potential value in evaluating the performance of parts of the criminal justice system. It discovered a crucial link between criminal victimisation (and the fear of it), and diminished support for the police and courts, the acceptance of the inevitability of crime, the corruption and ineffectuality of law enforcement, and reduced levels of reporting. All of these things are inimical to social order, and the demonstration of widespread criminal victimisation of the poor could probably be seen, in this context, as presenting an issue through which consensus and legitimacy could be renewed.

For social democrats as for conservatives, the issue of public confidence in the criminal justice system is central. It therefore stresses effectiveness and fairness, but in the arena of political realities the two are not coterminous. The presentation by conservative politicians and media of black crime and black disorder as a major threat to the existence of America society, coupled with the serious danger of a desertion of the white working-class vote, clearly tipped the balance of concern from fighting crime through social intervention (thereby reducing social victimisation), to an emphasis on repressive measures. The state in capitalist society must manage not only conflicts between classes but also those within classes. The relative economic and social power of the white middle - and working class overshadowed attention to crime as a problem for black Americans, in favour of crime as a problem posed by black Americans.
A further contradictory element in social democracy's conflation of social and criminal victimisation stems from the role of the state in the management of the economic sphere of capitalism. As Michael Harrington has made clear (1976 - see Chapter III above) the increased financial expenditure of the American government on the war in Vietnam, effectively reduced the available revenues for social investment. The paradox of social democracy is that it is continually unable to resolve the contradictions of inequality in ways commensurate with its philosophical commitment to social justice, and so inevitably turns to the repression of disorder and crime - the velvet glove of welfare is discarded for the iron fist!

The sense of unease however, remains strong, for the philosophical ideal is never completely abandoned. The image of the 'social contract', which social democracy inherits from classicism, is one of mutual responsibility and obligation. Thus, by allowing injustice to persist, the state abrogates its responsibility to ensure the existence of social arrangements which will ensure both justice and order. The failure of consensus is thereby a failure of the state, and so long as it does not abolish social victimisation, neither can it abolish criminal victimisation.

In its approach to victims of crime, social democratic criminology attempts to overcome this contradiction. In the same way as the interventionist state strives through social welfare measures to cushion the casualties of social victimisation, it should logically extend the welfare net to cover the victims of distorted personal and social relations. Historically, the provision - from the 1960's onwards - of state compensation for the victims of violent crime, is an example of this. Although effectively little was done in Britain to encourage independent victims support schemes and other related services, these would be seen by some social democrats as an essential adjunct to statutory social services, much in the same way as is the rest of the voluntary social welfare sector.

The tacit support for victim services which has come from the British Labour Party and from Labour Party controlled local authorities, is a more recent phenomenon associated with other developments in debates on crime control, with which I will deal in Chapter VI.
5.3. Right-wing criminology:

In the 1970's, scholars began to recognise the emergence of a right-wing criminology. What had hitherto merely been treated as a set of reactionary statements on crime and punishment with no serious academic credentials, was now seen to have developed into a coherent theoretical perspective which posed significant challenges to social democratic orthodoxy in most of the latter's theoretical assumptions and policy prescriptions, and which was forcing other traditions to confront it seriously. Platt and Takagi (1977) labelled this perspective the "new 'realism'" and noted that it had arisen in response to the renewed problems of social order generated by capitalism's new crisis, and the apparent failure of social democratic social and criminal justice policies to deal with them. Politically, as Young (1986 p.23.) maintains, they range from Ernest Van den Haag, who is a traditional conservative, to Norval Morris who is "a 'J.S. Mill' type of liberal", to James Q. Wilson, who differs from both of them.

Right-wing criminology operates in two over-lapping realms; among right-wing politicians and media pundits, and among academic criminologists. Its appeal is broad and attracts much support among public opinion on issues of crime and punishment. A significant reason for this appeal almost certainly lies in the fact that it is - by contrast with other criminologies - 'victim-centred', although the specific nature of its orientation to 'victims' must be carefully examined.

The opening shot in the resurgence of right-wing criminology, was the publication in 1968 of Gary Becker's economic approach to crime (Becker 1968). Becker's position is more correctly seen as a restatement of classicist principles in relation to human nature and the well-springs of behaviour; it is more a restatement of the Benthamite utilitarian view of 'economic man' than it is an application of conservative political philosophy. Becker's model of criminal behaviour dispenses with the various determinants stressed in sociological and psychological positivism. It sees criminal behaviour, like all other behaviour, as motivated solely by the offender's perceptions of "opportunity costs". The decision to engage in, or refrain from, criminal behaviour depends upon the assessments which the individual makes - which he rationally calculates - concerning the balance between potential rewards and potential risks.
Thus effective crime control rests upon the ability of the criminal justice system to maximise the risk, and potential offender's perceptions of the risk, of apprehension, trial, conviction and punishment. Also, recidivism can be combatted by maximising the opportunities for prisoners to find employment on release. The emphasis of the economic model (Sullivan 1973) is upon the denial of pathology, abnormality, or social circumstances as the causes of crime. The image of the offender as a rational calculator runs strongly through all variants of right-wing criminology.

The most systematic exposition of right-wing criminology lies in the work of James Q. Wilson. In Thinking About Crime (1975) he is at pains to refute the central contention of social democratic criminology—that poverty is a primary cause of crime. He notes that the period of the sharpest rises in recorded crime correspond, paradoxically, to the decades of greatest affluence and the highest levels of social investment in welfare. He further notes that the relative economic position of black Americans improved substantially but that the position of ghetto blacks worsened. He is in accord with the view of the Moynihan Report (see Chapter II above) that this led to a weakening of the black family structure and the resultant under socialisation of black youth. Indeed his argument about the causes of the broader post-war crime wave shifts quickly towards the conservative emphasis on the failure of social control.

The 1960's saw a boom in the proportion of the population in the late teenage groups, thus multiplying the "magnitude of socialisation tasks" (ibid. p. 13). The "contagion" of youth culture, the declining deterrence effect of the police and courts, the decline in the arrest rate and in the less than proportionate increase in convictions and penalties, the decline in "the supply and value of legitimate opportunities", all led to the decreasing costs of illegal activities and to the reasoned and calculated conclusion, especially on the part of youth, that "it made more sense to steal cars than to wash them" (ibid. p. 19).

Another predominant theme in conservative criminology, in Wilson's work, is that crime and disorder have an eroding effect upon 'community', and that it is also that "the failure of community"—in the sense of the deline or absence of mutually interested actions and associations of citizens—further encourages crime and thus the further decline of
community.

Wilson's concern with community and its interactive associations with crime, develops into a theory of victimisation. He notes, citing evidence from surveys of victimisation, that . . .

" . . . victims of crime are disproportionately to be found in communities (or increasingly, non-communities) that support liberal candidates."

( Ibid. p. 23).

Wilson is making a number of important and related points. Firstly, the fact that working-class (and especially black working-class) communities suffer more, and are more afraid of, crime, gives the lie to the argument that poverty leads to criminal behaviour; in truth, poverty is highly associated with victimisation, most of which results from the actions of groups within those communities, often having relatively the same social characteristics. The victims of this internecine conflict suffer because they are powerless - the aged, the low-income - to move away from high crime neighbourhoods, and they receive less than adequate protection from the police. The second point is that, in the results of surveys of the attitudes of inner-city residents, there is a detectable concern not only with crime, but with rowdiness, drunkeness, immorality, and the presence of drug-addicts and "derelicts" - a concern for the decline in "right and seemly behaviour". ( Ibid. p. 35).

In a later work, Wilson and Kelling (1982) explore this point in detail. They found that citizens are concerned not necessarily with violent or criminal people, but with disorderly people, including "pan-handlers", prostitutes, and the mentally disturbed. Disorderly behaviour, when left "untended" leads as much to the breakdown of community controls as crime itself. It encourages the 'respectable' to avoid certain areas, so that any respectable person appearing becomes a noticable and potential target for street crime. It encourages muggers, whether opportunistic or professional, to believe that there are reduced risks of being caught, and that witnesses will not care enough to call the police. It encourages feelings of powerlessness, of resentment and cynicism for law enforcement, and of great fear for personal safety. Lack of control leads especially
to conflict with the police, who appear ineffective and uncaring and who come to see the area's residents as "animals who deserve each other." (ibid. p.33).

These worsening relations have resulted from the shift (in the 1960's and 1970's) in the role of the police from that of "night watchman"/"order maintenance" to that of "crime fighter", and the progressive centralisation of policing and prosecution from community to state level. The powerlessness of communities and thus victimisation and fear, are exacerbated by social policy especially those policies bearing on due process safeguards and other rights of offenders which have interfered with the order-maintenance role of the police and with their alliance with respectable communities.

Fundamental to Wilson's position is the notion of the division of working-class communities into two increasingly distinct groups. One group, on low wages or welfare, holds on to consensual values of 'respectability' and is not involved in illegality or immorality. But, because of absence of social or a real mobility this group is forced to live with the disorderly and predatory groups mentioned above. These facts particularly hold because of increased residential segregation in the past ten-twenty years - for aspiring middle-class and working-class blacks. The real price of segregation, Wilson says, is not that it forces blacks and white apart, but that it forces blacks, of different class positions together! The end product is the unhappy choice between rage and despair at the fact that the ghettos are now controlled by a predatory under class. (Wilson op.cit. pp.33-35).

For Wilson, as for most conservatives, community, community controls, values, and propriety are central to justice. The great injustice which he sees is that countless people who observe all prohibitions and obligations incumbent upon citizenship, suffer greatly at the hands of those who fundamentally do not. Whereas the somewhat similar conclusions of social democrats lead them to argue for greater social intervention by the state, Wilson contends that in the short run at least government can do little to maintain a neighbourhood community, except in the sense of slowing its decline by aiding it in order-maintenance. In the long run however, government can do much. It can insure the upward mobility of those who wish to change their lot; and, it can outlaw racial discrimi-
nation and ensure geographical mobility. The traditional solutions of urban renewal have failed because they have tended to move the underclass into new housing projects, and even out into the suburbs. More policing will not of itself do the trick as this will not of itself win the allegiance of respectable elements in poor communities.

The final thrust in Wilson's theory is against "liberal" (i.e. social democratic) criminologists and politicians in their allied orientation towards crime and victimisation, especially in the work of the Johnson Crime Commission and of Ramsey Clark. It is axiomatic for Johnson and Clark that crime is born of discrimination and poverty, and their view is based on the determinist assumption that people are primarily driven by the objective positions in which they find themselves. However, Wilson points out, it is a minority of poor people who commit crime. Sociological criminologists have not, therefore, shown that these "root causes" inevitably lead to crime, but they are agreed on the centrality of attitude-formation and of value-systems arising in the context of cultural patterns and intimate groups.

None of these latter findings, implicit to the conclusions of subcultural theorists such as Walter Miller and Albert Cohen, and in Edwin Sutherland's theory of differential association, "could supply a plausible basis for the advocacy of public policy." (ibid. p.48). How, Wilson asks, can government policy be expected to influence the subjective states that precede or accompany criminal behaviour.

"Society, of course, shapes attitudes and values by its example, its institutions, and its practices, but slowly imprecisely, and with great difficulty. If families inculcate habits of virtue, law-abidingness, and decorum, it is rarely because the family is acting as the agent of society or its government, but rather because it is a good family."

(ibid. p.49).

Wilson, with the pessimism which characterises so much conservative thought, doubts that government policy can off-set the influences of family and peer-group. How could the government supply the lower class with a new set of values consistent with law-abidingness? How could the supply of extra money change a class which exists because of its
values rather than its income? Surely, he maintains, sociological criminologists are confusing causal analysis with policy analysis. It is one thing to identify the causes of a phenomenon - and sociologists list many primary causes - but quite another to wholeheartedly claim that policy will affect them.

Social problems are invariably caused, he goes on, by factors which cannot be changed easily or at all. The tastes, attitudes, values from which human volition derives, "are either formed entirely by choice on the product of biological or social processes that we cannot or will not change" (ibid. p.50-51).

"The one thing we cannot easily do . . . is change, by plan and systematically, the minds of men. If peace can only be assured by doing what we cannot do, then we can never have peace." (ibid.).

Thus, Wilson conjures in his work an overview of the social and human conditions which lead to criminal victimisation, though certain conclusions have to be inferred from his often vague and general discourse. People harm one another because it is (in part at least) their nature to do so!

The negative and positive facets of social order, to a great extent reflect the negative and positive sides of human nature. Also, to the extent that people choose to adhere to the values with which they are made familiar, they will do good, at at least refrain from bad actions. To the extent that social order, seemingly through deliberate government policies towards social institutions and criminal justice, is organised to restrain bad actions, the less it will resemble the 'war of all against all.'

However, even in a society where most are well socialised and restrain themselves from bad actions, there will be those who prey upon them. This inevitable fact leads to the conservative's trust and dedication to social defence, to an emphasis upon the principles of punishment and deterrence. Here conservatives depart strongly from social democratic criminologists and politicians who in their deterministic view of man,
says Wilson, "make any reliance on deterrence seem futile or irrelevant." (ibid. p.53).

Wilson, in company with others on the new right, affirms the rightfulness and efficacy of punishment. If humans are rational calculators, will they not then inevitably be deterred by the increased risks of pain and deprivation? The duty of the state to act through the criminal justice system to ensure the adequate protection of the innocent is paramount.

I have dealt at length with the work of Wilson as this would seem to be the most fully presented and challenging account of the conservative position, and also one from which can be derived the conservative account — a fairly systematic criminological account — of both the wider and more immediate origins of criminal victimisation. I will now move on to deal with other right-wing authors whose works also contribute to conservative images of victimisation.

It is clear, as I have already stated, that right-wing criminology has a strong orientation towards notions of victimisation. In the work of Wilson, and Norval Morris (Morris and Hawkins 1969; Morris 1974), emotional tones are very muted. Indeed, in their attacks on social democratic penology, their concern is explicitly related to considerations of the effectiveness (or otherwise) of penal sanctions in reducing the incidence of criminal behaviour, and of the justice and fairness in respect of the offender. However, in the work of others, moral outrage at the plight of crime victims, and their treatment by the criminal justice system, obtrudes strongly.

Right wing law and order rhetoric and popular media presentations of crime have always, of course, focused on actual victims' experiences as well as addressing the widespread individual fear of victimisation. Patricia Morgan's book Delinquent Fantasies (1978), for instance, inveighs against the "new barbarism" brought about by rising rates of street crime, burglary, vandalism, and disorderly conduct and is replete with the details of exceptional — though real — cases. The onslaught of delinquents and criminals on public life involves many costs. There is a dramatic reduction in personal freedom; so many other rights of citizenship cannot be exercised unless safety of life and limb are guaranteed.
Personal freedom resides not having to calculate the risks involved to your person and your property, of your every journey outdoors. (ibid. p.9).

Delinquency wastes considerable social and economic resources, and contributes to the decline of the environmental fabric, making for places which are harsh and where danger from deliberate harms abound. Like Wilson she sees 'urban breakdown' and the 'decline of community' as very much the effects rather than the causes of delinquency leading to circumstances in which victimisation becomes more likely. Those who have the mind and means to escape - professional and skilled groups - do so, leaving behind the powerless, the heavily welfare-dependent groups.

What they run from is not just discrete acts of violence and vandalism, but . . .

" . . . what could be called a delinquent syndrome, a conglomeration of behaviour, speech, appearance and attitudes, a frightening ugliness and hostility which pervades human interaction, a flaunting of contempt for other human beings, a delight in crudity, cruelty and violence . . . "

(ibid. p.13).

Morgan stresses what she sees as the fundamentally demoralising effects of crime and disorderliness. People feel that they have lost control of their lives, and are at the mercy of fundamentally unjust and capricious forces, and control and understanding the environment is cut away, only to be replaced by meaninglessness and chaos. People, by their direct and indirect actions, then start to speed the process of decline, community is undermined, leading to "fragmentation where there ought to be combination." (ibid. p.15).

Crime is an attack on the rights of victims and non-victims alike; for the right not to be arbitrarily coerced is basic, as is the protection of the old and weak an expression of care, concern and solidarity in human society.

Like Wilson, she also rails against the "ever-widening gulf between the views of the public and those of academics and professionals on the
realities of victimisation." She condemns the new deviancy theory and its concept of the 'moral panic' and the "left-liberal" denial of an increase in crime or its seriousness, and amasses statistical evidence for increases in crime and emphasises the relevancy of under-reporting of crime.

Further to her argument, and again in line with Wilson, she criticises the assumption that concentration upon the needs of the child can be substituted for control and the inculcation of basic values. She also charts the rise of the "new establishment" - the alliance between the social sciences and social democracy. The underlying optimism and "vast public spending", "welfarism as a cure for all ills", the influence of the poverty lobby and of civil libertarians, fabian criminology, rehabilitationism and the doctrine of non-intervention, the community treatment of delinquents, the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, and 'progressivism in education', are all cited as parts of a pernicious process by which, in the field of delinquency, "procedures of social control and socialisation have been taken away from lay experience and practice" and appropriated by professionals. This has struck right at the heart of the importance of order and values in society. The "new establishment", not being able to deliver the goods, is a significant part of the problem itself. (ibid. p.48).

Conservatism has not until very recently been treated as a distinct paradigm within criminology. As a political philosophy, conservatism has always contained strongly articulated ideas on crime and deviance and, in fact, it is against these ideas which nineteenth century positivism, and twentieth-century social democratic criminology have reacted. Also, radical criminology - in its earlier as well as its more recent phases (see 5.4 below) has certainly conducted its polemics as much against conservative as against social democratic notions of crime, order and justice.

In a recent assessment of conservatism as a paradigm within criminology, Jock Young (1981 pp.274-80) has noted that . . .

"Conservatism is directed against liberalism and reformism, and its essentially pragmatic character is a consequence of protracted historical resistance to the reforming impulse." (p.274).

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Conservative political philosophy originally arose as a reaction against the ideas of the French Revolution. It has stressed the organic nature of society, and defended the traditional order against the individualism and rationalism of the emerging bourgeoisie. Conservatives have also stressed social tradition, with its emphasis on community, kinship, hierarchy, authority and religion, and has given central place to the role of the value system in permeating the component parts of social organisation, and in constraining the type of individual egoism which might undermine the social collectivity.

Conservatism is opposed to rapid social change because of the eroding effect upon social values and institutions which might result. Change is always better if gradually applied and with strict attention to the role of social policy in reinforcing 'natural' collectivism and in defending social institutions.

The conservative notion of human nature is essentially important in informing the notion of social order. Human nature is dual. Man is a social animal, but he remains an animal in the sense that the 'old Adam' remains within us giving rise to potentially anti-social impulses which society must control through the inculcation of appropriate values. This image involves a voluntaristic notion of human action in which we are endowed with freedom of choice and the ability to consciously restrain our lower urges. Thus although the processes of socialisation are important - their importance lies in the development of these self-regulating capacities of the individual. Sacrifice, self-discipline, and submission to traditional values and authority structures are the foundations of conservative philosophy (ibid.).

It is also important to note that there are a number of points at which conservatism overlaps with Classicism. Firstly, both share a voluntaristic image of human nature and action; but, whereas classicists see reason and individualism as positive and progressive social forces, for conservatives, reason in itself - especially when harnessed to the egoism of individual desires - can lead directly to social disintegration. Thus for conservatives the social system is of necessity coercive; for social values, institutions, government, and especially law and the criminal justice system, must be so organised as to constrain and deter harmful egoism.
Secondly, both accept the notion of a 'social contract'. For the classicist this contract is seen - in the spirit of Locke - as freely entered into on the basis of the rational calculation of the mutual benefits to the individual and the social collectivity. For conservatives, adhering to a Hobbesian notion of the contract, see it as going beyond reason to a fundamental faith in the reasonableness of deep-rooted and historically proven social arrangements and hierarchies. Thus Edmund Burke (1729-1797) noted that the contract is quite unlike that which might emerge in trade and "be dissolved by the fancy of the parties". It is a partnership over generations . . .

" . . . not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society . . ."

(Burke 1770: cited in Buck 1975 p. 51).

Thus, the conservative contract is of a much more immutable and one-sided nature than that of the classicists, and this has a bearing on conservatives' seemingly contradictory approach to victims of crime.

Finally, it is important to compare both of these theories on the basis of their conceptions of the relationship between 'order' and 'justice'. For the classicist, social order and tranquility are to be achieved through the pursuit of justice - by which is meant here - at base - the securing of the rights of individuals to property and the security of one's person, as well as the securing of a host of procedural rights concerned with a variety of civil contracts, the rules of due process and so on. We may see therefore that the activities of the strictly constitutionalist United States Supreme Court - the Warren Court - in its many decisions aimed at securing the rights of minority group members and of defendants - was operating squarely within the optimistic classicist belief that visible, equally distributed justice will lead to a fairer criminal justice system and as a foundation stone of harmonious social relations.

We have also seen, in Chapters II and III, and in the proceeding.
section of this chapter that social democratic politicians took over the classicist formula and considerably extended its conception of 'justice'.

The conservative formula reverses that of classicists and social democrats. Order now becomes the means through which justice can be achieved. As Ernest van den Haag has put it:

"... the paramount duty, the raison d'etre, of governments is to provide a legal order in which citizens can be secure in their lives, their liberties, and their pursuit of happiness."

(1975 p.3).

... also:

"Order is indispensable to justice because justice can be achieved only by means of social and legal order."

( Ibid. p.35).

So important is the maintenance of social and legal order, that Haag contends that injustice may be necessary, temporarily, for its maintenance. The duty to do justice must always be subordinate to the government's duty to secure order. (Ibid. p.36).

In conservative politicians' statements on crime, the terms "order" and "the rule of law" occur with great frequency. Indeed it is in a close examination of the usage of these terms that the roots of conservative images of criminal victimisation are to be found.

In the period preceding the 1968 Presidential Election the two issues of crime and disorder were seized upon by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. The conception of victim being used was a dual one - social order was a victim, but there were other victims too: a sense of values, communities beset by crime and riots, and demoralised and bleeding individual victims looking to government to protect them.

When Richard Nixon entered the Presidential race in 1967, it was a
very short time since political analysts were predicting a continual decline in electoral fortunes for the Republican Party. Blacks had voted for them since the days of Lincoln; now their mass desertion to the Democrats in 1960 and 1964 was particularly seen as a fatal blow to the Republicans' future fortunes. Nixon and other GOP notables such as Ronald Reagan, Governor of California, quickly discovered during the mid-term congressional elections of 1966 that 'law 'n' order' was an issue which could be used to galvanize the white middle - and working - class vote in the North and South. (Chester et al. 1969; McGinnis 1970).

As we have earlier seen, both Kennedy and Johnson had, during their presidencies, experienced problems of the loyalties of their traditional white working class constituency. As democratic administrations poured more money into the "war on poverty", the main beneficiaries of which were seen to be the non-working poor and blacks, the risks of desertion to other parties of the employed working class, became an important consideration. In the context of the 1968 election, welfarism stood largely discredited. Added to this the fear of crime and crime itself had given rise to considerable grass roots demands for a solution to the "crime problem" through "get tough" policies in terms of better and more extensive policing, longer prison sentences and other repressive measures.

In many areas of national concern "backlash" had become a key-word, and in terms of the Nixon campaign the particular methods through which this could be harnessed involved two related strategies. The first, or "Southern strategy" involved Nixon in aiming for the large-scale realignment of white voters on the old Confederate States. Although traditionally Democratic these voters were considerably alienated from the Johnson Administration because of the commitment to Civil Rights. Although unaffected by the riots, Nixon could use the spectre of black rioters and looters to convince Southern white voters that it was only a matter of time before 'their' blacks turned to similar activities.

The "Northern strategy" is more relevant for our discussion, and revolved around a number of inter-locking themes within which the image of victimisation emerges in a rather interesting way. In the following extract in a speech by Reagan a number of issues, already seen by the electorate as inter-related, are given expression within the same sentence. The country, he says, cannot afford . . .
"... politicians who demand that Social Security be tripled; that that national duty in Vietnam be discarded to provide huge make-work programmes in the city slums ...; that no youth need honour the draft; that Negroes need not obey the law, that there will be pie-in-the-sky once the country gets moving again."


Taking up the issue of welfarism Nixon continually sought to discredit programmes of social investment. Government programmes had not worked, and it was time for private enterprise to take its long-overdue turn. This "new road" would also, incidentally, benefit black communities, especially through the extension of black participation in business. In Nixon's speeches these same issues were also variously intertwined. The choices of the campaign were between himself and Johnson, who believed in the "knee-jerk reaction of a government programme" ...

"Over the past eight years we have had billions of dollars poured in - the result? - failure, frustration and riots across the land."

(cited ibid. p.682).

Also ...

"... there's one issue on which the difference between the candidates is crystal clear. And that's the issue of law and order in the United States. Mr.Humphrey defends the record of the last four years, defends the attorney-general and his policies ... I completely disagree with him. I say when crime goes up nine times faster than the population, and when forty-three per cent of the American people are afraid to walk on the street of their cities at night, its time for a complete house cleaning."

(cited in McGinnis op.cit. p.12).

That the Nixon campaign operated in, as well as nurtured the fertile
ground of public conceptions of these particular inter-relationships is
nicely illustrated by the report of an interview conducted by a reporter
of the Saturday Evening Post with some women in the small town of
Millersburg, Pennsylvania. Talking in terms of a "communist plot to
destroy us" they were pressed to say if their fears of crime and disorder
were real things in their lives "like the furnace not working, or the
plumbing going bad." They answered . . .

"Well, it's all part of the same
thing. Crime, the streets being
unsafe, strikes, the trouble
with the coloured, all this dope-
taking, people leaving the churches.
It is a sort of breakdown of our
standards, the American way of life."

(Chester et al. op. cit. p282).

The authors insist that these were not paranoid ravings but the
articulation of conflated fears by ordinary people.

Of particular significance is Nixon's knack of taking the slogans
of the left and of social democratic conceptions of justice and giving
them a different emphasis. A particular example which arises in a
number of different accounts of his campaign, is the concept of 'civil
rights'.

"I pledge a new attorney general.
I pledge an all-out war against
organised crime in this country.
I pledge that the first civil
right of every American, the
right to be free from domestic
violence, will again be recog-
nised and protected in this
great country of ours."

(McGinnis op. cit. p14-15
emphasis added).

Nixon, conscious of the need not to entirely alienate blacks, and
also of the need to appear an undeclared racist to some whilst as a non-
racist to others, made somewhat oblique references to blacks as crime
victims, even going so far as to suggest that blacks and most to gain
from law and order since it was they who suffered more than their share
of victimisation. Also, along lines similar to his redefinition of
'civil rights', he further redefines the relationship between justice and order.

"To those who say that law and order is the code word for racism, here is a reply: our goal is justice - justice for every American. If we are to have respect for law in America, we must have laws that deserve respect. Just as we cannot have progress without order, we cannot have order without progress."

(cited in Chester et al. op. cit. p.497. emphasis added).

This inversion of the social democratic notion of this relation, was articulated several times during the campaign. In an attack on Attorney-General Clark, a Nixon aide said after the election . . .

"Clark's trouble was that he was philosophically concerned with the rights of the individual . . . Our concern is more an orderly society through law enforcement."

(cited in Harris 1969 p.152).

Also, J. Edgar Hoover, Head of F.B.I. was also quoted at the time as saying that "justice is merely incidental to order." (ibid. p.106).

In the conservative thesis the, victimisation is that which the lawless visit upon the law-abiding. The former do not commit their depredations because of "inequality" or "injustice", but because of the failures of social and internal controls results from the weakening of ties of social discipline in the context of social institutions such as the family, workplace and school. It is also integral to the conservative position especially as espoused by Nixon and others, that the 'liberalism' of Democratic administrations had contributed to this process - the victimisation process - through the "softening" effects of welfarism and an accompanying "weakening" of law enforcement and corrections, by placing the rights of offenders above the rights of law-abiding citizens to be free from victimisation.

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In the conservative re-definition of 'civil rights', it is criminal victimisation which leads to social victimisation. The greatest wrong which a citizen may suffer is not 'inequality' - for this is indispensible to a justly ordered society - but the interference by criminals, or indeed the interventionist state, in the harmonious natural patterns of social and economic relationship.

In conservative rhetoric on crime, criminal victimisation is directly referred to in terms of the harms inflicted upon individual victims and the fearfulness of the law-abiding. Thus, in the post-war history of the British Conservative Party's concern for law and order (see Gamble 1974), two themes have predominated. Firstly, grass-roots spokespersons and politicians have articulated the problem of crime in terms of the plight of individual victims and the lack of a sense of personal safety. Secondly, law-abiding victims and non-victims suffer in two ways; they are hurt and frightened, but they are also hurt by the sense of injustice which results from the failure of the state to protect them. The emphasis is always upon the role of the parents, teachers, the police, in maintaining efficient and constant surveillance and regulation of those seen as most likely to offend-children, the working-class, ethnic minorities, and 'subversive elements' - and upon a sure and certain faith in the efficacy of retributive punishments in securing freedom from harm and fear.

For most of the post-war period Conservative Party politicians in Britain who have been centrally concerned with questions of law and order (such as Duncan Sandys and Eldon Griffiths) have been isolated from the Party leadership. Since the shift to the right marked by the election to the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in the mid 1970's however, and especially since the election victory of 1979, law and order has been elevated to a level of attention and importance equal to that of the management of the economy. Indeed, since the early 19th century issues involved in the management of capitalism's economic and social spheres are perpetually intertwined, but never more so than in conditions of crisis. The attacks upon what are seen as the failures of decades social democracy to secure social order as well as economic security, are central to the ideology of the dominant monetarist wing of the Party.

For monetarists the issue of criminal victimisation assumes a much deeper importance than for the 'social and economic Toryism' which has been dominant for so long. As I have remarked above, conservatives have
always seen the duty of the state as ensuring the 'adequate protection of the innocent' from any unlawful activities. The conservative image of criminal victimisation actually extends beyond the boundaries of the predatory victimisation imposed by ordinary criminals. Equally of concern is the victimisation of those who will not join trade unions, or those who will not take industrial action, the firm, consumers, and workers in other industries affected by strikes. Most importantly, there is concern for the 'victimisation' of such abstractions as 'the national interest', 'the well being of the economy', by the 'enemies within'.

The heightened sensitivity of the present leadership of the Conservative Party to all these forms of victimisation, stems from a very conscious awareness (reinforced by increasing public disorder, crime rates, and by bitter industrial disputes), that monetarism's project of economic and social reconstruction will inevitably give rise to the sharpening of social conflict at all levels.

There is much in the Conservative Party's approach to crime and victimisation which parallels that of Republicans from Goldwater to Reagan. Firstly, there is an explicit denial of a causal link between economic inequalities and problems, and the propensity for people to commit crime. Thatcher has consistently reiterated the central conservative belief that poverty, unemployment and crime are not linked - for are not most people so affected scrupulously honest? Perhaps the most telling evidence of her commitment to this view lies in her responses to charges that the disorders of 1981 were generated by Britain's economic problems and the government's down-grading of social investment.

Problems she declared, cannot be solved by "throwing money at them" - the emphasis upon money and investment, she contends, misses the whole point. It is the economic policies of successive governments which have made the law-abiding the 'victims' of inflation and punitive levels of taxation, and their social policies which have compounded criminal victimisation.

The only example of a work which is informed by political conservatism and which is fairly explicitly part of the field of victimology, is Frank Carrington's *The Victims* (1975). There a number of themes here which stand out. Firstly, Carrington is incensed by the Warren Court's
re-affirmations of the rights of defendants. The decisions on cautioning, bail, parole, confessions, searches and seizures, and the unconstitutionality of the death penalty (see Chapter III above), are all seen to contribute to victimisation, fear and disenchantment with the criminal justice system. They favour the rights of offenders over the rights of the law-abiding; they systematically weaken the effectiveness of the police in detecting crime, of prosecutors in securing convictions, and of judges in meting out just and deterrent sanctions. They bring the system into disrepute and contribute to cynicism, non-reporting of crime, and other attitudes and behaviours which create the conditions for victimisation.

Secondly, he attacks the assumptions of the "liberalism" and civil libertarianism which he sees as underpinning the rises in the crime rate, the denial of those rises, and the failure to remedy them. He cites at length the views of Sidney Hook on the rights of criminals and non-criminals. The potential victim has as much a human right not to be molested, interfered with and outraged, as the person accused of such crimes has to a fair trial and a skilful defence. Victimisation denies one most of the rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, and all of them if one is killed. Liberalism - the devotion to legally guaranteed rights - when it operates without reason and intelligence, ignores the rights of the many in favour of those of the few.

"A fruitful way to begin the quest for intelligent solutions is to reorient our thinking... to the rights of the potential victims of crime and the task of reducing their numbers and suffering. In this way we can best serve the interests of both "justice and compassion."


Thirdly, Carrington classifies victims as being predominantly of three types; the poor and the powerless, policemen, and society itself. He is particularly insistent (as are most other conservative criminologists) to deny the charge that law and order are code-words for the repression of racial minorities. The poor and the powerless are, he observes, victimised by all forms of crime fare more than other groups.
That victims of crime are ignored in our criminal justice system is a sorry enough situation in itself. But by far the most shameful failure of the system is its almost total inability - or unwillingness - to provide protection ... for those who most need it: the poor, the minorities, and the ghetto dwellers. If the right to be free from criminal harm is to mean anything, it should surely be accorded to those who are most exposed to lawlessness and violence ... "

(ibid p.34).

Carrington supports his general contention that (largely intra-racial) crime is the scourge of the racial ghettos, with findings from the victimisation surveys, and a most impressive selection of quotations from black journalists, politicians, and community leaders, businessmen and ordinary residents. He also cites the hard-line crime control manifesto of the New York branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, in which action is called for on organised crime, drug-pushing and the presence of addicts, burglary, mugging and vagrancy, the restoration of capital punishment or a thirty-year minimum sentence for first degree murder, the limitation of probation, bail and parole. It also urges black residents of Harlem to drop their hostility to the police and to report crime more frequently - in short to stop acquiescing in the pervasiveness of crime through apathy and grudging acceptance. (ibid. p.41-42).

A major part of Carrington's thesis is that victims of crime receive a very bad deal from the criminal justice system as a whole. It fails adequately to protect them from crime, the courts use them in the prosecution process but fail to protect them from intimidation, or to give them justice, or compensation for their injury or loss, and moreover their social and psychological needs go unmet. Carrington proposes a large number of policy and practical changes in the criminal justice system, and the provision of comprehensive services of victim aid, in order to change the orientation of the system of policy-makers away from offenders and towards crime victims.

Carrington is of interest here for two reasons. He maintains a
strictly conservative perspective on social order and criminal justice. He is in favour of extending the powers of the police because, in his scheme, this would lead to increased protection and rates of detection, with a corresponding uplift in public confidence and co-operation. He is also in favour of capital punishment and of longer prison sentences for 'dangerous' offenders. His philosophy of punishment, which is basically retributivist, is also informed by the aims of social defence, deterrence, and what he sees as the widespread sense of injustice, on the part of victims and non-victims alike, at 'soft' punishments, strict procedural rules in policing and prosecution, and defendants rights to early release on parole.

Carrington is also a leading figure in the powerful "victims' lobby" in the United States. He is a director of the National Organisation on Victim Assistance - which also promotes the setting up of state and private support schemes for victims - and was a member of President Reagan's Task Force on Victims on Crime, the Report of which is extremely wide-ranging in the scope of its recommendations (1982 pp.17-36). Some of them give expression to long-held conservative opposition to the use of the Exclusionary Rule in Fourth Amendment cases - rendering evidence obtained in illegal searches and seizures inadmissible - and it proposes strict limitations and conditions on the use of bail.

The Report reflects not only a concern for 'social order and community as victim' but it also contains proposals which would revolutionise the position of victims in criminal proceedings and criminal justice in general. They would be protected by anonymity, and in certain cases required only to appear at hearings in the initial stages of the process - necessitating a radical revision of rules relating to 'hearsay'. The present proceedings of parole boards would be opened to the public and legislation introduced to limit judicial discretion in sentencing and abolish parole - this last point giving expression to the academic campaign which has been waged by Andrew von Hirsch (1976).

Further legislation would require that consideration of reports on the impact of crime on the victim(s) be a requirement at the sentencing stage, and that restitution be required in all cases and that restitution can be made a condition of probation or parole.

It is proposed that these revisions be backed by a modification to
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution to read . . .

" . . . the victim, in very criminal prosecution, shall have the right to be present and be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings. "

(ibid. p.114).

The Task Force Report also contains a proposal for the re-evaluation of the juvenile justice system from the perspective of the victim. This clearly articulates the unhappiness of conservatives with the welfare model of juvenile justice and with the assumption of non-responsibility for the criminal actions of juveniles. It argues that juveniles of fifteen years or over who commit violent crimes be tried as adults (ibid. pp.51-54). It also argues for a greater consideration for the needs and rights of victims of juvenile cases. Furthermore, legislation should provide federal funding, matched by local revenues, to assist in the operation of publicly - and privately - operated assistance to victims and witnesses. (ibid. pp.37-55).

There are then two sets of proposals emerging from this, the first Presidential Task Force on criminal justice matters since before the Kennedy administration to be dominated by conservatives. In the first case it brings together, in an authoritative way, the central ideas of the conservative 'counter-reformation' in criminal justice, which began towards the end of the Johnson years but which is, under Reagan, coming to fruition. The vision is of a criminal justice system in which considerations of the maintenance of social order and discipline, and the rights of injured parties over-ride those of defendants. Secondly, the far-reaching demands for victim and witness services could itself be seen as a reaction motivated in part, by the conservative resentment at the size of the welfare budget. If offenders, their dependants, and countless other groups, can be recipients of federal aid - why not the victims of crime?

Paradoxically perhaps, many of the recommendations for federal and state government action would be exceedingly costly, if they were to reach a high proportion of crime victims, in a period of massive cutbacks in spending on social welfare in general. As if sensing this
obvious contradiction, the Task Force makes much of the importance of the private initiatives. Corporations should provide services for employees and make donations to services provided by the public and private sectors. Private schemes should be "imaginative" in their means of obtaining funding. (ibid. p. 168).

The extent to which these two sets of proposals will be met, remains to be seen. Indeed, their discussion and implementation is complicated by a number of contradictions which I shall outline below.

The conservative concern for social order, community, and individuals as victims of crime, is also given expression in the criminal justice policy proposals of the Conservative Party in Britain; but concern for individual victims is here given less stress than in criminal justice politics in America.

In the pronouncements of Margaret Thatcher, social order is a dominant theme. In her schema, crime, strikes, picketing, political demonstrations, hooliganism, terrorism, international conflicts - are all conflated and subsumed under the heading of 'disorder'. The key concepts of 'the rule of law', 'order', and the 'rights of ordinary people going about their private business in safety', are central to her argument.

Under her leadership and especially during the Home Secretaryship of Leon Brittan, the tenor of criminal justice policy in Britain has shifted significantly towards more traditional conservative priorities. Thus, in various policy changes on parole, in the area of juvenile justice, and in the major prison building programme, the emphasis upon control has hardened. In the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, several changes enhance the powers of the judiciary and magistracy, placing more emphasis on the incarceration of adults and juveniles, and increasing the control functions at the expense of the social welfare functions of probation and social workers. These changes re-instate the aims of retribution and deterrence over those of primary prevention through social investment, rehabilitation, and after-care.

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 extends considerably the powers of the police to stop and search people and vehicles on the grounds
of "reasonable suspicion" that they will find stolen or prohibited articles, and powers of entry, arrest, and detention. The Conservative rhetoric surrounding this new legislation has very much pursued the well-worn theme that the balance of rights and safeguards has drifted too far in the direction of the benefit of the lawless, and that this imbalance needs to be re-dressed. The Act was based on the second of two bills, the first of which failed in 1982 in the face of extreme opposition from numerous quarters. During the final reading of the second bill, in May 1984, Conservative spokesmen emphasised two related themes. Eldon Griffiths, for instance, dismissing claims that the bill threatened civil liberties, said:

"The greatest civil liberty of all is the right of people to walk the streets and live in their homes at peace. This bill sustains that civil liberty."

(The Guardian 1984)

The experience most familiar to students of conservative rhetoric on crime is déjà vu!

For Leon Brittan, the bill "gave the police the powers they need and the public they have the right to expect it" formed part of the overall strategy to create more effective policing (ibid.). That strategy is outlined in Criminal Justice: a working paper, published in May 1984, in which "public confidence" in the criminal justice system is seen as central. Nationwide consensus is necessary to ensure that the system retains public support and co-operation. (Home Office 1984).

"For that consensus to be obtained, the public must have confidence that the citizen is able to go about his business in the knowledge that he will not be hindered by the illegal actions of others - that the rule of law will be maintained."

(ibid. p.7).

To this end is needed police effectiveness and the trust of "the community at large." There must further be a reversal of the trend in violent crime through the reinforcement of retribution and deterrence.
"Sentences which fail to reflect society's deep abhorrence of violent crime undermine public confidence and so weaken the whole criminal justice system."

( Ibid. )

Of particular interest to the discussion here are the sections of the Working Paper on "Crime Prevention" and "Victims". The government is clearly in favour of greater "community involvement" in crime prevention. In this the Crime Prevention Unit within the Home Office is to have a key role in promoting crime prevention at all levels - from 'target hardening' to the operation of neighbourhood watch schemes - and to evaluate the effectiveness of these. It is perhaps logical, given the importance of 'community' in the maintenance of order, that these defensive and pre-emptive approaches should be officially promoted; but, the tone of the document is noticeably low-key on these measures in comparison to its enthusiasm for increasing the effectiveness of the police, courts and prisons. The bulk of the community initiatives are envisaged as emanating from the voluntary sector, and police-run crime prevention schemes are seen as being the responsibility of local police forces to operate and finance in competition for resources with other perceived priorities. ( Ibid. pp. 10-11).

On victims of crime the Working Paper is very vague indeed, offering no new government commitments to financial assistance. There is some reference to increasing, through training, the sensitivity of policemen at the scene of the crime to the needs of victims, and ensuring that victims are kept in touch with the development of cases. It notes that the Criminal Justice Act 1982 empowers sentencers to give compensation orders precedence over a fine, and to order compensation as a sentence in its own right. As with all other issues associated with sentencing, the final decision is seen to rest with the courts. There is a bald statement of fact about the operation of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, and the intention to place it on a statutory basis. The proposals to extend the experimental schemes for offender reparation to victims receive support, but once more the initiatives will be local and there is a reference to "financial assistance to a few experiments, and help in evaluating them." ( Ibid. p. 27).

Victims' support schemes merit little more than a hundred words
(ibid. p.26) with commitment to the continued financial support of the National Association of Victim Support Schemes which co-ordinates two hundred and forty-one schemes throughout the country, and which received 100,000 referrals from the police in 1984 (Hillard 1985).

In December 1984, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee issued its report on Compensation and Support for Victims of Crime (1984), in which it applauded the work being done by victims support schemes, but noted that the whole enterprise was vastly underfunded. NAVSS received directly from the Home Office £60,000 in 1984-85, and £120,000 in 1985-86 mainly for administrative operations (Hillard op.cit.) but local schemes depend upon the uncertainty of grants from Urban Aid and the Inner City Partnership. In 1985 51 schemes obtained grants from local authorities but only three of these exceeded £500. (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee op.cit. p. vi.) They otherwise depend upon charitable donations and fund raising events. Only a minority of schemes are able to employ a full-time co-ordinator; only 76 have use of their own office, and each scheme spends a large slice of its funds on basic running and accommodation costs. The Association of Chief Probation Officers and the NAVSS said in evidence that many schemes are in serious danger of collapse and that the lack of adequate and secure funding is imposing severe limitations on the development of victim support in a period when the demand is expanding rapidly. (ibid p.vi-ix).

In its reply to the Committee's report (Home Office 1985) the government reiterated statements by the Home Secretary that it has always regarded the schemes as the product of "spontaneous effort at the local level", and that it is appropriate that ...

"... the local community should contribute to the support of its local scheme and that some voluntary effort should be devoted to fund raising activities."

(ibid. p.5).

In practical terms this means that not only are they underfunded, but that considerable energies are diverted into fund-raising which could go to the delivery of services to victims. It also seems clear that the government do not intend to give a high priority to victim services. The £120,000 which it currently donates can be matched against the £538,000
given to that other poor relation of the criminal justice system, the
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (Hillard
op.cit.). Of the £2800 million spent on law and order in 1984, government
expenditure on all services relating to victims amounts to £1.56 million
or 1.5%, the bulk of which consists of grants to the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board for compensation payments to victims of violent crimes,
and its administrative costs. (House of Commons ... op.cit. p.iv).

Let us now turn to the question of the evaluation of the orienta-
tion to victims and victimisation to be found in conservative crimin-
ology. We can re-state that for conservatives 'justice' flows from
'order'. Order, we can take to mean the orderly social and economic
relations implicit in the successful functioning of social institutions
and of the disciplined and efficient operation of the market. Basic
also to their position is the idea of the 'rule of law' - that legal
relations and constraints should govern all social and economic relations,
in terms of the rights and obligations of all citizens. A third feature
is the tendency of conservatives to conceive of victimisation in three
related ways. Crime, and other forms of disorder broadly defined, cause
serious harm to 'order', especially to the 'rule of law' upon which it
rests, to harmonious and natural patterns of social and economic re-
relationship - to community, and to individuals. What may be most clearly
detected is that although the victimised individuals often wander across
the conservative landscape - attracting much compassionate attention -
these individuals are soon lost in the rhetoric of injured order.

It is probable that this is not callous disregard or cynical man-
ipulation of individual victims, and that conservatives do believe that
the interests of actual and potential victims lies in repressive criminal
justice. As such this reveals much about the inadequacy of the conserv-
ative orientation to victimisation.

Firstly, criminal victimisation is the only type of victimisation
of which they can conceive. For social democrats, as we have seen,
criminal victimisation is but an aspect of social victimisation in general.
People are harmed by 'normal' social and economic relations and this in
turn gives rise to their harming social order and each other. Conservatives
specifically deny the existence of social victimisation - in the sense
of 'inequality' or 'disadvantage' or 'deprivation'. These things are
seen as fair and just, and part of natural social evolution.
As Ian Taylor has said in his discussion of right-wing criminology:

"The rhetoric of the Right is almost always silent on the specific social context of any crime, and tries to displace crime and delinquency from their origins in the social formation itself, and in so doing asserts that the disorder in social relations is unrelated to the accelerating crisis of social reproduction in capitalist society. Right wing criminology's essential project is indeed to disconnect the facts of social disorder from the (developing) disorderlyness of social relations by remaining silent on the specific social context of crime and by speaking about crime as individual moral defect."


Also, as Lea and Young maintain, the conservative position sees crime not as a problem created by capitalism, but a major problem for capitalism. Eliminate crime and a major blemish will disappear from a structurally unchanged system. It is not seen as an epiphenomenon - a problem related to the major problems of society. (1984, p.59).

If conservatism does this for crime, it also does so for social victimisation. It has no conception of the harmfulness of normal social relations. Even in the midst of capitalism's accelerating crisis it is concerned to deny or disregard the specific effects of unemployment, poverty, bad housing, and other features of the system. In so doing, it reveals its fundamental anti-humanism - a fundamental absence of the principle of compassion from its social analysis stems both directly and indirectly from the centrality of the concepts of possessive individualism and the non-interventionist state to its system of ideas. This led logically to the denial of the responsibility of social collectivities - whether communities or the nation-state - for the origins of the misfortunes of their individual members or for their welfare. That responsibility is, at base, a private responsibility. This may mean one of two things - sometimes both things relatedly. Either individual misfortune is brought about by some action or neglect on the victim's own
part, or else the individual has failed to anticipate the possibility of misfortune and has thus failed to make adequate provision for that eventuality.

Although they are too politically astute to say so, conservative politicians probably feel that some criminal victimisation is 'victim-precipitated' or else results from the failure to take proper precautions. They most certainly believe that were most people adequately insured against theft, criminal damage, and burglary, the need for practical help for victims would be significantly diminished. Given these sorts of attitudes, a comprehensive and state-funded system of victim services, including the expansion of the scope of state compensation, would be no more than extending the interventionist welfare state into further areas of private existence, at a time when the frontiers of the state are being 'rolled back'. Thus, even in the case of those forms of victimisation in which the victim is 'innocent', it must be neighbours and voluntary organisations which must rally to them.

The second point is that the conservative position on the victims of crime, and other phenomena, both in theory and in practice, adds to the 'classicist contradiction'. Young (1981 p.264) speaks of this as the contradiction between formal and substantive equality. The assumption of individual equality is belied by the existence of social inequalities between individuals. In reality capitalism generates inequalities, a massive maldistribution of advantages and disadvantages, which lead to real problems in positing 'equality before the law'.

As stated earlier, conservatism incorporates a notion of the 'social contract', which stresses both equalities and inequalities. All individuals have an equal duty to keep the contract, but it is recognised that some (especially the lower classes) are less likely to do so than others. Thus the weight of repressive criminal justice is shifted unequally to them. In this grudging acceptance that inequality and crime might be linked, there is no admission of the justification of lower-class crime - all are bound by the contract - do not most poor people respect it, recognising that it is to the long-term benefit of all?

The point wherein the conservative social contract differs so profoundly from the classicist social contract, relates to the responsibilities
of the state with regard to the well-being of individuals. Social democrats recognising the 'classicist contradiction', have sought to remedy it by stressing the duty of the state to promote circumstances which will lead to a better fit between formal and substantive equality, and their emphasis upon 'social justice' for the victims of normal social processes stems from this concern. Their desire to incorporate the victims of crime within the framework of the interventionist state is a logical extension of this concern, especially in light of the evidence for the unequal distribution of criminal victimisation between the classes.

The structural realities of capitalism continually frustrate the social democratic enterprise, but the contract remains one which is, in theory at least, binding on both parties. But, the conservative contract contains only the obligation of the state to provide 'order'; but if order breaks down, or if order itself gives rise to harm, the responsibility of the state is effectively denied. In the absence of truly mutual responsibility, this 'contract' is then fundamentally one-sided.

5.4. Radical Criminology

In social democratic and right-wing criminologies then, images and conceptions of victims and victimisation exist in complex inter-play. What I have called the 'denial of the victim' - that is the failure to confront issues of harm in relation to real individuals and groups, and the processes by which they become harmed - sits together uneasily, in both perspectives, with regularly articulated notions of 'victims' and 'victimisation'.

In the case of social democratic criminology the notion is an ironic one: it is the offender who is the real victim. Within the context of this perspective in criminology has emerged victimology, which has erected a challenge in the form of anew irony: those who suffer most from social inequalities, suffer most from crime! For right-wing criminology (especially in its politically conservative form), discussion of crime centres on the illustration of real victims, but moves quickly towards the concept of social order (at both micro and macro levels) as victim. There is a theory of criminal victimisation, in that the undersocialised prey upon the weak; but this takes no account of
non-criminalised forms of victimisation, nor of social victimisation.

The examination of these images and orientations with regard to radical criminology reveals a no less complicated picture, and it is with this which I will now deal. This discussion is in preparation for my proposals for a socialist victimology in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

It is my contention here that radical versions of criminology have, on the whole, failed to fully confront the issue of victimisation. As in the social democratic and right-wing positions, the radical paradigm operates with implicit notions of victimisation, but these tend either to be selective, or are considerably abstracted. In describing and tracing the origins of these orientations, I will divide the development of radical criminology into three phases - radical deviancy theory; 'left idealism'; and 'left realism'. I will put forward a number of reasons for these contradictory orientations, in terms of the development of knowledge and practice in radical criminology and radical political philosophy.

(i) **Radical Deviancy Theory**

Phase I then, involves the emergence in Britain in the mid-to-late 1960's of a newly politicised version of the new deviancy theory. The latter had from its beginnings in the 1950's (e.g. Lemert 1951) and subsequently throughout the 1960's in the work of Becker (1963), Goffman (1963), Lemert (1967) and Matza (1964; 1969) who, drawing from the traditions of symbolic interactionism and social phenomenology, collectively revolutionised thinking on deviance, crime and social control. They erected a particular challenge to central tenets of positivism.

A consensual image of social order was replaced by an image of a pluralistic society based upon the unequal distribution of power, especially to define acts as deviant and enforce those definitions. The image of the deviant as determined was replaced by one in which the deviant actor freely chose behaviour as a means of solving a number of socially induced dilemmas, and did so on the basis of their meaningfulness for the deviant. The positivist devotion to quantificationist methods in which the deviant was taken as object, was replaced by a
commitment to understanding deviant world-views and subcultural forms.

There emerged then, in the new deviancy theory, a predominant image of the deviant as victim of state intervention. This took over the social democratic idea of state victimisation and enlarged it to include the operations of the 'social control culture' as a significant part of the process of social victimisation. Thus, the processes of law creation, law enforcement, labelling, and correction, as well as the 'softer' social control apparatus of the social welfare system and the "therapeutic state", systematically victimised deviants, especially those from lower-class, ethnic, and other minority sub-cultures. Additionally, social control itself led to further deviance and so to intensified intervention.

New deviancy theory's commitment to relativism is central to its image of deviance. Behaviours which are outlawed are mostly those engaged in by powerless groups, and these are not necessarily objectively harmful; many are demonstrably unharmful either to participants or to social order. A great stress was also laid upon deviance which was held to be 'victimless', such as marihuana use and abortion, or to involve willing victims, such as the sale of illegal drugs, prostitution (e.g. Schur 1965). Part of the spirit of the theory held that the state had little right to interfere in these essentially private activities and because intervention merely served to 'amplify' them. Where crime with victims were discussed, the amount of harm to victims - especially as perpetrated by juveniles - was considerably underplayed and minimum levels of criminal justice or social welfare intervention were urged. (e.g. Schur 1973).

Radical deviancy theory as represented by the National Deviancy Conference (Cohen 1981), and by such authors as Cohen (1972), Young (1971), and others, shifted the emphasis of all these concerns to within the context of the understanding of deviance and social control in capitalist society - particularly with regard to the interplay of deviance and capitalism's economic and ideological dilemmas. The spirit of 'underdog sociology' however, remained virtually intact in all respects, and the image of the victim continued to be that of the labelled deviant. Also, whereas theorists such as Becker (1967) had never satisfactorily resolved the question of 'whose side' the sociologist was supposed to be on, the radicals developed a conscious identification with deviant activities and with the deviant's personal and social predicament, and
stood firm on forthright opposition to the activities of the capitalist state and its agencies of control.

Therefore, in their approach to deviant behaviours as diverse as drug-taking, sexual deviance, vandalism, soccer hooliganism, and political terrorism, radical theorists adopted a framework of explanation in which the meaningfulness of deviant action was central. In forms of deviance which were 'victimless' or in which the 'victim' was held to be an abstraction such as 'morality' or 'order', they saw a celebration of human diversity, political opposition (whether conscious or not) to utilitarian culture, and a denial of consensus.

When the forms of deviance under scrutiny were crimes with victims, radicals often engaged in a denial of the existence of the victim, or else minimised the harm which was posed. Radicals thus drew upon both the social democratic image of the offender as the victim of social injustice, and the new deviancy image of the offender as victim of state intervention, and elaborated an image of the offender as a (somewhat) politically informed victim fighting back against the victimisation imposed by the social system and the control system.

Radical deviancy theory was closely wedded to the trend of politicisation of deviance in the late 1960's and early 1970's. It identified with the Black Panthers, psychiatric patients, prisoners, gays, travellers and others who were seen as struggling against the repression of the criminal justice and social welfare systems. The struggles for justice on the part of these groups was seen as part of more general class struggle, and there was a sense in which deviants were seen as more conscious of the contradictory and unjust nature of capitalism than were the traditional working class. There was some very partial recognition of the plight of female and child victims of violence, but none at all of individual or collective victims of robbery, burglary, vandalism or other crime.

In fact, a sort of radical victimology - although never systematically developed - did emerge during this phase. It concerned the study of white-collar and corporate crime. Positivist criminology was castigated for its single-minded concentration upon 'little criminals' at the expense of the 'crimes of the powerful'. The explicit message was that
the objective harm done by corporate criminals, in economic or health terms, far out-stripped that done by working-class criminals. This has become an essential and unquestioned part of radical criminological rhetoric, and although never a major area of study, it has always been resurrected as a counter to conservative claims on the harmfulness and extent of crime, and social democracy's exclusive focus upon working-class crime. (inter alia Pearce 1976; Liazos 1977).

(ii) Left - Idealism :

In radical criminology's second phase, we witness a self-conscious shift towards a Marxist analysis of political economy and the state. In the work of Taylor, Walton and Young (1973; 1975) we discover a bridge between these first two phases. The perspective which was being developed substantially emphasised the functions of criminal law and crime control for capitalist order. The maintenance of social order, the elimination of deviance and dissent, the shorting-up of consensus and quiescence, is central to the ideological agenda of capitalism. Thus for much of the 1970's radical criminology was dominated by the study not of crime, but of law and the control functions of the state (e.g. Fine et al. 1979; Sumner 1979).

A most important element in left-idealism, and one which it carried over from radical deviancy theory, is its critique of the official crime statistic. The problem of working-class crime is held to be very much exaggerated. Street-crime, burglary, theft and vandalism, are not seen to pose a serious threat to the well-being of the population, but as disrupting the orderly relations of production and consumption. Moreover, whereas lower-class crime was overplayed, the crimes of powerful individuals, corporations and governments are under-played; even though, objectively, these represent the greater human and financial costs. (Liazos 1972; Pearce 1976).

The denial that mundane crime poses objective problems for working-class communities, is accompanied by the assertion of systematic bias and inaccuracy inherent in official statistics of crime. By the definition used in the last chapter, radical criminologists in phases I and II are strict "institutionists" (Biderman and Reiss op.cit.), seeing crime statistics as reflecting only the biased activities of the
As I will assert a little further on, radical criminology has also carried over from its phenomenological roots a marked disdain for quantitative methods of enquiry, which emerge as the pessimistic belief that official statistics are 'nothing but' reactive organizational outcomes, and that all attempts to quantify social phenomena such as crime, are based upon a mistaken and 'positivistic' conception of social reality.

The disdain for official statistics was matched by an opposition to media images. The study by the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies, of the mugging phenomenon of the early 1970's (Hall et al. op. cit.) provided a central reference point for the understanding of the ideological functions of the media in relation to crime and social control. This work focussed particularly on the media production of the mugging label, and its production and reinforcement of imageries of the act itself, and the characteristics of offenders and victims. The identification of the mugger was typically a young black male, and of the victim as an older white person, was seen in terms of the wider theme of race as this had become intertwined with the problem of crime, youth and the crisis of British capitalism. Although the analysis provided by this study is considerably more sophisticated than I have space for here, its importance lies in its almost exclusive attention to the super-structural features of a Marxist account of crime, ideology, and control, and the absence of an analysis of the reality of street-crime and other crime at the more immediate level of everyday life in working-class communities. This one-sidedness results in an almost complete absence of studies of criminal behaviour. Indeed, as Hall and his co-authors note:

"This is a book about 'mugging'; but it is not a book about why or how muggers, as individuals, mug... it does not attempt to reconstruct, from the inside, the motives or the experience of 'mugging'. There is, undoubtedly, such a book to be written; but there are many in a better position to do so than us."

(ibid p.327).

Such a book did appear, but it was not written by a radical criminologist, but by a veteran of New Scotland Yard! (Pratt 1980).
The neglect of the study of criminal behaviour and motivations, has been matched by radicals' neglect of the impact of crime and the fear of crime on individuals, households, and whole communities - a failure to take criminal victimisation as an area of serious debate and systematic study. Paradoxically, feminist criminologists spent the 1970's in the construction of a victimology which both encountered crimes against women super-structurally and in terms of the immediacy of the experiences of victims as gathered in small-scale surveys and case studies.

In the work of Hall and his colleagues, this critique is revived, as is the image of offender-as-victim, given a new form and given extremely detailed treatment. The phenomenon of 'mugging' is presented as an issue around which crystalises, in the early 1970's, all the fears and concerns of the capitalist class for the maintenance of social discipline and order in the face of a serious economic crisis and its implications for consensus. Mugging represents the point at which the crime problem and institutionalised racism combine through the refractions of media images and conservative political rhetoric, to produce a spectre - a folk devil, the black mugger. This enabled the capitalist class can mobilise the consensual support (especially of the white working class) for a repression which will go beyond the ordinary boundaries of crime control to include diverse types of economic and social resistance.

The symbolic role of the black 'mugger' in law and order rhetoric, is carried through to his place in the author's own analysis. He is (symbolically) a victim of racism in education, employment and of its psychic damage. 'Mugging' thus comes to symbolise a desperation, a response, a solution to the contradictions of personal and collective existence for black youth. Although the issue 'mugging' is examined closely, and its tenability as a solution to the problems of blacks in the inner city is denied, there is no real examination of the impact of street crime, burglary, and vandalism, upon working-class communities - both black and white.

For Hall and his co-writers, the denial of the impact of victimisation and the denial of the victims, was one which resulted from a neglect of the issue. For a newer generation of writers of the Birmingham school (Gilroy, Bridges and others) the denial is deliberate and forthright, and it must be explained with reference to other aspects of
their general theoretical position.

As we saw in Chapter IV above, this group have been very active in opposing the misuse of race-coded police statistics which have an integral part of what Bridges (1983) has called the 'permanent panic' on black crime, which has been engendered by the press and by police chiefs as part of a broad conservative thrust on law and order. I also discussed at that point, their views in the context of their being a reaction to the left-realist position on crime and policing. In these authoris' work there is no point at which they have been prepared to discuss the commission of violent or property crimes by a section of black youth in inner-city areas. The only criminalised activities worthy of mention are those associated with organised resistance by 'militant' youth to harassment by the police or white racists.

The suggestion, either on the part of the police or on the part of left-realists, that crime is a problem for working class neighbourhoods or for the black community, has received very brief and dismissive treatment. Most often this issue is side-stepped with reference to the symbolic racism of stereotypes of the young black criminal and with reference again to the 'well documented unreliability' of crime statistics. The denial of the reality of black crime, and the consequent denial of the existence of the victims of that crime - whether black or white - marks their work out as considerably less sophisticated and intellectually honest than that of Hall and others, from which they draw for much of their general analysis of issues of law and order and racism in the capitalist crisis. (see also Bridges 1983; Bridges and Gilroy 1983; Gilroy 1983; Gordon 1983).

Until recently there has been only one acknowledgement in these authors' work, of the findings of victimisation surveys. Gilroy (1982.b p.95) refers to them briefly in support of his contention of the fictional nature of 'crime waves'. Ironically, he does not draw upon any other of the numerous survey findings. More recently, however, Bridges and Fekete (1985) have addressed the discipline of victimology, and the surveys, more directly. They are especially concerned to discredit both and the way in which these have informed the positions of left-realists, and radical reformists in the Labour Party. (see Chapter VI).
Their assessment and critique of victimology is confined to the work of "Jewish criminologists in the immediate Second-World War period." (ibid. p.47). They mention the work of von Hentig (1948) on the 'penal couple', and the later work of Amir (1958) on the victim-precipitated nature of forcible rape. (see discussion in 1.3 and 1.4. above). They identify this work as "conservative and reactionary", and as stereotyping immigrant communities by focusing on the tendency for them to contain criminals prone to exploiting members of their own community. (ibid.). The use made victimisation survey data, and the promotion of local surveys, which Lee and Young (1984 and elsewhere) have used in the construction of their left-realism, is held to be "not entirely shorn of the conservative implications of victimology." (ibid.). The latter's work is held to continue, in the spirit of von Hentig, to stereotype sections of the black community as heavily involved in crime, and it furthermore...

"... represents a retreat from the limited critical stance of the sociology of deviance to a narrow focus on the 'penal couple' of criminal and victim."

(ibid. p.48).

If this statement is meant to suggest that the new realist approaches to victimisation are concerned only with the micro-level social-psychology of victim-offender interactions and that they neglect structural sources of victimisation, then it is clearly incorrect - as incorrect as it would be to suggest that feminist victimology is only concerned with the micro-level dynamics of the male-female relationship.

The alliance between left-realists and radical reformists in local authorities is also attacked. Labour politicians and local authorities, confronted - after the riots of 1981 - with their own inability to mount effective opposition to the impact of the government's monetarist policies, or to the growth of the powers of the police, have "sought refuge in the issue of crime victimisation" among working-class communities as a means of countering - for electoral purposes - the traditional Tory appeal on law and order. This emphasis reinforces right-wing conceptions of the city as an 'urban jungle' riddled with inter-racial crime and disorder, and feeds proto-fascist notions of the white
working class as the victims of the black presence in Britain. (ibid. p.47).

Victimisation surveys, including those commissioned by Labour local authorities are condemned as "useful to the police not only in planning but, even in legitimating their operations against high crime areas and against particular sections of the community". (ibid. p.54). They also provide market research for "collaborative policy initiatives" such as victim support schemes and neighbourhood watch. (ibid. p.55). The surveys are criticised further for their focus on ordinary crime to the exclusion of corporate crime or police harassment or brutality.

The primary focus of realist surveys upon ordinary crime emerged, of course, because of a specific belief in its under-reporting and pernicious impact - which authors such as Bridges, Gilroy and others, do not share. Also, such surveys were - precisely because they were informed by the debates on police accountability - designed to generate data on police harassment. They also attempted to uncover racist harassment and sexual abuse. (see discussion on Islington Crime Survey questionnaire design at 7.3, below). They also question the reliability of survey data, in that they see the respondents as having their perceptions directed towards ordinary crime, giving rise to an over-reporting of those categories. Incredibly, they select out the work of Levine (1976) on over-reporting in victimisation surveys, when the consensus among the vast majority of victim survey methodologists is that the potential for under-reporting is by far the greater problem. (see Sparks 1982 p.77 and my discussion at 4.6 above).

Bridges and Fekete conclude that the left-realists and those who campaign for the local democratic control of policing, play into the hands of the right, and - by their activities - actually facilitate a situation in which the police will be imposed as a 'caretaker class' upon working-class communities, surplanting local political leadership and services. But, they add . . .

"This is not to deny the claim of the left 'realists' that crime and victimisation are genuine problems for the working class, but so are mass unemployment, urban decay, institutional
This is the first time that any of this group of writers on race and crime has conceded that ordinary crime might be a problem for the working class. But the concession emerges in the context of the argument that crime cannot - should not - be separated out, conceptually or in terms of policy, from all the other ills of capitalism.

It is important to try to explain what substantially amounts to a denial of the existence of criminal victimisation as a burden, in addition to the burdens of multiple deprivation, and one which compounds the latter. Here we must recognise that Bridges and Gilroy are writing from within a distinct theoretical tradition, in which a functionalist version of Marxism has been applied to the analysis of the position of black people in first world countries. Their particular analysis upon the practical impact of racism and the super-exploited class position of blacks, has given rise to an idealised image of the black community, as an indivisible force engaged in an anti-colonial struggle against imperialism and racism from with the heart of the capitalist world. Thus the culture of the black community is viewed as a culture of resistance.

Young (1983) has identified, in his general critique of this theoretical tradition, a number of distortions. Firstly, there is a tendency to use the rubric "black" to cover numerous immigrant groups, with very little acknowledgement of their different cultural heritage and different experiences of discrimination in Britain. It also tends to maximise differences between the black and white working class, and thus to minimise the extent of the degree of assimilation of black youth to the culture and values of Britain. It minimises the conflicts between generations in order to stress a supposed continuity of struggle between the first and second generations. It minimises the conflict between the sexes and is uncritical of aspects of black culture which are repressive of women. The tradition especially minimises - even denies - the disorganised aspects of black culture, even though the deleterious impact of racism is acknowledged.
In the context of these idealistic distortions of the sociology of the predication of the black community (especially the black working class) it is perhaps easy to see why the acceptance of the existence of black participation in crime would have to be translated as a form of 'primitive rebellion'. But it is the existence of criminal victimisation in the black community which poses the greatest threat to the position, for the acknowledgement of harms resulting from intra-racial conflicts, would significantly undermine the image of cohesive and conscious resistance to racism. In reality, as victimisation surveys in Britain and North America have shown, the black community suffers disproportionately from criminal harms, as indeed it does from all other aspects of social victimisation.

Similarly, racism and poverty have had a disorganising effect upon aspects of black culture, in which brutalisation leads to the victimisation of women and other powerless sectors of the community. It is not surprising, therefore, that the work of Harrison (1983) is so roundly condemned and derided for his study of the impact of poverty and racism upon the quality of existence in the inner-city, (see Bridges and Fekete op.cit. p.58), for the conclusion which would have to be drawn from conceding the truth of his findings and analysis, would be that the most oppressed sections of the black and white working class could benefit from the policing of crime and other harmful outcomes of alienated social existence.

(iii) Left Realism :

The third, and most recent, phase in the development of radical criminology has been the emergence of the position known as 'left-realism'. It is in this phase that attention has been explicitly turned to victims and victimisation.

The emergence of left-realism has rested in a critique of the idealism about crime inherent in the previous two phases of radical criminology. These have been submitted to scrutiny and criticism by Jock Young, and the beginnings of his assault on the omissions and distortions of radical criminology began with his arguments for crime (especially crimes whose victims were individuals rather than businesses) to be viewed as a problem of capitalism rather than just for capitalism (Young 1975). In other words crime must be seen as reactionary and in-
jurisdiction - an expression of individualism and exploitation, rather than of a quasi-political form of resistance to the contradictions of capitalism. Furthermore, he argued that radicals ought not to condone criminal acts, even if they may be seen to arise from inequality and oppression, and that the working-class community suffers immensely from the criminals in its midst (1976 p.18).

Young also (ibid. p.13) identified trend in radical criminology, in which crime is seen as a product of people purposefully pursuing ideas detached and free from material circumstances. This is an inversion of the crudely materialist vision of the criminal as determined by non-purposive material factors. Later, in a more systematic critique of left-idealism, Young (1979) identified its central tenets as a voluntaristic conception of action, a coercive conception of social order, and a functionalist conception of social control. It sought to deny the objectively harmful nature of crime, denied the essentially intra-class nature of much crime, and denied the possibility of a consensus about criminal harms, or that working-class communities might have a stake in social order and the control of crime. The empirical focus of left-idealism was directly related to forms of crime which might fit into some conception of criminalised social resistance or else upon white-collar and corporate crime. Rarely did it focus upon interpersonal violence, burglary, or street crime, as these impacted upon members of the working class.

The idea of common interest is fostered by key parts of the control apparatus such as education, parliamentary democracy, the mass media. Some control institutions have an overtly ideological role, while others represent the 'iron fist' of coercion. The institution of law represents a sham universalistic gloss on the interest of the powerful, whereas the police and prisons represent the direct coercion in which the state is based.

Crime, according to the above logic results directly from capitalist inequality, and is only conceived of by idealists in terms of the opposition posed to social order. They are at pains to show that there is much more crime, in all classes, than is thought to exist and that this demonstrates the illusory nature of consensus. Equally, this position is very selective about the styles of crime selected for study.
"The empirical focus of left idealists is directly related to those forms of crime closely related - either historically or contemporaneously - to the class struggle over property rights or to large-scale theft or looting, but rarely to minor violence, petty theft, or alcoholism; although soccer hooliganism and vandalism have been interpreted as inarticulate forms of class struggle. A key feature of left idealism emerges here: it plays down the impact of working-class crime against the working-class; it maximises the anti-working class effects of ruling-class crime whilst at the same time stressing its endemic nature."

(ibid. p.15).

This outline of left idealism and its orientation to social order and crime is still a valid description of most radical thinking on crime, and reads as an uncanny prophesy of the work of such authors as Gilroy, Bridges and others on race and crime. It is clear why left idealism in criminology cannot accommodate an appreciation of the victim of ordinary crimes - those most numerous in reality. Crime only hurts social order; crime is a defensive reaction; crime is an expression of rage against intolerable oppression; but the exploitation of one person by another is of no theoretical interest unless it is perpetrated by corporations against the people, the police and prison system in harassment and beatings, or by racist thugs against black people.

Two other papers published by radical criminologists in the 1970's are worthy of mention here. An article by Tony Platt (1978) is notable for its early use by a radical of data and conclusions drawn from the National Crime Survey. He points out the low reporting rate of street-crime consequent upon the fear and apathy of victims, or their belief in the ineffectuality of the police. Street crime is predominantly intra-class and intra-racial, its victims overwhelmingly poor people, blacks or Chicanos, living in metropolitan areas. Although violent victimisation makes up less than ten per cent of street crime, it is an important source of generalisation and victimisation in working class communities.
Also he says:

"Rape, assault, child and wife beating and homicide not only cause great personal suffering to the victims and their relatives and close friends, but also undermine collective solidarity."

(ibid. p.29).

Platt therefore strongly opposes the notion that only the business community or middle classes suffer from crime, and also the idea that working-class criminals are 'primitive rebels'. He regards street crime as parasitic upon the working-class and a major threat to its political organisation.

James Teevan (1979) also addresses himself to the labelling and conflict theory schools. He puts forward four reasons why the victims of crime have been ignored: 1) victims have not been perceived as 'underdogs'; 2) criminologists are unlikely to have personally experienced criminal victimisation; 3) criminologists have been unconsciously infected by the derogation of victims implicit in much social psychology; 4) victims remind criminologists of their failure to solve the problem of crime; 5) victims have simply not been seen as 'interesting' enough to study, given the sociology of criminological knowledge and priorities.

Teevan also makes the interesting point that most radical criminologists feel that they can only study victims at the expense of the criminal. In other words attention to victims implies castigation of the criminal. But, he adds:

"As criminologists we should be able to tolerate the ambiguity inherent in such a situation. Certainly a critical approach would have little difficulty blaming the capitalist system for both the conditions conducive to crime and the resultant suffering of crime victims."

(ibid. p.12).
It is indeed true that a majority of radicals do experience this problem when the question of criminal harms is raised. A major reason for this is certainly that, until recently, the only people who ever mentioned victims were conservatives, or else members of the general public whose views on crime and punishment were regarded as expressions of false-consciousness, doubtless influenced by right-wing law and order campaigns. Thus, the very raising of the subject is inevitably seen as pandering to racist stereotypes of the offender or to 'the myths of the crime wave', and calls for the increasing militarisation of the police.

Ian Taylor (1981 pp.9-17) speaks in terms of the necessity for radical criminologists to claim back the problem of crime from the right. The "reality of right-wing criminology" as he puts it, is precisely that it does address a phenomenon which is real and the anxieties and fears of working-class people which are equally real. There is a marked tendency, however for radicals to want to deny or qualify popular fears, by pointing to statistical 'facts', or by stressing that fear results from 'moral panics'. He also suggests that radicals should attempt to account for intra-working class crime and disorder in terms of a wider sociological analysis of social problems which interlock with crime, such as alienation and the culture of worklessness, housing, education and social values.

The most recent work to stem from the left-realist position (in addition to that of Taylor) is that of John Lea and Jock Young (1982; 1984). In a paper on the origins of the riots of 1981, they incorporate two central features of the position - the reality of crime and victimisation, and a partial consensual basis for order, into their general analysis. They assert, for instance, that in the evaluation of events leading up to the conflicts, the existence of high crime rates in the riot areas cannot be discounted, and that police tactics such as Swamp 84 and other measures which discriminated against and further alienated the black community, were informed by the desire to reduce the level of street crime.

The position receives very detailed treatment in their book What is to be done about law and order? (1984). Here attention to the realities of victimisation and fear developed further than any radical work
outside of the feminist stream. For their arguments on the risks of victimisation they have delved deeply into the literature of victimology, especially the data from the various surveys. The important difference between this work and other in the realist position (including their own earlier papers) is that the discussion of victimisation moves from the plane of statistical 'rates' and 'risks' towards a sociology of victimisation informed by a consideration of crime and fear as elements in the broad context of the disadvantaged social situation of working-class people. They speak, for instance, of the way in which the official crime statistics hide the focusing of criminal victimisation - its unequal distribution and unequal impact. Also, they see criminal victimisation as adding to the high victimisation from other social problems. Lastly, criminal victimisation has the capacity to compound the social predicament of the individuals or groups affected. Criminal victimisation has all the characteristics (and perhaps more) of other unequally distributed social problems. (ibid. p.53). Certainly, as I remarked above, there is the ever-present influence of feminism and the 'critical critics' (Downes, Rock and others) but there is also serious attention paid to the insight of the social democratic and conservative traditions.

Social democratic and reformist political philosophy is applauded for its desire to humanise and socialise the contradictory social and economic relations of capitalism. Social democratic criminology is also applauded for its ability to situate crime and crime control against the background of these contradictions. But, social democratic theory and the optimistic reformist spirit to which it gives birth, is rejected for its limitations and its inability to perceive the depth and permanence of these contradictions and so too of the distorted human relations which stem from them. Left-realism, especially in Lea and Young's version, does not however lapse into the pessimism of phases I and II. It is not just radical criminologists, they claim, but radical politicians and working-class communities which must seize back the initiative on crime control.

Although conservatism as a political philosophy is roundly condemned, left-realists owe quite a debt to right-wing criminologists and the spirit of James J. Wilson looms especially large. Such writers are applauded for their own realism and attention to the importance of forms of order and personal security.
I will now move on to offer some observations on the left-idealistic denial of victims and victimisation. Firstly, radical criminology is in general trapped within the inter-actionist, social democratic libertarian and structural Marxist aspects of its heritage. It is a state-centred criminology, although it has inherited aspects of the offender centred character of social democratic criminology. The influence of libertarianism, and some trends within Marxism, have tended towards a romanticised conception of the offender as a politically informed rebel. Furthermore, emphasis upon the rationality and meaningfulness of crime and deviance, has militated against an appreciation of the objective nature of criminal harms. These aspects of its heritage have substantially restricted its scope and ability to examine broader aspects of the crime problem, which would permit a fuller understanding of the social roots and impacts of crime.

Secondly, as Paul Hirst (1975) once suggested, radical criminology has largely failed to generate its own concepts. By choosing as the object of its studies — crime — it has allowed itself to be somewhat limited by the agenda of mainstream criminology. Although the Schwendingers' call for a redefinition of 'crime' in terms of radical concepts of 'harm' and 'social justice' is often favourably quoted, very little has been done towards this end in the intervening period of years.

Thirdly, radical criminology has remained relatively isolated from contemporary currents in radical social science. At one level it has not directly participated in recent re-examination of social philosophy and theory, as promoted in the work of Anthony Giddens (e.g. 1982) and this may in part account for its rather non-reflective orientation towards theories of order. Furthermore, radicals have almost entirely discussed crime at its structural and ideological levels, whereas within radical sociology there is a well established and rich tradition of qualitative empirical studies of the material and psychological effects of the crisis of capitalism upon actual individuals and communities. The works of Jeremy Seahrook (1978; 1982) for instance, are important examples of the sociology of social victimisation, as are some radical writings on health illness (e.g. Doyal 1979; Mitchell 1984).

Also, a most important study providing a first had sociological
account of the impact of crime in the context of multiple aspects of inner-city decline, comes from a radical sociologist - not a criminologist! (Harrison 1983).

A fourth and related point is that radical criminologists have largely distanced themselves from empirical work on crime, and have especially rejected quantitative methods. This stems in part from the longstanding disdain for official crime statistics which goes back to radical deviancy theory in the 1960's, which regarded such counts of crime as merely reactive organisational outcomes having more to tell us about the activities of police and courts than about the 'real' prevalence of crime. Indeed there was believed to be no real prevalence of crime independent of definitional processes. Also under the influence of phenomenology, it was believed that social phenomena cannot meaningfully be expressed in quantitative fashion. Left idealism inherited this perspective and made it more specific. The criminal statistics were now seen as part of the ideological presentation and mystification of the crime problem, in which the statistics were used to feign and lend scientific creedence to moral panics.

These attitudes to quantitative methods are further fed by the fact that radical criminologists tend to have had educational backgrounds in the arts rather than mathematics and the natural sciences and to have taken social science degrees during periods when qualitative methods - self-accounts, participant observation, unstructured interviews and other naturalistic devices - were most in vogue. A contradiction here of course is that such methods have revealed some very interesting insights into both social and criminal victimisation. (e.g. Harrison op.cit.; Seabrook op.cit.). A view expressed by Greenberg (1979) is that most criminologists, both radical and otherwise, simply do not understand quantitative methods and so reject them partially on those grounds. He believes that they have rejected these methods prematurely. He argues that there are many research questions which cannot be answered with qualitative methods and that the formal procedures of mathematics allow patterns to be discerned which are not evident from simple inspections of data. Also, the increasing use of quantitative research to formulate and legitimate public policy makes it especially important for criminologists to have at their disposal adequate methods for the critique and evaluation of policy. (ibid. pp. xv-xvi.).
Lynn McDonald (1976) has argued persuasively that there is no contradiction between quantitative research strategies and radical perspectives. Indeed it is true that in the study of all other social problems of capitalist society—problems which produce social victimisation, such as poverty, housing, health and other inequalities—radicals at least make use of descriptive statistics, the source of which are often government agencies, and often rather uncritical.

A fifth point is on the question of radical criminology's confused moralism. Stan Cohen (1979) has written in great detail on this subject, and although I will be examining the implications of his ideas for the development of socialist victimology in Chapter VIII, it is relevant here to note the following points. The heritage of 'underdog sociology' have given radicals a strong sense of identity with deviants and offenders. On the one hand this has resulted in moral stances by radicals on social victimisation in general and within the context of criminal justice, but it has also resulted in "the tendency to pretend a suspension of morality" in relation to the harmful effects of crime. (ibid p.25). Equally, radicals have never really wrestled with the complexities of such philosophical concepts as guilt, desert, justice (as opposed to social justice), tolerance or diversity. The end product of this omission is that radicals have produced no systematic moral position on the question of harms, far less have they produced any vision of criminal justice in an alternative society.

A further aspect of the development of radical criminology, and which has an important bearing on its neglect of victimisation, concerns the relatively small place which has been accorded to humanistic perspectives on broad social or interpersonal relations. Ironically, out of the humanism which was so central to the interactionist—phenomenological phase, has not developed a socialist or Marxian humanism. Such an effort, as I shall argue, is essential to a socialist reconceptualisation of the issues of crime and victimisation. In so doing, radical criminologists would rejoin a tradition which began before Marx and Engels, but was elaborated by them in a way in which humanism was rescued from the world of idealism and incorporated into a concrete political economy.

It is not easy therefore, to summarise the radical orientation to criminal victimisation, for it consists of not one, but many imagories.
In the radical deviancy theory and left idealist phases, we find that the image of offender-as-victim predominates - sometimes the offender is seen as the victim of the unequal distribution to define and enforce, sometimes as the victim of the broader inequalities of capitalism. Offenders are victimised by the criminal justice system as well as by capitalist social order. Thus a notion of social victimisation is inherited from the social democratic tradition, but is given greater specificity. Social democratic optimism though, is replaced by a profound pessimism and cynicism that the substantive inequalities which give rise to legal and social inequalities can ever be corrected.

Added to these notions that the criminal justice system and the social system are the main sources of victimisation, is a strong undercurrent of the belief that crime is a form of political rebellion, the real victims of which are capitalist order, or else members of superior social classes. A denial of personal victimisation then results, as does the denial of crime and fear as an objective problem for the working class or oppressed groups within it. Such a concept of criminal victimisation as exists in this analysis tends to be highly selective, and to include only victims of state, corporate, police, racist crime or the victims of male violence. The concept is also enlarged to include acts which cause harm but which are not criminalised, such as normal economic exploitation, pollution, racism, sexism, poverty and war. (c.f. Schwendinger 1975). Victims of household and street crimes are systematically excluded.

Left-realistic criminology marks an interesting departure from this tradition. One might say that if what amounts to a radical 'paradigm' has emerged in the criminology in the past twenty years, then left-realism amounts to a 'paradigm shift'. The radical world-view is not only extended but in several respects is considerably revised. A reading of left-realistic criminology reveals a close attention to a number of sources.

Firstly, although David Friedrichs (1983) has held there to have been little contact between radical criminology and victimology, it would seem clear that the single most important force pushing radical criminology towards a perspective on victimisation, has been the re-emergence of feminism in radical politics from the late 1960's and, throughout the 1970's, the development of a feminist version of victim-
ology. Feminism is of course concerned to highlight the social victimisation of women, and does so by situating this victimisation within the dual contexts of patriarchy and capitalism. The social, political, and ideological position of women - one of powerlessness and subjugation - directly results in exploitation and powerlessness in the home, at work, and in other institutional settings. Feminists have also been concerned for criminal types of victimisation, such as rape, physical assault and abuse, and also for the sexual and violent victimisation of children. (inter alia Weis and Borges 1973; Pizzey 1974; Brownmiller 1976; Smart 1976; Wilson 1983).

Feminists, both inside and outside of criminology, have sought to problematise the definition of criminal victimisation, for it stresses the many inter-personal and objective harms which have not been criminalised (such as rape in marriage, and sexual harassment), and has highlighted the failures of the police and other agencies to clearly define criminal harms (such as physical assaults on women in private situations) as criminal. Feminist victimology in Britain has, in the 1980's, produced a large number of important findings on sexual victimisation. (see discussion at 4.6 above).

Feminism has had two main effects upon radical criminology. Firstly, it has sensitised it to the plight of the real as opposed to the abstract victims of crime. As such it has erected an important psychological hurdle for radicals, who are forced to confront the fact that - in relation to women victims at least - some of the male members of the oppressed groups with which they so closely identify, are engaged in causing great harm, not to an abstract and oppressive social system, but for the significant redefinition of the concept of offender-as-victim to that of offender-as-victimiser.

Additionally, feminism has laid the ground for a general theory of the social roots of victimisation, in both as criminal and non-criminal forms. I will deal with this more fully in the final chapter, but for the moment we can say that writers in the realist mold have been mindful of both of these contributions - the existence of victimisation in its objective rather than symbolic forms, and the necessity to elaborate a social theory of criminal harms.

A further important aspect of left-realism is its insistence that
the problem of policing cannot be treated separately from the problem of crime. (ibid. p.168). As such, there has been an attempt to develop a theory of policing which is informed by the belief that the social relations of capitalism produce not order, but a fundamental disorder and disorganisation from which the working class suffers disproportionately. Therefore, working class communities have an interest in an order which would be safe guarded by a police force transformed into a police service - one which is subject to democratic control and which provides adequate protection from criminal harms. (ibid. p.269).

The left-idealist position on the question of policing has flowed logically from its position on crime. As Kinsey and Young have argued, the left-idealist position has tended towards the argument that the only solution to the problem of policing is the abolition of the police. (1982 p.118-123). For the abolitionist all crime is political, and comes in two forms - working-class crime, which is born of poverty, desperation and unemployment; and the crimes of the powerful, which are born of greed, guile, and manipulation. The effects of working-class crime are seen as exaggerated and the effect of ruling-class crime massively under-stressed. Furthermore, the police are seen as direct agents of the ruling-class, and their primary role is the policing of social relations and working-class indiscipline and resistance. Thus, the political goal of abolitionists is to expose the wretched nature of the police as servants of the capitalist state, rather than to address the problem of crime as it adversely affects the working class. Any suggestion that the police may be transformed into servants of working-class communities is seen as dangerously naive.

For the left-realists then, a police force is necessary because crime is a real problem; there is a great deal of crime and it hurts the working class community. Crimes such as vandalism, rape, mugging and burglary, constitute a further set of burdens that working-class people have to suffer. But, working-class communities receive less in the way of police protection than the business or middle-class communities. Democratic control of policing is a necessary pre-condition to getting a police force which deals adequately with crime. In such a system there would be a reciprocal system of consultation between local communities and the police in order to formulate a local policy around needs and priorities. Also the police would be accountable to
the elected representatives of the community. This would include effective complaints procedure, and also an efficient system of monitoring of police behaviour and performance.

The final component of Lea and Young's left-realism is one which flows from their reformulation of the questions of crime, policing, and quantitative research methods. This concerns their analysis of race and crime. As we have seen, their position on crime includes a recognition of the intra-class nature of much ordinary crime. In 1982 and 1983 they produced a number of articles on this issue, and dealt with the fact that such crimes also tend to be intra-racial, or else in general carried out by poor members of the community against other poor people, irrespective of the race of either offender or victim. These views and the analysis which extended from them, attracted very heavy criticism from various authors, including a number of black criminologists. I will here summarize the respective positions, as they have a direct bearing upon the understanding of events surrounding the Islington Crime Survey.

During the summer of 1981, there had been extensive and serious rioting in British cities. In each case, rioting had been triggered by some aspect of police behaviour, although the riots were held by many to have had their roots in a number of grievances. These included high rates of unemployment (especially among black youths), widespread poverty, urban decay, the decline in services and resources, and the contracting opportunities for release from these problems. Not only did the rioting occur in communities under great stress, but also in localities in which both black and white youths were alienated from the police, and in which relations between the police and the community-at-large were very poor.

Among radical criminologists, the analysis of police-community relations, and the subsequent riots in these areas, centred around the perspective that the black working-class was a super-exploited section of the class as a whole (e.g. Gilroy 1982a). They suffered worse social conditions, were more likely to be poor, or unemployed, or else confined to menial job opportunities at the bottom of the employment structure. Added to this, black people suffered from the racism which was endemic in the social structure, and in a more immediate way, from racism.
of the police. Not only did black people suffer sharper disadvantages, but they were also stereotyped - by the media, right-wing politicians, and the police - as disproportionately involved in criminal activities. There were, therefore, numerous trends towards the criminalisation of the black community, and especially black youth. This process led to harassment by the police - especially through the misuse of stop-and-search laws - and its combined effect was to produce the riots, which could be seen as a form of political resistance. In general, the existence of higher levels of crime in such areas - especially street robbery, violence, and burglary, did not feature in the radical analysis. In fact, it was axiomatic in this analysis that the official statistics on crime in the affected areas were highly inflated, and in particular that police statistics which purported to show an over involvement of black youth in street crime, were reflections only of racist bias in policing.

Lea and Young, by inserting the question of intra-class and intra-racial crime into the debate, produced an analysis - both of crime and policing - which was substantially different to what had gone before. The basis of this new position was laid in three articles published in 1982 (Lee and Young 1982a; 1982b; 1982c). Firstly it was contended that, in certain inner city areas, such as Brixton in London, that the rate for street crime was in reality much higher than in other urban areas. Secondly, they argued that police estimates of the disproportionate involvement of black youths in street crime, could not be seen merely as a function of police prejudice, although this does result in an exaggeration of the contribution of black persons to the overall crime rate. (1982c. p.9).

The over involvement of black youth in crime is explained with reference to a number of factors. Firstly, black youth are the victims of relative deprivation. The new generation of young black people have assimilated the expectations of the majority culture, only to be denied them in reality (ibid. p.8). A counter-culture of discontent has thereby arisen which contained contradictory elements. In one respect it represents a search for positive identity and survival in the harsh conditions of the inner city, but also it fosters competitive individualism, disorganisation, and anti-social behaviour, which may lead to predatory crime.
A further aspect of this position concerns changes in styles of policing. Lea and Young argue that consensus policing, by which the police operate with the co-operation and tacit support and approval of the community, is giving way under certain conditions to a military style of policing. Consensus policing presupposes a stable working class community opposed to crimes of which its members were the direct victims. The community would then tolerate police activity and also act as an essential source of information, facilitating such police activity. With rising long-term unemployment, and sharpening social deprivation the basis for this type of policing begins to crumble. As crime rates soar, the police adopt strategies in which they concentrate less on offenders located with the aid of the community and more against the community itself - especially identifiable groups within it, such as the young or black people. Such strategies lead to the alienation of the community as a whole, and which then dries up as a source of information and co-operation. There is then set in train a vicious circle of policing and community isolation.

The final feature of the position is the contention that the black sections of the working class have been politically marginalised. In one sense the black community, and especially its youth, are marginalised socially and economically. Racism and social disadvantage have served to militate against social and economic integration. In another sense - one intimately related to the last - the black community has been marginalised from the class organisation and class politics which for the white working class have historically been a source of social stabilisation. Although much is said about the inner city, say Lea and Young, there has been relatively little political mobilisation by the communities themselves.

The criticisms of Lee and Young's left-realist position may be summarised as follows. Firstly, there are fairly specific denials of mundane crime as a serious problem for the white or black sections of the working class. This conclusion rests upon two foundations: an emphasis upon police racism, harassment, and violent and other illegal activities, directed against the black community, and also a refusal to take crime statistics as other than reflections of police partiality and racism. (e.g. Gilroy 1982a, p.46; 1982 p.64). Working class crime is never confronted directly by these writers. It is continually spoken of in terms of "rebellion" and "resistance". Thus in Paul Gilroy's
The Myth of Black Criminality (1982: p.47) he points out that "crime can have political implications which extend beyond the political consciousness of criminals"; the "boundaries of what is considered criminal or illegal are elastic and the limits of the law have been repeatedly altered by intense class conflict"; furthermore, "the political formation of the working class in this country is saturated with illegality".

What Gilroy effectively does through the use of these truisms, is to consider on the one hand the criminalised activities of the working class movement and the criminalisation of working class cultural forms, and on the other the predatory and intra-class nature of much working class criminal activity, in a way which renders the latter as of having the same political significance as the former, thus denying the latter's harmful, divisive, and reactionary character.

The position on policing which emerges from this view of working class crime, is the 'abolitionist' stance outlined above. Instead of viewing policing as containing contradictory elements - the policing of social relations (based on coercion) and policing of criminal harms (based on consensual approval) - it is seen only in terms of the coercive management of "insurgent" and "militant" sections of the working class. (e.g. Bridges and Gilroy op.cit. p.35).

Lastly, the position of Bridges, Gilroy and others, centres around a particular analysis of black British cultural forms. Whereas Lea and Young have sought to show sharpe distinctions in the black working class, there is a tendency for their opponents to portray black culture as a culture of political resistance, in which most of its forms are highly politically informed and cohesive. They omit any direct discussion of the existence - within the black working class - of orientations and attitudes which are profoundly exploitative and individualistic. These orientations not only detract significantly from the possibility of collective socialism and solidarity against racism, poverty, and other aspects of capitalist disorganisation, and serve profoundly to reinforce them and add to their impact.

A most significant aspect of the critique of the left-realism of Lea and Young, and Ian Taylor (1981), concerns the charge that the position is a fundamentally "realist" one. Lee Bridges (1983) contends
that left-realism lends "sociological credibility to police racism" (p.24). He asserts that the view that black youth may be over involved in street crime in certain areas tends to reinforce the police and right-wing view of the black community as fundamentally criminal. Bridges also claims that Lea and Young's contention of the existence of conflicting attitudes within the black community around the question of life-styles and illegal behaviour, lends credibility to the post-Scarman attempts to introduce community policing as a way of separating "the older generation of blacks from their support for rebellious youth". (ibid. p.24).

Gilroy claims that:

"The emphasis upon black culture legitimates the idea that any blacks, all blacks, are somehow contaminated by the alien pre-disposition to crime . . ."

(1982 b p.52).

... and that Lea and Young merely repeat the pathological view of the West Indian family structure and relations, "in polite social democratic rhetoric". (ibid.).

Another respect in which Lea and Young are criticised concerns their view that the political marginalisation of the black community leads to an absence of institutionalised channels for social protest and political struggle, and that this marginalisation has fuelled the sense of alienation which leads, under certain circumstances to criminal behaviour and to riots. Gilroy (op.cit.) for instance sees them as ignoring the existence and importance of forms of political struggle emanating from within the black community, especially those centering around issues of police harrassment of black people, police inactivity on racial attacks, and other related matters. (see also Bridges op.cit. p.24; Bridges and Gilroy 1982 p.24). Furthermore, the Labour Party is seen as being largely responsible for the absence of black people from Party membership through its betrayal of the black community on the issue of immigration control in the 1960's (Bridges op.cit. p.12), and is further held to be attempting - with the assistance of the left-realists - to co-opt forms of black political struggle.

The purpose of this account of the contemporary conflicts within
radical criminology, is to lay the ground for my analysis, in the next chapter, of the political and intellectual origins of the Islington and Merseyside crime surveys.
CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
6.1. Introduction:

In my attempts to explain the re-orientation towards victim issues in criminal justice politics and in criminology, I have attempted to situate recent developments in criminology in terms of the distinction which Ian Hacking (1981) has made between the internal and external histories of academic disciplines. Thus, I have dealt with debates and movements internal to criminology and which help to make sense of its drift to victim-centredness. I have also written about the impact of external political imperatives as these have impacted upon various positions within criminology. Up to this point the weight of evidence and the focus of the argument concerning the interaction of politics and criminology, have centred upon the American case.

In this present chapter, I will examine the British case. I will begin with an overview of broad political developments in Britain since World War II, with special reference to the impact of these upon changes in social democratic and conservative positions on crime control. I will then go on to look at the development of a new 'radical reformist' politics in the Labour Party. Finally, I will attempt to situate, in terms of the political background, the emergence of the British Crime Survey, and the local victimisation surveys in the Midlands, Merseyside and Islington.

6.2. The Crisis in Post-War Britain - a political survey:

The purpose of this section is to describe the elements of the crisis of British capitalism since 1945. I will begin by looking at the economic dimension of that crisis, and then discuss its ideological and social dimensions. I wish particularly to illuminate the background to the politics of crime control.

The term 'crisis' as applied to contemporary British society is one which is much used, but which requires careful definition and specification if it is to be of use to us in terms of making the connection between economic problems and transformations and those which occur in the related realms of ideological and social conflicts. Gamble and Walton (1976 p.2.) explain that Marx used the term mainly to refer to economic and commercial crisis which were interruptions to
production and the process of capital accumulation, including the 
stock piling of goods, widespread bankruptcies, financial panics, cut­
backs in production, and mounting unemployment. But, Marx also spoke 
of their periodic crises which could be distinguished by the 'univer­
salität of their theatre' and the intensity of their action. Such a 
'universal crisis' would be not only economic, but political and 
social as well. The inter-relations of the economic and political­ 
social dimensions of such a crisis would have two aspects. Firstly, 
the problems occurring in the economy would have a profound effect 
upon ideological and social conflicts. Secondly, certain ideological 
and social conflicts would be seen as a barrier (in addition to the 
economic barriers) to the required expansion of capital. Purely 
technical solutions to such crisis will not suffice, and solutions of 
a more general political nature are therefore necessary.

In relation to the politics of criminal justice and crime control, 
we may see that the problems of crime and disorder are both directly 
and indirectly affected by economic crisis. Further, the activities 
of the state in relation to crime control cannot be entirely separated 
from the broader context of economic crisis; for the costs of crime 
control form part of the social costs of the capitalist state in its 
role as manager jointly of the economic and social realms of capitalist 
society. Also, the state's crime-control activities must be seen as 
part of a general thrust, in ideological as well as practical terms, 
to manage 'disorders' of a more general nature.

I will develop these inter-relations later in this section; but, 
it is firstly necessary to specify the economic context and crisis of 
British capitalism, in preparation for an account of the social, 
political and ideological dimensions of a more 'universal' crisis 
affecting Britain in recent times.

Commentators on the crisis of British capitalism since the War, 
have noted that capitalism in the 'advanced' countries has been seen 
by its supporters, and even by many of its opponents, as impregnable - 
as the most sound set of economic and social arrangements which could 
be achieved. But, since the early 1970's, the economic and social 
policies contributing to this stability have been breaking down. The 
economic crisis which has faced Britain since that time must be under-
stood in part, as a reflection of the problems which have assailed the larger system of international capitalism to which Britain belongs (ibid. pp.4-5).

From 1945, and through to the late 1960's and early 1970's, the international capitalist economy enjoyed a period of unprecedented expansion - the period often referred to as the 'long boom'. Despite occasional interruptions this period was remarkably free from crisis; but since the early 1970's this situation has changed abruptly. In an overview of these changes I will rely substantially upon the accounts given by David Currie (1983), and Gamble and Walton (op.cit.).

According to Currie the roots of the crisis lie in certain features of accumulation in the long boom itself. In the wake of the last war, and as a consequence of economic adjustments to it, the victorious capitalist countries emerged as low wage/high profit economies. The 'war economies' had given a special boost to technological innovation, and this subsequently contributed to considerable gains in productive output. Also, the end of mass unemployment and the growth of real wages brought new and expanded markets for commodities - especially for consumer goods. The increased volume of investment in third world countries, begun in the 1930's, had resulted - even after political independence - in the control of raw material supplies by multinational corporations which were mainly American-owned. The cheapness of these raw materials - especially crude oil, acted to boost the profitability and potential for accumulation of the industrial economies. The dominant economic position of the United States led it to impose a great deal of control over the cohesiveness of the Western capitalist economies which at the same time allowed its companies freedom to penetrate these markets and to buy-up significant parts of European industry.

Of great importance also to an understanding of post-war economic changes, is the expansion in growth and influence of state structures in their role in the management of economies and social arrangements. This point will be elaborated below.

Between the different Western economies, great differences can be discerned in the rates of development both in economies and in the
growth of the state structures. Most commentators are agreed that the position of the British economy has been weaker than those of its European neighbours. The importance of this fact lies in the particularly serious effects which the factors bringing about the end of the long boom had for the British economy, and which in turn reverberated through British society at all levels.

By the late 1960's, increasing signs of strain were apparent in the international economy. The objectives which governments had usually set themselves - full employment, economic growth, a balance of payments surplus and price stability, were increasingly harder or impossible to achieve. In addition the late 1960's saw declining real wages and a decline in profitability in industrial and commercial enterprises.

In Britain, all of these elements of malaise were present to a degree not seen elsewhere in the major capitalist countries. A continual rise in the rate of unemployment, matched by a decline in real income and the fall of profits, has been linked to the decline of Britain as an imperialist nation, but also to other factors such as Britain's stark inability to defend itself in the face of the crisis in the international monetary system, and more especially - after 1970 - to the new burdens imposed by high oil prices and the spiralling growth in the price of primary commodities. (Gamble and Walton op.cit.). Perhaps the most pressing feature of the crisis has been the steep rises in the annual rate of inflation, which again has affected the British economy to a degree not experienced by other major nations.

In summary therefore, 1974 saw the beginning of a world recession, the generality and depth of which was unprecedented in the post-war period, and which has marked the end of a long expansionary phase of capitalist accumulation. Although the onset of the recession was marked by very big rises in the price of oil, increasing the rate of inflation to double digit levels, the crisis should more properly be seen as having more widespread and deep-rooted causes which have developed over a longer time period, and which together acted as a growing barrier to accumulation. (Currie op.cit. pp.88-9).
The importance of these economic factors, for the purposes of my argument, lies in the extent to which they may be seen to have penetrated the realms of the ideological and social conflict, and the ongoing events in the political arena.

At one level the issues can be simply sketched. The economic crisis has resulted in a greater level of conflict between capital and labour. Thus the conflicts which were present even in the long boom - over wage levels, productivity, working conditions and fringe benefits, and control of the production process - now sharpened considerably, and broadened into a defence of the gains which labour had made in the preceding thirty years, as well as to the very issue of the right to work.

There has been an additional increase in social problems and conflicts manifested in other forms, including the rise in the crime rate. These increases in industrial and social conflict, in addition to the economic aspects of the crisis, tended to highlight the role of the state as the manager of capital accumulation and of social relations. What we are speaking of here is what has been widely referred to as the 'crisis of hegemony', the 'end of consensus', or the 'crisis of legitimacy'. What is also involved is a marked ideological divergence between social democratic and conservative political philosophies over the question of solution to the crisis in its universal forms. Debates around crime and its control have formed an important focal point for the discussion of the crisis, its causes, effects and solutions. I will now proceed to unravel the ideological and social aspects of the crisis of British capitalism in the post-war period.

According to Stuart Hall and others (1978 p.218-9) the history of Britain since the Second World War can be thought of in terms of two inter-related sets of factors. Firstly, the shifting fortunes of the economy (as described above) with its certain drift towards increasing levels of crisis. Secondly, there is a traceable sequence of shifting ideological configurations. The authors' analysis focuses upon the issue hegemony - the tendency for the contradictions and problems of the sphere of capitalist production to permeate through to use Gramsci's terminology, to the 'complex spheres of the superstructures'.
In other words, the political class struggle, and the other subsumed variants of social conflict arising from economic problems, present themselves in terms of antagonistic ideologies. The ruling class, acting through the state, now attempts to secure widespread ideological support for its particular perception of events and problems as an essential part of the solution of economic crisis.

"... what hegemony ultimately secures is the long-term social conditions for the continuing reproduction of capital. The superstructures provide that 'theatre' where the relations of class forces, given their fundamental form in the antagonistic relations of capitalist production, appear and work themselves through to a resolution."

(ibid. p.218).

The period 1945 to the late 1970's follows a series of shifts from a 'consensual' to a more 'coercive' management of the class struggle by the capitalist state. The period begins with the formation of a 'hegemonic equilibrium' in the immediate post-war period, involving the construction of consensus as the condition for a post-war period of economic and political stability in the 1950's. This then gives way in the early to mid-1960's, to a certain disintegration or exhaustion of consent. There then follows, from the mid-1960's, an attempt to put together an essentially 'Labourist' variant of consent, drawing on essentially social democratic policy solutions. This new level of consent is further exhausted by 1970, when it is replaced by deepening economic crisis, a rise in the level of manifest class conflict, and a reliance upon a more 'exceptional' form of class domination through the state. The state moves from a position of the appearance of neutrality to one of open partisanship with the interests of capital. Let us now follow through this sequence in some more detail.

In the wake of World War II a new period of hegemony was located in the stabilisation and growth of the international capitalist economy. The Labour government of 1945 - 51 constructed the Welfare State, took some declining industries into public ownership, and
managed the transition from a war economy to peacetime production by
the exercise of a fierce austerity (ibid. p.228). The commitment was
to the building of a reconstructed version of social democracy, with
a renewed commitment to a vastly expanded role for the state in the
management of the market economy. This was accomplished through a
policy of 'corporation' - involving public ownership of certain key
industries through the state - and through the planned economy'
involving increased government intervention in the management of in-
vestment, supply and demand. (Taylor 1981 p.37).

The role of the state in social democracy has been jointly one of
regulating production and market forces, and the social control of the
social problems arising from the contradictions of the capitalist mode
of production. Thus, British social democracy in the immediate post-
war period attempted to provide social justice and the construction
of a caring community, as well as mounting an attack on the inequal-
ities of individualism of 'liberal democracy'. Capitalism as conceived
as being able to be organised in such a way as to provide an abundance
of resources, which in a reorganised system of distribution, could then
be directed to people and communities in particular med (ibid.).

The earlier 'unreformed' capitalism of the pre-war era was indicted
for its inability to meet social needs and for being responsive only
to the 'needs' of the market. The thrust of Labour's social democratic
project was therefore to introduce social measures aimed at a social
transformation of capitalism, without abolishing its fundamental economic
bases. As Hall and others (op.cit. p.228) have put it - it tried to
graft certain humane ideas of social reform on to a system of production
it did not reconstruct.

The period of the Labour government of 1945-51 is important in
that it was there that the foundations of the post-war consensus were
laid. This involved a crucial strategy for integrating and co-opting
the organised working class into the 'mixed economy'. In an important
sense this incorporation necessitated the (self-) disciplining of the
labour movement in the face of planned austerities, in return for a
planned re-distribution of the fruits of accumulation through direct,
as well as indirect, avenues. The working class would benefit, in time,
from increases in real wages, as well as from the organisation of
universal welfare and national insurance.

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The welfare state measures are often spoken of as constituting a 'settlement' between capital and labour, realised through the medium of an enhanced interventionist state, and which served as a model for other capitalist countries. Indeed the social democratic welfarism of the Kennedy-Johnson era in the United States, which I have discussed at length above, post-dated these British events by twenty years. In both cases, the measures had their roots in the earlier stages of capitalism. In the United States federal interventionism initiated by the Democratic Party in the 1960's were continuous with the spirit of the social policies of the 'Progressive Era' and the 'New Deal'. In the British case, the nineteenth century had seen a series of reluctant interventions by the state in social problems, and the Labourism of the post-war era had a number of continuities with early twentieth-century Liberalism. (Nairn 1981 pp.48-50).

An interesting feature of the British 'settlement' and of British social democracy was the extent to which - in sharp contrast to the United States - the major competing political parties accepted its premises. After 1945, a successful internal struggle by the Right Progressives against the traditional Tories secured the position of R.A. Butler, Iain MacLeod and others in the Conservative Party. Then, in the late 1940's and 1950's, Conservative Party policy moved closer to the policies of the Labour Party under Attlee and then under Gaitskell, than at any previous time (Taylor op.cit. pp.38-9). Indeed, Churchill himself had begun his political career as a Lloyd George Liberal and as a vociferous champion of the prototypical Mismarkian welfare state. (Harrington 1972).

"In 'Butskellism', a commitment to state planning and intervention, to the financing of social welfare and to political and economic reform, made Conservatism appear as a mild form of Labourism, distinguishable only by the concern of Conservatives to protect the traditional institutions of legal authority (the courts, the police and the law itself) and the liberty of the individual from the encroachments of the increasingly powerful welfare state. "

(Taylor op.cit. p.39).
The 'new' or 'social' Toryism marked the shift of the Conservative Party into the terrain of consensus politics, shedding along the way its image as the party of privilege. It continued its commitment to social welfare and to the general management of employment and demand throughout a period of office which lasted from 1951 to 1964. But, by far the most important aspects of the Party's dominant position in British politics was its remarkable success in promoting and sustaining a particular ideological perspective. This had a number of related facets. Firstly, it maintained the view that open class conflict was an anachronism and that Britain was quickly becoming - under the guise of full employment and the 'affluent society' - a 'classless' society in which national interests, of which the state was guardian, superceded those of sectional interests. Secondly, the new Toryism avowed its intention to create a 'property-owning democracy' in which the social democratic vision of public ownership through state control, was replaced by a distribution of ownership (of shares and property) over the widest practicable number of individuals. (Hall et al. op.cit. p.230).

Thirdly, the very notion of an affluent society was held up as evidence of the outmoded nature of Labour's commitment to 'state socialism' and its apparently continued championing of the political economy of the working class. Several changes in the structure of British society were attendant on the boom. Working class living standards were underpinned by rising money wages and welfare provision. New technologies and modifications in the labour process, together with the rise of the state and tertiary sectors, expanded the size of the intermediary classes. These changes unhinged many traditional patterns of class relations in the sphere of everyday life, re-organising social attitudes (especially those of the young) and undermining some traditional forms of working-class consciousness and solidarity. (ibid. p.231). The real effects of the boom were indeed that the working class made significant material gains, an immediate effect of which was a diminished sharpness in the class struggle. As Martin Jacques (1983 p.41) has written, the fifties saw rising living standards, full employment and a relative social stability. Also, the period saw an unusual consensus - presided over by the Tories - in which conflict appeared relatively marginal or at least thoroughly contained.
By the late 1950's and into the early 1960's, however, this image of sustained social harmony was being undermined. Initially, changed economic circumstances began to erode aspects of the very material affluence in which the broad consensus was based. As I noted earlier, these were Britain's slower rate of growth during the boom, the decline of her international/imperial position, and the creaking nature of her industrial infrastructure. These factors, coupled with a rather slow rate of technological innovation, set Britain at a strikingly vulnerable situation of disadvantage once the long boom began to evaporate.

Inflation began to recharge the level of industrial conflict. But, eventually - after a period of high wage settlements - inflation ate into real wages as it also ate into profit margins. The industrial and social conflicts which 'affluence' and 'consensus' had merely masked, began to surface in a number of older forms, such as an increase in days lost through strikes, as well as newer political conflicts over Britain's international role (the Suez crisis) and nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the disturbing challenge to traditional values perceived in the new 'youth cultures', in rising levels of black immigration, and in high crime rates, seemed to indicate that the end of 'boom' and 'consensus' had revealed British Society at all levels as in need of the imposition far-reaching measures.

We may here continue to draw parallels with the situation in the then contemporary United States. The "stage-managed production of popular consent" which was the hallmark of the MacMillan era (Hall et al. op. cit. p.233) is also apt for describing the ideological thrust of the Truman and Eisenhower years. Indeed the 'end of consensus' in the American context was marked by not dissimilar trends. Poverty, rediscovered by economists and sociologists to be growing in proportions and intensity - had also been masked by the appearances of plenty and upward mobility, (e.g. Harrington 1962) and was a major factor in the fortunes of Kennedy's Democrats. In Britain, a torrent of similar work by academics (notably by Peter Townsend and others) and by government-sponsored studies (e.g. the Growther, and Plowden reports) re-established the view that inequality and social injustice were integral and structural features of post-war Britain - a society which was in reality as divided along lines of class as that which existed prior to the war.
These themes, drawn together as evidence of the social archaism of the Conservative Party and its failure to address issues of redistribution and social justice, were seen by Wilson's Labour Party to be wedded to the archaism of Britain's industrial and international position. Thus, the 'white heat of the technological revolution', and an accompanying vision of the corporatist state, were offered as an alternative strategy for managing the crisis through renewed growth and a greater re-distribution. Labour succeeded in writing behind these goals large sections of the working class together with important sections of the middle strata. (Jacques op.cit. pp.41-2).

Four important elements characterised the 'modernist' approach of the 1964-70 Labour governments: 1). industrial capital was to be made more competitive - partly through increased investment achieved through boosting profits and restricting wages through incomes policies; 2). the state would act as a key agency for restructuring parts of British industry and rationalising the labour process, as well as being itself a target for reform; 3). a tripartite collaboration would be struck between the state, big business and the unions; 4). following the collapse of sterling as a reserve currency in 1967, the government increasingly looked to the EEC as the new international framework for British capitalism.

The new consensus engineered by Labour in the 1960's was based upon the appearances of an active and equal partnership between labour and capital under the neutral direction of the corporate state as representatives of 'the people'.

"Each party had its constituency; each its duties - principally of discipline. Capital defended business, and would be rewarded with profits. Labour defended the working man, who would be rewarded with a higher standard of living. The State represented 'the rest' - the nation - and stabilised the contract, enforcing it on the community."

(Hall et.al. op.cit. p.236).

This 'permanent alliance' is thus the pivotal idea, the practical
basis of the social democratic experiment in consensus-building. Once more, the parallel with the United States can be drawn. The consensual alliance which President Johnson attempted to build involved a similar combination of the interests of labour, capital and 'nation', through the aegis of the federal government. The difference was that the Labour Party in the 1960's had not yet come to represent the interests of diverse plural groupings in the way that the Democratic Party has traditionally done.

By the late 1960's two sets of considerations had weakened the Wilson consensus. Firstly, the 'redistribution' and 'regeneration' inherent in the corporatist approach, had failed to touch the existing inequalities of class power. Paradoxically, the lot of the poor had worsened under Labour, and deep structural inequalities seemed as set and unchanging as at any time during the present century (see Westergaard and Resler 1976). Secondly, Britain was profoundly touched internally by the social conflicts which were affecting major European nations and the United States. The opposition to the Vietnam War represented a focal point for a renaissance of forms and themes of political opposition which placed a question mark over the appearances of consensus and threw into sharp relief problematic features of the social order and arrangements.

The return of a Conservative government (1970-74.) under Edward Heath, marked a decisive shift to the right in the Tory Party. This shift was in part a response to its loss of the centre ground of politics in the Wilson years. The replacing of the 'high Tory' Home by the more broadly middle-class and managerial image of Edward Heath, also marked a departure from the Party's post-war accommodation to Labour's modernism through a form of 'social democratic' or 'social' Toryism. In sharp break with this trend, the Heath government abandoned interventionism in industry and the tri-partite alliance. In contrast they adopted a more laissez-faire conception of economic and industrial policy, stressing the function of market forces and a reduced role for the state. (Jacques op.cit. p.45).

The period also saw the emergence of 'law and order' as a key theme in British politics.

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In the same way as the ascendancy of Nixon and Agnew represented a right-wing 'back-lash' against political progressive movements and the 'wave of permissiveness, disorder and crime' in the United States, so the 'Selsdon Man' programme of the Conservative Party under Heath served to place such phenomena at the top of the political agenda in Britain. As Stuart Hall and his co-writers have made clear (op.cit.) the seeds of such an event had taken some considerable time to germinate. Throughout the 1960's, sections of the media and right-wing politicians had been reinforcing in the public mind the connection between the 'rising tide of permissiveness', the newly emerging youth cultures, political demonstrations, crime, public disorder, black immigration, student activists and trade union militancy. The conflation of these issues and their presentations as a collective problem whose existence threatened the economic and moral health of the nation, had prepared the ground for a 'back-lash' of a type which was relatively new in British politics.

The strong law-and-order theme thus enabled the Conservative Party to present itself as the champion of the cause of the 'silent majority' and to weld it into a political force through what the above authors have called the 'construction of nightmares'. (ibid. p.275). Moral panics in relation to the issues of crime, immigration, and the 'political menace' posed by left activists to the social fabric, became centralised political themes. No one issue of concern could be discussed without the invocation of the others, linked together as a metaphor for the decline of Britain's economic and moral order.

Two underlying themes of this 'back-lash' are worthy of mention here. Firstly, the issues of crime and immigration had been linked together in subtle ways since the time of increases in the rate of black immigration in the late 1940's. In various ways right-wing as well as social democratic politicians had conceived of black settlement in Britain in terms of its potential for contributing to social disorder. In the late 1960's Enoch Powell had raised the spectre of the imminence of black insurrection and bloody racial conflict on the scale being then witnessed in American cities. The key moment, however, in the presentation of crime (or disorder) and immigration as inextricably linked, came with the 'mugging panic' of 1972, in which a particular crime - street robbery - became seen as not only increasingly prevalent, but also one predominantly committed by black youths preying upon white...
victims. This depended upon a number of essential conditions:

"... a state of anticipatory mobilisation and 'preparedness' in the control apparatuses; a sensitising of official circles and of the public through the mass media; a perceived danger to social stability ...; the identification of a vulnerable 'target group' (e.g. black youth) involved in dramatic incidents ('muggings') which trigger public alarm; the setting in motion of the mechanism by which conspiratorial demons and criminal folk-devils are projected onto the public stage."

(ibid. p.305).

The 'mugging panic' marks a most important stage in the development of law-and-order politics in Britain. In one key sense it signalled a beginning of the official and authoritative recognition of the fear of crime as a central political theme. In another sense the 'facts' of black involvement in dangerous crimes represented a fulfillment of more than twenty years of prophesy concerning the consequences of mass immigrations. In the official re-writing of the law-and-order issue, this association of the issues of race and crime, became integral to the political and public controversy thereafter, and was to in a yet stronger and more dynamic form in the 1980's.

Importantly, also, the period of the 'mugging panic' and the associated criminalisation of black youth, produced a marked change in the policing of black communities. It was then that there began the tough 'hassling' of black communities, 'fishing expeditions' for illegal immigrants, the routine 'moving on' of groups of black youths, the heavy surveillance of ghetto areas, raids on black social centres, and other measures which evidenced the response of the police to the 'new' definition of the criminogenic nature of black culture. (ibid. p.299). Thus, the inner city riots of the 1980's can be traced, in part, to these origins of the oppositional relationship between the police and black people.

The second theme of the 'back-lash' which I wish to discuss here
is the beginning of the right's organised and systematically articulated assault upon social democracy and welfarism. In 1970 for instance, Lord Hailsham attacked Labour for presiding complacently over the biggest crime wave of the century, and charged that the "permissive and lawless society is a by-product of socialism" (Quoted ibid. p. 275). Social democracy had not only damaged the social and moral order, but it had also had disastrous effects upon the economy, especially through Labour's failures to successfully discipline the trade union movement. The Heath government consequently adopted a coercive approach in its dealings with the unions, which was couched in the new terminology of its law-and-order stance.

The strength of organised working class reaction to the government's economic and industrial relations policies resulted in the first general strike since 1926 - over the imprisonment of the 'Pentonville 5'. As a result Heath jettisoned what has been called his 'pre-Thatcherite' position, and returned to a comprehensive corporatist approach, resembling Labour's modernism. (Jacques 1983 p. 46).

In the face of continued working class opposition to the failures of Heath's modernist lurch, there occurred a crisis of hegemony - certainly unparalleled in post-war Britain. This found political expression in two electoral victories in 1974 for Wilson's Labour Party, but with its lowest ever majority. A point of particular importance for the understanding of the development of Labour Party politics in the following decade, concerns the weakened electoral position of both the main parties in favour of other parties, with whom Labour was forced, in 1974-79 into a near coalition. Additionally, the industrial militancy of 1970-74 may be seen to have concealed a shift to the right in British society as a whole.

The assumption of the premiership by James Callaghan in 1976 ushered in a new 'social contract' between government, unions and big business. The ideological mould in which this alliance was cast was that of a re-newed call for 'modernisation' and for a 'collective effort' by the whole nation in order to solve Britain's serious economic situation. Capital would restrain its free-enterprise enthusiasts, committing them to national targets; the unions would discipline their shop-floor militants. But, this is also the period of the most
marked international capitalist recession, and Labour's response consisted of an attempt at the crisis management of the economy in which the central element was the securing of union acquiescence to cuts in real wages and public expenditure, together with rising unemployment. (ibid. p.49-50).

This quiescence finally broke down in 1978-79 in the 'winter of discontent', in which the low paid sections of the trade union movement staged a series of long official strikes as a demonstration of resistance to the harshest yet attacks of their living standards. The strikes - more sectionalised than those which brought down Heath in 1974 - were nonetheless a refusal to participate in what the unions and their members saw as a fundamentally unequal partnership. They also contained strong anti-Labour currents, which would eventually tell in the election of 1979.

The period 1974-79 therefore must be seen as one of the worsening crisis of British capitalism, and the apparently insoluble crisis of hegemony which stemmed from it. But, the period must also be read as one of a serious crisis of social democracy in its numerous features. British social democracy since 1945, had succeeded in managing the economy and the social arrangements in ways which, because of Labour's special relationship to the unions, had permitted it to maintain consensus and balance class forces - often against incredible odds. By assuming the guise of the neutral guardian of national interests, the social democratic state had assumed a remarkable level of control over the long-term conditions of capital, whilst at the same time securing sometimes far-reaching, sometimes more marginal, benefits for the working class. But the crisis for the social democratic 'repertoire' of management strategies, came at the point at which it was manifestly failing to accomplish either of these feats.

The crisis of social democracy - its decline as a potent political force - must be seen both in terms of its failure to materially satisfy the parties to the class alliance and the failure of its ideological appeal. Both of these aspects must be viewed against the rise of the right in British politics since the 1960's.
The Rise of the Radical Right:

I have so far made a number of comparisons between the political and ideological movements and shifts which have occurred in Britain since 1945 and those which occurred during the same period in the United States. There are, in these two cases, some close parallels to be discerned in the nature of the economic crisis of capitalism (with the accompanying fiscal crisis of the state), the decline of social democracy as a viable politics for the restoration of consensus, and the rise of the new (or radical) right as a potent political and ideological force.

In chapters III and V, I considered various aspects of the rise of new right conservatism in its American context. But, here I am concerned to outline similar developments in Britain and in particular the components of the political phenomenon that has become known as 'Thatcherism'. I intend to do this with reference to the appeal of the policies of the British Conservative Party in respect of its formulae for the restoration of economic health, and its concentration upon problems of order in the social sphere.

According to Hall and Jacques (1983 p.9.) Thatcherism, a special form of the politics of the radical right, appeared at a historical conjuncture where three trends converged: first, the point at which the long-term structural decline of the British economy synchronised with the deepening into recession of the world capitalist economy; second, in the wake of the collapse of the third post-war Labour government and the disintegration of the social democratic consensus which had provided the framework for British politics since 1945: third, at the resumption of 'the new cold war', the increased stockpiling of nuclear weaponry, "with Britain sliding . . . into a mood of intense, bellicose, patriotic fervour" (ibid.).

The hallmark of Thatcherism then, is an "authoritarian populism". In one sense the Tory Party under Thatcher has been seen to champion the 'rights of ordinary people', - mobilising resentment of the power of 'big government' and 'big unions', and widespread fears of disorder, crime and the effects of black immigration. Additionally, it has championed the 'strong state' - with its emphasis upon compulsion.
(rather than consensus) in its dealings with the labour movement, and
an over-riding emphasis upon law-and-order at home, and a combative
stance towards Britain's 'enemies' abroad.

It has also grafted a form of free market liberalism onto a set of
radical right policies, in the areas of crime, permissiveness, race and
industrial relations - which were previously the preserve of the iso-
lated fringes of the Tory Party. Thatcherism therefore represents a
reversal of the social Toryism dominant in the Party since 1945. The
new rightward shift inside the Party, which had occurred during the
period of the Heath administration, together with a similar shift
within the country as a whole (which had developed fitfully since the
late 1960's), gave special character to the renewed and more concerted
'backlash' of the period from 1979. Indeed it is doubtful whether the
term 'backlash' is sufficient to describe the phenomenon of Thatcherism.
'Backlash', a word which has connotations of a reactionary opposition
to progressive social policies and movements, is appropriate to des-
cribe the political and national atmosphere in which Thatcherism arose:
but the phenomenon is much more than that. In essence, Thatcherism's
exceptional characteristic is its commitment to the reversal of those
principles and policies which have been accepted as the basis for the
management of the economic and social spheres for most of this century.

Firstly, monetarism was adopted as the doctrinal basis of a new
economic policy in favour of the (neo-) Keynesianism of the foregoing
decades. Thus, the virtues of the 'free-market' are stressed in
favour of those of protectionism and a deep-running economic inter-
ventionism in the private sector in addition to the continual expansion
of the national and local public sectors. The economic role of govern-
ment is re-defined as having responsibility for money supply control,
especially with relation to state expenditures, instead of maintaining
incomes policies as a basis for the management of the economy.

Secondly, the Conservative programme was committed to a wide-
ranging attack on the interventionist state. State intervention, and
especially state control of industry, was castigated as inimical to
the development of private initiative and enterprise, and the reductions
in public expenditures which were planned in order to liberate the
private sector from its excessive tax burden. The radical right be-
lieves that Britain has lost most of its economic dynamism because private effort is not properly rewarded and is obstructed by organised labour and labour legislation. Furthermore, the state appropriates most of the surplus as taxes, which it then uses to finance unprofitable sectors of the economy and social programmes of dubious value.

A third factor is a new hard line against the trade union movement which is related in part to its belief that the power of organised labour is able to wrest rewards disproportionate to its contribution to the economy. Concomitantly, the Conservatives under Thatcher have rejected the notion of the T.U.C. as a 'partner' in government.

Conservative economic strategy may be seen as part of a "counter-revolution against the whole drift of British society in recent times" (Bleany 1983 pp.137-8). But, its economic strategy is closely linked to its stance on social policy.

Ian Gough (1983) has analysed the attitudes and policies of Thatcherism towards the welfare state, and has identified a number of important features. Firstly, commitment to a reduction in real public expenditure has resulted in marked budgetary stringencies in relation to welfare, housing, and associated services. These stringencies have continuities from the austerity programme of the Callaghan years, but the reductions have been accelerating since 1979. The Welfare State is under attack for two reasons: first, because of the proportion for which it accounts of state expenditure; second, because — as I argued in the last chapter — there is an ideological objection to the effects of welfare upon the morale of the economically active and inactive. The role of cuts is thus two fold. In a quantitative way they follow from the precepts of monetarism; and, the qualitative shifts in social policy are designed to re-assert individualism, self-reliance and family responsibility, and to reverse the collectivism of the post-war era. (ibid. p.155).

(ii) Thatcherism, Labourism, and Law and Order:

Thatcherism may then be expressed as an admixture of two complementary ideological bases — monetarism and authoritarian populism. (ibid. p.154). Both of these have contributed to the special character and place of law and order policy in the programme of the Conservative
government since 1979. According to Stuart Hall (1983 p.37-39), the area of law and order is one which - in addition to race - the right had, by 1979, 'won territory without having to win power'.

"On law and order, the themes - more policing, tougher sentencing, better family discipline, the rising crime rate as an index of social disintegration, the threat to 'ordinary people going about their private business' from thieves muggers, etc., the wave of lawlessness and the loss of law-abidingness - are the perennials of Conservative Party Conferences, and the sources of many a populist campaign by moral entrepreneur groups and quoting editors."

(ibid. p.37).

Also . . .

"The language of law and order is sustained by a populist moralism. It is where the great syntax of 'good' versus 'evil', of civilised and uncivilised standards, of the choice between anarchy and order, constantly divides the world up and classifies it into its appointed stations."

(ibid. p.37-8).

As Hall asserts, this play upon values and moral issues is what gives Thatcherism's law and order crusade much of its popular appeal. It also touches on people's concrete experiences of crime, and moreover their fears of victimisation. Also, since Thatcherism offers no social remedies for crime's underlying causes, it welds people to the 'need for authority' which has been so significant for the right in the construction of consent to its authoritarian programme. (ibid. p.38).

The nature of the populism of the radical right then, operates on genuine contradictions - it has a rational and material core. Its success lies not in its capacity to dupe, but in the way that it addresses real and lived experiences, real contradictions, and yet is able to represent them within the logics of a discourse which pulls them into line with its wider policies and class strategies. (ibid p.39). In essence, the law and order theme of the 'Selston Toryism'
of 1970, with its implicit incorporation of the theme of race, never died away. Its resurrection and sharpened focus provided, in 1979, what most would argue was one of the key factors in the landslide Conservative election victory of that year.

I would now like to consider some further aspects of Conservative law and order policy under Thatcher. Firstly, it would seem clear that Thatcherism's ideological stance on law and order does have some continuities with those of "Selsdon Toryism", but there are also some substantial differences to be observed. The 'mugging panic' of 1972, for instance, signalled the Conservative leadership's support for the incorporation of some perennial 'backwoods' concerns into the mainstream of the Party's public posturing. This development, particularly assisted by the appeal of Powellism, was one which was accelerated throughout the 1970's. But the accommodation of Toryism to orthodox monetarism, from 1976 onwards, has led to the law and order issue becoming a 'unifying theme', through which more resonant interconnections have been elaborated. In the world-view of the radical right there is (as I have argued above) an over-riding tendency to the conflation of issues of disorder. Monetarism has served to confirm in that world-view the inter-relationship of the economic and social.

Thus, in one sense, law and order is concerned not just with ordinary crimes - but with all disorders as they may be seen to disrupt the orderliness of socio-economic relations. The existence of crime and other social disorders is therefore inimical to social discipline and the quest for economic order. In another closely related sense, law and order is about state investment in, and a concern for, the efficient operation of the agencies of the criminal justice system. (ibid. p.218).

Monetarism has given rise to a number of ideological and policy related compliments and connections between the broader canvas of national and economic issues and certain law and order themes. Authoritarian populism has - as it were - served as the rhetorical style within which such compliments and connections are made. Hence the primary attention paid to increasing the potency of national defence is complimented by measures to defend the nation against the 'enemies within', be they muggers, hooligans, terrorists or industrial militants.
The emphasis upon the importance of 'incentives' in the field of market relations is complemented by the emphasis upon the centrality of 'deterrence' in sentencing and crime prevention. The pre-occupation with the principles of cost-effectiveness and budgetary limitations in the state and private sectors, has created an atmosphere in which (as I shall argue more fully below) monetarist principles are extended into social and public services (including the agencies of criminal justice) which - in theory at least - social democracy and social Toryism had regarded as exempt from the 'rules of the market'.

Secondly, as Martin Kettle (1983) has made clear, it is necessary to make clear certain differences between the rhetoric of Thatcherism's law and order stance, and the actual policy changes which have occurred. Although the Conservative Party campaigned in 1979 as the 'party of law and order', its criminal justice record in office has been, in almost all aspects, a disappointment to the 'hang 'em and flog 'em' backwoods. The free parliamentary vote on a motion for the return of capital punishment was defeated by 119 votes, with 94 Conservatives (including the then Home Secretary William Whitelaw) voting against. The commitment to tougher regimes for young people in detention centres has not been extended beyond experimental efforts in four centres. The entire thrust of Whitelaw's sentencing policy was directed to keeping prison numbers down, even though the numbers in prison have continued to rise, and a huge and costly programme of prison building has since been undertaken. The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, with its sweeping changes in favour of giving the police greater powers to search, detain and question suspects was abandoned in the face of opposition from most quarters. A subsequent Bill, which became the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was a considerably modified version of the original. Even so, the Act has codified and legalised existing police practices in these areas, thus giving more discretion to police officers in dealing with suspects. In this sense the Act is comparable in its spirit - the goal of 'tilting the balance of existing legal rules in favour of the police rather than the offender' - to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act passed by the United States Congress in 1968, and which I have discussed in Chapter III.

Another substantive aspect of the Conservatives' legislative record is the Criminal Justice Act 1982. Conservative Party criticism of
the operation of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 had continued unabated throughout the 1970's. This criticism was aimed in general at the welfare model of juvenile justice which underpinned the Act, and specifically at the discretion afforded to social workers in respect of implementing, or declining the implement, those care orders which courts had made in respect of juvenile offenders. A new policy recommendation was included in the Conservative Party election manifesto, to strengthen the power of the magistrates in the juvenile courts, and to enable them to make a 'residential care order' which would guarantee the child's removal from home, and a 'secure order' which would enable magistrates to place 'particularly recalcitrant' children in secure accommodation provided by the local authority.

It is important to examine both of these pieces of legislation in terms of their basic continuity with the policies and concerns of the Labour government. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was based upon the conclusions of a Royal Commission set up by James Callaghan, and although a Labour government might not have sought to legislate in quite the same way, the substance of the difference cannot be allowed to obscure the importance of what Martin Kettle has called the "bi-partisan policy-making continuity in the criminal justice field." (1983 p.221).

Similarly, in the case of The Criminal Justice Act 1982 the measures in relation to young offenders had been originally made by the House of Commons Expenditure Committee, which was chaired by the Labour M.P. Renee Short. In 1975, their report was critical of several aspects of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (enacted January 1971), and recommended a number of changes. Some of these were implemented by administrative action, others were incorporated into the Criminal Law Act 1977. Some of the more far-reaching proposals were not implemented by the Labour government, but had to wait for the actions of the Conservatives after 1979. The significant point to be drawn from the political analysis of the background to these changes, is that it reflects again, in the view of Tutt and Giller (1983), a bi-partisan agreement that reforms were required.

With regard to the prison system, the re-structuring of the early 1980's was wholly based on the proposals of the May Committee of Inquiry.
set up in 1978 by Labour's Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees. Also, the Conservative government in its 1980 White Paper on the reduction of pressure on the prison system, was as parsimonious on the question of internal reform as the Home Office had been under Rees. In both cases it was the Home Office's own view which prevailed, not that of any political party. Indeed, the Home Office has traditionally been regarded by the Labour Party as a wholly marginal department to the economic and spending departments, at worst one which is doing a necessary job.

A crucial reason for this consensus and continuity between Conservatives and Labour has been suggested by Kettle (op.cit.p.233). There has been, until comparatively recently, the absence of any living alternative 'libertarian' tradition in the Labour Party, or in the labour movement more broadly. This has been accompanied by a profoundly pessimistic determinism within the left of the Party about law and the state. Thus, there has emerged a crude and simplistic notion that the sole function of the state under capitalism is to defend capitalist interests, and that any attempts at reform are mere glosses.

Within the centre and right mainstream of the Party, the predominant position has also unquestioningly housed the implicit assumption that only long-term social and economic changes will diminish crime, and that until such changes occur, crime and delinquency must continue to be dealt with along largely traditional lines. The major exception to this general rule has been that, in respect of delinquency at least, there has been an acceptance of the rehabilitative ideal as part of a broadly 'welfare' model of juvenile justice. (Downes 1983 p.10).

In the period since the 1979 Election, this bi-partisanship has come under considerable strain, and may be seen to have severely buckled! In part, this was due to the fact that Labour's planners perceived not only that Labour had inherited in respect of law and order, what Downes has called "a 'soft' image with a 'hard' policy" (ibid.), but also to the fact that the party was already seriously losing the initiative (or had no initiative at all) on what had become an issue of major national concern. Thus the 1978 Labour Party Conference passed a motion which called for resolute action "to combat the menace of"
of vandalism, wanton destruction and needless violence", and demanded a policy which would "shatter the subculture which is developing as a result of ineffective action". (Kettle 1984 p.367).

This motion with its rather belated acknowledgement of law and order as a political issue, failed miserably to defuse the strident Conservative portrayal, in the 1979 election campaign, of Labour policy and welfarism as responsible for the 'crime wave' of the 1970's. The subsequent Conservative victory, based in part upon the playing of the law and order card, reverberated within the Labour Party in a way which resulted in a serious internal examination of its attitudes towards criminal justice as a whole. At one level this re-examination occurred within the mainstream of the Party. In December 1980, for instance, Merlyn Rees was replaced as Shadow Home Secretary, by Roy Hattersley, who very quickly began to articulate a new-found and well-informed progressivism on a number of criminal justice issues and one in which, for the very first time, Labour's vision and position on law and order was expressed in terms of political interventionism as an instrument of change. (see Hattersley 1983).

Hattersley's appointment also led to a very critical front-bench stance on policing and on the prison crisis. He also closely aligned himself to the civil libertarian trend on the left of the Party, and this convergence of interests gave shape to Labour's hostile official response to the 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (which gave rise to the two Police and Criminal Evidence bills) and to "the unrepeaceredly trenchant Labour attitude to policing during the 1981 urban riots". (Kettle 1984 p.367).

Labour's new stance on criminal justice, from late 1980 onwards, was based in part on political expediency and in part on a new convergence between the perspectives of the front bench and more critical ideas of groups such as the Labour Campaign for Criminal Justice, and the Society of Labour Lawyers, as well as with the civil libertarian tendency referred to above. But the matrix of internal debates within which such a convergence occurred, involved ideological shifts and conflicts which were more fundamental for the Party, and which were concerned with issues and policies far more broad than those in which criminal justice matters had previously been embedded.
From 1981, Labour policy in regard to law and order - most specifically on the issue of policing - entered an entirely new phase. This is closely associated with the political ascendancy within the Party of a new 'radical reformism'. It is this trend and its implications for criminal justice issues, to which I will later turn. Firstly, however, I will deal with the political and intellectual background to the British Crime Survey.

6.3. The Origins of the British Crime Survey:

In the attempt to situate the emergence of the British Crime Survey, it is necessary to discuss a number of aspects of its external history, the broader socio-economic and political contexts in which it arose, and the particular imperatives to which it was a response. It is difficult to rank these external factors in terms of any sense of priority, as they must be seen to interact in ways which would render such an exercise meaningless. I will begin with one of the crucial developments in the history of post-war Britain - the decline of social democracy and the rise of the conservatism of the new right.

I earlier described the continuities and discontinuities in the stances of recent Labour and Conservative governments with regard to criminal justice policy. In both Britain and the United States the rise of the new right has ushered in perspectives and orientations towards crime control which are new to the current historical era. The traditional social democratic emphasis upon establishing social justice as the basis for a crime-free society has all but been abandoned. In the latter perspective, the assurance of adequate social provision and conditions forms the most important plank of crime control strategy. In the conservative vision, however, assumptions about the origins of crime in social injustice and controlling crime through social engineering, are seen as fundamentally misguided.

The ideological bases of conservative crime control policies - a 'homo duplex' conception of human nature, the necessity of order as a basis for social justice, the rejection of welfarism, the primacy of incentives and deterrents in individual behaviour - give rise to a view of crime as emerging from a failure of individual controls in addition to the presence of opportunities to commit crime. The funda-
mental role of the state is thus to employ deterrents and disincentives to criminal behaviour, through the punishment and incapacitation of offender. Additionally, disincentives to crime must incorporate efforts to significantly reduce opportunities through practical measures of prevention. Thus, greater levels of protection for property and persons, and the mobilisation of the public in respect of personal efforts towards better security, and co-operation with the police, are to be seen as essential compliments to traditional crime control measures. Conservatives set themselves the joint task of mobilising public opinion in favour of greater repression of crime through the punishment and control of offenders, as well as the mobilisation of the public into action. In other words, they seek the public's direct co-operation in crime prevention; this would include behaviour aimed at preventing victimisation (locking doors and windows; greater vigilance) and behaviour which would directly aid the police in their efforts to prevent crime and in the apprehension of criminals.

Since the mid-1970's a distinctive right-wing criminology has emerged which has given articulation to these perspectives. But, during the same period, the mainstream of criminology has also undergone a number of important changes. The first of these concerns the establishment of victimology and a move towards the incorporation of issues of victimisation and situational factors in the study of crime. The second - an outgrowth of the first - concerns the recent emergence in Britain and the United States of an administrative criminology.

However, before examining the links between conservative political perspectives and these recent developments in criminology, it is important to note another crucial aspect of the external history under discussion. Throughout the 1970's the official crime rate continued to rise, and the panic about crime and victimisation grew in importance in public and political debates. The Conservative Party won the 1979 election in part on the basis of its promise to 'do something about crime'. But, for all intents and purposes, the prognosis available to the new government was that the crime rate looked set to continue to increase sharply throughout the 1980's. In one sense this assessment was based on current trends, as well as the fear that mass unemployment (particularly among youth) and other social consequences of the government's stringent economic policies, would lead to further increases in crime. Indeed, the riots of 1980, although their links to
unemployment and poor social conditions were officially denied, served to strengthen the crime control perspective of the right, in three ways.

Firstly, they acted as a spur to the renewed commitment to expenditure on policing and other levels of the criminal justice system. Secondly, they gave renewed impetus to the search for public support for a shift towards repressive methods of crime control, and also for measures of primary crime prevention. A most crucial ideological component in the rights position is what may be referred to as a 'siege consciousness'. The assumption that 'values of decency' the personal security of good citizens are increasingly threatened by an external or internal 'enemy', pervades the work of right-wing criminologists and politicians alike. Its corollary is a strange admixture of intensified individualism wherein each must look after their own, and an appeal to 'community' in the form of the mutual co-operation of the good against individual evils. Thirdly, the riots supplied an opportunity for the renewal of the association of race and crime, and a renaissance of an official racism which had lain dormant since the Powellism and Selsdon Toryism of a decade earlier. As Lea and Young (1982, p.6) make clear, the riots were portrayed by the right as an attempt by criminals to resist the imposition of law and order upon them. The supposed growth of criminal ghettos in areas of high black population, were seen as necessitating the entry of the police into such areas in order to stamp out the crime which precipitates rioting.

The Conservative government was faced, in the early 1980's, with a set of urgent political imperatives. Given its public postures and promises, it could not be seen to be failing to be 'doing something about crime' without the risk of the serious loss of electoral credibility. It is therefore in the context of these particular developments that there emerged in mainstream criminology new theoretical perspectives, foci of research and prescriptions for practice, which were primarily informed by a commitment to the prevention of crime, and which owed a considerable debt to the achievements of American victimology.

According to Jock Young's assessment of the current state of mainstream positivist criminology (1986 pp.4-30), the discipline finds
itself in a conceptual mess, at the core of which is its etiological crisis. Criminology has forsaken the search for the causes of crime, which has occupied it for most of its history. This etiological crisis may be seen as closely related to two inter-locking factors. Firstly, internally, criminology has been unable to demonstrate that its central hypotheses concerning the relationship between social disadvantage and criminal behaviour are reliably confirmed in a way which would lend them to effective social intervention. Here we must stress that mainstream criminology has historically been tied to social reformism and social democracy. Secondly, the internal failure of criminology - its failure as a social science - is intimately tied to a failure in its external relations with the interventionist state. In other words criminology has failed to demonstrate itself to be that very thing which from its inception it aspired to be - a credible policy science.

In reality, both of the dimensions of the failure of criminology are inseparable from the failure of post-war social democracy to abolish social or criminal victimisation. I referred in Chapters III and IV to the special relationship of criminology to social democracy and the welfare state, and also to the impact which the economic and social crisis of social democracy since the 1960's, has had upon the debates within the discipline, and its various changes of direction. As Young (ibid. p.13) makes clear, criminology's considerable disarray has taken the form of a cycle of amnesia and re-discovery, in which the discipline has desperately sought for promising hypotheses and policy prescriptions which work.

The crisis has been made worse by the fact that mainstream criminology has come under concerted attack from right-wing criminology (for instance in the form of the 'justice model'), and this has authoritatively and convincingly challenged most of the former's cherished theoretical assumptions, as well as demonstrating the patent failure of positivist criminology to solve the basic problems of the rising crime rate and recidivism. (c.f. Wilson 1975).

Positivist criminology has also come under attack from radical criminology - firstly in the form of the new deviancy theories (such as labelling theory) which sought to discredit its basic theoretical propositions, whilst at the same time discrediting the apparatus of
social democratic crime control as a whole. In this respect, the impact of liberal and radical critiques of mainstream criminology must be seen as in part forming the intellectual atmosphere within which administrative criminology has developed.

To some extent, criminology's etiological crisis has been solved by the jettisoning of the quest for causes in favour of a new pragmatism inherent in administrative criminology, and in which victimology and its survey methodology have become a basic component. In this way, positivist criminology has re-established itself as a social science, with testable hypotheses concerning policing methods, community and practical crime prevention, and other victim- and victimisation-related problems. It has also re-established itself as a policy science, inasmuch as a large number of practical solutions to the crime problem seem to flow from its newer theories, grounded in the most formidable collection of empirical data available to criminologists this century.

Surveys of victimisation have had a central role in these developments and through these, victimology's essential contribution to knowledge in criminology has been the uncovering of criminal victimisation as a social problem of immense proportions. This social problem is shown to be unequally distributed throughout the social classes and groups. It is also shown to be closely related to types of urban social structure, to other social problems, as well as to aspects of the built environment. Criminal victimisation disproportionately affects those sectors of the population who are most oppressed and powerless, and least able to cushion themselves against its effects. The problem was found to be largely intra-racial and intra-class, and contributed to a downward spiral of demoralisation which prepared fertile ground for increased victimisation. Additionally, the fear of crime was discovered to be a problem in its own right: one which contributed to the diminished quality of life of the ghettos, and a contributor to the downward spiral.

These findings have been adopted, at various points in time, by quite different theoretical impulses within criminology. In the 1960's they found a home within the dominant subcultural theory of Cloward and Ohlin (1960), as they did in social democratic crim-
inology in general. The surveys showed a concentration of victimisation in the poorest districts. Thus, not only was poverty and stifled opportunity linked to criminal behaviour, but also to criminal victimisation. The fillip which subcultural theory received from victimology, effectively delayed the etiological crisis and bonded criminology more closely to the social democratic reformism of the Johnson administration.

As Young (op. cit. p.28) points out, the surveys offered - for the first time in the history of criminology - the potential for a sociological theory which embraced both the causes of crime and its effects. But, this potential was never realised. The failure of Johnson's "war on poverty" and the attempts to reduce crime and delinquency through social reform, finally exhausted the credibility of subcultural theory. The survey findings have also profoundly influenced right-wing criminology, as well as the left-realist perspective in radical criminology, and I will deal with both of these cases later.

It is within administrative criminology that the methodology and findings of the surveys have found their most comfortable accommodation. They have contributed to what amounts to a "silent revolution" in conventional criminology involving the rapid demise of positivist and social democratic ways of thinking about crime, and a ditching of the etiological quest in favour of the development of a technological criminology. This is primarily concerned with aiding the state in the management of crime and criminals. On the one hand, these measures may be designed to alter the balance of the opportunity-costs of breaking the law by, for instance, making apprehension more likely, and punishment more certain. Here we must note that the rapid expansion of administrative criminology has occurred, both in Britain and the United States, in the context of the rise of a free-market conservatism which, in terms of theories of criminal justice, has ushered-in the re-emergence of the neo-classical paradigm.

"The concept of marginal returns in the market place became transferred to neo-classical theories of the marginal risks of getting away with crime. A clearly economic conception of rational choice is combined with a rigorous cost-effective evaluation of policies aimed at restricting
choice in order to make crime an irrational - and therefore presumably unlikely - decision."

(Young op. cit. p.12).

But, the spirit of monetarism - both in its economic and social-reconstruction forms - is also evident in the other (perhaps more important) facet of administrative criminology's general project.

It is interesting to note the way in which administrative criminology uses the data from the surveys to continually inform policies of practical crime prevention. It utilises the concepts of differential risk and opportunity as variables which can be continually measured and varied by policy makers and police on a territorial basis. In general the data are used to inform the current rationalisation of policing practice: and, in particular instances, they may be used to facilitate the prevention of victimisation through pin-pointing aspects of the vulnerability of persons and property. (e.g. Mayhew et.al. 1976; Clarke 1980).

Some findings of victimisation surveys and studies in relation to the role of the public in crime control have made a special impact upon planners. The surveys have highlighted the problem of the "dark figure", and the important role of the victim in invoking the criminal justice process.

I have noted elsewhere in this work that a particular part of the impact of victimology is that victims and witnesses have become elevated to a most important place in criminological work, as well as in criminal justice planning and police-public relations. It has been deemed essential to contrive means through which the flow of information from the public to the police can be maximised. Thus, two of the most well-known products of administrative criminology - community-level policing, and neighbourhood watch schemes - may be perceived as administrative steps towards that goal, although they must also be seen as part of the much larger project of bringing about the more efficient and cost-effective solutions to crime and disorder.

Victimology has been incorporated in yet another way into the conservative perspective on criminal justice. In the United States the 'victims rights lobby' has been hugely influential. This is evidenced
by the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982) and by the proliferation of state legislation improving victim's rights and conditions in the criminal process, and the general expansion of services to victims of crime. But, in Britain also, the victims lobby - in the shape of the National Association of Victims Support Schemes and in the increasing swell of opinion in favour of 'doing more for victims of crime' - has assumed an importance which the Conservative government has found difficult to ignore.

There are several respects then in which the concerns of the right's crime control policies and administrative criminology have converged and been mutually reinforcing. It is particularly important here to examine the role of various agencies and interest in the background to the emergence of the British Crime Survey. However, before doing that, it is necessary to state a further essential dimension of the general context in which it occurred, namely the emerging debates on police accountability.

(i) The changing political position of the police:

For a number of important reasons, policing emerged in the early 1980's as a political issue almost as central as that of crime. Firstly, as I remarked earlier in this chapter, the policing of the riots of 1981, became both an issue of inter-party debate within parliament and a focus for debate and pressure group and public agitation. But, the political controversy surrounding the specific tactics used in the face of the disorders, served to initiate the wider controversy concerning the policing of high crime areas with large black populations. The Scarman Inquiry (Scarman 1981 p.126) into the disorders in Brixton, had been guardedly critical of "hard" policing methods and "swamp" tactics in respect of street crime, which led to a widespread loss of confidence in the police.

Added to this, political pressure for police accountability by Labour local authorities in major urban areas such as in London, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and Merseyside, served to expose all including the most mundane aspects of policing into the public gaze. For, not only were the police now criticised for their activities in regard to disorders and their wider relations
with minority communities and for the existence of widespread misconduct, but also for their record in respect of preventing and solving such special types of victimisation as sexual and racially-motivated assaults. As I earlier described, the new urban left also began to look more closely at the police's apparently poor record in respect of clearing-up serious crime in general.

The atmosphere of public criticism and scrutiny engendered by the left and given considerable sanction by the Scarman Report, was perhaps exacerbated by the government's championing of the police in the fight against crime and through such actions as the high pay increases introduced early in the new parliament.

The police were at that time also operating within a climate in which it was incumbent upon them to demonstrate to the government that organisationally, steps were being taken to overhaul efficiency, and that the considerable public funds being channelled into law enforcement could be justified. According to the results of research conducted by Sinclair and Miller (1984) the focus upon police efficiency has arisen out of cross-party interest in the efficiency and effectiveness of all public services, and specifically out of the inclusion of the police within the ambit of the Government Financial Management Initiative with its "business-like", and "cost conscious" approach to management.

This climate had actually predated the 1981 disorders and the surrounding debates. In 1979, for instance, Metropolitan Commissioner McNee had invited the Policy Studies Institute to put forward proposals for a wide-ranging study of relations between the police and people in London. This study (Smith and Gray 1985) was conducted between 1980 and 1982 and addressed a large number of areas having a bearing upon relations with the public as well as with operational efficiency. The study also incorporated a victimisation survey, the first to be commissioned by a British police force, and this was of the utmost importance, I believe, in establishing institutional support for such surveys, especially in demonstrating their potential for generating data which could directly inform changes in policing practice. Indeed, the results of the PSI study formed the basis for a quite detailed statistical and critical analysis of local crime figures and police performance set in motion by Commissioner Newman in 1983 (Perera 1983).
Thus, the upper echelons of the police found themselves, in the early 1980's, in a position in which their autonomy of operation and other aspects their corporate power were considerably threatened. In the terms used by Dickson (1968) in his analysis of the activities of police bureaucracies, they sought to influence the 'political and economic environments' within which they operated. In the face of the Scarman Report they sought to organise themselves into an effective political lobby - a process which was begun under Commissioner Mark in the mid-1970's (see Reiner 1982). In other ways they have sought to introduce changes in policy and operation which are aimed at recovering the confidence of the public. Examples of such policies include neighbourhood watch schemes and other efforts commensurate with the new emphasis upon community policing. Other changes have included the upgrading of equipment and communications and efforts towards the rationalisation of manpower. The early 1980's therefore saw the dawning of the official recognition of the necessity to give priority to increasing the flow of information from the public, a goal which could itself only be achieved by a return to consensus policing. The support (albeit limited) which was given to survey work and other types of research linked to the goal of organisational development, may be seen as fitting into this new corporate consciousness.

Thus, for the police, a number of factors combined in the late 1970's and early 1980's which imposed new pressures and political imperatives. The period saw intensified public debate around a number of areas - rising rates of crime; criticism of the service the police were providing for the public and for special groups of poor, female, and black victims of crime; the low rates of detection; the policing of industrial disputes, political protest, and civil disorders; and, the policing of youth and ethnic minority communities. In addition, political pressure for greater police efficiency emanated from all parts of the political spectrum. The police were further placed on the offensive by left-wing demands for accountability, buttressed by the authoritative support of the shadow cabinet. All of this occurred in a climate in which the Thatcher government was jointly pressing for greater efficiency in preventing and solving crime, and for greater cost-effectiveness through organisational rationalisation.

Thus, a new era had been reached in the political history of crime
statistics. The main means at the disposal of police bureaucracies to aid them in their search for greater autonomy of operation and competition for funds, has traditionally been the attempt to manipulate the crime statistics in a way which preserved or enhanced their interests. The age of crime surveys has to a large extent neutralised this particular device. A good illustration of this point is the attempt by the Metropolitan Police in 1982 to justify their hard approach to the policing of black communities by the selective portrayal of race-coded statistics on street robbery, apparently showing the majority of offenders to be black youths. The various political ripostes, including those of the Labour opposition in the House of Commons, and those by criminologists (e.g. Smith 1982; Lea and Young 1984), were considerably informed by the wisdoms and empirical data of victimology. The Met's specific use of surveys and the later co-operation of the police with the Midlands and Merseyside crime surveys, provides evidence of the degree to which the upper echelons of the police establishment came to see such surveys as part of a new political reality - and indeed one which could serve corporate ends. It might be argued that from this point of view, victimisation surveys are somewhat 'double-edged'. In one sense they will certainly show the crime rate to be higher than thought, and therefore the detection rate to be lower. Such findings may, however, be held to advantage in the battle for increased funding, and may assist what Dickson (op.cit) has called the creative conjuring of the police's institutional environment - the nature of the crime problem. In other words the police may thereby be able to foster an image of a hopelessly beleaguered and stretched organisation.

There is another respect in which the surveys may be held to assist the police both in terms of their corporate image and in terms of internal rationalisation and organisational development. The data may (as in the case of the Met's use of the PSI data) directly assist changes in the 'targeting' of particular offences and the making of new operational policy. In a related way the data and the methods may become incorporated into the British police's belated technological and data revolution, in which the relationship between institutional knowledge and practice rests upon a greater degree of empirical certainty.

There may also be several ways in which data help to pin-point those aspects of police-public relations which create satisfaction or
dissatisfaction and which may be used to inform specific policies supported by changes in the training of police officers. These matters bring us back yet again to the institutional need for information about all aspects of the crime problem, and to increase the flow of information from the public.

(ii) The role of the Home Office:

I would now like to turn to consider the role of the Home Office, and specifically of its Research and Planning Unit, in the development of the British Crime Survey. Firstly, it is as well to make some observations concerning the relationship of the Home Office to government with regard to crime control policy. In Britain the policy area of crime and justice subsumes a group of large agencies - run by the national state apparatus - like the police, courts and prisons, as well as the immigration and security services. In England and Wales, it is the part of the state which is administered by the Home Office. According to Martin Kettle (1983 p.248; pp224-2), consideration of concrete changes in crime and justice policy must take into account the considerable autonomy with which the Home Office and the various agencies operate. The Home Office, (in the person of its civil servants), has its own line - quite independent of any party line, even that of the Conservatives. This line is largely dictated by its need and desire to sustain the agencies which it nominally controls.

There have been recent examples of the way in which the agencies - especially the prison system, the courts and the police, have resisted direct government appeals for changes in policy. The Home Office, Kettle maintains, is profoundly resistant to change from the outside, and most recent examples of changes in the policies of its agencies have been internally conceived, responding to departmental needs and financial imperatives.

Thus, the emergence and execution of the British Crime Survey should be equally understood as originating from at least two internal sources. Firstly, the shift to administrative criminology within the Research and Planning Unit; and secondly, the support which senior Home Office officials were able to secure for the survey, in the face of initial opposition from its agencies.
I have earlier outlined the development of administrative criminology, and it is as well to specify that the Home Office Research and Planning Unit (HORPU) has, in Britain, been its almost exclusive promoter. Through its 'in-house' research activities and through its budget for funding research by outside bodies, HORPU has moved the whole emphasis of criminological research away from a more offender- and treatment-oriented focus, towards a focus upon crime prevention, victimisation and policing. A glance at the list of its published reports since 1955, reveals that until 1975 most were focussed upon offenders' characteristics and problems and the implications of working with these in social work, probation, therapeutic, prison and after-care settings. From 1975, the emphasis of the reports switches considerably towards issues of sentencing and policing, and to situational crime prevention, as well as to research which is sensitive to the perceptions and experiences of victims and non-victims among the general public, and relationships between the public and the police. (Home Office 1985a).

In the past decade HORPU has been run by, has employed, and has otherwise operated within an intellectual fraternity of criminologists who have been profoundly influenced by American victimology and in particular by the National Crime Survey and its relationship to the shift at a number of levels in criminal justice policy in the United States, towards victim- and community-centred models. HORPU is, however, only one of a number of interests inside the Home Office. Once the idea of a national victimisation survey (originally to be called the "National Crime Survey") was mooted, it was necessary to obtain the support of the most senior civil servants, and subsequently of the appropriate government ministers. To this end a workshop to look at the feasibility of such a survey was convened at Cambridge University in early 1981 by the Home Office Crime Policy Planning Unit. This gathered together many mainstream British criminologists with a long-standing interest in the problems of counting crime and victimisation (e.g. Nigel Walker, A.K.Bottomley, A.E.Bottoms, Mike Maguire) and HORPU members who were directly involved with the planning of the survey (R.Clarke, J.Croft, M.Hough, P.Mayhew). Also attending were survey victimologists from Holland, West Germany, and Canada, a representative from the U.S. Justice Department, as well as one of the fathers of American victim surveys - A.D.Biderman, and Wesley Skogan.
who was to become a consultant to the survey. The workshop also included representative of all key Home Office departments, including those with responsibility for finance, criminal statistics, and the police, and a member of the Inspectorate of Constabulary. The police themselves were represented by a commander from the Metropolitan force, and the government by a senior treasury official.

This workshop had a key place in the history of the British Crime Survey, and its organisers were obviously astutely aware of the fragile context in which the Survey was being proposed. It was necessary to win broad support and overcome some entrenched resistance, especially on the part of the Home Office Police Department which seemed, in playing its 'dead bat', to have been less enthusiastic than the police themselves. There was also opposition from the Criminal Statistics Department on the basis of a fear that HORPU would eventually usurp their position.

Apart from the problem of inter-departmental rivalries, there remained the problem of convincing the government. The Report of the workshop (Home Office Crime Policy Planning Unit 1981) was generally favourable to the Survey and outlined many potential benefits including, notably, the undoing of the high degree of uncertainty which surrounds most decisions about criminal policy (ibid p.24). It is telling that the workshop was arranged by the Criminal Policy Department instead of HORPU, as this probably served to emphasise that this was research which was directly related to policy. Also, the estimated costs of the Survey - at £300,000 over two years - were stressed as puny in comparison to the annual cost of the police (at £1,700 million) or indeed the annual costs of compiling criminal statistics - approximately £1 million (ibid p.24).

It is also important to note here that the 1980's saw a reduction in the budgets available for social research, and a marked trend towards justifying that research in terms of its policy 'pay-off'. In many government departments at that time all surveys had to gain prior approval at junior ministerial level. (Field Notes VIII).

From the early 1960's onwards there had been a great expansion in survey research, concommitant upon the expansion of social expenditure
and of the social sciences. (Social and Community Planning Research 1985). There was, however, a distinct cultural lag in Britain, in comparison to the United States, in terms of the rather tenuous relationship between survey research and the implementation of social policy, and between social scientists and policy makers. Indeed, it is argued that in Britain the results of studies conducted by government departments' own research departments are more likely to have an impact on policy than those of externally funded bodies. (see Thomas 1983 pp 120-24).

The traditionally perceived role of social research in Britain - as being essentially about illuminating social problem areas, but not about their solution - was under considerable strain in the early 1980's. Nowhere was this perhaps more so than the area of research into criminal policy. And, the shift in the emphasis of the research programme of HORPU in the past decade (see above) towards that which is directly amenable to testing and implementing policy may be cited as evidence of this (see Croft 1980 pp 4-7).

Against this background, the conceptual novelty and cost of the proposed Survey were important issues. However, despite the objections and suspicions, it was successfully sold to all the interests and eventually to the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw. It has been suggested (Field Notes VIII) that this was achieved through the stressing of five main points.

Firstly, HORPU's record of policy-oriented research was cited in support of the potential for the Survey as a direct source of information for administrative and legislative decisions. Secondly, the Survey would throw important light on the shape of the crime statistics, especially with regard to whether the sharp rises in recorded crime were, in reality, an artefact of increased reporting. It was hypothesised (probably on the basis of the results of the U.S. National Crime Survey) that although crime was greater in volume than that in the official statistics, the annual rises would be shown to be less dramatic. This view was certainly borne-out by evidence on the annual increases in domestic burglary, drawn from the General Household Survey. (Home Office 1982).
Thirdly, crime could be shown to be increasing because of increased opportunities to commit it, and there was a need to shift the emphasis of research from recorded offences to a cross-section of 'dark' and 'light' incidents. Fourthly, the Survey would usher-in a new technological approach to crime in which research data would replace intuition and guess work in crime control policy at all levels. Indeed the Perks Report (1967) had recommended the routine collection of data on victims, offenders and the circumstances of offences, in order to make criminal statistics a more relevant information base for crime control. These recommendations had never been adopted.

Lastly, the Survey was associated with the promise of increasing the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of policing. As such, its role would be both to initiate and to evaluate changes in policing practice.

It is therefore possible, I believe, to attribute the emergence of the Survey to a number of background factors. One factor, however, is of particular interest here—namely the convergence of interests between administrative criminologists and the Thatcher government. I have variously mentioned the convergence of administrative criminology and right-wing theories of crime control and the fact that the theoretical underpinning of the Survey placed a marked emphasis on crime as a product of opportunity, is of prime importance here. Additionally, the government had a great stake in the minimising of the public panic about crime. Thus, the promise that the Survey would educate the public out of its misconceptions about the crime problem was particularly alluring. It could demonstrate how minor much crime is, and how mundane and everyday the circumstances in which it occurs. Indeed it was believed that the fear of crime—which HOFPU criminologists hypothesised to be a greater problem than crime itself—was counter-productive for the government, especially if it was seen to be losing the fight against crime. Thus, the government of law and order could be said to have been caught in a spiral somewhat of its own making!

In association with this, the Survey appealed in its potential to mobilise the public against crime. Thus, as the Report of the Survey workshop states...
by focussing on the circumstances in which offences are committed rather than on the characteristics of offenders and the response of official agencies, a survey might help to make the public more aware of the limitations of official action in dealing with crime and encourage preventative self-help measures.

(Home Office Crime Policy Planning Unit op.cit.p.21).

(iii) The Midlands Crime Survey:

In the wake of the publication of the report of the first British Crime Survey, the Home Office let it be known that it would encourage the conducting of locally-based surveys. There were a number of reasons why such surveys should have been desired. Firstly, an obvious drawback of any national survey is that in the publication of its findings, it necessarily makes a number of broad statements about crime and victimisation, which are not necessarily helpful (in more than a general way) in the elucidation of problems in particular geographic areas or in specific localities. The knowledge that, nationally, victimisation rates tend to be highest among certain groups or within certain types of residential areas, though providing general indicators, cannot be a substitute for data generated by surveys of local areas and populations. Secondly, local surveys of crime would be a logical extension of the principle then gaining ground, that all social surveys should have some policy relevance. Thus, data generated by crime surveys should have a direct bearing upon the targeting of particular types of offence, especially in respect of the volume of 'dark' incidents. They must also be able to inform policy regarding relations with the public and with special groups within the population, and have implications for policies of crime prevention.

It has been pointed out by one informant, however, that there are serious inherent difficulties in the use of a national survey in the hope of influencing policing practice. (Field Notes VIII). Britain has no national police force and no national policing policy. There are fifty-one forces, each with a chief constable who has almost total power to decide upon the operational policies and priorities of his force. Thus, it is open to chief constables to reject national survey...
findings on the grounds of the 'different conditions and problems' appertaining to their separate geographical areas. There is a second problem affecting the reception of survey data by the police, in that police work typically involves a reactive approach in which the police investigate crimes after the event. Integral to the British Crime Survey, and the administrative criminology from which it sprang, is the desire to develop an empirical basis for preventative policing in party with the community. It was believed that local surveys would address not only the specifically local issues of offence and victimisation patterns, but also be instrumental in assisting changes in the orientation of police work.

The Midlands Crime Survey was the third local survey of crime to be conducted in Britain. The first was the study of three areas of London by Sparks and others (1977) and the second, the PSI study (Smith and Gray 1985) which had covered the whole of the Metropolitan Police area of London. Whereas the Sparks study had been primarily concerned with testing out the methodological problems of victimisation surveys in practice, the PSI study had been aimed at generating data on a wide number of issues bearing upon policing policy.

The Midlands Crime Survey (see Farrington and Dowds 1983;1985) was based closely upon the methodology of the first British Crime Survey. It had at its core a sample survey of victims of crime and as with the BCS and all other similar surveys, sought to uncover the dark figure of crime. The survey questionnaire covered respondent's experiences and perceptions of the police and related issues. The main objective, however, was to explain why the rate of recorded crime in Nottinghamshire should not only have been, for a number of years, the highest in England and Wales, but also about twice as high as in each of the adjoining counties of Leicestershire and Staffordshire. To this end the work included a study of police recording practices in the three counties.

The political origins of the Midlands Crime Survey are of some interest here for the purpose of comparison with those of the British Crime Survey, and in particular with those of the Merseyside and Islington surveys which I will discuss below.

The desire for a survey originated in 1982 within the Nottinghamshire
police committee. At that time the finance committee of the County Council had set up a review of police expenditure - at that time totalling £42 million per annum. The review panel had initiated a number of efficiency studies of aspects of police work and it is clear that the issue of 'value for money' had become part of a new spirit of scrutiny of police operations. Additionally, the county's very high crime rate had become an important political issue. There was concern that the publicity which accompanied annual prominence in the national crime statistics, was damaging to the county and was especially a disincentive to financial investment and the setting up of new companies in an area hard hit by unemployment. The police committee and the council were dominated by Labour Party members; but, although the pressure for financial scrutiny of policing activities and for an investigation of the crime figures came mainly from them, the support of other parties and from the chief constable was readily gained. Nottinghamshire does not appear to have been affected by the serious conflict between police committees and chief constables so characteristic of some other British cities in that period. The desire to investigate the level of crime in the county does not appear to have been overtly linked to any struggle for political accountability or in any serious criticism of the police's operational efficiency. This fact is almost certainly linked to the absence in Nottinghamshire of three important factors. There had been no civil disorders; there was no conflict between the police and ethnic minority population; and, there was an absence of a new urban left group on the ruling Labour council, taking unadversarial stance towards the police. (Field Notes IX).

For all intents and purposes, the political imperatives which gave impetus to this Survey seem rather similar to those which informed the British Crime Survey. The scrutiny of police expenditures implied in the work of the review panel, and the scrutiny of police work implied in the work of that panel and of Farrington and Dowds seems to have been couched in terms acceptable to the police. The police clearly believed that the survey would indicate that the high Nottinghamshire crime rate was reactive outcome of recording practices. The council also believed that the county's public image problems would be solved. Indeed the results of the survey, which showed the crime rates of the three counties to be rather similar, were most pleasing to both the
main sets of interests.

6.4. The Emergence of Radical Reformism in the Labour Party:

I have now dealt in some detail with the political and economic developments of post-war Britain, and I have attempted to account for the emergence of the British Crime Survey. I will now go on to outline the emergence of radical reformism in the Labour Party and the accompanying changes in consciousness with regard to crime and policing. I will then go on to account for the emergence of the Merseyside and Islington crime surveys.

In his discussion of post-war social democracy, Ian Taylor notes "the importance of its stress on social provision and democracy, taken together, as a form of socialist politics." (op. cit. p.41). Social democracy's twin demands were, firstly for a recognition of broad social need, and the general desirability of preventing a return to the anarchy and inequality of a free market economy: secondly, for the thorough going democratisation of British political institutions. The policies of the post-war Labour Party have been unsuccessful in respect of these original goals. Keynesian economics has to some extent mitigated the worst effects of capitalist economic cycles, but there has been no fundamental liberation from social inequality. Parliamentary Socialism, Taylor maintains, has failed to deliver the promise of social democracy, and the commitments of 1945 remain as unfulfilled demands.

"But they were a politics that could have advanced, and could still advance, the cause of the more fundamental transformation to socialism, by giving voice to popular demands for social justice and for real democratic involvement in, and control of, state social provision."

( Ibid. p.43).

It is in the spirit of this last statement that there has emerged a new ideological force within the Labour Party - one which has arisen in part from a dissatisfaction with the failures of post-war Labourism,
and in part from a faith in the potential for building of socialism at the local level. This new force - radical reformism - has, since 1980, transformed the politics of the Labour Party through what has amounted to a revolt against the centrist leadership on the part of constituency parties and by ruling Labour groups in the town halls. It has also engendered a new and ongoing debate about the meaning of socialism and the socialist potential of a future Labour government.

These developments have been stimulated by a cluster of concerns which were thrust to the top of the agenda in the late 1970's. One of the most important and longstanding of these was the dissatisfaction within the constituencies - and within the Party's broad left - with Labour's post-war legacy. As Ian Taylor has asserted, the promises of 1945 have had a most meagre realisation, and in many respects the impetus towards social justice and a socialist democracy have been significantly reversed, leaving behind what Boddy and Fudge (1984 p.19) have called, a stale vision of a centralised, state socialism.

The revolt against statism is quite central to radical reformism several aspects. Statism has not only failed to transform capitalist economic and social formations, but it has also alienated the Labour Party's electoral supporters, whose experience of the state - at national and local levels - is of a set of arrangements which are bureaucratic, remote, and fundamentally undemocratic. There has also followed a marked decline in Labour's electoral fortunes. Labour has been faced with the perennial problem of abstentionism as well as the newer threats posed by a swing of sections the Labour vote towards the Conservative and Alliance parties. Indeed, part of Thatcherism's appeal lies in the promise to 'get government off the backs of the people', and the Alliance is committed in varying degrees to a democratisation and localisation of government institutions.

Another important source of the radical reformist impetus is the economic policies of the Thatcher government. The latter's determination to 'roll back the frontiers of the state', cut public expenditure and free market forces, has meant "a state of permanent crisis for local government . . . a crisis felt more keenly by progressive Labour councils intent on maintaining and developing the collective provision of services at the local level" (Boddy and Fudge op.cit.p.1). Thus,
a major objective of radical reformists has been to defend levels of services and local authority employment against cuts, controls and privatisation. But, equally, the battle is seen in terms of a more general challenge to local democracy and to the established position of local government in the British political system.

A third feature of radical reformism is its concern "to develop and explore what socialist initiatives and alternatives might look like in practice" (ibid. p.19), and to illustrate and build awareness of such alternatives, by providing working models at the local level, as a means of winning popular support for socialist policies. In other words this strategy has two edges: firstly, to construct a socialist future out of programmes which 'pre-figure' such developments: secondly, to influence opinion on social policy issues, and especially away from support for those reactionary solutions to social problems which are the stuff of Thatcherite populism. (see Fudge 1984 p.211).

In his examination of the origins and policies of the "new urban left", Gyford (1983) identifies its most important hallmark as the belief in the viability of the concept of a 'local road to socialism'. In pursuit of this, Labour councils are seen as needing to break out of the confines of council chamber politics and to link-up with various 'extra-parliamentary forces' - trade unions, ethnic minority organisations, the women's movement, tenants' and residents' groups, and other local pressure groups, and mobilise them for the fight against the government-imposed cuts in services. But, in order to mobilise such groups for socialist alternatives, it would be necessary to decentralise local services making them more accessible and at the same time promoting support for the defence of council workers' jobs.

A major element therefore in the struggle for local socialism is the creation of new alliances and coalitions out of disparate interest groups. Traditionally, it was the mass political party based on a homogeneous working class with a tradition of collective action, which seemed to hold out the best promise of socialist advance. But, 1980, radical reformists began to argue for a mass popular party based upon an alliance of trade unions and a plurality of other groups - similar in kind to that which forms the basis of support for the Democratic Party in the United States. This type of alliance - termed a 'rainbow
coalition' in its American context - has been described by its most recent proponent as follows:

" 'Rainbow' is not so much about a race as a direction, because all colours are in the rainbow. I looked at the growing racial polarisation and said what about the Indians, Hispanics, the Asians, the blacks, but also the gays, the handicapped people and women? . . . It's all about involving people who historically have been locked out . . . And of course with the right-wing shift in the country, there are now even more people locked out. "


In its British context though, this coalition would be an alliance for resistance, and also a means of transforming popular consciousness. For radical reformist the 'rainbow coalition' would go beyond the traditional limitations of orthodox pluralistic alliances formed at junctures for electoral purposes, and form the basis of a radical pluralist alliance which would give shape to a new popular socialist politics. It would give recognition to a variety of specific interest groups within the working class, of disadvantaged and oppressed groups, as well as those sections of the middle and professional classes sympathetic to socialist values. Gyford (op.cit. pp.91-93) stresses that such a strategy is subject to a number of potential hazards. Firstly, drawing upon the McGovern experience, there is the danger that blue-collar and trade-union voters will defect to other parties because they feel alienated from the style and substance of the new politics. Indeed, in the British context, there is a potential danger that the Labour Party's white working class constituency may feel itself considerably alienated from the rainbow politics of the new urban left in the town halls. This may occur because of a failure for the former to identify the connection between its own aspirations and those of minorities in the coalition. The overwhelming defeat of Peter Tatchell in the safe Labour seat of Bermondsey, says Gyford, is a clear instance of the need for radical reformists to bridge the gap between their own view of the world and that of the broader constituency.
A related problem of which radical reformists display a heightened level of anxiety, concerns the perceived danger of the strategy lapsing into a mere populism or pluralism and "an unprincipled pandering to some of the more reactionary views which can be found in the pubs, clubs and bingo halls" (ibid. p.91). Thus, if the decentralisation of power to the community were to result in displays of racism, and other 'intra-community divisiveness, then the cause of local socialism would hardly be advanced.

A third problem says Gyford, is the danger that left activists in local authorities would attempt to avoid the above problems - of the fragmentation of Labour's constituency through disaffection on reactionary pluralism - by a recourse to essentially tutelar tactics, or a "preceptorial" form of politics. In the latter, those who hold the 'correct' ideological positions and understandings, attempt to mobilise the mass through a process of education through gradual involvement in decentralised power. The great danger, Gyford continues, is that preceptorialism "may, under pressure, degenerate into manipulative elitism" (ibid. p.93) in which the views of the activists come to be taken as really representative of the objective interests of the people, regardless of people's actual views. In this way it is easy to begin a process which equates party and people.

I will now leave my more general description of the origins and perspectives of radical reformism and turn to an analysis of the perspectives on crime victimisation and policing which have developed from them. I will also set the scene for my later discussion of the Islington and Merseyside crime surveys. Firstly, however, I will present an outline chronology, the purpose of which is to establish the sequence of events which form the backdrop to the developments examined in the remainder of this chapter.

... 

AN OUTLINE CHRONOLOGY 1979 - 86

1979
October
Landslide election victory for the Conservative Party. Law and Order, and Labour's policies on crime and disorder were an important election issue, and were thought to have significantly contributed to the swing 

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December
In response to a request from the Commissioner of Police, the Policy Studies Institute produced an outline proposal for a wide-ranging study of relations between the police and the public in London: the study would incorporate a survey of victimisation as well as a survey of police officers.

1980
February
Fieldwork begins for the Policy Studies Institute study of crime and policing in London.

1981
January
Thirteen young black people are killed in a fire in a house in Deptford, London. The fire was originally believed to have been started by a racist fire-bomber. Subsequent months produced a campaign and demonstration against police handling of the investigation and the conduct of the inquest.

February
William Whitelaw, Home Secretary, announces a Home Office enquiry into racial attacks.

April
Home Office workshop of British, American and European criminologists held at Cambridge to discuss the feasibility of a national survey of criminal victimisation in Britain.

April
Serious disorders in Brixton, London, by black and white people against the police, in the wake of "Swamp '81" - a blanket policing operation against street crime and burglary, with widespread use of 'stop-and-search' tactics. Labour Party are very critical of police riot-control methods and especially of the use of the Special Patrol Group. Labour spokesmen insist that the riots have their cause in the social stress brought on by government's monetarist policies. The government insists that the riots are sparked by 'criminal elements'.

May
Scarman enquiry into Brixton disorders begins.

May
Local election victories for the Labour Party bring many young radical reformist politicians with an interest in policing issues, to power in inner-city
Serious disorders in Southall, Middlesex; Brixton, London; Moss Side, Manchester; Toxteth, Liverpool; and in other cities.

Labour Party Conference passes a motion calling for restrictions on police powers, democratisation of the police, a new complaints procedure, and disbandment of the Special Patrol Group.


Publication of the report of the Home Office study of racial attacks. This shows that the rate for attacks on Asians was 50 times higher than for white people, and the rate for people of West Indian or African origin was over 36 times higher than for white people.

Fieldwork begins for the first British Crime Survey, covering 11,000 households in England and Wales, and 5,000 households in Scotland.

Metropolitan Police publish statistics on a limited number of crimes, coded by the ethnic origin of the offender or suspect.

Commencement of Greater London Council Police Committee enquiry into racial harassment in London.

Colin Roach, a young unemployed black man, is found dead from gunshot wounds in the front hall-way of Stoke Newington Police Station, in the London Borough of Hackney. An inquest jury returned a verdict of suicide. Evidence that Roach had previously suffered police harassment, and the treatment of his family after his death, led to renewed bitterness between the black community and the police.

Publication of the report of the first British Crime Survey.

Fieldwork begins for the Midlands Crime Survey, covering Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire.
September
Publication of the report of the Midlands Crime Survey.
Publication of the report of the Greater London Council enquiry into racial harassment in London.
The report cites widespread dissatisfaction with police practice, and found a high level of non-reporting by victims.

November
Publication of Policy Studies Institute study of crime and policing in London.

1984

February
Fieldwork begins for the second British Crime Survey, covering 11,000 households in England and Wales.

March
Pilot study conducted for the Merseyside Crime Survey.

March
Beginning of year-long miners' strike. Police tactics in the use of riot-gear, the enforcement of the law on picketing, and the new interpretation of public order laws in order to prevent the movement of 'flying-pickets', sharpens debate on police reform on both the left and the right of the Labour Party.

May
Fieldwork begins for the Merseyside Crime Survey, covering 2,400 households in the County.

September
Pilot study conducted for the Islington Crime Survey.

October
Fieldwork begins for Merseyside Survey of Police Officers, covering 1,600 officers of all ranks.

October
Labour Party conference passes four motions on policing. All are highly critical of the police, especially in relation to public disorder and industrial disputes. None of the motions mentions crime.

November
Publication of the first report of the Merseyside Crime Survey.

1985

March
Fieldwork begins on Islington Crime Survey, covering 2,000 households in the borough.

June
Publication of the first report of the Survey of Merseyside Police Officers.

June
Publication of the report of the second British Crime Survey.
September
Serious disorders in Handsworth, Birmingham; and in Brixton and Tottenham, London. In each case rioting was triggered by some police action. As in 1981, Labour and Conservative news on their origins polarize. The Labour Party renews its calls for an accountable police force.

1986

January
Publication of the first report of the Islington Crime Survey.
6.5. The Development of the Radical Reformist Perspective on Crime and Policing

I observed earlier in this chapter that in the late 1970's and early 1980's, policing policy was elevated to a central position in the public debate on crime. I have so far looked at the ways in which the recognition of the need to reationalise policing methods and to substantially alter the thrust of police-work, was an important element in both the conservative perspective on crime control and one which informed much of administrative criminology. The British Crime Survey, the PSI and Midlands surveys can be seen, in the light of these developments, to represent an important element in the emerging technology of organisational changes in policing.

I now wish to turn my attention to the intellectual and political origins of the Islington and Merseyside crime surveys, and in so doing it is important to explore the ways in which a perspective on crime and policing emerged from the new radical reformist politics described above. I will now deal with the most important aspect of that perspective - the debates surrounding the struggle for a democratically accountable police force.

In their analysis of the background to the riots of 1981, Lea and Young (1982.c.) forward the following arguments. Firstly, there has been a steady movement away from consensus policing in the inner cities and a drift towards a 'military' style of policing. Inner-city youth, especially black youth, find themselves the victims of multiple deprivation, and to this, there has arisen a counter culture of despair and resistance. This is simultaneously accompanied by soaring rates of street crime. In response to this the police have increasingly used the tactics of 'hard' policing, including the use of stop and search, and the 'sus' laws.

Consensus policing, which involves the police working to eliminate crime with the bulk of the community supporting their activities, and a fairly high level of information coming from the public, in the form of complaints and evidence. This notion of consensus policing, argue the authors, rests on the assumptions about the nature of the social
structure of inner cities which are of declining validity. It presupposed a stable working-class community opposed to those crimes directed against them. However, with rising long-term unemployment and other social problems, the basis for consensus policing crumbles. Crime rates soar, and the police adopt strategies which are aimed less at identifiable offenders than against the community itself, especially its young. Such strategies serve to alienate the community from the police and the flow of information about crime dries up. This makes it yet harder for the police to control crime and they are further pushed towards 'dragnet' type operations which serve further to alienate innocent members of the community. An example of this is the 'Swamp '81' operation in Brixton, London, which was aimed at apprehending burglars and street robbers. It antagonised the whole community, resulting in very few arrests leading to charges of burglary and robbery, and was an important precipitator of the Brixton riots. The use of such 'military' methods leads to a situation in which for the public, as well as for the police, the distinction between innocent and offender becomes blurred. Attempts by the police to arrest suspects become seen as symbolic attacks on the community as a whole and bystanders begin to intervene to prevent them. Not only do the preconditions for a riot then emerge, but also does the vicious cycle by which information further dries up, necessitating even harder policing methods.

A second aspect of this analysis links both the problem of crime and the riots to what the authors refer to as the 'political marginalisation of the inner city'. The urban riots may mark the return of violence as a kind of politics of last result, and this may be because the de-industrialisation characteristic of late capitalism reproduces some of the social and political features of early capitalism by which economically and politically, whole communities become marginalised from the political process. Thus there are large groups of young people in deprived communities with no experience of work nor of political organisation. This is not to be seen simply as a set of social problems and deprivations, but also as a crisis for the political process. Local networks of trade union branches, trades councils, and the Labour Party - the traditional institutions of working-class politics - are of declining relevance.

Thus, for radical reformist politicians in the inner-city areas
in the early 1980's, the issues of crime and policing were beginning to appear inseparable from a number of other local political and social issues. Moreover, within the terms of their political analysis, radical reformists began to see existing styles of policing as reinforcing or compounding the oppressed situation of the black community and of youth. Labour councils then entered into a sustained period of open political conflict with chief policemen in which the battle for accountability became a most urgent political imperative. An additional imperative, I would argue, was the perceived need - in the context of the politics of the 'rainbow coalition' for the Labour Party to respond to the demands of groups representing blacks and women, on a number of issues pertaining to policing. The most important of these were the police's abuse of powers and their failure to provide adequate protection from racial and sexual attacks.

In order to illustrate the above points, I will now turn to the arguments around policing and police accountability being forwarded in the early 1980's by radical reformists in London and Merseyside.

Steve Bundred (1982), the then vice-chair of the Greater London Council Police Committee - a monitoring group with no legal powers - made a number of salient points about the policing of London. The Metropolitan Force has been directly responsible to the Home Secretary alone since its foundation in 1829. In other words the capitals police, unlike other forces in England and Wales, are not responsible for any aspect of their organisation or operations to a police authority. The force is the most costly of all British forces and, in a period when central government has been demanding cuts in services from all sectors of local government, these costs have continued to rise substantially. In 1982-83, for instance, the London Boroughs collected about £333 million from ratepayers for this service. This figure represented half the amount the Greater London Council collected for road building and maintenance, London Transport operations, the fire service, parks, arts and recreation, housing, industry and planning - all put together (ibid. p.59-60). The force employed 9% more police officers per 1,000 population than Merseyside - a county which has a higher official crime rate - and an average of 31% more officers than other metropolitan counties with equivalent or lower crime rates. Moreover, the force employed 80% more civilians than all the other metro-
politan counties put together. Expenditure per police officer, at £19,300, was 27% higher in London than in the average metropolitan county.

Yet, while the London force is the country's most expensive, it is also the least efficient in terms of the clear-up rate for recorded serious crimes, and throughout the 1970's became progressively more so. In 1970 the clear up rate for crime in the capital was 28%, by 1979 it was 20% and by 1981 it had fallen to 17%. These rates compared very unfavourably with those of Merseyside and Greater Manchester, which in 1981 had clear-up rates of 34% and 41% respectively. (ibid. p.61).

The force faced, according to Bundred, a crisis of public confidence which centred around such issue of widespread corruption and the startlingly high level of deaths in police custody. Also, the issue of the policing of young people and the black community was seen by Bundred as the most crucial area around which public support for the police had declined, and the riots of 1981 are held to demonstrate this. (ibid. p.62). Equally, the failure of the force to effectively counter the growing level of violent attacks on black and Asian families or to ban marches by fascist groups through black areas, are cited as additional causes of the alienation of ethnic minorities from the police.

Bundred's analysis, which is framed in the context of a set of proposals for the setting-up of a police authority for London - comprising elected political and ethnic community representatives - tends to stress a number of civil rights issues and to underplay the extent to which ordinary crime and the fear of crime impact on the lives of Londoners. But, as I argued earlier, the radical reformist position on crime was some time in developing an awareness of the need to link the issues of police powers and accountability with more fully articulated demands for changes in the police's operational policies in the light of knowledge about the extent, distribution and impact of criminal victimisation.

Indeed, this sequence in the development of radical reformist consciousness also occurred in Merseyside. From the early 1970's there had been disquiet in Labour Party circles concerning police be-
haviour in the City of Liverpool and in other towns in the Merseyside county. Margaret Simey, a Labour councillor for an inner city Liverpool ward, had published and spoken often on the subject of the accountability of the Merseyside force. Under the terms of the 1964 Police Act a chief constable of a police force outside of London is accountable primarily to his police authority and the Home Secretary. A police authority's duties are to maintain an 'adequate and efficient' force in its area and to keep itself informed of the manner in which complaints are being dealt with. Its powers to ensure this are enshrined in its ability with police work in its area. It is also empowered to appoint, discipline and dismiss (in the interests of efficiency) senior ranks (the chief, his deputy and his assistants), although such appointments and dismissals are subject to the Home Secretary's approval. Legally, nothing precludes an authority from discussing and offering advice on any matters in connection with its over-riding duty, or from the issuing of instructions in fulfilment of its functions. There is, however, nothing which specifically warrants the authority issuing instructions, nor any duty imposed on the chief constable to obey. He can decline to give a report to his police authority if he feels that it is not in the public interest to do so, or if he thinks such a report is not needed for the police authority's exercise of its duties. This clearly implies that there are matters relating to police work which lie outside a police authority's responsibilities. Indeed police authorities can discuss the effectiveness of manpower and equipment in police operations, but not issue instructions in this respect. (Jefferson 1984 pp.20-21).

In many urban areas of Britain considerable conflict has arisen between police authorities and their chief constables. During the 1970's dissatisfaction on the part of Labour controlled authorities centred around the unsatisfactory nature of the complaints system. Under the present system complaints against the police are investigated by the police themselves and police authorities have no direct powers.

This particular issue came to a head in Merseyside around the case of Jimmy Kelly, a resident of Huyton who in mid-1979 was arrested and died in police custody (see Scraton 1984.c. pp.43-66). The police authority, in calling for a report from the chief constable in their efforts to investigate the case, were countered by the assertion that the case was sub judice and that they had therefore no right to discuss...
it. In the same period, a number of other complaints against the Merseyside police produced a widespread reaction and further sharpened the growing concern at the decline in the quality of police-public relations, amounting in parts of the county to what was seen as a major breakdown in public confidence. (Scraton 1984.b, p.15).

The riots of Summer 1981 which occurred in inner-city Liverpool brought the police authority (which had by May of that year achieved a majority of Labour members) into renewed and direct conflict with the chief constable over the issue of accountability, as well as on aspects of operational policy. According to Margaret Simey (1982 p.54) the poor relationship between the police and the public lay at the heart of the disturbances, but the police authority had no effective powers to monitor or enforce the adequacy of the service for which it was responsible. For her this raised the question of whether they were getting value for money for the more than £80 million being spent on policing the county annually. Also, she maintained that public hostility to the police and "the breakdown of that democratic scrutiny on which only democratic government can succeed" (ibid.), were inevitably linked. "Accordingly" she continued, "we abandoned the 'blame game' and turned our attention to the practicalities of regenerating the political dimension of policing." (ibid. p.55).

Simey therefore maintained that the problems of policing in Merseyside stemmed directly from an absence of a system of democratic accountability. As part of their campaign for this accountability, Labour Party members were challenging the customary interpretation of the role of the police authority as an advisory body and instead becoming a body carving for itself an executive role in which its interventions in policing issues - especially it seems issues of policing operations - were becoming more positive. The role of the police authority, she wrote, should - like that of every other public service - be directed towards a political purpose, in this case, the safe guarding of the public peace. (ibid. pp.55-6).

The Merseyside Labour group, on achieving a majority in 1981, produced a manifesto in which they set out their basic philosophy, together with a number of policy recommendations. These included the reconstitution of the membership of the authority so that the majority
party on the county council would have an effective voting majority.

Most importantly, the group placed an emphasis upon the need to restore public confidence in the police. This would be accomplished through putting into practice the recommendations of the Scarman enquiry concerning local consultation groups. These groups should, however, be representative of local communities and be independent of police control. Also, the police should respond to views of the public regarding policing methods - especially the need for localised telephone numbers for emergency calls and the demand for more officers to be visible 'on the beat'.

Indeed, what Simey clearly expresses, is the then growing demands in the Labour Party both at national and local levels, for the need to reverse the trend towards 'military' or 'hard' policing methods towards 'partnership' policing in which the aims and methods of policing reflect the aspirations of the communities which a police service would serve. Thus:

"The message of our experience is clear. We must go back to first principles and re-think the practical implications of the social contract on which policing by consent is based. A contract necessarily implies an agreement between two partners as to their respective rights and duties. If the people were to consent to be policed, the police must consent to submit to democratic control."

( ibid. p.57).

The issue of relationships between the police and people in areas of high black population was of special significance. The question of the pervasiveness of racist attitudes among policemen and the ways these were reflected in policing methods and operational policies had been a central feature of demands for an accountable police force in both London and Merseyside, as well as in other big cities. The riots of 1980 and 1981 all occurred in inner-city areas where the drift to military policing was most advanced and wherein the basis for consensus policing had long since been eroded, and the riots were substantially (though not exclusively) an expression of the fury and frustration of
young blacks as a response to their experience of indiscriminate targeting and other practices associated with 'hard' policing.

On the left of the Labour Party at this time, the analysis of relationships between the police and the black community contained two related elements. Firstly, police committees and the new monitoring groups - in association with local black and ethnic, civil rights and other interested organisations - had built up substantial dossiers of evidence of overtly racist behaviour on the part of policemen as well as the failure over many years of the police to act on the problem of racial attacks. (see Scraton 1982 pp.21-38). Thus a serious problem was seen to exist at the level of police discretion which, in the absence of a consensual basis for policing, allowed (in addition to purely illegal abuses of power), discriminatory enforcement of the law on the one hand, and the discriminatory neglect of the needs of one section of the community, on the other. Throughout the 1970's, however, racism in the police was elevated - in the words of Phil Scraton, from a personal to an institutional level (op.cit. p.21).

Thus the second aspect of the analysis was in keeping with that offered by the Birmingham School, the Institute of Race Relations and the journal Race and Class. In essence then black communities are seen to have been systematically marginalised in terms of work, housing, social amenities, politics, education and the law. In Scraton's words, again:

"... the law has been enforce rigourously in and against these communities. The development and rigourous application of the state's racist immigration laws and regular use of passport raids by the police, have served to keep black communities under permanent surveillance. Thus the black population as a whole has been targeted as 'the problem'. "

( Ibid. p.21).

These two aspects of the analysis, coming together, provided a stark picture of the police as a state agency for the enforcement of racist laws, as riddled with racism at the personal level, and as a force for containment and control of whole communities which have been
criminalised irrespective of involvement in illegal activity. It also provided an idealised picture of black communities — especially of black youth — as united in a substantially politically informed opposition to the police.

The analysis, despite the flaws contained in its second aspect, lent great weight to the left's critique of the operational policies of urban police forces. It was easy to see the police, in their increasingly militaristic mode, as a force which acted both to compound the social oppression of the black community (and poor whites) and which acted to effectively repress all forms of cultural and political opposition to that oppression. What the analysis avoided, was the extent of criminal victimisation of blacks and the poor in the inner city, and their stake in an effective and democratic form of policing.

Radical reformism's stance on issues of crime and policing contained, therefore, a number of elements and sources. Firstly, it tended to minimise the extent and impact of crime, refusing to confront the issue of intra-working class crime except through a discussion of its social roots, or through the related issue of policing. There are two issues of importance here, and they are reminiscent of those which informed the American Democratic Party's policy on crime from the 1960's onwards.

Firstly, the Labour Party's white working class constituency consistently presented crime and the fear of crime as a major concern. It also increasingly identified black people as a major source of both crime and their fears. Secondly, radical reformists considered the criminalisation of black people as part of the institutional racist character of capitalism, of the media, and of the police. In order to resist such racial stereotyping of the crime problem, radical reformists engaged in a side-stepping and obfuscation of the issue of the intra-working class and intra-racial nature of much crime, and more specifically of the level of involvement of young blacks in crime.

Additionally, as I noted in Chapter V, radical reformists were engaged in a psychological denial of the impact of crime upon the individuals and households who were its victims and the impact of crime and fear upon communities. Indeed, they appeared ignorant of the existence of a major source of social harm which affected the lives of
many of their constituents - a source of harm which in part stemmed from (and in turn compounded) many of the other problems and injustices to which they were exposed. Several elements in the left-idealistic view of crime and policing - to which radical reformists subscribed - tended towards the denial of the victim.

But, radical reformists were soon to undergo a process of education about crime and victimisation. As I have already said, the riots served to make policing a central issue. More specifically, however, the issue presented itself as that of the policing of the black community. It also brought home to radical reformists - as politicians and administrators - their own impotence in terms of having new power to affect the operational decision - making processes of policing. The riots also forced them to confront certain issues in relation to the policing of public disorder and minority communities, namely whether the police were adequately carrying on their functions in relation to the protection of the community from crime, and the detection of offences. This concern began with the question of policing policies in relation to racial attacks and the victimisation of women, but soon enlarged into a concern for the high rates of burglary and vandalism on council estates, and also the high rates of street robbery in certain localities.

Within the context of this concern for police effectiveness, radical reformists could now begin to speak about victimisation more broadly than before, and also develop a thirst for the type of information which would back-up this, the second prong of their campaign for police accountability. They discovered that according to the police's own statistics, the number of crimes cleared-up represented only a small fraction of crimes recorded. Intuition, as well as the results of surveys of violence to women and blacks, told them also that crimes known to the police represented only a fraction of crimes committed.

The second part of their education came with the publication, in early 1983, of the results of the first British Crime Survey. These results detailed above in Chapters I and IV, lent tremendous weight to their view that policing quite simply did not give value for the great amounts of public money spent on it. But, it also emerged that inner-city areas had higher rates of victimisation, and lower clear-up rates, that the fear of crime had a great impact upon the quality of life, and
that low-income households suffered disproportionately from certain crimes, such as burglary.

Thus, the radical reformist perspective on policing began with a limited concern for the policing of labour disputes, demonstrations and public disorder. It then enlarged into a concern for relations between the police and the black community, and then by a process of progressive focusing, it began to engage such issues as the extent and distribution of crime. This latter feature then gave rise to questions about the degree of police protection from crime afforded to ethnic minorities and other working class constituents.

Additionally then, interest began to focus more directly upon issues of victimisation. There were three overlapping facets of this. Firstly, radical reformists began to glimpse that criminal victimisation could be conceived very much in the same way as could problems of bad housing, poor health, environmental pollution, and traffic hazards, Local social problems were seen as amenable to control through the intervention of the local state, using existing local agencies. Crime was clearly a hazard from which the poor suffered most, but the existing agency for the control of crime operated outside of the control of the local state.

Secondly, the police not only failed to give adequate protection to working class people, or to clear up much crime, but also it was evident that their constituents were alienated from the police for more reasons than had initially been apparent. Working class victims felt that the police did not take their complaints seriously, and this was equally true of the victims of burglary, robbery and vandalism, as of the victims of racial harassment and abuse of police powers.

Thirdly, and rather blantly, radical reformists—like radical criminologists—came to appreciate the facts of the impact which crime and fear has upon its victims. There had been much initial suspicion, for instance about victims support schemes. Although there was some acknowledgement of the importance of their work radical reformists did not involve themselves in it politically, nor did they give, in most cases, more than miniscule financial support. In Merseyside, for instance, a scheme known as Victims of Violence had obtained police
support and its operations became part of a right-wing campaign for retributive punishment for offenders. Although this scheme was never recognised by the National Association of Victims Support Schemes, its existence and profile rather reinforced the view that concern for victims was a prerogative of the right. However, in recent years the South-West Liverpool Victims Support Scheme (affiliated to NAVSS) has been entirely funded by Liverpool City Council. This scheme is, however, only one of twelve NAVSS schemes operating in Merseyside. In Islington the council makes a rather less generous annual contribution to the borough's scheme - £1,009 in 1984-85 and £2,817 in 1985-86.

However, the radical reformist perspective on crime did gradually come to incorporate two further important premises. Firstly, that the local state should be active - especially in council estates - in the prevention of victimisation through providing better lighting in public areas and making properties more secure from burglary. Secondly, the local state should take some responsibility for the amelioration of the impact of crime and victims. I will now go on to look at the local political backgrounds to the emergence of the Merseyside and Islington crime surveys and relate these to the wider political developments which I have just described.

(i) The Merseyside Crime Survey:

As I earlier described, there had been considerable conflict between the Labour - controlled Merseyside Police Authority and the Chief Constable of Merseyside, Kenneth Oxford, since the late 1970's. This had stemmed not only from the police response to the 1981 riots, but also a catalogue of instance of police racism and misuse of power, and also the death in custody of Jimmy Kelly. Also, the Merseyside County and Liverpool City councils were currently locked in a bitter dispute with the Thatcher government over funds to ameliorate those inner-city problems which they saw as the root cause of the riots and of Merseyside's severe crime problem.

In early 1983, Oxford applied to the Police Authority for permission to computerise all police records as part of a technological overhaul of operations. As a result of the ensuing debates, a seminar on this subject was held, to which Richard Kinsey of Edinburgh University - a radical criminologist who had written widely on policing matters - was invited to contribute. The Labour Party, which had taken
control of the police committee in 1981 contributed a core of radical
reformist Labour members of the Authority who were interested in the
politics of policing, but who held to a generally ill-formed critique
of the police and vague ideas about accountability. The riots had been
an educative process for them, in the ways outlined earlier, and they
were "looking for a way in to policy-making which would influence
various levels of policing practice". (Field Notes VII).

Kinsey proposed the idea of a crime survey, and this was seized
upon by some members who would subsequently lobby for its implementation.
During this period, the Planning Department of Merseyside County Council
was conducting a research project on the underlying causes of inner-
city crime. Hence there was already some interest in basic questions
on the extent and distribution of crime, and the impact of policing,
and this tended to facilitate the progress towards gaining broader pol-
tical support for the survey.

Councillor John George, the vice-chair of the police committee had
been impressed with the BCS report and had been using it as a basis for
dialogue with Oxford. However, he realised that if the results of a
national survey could allow him to argue about policing matters from a
'scientific basis', then a local survey would allow for a much more
potent questioning of policing policy generally.

Councillors then began, on the basis of their reading of the BCS,
to be alerted to some basic criminological issues, such as the problem
of the dark-figure of crime, and the difficulties of relying upon the
official statistics. These issues also filtered through to them through
their reading of articles on the BCS in Labour Weekly and the journal
New Society.

At the same time, the Home Office was trying to encourage local
surveys which would replicate the BCS and operate on a cost-sharing
basis - 50% from the Home Office, 50% from the local authority. In
the light of this Councillor George requested a costing of such a survey
from Geoff Willis of the Planning Department and it was estimated that
it would cost £100,000 and take six months to complete. The survey
was then put out to tender which was subsequently won by Edinburgh
University. Richard Kinsey became its director and he then engaged
John Lea and Jock Young as consultant to the research team. It was seen as essential not only to have reputable academics in charge, but also to co-operate with the Home Office on replication of the BCS. The team engaged the firm Social and Community Planning Research - who had conducted fieldwork for the BCS. As one informant put it:

"We had to show the Home Office that the survey was useful to policing Merseyside, in order to get the 50% grant. We also wanted a valid scientific exercise, partly to get Oxford's support, but mainly so that if any unpalatable results emerged, they couldn't be rubbished as 'not soundly based'. It was an important process of legitimisation."

(Field Notes VII).

For the politicians, the survey had to fulfill certain aims. It should firstly be a tool for opening-up policing practices to quantification and political scrutiny . . .

"... opening it up in terms of debate, knowledge and influence ... taking it away from the autonomous control of the chief constable."

(ibid.).

Indeed if the struggle for accountability was to be advanced, the councillors needed to be in a position to know more about crime 'on the ground' and the policing needs of the community, than the police did themselves, and to be able to speak with complete authority about what the police ought to be doing. Secondly, it should 'capture the police in operation', making it useful to the police in terms of their own operations and their own 'planned policing' initiatives.

For these reasons the design of the survey had to incorporate more than a mere emulation of the BCS design. It had to enable politicians and planners reading the results to pin-point aspects of the crime problem in Merseyside with great precision. Thus, there was incorporated into a survey a study of five small and demographically dissimilar areas, enabling precise conclusions to be drawn concerning
the crime problems and policing needs of identifiable localities.

A feature of the political background to the MCS, which was in marked contrast to that of the ICS (discussed below), concerned the different priority given to the question of race and crime. Whereas the ICS questionnaire included questions on inter-racial incidents, and had been especially interested in the respective victimisation rates of black and white residents, these issues had not been given the same priority in the MCS. There are number of reasons for this.

Firstly, the idea of a survey did not arouse the same suspicions and opposition in Merseyside as it did in London, and the Merseyside Community Relations Council, and other groups representing the interests of ethnic minority communities were generally supportive. Secondly, and relatedly, members of the Labour Party in Merseyside held the question of race to be a less important than political or social issue in Merseyside, given that the black community in Liverpool was considerably longer established and more assimilated than in other British cities. Indeed these unique features of the black community in Merseyside presented a number of methodological considerations quite different to those faced in Islington, and I shall refer to them in the next chapter.

Another aspect of the survey design was the decision to conduct a separate survey of Merseyside Police Officers. This survey covered the organisation of the force, the use of police time, and problems of internal management; it also covered relations with the public, the priorities of police work, and other daily policing matters. (Kinsey 1985). A separate survey of police officers had not originally been planned, and its intention was to enable the council to match the experiences and perceptions of the population to those of policemen of different ranks. This development must be seen in the context of the desire to obtain as much knowledge as possible about both crime and policing, so that this knowledge could be used as a powerful political tool. It had been predicted that, in comparing the policing priorities of the public with those of the police themselves, a considerable mis-match would be revealed.

The findings of the crime survey would presumably highlight a
number of areas in which policing practice should change. For instance, if it were to be discovered that certain portions of the population were exposed to high rates of victimisation but received little in the way of policing services, then police practice should be adjusted in accordance with this finding. Equally, public expectations of how the police should allocate their resources, would be matched against how those resources are actually apportioned, and would serve as another indicator for change. The overall findings of the crime survey and those of the police survey would be a measure of the extent to which policing in Merseyside had to change in order to become an effective public service. These changes would not however take place automatically, but the detailed knowledge of what was required would represent an essential weapon in the fight for that which would put them into effect - in other words, democratic control of the police.

(ii) The Islington Crime Survey:

The Islington Crime Survey has its origins in events in 1982. In this year John Lea and Jock Young had begun to formulate a left-realist perspective on crime. This, as we have seen, rested on a belief that crime was a serious problem for the working class, and also on a positive re-assessment of quantitative measures of crime. Their desire to see a local survey of victimisation stemmed from their considerable faith in the potential of such surveys - drawn from their reading of the NCS, the BCS and PSI surveys - to reveal useful information on all matters appertaining to the understanding of policing and crime. Furthermore such surveys had the potential - if one had control over their design - to test the propositions of the left-realist perspective. Thus, not only could a survey tap into attitudes, knowledge and behaviour in relation to crime and policing, but it could also quantify the collective experiences of crime and policing in sectors of the population. In addition, many other radical criminological questions could begin to be answered. As Jock Young put it:

"We saw that Anthony Platt was very active in his use of the American victimisation material, in developing a radical perspective on street crime. We in the U.K. were totally reliant on U.S. material. The BCS was about to come out, and instead of just
criticising it from the usual anti-quantitative perspective, we thought - why not run our own!"

(Field Notes II).

During 1982-3, their writings and those of Ian Taylor, had attracted considerable opposition within left idealist criminology, and well as on that part of the left which was predominantly concerned with issues of race, class and policing. This opposition to their perspective - especially that on race and crime - would prove to be a most important factor in the battle to make local victimisation surveys a reality. Also, in that year Policing the Riots was published (Cowell et.al.1982), and this book - the results of the Policing Now conference of 1981 - may be seen to have signalled the beginnings of an alliance between left-realist criminologists and various representatives of sections of the Labour Party on the issue of police accountability. Its contributors included radical criminologists like Lea and Young and Richard Kinsey, who was to become the director of the Merseyside survey, and Trevor Jones, who was to become the head of the Islington Police Committee Support Unit. In addition there were papers by Margaret Simey, by then chairperson of the Merseyside Police Authority, and Harriet Harman, legal officer of the National Council for Civil Liberties and who was later to become a Labour M.P.

In the context of the developments of 1982 and of the foregoing political and intellectual developments outlined above, Lea and Young had been promoting the idea of local surveys within the Labour Party. Also in early 1983, Trevor Jones was appointed as research officer with the Islington Police Committee Support Unit and at his interview had put forward the idea of a victimisation survey, and this got support from councillors.

At about the same time, Walter Easey - head of the Police Committee Support Unit in the borough of Camden - approached Lea and Young. He, like many people in Labour local authorities, was excited by the results of the first BCSm but saw a need for local surveys which would inform the local debate on police accountability. There then began a span of about six months of discussions with Easey and with Camden councillors (in which I was involved at an early stage) and a research proposals was prepared (Young et.al.1983). During this period, Young, Lea and
Trevor Jones were involved in intensive lobbying of Islington councillors, and of those in the borough of Hackney. I myself attended numerous meetings in association with this lobbying, and to all purposes it looked as if there was support for the idea of a number of small surveys in the three boroughs.

By mid-1983, Camden council police committee had agreed in principle to the conduct of the survey, and promised £5,000 for initial preparations. Also, Islington and Hackney declared their support for a survey in each of their boroughs. The boroughs of Greenwich, and Southwark also expressed great interest and were involved in exploratory discussions with the research team based at Middlesex Polytechnic. It was agreed that the police committees of these boroughs, and the research team, should approach the Greater London Council through its own police committee, in order to secure political and financial support. Neither was forthcoming. The GLC Police Committee responded that it felt that victimisation surveys were not very useful, and also that the GLC was itself funding some sort of survey of policing. Whether or not this survey was conducted, no report has ever been published. There was also some suggestion that their objection centred around a feeling that there might be 'political implications' of conducting local surveys. We took this to mean that they were nervous about confronting the inevitable issue of intra-working class and intra-racial crime patterns. This inference is based partly on the fact that the GLC police committee was currently employing two researchers who were left criminologists (Paul Gilroy and Joe Sim) opposed to the left-realist perspective. Overall, however, this adverse response was probably more firmly rooted in the view of many radical reformists that policing was the most pressing political issue - not crime. There was a corresponding conception of victimisation which was interested solely in the victims of police illegality, racial and sexual harassment and domestic violence. Subsequently, the final rejection by the GLC, came in the wake of the following events.

All seemed to be going well with support for the surveys in Islington, Camden and Hackney. Jock Young attended a meeting of the Hackney police committee, which was an open meeting to which numerous interested parties had been invited in order to discuss many issues, including the aims of the newly established support unit and the
proposed survey. Young was subject to a lot of hostility. The meeting had been leafleted by Phil Powell - a fellow lecturer from Middlesex Polytechnic - and a group known as the Hackney Black People's Alliance, as well as some former Polytechnic students who were now working as race relations officers. Their contention was that Young and Lea had written essentially "racist" material on the 1981 riots and on inner-city crime. It was also claimed that the proposed survey was also racist in nature, and it would be used "as part of the process of the criminalisation of black youth". (Field Notes I).

It is difficult to establish precisely in what ways these opponents concluded that the survey would be racist. One possibility is that knowing that Lea and Young believed that some sections of the black community were disproportionately involved in certain offences (because of social disadvantage and cultural expressions of resentment and alienation), the survey would set out to demonstrate this, in some way using the same statistical alchemy which had also been used by the Metropolitan Police with their race-coded robbery statistics. (Smith 1982). Another possibility, and one which if correct, epitomizes the blinkered approach of left-idealistic and abolitionist views on crime and policing, is that it was anticipated that the survey would ask respondents who they believed was responsible for most crime, and ask victims (especially of street crime) about the characteristics of offenders.

In the first case, such an opinion survey would undoubtedly show that blacks were believed (by whites) to be responsible for most crime. Secondly, the possibility might be that data on offenders would reveal an inter-racial element in some crime, or that it would reveal a lot of intra-racial crime within the black community. It is likely that the anticipation of this latter finding would be extremely threatening and challenging to their thesis on the nature of crime and policing, and their model of a black community united in opposition to racist oppression.

What was clear was that such lobbying by political activists had persuaded the various representative groups of the black communities in Hackney and Camden of the correctness of the fears about the implications of the surveys. The Hackney Legal Defence Group, representing
a number of black organisations, accused Lea and Young of driving a wedge between the Afro-Caribbean and Asian communities by portraying black youth as disproportionately involved in predatory street crime against fellow poor people, arguing that the research could be of no benefit to the black community. (see Levidow 1983). Again, a letter signed by several black and Asian groups and sent to Camden council, challenged the view that the move away from consensus policing was contributed to by high rates of street crime committed by black youths. It also held that Lea and Young were uncritical of the police's definition of the crime problem, and that "existing victimisation surveys have failed to shift public discussion away from the police version of events". (ibid.). It is not clear to what this last statement refers, as the data of victimisation surveys surely undermine the police account of the crime problem in a number of discrediting respects. This is even more the case with the data from independent surveys conducted by feminists.

Indeed, these statements - and opposition to the council victimisation surveys - are only explainable with reference to the underlying assumption that Lea and Young were unwittingly (or even knowingly) acting in a way which was racist. In other words that the results of their research would reinforce racist stereotypes of the crime problem. But, this was a survey of victims of crime. A central hypothesis of the survey research was that black people suffer higher rates of criminal victimisation and that this phenomenon is explainable with reference to the disproportionate range and intensity of social disadvantages from which they suffered. Also, it was likely that black victims would be shown to be receiving a poorer police service.

Additionally, the surveys would perhaps show high levels of expressed dissatisfaction with the police in several aspects of their operations, and would reveal the extent to which members of the black community were subject to legal and extra-legal forms of police harassment.

The net result of the success of the anti-survey lobby was that Labour politicians in Hackney, and then in Camden, began to question the wisdom of their initial support. The mixture of political nervousness and intense lobbying which threatened the withdrawal of the black Labour vote, eventually caused them to withdraw support altogether.
In Hackney, the public meeting of the police committee referred to above, was the point at which support was withdrawn. Barbara Roach, the newly appointed head of the police committee support unit, had initially been very supportive, but was now very hostile. She has claimed subsequently that it would have been impossible to proceed "without the support of all sections of the community", and that "the survey would not have told us anything which we did not already know". She clearly felt that the council's support for the survey would destroy all credibility which the newly formed support group - pledged to monitor police behaviour - was building with the black community. (Field Notes IV).

In Camden, direct pressure to ditch the survey was brought to bear on the police committee by Camden's race relations officer George Shearing, who in turn had been lobbied by black groups. It seems that there were close links in Camden and Hackney between councillors, race relations people, and the group of academics (including Paul Gilroy) gathered around the journal Race and Class.

It is perhaps rather surprising then that the survey survived in Islington. Very similar lobbying was carried on their during the summer of 1983. Paul Gilroy, for instance, had helped set up the Islington Black People's Alliance, linked strongly to the Alliance in Hackney, and the Colin Roache Defence Committee. Pressure was also being brought at Middlesex Polytechnic by Phil Powell, in order to end the Polytechnic's association with the survey.

In Islington the opposition failed not only to dissuade councillors from support, but also failed to convince the ethnic representative groups that the survey was racist or that it could not benefit their communities. The police committee support unit and the research team held a number of consultations with these groups in an atmosphere in which the precise aims and content of the survey could be candidly discussed. Support had come from a number of key groups: the North London Bangladesh Welfare Association, and the Islington Union of Muslims (both Bengali organisations); the African Centre; Turkish organisations; and the Indian Workers Association. Afro-Caribbean groups had remained cautiously neutral under pressure from the Isling-
ton Black People's Alliance, but there was no suggestion of withdrawing the black vote from Labour - a threat issued elsewhere - or of non-co-operation by the black community with the survey.

Trevor Jones has also claimed that the different political responses in Islington in contrast to Hackney and Camden, can be explained with reference to the internal features of Labour Party organisation in the boroughs. The left leaderships in Camden and Hackney, he says, have always had a weak base of support, their power being dependent upon the political control of key council and Party committees. They are therefore very susceptible to lobby pressure by key groups. Islington Labour Party by contrast, has a large paid-up membership (over a thousand). There is also a longer history of left leadership in Islington, and this is more firmly rooted in the democratic support of an active membership. (Field Notes I).

It is also important to note that the racial and ethnic composition of the population in Hackney differs somewhat from that in Islington. In Hackney, people of Afro-Caribbean origin are by far the largest ethnic minority group in that borough, and comprise nearly 30% of voters. In Islington, the largest minority group is that of Irish people. These facts are important in that the politics of law and order in English cities are traditionally infused with the politics of race, and especially of the racial divisions and antagonism within the working class. Thus in Hackney, radical reformists retreated from confronting the problem of ordinary crime because it would have inevitably led to the confrontation of the issue of crimes committed by black people, including those against other black people, and also the fears of the white section of the working class about black crime. This would have been highly likely to leave the council open to charges of racism, which would have led to a damaging effect upon the black community's support for the Labour Party.

In Islington, the white working-class is larger than that in Hackney and is vociferous in its complaints about the high level of street crime and burglary. Here, the representatives of the black community had been convinced of its own stake in the examination of the broad canvass of criminal victimisation. However, another pressing
electoral consideration loomed large. In the north of the borough the Social Democratic Party - and in the south, the Liberal Party - represented a real threat to the traditional Labour voting block. The Liberals offer a brand of 'community-level politics', and the Social Democrats have a high-profile policy on 'law and order'. Both policies might have had strong appeal to a white working class frightened by crime and despairing of any political action on the issue by the local authority.

In the meantime two other boroughs - Greenwich and Southwark were still candidates for surveys. At Greenwich, Martin Walker - head of the police committee support unit - had gained the support of ethnic and women's groups. Several meetings were held between these groups and members of the research team. Some promises of money were made by the council's Police Committee, but only on condition that ethnic minority support was forthcoming. Reassurance to these groups that the survey was "about victims, not offenders", ensured that this support was won. At Southwark the survey was endorsed only after a bitter row in the police committee. In both these boroughs the surveys failed to occur due to the absence of funding from the GLC.

For the research team, and for Trevor Jones, the period from Autumn 1983 onwards was critical. The only borough in which there was political and community support, and in which there was a chance of adequate funding by the council, was Islington. In the succeeding months the campaign for the survey's realisation was conducted on different fronts.

Firstly, Trevor Jones conducted a campaign in the local press and television to advertise the work and concerns of the police committee to Islington residents. This had the added effect of building-up the credibility of the police committee, until now a 'minority' committee on the council, and in terms of Labour Party political priorities. Pressure was thereby also kept up upon the GLC to provide funding. Jones and members of the research team then began to do qualitative work to lay the ground for the survey. Interviews were conducted on some high-crime council estates in the borough, and preparations were made to conduct a pilot survey in four dissimilar areas, including the Girdleston Estate.
Lea and Young then began, in the period into early 1984, a campaign for academic support for left-realism and, by implication, for the Islington Survey. They had contracted to write a book for The Socialist Society (Lea and Young 1984), but within the Society there was still opposition, based on reverberations from the 1982 exchanges on race and crime. According to Young, the feminists were won-over by reading the material, but other opinion was luke-warm because of the traditional New Left and orthodox Marxist belief that crime is not a social problem worthy of serious study, "but was an argument in a rather prissy, disdainful neck of the academic woods". He added:

"They had some fairly orthodox Marxist views on crime and thought of it in terms of the 'lumpen proletariat'. All the feminist stuff on crime seemed strange to them. But they were persuaded. In the end, it was the alliance of the feminists and traditional Marxists which won us the vote."

(Field Notes II).

In the academic world, positions began to polarize. Young's opponents tried to block his articles from the journal Critical Social Policy and voted against his admission to the editorial collective. The importance of the academic debates was that they were read by, and inevitably influenced the views of, the race relations hierarchy in the boroughs. Most of these were persuaded by the position of Gilroy, Bridges and others. But, as Young says:

"In Islington it was different. There the race relations person - Kazaz Khan - was supportive of us. He's an Althusarian and a 'high marxist' intellectual with a traditional disdain for crime and its effects on working class communities."

(ibid.).

Another important arena of debate - the most important - was that which took place within the Labour Party. As I have argued above, the position of the radical reformist wing of the party at local level, was somewhat tentative and underdeveloped. Lea and Young had assumed that
the response to left-realism and the survey within the Party would be a largely hostile one. Young remarks:

"We were very wrong... we'd mistakenly generalised from the fringe politics of London to those of the Party in the boroughs. We were getting surprising levels of support, especially from Labour Weekly - a paper which speaks to Party activists. Islington Council had been moving politically towards a more realist position on crime, and they were generally fed-up with the ultra-left positions."

( Ibid. ).

He added:

"As radical reformists, their realism fits into their general political position. Also, they could not afford to alienate their large white working class constituency by appearing uninterested in the realities of crime."

( Ibid. ).

Ken Hyder, who writes on crime and policing for Labour Weekly, also embraced a traditional, non-problematic view of crime. Indeed, by Spring 1984, the issues of crime prevention and victimisation had become acceptable concerns for the left of the party.

Support in Islington began to crystalise, and in May, 1984, Trevor Jones proposed the appointment of a full time research officer to direct the survey. Brian Maclean, a Canadian criminologist and methodologist attached to the London School of Economics, joined the research team. Soon, the support unit moved into new premises with a computing facility.

In September 1984, the council voted £13,000 for Maclean's appointment, his brief being to conduct the pilot and prepare the main survey. Lobbying now began for the money for the main survey, and the pilot results were written-up and submitted to the police committee (Maclean 1984a; 1984b). In the same month the committee applied for £2,000
of Inner City Partnership money, but was turned down by the Department of Employment in January 1985, on the grounds that the survey would not help community relations, and because of police opposition at the Metropolitan and local levels, as well as opposition from the Home Office. In February, the Policy Committee of the council - the main council committee - voted for the survey, giving £18,000 out of 'contingency reserves', just two days short of two years since the initial approach was made.

6.6. Conclusion:

In the course of this chapter, I have outlined the left-realistic position on crime and policing in contrast to that of the left-idealism from which it is a sharp departure. I have also outlined the ways in which the radical reformist position on policing grew by degrees into a perspective on law and order which was capable of encompassing not only policing, but also crime, victimisation, crime prevention and other related issues. This shift in consciousness also occurred in the context of much broader political and intellectual shifts. I have written, for instance, of the way in which the crisis of British capitalism since the 1970's and its impact upon political configurations - the decline of social democracy and the rise of Thatcherism - has had a profound influence upon debates and perspectives within the Labour Party.

I have outlined the rise of radical reformism within the Party, especially as this has occurred at the level of local politics. I have also shown how law and order moved to the centre of the political stage and how, with the coming of the inner-city riots, the Labour Party was forced to embrace policing as a central consideration in social policy discourse.

Through my examination of the political and intellectual background to the Merseyside and Islington crime surveys, I have hoped to present a case study which illuminates aspects of the internal and external histories of the radical paradigm in British criminology, and some of the intellectual shifts occurring within it. The shifts in consciousness on crime and policing in these two places can be understood in part by the ways in which the left chose to respond to the
way in which the national crisis impinged upon local political economy with all the attendant problems for the local social order. These shifts are also to be understood in terms of the influence of the left realist perspective in radical criminology. Perhaps its most central task was to contribute to the process of education of radical reformists concerning policing, crime and victimisation. Many Labour politicians had developed their ideas on these matters in the context of the idealism and abolitionism predominant in the Party up to that time, or else through their experience of courses in 'deviancy studies' in which those influences were also marked. Still others had known for years of the victimisation and fears of their constituents, but had not defined these as political issues.

The Merseyside and Islington surveys may be seen in the light of the convergence of the theoretical interests of left realists and the political interests of radical reformists. The resulting relationship was comparable to that which emerged between social scientists and social democratic wing of the Democratic Party in the 1960's. One may point here to the alliance in the United States which produced the 'discovery of criminal victimisation' and the alliance in Britain between social scientists and the Fabian wing of the Labour Party which produced reforms in the juvenile justice system and other social legislation. (see Bottoms 1975; Clarke 1980; National Deviancy Conference 1980).

In the course of the design of the surveys the criminologists considerably enabled the politicians to confront, articulate, and debate the issues for the first time. As a result they gained access often for the first time, to areas of knowledge in criminology and victimology. Their contact with the survey method sensitised them to the importance of research in generating the knowledge as essential to their position in political battles with the government and the police. Empirical knowledge on crime and policing issues became quickly viewed as essential, firstly in providing social indicators of the precise nature, distribution, and trends at the local level; secondly, as directly informing local state intervention in social problems.

Indeed the survey methodology held out for radical reformists a cluster of potentials. It presented above all an information base.
which would assist in the struggle for the democratisation of the police. The surveys' ability to generate data on dimensions of public perception, opinion and experience which had hitherto been known only in a limited way, and the detail with which they promised to illuminate aspects of police behaviour, gave them tremendous appeal.

Information would be provided, for instance, not only on the 'dark figure' of crime - and this perhaps the failure of the police to provide adequate protection for all sections of the community from wrong-doing; but, they would also provide data on the 'dark figure' of police wrong doing and levels of dissatisfaction with more general aspects of police performance.

There are a number of respects in which the survey method fitted into the spirit of local radical reformist political practice. For instance, surveys might considerably assist the processes of public consultation and community involvement in policy-making, which were already being set in motion in Merseyside and Islington (see Bassett 1984; Gyford op.cit.). Being in close and regular touch with public knowledge and opinion on a range of social issues could assist in the greater democratisation of the local state and thus provide a moral counter to charges from the right that the policies the left councils had little public support. Democratic local politics gives rise to the need for a market or opinion research basis for policy - one through which the 'voiceless' can be given a voice.

There are ways - particularly in the area of crime and policing - in which the results of local surveys could act as a means through which the electorate could be educated away from the media and government-inspired myths of crime. The left councils tended on these issues towards what Gyford (op.cit.pp.92-3) has referred to as a "preceptoral" form of politics, in which the correct ideology rests with certain members of a ruling party who, by degrees, teach the mass the 'correct' understanding of the social world and are thus mobilised towards greater democratic involvement in essentially pre-figurative socialist programmes.
Factors in the Design of Crime Survey Questionnaires

CHAPTER VII
7.1. **Introduction**:

In late 1982, discussions began to be held between staff in the Social Science faculty of Middlesex Polytechnic and members of the Labour Party in London, concerning the possibility of conducting crime surveys in various inner-city areas. In January 1983 the report of the first sweep of the BCS was published and made a great impact both on left-wing criminologists and on local Labour Party politicians, and alerted them to the implications of the findings for the issues of crime and policing in their own localities. The period in question was one of the aftermath of large-scale riots in several major cities in 1981 - including Bristol, Manchester, Liverpool and London - by black and white youths. These events were seen in part, to be an expression of a crisis in the relationship between the police and those cities and sections of the community, particularly black people, and youth. At that time, a critical debate was being conducted around the issue of police accountability; this debate was particularly, though not solely, focused on the situations in London and Merseyside.

Throughout 1983 the discussions blossomed into formal negotiations and planning towards the operation of surveys in five London boroughs - Camden, Hackney, Islington, Greenwich and Southwark. The context of these discussions throughout that year included not only the BCS, but also the work which was being done for the PSI survey of crime and policing in London. When the PSI Report was published in November 1983, its impact upon radicals in criminology and politics was even more important than that of the BCS. For the first time, a survey of criminal victimisation was combined with a substantial survey of public experiences of policing, as well as a detailed survey of police officers, covering operational matters and perceptions and attitudes.

During 1983 only one local survey was operational - the Midlands survey conducted by Farrington and Dowds (published September 1983); this had been entirely funded by the Home Office. The Merseyside Crime Survey and its accompanying survey of police officers (conducted in 1984-85), would be funded on a 50% - 50% basis between the local authority and the Home Office. The Islington survey would turn out to be the only local survey to be funded entirely by the local authority for whom it was conducted.
To the interested parties, the idea of local surveys of victimisation had a great deal of appeal. Firstly, these would be conducted by those Labour Party-controlled local authorities in the forefront of debates about policing policies and accountability, and would reflect the priorities of those bodies, as opposed to the rather different institutional priorities of the Home Office which were enshrined in the design of the BCS. Secondly, it was felt that the political struggle for police accountability was hampered by a paucity of knowledge about such important things as the extent and distribution of crime and fear of crime in local areas, the differential vulnerability of groups and housing types, and the impact of crime and fear upon individuals and communities. Additionally, surveys held out the promise of capturing the range of public attitudes, perceptions and experiences in regard to policing methods in the boroughs. Were the police concentrating their efforts in appropriate areas of activity?; how successful were they in preventing and solving those crimes which most affected and worried various groups?; what levels of confidence existed in the police?; and, what experiences had victims and non-victims had in relation to the police?

As part of the ongoing process of negotiations and planning, it was agreed that a first draft of a questionnaire should be produced in order to demonstrate the promise and potential of the surveys in some detail, and in preparation for its piloting on the Girdlestone Estate in Islington. A formal relationship was established between the interested London Boroughs and a team of academic researchers based at Middlesex Polytechnic. This team was led by Dr. Jock Young, Reader in Sociology, and included Dr. Julienne Ford, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, John Lea, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, and myself - a Lecturer in Social Sciences at Stockport College and part-time Lecturer in Criminology at The Open University, and registered for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Middlesex Polytechnic. The task fell to me to write this initial draft. There were four sources of input into this task - discussions with members of the police committee support units in the boroughs with regard to their priorities; discussions with team
members concerning theoretical and methodological issues bearing upon
the survey; my own studies of the literature of victimology and the
conduct and methodology of surveys of victimisation; and finally, my
own research on the impact of crime on victims conducted as part of my
association with Wythenshawe Victims Support Scheme in Manchester. In
addition, some preliminary interviews with residents of housing estates
in Islington were being carried out by team members in order to gain
some sense of the issues as seen by the residents themselves. (Jones and
Young 1983).

This draft (which I shall refer to as the Girdlestone Draft) was
completed in mid-1983 and was piloted in various localities of Islington
in order to assess its adequacy in terms of question wording and length
of interview. It was later used as a basis - along with questionnaires
from other surveys - for the questionnaire eventually piloted on the
Girdlestone Estate in early 1984 (see Jones et al 1986 p.239). Some
of its original items were retained in the Islington Crime Survey (ICS)
and Merseyside Crime Survey (MCS) questionnaires.

What now follows is an examination of the preparation of this draft
questionnaire, and an explanation of its structure and content in relation
to the research questions posed and the literature on survey method-
ology discussed in Chapter IV. I will then go on to examine the question-
naires used in the Merseyside and Islington surveys, and offer a critical
examination of these. Facsimiles of these, and the Girdlestone Draft,
are to be found in Appendix I of this thesis.

7.2. The Design of a Draft Questionnaire for the Islington Crime
Survey:

The Girdlestone Draft was designed in two parts: the Main (or
Screen) Questionnaire, and the Incident Form. Both parts were to be
administered by an interviewer in the respondent's home. The Main
Questionnaire was aimed at gaining information on perceptions of crime
and neighbourhood problems; information on the characteristics of
respondents and their households; social networks and lifestyles; and,
experiences of criminal victimisation.

The survey was to be based on a selected sample of households, and
the original intention was to administer the questionnaire to each member of the household. This had not been attempted in any previous survey. The purpose was to overcome two well-known difficulties; firstly, that the respondent might not know of some victimisation experience of other household members; secondly, the respondent may wish to conceal such experiences. In the light of anticipated difficulties and the high costs of such an innovation, it was decided to abandon it. It was agreed subsequently to ask one member of the household aged over 16 years about the experiences of themselves and of other members of their household.

This Girdlestone Draft was essentially a hybrid. It was based substantially on the questionnaires for the first sweep of the BCS, (hereafter referred to as BCS I), and the Sparks survey of three areas of London and, to a more limited extent, questions from the PSI and National Crime Survey (NCS) questionnaires. Some questions were used in their original form, but many were adapted to suite local circumstances. These latter adaptations, and other questions originated by myself were also aimed at overcoming certain of the well-known methodological difficulties.

The Main Questionnaire opened with instructions to interviewers to paraphrase a statement that the survey was being conducted by "the council", and was about "crime and some other problems of the Borough". The statement promised the respondent complete anonymity, and the address-slip directing the interviewer to the household was to be torn off and given to the respondent. This device was used for two related reasons. Firstly, it was anticipated that there might be some public hostility or suspicion about a "survey about crime", especially among those sections of the population who were likely to have had most exposure to victimisation (e.g. people living on run-down 'problem' housing estates, and members of ethnic minority groups). It was hoped to forstall these reactions through a high-profile publicity campaign and through pre-interview letters to respondents. The real problem however, would be for the interviewer at the point of access - the doorstep. Secondly, victimisation surveys commonly have a response rate of about 80%. But, response rates are typically lower in inner-city areas such as those to be surveyed - the first sweep of the BCS
had a 73% response in the LGC area (Wood 1984) – and any device which could maximize response was to be favoured.

Questions 1-5 were revisions of questions from BCS I, and were aimed at establishing respondent's attitudes towards their locality, their feelings for it, and the sort of problems they felt it had. Also, whether they felt those problems had got better or worse in recent times. Although respondents would know that this was a crime survey, we deliberately sought to establish the range of problems perceived to affect an area. This was based on evidence (e.g. Garofalo and Laub 1979) that inner-city residents commonly perceive other problems such as bad housing, unemployment, refuse on the streets, as more serious problems than crime.

Questions 6-8 (and also 18d) were aimed at establishing the sort of social contacts and networks within which the respondent was involved. Question 6 asked about the location of relatives and close friends; Question 7 was about the sort of acquaintance which people had with their immediate neighbours; Question 8 asked on whom the respondent could call for help in an emergency. A later question – 18 – was associated with which community organisation (e.g. church, club, political party) respondents might participate in, as well as the level of their active involvement. Other surveys have not seemed to have been interested in social networks and social isolation (as opposed to social activities) although Sparks et al. asked about levels of interest in "What goes on in this neighbourhood?" (op.cit. p.241). This is perhaps because the major focus has been that of respondents' lifestyles in relation to the risk of victimisation, whereas our survey was equally interested in the impact of victimisation and the needs of those affected, which might be addressed by local services.

Our reasoning was based on certain issues of knowledge and theory. Firstly, there is evidence from the NCS that persons who are relatively socially isolated (single, separated, divorced, widowed) are more vulnerable to certain types of personal and household crimes (U.S. Department of Justice 1984, p.5). It is not known why this is so, and it is certainly the case that this correlation must be understood in a
number of different ways. It is certainly well-established that persons existing outside of social helping networks are less likely to be able to cushion themselves against the practical and psychological impacts of crime and are more likely to be in need of victim services. (NAVSS 1984; Phipps 1984a). These questions are related to those on lifestyle and behaviour, and later questions on the impact of crime and knowledge of compensation and victim support services.

The social network questions are also related to theories which propose that relative anonymity in social relations, and an absence of community sentiments and networks, foster an environment in which crime is more likely to occur (Conklin 1975; Wilson 1975). Also relevant here is work on crime prevention which proposes that deliberately fostered networks for surveillance and reporting of crime will reduce its incidence. (Lea and Young 1984 pp. 254-6). At the time, a new Metropolitan Police Neighbourhood Watch Scheme was being introduced in Islington, as well as a Scheme being operated by the Council, and information about informed neighbourhood networks was, of course, highly relevant to the success of these. It was also reasoned that respondent's perceptions of the quality of life in their neighbourhood would be related to their perceptions of the level of safety and security, and that these would in turn be related to their ideas about policing.

Questions 9 and 10 ask the respondent to express a view on the amount of crime which they believe to exist in their locality, and to say how much of different types of offences they thought there were. Questions 10a and 11 ask whom they feel is responsible for this crime, and whether residents are more at risk than those living in other localities. These questions were related to testing the well-known finding of crime surveys that residents - even of high crime-rate areas - often believe that crime is worse elsewhere. (Garofalo and Laub op. cit.). We were also interested in the idea that in certain high crime localities residents come to accept a certain level of victimisation as 'normal', and that this attitude is itself part of the process by which crime is unwittingly promoted, leading to a spiral of non-reporting. and apathy on the part of the residents, and adverse labelling and subsequent inaction on the part of the police. All of these questions 9-11 were modifications of questions in BCS I and that conducted by Sparks
Questions 12-15 addressed the traditional concern of surveys of victimisation with reported feelings of personal vulnerability. We began with asking whether respondents ever personally felt unsafe inside their own homes, either in the daytime or after dark. Most survey questions relating to fear of crime - since the work of Ennis (1967) - deal solely with apprehensions about being out alone in one's neighbourhood after dark. BCS I, for instance, had asked a number of questions relating to people's fears of burglary whilst away from their homes, but none about their fears for their safety whilst at home. The experience of victims support schemes (Phipps 1984a) has been that people in high-crime areas - especially those left alone or living alone - often feel vulnerable to burglary or criminal damage whilst indoors. Also, advance field work for the Islington survey (Young and Jones 1983) had revealed such fears. Home Office research (see Wilson 1982) had also established that residents of unpopular housing estates experienced feelings of anxiety and insecurity in relation to break-ins and rowdyism. This was associated with feelings of isolation and being surrounded by strangers, and being unable to control what went on outside the dwelling. There was also the need to take account of harassment of ethnic minority households.

Along these same lines we were also interested to know what people who felt unsafe feared might happen to them whilst indoors; also we, asked those who felt safe whether they thought there were types of people who would be unsafe inside their own homes. The perception of respondents of the safety of other groups had also been a concern of the PSI survey (Smith and Gray 1985).

We then proceeded to ask (Question 13) whether respondents felt unsafe in nearby streets or out of doors on their housing estates. The BCS had asked how safe they felt "walking alone in this area after dark" (Wood 1984); Sparks (1977 p.243) had asked how safe they felt "to be out on the streets of this neighbourhood after dark"; we departed from the common emphasis on the hours of darkness, for there was much evidence that inner-city dwellers - especially women and older people - felt unsafe in their localities in daylight. (e.g. Harrison 1983). We
asked what they thought might happen in the daytime as well as after dark, and whether those feeling safe thought others were vulnerable.

In Question 14 we asked whether respondents at anytime actually avoided going out because of their fear for the safety of their homes; question 15 asked whether they at anytime actually avoided going out alone, because of fears for their safety on the streets. The comparison of results from these two questions would be related to the results for 13 and 14 and subsequent questions, so that the impact of fear on lifestyle and behaviour could be gauged for various groups.

Question 17 continues the search for details of respondents' lifestyles. BCS I had been constructed, in part, to yield data in relation to two of the principle theoretical areas of victimology - 'opportunity' theory and 'life-style' theory. (Skogan 1984 p.195.). Indeed, a large proportion of BCS I questions seem so related. Thus, there is much emphasis upon ascertaining patterns of "evenings spent out", which may correlate with differential burglary rates, the mode of transportation in travelling to work and leisure pursuits, and the amount of alcohol consumed at leisure venues. (Wood op.cit.). In the main BCS questionnaire, there is an item which attempts to detail respondents' evening activities "in the past seven days" prior to the interview, and the main mode of travel there and back. Our question 17 sought to establish activities and modes of transportation for a seven day period but, in contrast to the BCS question, we distinguished between daytime and evening trips. It seemed to us that exposure to risk of victimisation (whether from street crime or burglary) could not be examined with reference to the evening period alone. We suspected that the BCS was strongly oriented towards using the exposure-to-risk model to explain their findings regarding the highly skewed distribution of physical assaults towards the younger end of the male population. In addition, we felt that the pre-occupation with trips away from the home as the main referent for exposure to risk, ignored the importance of the home itself as a location of victimisation.

There then begins a series of questions relating to perceptions of, and experiences with, policing. The political and theoretical
orientations most informing the origination and design of the Islington survey, tended markedly towards the desire to monitor police behaviour in respect of victims and non-victims, and to discover people's perceptions of the police and their overall performance. At the time when the conducting surveys in London boroughs was being discussed, we were aware that the PSI survey had been conducted between 1980-82, and that the coming report would cover these topics in a manner and depth which was outside our scope and resources. Apart from the fact that we would focus on identifiable localities, our main intention was to discover attitudes towards police performance. We were interested, for instance, in which groups displayed least satisfaction with the police, and particularly whether levels of satisfaction were associated with the reporting of crimes to the police. The most important knowledge which we wished to bring to light, was whether those crimes which caused most concern, and which resulted in the higher rates of victimisation in certain groups and localities, were receiving adequate police attention, both in terms of pro-active and reactive approaches to policing. Concomitantly, we wished to evaluate - again from the perspectives of those affected - the quality of the service being given to those who called on the police for help. The information gained from the questions in the following section, therefore, would be eventually correlated with numerous characteristics and experiences of respondents.

Question 19 asks respondents to rate the job done by the police "in this area", and approximates the wording of similar questions in numerous surveys going back to Ennis (1967) and the Kerner Riot Commission (1968). Sparks (op.cit. p.245) had used similarly broad wording, as had BCS I. We then moved, in Question 20, to the more specific aspects of police performance in the locality. Sparks (ibid.) had asked whether there were things the police should be spending more time on, and if so, why the respondent thought the police neglected these things. The PSI survey had also looked at views on policing priorities in some detail. (Smith and Gray op.cit.). We asked about the crimes the police should concentrate upon, and went on to ask (Question 21), whether the police were present in the area "often enough", and whether (Question 22) they were seen to be in touch with the local community over issues of greatest concern. Question 23, addressed an issue which was currently
a matter of heated debate - that is, whether the police would do a better job against crime if they operated in foot patrols rather than in cars. Question 24 asked about the quality of the relationship between the police and residents of the locality or the estate.

Question 25 asked if the respondent had asked the police for any type of help during the reference period. Previous research (e.g. Ekblom and Heal 1982) had shown that a majority of calls on police time - 999 and other telephone calls, visits to the station, personal approaches to officers - involved 'service' matters. However, we wished to examine whether this was true of the localities we wished to survey, all of which had high crime rates.

Questions 26-30a all related to experiences of being stopped and questioned or stopped and searched by police officers. These were based on questions from PSI and BCS I. The monitoring work of the police committees of the Greater London Council, and of the boroughs to be surveyed, had revealed that 'stop-and-search' tactics, and the use of the 'sus' laws were widely used by the police in the capital. Indeed, it was widely believed that their widespread use - especially with young and black people - had contributed to the deteriorated police-public relationships which led to the riots of 1980 and 1981. (Cowell et.al. 1982; Scarman 1982). We wanted to know who was being stopped, how often this was occurring, whether searches were taking place of persons or cars, and whether the respondents felt that these actions were justified. We further wished to learn about people's evaluations of the police behaviour towards persons stopped, as police monitoring groups were unhappy not only with the use of stop-and-search powers, but also of manhandling and abuse of those affected at one extreme, and affronted feelings and alienation from the police, at the other. (see Christian 1983).

Question 32 asked whether respondents have "ever been really annoyed" at the way the police behaved towards them or someone else in the household; or about the way in which the police handled a matter in which any of them were involved. Question 32a asked whether they had "ever been really pleased" about police behaviour handling of matters. Both of these questions use very similar wording to that of
questions in BCS I. Question 33 asked whether the police should be accountable for their actions to an independent body. We were not sure, however, whether this question would be adequately understood; in other words whether people would know about current accountability system or the proposals for alternative accountability.

The questionnaire then turned to items aimed at capturing respondents' experiences of victimisation. We were interested in offences which affected whole households - burglary, theft from the home, criminal damage; as well as offences which affected an individual - such as thefts, robbery, assaults and so forth. It was realised that this distinction between household and personal crime is in some ways false: a household very often consists of only one person; a personal offence against one member of a family may have consequences for the others; also, many personal offences occur in the context of the household. Nevertheless, the focus upon the incidence of victimisation in the Girdlestone Draft was matched by its concern for the impact of victimisation.

We were mindful of the literature on the methodological problems of surveys and the evidence that problems of forgetting and telescoping were likely to be less serious if the reference period was "bounded". Our reference period was to be 1st January 1983 to 31st December 1983. We designed a bounding procedure which was based on that used by Sparks (op. cit. p.254). Interviewers were instructed to say at this stage that they would now like to ask questions about crimes committed against the respondent and members of their household, and that they were particularly interested in incidents which had happened in 1983. The respondent would then be asked to place in the time period, memorable events - such as holidays, family events, illnesses, job changes and other significant things. The purpose was three-fold; firstly, it was hoped that by bounding the period at one end by an event or occasion - perhaps "the Christmas period" - and at the other by the interview itself, there would be less chance of events occurring before 1st January being telescoped forward into the period. Secondly, it was hoped that the placing in time of significant events would assist the placement in time, (i.e. the approximate month) in which offences occurred. Thirdly, we hoped that the process of memorising a sequence of
significant events might itself serve as a trigger for remembering incidents of victimisation, especially minor ones of little salience.

The interviewer would then proceed to ask a series of questions about the occurrence of incidents of victimisation. They were instructed in the case of any incident being reported at this checking or screening stage, to tell the respondent that details of the offence(s) would be taken shortly after. We were aware from experience of the work of victim support schemes how sensitively victims often viewed incidents, and that there might be a need to feel that the interviewer would be more than just coolly checking-off a list of items. Therefore, in the training of interviewers, the need to express concern and interest was paramount – firstly, as an ethical consideration, secondly, as a means of securing respondents' confidence and willingness to report. We also realised the importance of wording these screen questions in ways which would both correspond to the legal definition of offences, be understandable to interviewers in terms of the necessity to probe and clarify, and recognisable to the respondent in terms of memorising and classifying events as crimes. Very precise question wording and an expressed emphasis upon interviewer probing, was felt to be essential in aiding the later task of coding the offences.

Questions 34 and 35 deal with burglary and attempted burglary, and question 36 attempts – within the confines of one item – to ascertain incidents of theft from a dwelling by persons who had a right to be on the premises, as well as thefts which occurred in the course of a burglary. It was reasonable to suppose that respondents might be confused if these questions were to be asked separately. In any case responses at the pilot stage would possibly inform us if this was a less confusing method. Question 37 similarly appears to confuse two crimes, in that theft from a garage might be counted as a burglary, or a theft from a dwelling, whereas a theft from a doorstep might be counted as burglary if from a secure common area or a secured porch, or as a simple theft in other circumstances. Again probing for exact details were essential. Also, the details as gleaned on the Incident Form (discussed below) would assist in this process.

Question 38 asks whether any respondents or any other member of
the household has been a victim of a theft from the person and Question 39 relates to robbery. It was felt to be important that enough information on these offences was gained in order to enable a distinction to be made at the coding stage between the two crimes. The issue of violent street robberies is a politically sensitive one in London, and it was felt to be essential to distinguish adequately between 'snatch thefts' from the person (of handbags and other objects) which involve very minimal force, and robberies in which force is used or the threat of force is used or implied, in the process of stealing, or attempting to steal, something from a person. (Wood op.cit.). As with the categories of theft from a dwelling and burglary, details gained on the Incident Form, would possibly be crucial for accurate coding.

Questions 40 – 42 deal with offences involving theft of, theft from, or criminal damage to vehicles. The first sweep of the BCS had found that the most common targets for crime were not individuals or their homes but their motor vehicles, and that people parking their cars on the street at night, who lived in council housing, or inner city areas, were those most vulnerable to such offences (Hough and Mayhew 1983 p.19). We wished to establish how widespread this form of costly victimisation was in the particular localities being surveyed, and were especially interested in its prevalence on housing estates.

Questions 42 and 44 deal with criminal damage. We felt it necessary to distinguish between criminal damage to the home, the car, and to communal or public property. Thus, 44 tries to assess the extent to which respondents are affected by criminal damage in which the council, or some other agency are the official victims. Defacing and damaging walls, hallways, lifts, bus-shelters and telephone kiosks are all included here, and related to our belief that criminal victimisation in the inner city should be held to include the effects of crime against targets other than households and persons. This question had not been asked in previous surveys.

Questions 45 and 46 ask about physical assaults on respondents and members of their households. It is known that there are several problems associated with getting respondents to report violent victim-
isation to surveys; in summary these involve forgetting, not telling, and failure to identify an assaultive incident as an assault as legally defined. It would therefore seem that actual question wording is of paramount importance. We used a form of wording which was a mixture of that used in the BCS I and NCS questionnaires. The former asks: "has anyone (including people you know well) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort or kicked you or used force or violence on you in any way?" (Wood op.cit. Main Questionnaire p.24). The NCS asks: "did anyone beat you up, attack you or hit you with something, such as a rock or a bottle?" and "were you knifed, shot at, or attacked with some other weapon by anyone at all?" (NCS: Basic Screen Questionnaire: Questions 48, 49). It seemed to us that the wording of the NCS question leads the respondent right away from the identification of more common assaults, especially those committed by non-strangers. The BCS I question was very precise, but rather long; it did however have the advantage of specifying "including people you know well". Sparks (op.cit. p.255) had included a probe: "anyone - even someone you know . . . for example, in an argument or a quarrel?". We opted for a wording (Question 45) which included the words "anyone", "slapping", "hitting", "punching", "pushing", or "holding" and added "were you deliberately hurt in any way, including with a weapon of some kind?". We hoped that this would focus respondents' attention on a range of assaults from the least to the most serious. The omission of any specific reference to non-strangers was an obvious mistake; even though the Incident Form asks for the relationship of the offender to the respondent, it does not sufficiently focus upon assaults by non-strangers and in any case many such incidents would not previously been captured at the screening stage.

Question 47 asks about sexual assaults. Sparks had not distinguished sexual from other physical assault and we felt that this was a mistake. BCS I had asked: ". . . have you been sexually attacked, assaulted or interfered with?" We asked: "did anyone sexually attack or assault you, touch, molest or interfere with you in any way sexually?" Clearly all these forms of wording have their limitations, especially in the light of the known and inferred problems of under-reporting of such incidents. This is clearly an area in which the wording of questions
is less important than the relationship established in the interview situation, including the trust and supportive atmosphere and rapport which should ideally be established. We were very pessimistic about this item yielding reliable results, and there was a consensus of opinion among team members that the problem would have eventually to be solved through the matching of female interviewers with female interviewees, and possibly through qualitative work at a later stage.

Question 4B was meant to capture types of victimisation which involved crimes which fell outside of the other categories—such as blackmail, menaces, threatening behaviour, as well as those which might have been committed by businesses. We asked as part of the probe, if anyone had, for example, sold anything to the respondent which was defective, or whether money had been taken under false pretences. Sparks (ibid p.257) had asked a similar question but his probe had been less leading, asking for "anything which was against the law".

Crime surveys do not usually concern themselves with forms of victimisation which are not strictly illegal, and this has especially been the case with sexual and racial harassment. Many forms of behaviour which are found insulting, intimidating or frightening, are not defined as crimes, but they affect the quality of life and broader rights of women and black people (c.f. Hall 1985). The PSI (Question 46) was the first to address this issue, but it did so with a form of wording ("have you been sexually pestered or insulted by anyone?") which was unlikely to capture the full range of forms of non-criminal victimisation and harassment. Therefore, on the basis of discussions with representatives of women's groups, and on the basis of our understanding of feminists' dissatisfactions with the strict adherence to legal categories in victimisation surveys, it was decided to originate some questions of a wider nature.

We introduced these by saying to respondents that we now wished to ask about incidents which, "although not actually criminal, still gave you cause for concern". Respondents were asked to look at a card on which six types of incident were printed:
(a) "Being stared at in a way which gave you concern".
(b) "Being followed in a way which gave you concern".
(c) "Being approached or spoken to in a way which gave you concern".
(d) "Being shouted at or called after in a way which gave you concern".
(e) "Being touched or held by anyone in a way which gave you concern".
(f) "Being confronted by a person or a group of people whose presence and manner gave you concern".

The rider - "in a way which gave your concern" - was included so that we would be sure that we were capturing events which the respondents had defined negatively. If they answered positively, they were then to be asked how many times this had happened and which of the following statements applied to the incidents:

1. "Made me feel threatened or frightened as if something unpleasant was just about to happen to me".
2. "Made me feel annoyed or insulted".
3. "Made me feel uneasy or embarrassed".

These forms of wording and scaling were experimental but were substantially retained in later versions of the questionnaire. At the pilot stage interviewers were to be asked to ascertain whether there were other types of harassment not covered by the questions, and also where the incidents had taken place. There was a need, for instance, to distinguish between the workplace, the home, and public places, as have most other such questionnaires.

Questions 50 - 54a sought to ascertain whether respondents had heard of, or knew about, the work of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Victims Support Schemes, Islington Police Committee Support Group, the Metropolitan Police Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, and the Islington Neighbourhood Crime Watch. We also wished to know whether respondents had made use of these. In all cases, interviewers were to hand out information describing these schemes and their work. Question 53 asked whether respondents had recently done anything to protect their
homes, or mark their possessions, or make arrangements to have someone watch their property whilst they were away. This item was to be used to compare changes in such behaviour before and after the two neighbourhood watch schemes began to function.

These questions brought to a close the screening phase of the interview. At this stage interviewers were instructed to proceed straight to the Incident Forms for those respondents who had mentioned victimisations, but to proceed with taking the details of the respondents' personal and household characteristics in other cases. In distinction from other surveys we had decided to ask for personal and household details last. We reasoned that some respondents - perhaps those who had been the subject of serious or repeated victimisation - might decline to proceed with an interview that started on such lines. If they declined at the end, at least we would have captured the reports and details of the incidents, and there were many personal and household details which the interviewer could record.

The second phase of the questionnaire involved the use of a second questionnaire - the Incident Form - in order to gather details of up to four incidents or series offences. The interviewer was instructed to summarise the reported incidents for the respondent. If the respondent or another household member, or the household itself, had been subject to a series (i.e. more than five) of very similar offences, then the interviewer would ask the respondent to recall the details of "one such incident which particularly stands out in your mind". This was then to be counted as one of the maximum of four offences for each of which a separate form was to be used. Offences were classified into four groups:

A. Burglary; Attempted Burglary; Thefts from the Home.
B. Thefts (excluding from inside the home).
C. Criminal Damage to the home, and other personal and communal property.
D. Assaults.

For each reported offence a separate incident form was used divided into the following sections:
Details of offence.
Reporting to the police.
Impact of offence.
Information on offenders.

The questions on Burglary and related crimes sought to establish the precise circumstances and nature of the offence, including the time of day, and period of the week; the mode of entry made into the dwelling; damage done and mess made, as well as whether anyone was home at the time, and if so, whether any violence was used or threatened. We also asked for the financial value of loss, damage or repairs, whether any of this was recovered from an insurance policy, or whether any property was otherwise recovered.

In the experience of victim support schemes the question of the cost and speed of certain repairs of damage stemming from burglary or attempts at entry, is of prime importance to victims. Windows broken or doors kicked-in, make the property vulnerable to further incidents. Private tenants must of course pay the full cost of very expensive repairs, even though the amount may be recovered later from an insurance company. Local authority policy towards such repairs varies, with some operating a fixed charge for replacing locks, doors or windows. In general, local authority direct works departments will make a door or window secure within twenty four hours. This involves nailing hardboard over any damage or attaching temporary bolts, and returning within a week to complete full repairs. In the meantime, many such dwellings are burgled again. The case of households whose fuel slot-meters are broken open and the contents stolen is even more serious. The tenant is liable for the money in the meter as well as for the repair or replacement of the meter itself. On local authority housing estates, where most surviving slot-meters are to be found, there are many victims who are having amounts deducted from their social security benefits over very long periods of time. We were interested to assess the extent of these additional burdens among victims in the borough. (Phipps 1981a; NAVSS 1984). Other questions on burglary were designed to pinpoint areas of vulnerability and the possibilities of situational crime prevention.
The questions on Theft were rather briefer, asking for a short description of the incident, where it occurred, the value of property stolen, and recovery from insurance or otherwise. On Criminal Damage we wished to have a brief description of the incident, its target and location, the cost of the damage and whether this was recovered from insurance, and also whether anyone (like the direct works department of the council) made good any damage. On Assaults, the section begins with a request for a brief description of the event; the interviewer is instructed to say that it is realised that recounting the incident might be stressful. Details are then recorded on the location of the incident and the precise nature of the attack—whether grabbed, punched, or kicked, hit with an object or weapon, raped, at attempted rape, and other sexual assaults. The wording was based on a similar BCS I question. There followed a question on threats of sexual and other assaults; this was again a variation of BCS I wording, with the addition of "threats to injure or harm in some other way", and "threaten to injure or harm a person who was well known to you".

The second section deals with victims' reporting behaviour. We asked whether the police came to know about the incident. If respondents said that the police had been informed, they were asked who had reported it to them, and if it was the respondent or some other person. We asked, by means of an open-ended question, what was the main reason why they had done so. For this we used wording similar to that of Spark's open-ended question (op.cit. p.266). It would seem to be not usual for surveys to give attention to victims' reasons for reporting crimes, but these would seem to be equally indicative of victims' (and witnesses') orientations towards the police and the criminal justice system as reasons for non-reporting. Non-reporters were asked to choose from a list of twelve possible reasons for not reporting the incident, and were allowed up to three responses. The BCS had used an open-ended question with instructions to probe fully and record verbatim. We decided to follow the style of the NCS (NCS: Crime Incident Report. items 20a-e) in giving a choice of responses, but we gave choices which are not usual in the surveys, including: "dissatisfied with police's response to reporting a past problem/offence", and "other reason: (e.g. couldn't get out or to a phone)".
We were very interested to know, in the light of our knowledge of victims' complaints about the demeanour and apparent 'insensitivity' and 'inappropriateness' of police behaviour towards victims, whether these things had an effect upon subsequent reporting.

We also wished to know how long the police took to arrive when called, and whether respondents felt the police responded quickly enough, "considering the seriousness of the incident". In addition to wishing to compare our results to those of other researchers (e.g. Ekblom and Heal op.cit.), we were aware that the Metropolitan Police were at that time proposing a 'graded response' approach in which an immediate response would only be made in cases where the incident was of a high level of seriousness, or where there was a high likelihood of apprehending a suspect. It was therefore important to assess victims' attitudes to their experiences of current police practice. This section closed with questions on victims' attitudes to plain clothes and uniformed officers' treatment of them, and whether the victims were kept informed of the progress or outcome of the investigation and/or court proceedings. We also asked if victims were satisfied with the outcome of the case - was the sentence handed down a satisfactory one; if not, what would have been a suitable sentence for a court to impose?

The third section deals with the various aspects of the impact of offences. The Victim Form of BCS I - the equivalent of our Incident Form - had asked a very limited number of questions concerning impact of incidents. One question had asked the nature of injury arising from violent offences; another asked for the value of anything stolen and whether any or all of this was recovered from an insurance company. Additional questions had asked to what extent the respondent had found the event upsetting and what had been the most upsetting thing about it; also, whether the respondent or members of the household had subsequently made any changes in behaviour to protect themselves or their property from crime. (Wood op.cit.). The NCS Crime Incident Form asks a few rather similar questions.

We decided to open with a question which invited the respondent
to rate the impact of the offence "for you or for anyone else living here with you", in terms of their judgement of "severe", "moderate", or "minimum/none", across four dimensions: financial, emotional, practical and physical. There are two clear problems with this item, firstly, the wording does not make clear to whom we are referring - the actual victim of a personal offence or else another household member. For example, if a respondent's son had been the victim of an assault, we might be interested in the dimensions of impact for him; but, other household members may be affected in various ways by the incident and the victims responses to it. Similarly, in the case of the victimisation of a household, one or some or all of its members may have been affected, in different ways and to different extents. These problems of ambiguity are partially overcome by further items asking separately for "any lasting effect on you personally", and .. "on anyone else who lives here with you".

A second problem with the item concerns the common difficulties associated with the quantification of perceptions of the extent of the impact of any event. Similar events may have different impacts for different respondents. However, victims' estimations of the extent and nature of impact is related to a hidden purpose of our questioning in this section. Whereas other surveys have been interested in establishing correlations between crime and types of impact for purely descriptive purposes, our own intention was to establish the need which exists for various types of intervention to aid and support victims. Thus, we asked what sort of practical help - for instance with insurance claims, clearing-up mess, repairs to damage, replacing stolen money - were seen as required as a result of the incident, and whether such help was provided by any person or agency.

Research has shown that, in general, victims of crime absorb the costs and inconveniences of crime themselves. Some personal victims are in a position to receive practical and emotional support from relatives and friends, but others are without the benefit of such networks. Victims of household offences, although experiencing an incident, such as a burglary, as a collective unit, may very well not have the resources to cope with financial or psychological strains.
arising from crime. (Bard and Sangrey 1979; Williams 1983).

These questions were prepared after consultation with the full-time co-ordinator of Islington Victims Support Scheme. As remarked elsewhere, such schemes are able to provide a fraction of the help needed by crime victims. We felt that if widespread need could be demonstrated, especially among non-reporting victims who are unhelped by support schemes, then this might lead to political support for local authority grants to expand the service in Islington, and for making certain local authority services, such as housing and social services, more attuned to victims' needs.

The final questions in this section ask whether the victim was contacted by Islington Victims Support Scheme. This item was aimed at checking patterns of police referral to the Scheme. Police officers at the scene of a crime are supposed to automatically advise the victim(s) of the existence of the Scheme, and to say that the victim's name will be passed on unless they have an objection. It is however suspected, by many schemes, that this is not done in all cases and that the police may operate their own informal system of selection, referring only those victims felt worthy or who correspond to some stereotypical notion of those victims most likely to need help.

All victims referred would be contacted by letter, telephone, or by a visit to the home. Due to the limited number of volunteer hours available to the Scheme, many victims are contacted by letter inviting them to get in touch if help with any matter is required. The response rate from these letters is quite low, and it was of interest to us and to the Scheme, to know why this was so.

Lastly, we asked those visited or telephoned what type of help the scheme had provided and whether other types of help might also have been provided. The respondent was also asked how they felt about being referred by the police to the Scheme.

The final section of the Incident Form dealt with information on offenders. In terms of the theoretical focus and political background
to the survey, there were a number of issues which needed addressing. Firstly, we were interested in knowing the relationship of the victim and the offender. This question is the oldest concern of victimology and has a number of facets. For assaults, there is much evidence, especially from the NCS, that these are highly likely to take place in private situations between persons well-known to each other (U.S. Department of Justice 1980b). We also know that surveys being conducted by feminists were focussing on this area, and we hoped to compare our results with theirs. The BCS had included questions on the relationship between victims and offenders, which were clearly related to victimological concepts such as victim precipitation. BCS I, for instance, had asked not only about the relationship of victim to offender but also whether the victim felt "anyone else apart from the offenders were responsible in any way for what happened, because of something you did or something you forgot to do". Amazingly the question uses the word "you" in two places, rather than the more neutral word "they"; but, perhaps this was deliberately to aid the respondent to declare elements of their own behaviour - by deed or omission - as a contributory element. (Wood op.cit. p.14).

Another issue concerned the debate on race and crime, specifically the question of the racial origins or characteristics of victims as matched to those of offenders (see Stevens and Willis 1979; Lea and Young 1984). BCS I had asked victims who had actually seen the offenders, whether the latter were "white; black (West Indian or African); Indian; Pakistani or Bangladeshi; something else: mixed group; don't know". (Wood op.cit.p.6). Although we were greatly interested in this issue, such a direct question was omitted from the pilot questionnaire because of the problem of gaining support of ethnic minority organisations for the idea of the survey.

We started by asking whether the victim of a personal offence or else any household member in the case of a household offence, had actually seen "the person or persons who did it". If they answered affirmatively, they were asked how many people were involved, their gender and ages. We also asked if they were known by name or sight, or were strangers, or a mixture of these. We also wanted to know
whether the offenders lived "round here", or "on this street".

Instead of a direct pre-coded question on the race of the offenders, we decided to ask the open-ended question: "how else would you describe them?" The interviewer was instructed to record the response verbatim, and to probe only for clarification of that response. Thus, if the respondent answered: "they were youngsters", this would be followed by questions on their age, gender, residence and familiarity to the victim. If, however, the respondent answered: "they were coloured", the interviewer would then attempt to ascertain their origins within those categories used in BCS I.

Those respondents who had not actually seen the offenders, were asked: "what sort of people do you think did it?" Maguire (1980; 1982) had ascertained, for instance, that victims of burglary, though rarely coming face-to-face with the offenders, apparently operate with clear descriptive imageries of burglars. These often contain notions of dirtiness, dangerousness, and other stereotypical features. We wanted to discover the type of images of the offender these victims possessed, and whether these were related to media and other popular images of the characteristics of offenders.

Lastly, all respondents were asked: "why do you think they did this to you/to your household?" We wished to know what motive, if any the victim imputed. This was especially related to our attempt to discover to what extent victims felt that the motive for an offence was related to racial hatred or sexual exploitation. We had no firm idea of the response which would be elicited by this previously unposed question.

The interview closed, for those with whom the Incident Form was used, with those personal questions about the respondent and their household which had been asked of non-victims at the close of the Main Questionnaire.

The questionnaire used by Sparks (1977) for his London survey, had included questions on offences which might have been committed by the respondents themselves. This was the first time that self-reported
Criminality had been a feature of a victimisation survey. Respondents had been presented with three cards, each listing six offences under the headings "Property Offences", "Motor and 'Public Order' Offences", and "Offences against the person". They were asked how many of the offences on each card they had committed once, and how many more than once. Those who answered "no" were pressed to say whether they had ever done "anything that was a crime ... even if the police were not involved or nobody found out about it". Lastly, respondents were asked if they had "ever been arrested or charged with a crime, even if you didn't do it." (ibid p.261).

The collection of this data, which was met with very few refusals (ibid p.101) led to a number of interesting findings. Firstly, the authors found a significant association between the self-reporting of violent offences and being a victim of violence (ibid p.102). Secondly there was moderate tendency for those who admitted violent or property offences to be less likely to notify the police of offences committed against themselves. (ibid p.118). Thirdly, attitudes towards the police were generally more unfavourable among those admitting offences, especially if they had experience of arrest. (ibid p.134).

In the preparation of the Islington Draft, it was conceded that the nature of a person's engagement in, or attitudes towards criminal behaviour, may have a bearing upon these issues. However, we decided against the inclusion of self-reported offending for two reasons. Firstly, we realised that the various political and community groups in Islington whose support was required for the success of the survey, would condemn such a move. Secondly, despite the experiences of Sparks and his colleagues, we believed that such questions would be viewed negatively by respondents. Coming, as they inevitably would, at the end of a long interview focussing on victimisation experiences and attitudes to the police, we suspected that respondents might infer some element of confidence trickery. Thirdly, our theoretical orientation to victimisation, being less informed than that of Sparks (or the BSC) by the concept of victim precipitation, led us to be more interested in the initial stages of our research, in the patterns of experiences of crime in different sectors of the community.
There were also some important differences of emphasis between our own questionnaire and that of the third component of BCS I known as the Follow-Up Questionnaire. This was used with all respondents reporting victim incidents and 40% of all others (Wood op.cit.p.7). This asked a range of questions on "experience and behaviour". Respondents were asked whether they personally knew victims of crimes. Presumably, it was hoped to discover the extent to which the experiences of others contributed to fearfulness, avoidance behaviour, and a range of attitudes. Indeed, Maxfield's (1984 p.24) analysis of the resultant BCS I data revealed that knowing a victim slightly increased fearfulness and estimation of prevalence in relation to burglary and robbery. This is followed by asking whether respondents worried about the risk of fire, traffic accidents, and accidents in the home - presumably in order to test whether the fear of crime is related to the fear of other hazards.

By far the majority of questions related to the respondents' pattern of activities - how often they go out and to which venues, the mode of travel taken, and the amount of alcohol consumed. As I remarked at the beginning of this section, the BCS has been principally interested in testing the two theories - "opportunity" theory and "lifestyle" theory. At the conceptual level these theories - particularly the latter - focus upon the "routine activities, role adaptations, and occupational, residential, familial, and other constraints upon behaviour, which shape individual exposure to risk" (Skogan op.cit. p.195). Indeed, one might add that the administrative criminology of which the BCS has become an integral component, is interested primarily in the situational, behavioural, and inter-personal factors upon which these two theories focus. Our omission of an emphasis upon these foci in favour of other alternatives - especially in relation to policing and aspects of local and national social structure and policy - reflects the quite different theoretical and political underpinnings of the Islington Crime Survey. I will give some further consideration to these issues in the following section.

7.3. (i) The Merseyside Questionnaire:

The questionnaire for the Merseyside Crime Survey (MCS) follows
the, by now, common practice of division into two parts: 1). Firstly, a basic screen questionnaire, whose purpose is to illicit a variety of information on attitudes to the locality, aspects of life-style, perceptions of the crime problem, fear of crime, experiences of crime, experiences with the police and demographic characteristics of the respondent and the household. The information thus gathered permits a comparison between the circumstances of victims and non-victims in the sample. 2). An incident (or victim) form, which is used only with those respondents who report incidents of victimisation as having occurred within a specific time period. It is used for the collection of data on the circumstances and details of the incident - its impact, whether it was reported to the police, and any details which are known about the offenders.

The first part of the MCS questionnaire - the basic screen - begins with four questions aimed at generating information on length of residence in locality, social networks, and perceptions of the locality's problems. Question 1 uses the wording of the PSI and asks: "How long have you lived around here? I mean the area within 15 minutes walk of here". Question 2 seeks to establish - apart from people living with them - if the respondent has "any relatives or close friends living in this area, within 15 minutes walk of here?" (see Girdlestone Draft Question.6.). The purpose of such social network questions in crime surveys may be two-fold. Firstly, one may wish to find out the extent to which the risk of victimisation is associated with social isolation; and, secondly, the extent to which victims may be able to call upon the assistance of household members, friends or relatives. Thus, the inclusion of a question - such as that in the Girdlestone Draft (Question 8) - as to whether the respondent felt they could seek the help of others, might have been useful here. Additionally, knowledge of the existence or otherwise of friendly or helping networks maybe useful with regard to hypotheses regarding the inter-relationship of crime and community patterns. Question 3 asks how may neighbours are known "well enough to talk to?" Question 4 gives a list of thirteen "things which are a problem in some areas." The respondent is asked to say whether they feel each
to be a "big problem, a bit of a problem, or not a problem." This question is clearly aimed at establishing some comparison of the perception of the seriousness of crime in relation to other problems. This particular pre-coded format is an alternative to the open-ended format used in the Girdlestone Draft (Questions 2, 4 and 5) in which respondents were asked to say what they "dislike about this area/estate" or "the changes you have seen", for better or worse.

There then follows a series of six questions relating to perceptions of the crime problem in the locality and of the risks of victimisation of the respondent and others, from specific offences. Question 5 relates to the extent to which they fear the possibility of being a victim of burglary, mugging, vandalism, assault, and being "insulted or bothered by strangers." Female respondents are asked about their fear of rape, sexual molestation and pestering. It is based substantially on question 8 in BSC II, which is linked to a series of questions about risk in the neighbourhood as opposed to the respondent. The item may be compared with PSI question, which is slanted less to the fear of victimisation and more to the perception of the frequency of certain offences in comparison with "five years ago" and the "rest of London." Interestingly, question 10 in the second sweep of the BCS (hereafter referred to as BCS II) also asks about the frequency in the area of various types of nuisance, including noisy neighbours and loud parties, graffiti, teenagers hanging around, drunks or tramps on the street, rubbish and litter lying about. The inclusion of this item has, I believe, the advantage of allowing comparison between the perception of the extent of crime, fear of victimisation, and general dissatisfaction with the perceived quality of the neighbourhood, and with what Wilson and Kelling (1982) refer to as 'incivility'.

Question 6 relates to the perceived "risks for women who go out on their own in this area after dark" and is based on PSI question 4 a - b. Question 7 asks: "Do you yourself ever feel worried about going out on your own in this area after dark?" and maybe compared to the different wording of questions 7a and 7b in BCS II which asks "how safe" the respondent feels about going out after dark and, if unsafe, which things they are afraid of.
Question 8a continues by asking whether the respondent ever avoids going out after dark, "simply as a precaution against crime", and whether walking near certain types of people, streets, or areas, going on buses trains or on foot, are avoided - in addition to being asked about the avoidance of going out after dark per se. The wording may be compared to that used in the Girdlestone Draft (Questions 12 and 13) as well as the Follow-Up Questionnaire of BCS II (Question 13).

There are two types of problem associated with such questions, and which I touched upon the preceding section. The first is that there is a tendency to pre-suppose that criminal victimisation or the fear of crime are only associated with the hours of darkness. Many benefits for purposes of comparison would surely arise from asking people whether they avoided certain patterns of behaviour or particular venues, during the daylight hours (see Girdlestone Draft Question 13).

The second problem is the emphasis which is placed upon victimisation outside of the home. The Sparks PSI and BCS I/II questionnaires, although asking questions on the perception of the extent and general or personal risk of burglary in the area, refrained from asking directly about respondent's feelings of safety in their own homes. The MCS asked (Question 9): "Do you ever feel unsafe in your own home because of crime." The Girdlestone Draft (Question 12) had asked a two-part question as to whether respondents ever personally felt unsafe inside their own house or flat - either in the daytime or after dark. The MCS question has the potential to open up an important new area, firstly in relation to residents feelings of safety and security in their living accommodation - feelings which Maguire (1982) has argued to be of central personal importance across the culture, and secondly, in relation to certain political demands for action by the local authorities or the police for improved levels of public safety. A survey question relating to feelings of safety in the home is also related to the fear of victimisation by members of the respondent's household.

In view of the potential of this question, it is unfortunate that it is not followed-up by a question aimed at ascertaining which potential
incidents were actually feared. In fact the next question (Question 10) goes on to ask about the perceived frequency of a number of offences, compared to "five years ago"; this is derived from Question 7 of BGS I.

There then follows a series of twenty-seven questions relating to experiences and perceptions of, and attitudes towards, various aspects of policing in Merseyside. Questions 11 and 12 begin by asking whether the numbers of police seen patrolling the area on foot or in cars, are adequate. The PSI (Questions 12 and 13) had asked whether the "number of police seen in this area" were adequate, whether "most police you see are on wheels, . . . on foot, or is it about equal?", and whether there are enough of each. Both of these forms of wording are to be preferred to that in BGS I (Question 48o) which asks when the respondent had last seen a police officer on foot, in a time period stretching from "today/yesterday" through to a period longer than fourteen days ago. It would seem to me that a question on seeing should not be separated from a related question on perceiving the adequacy of a policing presence.

Question 13 asks whether the "Merseyside police have a good understanding of the problems of this area", and Question 14 whether the police treat all people fairly and equally. There are instructions to probe (if the answer is negative) as to "what sorts of people do not get equal and fair treatment." The PSI (questions 44a and 45) had used a similar form of wording and had found that 29% of Londoners answered "yes", almost all citing ethnic minorities and young people.

Questions 15 - 22 all deal with contacts with the police which were initiated by respondents. They deal in turn with "999 calls", calls directly to police stations, visits to police stations, and approaches to police in the street. In each case the interviewer is instructed to record the number of calls or visits, the reason for the last call or visit, and the respondent's level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the way the call or visit was dealt with. The form of the wording of these questions as well as the amount of detail sought, are very similar to that used in the PSI (Questions 6-8)
although the MCS has expanded them slightly.

Questions 23-24 deal with police-initiated contacts with respondents. These are arranged identically to the questions above, in that full details of the number and circumstances of the encounters and the level of respondents' satisfaction are sought. Both of these questions deal with being approached and spoken to by a police officer in the street or a public place. The wording of these may be compared to that used in BCS I (question 39) and PSI (question 8).

Questions 25-31 deal with police searches of the home, the person or things being carried, and cars. These questions are innovations and may be compared to similar questions in the Girdlestone Draft (Questions 27-31). Respondents are also asked to say how often they had been subjected to searches, what reason, if any, was given by the police, and whether the respondent felt that "sufficient reason" had been given. It is with this group of questions that the MCS begins to depart from the questionnaires for the two sweeps of the BCS. Whereas BCS I asks two questions about being "approached or stopped because they thought an offence had been committed" when in a car or on a motor cycle, and "stopped and asked questions by police when you were on foot" (questions 39 and 40), no questions are asked in regard of searches. BCS II is actually devoid of questions relating to people's experiences of policing whereas the PSI includes seventeen questions in its Stop/Arrest Sheet. The MCS included no questions directly associated with arrests, but it could be argued that Questions 32 and 33 which ask whether the respondent has "ever been really pleased or really annoyed about the way a police officer has behaved towards you or a member of your family, or handled a matter in which you were involved?", might conceivably catch some incidents of arrest, questioning, and aspects of police behaviour on such occasions. But, this would only be likely to happen if the respondent had actually been really annoyed. Also, their tendency to say that they were so affected might be influenced to the extent to which they actually expect to be treated in that way. Among certain groups in the inner-city, there may be an expectation that being arrested, roughly treated
and having one's rights disregarded, and that these are the 'facts of life' of being young or black in certain localities. Thus, although the MCS stop-and-search questions may generate crucial data on the extent of police tactics with particular groups in particular areas, it is arguably equally important to be able to compare it with data on arrest rates and the spectrum of arrestees' experiences.

Question 28 addresses respondents' perceptions of the frequency with which the police "stop and question or search people in the street in this area". This is followed by asking (Question 29) whether the police should do so with more people or less, or whether it is "about right". Questions 30 and 31 ask whether "police only stop and question or search . . . if they are acting suspiciously or do you think the police sometimes do so without sufficient reason?" These questions are useful in terms of determining the perceptions of sub-groups in the population and relating them to their actual reported experiences.

Questions 34 and 35 ask whether, to whom the respondent would make a complaint if they were "seriously dissatisfied about something a police officer had done or failed to do". In the event respondents say that they would not, the interviewer is instructed to probe fully and record verbatim their reasons. This question and its form is identical to PSI Question 55.

Question 36 asks: "Do you know any police officer, well enough to talk to by name?" and, if so, in what capacity are they known. This question is much the same as BCS I (question 36) but may also be compared to Questions 9 and 11 in the PSI, as to whether "you have any close friends or relatives in the police?" and, if aged under forty-five years whether "you have ever considered joining the police force yourself". The position of question may seem oddly placed in the MCS, but its purpose (and that of the PSI questions) is presumably to obtain a measure of the extent to which interacting with police officers more closely and routinely affects the way respondents answer questions relating to police behaviour, strategy and powers.

Questions 37 and 38 turn to the subject of public conceptions of
the priorities of police work. The respondent is first asked to sort
nine cards into three piles, corresponding to their judgement of the
particular work as "very important ... fairly important and, ... not
very important". The nine choices range across traffic and crowd
control, investigating and preventing crime, responding to emergencies,
as well as involvement with schools and youth and community projects.
This is followed by asking the respondent to choose five types of
criminal offence (from a list of seventeen) on the basis of their being
the ones "the police should spend the most time and energy on?" The
choices include street robberies, theft from the person, domestic
and commercial burglary, sexual assaults on women, theft of motor cars,
and vandalism, as well as prostitution, the use of hard and soft drugs,
company fraud and embezzlement, racist attacks and disorderly be-
|haviour in the streets and at football matches. This question is
based on PSI Question 19, but certain items have been added (raci-
|al attacks, company fraud and embezzlement) and other have been omitted
(illegal betting and gaming; crimes in which firearms are used; sale
of pornographic books and magazines).

The MCS then asks which of a list of five offences (vandalism,
shop lifting; indecent exposure; theft from a motor car; a serious
fight) have been "actually seen" in the last five years, and follows
this with a number of questions related to the respondent's 'witness
behaviour' - how they would respond, or have responded in the past,
to actually seeing an offence. Question 40 asks whether on each
occasion an offence was last witnessed, whether the police were
called. If the police were not called, the respondent is asked to
say whether this was because "you were able to deal with the matter
yourself ... because someone else was dealing with it."

Questions 41 - 44 deal with the preparedness of the respondent
to help the police with information about hypothetical offences which
they may witness: if they had seen "a couple of youths smashing up
a bus shelter" (Question 41) or "knock a man down and take his wallet"
(Question 42) or ... "a traffic accident in which someone had been
badly hurt." (Question 43). Finally, whether the respondent would be
prepared to tell a police officer "investigating an outbreak of van-
...dalism in your area", who might be responsible (Question 44). These questions are based on PSI questions 24-23, but that questionnaire had not referred additionally to the "outbreak of vandalism". Another slight difference is that in each case the PSI not only asked if the respondent would help identify "the people who had done it?", but also: "Would you be prepared to give evidence in court about it?" This follow-up would perhaps give an indication, beyond that of helping the police, of willingness to help in the prosecution process.

Question 45 begins by stating that not all the calls the police receive are really urgent, and asks which is the most suitable response for the police to give each of a number of reports - to send a car immediately, send a foot patrol, make a visit later, or ask the caller to visit the station. The substance of these hypothetical reports ranges from the caller seeing an unknown youth in the back garden of a neighbour's house, hearing screaming next door (it being known that the husband is sometimes violent), discovering his car had been stolen during the night, and that youths were playing football in the street to the annoyance of the neighbours. The final calls deal with wanting advice on crime prevention and organizing a sponsored walk.

There then follow three questions relating to Home Watch Schemes. The first (Question 46) after explaining the purpose of Home Watch, asks if the respondent knows of a scheme operating "in this area?" Question 47 seeks the extent of the respondent's support for such schemes, and Question 48 asks whether they would be willing to take part.

These questions are based on a series of seventeen questions (Questions 25-41) included in the Follow-Up section of BCS II, and which are about the prevention of burglary. Respondents were asked whether their home contents are insured against theft and are then asked the reasons why this may not be so. Question 27 asks what is the "best thing the police could do to prevent burglary?" (e.g. "devote more time to it", or "more police on foot"). Question 28 asks what is the "best thing people themselves can do to prevent burglary?" (e.g. better home security measures; "tell neighbours"; "tell police").
Subsequent questions explore what mutual helping arrangements might exist between neighbours, including looking after each other's properties during absences. It is in this context that BCS II then asks a number of questions about Neighbourhood Watch Schemes and unlike the MCS, asks: "Do you think schemes like this would be effective in preventing burglary?" There follows a number of questions relating to the detail of involvement in a scheme - including putting stickers in windows, watching others' property, and telling neighbours of one's absences.

Finally, Question 44 asks what priority the police should give to such schemes. I will make some comments on these differences between MCS and BCS II late in this chapter.

This section of the questionnaire ends with a question about knowledge of Police-Community Liaison Forums, and a final question which asks: "Is there anything at all about the way this area is policed, the way police officers here do their job or the attitude of the police to people who live here that you would like to see changed?" The interviewer is instructed, on receiving an affirmative reply, to probe fully and record verbatim the response. This question seems oddly placed and it would probably have been more logical for it to follow on from the earlier questions about police performance and priorities. It is obviously intended - through its wording and open-ended format to elicit dissatisfaction with aspects of police work and with relationships with particular communities, but it does not follow-on closely from other related questions. It is interesting to note that the MCS does not opt to ask the by now familiar question of crime surveys, regarding whether the police can be said to do a good job or a poor job - even though such questions usually lack any useful specific reference to the evaluation of aspects of their work, rather than their work as a whole.

The next section of the MCS questionnaire is devoted to the criminal victimisation of respondents and members of their households during the twelve months prior to the interview. The preamble to this section makes clear that the interviewer is interested not just in "serious incidents" but "about small things also." The questions then
move through a number of different types of offence. Questions 53-55 deal with thefts of motor vehicles or bicycles and vandalism to motor vehicles. Questions 56 and 57 deal with burglaries (and attempts) and theft and damage in the respondent's home, outside the home (e.g. from the doorstep, garden or garage), or "deliberately defaced or done damage to your house/flat or to anything outside that belonging to someone in your household?" These questions are closely based on similar questions in BCS I (Questions 19-22) and the PSI (Questions 24-38).

I remarked earlier - in my comments on the Girdlestone Draft - that in asking questions about thefts in and around the household, it is important to word the questions in such a way that thefts from dwellings (in which the offender has a right to be on the premises) and be distinguished from thefts which have resulted, for example, from break-ins. Secondly, questions about thefts from outside of the property are subject to the same problem; thefts from a garage, for instance, would technically be counted as burglaries, whereas those from a doorstep would not. MCS Question 57e tends to confuse these latter categories.

The next four questions deal with incidents which have occurred personally to the respondent, rather than to members of his or her household, in the previous twelve months. The respondent is urged to include "anything that happened to you . . . - at home, in the street, at work, in a shop, in a pub, in a park, on a train or anywhere else". Questions 58 and 59 then ask about incidents of theft (and attempts) from the person and thefts or incidents of criminal damage occurring to property away from the home (e.g. cloakroom, office or car). These two questions are identical to BCS I (Questions 23 and 24).

Question 60 asks about experiences with assaults and whether "anyone (including people you know well) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort or kicked you or used force or violence on you in any other way?" This wording is identical to that used by BCS I (Question 25) and the BCS II (Question 43). In my com-
ments on the Girdlestone Draft, I referred to the dual problem of getting the respondent to focus both on minor as well as major assaults and on assailants who are well-known as well as on strangers. Catching assaults by non-strangers (including members of the respondent's own household) is a notorious problem of crime survey methodology, and such wording as "including people you know well" has been used in order to overcome it.

Question 61 is addressed to females only and asks "... have you been sexually attacked, assaulted or interfered with?" and additionally "... have you been sexually pestered or insulted by anyone?" The first part of this question is based on BCS I (Question 26). Its wording is also close to the BCS II Question 45, but it omits the words "... either by someone you knew or by a stranger?". This omission would seem to lead potentially respondents away from identifying sexual assaults by non-strangers as a matter for the survey. The second part of the question is based on BCS II, Question 46, but as I indicated earlier, this form of wording does not seem likely to capture a range of harassing and frightening incidents experienced by women, not least because its form of wording tends to be vague and imprecise. Only one in forty female respondents in BCS II had mentioned such incidents (Hough and Mayhew 1985 p.11); additionally, the question does not address the issue of incidents which might be of a non-sexual nature (racial and other forms of abuse or threats) and which might well be also experienced by men.

Question 65 concerns non-criminal forms of harassment and intimidation which might be experienced by both men and women, and is based upon Girdlestone Draft Question 49. The MCS version adds a category of incident (kerb-crawling) to the six present in the original form, and omits from each the rider "in a way which gave you concern." The MCS retains the original categories of intensity of effect - threatened /frightened; annoyed/insulted; uneasy/embarrassed.

Question 66 asks whether the respondent knows personally any people who have been mugged, burgled, sexually attacked and molested;
Question 67 asks whether any of these things have happened in the previous five years; and, Question 68 asks the respondent to estimate his or her chances of being the victim of such crimes "in the next year."

These are based on very similar questions in BCS I and II. These questions, taken together with earlier questions on experiences with crime and beliefs about crime, are of some importance in terms of understanding the relationship between the direct and indirect experience of crime and levels of fear of crime. Maxfield's analysis of data derived from BCS I show that those people who are most worried about or fearful of burglary and mugging, tend to be those who have themselves been victims or who personally know a victim, rather than those who have had no experience or contact. Furthermore, individual beliefs about the frequency of these crimes interact with direct and indirect experiences in ways which are mutually reinforcing. (Maxfield 1984 p.24).

Questions 69-73 tackle the important matter of public perceptions of the type of people most likely to commit crimes of burglary and mugging and those who are most likely to be their victims. Most of these questions are derived from the BCS II Follow-Up Questionnaire, but Question 71 asks whether "people with jobs" or "unemployed people" are more likely to commit burglary, and this replaces a BCS II question which gives the choice between "professional criminals" or "casual thieves or opportunists." The MCS question is not only more meaningful but also more interesting in terms of the determining the extent to which respondents might be prepared to attribute part of the crime problem to high rates of unemployment.

The final question in this section is based on a question in the BCS II Follow-Up Questionnaire (Question 48). It asks the respondent to state which out of a list of possible types of action which might be taken by the police or courts, would be most appropriate in each case of a twenty-five year old man who had been found guilty of one of a number of offences (mugging, burglary, shoplifting, car theft, rape, smoked marijuana), given that he had been in similar trouble before. Unlike the BCS II question, the MCS version does not first ask the respondent to rank a number of these dispositions in order of their
The inclusion of questions on attitudes to sentencing in Crime Surveys is important for two reasons. Firstly, the results permit a comparison of the attitudes to sentencing of victims and non-victims, as well as the relationship of such attitudes to such other variables as the level of fear of crime. Secondly, they permit comparison of public attitudes and the sentencing practices of the courts. A number of surveys have shown that public ideas about appropriate sentences are often less severe than are supposed and that there is substantial public support for alternatives to custody, especially compensation orders. (see Shaw 1982 p.20). The results of BCS II also show that in response to the above question, respondents favoured the use of imprisonment less frequently than the courts for all offences other than burglary, and favoured the use of community service for all offences. The results for rape are not recorded. (see Hough and Mayhew 1985 p.45).

The final section of the MCS questionnaire is known as the Victim Form. This was used with respondents who reported having been victims of offences or series of offences in response to questions on the Main or Screen Questionnaire. The Victim Form was completed for each offence or series, up to a maximum of four.

The opening or screening question refers back to the summary sheet at the end of the Main Questionnaire, and the respondent is reminded of the incidents they have mentioned. At this point it is worth considering a comparison of the opening procedures of a number of crime survey victim forms. I earlier referred to the problems of forward and reverse telescoping and of a method known as 'bounding' which has been employed by some researchers for overcoming these problems. With the exception of the American NCS - which bounds each of its recall periods by the date of the previous interview - and the Sparks study (1977) which employed a significant date callendar for the purpose, all other major crime surveys have refrained from using such a procedure mainly due to the amount of time by which the interview is extended and also because its effectiveness has been questioned. However, the BCS victim forms in use for the two sweeps have instructed interviewers to get respondents to state the exact month in which each incident occurred.
or if not, to place the occurrence of each incident mentioned in one of four quarters of the calendar years serving as recall periods for each sweep, or the period from January of the next calendar year up to the date of the interview. If the incident occurred in this latter period (about one month) then the exact week of occurrence is sought. Lastly, if the respondent is unable to place the incident time, it is coded separately.

Although this procedure is far less time consuming than that used by Sparks, it may still require a disproportionate amount of time to complete. The victim form for the Midlands Crime Survey opted for the briefer method of ascertaining that the incident being dealt with occurred "during 1982" (the recall period) or "since 1st January 1983". The PSI's Victim Sheet and the victim forms used by the Merseyside and Islington surveys utilise no bounding procedure at all. These surveys are therefore open to the charge that their estimates of unreported crime may have been inflated by incidents telescoped in from outside of the twelve-month recall period, or indeed that incidents may have been lost through backward or reverse telescoping. Additionally, in the absence of a 'reverse record check' - a procedure by which a proportion of incidents said to have been reported to the police are checked against police records - it could be argued that a proportion of reported incidents have also been telescoped in those ways.

Question 2 follows by asking for details of the incident, and subsequent questions deal with where it happened. Sufficient detail would be gathered by these questions (for instance on whether the person responsible had a right to be in the premises) to enable a fairly accurate distinction between burglary and theft from a dwelling.

Questions 5 - 8 seek to establish some details about the offenders - if indeed these were seen by the victim. Question 5 uses a form of wording based on Question 66 in the Girdlestone Draft: "Why do you think they did this to you/your household?" This open-ended question (with instructions to probe fully and record verbatim) is clearly intended to discover the motive which the victim imputed to the offender(s)
and may prove to be an interesting way, for instance, of discovering the extent to which crime victims who are members of ethnic minority groups or women feel that their victimisation is racially or sexually motivated.

Question 6 follows with: "Can you say anything at all about the people who did it - how many were there or what sorts of people they were?" and is followed by questions as to the number, gender, age, and race of the offender(s) and whether they were known to the victim or were strangers. If they were known, Question 8 establishes whether this was "just by sight", "just to speak to casually" or were "... well known". If they were well known their relationship to the victim is sought.

Questions 9-13 seek to establish whether anything was stolen (or an attempt made), whether any damage was done, and the value of the property stolen or damage done. Questions 15-17 ask if any property stolen or damaged was covered by an insurance policy, whether any money was forthcoming from an insurance company, and if so, whether the victim was "financially worse off in the end." Such questions are of obvious importance when one considers the BCS findings on victims of crime and property insurance. Among burglary victims, for instance, 40% did not have cover for stolen or damaged property, and a fifth of those covered did not claim. Of those who were insured and did claim, fully 98% estimated themselves to be worse off - 35% by £100 or more (Hough and Mayhew op.cit.p.28).

Question 17 asks: "At the time it happened, were you or anyone else aware of what was happening?" If the respondent was aware they are then asked (Question 18) whether the offender(s) had a weapon or something they used or threatened to use as a weapon. Question 19 asks whether the offender(s) actually hit anyone or used force or violence on anyone in any way, or threaten it. These questions are in the form used in BCS I.

The following three questions are devoted to various aspects of the impact of the incident. Question 20 asks whether the respondent
or anyone else in their household had attention from a doctor as a result of the offence; whether this was for physical injuries or for shock or "other psychological symptoms, and also whether the person was hospitalised. Question 21 asks the respondent to rate the effect which the incident "had on you or other people in the household?" This originally worded question is the only one which is aimed at estimating the impact of offences on victims, other than their financial impact. Question 22 asks which help or advice the victim needed but could not get, and lists a number of things such as replacing documents, insurance claims and repairs. These questions may be compared to three questions in BCS I (Questions 41-43) which ask about time off work which resulted from the incident, how upsetting it had been, and what changes in behaviour and activities had resulted. Also, in BCS II, the number of questions on impact and problems and needs arising from the incident was increased to seventeen. Additional questions referred to inconvenience and emotional or personal problems, and victims support schemes. The implications of this shift will be discussed later.

Question 23 asks whether the police came to know about the incident. In the event of a negative reply, the interviewer is instructed to probe fully and record the reply verbatim. The wording of this question and especially the probe, is of interest here. The words "Why not?" are used in P:3 Question 6 and in BCS I Question 35. They are not as strong as those used by Sparks (1977 p. 266) - "Why didn't you call the police?", or in the PSI (Question 6) - "Why did you not tell them about it?" The open-ended format of the question is in contrast to Sparks in which the respondent is offered eight choices of response, and to the Girdlestone Draft (Question E3) which offered twelve. The open-ended format is to be preferred, as it may well catch reasons for non-reporting which flow from life-situations and cultural perceptions which the researcher might not anticipate.

An interesting variation upon questions about reporting and non-reporting of incidents occurs in the Girdlestone Draft (Question E2), and BCS II (Question 72) which both ask for the reasons why the respondent decided to report (as opposed to not reporting) the incident to
the police. The range of responses to such a question may well give
an indication of public commitment to the policing of crime which may
be belied by the responses to the negative question (see Hough and

Question 24 follows by asking by what means the police came to
know about the incident - who it was that informed them. There are two
subsidiary questions : one asks whether the police ever found out who
did it. This touches on the very important matter of victims' know-
ledge of the progress of police investigations into incidents - for
instance, whether someone has been charged and, if so, details of the
court appearance and the eventual outcome. Research has shown that
victims more often know very little about any of these matters as there
is no policy (on the part of police and courts) for routinely informing
them. Victims clearly express a need to know and many authors have
argued their right to know about the progress of police and judicial
action (see Shapland et al.1985; Maguire and Corbett 1986).

The other subsidiary question asks how satisfied or dissatisfied
the respondent was "with the way the police dealt with the matter, and
comments on dissatisfaction are to be probed and recorded in full.
This question may be contrasted to items in BCS I and the PSI which
ask separately whether the respondent talked to uniformed or plain
clothes officers about the incident and, in each case, whether they
were satisfied with the way the officers dealt with it.

Question 25 asks : "When the police come to know about an offence
like the one we have been talking about, how high a priority do you
think they should give to investigate it?" This may be compared to
similar questions on public views on policing priorities which may be
found in the PSI and in Belson's survey of public and police attitudes
in London (1975 pp.30-1).

The MCS Victim Form closes by asking which of a number of types of
action the police or courts should have taken against the person res-
ponsible for the incident. This is a more specific version of Question
74 in the Main Questionnaire which seeks respondent's views on appro-
priate action in respect of a range of offences. The results would permit a comparison of the attitudes of victims and non-victims.

(ii) The Islington Questionnaire:

Having been developed together, the Merseyside and Islington questionnaires overlap to a considerable degree. I would like, at this point, to focus on the few differences which exist. The most notable difference is the absence in the MCS of questions which refer directly to police malpractices. These ICS questions (Questions 45-51) begin by asking: "Who should decide how a local area is policed?" - the police themselves, the Council, the Home Secretary, or others? As this is clearly a question which seeks the public's perspective on the accountability issue, it seems strange that it is not prefaced by a short statement which gives some outline of the issues involved. As it stands, it tends to assume that the respondent is already acquainted with the existing structure of accountability and control, and that he or she is also aware of the present position of certain local authorities on the accountability issue.

It may be, however, that the question is aimed at assessing the level of knowledge of the issue. This question, which is an innovation, must also be assessed in the light of Question 78 which asks if the respondent has heard of P.A.C.E. - a body set up and funded by Islington council to monitor the performance and behaviour of the police in the borough. It also asks if they believe there is a need for such a body in the Borough.

Question 46 and - two further innovations - asks whether the police, during investigations, ever use threats or unreasonable pressure to get the answers they want and, in taking written evidence, write down what is said fairly and accurately. Questions 48-51 are taken directly from the PSI, and ask about the use of unreasonable force in making arrests, the use of violence on people held at police stations, the planting of evidence, and the accepting of bribes. Some related PSI questions are not used either in the MCS or ICS; for example PSI Question 45 - "Are there any groups or types of people... who do not get fair treatment from the police?", and Question 53 on whether police
officers: "ever accept goods or favours from people who want to keep on
the right side of them?"

The PSI also asks some questions seeking the public's estimation
of police performance and behaviour in situations which the respondent
may have actually observed or experienced. Questions 27-29, for in-
stance ask in detail about the police handling of crowd disturbances.
Respondents are also asked if they have ever been reported and summoned
for a motoring offence, arrested and taken to a police station, or had
sons or daughters arrested. In each case the respondent is asked to say
whether the police behaved properly and fairly. In addition, the PSI
questionnaire includes a separate Stop/Arrest Sheet for the further
questioning of respondents who have had this kind of experience of the
police, and eliciting details of the encounters, such as whether police
officers were rude or insulting or used force or violence.

Other PSI questions not used in the MCS or ICS include those on
police use of firearms, police requests to ban demonstrations, and the
tapping of telephones. Also, the MCS question on public estimation of
graded police response to various crimes was not included in the ICS.

A further set of original ICS questions which do not appear in the
MCS, are those dealing with inter-racial incidents. Questions 68-72
ask respondents whether, in the last twelve months, anyone of another
race have shouted insults at the, assaulted them, damaged any of their
property, or stolen anything from them. In each case, the character-
istics of the perpetrators are sought and the imputed motive is sought.
These questions are associated with the important question - referred to
elsewhere in this thesis - of the extent to which personal criminal
victimisation is mainly inter- or intra-racial. Of the four types of
incident covered, only 'shouting insults' is not covered in part of the
questionnaire dealing with experiences of crime. Thus the 'shouting
insults' question may be seen as contributing some detail to the
questions implicitly about sexual and racial harassment referred to
earlier. The questions on assault, criminal damage, and theft would
therefore seem to be a duplication of similar items elsewhere in the
questionnaire, for which the details of the offenders are sought in
the incident form. However, these questions are clearly meant as an
experiment in generating a particular type of response.

The ICS also includes an original question (Question 92) on heroin use. Respondents are asked whether they know anyone who has ever used heroin, but does not ask if they themselves have used this drug.

On turning to a comparison between the ICS and MCS victim or incident forms, there are some further differences to be noted. Whereas MCS Question 5 asks "Can you think of any reason why the (person/people) picked on you?", the ICS makes no reference to the matter of the motives which the respondent imputed to offenders.

The ICS places a somewhat different emphasis upon the impact and consequences of crime upon victims. The MCS follows closely upon BCS in seeking to ascertain mainly 'factual' details of the impact - injury, financial loss through theft and damage - although it does also include a question (BCS I Question 21) on the estimated effect of the incident "on you or other people in your household". However, this last item seeks a pre-coded response (from "very big" to "there was no effect at all") and a more detailed response which would be more likely to give some insight to the range of types of effect, is not sought. The ICS also asks (Question 8c) whether anything which was stolen or damaged had a sentimental value - implying one which went beyond the monetary value of the lost item or of a settled insurance claim. It also includes (in addition to the pre-code question above) an open-ended question (Question 18b): "What were the effects?", with instructions to probe fully and to record the response fully. Furthermore, Question 20 includes three further open-ended questions, seeking the worst aspect of the incident, other bad aspects and the effects of the worst aspect.

Maguire and Corbett (1987 Chapter 3) have argued that broadly based crime surveys using a questionnaire format, tend to show crime as having a lower overall impact, whereas in-depth interviews tend to produce more victims who report suffering from various adverse effects. They interviewed 242 victims of burglary, robbery, assault and theft from the person. The authors first set out to assess the extent, nature and intensity of the initial effects produced by different types of offences upon different types of victim. Different results emerged from these
interviews in comparison to the results from the BCS - a higher proportion of those being interviewed at length reported serious effects. It is argued that the establishment of a personal rapport with the interviewee, the opportunity to probe, and for the respondent to give more consideration to the event and its aftermath, tended to draw out effects which would not be reported in a briefer survey.

Given these results, and given the problems of doing in-depth interviews as part of a large-scale survey, it is necessary to innovate ways in which respondents can be assisted to respond more fully. The use of open-ended questions is thus always to be preferred, in party with acquainting interviewers with the type of effects for which they should probe.

I will now turn to those questions in the MCS and ICS which deal with victims' needs for services and assistance. The Girdlestone Draft had, in consultation with Islington Victims Support Scheme, presented a number of questions (Questions 50-51 and Questions F7-F9) which were aimed at achieving the following objectives: to estimate the unmet needs of crime victims; to estimate public knowledge of the service being offered; to check the frequency with which the police were referring victims to the Scheme; to record the evaluations of victims who had been contacted by the Scheme. ICS Questions 19-23 ask whether victims received help from anyone - either lay or professional or "from anyone else?" In each case full verbatim details are taken. Islington Victims Support Scheme receives no specific mention in these questions, but the case of victims contacted by the Scheme would have been covered by Question 7 in the Main Questionnaire; Questions 73 and 74 seek all respondents knowledge of the Scheme's existence and purpose.

The MCS questionnaire contains no direct reference to victims support services, nor do its questions on the impact of offences seem to be primarily directed to the task of estimating the range, intensity or extent of the unmet needs of crime victims. By contrast, the ICS and BCS II have included a larger number of questions aimed at directly establishing the need for specialised victim services.
Maguire and Corbett (op. cit.) have, on the basis of the results from BCS, calculated that for an area with 130,000 population - the averaged-sized Victims Support Scheme area - with an average crime rate, that there would be a minimum of 4,000 victims considering themselves 'very much affected' by an event classifiable as a crime. About 2,500 would have reported the matter to the police, but in perhaps 1,000 of these cases no crime would have been officially recorded.

A major implication of these findings is that, especially in inner-city areas with high crime rates - there are large numbers of crime victims whose needs for services are not being met, even by the existing victims support schemes. Such schemes are almost entirely dependent upon referrals by the police, but only a proportion of those who report crimes are actually referred. Also, the schemes are unable to offer any help to those many victims who do not report crimes. These may be compared to BCS II, in which victims are asked whether they would have liked to have been contacted by a Victims Support Scheme or not; whether they would have accepted an offer of help; and, at what point such contact would have been most welcome.

In respect of crime victims who report crimes, there is an additional area of their experience on which it would have been useful for the MCS and ICS to focus. Very little is known about the behaviour of the police towards victims at the scene of the crime. That evidence which exists (e.g. Maguire 1982; Maguire and Corbett 1987) indicates considerable dissatisfaction on the part of a proportion of victims (as well as satisfaction on the part of others) with police officers' responses to their plight and upset. It would be useful to know what type of response victims would find most helpful, especially in the period immediately after the incident has occurred or is discovered. BCS I, for instance, asked victims about their satisfaction or dissatisfaction on having spoken about the incident to uniformed or plain clothes officers. It is possible that such questions would generate some responses useful to the above purpose, but one suspects that they were not designed with this in mind.

The ICS also includes two questions on reparation by offenders to
thier victims. Question 28 on the victim form asks victims if they would have accepted the chance to meet the perpetrator of the offence against them, for the purpose of agreeing upon repayment. Question 29 asks if the victim would have agreed to an out-of-court settlement without having to meet the offender. These questions, which are identical to ones in the BCS II victim form, although the latter adds a follow-up in which it asks whether the respondent would want the offender to be prosecuted and punished even in the event of an agreement being reached.

There are two further items which occur in the ICS main questionnaire, but which do not appear in the MCS. Question 10 asks all respondents whether they have any special locks or other security devices in their home, as a precaution against crime. This may be compared to BCS I Question 47 which asks victims if they (or members of the household) have "made any changes in your behaviour to protect yourselves or your belongings from crime?" The open-ended form of this question is aimed at a number of different types of possible changes, including restricting one's movements (e.g. avoiding certain places, or going out after dark) taking out extra insurance, as well as more protective behaviour such as adding locks or marking valuables (see Wood 1984). As such, the item is of wider significance than the ICS question in terms of the responses it seeks to generate, but narrower in focus in that it is addressed only to victims rather than being used, for example, to test whether fear of crime or indirect experience of crime, might produce similar behavioural effects.

Lastly, the ICS asks all respondents to state "which political party you identify yourself with?" The data from this type of innovative question may make a useful accompaniment to our knowledge on victimisation and the variables of social class and ethnicity. It may well be indicated that those who suffer most from crime do in fact identify themselves with the Labour Party.

The questionnaires for the MCS and the ICS, despite the differences which I have outlined, overlap to a 90 per cent extent. Their questions are largely derived from BCS I and PSI studies and as such are comparable.
with much of the BCS and PSI data bases (see Jones et al 1986 p.5f.m).

(iii) The MCS, ICS, and BCS Questionnaires Compared:

At this point, it is worthwhile to highlight certain differences (other than those with which I have dealt) in the content of the questionnaires for BCS I and BCS II, and those used by MCS and ICS. Perhaps the most noticeable difference relates to the questions concerning respondents' life-styles, which occur in the BCS I Follow-Up Questionnaire. These questions (eight in all) refer to evenings spent outside the home and the activities engaged in; how often in the past week the respondent has been out on foot alone after 6 p.m., and, four questions on average weekly alcohol consumption. The BCS II reduced the number of these questions to three. In each sweep, the BCS included a question on avoiding going out on foot within this sequence of questions. It is however clear that what were being sought were the life-style correlates of serious victimisation (especially robbery and assaults) and that this emphasis was heavily influenced by the work of Hindelang and others (1978) in the United States. The results of BCS I have indicated, as in the American research, that going out in the evening (particularly at the weekend) and heavy drinking are risk-enhancing activities, accounting for at least some of the known risks associated with age, gender and urbanisation. Daytime activities (especially working out of the home and travelling on public transport) affect the chances of both personal and household victimisation. The BCS life-style findings, according to Gottfredson (1984 p.33), suggest that victimisation research needs to focus its attention on the small portion of the population who suffer repeated victimisation.

BCS I also included a question on self-confessed offending, asking respondents if they had ever committed crimes of violence or dishonesty. Those respondents reporting that they had engaged in any of a list of twenty-five of these offences (in three groups: 'assault and violence'; non-predatory theft'; 'delinquencies'), at least once in the past twelve months, were coded as 'offenders' and other respondents as 'non-offenders' (ibid.p.35). The BCS I results indicate that for each of the three groups of offences, 'offenders' were substantially more likely than 'non-
offenders' to report being victims of personal crimes, and somewhat more likely to report household victimisation. (ibid. p.15, p.36).

Although the findings on the life-style and self-reported offending correlates of victimisation raise some questions about validity, they also present the opportunity of explore further dimensions of criminal victimisation - especially the phenomena of multiple and series victimisation. The absence of any questions relating to these issues, in the MCS and ICS, is a reflection of their differences in focus from the BCS. However, such issues may be shown to have some bearing upon theoretical questions of interest to the realists who designed them. Lea and Young (1984 pp.38-49) in their discussion on marginality, crime and victimisation, point to the existence both of symmetry and asymmetry in the patterning of victims and offenders. While it is true, they argue, that the highest offenders are also the most likely victims and that phenomenon tends to be intra-group, there also exists a relationship between offenders and victims which inter-group and is aimed at the most vulnerable sections of the community. Recent analysis of results from BCS II, for instance, has shown that the rates for households burgled (including attempts), the perceived risk of burglary, and personal fear of burglary, all increase substantially as one moves from 'better-off', 'average', and 'poor' areas of local authority council housing. (Hope 1986 p.46).

The unravelling of these complicated phenomena may certainly require criminologists to study the social processes which give rise to the correlates of all types of victimisation. As Gottfredson contends:

"Criminologists have paid far too little attention to these issues, and to how they relate to theory about crime. Finally, the findings here indicate that there should be more studies of micro-environments and their role in the generation of criminal victimisation: measures of specific situations in which crime is likely to happen need to be refined and examined - at the
neighbourhood level and, for example, at the level of the specific type of pub, school, and housing unit. "

(op. cit. p. 33).

It may be that the survey method, though excellent for raising theoretical questions in this area, is inadequate to the task of explaining them. It may be that qualitative methods would be more suitable to this purpose. However, the omission of these questions from the MCS and ICS prevents comparison with the BCS data base in these matters.

7.4. Conclusion: Constraints and Imperatives in the Design of Crime Survey Questionnaires:

I will now examine a number of constraints and imperatives which impinge upon the design of questionnaires for use in crime surveys. I will examine three interacting sets of factors—those associated with Theoretical Issues, Political Issues, and Methodological Issues.

(i) Theoretical Issues:

All researchers, prior to commencing their research efforts, begin with a number of theoretical interests. Criminologists, as social scientists, tend to operate within paradigmatic structures which give shape to their perceptions of the crime problem, and to the debates which form the immediate context of their attempts to build and refine systematic theoretical positions. A perennial problem which confronts criminologists is that of the attempt to ground their theories in empirical knowledge given that criminal offences occur with relative infrequency and tend to occur in the context of secrecy. Additionally, those procedures which exist for the routine collection of data on crime are controlled by various agencies—the police, the criminal justice departments of government—whose interests are more often divergent with those of criminologists.

Since the 1960's, the crime (or victimisation) survey has presented
an opportunity for criminologists to directly control research efforts which are capable of delivering large amounts of data on crime and numerous related issues, and through which longstanding theoretical problems can begin to be solved and other dimensions of those problems can be generated anew. However, the survey method in criminology—as I have made clear in previous chapters—is subject to numerous methodological difficulties, many of which may never be satisfactorily resolved. Surveys are also subject to other factors—such as political financial and other practical constraints which inevitably impose limitations upon the extent to which theoretical issues can be satisfactorily addressed.

What then of the theoretical issues which have informed the design of crime survey questionnaires? If we begin with the American National Crime Survey, we will see that it was the first major survey to address the longstanding problem of the dark figure of unreported and unrecorded crime. In so doing it inevitably broached the question of the social distribution of criminal victimisation. This has continued to be the central focus of the NCS, as revealed through the shape of its questionnaires and its many reports, throughout its history. The NCS asks no questions at all about respondents experiences with the police, nor about their attitudes and perceptions in relation to police performance and behaviour, except as might be inferred from responses to a question about reasons for not reporting incidents of victimisation.

By contrast, the content of the BCS questionnaires has been influenced by, and seeks to address, a much larger number of additional theoretical questions. The range of these includes:- perceptions of the problems of the locality; fear of crime and perceptions of risk and prevalence; perceptions of police performance, powers and priorities; direct experiences with the police (public-initiated and police-initiated contacts); witness behaviour; behaviour in relation to victimisation prevention; attitudes towards sentencing; and various correlates of victimisation such as are the focus of the questions on life-style and self-reported offending. It is also the case that the BCS victim forms have paid much more attention than the NCS to the
impact of victimisation and to special needs that arise as a result. Also, the use by the BCS of a follow-up questionnaire (with all victims and 40% of non-victims) has permitted the broadening of the scope of the Survey to include questions on other related criminal justice issues and to change the foci of those with each succeeding sweep.

Whatever criticism may be levelled at the BCS, it remains the case that it is the most innovative of the nationwide crime surveys which have anywhere been conducted. One of the reasons for this is that the administrative criminology of which the BCS is a crucial instrument, is fairly open to experimentation in the gathering of data which may have a direct policy relevance. The Home Office Research and Planning Unit maintains strong links with other criminological research centres (at home and abroad), with the police and other criminal justice agencies, and with specialist organisations such as the National Association of Victims Support Schemes. These links contribute to the process by which research questions are continually raised, and data-gathering priorities are formed and changed.

The PSI survey questionnaire indicates some rather different theoretical interests. Although the survey of Londoners addresses experiences with victimisation, the number of questions on victimisation in the main questionnaire is very small, and the victim form contains very few questions on the details of incidents and none on the financial, injury or other impact of crime, or the needs of victims for assistance. The weight of the emphasis of the questions is almost entirely towards policing issues, including various aspects of police–public relations, police behaviour and performance. Also, a special supplementary questionnaire—the Stop/Arrest Sheet—sought in detail suspects' experiences with police officers in different situations.

The main theoretical position which seems to inform this part of the study, would seem to be that which sees the success of the law enforcement role of the police as dependent largely on the securing of consensual relationships between police and public, improving public confidence in the police and the level of public co-
operation. (Smith and Gray 1985 pp.8-17). It was therefore seen as essential for the survey to accurately assess the extent to which harmony exists "between how the police behave (how they exercise their discretion) and how people expect and wish them to." (ibid p.15). The PSI study also included to this end, a survey of London's police officers and attitudes towards aspects of their work and their relations with the public.

The MCS and ICS have, as we have seen, used questionnaires which have a fair degree of symmetry with the BCS and PSI. The theoretical orientation of these local surveys is in many respects similar in terms of their focus upon victimisation and its correlates, but they contain an emphasis on responses to crime by the police and public evaluations and expectations if police performance which is (in the case of the ICS) not found in either the BCS or the PSI. These emphases, together with such innovations as questions on sub-legal harassment, inter-racial incidents, heroin use, and on political affiliation and victimisation, mark a movement in the design of crime surveys, away from an exclusive interest in victimisation, towards a much wider range of issues associated with crime and policing.

However, it is possible to point to a number of theoretical areas which are under-stated in the MCS and ICS, for reasons which I will deal with below. These include questions on life-style and self-reported offending in the case of both surveys, and questions likely to capture the detail of the impact of crime and the needs of victims, in the ICS. Also given that one of the hallmarks of realist criminology is that it seeks to carry forward the search for causes abandoned by administrative criminology (see Young 1986), both surveys give quite meagre attention to mapping the socio-cultural context of victimisation, including the elucidation of neighbourhood networks and affiliation. These, and other theoretical areas - such as on 'defensible space' (Newman 1972) and the sociology of the built environment - would be indispensable to the task of constructing a systematic sociological theory of victimisation and its prevention.
An inherent problem of the survey method is that it does not permit more than two or three conceptual areas to be tackled in any depth and, in the light of certain limitations, researchers must when designing survey questionnaires, arrange their theoretical interests into some order of priority. I will now go on to look at constraints and imperatives of a political nature.

(ii) Political Issues:

There are four ways in which political considerations may impinge upon the design of crime surveys. Firstly, researchers may be directly influenced by the needs of the agency for whom they work or which has agreed to fund the research project. Secondly, researchers inevitably operate within political environments and climates. Thus, theoretical positions such as administrative criminology or left-realism (as I hope to have shown) are both entwined in the politics of crime control. Indeed, theoretical positions in criminology are themselves political in that they comment upon and make assertions about social phenomena and social agencies, and seek to directly affect social and criminal justice policy. Thirdly, crime surveys cannot succeed unless they are given the support of numerous interests, be they the police, community groups, or politicians. Fourthly, the design of surveys may be influenced by the potential political impact of the findings.

The NCS was from its inception influenced by political considerations which arose out of the convergence of interests between mainstream criminologists and social democratic politicians. The particular shape of the NCS questionnaire, with its emphasis upon the dark figure, and the social distribution of criminal victimisation, reflected the concerns of a criminology and a Justice Department which was bent on uncovering a potent source of social injustice which arose from the conditions of poverty and hopelessness, and which sapped the legitimacy of the social system.

The BCS, as I hope to have shown in Chapter VI, is the child of the recent politics of crime in Britain and particularly of the
convergence between the interests of administrative criminologists and the criminal justice policies of the Conservative government. The content of the BCS questionnaire reflects Home Office priorities and the need for a reliable data base to underpin them. The BCS also reflects a process of political consultation with various interests such as the police and the judiciary and, given that the Survey is aimed at uncovering public perceptions of the performance of those agencies, may be seen in part as a political device to assist the government (through the Home Office) to negotiate changes in those agencies' practice.

In a more immediate sense the political imperatives of the early 1980's certainly motivated the Home Office Research and Planning Unit to concentrate on demonstrating that crime is a much less serious problem and that the risks of crime are in most cases minimal. A related political aim was to provide an understanding of current public perceptions and behaviour which would assist in the introduction of measures to increase the flow of information to the police. (see Kinsey et.al. 1986 p.54).

The PSI and Midlands surveys were both influenced in their design by their particular relationship with the police. The PSI questionnaires, for instance, were designed in the context of a process of consultation with the A7 Branch of the Metropolitan Police, and, in the case of the survey of police officers, with the Assistant Commissioner and representatives of the Police Federation (Smith and Gray op.cit.p.7).

The Midlands survey was created in order to solve a pressing problem for the Nottinghamshire Constabulary and the Labour local authority, namely that the County's official crime rate (which was the highest in England&Wales) was harmful to its image in terms of attracting businesses and jobs, and tended to bring discredit on the police (Field Notes IX). The design of the survey questionnaire is almost identical to that of BCS I, and the results of the survey are couched mainly in terms of explaining the higher Nottinghamshire crime rate, in comparison to the lower rates of neighbouring Midlands.
counties, as outcomes of differential police reaction and recording practices (Farrington and Dowds 1983; 1985).

The MCS was created largely out of the politics of police accountability in Merseyside, and represented a convergence of the interests of left realist criminologists and Labour members of the Police Authority. Thus the design of the MCS questionnaire to a great extent reflects the desire of those interest to lay bare certain aspects of police performance and public opinion about policing, as a basis for ongoing arguments for greater police accountability. It must also be remembered, however, that the Home Office had made a considerable financial investment and there was an important need to gain the support of the Merseyside Chief Constable. These factors would probably help to explain the absence from the MCS questionnaire of items relating to police misconduct, even though this issue had been an important focus of Labour Party and public anxieties about the policing of Merseyside since the late 1970's.

A similar convergence of interests also occurred in Islington, but the political configuration there was different in at least two important respects. Firstly, the whole of the financial backing for the survey came from the Council thus obviating the direct influence of the Home Office and thus of the police. Secondly, the situation was marked by the complexities of the 'rainbow politics' of inner London. Thus, in the design of the questionnaire, the views of ethnic minorities and community groups, as well as of women's groups and other organisations, were taken into consideration in a way which is unique to this survey. These two sets of factors would explain why the issues of police misconduct, sub-legal harassment and inter-racial incidents and a greater focus on the impact of crime - all of obvious theoretical interest to realist criminologists - were able to be given such an important significance.

(iii) Methodological Issues:

A further set of factors which interacts with those of theoretical and political interests, concerns certain of the methodol-
ogical problems associated with the conduct of crime surveys. One of these is the need to ensure as high a response rate as possible, including maximising the number of completed interviews. Therefore, one of the most important aspects of questionnaire design is to ensure that the interview length does not, on the whole, exceed one hour. (Sparks 1982 p. 71) This constraint poses the single most important limitation upon coverage of topic areas in questionnaires and poses inevitable dilemmas concerning the inclusion or exclusion of topics, the allocation of space to certain topics in preference to others, and the depth at which each topic will be treated. The time constraint affects for instance the number of open-ended questions which can be included, given the extra time needed to complete them. It is well known that the response rate and the rate of completed interviews is higher in inner city areas and so in the case of the MCS and ICS it would be particularly necessary to give attention to this problem.

Added to this there is the problem of financial constraints. Intensive mass surveys using high levels of sampling, are extremely costly and the number of interviews which can be conducted is therefore limited. This imposes a pressure to ensure high levels of quality of data derived from the interviews, and to ensure that data collected is not erroneous to the central purposes of the survey. This may well mean that question items in certain topic areas may have to be neglected in favour of those which are of most importance.

In the case of MCS there is an interesting illustration of the way in which methodological problems and financial constraints can combine to affect the content of questionnaires. The omission of questions on inter-racial incidents and the lack of emphasis upon the differential rates of victimisation for ethnic groups may be attributed not to political problems, but in part to an exceptional feature of the population to be surveyed. The black population in Liverpool is much older than that in other British cities, with many fourth and fifth generation black families. In one sense it may be argued that this population is not distinguished in terms of its cultural differences as is more clearly the case in Islington, and also that the extent of inter-marriage has resulted in numerous mixed-race house-
holds. These factors would have presented certain confounding methodological difficulties which would not have been solved through the use, as in Islington, of an ethnic booster sample—a device by which black and Asian residents were over-sampled in order to be sure to capture enough instances of victimisation to make them amenable to statistical analysis. The additional cost which would have been involved, would not have ensured data of high validity. In any case, the authors of the survey were more interested in variables which were associated with inner-city residency, than with those associated with personal characteristics. It is also probable that the survey method would not therefore have lent itself particularly well to the uncovering of racially-motivated forms of victimisation. In spite of these methodological problems, it appears to be the case that the problem of racial attacks is as serious on Merseyside as in other cities with large black populations, and as such, the question of race and victimisation remains as an important theoretical issue (see Merseyside Community Relations Council 1987).

The crime survey questionnaire is therefore essentially a compromise between what researchers would find ideal and, what given the many constraints and imperatives which impinge at every stage of preparation, it is possible to deliver. From the point of view of the research questions which arise from the theoretical and conceptual basis from which we begin the end product will always be found wanting. Our judgement of the adequacy of that product should therefore be governed by the criterion that it is the best possible instrument for the realisation of our research goals, given the resources at our disposal, and the limitations of the survey method.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: TOWARDS

CHAPTER VIII
8.1. Introduction:

In this concluding chapter, I wish to accomplish three things. I will firstly offer a summary of the themes and findings of this thesis and comment upon my theoretical conclusions. Secondly, I will discuss the problems posed by the present orientations in victimology, administrative criminology, and left idealism. Thirdly, I will discuss the impact which victimology has made on left realist criminology, and outline the tasks which must be confronted in the effort to develop a radical victimology. I will offer some suggestions for its development of theory methodology, and its orientation to policy.

8.2. A Summary of the Themes and Findings of this Thesis:

This work began with a review of the literature of victimology. In the course of this I attempted to define victimology and delimit its subject area. This proved to be difficult as the concerns of victimology overlap and are continuous with those of mainstream criminology. I noted that Mannheim (1965) was not in favour of identifying victimology as a discipline which is distinct and separate from criminology. Indeed, as one surveys the field, it is apparent that there are authors who are happy to identify themselves primarily as 'victimologists', but also others who would disavow this label. Also, there is an increasing tendency, in the journals of criminology and criminal justice, for the distinction between work in 'victimology', and 'victim-centred criminology', to become meaningless. I believe, however, that we can reliably conclude that the orientation towards victimisation and victims, which began in a small way with von Hentig in the 1940's, and gathered momentum through the 1960's and 1970's, is now an established and integral part of criminology, and has been largely responsible for transforming criminology from within.

Victimology has contributed to moving criminology away from its exclusive orientation to the etiology of crime and the treatment of the offender, and has operated in three modes. It has firstly consisted of a social psychology of victim-offender relationships; secondly, it has been a means for the promotion of the measurement of hitherto neglected aspects of the crime problem; thirdly, it has actively sought to promote and influence social and criminal justice policy in relation to services for crime victims and policies of crime prevention.
As a social psychology of victim-offender relationships, victimology has had little influence upon mainstream criminology. This remains an aspect of victimology in which a great deal of research work and findings are being accomplished in the search for the etiology of victimisation in inter-personal relations. Its quest for etiology probably explains its lack of appeal to criminologists; for, as Jock Young (1986) has argued, mainstream positivist criminology in Britain and the United States, has all but abandoned its search for the etiology of crime. As such, the discipline has not been receptive to new theoretical avenues, especially ones which are informed by theoretical frameworks in psychology, rather than in sociology.

There is a respect, however, in which victimology has been of immense importance to criminology in its attempt to solve its etiological crisis - in reality an historical juncture at which it was gradually being forced to confront its failure to explain the causes of crime and to address the permanence and increasing severity of the crime problem in a way which would lend itself to the creation of policy solutions. As Young contends, the etiological crisis was even more anomalous and threatening for positivism in the United States than it was in Britain. Not only was crime rising in pace with affluence, but street crime became a major fear of the public and there seemed little advice that establishment criminology could give that would effectively stem the tide. (ibid. p.4). One of victimology's most important contributions to the recent history of criminology, therefore, has been to considerably broaden the basis of criminological knowledge as well as contribution to a reconceptualisation of the intellectual tasks involved in the study of crime and criminal justice. It has done in two main ways. It has moved criminology away from its exclusive offender-centred focus, and it has broken the discipline's methodological deadlock. In other words, it has encouraged the development of theory and research in criminology which takes into consideration the victim, and the problem of social order at the community level. It has given criminology the means to break out of the impasse with which it has been plagued since its inception - the one caused by its reliance upon the imperfect data-gathering devices of state agencies. More than this, victimology has offered the potential for the expansion of its methods of enquiry in the direction of making the connection
between crime, its impact, and other aspects of social organisation and social problems.

In Chapter II, I turned from victimology's internal history and relationships to criminology, to begin to explore a crucial feature of it external history and its relationship to various social forces and political philosophies. In particular I examined victimology's role in relation to the political crisis arising from the state's concern with the management of problems in the social sphere. This external history can, I have proposed, be divided for the convenience of analysis, into two phases. The first is the period of the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, in which it allied itself, in the United States, to the social democratic reformism of the Democratic Party. The second phase seems to begin in 1975, and sees victimology cementing an alliance with the New Right. In tracing the 'discovery of criminal victimisation', I noted that it occurred in the context of the 'discovery of poverty'. Indeed, in the social democratic rhetoric of the time, the 'war on poverty', and the 'war on crime', were seen as part of the same overall campaign. It was axiomatic that the crime problem could only be solved through massive state intervention to eradicate poverty and discrimination.

In the light of the survey findings, the rhetoric quickly incorporated the concept of victimisation, but did so in a double sense. It was clear that much criminal victimisation was disproportionately concentrated in the slums and racial ghettos. In these areas, physical deterioration and social disorganisation combined to generate a multiplicity of social problems. The brutalising nature of these conditions of existence further produced an internecine form of crime problem in which the oppressed victimised the oppressed. Criminal victimisation was a scourge of the ghetto, and was directly attributable to the social and psychic strains which residents daily faced. It not only created an atmosphere of insecurity and fear, but also caused continual attrition of the relationship between residents and the police. This in turn bore a direct relationship to mass civil disorder.

In my discussion of social democratic thinking on crime, I noted that there then developed a merging of the concepts of social victimisation - the harms which emanate from 'normal' features of the social
economic arrangements - and that of criminal victimisation. Criminal victimisation is seen to stem directly from social victimisation. It therefore become imperative to address the problems of criminal victimisation - a compounding aspect of social disorder - through measures aimed at ensuring greater social justice. The official acknowledgement that the fear and impact of crime were a serious social problem in their own right came with the publication of the Reports of President Johnson's Crime Commission (1967), the Kerner Riot Commission (1968), and also the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969).

In each of these official studies the work of victimologists and sociological criminologists made a considerable impact, and it was clear that there was a new orientation on the part of academics towards a technocratic approach to crime and victimisation. In work of Biderman, Reiss, Wheeler, Ennis and others, for instance, there would seem to be an over-riding desire to release criminology from its methodological impasse. Concomitantly, it is as if these authors, sensing the impending etiological crisis of the discipline, sought also to save it from an impending crisis of institutional and state support.

I also noted in Chapter II that towards the end of Johnson's presidency and the 'age of reform', a number of conclusions were being drawn concerning the efficacy of social reformism in the fight against crime and civil disorder. Indeed, during the period of the Crime, Riot and Violence commissions, it was already beginning to be clear that direct federal intervention was failing to prevent rising levels of crime and delinquency. Most important of all the Great Society programmes had failed to prevent the annual recurrence of the urban riots, and the growing threat which ghetto crime posed to groups beyond its margins. In the face of these realisations, social democratic consciousness linked its abiding concern for the establishment of social justice with an over-riding concern for social order.

The imperatives of social order inevitably pushed social democrats towards the conclusion that social order was a necessary corollary of social justice. The reasoning was as follows. Both the Crime and Riot Commissions had concluded that a majority of ghetto residents were law-abiding citizens living in fear and insecurity, caused by the high rates
of intra-racial victimisation. But, at a certain point, social democrats began to talk in terms of two ghetto communities - one which is law-abiding, even in the face of serious social injustice; and another (almost pathological) element, which are propelled into crime and marginal activities by extreme social disorganisation. The following quotation from Theodore White (liberal journalist and confident of leading Democrats) sums up the type of fears which abounded, not only on the Right, but in the Democratic Party and its broad constituency. There are two communities . . .

" . . . one that is beginning to achieve, and another that is threatened with collapse of all human values, all dignity, all functions; they are almost as different as two separate ethnic groups. "

It is apparently the second of these groups who are responsible for most crime and disorder.

" . . . for the second, or collapsing, Negro community threatens both its black kin and its white neighbours with the greatest of all disasters: biological anarchy - a decomposition of family life and family discipline which simply cannot be contained in the traditional forms of American democracy or orderly politics. "

(White 1965 p.227).

This reconceptualisation of the problem of crime and disorder in the ghettos, highlighted a basic contradiction in the social democratic approach to crime control - one which it was unable to solve. If it is the case, as demonstrated, that crime and victimisation stem directly from injustice, then it followed that these evils must be eradicated through the implementation of social justice. But, they must also be attacked through the reform of the criminal justice system. Thus, because it was also demonstrated that the poor are the victims of inequality in criminal justice, the system must strive to ensure the fair treatment of all offenders, whilst at the same time striving to be more efficiently repressive.
In Chapter III, I engaged in tracing the philosophical roots of social democratic consciousness in the American context. I firstly discussed the analysis of democratic pluralism by Wolff (1965), and noted that the doctrine had been seen as a more promising alternative to classical liberalism, given the stark realities of the size and complexity of industrial society. Pluralism contained certain elements which gave shape to the politics of the Progressive Era, and later to the New Deal, and the Great Society. It emphasised the existence and claims of numerous political 'communities'; it expressed, through the principle of distributive justice, a set of prescriptive statements about what social arrangements ought to exist; it further emphasised the principle of direct participation in political life and gave American politics a penchant for coalitions of interest groups. Its approach to social justice - and hence its conception of injustice - was based upon a broad notion of rights to full social and political participation. Where the latter was absent - social injustice was present.

The New Deal era ushered in a social democratic politics in which 'saving capitalism from itself' - solving the inevitable social problems generated by the distinctive economic character of the system - became an explicitly articulated political goal (Harrington 1972; 1976). In this period the Democratic Party established itself as a social democratic party through which the claims of the organised working class were expressed. This partly became committed to the resolution of the problems of the economic and social sphere through direct state intervention (Davis 1980). The contradiction present in Democratic Party politics - and inherent in social democracy itself - is that it champions the political economy of the working class whilst at the same time attempting to preserve and rationalise capitalism.

This contradiction was expressed by Reich (1970) in the following way. "Consciousness II" (social democratic consciousness) is deeply committed to social reforms which are directed at redressing the ills resulting from "Consciousness I" (classical liberal consciousness). "Consciousness II" has a profoundly optimistic outlook on the potential for the reform of the social system; it also incorporates a view of man as an essentially positive social product. But, "Consciousness II" incorporates a potential which is deeply repressive. Its commitment
to corporate statism (from the New Deal era onwards) tended to circum­
ven t the underlying spirit of democratic pluralism, so that its adherents
tended to develop an over-riding concern with problems of order, rather
than conceptions of liberty. This tendency was then related to the
contradictions of social democratic policy on crime control.

In Chapter IV, I wrote of the fundamental importance of social and
moral statistics to the foundation of the interventionist state, acting
as they did as a 'political barometer', and a means of describing and
specifying the extent and causes of social problems. The spirit of
indeterminism with which nineteenth century reformists confronted social
problems such as crime, is carried through in the optimism of twentieth
century social democracy. Along these lines, I also noted a direct
line of continuity between the spirit of Comte's 'social physics'
and the reforming spirit of present-day sociology and sociological
 criminology. There is also a strong line of continuity between the
role accorded to quantitative measures of crime by Bentham, Quetelet
and others, and new 'avalanche of statistics' which issues from surveys
of criminal victimisation. I also extended the theme of the alliance
between criminology and the state and argued that victimology has become
but the latest of a long tradition of trends in the social sciences which
is able to ally itself to the state - at particular historical junctures
- by virtue of relevance of its methodological technology to problems
and imperatives as contemporarily perceived.

The Chapter also examines the problems of official crime statistics
with particular relevance to the 'dark figure' of crime and critically
examines the roles of the police and victims in their construction. I
also looked at different orientations within criminology toward the
question of the measurement of crime and traced the history of the
internal debates on this issue between those who pessimistically assert
that attempts at accurate measurement will always be subverted by re-
active factors, and those who more optimistically assert that measures
of crime are ever perfectable. I then examined the claims of victim-
ologists that the sample survey of victims of crime represents a
superior method for counting crimes and measuring other aspects of the
crime problem. I concluded that despite their many methodological
problems, the surveys represent an indispensible tool for addressing
some long-standing problems in criminological theory, and also for
generating quite new problems to be addressed.

In Chapter V, I turned to victimology's fascinating ability to appeal to quite different political philosophies within the ambit of crime control and criminal justice, and examined the complexities of the quite different conceptions of victimisation which appear in social democratic, right-wing, and radical varieties of criminology.

I summarised the social democratic position with reference to the content of Chapter II and noted that the appeal of victimology lay firstly in the fact that it has addressed the concern for the overlap between social victimisation and criminal behaviour. It helped in the reformulation of this concern in the direction of the overlap between social and criminal victimisation. Secondly, through its many studies of the victim in the criminal justice process, it addressed the traditional concern for the inequalities of the poor before the law. It reformulated this concern in the direction of revealing the role of the victim in the prosecution system, and the absence of the rights of the victim in that process. It added to this the discoveries that victims of crimes obtain a less than satisfactory service from the police, and that their needs are generally unmet by the agencies of the welfare state. Thirdly, victimology has offered a methodological technology which directly addresses the problem of the rationalisation of crime control at numerous levels. Herein lies the kernel of its special relationship not only to social democracy, but also to the New Right.

I described in full the position of James Q. Wilson (1975) and another which is derived largely from it - that of Patricia Morgan (1978), as well as the work of Frank Carrington (1975). Each of these authors draws heavily upon the data of crime surveys and case studies of the plight of the victims. All three also lay stress on the idea that crime results in a decline in traditional community values and networks - a decline which leads to increased victimisation. This especially happens in poorer neighbourhoods where the rates and costs of crime are highest. All write from the point of view of an apparently strongly held notion of the 'injustice' which is heaped upon the innocent by the predatory. All hold strongly to a traditional view of 'community' - one which is malfunctioning! Basic to the perspective
of right-wing criminologists therefore, is the contention that through the rational organisation of community and victims (both potential and actual), in conjunction with the rationalisation of policing and of punitive justice, lies the solution to the problems of crime and disorder. One might say that the mobilisation of virtue which underpins the solutions offered by right-wing criminology and the broad sweep of conservative approaches to criminal justice, are the complement to the insistence on the principle of deterrence as a central feature of crime control.

My argument has been that there is a direct line of continuity between this technocratic rationalism (or what Piven (1970) has called "adaptive rationalism") of social democracy's programmes, and the rationalism which informs the programmes of the New Right.

This continuity can be seen most clearly in the operations of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) - the state bureaucracy which was created in 1968 as a means through which the reform of criminal justice and law enforcement could be achieved. Although originally intended to combine the principles of humanisation and efficiency in the area of court procedure and prisons, and to give support to preventative programmes and community alternatives to custody in the area of adult and juvenile crime, the bulk of the LEAA's monies went to finance the hardware and gadgetry of police 'professionalisation' (Goulden 1970). The latter consequence was facilitated by the Nixon administration's "new federalism", whereby the LEAA made grants, but chose not to specify special conditions (such as ethnic quotas in police recruitment) nor to directly control the manner of expenditure by the states. By 1982, the crime rate had increased considerably, and was continuing to rise. In that year the agency was dismantled by the Reagan administration, and declared a monumental failure.

I argued that victimology's alliance with the New Right stemmed from its potential to contribute to the technology of repression. Whereas its many discoveries exalted the sense of injustice and loathing of inefficiency in social democratic consciousness, it equally addressed the Right's own sense of injustice about the plight of victims, and in particular their loathing of inability of the interventionist state to protect the innocent from victimisation. The publication in 1975 of James Q. Wilson's Thinking About Crime, and Frank
Carrington's *The Victims* marked the co-optation of victimology's findings into the rhetoric of right-wing criminology's critique of social democratic crime control, and established its wisdoms as part of conservative rhetoric. Victimology and its discoveries have therefore been appropriated by the adaptive rationalism of social democracy and free-market conservatism, in their separate efforts at social reconstructions through criminal justice.

I closed with an examination of the contrasts between images of victimisation in three types of radical criminology - radical deviancy theory; left-idealism; and left-realism. I noted victimology's particular impact on the latter and questioned David Friedrich's (1983) view that victimology and the radical paradigm have developed quite separately and have involved rather little direct interaction or reciprocal influence. Freidrichs omits to mention the victimological aspects of the radical study of 'crimes of the powerful', and most importantly, he neglects the influence of feminist victimology, through its numerous studies of rape, and other-sexual and non-sexual violence to women.

Feminist victimology's effect upon left-idealism has been rather paradoxical in that the latter has added violence to women to the small list of types of victimisation which it will acknowledge - at least through devotion of time and space! But, the influence of feminist victimology upon left-realism (a perspective which the former effectively pre-dates) has been far-reaching. It has firstly influenced left-realism in penology as represented by Radical Alternatives to Prison, and its journal *The Abolitionist*. RAP has, since 1982, moved away from an entirely abolitionist platform, towards a position on the limited use of imprisonment and a radical re-examination of the concept of 'dangerousness'. It has done this not only in relation to rapists, but also to other offenders (see Box-Grainger 1982a; 1982b).

Left-realist criminology has been influenced by feminist victimology, in the sense that it has alerted radicals to the widespread existence of a type of victimisation missing from the official statistics and neglected by scholars; it has demonstrated the unequal distribution of the phenomenon and the value of surveys for uncovering its hidden dimensions. Feminist victimology, therefore, has a well-
developed relationship between its theoretical edge and its evidential base. Thus, there was much in it that radicals would wish to emulate. However, left-realism has built its perspective not only on this basis, but substantially out of a dialogue with, and a critical reading of, mainstream victimology. In left-realism's earliest stages (from the mid 1970's onwards), it was dependent upon data from the American National Crime Survey. More recently it has made further use of this but also of data from the British Crime Survey, and the Policy Studies Institute Survey, as well as the various British surveys of women's victimisation, and the qualitative work on social victimisation of Jeremy Seabrook (e.g. 1983), and Paul Harrison (1983). In the present period left-realist have been actively involved in the design and implementation of local surveys of victimisation - The Islington and Merseyside crime surveys.

In Chapter VI, I presented a detailed account of the political background to the emergence of victimisation surveys in Britain. I charted the decline of social democracy and the fortunes of the Labour Party, and the rise of the New Right and Thatcherism, in the context of the crisis of British capitalism. I focussed particularly on the 'crisis of order' and the politics of law and order. In this context I discussed the immediate origins of the British Crime Survey.

The intellectual origins of the BCS lay firstly in the emergence, in the 1970's of a distinctive conservative criminology which was successful in articulating the political Right's critique of the crime control policies of social democracy. Secondly, they lay in the development within mainstream criminology of an administrative criminology concerned, as an outgrowth of victimology, with issues of victimisation and situational crime prevention. Administrative criminology presented the Right with a set of theories about the origins of crime which stressed the need to rationalise policing and to mobilise the public in the service of crime prevention. In other words, in contrast to the social democratic perspective, the emphasis was away from fighting crime through attempts to bring more social justice through state intervention and investment in the social sphere. Administrative criminology also delivered a methodological technology, in the form of the survey method, which promised (as it had in the United States), to provide a data base for the design and evaluation
of direct crime prevention and deterrence.

I also examined the political relationship between the police, the Home Office and the Thatcher government and noted that the surveys offered a basis for the rationalisation of policing methods and policies at a time which the police were being subjected to public and government scrutiny of their effectiveness in solving crimes and efficiency in organisational terms.

Chapter VI also examines the emergence of a radical reformist politics in the Labour Party and the political context of its involvement with the problem of policing the inner-cities. It also traces the expansion of the concern with policing, to incorporate a concern with victimisation and its prevention. Radical reformists started from a position wherein policing was considered as an issue separate from the issue of crime. In that position, the extent and impact of crime were minimised, and the issue of intra-working class crime ignored. Also, policing was seen primarily in terms of its public crime control and order was effectively denied.

The insights and findings of victimology, having been co-opted and refined by left-realist criminologists, made a marked impact on radical reformists' thinking about crime and policing, and caused those two issues to be considered interdependently. Hence, the evidence of the poor performance of the police in terms of the clear-up rate and the lack of protection afforded to working-class and ethnic communities, led to demands for changes in policing policy in terms of a greater responsiveness to the needs of residents of localities affected by crime. This chapter closes with an examination of the immediate political background of the Merseyside and Islington crime surveys, and traces the combination of interests which gave shape to each.

Chapter VII returns to the issue of the methodological problems of victimisation surveys. It focuses specifically on the design of survey questionnaires. I firstly give a critical examination of a draft questionnaire designed in the early stages of the Islington Crime Survey and give an account of the theoretical questions which this draft was intended to address and the methodological problems which it
was intended to solve. This is followed by critical evaluations of
the Merseyside and Islington crime survey questionnaires and a comparison
between the content of these and questionnaires used in other major
surveys. The purpose of that chapter was to show how theoretical,
methodological, political and purely practical considerations all com-
bined to contribute to the eventual outcomes.

8.3. The Problems of Victimology, Administrative Criminology and
Left Idealism

(i) Victimology and Administrative Criminology

Much of this thesis has concerned itself with victimology and its
impact upon and contribution to criminology. Clearly, for such a
young subject, victimology has succeeded in generating a vast number
of studies. The output of victimisation surveys alone represents, as
we have noted, a huge reservoir of data. In addition to this, victim-
ology has influenced the production of much other work on the fear
and impact of crime, the plight of types of victim, the place of the
victim in the criminal justice system, and the needs of victims for
specialist services. The work of victimologists has also extended
considerably into the debates on sentencing policy and alternatives to
custody. (inter alia Wright 1982). In many respects victimology has
rescued mainstream criminology from an embarrassing irrelevance and has
given the latter a new and important relationship to policy on crime.
Victimology, in the guise of administrative criminology, has also been
tremendously successful, both in Britain and the United States, in find-
ing favour in terms of conservative strategies on crime control. How-
ever, certain important questions remain to be answered - how far will
victimology be able to contribute real and lasting solutions to the
problem of criminal victimisation?; and, how able is it to address
those etiological questions which criminology has abandoned?

I noted earlier that victimology has operated in three distinct
but related modes, focusing alternately upon the social psychology of
victim-offender relationships, the study of the victim in relation to
crime prevention and the courts, and the quantification of aspects of
victimisation.

In its social psychological mode, victimology has made compara-
tively little impact on criminology, except in as far as it has contributed the concepts such as 'victim precipitation' and 'proneness'. Important though such concepts may potentially be for the future development of a fully developed theory of victimisation, they do not presently receive much attention in terms of being operationalised in empirical studies.

In turning to the work that victimologists have conducted on victims in the criminal justice system, and the impact of those studies on policy makers, this second move has been impressively successful in the United States in informing legislation to secure new legal rights for victims in the criminal process. In Britain, however, this work - although widely known and accepted in policy circles has had as yet only a minor impact on legal changes or in terms of government support for victim support services. (NAVSS 1987).

By far the biggest impact has come through victimology's quantitative methodology, and which it has passed on to administrative criminology. I have written enough in foregoing chapters for me not to have to re-state the importance of the knowledge which has resulted, and the promise and potential of the knowledge and methods, and I will also return to this below. Here I am concerned to evaluate this methodology in terms of its problems.

Long ago, C.Wright Mills (1959 pp.50-75) wrote of the problem of the "methodological inhibition" which characterised sociology's approach to the study of social problems, especially in its heavy reliance upon the results of sample surveys. The judgements which he passes on "abstracted empiricism" apply so oppositely to the case of surveys of victimisation, that I will dwell on them.

Mills' first observation is that, as a style of social science, abstracted empiricism is not characterised by any substantive propositions or theories. It is not based upon any new conception of the nature of society or of man, and the studies are thereby characterised by a conceptual thinness. Secondly, the apparatus of social surveys has become very large-scale; it operates from within bureaucracies in which the intellectual administrator and technician, compete with the more usual kinds of scholars. The philosophy of science which under-
pins the approach is important in that it lays great stress upon the natural scientific method as a formal canon for work in social science. Methodology, itself seems to determine many of the problems which are approached, and because of this epistemological dogma, abstracted empiricists are systematically ahistorical and non-comparative. Social theory as a whole becomes, therefore, reduced to a systematic collection of variables useful for the interpretation of statistical findings.

Social surveys are also charged by Mills with what he calls "psychologism". They attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of facts and theories about the make-up of individuals. Inherent also is an accompanying denial of the importance of social structure, or else it reduces social structure, as far as explanations for phenomena are concerned, to a set of milieux.

Those in the grip of abstracted empiricism also often refuse to say anything about society or social phenomena "unless it has been through the fine little mill of the Statistical Ritual" (ibid., pp. 71-72). There is often an utter obsession with minutae and detail, and this leads to fact-cluttered studies that contain little or no direct observation by those who are in charge of them.

To what extent then is administrative criminology and its national victimisation surveys open to the charges set out by Mills? Firstly, it is certainly the case that the National Crime Survey and the British Crime Survey are devoid of the direct informing influence of theories of social structure. Crime and victimisation are not viewed in terms of their historical development, nor is the approach to these phenomena linked to a theory of the connection between them and other social phenomena such as poverty, unemployment, or features of urbanism. The methodology of these surveys is, however, informed by the numerous theoretical concepts of victimology - 'opportunity', 'fear of crime', 'victim precipitation', and so forth, and these have been incorporated into a 'social control' theory of crime, in which the main causative factors are situational. These are not however, linked to aspects of social structure such as the distribution of power or wealth, or to relationships between or within social classes. Indeed criminal activity and criminal victimisation are approached entirely in terms of milieux and individual characteristics. The situational factors
must be manipulated, and the focus switched to making the opportunities for crime more difficult through target hardening (Young op.cit. p.11). The focus for empirical work thus becomes that of individual behaviour patterns, in which oceans of data are assembled in order to demonstrate the correlates of victimisation, whilst the question of the wider causes is unaddressed.

The work of Hindelang and others (1978), for example, on a lifestyle theory of victimisation would seem to epitomize Mills' notion of "fact-cluttered studies" in which "general conceptions are used to formulate structural or psychological problems for the 'front-end' of 'the write up' of the study". (op.cit.p.70).

There is no doubt that the philosophy of science underpinning the methodology of the surveys has had a constraining and inhibiting impact upon the theoretical and conceptual thrust of victimology generally. But, here one must note that the specific philosophy of science cannot be separated from the political and technological perspective of the state agencies under whose auspices victimologists work, and their relationship to the priorities of the criminal justice - industrial complex as a whole. (see also Quinney 1980 p.133-38).

Mills is not, however, entirely dismissive of the survey method nor in principle the collection of facts and measurement of phenomena. He claims that the method has great importance in the testing of carefully elaborated hypotheses, and the significance of facts and correlations. But, he says, sociology must begin from the standpoint of problems of social structure. Studies of milieux are also important, but there should also be two-way interaction between these and studies of social structure. In the light of these comments, we might conclude that the major crime surveys address the problem of crime at a level which is not only completely divorced from a macro-level orientation to crime and social structure, but also - given the empiricist and atheoretical bent of administrative criminologists - they are destined to stay so. Victimology has failed to develop a social theory of criminal victimisation and, as such, this contributes to the narrowness of the focus of the surveys and to the failure to connect the findings to wider structural issues.
(ii) Left Idealism:

Jock Young (op.cit.) has listed some ways in which the left-idealistic perspective in radical criminology has failed to substantially carry on various important features of the tradition of sociological criminology, discarded by the mainstream of the discipline.

Left idealism has, he maintains, lost sight of the basic purpose of criminology - namely, to explain the origins of the crime problem, and to build a theory which would give an adequate account of the connection between social arrangements and criminal behaviour. It has become diverted into a radical sociology of law, and order-maintainance in which the processes of criminalisation is held to be more important than the processes by which people come to break the law.

Left idealism has also rejected most of the findings of the old criminology. And, by a process of selective inattention - "Koshering" - it has neglected to extract the rational kernel from any writings which did not fit the new Marxist credentials. Left idealism has concentrated exclusively upon capitalism's problems of 'disorder', and in so doing have lost touch with the study of crime - or rather subsumed it under the general ambit of studies of disorder. Additionally, left idealists have favoured 'top-down' explanations of crime and are uninterested in those which might explain the genesis of criminal behaviour in terms of milieux, subcultures, personal predicaments, or individual experience and consciousness. Left idealism has thereby effectively discarded the search for etiology at levels other than that addressed by a generally 'superstructural' approach. Lastly, any discussion of how the problem of crime might be addressed at the level of practical solutions, have been rejected. Left idealists have lapsed into a functionalist version of Marxism which stressed the possibility of realistic social change only in the long-term revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, and the impossibility of radical reforms in the short term.

I have been concerned in this thesis and elsewhere, to identify and explain radical criminology's 'denial of the victim', and its neglect of the study of the victimisation which stems from ordinary crimes. (Phipps 1981b; 1986). In my account, in Chapter VI, of the
background to the Islington and Merseyside crime surveys, I noted the myopia and selective perception of radical reformist politicians in relation to the problem of victimisation affecting their working class constituencies. This has had the further consequence that - even given the evidence for the unmet needs of victims of crime - radical reformists have been loath to actively support non-statutory victim services or argue for an appropriate extension of the ambit of the local welfare state.

In Chapter V, I listed what I saw as the intellectual sources of this denial of criminal victimisation. I argued that a romanticised image of crime and criminals stemmed from aspects of the heritage of radical criminology, including the social democratic, interactionist and phenomenological aspects of its heritage and from libertarian and functionalist strains within Marxist political perspectives. Also, I claimed that radicals have failed to move beyond legalistic conceptions of crime, perhaps because of their primary concern with the state's response to disorder. Radical criminologists have failed to benefit from the advances made by radical sociologists in the area of theoretical debate and social research, and in terms of a thorough-going critique of capitalist society.

Additionally, radicals have largely rejected the importance of improved methods for measuring crime. They have also suffered from a 'confused moralism' in which they take intensley judgemental stances on some social problems but pretend a value-neutrality in relation to working-class crime. Lastly, radical criminology has failed to elaborate the humanism which informed its earlier years, into a more systematic socialist or Marxist humanism.

8.4. The Tasks of an Emerging Radical Victimology

(i) Sources of Theory for a Radical Victimology:

It is essentially important for a radical victimology to develop a systematic social theory of criminal victimisation. Such a theory should be capable of addressing its subject matter at a number of different related levels - the superstructural, structural and the micro levels of milieux interpersonal relations and personal experience.
At the superstructural level, radical victimology ought to be able to show how criminal harms are generated by normal features of the value system and other ideological motive forces of capitalism. Thus, for example, we could begin to elaborate the links between inter-personal harms and core values such as possessive individualism, and also the relevance of ideological forces such as the drive to capital accumulation as these permeate down to affect social relations at other levels.

At the structural level, a radical victimology should demonstrate the connections between victimisation and normal features of social organisation - the unequal distribution of wealth and power, the existence of inter- and intra-class conflict, the structure of social institutions (the family, work, education and community) and aspects of material and environmental conditions. In other words the task is, in part, to construct of macro-sociology of victimisation.

A radical victimology would also be concerned to construct an adequate theory of the more immediate sources of victimisation. This would include the study of social milieux and small life worlds, inter-personal relationships in groups and dyadic situations, as well as studies of individual constructs and cognitive orientations.

Left realism, in its present inchoate state, has already begun to address some of these issues, empirically and theoretically. I will now go on to discuss them in terms of the potential sources for the expansion of realism's theoretical base.

Left realism's emergence has already been influenced by two important theoretical trends which have argued the links between ideologies and victimisation. The first is the feminist victimology which first turned radical criminologists away from the 'denial of the victim', and demonstrated the connections between patriarchal and sexist values and the widespread existence of the violent victimisation of women. The second is the Marxist socialist tradition. In this it is axiomatic that the motive forces of capitalism provide a dialectic of material conditions and social values from which stem exploitation, brutalisation and a range of physical and psychological harms. In this respect the work of criminologists of the Birmingham school, though shot-through with idealism in its selective approach to victimisation,
has constructed a theoretical framework for the understanding of the interplay between developments in capitalism, the existence of racism as a potent social ideology, and the victimisation of black people.

What I would like to suggest, at this point, is that the attempt to construct a radical victimology as an integral part of left-realist criminology, necessitates the consideration of the importance of a socialist or Marxist humanism. I will give an account of the features of this tradition, and suggest its relevance to our theoretical tasks.

George Novak (1973 pp.121-50) has argued that humanism is an integral component of a consistent materialist philosophy. It has become common for Marxists to argue, he suggests, that humanism pushes aside materialism by a relapse into a "fashionable form of sentimental or moralising socialism" (ibid. p.121). Socialist humanism is often accused of idealism - making an idol of reason detached from the social context. But, for Novak, reason - like any other human capacity, is a product of social activity and a function of social development. Socialist humanists do, however, address the problem not only of the perfectibility of human social arrangements, but also the perfectibility of the individual personality.

He traces humanism in the history of bourgeois thought from the Greeks, through the Renaissance, to the thought of the industrial era, and concludes that it has represented a progressive current. From the Middle Ages onwards, humanism - locating human beings and their interests as central to the study of social endeavour - was closely tied to the rise of science. In the industrial era humanism was a powerful force informing social reformism and nascent socialist programmes. However, nineteenth century humanists faced an insurmountable internal contradiction.

"The splendid hopes and far-ranging programmes they projected for the cultivation of the potentialities of our species, could only be converted into meagre actualities because of the exploitative and oppressive structure of class society."

( ibid. p.122-3).

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In the work of Marx, the discrepancy between humanist ideals and social reality is addressed and explained in terms of the need for a complete socialist transformation of social and human relations. There has been much debate on the status of humanism in the work of Marx. Some writers, including Louis Althusser and others, have claimed that humanism is a feature of the 'young', 'immature' Marx and his earliest writings on alienation. There is also a school of thought which argues that the humanist impulse - the concern for the human aspects of the social relations of production and the potential for human and social transformation - is present throughout the whole of his works. (Avineri 1968; Messaros 1970).

The hallmark of Marxist humanism, in contrast to its Marxist opponents, is the concern - referred to above - to study and understand the dialectical relationship of social, economic, and ideological structures and development on the one hand, and the micro-level of personal consciousness and development on the other. It is this characteristic which should commend it to criminologists. Important work in this tradition includes that of the Frankfurt School, and of the writers such as Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, who attempted to synthesise the works of Marx and Freud (see Robinson 1969; Phipps 1973). More recently Peter Leonard (1984) has revived the spirit of this work and has attempted to construct a materialist theory of human personality. His programme incorporates not only a consideration of the rational insights of bourgeois psychologies, but also a detailed examination of feminist theory of the relationship of structures and ideologies to human consciousness and practice. Indeed, Leonard carries forward a perennial concern of Marxist humanists, namely the centrality of the problem of how social structures and ideologies reproduce themselves in the human psyche and in everyday relationships between individuals.

For David Friedrichs (1983), Marxist humanism has much to offer radical criminology. He claims that the dominant thrust of mainstream American criminology in the twentieth century has been non-humanistic, and "essentially positivistic, deterministic, uncritical, and detached . . .". I can only partially agree with this, as a reading of social democratic criminology (both in its academic and political forms) reveals a strong undercurrent of humanism or humanitarian concern. Indeed much of the thrust of positivism in criminology has been not at
all 'detached' but morally committed and openly allied to social reformism. The eclipse of mainstream criminology's humanism may be seen in the light of its abandonment of the quest for etiology. Both may be seen as attributable to the absence of a political economy of capitalism and its particular historical relationship to the state and its repressive institutions.

Friedrichs further argues, correctly I think, that a unification of radical and humanistic ideals in criminology would enrich theory and research, and contribute not only to radical criminology's critique of capitalist society and its criminogenic features, but it will assist in a theoretical and programmatic way to the development of a just society. Contributing to such a vision may be one of the most central tasks of a radical criminology. (see Boehringer 1975).

What then of the relevance of Marxist humanism to a radical victimology? Here, I think we can propose in general that the central concepts of Marxist humanism - alienation, brutalisation, and marginalisation - those that have informed Marxist criminology in its various phases, have an important place in another of radical victimology's essential tasks - namely, to address and remedy some of Marxist criminology's problems (Young 1981). Thus, the latter has been characterised by an over-concentration upon the total society and a lack of emphasis on the micro-level of analysis of the biographical interaction of individual and society. There is also the related problem of applying Marxist analysis to the understanding of non-economic crimes. Also, there is the need to address the problem of the shorter-term reform of society and the criminal justice system. Lastly, there is the problem of planning the shape of criminal justice policy under socialism.

The content of Marxist humanism is capable of contributing to the resolution of all of these problems. It is by far the least orthodox of trends within Marxism both in the inclusiveness of its thought, and in its non-utopian insistence - born of its critique of Stalinism - that a socialist society would continue to wrestle with many of the social and human predicaments (including crime and victimisation) which have afflicted social existence under capitalism. (see Fromm 1965).

A commitment to humanism also presupposes a commitment to studying
the problem of social and interpersonal harms. I have referred in Chapter V to the confused moralism of radical criminology, and the intense difficulty which radical social scientists have with the question of value-judgements. The problem is somewhat related to the 'value-free' postures of academic social science. But, it is also related, as some Marxist writers have made clear, to the confusion with Marx and Marxism on moral issues generally (see Ash 1964). In some senses Marxism is very moralistic but in other senses agnostic on the question of morality. As Steven Lukes (1986) has said, the interests of human individuals in the here and now has taken second place to the hopes for the maximal realisation of human powers at some future time.

Stan Cohen (1979) has decried radical criminology's neglect of the problem of evil. The attempts of realists to address the contradictory features of working-class crime and to engage in moral judgements upon it, as well as the crimes of the powerful, may be seen as helping to open up this issue.

In this respect, there is certainly a case for radical victimologists to re-appraise the usefulness of the concept of pathology. This was a central tenet of positivist criminology and, as far as radical criminologists have been concerned, it has been finally and eloquently debunked by David Matza. There is however a case for the careful re-definition of pathology as part of a wider debate about the objective nature of social and inter-personal harms. (see Kavolis 1969).

Another important source of theory for a radical victimology, and one which has had a considerable influence upon left-realists has been the social democratic tradition in which criminal victimisation has been viewed as an aspect of, and as derived from, social victimisation. Social democratic criminology has always been heavily influenced by critical sociology and its focus upon the unmasking of social inequalities. In the work of Ramsey Clark (1970) we find the clearest statements of the overlap and inter-penetration of criminal behaviour, victimisation, and inequality. And, in the work of British criminologists such as McClintock and Avison (1968 p.83) we find the demonstration of positive correlations between rates for certain crimes and such phenomena as infant mortality. The work of radical sociologists in the field of poverty (especially Townsend 1979), inequalities in
health (Doyal 1979; Townsend and Davidson 1980), and on the effects of poverty and deprivation on inner-city communities (Harrison 1983; Seabrook 1983), lays strong emphasis upon the inter-relatedness and mutually compounding features of social problems, and it is these structural insights which will be of very great use in our attempts to situate and locate the structural sources of criminal victimisation.

The work of Lea and Young (1984) has begun to develop a theory of crime and victimisation which incorporates the findings of crime surveys, mainstream criminology, and sociology. Intra-working class crime, for example, is analysed on the level of intermediate social structures - communities and subcultures - as well as attempting to reveal the interconnectedness of victimisation and other aspects of the macro social structure, including the problems of poverty and unemployment.

It is also important for us to assess the extent to which the concepts of mainstream victimology's social psychology victimisation may contribute to the building of theory at the micro level. In experimental social psychology, a number of theoretical frameworks are being tested for their relevance to psychological situational variables which have a bearing on some problem areas of victimology. These include attribution and social exchange theories in their application to victim behaviour, and public responses to the victim's plight (see Greenberg and Ruback 1982); the 'just world' perspective on the denial of victims and 'victim derogation' (Lerner 1975; Cialdini et al. 1976); and experimental work on the variables which contribute to the targeting of potential victims (Castleman 1982). Our critical and speculative approach might aid us in concluding what this work has to offer for developing a micro-theory of interpersonal harms. Much of it is presently completely divorced from a macro-level analysis, but some reconciliation of the social psychology with social structure should be possible (see Harris and Hill 1982). Indeed, the phenomenological work of Emanuel Marx (1976) on interpersonal violence may serve as a model for how such a reconciliation might be approached.

Equally, the work of Pizzey and Shapiro (1981) on the behavioural and cognitive factors at work in 'violent relationships', may well contribute to the re-examination of 'victim proneness', 'victim precipitation', and other victimological concepts, in order to move towards
understanding of the phenomena of 'multiple' and 'series' victimisation.

I am concerned here to suggest that the construction of a social theory of victimisation requires that we pay careful attention to the cognitive orientation which we bring to the task. An emerging radical victimology should be informed by a consciousness, the guiding principle of which should be a commitment to an open, speculative, and inclusive intellectual attitude. In light of what we have learned of the blind spots of left idealism and distorting consequences, we must be permanently mindful of the need to expand our consciousness of issues bearing on our endeavours. As such, we must develop a parallel sociology of our knowledge - one which is rigourously reflexive. I stress this point because of the fact that a radical victimology would be necessarily eclectic and multi- (or perhaps inter-) disciplinary. This feature is not necessarily a strength and has many potential pitfalls. For these reasons, intellectual honesty and reflexiveness will be essential if the new approach is to retain its incisiveness, relevance and integrity. A radical victimology would therefore examine the fields of criminology and victimology in such a spirit. It would carry on the task - in party with the other branches of realist criminology - of 'giving criminology back its past' (Young op.cit. pp.13-16). The construction of our understanding of the phenomenon of criminal victimisation requires that we excavate features of the old criminology which would assist us in putting the search for etiology back on the agenda.

All of the false-sarts and blind alleys of the old criminology's relinquished quest must be explored anew their potential in helping us to understand the processes by which individuals come to engage in or become victim to, criminal harms. Thus, the tradition of mainstream sociological criminology in its search for the connection between social inequality, sub-cultural forms, and crime, is a rich vein to tap. We must also re-examine appreciative tradition, from the nineteenth century reportage of Mayhew and others, through to the Chicago School and its derivatives, to the work of the interactionists and phenomenologists. These traditions are indispensable for what they have to offer both in terms of theory and method as a reading of the work of left-realist such as Lea and Young, and Ian Taylor reveals, the realist perspective is also engaged in a debate with social democ-
ratio and right-wing criminologies in terms of the contribution which a careful examination of their propositions may make to the ongoing development of radical criminology.

(ii) The Methodology of a Radical Victimology

Much of the work of this thesis has been concerned with methodology. In various chapters I have discussed the role of social statistics in the development of the social sciences and criminology, and the special place which such quantitative methods of enquiry have had in relation to social reformism and social democracy. In Chapter IV, I discussed the measurement of crime and the surrounding methodological debates, and saw this as a central problematic of mainstream criminology. I also evaluated the claim that victimisation surveys provide a solution to the criminological obsession with the problem of adequate data on crime. I drew the tentative conclusion that despite their many methodological problems, they possess an enormous potential for illuminating hitherto hidden aspects of the crime problem, and moving us away from intuition and guess work towards a firm data-base for the elaboration of theory. The survey method is an indispensible and powerful tool for the uncovering of victimisation and its correlates. It has proved itself capable of generating data which challenge long-held theoretical assumptions, but also data for which no existing theoretical framework seems entirely appropriate. I speak here, for instance, of findings which demonstrate the extremely 'skewed' nature of the distribution of victimisation and the problems of 'multiple' and 'series' victimisation. One may also mention here the discovery of forms of victimisation (e.g. racial and sexual assault and harassment) which are not widely acknowledged as prevalent, or else which are not criminalised.

I have also drawn attention to the various shortcomings of the survey method. The critique offered by Wright Mills (1959) concerning the dangers of "methodological inhibition", and "abstracted empiricism", and "psychologism", and Hilary Graham's (1983) critique of the masculine-centredness of the language categories and procedures of social surveys, have presented a formidable array of challenges to those who would rely too heavily upon this single methodology. Graham's conclusions are that, quite simply, survey methodologists may construe and articulate the world of personal experience in ways quite different to the subjects...
of the research. Thus, the survey method has the capacity to produce data which is dangerously affected by reactivity or else that relevant data is lost, or that its meaning is distorted at the stage of interpretaiton. Her remarks have a particular relevance to the use of surveys to capture the experiences of women, but they are equally applicable to the case of other groups such as ethnic minorities, the young, and working class people.

An important feature of left realism, one which distinguishes it from previous trends in radical criminology, is that it has re-discovered the virtues of quantitative methods after twenty years of a well-ingrained radical disdain of such 'positivistic' devices, and a belief that social phenomena are simply not amenable to measurement.

Most of the difficulties of survey methods are widely acknowledged by left realists and mainstream victimologists alike. Both, however, seem optimistic that refinements of the method may overcome these problems. The time is perhaps right for us to consider whether this faith if well-founded, or whether many of the problems can not in fact be solved within the confines of the method, or indeed whether some of them are not actually a product of the method. Let us look at some examples.

Firstly, there is the example of the very small number of sexual crimes captured in the first and second sweeps of the British Crime Survey. The Islington Crime Survey was more successful in that a greater proportion of women were willing to report such incidents. When we turn to feminist surveys however (e.g. Hall 1985; Hanmer and Saunders 1984) a much greater number of incidents are revealed. These differences have in part to do with sampling, definitional variations, and question wording; but it also seems to be the case that feminist surveys have sometimes adopted a quite different interviewer style in which (in addition to matching female interviewers with female subjects) there is a greater effort to establish a dialogue through probing and discussion. In this respect the data is produced by a research process which incorporates a qualitative element. This effect is also found in Maguire and Corbett's (1987) research on victims of crime, wherein in-depth interviews generated a higher proportion of reports of adverse effects of incidents than did the more straightforward interview.
A second problem which might be mentioned concerns the higher rate of assaults reported to crime surveys by young people, in comparison to older people. It may be suspected that many of the responses to questions such as "did anyone hit you . . etc?" include incidents which the respondent counted as of little consequence. These may certainly be accurate counts of incidents, but the counting proceeds without reference to the meaning which the respondents attribute to them.

These and other examples of problems associated with victimisation surveys clearly cannot be finally solved by the use and refinement of the survey method. The method has, in reality, the capacity to generate more questions than it is capable of solving. It is therefore necessary to consider how the survey method might be augmented by other methods capable of throwing new light on phenomena. Glaser and Strauss (1967) have, for instance, argued that some of the problems of quantitative methods may only be overcome through varying the source of their data and by engaging in alternative, more naturalistic, methods of data collection.

Left realists have discovered that quantitative methods are, by and large, appropriate for 'mapping' the phenomenon of victimisation, and presenting the facts to be explained. But, there is also the need to concede the place of 'softer' methodologies in complementing and making clear the human significance of, survey data. Thus, in the literature, there are numerous examples of the use of alternative methods in relation to victims of crime. Thus, reportage based on structural observations (e.g. Harrison 1983), case studies (Hunt 1972), self-accounts and depth interviews (Bard and Sangrey 1979; Shapland et al. 1985; Maguire and Corbett 1987), and other similar strategies, have produced data of great value. Alternative methods would also be essential in opening-up the much under-researched issue of understanding victimisation from the perspective of the victimiser (e.g. Sykes and Matza 1957; Walsh 1980; Maguire 1982).

The development of a methodology for a radical victimology should include the possibility of triangulation - the approach to research questions through multiple methods. Smith (1975 pp.272-92) claims that
findings which are based on the constricted framework of a single method must always be subject to the suspicion that they are "method-bound" and that they may totter when exposed to an equally prudent but different testing method. Research methods are never atheoretical or neutral in presenting the world "out there". They act as filters through which the environment is selectively experienced. By using one's knowledge of how each method may selectively bias or distort the social scientist's picture of "reality", combinations of methods may be selected which more accurately represent what is "out there". The types of triangulation open to the researcher include a) **Data triangulation over time** - wherein, for example a panel analysis may be used (as in the National Crime Survey) to compare the same measurements for the same sample at different points in time. b) **Data triangulation in space** - wherein the same measures are used in different locations with different populations. The existence and comparison of data from local and national crime surveys presents the possibility for this. c) **Investigator triangulation** - in which multiple observers are used in naturalistic studies for the purpose of calculating inter-investigator reliability correlations. d) **Methodological triangulation within methods** - in which the purpose is to provide replication by the repeat of a study; and, **between methods**, in which the main goal is that of disconfirming the charge that findings are merely artifacts of particular methods. This last type would seem to have a special relevance to the methodological imponderables of crime surveys.

Thus, for example, the problem of the highly focused nature of victimisation - the fact that, even within populations with high average victimisation rates, a small proportion of people suffer disproportionately - could be tackled through the application of different methods. Using survey results as pointers to the characteristics of multiple and series victims, research teams could supplement their results through the use of ethnographic methods to investigate the subcultural and interpersonal dimensions, and the use of self accounts to investigate the associated meaning structures. In essence there is a pressing need to throw light upon the victimisation surveys own dark areas.

The potential value of using any of these alternative methods must of course be judged against the costs in terms of money, time and other considerations. At the present time crime survey methodologists rather
than being able to engage in these alternatives, are being pressured towards a *parsimony* of practice. Therefore, the known problems may in some senses have to be 'lived with'. Another possibility is that methodologists, if they are in the position to conduct subsequent 'sweeps' of victimisation studies, may wish to predict the value of varying the method - from the survey method to an alternative method in its stead.

(iii) **Policy Issues for a Radical Victimology**

Despite its problems and shortcomings, the surveys have shown themselves to be capable of addressing a wide range of issues relating to victimisation. Because of their potential to focus on differential vulnerability to crime within populations, and differential responses on the part of the public and the police to different aspects of the crime problem, surveys are particularly suited to addressing issues of policy. In this respect the three tasks which I am outlining - in the areas of theory, methodology and policy - are, in reality interlocking and inseparable, but I have separated them for purposes of discussion.

Young (1986) has argued that a realist criminology also necessitates an accurate victimology. This should not, however, just consist of an empiricism - a means merely of describing the crime problem and the plight of victims - but should be a means of constructing alternative explanations to those of the Right and suggesting alternative policies.

As Lea and Young (1984) have made clear, there is an intimate connection between the plight of the local social structure and the quality of information about its features and problems, and the breakdown of community is accompanied by a decrease in accurate knowledge about crime. The issue of information and access to it is an inherently political issue, for that knowledge and the power to change the social structure are intimately linked.

In a similar vein, Ian Taylor (1984 p.86) has written of the urgent need for socialists to give serious attention to the construction of "transitional or pre-figurative" social programmes. Indeed, this is precisely the platform of radical reformists in the Labour Party.
The programmes should, says Taylor, encompass the entire field of social policy, in order both to counter the activities of the Right, and in order to generate socialist responses to a wide variety of social needs. There is also an urgent need for a "transitional socialist criminology" to promote programmes on crime, for the more that free-market conservatism bites into the social fabric, the more predatory crimes will become a problem in the inner-cities. Such a socialist criminology must be a practical criminology which champions the working class but does not become merely a reflection of the common sense about crime which is common in the class and which has often been co-opted by the Right.

Indeed, in agreeing with Taylor, I would argue that such programmes should reflect a triangular relationship between the realism of working class common sense, the theoretical and methodological thrust of realism and radical reformism's emerging policies on crime control. What I am suggesting here is that the expressed needs and concern of the populations and groups should be constantly monitored, and that these should - together with empirical evidence of the extent and distribution of victimisation and risk - inform the focus of local policy. In consultation with the public, radical reformists in the inner-cities should originate programmes which address the problem of crime as part of their approach to the related problems of the local social structure. Within this triad, radical victimologists have a crucial part to play in laying bare new areas of knowledge and helping to develop programmes, but also being directly involved in monitoring and evaluation.

So far, the second generation of local crime surveys has been mainly oriented towards policy on police accountability and especially with mapping dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the police in terms of crime prevention and detection. Data from these surveys have facilitated the formulation of clear demands concerning aspects of police practice and responsiveness. They have, for example, also formed a basis for the construction of totally new approaches to policing, including the concept of 'multi-agency policing'. (Kinsey et al., 1986). But, even in the face of such developments, there will be a continuing need to evaluate police performance.

There are other programmes, specifically related to victimisation,
which a radical victimology might address. The immanent one is that of crime or victimisation prevention. The surveys have already generated much which speaks to the problem of how individuals, household and communities can be protected from criminal harms. Work on the potential and problems of Neighbourhood Crime Watch has already begun. Kinsey et al. (op. cit. p.104) have, for instance, concluded that community-based initiations in crime prevention are an important innovation, but that there are a number of reasons why it should be a local authority rather than a police function to operate such schemes, and that crime prevention can only succeed as part co-ordinated local social policies. Indeed the whole problem of victimisation and crime prevention is politically tied to the issue of local democracy and the responsiveness of the local state to the needs and demands of its constituents. In this respect the movement towards the democratisation of aspects of local government, particularly in terms of accountability in the delivery of services, is very relevant to the question of how local government policy, broadly conceived, can address these issues. The role of radical victimologists should, again, be one of critical evaluation.

Some other areas of policy development to which a radical victimology should contribute. Firstly, there is the area of services for victims of crime. I have noted in Chapter V the absence of financial support by the Conservative government for victims support schemes, and also the very slow response on the part of Labour local authorities. Very substantially as a result of crime survey findings, the work of realist criminologists, and the political lobbying of the National Association for Victims Support Schemes and the Labour Campaign for Criminal Justice, the Labour Party has now included state support for victim services as part of its policies on criminal justice (Labour Party 1987). The task of a radical victimology would be to continue to demonstrate that the area of victims' needs is a major one for both criminal justice and social policy. The findings of Maguire and Corbett (1987), for instance, are not only that the existing limited structure of victims support fails to provide help of more than a small proportion of victims in need, but also that the system of direct referral by the police includes elements of selectivity and bias which ensures that specific localities, communities and sub-groups of those who report crimes to the police are effectively denied the service. In addition to this, there are no services at all available to victims who do not
report crimes.

There is a pressing need, therefore, for crime surveys to retain and expand the priority which they give to the quantification of the impact of crime, the measurement of the extent to which services reach victims, and the victims' evaluations of those services.

A further area worthy of attention is that of the place of the victim in the criminal justice system. Although highly developed in many respects (e.g. Sumner 1979), the Marxist sociology of law has been notable for its neglect of the study of this aspect of bourgeois rights. The historical account of the state's appropriation of the ancient rights of victims to seek representation and redress in the criminal process has largely been engaged in by liberal theorists (e.g. Eser 1966; Christie 1978). This is an area essential to the development of a socialist jurisprudence and the construction of alternative socialist forms of justice. Those, and the works of writers such as Santos (1979) and Wright (1982), may mark point of entry for radical victimologists to develop, through the survey method, an accurate account of knowledge and opinion concerning such present policies as relate to cautioning and sentencing, especially in relation to juvenile offenders. We can also explore attitudes to such innovative initiatives as mediation schemes, restitution and reparation by offenders to their victims, and other schemes which have the features, jointly, of diverting the offender and victim from the problematic features of the formal criminal justice system, and potentially of giving back the solution to what in the most part are community problems, to communities themselves.

Lastly, a radical victimology should contribute to other aspects of emerging socialist criminal justice policies. Ian Taylor (op.cit. p.125), and Tony Platt (1982) have argued that radicals should contribute to the struggle for reforms in the areas of imprisonment, community alternatives to custody, as well as legal aid and civil liberties. In this respect it is perhaps appropriate to close this section with Platt's remarks on radical criminologists' emerging orientation towards policy issues.

"... it is a positive sign that we are now beginning to address the serious problem of crime and to formulate progressive policy proposals. At the same time we need to do a great deal of dif-
ficult theoretical work, to escape from the intellectual straight-jacket of "criminology" and use the complex science of Marxism to get beyond muck-raking radicalism. And given that Marxism is, after all a guide to action, our policy proposals and theoretical enterprises must be informed by and tested in practice. "

( ibid. p.44).

(iv) Conclusion:

I will close this section on the tasks of a radical victimology with some remarks concerning its internal development and external relationships. Here I would like to invoke Alvin Gouldner's (1973) arguments concerning the relationship between sociology and Marxism, as I think that these are instructive for realist criminology. For Gouldner, academic sociology has a liberative potential. In the nineteenth century the methods of positivist sociology made possible the empirical self-understanding of societies and rendered problematic many of the facts and ideologies of those societies. This rational kernel of the discipline contributed substantially to varieties of socialism including Marx's own, and continues to give sociology its potency. In this respect the theoretical and empirical tools of sociology make it ideal for the critical evaluation of established dogmas, social and political structures, and institutional and bureaucratic mechanisms.

There would seem to me to be two points of relevance emerging from this. Firstly, as Gouldner asserts, Marxism is itself intensely ideological and as such sociology may be a powerful source of "critique and renewal". The realist criminology which is being constructed, and a radical victimology will inevitably be internally guided by ideological considerations. I earlier urged that we must develop a critical sociology of our own knowledge - one which is rigourously reflexive. One role of the methodologies which will be adopted - both quantitative and qualitative - will be to allow us to examine our own performance.

There is a second implication for us of Gouldner's arguments. Not only will ideologies inform realism's internal development, but alliances will continue to be formed, particularly with the radical reformist
left of the Labour Party. We can, in our empirical work, continually monitor and evaluate the anti-crime, anti-victimisation policies of the national and local state. Given that our relationship will be most closely with the local state, the challenge is two-fold. It affords realist criminology and its victimological component, a unique opportunity to affect radical social experiments in the field of crime and crime prevention. The second challenge is that of the danger of co-optation to the local (or the national) state; a danger that academic credibility and integrity, and the liberative potential of our endeavours will be sullied by political constraints and imperatives, if we fail to maintain some critical and organisational detachment.

The central problematic of radical victimology can be stated as follows: to study social and interpersonal harms, and to discover the origins of the processes by which harms are perpetrated, whether by socio-economic systems, governments, corporate or social institutions, or by groups or individuals. A radical victimology would be guided by a programme similar to that proposed for the new criminology (Taylor et al. 1973). In other words the sources of harm would be traced to their wider origins in social structures; their origins in intermediate level social and structural arrangements such as urban collectivities and communities; the immediate origins of harms in the nature a quality of interpersonal relations. The study of 'actual acts' and their situation and inter-psychic components would be as important a task as that of charting the extent, distribution and impact of harms more generally. A radical victimology would also necessarily study the 'social reaction to social and interpersonal harms', the wider origins of that reaction and its effects. Its emerging understanding of the victimisation process as a whole, would lead a radical victimology to propose social and policy reforms aimed at eradicating victimisation in the short and medium terms, and contribute to socialist programmes for the transformations necessary for realisation of a society in which victimisation would gradually be abolished.

A radical victimology would be informed by a socialist or Marxist humanism, and attempt to build upon all that is progressive in mainstream criminology, victimology, and left-idealism. In so doing it would attempt to synthesise their respective orientations to the offender, the victim, and the state. (Kinsey 1985).
Lastly, a radical victimology must engage in a debate on a complex but deeply relevant problem. The problem of social and interpersonal harms is one which is universal and transcends the boundaries of culture and history. The problem of harm is a human as well as a social problem - one which is related to the subject-object dichotomy which is a component of our "species-being" (Marx 1844). Social systems have in their various ways exacerbated this dichotomy, separating us from our world, our fellow humans, and ourselves, and setting in motion the processes by which harms occur. A greater understanding of these processes would be a radical victimology's essential contribution to a just society.
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<td>Transcript of Interview with Trevor Jones of London Borough of Islington Police Committee Support Unit: 3rd April 1985</td>
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<td>Transcript of Interview with Dr. Jock Young, Middlesex Polytechnic Centre for Criminology: 10th July 1985</td>
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<td>Transcript of Interview with Barbara Roache of London Borough of Hackney Police Committee Support Unit: 10th July 1985</td>
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<td>FIELD NOTES VI</td>
<td>Notes of proceedings of press conference to launch First Report of Merseyside Crime Survey; Merseyside County Council Headquarters: 15th November 1984</td>
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<td>FIELD NOTES VII</td>
<td>Transcript of taped interview with Pete Gill and Geoff Willis of Merseyside County Council Planning Department / Police Committee Support Unit: 12th July 1985</td>
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FIELD NOTES VIII

Notes of interview with Douglas Wood of Social and Community Planning Research 27th October 1986

FIELD NOTES IX

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<td>London, RKP</td>
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</table>
I would like to begin by asking you some questions about this area/estate:

1. What sort of things do you LIKE about his area/estate?

2. What sort of things do you DISLIKE about this area/estate?

3. If you moved away would you be SAD or GLAD?
   1. SAD
   2. GLAD
   IF SAD:- Skip to Qu.4
   IF GLAD:- 3(a) What sort of area or estate would you prefer to live in?

4. In the time that you've lived in this area/on this estate, what sort of changes have you seen take place?

5. Have things changed for the better, stayed the same, or got worse?
   1. Got better
   2. Stayed the same
   3. Got Worse
   4. DK
6. Do you have relatives or close friends living near you - say within a short walking distance?

1. YES .........
2. No .........

If YES skip to Qu.7

If NO ask: -(6a) Where do your nearest relatives/close friends live?
(RECORD EXACT LOCATION - area, town etc.)

7. How well do you know your immediate neighbours (e.g. those living in adjoining houses or flats; across the way; or up/down stairs)?

1. Know them very well to speak to .........
2. Sometimes speak/nodding acquaintance ......
3. Don't really know them ......

(record any additional comments)

8. If you needed someone's help, in an emergency, do you have any one on whose help you could call? If so, who would that be?

1. Yes:- READ OUT
   Someone living with you ...
   - a relative living nearby 
   - a close friend 
   - a neighbour 
   - another person(specify) 

2. No:-
3. Not really/Don't know .........

9. Just thinking about this area/estate, would you say there is much crime around here?

- would you say there is: 1. a great deal .........
2. quite a lot .........
3. not much .........
4. very little .........
5. none/never hear of any .........
6. don't really know .........

10. (ASK ALL:- (show card with scale)
I'm going to mention certain types of crime - I wonder if you could tell me how often they occurred around here/on this estate?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEFT</th>
<th>A LOT</th>
<th>A FAIR AMOUNT</th>
<th>NOT MUCH</th>
<th>VERY LITTLE</th>
<th>NEVER HEAR</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
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<td>HOUSES BEING BROKEN INTO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PROPERTY BEING DAMAGED</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEHICLES BEING DAMAGED OR STOLEN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ATTACKS OR EMBARRIES IN THE STREET</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER (Specify)</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

10a. What sort of people would you say are responsible for these crimes being committed around here?

(Read out all offences scaled 1-4 and record above)

11. Do you think there is more crime committed against the residents of this area/estate than on other areas or estates nearby?

1. Yes - More .........
2. About the same .........
3. No - Less .........
4. Don't really know .........

12. Do you ever personally feel UNSAFE inside your own house/flat - either in the daytime or after dark?

(Ask separately)

In the daytime
1. YES - definitely .........
2. Sometimes feel unsafe .........

After dark
1. YES - definitely .........
2. Sometimes feel unsafe .........
(12a) What sorts of things do you fear might happen, while you are at home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daytime</th>
<th>After dark</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Record Verbatim)</td>
<td>(Record Verbatim)</td>
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(Ask Separately)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the daytime</th>
<th>After Dark</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(3. No - Never)</td>
<td>(3. No - Never)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4. Never think about it)</td>
<td>(4. Never think about it)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5. Don't know)</td>
<td>(5. Don't know)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(12b) Are there people living round here whom you think not safe in their own homes?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Daytime</th>
<th>After Dark</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the daytime</td>
<td>After Dark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. YES</td>
<td>1. YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NO</td>
<td>2. NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Don't know/couldn't say</td>
<td>3. Don't know/couldn't say</td>
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(If YES to 12b ask: (12c) What type of people are not safe in their houses in the daytime and/or after dark?

(Record Verbatim)

14. Do you ever avoid going out in the daytime or after dark, because you feel that your house/flat might not be safe while you are gone?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daytime</th>
<th>After Dark</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) In the daytime</td>
<td>(b) After Dark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. YES</td>
<td>1. YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NO</td>
<td>2. NO</td>
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</table>

15. Do you ever avoid going out ALONE, in the daytime or after dark, because you fear what might happen to you while you were out?

<table>
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<th>Daytime</th>
<th>After Dark</th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) In the daytime</td>
<td>(b) After Dark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. YES</td>
<td>1. YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NO</td>
<td>2. NO</td>
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</table>

(13a) What sort of things do you think might happen? (record verbatim)

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<th>Daytime</th>
<th>After dark</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>(Record Verbatim)</td>
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Now, thinking about LONDON (as a whole) - in the past few years:

16. Do you feel that the amount of crime has, in general, increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?
   - Increased
   - Decreased
   - Stayed the same
   - Don't know.

17. I'd now like to ask you how often you go out in the daytime/ evening, the things you did, and about the type of transport you used:

Let us take the last week/7 days for instance:

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<tr>
<th>DAYTIME</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>TRANSPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MON.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TUE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WED.</td>
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<td>THU.</td>
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<td>FRI.</td>
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<td>SAT.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SUN.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Do you belong to local organisation (e.g. a church, club etc) or to any national organisation with a local branch?
   (Write in which)
   -----------------------------------------------

19. In general, what sort of job would you say the police do in this area?
   (Show card) 1. a very good job
   2. a fairly good job
   3. a fairly poor job
   4. a very poor job
   5. don't know

20. Again, thinking about this area - do you think they are concentrating their efforts on the right sort of crimes?
   1. YES
   2. NO
   3. DON'T KNOW

If YES - go to Qu.21

If NO, ask: (20a) What sort of crimes, in your opinion, ought the police to be concentrating on? (record verbatim)

21. Do you feel that the police are present in this area?
   1. Often enough
   2. Not often enough
   3. Too often

22. Do you feel that there's enough contact between the police and the community over issues which may concern local residents?
   1. YES
   2. NO
   3. DON'T KNOW
23. Do you feel that the police would do a better job against crime if they operated in foot patrols rather than in cars?

1. YES
2. NO
3. DON'T KNOW

(Show card then ask:-)

24. Would you say relationships between police and the residents of this area/estate are:

1. Very good
2. Quite good
3. Quite poor
4. Very poor
5. Don't know

25. During this year (1983) have you asked the police for any type of help?

If YES: - what kind of help was this? (record)

........................................................................
........................................................................
........................................................................

(if respondent has reported being a victim of a crime, tell them that you will ask the details shortly - then ask :-)

ASK all:- (25a) Were you satisfied with their response and manner toward you?

1. YES - very satisfied
2. YES - quite satisfied
3. NO - quite dissatisfied
4. NO - very dissatisfied

26. Have you ever been stopped by the police and asked questions when you were on foot?

IF NO GO TO QU.29

IF YES: - (26a) did this happen this year? 1. YES
2. NO

(26b) how many times has this happened this year? (record number) 3.

27. On any occasion, did the police search you or anything you were carrying?

1. YES
2. NO

IF YES: - (27a) On any of those occasions, do you feel that the police were unjustified in stopping and/or searching you?

1. YES
2. NO

28. On any occasion, did you have any reason to feel that the police did not behave properly towards you?

1. YES
2. NO

IF YES: - probe for details of incident.

........................................................................
........................................................................
........................................................................
........................................................................

29. Have you ever been in a car or on a motor cycle/moped which was stopped by the police or approached by them while stationary?

1. YES
2. NO

IF NO: - go to Qu31

IF YES: - (29a) did this happen this year?

1. YES
2. NO

(29b) How many times has this happened this year? (write in number) 3.

30. On any occasion, did the police search the vehicle or your, or anyone travelling with you?

1. YES
2. NO
31. Did you feel that the police were unjustified in stopping and/or searching the vehicle or anyone travelling in it?

1. YES ....
2. No ....

On any occasion that you were stopped or searched did you feel that the police did not behave properly towards you?

1. YES ....
2. No ....

If YES:— (probe full details of incident) ..........................................................

3. Have you ever had any other experiences with the police in which you feel they have not behaved properly towards you?

If NO:— go to Qu.32

If YES:— (probe details of incident and respondent's estimation of police behaviour in these circumstances) ..........................................................

32. Have you ever been REALLY ANNOYED about the way the police behaved towards you or someone you know well or who lives with you, or about the way the police handled the matter in which you or they were involved?

(probe circumstances e.g. when this happened, and whether this happened to respondent, another household member, or some other person (specify)) ..........................................................

33. Do you think that the police ought to be accountable for their actions to some sort of independent body?

1. YES ....
2. NO ....
3. Don't know/Not sure .......
It is important to establish that my offences committed against the respondent or his/her household, occurred in 1983. Try to get approximate month(s) in which the incident(s) occurred. Use the bounding procedure to help the respondent to place events in time, by placing them in relation to significant events in their year.

I would now like to ask you some questions about crimes which may have been committed against you or any other person living with you. I am particularly interested in things which may have happened this year - 1983. But, firstly, in order to help you remember when these might have occurred can I ask you to recall some of the important things that happened this year e.g. did you go on holiday; were there any family events like births or marriages; did you start a new job, or anything else which you may remember.

Write down approx. dates of these events. If necessary, try to get the respondent to place events in relation to school terms, public holidays, etc. Then run through the dates in sequence, taking particular care to indicate that the period concerned started “just after Xmas last year”.

NOW USE THESE DATES TO PLACE MONTH OF OCCURRENCE OF ANY REPORTED OFFENCES.

If the respondent reports an offence to you - tell him that you will ask for a few details shortly, then carry on with the rest of questions in this questionnaire.
38. Did anyone steal anything from you whilst you were away from your home (e.g. at work, out shopping, on public transport?)

1. YES
2. NO

If YES: How many times (write in) 3. ........

When did this happen (write in month(s)) ............

39. Did anyone steal/or attempt to steal anything from you by using or threatening you with violence?

1. YES
2. YES - ATTEMPTED TO
3. NO

If YES: How many times? (write in) 4. ............

When did this happen? (write in month) ............

39a. Did this happen to any one else living here with you?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES: Ascertain to whom this/these incident(s) occurred and write in below:

How many times? (write in) 3. ............

When did this occur? (write in month) ............

40. Did anyone steal (or take away without your permission) any vehicle belonging to you or to any person living with you?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES: How many times? (write in) 3. ............

When did this happen? (write in month) ............

41. Did anyone steal anything from outside or inside of a vehicle belonging to yourself or to anyone else living here with you?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES: How many times? (write in) 3. ............

When did this happen? (write in month) ............
42. Did anyone deliberately deface or damage a vehicle belonging to you or to anyone else living here with you?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:— how many times (write in)

3. 

When did this happen (write in month(s))

43. Did anyone deliberately deface or damage any part of the inside or outside of your house/flat?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:— how many times (write in)

3. 

When did this happen (write in month(s))

44. Did anyone deliberately deface or damage, or otherwise interfere with, any communal or public property, near to your house/flat which caused you inconvenience or annoyance?

(probe: e.g. a lift, telephone box, bus stop, or things used by the residents)

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:— how many times (write in)

3. 

When did this happen (write in month(s))

45. Did anyone physically attack you by, for example, slapping, hitting, punching, pushing or holding you?— were you deliberately hurt in any way, including with a weapon of some kind?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:— how many times (write in)

3. 

When did this happen (write in month(s))

(45a) Did this happen at all to anyone else living here with you?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:— to whom did this happen (write in below)

(46) Did anyone threaten you with any of those things or attempt to do those things to you?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:— how many times (write in)

3. 

When did this happen (write in month(s))

(46a) Did anyone threaten with violence or attempt violence on anyone else living here with you?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:— to whom did this happen? (write in below)

(46b) How many times (write in)

3. 

When did this happen?
47. Did anyone sexually attack or assault you, touch, molest or interfere with you in any way sexually?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:-- how many times? (write in)

When did this happen
(write in month(s))

(47a) Did this happen to anyone else living here with you?

If YES:-- to whom did this happen?

1. YES (write in below)
2. NO

.............

how many times? (write in)

When did this happen?
(write in month(s))

48. This year, has anything else at all happened to which you think may have involved a crime of some kind (e.g. did anyone deliberately sell you anything which was defective, or perform some paid service for you which was not as promised)?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:-- how many times? (write in)

When did this happen?
(write in month(s))

49. (a) Being stared at in a way which gave you concern?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:-- how many times? (write in)

When did this happen?
(write in month(s))

(b) Being followed in a way which gave you concern?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:-- how many times? (write in)

When did this happen?
(write in month(s))

(c) Being approached or spoken to in a way which gave you concern?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:-- how many times? (write in)

When did this happen?
(write in month(s))

(d) Being shouted at or called after in a way which gave you concern?

1. YES
2. NO

If YES:-- how many times? (write in)

When did this happen?
(write in month(s))

(e) Being touched or held by anyone in a way which gave you concern?

READ OUT: Finally, I want to ask you about some things which may have happened to you which, although they may not have involved anything actually criminal, still gave you cause for concern.

Please look at this card and, if anything like this happened to you, tell me which comes closest to how you felt at the time?
1. YES
2. NO

If YES:- how many times?
   (write in) 1  
   2.  
   3.  

When did this happen?
   1.  
   2.  
   3.  

51. Have you heard about Consumer's Support Schemes?
1. YES  
2. No  

If YES:- (51a) Do you know what these schemes do?  
   (record brief details of answer)

If NO:- go to Qu.52

(51b) Did you know that there was a support scheme for
   victims of crime in Islington?
1. YES  
2. No  

If YES:- can you tell me briefly about this? (record brief details
   of answer)

50. Have you heard of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board?
1. YES  
2. No  

If YES:- (50a) do you know what this body does?
   (record brief details of answer)

If YES:- to Qu.50 ask :-
   (50a) Have you ever applied to them for compensation?
1. YES  
2. No  

Interviewer: hand out details of CICB to ALL RESPONDENTS

52. Have you heard of the Islington Police Committee Support Group?
1. YES  
2. NO  

If YES:- do you know what it does? (record brief details of
   answer)

N.B. if respondent or any member of household was helped by Islington
   VSS as a result of an offence, check whether this offence has been
   reported to you and say that you will ask some further questions
   shortly.

Interviewer: give out to ALL RESPONDENTS details of NAVSS and IVSS
1. YES .......
2. NO .......

Interviewer: give out details of Islington Police Committee Support Group to ALL RESPONDENTS.

53. Have you done anything this year to protect your house/flat from crime - things like stronger locks on doors, or locks on windows etc?

   YES .......
   NO .......

(53a) Have you marked any of your personal possession with any permanent identification marks?

   YES .......
   NO .......

(53b) This year, have you made any arrangement with anyone to watch your house/flat while you were away?

   YES - a neighbour ......
   - a friend/relative ......
   - the police ......
   - another person(specify) ..... ......
   
   NO.

54. Have you heard of the Metropolitan Police Neighbourhood Crime Watch?

   YES .......
   NO .......

   If YES:- do you know how it works (record brief details of answer)

   ........................................
   ........................................
   ........................................
   ........................................
ONLY ASK THE QUESTIONS IN THE FOLLOWING SECTION IF RESPONDENT HAS NOT REPORTED ANY CRIMINAL OFFENCE TO YOU (T.O. other than Incidents Causing Concern) IF RESPONDENT HAS REPORTED A CRIMINAL OFFENCE TO YOU (T.O. other than Incidents Causing Concern) GO STRAIGHT TO THE INCIDENT FORM.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS AND HOUSEHOLDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEX</strong></td>
<td>1. MALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. FEMALE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE</strong></td>
<td>1. 16-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 21-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(show card)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 31-40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 41-50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 51-60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 61-70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 71-80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 81+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Refused</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARITAL STATUS</strong></td>
<td>1. Single (never married)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Married</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Separated</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4. Divorced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Widowed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Not known/refused</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RACE</strong></td>
<td>1. White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Asian</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Respondent's EMPLOYMENT STATUS**

- are you in employment at the present time OR in full-time education, or doing something else?
  1. Working full-time
  2. Working part-time
  3. In full-time ed.
  4. Part unemployed
  5. Wholly unemployed
  6. Retired
  7. Other (specify)

  ....... for how long has this been?

  Were you unemployed at any time during 1983? If so, for how long?

  What is your main occupation? What kind of work do you normally do?

  What kind of work are you doing now?

  [If respondent is not home] Can you tell me which of these categories applies to your husband/partner?

  Was he unemployed at any time during 1983? If so, for how long?

  What is his main occupation? What kind of work does he normally do?

  Please look at this card - can you tell me which number comes closest to your weekly/monthly income (after all deductions have been made).

  What kind of SCHOOL-COLLEGE did you last attend/are still attending?
  1. Comprehensive
  2. Secondary Modern/Technical
  3. Elementary
  4. Grammar (or Public/Boarding/PRIVATE)
  5. College - community or adult education
  6. College of Art/College of Education
  7. University/Polytechnic/College of H.E.
  8. Other

  I would now like to ask you some questions about your household

  How long have you lived at this address?
1. Own Outright
2. Mortgage/loan
3. Rent from LA
4. Rent from PRIVATE LANDLORD
5. Other, e.g. Housing Association

**Do you, or anyone living with you, own a CAR/MOTOR CYCLE/MOPED/BICYCLE?**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>MOTOR CYCLE/MOPED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>BICYCLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Do you have a telephone?**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Is there a telephone in this building or nearby outside which you could use in an emergency?**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>NO</td>
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</table>

(record any additional comments)

**With whom do you live?/Share your accommodation?**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Live Alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Spouse/partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Friend(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Relatives(other)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHECK:** In total then, how many people make up this household?

Record no:—
INCIDENT FORM

Use this form to gather details of the nature and circumstances of up to FOUR incidents which occurred in 1983.

Before using the form, refer back to the incidents and summarize them below, saying (e.g.) "So you have told me about two incidents which happened this year - your house was broken into in March and some things stolen; also your son was attacked in the street in September; I now want to get some details of these crimes".

If the respondent or anyone living with the respondent, has been subject to a SERIES (i.e. more than FIVE) of very similar offences, ask the respondent to recall the details of "ONE SUCH INCIDENT WHICH PARTICULARLY STANDS OUT IN YOUR MIND". Count this example as ONE OFFENCE, and also ask details of other types of offence (if reported to you). You should record details of a maximum of FOUR offences including SERIES offences.

(A) BURGLARY, ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, THEFTS FROM THE HOME

(B) CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO HOME and other PERSONAL & COMMUNAL PROPERTY; VEHICLES

(C) THEFTS (excluding from the inside of the home)

(D) ASSAULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION A. BURGLARY, ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, THEFTS FROM THE HOME</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) So, this incident occurred in (month)? ..........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Was it part of a SERIES of more than FIVE such incidents,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. YES ................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NO ................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) If part of a SERIES ask:- When did these incidents begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to happen? (write in) ........................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Ask all:- at what time of day did this incident happen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. during morning (6am - Noon) ..........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. during afternoon (Noon-6pm) ..........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. during evening (6pm-Midnight) ........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. during night (Midnight-8am) ..........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Can't remember or don't know ..........................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (5) Did it happen during the week or at the weekend?  
|     (Take weekends Friday midnight 1. Week  |
|            - Monday 8am) 2. Weekend 3. Can't remember/don't know |
| (6) Did the person who did this enter your home with your permission, |
|     or did they force entry, or otherwise get in without your permission, |
|     or unsuccessfully attempt to get in without your permission?  
|         1. With permission/had right to be there  
|             2. force entry  
|             (show card) 3. walked in/ climbed in/ pushed past  
|             4. attempted to gain entry  
|             5. don't know  
| (6a) If entry FORCED/OR ATTEMPTED:- please say how this was done?  
|     (brief details) ........................................ |
| ........................................................................ |
| ........................................................................ |
| ........................................................................ |
(7) Was any damage done in gaining entry?
1. Yes - a lot
2. Yes - some/little
3. Not really/No

(8) Was any damage done, or mess made, inside the house/flat?
1. Yes - a lot
2. Yes - some/little
3. No/Not really

(9) Were you or anyone else indoors at the time this happened?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know/might have been

If YES:
(9a) Did the person(s) who did it use any violence towards you or threaten you or any other person who was there at the time?
1. Used violence to me
2. Threatened me with violence
3. Used violence to another person
4. Threatened another person
5. Used no violence of threats
6. Don't know

(10) If any property was stolen or damaged what do you estimate was its value (how much would it cost to replace or repair)?

Write in estimated amount

(11) Did you get anything towards the value of anything stolen or damaged from an insurance company?
1. YES
2. NO

(12) Was anything which was stolen eventually recovered for you?
1. YES
2. NO

SECTION B. THEFTS (EXCEPT THEFTS FROM INSIDE THE HOME)

(B1) Please briefly describe this incident (record basic details)

(B2) Where did this incident occur?

(record location)

(B3) What was the value of the property stolen?

(record estimate)

(B4) Did you receive anything towards the value from an insurance company?
1. YES
2. NO

(B5) Was anything stolen from your eventually recovered?
1. YES
2. NO
SECTION C. CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO HOME OR TO ANY OTHER PRIVATE OR COMMUNAL PROPERTY

(C1) Please describe this incident in your own words. (record basic details)

(C2) So, the damage was caused to:

1. the inside of home
2. the outside of your home
3. to a vehicle
4. to other private property
5. to communal/public property

If YES to C2:4 or 5 ask:

(C2a) Where did this occur?

1. Immediately outside home or very close to home
2. Within 10-5 mins. walk
3. Elsewhere (record location)

(C3) What is your estimation of the cost of damage done? (i.e. for repair or replacement)?

(Record estimate)

(C4) Did you receive anything towards the costs from an insurance company?

1. YES
2. NO

(C5) Did anyone repair or make good the damage? If so who?

Record details

and comments

SECTION D. ASSAULTS

(D1) Read out: You told me earlier that you were assaulted/threatened with violence. I know this might be painful to you, but would you mind briefly describing what happened to you?

(D2) So, the incident happened to you

1. in your home
2. immediately outside or nearby
3. Elsewhere (specify)

(D3) In which way(s) did they attack you, or attempt to attack you?

1. grabbed/pushed
2. punched/slapped
3. kicked
4. hit with something/a weapon
5. Raped
6. Attempted rape
7. Sexually assaulted
8. Other - specify

(D4) In which way(s) did they threaten to use force or violence towards you?

1. threatened to hit/kick/slap/beat-up
2. threatened to hit with weapon/some implement
3. threatened to sexually assault/rape
4. threatened to kill
5. threatened to injure or harm in some other way
6. threatened to injure or harm a person who was well known to you
7. Other (specify)
REPORTING TO THE POLICE

Did the police come to know about the incident?

1. YES  
2. NO  
3. Don't know  

If NO: go to Qu.

If YES: who reported it to them?

1. Respondent  
2. Another member of your household  
3. A friend/relative/neighbour  
4. Another person (specify)  
5. Police saw it happen/discovered it  
6. Don't know  

If incident reported by respondent ask: what would you say was your main reason?

If No: Can you say why you didn't inform them?

(Show card)

1. Didn't think incident was serious enough  
2. Didn't think police would come  
3. Didn't think police could/would do anything  
4. Thought it was a private matter  
5. Didn't want to get those responsible into trouble  
6. Thought it would be too time-consuming  
7. Feared retaliation/further trouble from those responsible  
8. Police already on scene  
9. Dissatisfied with police's response to reporting a post problem/offence  
10. Someone else called them  
11. Told some other official person  
12. Other reason (eg couldn't get out/or to a 'phone)  

Do you think, considering the seriousness of the incident, that the police responded quickly enough?

1. YES  
2. NO  
3. Can't say  

If you talked to uniformed officers about the offence:

Overall were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way these officers dealt with you?

1. satisfied  
2. dissatisfied  

If dissatisfied (probe reasons):  

If you spoke to plain clothes officers about the incident:

- overall were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way these officers dealt with/treated you?

1. satisfied  
2. dissatisfied  

If dissatisfied (probe reasons):
If police knew about the matter ask:–

As far as you know, was anybody, responsible for the incident arrested or charged?

1. YES
2. NO
3. Don't know

If YES:– Do you know whether they appeared in Court?

1. YES
2. NO

Do you know the outcome of the case?

1. YES
2. NO

What sentence did they receive?

1. Prison
2. Fine
3. Probation
4. Other

Were you satisfied with this outcome?

1. YES
2. NO
3. Don't know

If dissatisfied with:– In your opinion, what would have been a suitable sentence for a Court to impose?

1. Prison
2. Fine
3. Probation
4. Other (specify)

IMPACT OF OFFENCE

What sort of problems did the incident cause for you or for anyone else who lives here with you?

FINANCIAL
Severe
Moderate
Minimal/no

EMOTIONAL

PRACTICAL

PHYSICAL

_Show card_

(_tick_

If you or anyone who lives here with you, received any physical injury or suffered emotional problems, did this result in:

1. Medical or hospital treatment
2. Admission to hospital
3. Time off work.

What the incident had any lasting effect on you personally:

(p. e. for instance, do you do the same range of things or take part in teh same type of activities as you did before the incident happened? Has your health been affected in any way?)

record brief
details

Has the incident had any lasting effect on anyone else who lives here with you? (p. e. above Qa)

record brief
details

As a result of the incident, did you require any practical help? (p. e. to sort out problems like claiming insurance; clearing up mess; replacing money stolen; repairing things damaged)

record brief
details

Locations: Police

Document Type: Questionnaire

Page: 555
Did anyone offer or provide help in any way

record brief
details

Were you contacted by Islington Victims Support Scheme?

1. YES - by letter
2. YES - by telephone
3. YES - was visited
4. NO

If contacted by letter, ask:- Did you get in touch with them after you received the letter?

1. YES
2. NO

If NO to ( ) what was the main reason why you didn't contact them?

(record comment)

If visited or telephoned by IVSS probe:- What type of help did the Scheme provide? Was it the help which was needed? What other type of help could the Scheme have provided? Also, how did respondent feel about being referred by the police to the Scheme?

information on offenders

(61) did you actually see the person(s) who did it?

1. YES
2. NO

If NO:-
If YES:- ask:- how would you describe them?

1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. More than three
5. Don't know

(62) how many of them were there?

1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. More than three
5. Don't know

(63) were they male or female?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Mixed
4. Don't know

(64) how old were they?

1. Children of school age
2. Young person(s) 16-21 yrs
3. Person(s) over 21 yrs
4. Person(s) of mixed ages
5. Don't know

(65) was it a person/people known to you or that you recognised by sight, or strangers?

1. Knew them by name
2. Knew them by sight only
3. Strangers
4. Knew some - but not others

(66) do they live round here (in this area/on this estate), or elsewhere?

1. Round here
2. Elsewhere
3. Don't know

If No (67) how else would you describe them?

(68) what sort of people do you think did it?

(69) why do you think they did this to you/your household?
CRIME AND POLICING IN MERSEYSIDE

May 1984

Address Serial No. CHECK WITH AFR Time interview started

1. How long have you lived in this area? Under 1 year
   1 but under 5 years
   5 but under 10 years
   10 but under 20 years
   20 years or more

2. Apart from people living with you, do you have any relatives or close friends living in this area, within 15 minutes walk of here?
   Yes
   No

3. Thinking about your neighbours, the people living within a few doors on either side, how many of them do you know well enough to talk to? Would you say ... READ OUT ...
   ... all of them,
   most of them,
   a few of them,
   or none of them?

4. I am going to read out a list of things that are a problem in some areas. As I read each out, would you tell me whether in this area, within about 15 minutes walk of here, it is a big problem, a bit of a problem or not a problem.

READ OUT ONE BY ONE AND RECORD ANSWER FOR EACH

Check out code might for each problem

a) Unemployment
b) Poor housing
c) Heavy lorry noise
d) Crime
e) Poor schools
f) Poor public transport
g) Poor street lighting
h) Race relations
i) Vandalism
j) General unfriendliness
k) Not enough places for children to play
l) Not enough things for young people to do

Big problem
Bit of problem
No problem
Don't know

5. SHOW CARD A. Most people worry a bit about unpleasant things that might happen. How much do you yourself worry about the possibility of your home being broken into and something stolen?

RECORD BELOW. REPEAT FOR b)-h) BUT SHIT C) TO E) FOR MALE RESPONDENTS

Check out code might for each problem

a) Your home being broken into and something stolen?
   Not at all
   Quite a lot
   Don't know

b) Being mugged in the street?
   Yes
   No

6.a) Do you do this just occasionally or often or all the time? RECORD BELOW. ASK a)

RECORD BELOW. REPEAT FOR b)-h)

7. Do you yourself ever feel worried about going out on your own in this area after dark?
   Yes
   No

8.a) Simply as a precaution against crime, do you ever avoid going out after dark? RECORD BELOW. IF NO, REPEAT FOR NEXT PRECAUTION.

b) IF YES AT a) Do you do this just occasionally or often or all the time? RECORD BELOW. ASK a) FOR NEXT PRECAUTION.

(a)

(b)

Occasionally
Often
Always

1) avoid going out after dark?
2) avoid walking near certain types of people?
3) stay away from certain streets or areas?
4) go out with someone else rather than by yourself?
5) avoid using buses or trains?
6) use a car rather than walk?
Do you ever feel unsafe in your own home because of the possibility of crime?

Yes: 1
No: 2

Would you say that people's houses being burgled is more common in this area now than it was five years ago, less common or about the same? RECORD BELOW. THEN REPEAT FOR b) TO g)

Check all code only sights in each column

More Less Same Don't know

a) people's houses being burgled 1 2 3 8
b) people being mugged in the street 1 2 3 8
c) rowdiness by teenagers 1 2 3 8
d) fights and disturbances in the street 1 2 3 8
e) vandalism and deliberate damage to property 1 2 3 8
f) sexual assaults on women 1 2 3 8
g) women being pestered 1 2 3 8

What about the number of police you see patrolling on foot in this area. Would you say that generally there are... READ OUT...

... too many, 1
... too few, 2
or about the right number? 3
(DON'T KNOW) 8

And what about the number of police you see in cars in this area. Would you say that generally there are... READ OUT...

... too many, 1
... too few, 2
or about the right number? 3
(DON'T KNOW) 8

Do you think the Merseyside police have a good understanding of the problems in this area? Yes: 1
No: 2
Don't know: 8

In this area, would you say the police treat all different groups and types of people fairly and equally? Yes: 1
No: 2

In the past 12 months, have you yourself made a direct 999 call to the Merseyside police? Yes: 1
No: 2

If you made a 999 call (code 1 at Q.15)
a) How many 999 calls have you made to the Merseyside police in the last 12 months? CHECK 2Dig Entry or 99 =/q WRITE IN Calls (210-11)

b) The last time you did so, what was the reason for the call? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

On that occasion, what did you think of the way your call was answered and dealt with? ... very satisfied, 1
fairly satisfied, 2
a bit dissatisfied, 3
or very dissatisfied? 4
(DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER) 8

Why do you say that? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

To be coded onto coding sheet - see open coding
17. **ASK ALL**
Apart from 999 calls, in the past 12 months, have you yourself contacted a Merseyside police station by telephone at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Q.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18.a) **IF TELEPHONED STATION (CODE 1 AT Q.17) IF 213**
How many times have you telephoned a Merseyside police station in the last 12 months?

- WRITE IN [ ] Calls
- OR CODE
- Can't recall

b) The last time you did so, what was the reason for the call?
PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM

To be coded onto coding sheet - see open coding

18.c) On that occasion, what did you think of the way your call was answered and dealt with?

- WRITE IN [ ] Very satisfied
- OR CODE
- Fairly satisfied
- A bit dissatisfied
- Or very dissatisfied
- (DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Q.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18.d) Why do you say that?
PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM

To be coded onto coding sheet - see open coding

19. **ASK ALL**
In the last 12 months, have you personally called in at a Merseyside police station for any reason?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Q.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19.a) **IF CALLED AT STATION (CODE 1 AT Q.19) IF 217**
How many times have you called in at a Merseyside police station in the last 12 months?

- CHECK 2 OR 3 ENTRY OR 99 = N/A
- WRITE IN [ ] TIMES
- OR CODE
- Can't recall

b) The last time you did so, what was the reason for your visit?
PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM

To be coded onto coding sheet - see open coding

19.c) On that occasion, what did you think of the way the police treated you and dealt with the matter?

- WRITE IN [ ] Very satisfied
- OR CODE
- Fairly satisfied
- A bit dissatisfied
- Or very dissatisfied
- (DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Q.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19.d) Why do you say that?
PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM

To be coded onto coding sheet - see open coding
ASK ALL

21. In the last 12 months, have you approached and spoken to a Merseyside police officer in the street or any other public place for any reason?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Q.22)

22. IF APPROACHED POLICE (CODE 1 AT Q.21) IF 21

a) About how often have you approached and spoken to a Merseyside police officer in the street or any other public place in the last 12 months?

WRITE IN [ ] TIMES (222-23)

(b) The last time you did so, what was the reason?

PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

23. In the last 12 months, has a Merseyside police officer approached you and spoken to you in the street or any other public place for any reason?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Q.24)

24. IF APPROACHED BY POLICE (CODE 1 AT Q.23) IF 23

a) About how often have you been approached and spoken to in the street or any other public place by a Merseyside police officer in the last 12 months?

WRITE IN [ ] TIMES (226-27)

(b) The last time it happened, what reason did the officer give for approaching you?

PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

ON THIS CODING SHEET - SEE OPEN-CODING

224. On that occasion, what did you think of the way the officer treated you? Would you say you were...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Fairly satisfied</th>
<th>A bit dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER)

8

Why do you say that? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

ON THIS CODING SHEET - SEE OPEN-CODING
### 25.a) In the last 12 months, has a Merseyside police officer ever searched your home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT a)**  
ASK b) AND c) if any (written at c)  

b) How often has this happened in the last 12 months?  
WRITE IN TIMES (229-30)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(231)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT c)**  
ASK d) and e)  

b) The last time it happened, did the officer give any reason?  
WRITE IN TIMES (231)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(235)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final list with Serial Number:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 26. In the last 12 months, has a Merseyside police officer ever searched your person or asked you to open bags you were carrying?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT a)**  
ASK b) AND c) if any (written at c)  

b) How often has this happened in the last 12 months?  
WRITE IN TIMES (231-34)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(235)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT c)**  
ASK d) and e)  

b) The last time it happened, did the officer give any reason?  
WRITE IN TIMES (235)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(239)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final list with Serial Number:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.27</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 27.a) Apart from anything we have talked about already, in the past 12 months, has a Merseyside police officer ever searched a car you were in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT a)**  
ASK b) AND c) if any (written at c)  

b) How often has this happened in the last 12 months?  
WRITE IN TIMES (237-38)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(239)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final list with Serial Number:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.28</td>
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</table>

### 28. How often do police stop and question or search people in the street in this area?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT a)**  
ASK b) and c)  

b) Do they do it ... READ OUT ...  
WRITE IN TIMES (241)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(243)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT c)**  
ASK d) and e)  

b) Should people, or is it about right?  
WRITE IN TIMES (243)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(247)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final list with Serial Number:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.29</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

### 29. Do you think that, in this area, the police should stop and question or search more people in the street?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.30</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES AT a)**  
ASK b) and c)  

b) Do they do it without sufficient reason?  
WRITE IN TIMES (243)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(247)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final list with Serial Number:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.30</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 31. If without reason (code a at Q.30) if a CI.ISPED at Q.30  

b) How often, when the police stop and question or search people, do they do it without sufficient reason?  
WRITE IN TIMES (245)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(249)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final list with Serial Number:**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.31</td>
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</table>

### 32. How often, when the police stop and question or search people, do they do it without sufficient reason?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.32</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**IF YES AT a)**  
ASK b) AND c) if any (written at c)  

b) Would you say it ... READ OUT ...  
WRITE IN TIMES (251-32)  
OR CODE  
Can't recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(255)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Final list with Serial Number:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.33</td>
<td>Q.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **32.a)** Have you ever been really pleased about the way a police officer behaved towards you or a member of your family or handled a matter in which you were involved?  
| **33.a)** Have you ever been really annoyed about the way a police officer behaved towards you or a member of your family or handled a matter in which you were involved?  
| **34.a)** If you were seriously dissatisfied about something a police officer had done or failed to do, would you make a complaint?  
| **35.** IF WOULD COMPLAIN (CODE 1 AT Q.34a)  
| **36.a)** Do you know any police officers well enough to talk to by name?  

**Details of Incident and Reason Pleased/Annoyed:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(244)</td>
<td>Q.33</td>
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<td>(245)</td>
<td>Q.34</td>
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<td>Q.35</td>
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<td>(261)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(262)</td>
<td>(263)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. **HAND RESPONDENT SHUFFLE PACK X**

The police are asked to do a lot of different jobs. Some of them are shown on these cards. They have limited resources and cannot always cover everything. Can you sort the cards into three piles - one for the jobs you think are very important, one for the jobs you think are fairly important and one for the jobs you think are not very important.

What are the numbers of the cards you picked as very important? Record below. Repeat for fairly important and not very important. Then record any on which respondent cannot decide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One card only picked for each job</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Fairly</th>
<th>Not very</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q 6 w 7 a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. keep close contact with schools and give talks to school children</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. control crowds at public meetings and sports matches</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. be around on the streets to deter crime and people who might start trouble</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. give advice to the public on how to prevent crime</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. respond immediately to emergencies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. play a part in youth and community projects</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. investigate crime</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. keep a check on the security of shops and offices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. control and supervise road traffic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Write in col. 273 m00 or 274 if required.

(273-80) SPARE

CARD 03

(307) 0

38. a. **There are a lot of different sorts of offences and the time the police have is limited.**

**HAND RESPONDENT SHUFFLE PACK Y**

These are a selection of different types of offence. Which five do you think the police should spend most time and energy on? Probe to obtain a total of five if possible.

b. **HAND RESPONDENT SHUFFLE PACK Y AGAIN**

And which three do you think the police should spend least time and energy on? Probe to obtain a total of three if possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHECK NO MORE THAN 5 COLUMN CODE (309-324)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b) RING NO MORE THAN FIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) RING NO MORE THAN THREE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 10. Rowdyism in the streets | 1 | 2 | (308) |
| 11. Drunk driving | 1 | 2 | (309) |
| 12. Sexual assaults on women | 1 | 2 | (310) |
| 13. Bag snatching and pickpocketing | 1 | 2 | (311) |
| 14. Burglary of people's houses | 1 | 2 | (312) |
| 15. Burglary of shops and offices | 1 | 2 | (313) |
| 16. Robberies in the street where violence is used | 1 | 2 | (314) |
| 17. Unruly behaviour at football matches | 1 | 2 | (315) |
| 18. Theft of motor cars | 1 | 2 | (316) |
| 19. Prostitution | 1 | 2 | (317) |
| 20. Glue sniffing | 1 | 2 | (318) |
| 21. Use of cannabis, pot or marijuana | 1 | 2 | (319) |
| 22. Use of heroin or other hard drugs | 1 | 2 | (320) |
| 23. Shoplifting | 1 | 2 | (321) |
| 24. Company fraud and embezzlement | 1 | 2 | (322) |
| 25. Vandalism COL 274 SHOWS THAT 25% | 1 | 2 | (323) |
| 26. Racialist attacks | 1 | 2 | (324) |

| 39. a. SHOW CARD B In the last 5 years, have you yourself actually seen any of these things happening? Q 110a |
|-------|---|---|
| Yes | 1 | b) |
| No | 2 | Q.41 |

If yes at a) Which? Any others? Probe to no.

| VANDALISM | 1 | (328) |
| SHOPLIFTING | 2 | (329) |
| INDECENT EXPOSURE | 3 | (330) |
| THEFT FROM A MOTOR CAR | 4 | (331) |
| A SERIOUS FIGHT | 5 | (332) |
40. ASK THIS QUESTION SEPARATELY FOR EACH TYPE OF INCIDENT WITNESSED AT Q.39

a) The last time you saw an incident of ____, did you call the police? RECORD BELOW. IF YES, GO TO NEXT TYPE OR TO Q.41

b) IF NO AT a) Was that because you were unable to deal with the matter yourself? RECORD BELOW. IF YES, GO TO NEXT TYPE OR TO Q.41

c) IF NO AT b) Was it because someone else was dealing with the matter and it was up to them to call the police? RECORD BELOW. IF YES, GO TO NEXT TYPE OR TO Q.41

d) IF NO AT c) Why didn't you call the police? PROBE AND RECORD VERBATIM BELOW. THEN GO TO NEXT TYPE OR Q.41

Vandalism ~ (333)
Shoplifting ~ (336)
Indecent Exposure ~ (339)
Theft ~ (342)
Fight ~ (345)

a) Police called: Yes 1 1 1 1
No 2 2 2 2

b) Dealt with: Yes 1 1 1 1
No 2 2 2 2

c) Other dealt with: Yes 1 1 1 1
No 2 2 2 2

41. ASK ALL

a) If you had seen a couple of youths smashing up a bus shelter and the police were looking for witnesses, would you be prepared to tell the police what you had seen?

b) IF YES AT a) Would you be prepared to help identify the people who had done it?

c) IF YES AT b) Would you be prepared to give evidence in court about it?

d) IF NO (CODE 2) AT a) b) OR c) Why not? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

42. ASK ALL

a) If you had seen a couple of youths knock a man down and take his wallet and the police were looking for witnesses, would you be prepared to tell the police what you had seen?

b) IF YES AT a) Would you be prepared to help identify the people who had done it?

c) IF YES AT b) Would you be prepared to give evidence in court about it?

d) IF NO (CODE 2) AT a) b) OR c) Why not? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.
13a. If you had seen a traffic accident in which someone had been badly hurt and the police were looking for witnesses, would you be prepared to tell the police what you had seen?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>354</td>
<td>1 b)</td>
<td>2 c)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES AT a) Would you be prepared to give evidence in court about it?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>355</td>
<td>1 Q.44</td>
<td>2 c)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) IF NO (CODE 2) AT a) OR b) Why not? PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM.

---

44. a) If you had discovered in the morning *at his car had been stolen from outside his house during the night* would you tell the police?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>356</td>
<td>1 Q.45</td>
<td>2 b)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF NO (CODE 2 AT a) Why not? PROBE FULLY, RECORD VERBATIM.

c) IF NO OR DON'T KNOW (CODE 2 OR 3 AT a) And if you had definite knowledge of who was doing it.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>357</td>
<td>1 Q.45</td>
<td>2 d)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) IF NO (CODE 2 AT c) Why not? PROBE FULLY, RECORD VERBATIM.

---

55. a) Is there a Home Watch Scheme operating in this area?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>358</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) Is there a Home Watch Scheme operating in this area?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>359</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) If you think that, for this area, Home Watch Schemes are ... READ OUT ...  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>360</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

56. a) Is there a Home Watch Scheme operating in this area?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>361</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) Is there a Home Watch Scheme operating in this area?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>362</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) If you think that, for this area, Home Watch Schemes are ... READ OUT ...  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>363</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

57. a) Is there a Home Watch Scheme operating in this area?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>364</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) Is there a Home Watch Scheme operating in this area?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>365</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) If you think that, for this area, Home Watch Schemes are ... READ OUT ...  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>366</td>
<td>1 Q.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
48.a) If you were asked to take part in a Home Watch Scheme, would you agree or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Q.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF NO (CODE 2 AT a). Why not? PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM.

49.a) Have you ever heard of Police-Community Liaison Forums?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&lt;=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF HEARD OF THEM (CODE 1 AT a) Have you ever attended a Police-Community Liaison Forum?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF NOT HEARD OF THEM (CODE 1 AT a) Do you know anyone else who has?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50.a) Is there anything at all about the way this area is policed, the way police officers here do their job or the attitude of the police to people who live here that you would like to see changed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) What? Anything else? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

52. The next few questions concern things that may have happened to you over the twelve months since ... (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983 in which you may have been the victim of a crime or offence. I am only concerned with incidents which have happened to you personally or to other members of your household – that is people living with you and catered for by the same person as you.

I don't just want to know about serious incidents - I want to know about small things too. It is often difficult to remember exactly when things happen, so I will take the questions slowly and I would like you to think carefully about them.

First, I need to ask a few questions to find out which parts of the questionnaire apply to you and which don't.

Does anyone in this household own or have the regular use of a car, motorcycle, scooter or moped?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(372)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF NO (CODE 2 AT a) Has anyone in this household owned or had the regular use of a car, motorcycle, scooter or moped at any time in the last 12 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Q.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Q.53 = 1

b) How many times?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (Q.53 = 1) Was anyone in your household using the same vehicle at the same time as these incidents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. IF VEHICLE IN PAST 12 MONTHS (CODES 1 OR 2 AT Q.52) IF YES (Q.54 = 1)

a) During the twelve months since ... (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983, have you or has anyone else in your household had their car, van, motorcycle or other motor vehicle stolen or driven away without permission?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (Q.56 = 1) How many times?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (Q.57 = 1) And apart from this, in that time has anyone had their vehicle tampered with or damaged by vandals or people out to steal?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES (Q.58 = 1) How many times?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Skip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
54. a) Does anyone in this household own a bicycle?  
   b) IF NO AT a) Can I check. Has anyone in this household owned a bicycle at any time in the last twelve months?  

55. IF BICYCLE IN LAST 12 MONTHS (CODES 1 OR 2 AT Q.54) OF INTERVIEW, 1983, has anything been stolen out of your house/flats?  
   a) During the twelve months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983, have you or anyone else in your household had a bicycle stolen?  
   b) IF YES AT a) How many times? (NOTE: IF 2+ BICYCLES TAKEN TOGETHER, COUNT AS ONE INCIDENT)  

56. ASK ALL/  
   a) Now I would like to ask some questions about things that may have happened in your home - either here or somewhere else where you were living - during the 12 months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983. In that time has anyone got into the house or flat where you were living without permission and stolen or tried to steal anything?  
   b) IF YES AT a) How many times?  
   c) (Apart from this) In that time has anyone got into your house without permission and caused damage?  

57. IF CYCLE TAKEN TOGETHER, COUNT AS ONE INCIDENT  
   a) (Apart from anything you have mentioned already) In the twelve months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983, have you or anyone else in your household had a bicycle stolen?  
   b) IF YES AT a) How many times?  
   c) (Apart from this) In that time have you ever had the milk stolen from outside your house/flats?  
   d) IF YES AT d) How many times?  
   e) And (apart from anything you have told me about already) in that time has anyone deliberately defaced or done damage to your house/flats or to anything outside it that belonged to someone in your household?  
   f) IF YES AT e) How many times?  
   g) And (again, apart from anything you have told me about already) in that time has anyone deliberately defaced or done damage to your house/flats or to anything outside it that belonged to someone in your household?  

58. a) The next few questions are about things that may have happened to you personally, not the other people in your household, over the twelve months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983. Please include anything that happened to you during that time - at home, in the street, at work, in a shop, in a pub, in a park, on a train or anywhere else.  
   b) IF YES AT a) How many times?  
   c) (Apart from this) In that time has anyone tried to steal something you were carrying - out of your hands or from your pockets or from a bag or case?  
   d) IF YES AT d) How many times?
60. ASK ALL

a) And again apart from anything you have already mentioned, since (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983, has anyone, including people you know well, deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort or kicked you or used force or violence on you in any other way? Yes AA

b) IF YES at a) How many times? WRITE IN: TIMES (430-31)

c) And in that time, has anyone threatened to damage things of yours or threatened to use force or violence on you in a way that actually frightened you? Yes AA

d) IF YES at c) How many times? WRITE IN: TIMES (432-33)

61. IF RESPONDENT IS MALE, SKIP TO Q.62

a) FEMALE RESPONDENTS ONLY IF (47/2)?

Apart from anything you have mentioned already, since (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1983, have you been sexually attacked, assaulted or interfered with? Yes AA

b) IF YES at a) How many times? WRITE IN: TIMES (434-35)

c) Apart from anything you have mentioned already, in that time have you been sexually pestered or insulted by anyone? Yes AA

d) IF YES at c) How many times? WRITE IN: TIMES (436-37)
IF 2+ INCIDENTS RECORDED FOR ANY PARTICULAR QUESTION AT Q.62, ASK SEPARATELY FOR EACH RELEVANT QUESTION. 

You mention ______ NUMBER ______ INCIDENTS ______ TYPE OF OFFENCE ______. Were any of these very similar incidents, where the same thing was done under the same circumstances and probably by the same people?

**QUESTION NO.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None in Series</th>
<th>Number of Similar Incidents in Series</th>
<th>CHECK DETAILS BELOW WORK CODE AND CODE RELEVANT QUESTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF ANY INCIDENTS NOTED AT Q.62:

- Total number of _series_ of incidents identified at Q.62 WRITE IN: [ ] SERIES (438-19)
- Total number of other _single_ incidents noted at Q.62 WRITE IN: [ ] INCIDENTS (440-41)
- Overall total of series and single incidents (a + b) WRITE IN: [ ] SERIES & INCIDENTS (442-43)

CHECK ENTRY AT Q.63: SUM OF ENTRIES AT a) and b) IF TOTAL AT c) IS 1, 2, 3 OR 4, COMPLETE VICTIM FORMS FOR THESE INCIDENTS/SERIES. 

Note: Information at Qs. 52 and 61 (check entries at Qs. 438-443)

IF THE TOTAL EXceeds FOUR, ESTABLISH WHICH FOUR INCIDENTS/SERIES OCCURRED MOST RECENTLY AND COMPLETE VICTIM FORMS FOR THESE

NOTE BELOW IN ALL CASES WHERE VICTIM FORMS COMPLETED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VICTIM FORM</th>
<th>SINGLE INCIDENT</th>
<th>SERIES</th>
<th>SCREEN QUESTION NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFTER COMPLETION OF VICTIM FORMS, RETURN TO Q.65.

CHECK NUMBER OF VICTIM FORMS COMPLETED. IF SOME OR ALL OF THE REQUIRED VT’S (A & B) ARE NOT PRESENT, THEN TO PAGE 31 AND ENTER THE NUMBER OF MISSING VT’S AS A LEAD ENTRY ON COLUMN 137

ASK ALL:

65.a) SHOW CARD D In the 12 months since ______ DATE OF INTERVIEW ______, have you yourself been upset because of any of these things happening? 

If YES at a) ASK b) AND c)

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) Which? Any others? PROBE TO NO. RECORD BELOW ASK c) AND d) SEPARATELY OF EACH YES ANSWER AT b)

c) How many times have you been upset because of ______

1. Were you upset because it made you feel threatened or frightened or because it made you feel anxious or uneasy or because it made you feel uneasy or embarrassed? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY

| Upset by: |
| No. of times |
| Threatened/ Frightened |
| Annoyed/ Insulted |
| Uneasy/ Embarrassed |
| Can’t Say |

- being stared at A [ ] Yes [ ] No (445-7)
- being followed A [ ] Yes [ ] No (448-5)
- being approached or called after A [ ] Yes [ ] No (451-3)
- being shouted at or called after A [ ] Yes [ ] No (454-6)
- being touched or held A [ ] Yes [ ] No (457-9)
- instances of kerb crawling A [ ] Yes [ ] No (460-2)
- being confronted A [ ] Yes [ ] No (463-5)

ASK ALL:

66.a) Apart from yourself, do you personally know any people who have been mugged in the street in the last 12 months?

IF YES AT a) ASK b) AND c)

b) How many?

c) Has any of these incidents happened in this area?

THEN REPEAT FOR (i) - (iv) BELOW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes  No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No  On</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- people who have been mugged in the street AA 00 [ ] Yes [ ] No (466-8)
- households which have been broken into and had something stolen AA 00 [ ] Yes [ ] No (469-7)
- women who have been sexually attacked AA 00 [ ] Yes [ ] No (472-4)
- women who have been sexually molested AA 00 [ ] Yes [ ] No (475-7)
ASK ALL.

Now I would like to ask about things that have happened to you in the last five years, since this time in 1979, but not in the time since the last interview, 1983.

Apart from anything you have mentioned already, in the last five years have you yourself been mugged in the street?

RECORD BELOW. REPEAT FOR b)-d) BELOW BUT OMIT c) AND d) FOR MALE RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Card Code</th>
<th>Record Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(478-80) SPARE</td>
<td>CARD 05 (507)</td>
<td>(DONT KNOW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68.

ASK ALL.

SHOW CARD F. Some crimes are more likely to happen to some people than others. How likely do you think it is that, in the next year, your home will be broken into and something stolen?

RECORD BELOW. REPEAT FOR b)-h) BUT OMIT c)-e) FOR MALE RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Card Code</th>
<th>Record Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(520)</td>
<td>(508)</td>
<td>(DONT KNOW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70.

And do you think most burglaries are committed by ... READ OUT ... people from the area?

RECORD BELOW. DON'T KNOW = 98.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Card Code</th>
<th>Record Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(521)</td>
<td>(509)</td>
<td>(DONT KNOW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71.

And do you think most burglaries are committed by ... READ OUT ... children under 16, or people aged 16 to 20, or people over 20?

RECORD BELOW. DON'T KNOW = 98.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Card Code</th>
<th>Record Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(522)</td>
<td>(510)</td>
<td>(DONT KNOW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72.

What kinds of people do you hear about being mugged in the street? Is it ... READ OUT ... mostly men, or mostly women, or both equally?

RECORD BELOW. DON'T KNOW = 98.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Card Code</th>
<th>Record Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(523)</td>
<td>(511)</td>
<td>(DONT KNOW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73.

And in terms of age, are the people you hear about being mugged in the street ... READ OUT ... mostly young, or mostly old, or mostly in between, or does it happen to all ages equally?

RECORD BELOW. DON'T KNOW = 98.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Card Code</th>
<th>Record Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(524)</td>
<td>(512)</td>
<td>(DONT KNOW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74.a)

SHOW CARD F. This is a list of things the police or the courts can do about offenders. Suppose a man of 25, who had been in similar trouble before, had mugged somebody. Which one of these things do you think should happen to him? Please read out the number from the card. RECORD BELOW. DON'T KNOW = 98.

b) IF COMPENSATION (04) Should anything else happen to him apart from having to pay compensation? IF YES What?

NOW REPEAT FOR (i)-(vi)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Card Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(525-28)</td>
<td>(a) (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(529-32)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(533-36)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(537-40)</td>
<td>(e) (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(541-46)</td>
<td>(g) (h)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
75. Ask all.

Finally, some questions about yourself.

How old were you last birthday? WRITE IN: 2 digits Example: 1949

Do you have a partner, I mean a (husband/wife), or someone you live with as if you are married to them?

At present, are you in full-time education, in paid work, seeking work or doing something else?

What kind of work do you do most of the time? IF FULL-TIME, SEEKING WORK IN GRID BELOW RELATIONSHIP TO RESPONDENT, SEX, AGE AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF ALL PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLD AGED 16+ APART FROM RESPONDENT.

If respondent has spouse or cohabitee record details of that person in first column.

What qualifications or training are needed for that job?

Are you...READ OUT...an employee, or self-employed?

Do you supervise or are you responsible for the work of any other people? IF YES: how many?

What industry is your employer in? PROBE AS NECESSARY: What does your employer do or make?

Including yourself, how many people are employed at the place where you usually work (from) is it...READ OUT...

IF SELF-EMPLOYED: Do you have any employees?

IF ANY EMPLOYEES: How many...READ OUT...

77. Ask all.

Can I just check. Apart from yourself, are there any other adults, aged 16 or over, who normally live here in this household, living with you or catered for by the same person as you?

If yes at a ask b)-g)

How many?

Record in grid below relationship to respondent, sex, age and economic status of all persons in household aged 16+ apart from respondent.

If respondent has spouse or cohabitee record details of that person in first column.

If respondent has no spouse or cohabitee, first column is blank.

Check one only on each applicable column for each person on grid.

Person:

A

B

C

D

E

F

Card 06

Relation to respondent

Spouse/cohabitee of respondent

Check, age, etc.

Check, age, etc.

Nature of relationship

Card 07

Status

Male

Female

Age

Check, age, etc.

Check sex, age, etc.

Economic status

Full-time education

Paid work - full-time

Paid work - part-time

Seeking work

Other

Establish identity of household head (person in whose name accommodation is owned/rented or male partner of that person)

Head of household is:

Respondent

Spouse/cohabitee of respondent

Parent/step-parent of respondent

Other person

If yes at a ask b)-g)

IF BOTH ARE

Head of household is:

In paid work (codes 2 or 3)

Check grid above and record:

Head of household is:

In paid work (codes 1, 4 or 5)

Q.77

Q.79

Q.79

Q.79

Q.79

Q.79

Q.79

Q.77

Q.77

Q.77
1. INTERVIEWER: RECORD

a) SCREENING QUESTION AT WHICH THIS INCIDENT/SERIES WAS MENTIONED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(008-09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBDIVISION</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(RING NUMBER)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) THIS VICTIM FORM REFERS TO:

- AN INCIDENT
- A SERIES
- c) IF SERIES (CODE 2 AT b) NUMBER
- d) (RING (RING NUMBER) CODE)
- e) 1
- f) 2
- g) 3
- h) 4

2. ASK ALL

Can you tell me, very briefly, what happened? PROBE FOR OUTLINE DETAILS OF NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT. RECORD KEY DETAILS ONLY.

3. ASK ALL

Where did it happen? PROMPT AS NECESSARY WITH PRECODED CATEGORIES.

- OWN HOME
  - Inside own home (including attempted break-ins)
  - In garage specifically for this house/flat
  - In row of garages for block of flats/state
  - IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE HOME
    - Outside own home on same premises (doorstep, corridor of flat block, garden, carport, yard or car park attached to flat/block)
    - In street immediately outside home
    - Elsewhere

b) IF IN GARAGE SPECIFICALLY FOR THIS HOUSE/FLAT (CODE 2 AT a)

Is there a door inside the garage with direct access into your house/flat?

- Yes
- No

4. ASK ALL

IF IN HOME/INTEGRAL GARAGE (CODE 1 AT Q.3a OR b)

(Was the person/people who did it actually inside your (home/garage) at all during the incident?)

- Yes
- No

b) IF YES (CODE A AT a) Did (the person/the people) who did it have a right to be inside?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

4.a) (Was the person/people) who did it actually inside your (home/garage) at all during the incident?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

b) IF YES (CODE A AT a) Did (the person/the people) who did it have a right to be inside?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

4.b) IF YES (CODE A AT a) Did (the person/the people) who did it have a right to be inside?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

5. ASK ALL

Can you think of any reason why the (person/people) who did it picked on you?

- Yes
- No

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) What reason? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM
6. FOR ALL:
INTERVIEWER: CODE FROM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID
IF THE ANSWER IS WHOLLY OBVIOUS. OTHERWISE ASK:
Can you say anything at all about the people who did it - how many there were or what sorts of people they were?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>Skip to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 Q.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2 Q.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. IF N.I.: INFORMATION ABOUT OFFENDER (CODE 1 AT Q.6)

a) How many were there?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(019)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) (Was the person/Were the people) who did it male or female?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(020)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of both sexes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) How old was (the person/ were the people) who did it? Would you say:

- a child/children under school age: 1
- a child/children of school age: 2
- a young person/people between 16 & 25: 3
- or an older person/older people: 4
- PEOPLE OF MIXED AGES: 5
- DON'T KNOW: 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(021)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) As far as you know, (was the person/ were the people) who did it ... READ OUT ... mixed race? white, black (West Indian or African), Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi, or something else? (SPECIFY)

(022) 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(023)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One person - known before: 1 Q.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- stranger: 2 Q.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+ people - all known: 3 Q.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- some known: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- none known: 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. IF ANY KNOWN (CODE 1, 3 OR 4 AT Q.7e)

a) How well did you know them? Just by sight or just to speak to casually or did you know (any of) them well?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(024)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just by sight: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just to speak to casually: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(All/Some) known well: 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF KNOW WELL (CODE 1 AT a)

What was their relationship to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(025)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/cohabitee: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other household member: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current boyfriend/girlfriend: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former spouse/cohabitee: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other former household member: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former boyfriend/girlfriend: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relative: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (SPECIFY): 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. FOR ALL

CODE IF WHOLLY OBVIOUS. OTHERWISE ASK:

Was anything at all stolen during the incident that belonged to you or anyone else in your household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(027)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No: 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. IF ANYTHING STOLEN (YES AT Q.9)

a) Including any cash, what would you estimate was the total value of what was stolen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(028-9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing: 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under £5: 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5 but under £25: 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£25 but under £50: 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£50 but under £100: 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£100 but under £250: 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£250 but under £500: 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£500 but under £1000: 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1000 or over: 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don't know): 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Was any of the stolen property recovered?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(030)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) IF YES (CODE 1 AT b)

Some or all of it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(031)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All: 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. **ASK ALL**
(Apart from what was actually stolen) To the best of your knowledge, did the person/people who did it try to steal anything (else) that belonged to you or any other member of your household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. **ASK ALL**
(Apart from things that were stolen) Did the person/people who did it damage, deface or mess up anything that belonged to you or to anyone else in your household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. **ANYTHING DAMAGED (CODE 1 AT Q.12)**

a) What damage did they do? Anything else?

PROBE TO NO. RECORD VERBATIM.

14. **INTERVIEWER CHECK:**

**SOMETHING STOLEN OR DAMAGED (CODE 1 AT Q.9 OR Q.12)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Q.15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Q.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. **IF ANYTHING STOLEN OR DAMAGED**

a) Was any of the property which was stolen or damaged covered by an insurance policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) **IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)** Did you get anything for the loss or damage from the insurance company?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Claim outstanding</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. **IF ANYTHING STOLEN OR DAMAGED**

b) **IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)** By how much?

PROMPT WITH PRECODED CATEGORIES IF NECESSARY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under £5</th>
<th>£5 but under £25</th>
<th>£25 but under £50</th>
<th>£50 but under £100</th>
<th>£100 but under £250</th>
<th>£250 but under £500</th>
<th>£500 but under £1000</th>
<th>£1000+</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. **FOR ALL**

a) CODE IF WHOLLY OBVIOUS, OTHERWISE ASK:

At the time it happened, were you or anyone else aware of what was happening?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) **IF YES AT a**, ASK Who was aware of it?

CODE AS MANY AS APPLY

- Respondent
- Other household member
- Person outside household

18. **IF ANYONE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING (CODE 1 AT Q.12a)**

Did ([the person]any of the people) who did it have a weapon or something they used or threatened to use as a weapon?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) **IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)** What was the weapon?
19. IF ANYONE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING (CODE 1 AT 217a)

a) Did (the person/any of the people) who did it actually hit anyone or use force or violence on anyone in any way?
   - Yes  (049)
   - No  (050)

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
   - Who did they use force or violence on?
     - Respondent
     - Other household member
     - Other person outside household
   - CODE AS MANY AS APPLY

  - Yes  (051)
  - No   (052)

  - Yes  (053)
  - No   (054)

Did the (person/any of the people) who did it threaten to use force or violence on anyone there or harm them in any (other) way?

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
   - Whom did they threaten?
     - Respondent
     - Other household member
     - Other person outside household
   - CODE AS MANY AS APPLY

  - Yes  (057)
  - No   (058)

  - Yes  (059)
  - No   (060)

  - Yes  (061)
  - No   (062)

21. ASK ALL

How much effect would you say the incident had on you or other people in your household? Would you say the effect was very big 1

... READ OUT ...

very big 1

quite big 2

not very big 3

or was there no effect at all? 4

(DON'T KNOW) 8

22. ASK ALL

a) SHOW CARD II: After the incident were there any of these sorts of help or advice which you needed but could not get?

b) IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
   - Which?
   - Any others?
   - PROBE TO NO

   - Transport 1
   - Replacing documents 2
   - Financial problems 3
   - Insurance claim 4
   - Compensation 5
   - Repairs 6
   - Legal advice 7
   - Someone to talk to 8
   - Progress of case 9

23. ASK ALL

a) Did the police come to know about the matter?
   - Yes 1
   - No 2

b) IF NO (CODE 2 AT a)
   - Why not?
   - PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.
24. IF POLICE KNEW ABOUT MATTER (CODE 1 AT Q.23a)
   a) How did the police come to know about it?
      Police told by respondent
      Police told by other household member
      Police told by other person
      Police were there
      Police found out in other way (SPECIFY HOW)
   b) Did the police ever find out who did it?
      Yes
      No
      Don't know
   c) Overall, how satisfied were you with the way the police dealt with the matter?
      Would you say very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a bit dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?
      (DON'T KNOW)
   d) IF DISSATISFIED (CODE 3 OR 4 AT c) Why were you dissatisfied? PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.

25. ASK ALL
SHOW CARD I When the police come to know about an offence like the one we have been talking about, how high a priority do you think they should give to investigating it?
   Very high priority
   High priority
   Average priority
   Low priority
   Very low priority
   Should take no action
   (DON'T KNOW)

26. ASK ALL
   a) SHOW CARD F This is a list of things the police or the courts can do about offenders. Which of these things do you think should have happened to the (person/people) who did the thing we have been talking about? Please read out the number from the card. RECORD BELOW. DON'T KNOW = 99.
      b) IF COMPENSATION (04) Should anything else have happened to them apart from having to pay compensation? IF YES, WHAT? RECORD BELOW. DON'T KNOW = 99.
1. How long have you lived in this area? (1) Under 1 year (2) 1 but under 5 years (3) 5 but under 10 years (4) 10 but under 20 years (5) 20 years or more

2. Apart from people living with you, do you have any relatives or close friends living in this area, within 15 minutes walk of here? (No) 1 (Yes) 2

3. Thinking about your neighbours, the people living within a few doors on either side, how many of them do you know well enough to talk to? (All) 4 (Most) 3 (Some) 2 (A few) 1 (None) 0

I am going to read out a list of things that are a problem in some areas, as I read each out, would you tell me whether in this area, within about 15 min walk of here, it is a big problem, a bit of a problem or not really a problem.

- UNEMPLOYMENT
- P oor housing
- N eed help with the bills
- Crime
- Poor policing
- Poor point (available)

Big
Bit of
Not
Don’t
a problem
a problem really
know

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column/Code</th>
<th>Big Problem</th>
<th>Bit of a Problem</th>
<th>Really Not</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g) Poor street lighting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Race Relations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Vandalism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) General unfriendliness</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) Not enough places for children to play</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l) Not enough things for young people to do</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **SHOW CARD A.** Most people worry a bit about unpleasant things that might happen. How much do you worry about the possibility of your home being broken into and something stolen? RECORD BELOW. REPEAT FOR b) - h) BUT OMIT c) to e) FOR MALE RESPONDENTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>A bit</th>
<th>Quite a bit</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Very much</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Your home being broken into and something stolen?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Being mugged and robbed?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) WOMEN ONLY being raped?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) WOMEN ONLY being sexually molested</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) WOMEN ONLY being sexually pestered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Having your or property damaged by vandalism?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) being attacked by strangers?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) being insulted or bothered by strangers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6a) **Do you think there are risks for women who go out on their own in this area after dark?**  
**IF YES DO NOT CODE AND GO TO b**  
**IF NO - CODE AS NO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More</th>
<th>Less</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) people being mugged and robbed in the street</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) people's houses being burgled</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) rowdiness by teenagers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) fights and disturbances in the street</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) vandalism and deliberate damage to property</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) sexual assaults on women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) women being molested or pestered</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **ASK ALL.** Do you yourself ever feel worried about going out on your own in this area after dark.  
**NO**  
**YES**

8. **Simply as a precaution against crime how often do you...REPEAT FOR EACH BELOW.**  
**Never**  
**Occasionally**  
**Often**  
**Always**

| i) avoid going out after dark?  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 (42) |
| ii) avoid walking near certain types of people  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 (43) |
| iii) Stay away from certain streets or areas?  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 (44) |
| iv) go out with someone else rather than by yourself?  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 (45) |
| v) avoid using buses or trains?  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 (46) |
| vi) use a car rather than walk?  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 (47) |

9. **Do you ever feel unsafe in your own home because of the possibility of crime?**  
**NO**  
**YES**

10. **Do you have any special locks or other security devices in your home as a precaution against crime?**  
**NO**  
**YES**

11. **Would you say that people being mugged and robbed in the street is more common in this area now than it was five years ago, less common or about the same?** RECORD BELOW. **THEN REPEAT FOR b) to g.**  
**More**  
**Less**  
**Same**  
**Don't Know**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More</th>
<th>Less</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) people being mugged and robbed in the street</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) people's houses being burgled</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) rowdiness by teenagers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) fights and disturbances in the street</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) vandalism and deliberate damage to property</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) sexual assaults on women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) women being molested or pestered</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. What about the number of police you see patrolling on foot in this area. Would you say that generally there are ....READ OUT...

...too many
...too few
or about the right number?

1 2 3

(DON'T KNOW)

13. And what about the number of police you see in cars in this area. Would you say that generally there are ....READ OUT...

...too many
...too few
or about the right number?

1 2 3

(DON'T KNOW)

14. Do you think the police have a good understanding of the problems in this area?

YES
NO
DON'T KNOW

2 1 9

15a) In this area would you say the police treat people of all sorts fairly and equally?

YES
NO
DON'T KNOW

2 1 9

b) IF (NO) AT a) - what sorts of people do not get a fair and equal treatment (RECORD VERBATIM)

Any others (PROBE TO NO)

1 2

(61)

(62)

(63)

16a) Do you know any police officers well IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q17a enough to talk to by name?

IF YES, CODE 2 at A)

Are any of these......

RELATIVES or close personal friends
OTHER officers you meet through your work
OTHER Local officers you see regularly when they are on duty

READ OUT AND RECORD FOR EACH

NO
YES

1 2

(68)

(69)

(70)

(71)
17a) In the past 12 months how many direct 999 calls have you yourself made to the police?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(72-73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00-cc77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- If any calls were made write in number or code 99 and go to 17b, c, d.
- If no calls were made circle 00 and go to 17b.

b) The last time you did so, what was the reason for the call?

PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM

18a) Apart from 999 calls, in the past 12 months how many times have you yourself contacted a police station by telephone at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(8-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00-cc15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- If any calls were made write in number or code 99 and go to 18b, c, d.
- If no calls were made circle 00 and go to 17a.

b) The last time you did so, what was the reason for the call?

PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM

c) On that occasion, what did you think of the way your call was subsequently dealt with? Would you say you were...

VERY SATISFIED
Satisfied
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER

4
3
2
1
9

I.D. V S 8 4

(1-4) 

SERIAL NUMBER (5)

d) Why do you say that?

PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM

(6)

(7)
19a) ASK ALL
In the past 12 months, how many times have you personally called in at a police station for any reason?

NONE
CAN'T RECALL
OR NO. OF VISITS

IF ANY VISITS WERE MADE WRITE IN NUMBER OR CODE 99 AND GO TO Q.19b,c,d, IF NO VISITS WERE MADE: CIRCLE 00 AND GO TO Q.20a.

d) The last time you did so, what was the reason for your visit?

PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM

17-18)

b) The last time you did so, what was the reason?

PROBE FULLY - RECORD VERBATIM.

19)

On that occasion, what did you think of the way the police dealt with the matter? Would you say

VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
OR VERY DISSATISFIED
DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER

4
3
2
1
9

20a) ASK ALL
In the last 12 months, how many times have you approached and spoken to a police officer, in the street or any other public place for any reason?

NONE
CAN'T RECALL
OR NO. OF TIMES

IF ANY APPROACHES WERE MADE WRITE IN NUMBER OF TIMES OR CODE 99 AND GO TO Q.20b, c, d, IF NONE WERE MADE CIRCLE 00 AND GO TO Q.21a

c) The last time you did so, what was the reason?

21)

On that occasion what did you think of the way the officer treated you? Would you say you were

VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
OR VERY DISSATISFIED
DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER

4
3
2
1
9

d) Why do you say that.

PROBE FULLY - RECORD VERBATIM

(20)
21(a) ASK ALL
In the last 12 months, about how many times has a police officer
approached you and spoken to you in the street or any other
public place for any reason.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(29-30)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00-cc36</td>
<td>99.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF ANY APPROACHES WERE MADE WRITE IN NUMBER
OF TIMES OR CODE 99 AND GO TO Q.21b, c,d.
IF NONE WERE MADE CIRCLE 00 AND GO TO Q.22a

b) The last time it happened, what reason did
the officer give for approaching you?
PROBE FULLY - RECORD VERBATIM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(31-32)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(33)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C) On that occasion, what did you think of the
way the officer treated you? Would you say
you were .... READ OUT ....

| VERY SATISFIED | 4 |
| SATISFIED      | 3 |
| DISSATISFIED   | 2 |
| or VERY DISSATISFIED | 1 |
| DON'T KNOW/CAN'T ANSWER | 9 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(35)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(36-37)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00-cc41</td>
<td>99.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22a) ASK ALL
In the past 12 months, how many times has
a police officer(s) searched your home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(38-39)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01-cc41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) The last time it happened, what reason did
the officer give you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO REASON GIVEN</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

C) Would you say that was a sufficient reason.

| NO | 1 |
| YES | 2 |
23a) **ASK ALL**
In the last 12 months, how many times has a police officer searched your person or asked you to open bags you were carrying?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(41-42)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00-cc46</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If any searches were made, write in number of times or code 99 and go to Q24a. If none were made, circle 00 and go to Q24a.

b) The last time it happened, what reason did the officer give you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(43-44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01-cc46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If no reason was given circle 01 and go to Q24a.

If reason was given, probe fully - record verbatim and go to 24c.

b) The last time it happened, what reason did the officer give you?

If no reason was given circle 01 and go to 24c.

If reason was given, probe fully - record verbatim and go to 24c.

NO REASON GIVEN

24a) **ASK ALL**
Apart from anything we have talked about already in the past 12 months, how many times has a police officer searched a car you were in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(46-47)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00-cc51</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If any searches were made, write in number of times or code 99 and go to Q24d. If none were made, circle 00 and go to Q25.

b) The last time it happened, what reason did the officer give you?

If no reason was given circle 01 and go to Q25.

If reason was given, probe fully - record verbatim and go to 24c.

NO REASON GIVEN

24c) Would you say that was a sufficient reason?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01-cc54a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NO

YES

2
25) **ASK ALL**
How often do police stop and question or search people in the street in this area? 
Do they do it .... READ OUT ... 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(51)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY OFTEN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUITE OFTEN</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCASIONALLY</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or HARDLY EVER?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DON'T KNOW)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26) Do you think that, in this area, the police should stop and question or search people in the street? .... READ OUT ........

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(52)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MORE PEOPLE IN THE STREET</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS PEOPLE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or IS IT ABOUT RIGHT (DON'T KNOW)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(53)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27a) **ASK ALL**
Do you think the police only stop and question or search people in the street if they are acting suspiciously or do you think the police sometimes do it without sufficient reason?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(54)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IF ONLY WHEN ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY, CODE 1 and go to Q28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND GO TO Q28 - IF DON'T KNOW CODE 8 AND GO TO Q28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) **IF WITHOUT REASON**
How often, when the police stop and question or search people, do they do it without sufficient reason? 
Would you say .... READ OUT ....

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(55)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>almost always</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mostly</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sometimes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or hardly ever?</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DON'T KNOW)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28a) **ASK ALL**
Have you ever been really pleased about the way a police officer behaved towards you or a member of your family or handled a matter in which you were involved?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(56)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1-cc59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) IF YES
Has this happened at all in the last five years?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1-cc59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) IF YES (CODE 2 AT b) Last time, what happened that pleased you? 
PROBE FOR OUTLINE DETAILS OF INCIDENT AND REASON PLEASED, RECORD VERBATIM.
I ASK ALL
Have you ever been really annoyed about the way a police officer behaved towards you or a member of your family or harried in which you were involved?

IF NO
CIRCLE 1 AND GO TO 030a

IF YES
CIRCLE 2 AND GO TO 060b

Has this happened at all in the last five years?

IF NO
CODE 1 AND GO TO 060b

IF YES
(CODE 2 AT 060b Last time, what happened that annoyed you? PROBE FOR OUTLINE DETAILS OF INCIDENT AND REASON ANNOYED.

IF YES
(IF 060b)

IF NO
(CODE 1 AT 060b)

I ASK ALL
Are you seriously dissatisfied about something a police officer had done or failed to do, would you make a complaint?

IF NO
(CODE 1 AT 060b)

IF YES
(CODE 2 AT 060b)

IF DON'T KNOW (OR 062)

WHY NOT?
PROBE FULLY - REWRITE VERBATIM

IF YES AT 06a

Senior police officer (other of rank specified)
Policewomen
Police Commissioner
Police Local/Divisional Station
Police Station
Police Constable
Police Secretary
Police Officer

IF YES AT 06a

IF DON'T KNOW (OR 062)

WHY NOT?
PROBE FULLY - REWRITE VERBATIM

IF YES
(CODE 2 AT 06a)

IF NO
(CODE 1 AT 06a)
**SHOW CARD B** The police are asked to do a lot of different jobs. You may think some of them are more important than others. How important do you yourself think it is for the police to keep close contact with schools and give talks to school children?

**RECORD BELOW, THEN REPEAT FOR b) - i)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Fairly</th>
<th>Not very</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) keep close contact with schools and give talks to school children</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) control crowds at public meetings and sports matches</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) be around on the streets to deter criminals and people who might start trouble</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) give advice to the public on how to prevent crime</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) respond immediately to 999 calls</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) play a part in youth and community projects</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) detect criminals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) keep a check on the security of shops and offices</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) control and supervise road traffic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**SHOW CARD C** Now I would like your opinions on how successful the police are in dealing with some particular sorts of crime. How successful would you say they are in dealing with muggings and robberies in the street?

**RECORD BELOW, THEN REPEAT FOR b) - g)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Fairly</th>
<th>Not very</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) muggings &amp; robberies in the street</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) people's houses being burgled</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) rowdiness in teenagers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) fights and disturbances in the street</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) vandalism &amp; deliberate damage to property</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) sexual assaults on women</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) women being molested or pestered</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are a lot of different sorts of offences and the police have is limited.

**GIVE RESPONDENT CARD**  These are a selection of different types of offences. Which five of these do you think the police should spend most time and energy on? **PROBE TO OBTAIN A TOTAL OF FIVE IF POSSIBLE**

**WRITE IN THE APPROPRIATE CODE IN EACH OF THE BOXES IN THE ORDER GIVEN BY RESPONDENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENCE</th>
<th>CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rowdyism in the streets</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunk driving</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual assaults on women</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag snatching and pickpocketing</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary of people's houses</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary of shops and offices</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies in the street where violence is used</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unruly behaviour at football matches</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of motor car</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glue Sniffing</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of cannabis, pot or marijuana</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of heroine or other hard drugs</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoplifting</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company fraud and embezzlement</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racistal attacks</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIRST RESPONSE</strong></td>
<td>(22) (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECOND RESPONSE</strong></td>
<td>(24) (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD RESPONSE</strong></td>
<td>(26) (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOURTH RESPONSE</strong></td>
<td>(28) (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIFTH RESPONSE</strong></td>
<td>(30) (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GIVE RESPONDENT CARD**  **AGAIN**

And which **THREE** do you think the police should spend least time and energy on? **PROBE TO OBTAIN A TOTAL OF THREE IF POSSIBLE**

**WRITE THE APPROPRIATE CODE IN THE BOXES IN THE ORDER GIVEN BY RESPONDENT**

**FIRST RESPONSE**

**SECOND RESPONSE**

**THIRD RESPONSE**

**FOURTH RESPONSE**

**FIFTH RESPONSE**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th></th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>35a) ASK ALL</td>
<td>36a) ASK ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the past five years have you yourself ACTUALLY seen any vandalism?</td>
<td>In the past five years have you yourself ACTUALLY seen any shoplifting?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-oc52</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-oc56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th></th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(49)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) The last time you saw an incident of vandalism did you do anything about it yourself?</td>
<td>IF NO GO TO QUESTION 36a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td>IF NO GO TO Q.37a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td>IF YES ASK b) to d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th></th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(50)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Did you inform anyone else who might have done something about it?</td>
<td>IF NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th></th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(51)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) Did you call the police?</td>
<td>IF YES GO TO Q.37a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td>IF NO ASK d) to e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th></th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(55)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e) why not? - PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM</td>
<td>IF NO GO TO Q.37a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td>IF YES ASK e) to f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37a) ASK ALL
In the past 5 years have you yourself ACTUALLY seen an incident of indecent exposure?

IF NO GO TO QUESTION 38a
IF YES ASK b) to d)

e) The last time you saw an incident of indecent exposure did you do anything about it yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(56)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1-c60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(57)

c) Did you inform anyone else who might have done something about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(58)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(59)

d) Did you call the police?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1-c654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(61)

e) Why not?

PROBE FULLY  RECORD VERBATIM

38a) ASK ALL
In the past five years have you yourself actually seen a theft from a motor vehicle?

IF NO GO TO Q.39a
IF YES ASK b) to d)

b) The last time you saw an incident of theft from a motor vehicle did you do anything about it yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(62)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(63)

c) Did you inform anyone else who might have done something about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(64)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(65)

d) Did you call the police?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(66)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(67)

e) Why?

PROBE FULLY  RECORD VERBATIM
39a) Ask all
   In the past five years, have you yourself
   ACTUALLY seen a serious fight?
   IF NO GO TO Q.40a
   IF YES ASK b) to d)
   d) The last time you saw a serious fight did
      you do anything about it yourself?
   IF NO CODE 1
   IF YES CODE 2
   c) Did you inform anyone else who might have
      done something about it?
   IF NO CODE 1
   IF YES CODE 2
   b) Did you call the police?
   IF NO CODE 1
   IF YES CODE 4
   e) Why? PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM
   (64)
   (65)
   (66)
   (67)
   (68-69)
   (70-71)
   (72-73)
   (74-75)
   (76)
   (77-80)
   ID
   SERIAL NO.

40a) Ask all
   a) If you had seen a couple of youths
      smashing up a bus shelter and the police were
      looking for witnesses, would you be prepared to
      tell the police what you had seen?
      IF NO CODE 1
      IF YES CODE 2
      (60)
   b) Would you be prepared to help identify
      the people who had done it?
      IF NO CODE 2
      IF YES CODE 3
   c) Would you be prepared to give evidence in
      court about it?
      IF NO CODE 3
      IF YES CODE 4
   (7)
   (8)
42) **ASK ALL**

a) If you had seen a traffic accident in which someone had been badly hurt and the police were looking for witnesses, would you be prepared to tell the police what you had seen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.43

IF YES GO TO 01

b) Would you be prepared to help identify the people who had done it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO CODE 2 AND GO TO Q.43

IF YES GO TO 01

c) Would you be prepared to give evidence in court about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO CODE 3

IF YES CODE 4

43a) If you overheard a conversation between two people who were obviously planning a break-in, would you inform the police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.44

IF YES GO TO 01

o) Would you be prepared to help identify the people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF 'O CODE 2 AND GO TO Q.44

IF .S GO TO 01

c) Would you be prepared to give evidence in Court about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

44) If a police officer called at your home and told you he was investigating an outbreak of vandalism in the area, would you give him any information you had about possible culprits?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO CODE GO TO Q.47

IF YES CODE NEVER

45) Who should decide how a local area is policed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The police themselves

The Council

The Home Secretary

The Local people

Combination of above

Don't know

46) When the police are investigating people, do you think they ever use threats or unreasonable pressure to get the answer they want?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NEVER

HARDLY EVER

SOMETIMES

OPEN

VERY OFTEN

47) When the police take written evidence from people, do you think that what they write down is always a fair and accurate record of what was said

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(17)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NEVER

HARDLY EVER

SOMETIMES

OPEN

VERY OFTEN

....READ OUT....
8a) Police Officers sometimes have to use force to defend themselves when they are making arrests or restraining prisoners. Apart from this, do you think the police in London ever use more force than necessary when making arrests?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEVER</td>
<td>1-cc21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDLY EVER</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMETIMES</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFTEN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERY OFTEN</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.49a

b) Does this happen ...READ OUT...

c) Does it happen more often than it used to, less, or about the same?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT THE SAME</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) How have you come to know about it?

Is it through:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES OR NO FOR EACH</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- it actually happened to you</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or someone you know?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- you or someone you know seeing it happen to someone else?</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or TV or it happening?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seeing news pictures or</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV or it happening?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- hearing it discussed on</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio or TV</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reading about it in the newspapers?</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or someone you know?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49a) And do you think the police in London ever use violence on people held at police stations without good reason?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(21)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEVER</td>
<td>1-cc28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDLY EVER</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMETIMES</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFTEN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERY OFTEN</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Does this happen ...READ OUT...

c) Does this happen more often than it used to, less, or about the same?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT THE SAME</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) How have you come to know about it? Is it through:

READ OUT AND CODE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(23)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES OR NO FOR EACH</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- it actually happening to you</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or someone you know?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- you or someone you know seeing it happen to</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>someone else?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seeing news pictures on</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV or it happening?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- hearing it discussed on</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio or TV</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reading about it in the newspapers</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or someone you know?</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col./Code</td>
<td>52a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>ASK ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-cc31</td>
<td>IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>b) How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>c) And is it happening more than it used to, less or about the same?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>d) When this happens do you think it is mostly uniformed police who do it or mostly CID or don't you know?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>e) Do you think bribes are accepted ...READ OUT...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>f) And is it happening more now than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>g) When it happens, do you think it is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>h) Do you think it is mostly uniformed police who do it or mostly CID or don't you know?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
53a) **ASK ALL**

Apart from this, in the 12 months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW) 1984, has anything been stolen out of your home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IF YES ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) **How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF TIMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(42-43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Can't recall

c) **ASK ALL**

Apart from this, in that time have you ever had the milk stolen from outside your home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IF YES ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) **How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF TIMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(44-45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Can't recall

e) **ASK ALL**

And apart from anything you have told me about already, in that time has anything else that belonged to someone in your household been stolen from outside the 'home' - from the doorstep, the garden or the garage for example?

f) **IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO g)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF YES ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g) **How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF TIMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(46-47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Can't recall

h) **ASK ALL**

And again, apart from anything you have told me about already, in that time has anyone deliberately defaced or done damage to your home or to anything outside it that belonged to someone in your household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO 54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IF YES ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF TIMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(52-53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Can't recall

h) **INTERVIEWER NOTE:** IF RESPONDENT HAS ANSWERED YES TO Q.54a TAKE OUT VICTIM FORM FOR VANDALISM AND CODE IT 'RESPONDENT'. WRITE IN THE NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE APPROPRIATE LOCATION OF THE VICTIM FORM.
**INTERVIEWER NOTE:** IF RESPONDENT IS MALE ASK QUESTIONS 55a-e and then go directly to question 56c.

**INTERVIEWER:** Ask questions 55a-e. You may say to her "I would like to know if any of these things happened to you in the past 12 months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW). Please check off the things which happened to you and write down the number of times."

55a) In the 12 months since... (DATE OF INTERVIEW) 1984, has anyone (including people you know well) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort or kicked you or used force or violence on you in any way?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>56a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>FEMALE RESPONDENTS ONLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IF MALE GO TO Q.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apart from anything you have mentioned already in the 12 months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW), 1984 have you been sexually interfered with, assaulted or attacked, either by someone you know or by a stranger?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* If YES...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>b) How many times WRITE IN OR CODE 99 NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>* INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF RESPONDENT HAS ANSWERED YES TO Q.56a TAKE OUT VICTIM FORM FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AND CODE IT 'RESPONDENT'. WRITE IN THE NUMBER OF TIMES AT THE APPROPRIATE LOCATION OF THE VICTIM FORM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MALES ONLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the past 12 months has any female member of this household been sexually interfered with assaulted or attacked either by someone she knows or by a stranger?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>IF YES...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>c) How many times WRITE IN OR CODE 99 NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>* INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF RESPONDENT HAS ANSWERED YES TO Q.56a TAKE OUT VICTIM FORM FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AND CODE IT 'RESPONDENT'. WRITE IN THE NUMBER OF TIMES AT THE APPROPRIATE LOCATION OF THE VICTIM FORM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALL FEMALES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has this happened to anyone else who may live here?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>IF YES...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>d) How many times WRITE IN OR CODE 99 NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>* INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF RESPONDENT HAS ANSWERED YES TO Q.56a TAKE OUT VICTIM FORM FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AND CODE IT 'RESPONDENT'. WRITE IN THE NUMBER OF TIMES AT THE APPROPRIATE LOCATION OF THE VICTIM FORM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALL FEMALES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apart from anything you have mentioned already, in that time have you been sexually pestered or insulted by anyone?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>IF YES...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>e) How many times WRITE IN OR CODE 99 NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>* INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF RESPONDENT HAS ANSWERED YES TO Q.56a TAKE OUT VICTIM FORM FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AND CODE IT 'RESPONDENT'. WRITE IN THE NUMBER OF TIMES AT THE APPROPRIATE LOCATION OF THE VICTIM FORM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ASK ALL:
Does anyone in this household own or have the use of a car, van, scooter or moped?

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.58
IF YES CODE 2 AND GO TO b)

IF YES CODE 2 AND GO TO b)

b) IF VEHICLE IN H/H IN PAST 12 MONTHS

During the 12 months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW) 1984, have you or anyone else now in your household had their car, van, motorcycle, scooter or moped stolen or driven away without permission?

IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO d)
IF YES ...

How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99

NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL

(67-68)

d) And apart from this, in that time has anyone had their vehicle tampered with or damaged by vandals or people out to steal?

IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO Q.58
IF YES ...

How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99

NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL

(69-70)

58a) ASK ALL:
Does anyone in this household own a bicycle?

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.59a)
IF YES ...

b) Apart from anything you have mentioned already, in the 12 months since (DATE OF INTERVIEW) 1984, has anyone in this household had a bicycle stolen?

IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO Q.59a
IF YES ...

How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99

NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL

(72-73)

59a) ASK ALL:
Do you have a telephone in this accommodation?

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.60

IF YES ...

How many times? WRITE IN OR CODE 99

NO. OF TIMES CAN'T RECALL

(74)

(75-76)

(77-80)
60a) ASK ALL

SHOW CARD E In the past 12 months since
(DATE OF INTERVIEW) 1984, have you
yourself been upset because of any of these
things happening?

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.61
IF YES CODE 2 AND ASK FOR EACH...

b) How many times?

c) Were you upset the last time because it made you
feel threatened or frightened or because it made you
feel annoyed or insulted or because it made you
feel uneasy or embarrassed?

i) Being stared at

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

THREATENED/FRIGHTENED
ANNoyED/INSULTED
UNEASY/EMBARRASSED
DON'T KNOW

(1-cc28)

1 2

(7-8) 00-cc10

NO. OF TIMES

v) Being touched or held by anyone

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

THREATENED/FRIGHTENED
ANNoyED/INSULTED
UNEASY/EMBARRASSED
DON'T KNOW

(19-20)

1 2

(21)

NO. OF TIMES

vi) Instances of Kerb Crawling

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

THREATENED/FRIGHTENED
ANNoyED/INSULTED
UNEASY/EMBARRASSED
DON'T KNOW

(24)

1 2

(25-26)

NO. OF TIMES

vii) Being Confronted

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

THREATENED/FRIGHTENED
ANNoyED/INSULTED
UNEASY/EMBARRASSED
DON'T KNOW

(27)

1 2

(28)

NO. OF TIMES

61a) **ASK ALL.**
Apart from your own household, do you personally know anyone who has been mugged and robbed in the last 12 months?

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO c)

b) **IF YES.**
Was it in this area?

IF YES 3
NO 2

62) **ASK ALL.**
Some crimes are more likely to happen to some people than others. How likely do you think it is that, in the next year, your home will be broken into and something stolen?

RECORD BELOW. REPEAT FOR b) - g) BUT OMIT c) AND d) FOR MALE RESPONDENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Fairly Likely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Your home will be broken into and something stolen?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) You will be mugged or robbed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) <strong>WOMEN ONLY.</strong> You will be raped?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) <strong>WOMEN ONLY.</strong> You will be sexually molested or pestered?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) You will have your home or property damaged by vandals?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) You will be attacked by strangers?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) You will be insulted or bothered by strangers?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
63) **ASK ALL**
Do you think most burglaries in this area are committed by
people from the area
or people who live outside it?
(DON'T KNOW)

64) And do you think most burglaries in this area are committed by
children under 16
or people aged 16 to 20
or older people
(DON'T KNOW)

65) What kinds of people do you hear about being mugged and robbed in this area? Is it...
mostly men
or mostly women
or both equally
(DON'T KNOW)

66) And in terms of age, are the people you hear about being mugged and robbed in this area...
mostly young
or mostly old
or mostly in between
or does it happen to all ages equally?
(DON'T KNOW)

67a) **ASK ALL**
SHOWN CARD G. This is a list of things the police or the courts can do about offenders. Suppose a man of 25, who has been in similar trouble before, has mugged and robbed somebody. Which one of these things do you think should happen to him? Please read out the number from the card.

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

b) Should anything else happen to him from having to pay compensation?

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

REPEAT A AND B FOR CATEGORIES BELOW

ii) Broken into a home and stolen something

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

b) IF 04
WRITE IN OR CODE 99

iii) Stolen £5 worth of goods from a shop

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

b) IF 04
WRITE IN OR CODE 99

iv) Stolen a car
WRITE IN OR CODE 99

b) IF 04
WRITE IN OR CODE 99
68a) **ASK ALL**

In the last year have you had any contact with people of another race.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(58)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1-cc77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF NO, GO TO Q.73**

**IF YES**

b) How often have you had contact with people of another race?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(59)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HARDLY EVER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMETIMES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFTEN</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERY OFTEN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) Do you have contact with people of another race due to...

Write in or code 99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE OR MORE</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) Overall... would you describe your contact with people of another race to be generally

Write in or code 99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(61)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEGATIVE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITIVE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIXED</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN'T TELL</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**69a) ASK ALL**

In the last 12 months, has anyone of another race shouted insults at you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(62)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO CODE 00 AND GO TO Q.70</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF YES CODE 00 AND GO TO Q.73</td>
<td>1-cc77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b) How many times in the last year?**

Write in or code 99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(63)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE OR MORE</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) The last time it happened how many did it?

Write in or code 99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(64)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE OR MORE</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) How old was the person/people who did it?

Would you say:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(65)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a child/children under school age</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a child/children of school age</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a young person/people between 16 &amp; 25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or an older person/older people?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people of mixed ages</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e) Was the person/people who did it...

Write in or code 99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(66)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black (West Indian or African)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or something else? (SPECIFY)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RING ONE CODE ONLY OUT OF 1-4

**IF 2+ CODES APPLY, RECORD AT CODE 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(67)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIXED GROUP</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f) Why do you think they did this to you?

Probe fully... record verbatim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>(68-69)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00-cc77</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(70) |
| 1 |

(71) |
| 1 |

(72) |
| 1 |

(73) |
| 1 |

(74) |
| 1 |

(75) |
| 1 |

(76) |
| 1 |
1.0. SERIAL CARD - 48 -

Col./Code (77-80)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I.D.</th>
<th>SERIAL NO.</th>
<th>CARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V584</td>
<td>(1-4)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Col./Code (6-7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>00-cc14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

70a) ASK ALL

In the past year, has anyone of another race physically assaulted you?

- IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO Q. 71
- IF YES ASK QUESTIONS b) to f)

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

NO. OF TIMES

- DON'T KNOW

99

b) The last time it happened how many people did it?

- ONE
- TWO
- THREE
- FOUR
- FIVE OR MORE
- DON'T KNOW

(8)

5

9

(9)

(10)

d) How old was the person/were the people who did it?

- a child/children under school age
- a child/children of school age
- a young person/people between 16 & 25
- or an older person/older people?
- People of Mixed ages
- DON'T KNOW

(11)

(12)

(13)

e) Was the person/were the people who did it...

READ OUT....

- white
- black (West Indian or African)
- Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi
- or something else (SPECIFY)
- MIXED GROUP
- DON'T KNOW

(11)

(12)

(13)

f) Why do you think they did this to you?

PROBE FULLY - RECORD VERBATIM

(11)
ASK ALL
In the last year has anyone of another race damaged any of your property?

IF YES ASK b) to f)

IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO Q.73

b) How many times in the last year?

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

NO. OF TIMES

DON'T KNOW

99

(16)

c) The last time it happened, how many people did it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>Three</th>
<th>Four</th>
<th>Five or more</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(17)

d) How old was the person/were the people who did it?

Would you say:

- a child/children under school age
- a child/children of school age
- a young person/people between 16 & 25
- or an older person/older people?
- people of mixed ages
- Don't know

(18)

e) Was the person/were the people who did it....READ OUT...

RINGS ONE CODE ONLY

OUT OF 1-4, IF 2+

CODES APPLY, RECORD

AT CODE 7.

MIXED GROUP

DONT KNOW

7

9

(25)

(26)

f) Why do you think they did this to you?

PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM

ASK ALL

In the last year has anyone of another race stolen anything from you?

IF NO CODE 00 AND GO TO Q.73

IF YES ASK b) to f)

b) How many times in the last year?

WRITE IN OR CODE 99

NO. OF TIMES

DON'T KNOW

99

(24)

c) The last time it happened, how many people did it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>Three</th>
<th>Four</th>
<th>Five or more</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(25)

d) How old was the person/were the people who did it?

Would you say:

- a child/children under school age
- a child/children of school age
- a young person/people between 16 & 25
- or an older person/older people?
- People of mixed ages
- Don't know

(26)

e) Was the person/were the people who did it....READ OUT...

RINGS ONE CODE ONLY

OUT OF 1-4, IF 2+

CODES APPLY, RECORD

AT CODE 7.

MIXED GROUP

DONT KNOW

7

9

f) Why do you think they did this to you?

PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM

- 50 -

- 51 -
Victim Support schemes are groups of volunteers trained to offer information help and advice to the victims of crime.

Have you heard of Victim Support Schemes before now?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(30)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some areas the police ask Victim Support Schemes to call around to see if victims of crime need any further information, advice or assistance, for example about insurance claims, repairs or court appearance; or if people are upset they can talk about their feelings.

Do you think all victims of crimes should be contacted by such schemes or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(31)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO - NONE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO - NOT ALL</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONLY SERIOUS CRIMES</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES - ALL CRIMES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where were you contacted by a Victim Support Scheme?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(32)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-cc34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did you accept their offer of assistance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(33)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Would you have liked to have been contacted by a Victim Support Scheme or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(34)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Would you have accepted an offer of assistance from such a scheme?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th>(35)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Household Information

**ASK ALL**

**Are you... READ OUT...**
- married or living as married
- single living with parents
- widowed
- divorced or separated
- single

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1-cc57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**How many total years of schooling and college did you complete?**

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF YEARS</th>
<th>(47-48)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**How old were you on your last birthday?**

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE IN YEARS</th>
<th>(49-50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Apart from yourself how many other adults aged 16 OR OVER normally live here in this household catered for by the same person as you?**

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF PEOPLE</th>
<th>(51)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**How many children aged UNDER 16 live in this household?**

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF CHILDREN</th>
<th>(52)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Does your household... READ OUT...**
- own this accommodation
- rent this accommodation from council
- rent this accommodation from housing assoc.
- rent this accommodation from private landlord
- or receive this accommodation RENT FREE with your job

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(53)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Who is the head of this household?**

**WRITE IN**

- Respondent
- Spouse or cohabitee of respondent
- Parent/Step-parent of respondent
- Other person

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-cc57</td>
<td>1-cc57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-cc57</td>
<td>4-cc57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*IF H.O.H. IS SPOUSE OR PARENT OF RESPONDENT GO TO Q.86a ELSE GO TO Q.87a*

---

**ASK ONLY IF H.O.H. IS PARENT OR SPOUSE/COHABITEE OF RESPONDENT**

**Is the head of this household at present... READ OUT...**
- in full-time education
- in paid full-time work over 30 hr/week
- in paid part-time work under 30 hr/week
- seeking work
- disabled
- O.A.P.
- Other

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(55)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**IF IN PAID WORK ASK b to g)**

**a)**

**What is his/her job?**

**WRITE IN**

**b)**

**What is his/her job?**

**WRITE IN**

**c)**

**What is the title of his/her job?**

**WRITE IN**

**d)**

**What qualifications are needed for that job?**

**WRITE IN**

**e)**

**Is he/she... READ OUT...**

**WRITE IN**

**f)**

**Does the job involve supervising or being responsible for the work of any other people?**

**CIRCLE NO OR WRITE IN**

**g)**

**How many employees does he or she have?**

**WRITE IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>UNDER 25</th>
<th>OVER 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Options</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) I ASK ALL</td>
<td>Are you at present...READ OUT....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) IF IN PAID WORK</td>
<td>What is your job?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) IF IN PAID WORK</td>
<td>What is the title of your job?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) IF IN PAID WORK</td>
<td>What qualifications are needed for your job?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) IF IN PAID WORK</td>
<td>Are you...READ OUT...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) IF SELF-EMPLOYED</td>
<td>How many employees do you have?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88) ASK ALL</td>
<td>How many people are in paid work in this household?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89) Considering income from all sources how much do you estimate was the total income for this household last year...READ OUT...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90) What country does your family come from originally (IF IN DOUBT REFER TO FATHER'S FATHER)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91) Which political party would you identify yourself with?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Go to checklist**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVIEWER: RECORD BY OBSERVATION FOR ALL:</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEX OF RESPONDENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE OF RESPONDENT:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK (WEST INDIAN/AFRICAN)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIAN/PAKISTANI/BANGLADESI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER NON-WHITE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIXED/UNCERTAIN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETACHED HOUSE</td>
<td>1-oc73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI-DETACHED HOUSE</td>
<td>2-oc73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRACED/END OF TERRACE HOUSE</td>
<td>3-oc73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-CONTAINED FLAT/MAISONETTE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROOMS/BEDSITTER</td>
<td>5-oc73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER SPECIFY</td>
<td>oc73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF FLAT/MAISONETTE NUMBER OF FLOORS IN FLAT/MAISONETTE BLOCK.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 FLOORS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 OR 4 FLOORS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 FLOORS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+ FLOORS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF FLAT/MAISONETTE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On what floor does respondent live</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11+</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERVIEW METHOD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women/women direct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women/women indirect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men/women direct</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men/women indirect</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME INTERVIEW COMPLETED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE OF INTERVIEW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DURATION OF INTERVIEW</td>
<td>WRITE IN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL NUMBER</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERVENER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTIM FORM NUMBER</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTIMISATION TYPE</td>
<td>BREAK, ENTER, THEFT</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VANDALISM</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THEFT FROM PERSON</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASSAULT</td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEXUAL ASSAULT</td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ASK ALL**

1(a) How many times in the last year were you a VICTIM OF... READ OUT APPROPRIATE CATEGORY OF CRIME...

- BREAK, ENTER, THEFT, VANDALISM, THEFT FROM PERSON, ASSAULT, SEXUAL ASSAULT

WRITE IN OR CODE 99 IF NO. OF TIMES EXCEEDS ONE GO TO (b) IF NO. OF TIMES IS ONE CODE 1 AT (b) AND THEN GO TO Q.2.

(b) You mention...(number) incidents of .......

(type of offence). Were any of those very similar incidents, where the same thing was done under the same circumstances and probably by the same person/people?

NO - INCIDENT

YES - SERIES

2. Can you tell me very briefly what happened?

PROBE FOR OUTLINE DETAILS OF NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES. IF MORE THAN ONE INCIDENT RECORD KEY DETAILS OF MOST RECENT. IF A SERIES RECORD KEY DETAILS OF THE SERIES.
3. FOR ALL

INTERVIEWER: CODE FROM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN
Said IF THE ANSWER IS WHOLLY OBVIOUS.
OTHERWISE ASK:

The people who did it - can you say anything at all
about how many there were or what sorts of people they
were?

NO
YES

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.6a
IF YES CODE 2 AND GO TO Q.4, Q.5.

4. (a) IF ANY INFORMATION ABOUT OFFENDER

How many were there?

One
Two
Three
Four
Five or more
Don't know

(b) Was the person/Were the people who
did it male or female?

Male
Female
People of both sexes
Don't know

(c) How old was the person/Were the people who
did it? Would you say:

a child/children under
school age
a child/children of school
age
a young person/people 16
to 25
or an older person/older
people
People of mixed ages
Don't know

(d) As far as you know, was the person/the people
who did it... READ OUT....

RING ONE CODE ONLY OUT OF 1-4.

IF 2+ CODES APPLY?

RECORD AT CODE 7

White
Black (West Indian
or African)
Indian, Pakistan
or Bangladeshi
Other (specify)
Don't know

(e) Was it someone/Were any of them people you
knew before it happened or was it/were they all stranger(s)?

One person - known before
stranger
2+ People - all known
Some known
None known

5. IF ANY KNOWN

SHOW CARD II

How well did you know them?

Please read out the number from the card

WRITE IN NUMBER

IF NUMBER 14 PROBE FULLY AND RECORD VERBATIM
6. (a) **ASK ALL**

**CODE IF WHOLLY OBVIOUS, OTHERWISE ASK:**

Was anything at all stolen during the incident that belonged to you or anyone else in your household?

- **IF NO** CODE 1 AND **GO TO QUESTION 7a**
- **IF YES** CODE 2 AND **ASK B, C**

(b) **IF ANYTHING STOLEN**

Including any cash, what would you estimate was the total value of what was stolen?

- Under £5
- £5 but under £25
- £25 but under £50
- £50 but under £100
- £100 but under £250
- £250 but under £500
- £500 but under £1000
- £1000 +
- Don't know

(c) **How much of the stolen property was recovered?**

- None
- Some
- All

7. (a) **ASK ALL**

**CODE IF WHOLLY OBVIOUS; OTHERWISE ASK**

Apart from things that were stolen), Did the person/people who did it damage, deface or mess up anything that belonged to you or to anyone else in your household?

- **IF NO** CODE 1 AND **GO TO Q.8a**
- **IF YES** CODE 2 AND **ASK b AND c**

(b) **IF ANYTHING DAMAGED**

What damage did they do? Anything ELSE PROBE TO NO, RECORD VERBATIM

(c) **What was the total of the damage they did?**

- Under £25
- £25 but under £50
- £50 but under £100
- £100 but under £250
- £250 but under £500
- £500 but under £1000
- £1000 +
- Don't know
8. **(a) IF ANYTHING STOLEN OR DAMAGED**

Was any of the property stolen or damaged covered by an insurance policy?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No 1 - cc 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO c), d)  

IF DON'T KNOW CODE 9 AND GO TO c), d)  

IF YES CODE 2 AND ASK b), c) and d)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know 9 - cc 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) **IF YES**

Did you get anything for the loss or damage from the insurance company?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Claim outstanding 3  

Did not make claim 4  

Don't know 9  

(c) **Was anything that was stolen or damaged have a sentimental value to you?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) **Bearing in mind any property that was recovered and anything you got from an insurance company, for what was stolen or damaged, were you financially worse off in the end?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Don't know 9

9. **ASK ALL**

CODE IF WHOLLY OBVIOUS, OTHERWISE ASK:

At the time it happened, were you or anyone else aware of what was happening?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No one 1 - cc 77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO, CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.14a  

IF YES - Respondent only 2  

Respondent and other H/H members 3  

WHO WAS AWARE? Other H/H members only 4  

OTHER specify ______________________ 5

10. **IF ANYONE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING**

Did (the person/any of the people) who did it have a weapon or something they used or threatened to use as a weapon?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

YES 2  

IF NO GO TO Q.11a

IF YES - What kind of weapon  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOTTLE/GLASS</td>
<td>1 2 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNIFE/SCISSORS</td>
<td>1 2 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STICK/SWEEPER/BLUNT OBJECT</td>
<td>1 2 (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIREARM</td>
<td>1 2 (48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTHER specify ________________________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 (50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 (51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. (a) IF ANYONE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING

Did the person/any of the people who did it actually hit you or use force or violence on you in any way?

IF NO GO TO Q.12a

IF YES - In what way

CODE FOR EACH

HIT WITH WEAPON/SOMETHING USED AS WEAPON

KICKED

PUNCHED/SLAPPED

ONLY IF NOT RAPED:

ATTENDED RAPE

ONLY IF NOT ATTEMPTED/ SEXUALLY ASSAULTED

RAPED

OTHER SPECIFY

(b) Were you injured in any way?

IF NO GO TO Q.12a

IF YES - In what way were you injured

CODE FOR EACH

BRUISES/BLACK EYE(S)

SCRATCHES

CUTS

BROKEN BONES

OTHER SPECIFY

12. (a) IF ANYONE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING

Did the person/any of the people who did it actually hit anyone else or use force or violence on anyone else in any way?

IF NO GO TO Q.13

IF YES - In what way?

CODE FOR EACH

GRABBED/PUSHED

PUNCHED/SLAPPED

KICKED

HIT WITH WEAPON/SOMETHING USED AS WEAPON

RAPED

ONLY IF NOT RAPED:

ATTENDED RAPE

ONLY IF NOT ATTEMPTED/ SEXUALLY ASSAULTED

RAPED

OTHER SPECIFY

I.D.

SERIAL NO.

CARD
13. **IF ANYONE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING**

Did the person/people who did it threaten to use force or violence on anyone there or harm them in any way.

**IF NO GO TO Q.14**

**IF YES WHO did they threaten**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE FOR EACH</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RESPONDENT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER H/H MEMBER</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PERSON NOT MEMBER OF H/H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

14. (a) **ASK ALL**

Can I just check as a result of what happened, did you or anyone else in your household have attention from a doctor?

- No One: 1 - cc 36
- Respondent: 2
- Other H/H Member: 3 - cc 26
- Respondent & other H/H Member: 4

**IF NO CODE 1 AND GO TO Q.16**

(b) **IF RESPONDENT RECEIVED DOCTOR'S ATTENTION:**

What was the reason you needed attention from the doctor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE FOR EACH</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Injuries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty Sleeping</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headaches</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nausea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER Specify</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

13. (b) Was anyone else injured in any way?

**IF NO GO TO Q.13**

**IF YES** - In what way were they injured

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE FOR EACH</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRUISES/BLACK EYE(S)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCRATCHES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUTS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROKEN BONES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER SPECIFY</td>
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13. **IF ANYONE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING**

Did the person/people who did it threaten to use force or violence on anyone there or harm them in any way.

**IF NO GO TO Q.14**

**IF YES WHO did they threaten**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE FOR EACH</th>
<th>NO</th>
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<tr>
<td>RESPONDENT</td>
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**IF NO GO TO Q.14**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RESPONDENT</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PERSON NOT MEMBER OF H/H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. (a) IF OTHER H/H MEMBER RECEIVED DOCTOR'S ATTENTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needed attention from the doctor?</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Injuries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty Sleeping</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt depressed</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headache</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nausea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTHER specify ___________________________

(b) Did need to stay overnight in the hospital?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did need to stay overnight in the hospital?</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. ASK ALL

How much time did you lose from work as a result of this incident (these incidents)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Lost</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Day or less</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Days</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 days to a week</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 1 week</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 1 month</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. ASK ALL

How much time did anyone else in the household lose from work as a result of this incident (these incidents)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Lost</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. (a) ASK ALL

How much effect would you say the incident had on you or other people in your household?

Would you say it had...READ OUT....

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a very big effect</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quite a big effect</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not much effect</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or no effect at all</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) What were the effects

PROBE FULLY - RECORD VERBATIM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 a) ASK ALL</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you receive any help from anyone?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 - cc 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 a) ASK ALL</td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was the worst aspect of the incident?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 b) IF YES ASK b) and c)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who offered help.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBE FULLY - RECORD VERBATIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 b) Were there any others?</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 c) Who was the most help?</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBE FULLY - RECORD VERBATIM</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20 c) What were the effects of the worst aspect of this incident?</td>
<td>(51)</td>
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<td>PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
21 a) **ASK ALL**

Did you receive any help or advice from any professional people such as: **READ OUT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A. Bureaus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicitors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Cttee Support Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Prove Fully Record Verbatim**

22 a) **ASK ALL**

Did you receive any help or advice from anyone else?

b) What sort of help or advice were you given?

c) Were you satisfied with this help?
23 a) **ASK ALL**

After the incident were there any of these sorts of help or advice which you needed but could not get?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF NO** GO TO (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - cc 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) **IF YES** Which? Any Others PROBE TO NO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1  | 2   |
| (9) | (10) |

| 1  | 2   |
| (11) | (12) |

| 1  | 2   |
| (13) | (14) |

| 1  | 2   |
| (15) | (16) |

c) Were there any other sorts of help or advice which you needed but could not get?

| Yes |
| 2   |

**IF NO** PROBE TO NO

| (17) |

24. **ASK ALL**

Did the Police come to know about this matter (these matters)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - cc 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF YES** GO TO Q.25

**IF DON'T KNOW** GO TO Q.26

**IF NO** Why not? PROBE FULLY RECORD VERBATIM AND THEN GO TO Q.26
25. **If Police Knew About Matter**

(a) How did the Police come to know about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police told by respondent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police told by other person</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police were there</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police found out in other way (specify how)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Did the police ever find out who did it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Overall, how satisfied were you with the way the police dealt with the matter? Would you say you were...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction Level</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A bit dissatisfied</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or very dissatisfied</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) If dissatisfied (code 3 or 4 at c)

Why were you dissatisfied? **Probe fully**

RECORD VERBATIM

26. **Show Card J**

When the police come to know about an offence like the one we have been talking about, how high a priority do you think they should give to investigating it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Level</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high priority</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High priority</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average priority</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low priority</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low priority</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should take no action</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) ASK ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW CARD G This is a list of things the police or the courts can do about offenders. Which of these things do you think should have happened to the (person/people) who did the thing we have been talking about?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please read out the number from the card.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN OR CODE 99</td>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) IF NUMBER 4 COMPENSATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should anything else have happened to them apart from having to pay compensation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN OR CODE 99</td>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 The government is considering schemes in which victims and offenders would meet out of court in the presence of an officially appointed person to agree to a way in which the offender could make a repayment to the victim for what he had done. Would you have accepted a chance of such a meeting after this crime?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 If an out of court agreement like this could be arranged without you having to meet the offender(s) would you like this to happen or not?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 INTERVIEWER: ASK ONLY THOSE QUESTIONS TO APPLY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERVIEWER: GO NOW TO FINAL PAGE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASK ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you ..........READ OUT married or living as married</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single living with parents</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>widowed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>divorced or separated</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 How many total years of schooling and college did you complete?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN NO. OF YEARS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Apart from yourself how many other adults AGED 16 or OVER normally live here in this household catered for by the same person as you?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN NO. OF PEOPLE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 How old were you on your last birthday?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN AGE IN YEARS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 How many children aged under live in this household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN NO. OF CHILDREN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 DOES your household .......... READ OUT .......</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWN this accommodation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENT this accommodation from Council</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENT this accommodation from housing assoc.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENT this accommodation from private landlord</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or receive this accommodation RENT FREE with your job</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Who is head of this household</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spouse or cohabitee of respondent</td>
<td>1 - 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS NOT HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD
(a) Are you at present ....READ OUT...

Paid work
(in paid full time work over 30 hr week
(seeking work dependent on H.O.H.
ill
disabled
O.A.P.

or other specify

IF IN PAID WORK ASK b) to q)
IF NOT IN PAID WORK GO TO Q.39

IF IN PAID WORK
(b) What is your job?
PROBE FULLY - RECORD HERE:
(c) What is the title of your job?
PROBE FULLY - RECORD HERE:
(d) What qualifications are needed for your job?
PROBE FULLY - RECORD HERE:

CIRCLE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE

(e) Are you.....READ OUT.....

AN EMPLOYEE
SELF EMPLOYED

IF EMPLOYEE ASK f
IF SELF EMPLOYED ASK g!

f) IF EMPLOYEE:
Does your job involve supervising or being responsible for the work of other people?

CIRCLE NO. OR WRITE IN NUMBER

NO

G) IF SELF EMPLOYED CIRCLE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE
How many employees do you have?

38. ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD
(a) Are you at present ....READ OUT...

Col./Code
(52)
(53)
Col./Code
(54)

IF MORE THAN ONE CODE
FIRST TO APPLY
in full time education
in full time work over 30hr/week
in paid part time work
seeking work
ill
disabled
O.A.P.

or other specify

IF IN PAID WORK ASK b) to q)
IF NOT IN PAID WORK GO TO Q.39

IF IN PAID WORK
(b) What is your job?
PROBE FULLY - RECORD HERE:
(c) What is the title of your job?
PROBE FULLY - RECORD HERE:
(d) What qualifications are needed for that job?
PROBE FULLY - RECORD HERE:
(e) Are you.....READ OUT.....

CIRCLE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE

an employee
self employed

IF EMPLOYEE ASK f
IF SELF EMPLOYED ASK g!

f) IF EMPLOYEE:
Does the job involve supervising or being responsible for the work of any other people

CIRCLE OR WRITE IN

NO

G) IF SELF EMPLOYED CIRCLE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE
How many employees do you have?
### 39. Ask All

How many people are in paid work in this household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code or Write In</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56-57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 40. Considering income from all sources how much do you estimate was the total income for this household last year...READ OUT...

- Under £3,000
- £3,000 - £7,999
- £8,000 - £11,999
- £12,000 or more

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code or Write In</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 41. What country does your family come from originally (If in doubt refer to Father's Father)

- U.K.
- Republic of Ireland
- Continental Europe
- Continental Asia
- Greece/Turks/Cypriot or Non
- Africa
- West Indies
- Orient
- Other Specify

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code or Write In</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 42. Which political party would you identify yourself with?

- Conservative
- Labour
- SDP/Liberal
- Other Specify
- Don't Know

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code or Write In</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Interviewer: Record by Observation For All:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX OF RESPONDENT</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE OF RESPONDENT</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>(62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (West Indian/African)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian/Pakistan/Bangladeshi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-White</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed/Uncertain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detached House</td>
<td>(63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Detached House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terraced/End of Terrace House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Contained Flat/Maisonette</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms/Bed sitter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER SPECIFY</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF FLAT/MAISONETTE NUMBER OF FLOORS IN FLAT/ MAISONETTE BLOCK</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Floors</td>
<td>(64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or 4 Floors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9 Floors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+ Floors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF FLAT/MAISONETTE</th>
<th>Col./Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On what floor does respondent live</td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1ST
- 2ND
- 3RD
- 4TH
- 5TH
- 6-10
- 11+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX OF INTERVIEWER</th>
<th>COL./CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>(66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONDENT IS:</th>
<th>ORIGINAL RESPONDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER H/H MEMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME INTERVIEW COMPLETED:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(68-69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE OF INTERVIEW:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DURATION OF INTERVIEW:</th>
<th>WRITE IN (MINUTES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70-76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(28)