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The Problem of Immanence in Kant and Deleuze

A thesis submitted to Middlesex University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

In The Problem of Immanence in Kant and Deleuze, I reassess Kant’s project in the light of its origins in Leibnizian rationalism. In his early works Kant seeks to ground the principle of sufficient reason as a ‘real’ rather than a ‘logical’ principle; it is this project that shapes his ‘critical’ formulation of the problem of the ‘synthetic apriori’. I claim that Kant’s project of ‘immanent critique’ never quite escapes the continuing requirement for metaphysical and teleological grounds, and that in the Opus Posthumum we find Kant returning to his rationalist roots in order to find a new relation between self, world and God, the three Ideas of reason. In parallel to this story, I argue that in his major work Difference and Repetition, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze effects a return to Leibnizian philosophy (in pursuit of a new account of sufficient reason) which allows him to resolve in retrospect certain problems that arose in the unfolding of Kant’s philosophy.

My account is conducted on both historical and philosophical levels. From the historical point of view, I suggest firstly that Deleuze’s return to the problematic of ‘immanence’ should be seen as providing an alternative transformation of Kantianism to the better known trajectory of German idealism, one that is more faithful to Kant’s project in its historical totality. Secondly, I demonstrate how Deleuze’s interpretation is facilitated by insightful readings of more neglected thinkers of the post-Kantian period such as Maimon, Novalis and Hölderlin.

Philosophically, the weight of the thesis lies with the extensive development of two themes. Firstly Kant’s theories of Ideas and intuition are interpreted from a Deleuzian standpoint, in order to provide materials for a theory of nonconceptual difference. Secondly, a new perspective is taken on the question of the primacy of self-consciousness in Kantian philosophy.
Acknowledgements

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Works by Immanuel Kant

With the exceptions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (for which I follow the usual practice of citing the pagination of the 1781 (A) edition and the 1787 (B) edition) and the *Critique of Judgment* (for which I cite solely the Akademie pagination, reproduced in the Pluhar translation), citations from the following editions are followed by references of the form ‘Ak. ...’, to Kant’s *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. Berlin & Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1922.


Works by Gilles Deleuze

All works by Deleuze, with the exception of *Difference and Repetition*, are cited in translation except where none exists. I cite references to the English translation of *Difference and Repetition* first, followed by a reference to the French edition.

I shall briefly recount the genesis of this thesis because it reflects in reverse the present structure of the work. I started my research with the intention of coming to an understanding of the claims and context of Gilles Deleuze’s fascinating but enigmatic magnum opus from 1968, *Difference and Repetition*. At length, after considerable detours into radical empiricism (William James, with reference to Hume and Russell) and process philosophy (Bergson, Whitehead), it became clear that, despite his animadversions to the contrary, Deleuze’s project could only be understood from within the philosophical problematic discovered and developed by Kant and the post-Kantians. In a way reminiscent of the post-Kantians, Deleuze firstly attempts to transform Kantianism from within, and secondly to use this transformation to provide access to a philosophy of absolute self-differentiation. Like Hegel, Deleuze claims to have produced “the only realised Ontology” (DR 303/387). It became clear that Deleuze’s famous objections to Hegel are only part of the story – in fact he seems to accept many of Hegel’s fundamental moves. He seems to accept the necessity of a turn to the absolute, while paradoxically returning to Kantian methods and distinctions to carry this out.

Thus my project could not proceed without attempting to understand Deleuze’s relation to post-Kantianism. However, what was to be made of the fact that Deleuze had devoted so much scholarly energy to rereading some of the major pre-Kantian philosophers, such as Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume? Deleuze’s interest in Spinoza was perhaps the easiest to explain, as it could be seen as a new confrontation with that dominant, but vexing presence who hangs over the post-
Kantian project. Just as the post-Kantians returned to Spinoza to complete Kantianism, so too does Deleuze's return exactly mirror this aim; I suggest in chapter 2 that Deleuze finds in Spinoza an account of 'absolute difference' that can be placed in competition with Hegel's similar account.

But what of Leibniz and Hume? Perhaps, if post-Kantianism was an attempt to reconcile the goals of pre-Kantian metaphysics with the critical claims of Kant, then Deleuze could be seen as repeating this project with a new thoroughness, by returning to these other major figures. Deleuze would then be returning to the question of the genesis of Kantianism from problems left by Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume, in order once more to put in question the nature, limits, and status of Kantianism itself. Implicit in such a reorientation would be the kinds of questions that preoccupied the post-Kantians: what is the philosophical status of Kantian critique itself? Does it, or can it, have a consistent metacritical dimension? What is the relation between metacritique and metaphysics? Lastly, could these questions about the nature and limits of Kant's self-critique of reason be pursued through a questioning of the notion of "immanence"? From Spinoza to Kant to Hegel, this notion of immanence seemed to serve for Deleuze as a secret thread running through modern philosophy, in which the relation of critique and metaphysics was played out.

Despite my conviction that this was the key to Deleuze's philosophy, it was nevertheless apparent that many aspects of Deleuze's discussion of Kant were truncated, while his explicit discussions of Hegel were very inadequate. It was also clear that, if Deleuze was doing what I thought he was, he had never explicitly drawn together his conclusions and self-consciously justified them. Indeed, while Deleuze's works from 1953 to 1968 did seem to be consistently elaborating approaches to the questions I have just outlined, Deleuze swiftly followed what appeared to be his definitive statement of the issues, Difference and Repetition, with the publication in 1969 of Logic of Sense, a philosophical work no less ambitious, but apparently constructed on very different principles. With only an analogical relation to the project he had been developing for 15 years.

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previously. Shortly after this Deleuze seemed to turn his back on systematic philosophy altogether with the publication, with Félix Guattari, of the notorious *Anti-Oedipus*. The project to construct "the only realised Ontology" around the themes of difference and repetition, seemed to recede into the distant past, forgotten by Deleuze himself, and forgotten by other philosophers who now associated Deleuze with (and perhaps excommunicated him because of) the majestic *folie* that was *Anti-Oedipus*. For these reasons, then, reconstructing Deleuze's project along the lines I have outlined seemed a rather perilous enterprise, the more so because it seemed to me that Deleuze's earlier project was a good one, and I was not at all clear why he had forsaken it.

My reading of Deleuze therefore began to develop a more explicitly reconstructive aspect; it became necessary to reconstruct the kind of things Deleuze *should* be saying to defend his project. In particular it was necessary to spell out and augment aspects of his reading of Kant, and to elaborate aspects of his philosophy in general which would allow him to fend off the rival claims of Hegel. In the process of this reconstruction, the project inevitably began to extend into a re-reading of the metacritical issues in Kant and post-Kantianism in general which, while inspired by Deleuze, went beyond a reading of Deleuze. Much of the work has involved detailed reading of Kant and Hegel together with secondary literature upon them. I began to have a prospective thesis which dealt with the abiding theme of immanence *equally* in Kant, Hegel and Deleuze. The idea became that Deleuze's philosophy can be seen as the latest development in a newly interpreted philosophical history of post-Kantianism. It has been impossible, however, to carry out this project of comparing the three philosophers. I have had to focus instead on developing a reading of Kant's problematic that explains and justifies how Deleuze's problematic can be seen to arise from it and provides consistent solutions to enduring problems within Kantianism. However, I hope that my aim to compare Deleuze's and Hegel's respective transformations of Kantianism remains visible and, if not defended here, at least suggestive.

The structure is as follows. The introduction presents an account of Deleuze's relation to post-Kantianism (a related appendix develops a general

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account of the notion of metacritique). Part One contains two chapters which
attempt a general reorientation of Kant’s project, firstly with regard to the issue of
the self-critique of reason (or ‘immanent critique’), then by returning to Kant’s
pre-critical writings to assess the development of Kant’s problematic from issues
in Hume, Leibniz and Spinoza. In Part Two Kant’s critical resolutions of his
earlier problematic are placed alongside an alternative trajectory developed by
Deleuze, which starts from the same ‘pre-critical’ matrix, but inhabits and
transforms Kant’s critique in such a way that certain aporias faced by Kant
concerning the relation between critique and metaphysics are resolved by
Deleuze’s persistent retention of Leibnizian and Spinozist themes. The four
chapters in Part Two are divided into two pairs of chapters, in which Kantian and
Deleuzian views are developed in parallel. Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with
the relations between critique and idealism, and in particular with the crucial yet
problematic status of the noumenon. Chapter 3 concerns what I take to be the
fundamental moves of Kant’s critical project, and concerns the relations between
the Transcendental Aesthetic, idealism, and metacritique, while chapter 4 starts to
develop Deleuze’s unusual reading of these issues. Chapters 5 and 6 concern the
relation between the questions \textit{quid facti} and \textit{quid juris} in Kant and Deleuze. In
chapter 5 this embraces issues in the Transcendental Analytic such as the status of
the Transcendental Deduction, the account of concepts and the question of the
status of apperception, while chapter 6 develops what I perceive to be Deleuze’s
ultimate solutions to problems encountered in Kant’s treatment of these topics.

I have attempted to keep focused on the \textit{metacritical} dimensions of the
philosophies involved, and the relations between them, in doing so, I hope my
main theme can emerge: the possibility of an effective new reading of Kant
conducted under the horizon of Deleuze’s renewed problematisation of Kant’s
‘Copernican turn’. I attempt to discern a coherent movement that runs from
Leibniz-Kant-Deleuze, and that has its problematic Archimedean point in the
philosophical prospect of immanence. However my approach to the issue of
metacritique will be far from formal because of what I take to be the inherence

\footnotesize{Deleuze’s main philosophical statements. I will nevertheless at times refer to passages of the latter
which I believe to be consistent with the earlier project.

I should emphasise that this thesis requires no prior knowledge of Deleuze on the part of the
reader. I hope to generate the issues that animate \textit{Difference and Repetition} from a reading of
problems in Kantianism.}
and implication of metacritical issues in the very fabric of the theories for which they provide the ultimate ground. Thus, for Kant, metacritical issues govern the procedures of critique itself; for instance, I will argue that the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories is itself meant to be justified from the perspective of Kant’s system as a whole. For Hegel, metacritical aspects are intrinsic in the speculative experience undergone by phenomenological consciousness (in the *Phenomenology*), and the thought unfolded by the dialectical thinker (in the *Logic*). For Deleuze, *transcendental empiricism* will provide an analogous locus (mirroring the term ‘speculative experience’) of the overlap between metacritical and critical dimensions. However, in reading Kant and Deleuze, I will place myself against readings of metacritique which identify the subject of thought with the subject of experience. I emphasise the difference between the metacritical justifications made possible by the thinker or philosopher who is conducting the critique, and the account of the subject of experience in the system the philosopher is demonstrating and justifying.

This thesis is also the product of an intersection between two contemporary philosophical currents, that of Deleuze’s work and of the current and ongoing renaissance in the study of Kant and the post-Kantian philosophers. It is certainly an exciting time to be studying this latter tradition of thought, as not a month goes by without the appearance of new publications by a community of researchers (mostly German and American) who are excavating this tradition with a depth and intensity never before seen. It is to be hoped that this research has a profound impact in the future upon the foundations of what has come to be known as ‘continental philosophy’, as well as on philosophy in general.

On the other hand, I think it is no exaggeration to say that in general the philosophical reception of Deleuze has been disastrous. The main reason for this, as already suggested, is Deleuze’s publication in the 1970’s with Félix Guattari of *Anti-Oedipus* and its companion volume, *A Thousand Plateaus* (under the collective title of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*). Now, whatever the merit of these texts, it is enough to venture the suggestion that they will only really become comprehensible once Deleuze’s earlier work is understood, to which they constantly refer.\(^4\) It has in fact gone almost unnoticed that Deleuze, between 1953

\(^4\) I do not discuss the role of these texts in Deleuze’s own development. However, it may be observed that despite the unorthodoxy, disciplinary transgressions, and general bizarreness of
and 1968, was engaged with a unified, consistent and profoundly philosophical project whose riches and sophistication far outweigh, and in many ways are distinct from, the results and procedures of these later works. Thus a set of converging *doxai* about Deleuze has quickly formed. To critical theorists, he is merely another of the ‘French Nietzscheans’ (whereas in major works such as *Difference and Repetition* Nietzsche is by no means a dominant presence); to others in the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition, if they are aware of his work at all, it is as an example of a peculiarly French predilection for irrationalism (whereas much of Deleuze’s research concerns Kantian themes and high rationalists such as Spinoza and Leibniz); to others, Deleuze is a postmodernist (still further from the truth, as this thesis will show by implication). Added to this situation is the fact that much of the work done on Deleuze has been from a ‘cultural theory’ perspective. In short, Deleuze’s philosophy remains a largely unmined source at present. Nevertheless it must be recognised that this kind of situation is perhaps inevitable for new and difficult philosophical work. It needs only to be recalled that Kant was denounced in his time not only as a Berkeleyan idealist, but as a Spinozist, while Hegel continues to be regarded as a mystical pantheist. In the future, I hope at least that those influenced and interested by the post-Kantian tradition might begin to see the intrinsic interest and relevance of Deleuze’s project to them, and conversely that those interested in Deleuze will be able to gain from research into Kant and Hegel. Speculative thought is perhaps the area of philosophy where the exchange of ideas, without partisanship, can be pursued most freely.

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these volumes, Deleuze still maintained in 1980 that he was writing “philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word” (‘8 Ans Après: Entretien 1980’, with Catherine Clément in *L’Arc* 49, 1980), 99. It is telling that when this statement has been quoted, as in B. Massumi’s foreword to his translation of *A Thousand Plateaus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. ix), the last clause has been omitted!

5 In the bibliography I have referred only to secondary literature on Deleuze that has philosophical relevance to this thesis.

Introduction

The Problem of Immanence

1 Deleuze and the Post-Kantians

In this thesis I claim that the philosophical work of Deleuze represents the latest flowering of the project, begun in the immediate wake of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR), to complete consistently the ‘Copernican revolution’ in philosophy. Contrary to appearances, the Copernican turn is a living presence in Deleuze’s work, perhaps even more so than for many other contemporary philosophers. Several times in *Difference and Repetition* (DR), Deleuze speaks of carrying forward and completing the Copernican revolution; in particular, he writes of “a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept” (DR 41/59). In a sense, the peculiarity of Deleuze’s work, its strangely classical style and its apparent lack of the contemporary *sine qua non* of irony, comes from its *direct* continuation of the Kantian turn. It revolves in the orbit of 18\textsuperscript{th}-19\textsuperscript{th} century philosophy. Deleuze’s attacks on Kant and Hegel are therefore reminiscent of the attacks of the post-Kantians on Kant; they arise from a deep proximity to their objects.

Kant had subjected philosophy to a Copernican turn (CPR Bxvi) by constructing a *critique* that grounded and provided limits for all possible claims of

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1 For other references to the completion of the Copernican revolution, cf. DR 86/117, 162/210, 180/233, 249/320.

2 As I mentioned in the preface, my study of Deleuze is largely confined to the works of 1953-1968.
knowledge and morality. The right to this critique was secured by his claim to have secured the ‘highest principles’ of *apriori* cognition (CPR A150-158/B190-197). However, an unease quickly developed in young philosophers such as Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel that, while the ‘spirit’ of Kant’s critique was legitimate, the ‘letter’ was inadequate. The critical project lacked the method it deserved if it really was to provide the ‘highest principles’. Schelling wrote to Hegel in 1795, "Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. The premises are still missing. And who can understand results without premises?" Three fundamental steps are taken by the post-Kantians; taken together they can be said to comprise the project of *metacritique*.

1. Firstly it had to be questioned whether the critique itself was as pure as it could have been; whether the materials, form and technique of the critique itself had been *sufficiently* justified. In Kant’s case, examples of materials and forms would include the distinction between sensibility and understanding, and the form of intuition, while examples of techniques would include procedures drawn from the theory of judgment and the presupposition of *apriori* facts about cognition. Such elements could only be sufficiently justified if the justification was *immanent* to the critique itself.

2. But such a requirement leads to the issue of how critique itself can possibly be conceived. What kind of philosophical activity is critique? Is it even possible to conceive a distinctive notion of critique? If, for instance, Kant aims to show the necessary conditions of possible experience, then how can he show the validity of his own procedure if he is within the experience for which he is accounting? That is, the activity of critique entails being both necessarily ‘in’ the experience as conditioned, and ‘out’ of it in order to conceive the conditions of that experience. Lewis White Beck characterises metacritique in terms of an analogy with the notion of metalanguage. As each language will have a metalanguage in which its rules can be spelled out, so Kant can be characterised as a “transcendental grammarian”. However, as Beck acknowledges, if the critique is the attempt to ground knowledge then there occur problems particular

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to the ‘meta’ status of critique. For how can we justify with our cognitive faculties that the very elements Kant uses for his critique of the cognitive faculties are the correct elements for such a critique? Beck states that Kant is caught between two equally vicious alternatives – an infinite regress, or an intrinsically artificial halting of a regress by means of an appeal to facts, for instance ‘facts of reason’. 5

Now, there seem to be two general paths leading off from this issue. On the one hand, it can be argued that, as one cannot gain insight into the very conditions that allow one to have any insight at all, the status of critique itself is nonsense. Such was Wittgenstein’s solution to a similar issue, and it is echoed by many contemporary anti-foundationalist philosophers who find themselves having to deal with this kind of problem. 6 On the other hand, there is the sincere attempt to find a coherent and consistent way to justify critique itself, undertaken by the post-Kantians and whose failure is still held by many not to have yet been demonstrated. This latter path, I believe, is taken both by the post-Kantians and Deleuze. 7

3. Now these two steps taken by the post-Kantians led to a third, complicated issue that would provide the defining problematic within which post-Kantian philosophy moved. If metacritique was successful, then it would attain a self-grounding apriority that would surely no longer simply be critique, but philosophy itself. 8 The true attainment of first principles could then be achieved through a genetic approach, rather than through the procedure of finding

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5 Ibid, 31f. We will see in the next chapter whether this assessment does justice to the full structure of Kant’s critical project.
7 Interestingly, A.W. Moore is one analytic philosopher who has shown interest in Deleuze’s project from a Wittensteinian point of view precisely because he explores the transcendental status of the domain of ‘nonsense’. See Points of View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapters 5 & 9. While Moore cites The Logic of Sense, I am interested in Deleuze’s theories up to Difference and Repetition, where I believe Deleuze still shows interest in a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s project, along the lines of the post-Kantians. I cannot undertake a comparison of my views with Moore’s here.
8 Cf. Reinhold, ‘The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge’, in G. di Giovanni & H.S. Harris eds, Between Kant and Hegel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 66f. Fichte’s second preface (1798) to ‘Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftlehre’ gives a clear example of the vacillation that continued to beset Fichte concerning the true distinction of critique and philosophy (but note that he calls philosophy ‘metaphysics’ here, in contradistinction to Reinhold who carefully distinguishes philosophy and metaphysics.). While Fichte claims that a ‘pure critique’ should precede ‘pure metaphysics’, he confesses that “it will not become easy to render a systematic and comprehensive account of the procedure of the Wissenschaftlehre until it is possible to provide a
conditions. But what, then, was the true relation of critique to philosophy? How was critical method to be related to philosophical method? Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, amongst others, are all distinguished by their different solutions to this problem of the relation of method and genesis. For Fichte, the act of self-consciousness itself provided the dynamic template for genesis. For Schelling, self-consciousness presupposed a more profound identity of subject and object, the genesis of the articulations of which had to be constructed by the philosopher. For Hegel, by commencing with a *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the critique of philosophy was itself articulated as a genesis which, by its eventual attainment of completeness, would achieve the status of philosophy.

The threefold problem of metacritique can be seen as the enduring legacy left by the post-Kantians to modern philosophy. Philosophers, at least in the European tradition, can be defined as ‘modern’ to the extent that they operate within this problematic of seeking a method for metacritique. However, it is precisely on the issue of the interrelation of critique, philosophy and method that the work of Deleuze superficially appears to be least modern. Indeed, it should first be noted that Deleuze’s major critical studies have centred around the three great ‘pre-critical’ thinkers, Hume, Spinoza and Leibniz. While his study of Nietzsche devotes a whole chapter to the issue of ‘critique’, it has been roundly criticised for its apparent recourse to ‘pre-critical’ metaphysics; Deleuze’s notion of ‘total critique’ appears to depend wholly on a peculiar metaphysics of ‘active and reactive forces’. Contrary to the practices of Kant and the German idealists, with whom I wish to bracket him, we find little evidence of any preoccupation in Deleuze with their predominant concern to produce and account for method. In fact, Deleuze seems to be critical of the very idea of method: “Method ... is the pure exposition of this science itself”, Fichte, *Early Philosophical Writings*, ed. D. Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 98.

Deleuze expresses the intimacy of his project with that of the post-Kantians through many references to the importance of this distinction between genesis and conditioning. Cf. DR 154-158/200-205, 170/221.

10 Nietzsche and Philosophy (trans. H. Tomlinson, London: Athlone, 1983), is perhaps the best-known of Deleuze’s works, and has been the most subjected to criticism. For instance by D. Breazeale in ‘Hegel and Nietzsche’ (*Nietzsche-Studien* 4, 1975) 158-162, and S. Houlgate, in *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), 5-8. I agree with these criticisms to the extent that the book, by itself, does not hold up against Hegelian criticism, but I would add that the book perhaps benefits from being seen within the context of Deleuze’s somewhat peculiar strategy for doing the history of philosophy, which I touch on in Appendix I.
manifestation of a common sense or the realisation of a *Cogitatio natura*, and presupposes a good will as though this were a ‘premeditated decision’ of the thinker” (DR 165). But surely the issues involved in critique are necessarily methodological, and without such method, then the right to do philosophy, or at least a philosophy that can be at home in ‘modernity’, remains in doubt? The issues of where to begin, how to justify the beginning, how to proceed; these are all topics of the utmost importance for critical philosophy, yet Deleuze treats these issues with a cavalier attitude. In what sense, then, can Deleuze be, as I am suggesting, the latest of the post-Kantians?

There are broadly two ways one could approach such an issue, without slanting it so that particular post-Kantian methods would be already presupposed as the most correct kind of approach. The first way would be to explore the very notion of metacritique, particularly in its concrete development in post-Kantian philosophy, and to find if Deleuze has any good reasons in general for suggesting a different approach to the problem, which, while explaining his lack of explicit concern with methodology, would still discernibly relate his approach to the post-Kantian tradition. In this thesis I have chosen not to follow this path, but the reader may like to turn to Appendix I to find a propaedeutic for this kind of treatment; there the issues dealt with in the thesis are broached in a more formal way, that is nevertheless consistent with the conclusions of the thesis.

There is another way to broach the issue of Deleuze’s relation to the post-Kantian problem of metacritique, and that is to return to Kant himself. I have chosen to take this route for two reasons. Firstly, out of a suspicion that the post-Kantian charge that Kant had more or less ignored metacritical issues has itself perhaps been too uncritically accepted. It is a peculiar fact that treatments of metacritical issues in Kant are hard to find—no direct defense of Kant against the charge is made, the burden of proof often being implicitly put onto the post-Kantians to find an adequate resolution of the metacritical issues they themselves

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11 Cf. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 103f, 110 for Deleuze’s account of Nietzsche’s antipathy to method.
12 Deleuze’s attitude to what Hegelians call the ‘problem of beginning’ in particular borders on the sarcastic. After two long and extremely densely argued chapters of DR, Deleuze begins chapter three with the words “Where to begin in philosophy has always – rightly – been regarded as a very delicate problem, for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions” (DR 129/169). Despite going on to argue that it is in fact possible to have a presuppositionless beginning, the issue has already been dislodged from any transparent status by its very position in the book.
have raised. However, it seems to me that, especially if one pays attention to the development of Kant’s project as a whole, from its ‘pre-critical’ beginnings to its end in the *Opus posthumum*, Kant himself did have the metacritical problem of the self-justification of the critical project firmly in view, even if he may not ultimately have come to a satisfactory resolution of the problem. I spend much of the thesis defending this claim, and my second reason for my general approach grows out of it. That is, perhaps Deleuze’s philosophy can be understood precisely as a return to this original Kantian framing of metacritical issues. If this is right, it would explain the apparent invisibility of metacritical method from Deleuze’s work, given that the Kantian metacritical method is also far from explicit. But this is not all: it seems to me at least possible that Deleuze’s philosophy can be seen as resolving the enduring problems in Kant’s original approach to metacritique. My approach to the problem of metacritique, then, is twofold: to re-excavate the Kantian project, and to show how Deleuze’s philosophy can be seen as an attempt to complete this project.

As a consequence I start to piece together an alternative trajectory within post-Kantianism to the usual one of Fichte-Schelling-Hegel. Firstly, by emphasising the importance of Leibniz for Kantianism, it is possible to bring an unruly figure in post-Kantianism, Solomon Maimon, once more into the picture. Maimon’s Leibnizianism and his decentering of the importance of apperception have prevented him from being treated with the interest that the other post-Kantians have received in recent studies. As I will show, these are precisely the characteristics that make him interesting for Deleuze, and with good reason. The latter part of the thesis is in particular concerned with deciding the exact place and status of apperception in Kant, and I show that Deleuze’s turn to Maimon, Hölderlin and Novalis can be seen as consolidating a hidden and attractive trajectory emanating from Kantianism. I suggest that these thinkers are in some ways more attentive to certain tensions in Kant’s project (concerning apperception, teleology, idealism and their metacritical relevance) than are the more well-known German idealist avatars of post-Kantianism.

To assuage any preliminary doubts about my proposal that Deleuze’s philosophy be seen as a continuation and transformation of Kantianism, it is worth pointing out that Deleuze’s Kantianism is evident in the very structure of DR. our main text. The arrangement of this text displays the kind of segmentation of
different transcendental issues that we find in CPR, albeit in a different order. The first chapter, ‘Difference in itself’, outlines the formal structure of Deleuze’s account; the second, ‘Repetition for itself’, gives a novel account of temporal synthesis; ‘The Image of Thought’ has the character of a discussion of philosophy as propaedeutic, as “treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself” (CPR Bxxii). The fourth chapter, on the explicitly Kantian issue of ‘Ideas of Reason’ takes the title of ‘Ideal Synthesis of Difference’,¹³ and the final chapter, ‘Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’, is a belated ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. After DR, Kant all but disappears from Deleuze’s project, thus rendering his writings ever more enigmatic. At the end of this introduction I explain why I deal only with his writings up to 1968, and why I think they remain superior to the developments forged during the rest of his philosophical career.

2 What is Immanence?

So far I have merely stated that Deleuze’s philosophy represents an implicit alternative to post-Kantian developments concerning the relation of critique and philosophy. This is still an ‘external view’ of Deleuze’s motivation, as I have not yet given a sense of how Deleuze himself sees his project. In fact, it is extremely hard to find any statements in Deleuze’s writings about his goals, which is surely one more reason why his work has so far escaped the attention of philosophers. His writings seem hermetically sealed; we are left without clues to an entrance into them, or reasons why we should even want to enter them. For the rest of this chapter, I explore and compare some of the rare explicit directions Deleuze gives for reading his philosophy, and focus on the name of the key problem that emerges, that of immanence.

We can start by taking two statements which seem to present momentarily revealing insights into Deleuze’s motivating problem, and which are relevant, yet apparently at a striking tangent to, the framework so far developed. Firstly, there is a section on Kant in Deleuze’s late television interviews, where Kant is described as the philosopher of the tribunal of reason. After describing at length his “fascinated horror” at this tribunal, Deleuze pauses to muse over the question

of why somebody is attracted, or has an "affinity" for a particular kind of problem. He then confesses that he feels "connected to problems that try to find the means to do away with the system of judges, and replace it with something else". So we are faced with a problem at the outset: when Deleuze finally lets us in on what his problem is, it is described in terms of a deep anti-Kantianism. The first statement can be counterposed with the following:

Setting out a plane of immanence, tracing out a field of immanence, is something all the authors I've worked on have done (even Kant - by denouncing any transcendent application of the syntheses of the imagination, although he sticks to possible experience rather than real experimentation).

Taken together, these two statements are even more enigmatic than they are apart. Firstly, I have already suggested how Kantian some of Deleuze's concerns are. But secondly, surely the notion of immanence is above all bound up with Kant's notion of immanent critique, that is, the notion that a tribunal of reason must take place in which reason must criticise itself. What can immanence be without a system of judges? So the phrase "even Kant" in the second citation is very peculiar. By putting Kant's role in the philosophy of immanence in doubt, and silently excluding Hegel, Deleuze is obviously creating a very unusual notion of immanence, and thus seems to be in the grip of a "problem" that would be barely recognisable to most modern European philosophers.

Understanding what Deleuze might mean in his references to 'immanence' is anything but simple. For instance, we might try to define it negatively against transcendence. Every thing, proposition and principle could be understood in terms of a single system of principles, which logically and metaphysically would not allow for the conceivability of any outside. But what would justify the validity of this "plan" of immanence? Its justification cannot be secured simply by the

14 Abécédaire. "K comme Kant". He also says of his short book on Kant, "My book on Kant was different; I like it, I did it as a book about an enemy that tries to show how his system works, its various cogs - the tribunal of Reason, the legitimate exercise of the faculties". Negotiations (trans. M. Joughin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 6. For a still more negative assessment of Kant, cf. Dialogues (trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, London: Athlone, 1987). 9. We have already seen that Kant is much more than an 'enemy' for Deleuze. But maybe Kant is, as Hegel might say, the internal enemy of Deleuze's work.

15 Negotiations, 144.

16 It should be noted that I have excluded 'immanence' from my list of abstract metacritical criteria in Appendix I. This is because for Kant and the post-Kantians, immanence does not play any continuous thematic role. Rather it simply has an adverbial function, which can be analysed into the enactment of conformity to the criteria listed (eg. systematicity, circularity, intrinsic genetic
exclusion of transcendence. Immanence in such a case would surely be a very
genial, all too abstract criterion for the self-grounding internality of
philosophical principles, which would only be defined against “transcendence”
insofar as the latter would express a failure to engage in the project of self­
grounding. Transcendence would simply be defined by fiat as not philosophical at
all. While in his later works, Deleuze does begin to use the
immanence/transcendence couplet in such a way, in Spinoza and the Problem of
Expression (1968), he more carefully defines immanence against emanation rather
than transcendence.17 This means at least that emanative philosophies could be
shown in some way to actively fail the commitment of philosophy in general to
immanence, through the reintroduction of transcendence. However, even in this
work, the opposition of immanence and emanation seems to depend ultimately on
a simple equation of immanence with philosophy. Deleuze never does what one
wants him to do, which is to compare this abstract notion of immanence with
Kantian, or Hegelian specifications of what immanence might be and how the
notion might justify itself. If immanence were to be defined very basically as a
quality belonging to a self-supporting, and self-generating system, this would
remain opaque without a series of other questions that would delineate the method
and genesis by which such a system was constructed, and whether it relies, for
instance, on intellectual intuition, or on transcendental, teleological, if not
dialectical grounds.18 We appear to find no direct discussion by Deleuze of such
issues in relation to immanence.

However, I suggest that we nevertheless turn to Kant to comprehend the
first glimmers of the meaning of immanence in Deleuze. As will become clearer
later, there are two distinct senses of immanence implied in Kant’s work. On the

relation between critique and philosophy). As I will suggest, it is only in Deleuze that
‘immanence’ takes on a problematic status as a criterion in itself.
17 Cf. the chapter ‘Immanence and the Historical Components of Expression’, 169f; the book is
18 For this reason, Yirmiyahu Yovel’s second volume of Spinoza and Other Heretics, The
claims about immanence are “(1) immanence is the only and overall horizon of being; (2) it is
equally the only source of value and normativeness and (3) absorbing this recognition into one’s
life is a prelude – and precondition – for whatever liberation (or emancipation) is in store for
humans”. xi. While these are all accurate descriptions of immanence, they remain abstract as they
don’t incorporate into their definitions the kind of metacritical issues the post-Kantians discovered
to be necessary in the elaboration of immanence. Henry Allison takes Yovel to task for foregoing
one hand, there is the explicitly metacritical issue of how a self-critique, or immanent critique, of reason is possible. But this can be distinguished, on the other hand, from the result of immanent critique as Kant sees it – the restriction to the immanent use of empirical cognition. However, even in Kant himself (as I show in chapter 3), transcendental procedure and the restriction produced and consolidated by that procedure are related in a mysterious way that is essential to the central question of this thesis. I will argue that the Hegelian notion that the critical apprehension of limits requires in some sense their transgression is already affirmed in a highly particular way in Kant, and is taken up in a new way by Deleuze. For Deleuze, indeed, the result of transcendental philosophy will not primarily be the dictum that all philosophy must conform to the conditions for the possibility of experience, that is, enact the immanent use of the structures of experience - in fact, Deleuze encourages their transcendent use or exercise [exercice], as it is precisely this that will critically reveal the limits of experience. Deleuze’s notion of immanence, I contend, will require the transcendent use of the faculties, and the activity of thought beyond experience.

The complex position of the notion of immanence in Kant should not be overlooked in attempting to understand Deleuze’s treatment of the notion. Another disturbing statement by Deleuze can be brought to light which begins to detach Deleuzian immanence more decisively from the post-Kantian metacritical context (immanence as the signification of self-grounding systematic totality): “Immanence”, says Deleuze, “is the very vertigo of philosophy”. That is, far from signifying the completion or satisfaction of metacritical systematicity, immanence is given the character of a loss of control, analogous to the movement beyond experience just described. For Deleuze, critical and philosophical activity must be considered in terms of a movement towards immanence. Now, Deleuze

19 “No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond it. ... A limit or imperfection in knowledge comes to be termed a limit or imperfection, only when it is compared with the actually present Idea of the universal. of a total and perfect”. Hegel. Encyclopedia Logic, trans. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). # 60, 91f. The notion that the idea is “actually present” is clearly the controversial one in Hegel. In chapter 4 I will deal with Deleuze’s novel negotiation between Kant and Hegel on this issue of the absolute nature of Ideas.
will ultimately call his ideal of such activity "transcendental empiricism", a term which is analogous to the Hegelian notion of "speculative experience". But whereas for Hegel immanence would seem to describe both the intrinsic self-grounding procedure of metacritical philosophy and the satisfaction achieved by the consciousness described within the procedure, and thus serves as a mark of the union of the critique of experience and philosophy itself, in Deleuze the distance of the critical activity of transcendental empiricism from its expression in systematic terms seems to be marked.

From a post-Kantian point of view, the structure of DR seems to hark back to Kant's own organisation of his works according to a traditional model, that is, without any concern to make the content and form of the philosophical work coincide. Deleuze would claim that the genesis of the limits encountered in experience gives us no clue about how methodologically to generate the philosophical system itself. The self-generation and justification of the system for the philosopher does not reflect formally the self-generation of the structure of experience. The procedure of self-critique is therefore not directly mirrored in the shape of a system of experience. By returning to Kant, I will suggest that Deleuze's apparent failure to produce an interlocking system of form and content does not in fact reflect a lack, but has its source in good metacritical reasons. Perhaps a formally and aesthetically perfect system, such as Hegel's or Heidegger's is not in fact possible; perhaps the persistent attempt to produce a philosophy of immanence will be fragmented and in some formal respects unsatisfying. But this would not yet betoken any philosophical or even metacritical failure as such. Perhaps the fate of metacritical philosophy is to return

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21 I borrow the term from G. Kortian, Metacritique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 37. Hegel remarks that the Phenomenology is "the Science of the experience which consciousness goes through" (Phenomenology, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 21; cf. 56); but the recollection of this experience "for us" (ibid. 56) can also be called an experience; hence "speculative experience". However, this term only strictly applies to the Phenomenology, as works such as the Science of Logic concern "thought" alone. We will encounter in the last chapter Deleuze's negotiation between the notions of 'experience' and 'thought'.

22 As claimed in Appendix I, this does not rule out the necessity that systematic circularity must be potentially possible at some point in his system; it only dislodges circularity from its determining role.
in some ways to being “philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word”?

But wouldn’t we slip away from the substance of the Copernican turn in this case? Not only its methodological aspect, but the content of the idea of immanence being developed here seems enigmatic. For the notion that immanence is an _end_ towards which experience is pulled resounds with echoes of Platonism and high rationalism. Deleuze’s synthesis of the notion of thought beyond experience and the goal of immanence are reminiscent of Plotinus’ description of the ascent of the contemplative thinker to the level of absolute intellect, where thought and its object are merged. This fundamentally Aristotelian notion that thought and object are united in the active intellect would in this case fulfil the criterion of a thought of immanence while actually being the polar opposite of the _critical_ notion of immanence, that is, the requirement that all _apriori_ thought be referred to the human subject. Similarly, immanence in this form is the rationalist ideal of the classical philosophers, and is only preserved by Kant as an ideal of pure reason, not, surely, as a basis for critique itself.

Rather than refining the notion of immanence, then, surely all that has been done so far is deeply to problematise it, so that it risks becoming a swirling indeterminacy that we might begin to find evidence of in ‘all’ philosophies? It is necessary then to take pause for a moment. Could it be that Deleuze simply never properly explicated or even formulated his fundamental problem? Immanence would then be a ‘problem’ which _remains_ resistant to conceptualisation. It would then be a kind of ‘secret’. Jacques Derrida’s obituary for Deleuze intimated something of the sort. In its closing lines Derrida laments the fact that he and Deleuze never had the philosophical encounter that they owed each other. “My first question, I believe, would have concerned ... the word ‘immanence’ on which he always insisted, in order to make or let him say something that no doubt still remains secret to us”. Derrida has expressed here the paradox of Deleuze’s

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24 Cf. R.T. Wallis, _Neoplatonism_ (London: Duckworth, 1995). 54f. 62. Once again, we find Deleuze exhibiting another property attributed to the post-Kantians – here the tendency to return to the most metaphysical and mystical of philosophical systems: the re-emergence of Bruno, Proclus and Plotinus in Schelling, in particular, is echoed by Deleuze.
25 In Appendix I it was shown how Deleuze argues that one cannot create concepts and articulate problems at the same time.
philosophy – the notion of immanence surely implies the most public, the least secret (occluded, transcendent), and yet Derrida confesses that he remains excluded from this thought, this secret (despite, one might add, being the other major philosopher of ‘difference’ of Deleuze’s time).

We have seen that the notion of immanent critique is problematised by Deleuze, and that no systematic demonstration is apparent of how immanence is to be secured. For the post-Kantians the fact that method is of primary importance displaces immanence to the status of an adverb, so that, for instance, for Hegel the notion of ‘absolute subject’ is more important than ‘immanence’ as it indicates how immanence is achieved. There is, however, one other concept that Deleuze uses precisely in order to explicate further this how of immanence. It is the concept of expression. Deleuze writes of an immediate and adequate expression of an absolute Being that comprises in it all beings, and is explicated in the essence of each. Expression comprehends all these aspects: complication, explication, inherence, implication. And these aspects of expression are also the categories of immanence. Immanence is revealed as expression, and expression as immanent, in a system of logical relations within which the two notions are correlative.

However, once again it is surely Hegel who is considered to take the notion of the immanent self-critique of reason the furthest, precisely through creating a system of reason that is both fully self-reflecting and self-expressive. The above passage could even have been written by Hegel, except for the first word. In this sense, Hegel would not only be the philosopher of immanence, but of expression. Now Deleuze never really gives a clear explanation of why exactly he disagrees with Hegel’s notion of immanence; in many cases all we are left with is ad hominem attacks on ‘Hegelianism’ or ‘dialectics’. Although immanence is Deleuze’s problem, it is also Hegel’s, and we should now take a preliminary look at this

27 Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 175.
28 See C. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 3-50 for an account of the Romantic legacy of the concept of expression in Hegel’s writings. Taylor’s account of Hegel’s ‘expressivism’ as the self-realisation of the absolute, however, leaves unresolved some of the main problems concerning the validity of Hegel’s move beyond Kant. His argument that “the design of the universe could be shown to flow of necessity from the single basic goal: that rational subjectivity be” (p. 93), appeals to a metaphysical teleology that a Kantian does not have to accept: the notion that ‘rational subjectivity’ contains an intrinsic goal is better defended by R. Pippin on transcendental grounds; cf. Hegel’s Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 99f. 99f. However, Taylor does articulate well the metacritical status of expression when he says “the universe reflects rational necessity in two ways: it conforms to it, and it expresses it. It can be seen as in a sense analogous to a statement”. 108. Jean Hyppolite will be shown to elaborate on this idea below.
perplexing rivalry that Deleuze exhibits against Hegel, through the lens of the concept of expression. Insofar as Deleuze is often taken to be the anti-Hegelian par excellence, the results of this first look will turn out to be surprising.

3 Deleuze, Hyppolite and Hegel

In 1955 Deleuze wrote a review of his teacher Jean Hyppolite’s book Logic and Existence in which not only does he make clear how much he accepts of Hyppolite’s reading of Hegel, but he also provides the only published plan, that I know of, in which he lays out the aims of his future philosophical project. Deleuze begins by saying that Hyppolite’s main theme is that “Philosophy must be ontology, it cannot be anything else; but there is no ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense”. He adds that “that philosophy must be ontology means first of all that it is not anthropology”. Before we see why the philosophy of sense will terminate in an ontology, we should first unfold this notion of sense.

The use of the word ‘sense’ or ‘Sinn’ does not seem especially vital in Hegel’s own work, but Hyppolite makes clear that he is using it instead of the more familiar ‘notion’, or ‘concept’. Why does he do this? While there is undoubtedly a Husserlian inspiration at work, this move also draws out the sense in which the concept in Hegel is a philosophical reality, it expresses reality. Hyppolite cites Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics:

Sense is this wonderful word which is used in two opposite meanings. On the one hand it means the organ of immediate apprehension, but on the other hand we mean by it the sense, the significance, the thought, the universal underlying the thing. And so sense is connected on the one hand with the immediate external aspect of existence, and on the other hand with its inner essence.

30 Review of Jean Hyppolite, reprinted in Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. L. Lawlor and A. Sen (Albany: SUNY 1997), 191-195. In his 1978 lectures on Kant, Deleuze describes how for Kant “there is no longer an essence behind appearance, there is rather the sense or non-sense of what appears” (Seminar 1, 5). This signifies “a radically new atmosphere of thought, to the point where I can say that in this respect we are all Kantians”. The sensible world is no longer different in kind from its ideal essence and philosophical method is no longer subject to the effort of either deriving the sensible from the ideal or the ideal from the sensible, and accommodating the one to the other. A new approach is possible: as Deleuze says, “something appears, tell me what it signifies or, and this amounts to the same thing, tell me what its condition is" (ibid).
For Hegel these two opposite meanings signify a common source; they signify that the universal will be generated in the sensible; that the universal concept and the singular intuition are two aspects of the self-differentiation of the absolute. The articulation of the structure of the self-differentiation is what Hyppolite will call sense, while the movement itself can be called expression. For Hegel the problem with Kant’s critique is that the concept, the ideal, remains too external to the thing itself: “the categories are no fit terms to express the Absolute”. The concept is never merely possible in Hegel; a Kantian possible concept (eg. of ‘100 thalers’) is not really a concept, but merely “a content-determination of my consciousness”, that is, it is merely a representation. A concept, rather, is ultimately and intrinsically neither representational nor referential, but expressive of a reality. This couple sense/expression will be taken up by Deleuze; both Hegel and Deleuze are against philosophies of representation because such philosophies claim to express what is by right a metacritically justified absolute within a framework that remains relative to subjective representational experience (ie. which has only been justified anthropologically), so that the concept of expression doesn’t ever gain its full extension.

Kant therefore is only partially aware of the transition to which he is midwife: “from the being of logic to the logicity of being”. In these terms, the thing-in-itself is a contradictory left-over (contradictory because it is utterly empty yet is meant to be essential) from an ontology of essence, and confuses the transparent purity of the process of expression. For Hegel, there will ultimately be nothing outside the concept: absolute idealism will express every aspect of being. It is for this reason that Hyppolite says that “immanence is complete” in Hegel. A philosophy of immanence is one that transparently expresses every aspect of being. So when we hear Deleuze talking of immanence, we can no longer neglect the Hegelian resonance of this term; moreover, when Deleuze talks of expression, and the idea that all modern philosophy, starting from Kant, is a philosophy of sense, we should also hear this Hegelian reading of the essential tendency of Kantian thought.

32 Encyclopedia Logic, #44. 72.
34 Hyppolite. Logic and Existence. 176.
Now, Hyppolite systematises the notion of sense because he wants to lay priority on the special character of the *Logic* in Hegel’s system. For Hyppolite, the *Logic* is the expression of being itself; it is the high point of Hegel’s system in which “the concept, such as it appears in dialectical discourse, is [unlike in the *Phenomenology*] simultaneously truth and certainty, being and sense; it is immanent to this being which says itself”.\(^{36}\) Hegel’s logic is a logic of sense, in which the sense of being itself is said through the genesis of concepts produced by the philosopher.\(^{37}\) Attempting to avoid the anthropomorphic view of Hegel promoted by Kojeve earlier in the century, Hyppolite tries to restore the high metaphysical status of the Hegelian system; hence, like Deleuze, his anti-humanism is an echo of the claims of classical philosophy.\(^{38}\) In an important sentence for Deleuze, Hyppolite says that

> Hegel is still too Spinozistic for us to be able to speak of a pure humanism; a pure humanism culminates only in skeptical irony and platitude. Undoubtedly, the Logos appears in the human knowledge that interprets and says itself, but here man is only the intersection of this knowledge and this sense. Man is consciousness and self-consciousness, while at the same time natural Dasein, but consciousness and self-consciousness are not man. They say being as sense in man. They are the very being that knows itself and says itself.\(^{39}\)

The implication of Hyppolite’s reading here is that the phenomenological and historical parts of Hegel’s system are anthropological entries into the system. Hyppolite is influenced by Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’: man is the ‘place’, the structural possibility that Being can reveal itself as such, and express its sense *through* ‘man’. After man has been broken down and introduced into the absolute by the *Phenomenology*, the *Logic*, absolved of humanism, retraces the ideal genesis of the sense of being. This would be the meaning of Hegel’s statement that the content of the *Science of Logic* “is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence prior to the creation of nature and a finite mind”.\(^{40}\)

\(^{35}\) Ibid. 176.

\(^{36}\) Ibid. 35.

\(^{37}\) Ibid. 175.


\(^{39}\) *Logic and Existence*, 20.

In his review of Hyppolite, Deleuze affirms fully this reading of Hegel. I now cite at length two of the most important passages. The first places Deleuze’s development of the notion of difference explicitly within the context of Hegelian self-differentiation:

[T]he external, empirical difference of thought and being [in the Kantian system] has given way [in Hegel] to the difference identical with Being, to the difference internal to the Being which thinks itself... In the Logic, there is no longer, therefore, as in the empirical, what I say on the one side and on the other side the sense of what I say – the pursuit of one by the other which is the dialectic of the Phenomenology. On the contrary, my discourse is logical or properly philosophical when I say the sense of what I say, and when in this manner Being says itself.41

I claim that Deleuze will never depart from this image of a “properly philosophical” discourse. That is, his philosophy will be a philosophy of the absolute; it will accept the move from the relativity of knowledge in Kant to the notion of the absolute and the method of genesis. Deleuze in fact shares none of the reservations about Hegelian immanence that are exhibited by his fellow post-war French philosophers. He has no bad conscience about the notion of immanence and does not construct a philosophy of difference in order to subvert immanence (and introduce some notion of ‘irreducible otherness’ into it), but in order to fulfil it (precisely as Hegel does). Our problem will be to explain how and why Deleuze returns to Kant to carry out precisely this aim. Deleuze concludes the review with some pregnant questions for Hyppolite after summarising the mains claim of his book:

Following Hyppolite, we recognise that philosophy, if it has a meaning, can only be an ontology and an ontology of sense. The same being and the same thought are in the empirical and the absolute. But the difference between thought and being is sublated in the absolute by the positing of the Being identical to difference which, as such, thinks itself and reflects itself in man. This absolute identity of being and difference is called sense.... The richness of Hyppolite’s book could then let us wonder this: can we not construct an ontology of difference which would not have to go up to contradiction, because contradiction would be less than difference and not more? Is not contradiction itself only the phenomenal and anthropological aspect of difference?42

We thus have four criteria laid out in 1955 for Deleuze’s future philosophy. Firstly, like Hegel, he believes that Kantian critique must lead to an implicit philosophical affirmation of the logicity of being. Secondly, he affirms that the

41 Review of Hyppolite. Logic and Existence. 194.
42 Ibid. 195.
philosophy of immanence must also be a philosophy of the absolute, therefore all
differentiation found in it will be internal, self-generated, differentiation. Thirdly,
this philosophy must be able to say its own sense. Finally, we also have the
suggestion that the absolute claims of Hegelian philosophy must be purified of
dependence on phenomenal and anthropological content, and that this latter
category, for some unspecified reason, includes the concepts of contradiction and
negation.

Now, if we turn to look for an actualisation of this project, we appear to
find it not in DR at all, but in Spinoza and the Problem of Expression, published
in the same year. It is in Spinoza that Deleuze finds the fullest flowering of an
alternative model of immanent self-differentiation that remains faithful to the
Hegelian schema just outlined, while transforming it through a notion of
difference without contradiction. Deleuze attempts to enact a philosophical
construction of absolute immanence through a reading in particular of the first
book of the Ethics. He arguably fulfils certain conditions a post-Kantian would
require of Spinoza, for instance by accentuating the genetic aspects of Spinoza’s
system. Spinoza would thus appear to provide our destination on the path to
understand what Deleuze means by immanence. However, the place of Spinoza in
Deleuze’s philosophy turns out to be extremely complicated, and in fact
unresolved throughout his writings. It will turn out, in fact, that Spinozism will be
just as haunting and irresolvable a presence in Deleuze as it was in the work of the
post-Kantians.

4 Spinoza and the Problem of Immanence

Post-Kantian philosophy had an enduring fascination with Spinoza, who for Kant
remained peripheral to the German rationalist tradition embodied by Leibniz and
Wolff. The post-Kantians sought to revive the philosophical dignity and majesty
of Spinozism in the light of Kantian jurisdictions against metaphysics. For Fichte,

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43 Deleuze disputes Hegel’s criticism of Spinoza’s method for being merely geometrical, arguing
that there is a process of genetic definition in Spinoza, which he will attempt to retrace:
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 20-1.

44 Ibid. 18f, where Deleuze claims that the post-Kantians were not sufficiently aware of “the
presence in Spinozism of that genetic movement of self-development for which they sought
anticipations everywhere”.
the Wissenschaftlehre was “Spinozism made systematic; save only that any given self is itself the one substance”; this evaluation persists in various forms through Schelling and Hegel. In his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, Schelling recognised that “it was precisely Spinoza who ... thought of absolute necessity and absolute freedom as identical”, which was exactly the aim of Schelling himself. In the Science of Logic, Spinozism represents the culmination of the Doctrine of Essence, and seems to be only overtaken by Hegel insofar as Spinoza had not adequately worked out that substance and causality had to issue in reciprocal interaction, the resolution of which takes us into the Doctrine of the Notion. Indeed Hegel’s critique of Spinoza through the explication of the dependence of substance on causality and reciprocity can be seen as an intensification of Spinoza’s causa sui, rather than a refutation. Both Schelling and Hegel remarked upon the futility of ‘refuting’ Spinoza. He had to be incorporated, without overwhelming their systems.

But the more Spinoza was accepted, the more difficult it became to overcome him. In the Science of Logic, Hegel implicitly criticises Fichte’s recourse to the argument that “for anyone who does not presuppose as an established fact the freedom and self-subistence of the self-conscious subject there cannot be any refutation of Spinozism”. Hegel points out that this is not

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48 However, Spinoza is sometimes represented as the very antithesis of the German idealist project (cf., for instance, A. Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1993. 17-28). This view overlooks a fundamental distinction in the perception of Spinoza in the wake of the celebrated ‘Pantheism Controversy’ of the 1780’s. On the one hand, F.H. Jacobi understood Spinoza as the philosopher who most accurately displays the tendency of philosophical reason to lead to an infinite regress of causes or reasons. On the other hand, however, Spinozist infinity was shown by Herder not to involve a potential regress, but rather the affirmation of actual infinity. If thought and being could be shown, by way of a return to Leibniz and contemporary vitalism, to issue from the same principle, then this philosophy of absolute infinity is far from a nihilistically regressive demonstration of the futility of reason, but its highest flowering in the form of a Romantic pantheism. It is this latter Spinoza who is celebrated by Schelling and Hegel. Cf. Herder, God: Some Conversations, trans. F.H. Burkhardt (New York: Veritas, 1943). 107. In The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 243-6. J. Zammito shows how Herder, by explicitly comparing his reading of Spinoza with Jacobi’s, opened up the problematic status of Spinoza for the future German idealists. Hegel did in fact read Herder’s God (cf. his letter to Mehmel of March 26, 1802, in Hegel: The Letters, 90). F. Beiser on the other hand foregrounds Jacobi’s reading of Spinoza’s notion of infinity: while characterising Herder’s Spinozism predominantly in terms of vitalism: cf. The Fate of Reason (Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987). 83-85, 159-163.
49 Science of Logic, 581.
enough: Spinozism can indeed account for thought and explain freedom. Nor is it sufficient to say, as Fichte did, that the difference between Spinozism and Fichtean freedom lay simply in “the kind of person one is”, 50 that is, in one’s insistence on one’s own freedom. Thus, Hegel’s sublation of Spinoza will occur, not through the affirmation of the fact of freedom, but on systematic grounds. “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as Subs tance, but equally as Subject”. 51 However, precisely determining the success of systematic criteria is, as has been suggested in Appendix I, no easy matter.

Deleuze said that the philosopher he worked upon “most according to the norms of the history of philosophy” was Spinoza. 52 All of our discussion of the notion of immanence up until now thus seems to lead towards Spinoza as the holder of the secret of its meaning. Deleuze affirms in 1991 that it is indeed Spinoza who sets out “the ‘best’ plane of immanence”. 53 In the Spinoza book of 1968, Deleuze fashions a history of the philosophy of immanence, from the Neoplatonists through to Duns Scotus, which culminates in Spinoza.

However, there are three problems. Firstly, at a general philosophical level, it is not at all clear how seriously Deleuze intends his account of Spinoza to genuinely compete on its own terms with Hegel and post-Kantianism. 54 Given the amount of work that is done explicitly engaging with Kant and Hegel in DR

51 Hegel, Phenomenology. 10 (first italics mine). The reference to “system” here is to the whole of Hegel’s system, which the Preface introduces.
52 Dialogues, 15.
53 What is Philosophy? 60.
54 Although Deleuze claims to find a “genetic movement of self-development” in Spinoza, the presence of such a genesis would still seem only leave us with an (early) Schellingean absolute, and not yet an internally self-justifying Hegelian absolute. Deleuze would have to deal with Hegel’s critique of Schelling, and all the evidence suggests that Deleuze’s criticisms of Hegel lie elsewhere (as I will show in the body of the thesis). Cf. also Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (trans. R. Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights, 1988), 83-6 (on ‘Method’), where Deleuze further suggests that the entrance into Spinoza’s system is incorporated in a (metacritically) circular way into the unfolding of the system as a whole. However, the suggestion is merely formal, and Deleuze’s implicit comparison of Spinoza’s requirement to move “as quickly as possible” from the starting point of the possession of a “true idea” to the idea of God (cf. Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson, London: Everyman, 1993, 231, 237), with Fichte’s similar requirement in the opening arguments of the 1794 Science of Knowledge (trans. Heath & J. Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; cf. 94, “we choose that which offers us the shortest road to our goal”). remains undeveloped (and again undefended against possible Hegelian objections of abstraction). See Deleuze’s explicit comparisons of Spinoza and Fichte in
(where Spinoza plays quite a minimal role), it surely seems more plausible to suggest that rather than attempting (and failing) in *Spinoza and the Problem of Expression* to set up a version of Spinozism that can seriously compete with the metacritical intensity of post-Kantianism, he is testing out a model of absolute difference that can be put to work and properly justified elsewhere (i.e. in DR).

Moreover, we are faced with two large textual snags which lead right back into the depths of the issue of Deleuze’s ‘problem’ of immanence. Firstly, in a footnote to DR, Deleuze makes a startling remark: that in Spinoza “no “problem” at all appears in the usage of the geometric method” (DR 323/209, translation modified). I have explained the importance of problems in Appendix I, and in the body of the thesis I explain the centrality of the notion in DR. Now, if Spinoza is the focus for the problem of immanence for Deleuze, then how is he to ‘divine’ Spinoza’s problem at all if the actual execution of his philosophy contains no trace of its problematic? How can the conceptual edifice one creates be so removed from its problem? Secondly, in DR, Deleuze conspicuously does not use the term ‘immanence’ in relation to Spinoza, instead localising Spinoza’s achievement to a major advance in the problem of ‘the univocity of being’, a problem Deleuze traces back instead to Aristotle. Moreover, Deleuze also sees Nietzsche as the culmination of the history of the problem of univocity, with his notion of eternal return. While Spinoza’s absolute reaches a theoretical affirmation of univocal being, only Nietzsche’s transformation of univocity produces a practical affirmation. However, Deleuze does claim that this ‘realised’ univocity of being gives us “the only realised ontology” (DR 303/387). With the very large claim involved in this phrase surely we return precisely to the problem of immanence as treated in the post-Kantian tradition.

Deleuze in fact vacillates crucially over the question of whether the philosophy of immanence and expression that he wishes to defend, and which we

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55 It is worth pointing out that DR and *Spinoza and the Problem of Expression* were both published in the same year, so there is not much time for Deleuze to have changed his mind here.

56 In an interview from 1988, Deleuze says “I did begin with books on the history of philosophy, but all the authors I dealt with had for me something in common. And it all tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche equation” (*Voyageur*, 135). It must be added, however, that this ‘great equation’ is very much in the background of DR, being articulated only within the Kantian problematic I will be dealing with. One of my aims is to explicate the obscure relation between these two strands in DR.
have seen projected at the beginning of his career (in which “difference would be identical to Being”, and through which Hegel’s similar philosophy would be decisively overcome) is to be identified with Spinozism. We should in fact read between the lines of his late full affirmation of Spinoza as the philosopher of immanence in *What is Philosophy?*.

Spinoza was the philosopher who knew full well that immanence was only immanent to itself ... He is therefore the prince of philosophers. Perhaps he is the only philosopher never to have compromised with transcendence and to have hunted it down everywhere ... He discovered that freedom exists only within immanence. He fulfilled philosophy because he satisfied its *prephilosophical supposition*. ... Spinoza is the vertigo of immanence from which so many philosophers try in vain to escape. Will we ever be mature enough for a Spinozist inspiration?\(^{57}\)

Two important changes can be found to have taken place, unsignalled, in Deleuze’s work here, which cast an interesting light on his uncertainty about the notion of immanence. Firstly, immanence is now defined predominantly against transcendence, whereas before it was defined against systems such as emanation. But this notion of transcendence is highly unusual in that it includes not only concepts of entities such as God, but even the notions of subject and object. As Deleuze elaborates in his last ever published article, the short opuscule entitled ‘Immanence: A Life’, both the subject and the object are not transcendental, but ‘transcendent’, whereas the field of immanence itself is “an impersonal pre-reflexive consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without self”.\(^{58}\)

Here Deleuze in fact appeals to the later Fichte, and he seems very close to the philosophy of pre-reflexivity found in Fichte by Dieter Henrich in his seminal article ‘Fichte’s Original Insight’.\(^{59}\)

The claim that “immanence is related only to itself”, yet must be considered to be pre-reflexive, points to the second change indicated in the passage quoted above. *Immanence has become a pre-philosophical presupposition*. Now, in this move towards the late Fichte with this affirmation of

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\(^{57}\) *What is Philosophy?*, 48: italics mine.


\(^{59}\) “The possibility of reflection must be understood on the basis of this primordial essence of the Self. ... A gap, perhaps even an abyss opens up between the ‘Self’ and what makes the Self intelligible”, Henrich, ‘Fichte’s Original Insight’. trans. D. Lachtennan (*Contemporary German Philosophy* 1. 1982), 22-3. The texts of Fichte referred to by Deleuze are the post-1800 *Introduction to the Blessed Life*, and the 1797 *Introductions to the Wissenschaftlehre*, but Deleuze
the pre-philosophical, Deleuze takes two steps. Firstly, he would seem at last to fall back into the antinomy of post-Kantianism outlined in Appendix I by affirming a featureless form of intellectual intuition. This would also issue in major problems for the continuing affirmation of ‘difference’ and ‘multiplicity’. Secondly, he can no longer appeal to the metacritical affirmation of the absolute that he appears to expound in DR; in particular, he can no longer claim to have found “the only realised ontology”, because such a philosophy of immanence could never be realised; its pre-reflexivity precludes this. Thus we come to the conclusion that Deleuze’s late affirmation of the notion of immanence occurs at the cost of its becoming a pre-philosophical problem. Its completion seems to be its negation. But with this late move, his project loses much of its fascination. In Spinoza and the Problem of Expression, immanence appears to be a matter of philosophical construction. Deleuze’s deduction of Spinoza’s genesis of absolute difference was a model for the construction of immanence itself. All that was needed was an account of its metacritical validity in relation to other metacritical philosophies: we find the materials for this in DR. But the late Deleuze does not return to this project of construction, and never again makes the claim to have realised ontology: all Deleuze leaves us with is the “presupposition” of immanence. And this surely amounts to a return to Fichte’s criterion, that it depends on the kind of person one is whether one accepts this version of things.

All of this indicates that my proposed path, to take Deleuze as the latest stage of the post-Kantian metacritical project, in competition with Hegel, will by no means be untroubled. We will have to return to and reconstruct Deleuze’s ‘problem’, and examine whether he was justified in leaving it behind. I will claim that his earlier project still stands a chance of success, if we fasten its roots more firmly in its Kantian and post-Kantian soil. If we accept wholeheartedly, in a way that Deleuze seemed reluctant to do, the post-Kantian nexus of issues around the problem of immanence, then Deleuze’s philosophy in DR, and aspects of his turn to Spinoza, can be defended. It is not through Spinoza but rather through a return to Kant that Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence must be approached.

indicates that he is referring to the Introductions only insofar as they elaborate the “intuition of sheer activity: not a matter of existence, but of life” (6), and thus refers to the post-1800 Fichte.

60 In fact, there is more to be said about this particular version of this position, especially in its form as elaborated by Henrich and Manfred Frank (see chapter 5.4.i).
Part One

Kant, Critique and Metaphysics
Chapter One
The Self-Critique of Reason

The notion that the Critique of Pure Reason is the enactment of a critique of reason by itself has been itself subject to a ‘peculiar fate’. On the one hand, it is accepted that the self-critique of reason can safely characterise the Kantian method of the self-examination of the capacities of human cognition, a self-examination that delimits the possibility of what we can know, should do and may hope (cf. CPR A805/B833). Three implications are taken to follow from the idea. Firstly, the self-critique of reason entails that the critique be immanent; if reason is to fully criticise itself, it can allow nothing beyond itself into the process. Secondly, the condition for this immanent self-critique is the discovery and elaboration of the ability of reason to be self-reflexive. This is held to be connected with Kant’s discovery of self-consciousness as the new centre of gravity of the ‘Copernican turn’. Thus the reflexivity that Kant discovers in the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ is here extended to include, and to be fully realised, in reason. Thirdly, as we have seen already, critique itself must somehow be internally justified at a metacritical level.

On the other hand, the Kantian articulation of the project of the self-critique of reason is seen in terms of a discovery, the realisation of which was hampered by Kant’s execution of it. Kant attempted to examine the limits of knowledge, but as he could not account for the kind of knowledge necessary for the production of CPR itself, his account of these limits was flawed. From this point of view the project of the self-critique of reason is only actually realised in
Hegel, after further attempts by Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling. Hegel’s philosophy of immanence is thus equivalent to the full, thoroughgoing reflexivity of reason.

My claim is that, as the procedure of accounting for the project of critique itself came under relentless scrutiny, Kant’s own distinctive, if rather baroque, approach to the problem was soon forgotten. In this chapter I aim to excavate Kant’s original ideas concerning the self-critique of reason, in order to attempt to hold off the notion that the fate of immanence lies with Hegel.

What are Hegel’s main criticisms of Kant’s notion of self-critique? The question of metacritique in Hegel is so bound up with the internal details of his system that the question cannot be very profitably separated from them, so I will only present a brief characterisation here, based around two arguments: Hegel’s treatments of the problems of self-reference in the critique of knowledge and the distinction between reason and the understanding.

I start with Hegel’s famous criticism of the notion that “we ought ... to become acquainted with the instrument [of knowledge], before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed”. Kant’s critical project is often held to begin with a doubt about the possibility of the correspondence of knowledge with its object. Hegel takes Kant to reason that “this evil could be remedied through an acquaintance with the way in which the instrument works”: in Kantian terms, this will mean an analysis of the conditions of possible knowledge that will serve as a propaedeutic to metaphysics. But Hegel argues that such a propaedeutic will not work in the case of knowledge, for it is not possible for knowledge to reflect on its own nature and function without already engaging in the attempt to know: “the examination of cognition can only be carried out by an act of cognition. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it”. This problem

1 Encyclopedia Logic # 10, 14.
2 See the famous expression of this in the letter to Herz of 21 February 1772. I attempt to place this letter in a new context in chapter 3.1.
3 Phenomenology, 46.
4 Encyclopedia Logic # 10, 14. Nietzsche, apparently oblivious to Hegel’s critique, expresses the same point in the preface to Daybreak (trans. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), # 3: “come to think of it, was it not somewhat peculiar to demand of an instrument that it should criticise its own usefulness and suitability? that the intellect should ‘know’ its own value, its own capacity, its own limitations? was it not even a little absurd?” But cf. the note from 1886-7 in The Will to Power # 473 (trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1968) where Nietzsche says “the intellect cannot criticise itself, simply because it cannot be compared with other species of intellect and because its capacity to know would be revealed only in the presence
Kant is taken by Hegel as the springboard for the method laid out in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*. The consequence of this diagnosis of Kant is that knowledge, or cognition, must be taken as reflexive. The knowledge we have of an object will always already conform to criteria we have, however implicit, for what knowledge and its object should be. Hegel's method at the outset of the *Phenomenology* is to posit a "natural consciousness" in which this cognitive reflexivity is presented in its most rudimentary form, and then follow through a *genesis* of gradually more complex criteria for cognitive validity, each set of criteria being generated out of the *phenomenological* enactment and failure of the previous set. In this way, the problem of the self-critique of reason becomes explicitly a problem of "beginning" in philosophy. Hence for Hegel the self-critique of reason, as a result of the initial conundrum concerning the self-reference of the attempt to know knowledge, must be broken up into stages that are justified through a combination of phenomenological and genetic grounds, and remodelled according to the schema of implicit reflexivity or self-consciousness.

As well as invoking Hegel's *methodological* treatment of the issue of the self-critique of reason, it is necessary to mention Hegel's treatment of the *logical* issue of how reason can criticise itself. One of the problems, as we will see, with Kant's conception is that reason is a faculty among others, yet is somehow able to criticise the use not only of the other faculties, but of itself among these faculties. Hence in Kant reason seems to be subject to a potential *equivocity*. For Hegel, however, *reason* is redefined as a capacity of thought, entitled *speculative*, that is different in kind from the other faculties, which are treated as *abstractions* of this fundamental speculative power of thought. Without going into detail, we can at least apprehend how Hegel solves the problem of the equivocity of reason here. Hegel supposes that understanding, intuition, and imagination are internally or dynamically related to *speculative* reason. They are inadequate abstractions of the full dialectical extent of reason. Thus reason can criticise *itself* in the sense that it criticises *part* of itself; that is, on the condition that it *includes* the understanding as a merely partial, or abstract notion of reason (and the same goes for imagination and sensibility, as ever wider

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of "true reality." This latter criticism constitutes the crux of the matter, as will be shown in what follows.

*Phenomenology*. 49.
abstractions with ever diminishing conceptual content). There are thus different uses or functions of reason, depending on whether it is used speculatively or reflectively. For instance, “reason operates as understanding” when it is placed in a theoretical framework that expresses certain epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions about the oppositional nature of representation and its object. However, only speculative philosophy presents a metacritically adequate framework for epistemology and metaphysics.

These distinctions within the notion of reason provide Hegel with the materials to sort out the problem of the equivocity of reason in Kant. I will suggest (largely implicitly) that Deleuze’s account works in the opposite way to Hegel’s. Deleuze preserves Kant’s notion of the faculties and operates a “genesis” only of their relations. But by preserving the irreducible distinction of the faculties, it follows that the methodological and logical problems of the self-critique of reason once again swing open.

In the present chapter I want to show that the Hegelian view of Kant’s critique is vulnerable to a fallacy. Kant is held to have discovered a particular notion – the self-critique of reason - yet at the same time failed to implement it. But on such a reading, is there not the possibility that the interpretation of the particular notion in question does not accurately represent what Kant had created at all, and that what he actually did say may be defensible and open to development in another way? The Hegelian reading of the Kantian notion of the self-critique of reason has been fateful for the subsequent history of philosophy, and particularly for the notion of immanence. But is it the necessary culmination of the Kantian immanent critique? I will argue that the notion of immanence can be also developed by referring to the alternative route Deleuze takes, one that has its roots in the original matrix of Kantian philosophy, and is sensitive to the specific tensions and vertigo that are concealed in and secreted by Kant’s project. But to open up this possible reading, we need to return in detail to Kant, which will take up the present and the following chapter.

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6 For instance, cf. Encyclopedia Logic. chapter 6, ‘Logic further defined and divided’. #79f.
What does Kant himself say about immanent critique? Does he have a consistent view about the realisation of this critique? Is he in fact as blind to the problems of metacritique as those who came after thought?

The very title of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is peculiarly opaque. Because we are used to a certain reading of the notion of immanent critique, we expect the genitive of the title to be double. It is a critique of reason (objective genitive) only because it is a critique on the part of reason (subjective genitive). But is this what Kant intends by the title?

We should first note that Kant does not often use the word ‘immanence’ in connection with the problem of critique itself. Predominantly, he uses ‘immanent’ in contradistinction to ‘transcendent’, with reference to the use of the principles of pure understanding and the principles of pure reason (cf. A297/B313, A308/B365). This use of ‘immanence’ does not directly map onto the issue of the immanence of critique itself. Kant uses it only after he has shown that the possibility of experience is the key to the justification of the pure concepts of the understanding and the limitation of the ideas of pure reason. That is, the word ‘immanent’ only refers to the correctness of the application of pure concepts and ideas; it is not itself a criterion for their discovery or justification.

This is not to say that Kant is not thoroughly concerned with the problems implied in the notion of immanent critique. However, the relation between immanence and critique in Kant will be more complicated than might be apparent from a Hegelian perspective. In fact, we will see that Kant develops these issues in great detail, but his answers are usually to be found at the ‘outer limits’ of his critical writings. I mean this in two senses: firstly, in a straightforward sense, Kant deals with metacritical issues in the introductions and, especially, the final stages of each of the three critiques. But secondly, these final stages often find Kant negotiating with philosophical issues that are on the very borderline between the critical and what is misleadingly called ‘pre-critical’. It is here that Kant is dealing not only with the investigation into the possibility of experience, but also with the issue of what ‘legitimate’ questions and problems of philosophy in general are, and how to delimit them; and it is here that Kant investigates the relation of
critique and metaphysics. Hence the relevance of these passages for the problem of metacritique.

Our problem will be best posed if we examine the beginning and the end of CPR in the light of each other. It is at the beginning that Kant most famously, yet it turns out most obscurely, sets the task of the self-critique of reason, but it is at the protracted end, at the closing of the first circle of the critical project, that the status of critique itself is most extensively broached.

At the very beginning (as also at the very end, in the 'History of Pure Reason') Kant frames the issue historically. But the history invoked is internal to philosophy, and in particular to metaphysics itself. The critical project is presented as continuous with previous metaphysics, but as a coming to age of the problems at stake in metaphysics. It represents a particular moment in the history of metaphysics when something very new happens as the result of a growing burden of internal problems. In the Preface, he states that in our “age of criticism”, the ripened power of judgment “demands that reason should take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge” (A xi). My main question over the following pages is: Does this task of self-knowledge therefore unproblematically imply a self-reflection, a reflection of reason upon itself? I will argue that this interpretation must be held off for a number of reasons.

I shall note some basic points at the outset. Firstly, if the task of the self-critique of reason were to be modelled on reflection, then surely ‘transcendental reflection’ would be an apt term for it. But we will see that Kant reserves that term for the quite specific task of resolving ‘amphibolies’, that is, the confusion of transcendental distinctions such as sensible/intelligible or empirical/transcendental (see chapter 3). Secondly, for Kant the reflexivity of consciousness very specifically concerns the transcendental grounding of the possibility of knowledge (see chapter 5). But it is particularly important not to be myopic when it comes to questioning the status of critique itself: the justification of the possibility of knowledge is but one part of Kant’s system. In the first edition CPR Kant sees himself as attempting to justify all apriori principles available to human possibility. For instance, one should not forget that Ideas of Pure Reason have their own transcendental deduction (A669/B677), which is not directly grounded
on the reflexivity of consciousness; in fact, far from it, as we will see (chapters 3 & 5).

But most crucially, we need only turn to the text itself to see that, if there is a reflexivity implied in the self-critique of reason, it is much more elusive and quite different to what is implied by the usual model of reflexivity. For what does reason do in order to criticise itself? It institutes a court of justice “by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions” (A xi). Hence what facilitates the self-critique of reason is the setting up of a whole court or tribunal, which can only be a complex process by no means identifiable with any psychological or epistemological self-examination, and also implies the recognition by reason of something else – justice. What this wider meaning of the quid juris – of the relative rights of the cognitive faculties – might be will be the subject of this chapter.

There is an aspect of reason’s endeavour as described by Kant in the first edition preface which should be immediately surprising given the vaunted radicality of this self-examination. Immediately after the above citation about reason dismissing its own groundless pretensions, Kant adds, “and this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws”. As the text goes on, it turns out that reason is only in dissension with itself “in its nonexperiential use”. It is only at a particular point that reason misunderstands itself and this point must be discovered. Furthermore, the critique of reason will resolve the outstanding questions to reason’s full satisfaction, because “pure reason is ... a perfect unity”. The final sentence of CPR echoes this claim, this time stating that the task is “to bring human reason to full satisfaction” (A855/B883, italics mine). Thus reason’s dissension with itself is not yet presented as in itself tragic, as in the Hegelian model, but is put immediately in the perspective of a greater restoration of pure reason. The antinomies and transgressions of reason are only seen as irresolvable conflicts from the perspective of illusion; in fact, if only our prejudices and illusions could be put in their place, we would see pure reason for what it is.

8 In the Metaphysik Mrongrovius, Kant says only that the critique of pure reason is “a kind of self-knowledge” (LM 116: Ak. 29: 756), but he is here distinguishing between ontology which concerns the object or “things in general” and transcendental philosophy which is concerned with the subject, but only in the minimal sense that it is concerned with the “concepts through which we think things” (LM 114: Ak. 29: 752), rather than the things in general.
In fact, Kant asserts at the outset that reason is already open to an immanent survey by the human mind: “I have to do merely with reason itself and its pure thinking; to gain exhaustive acquaintance with them I need not seek far beyond myself, because it is in myself that I encounter them” (Axiv). But while none of these comments so far indicate that Kant thinks that reason’s self-discovery is in itself tragic, there is nevertheless what may be called an epic dimension to the Kantian ‘know thyself’ that comes out in other remarks. In particular, at the end of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states that the “first command of all duties to oneself” is to “know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself.” To seek “to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one’s heart which are difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom”. He concludes that “only the descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness” (PP 562, Ak. 6:441). While this may be held to apply mainly to moral self-cognition, I will argue that, especially given the importance of the systematic hierarchy of morality and knowledge in justifying the self-critique of reason, it may be extended to the entire project of the critique. The critical project is a voyage through the fogs of illusion (cf. A235/B295), a journey into the hell of self-knowledge, during which the light emanating through the fog is all the time present. In the critical project, reason takes on the most difficult of all tasks – self-knowledge; but, in the early critical Kant at least, it is reason itself in its eternal and, I will argue, metaphysical form, that must somehow undergo the harrowing of hell. Reason must test itself: but that can only mean it must test its uses and applications in experience. “Reason tests whether it cannot set itself beyond experience on the wings of ideas” (LM 116; Ak. 29:756). The critique of pure reason will be the realisation of pure reason.

For Kant, the voyage of critique is consistently described as a passage towards metaphysics. Kant writes to Lambert on 11th September 1770 that he is working on a “propaedeutic” to metaphysics (C 108; Ak. 10:98). The status of critique as propaedeutic is explicitly reaffirmed in CPR (A111/B25, A841/B869). However, there is a mediating link between critique and metaphysics: transcendental philosophy.\(^9\) The latter is a particular species of metaphysics that

\(^9\) Eckart Förster’s important article ‘Kant’s Notion of Philosophy’. *Monist* 72, 1989. was the springboard for some of the following ideas, although I differ with him on some fundamental ideas (in particular those concerning ‘real possibility’) to be discussed in chapters 2 & 5.
governs “the metaphysics of nature” (A845/B873). In the Introduction, Kant says “I call all cognition **transcendental** that is occupied not so much with objects, but rather with our *apriori* concepts of objects in general [Gegenstände überhaupt](A12/B26). In the Architectonic, Kant elaborates that “**transcendental philosophy** ... considers only the **understanding** and reason itself in a system of all concepts and principles that are related to objects in general [Gegenstände überhaupt], without assuming objects [Objecte] that **would be given** (Ontologia)” (A845/B873). This distinction between Gegenstand and Object will become important later, but for the moment it is enough to concentrate on the fact that Kant equates transcendental philosophy with ontology.\(^\text{10}\) Kant emphasises that “this critique is not itself [to be] called transcendental philosophy” and that “[t]ranscendental philosophy is here only an idea, for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan **architectonically**, ie. from principles” (A13/B27); the critique will “lay before us a complete enumeration of all the ancestral concepts [Stammbegriffe] that comprise the pure cognition in question” (ibid). These Stammbegriffe are equivalent to the pure concepts of Gegenstände überhaupt, and are called such because they have their *origin* in the understanding and reason.\(^\text{11}\)

What is important to see here is that critique and metaphysics are initially separated only by the fact that critique is a mere *idea* of a branch of metaphysics, transcendental philosophy. But if this is the case, the status of *immanence* in this critical task surely starts to become obscure. In one of his rare uses of the term outside its normal place in the discussion of the immanent/transcendent use of principles, Kant writes to J.S. Beck on 20\(^{th}\) January, 1792 that out of the *results* of the critique, “emerges a whole science of Ontology as *immanent* thinking, ie. a science of things the objective reality of whose concepts can be securely established” (C 398; Ak. 11:314). What is interesting for us here is the ascription of the notion of immanence to metaphysics (or transcendental philosophy as

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\(^{10}\) The context of this passage suggests that “ontologia” refers to the first clause, not the second. It should be placed in context with Kant’s more famous statement that “the proud name of ontology must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of pure understanding” (A247/B303). What Kant draws attention to here is the switch from pride to modesty, not necessarily any more substantial alterations.

\(^{11}\) Kant’s frequent statements that the *apriori* concepts have their *origin* in the understanding and reason are often overlooked, perhaps because such an idea seems unhelpfully metaphorical. However, I will suggest in the next chapter that the notion is essential to understanding the first edition CPR.
ontology), rather than critique, as if immanence were not itself a property of the self-critique of pure reason, but of what the critique is attempting to reach, of what we possess by right, but are occluded from seeing properly. In fact, it is metaphysics that, according to the concepts presented in CPR, “is nothing but the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically. Nothing can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason’s common principle has been discovered” (A xx). Critique involves the discovery of this common principle, which will allow the proper construction of metaphysics. Kant elaborates on the role of critique in relation to metaphysics in the Metaphysik Mrongrolius from 1783, where he suggests that critique forms the first part of metaphysics, of which the second part will be “the system of pure reason” (LM 117, Ak. 29:753). He further characterises metaphysics as the “system of pure cognitions of reason through concepts” (LM 113, Ak. 29:750), while specifying that the critique of pure reason simply “investigate[s] the possibility of the pure cognitions of reason” (LM 114, Ak. 29:752. Cf. A111/B25, where critique is “a science of the mere estimation of pure reason”). Further proof of this deep dependence of critique on metaphysics is provided by the letters in which Kant imagines a metaphysics which would incorporate the results of critique in a systematic order (cf. C 262; Ak. 10:494 for a plan from 1787). As both the plans for a metaphysics outlined in the letters and the metaphysics lectures themselves all involve development of the same material as that dealt with in the Critique, but in a different order, it seems clear that metaphysics is much more intrinsic to Kant’s philosophy than is often thought. 12

Now the notion of immanence could indeed be characterised by the phrase from the Preface to CPR mentioned above, “nothing can escape us” (Axx). But on the face of it, Kant seems to be allowing from the beginning that reason itself has a pure nature that is in principle possessed by human beings. Reason can come to know itself, because it alone gives us a light through the fog that is itself never to

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12 Perhaps the reason why Kant never felt it urgent enough to actually write his metaphysics was because it was not sufficiently different enough to the Critique itself to merit the labour of writing at his late age. Furthermore, on this reading, we can perhaps begin to justify Kant’s outrage when Fichte (and others) claimed that Kant had written a mere propædeutic, while Fichte himself had written the real thing: “Such an intention could never have occurred to me, since I took the completeness of pure philosophy within the Critique of Pure Reason to be the best indication of...”
be doubted. It is only its use that is to be doubted. As aforementioned, Kant says that reason is in dissension with itself "in its nonexperiential use" (Axi). As well as the notion of use, we should emphasise the paradox that will emerge from this phrase: as the principle of justification for human knowledge will be experience, transcendental illusion will arise from a certain misuse of ideas which are intrinsically nonexperienceable, by attempting to force them into the domain of experience. Thus nonexperiential ideas may be in themselves pure and eternal, but we should be careful about how we, for whom the principles of the possibility of experience are grounding, use and think about them. Kant insists that reason in itself is unsullied by the dialectic with which it becomes entangled; he even states that "there is properly no antithetic of pure reason at all" (A743/B771) and that all the battles of metaphysics mentioned in the preface of CPR are in fact bloodless. From "the safe seat of critique", there is no fear of injury from the apparent battle: we realise we are in a theatre watching gladiators in bloodless combat (A743/B771 & A747/B775). Thus Kant says that

the ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; rather it is merely their misuse which brings it about that a deceptive illusion arises out of them; for they are given as problems for us by the nature of our reason, and this highest court of appeals for all rights and claims of our speculation cannot possibly contain original deceptions and semblances. Presumably, therefore, they have their good and purposive vocation in regard to the natural predisposition of our reason (A669/B697).

But if this is so, then we seem to be far from the Hegelian notion that reason criticises itself, with the implication that reason's own claims are subject to criticism. In fact, reason seems to preserve itself from the hell of self-knowledge, in a manner perhaps similar to the way God sends Christ to harrow hell as a ransom for man.

Implied in these passages is the notion of a perspective beyond transcendental illusion. The presence of twin perspectives in Kant's philosophy is, however, often taken as one of its primary inconsistencies. Thus, for Hegel, the appeal to an intellectually intuiting God beyond finite knowledge, the appeal to a thing in itself beyond appearance, and the appeal to a pure reason unentangled with the travails of dialectical reason, are all isotropic variations of a fundamental problem in Kant that will only be resolved by the extension of dialectic to the

the truth of that work" ('Declaration concerning Fichte's Wissenschaftslehr'. August 7. 1799. C
absolute. Hegel would thus be saying that Kant does not recognise the *metacritical* status of the notion of the self-critique of reason, and only such a recognition could resolve the problem of how reason can criticise itself without already presupposing its own validity.

However, although Kant does not see the problem in the way Hegel does, he is not simply ignorant of issues of metacritical status. As already suggested in the Introduction, one of the predominant issues of metacritique concerns the relation between critique and philosophy or metaphysics. It can be shown that Kant is continually struggling with this question, and that, as the implications of the critical project are gradually unfolded, Kant constantly has his eye on the resolution, in systematic form, of the relation between critique and metaphysics. There are three main historical stages in this struggle, which are structurally important for the general thesis I wish to develop.\(^\text{13}\)

**In the first stage,** I contend that there are deep continuities running between Kant’s so-called ‘pre-critical’ writings and the first edition of CPR, in particular Kant continues to affirm some notion of *intelligible* access to noumena in this period. I argue that Kant’s reliance on an architectonic structure of pure reason, within which critique finds its place, rests on belief in the possibility of noumenal access. Moreover, the overall system is organised according to an internal teleology of pure reason.

**In the second stage,** Kant begins to work out how such access is possible, through the notion of *autonomy*. The *Groundwork* is the text which represents the transition between first and second stages. However, Kant realises that the deduction of freedom in the *Groundwork* is inadequate, thus precipitating the revision of CPR and the writing of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (CPrR). The reasons for this inadequacy are key to this thesis as a whole: they concern the constant threat of conflict between claims about both the fundamental practical and theoretical aspects of the spontaneous self and the claims put forward in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. One of the effects of this stage is the breakdown of the internal teleology of Kant’s system of philosophy. But the replacement of this

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\(^{560}\text{ Ak. 12:371).}\)

\(^{13}\text{Deleuze does not demarcate any such development in his account in KCP, or indeed anywhere else.}\)
by the Kantian \textit{cogito} as the central axis of the system, itself produces its own crisis.

\textbf{In the third stage}, Kant attempts to heal the havoc caused in the central doctrines of the critical philosophy by the above problems, by \textit{critically} reconstructing, in the \textit{Critique of Judgment} (CJ), the systematic teleology with which he began. As Deleuze points out, one of the central innovations of this work is the production of a \textit{genesis} of the faculties of mind, an internal teleology of the faculties, which now takes the weight from the metaphysical teleology of \textit{CPR}. However, the problems that riddled the notion of the self in the second stage continue to persist, and Kant's late, unfinished work, the \textit{Opus posthumum} is a final majestic (but problematic) effort to contain them in a renewed metaphysics.

The elaboration of the structural problematic that runs through these three stages will occupy this thesis as a whole. For the rest of this chapter, I examine the notion of the self-critique of reason in the first stage, focussing on the problems that arise as the issues of the second stage begin to intrude on Kant.\footnote{The following deals with these stages in Kant's project only from the viewpoint of the problem of the self-critique of reason. In fact, in the next chapter, it will be necessary to dwell on the first stage of Kant's project in even greater detail, so as to understand the destination of the project in general.}

\section{Critique and the Ends of Reason}

Kant's work was broken into three stages as a response to the emerging problem that the notion of an immanent self-critique of reason seems to be inconsistent with the notion of ‘twin perspectives’ on reason, and that if critique becomes too embroiled in metaphysics, then it loses its right to be a thoroughgoing critique. To explore this problem, we should persist with Kant's early treatment of it, and see how Kant first defends the notion that the domain of reason is already secure.

The notion that the \textit{nature} of reason is transparent \textit{de jure} at some point in the system is in fact found in Kant's pre-critical writings, for instance, in the \textit{Inaugural Dissertation}, where the claim is couched in strongly rationalist terms. Kant argues that in metaphysics, \textit{“method precedes all science”},

For, since it is the right use of reason which here sets up the very principles themselves, and since it is in virtue of the natural character of reason alone that objects and also the axioms, which are to be thought with respect to objects, first become known, the exposition of the laws of pure reason is the very genesis of
science; and the distinguishing of these laws from suppositious laws is the
criterion of truth (# 25; TP 406-7, Ak 2:411).

Given the evidence so far, is this "exposition of the laws of pure reason" so
very different from the project of critique? The laws of reason remain the
unquestioned criterion of truth. But how is this possible, within the account of the
mind developed in CPR? There are two questions here.
1. What in the mind gives us the right to have access to the laws of pure reason?
2. Even if our cognition is inherently limited, is it possible to become aware of
these limitations, thus giving us access to the truth of those limitations?
I will start by sketching a twofold answer by Kant to the first question, which will
be greatly elaborated in the following chapters. The first section in particular
sketches in the barest outline the basic template of my Kant interpretation.

ia Apriori Cognitions

There is one fundamental proposition in CPR, concerning the distinction between
thoughts and intuition: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without
concepts are blind" (A51/B75). This dictum applies in principle to both finite and
infinite intuition. The problem of CPR is generated by asking the question
'given a certain kind of intuition, what kind of thought is possible?'

As regards intellectual intuition, while it is important to point out that
Kant uses the notions of "intuitive understanding" and "intellectual intuition"
indiscriminately, it must be acknowledged that both components are nevertheless
always present. Further, although their precise manner of combination remains
dark to us, their product is always apriori.

As regards sensible intuition, the lack of identity between thought and
intuition opens the possibility of distinctive, synthetic kinds of apriori cognition.

15 The notion of Gegenstand should again be mentioned. It has already been suggested that the
notions of Gegenstand and 'transcendental philosophy' have initially the same range. It will be
shown in greater detail in chapter 3 and especially chapter 5.1 that Kant begins the Transcendental
Analytic with a notion of Gegenstand (object) that is much wider in reference than the notion of
Object. Gegenstand, at least in principle, refers to any kind of potential 'objective' (in a loose
sense) reference, and begins much more as a metaphysical than an epistemological notion. I argue
that this metaphysical emphasis is concealed by the fact that our de facto limitation to finite
intuition is stressed by Kant from the outset, so the Gegenstände he refers to are already conceived
in terms of finite intuition. It is this, I contend, that has led to the ongoing confusion concerning
the nature and relations to each other of the notions of Gegenstand and Object. All this is more
clearly perceived if sufficient attention is given to Kant's 'pre-critical' metaphysical background
(see chapter 2).
Firstly, while Kant suggests that some apriori concepts may be shared by God and man, the question of their relation to sensible intuition concerns only man. Thus the categories are apriori cognitions that only a finite being can have.

Secondly, pure intuitions are possible for finite beings because the structure of space and time is uniform and universal. Nevertheless, pure intuitions relate to the structure of passive intuition, so are unknown to God.

Thirdly, man has the ability to encounter Ideas. Ideas are divided into two categories: a rational Idea is a concept without a possible intuition, while an aesthetic Idea is an intuition without a possible concept. But although the concept-intuition relation is problematised in Kant’s account of Ideas, it is nevertheless the thought-intuition relation, I contend, that is the governing relation in Kant’s critical project. So a rational Idea, as a pure thought, must nevertheless have a sense, even if it is not a sense in empirical intuition; while on the other hand, an aesthetic Idea, which already has an extremely rich sense (although again not as an empirical intuition), must have some relation to thought. Here this can only stand as an assertion, but I will be attempting to understand and defend this claim, in its manifold forms, throughout the thesis. It is, moreover, an important aspect of both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s interpretations of Kant that they exacerbate and work through this issue; I will show how it achieves some consistency in Kant himself.

In essence, then, the structure of the critical project is concerned, on the one hand, with justifying these three finite, synthetic variants of the thought-

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16 Cf. the discussion of categories as schematised pure concepts at A146/B185f.: see chapter 51 below.

17 In Hegel and Deleuze this concern takes a particular form, due to their insistence on the correlation between aesthetic Ideas with rational Ideas. Cf. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge: “The aesthetic Idea is a representation of the imagination for which no [conceptual] exposition can be given; the Idea of Reason is a concept of Reason for which no demonstration can be given – demonstration in the Kantian sense being the presentation of a concept in intuition. As if the aesthetic Idea did not have its exposition in the Idea of Reason, and the Idea of Reason did not have its demonstration in beauty. But instead of asking for an intuition of the absolute identity of the sensuous and the supersensuous, Kant reverts to what is the very ground of the mathematical antinomies; an intuition for the Idea of Reason in which the Idea would be experienced as purely finite and sensuous and simultaneously and contiguous experienced as a supersensuous Beyond of experience” (trans. H.S. Harris & W. Cerf. Albany: SUNY, 1977). 87. Deleuze writes that while “at first sight an aesthetic Idea is the opposite of a rational Idea ... [the former] ‘gives food for thought’, it forces one to think. The aesthetic Idea is really the same thing as the rational Idea: it expresses what is inexpressible in the latter”; Kant’s Critical Philosophy (trans. H. Tomlinson. London: Athlone, 1984). 57. As I will suggest, Deleuze’s and Hegel’s differences concern only the particular manner and method by which the correlation between rational and aesthetic Ideas is worked out.
intuition relation, that is, concepts, sensible intuitions and Ideas, in their *apriori* aspects. This justification will take place, as we will see, through three transcendental deductions. On the other hand, *and at the same time*, the project is to demonstrate the *mutual limitation* of these three forms of *apriori* cognition for humans.

Now it is necessary to clarify here one essential aspect of this account, which relates to what has been said so far of 'pure reason'. Ideas in general are only possible for humans as a result of the mutual limitation of sensible intuition and understanding. While God can plausibly be held to have an intuitive *understanding*, *reason* (as well as art) is possible only for limited beings. But if reason is a projection of the finite being, and has no *prima facie* connection with divine thought, then how can it serve as our guiding light in the project of critique? This is indeed the crux of our problem in this chapter. However, the problem will be able to be placed in the correct perspective if it is maintained that the governing thought-intuition claim requires that Ideas have sense. My claim is that Kant comes up with important and often neglected approaches and results concerning this problem, which are essential to the metacritical dimension of the critical project. It is instructive to turn now to Kant’s very first proposal in the first-edition CPR.

**ib**  

*Noumenal access*

There is one kind of appeal that can be made to an element of reason which is of its nature untainted by dubieties of the critique of knowledge: to the notion of freedom. Kant’s references to noumenal freedom in the first edition CPR are notable for their simplicity; they contain none of the agonies that Kant was later to bring to the surface in his discussions of transcendental freedom in the *Groundwork* and second *Critique*. Kant states that

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18 In the following account I wish merely to draw attention to problems of access to a proof of noumenal freedom, and how it might be related to the self-critique of reason. Hence my account will have a certain provisional character, its validity being conditional on justification by a much fuller investigation into the intensely complicated issue of freedom in Kant.

19 It is also worth recalling that CPR contains no hint that a second critique devoted to practical reason is necessary: a 'metaphysics of morals' was to be generated in a future project out of the suggestions about freedom made in CPR, in a perfectly analogous manner to the generation of a 'metaphysics of nature' from the lessons about *apriori* nature. Cf. A841/B869, and his letter to Mendelssohn of 16 August 1783, where the writing of his moral philosophy is mentioned in
the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole of nature solely through sense, knows himself also through pure apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations which cannot be accounted at all among impressions of sense; he obviously is in one part phenomenon, but in another part, namely in regard to certain faculties, he is a merely intelligible object, because the actions of this object cannot at all be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We call these faculties understanding and reason (A546/B574).²⁰

As Karl Ameriks has argued, such a view can only be explained in terms of a persistence of rationalist views that Kant had not got around to submitting to critique.²¹ Kant does not defend the claim that the mere activity of understanding and reason gives us access to the mundus intelligibilis, he assumes it. Nevertheless, if the first edition CPR was conceived with this kind of access to the noumenon in mind, it may explain how reason is seen as sufficiently detached from the mundus sensibilis to be able to criticise its own role in it.

Kant does try to make good his assumption when he attempts in the second stage of this thinking the task of providing a critique of the notion of freedom. This would seem unpromising from our current avenue of approach, because we are looking into freedom as a possible basis from which reason can attempt its own critique. However, the Groundwork is a text that lies between the first and second Critiques, and while not claiming status as a critique, it does attempt a synthetic proof by moving from a negative, merely hypothetical concept of freedom to a positive one. In the Groundwork Kant attempts a deduction of positive freedom by way of the notion of the moral law, or self-legislation according to universal laws. However, he admits that there is a “hidden circle” involved in such a deduction (Ak. 4.453, PP. 99). As Ameriks shows, the circle is hidden in the attempt to go from a merely negative concept of freedom (some form of independence from sensual desires) to the categorical imperative by parallel with the plan for a metaphysics (C 203, Ak. 10:346). The Groundwork itself is of course far from a critique, but rather an inquiry into the first principles of the metaphysics of morals.

²⁰ “Sense” is used here to mean ‘sensibility’, that is, empirical intuition, as is often the case in Kant. My distinction between the wider use of the term (as in “sense or signification”) and merely empirical sensibility should be clear in what follows. As suggested in the Introduction, the overdetermination of the word Sinn is important precisely in staking out the limits of the expression or realisation of concepts and ideas.

²¹ Kant’s Theory of Mind (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 211, 214. My reading of transcendental freedom in the next few pages is indebted to Ameriks’ reading, specifically in the sixth chapter, entitled ‘Independence’, p.189-233. For a critique by Ameriks of another popular reading of Kant on freedom, see his review of Henry Allison’s Idealism and Freedom in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49, 1999. In chapter 5 I return to debates between Ameriks’ ‘rationalist’ reading of Kant, with which I have more sympathy, and Allison
secretly converting negative freedom to autonomous freedom, self-legislated freedom. Only the latter could ground the moral law. Therefore Kant seeks a third term (Ak. 4.448, PP 95) to ground the synthetic move: the notion of membership of an intelligible world. The distinction of the "world of sense" and the "world of understanding" echoes Kant's cautious use of such a distinction in CPR (A256/B312), which in turn echoes the distinction between "things thought sensitively ... as they appear," while things which are intellectual are representations of things as they are" (TP 384, Ak. 2:392).

Reason ... shows in what we call 'Ideas' a spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes far beyond anything that sensibility can ever afford it, and proves its highest occupation in distinguishing the world of sense and the world of understanding from each other and thereby marking out limits for the understanding itself (PP 99, Ak., 4:452).

At issue again is the claim that we have some apriori access to reason that can ground a critical account of the possibility of pure cognitions. But Kant's appeal to Ideas here in fact deepens the problem, as Ideas are defined by their "problematic" nature: an Idea is a concept that cannot find an intuition (cf. A254/B310). Now although Kant suggests that Ideas have no sense or signification within experience (A240/B299), this is only an abstract definition of the Idea, as Kant only gives the name of 'Idea' to certain concepts, which do have a sense or signification for us because they provide symbols or images of a practical goal. These rational concepts are only Ideas because they mean something that goes to the heart of the structure of the subject. This goes for aesthetic as well as rational Ideas. However, for 'practical' to mean more than 'technical' here, surely it needs to be grounded on a properly secured notion of transcendental freedom. But we have just turned to the notion of ideas to help us explain such freedom!

In fact, with his appeal to Ideas Kant achieves the opposite to what he seems to have intended: he cuts off the noumenal world, rather than grounds access to it. While Ideas do show a spontaneity in their very possibility, this would yield no more than the spontaneity we must attribute to the understanding, and even, in some measure, to the imagination. That Ideas are spontaneous does not tell us much; and what the Idea is about must remain problematic. Our

and Pippin's reading of the centrality of apperception debates which are intimately related to the issues touched on here.
"membership" of the *mundus intelligibilis* is therefore itself problematic. This problematicity then infects the *relation* between the two *mundi*, as the intelligible Idea is always seen as problematic due to its *lack* of intuitive presentation. Kant’s need for additional postulates to give *sense* to the moral law can be seen as a further response to this original problem of *intelligibilia*.

But what use is the necessary ‘third term’ if it is only problematic? Kant goes on to say it is a task of *speculative* philosophy to show that there is no contradiction between the causally determined and self-determining subject, “and to show that both not only *can* very well coexist but also must be thought as *necessarily united* in the same subject” (Ak. 4:456, PP 102). But a proof of the identity of the subject in noumenal and phenomenal realms is as lacking in CPR, as it is on the model of the *Groundwork*. Turning to speculative reason will provide even less chance of securing the identity of the subject in the two *mundi*, as the *relation* between the noumenal and the phenomenal is entirely problematic. And in this case, the “hidden circle” remains intractable, as freedom is not yet demonstrated to be autonomous, because it still has not been demonstrated that noumenal freedom has anything to do with *us*.

We have seen that whereas in CPR Kant assumes that our “inner determinations” are devoid of sensibility, and equates apperception with freedom, in the *Groundwork*, Kant affirms access to *intelligibilia* while blocking it with the other hand by calling *intelligibilia* ‘Ideas’. Kant’s revisions in the second edition CPR show his unhappiness with these positions, by showing how inner sense must depend on outer sense, thus closing off a realm of “inner determinations”. But these moves parallel his quest for a notion of autonomy, whereby the noumenon and phenomenon must be shown to belong to the *same* subject, without begging any critical questions. Kant continues to insist that practical freedom by itself is insufficient: it is not enough to act *as if* we are free, when our ‘freedom’ might well in that case be a disguise for our desires. However, Kant gives up on the idea of a deduction of freedom, and now describes the moral law as an

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22 It will be very important for this thesis that Kant is so convinced of the importance of Ideas, both rational and aesthetic, that he grants them a deduction, even though he is himself unsure of whether a deduction of freedom is possible, on which he holds their importance to depend. Deleuze’s theory of Ideas is an implicit attempt to resolve this paradox by explaining the intrinsic importance of Ideas on their own terms.
“apriori fact of reason”. But as we will see, this does not escape the issue that even the fact of reason remains problematic if it is to have sense.23

ii Culture and Illusion

I turn now to the second general question concerning Kant’s early notion of the self-critique of reason. Even keeping in mind the ambiguities of the possible routes to pure reason just outlined, and even if it is doubtful how reason can transcend its limits in experience, might there not be a way for reason to be able to recognise those limits as limits? That is, there may be no secure mundus intelligibilis to which we can lay claim, but there may be a way of seeing through the illusions produced by a misuse of our faculties. If only we can recognise the distribution of our faculties, then we can work out de jure how they mutually limit each other.

Now, even if reason in its structure could be called a “perfect unity”, this perfection would not necessarily for Kant imply tranquillity for the creatures subject to it. After all, Spinoza called his monstrous deus sive natura perfect. In fact the structural perfection of the Kantian system implies the existential torment of its subjects; but it is all the more perfect as it is for their own ultimate good. The human subject is intrinsically haunted by certain spectres – the shadow of God, the promise of immortality and the ‘perplexity’ of freedom. What will be important just as much as Kant’s failure to prove freedom, is his success in proving the importance of ideas in self-legislation. From a Deleuzian point of view, in fact, the idea of freedom can be seen as an abstract chimera concealing the primary power of ideas, of problems. If we appear to be condemned to think about freedom, haunted by the possibility of freedom, it is not that we are essentially dreaming of autonomy, it is rather that we are being forced to think by a particular problematic structure, which does not allow us to subsist unthinkingly within it; for Deleuze, there are many Ideas.

For Kant too, the spectres of certain problems cluster around the subject, feeding it and making it live. And still there is nothing tragic about this, if only we realise that we cannot know certain things – they are lived by us as eternal

23 I return to the notion of the fact of reason later in this chapter. The issues just outlined will be further elaborated from a more developed perspective in chapter 3.
problems, which we can only unravel by exposing the structure of reason. The first lines of the critique read:

Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every faculty of human reason (A vii; translation modified).

Humanity is haunted by problems that insist in it and excite it. It is burdened by questions, but this is natural to reason itself. Kant’s suggestion is that even while finite beings will never be free of transcendental illusion, we can learn to see through it, and see that the illusion is necessary in order for us to strive after perfection. Thus the illusion is ultimately not an illusion at all. It only seems like an illusion if we treat it as knowledge. The status of this ruse of reason will be crucial for resolving the issue of the metacritical status of critique.

It was mentioned above that critique can be seen as the insight into the laws of reason. The discussion has so far been conducted in terms of the ‘self-knowledge’ of the rational subject of its own laws. But it is necessary now to reintroduce the other dimension to the use of ‘law’ which is so prominent in the imagery of CPR. The notion of self-knowledge is after all paralleled by the impersonal metaphor of the court of justice. But if the illusions of cognition are part of the ruse of reason, then is not Kant disturbing the process of the ruse by exposing it? Either the critique is a violation of the providential structure of human cognition, or the critique itself must be seen as a new element in that structure. I argue the latter alternative is correct.

It is in fact the cosmo-historical framework within which Kant places the critique that finally sheds light on how reason can criticise itself. The court of justice is distinguished from reason insofar as it is what facilitates the realisation of reason. Thus while the court of justice is not itself involved in controversies of pure reason, it “is rather set the task of determining and judging what is lawful in reason in general in accordance with the principles of its primary institution. Without this, reason is as it were in the state of nature” (A751/B779). Thus the critique of reason is the founding of an institution which articulates our transcendence of the state of nature. But what in turn governs the founding and operation of this institution? The nature of reason can only be realised in a cosmopolis, a civilised world, but nevertheless the institution itself can only be
oriented by - the nature of reason. Now the only way to make sense of this circularity is by facing the inescapability of a teleological dimension. Thus the providential character of the ruse of reason must ultimately originate in the teleological structure of reason itself. Reason has a “single supreme and inner end, which first makes possible the whole” (A833/B861). Teleology, then, will be the ultimate tribunal for the rationale of the self-critique of reason.

In ‘The Architectonic of Pure Reason’, Kant says that the “cosmopolitan concept” of philosophy is “personified and represented as an archetype in the ideal of the philosopher” (A838/B866). Kant presents ‘philosophy’ as the “system of all philosophical cognition” (ibid), while metaphysics is the “name [that] can also be given to all of pure philosophy including the critique” (A841/B869). But “metaphysics is also the culmination of all culture of human reason” (A851/B879). From the “point of view” of this cosmopolitan ideal of the philosopher, then, “philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason” (teleologia rationis humanae) (A839/B867). These ends which are essential and natural to human reason, must be realised in culture.

Reason itself has certain ends; humanity is set problems about how to realise those ends. This is the teleological structure within which CPR takes place. Nevertheless, when it comes to the self-critique of reason, humanity is faced with a very special set of problems. The end of reason for humans is to realise rationality successfully, and now, in “the age of criticism”, the time has come to ask how this is possible. But the familiar duplicity in reason that has been noted from the start seems to continue to dog this conception. Kant insists that the problems set by reason “transcend every faculty of human reason” (Avii): what could it mean for the legitimacy of the moment of self-critique, if the nature of pure reason itself harboured certain problems which every human faculty was unable to solve? If a problem transcends all faculties or capacities (Vermogen), this means it transcends the reach or grasp of those faculties. Yet Kant seems to insist that the problem can be seen in the right perspective because of the distinction between reason in itself and applied reason or human reason in general: “All the questions that pure reason lays before us, lie not in experience but themselves in turn only in reason, and they must therefore be able to be solved and their validity or nullity must be able to be comprehended” (A763/B791).
The question of the status of reason in itself and its “essential ends” leads to the suspicion that the grandeur of the ruse of reason is really nothing other than bootstrapping. We have seen that “the essential ends of reason” must provide the basis for the process of civilisation whereby reason becomes capable of being criticised, which in turn grounds the very possibility of the self-critique of reason. But Kant all too frequently ends up relying on an external teleology, when explaining the nature of these ends. This is inevitable due to the structure of Kant’s system. For, as a result of the critique, reason must speculatively restrict itself to a merely regulative use, which is in turn grounded on the validity of its practical use. But we have seen that Kant presupposes full access to noumena in transcendental freedom, resting practical freedom on a speculative claim about transcendental freedom that is not effectively defended, because of a residual rationalism; that is, because of a faith in the purity of reason! The ruse of reason does indeed begin to look like a hollow ruse.

Thus, Kant’s account of the ends of reason either looks circular or ends up at most appealing to an external, metaphysical teleology. For instance, Kant states that “in regard to the essential ends of human nature even the highest philosophy cannot advance further than the guidance that nature has also conferred on the most common understanding” (A831/B859). Such a statement also fits uneasily with Kant’s insistence that reason must be drawn out of its “state of nature” towards “culture”.

We can also observe a circularity in the notion of the “unity of reason”. Kant states that the unity of reason depends on the pursuit of the highest ends of reason: the “striving” of reason will “find peace only in the completion of its circle in a self-subsisting systematic whole” (A797/B825). But he then states that “these highest ends must, in accordance with the nature of reason, in turn have unity, in order to advance, in a united manner, that interest of humanity which is subordinated to no higher one” (ibid). But if the highest ends ground unity, how can we presume that the highest ends themselves are unified? While Kant says that “reason itself (subjectively) is a system” (A738/B766), he seems to be relying on a metaphysical teleology, by which the ends which were supposed to be the ultimate standard by which critique oriented itself, are nevertheless made exempt from critique. This is an example of how circularity can seem to prove a system but in fact reduce it to bootstrapping. For the fact that the striving of reason
towards unity instantiates the end of reason itself would indeed be virtuously and systematically circular if it were not at the same time intended to provide the standard by which the self-critique of reason oriented itself.

In effect Kant presupposes a kind of pre-established harmony between the ends of reason, and in turn between the human faculties which attempt to orient themselves in the light of these ends. Ultimately, the question of a critical notion of ‘harmony’ will become more pressing as Kant works through the paradoxes of the second stage of his work.

3 Reason and its Interests

Due to the pressure of the issues of the second stage of Kant’s reflection (the problematisation of inner sense, of autonomy, etc.) Kant turns towards an excavation of the human subject, and away from the notion of a teleology and culture of reason; or at least he ceases to rely on the latter to ground the very notion of the critical project. It is no longer ‘reason itself’ which holds the key to the immanence of critique, but the manifold capabilities of the subject.

Thus, in CPrR Kant describes the ends of reason as *interests* of reason. The notion of ‘interest’ undergoes a shift from its role in CPR. In the latter, reason was considered to have an interest only in the particular manner in which it proceeded with its speculative, regulative use. Thus, it depended on a scientist’s interest if he favoured the elicitation of the homogeneity or diversification of laws in his exploration of nature (cf. A666/B694: “it is merely a different interest of reason that causes a divorce between ways of thinking”).24 Kant develops his notion of interest in the following important passage, which also points towards the third stage of Kant’s reflection:

> To every faculty of the mind one can attribute an *interest*, that is, a principle that contains the condition under which alone its exercise is promoted. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind but itself determines its own. The interest of its speculative use consists in the *cognition* of the object up to the highest apriori principles; that of its practical use consists in the determination of the *will* with respect to the final and complete end. (PP 236, Ak. 5:119-20)

24 Again, this shift in the notion of interest is not mentioned by Deleuze in his account of interests. Deleuze in fact talks of reason’s “positing” of ends and interests (KCP 2), which is an idea that Kant only explicitly affirms in the *Opus posthumum*. Deleuze does indeed mention the latter work in connection with the notion of “essential ends” (KCP 1), but could be charged with conflating different notions in Kant. I have attempted to separate out these notions.
The complexity of Kant's position is exhibited here. Kant first says that every faculty has an interest, which would include sensibility, imagination, as well as understanding and reason. However, an interest is described as a principle, and reason is privileged by being the faculty of principles. Kant claims that reason itself not only determines the interests of other faculties, but also determines its own interests. The possibility of regress is clear, for if we can infer that reason, as the faculty of principles, is the faculty of interests, how can it have its own interest, without being included in its own class as another faculty among others? We will return to this problem.

Moreover Kant describes reason's interest as itself divided, according to practical and speculative uses. Yet in the *Groundwork*, he says that his ultimate aim is to "be able at the same time to present the unity of practical with speculative reason in a common principle, since there can, in the end, be only one and the same reason, which must be distinguished merely in its application." (PP 46, Ak. 4:391).25

But Kant's work displays two tendencies at this point. On the one hand, there is the old tendency towards metaphysical systematic unity. But on the other hand, the moves towards a complex, and as yet incoherent account of the mutual relation of the faculties. To gain clarity about the relation of these two tendencies, we should focus again on the purity of reason as we have seen it so far, ignoring for a moment the internal problems we have found, in order to examine what role reason has from the human perspective. Reason is also a faculty. What is the relation between reason as faculty and reason as metaphysical law?

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25 This latter task of understanding the nature of the unity of reason promised in the passage from the *Groundwork* is essential to understanding post-Kantianism and Hegel's resolution of Kant's problematic. Teleology will remain the key: can the unity of reason serve as a ground or is it rather an ideal, or end? If Hegel claims that it can in some sense be both, how does he obtain this resolution? In ‘Transcendental Arguments, Reason and Scepticism: Contemporary Debates and the Origins of Post-Kantianism’ (in R. Stern ed., *Transcendental Arguments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999), pp. 72-105, Paul Franks discusses Reinhold's and Fichte's reorientation of this question, in relation to this passage in Kant.
If Kant cannot organise hierarchically the relation of the faculties, he seems to face the prospect of a kind of anarchy of the faculties. Thus, on the one hand, Kant tries to make reason an overarching faculty that is able both to act as a criterion for the correct use of the faculties and to discriminate between these uses. Something like this resolution is taken up by Hegel. But on the other hand, there are real difficulties with this option within the Kantian system, for each of the faculties has a quite distinct nature and function. This is clear in the passage quoted above from the second *Critique* (pp 236, Ak. 5:120). While each faculty has an interest, reason is said to “determine the interest of all the powers of the mind”, so seems to be the governor of the relation or mutual functioning of the faculties; however reason “itself determines its own” interest. Reason is thus either a member of its own class and is a faculty that needs to be determined, or is itself qualified to legislate over all the faculties, including itself as a faculty, in which case reason has a mysterious equivocal function. If reason can do what Kant says it can, he needs to explain how.

In KCP, Deleuze uses a hierarchical model of “subjection” to describe “the doctrine of the faculties”. In CPR reason delegates the understanding to legislate over the other faculties, whereas in CPrR reason itself performs the legislating function. In CJ, however, Kant is said to move from the model of subjection to a notion of the mutual harmony of the faculties, thus indicating that reason itself, if it is a faculty amongst others, cannot simply rule over the other faculties without explanation. Deleuze points out that CJ performs a genesis of the relation of the faculties, thus finally grounding the model of subjection. For instance, in the experience of the sublime, the faculty of imagination exceeds its limit and engenders a relation with reason, thus providing an internal relation between these two faculties. However, while I think Deleuze is right to look at the notion of harmony and genesis in CJ, obviously Kant does not return to the first two critiques to rewrite them in genetic terms. The notion of a hierarchy in the first two critiques thus still awaits explanation.

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26 I suggest in the final Appendix that Deleuze does in effect leave it to the model of genesis to explain the objects of the first two critiques, knowledge and morality. For Deleuze, as for Hegel in a different way, the genetic model is the only true ground for critique.
Kant remains attracted to the possibility of there being one faculty which governs the self-critique of reason. When asked in correspondence with Christian Garve in mid-1783 about the status of critique itself, Kant claimed that his task in CPR had been to construct a wholly new science, "the critique of an apriori judging reason". Kant emphasises that this "faculty" should be separated from other faculties of cognition, and that one can deduce out of its own nature all the objects within its scope, enumerating them, and proving their completeness by means of their coherence in a single, complete cognitive faculty. Absolutely no other science attempts this, that is, to develop a priori out of the mere concept of a cognitive faculty (when that concept is precisely defined) all the objects, everything that can be known about them, yes, even what one is involuntarily but deceptively constrained to believe about them" (C 198; Ak. 10:340).  

However, nothing like such a deduction is present in the Critique itself, indeed it seems to have more in common with the plans for a metaphysics that Kant outlined. Moreover, the very possibility of such a deduction, even if it were only suggested by the given structure of the Critique, seems afflicted by the kind of problems we have been dealing with in this chapter. 

Nevertheless, among commentators who, against the post-Kantians, claim to be able to uncover in Kant a coherent attempt at answering the problem of metacritique, there seems to be one core agreement: as well as Deleuze, L.W. Beck and (in a critique of Beck) G.J. Agich take the question of the faculties as bedrock for a discussion of the status of the self-critique of reason and metacritique in Kant. I shall therefore discuss their accounts in detail.

Beck phrases the metacritical problem as follows: how do we come to know of the operations and faculties of the mind? He immediately suggests that this may seem to beg the question of why there should be faculties at all, but he says that the notion of faculty should not be taken straightaway in terms of the empirical psychology of the time. He reminds us that the German word for faculty, Vermögen, is the noun form of the infinitive meaning 'to be able'; hence

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27 A similar account is perhaps at the heart of the famous footnote to the preface of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (also 1783) where Kant claims to be able to overcome the problems of the Transcendental Deduction by proceeding "almost by a single conclusion from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general" (Ak. 4:475). As this pulls us towards the issue of the Transcendental Deduction, full discussion will have to wait until chapter 5.


29 Beck, 'Toward a Metacritique'. 33.
“the discovery and assessment of what one is able to do seem to be a much less mysterious process than the discovery and assessment of faculties”.

Beck makes two interrelated suggestions about the status of metacritique. First, that the faculty or ability that initiates critique is the ‘fact of reason’. Second, that for this ‘fact’ to be other than the “dead, factual stop” it appears to be (thus artificially staunching the infinite regress of metacritique), it must be placed in the context of Kant’s remarks about “the essential ends of reason” that we encountered earlier. However, he claims that this entails a final Kantian acceptance of the need for a metaphysical account of the mind, which Beck says is provided for in Kant’s notion of rational physiology, “which did have a functional meaning in Kant’s time... deal[ing] with organic wholes and functions of parts within wholes”.

Rational physiology is thus the proper place to deal with the question of teleology, “since all the actions of mind have a bearing upon the whole and upon the final end of man” (ibid); a “transcendental physiology” would “give good reasons for the otherwise brutally factual attributes of mind which are presupposed without argument in the Critique” (ibid).

In defence of the former argument, Beck quotes the Groundwork, where Kant says that “man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes himself from all other things, even from himself so far as he is affected by objects” (PP 99; Ak. 4:452). Beck says that this self-awareness is the fact of reason, which he identifies with “the fact that there is reason”. Perhaps here we find a privileged instance of the notion of the self-reflexivity of reason? But if this is so, then why does Kant never identify apperception or self-consciousness with the fact of reason? Moreover, in the light of Kant’s more circumspect remarks concerning self-awareness in the first Critique and in its revisions concerning inner sense, do we really find a reflexive structure in the awareness of the fact of reason? Is it necessarily oneself that one is aware of when one apprehends this ‘fact’, given the difficulties encountered in self-knowledge in the Paralogisms? The apparent capacity to distinguish oneself from one’s empirical self, to which reason appears to bear witness, may be ill formulated. One may distinguish the capacity to think according to reason from one’s empirical self, but surely that in

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30 Beck. 32.
31 Beck. 35.
32 Beck. 31-2.
fact problematises the self-identity of that empirical self, by thinking beyond the confines of experience. To think of one's self, rather than securing a bridge between an intelligible and empirical aspect of oneself, can with equal right be seen to problematise the pre-reflexive self-identity assumed by one's empirical self.\(^{33}\) So, reflection upon oneself and reflection upon the fact of reason seem distinct.

Moreover, can't the latter be better characterised as the most general (in Hegelian terms, most abstract) form of the faculty of Ideas? For the mere fact that we can think "logically" is not adequately expressive of what Kant claims for reason. Now, while Kant derives the forms of logic from the understanding, reason is indeed described as the ability to order judgments in syllogisms. Nevertheless its aim is always to seek principles, to seek the unconditioned. And far from grounding the project of critique, this is the cause of the quandaries of the dialectic of pure reason; hence its 'rationality' is open to question. The mere capacity to 'reason' has, therefore (contra Beck), no internal ability to ground the possibility of critique; the fact that we can think logically really can be of itself no more privileged than the fact that we can imagine. For the fact of reason to ground critique it must first become a problem, and it can only do this when the question of the sense of its objects (concepts and Ideas) is posed. Rational Ideas, as concepts without intuitions, are always tethered to the problematic question of their reality, for without this connection, they are without sense; even the categorical imperative relies on postulates concerning its possible actualisation to give it sense. In this case, we can only describe such an awareness of the fact of reason as a problem in the Kantian sense. In effect, as Deleuze will make clear, the faculty of reason is here undergoing a transcendent exercise, whereby it encounters itself as a problem (cf. DR 138-148).

Beck's second claim for metacritique, which argues for a recourse to rational physiology, has been criticised by G.J. Agich, who points out that to appeal to metaphysics as the final grounding of critique, which is intended as the propaedeutic to metaphysics, would be viciously circular.\(^{34}\) This is correct, but not simply because metaphysics is being called upon, but rather because rational physiology, which Kant says is posterior to transcendental philosophy

\(^{33}\) I return to these issues in chapter 5.

is being called upon (we have seen that it is not straightforwardly illegitimate for Kant to appeal to some form of metaphysics, given his original conception of his project). Agich then turns his attention, like Deleuze, to the notion of interests of reason and to CJ. In order to provide a metacritical grounding of the critical project, Agich suggests that the third Critique provides an account of the “systematic unity” of the first two Critiques and their theoretical and practical interests respectively; it must show how this systematic unity is possible. Agich then infers that the only way this can be done is with reference to an “interest of reason in systematic unity which is not as such bound up with any particular interest, be it theoretical or practical”. Precisely such a paradoxical interest is worked out in the case of aesthetic judgment, which Kant of course argues is disinterested. The ‘feeling’ of the harmony of the faculties in the appreciation of art expresses the identity of the principle of subjective purposiveness with the principle of the systematic arrangement of the faculties.

Agich then refers to Kant’s comments about reflective judgment as the “ability to compare and combine” (CJ First Introduction 211). As Kant states that the critique involved in CJ will be merely subjective, Agich concludes that “to be critical simply means that reflection must be turned on the faculty or power of pure reason which makes critique possible as reflexive self-examination. The principle underlying critical reflection can only be the principle of the purposive unity of the faculties of mind”. While this fulfils, against Beck, the criterion that immanent critique not refer to anything outside the reach of critique, there are two problems with this account. Firstly, like Beck, Agich does not broach Kant’s indeterminacy about the relation between reason and the faculties. On one page he talks about “reason itself, that is, the faculties”, and on the next he says that “the one idea under which critique operates is simply, Kant says often enough, the concept of the cognitive faculty or the concept of pure reason itself”. Regardless of the contradiction

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35 ibid, 266.
36 He nonetheless claims that there is an “intellectual interest in the beautiful”; CJ # 42. Deleuze calls this “a third interest of reason” (KCP 54).
37 Agich, 268-9.
38 He does not mention the identity of this discussion of reflection with that of the Concepts of Reflection chapter in CPR. See below, chapter 3.
39 Agich, ibid.
40 Cf. Kant’s remarks in his letter to Garve and in the preface to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, cited above.
between the two statements, it is clear that Kant's vacillation about the role of reason is not being faced. Secondly, the appeal to the notion of "reflexive self-examination" is dark. Agich may be right about aesthetic judgment providing a ground for the possibility of the relation of the faculties in the critical project (this is also Deleuze's line; cf. *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, 58-60), but that does not mean that this ground itself is open to the transparency of self-reflection. Deleuze, for instance, argues that aesthetic judgment provides a ground for the relation of faculties because it shows how a genesis of the relation of the faculties is possible. Thus we need to keep hold of a fine distinction to avoid drifting into the Hegelian reading of the self-critique of reason: the grounds of the self-critique of reason are not equivalent to the self-grounding of the subject itself. The "hell of self-knowledge" exemplified in the critical project itself may not be identical to the self-examination of the subject. This point can be spelled out by way of a summary of the main points of this chapter.

5 Problems in the Self-Critique of Reason

We have attempted to make sense of the notion of a self-critique of pure reason, using the first edition CPR as our primary text. After encountering briefly Kant's account of the origins of apriori cognitions, we were led to his gestures towards membership in a *mundus intelligibilis* in the hope of showing how reason might be able to criticise its own functioning. Then we turned to Kant's recourse to teleology and culture in the explanation of the notion of the "essential ends of reason". What is important is that in each of these possible accounts of immanent critique, the capacity for critique is not immanent to the subject, but the immanence relates to the procedure carried out by the philosopher himself. Thus the critique of reason would be immanent if reason were proven to have a privileged role by Kant. The fact that we have seen that each of these possible procedures is subject to deep problems does not detract from the likelihood that such notions were exactly what Kant intended by the self-critique of reason.

The problems that we have discovered in the account of the self-critique of reason can be reduced to two core problematics.
1. **Equivocity of reason.** If there is to be a self-critique of reason, it would seem that the reason that is criticising must be the same reason as reason that is being criticised. The subjective and the objective genitive in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ must coincide. But how? For instance, how can we make sense of the notion that the nature of reason in itself might make it possible to criticise reason’s role as a faculty (or, we might say, reason for itself). If reason is used equivocally in the notion of the self-critique of reason, then it cannot be self-justifying. What then can be the difference that makes reason able to criticise itself?

2. **Unity of reason.** Kant expresses the need for reason (and its interests) to be unified in one principle. But if reason is so unified, then it would seem to be identical to the ultimate Idea in the Kantian system – the Idea of God, taken in its speculative sense. But Ideas remain problematic for human beings. Therefore reason itself would be problematic, and so would its critique of itself.

Is there a solution that presents itself within the confines of the discussion so far, that is, one that holds on to the distinctive elements of the Kantian system as it has been presented, for instance, the concern with the distribution and mutual delimitation of apriori cognitions, the distribution and distinction of the faculties and of their possible relations to each other, and the conception of ideas as problems? Can we outline a solution that does not yet radically reconfigure these distinctively Kantian elements, in the way Hegel does, for example? Hegel omits the notion of a preliminary examination of the ends of reason, and of the distinct relation of the faculties, on the grounds of self-reference that we encountered at the start of this chapter. But we have seen that the internality of self-critique in Kant is more complicated than Hegel suggests (if not yet more successful). I claim that there is a solution that embraces both of the above problems, but it is followed by two negative consequences, which are only turned to consistent use by Deleuze.

**Solution.** If reason is itself a problem, as is suggested in the second core problematic, this presents us with the chance to resolve the first issue, for the difference between reason as subject and reason as object would be that reason is
in itself *the realm of problems* that are intrinsically bound up with human experience, but must transcend human attempts to solve them.

**First consequence.** The correct *use* of reason would seem ultimately to become practical or regulative. But this would also make the task of the self-critique of reason in the first place practical, rather than theoretical. It would put the whole weight of the justice of the tribunal on the claims of freedom. While this may seem to open a path to a Fichteansolution to metacritique, it would make the apparatus of the whole *Critique of Pure Reason* very shaky: why, for instance, should we believe in the distinctions between sensibility and understanding, the characterisations of the faculties, etc., if practical reason is serving as the criterion?

**Second consequence.** We have seen that for Kant the transcendental validity of freedom is itself open to doubt. To characterise it as an Idea of reason would be circular, as Ideas are only given *sense* by their regulative use for freedom. But even if it does become an apriori fact of reason, it must depend on postulates to give it sense. So if freedom becomes an Idea, it collapses, but if Ideas depend on freedom, they also collapse. The upshot is that if reason itself is a problem for the finite being, then how can it serve as the criterion of critique?

These are unacceptable consequences to the solution within the confines of the Kantian critique. But in DR Deleuze attempts to fashion the solution so that it is fully self-consistent, by transforming, subtly but radically, several of the key elements in play. Firstly, we saw that the solution *identifies* reason with the realm of problems. Reason, the faculty of Ideas, *is* the capacity to apprehend problems. Now, with regard to the first consequence: if this identification is fully carried through, then there is no need to invoke freedom as its ground. A suggestion (and only that at this point) can be made that problems are themselves a *real* component of experience. I give an example of this that Deleuze only mentions in passing.41 The concept of one's own *death* is a concept without a possible intuition which nevertheless has a *sense* or *meaning* in that it is bound up with our *destination* or *telos* as subjects. Death is therefore a problematic Idea *par excellence*, a problem in which, as finite subjects who ask about the ends of

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41 *Kant's Critical Philosophy*. 56.
reason, who pose the very question of self-critique, we are necessarily entangled.  

But this in turn broaches the other issue brought up by the first consequence: how is one now to discover and justify the real components and apparatus necessary for the critique itself? How is one to justify the distinction of the faculties, etc? There are two levels to a Deleuzian answer. Firstly, Deleuze elaborates his account of Ideas through the key concepts of difference and repetition. Ideas are problematic horizons that are internally differentiated, yet cannot be experienced or recognised, only repeated. In chapter 4.3 I explain this unusual interpretation of Kantian Ideas, while in chapter 6 and Appendix IV I show how Deleuze develops a threefold account of temporal synthesis out of this structure of ‘repetition of internal difference’. This, I suggest, is how the real apparatus of critique itself is generated and demonstrated. Deleuze elaborates the second level of his answer by referring to what I called above Kant’s third stage or period: in CJ, Kant provides a model for the genesis of the relations of the faculties, notably in the case of the imagination and reason in the sublime. Deleuze develops this model of a free, self-grounding generation of the relations of a system of faculties, so that the range and limitations of the faculties are discovered in their own exercise, rather than being pre-given (see chapter 6.2).

The relation of these two levels, the account of Ideas and the genesis of the faculties, can be elucidated by reference to Kant. We have suggested that it is possible to analyse reason itself into the process of problematisation. But isn’t it the case that Kant’s examples of the genesis of the relation of the faculties themselves involve forms of problematisation? For instance, in the main example of genesis Kant gives, the experience of the sublime, the imagination is forced to

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42 This, in extreme abstraction, is the structure that governs much of the larger argument of Heidegger’s Being and Time. But from the point of view I am developing here, death would be an example, among others, of the problematic structure of an idea. Death is an idea because it is a future physical event that cannot in principle be experienced (not just because it is in the future), but analogously, birth is a past physical event that too cannot in principle be experienced (not just because it is in the past). At the end of the thesis I will allude to suggestions made by the Lacanian school that a defining, ‘transcendental’ feature of certain psychopathologies, such as neurosis, is the subject’s obsessive questioning of aspects of their own origin. Thus, the neurotic lives within the structure of the problem or question Am I alive? Similarly, fantasies of the primal scene can be seen as the symbolisation of the origin of the individual. In chapter 6.3 I will suggest that these ideas from Lacan, Leclaire and Laplanche are given their proper theoretical structure by Deleuze’s Kantian account of ideas as problems.
exceed its own limits by reason. In the sublime, "our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea" (CJ # 25, Ak. 5:250f). In thus exceeding its own limits, it paradoxically encounters its "vocation" (CJ # 28, Ak. 5:262); it could be said to encounter its own end or object in problematic form. Imagination is oriented by the violent apprehension of its ultimate relation with reason.

Now if this model of genesis can be extended to the other faculties, then each faculty has its own kind of "transcendent exercise". Deleuze draws a startling conclusion: "The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable

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43 Deleuze cites another example of genesis that is somewhat submerged in CJ: the genesis of the sense of the beautiful. Beauty is provoked by a harmony between objective forms and the subjective harmony of the faculties is united; the apriority of this synthetic relation between objective and subjective can be secured by means of a deduction, which is what Kant proceeds to do. However, Deleuze notes that Kant also describes how beauty is related synthetically with an intellectual, rational interest in the beautiful for the sake of morality. He then claims that "the interest with which [the sense of the beautiful] were united might serve as a principle for a genesis of the 'communicability' or universality of this pleasure" (Kant's Critical Philosophy, 52f).

44 However, an interesting remark in the first introduction to CJ gestures towards an interesting development of the possibilities just sketched out. We find Kant in the process of criticising the Schwarmerei conjured up by those who let their imagination wander too far from its proper use. It is essential, he says, to warn against "empty and fanciful desires", which are nourished by novels and "mystical representations, similar to novels, of superhuman perfections and fanciful bliss" (CJ First Intro 231). However, he goes on to say that it is an important problem for anthropology "to investigate why it is that nature has given us the predisposition to such fruitless expenditure of our forces as [we see in] empty wishes and longings (which certainly play a large role in human life)." Although Kant has said that this is a task for anthropology, he then goes on to make a teleological judgment about the purpose of these longings which has a resonance beyond the empirical sphere. He claims that the wisdom of nature is manifest in the emptiness of these longings, because if we had to assure ourselves that the objects of our desire were attainable before we actually let ourselves desire it, "our forces would presumably remain unused". Hence the very recklessness of desire is a condition for the possibility of following a desire and lending force to achieve it. Kant then says, in an echo of Spinoza's dictum that we do not yet know what a body can do, "for we usually do not come to know what forces we have except by trying them out". Kant then provides a suggestion, and no more, for the implication this has for his theory of faculties:

Nature has bound up the determination of forces with the representation of objects even before we have knowledge of our faculties, which are often produced in the first place through this striving, which seems like an empty wish to the mind. (my translation)

Although Deleuze never refers to this passage, it does foreshadow the notion of transcendental empiricism. This passage is indeed pregnant with future, as the notion that striving has primacy over the faculties and is in some sense their internal, genetic form, points also towards Fichte and Schelling. However, one can instead emphasise the way in which, in straining at the limits of the Kantian system, this passage does not primarily point towards a post-Kantian rearticulation of that system, but gestures towards a reading of Kant's own metacritical reasoning that displaces reason from its hierarchy. Kant says that the exercise of longing produces the faculty in the first place. A desire produces a new capacity, or faculty, to do something. Does this mean that we have to pose a primacy of inchoate desire at the heart of the faculties? But Kant is gesturing towards something else: for it is the wisdom of nature that has so engineered us that our desires are excessive. A teleological reason is once again lurking behind this permission for desires to act blindly, and there is only a hair of a difference between what could either be a cunning ruse of reason or its own problematisation at the hands of the faculties.
from its disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise” (DR 143/186). Deleuze thus seems to turn the distinction between ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’ on its head: the very form of the transcendent, which conditions the possibility of experience, depends on the violation of the possibility of experience. Nevertheless, if we keep in mind that we are concerned with the metacritical issue of the justification of critique itself, and if we bear in mind the preceding discussions, we can begin to glimpse Deleuze’s transformation of Kant in the following important passage:

Transcendent in no way means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world. The transcendent exercise must not be traced from the empirical exercise precisely because it apprehends that which cannot be grasped from the point of view of common sense, that which measures the empirical operation of all the faculties according to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration. That is why the transcendental is answerable to a superior empiricism which alone is capable of exploring its domain and its regions (DR 143/186).

As I will show later, Deleuze is very exercised by the problem that the derivation of transcendental claims merely echoes their empirical presuppositions, what Foucault called the “empirico-transcendental double”. He is concerned to move beyond “conditioning” to the standpoint of “genesis” (cf. DR 154/200; KCP 52). But there are in fact two distinct senses of genesis in Deleuze. Firstly, for Deleuze (in a way similar to Hegel), ‘experience’ is never a given but is generated through developing and responding to problems. Experience has a problematic ground, and should always be seen as emerging from a problematic field. Thus, when Deleuze writes that “the condition must be a condition of real experience, not of possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic conditioning” (DR 154/200), this “real experience” should be understood as referring to

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45 It is worth pointing out here that the translator of DR mistranslates on a number of occasions exercice transcendant as “transcendental exercise”, thus omitting the sense in which Deleuze is bending the Kantian notion of “transcendent use” or exercise to his own purposes. Wherever one reads “transcendental exercise” in the English, one should read “transcendent exercise”.


47 In his 1963 article, ‘L’idée de genèse dans l’esthétique de Kant’ (Revue d’Esthétique 16). Deleuze writes “If one considers that Maimon’s Transcendental Philosophy was published in 1790, it must be recognised that Kant, in part, foresaw the objection of his disciples. The first two Critiques invoked facts, searched for the conditions of these facts, and found them in faculties that were already formed. They refer themselves to a genesis that they are incapable of assuring for themselves. But in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant poses the problem of the genesis of the faculties in their primary free accord. He discovers an ultimate foundation, which is lacking in the other Critiques. Critique in general ceases to be a simple conditioning, to become a transcendental Formation, a transcendental Culture, a transcendental Genesis” (121).
experience considered as responding to (and generated from) an ideal set of problems. The second sense of genesis puts into action the first through the notion of transcendent exercise just mentioned. The "common use" of the faculties is taken to be itself teleologically and metacritically grounded in the "final", transcendent use of the faculties. Deleuze's aim is to rethink the sources and relations of the faculties within the composite that is empirical cognition, or experience, by untangling its sources, and "follow[ing] each of the 'lines' beyond the turn in experience". Each faculty can potentially be exercised in the face of perplexity over its proper object; and in this exercise it relates itself freely to the other faculties. Deleuze then gives a new universal sense (reflected also at the metacritical level) to the Kantian notion of an "object = x". The object = x is the problematic entity that traverses each of the faculties in their transcendent exercise.

But a general question remains: if reason is identified with problematicity in general, and if each faculty is capable of apprehending a problematic object, of its own constitutive passion, what happens to reason as a distinctive faculty? Surely there are other aspects of reason that are more important than the problematic form it must have for experience: such as its role as faculty of principles, of syllogisms, of totality and coherence?

But Deleuze's solution involves an analysis of reason that can be reconstructed as follows. I will present it very abstractly, in terms of a formalistic solution of some of the aporiae of the self-critique of reason which we have encountered; the account will be greatly elaborated in later chapters. Firstly, the role or function of reason is indeed to problematise; this is what reason does. But Deleuze's second move is to finally distinguish the nature or structure of reason from the faculty that reasons, the move that Kant never makes. In making this distinction, Deleuze cuts through the paradoxes that arise from the unifying role that reason is given in Kant.

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48 Bergsonism, 28. In Bergson, experience is a composite of perception and recollection, and the philosopher must separate these two elements and follow them in their 'ideal' state beyond experience.

49 A passage of Nietzsche's comes to mind, on "the misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not a system of various passions and desires: as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason" (The Will to Power # 387). This famous passage betrays a circularity that seems relevant here: reason is analysed into a set of passions that are then defined as being guided in turn by reason.
I turn to the question of the faculty of reason first. Deleuze rebaptises this faculty simply as “thought” (cf. DR chapter 3, ‘The Image of Thought’). The transcendent exercise of each of the faculties can indeed be translated into thought, so that their problematic objects can still be referred to as ideas. But this translation happens so that the finality or destination of problems in the faculty of thought is conceived according to the process of genesis:

Between sensibility and imagination, between imagination and memory, between memory and thought ... each disjointed faculty communicates to another the violence which carries it to its own limit (DR 145).

Because of the possibility of this transcendent exercise, thought has no intrinsic connection with “common sense” or “recognition” and so is in itself capable of dealing with the metacritical problematisation of the faculties, or the task of “superior” or “transcendental empiricism”.

But what then of the structure or nature of reason? By converting the faculty of reason into mere “thought”, Deleuze seems to detach it from its traditional connection with ratio: rational thinking, logic, etc. How can reason then have a nature if the faculties of the mind lose their intimate connection with such a nature, if “the supposed affinity between thought and the True” (DR 132/172) turns out to be ungrounded? But it is well to recall that Kant himself had already begun to tread along this path by situating judgment in the understanding, not reason. Moreover, the Kantian turn itself is provoked by the profound problematisation of the relation between logic and reality: the notion of ‘experience’ becomes the very site of this problematic relation. To deal with this issue will take up much of the next chapter. Perhaps a renewed ‘Copernican turn’ is necessary that advances Kant’s realisation in his famous 1772 letter to Herz that the relation of representation to its object is ungrounded – perhaps it is indeed necessary to push Kant’s thought further, and ask what grounds “the supposed affinity between thought and the True”?

The question of the structure of reason can only be posed by returning to Kant’s question of the relative rights of logical and real forms of differentiation. Historically, the first form that this takes for Kant is a renewed investigation into Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. I will argue that Deleuze goes back to the

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50 “Ideas ... [do not] refer to a particular faculty. Ideas occur throughout the faculties and concern them all. According to the place and the existence of a faculty determined as such, they render possible both the differential object and the transcendent exercise of that faculty” (DR 193/249-50)
sources of Kantianism by affirming that the structure or nature of reason is to be conceived again in its Leibnizian role as sufficient reason. Thought must attempt to find “a truly sufficient reason”\(^{51}\). Deleuze’s task is firstly to construct a “transcendental genesis, transcendental culture, transcendental formation”\(^{52}\) - a new critical teleology - through the discovery of a truly sufficient reason that will uncover the internal logic of Ideas in their paradoxically absolute, yet problematic status. Secondly, this account of the internal structure of reason is affirmed as such - and therefore metacritically - in transcendental empiricism. It is this twofold task that comprises, I believe, Deleuze’s answer to the problem of immanence.\(^{53}\)

Deleuze’s finally Leibnizian reading of Kantian Ideas is what stops the account of ‘problems’ from dissolving into a relativism.\(^{54}\) On the contrary, we will see that Deleuze constructs an Absolute to rival Hegel’s. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, Deleuze’s return to Leibniz is also in many ways a repetition of the very genesis of the Kantian problematic.\(^{55}\) I hope to show that Deleuze is very much misunderstood in current debates about the “crisis of reason”. In an interview on the topic of Leibniz, Deleuze remarks how Leibniz (who Deleuze calls the philosopher of the “baroque”) stands at the moment “theological reason breaks down, giving way to human reason pure and simple. The baroque itself already marks a crisis in theological reasoning – a final attempt to reconstruct a

\(^{51}\) Nietzsche and Philosophy 49; cf. DR 57/80, 154/200.

\(^{52}\) “L’idée de génèse dans l’esthétique de Kant”, 121.

\(^{53}\) Deleuze’s synthesis of Leibnizianism with themes developed from Kant’s third Critique may bring out a potential latent in CJ itself, if we are to believe Jean Hyppolite. who calls CJ “a Leibnizianism of immanence”; Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Evanston: Northwestern, 1974). 128.

\(^{54}\) Deleuze rarely comments on the spectre of relativism. One comment from The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque however, is useful: “For Leibniz, for Nietzsche, for William and Henry James, and for Whitehead as well, perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relativism we take for granted. It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject”. p. 20. Such a shift places the clear requirement on Deleuze that he provide ontologically or metacritically valid reasons for ‘getting underneath’ relativism in this way.

\(^{55}\) As we will see, Deleuze’s Leibnizian reading of the status of ideas can helpfully be contrasted formally with the Hegelian transformation of Kant’s rational ideas. Regarding the comparison between Leibniz and Hegel, Jean Hyppolite remarks that “in Hegel there is no method separable from the development. taken in itself. That is, there is no structure of method anterior to the structure of the discourse itself. That is very difficult for the structuralists to conceive of. That is why they have more recourse to Leibniz, who is the real father of their thought”. ‘The Structure of Philosoplic Language according to the Preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’. in R. Mackie & E. Donato eds., The Structuralist Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), 183. I would argue that Deleuze’s recourse to Leibniz precisely overcomes this perceived limitation, and thus moves in Hegel’s direction.
world that's falling apart ... In our attempts to preserve some part of it, or reconstruct it, we’re seeing a neobaroque, which brings us closer, perhaps to Leibniz”.56 My claim is that Deleuze’s “reconstruction of reason”, and his return to Leibniz, goes to the heart of the problem of immanence in philosophical modernity.57

The domains and territories staked out in Kant’s critical project remain surrounded by a deep fog – that of metaphysics itself, past, present, and in its uncertain future. The fantastic figures that coalesce in that fog - a motley distribution comprising transcendental freedom, monads both physical and immaterial, even reason itself - are not mere fantasies, but insistent ghosts bearing persistent questions. A dream or Schwärmerei can never be without significance for the Kant of the critical period, for their sense is always augmented by the fact that Kant at various points believed he could penetrate into and give form to the light emanating beyond the fog, and answer these spectral questions. The pre-critical and critical Kant always remain uneasily bonded.

56 Negotiations, 161-2.
57 My intention in the preceding is to prepare the way for a Deleuzian transformation of Kantian critique. I want to justify Deleuze’s philosophy through showing its power as a reading of Kant’s philosophy. However, the reason for proceeding in this way is in fact because Deleuze himself chooses not to present his project in this manner. Instead, in Kant’s Critical Philosophy Deleuze presents his interpretation of Kant’s philosophy in such a way as not to broach the post-Kantian issues that inform and motivate his own project. Thus, Deleuze holds off from presenting his full transformation of Kantianism until DR, where he presents his theories of transcendental empiricism, transcendent exercise of the faculties, ideas as Problems, etc. As a result of this restraint, Deleuze does not explicitly complete his interpretation of the logic of Kantianism on its own terms. Hence Deleuze ends his book on Kant with an appeal to the notion of the ruse of reason, arguably tying Kant’s whole theory into a vicious circle.
Chapter Two
Teleology, Rationalism and the Genesis of Kantianism

Kant’s philosophy has an intimate relation with teleology throughout all of its phases. But it is interesting that from the perspective of teleology, the Kantian critique seems to lose some of its distinctiveness, and appears very much as a continuation of the preceding philosophical tradition. In the last chapter I suggested that it is precisely by showing Kant’s philosophy in this light that we get the larger perspective on the status and aims of the critical project. In this chapter I shall attempt to recast the prehistory of the critical project. It is necessary to reorient our understanding of Kant’s own project, in order to bring out a certain harmony at work in the trajectory we are following. By suggesting that the latest destination of the problem of immanence lies with Deleuze, I have proposed a general historical movement from Kant to Hegel, and back to a transformation of Kantianism in Deleuze’s work. However, there is a prequel to this movement that needs to be brought out if we are to understand both Deleuze’s approach to philosophical tradition and the general problematic of modern philosophy that he has exposed. That is, we need to take account of the role of Leibniz and Spinoza in the movement. It will transpire that this is not so much a trajectory as an oscillating movement between absolute and finite claims to immanence.

This chapter is divided into two main parts. Firstly, I take a brief look at this issue from a Deleuzian perspective. Secondly, in the main body of the chapter
I present an assessment of the character of Kant's break with Leibniz. I have already argued that Kant's critical project cannot be separated from metacritical issues, which in turn find a vexed outlet in teleological issues. Now I argue that Kant's critical turn must be understood in relation to its transformation of Leibnizian rationalism. This claim will be gradually developed further throughout the thesis. On the one hand, I will show how Kant's ideas about the distinction between logic and reality give rise to a new conception of the 'object', that will form the centre of the new critical philosophy. On the other hand, while this new conception displaces Leibnizian ideas about teleology and harmony from the centre of Kant's philosophy, this displacement creates its own problems, and teleology and harmony return, as Deleuze argues, as the hidden epicentre of the critical turn.

1 Teleology and Modern Philosophy

The first task is to give some sense of why teleology is a decisive issue in the movement of modern philosophy, especially as understood by Deleuze. It is interesting that Deleuze devotes major studies to Hume and Leibniz, the two precursors of Kantian philosophy. His work on these philosophers sits alongside his study of Kant and should be seen as a rearrangement of the constellation that gave rise to the critical turn. For Deleuze, all of these philosophers at some point in their work fundamentally rest their claims on a teleological vision. The standard picture is that Leibniz is thought to be the rationalist who upholds teleology, in the form of the pre-established harmony, while Hume is his skeptical foe, with Kant emerging out of the profound clash between these two outlooks. I have already introduced suggestions as to how Kant rests some of the crucial claims for a self-critique of reason upon teleology. However, the standard picture changes even further if we find in *Hume* as well an importance accorded not just to teleology, but to the very principle of the pre-established harmony. While the latter is not mentioned in the *Treatise*, it does appear at a crucial juncture in the *Enquiry*, and it is this moment that is exploited by Deleuze in his 'teleologisation'
of modern philosophy. It occurs as Hume is engaged in justifying the claim that
the force of custom is sufficient for the "correspondence" of our thoughts and
conceptions with nature. In the absence of a ground for sufficiency internal to the
notion of custom, Hume claims that we find "a kind of pre-established harmony
between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas".2

Now both Hume and Leibniz are sensitive to the problems of justifying the
concept of causality. This is in part due to the conjunction of available theories of
causality in the 18th century: the notion that now strikes us as the most sensible
approach to causality, that finite substances are responsible for the changes they
cause in other substances (then called the theory of physical influx), was at the
time the least popular.3 This was because the only way available to conceive the
idea that a substance with a set of properties caused a change in another substance
was through the explanation that there was a transmission of properties from the
first to the second, which was held to be inconceivable. Therefore, the notions of
occasionalism4 and pre-established harmony became popular among philosophers
as elaborate avoidances of physical influx.5 Both Leibniz and Hume appealed to a
form of noncausal correspondence between substances: the reason for the order
between elements or substances was to be found instead outside the system of
physical changes. In the case of Leibniz, the order or harmony found in the
physical world is a result of God's selection of independent 'programmes' or
series6 that are compatible when realised together. Hume's philosophy can also be
seen to arise from the failure of the physical influx theory: he can find no evidence
from the senses of any 'transmission' of properties, given that all the senses

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2 Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 54-5. The last chapter of Deleuze's *Empiricism and Subjectivity* elaborates on purposiveness in Hume. I will deal in greater depth with these ideas in Chapter 6.2, where it will be shown that the importance Deleuze accords to teleology in Hume is at least in part a result of his reading Kantian concerns about 'affinity' back into Hume.
4 Associated with Malebranche, who argued that, as a result of the impossibility of physical causation between finite substances, God alone could be considered the real cause of the order in the world, of which the particular changes we see are only 'occasions'.
5 The retreat from occasionalism and pre-established harmony back to the rehabilitation of physical influx could not have happened without the Kantian idealisation of the issue, where the physical transmission of properties is no longer considered as important as the merely law governed nature of the change. Arguably, Hume's theories were not enough to make this paradigm shift because of his appeal to the merely psychological nature of connexion.
provide us with are distinct impressions. Given a lack of objective ground for the order found in the world, Hume turns to custom (and the barest hint of a pre-established harmony).  

One of Kant’s most celebrated moves in CPR amounts to the construction of an abstract formalisation of the problem facing notions such as causality in the 18th century: the fourfold distinction of analytic/synthetic and apriori aposteriori. Very roughly, the former couple concern two general types of connection in a judgment, while the latter concerns the modality of such a connection - its necessity or contingency - in relation to experience. Thus, whereas an analytic connection contains its reason solely in the logical explication of the presupposed meaning of a concept, a synthetic connection must involve an extralogical reason. The concept of a causal relation must be synthetic: Leibniz, Kant, and Hume all agree on this, if not in terminology. Furthermore, they agree in principle that the problem about causality concerns connections that should be, if they are to exist at all, apriori. Kant’s notion of the synthetic apriori simply names a problem faced by 18th century philosophy – that of how to account for any possible nonlogical apriori connections. How is one to synthesise apriori two or more elements, whether they be Humean sensations, or Leibnizian perceptions?

Kant’s move, on the basis of his formalisation of the problem, is to search for a positive solution to it. Nevertheless, it has already been suggested that Kant’s solution itself ends up affirming teleology, and thus in effect continuing the lines pursued by Leibniz and Hume, despite having brought the problem to a new explicitness. Now, Kant’s response to the conjuncture of Leibniz and Hume is shadowed by another negative solution by a philosopher working within exactly the same parameters, but who marks an end rather than a beginning to the

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7 Many commentators on Hume find a problem in his account of causality because the account of causality as custom is seen secretly to rely on a naturalistic account of the causality of the psychological connections in the mind that go to make up custom (cf. Barry Stroud. Hume, London: Routledge, 1977, chapters 3–4). From the point of view of the historical controversy about physical influx. Deleuze’s concentration on pre-established harmony in his interpretation of Hume has the merit of both being implicitly faithful to the historical situation and saving Hume from immediate contradiction, by shifting the burden of causality ultimately to purposiveness.

8 The difference between Kant’s formalisation and what is known as Hume’s fork rests on the fact that Kant’s schema is entirely formal and thus prior to the decision as to the legitimacy of any of the combinations, whereas Hume’s disjunction between logical truths and matters of fact results from arguments that rule out any representatives of what Kant will call synthetic apriori truths.

9 I will deal with the Kantian rationale for this distinction in detail later in this chapter.
problem of the synthetic apriori. By bringing in this philosopher we can better frame the extent to which a general structural problem, which is first named explicitly by Kant via the notion of the synthetic apriori, in effect hangs in the background of the historical course of modern philosophy. Nietzsche in effect completes the framework, by attempting to actualise one of its most fundamental possibilities: he takes the pre-established harmony away from the universe, and surrenders synthesis entirely to contingency. A brief look at his liminal position in this framework can cast light on the limits of the framework itself.

On the one hand, Nietzsche fulfils one definition of materialism that Kant put forward in an early essay: the view that the world has no rational laws and is governed by chance. But on the other hand, while his published work appears to revel in skepticism, in truths that are only my truths, in the private notes collected in The Will to Power, Nietzsche is revealed to be continually at work on a philosophical system that will allow him to say what he wants to say consistently. He accepts more of Hume’s skepticism than Kant, but still, like Kant, affirms something of Leibniz’s philosophy, even if it is in the most attenuated form. No matter how far Nietzsche seems to want to go towards a godless, subjectless a-teleological materialistic universe, at the last moment he pulls back and affirms a minimal Leibnizian subject – the subject of will to power. How does this happen?

Nietzsche accepts Humean reservations about causality, but opts to affirm utter contingency, without law, whether causal or externally teleological. He starts at the epistemological level; whereas Hume suggested that the interpretation of order in the world rests on custom (or habit) and ultimately on pre-established harmony, for Nietzsche ‘custom’ itself must be analysed into power relations. These themselves can only be thought teleonomically, for even if the will to power involves the seeking of nothing other than power, and thus seems ‘blind’, Nietzsche nonetheless emphasises that a being endowed with power always seeks its own power. In this way Hume’s two claims about custom and teleology

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10 In Will to Power # 530, Nietzsche lays out the issue of the synthetic apriori with reference to Kant and Hume, but goes on to criticise Kant’s notion of judgment in the following paragraphs.
11 Ak. 1:225; referred to in K. Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind, 27.
12 “All events that result from intention are reducible to the intention to increase power”, Will to Power # 663. But while self-preservation is reduced to the bare notion of “increasing power”. Nietzsche also affirms individuation (or ‘perspectivism’) in will to power, cf. Will to Power # 636. 630. On similar claims in his published writings, cf. the important notion of ‘the pathos of distance’ in The Genealogy of Morals (trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1967). I. 2, and Antichrist (trans. R. Hollingsdale, London: Penguin, 1968) # 2.
appear to be unified. Order is then simply the product of the power of certain ends being affirmed over other ends; any phenomenal harmony in the world is a result of power. However, through the very deepening of the notion of force, Nietzsche ends up violating Hume's own strictures against the notion of force. 13 Nietzsche even frequently entertains the notion that there is a "thinking, feeling, willing in all living beings".14 He affirms some form of self-directed monad, even if this monad has no pre-established programme, but is cast into a universe populated with other chaotic forces.15 If this monad is minimally described in terms of a force, it is vital that this force is in some sense able to feel the "pathos" of "feeling" or being "affected".16 Hence the minimal requirement of teleology is upheld: an internal directedness.

In *Will to Power* # 550, there is a passage that expresses in a nutshell the tension at work in Nietzsche. Nietzsche notes that "Hume was right" about habit but then goes on to gloss this by saying that

that which gives the extraordinary firmness to our belief in causality is not the great habit of seeing one occurrence following another but our inability to interpret events otherwise than as events caused by intentions ... the belief that every event is a deed, that every deed presupposes a doer, it is a belief in the subject.

While Hume does suggest that our confusion about causality may be the result of a need to attribute intentions to events, this is not the main thrust of his argument about custom or habit, but merely shows one manifestation by which habit may dominate our perceptions.17 Nietzsche takes himself to be radicalising Humean skepticism, by showing how the root of custom or habit is a primal belief that one

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13 *Enquiry*, 64-67. Cf. 77n, where Hume describes the "feeling of power" as just that - a mere feeling that is not to be "transfer[ed] ... to the objects"

14 *The Will to Power*, # 658; 499. Although, in # 478 Nietzsche says the opposite, precisely by implicitly invoking Hume: "every successive phenomenon in consciousness is completely atomistic - And we have sought to understand the world through the reverse conception - as if nothing were real and effective but thinking, feeling, willing!". It is tempting to read Nietzsche's "we" as referring to himself; this would support my claim that Nietzsche was in permanent oscillation between Hume and Leibniz. Further support is found in # 664, where the concept of force is explained in Humean terms as a mere habitual conception illegitimately extended.

15 Leibniz of course also characterised monads in terms of forces, or *vis viva*.


is a subject, and that effects in the world should be seen as the result of subjects. But Nietzsche paradoxically uses the primacy of the *illusion* of the subject as a means of reaffirming a Leibnizian account of the subject—in the guise of a *necessary* illusion. This position is intrinsically unstable. For Nietzsche’s *extension* of Hume simultaneously depends on the notion of will to power *and* declares it a necessary illusion. Nietzsche finds himself caught in the same kind of dilemma that faces Kant in his effort to balance the Paralogisms with his claims about the subject. On the one hand, he affirms the illusion involved in the idea of the subject, but on the other hand must affirm the *necessary structure* of that illusion as applying to *all* creatures who *take themselves* to be subjects. Thus apriority—necessity and universality—must be affirmed even in the diagnosis of an illusion about apriority.

A similar problem afflicts the logical structure of Nietzsche’s affirmation of chance. If chance is to be truly affirmed, then it must involve an affirmation of its absolute necessity. This means it must be distributive rather than collective; contingency must be located in each vanishing element of chaos for there can be no collective law of chaos. Nietzsche puts forward an alternative hypothesis that “the [world] has a ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course, but *not* because laws prevail in it but because laws are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequences every moment.” But Nietzsche knows that he cannot fully affirm this hypothesis as true, because of the problems with the notion of will to power just mentioned, so he accepts that “this is only an interpretation ... so much the better”.

Nietzsche’s embrace of interpretation occurs as a result of his inability to solve the issues of metacritique in which he entangled himself. Either

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18 On chance and necessity in Nietzsche, see *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 24-34.
19 *Beyond Good and Evil* (trans. R. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1973) # 22; cf. *Will to Power* # 634. This hypothesis should be related to some other non-Humean reasons Nietzsche gives for denying causality. In *The Gay Science* (trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1974) # 112, he claims that the notion of causality involves the selection of events out of a continuum, which are then simply redescribed. But “in every chemical process, for example, quality appears as a ‘miracle’, as ever; also every locomotion; nobody has ‘explained’ a push”. The argument from quality is borrowed from Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* (trans. E. Payne. New York: Dover, 1969) vol. 1, 97: “the inner nature of forces that thus appear was always bound to be left unexplained by etiology, which had to stop at the phenomenon and its arrangement, since the law followed by etiology does not go beyond this”. Cf. also *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (trans. E. Payne, La Salle: Open Court, 1974). 118f.
20 It is sometimes argued that the fact that Nietzsche presents his philosophy as just another interpretation, does not entail that he views his interpretation as equal in value to others. But one
Nietzsche’s philosophy remains in unstable flux between his published and unpublished utterances as a result of his inadequate treatment of metacritical issues, or one must grasp the nettle and suggest that Nietzsche was indeed attempting to work out a consistent philosophy in his notebooks, and that this attempt remained unfinished. The latter is in effect Deleuze’s strategy.

Deleuze presents Nietzsche, like Kant, as torn between Hume and Leibniz. Nietzsche’s philosophy is still beholden to the Kantian question, “how are synthetic apriori claims possible?”, because it attempts to find an extralogical reason – the will to power - for upholding a virulent skepticism. This is what keeps him within the limits of the structural problematic we have been discussing; but, as I have claimed, his position is the negative of Kant. Deleuze attempts to reconstruct Nietzsche’s philosophy through placing it in relation to Kant and the post-Kantians. Although he follows Nietzsche in claiming to abandon external teleology and the ultimate coherence of the world, Deleuze is consciously working through some of the difficulties mentioned above concerning the very possibility of affirming a-teleological materialism.

Firstly, as I have suggested, Deleuze explicitly (unlike Nietzsche) accepts the necessity for teleology in some form in order to deal with the space opened by the problem of the synthetic apriori. Where he thinks Nietzsche improves upon the three thinkers who went before him is in his expansion of the self-critique of reason to include the question of the value of knowledge and morality as ends. The “transcendental culture” that can be found in Kant is deepened in Nietzsche to problematise for all beings and cultures the question of their ends or values: “culture means training or selection”.

Secondly, Deleuze is much more sensitive to the problems of knowledge and subjectivity than Nietzsche, who is often happy to violate the genetic fallacy

cannot appeal to external criteria for metacritical justification – such as coherence, agreement with empirical evidence, completeness, etc. – without appealing to values that Nietzsche’s notion of will to power aims to undermine.

21 In fact, it sometimes appears that Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche has more in common with Solomon Maimon’s Kantian theory of differentials than Nietzsche’s own statements on will to power (cf. 51-2, and note 12). Despite Deleuze’s reputation, Nietzsche and Philosophy is about as profoundly un-‘postmodernist’ as it is possible for a reading of Nietzsche to be.

22 Nietzsche and Philosophy 133. Although I will not deal with this aspect here, it can generally be placed in relation to Deleuze’s ultimate strategy of analysing ends into ‘problems’ / ‘Ideas. Deleuze presents Nietzsche’s philosophy of culture at Nietzsche and Philosophy 133-41. Again, as in Kant, the question of the self-critique of reason is given a historical formulation, so that there are three stages of culture, the pre-historic, the historic and post-historic.
on the question of knowledge. It is important to notice that the paradoxes of truth that necessarily accompany Nietzsche’s radical affirmation of the truth of monadic anarchy are absent from Deleuze’s discussion. The problem of self-reflexivity in Nietzsche does not especially exercise Deleuze, because he is already rather Kantian on the questions of truth, reason and the subject, and because, I claim, he orients himself in relation to the post-Kantian treatment of metacríte.

Thus for Deleuze, the problematic of the synthetic apriori necessitates something more than Nietzsche’s attempt to affirm the necessity of a synthesis of absolute contingency. This ‘something more’ will be the attempt to return to the sources of the problematic of the synthetic apriori in order adequately to solve it on immanent grounds which are nevertheless consistently metacritical. This entails for Deleuze the acceptance of certain traditional metaphysical and epistemological claims that Nietzsche thought he could do away with. Hence Deleuze’s return to the forcefield of Kant, Leibniz and Hume, and his attempt to show how all three of them shed light on each other. Thus, Deleuze claims that even for Hume, knowledge involves some form of what he calls ‘transcendence’. “What is the fact of knowledge? It is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my judgment goes beyond the idea. In other words, I am a subject”.

An act of judgment is never a mere (a posteriori) synthesis between two particulars; the very act of being able to identify the particulars implies that one affirms more than one has before one. Deleuze assumes that this fact holds for Hume, Leibniz, and Kant, but the way they venture beyond the fact, the question quid juris, will be differently answered by all, each appealing in their own way to some form of teleology. Nietzsche serves as a focus for Deleuze’s attempt really because he “problematises” the very question of the whither? of teleology.

However, what is particularly striking about Deleuze’s attempt to render consistent the tension in Nietzsche’s philosophy between the two influences

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24 Deleuze is often confused with Foucault on the question of the subject. Foucault claims that the problem of escaping the subject was paramount in his generation. However, Deleuze never says this, and instead I will take him to be rethinking the subject according to the logic of immanence. What Deleuze is against is the recourse to consciousness in defining subjectivity. So if one is to
(Hume and Leibniz) upon the Kantian turn, is what Deleuze actually takes from Kant’s philosophy. In eschewing apperception, the categories and the *apriori* intuitions, Deleuze would seem to be left with nothing of Kantianism but its *problem*. Nevertheless, Deleuze describes the synthesis of the forces of will to power in Kantian terms as “the principle of the synthesis of difference”, which is temporalised in the eternal return as the “synthesis of time and its dimensions”.\(^{25}\)

Moreover, despite claiming that Nietzsche’s philosophy is a radicalisation of Kant, a “total critique” as opposed to Kant’s partial one,\(^{26}\) Deleuze insists upon claiming that the latter synthesis “fulfill[s] the requirements of a truly sufficient reason”.\(^{27}\) The very bizarre thing, unremarked upon by Deleuze, is that the radicalisation of Kant undertaken by Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, is in many ways a return to the first moments of Kant’s turn away from Leibniz. Nothing is so close to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche as Kant’s ‘pre-critical’ work, the *Nova Dilucidatio* (*New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*) from 1755! In that work, as we will see, Kant faces the problem of how, given that the mere monadic nature of substances is not enough to explain *change*, there must be “some third thing” (a persistent Kantian phrase) that explains the synthesis of real (changing) substances that occurs in relations of force. This ‘third’ signifies that the problem of synthesis *apriori* must have a triangular structure if the account of synthesis is to avoid falling into contingency or determinism. Therefore, Kant opts, not for a pre-established harmony, but what he will call in the *Inaugural Dissertation* a “generally established harmony” that is expressed in the “principles of succession and coexistence”. There are no categories, no apperception, no pure intuitions at this point in Kant’s career; however, as we will see, this does not mean (as is sometimes thought), that Kant is merely a Leibnizian at this stage. Indeed, Kant too is searching in this period for a “truly sufficient reason”. We will see that Kant’s “generally established harmony” develops ontotheological issues in Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony that will deepen and displace the notion of teleology.

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\(^{25}\) *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 46-9. In DR Deleuze goes on to explicitly redescribe this process in terms of ‘schematism’: see chapter 4 below.

\(^{26}\) *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: 90ff.

\(^{27}\) *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: 49.
To conclude: all of Deleuze’s works up to *Difference and Repetition* affirm purposiveness as the final tribunal for the coherence of a system. I suggest that this rests on an implicit diagnosis of the deep structural problem named by the synthetic *apriori* that runs through modern philosophy. However, in Deleuze’s major work he finally appears to lift away the structure of purposiveness. All we have is a complex, immanent structure of differences ‘repeating’ themselves in various *apriori* forms of synthesis. Nevertheless, “a secret subject, the real subject of repetition” must be found (DR 23). Furthermore, time itself is read in terms of the notion of repetition, which allows us to think “the final end of time” (DR 94).28 We will be able to chart Deleuze’s complex attitude towards teleology as we survey certain ontotheological and teleological moves made by Leibniz, Spinoza and the early Kant. Deleuze can be seen as actualising a hidden potential concealed in the meeting ground of these rationalist philosophies.

2 The Rationalist Background: Leibniz and Spinoza on God and Reality

The very title of Kant’s *Physical Monadology* suggests a tension that will reverberate through Kant’s attempts to build a new philosophy. Kant’s attempt to physicalise Leibniz’s immaterial monads arises out of dissatisfaction with what was seen amongst scientifically oriented Wolffians as an unacceptable conclusion of Leibniz’s rationalism: that substances could not interact. Kant breaks from Leibniz in three important ways.

Firstly, we have seen that the conjunction of theories of causality in the 18th century can be seen as a fundamental condition for Kant’s theory of the synthetic *apriori*. In his (so-called) pre-critical writings, Kant attempts to find a reconciliation between the theory of physical influx and harmony theory. As we will see, he rejects the notion that there must be a transmission of properties in causality, but states that substances can interact as *forces* under general principles of succession and coexistence that find their final ground in God.

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28 The abiding feature that Deleuze takes from Nietzsche turns out to be the notion of eternal return. It is this latter “end of all things” or end of time that orders all of the lesser ends that became *problematic* in Kant. Far from embracing a relativisation of ends, the eternal return for Deleuze is precisely the notion that allows the subject to *say the sense of*, or to *express* Being.
Secondly, Kant’s moves concerning change in the physical world imply a renovation of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. Kant’s insistence, right from his earliest philosophical writings, that the principle of sufficient reason was a fundamentally different kind of principle to the logical principle of identity, and involves a fundamentally different form of differentiation, is in my opinion one of the main motors of what will become the critical philosophy. In this respect, I think that it is misleading to insist on bracketing off Kant’s early writings as pre-critical. I would argue that in fact Kant’s critical philosophy cannot be fully understood without bearing in mind his early work on the principle of sufficient reason.29

Thirdly, Kant’s investigation into the nature and limits of the principle of sufficient reason as an extralogical ‘real’ principle in Leibnizian philosophy intersects with and is crucially constrained by ontotheological issues. I will suggest that Kant’s work on sufficient reason is mediated through his important development of a Leibnizian modal version of the ontological proof for the existence of God, which retains a problematic presence throughout Kant’s works. However, to understand the value of Kant’s argument it will be necessary first to explore some difficulties in the rationalist ontotheological background. I will demonstrate shortly that Leibniz’s version of the modal proof was first developed itself. For Deleuze, as for Hegel, immanence finds its temporal expression only in a form of eternity.

29 There is evidence that Kant himself did not see the break of 1781 as absolute. Firstly, many Reflexionen from the period leading up to the publication of the Critique show Kant to be thoroughly engaged with problems of rationalist metaphysics: some of these will be discussed later on. Moreover, as well as his discussions of metaphysics in his lectures, some of his letters from the first ‘critical’ years show that he understood his work as continuous with his previous writings. When Kant reported to Marcus Herz on May 1, 1781 that he had now finished the Critique, he said that “this book contains the result of all the varied investigations, which start from the concepts we debated together under the heading ‘the sensible and intelligible world’”, a reference to the full title of the Inaugural Dissertation, ‘Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World’ (C 179. Ak. 10:266). On August 26, 1783, responding to Johann Schultz’s questions about the Critique, Kant directed him back to the Inaugural Dissertation where he says Schultz “may find a clearer prospect here where I have only been able to make out something hovering vaguely before me, obscured by fog, as it were” (C 208. Ak. 10:352). Of course the very notion that one may perceive something more clearly when it is in itself more obscure (less distinct) is itself thoroughly Leibnizian. Even in 1797 in a letter to Tieftrunk, Kant affirms the place of the Inaugural Dissertation in his corpus, although he tries to discourage his correspondent from initiating the republication of anything earlier than that (C 528; Ak. 12:208). Cf. also Kant’s letter to Johann Bernouilli of November 16, 1781, where he repeats the idea, made eleven years before in his famous letter to Herz, that the single issue that propelled him away from the ideas of the Dissertation was “the problem of the source of the intellectual elements in our cognition” (C 186, Ak. 10:278). That this problem is crucial for the critical philosophy in general is not in doubt, as I will reinforce over this chapter and the next. It should, however, be localised in the shifting context of Kant’s views.
in close collaboration with Spinoza, and Leibniz’s retraction of crucial Spinozist elements continues to play a role in Kant’s treatment. As well as wishing to present historical suggestions about the importance of this ontotheological argument, I will attempt to present the structure at work behind this argument for the existence of God in a strong form, in order to provide a distinctive philosophical contrast to Kant’s later critical developments. It will become clear that there is another dimension to this treatment, as Deleuze returns to this modal proof in Leibniz and Spinoza, in order to pursue “the positing of Being identical to difference”\(^{30}\) Hence the assessment of its validity in general, and in particular in relation to Kant’s later writings, promises to provide an interesting viewpoint on the relation of metaphysics and critique that extends into the present day. I will claim that Deleuze returns to this proof for good reasons and that Kant’s reasons for turning away from it are flawed. Deleuze’s own synthesis of Leibniz and Kant revolves around the redevelopment of this suppressed ontotheological dimension in Kant.

\[\text{i The Limits of Logic in Leibniz}\]

Leibniz was led to the notion of pre-established harmony by a cluster of motives. Firstly, the paradox of the interaction of bodies and minds had been a particularly vexed issue since Descartes’s wranglings with the pineal gland. However, given the problems with the notion of physical influx, mind-body interaction can be seen as part of a more general problem of substance-substance interaction.\(^{31}\) For Leibniz, the problem was exacerbated by the notion that physical interaction would seem to be impossible between two bodies due to their actually infinite divisibility.

Due to these problems with physical interaction, Leibniz, unlike Descartes, could not move from the apriority of mathematics, logic and geometry to their physical instantiation in mechanistic principles. How then could he set about applying these *apriori* truths to the actual world? With Leibniz a problem that was to haunt Kant assumes its elemental form: what is the relation between

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\(^{30}\) Deleuze. Review of Hyppolite. 195.

logic and nonlogic, between logic and reality? What is the precise way to draw the limitations of logic? As we will see later, what ‘logic’ denotes can more generally be said to be anything that is *apriori* available to the mind, and implies no decisions about what there really is.32 This problem occupies the early Kant and even persists through CPR; Leibniz’s attempt to draw the distinction will be determining for Kant.

For Leibniz, there is one principle that is fundamental for rational thought in general: the principle of identity, or noncontradiction. Through logical *analysis* we can discover the truth about some concept by simply following the law of contradiction. The principle has significance for metaphysics: all entities and their relations, both ideal and real, have to be *possible*, that is, not self-contradictory; even God himself is subject to this rule. Leibniz is not prepared to allot this principle a merely formal validity, as Kant was to do. Nevertheless, Leibniz recognises that most analytic truths have to be merely conditional truths, dependent on the validity of the definitions involved. We operate with merely *nominal definitions* of things, while only hoping to generate *real definitions*. A real definition must *demonstrate* the possibility of something.33

There are indeed certain truths that are true by definition and are not merely conditionally true. Firstly, there are logical axioms that derive from the principle of noncontradiction. But are there other kinds of truths that are nonlogical but metaphysical or *real*, yet which are nonetheless self-evident? Leibniz is strict in ruling out as self-evident certain notions that have been taken as such by previous philosophers; for instance, he denies the self-evidence of Descartes’ *cogito*.34

Leibniz saw that ‘real’ or physical truths were different in kind to logical truths: “in order to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, another

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32 At length, I will argue that this distinction is more fundamental for Kant than the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. I suggest in chapter 4 that the shift to the latter distinction happens almost imperceptibly with Fichte. But it will be worth holding onto the former distinction for reasons that will become clear.

33 ‘Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis’. *Philosophical Writings* (ed. G.H.R. Parkinson. London: Everyman, 1973). 12f. To avoid confusion it should be noted that real definitions, although they *demonstrate* the possibility of something, do not have any direct relation with ‘real’ – that is, physical or material – truths in the sense I will be using the term. In the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz divides real definitions into two kinds: one is causal and describes a method for generating the thing, while the other involves finding the primitive notions in a thing through analysis; cf. Ariew & Garber. 56-7.
principle is required ... I mean the principle of sufficient reason".35 Truths which have no purely internal necessity and thus involve some degree of contingency, nevertheless require a sufficient reason for their existence and nature. Now although for Leibniz the principle of sufficient reason is formally equivalent to the law of ground and consequent, the notion of ‘sufficiency’ is by no means identical with causal grounds. Given the problems mentioned concerning causality, Leibniz could not simply claim that the principle of sufficient reason causally instantiates logical relations in the actual world. To do so would be to equate ratio with causa in a way that would beg the question. As we will see, the principle of sufficient reason will in turn be grounded through another principle, which is expressed through the notion of pre-established harmony: the principle of the best. The distribution of substances in the world will be based on their possible compatibility with each other; everything will have its reason because we live in the best of all possible worlds. Hence the apparent interaction of substances is rather their mutual harmonic functioning.

However, this notion of ‘reality’, although crucial to understanding how the move is made out of mere analysis,36 is in certain aspects opaque. Leibniz had insisted on keeping the principles of identity and sufficient reason separate; ‘all analytic propositions are true’ did not entail that ‘all true propositions are analytic’ because most true propositions are contingent and concern ‘reality’. But he cannot simply appeal to some brute fact or apprehension of physical reality and derive its principle from there. Surely Leibniz, who (as Kant said) ‘intellectualised appearances’, can appeal less than any other philosopher to a pre-given distinction between logic and reality. Even if Kant was wrong about this ‘intellectualisation’ in Leibniz, surely the latter still needs some internal, metaphysical account of the relation of logical and real truths?

34 For a discussion of this Leibnizian (and ultimately Deleuzian) attitude to the cogito, see chapter 5 below.
35 2nd letter to Clarke. Ariew & Garber. 321.
36 When Leibniz opposes synthesis to analysis, he merely differentiates them by their order (progressive and regressive reasoning; cf. ‘Universal Synthesis and Analysis’, 16). However he does allow that “it is better to produce a synthesis, since that work is of permanent value”. But if synthesis were merely the inverse of analysis there would be no more permanence in the one than in the other. Clearly Leibniz does want to associate synthesis with real definition, but the latter only concerns logical possibility. Again, Kant’s problem will be to tease out in precisely which way synthesis and ‘reality’ are related.
Now, there is one metaphysical truth that is necessary and for which it is possible to provide a real definition, but which must also be real, and that is the existence of God. The status of this truth in relation to the principle of sufficient reason is crucially important, but quite problematic. For, on the one hand, Leibniz claims that the ontological proof for existence of God grounds the principle of sufficient reason, but, on the other hand, certain aspects of his arguments for God’s existence depend in turn on that principle.\footnote{His cosmological and teleological proofs certainly depend on it: cf. \textit{Monadology} # 32-9, Ariew & Garber. 217-18; the question is whether the ontological proof also does.}

So it will be necessary to isolate the kernel of the ontological argument in order to evaluate the validity of the principle of sufficient reason. It will turn out that Leibniz’s turn to an ontological and teleological view of sufficient reason can be seen as a result of his turning away at a crucial moment from Spinoza’s ontological proof. This topic will prove to be key in the parallel evaluation of Kant’s move away from Leibniz.

\[ \text{ii \quad God, Perfection and Reality in Leibniz} \]

The ontological argument is usually presented as follows: 1. God is by definition an absolutely perfect being. 2. Existence is a perfection. 3. Therefore, God exists. In Leibniz, some of these terms gain quite specific definitions, in particular the two key terms, perfection and existence. Now, while the concept of perfection is often taken as a merely archaic element in the ontological proof, the use of the concept of existence is usually seen to be the important element at work in the proof, on which hangs its success or failure. However, a closer examination of Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s actual proofs shows that the reverse of this picture holds.

In the \textit{Monadology} the notion of \textit{perfection} is defined by Leibniz as “nothing but the quantity of positive reality taken strictly, when we put aside the limits or bounds in the things which are limited”,\footnote{\textit{Monadology} # 41.} while in 1677 he states that \textit{“perfection is degree or quantity of reality or essence”}.\footnote{Letter to Arnold Eckard, Summer 1677. (in \textit{Philosophical Papers and Letters}, ed. L. Loemker, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 1969. 177. Cf: “By a perfection I mean every simple quality which is}
also affirmed by Spinoza, who says “by reality and perfection I understand the same thing” (E2D6). Thus, the first premise of the ontological argument for Leibniz concerns a being that is comprised, as absolute, of all unlimited reality. It is not yet stated how reality is to be internally conceived, for instance, whether it is plural or monistic: it could well be plural, as all that is required is that the realities in question would not in any way limit each other.

One of Kant’s first innovations is his argument against the ontological proof; his criticism first appears in 1763 in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration for the Existence of God and remains in essence unchanged in its later formulation in CPR (TP 117f., Ak. 2:72, CPR A600/B628f.). Kant argues that the ontological proof fails because existence is not a perfection, that is a real predicate. Now, it should be noted straightaway that in the argument above, perfection is not simply equivalent with ‘real predicate’; the reality concerned is ontologically quite specific, being unlimited. However, his criticism remains relevant as it concerns the special status of existence itself. The concept of existence remains external to any definition of a thing, whether unlimited or limited, as that thing remains the same in definition (or in its predicates) whether existence is attributed to it or not. For Kant concepts merely concern possible things; a concept tells us nothing of its instantiation. Concepts are collective unities of predicates which are only contingently related to things (TP 118, Ak. 2:72-3). From the fact that the concept of something tells nothing of its existence, Kant infers that existence is not a predicate like any other. The ‘is’ of predication should be separated from the ‘is’ of existence, which Kant calls ‘positing’.

However, if we turn to a text of Leibniz’s from c. 1677, we find that he is already fully aware of such a potential objection to predicating existence of God: “if existence were anything other than what is demanded by essence (essentiae exigentia), it would follow that it itself would have a certain essence, or would

positive and absolute or which expresses whatever it expresses without any limits”. ‘That a Most Perfect Being Exists’, Loemker, 167.

40 In The Only Possible Argument, Kant suggests that a real definition can be found in the case of the eponymous argument (cf. TP 126; Ak. 2:81, TP 135, Ak. 2:91). But in CPR Kant suggests that real definitions are impossible, because they must depend on merely nominal, conditionally analytic definitions of the intension of a concept (cf. A727f./755f.). We will return to Kant’s proof for the existence of God later in this chapter.
add something new to things". So what is the true nature of Leibniz's argument concerning existence?

In the text in question, his argument does not look promising. He claims that "unless in the very nature of essence there were some inclination to exist, nothing would exist", and more oddly, that "everything possible demands that it should exist" (ibid). However, there is something deeper going on in the text, which is suggested by the introduction of the concept of possibility in the second proposition. But it should first be noted that Leibniz at least eludes for the moment Kant's claim that the ontological argument treats existence as simply another perfection to be added to the other perfections in God. Rather, the notion that existence is a perfection seems to mean here that existence is included in the concept of perfection itself. If "perfection is ... quantity of essence", existence is "essentiae exigentia", a demand of the essence. Thus the focus of the argument shifts back to the notion of perfection, and Kant's choice to interpret perfections as 'real predicates' now becomes relevant.

Now, the first premise essentially names God as the collection of all unlimited, positive realities. Whatever is the sum of all perfections is to be called God. But now Leibniz is claiming that realities or essences, of their nature, incline, or tend towards, existence. This is peculiar as it seems almost to state that existence is equivalent to essence, that essence essentially exists. But what can this 'almost' be? To answer this we have to turn to an argument that Leibniz thought was essential to the success of the ontological argument. Famously, Leibniz declares that the ontological argument is not fallacious, but it is an incomplete demonstration which assumes something which should also be proved in order to render the argument mathematically evident. The point is that it is tacitly assumed that this idea of a wholly great or wholly perfect being is possible and does not imply a contradiction. Even that remark enables us to prove something, namely that If God is possible he exists - a privilege which only the Divinity possesses.

How does Leibniz prove the possibility of the concept of God? The answer is surprising, for it shows that this proof, which is usually presented as if it were a...

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preliminary argument to the ontological proof, is actually part of it. Leibniz's main argument turns out to be an extension of the first premise of the ontological proof, and concerns the explication of the notion of unlimited quantities of reality. He argues: if a perfection is a simple, positive property, then any plurality of perfections are compatible amongst themselves, as they involve no negation. As they coexist perfectly consistently with each other, the notion of absolute perfection is therefore possible.

Now, this argument is usually referred to as the 'modal proof', but what exactly is the role of modality here? Does modality simply refer to the fact that the proof shows the logical possibility of God, or to the fact that some form of modality – of possibility or necessity is intrinsic to the proof itself? We have seen that Leibniz suggests that "everything possible demands that it should exist", but in the argument as presented there is as yet no use of the notion of possibility. The set of unlimited, perfect realities are simply presented as compatible because of their internal unlimitedness. Leibniz does not yet refer to 'all possible perfections', nor does the notion that the perfections are compatible yet refer to possibility.

In fact, the issue of modality at this point in Leibniz's argument is very thorny, and its solution involves locating the precise point of encounter between Leibniz and Spinoza. This encounter can even be historically located, to the day. For on his visit to the Hague in 1676, Leibniz presented Spinoza with a version of his 'modal proof' for God, which on the following day, he altered in crucial respects by explicitly bringing out its modal character. What must have happened on that fateful night, after his conversation with Spinoza? I will speculate that although initially Leibniz presented Spinoza with a proof that was completely in line with the latter’s thinking, and perhaps even improved upon it, Leibniz’s reservations on the following day mark a crucial moment in the history of rationalism, which will have repercussions on the genesis of Kantianism. But first

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45 'That a Most Perfect Being Exists', Loemker, 167.
46 Leibniz remarks that "I showed this reasoning to Mr. Spinoza when I was in the Hague. He thought it sound for when he contradicted it at first, I put it in writing and gave him the paper". Loemker, 168.
we should present Spinoza’s ontological proof, in order to see why Leibniz may have retreated from it.

iii God, Perfection and Reality in Spinoza

The first few propositions of the *Ethics* involve nominal definitions of substance and attribute (D3 and D4), and they are largely accepted from tradition, although substance is given a particularly stringent definition. These first propositions aim to demonstrate that substances having different attributes must have nothing in common with each other, because a substance by definition is conceived through itself. Now, an attribute is our way of distinguishing a substance from another.

Each substance must be conceived as having a primary attribute, without which it would simply be another substance, or nothing at all. Each attribute allows us to perceive its substance according to its particular essence. 47 If an attribute is “conceived through itself and in itself”, then it is not referred to anything else – it is “infinite in its own kind”.48

When we differentiate things, when we make a distinction between things, the distinction must either be based upon an attribute or a mode of the substance. But a substantial distinction, a distinction that concerns substances themselves, cannot be modal, because then we would be distinguishing a substance by its modes, and substance is prior in nature to its modes (ElP1). Therefore it must be distinguished by attributes. Spinoza concludes that there cannot be two substances sharing the same nature. It follows that no substance can produce another, because a cause must share something in common with its effect, and no two substances share the same attribute.49

47 Thus we perceive extended things through the attribute of Extension. These extended things are modes or affections of that substance; they are dependent on the attribute for their form. Thus particular thoughts too are modes of the substance conceived under the attribute of Thought.

48 If we think at this stage in a Cartesian manner, as we are partly being invited to do, then we can think of thought and extension as two substances which have nothing in common with each other. They therefore are not conceived as limiting one another, because extension can only be limited by extension, and thought only by thought. But the specificity of the attributes is not essential for the purpose of Spinoza’s argument in Part One of the *Ethics*.

49 Given the title of this chapter, ‘Concerning God’, it seems at first bewildering why Spinoza should make these hair-splitting constructions the subject of his first six propositions. But important work has been done here, without which the eleventh proposition, that “God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists” would not have its peculiar Spinozist force. So what has happened here? Firstly, Spinoza has ruled out the notion of an eminent God, or a God that contains its substances only eminently. Each substance must have nothing in common with any other substance. There
The product of these initial arguments is the bare notion of a plurality of substances of one attribute each, each of which has nothing to do with the other. What it is essential to see is that it would be incoherent to introduce a unifying substance ‘behind’ all of these attributes. Each attribute remains just that – a distributive ‘each’, and it is impossible to attribute sense to a collective totality – an ‘all’ - of attributes at this point. Spinoza will argue shortly that there are infinite attributes, ie. an absolute infinity comprising infinite attributes each infinite in its kind. But for the moment we have a pure disparity of attributes. As Deleuze points out at length, the product of these arguments is the construction of a rigorous use of the real distinction in metaphysics at the exclusion of the numerical distinction. A numerical distinction between attributes would be modal, or finite – it would presuppose a division between substances that share something in common. And what would be in common would presumably be some kind of eminent substance. Hence the notion of substance can only properly be articulated through pure real distinction.  

I give now the second step of Spinoza’s proof according to the interpretation given by Deleuze, which is closely related to those of Edwin Curley and Martial Guéroult. As we have seen, the first step of the real definition of can be no God that unifies its attributes or substances through a principle which lies beyond the properties of those attributes. Since an attribute is the primary characteristic of a substance, this would be an essentially irrational position. Descartes’ conception of substance in the Principles of Philosophy is one target amongst others here: he maintained that God was an uncreated substance responsible for producing what he called ‘created substances’, ie. human souls and the physical world they inhabit (Principles of Philosophy, 1.51-52). Spinoza ridicules the notion of created substance (EIP8S2). For Spinoza theology is the scientia dei, the knowledge of God, and should remain science, and it pays neither God nor us any respect to attribute to God unknowable or even irrational qualities, such as the power to create other substances, or free will, which Spinoza dismisses as a fiction.  

Again, Spinoza’s target here is Descartes, who conceived of real distinction as involving numerical distinction. Thus there were a plurality of substances sharing the same attribute – souls – which were yet conceived as really distinct – ie they were classed as substances. But for Spinoza this is to make nonsense of a good concept.  

I here give what I think is the strongest interpretation of Spinoza’s proof, which originates in Martial Guéroult’s close reading of Spinoza’s arguments about substance in Spinoza, Vol. 1: Dieu: Ethique I (Paris: Aubier, 1968). Deleuze wrote a long review of this work when it appeared, (‘Spinoza et la méthode générale de M. Guéroult’. Revue de Metaphysique et Morale 74.4. 1969), and although his own Spinoza and the Problem of Expression appeared in the same year, it is probable that Deleuze had benefitted from Guéroult’s teaching. Guéroult’s and Deleuze’s accounts of substance provide a quantum leap forward from more traditional accounts which read substance as a logical subject. However, another similar version of the proof should also be mentioned. Pierre Macherey argues for a proof based on a genetic or real definition in the causal sense. which is held to express God’s efficient cause (see footnote 33 above). God, if he is causa sui, is conceived as having an internal cause. And as we have seen, God has been genetically determined as a being consisting of an infinity of attributes. of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence (D6). This causal proof has the advantage of helping us to reconceive the status of
God involves the construction of a plurality of substances with one attribute each.
If a numerical distinction can never be real, so, says Deleuze, can a real
distinction never be numerical. The attributes are conceived through themselves.
as infinitely self-determined. If each attribute is unlimited (or infinite) then it is
really distinct; it expresses its own affirmative essence, it is not in a negative
relation with anything other. But we said that this implied that it cannot be
produced. But this, for Spinoza, is enough to prove its existence, as he states in an
argument that uses the concept of perfection in an identical manner to Leibniz:

Whatever perfection substance has is not owed to any external cause. So its
existence must follow from its nature alone; hence existence is nothing but its
essence. Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on
the contrary asserts it. (EIP11).

Elsewhere Spinoza states that “when the definition [of an uncreated being] has
been given, there must be no room for the question ‘Does it exist?’”52 The thought
of the nonexistence, or negation, of these perfections is secondary to their
internally necessary existence, as negation must involve limitation. Negating is
ontologically dependent on positing.53 An Hegelian objection to this can arise, to
the effect that positing too is not possible without negation, as the positing of
something as something entails its negative relation to other things, for it would
not be possible to identify it without such a relation. But the thought of really
distinct attributes is consistent without yet requiring any identification of what
they are;54 and if this is so, then the positivity of the attributes, as infinite in their
own kind, can, and indeed must be thought without negation.55

the relation of substance to attribute and mode not as a property relation but causal. But one
wonders whether the status of the attributes as really distinct is compromised by attributing them
the status of collective cause. This model does give us an immediate genesis of God, but at the
price of stretching the notion of cause. The notion of causa sui, even if conceived as immanent,
reintroduces eminence in that God, as infinity of attributes, is somehow caused by himself. See
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 77, and compare Spinoza’s Epistle 60, and
the alternative demonstration to EIP11.
53 In Bergsonism, Deleuze refers to Bergson’s argument that although it would appear that the
thought of the nothingness of the world has priority over its existence, in that nothingness must
have come before existence, this is a kind of ‘transcendental illusion’, as the thought of
nothingness requires ‘more’ than the thought of being; it requires positing, plus the negation of
that positing: Bergsonism, 46-7. Deleuze does not make clear whether he thinks this argument is
adequate against Hegel.
54 The demonstration of God in Spinoza does not in fact rely on any identification of what the
attributes are.
55 Fuller evaluation of the comparison of non-negative difference with dialectical difference must
be left until chapters 4 & 6.
Now, as Curley puts it, “if each attribute exists in this way, then its existence is necessary. But if the existence of each of the attributes is necessary, then it is not possible that one of them should exist without the others”. The very independence of the attributes implies that each of the others exists. However, there is a further twist in this explanation of Spinoza’s proof, which is particularly evident in Deleuze’s reading. For in seeking to characterise the coexistence of the attributes, Deleuze in fact presents Leibniz’s version of the proof, silently implying that Leibniz has presented a stronger version of the Spinozist proof:

it is [the] very disparity [of the attributes] that assures their compatibility (the impossibility of their contradiction) ... In the attributes we reach prime and substantial elements, irreducible notions of unique substance. There appears the idea of a logical constitution of substance, a “composition” in which there is nothing physical. The irreducibility of the attributes not only proves, but constitutes the nonimpossibility of God as unique substance with all attributes.~

Hence, the real distinction of attributes cannot be conceived as being a plurality of attributes belonging to one substance, in the sense that an eminent substance would have these attributes. It is rather that the real distinction of attributes, as infinite in kind, are affirmed as such of the same substance, which is now taken as absolutely infinite. The attributes are univocally affirmed — each attribute has the same status; it is not secondary to a higher genus, and it is their univocal affirmation which constitutes their status as substance. We are now a long way

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57 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 78-9.
58 Up until this point Spinoza has been working with substances of one attribute — each substance has been distinguished by its primary attribute, in default of it being distinguished by anything else. But the supposition that a substance is only distinct through its attributes bears with it an interesting ambiguity — for it means that the attributes must also have the character of substance, that is, they must be “conceived through themselves”. So now Spinoza appears to make a purely conceptual distinction between substance and the attributes (attributes after all must be attributes of something). By appealing to this conceptual distinction, Spinoza claims that there is in fact only one substance containing these very attributes. And if this is to be conceived as a substance, then it must be unlimited, i.e. infinite. So therefore, the attributes which are infinite in their own kind must be folded up in an absolute infinity of a single substance, which is now given the name God. This move can be perhaps made more comprehensible by referring to our awareness to the fact that we have access to at least two attributes, thought and extension, both of which seem to express the same substance. So it is conceivable that two attributes belong to the same substance (although it is important to remember what has been achieved so far — the necessity that these attributes do not divide substance). Secondly, we can think of a being with infinite attributes, and this is what is often called God.
59 Jonathan Bennett persists in positing a transattribute identity which is in turn expressed by the attributes. However, this transattribute identity cannot be grasped by the intellect (Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, # 34.2. 141). As Curley rightly objects, this introduces a new eminence into Spinoza, an inexpresible eminent unity, which is what he trying to escape: E. Curley, Beyond the Geometrical Method, 155n.25.
away from substance as hypokeimenon, or what Locke called the 'I know not what' that underlays a thing's properties. Spinozist substance must be conceived as concrete from the start: "When substance is absolutely infinite, when it has an infinity of attributes, then, and only then, are its attributes said to express its essence, for only then does substance express itself in its attributes". Each attribute is demonstrated to univocally express the same substance in its own way. By virtue of the modal proof we can conceive of each aspect of being as the immediate expression of God; we are beyond the notion that each attribute and mode is immanently caused 'by' God. According to Deleuze, "Spinoza seems to have gone further than any other along the path of this new logic: a logic of pure affirmation, of unlimited quality, and thus of the unconditioned totality that possesses all qualities; a logic, that is, of the absolute". For Deleuze, two things have been secured at the same time: immanence and a radical theory of difference. In fact, he suggests, the one implies the other. Only the real distinction of the attributes, taken to infinity, dispels the need for an eminent unity, or spurious totality of the component qualities of the absolute. Therefore only this radical theory of distinction, a theory of differences without transcendent or eminent unity, can fulfill the requirement of immanence. 

60Expressionism in Philosophy, 20. Deleuze's presentation of Spinoza's proof as a genetic proof clearly implies an objection to Hegel's criticism that Spinoza's substance is a dead presupposition, without genesis. Macherey explicitly presents his causal-genetic proof as a refutation of Hegel's view. The implications of this rehabilitation of Spinoza will become clear in later chapters.

61 In turn each attribute is divided into modes, conceived by Deleuze as intensive degrees of a quality, or as powers or capabilities. But each mode expresses the substance of which it is a part immediately through the attributes.

62 Macherey had argued that Guéroult was wrong to suggest that Spinoza returns to "simple elements" in order to "reconstruct" substance in a genetic definition (in Leibniz's first sense of a real definition), 'The Problem of the Attributes', 85. Deleuze's version, however, mediates between Macherey's and Guéroult's (while undoubtedly also, along with Guéroult, secretly appealing to Leibniz), by giving a modal sense to the genetic definition by which the simple elements compose substance; in so doing he avoids Macherey's turn to a causal definition in which the real distinction of the attributes is compromised, but stays faithful to the need for a genetic real definition, not an analytic one.

63 Expressionism in Philosophy, 79.

64 I think these remarks are enough to refute Alain Badiou's extremely flawed reading of Deleuze in Deleuze: The Clamour of Being (trans. L. Burchill, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2000). Badiou reads Deleuze's notion of the univocity of being as a "One-All", or ontological holism, which is exactly what Deleuze intends his notion of univocity to struggle against. Deleuze's main arguments for univocity are carried out in the first 100 pages of his book on Spinoza, but Badiou declines to comment at all on that book, stating merely that "his Spinoza was (and still is) for me an unrecognisable creature" (1). Furthermore, Badiou seems oblivious to the dialectical problems that arise in Plato's account of the 'one-all', and which inspire Hegel's dialectic, thus opening his account of Deleuze to basic Hegelian criticisms.
In the quotation above, Deleuze talks of the ‘nonimpossibility’ of God, which highlights again the question of modality. But is there really any internal reference yet to the notion of possibility in the proof? The modality at work here really involves necessary existence. Now, although Kant was to define necessity as a combination of possibility and existence, the Spinozist-Leibnizian ontological proof seems to be without reference to possibility. We can understand the notion of necessary existence at work here by referring to Charles Hartshorne’s version of the ‘modal proof’ for the existence of God, which he also equates with a second version of the ontological argument given by Anselm. 65 While the first proof fits the classical form mentioned above, the second exploits the fact that the necessary existence of God differs in relevance from the existence of contingent things. In the second proof, the existence of God is shown to be a very particular case among concepts, and it is shown to be absurd to say that the existence of God is a contingent matter. If God did not exist, God could not come into existence, because God’s nature is to be infinite or unlimited. So if God did not exist, its existence would have to be impossible and not contingent. Similarly if it existed, it could not have come to be, and would therefore have to be necessary. Therefore God’s existence is either necessary or impossible. But as we have demonstrated that its existence is nonimpossible, we conclude that it is necessary.

The Spinozist-Leibnizian proof says that whatever is that is perfect, is because nothing can stop it. If absolute infinity is referred to, this does not mean ‘all possible attributes/perfections’, but simply whatever unlimited attributes/perfections there are. In Spinoza’s version, and in Deleuze’s reading, this is presented as a pure upsurge of difference; with no other reason for its existence than its own ontological power. The internal rationality or reason of Spinoza’s absolute is identical to the immanent expression of the essential power of being. Our distinction between logic and reality thus collapses as reality follows with complete internal necessity from the very thought of God.

However, it is surely just this conception of reason that caused Leibniz to change his mind on that night in 1676. For Spinoza presents a necessary reason for the existence of this internally differentiated reality. But to ask for a reason is

also to ask why something exists and not something else: it is to ask for a sufficient reason. Spinoza shows that a perfection will exist because nothing can prevent it from existing. But the fact that such perfections can coexist, that they are compatible, is itself without explanation. An explanation would require that other realities do not exist with the same necessity, because they are not compatible with each other; that is, that they are prevented from existing, by some other thing. In the note from 2 December 1676, the day after the meeting, Leibniz writes:

My principle, namely, is that whatever can exist and is compatible with other things does exist, because the reason for existing in preference to other possibles cannot be limited by any other consideration than that not all things are compatible. Thus there is no other reason for determining existences than that the more perfect shall exist, that is, those things which involve the greatest possible reality.66

But to make this move is to introduce a modal, counterfactual dimension into the concept of God itself. For Leibniz now, perfections, considered by themselves, are ‘logical possibilities’. In a passage from 1677, the unlimited perfection that necessarily exists is precisely referred to as a ‘possible [that] demands that it should exist’. In this latter passage, Leibniz now asks:

Either all things exist, and then every possible so demands existence that it actually exists; or some things do not exist, and then a reason must be given why some things exist rather than others. But this cannot be given otherwise than from a general reason of essence or possibility, assuming that the possible demands existence in its own nature, and indeed in proportion to its possibility or according to the degree of its essence.67

This adds a sufficient reason to the real definition of God – that things exist or don’t exist because of their incompatibility with others. The sufficient reason of existent reality lies in its ‘proportion of possibility’:68 this would be the true ratio of things. Now the ‘modal proof’ for the possibility of the existence of God becomes truly modal. The existence of the sum of all perfection is now dependent

66 Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza’, 1676, Loemker, 169.
67 Russell, The Philosophy of Leibniz, 296.
68 “If we assume A, B, C, D to be equal as regards essence, i.e. equally perfect, or equally demanding existence, and if we assume that D is incompatible with A and with B, while A is compatible with any except D, and similarly as regards B and C; it follows that the combination ABC, excluding D, will exist; for if we wish D to exist, it can only coexist with C, and hence the combination CD will exist, which is more imperfect than the combination ABC”. It is more imperfect because “everything possible demands that it should exist ... hence it follows that that
on the possibilities that allow it to exist as such. A ‘third realm’ is found to stop the two realms of logic and reality from collapsing into each other.

Now, Leibniz seems to suggest that it is not possible that all things that are possible exist, because the actualisation of some possibilities will necessarily exclude each other. But what is the criterion for the first use of ‘possible’ here? Leibniz invents the new category of ‘compossibility’ to account for this new, real dimension to possibility. Compossibility is weaker than logical possibility: something is compossible only with something else, and is therefore contingent upon which other realities there are. In this way, contingency is introduced into the real definition of God.

iv Reality and Sufficient Reason in Leibniz

The move away from Spinoza has wide ramifications in Leibniz’s philosophy, one of which is to produce a permanent ambiguity in his proof for God’s existence. For instance, in the Monadology, Leibniz presents the classical form of the ontological argument (#40-41), then turns to another proof, which states that essences must have their basis in God, in order to complete the ontological proof. A look at the status of this proof from essences can highlight the problematic status of the notion of real possibility just introduced.

If we take what is given to us by the principle of identity, that there is an absolute realm of possible truths, we can call these truths “eternal truths”. Such truths concern the very possibility or not of something, they are truths of reason rather than truths of existence or fact, that is, ideal essences of which nothing is said about their ‘reality’ or instantiation. Leibniz also claims that these eternal truths “are consequences of [God’s] understanding, which, assuredly, does not depend on his will”; but this claim will be shown to be problematic in a moment. He then says

it is also true that God is not only the source of existences, but also that of essences insofar as they are real, that is, or the source of what is real in possibility

combination of things always exists by which the greatest possible number of things exists”. Russell. ibid.

69 Letter to Foucher. 1675. Ariew & Garber. 2.
70 Cf. Letters to Arnauld. Ariew & Garber. 70.
71 Discourse on Metaphysics. Ariew & Garber. 36.
... without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible.72

The ideal essences, "insofar as they are real" must be grounded in God. God is the source of the real in possibility. He elaborates in the following paragraph:

For if there is reality in essences or possibles, or indeed, in eternal truths, this reality must be grounded in something existent and actual, and consequently, it must be grounded in the existence of the necessary being, in whom essence involves existence, that is, in whom possible being is sufficient for actual being.73

In the next paragraph (#45), Leibniz concludes that “Thus God alone (or the necessary being) has this privilege, that he must exist if he is possible”. He then recapitulates his modal proof from perfection. Now this argument introduces a circularity that has major consequences for Leibniz’s theory. For he states that the real in possibility must be grounded in God, who necessarily exists. But the proof for his necessary existence is precisely that God is he “in whom possible being is sufficient for actual being”. But we have seen that God is the sum of possible beings which exist because of their compatible reality, their compossibility. The only way out of this circle is to identify God tout court with the structure of real possibility. But this would introduce contingency into the heart of God. This contingency can be ordered according to the principle of sufficient reason (according to “the proportion of its possibility”), but how could Leibniz then avoid the thought that God is simply the ontological site of reality in which the calculus of real possibilities is played out? That, if God’s internal possibility “is sufficient for actual being”, it is because God is another name for the play of real possibility? And in fact doesn’t Leibniz even raise this scenario in his image of the chess game in ‘On the Ultimate Origination of Things’?

As Deleuze says, Leibniz does indeed “discover a play in the creation of the world” (DR 51). It is at this point that we find Leibniz, having fled from Spinoza, in striking proximity to Nietzsche; for can’t we simply say that the essentiae exigentia find their reason in the calculus of compossibilities as an expression simply of their own power? God does not play dice, but divinity is the affirmation of the dicethrow. However, Leibniz gives the impression that he discovers a way out of the labyrinth in which he has found himself. For he returns

72 Monadology #43, Ariew & Garber, 218.
to his doctrine of ideal essences, and affirms that God’s understanding is identical to them, thus splitting God across the two realms of logical and real possibility. In this way, Leibniz thinks he can fulfil the principle of sufficient reason – for the contingency of compossibles is now no longer simply referred to their own power or perfection, but to God’s choice: their ratio is now a reflection of God’s choice of the best of all possible worlds. The contingency of compossibles is related to God’s freedom.

But is Leibniz’s ‘way out’ adequate to the rigours of rationalist theology as we have so far seen it? The answer is not clear, and we should focus our attention on the philosophical structure that Leibniz leaves us with. There seems to be a chasm separating God’s intellect and the reality of God. Is the notion of God’s ‘will’ enough to fill this chasm? If God is real possibility, then how can his will be separated from real possibility, simply because there exists a realm of intelligible truths (logical possibilities)? Leibniz himself seems to doubt the anthropomorphism of this solution. Indeed, when he explains what ‘the best’ or ‘most perfect’ is, he simply states that it is “that combination of things ... by which the greatest possible number of things exists”.74 We are returned to power, to Spinoza and Nietzsche, and to perfection in the Nietzschean sense: “perfection: that is the extraordinary expansion of the feeling of power”.75 The source of the world’s perfection is nothing other than the necessary process of its own becoming.

There are then two problems that destabilise Leibniz’s position: God threatens to turn into Spinozist reality, and the principle of the best is also put in doubt by the unstable dichotomy between God’s intellect and God’s reality. How is he to secure the distinction and the movement between logical and real possibility, which prevents him from sliding into Spinozism or monism? He introduces the possibility of sufficient reason into Spinozism by keeping hold of the distinction between logic and reality, which in turn requires a third. Reason finds sufficiency only in the calculus of compossibility, the set of real possibilities which play on a background of incompossible logical possibilities.

73 Monadology #44. ibid.
74 Russell, 296.
75 Will to Power # 801. Cf. Twilight of the Idols, “The Four Great Errors” 8. on the “innocence of becoming”.

93
It was mentioned above that in his first work, Leibniz equated existence with individuation.\textsuperscript{76} Perhaps here we have the suggestion of an answer to the question. In a new principle, Leibniz states that there can be no repetition of the identical: this is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. It is important to see that this principle only has relevance to the realm of reality. In the logical realm, any identity between indiscernibles would produce no difference at all and so is not thinkable at all in the first place. Individuation is not relevant in the logical realm. But everything that really exists must be individuated, that is, be an individual substance or its accident. The principle of identity of indiscernibles expresses the difference between logical and real realms. Logically identical essences cannot be individualised in two or more substances, says Leibniz, without clashing with the principle of sufficient reason.

However, why is it impossible that two identical things are individuated in reality? We cannot anymore appeal to God or teleology to explain this physical or real instantiation of the principle of sufficient reason. It must be down to some structure of reality itself for which we have not yet accounted. Seeking an escape from Spinozism, we must turn to space and time, the forms of real differentiation to ground the principle of individuation. Is this Leibniz’s last hope? What happens if it fails? In the next chapter I return to this issue, and show that while Leibniz’s theory of space and time cannot succeed, Deleuze’s philosophy in DR can best be explained by a return to this moment in Leibniz. But now it is time to return to Kant, and to show that his early philosophy too is constructed in the shadow of the problems we have just surveyed.

\textsuperscript{76} Cf. the 1663 Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui: “we treat of something real and what is called a ‘physical principle’, which would serve as the foundation for the formal notion in the mind of ‘individual’, understood as individuation or numerical difference”, quoted in L.B. McCullough. ‘Leibniz’s Principle of Individuation’, 203. Note that ‘formal’ here is used in its
Kant and the Principle of Sufficient Reason

After Leibniz, Wolff attempted to derive the principle of sufficient reason from the principle of contradiction, to clear up Leibniz's tangled attempts to create a distinction between logic and reality.\textsuperscript{77} Insofar as pre-Kantian rationalists needed the principle of sufficient reason yet were involved in the science of their time, they were faced by two directions. If they made it a real or material principle, they had to succumb to the question of its teleological character, while if they made it a logical principle, they dissolved the need for teleology, but had to reaffirm once more an abstract, Cartesian God to explain the 'fit' between the logical and the real (and negotiate with Spinozism). This logicising move represents a retreat from the question of reality, and is the object of all Kant's criticisms of Leibnizianism. Kant's criticisms of Eberhard revolve around the latter's inability to realise the gravity of the move from logic to reality.\textsuperscript{78} Strangely then, Kant's criticisms of Leibnizianism in fact conceal a return to Leibniz's own problematic, away from his contemporary legacy.

Kant saw that the principle of sufficient reason had to be a 'real' principle if it was to function independently of the principle of contradiction, the principle that 'everything must have its reason' was, in Kant's terms, synthetic. But Leibniz referred the ground of this principle to other synthetic or real principles that we have seen have their own deep internal problems. In the light of both Leibniz's entanglement and the Wolffian move, it is clear that Kant's rigid distinction between analytic and synthetic, when applied to fundamental metaphysical issues, might have the virtue of at least classifying the status of principles, the ultimate validity and status of which were very murky. Kant's strength at this early point in his career is to hold firm to the necessity for an extralogical principle, but not to avoid the question of its ultimate ground.

In the previous chapter I claimed that there are three main phases in Kant's development. Now it is necessary to complicate this picture, for of all the stages,

\textsuperscript{77} See H. Allison, \textit{The Kant-Eberhard Controversy} (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1974).
\textsuperscript{78} Cf. Allison, \textit{The Kant-Eberhard Controversy}, 51f.
the first is the most complex, and I suggest that it is itself divided into three stages:

**Stage 1a:** From 1755-1768, Kant is occupied with the examination of the nature and implications of the principle of sufficient reason.

**Stage 1b:** In 1768, Kant is forced (for more metaphysical reasons than is sometimes thought) to affirm the ideality of space. He attempts to incorporate this change within the rubric of the earlier theory in the 1770 *Inaugural Dissertation*. That this proves to be impossible results in a further radical move of splitting intellectual activity into noumenal and phenomenal domains.

**Stage 1c:** The difficulties of this move are the cause of the ‘silent decade’ that culminates in the 1781 publication of CPR.

This three phase movement is perhaps better described in terms of a continuous development that gets shattered in the middle by transcendental idealism. The move towards idealism is discontinuous: first space (1768), then time (1770) becomes ideal, finally, the understanding becomes first partially, then at last completely ideal (1770 onwards).

In the first phase, beginning with the *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*, Kant claims that there are only two purely *apriori* principles, the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. He renames the principle of sufficient reason the principle of determining ground, because, he says, “it is not immediately clear how much is sufficient” (TP 13, Ak. 1:393). The notion of a *Grund* (reason or ground), according to Kant, is “that which establishes a connection and a conjunction (*nexum et colligationem*) between the subject and some predicate or other” (TP 11, Ak. 1:392). He specifies that “a ground ... converts things which are indeterminate into things which are determinate” (ibid). He explains the strength of the criterion of determinacy in counterfactual terms: “it would be a ground such that, were it not posited, that which was determinate would not occur at all” (TP 13, Ak: 1:393). It follows that it must “posit in such a way that every opposite is excluded” (ibid).

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79 Kant subdivides his principle into antecedently and consequentially determining grounds, which correspond to *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi*. Thus, as concerns the latter, “the eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter ... furnish the ground of knowing that light is propagated successively and with a specifiable velocity” (TP 12, Ak. 1:393). Such a ground does not give us the ground of being (*ratio essendi*) for the nature of light. It is thus the antecedently determining ground which has metaphysical importance, and which will be examined.
Kant’s early solution to the problem of the principle of sufficient reason has three main characteristics. Firstly, Kant has a formal concern. In his early works he is investigating the problem of in what sense ‘real’ physical determinations are formally different to logical ones. If the principle of sufficient reason cannot be derived from the principle of identity, which grounds logical forms, the former principle must have different formal laws. What Kant calls determination will no longer depend for its form simply on the forms of logical propositions.

But how exactly does this differ from Leibniz? In Leibniz, the law of sufficient reason has the form of the law of ground and consequent. As Kant points out, what is sought is the determinate reason for the conjunction between subject and predicate, the reason for the connection. We saw that Leibniz relied on certain problematic metaphysical principles to specify the range and meaning of sufficiency. Kant will often address the situation functionally by simply saying that synthesis requires a third. As Kant says in the Critique, “where is the third thing that is always requisite for a synthetic proposition in order to connect with each other concepts that have no logical (analytical) affinity?” (CPR A259). Kant’s answer as to what this tertium quid is will vary enormously, but the ‘triangular’ structure of apriori cognition will remain constant. As we will see, in the early writings Kant seeks the third thing between God and world (cf. LM 15, Ak. 28:52), whereas later time (A155/B194) and experience in general (A157/B196) are said to be third things. One way to chart Kant’s progress concerning the nature of the third thing is by first understanding this functional, abstract notion of the third, and from there, attempting to chart the variables that actualise this function. I shall be attempting to do this in general over the rest of the chapter.

A second characteristic is scientific. Kant’s leanings towards Newton were apparent since 1747 in his first published work, On the True Estimation of Living Forces. It is not possible to go into Kant’s scientific theory here, but essentially we can say that Kant wants to harmonise the metaphysical and the physical dimensions in the notion of force. Against Leibniz, Kant wants both to affirm physical interaction, and also, with Newton, to shift the ground for the
determination of forces to the whole field of forces. As we will see shortly, this provides the rudiments for a scientific theory that resolves the physical influx controversies.

The last characteristic is ontotheological. Kant, like Leibniz, believes that the notion of reality is essentially bound up with God's existence, and he attempts to clear up Leibniz's problem with 'reality' in The Only Possible Argument. While Kant obviously takes this last ontotheological characteristic to be fundamental as regards the order of reasons, it is helpful to treat beforehand the previous two characteristics of 'reality', and its distinction from logic.

Formal and Scientific Characteristics of the Difference between Logic and Reality

In the New Elucidation, Kant's attempts to derive the real, synthetic principles of succession and coexistence from the principle of determining ground itself, really arise out of an original Kantian claim about the irreducibility of change to logic or pure ontology. Kant argues that if we simply operate with a bare notion of substance in articulating the principle of sufficient reason, we are left with substances that have only internal relations. But, Kant says, "a simple substance, which is free from every external connection and which is thus abandoned to itself and left in isolation, is completely immutable in itself" (TP 37, Ak. 410). Thus against Wolff and Baumgarten, Kant argues that it is not enough to say "that a simple substance is subject to constant change in virtue of an inner principle of activity" (TP 38, Ak. 4:11, my italic). Kant's argument here is formulated conditionally, and is analogous to a transcendental argument: "If the connection of substances were cancelled altogether, succession and time would likewise disappear" (ibid). We can take this as a regressive argument from the assumption of the connection of substances ("[S]uccession is apparent in the universe", ibid).

Now from this negative argument that isolated substances are not sufficient for

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81 This distinction between logic and reality does not immediately appear as such in Kant's early work. In the New Elucidation, Kant appears to derive his principles of succession and coexistence from the mere principle of determining ground, because they specify the ontological principle that to determine anything, or to ask why it is at is, is equivalent to excluding every opposite. Most of the work would seem to be being done by the definition of determination itself. But in the Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763), Kant goes on to
change to occur, it follows that if “a change occurs it must be the case that it arises from an external connection” (TP 38, Ak. 1:411). This “external connection” shows that contingency is necessary for substances to be connected, whatever their own necessary properties. Kant also takes it that “the real existence of bodies ... follows with the greatest clarity”.

Can reality then be defined in terms of change? Kant argues that Leibnizian substances by themselves cannot account for change. But we must proceed carefully here, for Kant’s introduction of the necessity of external connection still respects the inner grounds of substances themselves. We cannot simply identify change with external connection. Kant’s arguments on this point are best presented in the Metaphysik Herder of 1764. As we have seen, all relations between substances are contingent, or accidents (in the Scholastic sense). Now, Kant states that for a particular determination to occur, it is not enough to appeal to an efficiently determining force; the determined substance must also possess the capacity to be determined in such a way. “For example, I hear music: that requires the external power of the music, and the distinct representation of the notes requires one’s own power of hearing” (LM 15, Ak. 28:52). There must be both an outer ground and inner ground of any accident. Thus while any inner ground (the organs of the ear) requires an outer ground (music) to be effectuated, any external cause requires an inner ground. Now, crucially, Kant states that the

explicitly argue for a preliminary distinction between the logical and real that would seem to have priority over the analysis of ‘determination’ in the earlier work.

Kant also provides another argument in the next paragraph. A change involves something coming-to-be which previously was not, or becoming the opposite of what it was, but if isolated substances are the sole grounds involved, then these same grounds will determine both the first state and its opposite, which is absurd (ibid).

Kant says that a much-needed proof against idealism follows from this:

The soul is subject (in virtue of the inner sense) to inner changes. Since, as we have proved, these changes cannot arise from its nature considered in isolation and as disconnected from other things, it follows that there must be a number of things present outside the soul with which it stands in a reciprocal connection (TP 39, Ak. 2: 411-12)

The changes that occur in the mind must be caused by something outside it. Paul Guyer suggests that this is an anticipation of the Refutation of Idealism in the second edition of the Critique (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 12). There is truth in this, but what is implied in this early refutation of idealism is something more, based in the first instance on Kant’s acceptance of the necessity for distinct principles for reality. Hence his refutation of idealism was first of all a refutation of a form of idealism that can follow from a logicist understanding of Leibniz’s monadism. His claim is that rationalist metaphysics requires real existence for determination to take place Cf. Metaphysik Herder: “An egoist thinks that I, who am thinking here, am the only simple being, without connection (nexus) to others. [An] idealist, that there is merely a spiritual world. Origin of idealism, the truth that the body without thoughts constitutes no world” (LM 5. Ak: 28:42). The fundamental thing an idealist denies is thus the nexus, the connection between substances.
last claim includes any causation initiated by God. “For if, eg., God could produce a thought in a soul merely by himself: then God, but not a soul, would have the thought: because there would be no connection between them” (ibid). It is clear who Kant is arguing against here, for Spinoza’s Ethics precisely specifies that “the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God ... has this or that idea” (E2P11C). Here begins the attempt to return anew to Leibniz’s struggle to fend off Spinoza’s all-consuming identification of God with reality.

Indeed, this explanation of interaction can be seen as a development of the Leibnizian position that “creatures derive their perfections from God’s influence [influx] but that they derive their imperfections from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits.” But the behaviour of finite substances is no longer simply a result of imperfection, and is explained by the properties of changing substances. Thus Kant seems to be emancipating himself from the intimacy of the real/physical and theological realms in Leibniz. But before evaluating whether this is true, it is necessary to elaborate more on the formal and physical dimensions of Kant’s notion of reality.

In the Negative Magnitudes essay, Kant makes a distinction preliminary to ontological and theological issues, between logical analysis and real determination; firstly in its form, and secondly in its result. In a logical contradiction, one thing cancels another because their concepts are incompatible; furthermore, “the consequence of the logical contradiction is nothing at all” (TP 211, Ak. 2:171). In a real opposition, the cancellation concerns the states of another quantity of reality, and “the consequence is something”. Take two forces of equal quantity acting upon each other – they are really opposed, but the result is rest, which is not nothing. However, Kant does not simply require there to be bodies in order for there to be real opposition. He also uses the examples of debt (TP 212, Ak. 2:173) and pleasure (TP 219, Ak. 2:180). Suppose somebody to owe and be owed identical sums of money; the two quantities cancel each other out, but this is no logical contradiction. In these cases, the difference between logical

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84 Monadology #42, in Ariew & Garber, 218.
85 Similarly, Kant says, one person may be affected by a certain amount of pleasure at the same time as they are afflicted by an equal amount of displeasure: the result again (he claims!) is zero.
and real opposition can be framed as follows: the former involves an affirmation itself being negated, while the latter involves two positivities or affirmations cancelling each other out. The result – zero – may look the same in each case, but we should in principle be aware that they should not be confused.

Now, the form that the 'real world' takes for the early Kant is a physical monadology. In the work of that title, Kant argues that monads (ie. substances) are unextended, yet occupy space in the sense of having the capacity to fill space through emanations of their force (TP 55-59, Ak. 1:479-482). It also turns out that their impenetrability is not a result of brute matter, but of their repulsive force (TP 61, Ak. 1:483). This leads to an important physical distinction between internal and external determinations, which augments the distinction mentioned earlier between inner and outer grounds:

If one divides space, one divides the extensive quantity of its presence. But, in addition to external presence, that is to say, in addition to the relational determinations of substance, there are other, internal determinations; if the latter did not exist, the former would have no subject in which to inhere. But the internal determinations are not in space, precisely because they are internal (TP 58, Ak. 1:481).

Hence there will be a different form of differentiation in the case of extensive quantities to that of internal determinations. In the Inaugural Dissertation Kant will say that “the presence of immaterial things in the corporeal world is a virtual not a local presence” (TP 410, Ak. 2:414; italics mine). Even later, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant will specify that physical relations that are “constructed in a way different from that of the extensive quantity of space” are to be called intensive. 86

Thus the externality involved in the physical monadology is grounded not in material particles, but in the system of physical forces. This means that the monadic substance is only granted real unity through the emanation of its effects throughout the physical field. While the force can be attributed ‘virtually’ to the physical monad, its actual constitution rests on external reasons; it can only be determined in its changes through contingent relations. At this point we can start to see how all determinations must be referred to the state of the whole, as insisted by Newton. To explain the interaction of substances, Kant appeals to universal gravitation, and this will remain as the extralogical formal principle for the
reciprocal action (succession and coexistence) of his system right up to the *Inaugural Dissertation*.\(^{87}\) Universal gravitation, as the sphere of nature, is the “phenomenal eternity of the general cause” (TP 405; Ak. 2:410). Any determinate relation between substances thus depends on the status of the “world-whole”. The intensive forces of the monad are determined only by its external relations to other monads, but these relations are collectively reciprocally determining. The principle of real, as opposed to logical, determination has its final ground in the whole. It is in this sense that real opposition is finally to be understood; negative and positive magnitudes show us the local determination of the state of play between real, positive forces.\(^{88}\)

However, Kant does not see himself as relying on Newtonian science, but rather proving its metaphysical truth. If Kant is indeed presenting a new synthesis of physical influx and harmony theory, it is a precarious metaphysical balance. What are the metaphysical elements of Kant’s theory? Firstly, in characterising the nature of the interaction between inner nature and external relation, Kant introduces a somewhat Spinozist element into this largely Leibnizian discussion. He argues that there is an affectivity involved in interacting substances: “If a substance is active by its own power under an outer condition, then it suffers” (LM 16, Ak. 28:52). It is the capacity to suffer that holds off both pure efficient causality and absolute immersion in God, the two faces of monism.

Kant now asks “what explains this connection? Since one’s own power to suffer is always required, [physical] influence is impossible” (ibid). Kant argues that for any contingent relation between substances, “their existence depends on a third” (LM 14, Ak. 28:51). This “third thing” is the empty function that represents the need for any synthesis to have an apriori principle. It can be neither God nor finite substances (LM 15, Ak. 28:51); it rather provides the ground ‘between’ these for the correspondence between the inner and outer ground.\(^{89}\) Kant

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\(^{88}\) Cf. Kant’s question in the essay on Negative Magnitudes: how is it that “because something is, something else is cancelled”? (TP 241. Ak. 2:204). He claims that the absolute state of the world can be considered as zero, with every change involving a compensation elsewhere in the system. “Falling [is] ‘negative rising’, retreat, ‘negative advance’ ... falling is just as positive as rising” (TP 215. Ak. 2:176).

\(^{89}\) Precisely because the power to suffer depends on the contingent event of connection. God is not totally responsible for the accident. If God were, then any principle of harmony would become
characterises this third in terms of a "generally established harmony";\textsuperscript{90} it is equivalent to the "world-whole". Thus, despite allowing physical interaction, Kant's theory is far from being a theory of physical influx. However, all of this only makes sense if Kant is still affirming a rationalist notion of substance. But what allows Kant to preserve the 'inner nature' of his substances?\textsuperscript{91} What ultimately stops Kant's substances from dissolving into external physical relations?\textsuperscript{92}

In order to deal with this problem, Kant has to plunge himself into the same ontotheological problematic that Leibniz (and Spinoza) invoked.\textsuperscript{93} For only if God grounds internal substances, can their relations in external interaction conform to a general harmony, which is nothing other than the harmony of inner natures with their contingent changes in a whole. As we will see, Kant is performing a delicate balancing act: he wants God to serve as a ground for 'reality', but at the same time wants to limit God's power in reality. He thus wants to avoid any monistic identification of logic and reality, whether it involve the collapse of reality into \textit{apriori} logic, or the collapse of logic into reality as contingency. So I turn now to Kant's proof for the existence of God, which will pre-established again, and Kant's point about the irreducible contingency of change would be contradicted. Moreover, Kant says at the end of the manuscript that "this influence is impossible even [for] God, because he can never produce the accident in another, except insofar as he is ground of the power which produces the accident, eg., regret in the soul" (ibid). Here we can see that if it were possible for God to cause an influx, then it would be equivalent to the complete determination supposedly involved in pre-established harmony.

\textsuperscript{90} In his very informative article, 'Kant's Theory of Physical Influx' (Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 77, 1995) Eric Watkins defends the claim that since Kant had rejected pre-established harmony and affirmed physical interaction, he must be characterised as defending physical influx (without transmission). However, he overstates the case, and quotes too selectively from the \textit{Metaphysik Herder}. Despite Kant having explicitly argued against influx in the passage just quoted, Watkins implicitly dismisses this passage, apparently for the following reasons. Firstly, he says the difference between pre-established harmony and Kant's version of physical influx can be explained in terms of counterfactuals: "for pre-established harmony one substance would run the same course even if all other substances were annihilated", whereas the opposite is true for physical influx. Secondly, he says that "Kant gives no indication that the harmony God is responsible for is pre-established." (299) However, against both of these claims one should point out that Watkins has not excluded the notion of generally established harmony, which allows for intersubstantial causation \textit{and} grounds the 'inner ground' that Kant holds necessary to explain contingent interaction.

\textsuperscript{91} The account of the internality of force is not enough to justify such an affirmation. Indeed, in CPR, Kant makes a point of saying that forces are merely external relations.

\textsuperscript{92} The doctrine of the mere formality of logic is not affirmed until CPR, so Kant would still seem to hold, like Leibniz, that analytic truths have metaphysical validity in the sense that they belong to the realm of eternal truths. Whether they have real validity, however, is the key question.

\textsuperscript{93} Otherwise his account of reality would begin to fragment: there would be a reality based on the contingent external relations of the physical field, which could only be completed by an account of why these substances or forces are originally distributed in a certain way. This would be analogous to a split between extensive quantitative relations and a set of mysterious qualitative givens.
be treated in parallel to the previous discussions of Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s ontotheology.

ii  God, Perfection and Reality in Kant

Kant takes up Leibniz’s proof for the existence of God by illuminating some of the obscurities we found in his real definition of the possibility of God, precisely in its dependence on ‘reality’. In 1755 Kant’s proof is already present (New Elucidation, TP 15, Ak. 1:395) but in the 1763 Only Possible Argument, he presents the first full version of the argument. Kant begins with a version of his famous analysis of the concept of existence (TP 117, Ak. 2:72), the crux of which was mentioned above. However, what I want to focus on now is the purely modal definition of existence that Kant goes on to give in the core of his proof for God’s existence. Firstly, he unfolds the implications that we have already glimpsed in Leibniz’s references to real possibility. However, he suggests, moving towards the Spinozist line, that possibility itself must depend on some prior given reality.

Possibility [itself] disappears not only when an internal contradiction, as the logical element of impossibility, is present, but also when there exists no material element, no datum, to be thought. For then nothing is given which can be thought (TP 123, Ak. 2:78).

Kant fills out this argument in the earlier New Elucidation:

Possibility is only definable in terms of there not being a conflict between certain combined concepts; thus the concept of possibility is the product of a comparison. But in every comparison the things which are to be compared must be available for comparison, and where nothing at all is given there is no room for either comparison or, corresponding to it, for the concept of possibility (TP 15, Ak. 1:395).
This is the "real element of possibility" (TP 123). Kant then makes a startling argument: that it is absolutely impossible for nothing to exist, for in that case all possibility would be cancelled. Kant is in effect deriving existence from the impossibility that nothing is possible. He goes on to fill in this notion: "There is a certain reality, the cancellation of which would cancel all internal possibility whatever" (TP 127, Ak. 2:83). But this reality must be absolutely necessary to avoid the contradiction concerning possibility. "It is apparent that the existence of one or more things itself lies at the foundation of all possibility" (ibid). This modal derivation of existence crucially qualifies the need for an unanalysable notion of 'existence' or 'reality'. Kant goes on to argue that this necessary being is unique and simple because it contains the real ground of all other possibilities: “it follows that every other thing is possible only insofar as it is given through the necessary being as its ground” (TP 128, Ak. 2:83). Since every possibility presupposes this existence, “it follows that no other mode of its existence is possible. That is to say: the necessary being cannot exist in a variety of ways... It is, therefore, not possible in any other way than as it really exists” (TP 129, Ak. 2:85). The fact that it cannot be changed indicates that it is eternal.

Now Kant never explicitly retracts this thesis, and his 'Critique of Speculative Theology' in which he attacks the three main types of theological argument (ontological, cosmological, physico-theological) does not include his own earlier argument. If we spell out the implications of the proof for Kant's early theory, we can see how the proof might come to assume a subterranean status in Kant’s work.

What is apparent is how close to a Spinozist proof for God this is. God is defined first of all in terms of the existence of a necessary reality which cannot be otherwise. This means that Kant has transformed a Leibnizian proof into its Spinozist nemesis by following out its implications. Leibniz attempted to avoid Spinoza's God by holding onto the distinction between logical and real possibility. He wanted God to be able to choose which possibilities become real. But if God himself depends on a prior reality, this would not be possible. Kant,

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however, follows the Leibnizian concern for the difference between logical and real possibility, yet in effect makes the logical dependent on real possibility. The logically possible has its index in reality. But then surely this destroys the notion of possibility, and leads our triangular structure to collapse into a monism of the real. But we should keep hold of the peculiar internal relation between logic and reality in Kant’s argument. The logically possible has its index in reality, but reality in turn cannot have its own principle without relating to the structure of possibility. De facto reality is only differentiated by being related to a halo of unrealised elements, some of which will be incompossible with the established set of elements. It seems hard not to use the notion ‘possibility’ to describe this ‘halo’. But we can already see, though, that the very notion of ‘real possibility’ is quite opaque: what is the precise modal status of this notion? For both Kant and Hegel the notion remains awkward, but essential, and arguably Deleuze’s task is to work through the status of this notion. While on the one hand, real possibility must be other than logical possibility, its real status threatens to destroy its modal status altogether. I will suggest that this so-called pre-critical problematic is at the root of Deleuze’s philosophy, and inspires his theory of Ideas or problems, as well as, paradoxically, his decision to subordinate the abstract couple ‘possible/real’ to ‘virtual/actual’. Deleuze’s solution is to reconceive real possibility as ‘virtuality’, as this term would negate the abstract, logically based status of the notion of possibility, and preserve the sense in which the halo of unrealised elements that surround a set of reals is rooted in and conditioned by that particular set of reals. For Deleuze, to speak of possibility apart from virtuality is an abstraction. But until Deleuze’s position can be developed more adequately, it should simply be kept in mind that real possibility, as it stands, remains a problematic notion.

regulative nature of Ideas. I comment further on Kant’s later attitude to the proof with reference to their interpretations in chapter 3.3.ii. 

96 It is sometimes claimed that it was the post-Kantians who effected the dependence of the logical principle of identity on the real identity of the subject. For instance, in ‘The Two Logics and their Relation’, in Experience and its Systematisation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). Nathan Rotenstreich argues that Reinhold and Maimon begin this process. But Kant in effect had also initiated this process in his argument about real possibility. However, he retreats from it shortly by saving logic by making it entirely formal; see chapter 3 below. 

There is an important weakness in Kant's proof that does not occur in Spinoza's. Kant's inference that the necessary existence of some reality must be unique does not follow. In defending this thesis, Kant appeals to the principle of determining ground. But this is circular as the validity of the principle is itself dependent on the necessary existence of reality. While the reality Kant discovers at the heart of possibility may indeed turn out to be 'unique' in Spinoza's sense (cf. E1P14), he has not ruled out that it is simply a plurality or infinity of really distinct perfections. Kant needs reality to be unique in the sense of 'unified', because he needs the ontological reality he has discovered to ground the substances in 'one world'. But this unity cannot be presumed. In fact, Kant's failure on this point sends us back to Leibniz, whose account of sufficient reason in absolute reality provided a rational 'calculus of compossibilities' which explained the structure of reality. Far from simply excluding a plurality of perfections, the thought of such a plurality is structurally necessary for Leibniz's account. On the other hand, Leibniz's restriction of the influx of that plurality into the single, created world is of course conducted by appealing to the problematic notion of the best of all possible worlds.

We can proceed further with the continuing paradox of 'reality'. If one makes the definition of God revolve around 'reality' then one subordinates God to reality. As even logical possibility is ontologically subordinated to real possibility, there is no escape for God from the realm of the real. This reality indeed provides the 'inner grounds' that form the inner nature of substances. Kant has also taken pains to separate these inner natures from the external interaction that determines their changes, so this Deus sive Realitas has no power over the interactions themselves. But in this case we must finally ask, why is the traditional notion of God necessary at all?

However, as with Leibniz, the intelligible aspect of God is entirely central to Kant's system right up to 1770. There is a "schema" in the divine intellect that must order the physical relations of the universe (TP 42, Ak. 1:414). As Kant is reported to say in the Metaphysik Herder, "No perfection can be thought, even according to the common concept, without relation to a thinking and rational being: a relation to rational beings required of it". The note ends with the phrase, "an uninhabited palace" (LM 13, Ak. 28:50). This image of nature as an uninhabited palace is a haunting symbol that can serve as the problem or Idea that
is motivating Kant in these early discussions. But we have already seen that it is far from the case that “perfection ... according to the common concept” of itself requires an intelligent deity. As Spinoza and Leibniz tend to agree, perfection, as completeness, is equivalent to nothing other than reality.\(^98\)

The mind of God does not seem necessary for interaction. Now isn’t the relation of essences and real interactions between them already sufficient to compose a world, or to determine a world? What Kant already has is sufficient for perfection and some kind of order, and perhaps beauty is merely a quality pleasing to certain species, as Spinoza would say. In this way, a fully individuated reality can be affirmed through the spatiotemporal framework of the world-whole. However, there are further implications to Kant’s arguments as they stand, especially when put in the Spinozist and Leibnizian context constructed earlier.

If we recall the larger picture of Kant’s earlier work, it will be recalled that Kant is seeking ‘a third thing’ to ground synthesis, specifically to ground the connection between inner substances and external interaction. This can also be thought of as a third thing between God’s influence and the contingent power of finite substances. It is the discovery of this third thing that will enable him to escape from Leibniz’s fragmentary account of the triangular structure of sufficient reason, whereby God is miraculously given the power to ‘choose’ from all the

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\(^{98}\) Kant’s arguments “that the necessary being is a mind” are very unconvincing (TP 131-2, Ak. 2:87-88). Firstly, if God is identical to the greatest possible reality, then understanding and will must coexist with this reality. But, given the priority of reality in possibility, Kant cannot therefore meaningfully talk about the “greatest possible reality”. Possibility is relative to reality first of all. Logical possibility is now strictly identical to real possibility; it is not abstract. Furthermore, if understanding and will are indeed “true realities” there is nothing inherently necessary about their reality, which means they could be merely contingent. Or, as Spinoza simply says, “Man thinks” (E2A2).

Kant’s second argument revolves around the irreducibility of understanding and will to other real properties. However, this could be incorporated into a Spinozist argument about the equal necessity of thought and extension. It does not provide any way understanding can be seen to order the rest of reality, which is what Kant needs God to do.

The last proof is as follows: “Thirdly, order, beauty and perfection in all that is possible presuppose either a being, in the properties of which these relations are grounded, or at least, a being through which, as from a principal ground, things agreeing with these relations are possible” (TP 132, Ak. 2:88). We need only pay attention to the clause following “at least”. Kant argues that the necessary being is the ground for all other beings. “It follows that the necessary being will possess that property, in virtue of which everything else, apart from itself, is able to become real in agreement with these relations”. This in itself does not follow, so Kant adds a semi-transcendental argument that “the ground of the external possibility of order, beauty and perfection, is not sufficient unless a will in agreement with the understanding is presupposed” (ibid.) But this claim would seem to be a petitio as it is precisely its sufficiency that is in question.

Furthermore, the weakness of Kant’s arguments for the mind of God are in effect admitted insofar as the rest of the book proceeds at great length to provide empirical teleological examples for the governance of God.
logically intelligible possibilities the best way to organise substances. Now for Kant, we have seen that this third thing is simply to be called ‘world’. The explicitly teleological character of Leibniz’s system is devolved in Kant into a metaphysics of ‘general harmony’ based on an ontotheology structured around the notion of ‘real possibility’. For Kant, there is no selective God; rather God provides the infinite set of realities, while comp possibility is reduced to the set of relations in the world according to physically contingent interactions. Thus sufficient reason is grounded in the conjunction of God and world, in the relation between inner, intensive essence, and external interaction; the “world-whole” can still nevertheless be thought according to a calculus of real possibility. However, given the problems we have seen with the metaphysical side of this account, in particular with his account of the inner natures of substances, what happens to the ‘world’ Kant has discovered? It has just been suggested that Kant did not succeed in securing the unity of ontological reality. What then in fact results from Kant’s arguments? The real possibility of a plurality of worlds: this thought haunts Kant throughout his philosophy.99 As we will see, he attempts to phenomenalyse the problem in his work from 1770, but the problem keeps returning, even as late as the Opus Posthumum.100 It shows that he has not entirely escaped from the Leibnizian position in which God must ‘choose’ between worlds; on Leibniz’s model, what is a world but a selection of compossible substances? If Kant cannot guarantee the unity of one world, then, like Leibniz he can only affirm “a play in the creation of the world” (DR 51). His account of coherent individuation then also disappears. Such a situation would be more than Spinoza’s infinite upsurge of perfections, but only in that it structurally introduces a counterfactual rationality into the heart of the absolute.

To sum up this first phase of Kant’s early philosophy, we can see that Kant seems to be caught in an oscillation between two poles. On the one hand, if Kant loses individual substances, all would be contingency, as really substances could be merely relative, or enduring composites. Furthermore, in the early Kant,

99 See Metaphysik Herder from 1764, (LM 4, Ak. 28:41) and Kant’s attempt to deal with the problem in the Inaugural Dissertation (TP 380, Ak. 390f), and his admission later that “if a number of necessary causes were to be admitted”, then a plurality of worlds would be possible (TP 403, Ak. 2:408).

time and space are relative, so their structure would not help to organise the composition of the universe. Hence physical laws would be entirely arbitrary or only necessary in Spinoza’s sense,\(^{101}\) they would lack the counterfactual element necessary for sufficient reason. *So Kant must somehow ground real individual essences or substances in necessity.*

On the other hand, if Kant loses external interaction, he is back with the problems he diagnosed in Leibnizianism: change is not thinkable for pure substances. *So Kant must ground real substances in external contingent interaction.*\(^{102}\)

Kant confesses the oscillation in a passage from the *New Elucidation*:

> For this reason, one is *equally justified* both in saying that external changes may be produced in this way by means of efficient causes, and also in saying that the changes which occur within the substance are ascribed to an internal force of the substance, although the natural power of this force to produce an effect rests, no less than the foundation of the external relations just mentioned, on divine support (TP 44, Ak. 1:415; italics mine).

This passage illustrates the problems of Kant’s thesis. For not only does he say here that God causes both internal and external relations, but he says that one is “equally justified” in describing causal change as due to external efficient causes or to internal determination. It is again as if there is a Nietzschean echo from the future: that it is simply an interpretation whether one describes change as efficient causation, or in terms of internal forces.\(^{103}\) As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, Nietzsche’s resolution is in fact also a vacillation between the two possibilities; the notion of will to power is really more of a question mark set over the problem of synthesis. And we see this same question mark appearing in Kant’s project.

There is also a finite dimension at the centre of Kant’s oscillating metaphysical tendencies. Kant cannot give in completely to pre-established harmony theory on the one hand, or Spinozist determinism, as in each case this

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\(^{101}\) “A thing’s existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient cause. ... A thing is called contingent only because of a defect in our knowledge” (EIP33S1). Kant briefly discusses chance and necessity in Spinoza in *Metaphysik Herder* (LM 4. Ak. 28:41), where he says “the destiny of Spinoza ... has perhaps not been rightly understood”. But he does not go into the crucial difference between Spinoza and Leibniz on sufficient reason.

\(^{102}\) This oscillation could be given the form of an antinomy. The Kantian way out of an antinomy is to point to an ambiguity in the alternatives. Here, the ambiguity would be the notion of ‘ground’. we cannot adequately define ground because we cannot decide from its concept whether grounds might not be fully internal or external, or if both, how this is possible.

\(^{103}\) Cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, # 22.
would be to give God too much, to rob finite beings of any independence whatsoever. It has been shown that Kant’s middle way between physical influx and harmony goes by way of an emphasis of the “power to suffer”. From a finite perspective, the suffering substance is the core of the problem: it both has an internal essence, but is subjected to external forces. In a sense, it is the very locus of the synthetic apriori in the early Kant: the power to suffer is the locus of the “third thing”; but here again we hear Nietzsche’s pathos in the will to power.

We can also, however, begin to glimpse the Deleuzian horizon from here. Like Leibniz, Kant thinks of internally determined substances in terms of “series”: compossible substances can be called convergent series, and incompossible ones divergent. We have seen that the series that can be affirmed of God are not necessarily subject to organisation in the mind of God, nor can their “generally established harmony” guarantee one world only can be selected from the sum of reality. In fact, we have no criterion for compossibility at all. God, the principle of the best, the world-whole – are these anything other than phantoms or mirages in “the play in the creation of the world”? If there is the possibility of a ‘divine choice’, perhaps it can only be found from a perspective in reality itself. Perhaps in that case the notion of world is relative, and the only ‘absolute’ that can be affirmed is not a cosmos or world of convergent series, but a ‘chaosmos’ of convergent and divergent series (DR 57/80, 69/95). The ideal horizon that Kant will ultimately seek as the guarantee of the world will be precisely and correctly described as ‘problematic’; but Deleuze will push Kant’s position further so that it reconnects with his original position as we have seen it here: the very criterion for the calculus of compossibilities will be problematic, indeed absolutely problematic. Deleuze then looks further back in the past than Kant and Leibniz in his pursuit of a model of harmony adequate to this ontological situation. He alights upon Giordano Bruno’s notion of the complication of all series in the absolute. The philosopher can only explicate what is profoundly implicated in an original confusion of essences.104

104 See for instance Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity (trans. R. Lucca. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 66: “Every potency. every act which, in the principle. is (so to speak) enfolded [or implicated]. united and unique. is unfolded. dispersed and multiplied in other things. The universe. which is the great simulacrum. the great image and sole-begotten nature. is also all that it can be .... But it is also not all that it can be. because of its very differences. its particulars. its modes and its individuals”. On Bruno and ‘complication’. see Deleuze, Proust and Signs (trans.
Further, if a principle cannot be found to ground individuation in reality, might this not be because the play of real possibilities is pre-individual? In this way, Deleuze effects a strange union of Kant and Leibniz. For while Deleuze accepts Kant’s move to relate all logical possibilities back to real possibilities, he at the same time affirms the formal aspect of Leibniz’s logical realm, that it is without individuation: the virtual realm of complication is composed of interrelated “pre-individual singularities”, whose spatio-temporal actualisation is conducted under the horizon of the problematic relations of these singularities. If all this produces a harmony in the spatio-temporal realm, it will not necessarily be a harmony we recognise or desire, but it will be in a sense a “universal harmony”. Because of the absence of the mind of God, can we really persist in thinking that the universe is an “uninhabited palace”? If there are harmonies to be found in the cosmos, does this imply someone knew how to produce them? Must a musician intelligibly know the laws of harmony for her notes to sound their harmonies? Deleuze is in effect patiently following Leibniz’s and Kant’s moves to ground the principle of reality in teleological and harmonic principles, only to critically discard the inadequate moments of these moves (such as the appeal to the mind of God and the unity of the world), in order finally to unveil the true structure of composibility that lies waiting and hidden.

4 From Ontological Reality to Transcendental Ideality: The Retreat of the Noumenon

Kant’s early metaphysics attempts to ground metaphysical cognition by working out the nature of the ‘real’. But he is torn in two directions: towards Spinozism, and away from it in recoil, towards harmony theory. ‘Reality’ is the locus of this tension, which is played out in the attempt to balance between the activity and passivity of substances. In a sense, whether they dissolve on the one side into God, or on the other into external interactions is all the same: Spinozism would be affirmed in either case: Deus sive Natura. Kant, like Leibniz, searches for a ‘third’ that will relate but distinguish both sides, that will provide a metaphysically

grounded account of sufficient reason; but for both thinkers, the results remain problematic.

In 1768, in *Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space*, Kant takes a new step towards a solution. Kant’s problem was that metaphysically he had not adequately grounded the unification of the spatiotemporal field. The principles of succession and coexistence by themselves could not ground an absolutely unified field, because they were to be derived from Kant’s new version of sufficient reason, which is internally problematic. Kant’s move in 1768 is to absolutise space, in order to provide a better ground for the unity of coexistence, and to provide the unity he is lacking in principle. The structure of space itself will be the new principle of coexistence.

**Absolute, Real Space**

Paradoxically, Kant constructs his argument for absolute space *against* Leibniz’s account of spatiotemporal individuation, which was itself meant to provide a positive ground for individuation in reality. Kant’s main weapon is the argument from incongruent counterparts. Briefly, it states that certain spatial properties, such as leftness, rightness, etc., cannot be reduced to internal properties of substances, because there is nothing conceptual distinguishing them. Hence, spatial content differs in kind from conceptual content. Again, Kant’s discovery of an extralogical principle is based on his testing of the limits of logical analysis, the limit between logic and reality. The apriority of spatial relations is the latest example of the possibility of an *apriori* extralogical principle. Kant is still attempting to exclude the dispersal of internal differences of substances into the contingent external world.

So why did Kant soon deny the reality of absolute space, and affirm its ideality? In CPR he gives two arguments against the reality of space. Firstly, the Newtonians create an absurd proliferation of entities when they think of real things coexisting with an “eternal and infinite self-subsisting nonentity, which exist[s], (yet without there being anything real)” (A39/B56). Secondly, geometry is threatened by the reality of space, as its apriority would no longer be

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105 I shall examine this argument in some detail in chapter 4.2.
immediately guaranteed. But there is a clue from a late set of lectures on metaphysics that Kant has another anxiety.

If we consider space as real, we assume Spinoza’s system. He believed only in one substance, and all the substances in the world he held for its divinely inhering determinations (he called space the phenomenon of the divine omnipresence). (LM 368, 28:666).

The last phrase is added in the margins so is of doubtful provenance, but two things suggest that Kant is behind it. Firstly, this is certainly *not* a characterisation one finds in Spinoza himself, and secondly, it *is* very reminiscent of Kant’s own thoughts – but of 20 years previously, in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, where he says that space is “the phenomenal omnipresence” of the divine cause (TP 404; Ak. 2:410). \(^{106}\) But why should the reality of space entail Spinoza’s system if the Newtonians had affirmed it without being Spinozists? \(^{107}\) To make space *real* may seem like an initially attractive way to harmonise substances, but it has another pernicious effect that may explain why Kant dropped the notion so soon. For if space is real, then it is infinitely divisible. Kant’s insistence on the absurdity of the Newtonian conception of two coexisting substances leaves only one option. If relations of substances can only be *determined* in space, the result must be the occlusion altogether of inner essences; no conceptual determination can adequately distinguish real substances themselves anymore; inner substances are eroded, and Spinozist monism beckons.

There is another point that follows from Kant’s position on absolute, real space, which will become important later. With the autonomy of space from its contents, there is now no longer *in principle* a straightforward one-to-one relation between internal properties and their external expression, as the paradox of incongruent counterparts shows. Kant now has to solve the problem of what the nature of the connection can be between intelligible substance and the *apriori* manifold of space and time. If the manifold of space is *apriori*, and there is no one-to-one relation between substances and their spatiotemporal appearance, then

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\(^{106}\) The fact that in the *Dissertation* Kant nevertheless affirmed the *ideality*, not the reality of space and time seems at first peculiar, but this later statement in the lectures perhaps represents an implicit criticism of his earlier, more simplistic account of the relation of noumenon and phenomenon, which we will visit in more detail in a moment. K. Ameriks discusses this passage in ‘The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology’, in P. Guyer (*The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 268f.

\(^{107}\) However, the famous defender of Newton against Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, who put forward the thesis in *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God* that absolute space is part of God, was criticised for his Spinozist tendencies on this point.
the possibility of relation between the two no longer can devolve simply on the relation of forces described above. The argument from incongruence, however, by itself logically suggests two possibilities: on the one hand, if space is real, inner substances would not themselves be all conceptually discernible; but on the other hand, if space is made ideal, inner substances cease to become spatial at all. As will be shown in chapter 4, Deleuze can be understood as affirming the former possibility, against Kant's turn to the latter. So what the argument from incongruent counterparts will really show for Deleuze is that the inner nature of things, their 'internal difference' cannot be thought according to concepts.

ii Absolute, Ideal Space and Time

In the *Inaugural Dissertation* Kant moves from the affirmation of the absoluteness and reality of space to its absoluteness and ideality. However, as space is now the ground of the universal coexistence of real entities, Kant must also continue to carry out the transformation with regard to the principle of succession – thus time too is made ideal. What does ideality at first signify here? Kant appears to ground the ideality on the fact that space is merely relational, which is a return to a Leibnizian thesis. Thus it may appear that Kant is returning to the Leibnizian thesis that motion is merely a well founded phenomenon, and is nothing real; but at the same time he is affirming the absoluteness of space, contra Leibniz.

But if space and time are merely ideal, then of what value is the proof of their apriority in grounding real interaction? At this point, we should remember, the theses concerning space and time are ontological; the epistemic status is a product of CPR. Thus, Kant cannot appeal to 'the possibility of experience' to ground the validity and reality of spatiotemporal relations. Although it is tempting to read Kant's critical moves back into the *Inaugural Dissertation*, this should be resisted. Kant asks in that essay what the apriori forms are, by virtue of which there is a world, not by virtue of which there is experience. Now, if these forms

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108 We are still revolving in a Leibnizian orbit: the account of ideality emerges from Leibnizian theses about the ideality of relations, hence is not originally an epistemological matter.

109 In #13 Kant says that "the principle of the form of the sensible world is that which contains the ground of the universal connection of all things, insofar as they are phenomena" (TP 391. Ak. 2:398), and he goes on to specify that these conditions, which ground universal succession and coexistence are the "schemata and conditions of everything sensitive in human cognition". Any
are merely ideal, then how can the ontological apriority of space have any effect in the world? The focus of Kant’s whole effort up until now has been to provide apriori grounds for a real world of forces. Force was the locus of the encounter between inner and external grounds, or substances and their interaction. As such, it was the centre of the problem concerning ‘reality’. But force is now displaced from the centre of Kant’s project. Whereas it was the locus of the ‘third thing’ in Kant’s early writings, it is now demoted to merely empirical status; it will only be developed in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Kant must make a fundamental move: with the apriori absence of force, succession and coexistence must now be governed merely by external relations in the spatiotemporal field. That is, the interaction of substances will now be reduced to their extensive relations. But again, what happens in this case to the intensive, the inner grounds of substances? How are we to think of the internal nature of substances?

iii Logic and Reality in the Inaugural Dissertation

In the Dissertation, the ontological concept of reality now refers to the substances themselves, while the coordination of interactions that is the universe will be ‘ideal’. The ‘intelligible object’ (in the sense of Gegenstand) of the mind is real, while the sensible object is ideal. Kant’s resolution here involves a splitting up and distribution of the notion of substance into noumenal and phenomenal aspects. This division will last into the critical period, and keeping our eye on it will be important as it represents not just a trace of Kant’s ‘pre-critical’ period, but the product of a tension that will continue throughout the critical project. As far as the notion of force is concerned, this distribution effectively ends the

similarity between this and the theories of the Critique is overshadowed by the fact that it turns out that the mutual organisation of space and time are all that is necessary for a world; there is no reference to categories in the Dissertation. These conditions are all that coordinate the world and make it a unity.

112 Now that the notion of ideality comes to assume importance in Kant, it must henceforth be kept in mind that reality was primarily meant to be opposed to logic, not to appearance or ideality as such. There will indeed be a shift in Kant’s concept of reality but it must be charted carefully. See footnote 83 above on the role of idealism in the early Kant.

111 In CPR, intensity will be restricted to the degree of any extensive intuition: thus the Anticipations of Perception are subordinated to the Axioms of Intuition.

112 This will be discussed in the next chapter. See M. Radner, ‘Substance and Phenomenal Substance: Kant’s Individuation of Things in Themselves and Appearances’, (in Barber & Gracia, Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy) and K. Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind, 67, 145, for a discussion of this dual role of substance in CPR.
ontological role of intensive factors in the ‘world’, as they become unknowable. Intensive relations can only be thought, whereas extensive magnitudes are the object of measurement, but these are only ideal. In effect, by idealising space and time and noumenalising substance, Kant has shifted all determination into the phenomenal realm. All order will be intra-phenomenal, that is, relative to sensible experience. The noumenal realm is barely conceivable, and while it remains necessary to think it, the ways in which it can be thought seem to be very problematic. We should look briefly at the two aspects of cognition, intellectual and sensible, in order to pursue our question about the inner nature of substances.

A. Pure Concepts. Kant does allot a role to the “pure forms of the understanding” in the Dissertation, even though they are not yet clues to the categories. He says that “things which are thought sensitively are representations of things as they appear, while things which are intellectual are representations of things as they are” (TP 384, Ak. 2:392). The understanding is said to have two uses: the logical and the real. These familiar terms appear to have a new function here. We have just seen that space and time, as ideal, now replace the ontological structure of what has been called up to now ‘reality’. So of what real use can the understanding be? Kant defines the logical use of the understanding in terms of abstraction and reflection on what is given to sensibility, and says that the real use concerns concepts which have their origin in the understanding itself (TP 385, Ak. 2:393). Kant’s use of the term ‘real’ here indicates that it is the objects of the understanding – intelligible substances – that are being classed as real. The real use of the understanding has two “ends”: to keep separate sensibility from understanding (the role of ‘transcendental reflection’ in CPR), and the dogmatic

113 Paul Guyer also argues that the objects of pure understanding in the Dissertation are conceived in terms of rationalist ontology. However, he goes too far in suggesting that sensibility and the pure understanding “furnish representations of quite distinct sets of objects” (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 14); in the context of Kant’s earlier work, their relation can remain grounded by the ontotheological account of real possibility. Guyer is perhaps too in the thrall of a commonsense modern view that any concept of ‘reality’ (cf. 4), or the in-itself must refer to some kind of ‘matter’ behind the appearances; but among rationalist philosophers the thought of the in-itself was quite naturally conceived in terms of monadic intelligibility rather than some sort of matter. For a particularly powerful statement of this, see the Groundwork, where Kant goes so far as to say “even the most common understanding... is well known, is very much inclined to expect behind the objects of the senses something else invisible and active of itself – but it spoils this again by quickly making this invisible something sensible in turn, that is, wanting to make it an object of intuition, so that it does not thereby become any the wiser” (PP 98: Ak. 4:452). One could argue that it is one of the ‘visionary’ characteristics of ‘revisionary metaphysicians’, amongst whom I would include Kant, Hegel, Deleuze as well as Leibniz, to take nothing about the ‘in itself’ for granted.
end of providing “a common measure for all other things insofar as they are realities. This paradigm is NOUMENAL PERFECTION” (TP 388, Ak. 2:396). In a theoretical sense, this concerns “the Supreme Being, GOD”. So Kant is still in principle affirming his ontological proof.114

So while the real use of the understanding may seem to anticipate the categories - “to this genus belong possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc.” TP 388, Ak. 2:396) – for Kant these concepts originate in the apriori capacity of the mind to think intelligibilia.115 Indeed, while the understanding does play a role in coordinating experience, this is restricted to its logical use:

That which precedes the logical use of the understanding is called appearance, while the reflective cognition, which arises when several appearances are compared by the understanding, is called experience. Thus, there is no way from appearance to experience except by reflection in accordance with the logical use of the understanding (TP 386, Ak. 2:394).

What is striking here is that the role of experience is unessential at this point to Kant’s longtime goal of providing apriori principles for the coordination of physical beings. Experience is defined in terms of the logical use of the understanding.116 Indeed, Kant even warns against “subreptively” taking concepts derived from sensitive cognition for “the condition of the possibility itself of the object” (TP 409, Ak. 2:413); this thesis runs in the opposite direction to CPR. Indeed Kant’s formulation of the problem of subreption in the Dissertation is quite extreme. He even states that “the very principle of contradiction itself presupposes the concept of time and bases itself on it as its condition. For A and not-A are not inconsistent unless they are thought simultaneously (that is to say, at the same time)” (TP 394; Ak. 2:401). Kant in effect insists that we should not presume that God or intelligibilia conform to the principle of contradiction.

But in this case, what possible idea of intelligibilia or of God can we have without the principle of contradiction? Thus, while Kant seems to affirm access to

114 However, it cannot be denied that Kant has attenuated the ontological role of God here. God is discussed as a “paradigm” and “common measure”, and only in the last sentence to this section (§9), does Kant add: “But, although God, as the ideal of perfection, is the principle of cognising. He is also, at the same time, insofar as He really exists, the principle of the coming into being of all perfection whatsoever” (ibid).

115 Kant states that, far from being ‘distinct’, “representations which belong to the understanding can be extremely confused” (TP 387, Ak. 2:395), which shows how differently pure concepts are conceived to CPR at this period.

116 That is, what Kant will later call the ‘empirical use of the understanding’ is here identified with its logical use.
intelligibilia, and to refer to his ontotheological proof, these objects seem to have become rather problematic, to use a later Kantian term.

B. Sensibility. The emphasis on sensibility is new in 1770. However, for Kant at this stage, it is becoming increasingly problematic to relate the data of sensibility to real substances (intensively considered). ‘Sensitivity’ is affection by a substance: this remains thinkable only if we keep in mind the rationalist notion of the intensive nature of force, or the inner natures of substance. But there is a deeper reason at work behind Kant’s turn to the ideality of sensibility. We saw that for Kant concepts are merely possible unities in the mind, and something ‘more’ is needed to instantiate a concept: existence. But existence had remained a riddle; Kant had ultimately only given it rational content by relating it to the “absolute positing” of God in his modal argument from real possibility. However, with the introduction of sensibility, Kant can retreat from the complications in this view, and fulfil the criterion of the notion of existence that concept instantiation depend on something ‘more’, by simply connecting it with the ‘given’ of sensible intuition. This is the simplified path he takes in CPR, but it is not without its own metaphysical difficulties, as we will see in the next chapter.

In conclusion, the import for us of the two main developments in the Dissertation should be spelled out. Firstly, the effects of the introduction of ideality into Kant’s search for an adequate principle of sufficient reason, strengthened by the new critical notion of subreption, now problematises the ontological notion of the ‘real’, in effect distorting the old distinction of logic/reality. Secondly, the turn to sensibility introduces a new criterion for existence. This latter principle also dislodges the logic/reality distinction, as existence and reality lose their equivalence: something can fulfil the criterion of existence, even while remaining ‘unreal’ or ideal.

But these developments should be placed into the context that has emerged in this chapter. Paradoxically by idealising the external spatiotemporal relations of substances, Kant shores up the real possibility of internal substantial attributes. By

\[117\] The notion of affection will only become a problem in CPR when causality becomes a determining category: the question of how things in themselves could affect, that is, cause appearances became a dominant one in the early reception of the critique. Jacobi’s famous problem with things in themselves can be seen to arise out of it. Nevertheless, if we keep in mind the notion of force as it becomes submerged in Kant’s writings, then an answer to Jacobi’s problem remains available and unexplored, as we will see in chapter 4. My turn to early Kantian
making the coordination of the universe ideal, Kant avoids the Spinozism that would return if he were to make space real. More generally, he continues his aim to preserve, against the powerful ontological pull of Spinozism, the noumenal realm from dissolution into contingency, or absolute necessity. But the problem is that the turn to ideality makes intelligible substances retreat beyond the veil of phenomena. Kant’s achilles heel will from now on be the reality of the noumenon. What can the noumenon consist of? Given the fact that experience is composed of ideal laws, one is always caught in a situation where one says too much or too little of the noumenon. In CPR, Kant begins to explicitly designate it as ‘problematic’. But the noumenon will not only be liminal for experience, but will be the problematic horizon which is nonetheless necessary for critique to take place.

In the next part of this thesis, I propose to show the persistence of ‘pre-critical’ metaphysical issues throughout various aspects of Kant’s ‘critical’ philosophy. It is organised into two sets of two chapters, with each set describing a fundamental juncture in Kant’s project. The first chapter of each pair will deal with Kant’s argument, and the second with Deleuze’s transformation of the problems that arise from it. The first pair will develop the relations between critique and idealism and will show that it is important for both Kant and Deleuze not to dissolve noumena entirely into phenomena. The second pair will concern the importance of the concept of transcendental deduction in Kant and its apparent lack of importance in Deleuze. It will mostly focus on the first edition CPR, but it will also examine Kant’s development of the notion of the subject in the second edition CPR, and Deleuze’s account of the ‘fractured I’.

The twofold structure will reflect my aim to displace critical and metacritical weight from the Transcendental Analytic. The first pair of chapters will focus on the relation of Aesthetic (in the CPR sense) to Dialectical issues, whereas the second pair will focus on the relation of Analytic to Dialectical issues. In so doing I will also be taking up Deleuze’s structure in DR, which he rationalism in such disputes should be seen in the light of the post-Kantians’ general neglect of Kant’s early writings.

118 If we forget this pre-critical story, then we forget why Kant needed things in themselves, and see everything from the point of view of post-Kantianism.
calls "an exploration of the two halves of difference, the dialectical half and the aesthetic half" (DR 221/285).

119 Cf. K. Ameriks, 'The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology' on this tension in the development of Kant's metaphysics.
Part Two

Kant and Deleuze
Chapter Three
The Sense of the Noumenon: Kant

1  The Object = x

The breakthrough in the critical project is usually taken to be outlined in Kant’s letter of 21 February 1772 to Marcus Herz, where Kant realises that he has no justification for assuming that the pure concepts of the understanding used by the intellect have any relation at all to the given in sensibility. “Our understanding, through its representations, is neither the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends), nor is the object the cause of our intellectual representations in the real sense (in sensu reali) ... [But] if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects?” (C 133, Ak. 10:130).¹ He concludes that “the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics” is the answer to the question “what is the ground of the relation of that

¹ This question is often seen in terms of Hume’s problem about causality, although there is no reference to Hume in the letter, which continues to breathe the atmosphere of continental rationalism. Kant frames the dilemma in terms of occasionalism (“Hyperphysical Influx Theory”) and “Pre-established Intellectual Harmony Theory” (C 134, Ak. 10:131); he does not mention the possibility of simple physical influx, probably because this is seen (by Kant as well as others) as the least hopeful option. While Kant’s retrospective remark in 1783 that it was Hume who awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers does verify the role of Humean skepticism in Kant’s critical turn, it is important nevertheless to realise that, given the development described thus far, the internal problems in rationalism concerning sufficient reason are enough to produce and to make palpable to Kant the problem delineated in the letter. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, Hume’s contribution can be seen in terms of an exacerbation of a problematic about concepts such as causality that was affecting 18th century philosophy in general.
in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object [Gegenstand]?” (ibid). The purely passive reception of appearances does not account for the apriori intellectual elements of knowledge, nor can the intellect delve behind the sensible curtain of the object in an act of intellectual intuition, and identify the thought of noumenal substance with its appearance. Hence the pure understanding and the object cannot be causally related to each other, or more simply, cannot affect each other. Here the stage for the transcendental deduction is clearly being set. As Wolfgang Carl says, “the deduction must explain a non-causal relation between representations and their objects ... the special case in which the understanding may form for itself concepts of things completely apriori, with which concepts of things must necessarily agree”. But while Carl has argued that in the 1772 letter Kant is referring to the critical problem of the relation of pure concepts to the sensible world, L. W. Beck has rightly pointed out that the issue of the letter is not yet that of the applicability of apriori concepts to sensible objects, but “the problem of how there can be apriori knowledge of intelligibilia without intellectual intuition”. The Gegenstände of pure understanding are the thoughts of such entities as noumenal substances and God, the ‘proper objects’ of the understanding. In a Reflexion from the late 1770’s, Kant is still writing that “noumenon properly signifies something which is always the same, namely the transcendental object of sensible intuition”. Kant needs something that concepts are about but he still thinks it must be noumena.

The notion of object (Gegenstand) only becomes the site of a problem when the burden for determination is shifted onto sensible experience. But the problem is not yet that of the right of the understanding to think Gegenstände apriori. It is rather how to relate the Gegenstände given by right to the understanding with the appearances given in sensible cognition to each other. If the Gegenstände of the pure understanding are thought to be what is behind sensible affection, how is this

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2 As suggested in chapter one, the problem with intellectual intuition is that it combines two faculties that are incompatible in the case of human beings. However, as long as the intellect/understanding does not claim to intuit, it does have some rights (due to the apriori cognitions having their sources in the understanding).


5 Reflexion 5554 (1778-81), cited in Guyer & Wood, eds., Kant, CPR, 732.
connection to be established? What can assure token identity between noumenal and phenomenal substances?

Kant marks this problematic site with a new concept that at this point can only be defined negatively. The problem is designated by the formula or function “object = x”. This new term - Object - does not yet exist in the Inaugural Dissertation, and has nothing to do with the common sense of the word ‘object’. The notions of “object = x” and “relation to an object” are equivalent and denote the transcendental function of possible experience. This will be the new form of the “third thing” that relates affection or interaction with a notion of the ground of affection.

Kant elaborates in a Reflexion on how an ‘object’ can be formed by the union of concepts and intuition in a judgment:

Every object is known only through predicates which we think or assert of it. Before this, any representations that may be found in us are to be regarded only as material for cognition, not as themselves cognitions. An object, therefore, is only a something in general which we think to ourselves through certain predicates which constitute its concept. Every judgment contains two predicates which we compare with one another. One of these, which constitutes the given knowledge of the object, is called the logical subject; the other, which is compared with it, is called the predicate.

In any judgment, we have an object = x, which we designate by a subject term (S), and of which we predicate an attribute (P). Kant says that through predication, a judgment can either express what is already present in the concept S (analytic) or it can express something else in the object = x that is not present in S (synthetic). In both cases, both S and P are predicates; it is just that in analysis the reference to the object is redundant, but that does not mean that it is not also essential to any determination of an object. Likewise, in synthesis, the subject concept identifies the object, but it is no more intrinsically related to it than the predicate. In a synthetic judgment the predicate concept is predicated of the intuited object = x, not directly of

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6 Henceforth I will refer to Object as ‘object’, and where Gegenstand is referred to I will cite the German.

7 Reflexion 4634, quoted in H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale, 1983), 70-1.

8 This is to say that the analytic/synthetic distinction is not equivalent to a distinction between logical and real use. Rather both logical and real predication can be analytic or synthetic. In the former case the distinction is used to assess the formal status of the judgment, while in the latter, to assess whether a genuine determination (Bestimmung) of the object has been made (in which case it is synthetic) or not (analytic) (cf. Logic, trans. R. Hartman & W. Schwarz. New York: Dover. 1974, # 36. 118)
the subject concept. The latter is determined, or made “distinct”, as Allison says, it “therefore is the outcome rather than the starting point of such a judgment”.9 Throughout, it remains “a concept of a possible object”, and is open to revision in each synthetic judgment.

Kant substitutes the form “to every x to which appertains the concept of body \((a + b)\), appertains also attraction \((c)\)”, for subject-predicate logic in the case of objects.10 It seems that here Kant’s logic is very close to modern logic, but there is an important difference, due to the unusual status of the object. For Kant the object \(= x\) is itself neither defined extensionally nor intensionally. Despite having been described as what is determined, as what undergoes the process of determination, as the object that is being “related” to, it is always “still undetermined” (A691/B94).11 In another *Reflexion* from the 1770’s, Kant says that the “x is therefore the determinable (object) that I think through the concept a, and b is its determination or the way it is determined”. With the identification of the object with the determinable we make some progress in deciphering the status of the object. Kant uses this schema of undetermined/determinable/determination to specify his difference from a ‘logicised’ Leibnizianism, and to underscore the difference between logic and reality. He specifies that matter and form “are two concepts that ground all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The former signifies the determinable in general, the latter the determination” (A266/B322). Kant goes on to explain that these have crucially different functions in logical and real determinations. In logic, “the universal is the matter, and the specific difference the form”; thus matter precedes form in logic. But Kant now criticises ‘intellectualist’ metaphysics, for confusing this logical function with metaphysical or extralogical functions. In what seems to be as much a self-criticism as a criticism of Leibniz, he objects that “unbounded reality is regarded as the matter of all possibility, but its limitation (negation) as th[e] form”. Kant argues against Leibniz that form in metaphysics is prior to matter, due to the priority of the forms of space and time over

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10 Kant, *Logic*, #36, 118.
11 “Concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some representation of a still undetermined object” (A69/B94).
their contents. “[S]o far is it from being the case that the matter (or the things themselves, which appear) ought to be the ground (as one would have to judge according to mere concepts), that rather their possibility presupposes a formal intuition (of space and time) as given” (A268/B324). Space and time thus ‘prepare’ an item for determination by making it determinable. The object is an affecting thing that has been made determinable. Thus, it is not merely that the object is distinguished from the thing itself in the Lockean sense that it is “modified” by the sensibility of the subject (cf. TP 384, Ak. 2:393). The forms of intuition are prior conditions of determinability in general.

The examination of the notion of object is vital to grasping Kant’s break from Leibnizianism, for which the real use of judgments is formally reducible to the logical subject-predicate relation. If the judgment is merely logical, the predicate would be contained in the subject. But the object cannot be identified with the logical subject of the judgment, because it contains intuitive components which are not of the same character as concepts. They do not possess an internal unity in the sense that concepts do – their only unity is in the spatiotemporal field. A ‘unity’ of immediacy and singularity may be attributed to them, but again this is dependent on the differentiation of the manifold of the spatiotemporal field in relation to the subject.

But Kant’s identification of what it is in the object = x that allows us to determine the subject-concept is problematic. It is synthesis that determines the object, but how does this work? Reflexion 4634 (cited above) emphasises that the possible object is identified with a subject concept only through “the given knowledge of the object”, but in the Logic Kant emphasises that, as a determination, synthesis involves “making a distinct concept”, which he identifies with the making distinct of objects; the obscure object that is made distinct is thus the “something in general” referred to in the Reflexion above. So what is it in the object that grounds the relation of subject and predicate? Kant seems to vacillate between attributing the ground to

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12 This also rules out the object being referred to vaguely as some kind of intentional correlate to judging consciousness, as while the object can only be identified as such by a concept, it is its elusiveness to the concept that is at issue in the notion of an ‘object = x’.  
13 Logic, 70.
the subject-concept or the intuited object. This ambiguity can be traced to Kant’s uncertainty about the representational status of the intuition. The only thing that would warrant the subject concept is an intuition. It follows that in this case, the intuition would then be part of the concept, and itself an objective cognition. But surely Kant’s whole effort is to show how different intuitions are from concepts, and thus to distinguish himself on this point from Leibniz: a subject concept cannot be justified in identifying an intuition, without unifying “many possible cognitions ... into one” (A69/B94). As Pippin points out, the attribution of semantic status to intuition goes against Kant’s insistence on the exclusion of direct experience of individuals.

Now, the only time Kant seems explicitly to say that the intuition is itself an objective cognition is in his classification of the species of the genus of representation at A320/B377. Here all the major species of representation in CPR are classed as “representations with consciousness (perceptio)”. I suggest that there is a tension in Kant’s account at this point, which we can pinpoint under the concept of representation. We have just seen that Kant vacillates about the status of the subject-concept in a judgment because he cannot warrant its objectivity without attributing a direct relation between it and the object = x in the intuition. There seem to be two ways out of this: either affirm that intuition does have semantic value, or objective meaning as a representation, or affirm that the object = x, as “a possible object”, must be thought as a problematic concept, or a task. I shall argue that Kant does treat seriously this latter option, which involves finding some kind of internal relation

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14 In this section of the Logic, Kant stipulates that in making a distinct concept one moves from the part to the whole. In determining the object, “there are as yet no marks present – I obtain them first by synthesis” (ibid). When the mathematician and philosopher of nature attempt to determine an object, they must appeal to intuition. But how could the subject-concept be related to the object at all without any marks?

15 Allison bases his interpretation of the semantic content of an intuition on Molte Gram’s theory in Kant, Ontology and the A Priori (Evanston: Northwestern, 1968). In The Kant-Eberhard Controversy he discusses it at length (67-75), and continues to affirm it in a low key way in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: cf. 341-2, n. 19.

16 Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form (New Haven: Yale, 1982), 141. Pippin criticises Gram’s theory, and implicitly Allison’s.

17 “An objective perception is a cognition. The latter is either an intuition or a concept”.

18 After quoting the above Reflection, Allison goes on to explicate the concept of the object by referring to a passage from B141 concerning the unity of apperception, despite having opened up the perspective that an object is “a something in general”.
between the transcendental object and the noumenon, so that he can indeed continue
to affirm that "noumenon properly signifies something which is always the same,
namely the transcendental object of sensible intuition". Henry Allison has argued
that Kant has two notions of the transcendental object, one noumenal and one
properly transcendental, that should be distinguished. But if we keep sight of the
present problematic, it may be possible to see how Kant's various accounts of a
transcendental object may be consistent after all.

More generally, I want to draw attention to a structural ambiguity in Kant
about the notion of representation, which it will be left to Deleuze to explore, as will
be seen in subsequent chapters. On the one hand, we seem to be far away from a
representational model of knowledge whereby an intuition is subsumed under a
concept. Firstly, sensations themselves are not representational in the sense that they
intelligibly portray their content – they are simply the immediate matter of
experience. Secondly, concepts are not 'representational' in a direct sense but
represent only the ability to classify and discriminate the matter of sensation. Thirdly,
the object = x of experience is presented as indeterminate and problematic, thus
differentiating Kant's philosophy from Leibnizian rationalism.

But on the other hand, all of these tendencies are countered by others which
return to intellectualist accounts of representation. Kant's project is riven between a
radical anti-representationalism and an inability to sustain this radicality;
Leibnizianism, whether in its logicising or realising tendencies, is never far away.
The Deleuzian solution of this tension will emphasise the nonrepresentational aspects
of sensibility and reason which are already at hand but underdeployed in Kant.

2 Logic and Reality in The Critique of Pure Reason

In CPR the logic/reality distinction undergoes a further diversification, leading off
from the moves made in the Dissertation. Logic is now purely formal, and no longer
relates to any object (Gegenstand). However, logic must gain sense through reference

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19 Reflection 5554, op. cit.
20 Allison, 'Kant's Concept of the Transcendental Object' (Kant-Studien 59, 1968). 165.
to something outside logic. In the Dissertation, the notion of reality as an ontological category was split into phenomenal ideality/noumenal reality, while the notion of a logical and real use of the understanding lived on. In CPR this ontological split is deepened, so that, as a result of existential import now being considered functionally equivalent to relation to a possible intuition, Kant grasps the nettle and calls the phenomenal realm empirical reality. However, what prevents Kant’s ascription of empirical reality to phenomena here from being equivalent to phenomenalism is the fact that it is redeemed and justified through an account of its transcendental ideality: that the very possibility of empirical reality has necessary conditions.

The use of the understanding is transformed accordingly. Firstly, if the understanding can have a logical use, this can only be formal, so a new notion of use must be found to describe the role of understanding in experience: there will now be an empirical use of the understanding, in which the understanding is always used in conjunction with a possible intuition. But this will be contrasted with a transcendental use, in which the intuition is not just lacking but impossible.

Now while it would appear that the logic/reality distinction has been swallowed up in the new structure of CPR, in fact, it is possible to argue that it is still doing subterranean work. It has already been glimpsed that the notion of the problem has power only because it occupies a line between logic and the real, which in its importance for critique itself, is more general than the new distinctions just outlined. I shall argue that the phenomena/noumena distinction is the key to the structure and metacritical claim to legitimacy of CPR, and that the Analytic of Concepts in important ways depends on it. For if, in the case of humans, the apriori forms of intuition and the categories apply only to the sensible manifold, and their apriori validity depends on this restriction, then the project of limitation or making boundaries is indeed the methodologically prior component of critique. The main question that will dominate this chapter will concern how Kant maintains an apriori reference to the noumenon, while simultaneously restricting the intellect to sensibility. I will argue that this is accomplished through the account of Ideas, which both can and must be thought, thus giving problematic sense to the noumenon.
If this complex project of delimitation is indeed the prior component of critique, it will be seen why Kant maintained in 1783 that in the Dissertation one could “find a clearer prospect” of the aims of CPR despite the relative obscurity of the former (August 26, 1783, to Johann Schultz, C 208, Ak. 10:352). In the Dissertation, Kant laid the blame for the failures of metaphysics with “subreptions”, by which sensible cognition overreached its limits. But in CPR, really the same diagnosis prevails, although hidden in the vastly more elaborate structure. The problems of the Transcendental Dialectic all arise as a result of subreption, of the transgression of the distinction between phenomena and noumena. The three transcendental Ideas, of self, world and God, are all forms of this fundamental subreption, which in the Analytic, is given the name of ‘amphiboly’. One of the clearest statements of this general position is given at the end of the first edition Paralogisms, where Kant states that “one can place all illusion in the taking of a subjective condition of thinking for the cognition of an object” (A396).

Thus the staking out of limits is the preliminary procedure of critique, and carries on in fundamental ways the goals of the ‘pre-critical’ period. This procedure is divided into two moments, which are mixed together in CPR.

1. an investigation into the internal limits of the understanding and sensibility.
2. an account of how these two forms of cognition and differentiation relate to each other.

If we keep this twofold activity in focus, then the continuity in Kant’s project is visible, underlying both the ‘pre-critical’ and the critical project; the innovation of CPR largely concerns the second moment. But we must start by approaching the meaning of Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena. We will see in the next section that this distinction is by no means transparent in CPR, as it relies on getting right the parallel distinction between the rights and limits of the understanding and sensibility. The ‘problem of noumena’ only exists at all because the understanding is no longer unproblematically allowed to affirm “things as they are” (TP 384, Ak. 2:392).
The Problem of Noumenal Reality

The Logical Possibility of Noumena

It is possible to find a connection between Kant’s unstable position on noumena in 1770 and his important decision, expressed at the start of CPR, to make logic purely formal. In CPR, analytic truths, along with their highest principle, that of contradiction, are finally divested of any metaphysical validity. We saw in the last chapter that our inability to use the principle of contradiction in thinking of noumena (and God, as the principle of noumenal perfection), makes it problematic how we are to think of the noumenal at all. By completely depriving the principle of contradiction of any metaphysical import, Kant now makes it nevertheless possible at least to consistently think about noumena. The concept of noumena can therefore be clarified in a preliminary way by appealing to the distinction between logical possibility and real possibility. Noumena must be unconditioned and completely determinate, in a sense that appearances cannot be, as they are always conditioned. So while Kant insists that it is not possible to conceive of what a noumenon is like as it lacks intuitive content, the concept has logical possibility. Something is really possible in Kant’s terms if it has some significance within the framework of experience. It becomes pre-eminently possible to logically think noumena - the notions of God, world and self are all logically consistent thoughts – but their reality cannot be known. Kant calls such concepts “problematic” (A254/B310). As Kant says, even though empirical intuitions and matter are merely relational, “through mere concepts, of course, I cannot think of something external without anything inner, for the very reason that relational concepts absolutely presuppose given things and are not possible without these” (A284/B340). But what significance does this merely formal


22 Adams, ‘Things in Themselves’, 810-11. Similarly Kant allows the concepts with which noumenal reality is described to have logical sense, such as noumenal causality. Adams writes that Kant has a special term - problematic concept – which concerns an object of which “it is only the real possibility of such an object that is unknown to us ... [T]he concept of noumenal causality should be viewed as a
possibility have if we are restricted in knowledge to intuition? Why does Kant also insist that noumena must be thought?

ii The Necessity of Thinking about Noumena

Kant insists that it is necessary to think such boundaries in order properly to limit the domain of what can be known. That is, the thought of noumena is essential to any critical procedures of the mind. Kant gives a rather obscure, yet crucial account in the 'Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General [Gegenstände überhaupt] into Phenomena and Noumena'. He suggests that "we have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility" (A255). As no intuition can be given to such an extension of the understanding, he calls the concept of a noumenon "problematic", and a "boundary concept" (ibid), but this concept "is nevertheless not invented arbitrarily, but is rather connected with the limitation of sensibility" (ibid). Put this way, it looks like Kant is introducing a teleological explanation about why understanding must overstep itself – it must overstep itself in order to limit itself. But why must it limit itself? For whom is the concept of noumenon necessary? Must all human beings recognise this 'necessity', or only the transcendental philosopher? Two passages show that Kant opts for the latter:

The understanding [which] is occupied merely with its empirical use, which does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may get along very well, but cannot accomplish one thing, namely, determining for itself the boundaries of its use and knowing what may lie within and what without its whole sphere (A238/B297).

In all the tasks that may come before us in the field of experience, we treat those appearances as objects in themselves, without worrying ourselves about the primary ground of their possibility (as appearances). But if we go beyond their boundary, then the concept of a transcendental object [Gegenstand] becomes necessary (A393).

In both passages, Kant suggests that the ordinary use of the understanding does not need to "worry" about any critical procedure or apprehension of its limits. However,
the first passage talks of a 'self-determination' of boundaries, while the latter talks as if this transgression (and discovery) of boundaries happens without design and only then produces an object that must be described, upon examination, as problematic. While Kant seems to leave this alternative open, finding an answer to it surely is essential to the problem of the self-critique of reason. This issue will become more pressing as this chapter proceeds, but for the moment a further anomaly in the chapter under discussion should be pointed out.

Kant states that the concept of the noumenon “is not only inadmissable, but unavoidable, as a concept setting limits to sensibility” (A256/B311). He then stresses that it is not, as might be thought, sensibility that limits the understanding, but “the understanding acquires a negative expansion ... and rather limits it [sensibility] by calling things in themselves (not considered as appearances) *noumena*”. He adds that, as well as “warning sensibility” (A288/B345), the understanding “also immediately sets boundaries for itself” (A256/B312).

Why does the understanding limit sensibility and not vice versa? Firstly, the notion that the ‘proper object’ of the understanding is “things as they are” seems still to be doing some work. Space and time, as the forms of sensibility, cannot reach things as they really are – the former involve purely external relations and are to be conceived as ideal, infinite, immediately *given* forms (A25), cast over noumena in order to differentiate them for finite minds. Sensible concepts cannot pretend to adequately conceive of *completely determined* noumenal substances.

But secondly, this should be counterposed with Kant’s fundamental proposition that concepts and intuitions require each other (even God requires some form of intelligence that would include both). Kant explicitly states, against his earlier writings, that the noumenon “is not a special *intelligible object* [Gegenstand] for our understanding” (ibid). If the noumenon can be thought at all, it must be thought problematically, not purely intellectually (this is surely a rectification of the inconsistencies in Kant’s position on *intelligibilia* in the Dissertation). If a concept must be accompanied by some kind of intuition, the noumenon cannot simply be the thought of a *mundus intelligibilis*, but implies equally an (impossible for us) intuition accompanying that thought; it is the thought of *both* of these together that is
'problematic'. It is this problematic composite that ultimately "limits sensibility" and itself.

However, then Kant states that "an understanding to which [a concept of the noumenon] would belong is itself a problem, namely that of cognising its object not discursively through categories but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition" (ibid, italics mine). But he has just suggested that we "unavoidably" must think the concept of the noumenon and indeed goes on to say that it is through this thought of a problematic use of the understanding that "our understanding requires a negative expansion". How is the claim that the noumenal use of the understanding would have to involve an (intellectual) intuition to be squared with the fact that this problematic use must be thought by us? How is this "negative expansion" to be thought by us? It is not hard to hear an echo of the structure of "negative pleasure" in CJ, whereby although a faculty "finds nothing beyond the sensible that could support it, this very removal of its barriers also makes it feel unbounded, so that its separation [from the sensible] is an exhibition of the infinite" (CJ 274). Thus, *some kind* of content seems to be necessary for the problematic thought, even though no knowledge is gained. In a sense, Kant’s repartition of the Latinate ‘intellect’ of the Dissertation into ‘understanding’ and ‘reason’ is a function of this problem; for God, whether conceived as “intellectual intuition” or “intuitive understanding” is never held to be capable of reason. Reason itself is the effect of the problematisation of the understanding by finitude; but paradoxically it is only reason that can *think* this problematisation, through the manipulation of the content given to the understanding. After CPR, Kant continually suggests more and more ways in which “rational Ideas” can somehow be “presented” to the subject, whether through their moral significance, by analogy in symbolic “aesthetic Ideas”, or through the "ethico-theological" significance of the whole of cognition. I suggest that these attempts to clarify the problematic activity of reason must be seen as attempts towards the resolution of Kant’s final problem, the metacritical status of critique itself, the problem of immanence. But before such suggestions can be explicated, we should turn to two other ways in which Kant deals with the present problem in CPR itself: firstly
'transcendental reflection', and secondly, the issue of the internal characteristics of space and time themselves.

iii Transcendental Reflection

Now, while Kant says the understanding is not worried about limitation until it undergoes this negative expansion, he does also provide a "static" account of the distinction between understanding and sensibility in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection, which would seem to provide a "systematic" resolution to these "worries". However, this section is peculiar in many regards. It is here that Kant expounds the crucial notion of transcendental reflection, yet it is placed in a mere appendix, and moreover under a heading that expresses its content only negatively — as the *amphiboly*, or misuse of the concepts of reflection. Kant states that "reflection ... is the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts" (A260/B316; my italics). Such an act would seem to be vital to the preliminary orientation of critique, so why has it been left until this point? He goes on:

The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or pure intuition, I call transcendental reflection. (A261/B317).

Thus, there is not only a special act of the mind, "prior to all objective judgments" (A262/B318) by which the distinction between sources of the mind is made, but it is a transcendental act. Now, the very ability to detect amphibolies of reflection, whereby certain concepts are treated intellectually, which should be treated sensibly, is surely at the very root of the problem of the synthetic *apriori*. For synthetic judgments are judgments that are *apriori* yet not merely analytic, and thus presuppose some relation

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24 As was pointed out by Hegel, Kant not only draws attention to the incompleteness of his account of the pure concepts, but expresses the problem inherent in the formalist distinction and relation of concepts and intuitions by providing what Hegel calls "a treatise on the concepts of reflection - a sphere lying between intuition and the understanding or being and the Notion" (Science of Logic 586). Hegel arguably developed his central account of the Logic of Essence out of this hiatus in Kant. The problematic dialectic between positing reflection and external reflection is solved by what Hegel calls 'determining reflection', which can be seen to amount to a deliberate conflation by Hegel of what remains separate in Kant, categories which *determine* and the ambiguous activity of *reflection*.
to extralogical reality. The distinction that lies at the ground of this root is Kant’s oldest distinction, between logic and reality; and it is to this that Kant now returns:

If ... the question is not about the logical form, but about the content of the concepts, i.e. whether things are themselves identical or different, in agreement or opposition, etc., then since the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of knowledge, namely to sensibility and to understanding, it is the place to which they belong in this regard that determines the mode in which they belong to one another (A262/B318). 25

This is all very reminiscent of Kant’s pre-critical account of intelligible and phenomenal forms of differentiation. The “place to which [the objects/Gegenstände] belong” determines how they will be differentiated. Transcendental reflection is thus equated with a kind of ‘transcendental topology’ (cf. A268/B325). All Kant’s older notions of logical/real opposition, inner/outer, etc. find a new place here. 26 He continues:

For this reason the interrelations of given representations can be determined only through transcendental reflection, that is through [consciousness of] their relation to one or other of the two kinds of knowledge. Whether things are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc., cannot be established at once from the concepts themselves by mere comparison, but solely by means of transcendental reflection, through distinction of the cognitive faculty to which they belong (ibid). Later he states that “if I apply these concepts to an object in general (in the transcendental sense), without further determining whether this is an object of sensible or intellectual intuition, then limitations ... immediately show up which pervert all empirical use of them” (A279/B335). But although this ‘prior determination’ by transcendental reflection seems crucial, Kant never really states what it involves. 27 By which source of the mind is this act carried out? Kant

25 For this and the following quotation from this paragraph I have used Kemp Smith’s translation, as Guyer’s & Wood’s is unintelligible.
26 Thus at A265/B321 and A273/B329, Kant distinguishes between the form of differentiation involved in logical opposition as contradiction (which results in nothing), and that involved in real opposition as cancellation (which does result in something, for instance, rest). Each involves a different conception of ‘zero’.
27 It will be suggested that the notion of transcendental reflection is developed in C1, there, its “subjective” status, its ‘preliminary’ role as the foundation of the critical thought of limits, its claim to ground the distinction between cognitive capacities, all reappear within a new, more ‘metacritical’ context. Thus Kant does make a “subjective turn” after the publication of the first edition CPR, and the issue of the origins of apriori cognitions begins to be displaced into a logical reading of apperception, combined with further recourse to the doctrine of the faculties (in particular imagination). However, due to problems in the new account, in C1 Kant once again considers it necessary to develop the notion of reflection, which is accompanied by a development of the problem of the distinction and relation of the faculties.
Unfortunately provides no answer to this. In the present context, this absence of an explanation can only be because he thinks his accounts of understanding and sensibility are already adequately differentiated. That is, the ability to transcendentally reflect on the sources of cognition in effect devolves upon the latest incarnation of Kant's *metaphysical* distinction between the logical and the extralogical, or real. The limitation of the understanding to appearances would thus seem to depend on the kinds of analyses of 'forms of differentiation' examined in the last chapter.

iv Intuitive Reality

But here we come up against a different kind of tension that appears in Kant's CPR project. On the one hand, Kant needs to positively distinguish spatiotemporal intuition from conceptuality as such. But on the other hand, he must relate them internally by means of the transcendental deduction. But the distinguishing, or the ascertainment of limits, must logically precede the relating, as the justification of the correct kind of relating (in the deduction) depends on the prior establishment of limits.

Kant himself seems to be torn in two directions, as is indicated by his vacillation over the notion of 'formal intuition' (B160-1n.). Light can be shed on the controversy concerning this term by referring to an earlier use of it in the Amphiboly. There, Kant states that "multiplicity and numerical difference are already given by space itself as the condition of outer appearances" (A264/B320), and that the possibility of appearances thus "presupposes a formal intuition (of space and time) as given"(A268/B324). But formal intuition is here used in precisely the opposite sense to the famous footnote at B160, where Kant says that a formal intuition is a conceptualised representation of space and time (unified by the understanding),

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28 But it cannot be apperception (at least in the first edition), because apperception itself is described as a faculty of the understanding. Why should apperception by itself be able to make a *de jure* distinction between itself and intuition? Moreover, in the first edition apperception is only called upon in the subjective deduction, whereas the objective deduction is occupied with the issue of *apriori* "origins" or "sources", for which apperception is not yet relevant.
which must be opposed to the mere "forms of intuition", that is, space and time considered as apriori 'structures' for intuition.

It would seem that Kant's later move has to be the correct one, for the reason that our notions of space and time must always already be subject to conceptualisation. But Kant's earlier argument that "multiplicity ... is already given by space itself" should be taken seriously, for to lose this notion and give way to the other viewpoint leads ultimately to the Hegelian denial that intuition has any internal difference of its own, separate from the rights of the concept.

It is as if there are two notions of time and space in Kant, causing a potential split in the Kantian system. On the one hand, Kant has discovered a peculiar, vectorial structure of space through the incongruent counterparts argument. As regards time, Kant seems to be playing on the Cartesian notion that time is intrinsically not a logical relation; but time also has a vectorial structure, being one-dimensional and uni-directional. It is also claimed that the infinity of space and time differentiate them from concepts. These characteristics may account for Kant's statement that multiplicity is already inherent in space itself. But how does Kant move from this apriori characterisation of space, to the coordinated numerical and extensive magnitudes that he needs to ground the coherence of the world, or from the vectoriality of time to its extensive seriality? In the early Kant, this problem did not arise, as the internal, intensive nature of forces was in direct relation with their extensive coordination in the world. Or in other terms, the inner noumenal essence, which could be theoretically described through concepts, was actualised by its

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29 Robert Pippin has taken the note at B160 as a move towards the Hegelian problematic; cf. Hegel's Idealism, 130.

30 Firstly, Kant argues that space is not a discursive concept, as it contains its components within it, rather than under it. The components of space are parts within wholes, rather than species within genera. However, what is the justification for this? It rests ultimately on one particular property of space: that it is infinitely divisible and extendable, as geometry teaches us. But for Kant, concepts cannot have an infinite intension; they must contain a finite, though indefinite amount of predicates; therefore space cannot be a concept. The intension of concepts is to be distinguished from their extension in the following way for Kant. A concept may contain a potentially infinite amount of concepts, in the sense of lower genera, under it. But can only contain within it (in its definition) a finite amount. Cf. M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, 66-70. and M. Radner. 'Substance and Phenomenal Substance', 251f.

31 It is often noted that Kant proves nothing very concrete about space itself in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Far from being necessarily Newtonian, it is pointed out that Kant allows for non-Euclidean geometries as well.
contingent real interaction. But due to the changes in the formal structure in Kant’s system, he now faces a problem in relating intuitive manifolds to their conceptual form. The theories of both space and time pull in two directions: towards a nonlogical, original, nonrepresentational form, and towards numerical, coordinate extension. Later I will show in detail how this very problem will be decisive for Deleuze’s system. However, the internal tension caused by this problem in Kant obviously does nothing to help us discover a coherent ground for the distinction between sensibility and understanding.

4 Noumena and the Self-Critique of Reason

Transcendental and Absolute Conditions

“One can place all illusion in the taking of a subjective condition for the cognition of an object” (A396). This passage was cited above at the outset of our investigation into the distinction between noumena and phenomena, and should now be placed back into its context. For there, we find a different light thrown upon our problem, one which again echoes Kant’s early metaphysics, but arguably integrates it most successfully with the thrust of the critical project.

Kant explains how “the dialectical illusion of pure reason ... must have to do with the universal conditions of thinking”, of which there are three forms:

1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general.
2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking.
3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking (A397).

In each of these cases, “pure reason is concerned merely with the absolute totality of this synthesis, ie. with that condition that is itself unconditioned” (ibid). Each of these notions of an absolute totality finds itself expressed in a particular “putative science ... transcendental psychology, cosmology and theology” (ibid). The objects of these

32 My characterisation of this problem is historically problematic, because Kant does state in the passage in question that “multiplicity and numerical difference” are present in space, whereas I want to suggest that there is a distinction by right between the one hand, the characteristics of vectoriality and actual infinity, which are not intrinsically numerical, and the notion of extensive, numerical magnitudes on the other, which Kant does indeed in CPR describe as conceptual (in the Axioms of Intuition).
sciences are respectively, a pure unconditioned self, an unconditioned account of the world, and an unconditioned metaphysical account of God. Now, as expressed in the above citation, these three cases express succinctly the variables of Kant’s early search for a new well-grounded notion of sufficient reason. The “conditions of a thought in general” are equivalent to the apriori laws of logic, or what is by right available to the mind; while the “conditions of empirical thinking” and of “pure thinking”, that is, world and God (or phenomenal ideality and intelligible, noumenal reality), are the elements that Kant was attempting to balance in his new investigation of sufficient reason. Throughout the earlier writings, these three elements have been present in a triangular structure that was intended to give an exhaustive account of metaphysical cognition, and to ground what Kant was later to call the problem of the synthetic apriori, but earlier expressed in terms of the relation between logic and reality, necessity and contingency, etc.

Now, Kant still thinks each of the elements of this triangular structure of logical thinking – world – God, has an internal form that has apriori validity. “Thought in general” refers to the logical use of the understanding; “empirical thinking” to empirical use of the understanding in conjunction with sensibility; “pure thinking” refers to pure reason. This general account of internal form is present throughout all of Kant’s writings. But these internal forms are now seen as intrinsically problematic, due to the new foregrounding of the second procedure of critique, the project of justification (the quid juris). While “thought in general” can be justified through a ‘metaphysical deduction’ from the logical forms of judgment, the latter two must be given a ‘transcendental deduction’ - of pure concepts and of Ideas respectively.34

33 The centrality of the table of judgments is disputed among adherents to a patchwork theory of CPR. Thus Paul Guyer claims that the table is a last minute addition to the project of the Critique, which distorts the main motor of the account of experience: the forms of time-determination. See Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 98-99. I would agree with the negative aspect of Guyer’s claim but my positive account will focus on the persistence of metaphysical themes in CPR.

34 I shall begin to discuss Kant’s vacillation concerning the latter deduction shortly. It may seem peculiar that I have omitted to mention the transcendental deduction of space and time. However, in chapter 5 I show how the notion that space and time require a deduction is only affirmed by Kant retrospectively when the need for a transcendental deduction of pure concepts becomes clear (see A88/B120). Hence Kant’s reluctance to use the notion of deduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I suggest that the presentation of the apriori forms of space and time retain the ontological value they had in the Dissertation up to this point, at which they are specified as belonging to the structure of
We have seen that all thoughts require intuitions and vice versa. The middle form of 'empirical thinking' becomes prioritised if this mutual requirement is specified to the relation of concepts to intuitions. Just as the use of pure concepts must limit itself by restricting itself to finite intuitions (although we are not yet sure how), so must the structure of finite intuition – time and space - be shown to require the pure concepts in order to be possible. The pure concepts of the understanding are deemed to have 'real' significance if their necessity can be demonstrated for sensibility. The demonstration of this reciprocal (but asymmetrical) limitation is the task of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, and as many commentators agree, this task continues past the Deduction itself through the Schematism and into the Principles of Pure Understanding.  

The notion of 'real possibility' thus seems to gain a more restricted, 'critical' significance; here it essentially signifies the ability to schematise the pure concepts according to the pure forms of sensibility, time and space.  

The Schematism can be seen as a demonstration, after the transcendental deduction had proved the validity of pure concepts for the forms of intuition, of how intuitions themselves are capable of subsumption under concepts. Thus, if everything in the manifold of intuition is temporal, then one is permitted to search for temporal functions that can be isolated in order to relate them to pure concepts.

The result of the mutual determination of sensibility and the understanding is 'knowledge' or 'experience'. Thus, in CPR Kant's position seems to be that the new "third thing" is possible experience. So surely Kant's early problems of sufficient reason, real possibility and the search for a third thing are resolved by the notion of experience, and the demonstration of its necessity. At the end of the 'Analogy's',

'transcendental philosophy'. This again fits with my thesis that the mutual delimitation of kinds of cognition and differentiation is the key to the structure of Kant's philosophy: the significance of the structure of space and time only becomes clear when it is related to and delimited by the pure concepts of the understanding. Accordingly, I think it is justified to continue to talk of 'empirical thinking' as a unified structure, even though that structure comprises a specific union between the disparate elements of sensible intuition and pure concepts.


36 Kant had used the word 'schema' since his early writings, but usually in relation to the relation of substances. In the New Elucidation and the Dissertation, the essences of the divine intellect are schematised by being related to a world (TP 42, Ak. 1:414; TP 391, Ak. 2:398). The Platonist connotations are still strong here; see N. Rotenstreich, Experience and its Systematisation, 28-32.
Kant indicates that the unfolding of the synthetic *apriori* rules for all possible experience is the answer to his earlier problems with sufficient reason:

In the absence of this method, and in the delusion of wanting to prove dogmatically synthetic propositions that the empirical use of the understanding recommends as its principles, a proof of the principle of sufficient reason was sought, but always in vain. (A217/B265).

It is the priority of experience that precludes an *absolute condition* to be found for a self, a world and God. Because they cannot be ‘known’, these three limits of the triangular relation must become mere *Ideas*. However, a troubling ambiguity remains.

We have seen how the second “universal condition of thinking” is called the “synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking”. But if the conditions for the possibility of all experience are firstly the *conditions of synthesis* and secondly can be demonstrated to be such synthetically *apriori* (in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories), surely they could indeed be called “the synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking”. Why does Kant use such an ambiguously similar vocabulary in the first edition? I will show that there remains an inevitable proximity between these *Ideas* (“universal conditions of thinking”) and the possibility of experience, precisely because of Kant’s awareness of metacritical issues, not because of his lack of them.

The problematicity of Kant’s attempts to deal with these issues is not a sign of his obliviousness to metacritical issues, but results from a sincere attempt to provide a complete justification and demonstration of his system.

On the one hand, ‘experience’ or knowledge is to be taken as *the* third thing that will ground metaphysics; but on the other hand, knowledge is just one part of a wider structure of ‘real’ possibility. This can be seen in three related ways. Firstly, what if the two kinds of conditions, transcendental and absolute, don’t match up, or are not harmonious? Surely Kant is claiming that the transcendental conditions have some kind of ‘absolute’ status, if only for the realm of possibility restricted to sensible intuition? If these conditions are not secure, would they then undergo deviations during humanity’s journey towards the regulative ideal? But such a deviation would entail the distortion of Kant’s whole apparatus, so that the whole concept of a regulative ideal would be put in doubt. Hence to avoid any potential discrepancy between ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ demonstrations, Kant must find
some kind of further validity for his account of empirical thinking. It is because Kant
is well aware of this need that he does not fall so easily into what Foucault calls the
‘empirico-transcendental’ doublet, whereby any account of conditions is always
undermined by the partiality of its empirical starting point.

Secondly, the problem is paralleled in Kant’s account of ‘appearance’. In the
second edition preface to CPR Kant says, “even if we cannot cognise these same
objects [Gegenstände] as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them
as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that
there is appearance without anything that appears” (Bxxvii). There must be an
essential moment of non-appearance for something to be able to appear as such.
Once again, something ‘absolute’ peers through the structure of finite knowledge.

But, thirdly, this requirement holds as much for the possibility of critique
itself as for experience. The problem of noumena is intimately related to the problem
of critique itself. I have persisted in suggesting that if the critical procedure of
delimitation was not first possible, there could be no transcendental justifications of
the possible relations to one another of understanding and intuition. In the present
context, this means that the distinction between phenomena and noumena must have
an ‘absolute’ validity. The only way to secure this without illegitimately penetrating
the veil of phenomena would seem to be to claim that an adequate demonstration of
this account for transcendental philosophy implies a higher account; perhaps one
which is metaphysical, but one that can be defended metacritically.

37 James van Cleve presents a more abstract version of this same point: “If there were no things in
themselves, everything would be a virtual object – that is to say, everything would owe its existence to
being apprehended by a mind, or at least by a cognitive act (if one countenances the possibility of acts
without agents). But what about these minds or acts? Do they owe their existence to being
apprehended? Presumably not, since in that case, there would be either an absurd infinite regress to
ever higher acts or else an impossible feat of existential bootstrapping, some items pulling themselves
into existence by virtue of their own self-apprehension. Even if literal self-apprehension were deemed
possible (as in some Indian philosophies), we would have to accord to ‘both’ terms of the relation the
status of existence an sich, for a mere content cannot do any apprehending”, Problems from Kant
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 137. This problem with Kant’s theory was one of the first to
be raised by Reinhold and Aenesidemus, but became submerged following Fichte’s innovations.

38 This can be shown in another way. We have seen that in Kant’s early work, the ‘world’ signified the
system of interacting forces in a spatiotemporal field. But, due to the increased emphasis on restriction
to appearances in CPR, the notion of force has to be thoroughly phenominalised. In the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science physical impenetrability is related back to the phenomenal experience
of resistance. But at the same time Kant argues that the inner or intensive nature of physical things is
force. As force accounts for resistance, Kant can rule out the notion of brute ‘matter’. But how can
But there is nevertheless a sense that all metaphilosophical attempts to provide such an account involve a characteristic violence that is signalled in the very concept of ‘problematicity’. While, for instance, the transcendental use of the understanding is “a mere mistake of the faculty of judgment” (A296/B352), Kant also states that the real confusion involved in the delimitation of boundaries cannot be corrected de jure in any transcendental reflection initiated by the philosopher. There are certain transcendental principles “that actually incite us to tear down all those boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognises no demarcations anywhere” (ibid). It transpires that these transcendental principles arise out of the “transcendental use of pure reason” (A319/B376; italic mine). This transcendental use – of reason - cannot be resolved by mere reflection (transcendental or otherwise), because reflection is of course an activity of reason itself. This is why transcendental illusion is so serious. The fact that the activity of reflection itself is perverted by a transcendental use means that any appeal to reason by the understanding in the process of transcendental reflection will merely shift the question of the validity of its use onto reason.

Thus the problem is this: we are drawn to think about noumena by a transcendental illusion inherent in reason itself, but we have seen that the transcendental use or exercise of empirical cognition implied in the transcendental use of reason, is itself necessary in order to carry out the project of delimitation necessary for the critique itself. The project of delimitation requires some kind of apprehension of noumena; this apprehension must somehow be absolute and problematic at the same time. So what is the final criterion for saying whether such a transcendental use is an illusion or not – empirical cognition itself or the proposed metacritical grounding of empirical cognition? Such a riddle could in principle be clarified if there were something in reason itself which allowed us to distinguish the kinds of sense the problematic use of reason might have, in order to play its liminal role in the critical project.

Kant continue to affirm that the world is organised as a structure of interacting forces? Again, such an
The very notion of an ‘Idea’ can only have sense because it does have some positive relation to our finite situation. Kant insists that for something to be thinkable, it is not enough for it to be simply logically possible, but it must have some kind of real sense or meaning. Moreover, it has been repeatedly pointed out that Kant does allow the possibility of a transcendental deduction for Ideas; Ideas do have an apriori justification. Therefore problematic concepts must have some ‘real’ content, whether it be symbolic (the boundaries of knowledge imagined as fogs and icebergs; A235/B294), or, more importantly, what Kant later calls ‘ethico-theological’ (these boundaries mean something only because, by our nature, we seek the unconditioned; they mean we must find other ways than knowledge to find God and be good). The problematic conception of the Idea thus marks the primal meeting point of mere logic with reality. Problems must delineate the dimensions of reality. For, on the one hand, we could not know what knowledge is without encountering what cannot be known; only in this way do we discover the necessary fact that knowledge is conditioned, and what those conditions might be. Thus while Kant seems to define empirical reality in terms of the mere indexical presence of a sensible intuition,40 the concept of such a kind of reality is only delineated through questioning the limits of real significance. But in that case, on the other hand, the limits of real significance and the questioning of these limits are themselves prior to the transcendental analysis of the form of empirical reality. Just because God cannot be known, does not mean that he is not real; the question of God’s reality may instead be approached in other ways (practical or aesthetic). Rational Ideas may thus ultimately depend on a kind of ‘semi-divine’ presentation in aesthetic Ideas.

Now, R.M. Adams argues that problematic concepts do indeed gain a sense or significance when they are applied in their proper domain – the practical domain.
Thus the noumenal Idea of freedom or of God attains a kind of analogy to objective significance when it is taken as a practical object. It is as if a substitute for intuitive content is given to these problematic noumena, which fulfills the quantifying role of intuitions. Adams thus argues that the real possibility of noumena is in fact practically grounded in the objectivity of freedom. The concept of noumenal causality has significance or application because “through ‘the fact of pure reason’ we know what it is like to be free”. Thus problematic concepts are only problematic when mistakenly applied in the theoretical realm, and not seen in their proper nature as practical concepts. Adams quotes the second Critique on this point: in the case of Ideas of immortality and God “their possibility, which was hitherto only a problem, here becomes an assertion” (PP 140, Ak. 5:5).

This reading has many merits in the context of the ongoing dispute over things in themselves. Adams reverses the common idea that the thing in itself is the thing behind material appearances. For while Kant often argues that the affecting thing must be the referential object of an intuition, at the same time he withholds from specifying the relation between the thing and the intuition, and from characterising the individuation of things themselves. “The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter” (A380). That is, it must be borne in mind that in CPR Kant insists that not only space and time, but matter itself, are subject only to phenomenal, nonlogical differentiation. As “substantia phaenomenon” (A277/B333), matter is infinitely divisible in itself (cf. A359); hence there can be no longer be any physical monads. So as matter is a merely phenomenal notion, there is no sense in which it could have content in another world than the spatiotemporal. “What matter is, as a thing in itself (transcendental

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41 Adams, Things in Themselves, 816.
43 See K. Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind, 35, 83. In the Physical Monadology, Kant affirmed physical force of the monads themselves despite describing their presence as virtual, rather than localised.
object), is of course entirely unknown to us” (A366). In other words, it has no ideal, or problematic status. Now, if the affecting thing has retreated behind the veil of phenomena, what kind of identity can the thing in itself have with its appearance? It cannot have type-identity, because the numerical differentiation of phenomenal beings must be different in kind from noumenal being; we cannot know that or how they map on to each other, but also token-identity is utterly problematic. Kant himself recognises this in entirely restricting his criteria for identification to appearances. Therefore, there may indeed be many noumenal grounds for one body, just as much as there may be one noumenal ground for all bodies.

However, on the other hand, the concept of the self does have potential applicability beyond empirical intuition because of its problematic freedom, (or, on our reading, at least its ability to think problems). Hence Kant instead devoted his energies with regard to the issue of the thing in itself to securing one-to-one correspondence between the empirical person and their noumenal will. Even in the event of the failure of this project, the noumenon can still only be thought of as an immaterial substrate to appearances, and Kant’s dedication to attempting to think through the way in which the self, world, and God can shape for thought this problematic realm continues through the investigations of the supersensible substrate of nature in CJ and into the Opus posthumum.

This identification of things in themselves with noumena thus can be placed in opposition to Henry Allison’s interpretation, in which things in themselves are simply the logical subjects of affection when considered separately from the conditions under which we know them. For Allison, things in themselves play one important role: to distinguish transcendental realism from transcendental idealism, or to provide a different viewpoint (a “double aspect”) on the problem of knowledge. Thus things in themselves are restricted to their merely negative meaning. But we have just seen that the token-identity of material appearances with things in themselves is the most

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44 This sentence contains one of Kant’s most explicit identifications of thing in itself and transcendental object.
45 On a Discovery, 125. Cf. Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind, 57, and note 77.
46 All reidentification takes place within the framework of apperception in the form of reproduction and recognition. See chapter 4.
47 Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind, pp. 97ff., 149.
doubtful of all the noumenal correlations and Kant would seem, then, to have intended the destiny of things in themselves to be realised in the practical sphere (or at least, the problematic realm). Hence to understand the notion of thing in itself as the material thing "considered" in itself, is ultimately incoherent for Kant. The reference to noumena then, as the inner reason of things, is to the supersensible substrate, the true moral significance of the entities found in the world. There is a discrepancy between free subjects in their noumenal and phenomenal guises, which can be overcome by entering the (problematic) field of action. Thus within the teleology of reason, as especially spelled out in CJ, the noumenal realm is conceived as consisting of 'free' beings resisting and struggling against matter in an ethico-teleological hierarchy.

Two criticisms of Adams' account may serve to go on to produce a connection between this reading of noumena and the problem of immanent critique. Firstly, Adams avoids the question of what constitutes the 'real' in real possibility. He notes that the real possibility of God, on which Kant based the existence of God in The Only Possible Argument, becomes merely an Idea in CPR. But this conversion is left unexplained. How can the reality of a possibility be ideal? Surely Kant's earlier notion of real possibility is intended to secure something more than ideality? This complex question must await development until later. Secondly, as we have already had cause to doubt Kant's 'fact of reason' and his notion of freedom, can sense be

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48 Viewing the situation in these terms also problematises what Allison calls the "neglected alternative" in Kant's discussion of the ideality or reality of time (Kant's Transcendental Idealism 111f). It is argued that time could very well be ideal, but also reality itself could reflect this ideality. so Kant cannot assert that things in themselves are nonspatial and nontemporal; he should instead have regarded it as an open question. But to affirm this hypothesis would destroy Kant's reasons for ideality in the first place. Kant has argued that another form of differentiation is necessary to discuss nonlogical entities. He has claimed that it is not possible for spatiotemporal differentiation to coexist as such with inner essences, because to affirm this lead to what he thinks is Spinoza's 'spatial realism'. Also, due to his critical conception of matter, things in themselves cannot be spatially and temporally differentiated in themselves (cf. B308, where Kant talks of the impossibility of encountering spatial and temporal unity in the noumenon). The ideality argument arises because things in themselves must in principle be different from spatiotemporal differences. As essences that can only be problematically conceived, they are precisely unactualisable in spatiotemporal experience. So the alternative is not neglected - in the terms of Kant's metaphysics, it is self-contradictory. (Thus while Allison argues against the neglected alternative from the strict phenomenality of space, I agree with Ameriks' insistence on the immateriality of the noumenon. Cf. also his 'Kant and Mind: Mere Immaterialism'.

49 Adams. 'Things in Themselves'. 819; cf. CPR A577/B605.
made of the above suggestions about the sense of noumenal concepts without these two notions?

Ideas are problems because they are unexperienceable. "I understand by Idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense experience" (A327/B383-4). Nonetheless, Kant does suggest that there is a transcendental deduction of the Ideas, with a concomitant schematisation to fill in their sense (A669/B698f). Kant’s notion that Ideas too have schemata remains rather undeveloped, and it will be shown later that Novalis is the contemporary of Kant who takes this possibility forward; it is also taken up by Deleuze. On Adams’ reading, it would be difficult to understand how Ideas could have their own schemata, because schematisation, as the demonstration of real possibility, for him can only concern empirical reality. This is exactly what cannot be possible for Ideas. But if Ideas are read as primary problems which denote a ‘reality’, which may exist even though nothing is determined about it for knowledge, then the notion of ‘real possibility’ may be wider than merely empirical experience.

The "negativity" of noumena (A252, B309), the negativity which makes Ideas problematic, is in fact quite specific.\(^{50}\) Firstly, the goal of complete determination of Ideas is logically consistent, and is not itself negative. Secondly, if the noumenon is the object of problematic reference, it is negative insofar as it is problematic for knowledge. More specifically, its negativity lies in its problematicity concerning type- and token-identity with phenomena, and in the difficulty of individuating the noumenon.\(^{51}\) As a consequence of this negativity, the notion of objective reference must instead be determined by the categories (which will ground the determinate meaning of ‘relation to an object’). But that does not mean that there is not a pressing sense in which Ideas must themselves, for various reasons that we have seen (and for more to come in the next chapters) be crucial for the critical delimitation of experience itself.

\(^{50}\) The distinction between negative and positive notions of the noumenon only really comes to the fore in the second edition. Although Kant says in the first edition that the concept of a noumenon is "not at all positive" (A252), he means by this that nothing is "determined" with it. But the fact that it is undetermined (in the specific Kantian sense of the word) for knowledge, does not stop it having a somewhat "positive" role for thought.

\(^{51}\) Deleuze will take up this problem: see chapter 4.
Arguably though, Kant himself does not come to a stable account of the relation of noumena and Ideas. Kant’s late attempt at a “system of experience” (CJ First Intro 209) moves inexorably, but perilously, in the direction of further specifying the power of Ideas; Kant now tentatively attempts to understand “the concept of experience as a system in terms of empirical laws ... Unless this is presupposed, particular experiences cannot have thoroughly lawful coherence, i.e. empirical unity” (CJ First Intro 203). But such a “system” would surely somehow render accessible the “absolute condition” of “empirical thinking” that Kant previously said could only be regulative. In the Opus Posthumum, Kant not only begins to give a primacy to Ideas, but grants them “constitutive” validity, in what he calls a “system of transcendental idealism”. He appeals to the notion of an omnitudo realitatis, as a collective (not merely distributive) system which would provide an “absolute condition” of empirical synthesis, and gives it constitutive value. Experience is grounded by its relation to a given spatiotemporal totality. “What contains the possibility of physics as a whole cannot be a fragmentary aggregate; for as a whole given apriori, it must necessarily be a system which is capable neither of increase nor of diminution. Regulative principles which are also constitutive” (OP 57, Ak. 22:241).

As Eckart Förster has shown, there is a return in these late moves to the structure of Kant’s 1763 proof of the existence of God, as the real element of possibility. It has been suggested that the main reason Kant overlooks this argument in CPR is because the thought of God can now only have a regulative validity; it cannot itself be known, but it can guide knowledge as a thought. But that proviso

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52 “Whatever agrees with collective unity is actual (existencia est omnimoda determinatio, as ontology has it); but to achieve this thoroughgoing determination empirically (as is envisaged in the transition from the metaphysical foundations to physics) is utterly impossible. It is possible, however, in relation to the absolute unity of possible experience in general, insofar as the object of this concept contains the One and All of outer sense-objects” (OP 93: Ak. 21:586).
53 E. Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis. 77f.
54 Dieter Henrich claims that the old proof is rejected because of the “subjectivisation of the concept of absolute necessity” (Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis. 187), while M. Fisher & E. Watkins claim that “ultimately, Kant’s justification for claiming that God can be established only as a regulative principle is based on his distinction between reason and the understanding. Both faculties are principles of unity. However, they apply to different objects and the resulting unity is different in each case... Reason does not constitute the object, but rather regulates the understanding” (‘Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility’, 393). As far as they go, these claims are correct, but they do not take into account Kant’s
seems to be lifted in OP. A material or real condition for the unity of possible experience is now once again presupposed, the only difference being that Kant no longer characterises this fundamental reality as God, but as ether. However, while Förster is right, Kant does not return to the most distinctive aspects of his earlier proof, but resurrects the proof in the guise of a straight ontological argument, about the necessity for the existence of the sum of all predicates.

Nevertheless, OP in general indeed involves a return to importance of the triangular structure of self, world and God. They are no longer merely regulative, but now “the universal conditions of thinking” are held to have an internal and constitutive relation with the grounding of experience. The experiencing subject is now explicitly grounded on its “self-positing” within an Idea of the world. As we will see in the next chapter, this self-positing arises out of Kant’s elaboration of the “paradox of inner sense”: Kant will hold that “positing and perception, spontaneity and receptivity, the objective and the subjective relation, are simultaneous because they are identical as to time, as appearances of how the subject is affected – they are given apriori in the same actus” (OP 132, Ak. 22:466). For the moment, we should recall how similar this idea is to Kant’s early emphasis on “power to suffer” in his pre-critical writings. Again, the locus of the “third thing” is shrunk to the moment of relation between inner and outer, which itself depends for its coherence on the other element of the triangle, God. But in Kant’s final work, all the elements of the self-world-God triangle become mutually determining in a dynamic relation. The “power to suffer” the effects of the empirical world depends on the insertion of an “actus” of self-constitution by the subject in the world, but which itself depends on the “projection” of Ideas by reason. “Reason precedes, with the projection of its forms” (OP 222, Ak. 21:15); “Ideas precede appearances in space and time” (OP 252, Ak. 21:88).

These notions will be expanded upon in our turn to an epistemological account of the relation of the subject and Ideas in chapter 5 and Appendix III. But one increasing awareness of the systematic importance of Ideas, and their possible role in the metacritical justification of the Kantian project as a whole; hence the reason for the submerging of the old proof is by no means straightforward.
extraordinary final passage from OP should be mentioned, which crystallises the enormous pressure of different forces acting on Kant’s attempt to complete his system: after remarking again on the “actus of cognition” necessary in order to know inner and outer objects, Kant states that “the spirit of man is Spinoza’s God (so far as the formal element of all sense-objects is concerned) and transcendental idealism is realism in an absolute sense” (OP 255, Ak. 21:99). Nor is this affirmative reference to Spinoza a freak occurrence in OP. Kant talks of the abovementioned Ideas as “archetypes (prototypa), by which Spinoza thought all things had to be seen, according to their forms, in God: that is, in what is formal in the elements out of which we make God for ourselves” (OP 242, Ak. 21:51); such notions are repeated.\(^{56}\)

In both passages, Kant maintains that he is interpreting Spinozist intellectual intuition merely “formally”, but nevertheless the status of these Ideas is held to be “absolute”. But in that case, noumena would finally somehow be realised: Ideas, rather than being indirect signs and symbols of noumena, would be identified with them. Complete determination, therefore, would no longer be problematic.

But it remains uncertain what the final character is of this late return on Kant’s part to his earlier metaphysics: is it finally metacritical, or just metaphysical?\(^{57}\)

How can the collective unity be said to be constitutive without being a transcendental illusion? It seems that the horizon of totality, an Idea, is no more than a postulate to guarantee the coherence of experience. There is no synthetic demonstration linking empirical cognition and the system of the world; Kant seems to be claiming that their unity is analytic. Kant’s final “system of transcendental idealism” in fact seems to be strangely uncritical. After having spent so long trying to keep the gap between logic

\(^{55}\) “We can know no objects, either in us or as lying outside us, except insofar as we insert in ourselves the actus of cognition, according to certain laws” (OP 255, Ak. 21:99).


\(^{57}\) Burkhardt Tuschling has suggested that “in many respects during the period of more than 15 years spent on the so-called Opus posthumum Kant returns to his beginnings, from Hume and Locke back to Newton and, in particular, to Leibniz”, ‘The Concept of Transcendental Idealism in Kant’s Opus posthumum’, in R.M. Dancy ed., Kant and Critique (Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1993), 155.
and reality open, by trying to find synthetic *apriori* principles, Kant’s appeal to collective unity finally seems to close the gap between logic and reality. 58

What I will suggest in the following chapter is that Deleuze in effect returns to the pre-critical issue of ontotheology, and to a renewed engagement with the problematic of real possibility (which Kant overlooked when returning in OP to his earlier proof), in order to attempt to resolve the problems we have encountered concerning the relation of noumena and Ideas. Ironically, it will turn out that Deleuze is ultimately *less* of a Spinozist than the late Kant seems to have become, precisely by holding onto the *problematicity* of Ideas. If Ideas are real possibilities, they are so only as the problematic locus of a calculus of compossibilities. Paradoxically, it is the recourse to Leibniz that will allow Deleuze’s transformation of the Kantian problem of immanence to remain critical. The question will be whether Deleuze’s delicate balancing of rationalist metaphysics and critique is as precarious as Kant’s.

Chapter Four
The Sense of the Noumenon: Deleuze

Deleuze treads a fine line between Kant and Hegel regarding the status of the noumenon. On the one hand, like Hegel, he believes that Kant necessarily affirms some access to noumena (however, Deleuze does not maintain, as Hegel does, that Kant’s affirmation is covert and self-contradictory). On the other hand, while Deleuze contends that noumena can indeed be identified with Ideas, he avoids Hegel’s move to identify the noumenal (or absolute) Idea with the concept (however speculatively conceived).\(^1\) For Deleuze, the noumenon can indeed be accessed by *thought*, but this thought is not to be conceived using the terms and means of conceptual recognition. Deleuze therefore fashions an unusual route out of the Kantian problem. He endeavours to construct a speculative philosophy that demotes conceptual recognition (the theme of the Kantian Analytic) from its central position, and instead demonstrates and justifies a transcendental connection between Ideas (Dialectic) and sensible intuition, or what he will call “intensity” (Aesthetic). He makes an attempt to achieve a philosophy of immanence close to Hegel’s by alternative means. Being will say its own sense, the self-differentiation of Being will *express itself* without metaphysical remainder, through the construction of an internal relation between Ideas and

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\(^1\) Hegel writes that “plurality belongs to being: the *individuality*, in positing itself as determinate, posits itself not in an external difference, but in the difference of the Concept” (*Science of Logic*, 622, trans. modified). Deleuze would agree with all of this, except for the use of the term ‘concept’.
intensities. Deleuze thus describes his task as “an exploration of the two halves of difference, the dialectical half and the aesthetic half” (DR 221/285).²

For reasons that will only gradually become clear, the movement of self-differentiation will be understood in terms of repetition. “The only realised Ontology - in other words, the univocity of being – is repetition” (DR 303/387). With the notion of ‘realisation’, as with his references to ‘expression’, Deleuze is implicitly moving in the atmosphere of the analogous Hegelian realisation or immanent expression of difference. But for Deleuze, internal noumenal difference will be expressed by being repeated. This will no doubt sound obscure. But Deleuze turns to the notion of repetition precisely because repetition is taken to signify difference without a concept. If one takes this signification literally, one is faced with the formal possibility that Ideas (and noumena), if considered as ordered in a way different in nature to concepts (according to a model of complete determination), may precisely be said to differ without a concept, that is, to “repeat” their differences beneath, or outside, the representational concept. This possibility is doubtless abstract at the moment. However, we will see that Deleuze’s peculiar model of difference and repetition can in fact be unfolded into a powerful speculative system that combines and resolves in a new way speculative and metaphysical issues that have persisted from Leibniz, through Kant, to Hegel.

The structure of DR is complex and hermetic. In this chapter I begin my attempt to introduce and expound Deleuze’s theory by interpreting it in the light of the problematic of Kantianism. In so doing, I will be developing the problems which we have so far encountered in Kant’s theory; in particular this chapter will develop the problems that were met in the last chapter. First I explain the motivation behind Deleuze’s critique of representation. Then I begin to develop the two aspects of Deleuze’s theory of nonconceptual differentiation. Firstly I turn to Aesthetic issues, such as space and intensity, and secondly, to Dialectical issues, in particular the nature of Ideas as problems. Finally, I develop Deleuze’s model of difference and repetition as an account of the self-differentiating

² It is worth noting here, as an aid to deciphering certain passages that will be cited, that Deleuze coins a shorthand by which dialectical difference is referred to as “differentiation”, and aesthetic differentiation as “differenciation” (cf. DR 207/267).
movement of the Absolute Idea, explaining how it actualises neglected potentials in Kant’s philosophy (in its pre-critical and critical stages).

1 Beyond Representation

It has been noted that an ambiguity runs through Kant’s philosophy concerning the notion of representation. In their own ways, both Deleuze and Hegel attempt to resolve this ambiguity through an explicit critique of the concept of representation itself; they both claim to overcome representation. Hegel can firstly be seen as making a rationalist point against philosophies which give priority to Vorstellung: they accept what is given empirically as an adequate ground for making distinctions in philosophy, this reliance on “representations” hinders the attainment of adequate notions of things. But, Hegel says, this dependence on what is given to the ‘mind’ itself presupposes, more profoundly, an implicit structure of “reflection”, whereby, in the case of Kant for instance, the unity of the concept is treated as strictly opposed to the given manifold of intuition. Hegel suggests that Kant’s philosophy remains not so different to Locke’s undertaking of “a survey” of “the capacities of our understanding”, an “examin[ation] of our own powers”. A philosophy of representation in general, then, presupposes that, on the one side the elements of the given, and on the other side the cognitive ordering and relation of those elements, can and must be separated and isolated from each other. “Mere representational thinking, for which abstraction has isolated them, is capable of holding the universal, particular and individual

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3 Encyclopedia Logic, # 1-3, 3-7. “Vorstellung” is rendered as “mental pictures” in Wallace’s translation.
4 Ibid. Cf. Spinoza, ETIP28: “The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused”; cf. scholium: they “are like conclusions without premises”. There is a strong rationalist strain in the Encyclopedia Logic, evidenced in echoes of notions of necessity, real definition, and expression from Spinoza and Leibniz. Hegel also argues that “thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and qualities” (# 1, 3); this necessity is secured by a Hegelian transformation of the rationalist notion of ‘real definition’: “the defect of the empirical method is that a notion is not defined as it is in and for itself” (#24Z, 40; cf. #160Z, 223f and #213, 275: “the definition, which declares the absolute to be the Idea, is itself absolute. All former definitions come back to this”). Such a procedure is discussed in terms of the expression of the absolute (thus, Kant’s “categories are no fit terms to express the absolute” #44, 72).
Speculative thinking can overcome the structure of reflection, and by opening up the necessity of a purely "logical" dimension, force us to move beyond representation. For Hegel, representation and reflection are tied up with a "subjectivist" model of thought, but this model nevertheless must itself be incorporated as a necessary moment in the wider speculative structure of thought.

Deleuze's attempt to 'go beyond' representation is somewhat different and will revolve around two main strategies. Firstly, like Hegel, he performs a genetic transformation of Kant's system of cognition, and by giving increased emphasis to the nonrepresentational aspects of Ideas and intuitions, puts representation in a new context; but unlike Hegel (a), his notion of ideal genesis will not be modelled on the concept, and (b), he retains the structure of the faculties, and applies a genetic procedure to the relations of the faculties themselves. Secondly, like Hegel, Deleuze enacts a new analysis of the de jure limits of conceptual representation, but unlike Hegel he does not see conceptual representation as a 'necessary stage', but rather as a 'perversion' of a deeper structure of thought that is more truly adequate to Being. For reasons that will shortly become clear, a detailed discussion of a part of Deleuze's first strategy, the genesis of the relations of the faculties, will have to wait until chapter 6.2 (and Appendix V), while the other part, the genetic account of Ideas, will be encountered when we turn to Deleuze's theory of Ideas (section 3 below). I will deal with the second strategy in this section.

First, though, a working definition of the notion of representation in Deleuze should be provided. In DR, he appears at the outset to present quite a crude notion of representation, a kind of amalgam of very general aspects of Kantian, Hegelian and Aristotelian notions. 'Representation' appears to be not so much a notion as a general framework, or what Foucault calls an episteme, composed of certain elements and conditions. In fact, as the term does not play an important role in Deleuze's work before DR, it seems reasonable to assume that he is decisively influenced by Foucault's 1966 discussion of "the classical world

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7 In Proust and Signs, Deleuze criticises what he calls "the natural direction of perception or of representation" because of its "objectivism" (29). But this account is structured, as in Kant's Critical Philosophy: in terms of a "common sense" use of the faculties, not yet explicitly in terms of a critique of representation itself.
of representation” in *The Order of Things*. There Foucault presents a very
different account of the nature of representation from Hegel’s, with its emphasis
on its “subjectivist” character. As is clarified by the French title of that work, *Les
Mots et les Choses*, Foucault’s task is to present a historical account of three
stages or epochs (rennaissance, classical and modern), each of which express a
different structure governing the relation of words and things. In the first epoch,
“it is the thing itself which appears, in its own characteristics”, articulated as a
symbol or sign, through its *resemblance* to other things. In the classical world,
the structure of representation dominates, in which “what has become important is
no longer resemblances, but identities and differences”; its most general form is
an articulated system of a *mathesis*, a *taxonomia*, and a *genetic analysis*. The
sciences always carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be,
of an exhaustive ordering of the world: they are always directed too, towards the
discovery of simple elements and their progressive combination; and at their
centre they form a table on which knowledge is displayed as a system.

Although Foucault does not mention it, such a system is perhaps perfectly
encapsulated in Leibniz’s text ‘Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis’, where the
analysis into primary truths is paralleled by the project of a synthetic progressive
combination in a “universal characteristic”. Now, Deleuze argues that
representation can be expressed in terms of a “vulgarised Leibnizianism” (DR
11/21). Deleuze thus can be seen as isolating the *philosophical* structure of this
*episteme* when he claims that representation is defined by four elements: identity
of the concept, opposition of the predicate, analogy of judgment, and resemblance
of perception (DR 29/44, 262/337). Again, as with Foucault, representation is not
primarily treated in epistemological terms as involving an emphasis on
subjectivity. However, Deleuze never says why these four elements define
representation, and arguably, if Deleuze’s account is treated as a more
‘philosophical’ version of Foucault’s, then both theories can be criticised for

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8 Deleuze in fact refers to Foucault in this regard at DR 262/337.
9 *The Order of Things*, 130, 17f.
10 ibid, 50.
11 ibid, 74-5.
eyearly texts on the Universal Characteristic are perhaps perfect models for Foucault’s point here.
Cf. ‘Of an Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking’, ‘An Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia’. ‘Of
Universal Synthesis and Analysis’, in Parkinson. However, Leibniz is in fact a problematic figure
for Foucault’s model, as his roots in neo-Platonism and Renaissance philosophy have been
increasingly emphasised of late; cf. G. MacDonald Ross, ‘Leibniz and Renaissance Neoplatonism’.
providing a merely abstract set of conditions, for which no account is provided of
their necessity, nor a demonstration of their validity with any metacritical
necessity.\textsuperscript{13}

However, unlike Foucault, Deleuze presents his theory of representation
not as a historical framework, but as a framework which expresses a certain deep
structure into which all philosophical thought has had a tendency to fall.\textsuperscript{14} But on
the face of it, it seems doubtful that such a ‘philosophical’ episteme of
representation would have any bite unless it could be demonstrably related to
particular epistemological theories that are held to instantiate it. However it is
evident throughout DR that Deleuze not only intends this structure to apply to
Kant, but generates the sense of the above four elements from his reading of Kant.
No doubt Deleuze wishes his theory to apply beyond Kantian epistemology to
Hegelian, Aristotelian, etc. accounts of knowledge; but since his theory is so
Kantian in other respects, it seems a good idea to attach the notion of
representation to Kant. I suggest now that Deleuze has two main arguments about
representation, the first epistemological, and the second concerning the limits and
rights of the concept of representation, and indeed of conceptuality itself.

\textbf{i) The Epistemology of Representation}

In fact, there are four other crucial terms providing the real background to
Deleuze’s account of representation: generality, mediation, reflection and
recognition. Representation is firstly general, and is opposed to the apprehension
of singularity. A generality entails a mediation of an individual through some
‘third’ medium. Whether this third is a concept or a perceived resemblance is not
specified at this point. However, Deleuze seems to accept that a general
representation of something implies mediation in reflection. This takes him up to
Kantian and Hegelian requirements for representation, and allows us to give a

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minimal sense, as Kant does, to conceptuality as such, as a mediating act committed in the space of reflection. It thus finally implies an act of recognition: "the identity of the unspecified concept constitutes the form of the same with regard to recognition" (DR 137/180). It is this latter set of four terms that seems to be doing the work of accounting for the function of representation, as opposed to merely delineating its abstract conditions. Moreover, the first set (identity, opposition, analogy, resemblance) only seems adequately specifiable once we have explained the functioning of representation. For instance, Deleuze's idea that 'identity' is a function of the concept is only explicable if we already take identity to mean identification in some form of cognitive act. Hence for Deleuze's theory to work, it must rely on some very general notion of representational cognition, which is indeed delineated across the text, if never explicitly. This very general notion of a "standard picture" of representation would be uninteresting if it were not grounded in an elaborate and unusual account of nonrepresentational cognition.

Now, although DR uses a new theory of the faculties in order to criticise representation, it is interesting that in Kant's Critical Philosophy (1963) Deleuze in fact first gives content to the notion of faculty precisely through a division of the possible relations of representation. Any representation, he states, must be related to a subject or an object; Deleuze's organisation of Kantian representation can be tabulated as follows:

- **Knowledge** is relation of representation to the object in terms of agreement.
- **Desire** is relation of representation to object in terms of causality by subject.
- **Pleasure/pain** is the relation of representation to the subject "insofar as it affects the subject by intensifying or weakening its vital force".

However, Deleuze goes on to claim that there is a second sense of the word 'faculty' in Kant, whereby it denotes a "kind of representation", and, in particular, "a specific source of representations". This is divided as follows:

- **Intuition**: immediate presentational relation; source = sensibility.
- **Concept**: mediate representational relation; source = understanding.
- **Idea**: concept that can be neither presented nor represented; source = reason.

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15 Cf. CPR A68/B93, and chapter 5 below.
16 As we will see, Deleuze cannot mean to subsume identity in the sense of strict ontological identity under 'representation', as the analysis of strict ontological identity is one of the ways he gains access to the notion of 'repetition', which he counterposes to representation.

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What is striking in this table is that only the concept is strictly speaking a representation. Firstly intuitions, Deleuze says, whether empirical or apriori, by their very immediacy are not re-presentations. Secondly, in describing the Idea, Deleuze paraphrases A320/B377 where Kant says that an Idea is “a concept made up of notions which go beyond the possibility of experience”. However, this description occurs in Kant’s own classification of “the genus of representation”. In paraphrasing it, Deleuze avoids any mention of representation, implying that the Idea cannot be a species of representation, if representation comes to be defined in terms of knowledge or experience.

Thus the traditional concept of representation implied in the first concept of faculty is grounded, but also potentially undermined, by the second notion of faculty, which delineates what Kant would call the “subjective” aspects of cognition. If a genesis of these subjective aspects can be produced, then this second sense of faculty may begin to gain its own autonomy from the first. If each faculty can be shown to have its own kind of “object”, then the notion of representation as Vorstellung can be analysed into a system of the destination of the faculties, and their possible relations to each other. So, in the 1963 account, representation is therefore limited to the ‘faculty of concepts’, while in DR, conceptual representation is further reduced to a particular arrangement of the faculties of sense, imagination and memory. This is one part of Deleuze’s strategy.

However, Deleuze also wants to criticise the assumption behind Kant’s classification of intuitions, concepts and Ideas as species of representation at A320/B377. Here a different, more Wolffian, ‘intellectualist’ notion of representation is at work. Kant envisages a complete determination of concepts that, while it reproduces in Idea only the Leibnizian universe of all possible

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18 Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 8.
19 Cf. DR 56/79. However, Deleuze seems to rely on an inadequate translation here because Vorstellung does not imply any ‘re-’, or ‘taking up again’; in fact, for Kant intuitions are precisely vor uns, in that the subject is affected by them. However, Deleuze has a point, as sensible Vorstellung is indeed better described as ‘presentation’: the ‘object’ of mere intuition is scarcely an object at all, it is only distinguished in subject/object terms once the understanding is taken account of. As Deleuze puts it, “in Kant, phenomenon means not appearance, but appearing” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 8). It is after all, immediate; the sensible is the spatiotemporal event of appearing. The notion of sensible ‘presentation’ is analogous to what Nietzsche said of lightning: there is no doer behind the deed. The inference to behind the deed needs some other explanation (“relation to an Object”).
determination, nevertheless stipulates that each individual can *in principle* be treated as a conceptual representation. Therefore, instead of beginning DR with a critique of the representational aspects of *experience*, Deleuze begins rather with the outer limits of representation, and the theme of complete determination that Kant inherits from Leibniz. In effect, he subjects this ‘background’ notion of representation to a critique that Kant had left undone: to what extent can experience be considered to begin with *de jure* in terms of “representation”? What are the limits of representation itself? It is because of the priority of this question that the theory of faculties outlined above must be left until chapter 6. The critique of representation itself will provide us with reasons for turning ultimately to the variable relations of the faculties in order to generate an account of experience.

### ii The Limits of Conceptual Representation

The rationale for Deleuze’s concepts of *difference* and *repetition* is provided first of all in the introductory chapter of DR, where we can find an implicit critique of Kant’s utilisation of the distinction between the logical and real use of concepts. In effect, Deleuze returns to Kant’s ‘pre-critical’ emphasis on this distinction, in order to subject it to a critique that did not occur in Kant. What are the limits of the real use of concepts? I have suggested above that many of Kant’s ‘pre-critical’ concepts find their place in the critical project at the edges of CPR, whether in the Amphiboly, or in the Transcendental Ideal and Ideas. In a sense, part of Deleuze’s strategy concerning Kant is to draw attention to the weight the Kantian project actually leans on its outer limits. When Deleuze criticises “the so-called Copernican revolution”, it is really these limit and background concepts that Deleuze is exposing. Much of the intrinsic interest of Deleuze’s project is in the question of whether he can return to these persistent ‘metaphysical’ issues in Kant and still retain a ‘critical’ perspective himself. Such a project cannot occur without putting in question what critique itself is or can be.

Deleuze begins his highly abstract treatment of logic and reality in representationalist philosophy by discussing the background assumptions about concepts that are shared by Leibniz and Kant. Representational theories for which difference is conceptual difference, or difference involves mediation, are held to share three formal principles: “a principle of difference, that every determination
is conceptual in the last instance” (DR 11-12/21), a principle of sufficient reason ("one concept per particular thing"), and a reciprocal principle of the identity of indiscernibles ("one thing per concept"). Now while Deleuze himself admits that this is a “vulgarised Leibnizianism”, there are two senses in which this picture has validity. Firstly, it can be seen, in terms congruent with my position so far, as a minimal characterisation of the logicised version of Leibnizian rationalism. We have seen that both Kant and Leibniz himself attempt to resist this logicisation, and their resistance to it can be seen as the epicentre of their projects to find a principle of sufficient reason. It has also been seen that this project met with uncertain success, and so Deleuze’s characterisation of a logicised-Leibnizian framework of representation, in which logic and reality are only minimally distinguished, can serve as a return to the zero point from which to begin once again to make investigations into the limitations of logic and the rights of reality.

For Deleuze, the innovation of post-Kantian philosophy, and the decisiveness of its distinction between logic and reality, lies in its problematisation of the determinability of concepts and Ideas in experience. In a passage from the B-paralogisms, Kant presents the distinction between what is available to mere thought and what is not in terms of the rights of the ‘I think’:

Thinking, taken in itself, is merely the logical function and hence the sheer spontaneity of combining the manifold of a merely possible intuition; and in no way does it present the subject of consciousness as appearance, merely because it takes no account at all of the kind of intuition, whether it is sensible or intellectual. ... In the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given to me for thinking” (B428-9).

Even in the case of myself, there is, contra Descartes, no immediate way of making the leap from the merely logical validity of thought to any claim about the bearer of that thought. Deleuze says, in commentary on this passage,

Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference – no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an apriori relation between thought and being. Kant’s answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the ‘I think’ is that of time (DR 86).

Hence for Deleuze the locus of the distinction between logic and reality, the place of the ‘transcendental’ in Kant, lies in the foregrounding of the specificity of the question of determinability. I will comment on the peculiarities of the above
passage in chapter 6.3, but for the moment it suffices to suggest that even in Kant and Hegel, although the emphasis falls on the role of experience and determinability, there remains a logical background theory of an ‘ideal’ world of determinations in which everything has its concept. Thus in Kant, there is a “transcendental ideal” of complete determination, while Hegel’s theories of judgment and the syllogism in the Doctrine of the Notion in the *Science of Logic* also provide an ultimate theory of the necessary possibility of complete determination. In both of these cases, a finite subject, or even community of subjects, cannot fulfil this ideal (because of the limits of determinability), but nevertheless the ideal is necessary to the system both metacritically and for the purpose of the coherence of the concepts that are known and used by experiencing subjects.²⁰ Both empirical and transcendental concepts, in their real use, point towards complete determination. The unity of the act of conceptualisation is oriented by the projected unity of the intensional parts (representations) of the concept itself.

Deleuze’s question will be: what is the relation between the ideal world of representation and determinability? He will push this point in particular with regard to his insistence that the domain of the determinable is composed of certain non-representational components. More generally, what is the relation between the logical value of Ideas and their real status and value? If Ideas are problematic concepts for knowledge, yet necessary for thought, then shouldn’t their status beyond knowledge be explored as such? For Kant, problems cease to be such when they are put in the correct perspective, ie. practical reason. For Deleuze, the correct, transcendental perspective for problems is to see them as problems in themselves, while Kant, when talking of problems, tends to see them in terms of an overlapping between logic and empirical reality. But to see their ‘reality’ in terms of their being problems in themselves entails working out a rational, but nonlogical structure of the determinability of Ideas. It is precisely this that constitutes Deleuze’s carrying through of the Copernican revolution.

²⁰ This will no doubt provoke unease in the reader that I am missing what is most distinctive in Kant and Hegel’s theories of conceptualisation and mediation. Kant’s theory at least will be explored at some length in the next chapter. The virtue of ‘starting at the end’ with these theories of the concept is to underline how rationalist representational notions still undergird Kantian and Hegelian philosophy (among others).
But first we need to examine how Deleuze demonstrates the limits of the concept in the framework of representation, at DR 11-15/21-25. Logically, a concept has a comprehension (or intension) and an extension, which are correlated in an inverse relation, so that the more the concept comprehends, the less it extends over a variety of differing instances. Now how are logical and real uses distinguished by Deleuze in this framework? "The concept is thus constituted in such a fashion that, in its real use, its comprehension extends to infinity, but in its logical use, this comprehension is always liable to an artificial blockage" (DR 12/21). Thus, the "real use" simply denotes the full metaphysical extension of this rationalist picture, in which everything has its own individual concept, whereas the logical use concerns the procedure of stopping to analyse formal connections, and comparing concepts in general. As for Kant in the Inaugural Dissertation (#5, TP 385, Ak. 2:393), it is the logical use of concepts that is the index of finitude, as the procedure of analysis presupposes that one does not have infinite and instantaneous access to the contents of all concepts. But what does Deleuze mean by "artificial blockage"?

Every predicate in a concept must be specified by other predicates, because, for instance, "animal becomes something other in man and in horse ... a predicate must remain fixed in the concept while becoming something other in the thing" (DR 12/21). Because of this becoming-other, the predicate itself must become the object of another predicate. Thus in principle, the specification of predicates in a concept extends to infinity. However, in order to logically analyse and define a concept, it is necessary to order its comprehension in a hierarchy of higher and lower concepts, and not to follow the infinite specification of each component predicate. Thus the concept is blocked from flowing into its full metaphysically infinite comprehension. In this case, however, it follows that when a concept is treated purely logically, the concept, because it has been logically limited, can in principle apply to more than one thing, or have a greater extension; thus "no existing individual can correspond to it hic et nunc" (ibid).

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21 In Deleuze's treatment of this aspect of the concept, he is not yet treating the concept as rule, but simply with regard to its analytic content.

22 This could be said to apply in principle to Kant's notion that concepts are "representations of representations" (A68/B93), as well as, say, Lacan's notion of a signifying chain, in which "a signifier is that which represents a subject for another signifier" (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, London: Penguin 1979, 207; cf. Ecrits, London: Tavistock, 1977, 150). But
This is the *reason* for the "rule of the inverse relation of comprehension and extension". So artificial blockage is built into the use of concepts, as they presuppose an ideal fixity in order to ensure the possibility of definition. Even in the Wolffian "logicising" picture of representation, then, real and logical use are perpetually in tension with each other.

The classical question of the relative importance of real and nominal definition can be seen as intrinsically connected to this tension. However, this question also requires that the concept no longer be treated in such a pure metaphysical way, and that the issue of analysis and definition be related to the use of *signs*. Because we think in *words*, we can only dream of such a logicising calculus of infinite *concepts*. Words have a finite comprehension: "we have here a reason why the comprehension of the concept cannot extend to infinity: we define a word by only a finite number of words" (DR 13/22). That is, because a language is composed of a finite amount of words, any word must be defined by a finite amount of words. Now this means that any word will apply to things that in themselves may be different, but this difference will be excluded not just from the logical, but also the *real* use of the concept as word. Thus while the concept as word would simply be repeated, the signified would *differ without a concept*.

Deleuze insists that to speak of language at this stage is to introduce something extraneous to the pure logic of conceptual representation. The kind of blockage evidenced in words is a "*natural* blockage" (DR 12/22). Deleuze then crucially calls up again the Kantian distinction: artificial blockage "refers to logic pure and simple, but the other refers to a transcendental logic or a dialectic of existence" (ibid). Here, Deleuze is in effect providing the simplest formal example of the limitation of logic, or the delineation of the 'outside' of logic. It is all the more appropriate in that we tend to use words in the very articulation of logical concepts. What is important here is that, rather than presupposing that

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either of these conceptions by themselves remains representational unless the issue of determinability is explicitly broached.

23 In 17th century philosophy this distinction was important, and while rationalists and empiricists emphasised one side of the distinction or the other, they both never lost sight of the necessity of both logical and linguistic treatments of the concept; thus, despite devoting a substantial part of the *Essay* to 'words', Locke did not doubt that the *real essence* of things had to be considered as well as the *nominal* (cf. *Essay* III vi.6). Similarly, Leibniz devoted much attention to the possibilities of language and its adequacy to logical determination. The turning point is often seen to be Kant, who comes to define concepts as rules, or cognitive acts. But it is vital to Kant to keep the notion of complete determination.

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there just is something irreducible to the concept, and therefore ‘real’, as Kant
came to do more and more in his critical writings (while his pre-critical writings
are more attentive, more critical, concerning this question), Deleuze is
demonstrating the necessity of an outside to the concept through its own
limitations. Furthermore, by using this method, he may be able to show that, even
within the framework of representation, there may be different kinds or senses of
reality lying outside the concept, but which are nevertheless necessary for the
concept. Or, in other words, there may be different ways in which things repeat.

And this indeed turns out to be the case. Deleuze names three main types
of natural blockage or repetition within the schema of representation. Nominal
concepts, or words, is the first case; there are two others: what Deleuze calls,
consciously (though obscurely) echoing Kant, concepts of nature and concepts of
freedom. In CJ Kant suggests that concepts of nature and freedom are two
fundamental transcendental domains, which are separated by “an immense gulf”
(CJ 175). But here Deleuze seems to be ‘deducing’ that the realm of
representation is intrinsically bounded by intrusions of the need for nominal
concepts, and nature and freedom. The latter are, at this point in Deleuze’s
analysis, uncovered as necessary limitations of the ideal world of representation
presupposed by Kant.

Whereas nominal concepts are defined by their finite comprehension,
natural concepts are defined by their indefinite comprehension: “however far one
pursues that comprehension, one can always think that it subsumes perfectly
identical objects” (DR 13/23). Deleuze gives the example of Kant’s incongruent
counterparts, as “objects endowed with only an indefinite specification, and
purely spatio-temporal or oppositional, non-conceptual determinations” (ibid). He
goes on to state that such objects seem to testify to a “real opposition”, thus
recalling Kant’s attempt to distinguish logic and reality by delineating two forms
of opposition. However, Deleuze then adds that real opposition should not be
seen as “a maximum of difference, but [as] a minimum of repetition ... space and

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24 Hence Deleuze already rules out a preliminary opposition between infinite and finite in locating
the limitations of logic and reality.
25 Kant restricted his notion of real opposition to the argument recounted in chapter 2.3.1,
concerning the nature of zero; however, the attention paid to the vectorial character of space in
Directions in Space must be kept in mind as another component of Kant’s project to determine the
spatial form of real differentiation.
time are themselves repetitive milieux” (ibid). I will return to this suggestion in much greater detail shortly.

Deleuze then abruptly generalises his suggestion about instances of repetition in nature by turning to a brief quasi-Hegelian characterisation of nature as “external to itself”. If repetitions appear to be found in nature, this is not because in themselves they repeat – rather the repetition requires a mind to apprehend it. Concepts of nature “are always in something else: they are not in Nature but in the mind which contemplates it or observes it, and represents it to itself. That is why it is said that Nature is alienated mind, or alienated concept, or opposed to itself” (DR 14/24). It is difficult at this stage to see the connection between the move to relate real opposition in space to repetition and this suggestion of nature’s self-opposition, but Deleuze seems to suggest that the latter will also profitably be treated as a repetition, which becomes ‘for-itself’ only in a mind that discerns it.

Concepts of freedom can only be outlined at this stage, as the discussion presupposes that certain other parts of DR have been made clear. There is a third possibility for natural blockage, Deleuze says: an individual notion which does indeed have infinite comprehension, but for which the correct faculties for its cognition are not all present. Thus, it may be possible to synthesise the elements of this representation in memory, but the crucial capacity of self-consciousness is lacking. “What is missing ... for a determinate natural reason, is the for-itself of consciousness or recognition” (DR 14/24). In this case, Deleuze suggests, what we have is an unconscious representation. And indeed, he appeals to Freud to explain how this representation functions: “it is ... repeated, enacted, instead of

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26 Cf. Hegel: “Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself, Nature is not merely external in relation to this idea ... the truth is rather that externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature exists”, Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature (trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). # 247, 13f.; however in the next paragraph Hegel suggests that this intrinsic externality only has “the Schein of an indifferent subsistence and isolation” (17). In the remark he adds “in itself, in the Idea, Nature is divine; but as it is, the being of Nature does not accord with its Notion; rather is Nature the unresolved contradiction” (ibid). However, the fact that even the being of brute matter exhibits spatiotemporal form, leads Hegel on the path of discerning greater developments of this initial contradiction between the Idea and the being of nature. In a different way, Deleuze’s early work is also committed to hierarchy in nature.

27 Deleuze’s discussion is made highly peculiar by his insistence that such a concept must have infinite comprehension, considering he has already shown that beings who use words for concepts cannot have such concepts. Why doesn’t he allow the concept to be merely nominal? This would open the way for a plausible account of the unconscious, rather than a completely metaphysical.
being known". But what has this to do with a "concept of freedom"? Frustratingly, no argument or claim is made, and the phrase may be ironic. pointing to the Spinozist notion that we believe we are most free when we are least aware of what is determining us. Nevertheless if such ignorance can be seen to have constitutive power, then this domain of concepts may still retain some peculiar sense of their own. In fact, once we move out of the register of representation, Deleuze indeed places great ethical weight on the notion of unconscious repetition.

We have glimpsed that Deleuze’s three suggestions about extralogical (or real) determinability all essentially involve the notion of repetition. We must now begin the task of making sense of this obscure notion, which Deleuze opposes throughout DR to representation. The account so far has merely suggested a sense in which the ‘outside’ of the concept can be understood through the notion of repetition, as “difference without a concept”. But this is merely a negative understanding of repetition. We still have no way of thinking for itself this difference without a concept implied in the notion of repetition. With such a negative explanation, “no doubt the formal identity which corresponds to simple logical blockage may be opposed to real identity (the Same) as this appears in natural blockage” (DR 16/26). Repetition is still thought in relation to the concept. In fact, from now on, in line with Leibniz’s and Kant’s search for an extralogical principle of reality, the situation must be reversed: “natural blockage itself requires a positive supraconceptual force capable of explaining it, and of thereby explaining repetition” (ibid).

The exposition of the notion of repetition will be distributed over the whole chapter, as it will involve considerable detours into Deleuze’s notions of intensity, Ideas and structures, all of which are for him eminently nonrepresentational forms. We will start by returning to the notion of “concepts of one. However, it must be kept in mind that the goal of his discussion is to find the de jure limits to the structure of representation.

28 It may immediately be objected that memory without self-consciousness is inconceivable, but Deleuze is insistent throughout his work that memory must in fundamental ways be thought as outside consciousness. In Nietzsche and Philosophy he cites Freud’s claims that “our memories are by nature unconscious”, and “consciousness is born at the point where the mnemonic trace stops” (Nietzsche and Philosophy, 112). As we will see in chapter 6 and Appendix IV, Deleuze has a very restrictive account of what ‘consciousness’ is, putting the weight of the syntheses of the mind elsewhere, in the passive syntheses of habit and memory. However, it will be shown that Deleuze is really developing Kant’s A-Deduction on these points.
nature”, specifically to the example of space. Deleuze will be seen as providing a parallel account to Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, which further pinpoints the notion of ‘reality’ or the extralogical for transcendental philosophy. However, through returning to the rationalist roots of Kant’s Aesthetic, he also radically transforms its function with regard to the critical project as a whole. Kant’s problem will be shifted away from that of how to relate concepts to intuition, to the internal relation of Ideas with intuition. The domain of extralogical determinability, whose essence is to be thought as repetition, will thus turn around the correlation of aesthetic (intensive) differentiation with dialectical (ideal) differentiation. If these are the “two halves of difference” (DR 221/285), then the ‘whole’ of difference will amount to a complete account of the forms of real differentiation. For Deleuze this will mean a complete account of the relations of difference and repetition.

2 Aesthetic Difference: Space, Repetition and Intensity

We have just seen that Deleuze’s discussion of concepts of nature takes Kant’s notion of space as its immediate example. Kant’s example from Directions in Space and the Prolegomena is intended as a kind of shock to thought, or to the possibility of full conceptual determination: imagine a pair of hands which are entirely identical in terms of their qualities. What constitutes the difference between left and right? We cannot attribute this difference to the hands themselves because the spatial difference does not belong to them: it cannot be found in them. Only the presupposition of a spatial framework can give content to these differences. The qualities of space belong to space alone, and immediately impose themselves on anything in space. Left and right, up and down, are differences that are external to the concept. Deleuze follows Kant in saying that although these differences are external to the concept, from the point of view of intuition, they should be treated as internal differences, a form of difference internal to intuition.29 The example is vital as it allows us to determine the

29 “Here then is an internal difference ... this difference our understanding cannot show to be internal but only manifests itself by external relations in space”. Kant. Prolegomena. 30. Ak. 4:286.
peculiar characteristics of space, apart from the logic of conceptual
differentiation.\textsuperscript{30}

Firstly, space is so organised that every part of this infinite given whole
has a left, right, up and down, depth and surface. Secondly, Kant is very much
concerned in Directions in Space with the directional or vectorial character of
space.\textsuperscript{31} The differences that are irreducible to the concept concern left and right,
and so on. Now, if space has directions which can be conceived as planes
intersecting each other at right angles,

it is only insofar as they stand in relation to ourselves that we have any cognition
of them by means of the senses at all. It is, therefore, not surprising that the
ultimate ground, on the basis of which we form our concept of directions in
space, derives from the relation of these intersecting planes to our bodies. (TP
366, Ak. 2: 378).

Kant emphasises that “this relation to absolute space, however, cannot itself be
immediately perceived” (TP 369, Ak. 2:381), although the differences between
the bodies themselves which find their reason in absolute space can be perceived.
As well as the hands, Kant chooses examples of spirals in natural formations such
as shells and hops, or “the thread of a screw which winds round its pin from left to
right [that] will never fit a nut of which the thread runs from right to left” (ibid).
These vectorial and asymmetrical relations resist the concept for another reason.
As Bertrand Russell pointed out, Kant is to be credited with discovering here the
importance of nontransitive relations, and their irreducibility to subject-predicate
logic.\textsuperscript{32} For Russell, the criterion for any order or serial relation is that it be
asymmetrical. But whereas Russell takes such spatial differences as a cue for
radicalising Leibnizianism and dissolving intuitive differences once more by way
of a new logic that can account for relations, Deleuze opts to steer a path between
Kant and Russell. While he calls the chapter on sensibility in DR ‘Asymmetrical
Synthesis of the Sensible’, and emphasises the importance of asymmetrical and

\textsuperscript{30} C.G. Vaught attempts a critique of Hegel on the basis of the irreducibility of nonconceptual
spatial difference in ‘Hegel and the Problem of Difference’, in W. Desmond, ed., Hegel and his
Critics (Albany: SUNY, 1989). He criticises Hegel’s arguments concerning spatial mediation in
the ‘Sense-Certainty’ chapter of the Phenomenology (cf. 60-65) by pointing out that “space must
be presupposed as the non-dialectical context in which I turn around” (37). He takes this to
indicate that “difference is not always reducible to negation” (38). The aim and conclusion of
Vaught’s argument are similar to Deleuze’s, but their ways of getting there are quite different.

\textsuperscript{31} This side of the discussion is suppressed in the Prolegomena.

vectorial relations for maintaining order in the physical world, he stays with Kant on the irreducibility of sensibility or intuition to conceptual relations.

We will see the justice of this shortly, but for the moment we should stay with the two aspects of Kant’s discovery: nonconceptuality and asymmetry. We have before us a nonconceptual difference. Now, for Leibniz such a difference would be *per impossibile* a repetition, or an indiscernible. Why does Deleuze retain the term repetition when Kant has precisely specified the *difference* between the left and right hands, thus ruling out that they are repetitions *in themselves*?

The Kantian philosophy of space needs to be taken a step further. Kant emphasises that space is a whole. In the *Directions* essay he states that far from space being a consequence of the relative determinations of the parts of matter, the latter is a consequence of the former: “Our considerations ... make it clear that differences, and true differences at that, can be found in the constitution of bodies; these differences relate exclusively to *absolute* and *original space*; for it is only in virtue of absolute and original space that the relation of physical things to each other is possible” (TP 371, Ak. 2:383). Now, even if Kant will say in CPR that space is only experienced in parts, according to the Axioms of Intuition, the nature of space is determined firstly as a whole: as Deleuze says, “space and time are not presented as they are represented” (DR 231/298). Space is presented as internally qualified by certain vectorical and asymmetrical relations: “a dynamic space must be defined from the point of view of the observer tied to that space, not from an external viewpoint” (DR 26/139). So while in Kant’s critical discussions about space as a form of intuition, his main concern is always its geometrical apriority, he has in effect argued for more than this. In the *Directions* essay and in the *Inaugural Dissertation* Kant argues for the ontological, not merely epistemological and mathematical priority of space. Given his early recognition of the importance of the position of the lived body in space as the condition for vectorial relations, can’t the nature of the *internal* determination of

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33 This whole paragraph, buried at the end of the book, is essential for understanding what Deleuze is doing with the notion of repetition, particularly in relation to Kant and Leibniz.

34 It may be argued that the turn to the idealisation of space as a form of intuition effectively precludes this ontological dimension. But, as we have seen (chapter 3.3.i.), if Kant accepts the need for a minimal recognition of metacritical issues (which I have argued he undoubtedly does), then he firstly must also accept that the forms of intuition are required for finite beings, and secondly it follows that his account of ideality must have some ontological status.
spatial relations be further pursued? Deleuze remarks that "while he refuses a logical extension to space and time, Kant's mistake [in CPR] is to maintain a geometrical extension for it" (DR 231/298).35

We may start to glimpse how space may be conceived in itself according to the notion of repetition. Space is internally differentiated so that each part of space has a left and right, and that things which are identical in every other respect can nevertheless be incongruent. In the case of the incongruent counterparts, each hand repeats the other, although they will never be identical. This positing of a conceptually identical thing in space allows us to determine the action of space itself in its pure ("internal") form. This notion of space in itself, according to its own topological matrix, must be internally divided into left and right, and is nothing in itself without this internal division. There is no "middle"; all of space is articulated according to this structure. Moreover, left and right are obviously reciprocally determined; one without the other is inconceivable. For Deleuze, this is therefore a perfect example of an "intensive" relation. For something to be spatialised in three-dimensional space involves a repetition of an Idea of space, according to differential relations which can only be considered as intensive. These latter two conceptions should now be further expounded.

In search of an account of the internal determination of space, Deleuze goes on to attempt a complex mediation between Leibniz and Kant.36 Both Kant and Leibniz share a concern with grounding the continuity of space. While Kant too holds that space must be continuous, it is Leibniz of all philosophers who is

35 Another argument could be provided in support of this suggestion. Kant had long recognised the possibility of non-Euclidean geometrical frameworks. So his acceptance of Newtonian space is open to the charge of contingency. But, as will be seen, these non-Euclidean possible spaces could precisely be determined in a general or absolute theory of space, through the vectorial and intensive considerations Kant comes to suppress.

36 Leibniz does indeed recognise the importance of repetition for the explanation of the phenomenal, physical world. For Leibniz extension is merely the repetition of similar substances. "Extension is a repetition or diffusion of a prior nature" (Letters to De Volder, Loemker, 536, 519). Extension is in fact abstraction from differing qualities, or "repetition of things insofar as they are indiscernible" (Russell, The Philosophy of Leibniz, 103). If there is a real basis for matter, it lies only in the monad's potential for confused perceptions, or its passivity (cf. Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 255, 248). As Deleuze says "With Leibniz, the affinity between extrinsic differences and intrinsic conceptual differences already appealed to the internal process of a continua repetitio, grounded on an intensive differential element which enacts the synthesis of continuity in the point in order to engender space from within" (DR 26/40, translation modified).
most concerned with “the labyrinth of the continuum”.

On the one hand, if continuity is taken as basic (e.g. in Descartes’ concept of extension), then there seems to be no way to account for discrete objects, but on the other hand, if atoms are taken as basic, then their composition into continuous wholes is a mystery. Leibniz’s solution is to treat indivisibles as monads which can be represented as metaphysical points with a certain force, but also as infinitesimal mathematical points, able to engage in mathematical relations of continuity.

Now, spatial relations themselves are not divisible, but rather ideal. These ideal relations are not logical, but intensive relations of distance. Distances have no extensive parts, because they are mere relations. As Russell clarifies, extensive and intensive magnitudes have entirely different principles: whereas extensive magnitudes are composed of actual parts, and depend on the quantity of parts contained, “intensive quantities, on the contrary, do not in any way presuppose the existence of smaller quantities of the same kind”. Although their quantities cannot be extensively measured according to the criteria of magnitude provided by actual parts, they can be related to each other in terms of greater or less, etc. What is important is to recognise the nonextensive, purely relative nature of the magnitude in the first place: the magnitude concerns only the relation between the points concerned. While extensive relations must take place in a coordinated, representational field, intensive relations are prior to such a common space, as the relations that compose them are entirely singular: they can be “divided only by

37 In Russell’s opinion, this is the “most distinctive feature of Leibniz’s thought ... To find a thread through this labyrinth was one main purpose of the doctrine of monads” (The Philosophy of Leibniz, 100).
38 Russell, Philosophy of Leibniz, 114. Whereas Deleuze does not refer to this book in DR, he does refer to the chapter on distance in The Principles of Mathematics, where similar ideas are expressed.
39 As Leibniz says to Clarke: “Order also has its quantity: there is in it that which goes before, and that which follows; there is distance or interval. Relative things have their quantity, as well as absolute ones. For instance, ratios or proportions in mathematics” (Ariew & Garber, 341). Russell says: “Those mathematicians who are accustomed to an exclusive emphasis on numbers, will think that not much can be said with definiteness concerning magnitudes incapable of measurement. This, however, is by no means the case. The immediate judgments of equality, upon which ... all measurements depend, are still possible, as are also the immediate judgments of greater and less”. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, # 171, 182-3.
40 As Deleuze points out, it is this kind of magnitude that concerns continuous, as opposed to discrete “multiplicities” or manifolds: the latter “contain the principle of their own metrics (the measure of one of their parts being given by the number of elements they contain)”, while the former “found a metrical principle in something else, even if only in phenomena unfolding in them or in the forces acting in them”: cf. Bergsonism, 39; DR 182/236. Deleuze turns to the mathematician Riemann for the modern mathematical expression of this distinction.
changing in kind”. This will become clearer when we turn to Deleuze’s theory of differentials.

Now the relational theory of space must be taken as ideal, otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of the continuum. Considering he was Kant’s target in the Amphiboly, it is ironic that in effect Leibniz’s analysis rests on a diagnosis of the labyrinth as a kind of amphiboly, a confusion of the ideal and the real. Leibniz’s conception of the distinction between material extensive and ideal intensive relations is essential to his account of space.

However, this ideal nature of intensity is the subject of dispute between Russell and Martial Guéroult, and this controversy is in the background of DR. For Leibniz, the only unity that we find in the real world is due to the mind itself and its perception of the external world as “well-founded phenomena”; in themselves, the monads have no intrinsic relation to each other. But if both space and extension be entirely ideal and subjective, how, demands Russell, can the relations exhibited between phenomena be “well-founded”? Leibniz’s insistence upon the relational view of space is finally unsustainable, as it must presuppose an existing world of substances prior to, and somehow grounding, the relations. On the other hand, Martial Guéroult argues that what “contributed to Russell’s confusion is the wish to consider at all cost that space ought also be as subjective as extension ... a bias of Kantian origin”. Firstly, the subjectivity of the monads is not primarily meant to be epistemological, but ontological; furthermore, and crucially for us, there is a sense in which Leibniz, through the very account of intensive relations, affirms an absolute character of space, which is not simply reduced to the relations between extensities, no more than it is merely subjectively...

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41 Bergsonism, 40. To take another example of an intensive relation: the notion of whole is not composed of extensive parts. A whole contains intensive relations that are entirely related to the coordinates of that whole; if one element changes, then all the intensities change. This Leibnizian notion is very important to Bergson, another philosopher related to Deleuze. In chapter 1 of Time and Free Will (trans. F. Pogson, London: Allen and Unwin, 1910), Bergson argues against the notion of ‘intensity’ by suggesting that sensations should not be treated as psychophysical quanta which are externally added to each other. If one adds increasingly pressure to one’s hand with a needle, the sensations of pain are not simply quantitively added to each other, but constantly augment each other as a whole. But it can be argued that Bergson has mistaken ‘intensity’ for extensive magnitude, and is in effect using the notion of an intensive relation to argue against what he calls intensity. The discrepancy between Leibniz and Bergson is thus terminological. Bergson also suggests that durational relations are wholes (organised intensively in our sense). Leibniz is most definitely in the background: cf. Time and Free Will, 8-18, 129-139.
42 Russell, Philosophy of Leibniz, 122-128.
ideal. There is a real sense in which the set of all possible distances, as valid for God as well, can be said to form an absolute intensive space. Guéroult uses Leibniz’s word *spatium* to distinguish this intensive space from geometrical or phenomenological space. This intensive *spatium*, as the set of all possible distances, is moreover not confined to the particular spatial framework which the actual world happens to incarnate.\(^{44}\)

I suggest that this dispute perhaps revolves around a rather narrow image of Kant, who, as we have seen, emphasises (at different stages, according to different degrees) the very same problems as Leibniz: the ideality of pure relations, the ontological and even absolute nature of space, and the difficulty of relating things in themselves to ideal spatial relations. So if Leibniz does indeed affirm an absolute spatium, then where lies the real difference between his view and Kant’s different, but mutually consistent, suggestions about vectoriality and internal difference in space? There is real overlap between the two positions, as Deleuze remarks: “the opposition between Kant and Leibniz seems much less strong to the extent that one takes account of the dynamic factors present in the two doctrines” (DR 26/40).\(^{45}\)

Now if the subterranean Kantian idea of space is transformed via reference to the Leibnizian *spatium*, the field of intensive differentiation of space is *in principle* expanded: spatial determination is reducible to intensive differentiation, in such a way that an internal *genesis* of intensities can take place as a result of the implication that vectorial relations are always defined in relation to a possible perceiver. On the one hand, one may now determine say, a Möbius strip, according to its own spatial (or topological) field. On the other hand, it is also possible to determine kinds of space according to the experience of that space.\(^{46}\)

Thus, for instance, the experience of *depth* becomes the index of a truly intensive distance; spatial magnitudes are not exclusively, or even primarily composed of

\(^{43}\) Guéroult, ‘Space, Point and Void in Leibniz’s Philosophy’ (in M. Hooker, ed., *Leibniz: Critical and Interpretative Essays*, Manchester University Press. 1982), 298 (italics mine). Deleuze refers to this article at DR 331/306, but it is behind the whole discussion of space as intensive *spatium*.

\(^{44}\) Guéroult, 286.

\(^{45}\) Deleuze understates the case by emphasising dynamics. The similarities are also metaphysical and ontological.

\(^{46}\) “It is depth which explicates itself as right and left in the first dimension, as high and low in the second, and as figure and ground in the homogenised third. Extensity does not develop or appear without presenting a left and a right, a high and a low, an above and a below, which are like the dissymmetrical *marks* of its own *origin*. The relativity of these determinations, moreover, is further testimony to the absolute from which they come” (DR 229/295-6).
extensive relations. In sum, this is the alternative to geometry that Deleuze is concerned to spell out in his search for a real principle. "Space as pure intuition or spatium is an intensive quantity, and intensity as a transcendental principle is not merely the anticipation of perception" (DR 231/298).47

But the two positions of Leibniz and Kant are ultimately not compatible. For Leibniz, the absolute character of space is gained through the God's eye view of all possible relations. For Kant, however, if space is absolute, this is only for finite beings. Kant in effect abandons things in themselves to nonspatiality, leaving them without a discernible theoretical mode of individuation. It was seen in the last chapter that Kant does tend to think that intuitions themselves are representational, but he cannot say what it is in the affection that belongs to the thing in itself, as the spatiotemporal coordinates of the intuition, its quantity and quality, are purely ideal (the problem of token-identity).

Nevertheless our comparison of Kant and Leibniz has yielded up a new possibility. For alongside the distinction between noumena and phenomena, a new distinction has sprouted up between intensity and extensity. As extension or matter for Leibniz is only a "well-founded phenomenon", "what is exhibited extensively and mechanically in the phenomena is, concentratedly and vitally, in monads".48 This notion that intensity is the "inner" of extensity returns us to Kant's early notion of force, in which the intrinsic relation between the affection and the affecting substance is still thought intensively, so that intensity serves as

47 It must be admitted that Deleuze takes advantage of the semantic overdetermination of the idea of intensity in the history of philosophy. The adjective 'intensive' can refer to three different things, which are related yet distinct.
1. the intension of a concept, used to describe the noumenal essence of a substance.
2. intensive relations or magnitudes we were just discussing, such as distance; cf. also change in temperature, tonal relations.
3. a 'real', or sensible quantum, for instance, an excitation in the face of a sensation of depth: cf. intense feelings.

However, Deleuze's exploitation of this ambiguity may indeed reveal a hidden ground, as the above suggestions show a common locus for the internal, vectorial, and local characteristics of space.
48 Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff (ed. C.I. Gerhardt, Halle: H.W. Schmidt, 1860), 138-9; quoted in D. Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, 255. The distinction runs parallel with Leibniz's epistemological distinction between distinct and clear perception. For Leibniz these apply to different kinds of 'perception', and have different forms of differentiation: the latter concerns the recognition of a familiar form; the former concerns the apprehending in thought of its internal qualities. Deleuze takes up this distinction: "a clear Idea is in itself confused; it is confused insofar as it is clear ... Singularities condense to determine a threshold of consciousness in relation to our bodies, a threshold of differentiation on the basis of which the little perceptions are actualised, but actualised in an apperception which in turn is only clear and confused" (DR 213/275-6).
the inner of affection. Deleuze's moves to create a new "science of the sensible" (DR 56/79) should be seen partly as a return to this rationalist position. As we will see at the end of this chapter, Deleuze proposes that intensities should indeed be considered to have noumenal significance; moreover, he will propose a startling solution to the problem of token-identity. But in order to proceed further, we need to turn now to the ideal form of differentiation that grounds intensive relations. I suggested above that vectorial relations (such as left-right) were intensive incarnations of an Idea of space. In order to comprehend further Deleuze's Aesthetic, we must now turn to his Dialectic.

In fact, this genealogy of Deleuze's philosophy, through Kantianism and Leibnizianism, is so far partial. After his 1967 lecture to the Société franaise de Philosophie, 'The Method of Dramatisation', Deleuze was asked about the influences of post-Kantianism on the lecture, an earlier version of parts of DR. He replied, perhaps misleadingly but nonetheless informatively, "of course Maimon, and certain aspects of Novalis". Now, in the immediate wake of Kant, Solomon Maimon attempted to justify a return to a Leibnizian account of space, time and intensity which develops in crucial ways the account so far unravelled, by way of a return to Leibnizian differential calculus. Deleuze borrows heavily from him, and I shall devote the next subsection to a brief account of Maimon's position. Maimon's theory is useful for us because it makes a first and relatively straightforward attempt to effect a transition between aesthetic and dialectical difference. This will provide us with the grounding to begin to understand Deleuze's account of the nature and relation of Ideas and intensities. With regard to Novalis, Deleuze makes one brief reference in DR: "Novalis, with his tourmaline, is closer to the conditions of the sensible than Kant, with space and time" (DR 222/287). Novalis had a vivid apprehension that the Kantian schematism could be reworked to demonstrate the temporalisation and spatialisation of Ideas, so that minerals, fossils and living creatures all demonstrate the unfolding of an Idea in time; I suggest in Appendix II that Deleuze finds inspiration in Novalis' writings on this point. Deleuze's account of

50 There is a brief reference in Logic of Sense, 53, to Novalis' distinction between "ideal Protestantism and real Lutheranism", which provides an instance of Novalis' account of the relation of the ideal and the actual.
dialectical and aesthetic difference thus stages an innovative encounter between
these two post-Kantians and the rationalist tradition.

In the second part of the following section I proceed to introduce
Deleuze’s peculiar take on Kant’s notion of Ideas. In the third subsection, I argue
that Deleuze’s turn to structuralist theory to expound the notion of Ideas should be
seen as a unification and potentiation of his interpretation of Kant and Leibniz on
noumenal difference. After exploring the structure of Ideas it will then be possible
to return to spatiotemporal reality by suggesting it be rethought in terms of the
actualisation of these Ideas.

3 Dialectical Difference: Deleuze’s Theory of Ideas as Problems

i Maimon’s Theory of Differentials

For Deleuze, Maimon is the post-Kantian who first sketches out an answer to the
problem that will come to be Deleuze’s: how to connect intensities and Ideas.
Deleuze explicitly sets up Maimon’s philosophy as an alternative to Hegel’s: “Just
as we oppose difference in itself to negativity, so we oppose $dx$ to not-A, the
symbol of difference (Differenzphilosophie) to that of contradiction” (DR
170/221). We can understand Maimon’s turn to differential calculus precisely by
continuing the path we have so far taken, in pursuit of aesthetic difference.

For Maimon, Kant’s notion of the forms of intuition, space and time, is
incomplete. Space and time are not absolute, ideal forms, but really should be
considered as forms of differentiation necessary for finite beings.51 There are two
steps to this argument. Firstly, Maimon argues that to conceive of a pure
continuous and homogeneous spatial intuition (say a pure intuition of a colour)
devoid of difference would not actually be spatial at all, as there would be no
means at all to distinguish any coexistent points within it from one another.52
Therefore space cannot be understood as the form of all intuition (as spaceless

51 Solomon Maimon, Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie (Essay sur la Philosophie
translation of this work, and refer to the German pagination that is also referenced in the
translation.

52 “The representation of the relation of a sensible object to other sensible objects at the same
time is space insofar as it is an intuition. If we were to have a mere uniform intuition, we would not
have a concept of space, nor even an intuition of space”, ibid. 18. See F. Beiser, The Fate of
Reason, 300f. for a concise statement of Maimon’s theory of intuition.
intuitions are possible); it must rather be seen as a form of the differentiation of intuition. Space is really the form by which discreteness is represented to a finite intellect, while time is the way successiveness must be represented. But both of these forms of differentiation are mutually dependent. Discreteness requires successive synthesis, in order to be more than a mere abstract unity, while succession requires coexistence in order to retain continuity with itself. 'Space' as such exists no more than does 'time': separately they are both entia imaginaria, or limit-cases, and are only conceivable together.

The second step is to relate this move back to what he sees as the essential task of transcendental philosophy, to account for synthetic judgments. Synthetic judgments are judgments for which no logical identity has been discerned; therefore the rules of synthesis must present the fundamental ways in which difference is nonanalytically thought and unified. Space and time thus become two forms of differentiation (among others) for a finite being.

By reducing space and time to forms of difference for a finite intellect, Maimon returns to the Leibnizian idea that sensation is an obscure form of a more fundamental kind of differentiation that can only be adequately perceived by an infinite intellect. Synthesis is seen as a lack compared to infinite analysis, which is now more conceivable than on Kant's model, because space and time are forms of difference in general, not of all possible givenness (or appearance) as such for finite beings. Spatiotemporal intuition is then itself a kind of schema, "a sensible image of the differences of things". Maimon nevertheless insists that real "differences of things" must be conceived, prior to sensible differentiation, as their positive ground. In this way he attempts to overcome the obscurities in Kant's account concerning the nature of the material manifold, where the final ground for difference is the mere givenness of sensible 'qualities'. For Maimon it is possible to find a method to treat what is given in sensation as the object of an

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53 As C. Katzoff notes, for Maimon, "not all thought takes place in time. For example, a line is drawn out in time, but the relationship of the form of a triangle to its lines is thought instantaneously", 'Solomon Maimon's Critique of Kant's Theory of Consciousness' (Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 35, 1981), 192.

54 Ibid., 4. Cf. 21: "synthesis in general is unity in diversity".

55 Cf. G.H.R. Parkinson's defence of Leibniz against Kant's Amphiboly, 'Kant as Critic of Leibniz: The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' (Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 35, 1981); he shows how for Leibniz sensation is an obscure form of 'perception', in Leibniz's use of that term, rather than thought, as Kant has it.

ongoing progressive determination, so that the real differences of things are reconstituted. This method involves a reduction of the sensible given to an abstract form, which can then be related to other such forms through differential equations:

All sensible representation, considered in itself as quality, should be abstracted from all quantity, both extensive and intensive. The representation of the colour red, for example, should be thought without finite extension, not however as a mathematical point, but as a physical point or as the differential of an extension.57

Through differentiation and integration of the mutual relations of these ideal objects, we set out on the path of complete determination. Maimon calls the objects of this genetic method “Ideas of the understanding”, but their form would no longer be conceptual, but ultimately expressed according to an ideal differential calculus.

Now in the Anticipations of Perception Kant himself opened up a way in which these differentials could be directly related to sensible qualities in the form of intensive magnitudes. In order to understand Maimon, it is useful to look at his criticism of Kant’s restriction of the principle of intensities. This section of CPR is doubly interesting for us because it is there that the notion of ‘reality’ finally finds its explicit place in the critical project, where it is now dealt with in terms of the categories of quality. Kant says “that which corresponds to the sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon); that which corresponds to its absence is negation = 0. Now, however, every sensation is capable of a diminution, so that it can decrease and gradually disappear” (CPR A168/B210). There are two important points to be made about this moment in Kant. Firstly, this index of reality surely seems to provide the closest potential correlation to the problematic ‘thing’ behind the affection. Kant’s use of the term ‘reality’ here seems even to hark back to his earlier ‘pre-critical’ use of it. Now, if such a theoretical possibility is to be developed, then we must look at the form by which such an affection is determined to provide us a clue to a possible correlation; this leads us to our second point. ‘Reality’ is intrinsically differentiated according to a possible infinity of intensive degrees. This return to an earlier notion of intensity seems to give further plausibility to a possible correlation to noumena. While I will return to this larger issue later in this chapter, we can at least see now how this possibly

noumenal dimension to the notion of intensive magnitude might be formally
developed.

Now, unlike the discrete, extensive magnitudes of the Axioms of Intuition,
intensities are *continuous* magnitudes, and are hence in close correlation with the
internally and externally boundless and continuous nature of space and time
themselves. However, for Kant, this kind of magnitude is not encountered in
apprehension or synthesis itself; it merely represents the degree of sensation itself,
which Kant measures against zero, which is postulated as the point of nothingness
at the base of a continuous scale of reality.\(^{58}\) Thus Kant here delineates the
*possibility* of indeterminate infinitesimals, as vanishing intensive quantities,
determined only in relation to zero. Maimon’s move is to take up Kant’s
suggestion and use it to determine sensible qualities themselves. For Kant, the
vanishing point of a reality, say a colour sensation, is unknown. But because such
realities are continuous, reasons Maimon, their intensive magnitudes can only be
purely relational: *they can only be determined as greater or less than another
such sensation.* Maimon seizes on this necessity of relative determination in order
to redefine Kant’s notion of zero. Kant is criticised for stating that degrees are
determined in “relation to zero”; rather the magnitudes can only be determined in
relation to each other. Moreover, it is impossible to determine an intensive
quantity *in relation to itself,* infinitesimals can only be determined *in relation* to
another infinitesimal. Thus the zero expresses a peculiar character of differentials,
not an (actual or potential) infinite quantity. By itself, the reality or element is
simply \(dx = 0\), but in relation, it not only determines itself, but also that to which it
is related, in a reciprocal determination: \(dx/dy\). \(Dx = 0\) rather represents \(x\) in an
*ideal undetermined* form outside of its *determinable* reality.\(^{59}\)

But crucially, whereas Kant restricts intensive magnitudes to degrees of
the *same* reality, given the combination of the notion of intensive magnitude that

\(^{58}\) In ‘Kant and the Provocations of Matter’ (in A. Rehberg & R. Jones, *The Matter of Critique*,
Manchester: Clinamen, 2000). M.J. Bowles conducts an interesting exploration of Kant’s theory of
intensive magnitudes. In opposition to him, I think it is important to emphasise that although Kant
describes the first two Principles, the Axioms and Anticipations, in terms of a *synthesis* of
intuition, he does not require here a synthesis in the sense of an *unifying act* of the mind. This
would lead to the absurd notion that the mind was *continually* synthesising intensities from zero.
The Principles here merely demonstrate for the philosopher the schematic harmony between
numerical concepts and the intuitive manifold.

\(^{59}\) Cf. DR 171-2/221-3 for Deleuze’s account of the reinterpretation of zero in the history of
differential calculus.
we have been developing and Maimon’s interpretation of zero, it is an account of intensive difference that is really opened up. In principle one can also extend this differential conception of intensity to spatial forms, distances, tones, and other relations in which reciprocal determination is important.

Now Maimon suggests that through the integration of these reciprocal determinations, it is ideally possible to progressively construct the complete determination of these differentials: such would be the “Ideas of the understanding”. However, Deleuze moves beyond Maimon in suggesting that the “Ideas” do not belong to the understanding, but, due to their “sub-representative” nature, must be called Ideas in the strict Kantian sense. If Ideas are determined only through reciprocal and complete determination, their determination is not going to be able to proceed through concepts of the understanding, which by their nature are general, and could only nominally describe such determination. We need therefore to elaborate Deleuze’s development of Maimon’s account through returning to Kant’s notion of Idea.

Deleuze on Kantian Ideas

Maimon has found a way to conceive complete determination but has let his conception down by conceiving Ideas according to the understanding. Arguably Kant too is pulled in two different directions with his theory of Ideas. It is worth quoting at length a passage from CPR on “systematic unity”, as on the one hand it expresses perfectly how Kant envisages the coextensivity of the notions of system and representation (a pure logical world of complete representation), while on the other hand, at the level of metaphor, it gestures towards Leibniz’s, Maimon’s and Deleuze’s notions of a calculus of concepts or Ideas, ie. a specific theory of the form of complete determination:

One can regard every concept as a point, which, as the standpoint of an observer, has its horizon, ie. a multiplicity of things that can be represented and surveyed,

60 In Maimon’s first letter to Kant (7 April 1789), he writes “I define a new class of Ideas that I call Ideas of the understanding which signify material totality, just as your Ideas of Reason signify formal totality. I believe I have opened the way to a new means of answering the ... Quid Juris question” (C 294; Ak. 11:16-17). We will see that Deleuze will take up the sense in which Ideas provide a “material” – in the sense of “real” - principle of determination, but at the same time will move back towards Kant in retaining the “problematic” status of Ideas of reason. Moreover, as will become clear at the end of this chapter (and as I will attempt to justify in the following chapter), there is indeed a sense in which Maimon’s hope that the question quid juris may be solved by a new conception of Ideas is well founded.
as it were, from it. Within this horizon a multiplicity of points must be able to be
given to infinity, each of which in turn has its narrower field of view, i.e.
specification, and the logical horizon consists only of smaller horizons
(subspecies), but not of points that have no domain (individuals). But different
horizons, i.e. genera, which are determined from just as many concepts, one can
think as drawn out into a common horizon, which one can survey collectively
from its middle point, which is the higher genus, until finally the highest genus is
the universal and true horizon, determined from the standpoint of the highest
concept and comprehending all manifoldness, as genera, and subspecies under
itself (A659/B687).

It is clear how the geometrical model of this passage might be synthesised with
Maimon’s theory of differentials. But the most crucial aspect of Deleuze’s
development of the Kantian notion of Idea is his literal reading of Kant’s
statement that Ideas are “problematic”. An Idea, says Kant, is a “focus
imaginarius” (A644/B672). The collective unity of any concept would be a
complete determination, but completion is not possible for a finite being; it cannot
be experienced. Deleuze would argue that if Ideas are complete determinations,
but concepts are general, then it would seem that the reason Ideas are problematic
is precisely because they cannot be generalised. But nevertheless, they are in
principle open to thought, as the horizon of complete determination. It is precisely
the status of Ideas as problematic for experience that gives them the role as
“horizon” for experience or knowledge. In some very important pages on Kant’s
notion of Idea in DR, Deleuze points out that while understanding by itself does
not motivate knowledge, problems do.

The fact is that [reason] alone is capable of drawing together the procedures of
the understanding with regard to a set of objects. The understanding by itself
would remain entangled in its separate and divided procedures, a prisoner of
partial empirical enquiries or researches in regard to this or that object, never
raising itself to the level of a ‘problem’ capable of providing a systematic unity
for all its operations ... [it] would never constitute a ‘solution’. For every solution
presupposes a problem (DR 168/218-9).

In geometrical language echoing the passage from Kant just quoted, Deleuze
claims that in Kant the concepts of the understanding only attain their “full
experimental use ... by being arranged upon lines which converge upon an ideal
focus which lies outside the bounds of experience” (DR 169/219), or being
organised at the limit by a “common horizon” (God). In fact (as will be reinforced
in the next chapter when we turn to Kant’s account of concepts), Deleuze’s claim
is not strong enough; for would the understanding be able even to orchestrate
“partial empirical enquiries or researches in regard to this or that object” without
the conditions of a subjective goal and a conceptualisation carried out in the light of an Idea? Dedeuze could have recalled Kant’s theme in the Preface to the second edition CPR that

reason ... compel[s] nature to answer its questions ... Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles (Bxiv).

Knowledge itself is preceded by the posing of questions, that is, by thought. Knowledge should not be thought as simply involving descriptions of states of affairs according to rules; rather knowledge concerns solutions to problems. In chapter 5 I will show in detail how knowledge is subordinated to Ideas even in Kant. Here, I want to introduce the basic points of Dedeuze’s moves concerning Ideas. It is important to sketch out two more basic elements of Dedeuze’s interpretation.

It has been suggested that these ideal foci and horizons are strictly speaking not intuited or experienced at all due to their problematic status. But if empirical cognition is the locus of “unification” through concepts, then the projected unity of Ideas is presupposed only as a telos from the standpoint of knowledge, that is, from representation. Hence in Kant the power of Ideas is subordinated to representation, which implies that the world of Ideas is organised intrinsically according to a purely logical calculus that reflects and expands upon our already established concepts. This explains why Kant reduced the Ideas to three, by identifying them with the three “universal conditions of thinking” we encountered in the last chapter, so that they correspond to three basic forms of complete determination. Kant in fact specifies that the tripartite structure of Ideas is derived from the three kinds of syllogism (categorical for the Self, hypothetical for the World, disjunctive for God; A577/605).

However, if Ideas are to be thought primarily as problems (according to Dedeuze’s literal reading), this implies that they must already have their own consistency and form as problems that stand structurally outside achieved

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61 Dedeuze continually emphasises the Kantian distinction between thought and knowledge: cf. *Proust and Signs*, 97; *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 93, 172-3.

62 Dedeuze remarks on this derivation in *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, 19. Elsewhere he creates mischief with the correlation of the Idea of God with the disjunctive syllogism by arguing that it effectively makes Kant’s theological proof a diabolical proof: ‘Klossowski or Bodies-Language’, reprinted as an Appendix to *Logic of Sense*, 296.
empirical knowledge, “feeding” and even conditioning knowledge. By stating that Ideas are *unknowable*, Kant does not mean that Ideas are necessarily false problems and thus insoluble but, on the contrary, that true problems are Ideas, and that these Ideas do not disappear with ‘their’ solutions, since they are indispensable conditions without which no solution would ever exist (DR 168/219).

For Deleuze, this means that Ideas can be conceived as already possessing the power to synthesise difference in themselves. As we will see, complete determination is rethought in Deleuze as the ideal, complete determination proper to a problematic field. Ideas can be considered as completely determined, but not according to concepts. Rather, their complete determination is envisaged according to the rule of their own differential determinations, which are precisely problematic in that they can’t be reduced to empirical cognition through concepts and representations. In this case, the straightforward attribution of ‘unity’ to the Ideas no longer holds; the consistency of the Ideas instead obeys a different order, the order of the problematic. Reason can no longer be immediately considered to “seek unity”; from the ideal notion of collective unity we move to a permanently *distributive* structure of reason. It follows that Deleuze’s move here is really to invert Kant: it is not so much that the empirical use of Ideas is a transcendental illusion; rather our attempts to apply the rules of conceptual representation to problems and Ideas is the real transcendental illusion. For here, representation transgresses its own limits, and treats problems as concepts.

A final consequence of Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s notion of Idea should be mentioned, which will achieve its full extension at the end of this chapter. If Ideas are to be determined as problems in themselves, it follows that they lose some of their merely subjective status, as conceived on the Kantian model. Although Deleuze retains the term ‘Idea’, as problems, Ideas are no longer entirely dependent on the *experiencing* subject. Deleuze now has to perform a delicate operation, because on the one hand, he will insist that problems have an objective value ... ‘Problematic’ does not mean only a particularly important species of subjective acts, but a dimension of objectivity as such which is occupied by these acts. An object outside experience can be represented only in problematic form; this does not mean that Ideas have no real object, but that problems *qua* problems are the real objects of Ideas (DR 169/219).
But on the other hand, this ‘reality’ cannot be objective in a Kantian empirical
realist sense, or for that matter in any commonsense realist sense. So Deleuze will
retain the connection of Ideas to a ‘subject’ (however that subject might be
conceived), by saying that Ideas are “necessarily unconscious” (DR 192/249).
“Ideas ... express that extra-propositional or sub-representative problematic
instance: the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation of
consciousness” (DR 192/248). As will be seen in chapter 6 and Appendix IV,
Deleuze’s notion of the unconscious will be expounded through an account of the
passive syntheses of habit and memory. The unconscious, moreover, will be
defined by its virtuality. Now, crucially, Deleuze nevertheless insists that

the virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real
insofar as it is virtual... Indeed the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the
real object – as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it
plunged as though into an objective dimension (DR 208-9/269).

With this in mind, it is now possible to develop further suggestions in chapter 2
that Deleuze’s notion of ‘virtuality’ is related to a transformation of the project to
discover the principles of ‘real possibility’.

iii Leibniz, Kant and Structuralism

Deleuze emphasises that there must be a distinction between the differential
relations themselves, and the actual values of these relations as incarnated in the
physical world. As with Leibniz’s own understanding of the calculus, the
differential relations themselves refer only to a set of virtualities.63 In chapter 2
the notion of a calculus of ‘real possibilities’ was suggested, and in this chapter
we have constructed the possibility of a pure spatium as a space of possibilities. It
now appears that the continuity that we sought in spatial relations really belongs
to this ideal space, which will turn out to be the matrix of ‘real possibility’, and
which now should be rigorously distinguished from extensive space.64 It is

63 On Leibniz’s use of the notion of virtuality, see G. Tonelli, ‘Early Reactions to the Publication
of Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais (1765)’, in L.W. Beck ed., Proceedings of the Third International
Kant Congress.
64 “Continuousness truly belongs to the realm of Ideas only to the extent that an ideal cause of
continuity is determined. Taken together with its cause, continuity forms the pure element of
quantitability, which must be distinguished both from the fixed quantities of intuition (quantum)
and from variable quantities in the form of concepts of the understanding (quantitas)” (DR
171/222). Continuity refers to “the set of relations between changes in the ... variables”; it refers to
the ideal state of complete determination, which can only subsist outside any particular situation of
necessary to separate this ‘pure spatium of Ideas’, composed of virtual differential relations, in its state of sheer virtuality, from the determinations themselves that particularise and incarnate these various real possibilities. That is, we must now begin to make a rigorous distinction between ideal relations and intensive relations, at exactly the moment we have secured their formal correlation. I now turn to dialectical difference considered in itself, as apart from its aesthetic, intensive actualisation.

We have to conceive an ideal spatium for all Ideas, not just for what we ordinarily call space. It is here that we should introduce one of Deleuze’s other names for the notion of Idea; as well as “virtual” and “problematic”, he calls Ideas “structural”. “The reality of the virtual is structure” (DR 209/270). It is with his turn to structuralism that Deleuze finds the decisive means to mediate between Leibniz and Kant. “Structuralism cannot be separated from a new transcendental philosophy”, but at the same time, it cannot be separated from a return to Leibnizian conceptions of the differential calculus. The novelty and power of Deleuze’s philosophy can only be appreciated if we keep in mind this essential problematic nexus of Leibniz, Kant and structuralism. If we perceive this nexus correctly, we can understand the changes that Deleuze effects on each of its three elements.

For Deleuze, an Idea as such would consist of two elements: on the one hand, “the set of differential relations between elements stripped of sensible form and function, which only exist through their reciprocal determination”, to which correspond, on the other hand, “distributions of ‘singularities’, repartitions of actual determination, as the latter can only exist by selecting certain (“compossible”) relations from the ideal set. The elements of these relations can also be defined in terms of this ideal continuity: “the elements reciprocally determined by these relations [are] elements which cannot change unless the multiplicity changes its order and its metric” (DR 182-3/237). As we will see shortly. Ideas, considered as problematic multiplicities, are precisely open to such differential changes in order.

65 “It is not a matter of a location in a real spatial expanse, nor of sites in imaginary extensions, but rather of places and sites in a properly structural space, that is, a topological space. Space is what is structural, but an unextended, preextensive space, pure spatium constituted bit by bit as an order of proximity, in which the notion of proximity first of all has precisely an ordinal sense and not a signification in extension”. Deleuze, ‘How do we Recognise Structuralism?’, in C. Stivale, The Twofold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari (New York: Guilford Press, 1998). 262.

66 In Logic of Sense, Deleuze concedes that “the parallel [of structuralism] with differential calculus may seem both arbitrary and old-fashioned. But what is old-fashioned is only the infinitist interpretation of the calculus. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, Weierstrass gave a finite interpretation, ordinal and static, very close to a mathematical structuralism”. 339. This remark relates to the interpretation of zero, as recounted above.

67 ‘How do we Recognise Structuralism’, 263.
distinctive and ordinary points". A singularity would thus represent the point at which something "distinctive" occurred on a differential curve. However, crucially, Deleuze argues for the ontological priority of singularities over their differential relations. For in the mutual determination of singularities according to differential relations, nothing is yet decided about whether they converge or not with other singularities, that is, whether they are compossible or incompossible.

It is necessary to return to Leibniz at this point. It is as if we are faced with the set of all logically possible series (combinations of singularities), with no "real" criterion to decide which are "convergent", and which are "divergent". Deleuze’s model is crucially shorn of the presupposition of a God who orders possible series, that is, who presides over the calculus of real possibilities or compossibilities by appealing to the criterion of the best. But if there is no built-in convergence to the series on this model, how are they organised at all? In fact, it is as if Leibniz’s system not only survives, but even only comes to bloom, after the death of God. Even for Leibniz, God is not responsible for the sinning of Adam; rather, God selects the world in which Adam sins. But in another possible world, Adam does not sin. Prior to the determination of compossibility (according to the law of the best), Leibniz not only presupposes a distribution of logically possible series, but can be seen, according to Deleuze, as presupposing a distribution of the “singularities” which compose each possible series, and which can be ordered according to a calculus of real possibility. In the case of Adam, such singularities would include: to be the first man, to live in paradise, to give birth to a woman from himself, to sin, to resist temptation. These singularities must be said in themselves to be “pre-individual”. If we take the last two singularities, then it is logically possible for Adam either to sin or to resist temptation, but the two together are not compossible: this much can be determined. Therefore if the set of differential relations between a set of singularities can be reciprocally determined according to a calculus of real possibilities, we have something we can call, in an

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68 'La méthode de dramatisation', 97. Cf. DR 181/234, and DR chapter 4 passim.
69 In DR, Deleuze tends to emphasise his criticism of Leibniz’s account of compossibility: “It seems to us that compossibility consists uniquely in the following: the condition of a maximum of continuity for a maximum of difference - in other words, a condition of convergence of established series around the singularities of the continuum. Conversely, the incompossilibility of worlds is decided in the vicinity of those singularities which give rise to divergent series between themselves. In short, representation may well become infinite; it nevertheless does not acquire the power to affirm either divergence or decentering” (DR 263/339). But despite this criticism, it is clear that Leibniz has furnished the conceptual means for Deleuze’s account.
absolute sense, "the problem of Adam". The dialectic of problems thus gives us a "semi-divine" power to ask: "what shall Adam be?" As Deleuze says, this "vague Adam, a vagabond, a nomad, an Adam = x", would be "common to several worlds", being composed of several singularities whose relation has not been actually determined.

Leibniz's principle of the best should thus be put in its place: it is merely another possible solution nestled within the primary ontological matrix of problems. The "selection" of series should instead be considered minimally in terms of solutions to problems. Deleuze thus goes beyond Kant's conception of Ideas as problems here. These Ideas are problematic first of all because their organisation of singularities has not been decided. It is their virtual state of implication that is the true cause of their problematicity in two senses. Firstly, the criterion for their actualisation is itself problematic and depends on a finite being fashioning a solution. Secondly, Ideas could not in any case all be actualised at once, because, as problematic, they contain divergent series alongside convergent ones. Ideas therefore testify to an original "play in the creation of the world" (DR 51/72); as Deleuze says elsewhere, "there is no longer any originary reality".

Deleuze concludes that we are no longer faced with an individuated world constituted by means of already fixed singularities, organised into convergent series, nor are we faced with determined individuals which express this world. We are now faced with the aleatory point of singular points, ... which holds good for many of these worlds, or in the last analysis, for all worlds, despite their divergences and the individuals which inhabit them.

It is our goal to understand how this aleatory point, which Deleuze usually calls the "object = x", may hold throughout all divergent series, for it is here that Deleuze's synthesis of Kantianism and rationalism reaches its highest point. "Incompossible worlds ... have something in common: ... the genetic element in relation to which several worlds appear as instances of solution for one and the same problem". This problematic "common element", so understood, is in effect a higher potentiation of the Kantian "object = x", in such a way that the entire

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50 Deleuze remarks suggestively. "true freedom lies in the power to decide, to constitute problems themselves. And this 'semi-divine' power entails the disappearance of false problems as much as the creative upsurge of true ones": Bergsonism, 15.
51 Logic of Sense, 114. Cf. also The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 60-61.
52 "Klossowski or Bodies-Language", 296.
53 Logic of Sense, 114.
issue of Kantian \textit{transcendence} is transformed. It is our ability to pose problems that both grounds representation, which really is nothing but the realm of established solutions, and which also allows us to ‘transcend’ representation, and seek its conditions. “Solvability” must depend on an internal characteristic: it must be determined by the conditions of the problem, engendered in and by the problem along with the real solutions. Without this reversal, the famous Copernican Revolution amounts to nothing” (DR 162/210). We should now turn to Deleuze’s crystallisation of these Leibnizian and Kantian elements in the contemporary theory of structuralism.\textsuperscript{75}

The structuralist interpretation of an “object = x” traversing the series can be introduced by reference to a text that lies at the very origin of structuralism, Lévi-Strauss’s \textit{Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss}, where he explicitly relates his new theory of exchange to Kantianism.\textsuperscript{76} The text is instructive, as the links between Kant and structuralism are often misunderstood, weight being unduly placed on the analogy of categories to structures, when, as Deleuze shows at length, the analogy should really be with Kantian Ideas.\textsuperscript{77} Lévi-Strauss

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Logic of Sense}, 114.

\textsuperscript{75} It is true that Deleuze’s interpretation of the “series”, which for Leibniz were intelligible monads, but are for Deleuze broken up counterfactually into “pure” sets of singularities and possible relations, makes sense as a renewal of the rationalist account of essences. But at the same time, this fragmentation into pre-individual singularities radically breaks apart the Platonic sense of ideal unity involved in the notion of essence. Deleuze makes a point of saying that Ideas should be understood in terms of structure, which “has nothing to do with \textit{essence} for it is a matter of a combinatorial formula supporting formal elements that by themselves have neither form nor signification, nor representation \ldots nor intelligibility behind appearances”; ‘How do we Recognise Structuralism’, 261. It can also be seen, if we refer back to the issues raised in chapter 2, that the reasons why Deleuze does not affirm an intelligible essence \textit{behind} appearance themselves flow from his interpretation of rationalist theological arguments (i.e. the notion of univocity).

\textsuperscript{76} Deleuze refers in detail to this work in \textit{Logic of Sense}, 48-50.

\textsuperscript{77} Kant’s categories of the understanding are often referred to as ‘structures’ that order experience, and in turn structures are sometimes called ‘conditions for the possibility’ of psychic or social life, etc. However, for Kant himself, as we will see in chapter 5, the categories themselves have no value or application by themselves – they are \textit{not} conditions for the possibility of experience - unless they are justified by something else that is truly necessary for experience: apperception. As Kant crucially says at CPR A90/B123, “appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g. in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis”. Apperception is therefore absolutely necessary as an independent mediating premise in order to avoid this scenario; any “conditions of the possibility of experience” are sterile without it. We will discuss the notion of apperception at length in the next chapter, but it can be noted here that the premise of apperception would be clearly incompatible with many accounts of structuralism, which is often considered as a definitive break with ‘the philosophy of consciousness’. Clearly apperception cannot be necessary for a structuralist, but nor can it be presumed as a logical requirement for the capacity to judge, given the priority accorded to unconscious structures. Hence, the identification of structure with the categories of the understanding cannot stand. So when Levi-Strauss says that structuralism can provide a new
announces obscurely that “we set ourselves on a path closely parallel to that of Mauss when he invoked the notion of *mana* as grounding certain *apriori* synthetic judgments”. Now, Mauss cites *mana* as a word used by certain Polynesian tribes to denote the power possessed by gifts in the cycle of exchange. For Lévi-Strauss, it is an example of a “floating signifier”, a signifier without meaning in itself, but which conditions the possibility of the actualisation of a structural network, whether it be an exchange system or language itself. Any culture must be founded on a signifying system; but because such systems can only be understood synchronically (they appear to come into being all at once), this always produces a “non-equivalence” concerning the relation to the signified. “The moment the universe became *significant*, it was none the better *known* for being so”. Even though “a shift occurred from a stage when nothing had a meaning to another stage where everything had meaning”, it entails the passage of great periods of time “to identify certain aspects of the signifier and certain aspects of the signified”, that is to *know* the world. Hence, “there is always a non-equivalence or ‘inadequation’ between the [totality of signifiers and totality of signifieds], a non-fit and overspill which divine understanding alone can soak up”. In Deleuzian terms, there is always a surfeit of virtual differential connections that haunts our movements in actuality, which expresses itself in this “floating signifier, which is the disability of all finite thought (but also the surety of all art, all poetry, every mythic and aesthetic invention)”. For Deleuze, the notion that the system of exchange is “a synthesis immediately given to, and given by, symbolic thought” which nevertheless depends on the *movement* of an ‘object = x’ traversing all the series, is fundamental to what he calls the “ideal synthesis of difference”. There is a “static genesis” of combinations in an ideal *spatium*, which must nevertheless...

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79 Ibid. 60.
80 Ibid. 62.
81 Ibid. 63.
82 Ibid. 58.
83 The correct French title of the fourth chapter of DR. The notion that synthesis can occur in Ideas themselves is crucial.
pass through actuality in order for the structure to be determined, in order for singularities to be found.

Deleuze is outlining a general metatheory of structures, so what exactly the "elements" involved in the differential relations are remains undetermined. But again, if we keep in mind Deleuze’s general reliance on rationalism, we can recall that in Leibniz all elements do not finally come to rest in some sort of elementary points, rather the ‘substance’ of a thing is its monadological structure of sufficient reason. However, Deleuze gives some helpful examples of types of elements from structural linguistics and structural anthropology. Jakobson and Halle describe the building blocks of language, phonemes, as distinguished by certain ‘distinctive features’, which delineate the fundamental types of voicing and combination that firstly are possible for the speech apparatus itself, and secondly that are, as it were, composable according to the capabilities of that apparatus (the combination of certain phonemes being difficult to pronounce). The words bill and pill are distinguished only by this fundamental opposition between the different speech units b and p. But “a distinctive feature is a relational property so that the ‘minimum same’ of a feature in its combination with various other concurrent or successive features lies in the essentially identical relation between the two opposite alternatives.” This fits neatly with Deleuze’s account of a differential relation: “phonemes do not exist independently of the relations into which they enter and through which they reciprocally determine each other”. So the “element” in the differential structure of linguistics can be thought of as virtually “implicating” these “differential relations among phonemes [which] assign singularities within language”. But the determination of which relations are ‘composable’ and which ‘incomposable’ depends on an ideal...

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84 Deleuze writes that “Ideas are multiplicities .... ‘Multiplicity’ ... is the true substantive. substance itself. Everything is a multiplicity insofar as it incarnates an Idea” (DR 182/236).
86 Ibid. 14.
87 Deleuze, ‘How do we Recognise Structuralism?’, 264. Cf: “The linguistic Idea certainly has all the characteristics of a structure: the presence of differential elements, called phonemes, extracted from the continuous sonorous flux; the existence of differential relations (distinctive features) which reciprocally and completely determine these elements; the value of singular points assume by the phonemes in that determination ...” (DR 203/262).
88 Logic of Sense, 150.
problematisation that can only be carried out through experimental actualisations of the element.\(^{89}\)

iv Conclusion: The Virtual and the Actual

The distinction between virtual and actual has been repeatedly mentioned. In order to expound this distinction, it will be helpful to relate it to four problems that we have been encountering in our examination of the limits of transcendental philosophy. 1. the logic/reality distinction; 2. the problem of existence; 3. the status of possibility in transcendental philosophy itself; 4. the problem of individuation. Deleuze’s innovation is to unite these separate problems into one consistent thread.

1. **Logic/reality.** In my opinion, the distinction between the virtual and actual, in the light of the preceding, transforms and solves the rationalist and Kantian problem of the relation between real and logical possibility. “The only danger,” writes Deleuze, “is that the virtual could be confused with the possible” (DR 211/272). The danger is double. Firstly, Deleuze criticises the notion of logical possibility for being abstract (in the Hegelian sense). The problem is that it depends in a hidden way on the current reservoir of *concepts* available to the mind.\(^{90}\) The criterion for what is logically possible depends on

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\(^{89}\) Deleuze also refers us to Lévi-Strauss’ notion that there are “mythemes” analogous to phonemes. For instance, Lévi-Strauss takes the Oedipus myth and finds four separate types of event that recur in it. (C. Lévi-Strauss, ‘The Structural Study of Myth’, in *Structural Anthropology*, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1968). 214f. For Deleuze’s brief reference, see ‘How do we Recognise Structuralism?’, 266.) The first group is comprised of events such as Oedipus marrying his mother, and Antigone burying her brother despite divine prohibition. They all involve “overvaluation of kinship relations”, and are counterposed to the second group, in which Oedipus kills his father and Eteocles kills his brother, which indicate “undervaluation of kinship relations”. The other couple concerns the affirmation or negation of the notion of autoctonous origin, but we can focus on the first couple. In this case, a set of singularities is traced which leads us back to the virtual structure that delineates the unresolved problem of kinship relations for the ancient Greeks. The myth plays out various “limit situations”, or singularities, and serves, says Lévi-Strauss, as a kind of “logical tool” by which various combinations are put into play (ibid. 216). As regards the mythemes in these relations, Lévi-Strauss remarks they only have content insofar as they are engaged in actual relations, so that “it is as though a phoneme were always made up of its variants” (ibid. 212). It is possible to pronounce a phoneme independently, but a mytheme not only coexists virtually with its other combinations, but can only be actualised with other combinations. So, with both of these cases, linguistic and anthropological, we find to varying degrees that the elements must be considered in their virtual character.

\(^{90}\) With the notion of possibility, “difference can no longer be anything but the negative determined by the concept: either the limitation imposed by possibles upon each other in order to be realised, or the opposition of the possible to the reality of the real” (DR 211/273).
the distribution of already established concepts (whose implications are analytically implied in each other). However, as we have seen with the early Kant, this network must ultimately depend rather on a notion of real possibility. This leads to the second danger, that the true analogy between logic/reality and actuality/virtuality be presented in inverted form. Far from being identified with the logical, the virtual is in fact identified with the real. In fact, Deleuze completes the movement of Leibniz and Kant towards subordinating logical to real possibility, but at the same time, precisely with the notion of the virtual, avoids the threatened conclusion that everything would collapse into the bare givenness of reality.

For Deleuze, the locus of real possibility lies in Ideas. The set of virtual relations between singularities must be considered as prior to, and different in kind from, any actual organisation of compossible series, as the only criterion of compossibility is problematised in the absence of an intelligent God: hence the “play in the creation of the world” (DR 51/72). The virtual thus assumes its own consistency, its own “truly sufficient reason”, to which actuality is subordinated. But actuality in no way “resembles” the virtual, in the way that logical possibility resembles or repeats the real. Therefore the problem of the mutual collapse of logic into reality, or vice versa, is no longer a threat. The actual/virtual distinction is thus a more powerful, internally dynamic version of the logic/reality distinction.

2. Existence. We have seen that Kant’s solution in CPR to the problem of ‘reality’ was to identify it with mere existence as the presence of an intuition; we also saw what the effects of this identification were in Kant’s notions of idealism and noumena. For Deleuze

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91 I believe it is for related reasons that Deleuze claims in his review of Hyppolite that “contradiction [is the] merely phenomenal aspect of difference” (195). However, whether such a point could have any mileage in an argument against Hegel is another matter.

92 “Actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle. Actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense, actualisation or differenciation is always a genuine creation. It does not result from any limitation of a pre-existing possibility” (DR 212/273). Deleuze’s critique of resemblance here is difficult to understand unless placed in the context of the problem of monism as encountered in chapter 2: monism threatens either to swallow up logic in reality, or vice versa. Deleuze must avoid this at all costs if he is to resolve the problem of real possibility, as well as ultimately sustain his own philosophy of difference.
Every time we pose the question in terms of the possible and the real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption or a pure act or leap ... What difference can there be between the existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible, already included in the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept confers on it as a possibility (DR 211/273).

On these terms, “existence is therefore supposed to occur in space and time” (ibid), which, as in Kant, provide the index for the reduction of ‘reality’ to empirical reality. But Deleuze writes that in Kant space and time “are understood as indifferent milieux instead of the production of existence occurring in a characteristic space and time” (ibid). Now, space and time are indeed to be understood as other to the concept in Kantian terms, but nevertheless, they are not other to the Idea.93 “While space may be irreducible to concepts, its affinity with Ideas cannot nevertheless be denied – in other words, its capacity (as intensive spatium) to determine in extensity the actualisation of ideal connections (as differential relations contained in the Idea)” (DR 231/298-9).

So what we have called up until now the set of real possibilities can be determined ideally according to differential relations, while the singularities of these relations are defined by certain values in those relations. Deleuze’s account thus allows for actualisation to be ‘built in’ to the determination of the virtual. The continuity implied in relations of distance and the notion of intensity mirrors an “ideal continuity” at the level of Ideas. Deleuze is in effect bypassing Kant’s account of the concept to engineer an internal relation between Ideas and the spatiotemporal field. He goes on to suggest that, “when one makes a system of spatiotemporal determinations correspond to a concept, it seems to me that one substitutes a drama for a logos, one establishes a drama of this logos ... Pure spatiotemporal dynamisms have their power of dramatising concepts, because first of all they actualise, or incarnate Ideas”.94 This notion of dramatisation will be returned to shortly.

3. Possibility in Transcendental Philosophy. It is in the current context that we find grounds for Deleuze’s transformation of Kantian “conditioning” into

93 While it is true that continuousness must be related to Ideas and to their problematic use, this is on condition that it be no longer defined by characteristics borrowed from sensible or even geometric intuition” (DR 171/222).
94 Deleuze, ‘La méthode’. 107, 96.
“genesis”: “The condition must be a condition of real experience, not of possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic conditioning. In every respect truth is a matter of production, not of adequation” (DR 154/200). These statements may perhaps be less obscure in the current context. It can prima facie seem that Deleuze is simply abandoning Kantianism for materialism by appealing to “real conditions”. However, the point is that Kant’s critical interpretation of the ‘third thing’, as the set of conditions of possible experience, equivocates crucially over the problematic distinction between logical possibility and real possibility and betrays the sense in which the transcendental must be extralogical. The notion of possible experience by itself, without a proper account of the distinctive structure of real possibility for itself, lends itself to the charge that the conditions of possibility are extracted from the presence of already established empirical concepts. Thus “Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological consciousness” (DR 135/176-7). We have seen that the structure of what we previously called ‘real possibility’, but is now denoted by the term ‘virtuality’ extends into the sub-representative level of Ideas. We also encountered arguments from Maimon and Deleuze to the effect that while the ‘extensive’ form of differentiation provided conditions for conscious differentiation, these conditions were themselves conditioned by sub-representative differential Ideas. While these claims about the limits of consciousness must be defended in greater detail in chapter 6 and Appendix IV, which will take into account the necessary starting point of consciousness (and so-called ‘empirical reality’), we can at least see formally how a genesis which traces the actualisation of virtual structures might be sufficiently independent of the array of actual, conventional concepts. The “real conditions” Deleuze has in mind are by no means empirical particularities or ‘material conditions’, but are precisely the ideal structures we have been exploring, that form the problematic ground for the actualised ‘solutions’ found in external reality. “This is a radical reversal in the problem-solution

95 Hegel too can be seen to be concerned over this, and moves towards a genetic account of conditions which are no longer understood in terms of the possible, but obey a new speculative logic of the absolute (that is, of reality).
relation, a more considerable revolution that the Copernican" (DR 180/233).96

We will see in Appendix IV how Deleuze manages to hold onto the transcendental dimension through his account of the constitution of the subject through the passive syntheses of habit and memory: these provide the human being with the access to the ‘virtual’ necessary in order to “reconstruct” the genesis of Ideas.97 Again, it is quite clear that Deleuze is committed to transcendental philosophy and is no materialist.

4. Individuation. Deleuze in effect bypasses the Kantian problem of relating concept to intuition by finding at the extremes of ideality a means to connect up with the extreme of spatiotemporal individuation. Given the account of relative and complete determination it is finally possible to envisage how Deleuze intends intensive relations to do the work of individuation in the manifold. “The individual is no more an infima species than it is composed of parts” (DR 247/318). Deleuze redefines individuality according to the

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96 Deleuze in fact says this about the mathematician N.H. Abel, who produces a formal theory of problems and differentials in which Deleuze finds inspiration for his own theory.

97 However, in his 1956 study of Bergson, Deleuze's claims about the relation of ‘experience’ to transcendental philosophy are rather more problematic. He describes Bergson’s method as "more than a description of experience and less (in appearance) than a transcendental analysis. It certainly raises itself to the conditions of the given, but these conditions are tendency-subjects, they themselves are given in a certain way, they are lived. Moreover they are at the same time the pure and the lived, the living and the lived, the absolute and the lived. The essential thing is that the foundation be a foundation, but that it is nevertheless experienced" ('Bergson's Concept of Difference', in J. Mullankey ed., The New Bergson, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, 46). He then appeals to Schelling's conception of 'superior empiricism'. However, on these terms, it is almost impossible to conceive how such a method could be carried out. In 1961, Deleuze publishes 'De Sacher-Masoch au Masochisme' (Arguments 15, 1961, pp. 40-6), an astonishing text, uncommented upon as far as I know, which offers a full-blown affirmation of Jungian psychology. Depth-psychological access to the unconscious is affirmed through the apprehension of archetypes in regressive experiences (“all is symbol in the unconscious”, 46). Deleuze talks darkly of “the alliance of consciousness with superficial levels of the unconscious, which hold in check the more profound unconscious that encircles us through a line of blood” (43). It is tempting to read the earlier account of Bergson in these terms (as no other kind of access to the conditions of experience is suggested). In the essay on Bergson, Deleuze also writes that “consciousness already existed, with in and in difference itself. Duration by itself is consciousness, life by itself is consciousness, but it is so by right ... Consciousness in Bergson is not at all historical, history is just the only point where consciousness re-emerges, having traversed matter ... This identity in principle of difference and the consciousness of difference is memory” (52). This clearly resonates with a Jungian reading of the relation of phylogenesis and memory. It is only finally with his theory of Ideas that Deleuze escapes from the obscurities of this earlier account. In “How do we Recognise Structuralism?”, he takes up Lévi-Strauss’s criticism of Jung for not seeing that archetypes can only be structural. To attribute meaning to archetypes is, says Lévi-Strauss, “comparable to the long-supported error that a sound may possess a certain affinity with a meaning” (Structural Anthropology, vol. 1, 208). Deleuze also alludes to Lacan’s criticism of Jung’s archetypes as merely imaginary, rather than truly symbolic in the Lacanian sense (“How do
intensive relations that have gone into the spatiotemporal constitution of an entity; individuation occurs in an “intense field” and always ideally relates to certain “pre-individual singularities” that provide the distinctive points in its constitution or formation (DR 246/317). “It is because of the action of the field of individuation that such and such differential relations and such and such distinctive points (pre-individual fields) are actualised – in other words, organised within intuition” (DR 247/318).

These suggestions are no doubt very incomplete at this point, and will be further developed and made concrete in the final chapter. However, two things can be noted immediately. Firstly, if what Deleuze has performed here is valid, then hasn’t he in effect overcome the need for a Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, as the locus for a demonstration and justification of the apriori relation between rational determination and the sensible manifold? If such a move were to be possible, it would need to be specified and defended in much greater detail; this will be attempted in the final chapter. But there is indeed a sense in which Deleuze, in his exploration of the “two halves of difference ... dialectical Ideas [and] ... aesthetic actualisation” is explicitly calling into question the need for a Transcendental Analytic as Kant envisages it. Secondly and relatedly, we should draw attention to Deleuze’s remark that “that which we call drama particularly resembles the Kantian schema ... In a certain manner, all of post-Kantianism has tended to elucidate the mystery of this hidden art”.98

Deleuze rechristens the schematism a “dramatisation” of the Idea. Dramatisations “create or trace a space corresponding to the differential relations and to the singularities to be actualised” (DR 216/279). For instance, the

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98 ‘La méthode’, 96. In this same passage, Deleuze points out that certain post-Kantians have indicated the direction that he is taking, but does not give their names. However, Novalis’ “magical idealism” seems to be the main reference for Deleuze on this point, and comprehension of Deleuze’s notion of the spatiotemporal actualisation of Ideas may be aided at this point by a discussion of some of Novalis’s fragments. The reader may therefore wish to turn to Appendix II on ‘Novalis and the Schematism’. In DR, Deleuze writes that “The Kantian theory of schematism points beyond itself in two directions: towards the dialectical Idea, which is its own schema and which ensures the specification of the concept (Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Final Aim of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason’), and towards the aesthetic Idea, which makes schemata serve the more complex and comprehensive process of symbolism (Critique of Judgment # 49, 59)” (DR 328/282). The relation between schematism and symbolism will be touched on in chapter 5.3.i. below. Cf. also chapter 6.2.ii, footnote 33 for further discussion of the schematism in Deleuze.
topological actualisation of genetic elements in an egg determines the individual form of a living being. But also the times of differenciation incarnate the time of the structure, the time of progressive determination" (DR 217/280), so that the actualisation of genetic structures occurs according to certain speeds allowed by the spatiotemporal milieu. Developmental times will obviously be crucial if the structure of genes are conceived according to differential relations, as they may allow different singularities latent in the structure to emerge. Deleuze’s “science of the sensible” takes up the principle of intensity to create a new notion of “spatiotemporal dynamisms”, in which space and time are no longer abstract forms, but can be distributed and ordered in particular ways depending on the system in which they are incarnated (eg. physical, biological, psychological). The static genesis of an Idea is mirrored in the genesis of a particular form of space-time. If the world seems to cohere in what Kant called a “generally established harmony”, that is because of a deeper, distributive structure that is virtually present beneath the interaction of distinct intensive fields developing according to their own spatiotemporal laws. In a sense this continues the Leibnizian argument that the extensive relations that we experience conceal a reality that is ordered fundamentally differently. Thus for Deleuze extensive relations may seem to be ordered according to reciprocal physical determination, but the reality of these relations is ordered according to a metamorphosis in the old notion of “harmony”, according to what Leibniz might have called the “secret theatre” of intensities. As we will now see, this at least creates the possibility of a

99 Deleuze writes, at first perplexingly, that “the destiny and achievement of the embryo is to live the unlivable, to sustain forced movements of a scope which would break any skeleton or tear ligaments (DR 215/277). He argues that an embryo is a kind of “larval subject”. But ‘life’ should be considered as quite separate from consciousness. spatiotemporal actualisation having its own coherence and distributive unification, prior to its emergence above the “threshold of consciousness“ (DR 213/275).

100 Thus it would not be adequate to claim that Deleuze’s and Novalis’s spatiotemporal dynamisms simply represent different tempi and rates of change in a general framework of space and time. This would be to privilege the extensive, abstract model of space and time for no other reason than that it is possible to measure the contents of the world on a single scale of measurement. But this is merely a logical possibility, and requires a real definition, which is what is supplied by the intensive model of an absolute spatium.

101 Deleuze remains very close to Leibniz, as we can see if we reexamine now a passage from the letters to De Volder: “matter and motion are not substances or things as much as they are the phenomena of the perceivers, the reality of which is situated in the harmony of the perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers”, Ariew & Garber, 181.

102 Leibniz sometimes uses the term “theatre” to describe the movements of metamorphosis in bodies, which continue into the “greater theatre” of the relations of the Elect in heaven (Monadology # 75). Cf. the other passages where Leibniz describes his notion of metamorphosis
transformation of Kant’s distinction between the ideal form of space and the unknown ‘reality’ of noumena into a distinction between the extensive and intensive aspects of space, on condition that other metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the notion of noumena can be dealt with.

4 Self-differentiation as Repetition

i Identity and Repetition

We saw at the beginning of this chapter how Deleuze demonstrates the limitations of conceptual representation by showing how at a certain point concepts are left to repeat themselves, and miss the differences outside the concept. This was merely a negative demonstration of the importance of repetition; “natural blockage itself requires a positive supra-conceptual force capable of explaining it, and of thereby explaining repetition” (DR 16/26). Now, in the process of expounding nonconceptual determination, we have in fact ended up with two forms of nonconceptual differentiation: Ideas and intensities, the dialectical and aesthetic “halves of difference”. We also have glimpsed how Ideas are incarnated by intensities, or, what amounts to the same, intensities have an ideal correlate in the problematic field according to which they act. With this doubling of nonconceptuality, we can now proceed to give repetition a positive content.

But first it is necessary to notice a major paradox in Deleuze’s theory of difference and repetition. Deleuze actually begins his account of repetition (DR 1f./7f.) by asking the question of how (not even whether) strict or ‘substantial’ identity, that is, strictly identical particulars which exactly repeat the nature of other particulars, is possible.\(^{103}\) Let us take what Frege calls ‘Leibniz’s law’ of identity: “those things are identical of which one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth”.\(^{104}\) Identity = substitutability. Deleuze in effect intensifies the rationalist notion that identity could only be possible through a substitution

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\(^{103}\) In a footnote on Gabriel Tarde, Deleuze actually equates identity with repetition, while arguing that resemblance occludes such identity (DR 307/39).

that is strictly not conceivable under any form of generality (whether it be resemblance, concept, or analogy). But by this insistence, Deleuze forces us to ask, then how could it be possible? Identity seems unthinkable according to any rule, and merely forms a kind of limit concept. Nevertheless, it has been repeatedly pointed out that Deleuze is in pursuit of a "truly sufficient reason". But what could sufficient reason mean but that everything finds its own differentiation adequate to demarcate it from others? In other words, the "internal difference" of something must surely express its own identity?

For Leibniz, identity cannot be demonstrated within a system, only presupposed, for the reason that something can only be identical to itself. This is why the principle of identity serves as the absolutely fundamental principle of all rational thought. But although it is prior to the agonistics about what constitutes the form of reality, it remains not just logically valid, but metaphysically valid. Now we traced Kant's movements beyond Leibniz on this point. In the Dissertation, Kant is forced to face the implications of making the principle of identity metaphysical. Such a metaphysics of identity cannot be separated from questions of 'reality'; it too has to be subject to the critique's search for real forms. Kant argued that the principle of identity or contradiction depended on time, which was merely a phenomenal condition; therefore self-identity could not be presupposed in the noumenal realm, and was merely a condition for experience. As we saw, this once again produced the effect of collapsing logic into reality. Therefore Kant's next move, in CPR, was to backtrack and instead give logic a purely formal status. However, the result of this formalisation of logic is that logic, without metaphysical or phenomenal index, becomes entirely open to being axiomatised. Logic becomes in principle entirely free-floating and abstract, and now tells us strictly nothing about things in themselves.

Nevertheless, for Kant in CPR, all analysis presupposes a real synthesis; logic is insufficient for determination. If Kant continues to maintain that logical concepts such as identity continue to structure the pure concepts of the understanding, and give us clues to the categories, this is because the real burden of the notion of identity rests on experience: Kant's effort is therefore precisely to find a way of demonstrating self-identity. Something is only identical to itself
when its properties are unified in a concept according to the synthesis made possible by the categories; that is, identity is always reidentification.  

So identity seems to be caught in a kind of antinomy. On the one hand, it seems that strict self-identity cannot be purely logical without either depending on metaphysics or yielding to formal axiomatisation, while on the other hand identity can only be saved in the form of general reidentification according to the conditions of the concept in real experience. Is there a hidden middle ground?

Deleuze in effect occupies a highly unusual middle position between Leibniz and Kant. Deleuze argues in 1955 that it is only by “determining the differences in nature between things” “that we will be able to ‘return to things themselves’ ... If philosophy is to have a positive and direct relation with things, it is only to the extent that it claims to grasp the thing itself in what it is, in its difference from all that it is not, which is to say in its internal difference.” The context of this statement shows that by “returning to things themselves”, Deleuze is by no means echoing the trusted phenomenological maxim: on the contrary, he means to resurrect the rationalist project of returning to noumena. A “truly sufficient reason” will enable us to determine things in themselves.

Deleuze’s move is to suggest that strict identity can be thought as long as it is thought as repetition, as long as repetition is understood as difference without a concept. Repetition can be pure if it is not subordinated to the concept, which can only involve generality. The identical element that is repeated, is indeed noumenal, but this noumenon must rather be thought essentially as an Idea.

This admittedly abstract position can be better explained if we return first to Deleuze’s early work, where it assumes a more avowedly rationalist shape. In Proust and Signs, Deleuze expounds an extreme rationalist view of noumenal essence, modulated through a high aestheticism. The notion of “internal difference” is almost orthodoxly Leibnizian, referring to the essence of an internally qualified monad. “Essence implicates, envelops, wraps itself up in the

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105 This is perhaps why Kant’s adherence to traditional forms of judgment seemed so scandalous to Russell and the pioneers of the new logic. There was no longer any reason why logic could not be formally axiomatised, without regard to metaphysical assumptions about subjects, predicates, and their unity in judgments. The notion of intension is discarded, and logic becomes purely extensional. Correlatively, the ‘act of unity’ involved in the use of concepts seems to gain a merely psychological hue, whereas for Kant, it continued somehow to reflect the structure of logical judgment itself.

106 “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”. 42.
subject ... Essence is not only individual, it *individualises*."\(^{107}\) Essence is thus conceived as an original organisation of a possible series, a perfect monad. "Essence is in itself difference. But it does not have the power to diversify, to diversify itself, without also having the power to repeat itself, identical to itself. What can one do with essence, which is ultimate difference, except to repeat it, because it is irreplaceable, and because nothing can be substituted for it?"\(^{108}\)

This passage reveals the deep rationalist background of Deleuze's theory of difference and repetition. The first sentence of DR tells us that "repetition is not generality". In what follows Deleuze counterposes what appears to be a model of strict self-identity or nonsubstitutability, with the identity which is achieved by general concepts, that is identity as reidentification, or recognition. Essence must be conceived initially as the ideal correlate of complete and adequate determination, beyond the inadequate determinations of general concepts, which can always be applied to more than one thing.

Moving away from Leibniz now, Deleuze says that only in art do "difference and repetition, the two powers of essence" achieve a "perfect adequation", a completely *expressive* being.\(^{109}\) Only in art do we come close to a completely determined essence, in which all the elements are reciprocally determined, and which cannot be duplicated or exchanged according to the common currency of the concept. However, the more that generality and the *common* or recognisable forms of the material world interfere with the "ductile substances" of art, the more "repetition testifies to a discrepancy, an inadequation of consciousness and idea."\(^{110}\)

Furthermore, if the ideal form of repetition, the creation of art, always involves the explication of our own monadic essence, Deleuze's model also adheres in general to Leibniz's notion that to apprehend, know or think anything involves unravelling our own relations to it. For Leibniz, all knowing is a self-knowing. To the extent that we do not manage to express ourselves artistically we are condemned in all our actions to repeat aspects of our own essence unconsciously – the repetition will no longer be a transparent expression, but a

\(^{107}\) *Proust and Signs*, 43.

\(^{108}\) Ibid. 49.

\(^{109}\) Ibid. 67. 50.

\(^{110}\) Ibid. 68.
pathos: “We repeat ... all the more in that [the essence] escapes us and in fact remains unconscious”.

Now, for Leibniz, our explication of our own essence only corresponds to the other essences in the world, because God has chosen an entirely convergent set of series. We have seen that Deleuze’s model displaces these presuppositions. The essence, or individual difference, therefore, cannot be conceived as itself by right initially convergent with other such differences. So metaphysically we are faced with the set of all logically possible series, without the criterion for their organisation according to the principle of the best. As well as merely expressing our own essence, our own monad exists in “complication” with other monads, differently organised, with not necessarily convergent series. “Our only windows, our only doors, are entirely spiritual”; we can in fact communicate with other monads, through bearing witness to their own artistic expressions; to be a spectator of art is to penetrate someone else’s essence, to explicate their individual difference. Deleuze says “there is no intersubjectivity except an artistic one”. The conventional use of signs will tell us nothing about another monad.

Deleuze’s theory of difference and repetition in this version seems to be entirely rationalist: finitude is a result of imperfection, the fact that we must trade with general ideas, crude confused ideas. However, if we follow the development of this account of essential ‘internal difference’ in DR, then we find the Leibnizian account of essence unravelling into the account of singularities and differential relations outlined above. If the combination of these singularities is not itself subject to the rule of God, then this “complication” can be pursued further. Essence can no longer be said to “individualise” at all; rather, the existence of singularities must be said to be “pre-individual”. But in this case, “essence” is no longer an appropriate term, as it merely serves to conceal the question of why certain singularities find themselves actualised alongside others. Essences are replaced by a more problematic successor, the Idea. An essence can

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111 Ibid.
112 Deleuze quotes a passage from Proust about music which beautifully illustrates this Leibnizian picture, in which “the world enveloped by essence is always a beginning of the World in general, a beginning of the universe, an absolute, radical beginning: ‘At first the piano alone complained, like a bird abandoned in its countryside: the violin heard, replied from a neighbouring tree. It was like the beginning of the world, as if there had been, as yet, only two of them on Earth, or rather in this world closed to all the rest, constructed by the logic of a creator in such a way that only the two of them would ever exist: the sonata’”: ibid. 44.
113 Ibid. 42.
only ever be problematic, and by itself it has no power to individualise – on the contrary, it testifies to an original pre-individual state of the complication of differential relations. Deleuze’s account of internal difference is played out according to the movement of this logic, in which Leibnizian rationalism extends into a philosophy of immanence, devoid of theological transcendence, and terminates in the account of difference affirmed in DR.

Given this shift, it may seem peculiar that Deleuze retains his theory of “difference and repetition”, as these are said in Proust and Signs to be the two powers of an irreplaceable essence. If the essence is dissolved into problematic relations, what is there to repeat? All that is left is the notion of “inadequate” or “imperfect” repetition – finite repetition. But if Ideas themselves are intrinsically “complicated” within one another, according to differential relations ordered around singularities, this “inadequation” is surely intrinsic to Ideas themselves so conceived. An ideal essence could never be actualised as such (neither by God nor artist) because Ideas intrinsically exist only as problems – but only for beings open to them as problems, that is, only for finite beings. Furthermore, it follows that, if Ideas are multiplicities, there can be no such thing as “an” internal difference, despite what Deleuze’s early work tends to suggest. Internal difference is not an essence, but a set of differences related together under an Idea or problem.

So when Deleuze says that we must find the “secret subject, the real subject of repetition, which repeats itself through [discrete elements]” (DR 23/36), it is the problematic Idea that is referred to.114 “Variations do not come from without ... [they] express, rather, the differential mechanisms which belong to the essence and origin of that which is repeated” (DR 17/28). The variations in an intensive actualisation of an Idea do not alter the pure Idea considered in its own internal differential relations and singularities, but at the same time no element of

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114 What is repeated, for instance, in the case of space, is the Idea itself, in its intensive incarnation, according to which the differential relations and singularities of the Idea are actualised according to particular values. Deleuze’s example of learning to swim is apposite on this point (and is perhaps a Deleuzian echo of Hegel’s analogy of Kant’s critique of knowledge to a reluctance to jump into the water before having learned how to swim). One orientates oneself using the signs made by the teacher, but does not imitate them: “when a body combines some of its own distinctive points without those of a wave, it espouses the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the Same, but involves the Other – involves difference, from one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that difference through the repetitive space thereby constituted. To learn is indeed to constitute this space of an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points renew themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while disguising itself” (DR 23/35).
‘identity’ is presupposed in a structure; far from it. Structures “imply no prior identity, no positing of a something that could be called one and the same” (DR 183/237). In topology, one conceives shapes not in terms of their extensive coordinates, but in terms of their possible transformations. A geometrical figure, for instance, may have its dimensions varied, while the same shape is preserved; then it may have its angles varied while parallels and straight lines are conserved.\(^{115}\) The invariant of such a group of transformations is not conceived as an identical ‘element’ somehow contained in the figure itself, but is purely a function of the transformations themselves. So it is with Ideas. Similarly, a word is repeated in contexts that disguise, but also develop the range and context of its meaning ‘in itself’. Furthermore, if we follow through Deleuze’s composition of structures out of differential relations, then we must finally admit that even the invariants of these structures are secondary to the set of differential relations and their corresponding singularities, which are always ideally prior to any particular group of transformations. Hence the notion of difference and the notion of a “transcendental topology” are inextricably linked.\(^{116}\)

Sufficient reason is achieved, at the price of logical and real conceptions of identity. So, to return to the starting point of this section, it is not really that repetition shows the possibility of strict identity. It is the other way around: we should say that strict identity is an amphibolous notion of repetition. Repetition is the ‘real’ meaning of strict identity as internal difference. Whereas we might not be able to see how strict identity could include difference, we can see how repetition can do so.\(^{117}\) Ideas are intrinsically differential, and they are expressed in a repetition that must include difference, as actualisation is governed by


\(^{116}\) Deleuze is referring to Lacan: “one could not say more clearly that empirical psychology is not only founded on, but determined by, a transcendental topology”, *How do we Recognise Structuralism?*, 263.

\(^{117}\) Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is therefore by no means nominalist, but answers to a deeper, quasi-rationalist set of arguments about difference. The nominalist cannot even think the possibility of substitution that Deleuze takes as his starting point from the rationalist tradition. Thus Hume says that all identities are only resemblances, while Leibniz states that each thing must have its own concept, by the law of sufficient reason (this concept may be comprised of plenty of other concepts univocally identical to those of other things, on the condition that some of its concepts are dissimilar). For the nominalist, even though an original state of difference is empirically presupposed, things are only differentiated via their varying degrees of resemblance with each other (and contiguity). There is an important distinction to be made here between those ‘philosophies of difference’ that are grounded on nominalism, and Deleuze’s, which is not. Thus, Adorno’s notion of difference ultimately rests on a nominalism of the kind affirmed by Nietzsche.
problems, which are always immersed in a virtual field of differences. The notion of repetition gains autonomy when it is rooted in a specific order beyond the concept. Underneath the identity of any concept there will be a problematic Idea motivating it.

ii The Absolute Idea in Deleuze

With this in mind, it is now possible at least to begin to see the range of Deleuze’s contention that there is such a thing as “difference in itself” without identity. Deleuze remarks that difference is above all to be considered in terms of a thing’s difference-from-itself, or self-differentiation, which brings him close to Hegel, who also emphasises the primacy of self-differentiation in the discussion of identity and difference. Both Deleuze and Hegel share, in different ways, a commitment to the attainment of an ontological discourse in which “the external, empirical difference of thought and being has given way to the difference identical with Being, to the difference internal to the Being which thinks itself”.118 However, Deleuze argues for the primacy of difference-in-itself over identity. I suggest we now have the means not only to make sense of this notion, but to grasp its full range, and at least sketch out the possibility of a Deleuzian argument against the Hegelian account of difference.

Deleuze writes that in Bergson, “thanks to the notion of the virtual, the thing differs from itself in the first place, immediately. According to Hegel, the thing differs from itself because it differs in the first place from all that it is not, such that difference goes to the point of contradiction.”119 The basic Hegelian response to this would surely be that difference cannot be said to differ from itself if no identity is thought alongside it: “Difference in itself is self-related difference; as such, it is the negativity of itself, the difference not of an other, but of itself from itself; it is not itself but its other. But that which is difference from difference is identity”.120 Although this argument is purely categorical, rather than being

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118 Deleuze. Review of Hyppolite. 194.
119 ‘Bergson’s Concept of Difference’, 53.
about ‘things’, the argument is pertinent: in order to differ from itself, difference must refer to an identity.¹²¹

Now, although the early passage from Deleuze just quoted does not disengage this objection, Deleuze’s more sophisticated account of the ‘ideal synthesis of difference’ may be strong enough to deal with it. We have seen that the notion of identity is finally subordinated to a prior account of the differential relations and singularities in a problematic Idea. Secondly, it was argued in Chapter Two that an appeal to arguments from Spinoza and Leibniz could give a new sense to the notion of the ‘univocity of being’, which would emphasise that Being could only express itself as pure difference. This latter argument, in the order of reasons of Deleuze’s philosophy, should be seen as an extension to the absolute of the former argument. Deleuze’s account of problems as ‘real’ must be extended to the absolute, in order to achieve “the only realised Ontology”. But in order to facilitate this extension, and to understand how Deleuze, like Hegel but in competition with him, attempts to move towards an absolute and beyond the Kantian dualism between phenomena and noumena, we should return one final time to the motives behind Kant’s notion of noumena. In distinction to Hegel, Deleuze’s account of dialectical difference will be absolute precisely through holding onto elements in Kant’s notion of noumena.

Kant’s first move regarding the absolutisation of space provided a way to determine the apriority of geometry. However, due to his need to preserve some sense of the dignity of the noumenal, Kant felt it necessary to idealise space to avoid ontological Spinozism. During the silent decade, Kant realised that this very ideality of space and time provided him with all the materials to produce a new account of experience that would be apriori, because synthetic apriori judgments could be made about the relations between apriori ideal concepts and apriori ideal intuitions. Noumena were saved only to close them off from any kind of real determination; in this state they were preserved, to languish in a secret chaos.

Now, Kant’s early account of force perhaps could have obviated difficulties in relating the inner and outer in the later Kant, but again incipient Spinozism ruled it out. Deleuze in effect enacts a retrieval of certain elements

¹²¹ For Hegel identity and difference are exhaustively bound up with each other. Identity is always identification as something, i.e. under a differentiated concept, while difference can only be difference from others and from itself, implying identity in both cases.
from the pre-critical Kant, such as the notion of intensive difference and virtuality, in order to "go back to the things themselves". The thing in itself, as the source of affection, is thus simply the Idea that is progressively determined by its intensive relations. In this way, in principle we can potentially fulfil, or at least give meaning to, two criteria for a noumenon: complete determination and regulative content.

However, it was shown that Kant himself was content to leave the 'noumenal' state of things in themselves to this indeterminate relation, in which there can be no one-to-one correspondence. He argues in the Amphiboly that there is no need for anything 'beyond' appearances to individuate those appearances. Kant instead does attempt to sustain contact with the noumenal world through his account of the supersensible. Thus, the inner reason of things can only be the supersensible substrate, which forms the true significance of the world. The practical teleology of reason reveals a problematic structure to the noumenal world that cannot be known, but must be thought. The noumenal realm thus consists of a providential structure of free beings resisting and struggling against matter in an ethico-teleological hierarchy.

However, with Deleuze's model, the relation to the supersensible is already present in the relation to Ideas. The relation of the supersensible to the sensible should rather be thought as the problematic relation of Ideas to their spatiotemporal intensive schematisation. All the materials are present by which Ideas can be generated in a way that is apriori. But we may now legitimately ask whether we have sufficient means to determine noumena purely as problematic Ideas that are incarnated in intensive relations. In Kant, problematicity occurs only as a result of the limitations provided by the ideal status of space and time. In Deleuze, noumena remain problematic because they are nonrepresentable Ideas which cannot be known but only delineated by thought through a genesis which as such we can never experience. For instance, we can never experience the internal presentation of space.

For Deleuze, Kant's notion that 'noumena are problematic' should be read as a statement of equivalence. Kant, on this reading, had discovered the nature of Ideas as problematic, but had not realised that problematicity itself was a sufficient criterion for noumenal being. There are no things in themselves or noumena apart from problem-Ideas: "an object outside experience can be
represented only in problematic form; this does not mean that Ideas have no real object, but that problems *qua* problems are the real objects of Ideas" (DR 169/219). It is this that is the crux of his originality in the debate between Kantians and post-Kantians. For while Kantians hold absolute Ideas to be *merely problematic*, post-Kantians hold the absolute Ideas to have *real existence*. Deleuze's solution is antinomical in character: yes, *problematic Ideas have real existence*. This is why Deleuze can say that they are "at once both immanent and transcendent" (ibid). They are transcendent to empirical cognition, but immanent *de jure* to problematic cognition, to thought.

But with this, Deleuze has provided a new realisation of the early Kantian project to expound forms of real differentiation different in kind from logical differentiation. The inner nature of things that Kant sought to preserve in noumena turns out to be a reified effect of the fact that the profound structural, intensive and durational nature of Ideas that works away under the external envelope of abstract extensive space and time cannot be experienced in empirical cognition and eludes one-to-one identity with the phenomenal world. For Deleuze, it is in fact necessary to abandon substances in order to save noumena. A "truly sufficient reason" is therefore achieved, but precisely at the price of both substances and token-identity between noumena and phenomena. Deleuze has reawoken rationalism, or rather enacted a crucial transformation of the rationalist project so that sufficient reason gives way to "multiple reason" (DR 57/80). The self-identity of the noumenal substance is abandoned precisely in order to save reason. It is replaced by the principle of nonconceptual repetition as the form by which Ideas are incarnated.

With this formal theory in place, Deleuze now thinks he can account for the limitations of empirical cognition from within it. "When we discover the literal interior of repetition, we have the means not only to understand the outer repetition as a cover, but also to recapture the order of generality ... It is the inadequation between difference and repetition which gives rise to the order of generality" (DR 25/38). In order to assess this possibility, in the following two chapters we return to the perspective of experience, and the central and familiar Kantian territory of *knowledge*. 
Chapter Five

*Quid Facti* and *Quid Juris*: Kant

1 Transcendental Deductions

i Objective and Subjective Deductions

In spite of the image of the court of justice at the beginning of CPR, it is some way in before Kant introduces his famous distinction between questions of fact and of right – *quid facti* and *quid juris*. Thus the beginning of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories states that questions concerning the validity of *apriori* concepts can only be solved with a *deduction*. Kant counterposes the mere *possession* of an *apriori* concept with the *entitlement* to its use (A84/B117). This relatively late stipulation poses a number of metacritical issues: if the question of right is only now posed with the introduction of the notion of deduction, then what is the status of what has gone before? Secondly, how is it possible to simply possess an *apriori* concept without having a right to it? Surely, to possess such a concept without right does not amount to much.

Kant makes a remark in the discussion of deductions in general that sheds light on the peculiar structure of CPR. He suggests that the transcendental deduction of space as a pure form of intuition is only *retrospectively* made necessary by the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. The pure form of space is *made use of* in geometry and empirical intuition, but this of itself does not require a distinct justification of the *concept* of space. “With the *pure concepts of the understanding*, however, there *first* arises the unavoidable need to search for
the transcendental deduction not only of them but also of space” (A88/B120, italics mine).

We have seen that for Kant the pure concepts of the understanding in some sense ‘belong’ in the understanding: they have their origin in the understanding itself. They are the pure thought of objects in general (Gegenstände überhaupt), and as such represent a pure content of the understanding (A56/B80). At this level of discussion, Kant is still close to his pre-critical writings: there is no distinction yet between ‘thought’, ‘understanding’ or ‘intellect’. The pure concepts of the understanding (whatever they may be), in their ‘pre-schematised’ form, apply in principle to all forms of thought and are related to intuition in general. “Pure content” as yet implies nothing actual, although it must imply some relation to an intuition. Hence the relation of the understanding to the kind of intuition it is bound up with must be clarified.1 Thus Kant says that “[the pure concepts of the understanding] not only arouse suspicion about the objective validity and limits of their use but also make the concept of space ambiguous by inclining us to use it beyond the conditions of sensible intuition, on which account a transcendental deduction of it was also needed above” (A88/B120, italics mine).2

As we have already seen, there is a ‘metaphysical’ distinction between thought and intuition that is prior to the issue of epistemology, or the possibility of knowledge. Why does the issue of deductions in general arise specifically when dealing with pure thought? Why not first present another metaphysical ‘exposition’ of pure concepts in our ‘possession’? Kant in fact introduces the deduction with the thought that spatiotemporal “appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding not find them in accord with the conditions of unity”, thus presenting a mere “rhapsody” of intuitions (A90/B123). So nothing about the relation between intuition and thinking, on either side, is presupposed.

Now if we turn to the ‘second’ deduction itself, we find that it is split into two (in the first edition): Objective and Subjective Deductions. In the Preface (Axvii), Kant specifies that the Objective Deduction takes place at A92-3. There, Kant gives a simple argument that depends on the exhaustive distinction between

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1 See above, chapter 1.2.i.a.
2 In the ‘Discipline of Pure Reason’, Kant says “From whence the concepts of space and time with which they [mathematicians] busy themselves (as the only original quanta) might be derived, they have never concerned themselves, and likewise it seems to them to be useless to investigate the
intuition and thought. He states that, once one has analysed what an intuition is, intellectual form is the only possibility left that allows one to form a Gegenstand überhaupt. This, then, would indeed seem to be an exposition, not necessarily a deduction.

The mystery is heightened when Kant proceeds to spend most of his time on a Subjective Deduction, which he states in the Preface is not “essential to my ends” (Axxvi). However, the crucial paragraph is at A96-7, where Kant first mentions what has been achieved by the Objective Deduction:

Now these concepts, which contain apriori the pure thinking in every experience, we find in the categories, and it is already sufficient deduction of them and justification of their objective validity if we can prove that by means of them alone an object [Gegenstand] can be thought. But since in such a thought there is more at work than the single faculty of thinking, namely the understanding, and the understanding itself, as a faculty of cognition that is to be related to objects [Objekte], also requires an elucidation of the possibility of this relation, we must first assess not the empirical but the transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the apriori foundations of the possibility of experience [italics mine].

A distinction is made here between what can be said of “the single faculty of thinking, namely the understanding”, and the understanding as a faculty of cognition, that involves relation to objects. Here the Gegenstand/Object distinction comes to our aid. The implication is that the Objective [Gegenständlich] Deduction applies to all Gegenstände in general, hence all objects considered metaphysically. But if that was so, then surely God would also be subject to such a Deduction? However as the analysis of intuition has shown us that space and time, the forms of intuition, are transcendentally ideal and belong only to finite creatures, the need for a deduction (of both pure concepts and pure intuition) is specifically provoked by the question that then emerges concerning the relation of pure thinking to instantiation in finite intuition. Conversely, the concept of space only becomes an issue when the problem of its compatibility (i.e.

origin of pure concepts of the understanding and the scope of their validity; rather, they merely use them” (A725/B753).

3 Admittedly, the use of the phrase “single faculty of thinking” is far from decisive by itself, due to the malleability of Kant’s talk of faculties; but I think the current context, plus the metaphysical background already explored, adds strength to this interpretation.

4 It is interesting that Kant only mentions space in the passages in question, and perhaps it reinforces the fact that the ideality of time was always secondary in importance to that of space for Kant. However, this lack of attention to the notion of the ideality of time opens it to attack. In Appendix IV I show how Deleuze’s view of time as absolute returns to the rationalist conception of the absoluteness of duration.
as concept) with other pure concepts is raised. In this case, the discussion of space is thus retrospectively revealed to have been de facto metaphysical up until the point where its epistemological range is inquired into. We have an immediate possession of the apriori forms of space, as evinced in the possibility of geometry. But it becomes necessary to move from an ontological register to an epistemological one, only when the issue of the limits and range of the relation of intuition to thought comes to the fore – because the (ontological) restriction to finite intuition will restrict the free range of our pure concepts. So the relation of compatibility between finite intuition and pure concepts has already narrowed down and altered the range of what it is possible to know about Gegenstände. This is the reason why even the ‘Objective’ account of Gegenstände must be called a deduction, and not an exposition: the question of right arises because the finitude of intuition already imposes its restriction, or stakes its claim. So the Objective Deduction applies across the board to all beings who have finite intuition, while nevertheless remaining solely related to the formal possibilities of the relation between thought and intuition. But (to return to the Subjective Deduction), this latter distinction must not be confused with the one between understanding and sensibility, which is characterised separately in a twofold way: firstly in terms of knowledge, or “relation to an Object”, and secondly according to the status of the faculties involved.

This reading fits with the two characteristics that show that there is “more at work” than the Objective Deduction: firstly, the understanding must be dealt with in its actual relation to objects, while secondly, an elucidation of the specific possibility of this relation is required. This latter characteristic should be read in relation to what is said in the surrounding pages. Kant points towards “three original sources (faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience ... namely, sense, imagination, and apperception” (A94). It turns out in the course of the Subjective Deduction (as we will see) that “The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding” (A118). The efforts of this part of the Deduction are all

5 The various forms this incompatibility takes is precisely the subject matter of the Transcendental Dialectic. The antinomies are resolved by showing that the mutual extension of spatial and intellectual concepts cannot proceed in tandem with each other. As space is only related to finite intuition, it is illegitimate to extend spatial concepts beyond such intuition.
towards showing how the understanding is the \textit{product} of a very particular relation of the three faculties just mentioned.

This, in outline, shows how the justifications of intuition and pure concepts are interrelated. The specific problem of the Subjective Deduction concerns how to conceive of the actual character of the interrelation. Given finite intuition, which involves restriction to one place at a time and one time at a place, how will the activity of thought be able to function, and think coherently across discrete intuitions? The crucial problem of A88/B120-A91/B123 – is that thoughts and intuitions are not \textit{analytically} related, so that a “rhapsody” of intuitions is conceivable. In the light of the fact that intuitions and thoughts remain in themselves really distinct, the search for an \textit{apriori} “rule of synthesis” (A91/B123) must be initiated. As we will see shortly, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories will begin to justify and demonstrate the necessity of such rules. However, as has been noted before, there is also a third deduction, of the Ideas of Pure Reason. By itself, the second deduction does not give us the coherence of experience, although commentators often talk of Kant’s Deduction of the Categories as if it granted this. As we will see following our examination of the deduction of pure concepts, coherence is only possible if concepts find an orientation through Ideas.

\begin{itemize}
\item[ii] \textbf{The Arguments of the Two Editions of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}}
\end{itemize}

We are now in a preliminary position to survey the method of CPR as a whole. Kant’s claim in the \textit{Prolegomena} that the method of CPR is \textit{synthetic}, (while the \textit{Prolegomena} is analytic) has often caused confusion because synthetic method requires having secured \textit{apriori} proofs from which to progress.\textsuperscript{6} However, such proofs would seem to be the very goal of critique, so some commentators who have sought to defend Kant’s claim here have attempted to seek a moment of \textit{apriori} self-grounding in CPR from which to progress. Now Kant’s belief that he has found “the supreme \textit{[höchste]} principle of all synthetic judgments” (A154/B193) is often taken to rest on transcendental apperception, so the locus of this \textit{self-grounding} has been sought there. As a \textit{höchste} principle does not have to

\textsuperscript{6}Kant does not mean to equate this methodological use of the distinction between ‘synthetic’ and ‘analytic’ with the other use of the distinction in terms of conceptual intension.
be a self-grounding principle, the crucial element of *reflexivity* involved in self-grounding is sought in particular in the character of apperception as self-referring. However, it can be shown (I hope to do so in what follows) that the function of apperception in knowledge, while self-referring, is not self-grounding in the strong sense required. Kant’s ‘I think’ is by no means a Fichtean ‘I’. While most would agree with this latter statement, the self-grounding criterion for the ‘I’ is still often taken as the starting point for a synthetic procedure through the appeal to some indubitable aspect about the ‘I’. Some fact about experience or subjectivity is chosen, from which further principles can be deduced.\(^7\)

However, this approach has opened itself to skeptical counterclaims about the necessity of the fact or first principle from which synthetic *apriori* claims are said to follow.\(^8\) Defenders of Kant have had to take another tack. Allison’s approach is well-known. He does not attempt to find an *apriori* first principle, but rather treats apperception as a *logically* necessary principle for judgment. In turn, the primacy of apperception is then shifted onto the role of judgment as an epistemic condition.\(^9\) On the other hand, Karl Ameriks has argued instead that the transcendental deduction should be seen simply as a regressive argument, and not synthetic at all; it is therefore not intended primarily to defeat the skeptic.\(^10\)

Ameriks appeals to the transcendental deduction of space to show how geometry is taken as a fact, and regressively argued from. Thus analogically, Kant starts from certain claims about experience which he does not defend, such as the capacity for some empirical cognition.

I think Ameriks is right that this appears to be Kant’s approach in the second edition CPR. Kant in effect takes the regressive strategies of the *Prolegomena* and textually inserts them at crucial points in CPR. So at B128, we find Kant appealing to the *facts* of geometry and natural science. However, because Kant leaves most of the rest of CPR standing, including the important later sections, this creates a fundamental fracture right through CPR, as many

\(^7\) Dieter Henrich’s version in *Identity and Objectivity* (contained in Henrich, *The Unity of Reason*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994) is a classic example, and Strawson’s account in *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen, 1966) also presents a synthetic account in that it moves from a description of self-conscious experience to synthetic *apriori* conclusions about the conditions necessary for this; cf. 97f.

\(^8\) See section 4.1. below for further detail.

\(^9\) Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 137f.

proponents of the ‘patchwork’ theory have recognised.\textsuperscript{11} The regressive reading sets limits on the scope of CPR that are not present in the first edition. Notably, the relation between cognition and metaphysics is now cut adrift, and therewith the metacritical dimension comes unstuck. In effect, CPR becomes limited to a theory of knowledge. The critical project becomes diverted by a general epistemologization. Ameriks’ reading of the transcendental deduction as a regressive argument, in focussing on the issue of whether Kant’s argument is anti-skeptical or not, overlooks the greater account of metacritical validity at stake in Kant’s theory as a whole.\textsuperscript{12} Firstly, that Kant by no means (as Ameriks claims) presupposes the fact of empirical cognition, is attested by his statement (to be analysed later) that the coherence of experience is not to be assumed without a third deduction. While this is a first-edition claim, I would argue that it is intensified by Kant’s turn to a new attempt to ground the coherence of empirical judgments in CJ. Secondly, the primacy of regressive argumentation underestimates the metacritical form of Kant’s theory, and the fact that Kant, as an ex-rationalist, would find it hard to presuppose anything phenomenal or empirical as an acceptable given. To argue regressively from a given fact to its conditions is always open to the objection that the initial presupposition itself has not been critically evaluated. It presupposes at some point a kind of Cartesian evidence, a validity of immediate apprehension that is clearly undermined by Kant’s paralogisms and his insistence that all knowledge claims be mediated by intuitions and some conceptual structure \textit{(to be justified)} of those intuitions. Kant’s transcendental account is grounded as a whole by the ‘system’ of the three deductions, as well as by piecemeal ‘transcendental arguments’ in the regressive sense. It is this systematic grounding, I believe, that made the CJ project pressing for Kant, wherein the issues of faculties and their relation, and systematicity come to the fore again. Again, the question of whether Kant’s theory as a whole ultimately \textit{is} metacritically defensible is separate from whether he intends it to be so. In sum, if the second edition CPR does testify to an epistemologization, then that is because Kant after 1786 decides to devote a \textit{fuller} account in CJ (and

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\textsuperscript{11} However, diagnosing where the fracture occurs is a matter of dispute. I think Eckart Förster, in ‘Kant’s Notion of Philosophy’, referred to in chapter 1 above, has recognised it most acutely.
\textsuperscript{12} Ironically, Ameriks’ has done more than most to bring out the metaphysical claims of Kant’s project in his other writings. It is this side of Ameriks’ scholarship that I believe is the most
ultimately in OP) to the metaphysical and metacritical issues that have been displaced. My concern then, in the first part of this chapter, is to reveal the structure of the first edition, as it is there that we find ‘The Idea of Transcendental Philosophy’ worked through in its primal state.

This fracture in CPR is, moreover, in fact most visible in the notion of possession, which we related to the *quid facti*. In the second edition, Kant states that we possess the *facts* of geometry and natural science: the *quaestio facti* refers exclusively to these indubitable facts. However, the meaning and reference of both ‘possession’ and *quid facti* has changed. In the first edition, we were said to possess certain *apriori forms*, which were *original* to each of our faculties. Thus, the *quid facti* did not refer to any particular set of facts, but, as Kant says in the discussion of Deductions in general, to the *fact of possession* of these pure forms.

We have seen that this metaphysical framework provides the problematic background that allows the question of *Objecte* to emerge. But while ‘relation to objects’ is equivalent to knowledge [*Erkenntnis*], knowledge itself is a particular organisation of the faculties, and is itself only justified by prior nonepistemological accounts of the limits of intuition, and by the transcendental analysis undertaken as a whole by the philosopher. This has already been argued from another perspective in chapter 3. I now turn to an alternative reading of the transcendental deduction in the first edition. After displacing the centrality of Kant’s epistemology of conceptual recognition, I will elucidate the internal connection between the three deductions in the first edition, concentrating on the second and third deductions, of concepts and Ideas. I then conclude the chapter with a critique of the primacy of apperception (mostly as understood in the B-Deduction) as it is defended by contemporary commentators.

2 The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

i Unity and Synthesis

A concept, Kant states, is “as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule” (A106). A rule is a norm that is conformed to in an action. As Jonathan Bennett shows, Kant’s aim in his theory of concepts is to show that “thinking is valuable, although ultimately I would ground his ‘Leibnizianism’ not in the historical Leibniz, but
something we do while sensing is something that happens to us”. Given what has already been noted in this chapter (and which Kant argues for in the introduction to the Analytic, before his exposition of concepts), it is important to realise that Kant’s account of concepts as rules is already an account of concepts as used by finite beings. Whereas a sensation or an affection is always immediate, regardless of the complexity of the sensation, the notion of the rule itself is already complex, as it implies a rule, the act of recognition of the rule, whether implicit or not, and the act of recognition of the thing to which the rule is applied. Conforming to rules implies several intelligent and intelligible activities.

At A68-9/B93-4, Kant says that a concept, “rests on” functions. By ‘function’ Kant means the “unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one”. This action, separated from all affection, must be “spontaneous”. This notion of spontaneity therefore involves no real claim yet about the subject, but merely signifies that concepts are not receptive. Further, all concepts are “predicates of possible judgments”, the latter which are “accordingly functions of unity among our representations”, because in a judgment “many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one”. “The understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them”.

Now, the analytical unity of marks that composes a concept is indeed based on “the unity of an action”, what we may call “the analytical unity of

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13 Bennett, *Kant’s Analytic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 55. Cf. Pippin, *Kant’s Theory of Form*, 97: “to understand a concept is to know how to use it”.

14 To have the concept of a man is not the same kind of thing as having an intuition of him, “it is just to be able to recognise men as men, to distinguish men from apes, to know that a man cannot be a vegetable, and so on” (Bennett, *Kant’s Analytic*, 54).

15 As intuitions are the only representations related immediately to their objects, a concept must always be “a representation of a representation”. However, the concept may represent an intuition or set of intuitions, or, more likely, another set of concepts. A concept always “holds of many, and ... among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to the object”. As Kant explains in the Introduction to the first Critique (A8/B12) and further in the Jäsche Logic, a concept is composed of “marks” (Merkmale), so that, for instance, the concept ‘body’ is composed of ‘extension’, ‘impenetrability’, and ‘shape’. In using the concept ‘body’ as the subject of a judgment, one will predicate of it another concept. This concept will be composed of other marks, some of which may be contained in the first concept. For instance, ‘divisibility’ can be predicated of ‘body’, because the concept ‘extension’ includes ‘divisibility’. Thus the object which we have identified as ‘body’ will be unified with other things which we identify as ‘divisible’.
consciousness" (CPR B133n.). If concepts are “functions of unity”, then a unity of consciousness is required as a condition for the possibility of moving in the network of concepts, and organising the intuitive marks intended by them. However, “only by means of an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytical unity” (ibid). But synthetic unity is in turn the product of a complex process of synthesis. Kant gives the name ‘synthesis’ (already overdetermined) to the “action” by which “the manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it” (A77/B103). This “action” is obviously complex and it will turn out to designate the distinct processes of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, which are produced by interrelations of the faculties of imagination and apperception. Kant states in this section (‘On the pure concepts of the understanding or categories’), that synthesis is “the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious” (A78/B103). He goes on to specify that “to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding”. Thus the unity of the concept itself, that is, the unity of the act by which a concept is predicated of another is only made possible by the syntheses of the imagination. While Kant emphasises that the ascription of a concept is an ‘act’, he leaves the active or passive status of the other syntheses undetermined.

At A98-99, Kant makes “a general remark on which one must ground everything that follows”, that all representations must be treated as modifications of the mind “subjected to the formal conditions of inner sense, namely time”. Kant describes ‘transcendently’ the process required to represent a manifold as such. In order to be represented as a manifold, the manifold must be grasped and

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16 This also holds for the logical use of concepts; see Logic, # 17, 106. See Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 66f; Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant’s Table of Judgments. trans. J. Kneller & M. Losonsky (California: Stanford University Press, 1992). 9f.
17 “For it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation” (A103, my italics). Kant says here that the word “concept” is enough to lead to this notion.
18 Cf. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 14-16.
19 In a Reflexion on the first Critique, Kant affirms that “the transcendental synthesis of the imagination underlies all our concepts of the understanding” (Ak. 23:18), quoted in Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1990), 27.
gathered as a unity; it must be ‘apprehended’ (first aspect of the synthesis). But, to be represented as a manifold, is to enter a judgment, an Urteil, a separation, and this requires that in the following instant, it is reproduced by and in the imagination (second aspect). Kant argues against Hume that reproduction does not happen as a result of association; the rule that the reproduced element must be reproduced in this present is prior to the contingent fact of association (cf. A100, A112f.). Furthermore, in order for the reproduction to be related to what was apprehended, they must both be represented as the same, that is, recognised (third aspect). But concepts are exactly what allow sameness to be recognised, by ‘marking’ the reproduced element; this sameness is not simply given. The concept is a rule: the distinct moments are brought to a rule by sharing a mark that is judged to be common. The Merkmal is what is bemerkt, noticed, picked out, selected. The rule can work both analytically and synthetically. If you see a, you must apply the concept X, which also contains b and c; these marks ‘count as’ X; this is an analytic judgment. Or if you see d being reproduced with a, then

20 However, he silently presupposes the synopsis of intuition, which is left out of the threefold synthesis. Nevertheless, it is important to the process of the deduction. We know from the Transcendental Aesthetic that data of time must be infinitely divisible. Any sensation, due to the form of appearance, must be a stretch of indeterminate spatial extension and a stretch of duration. That is, it is internally manifold, or multiple in itself. But an important decision must be made right at the outset about what is meant by this representation of inner sense. Nothing states that the subject here experiences some ‘flow’ of time, within which the contents alter. In fact, the opposite must be the case for Kant. The representation of a manifold in time must be a representation of the duration of the manifold from within the present. Inner sense is after all a form, a pure framework. Hence the real starting point of the Deduction is the presupposition of a bare multiplicity or manifold, the conditions for the representation of which must be unfolded.

This follows from the notion of a bare spatiotemporal multiplicity. If a multiplicity is a pure flux, some element of which is not retained in any form (for instance in the form of a past of a present), then there can be no conceivable multiplicity at all. Hence the retention of some aspect of a multiplicity is necessary for it to be a multiplicity. Furthermore, this retention is not simply a retention but the development, or unfolding of the multiplicity as such. But while it seems to become extended into the present, it is more properly thought of as extending into the past: it is only represented as extending into the present. The present is represented as having a past. These ideas are developed more abstractly by Schelling and Hegel. However, it is important to see that for Kant the notion of a pure multiplicity was thinkable as the matter of intuition, without yet implying that the multiplicity bear within it an identity or at least unity, which can only occur through the form of the concept. Now. Schelling and Hegel would object to this that in order to think of a multiplicity as such requires thinking an identity to the manifold as differing from itself, and that Kant’s belief that reidentification can only happen through a concept merely shows the limitation of Kant’s notion of concept. However, there is still a sense in which the multiplicity, as intuited, is at least potentially infinitely divisible, which underlines the importance of keeping the distinction between the internal coherence of the multiplicity itself, and the coherent ordering of the multiplicity in the inner sense of the perceiver. Because the former is indefinite, and is even perceived at every instant as indefinite, the multiplicity itself should not be completely identified with its ongoing reidentification in the subject.

you may make an empirical judgment that unifies d with X (a, b and c); such is a synthetic judgment. The rule ‘represents’ the reproduction of some manifold that is recognised as falling under it.

The post-Kantians argued that to see this ‘representation of a manifold’ in terms of an analysis is inadequate, because it breaks up what can only happen together into three apparently separate aspects. They argued that the act of representation had to be generated rather than analysed. Taking off from Reinhold’s early attempt, Fichte and the early Schelling argued that the articulation of self-consciousness was the only way to generate an account of difference and identity; in self-consciousness, consciousness takes itself as its own object, thus differentiating itself from itself while securing its own unity through the identification of itself with itself as object. This is prefigured in Kant’s decision to run through the stages of synthesis again from the ground up, stating that apperception is the “inner ground” of synthesis (A116). However, is Kant’s notion of apperception in the A-deduction playing a grounding role in the post-Kantian sense? Is something lost sight of if Kant’s account is seen through post-Kantian spectacles?

The problem lies in the relation between the claim for a unity of consciousness and the correlative claim about a consciousness of unity that is taken to follow from this. In *Identity and Objectivity*, Henrich argues that Kant’s insistence on the identity of the act of recognition showed that Kant was presupposing a Cartesian consciousness. 22 Henrich’s key passage occurs at A108: “The mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this *apriori*, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action”. But does this *apriori* consciousness of the identity of an action imply the consciousness of the numerical identity of the self? Henrich’s claim has been criticised by Allison, who points out that “what we are aware of is not numerical identity, it is rather the ‘fact’ that this identity must be presupposed as a necessary condition of knowledge”. 23 However, Allison’s claim too contains its own exaggeration, as a result of his belief that the “rule-governed unity of representations in consciousness ... [requires] the conceptual recognition of this

unity" (ibid). This means that the normative status of the categories for consciousness “must be for that consciousness”. 24 In the third chapter I referred to passages where Kant states clearly that ordinary empirical consciousness has no need of ‘transcendental’ philosophy; only when it confronts the effects of transgressing its rightful limits does it begin to apprehend such a need. Allison’s claims for what the spontaneity of apperception can accomplish are too high, and I think the right level for the work of apperception in the deduction should be sought elsewhere. 25 A few sentences earlier Kant says that “this unity of consciousness would be impossible if in the cognition of the manifold the mind could not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which this manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition” (A108). Here Kant states what it is that one becomes conscious of - not of oneself, nor of the “fact” of transcendental unity, but of the identity of the function guiding this unity. Now we have seen that Kant describes concepts and judgments as “functions of unity” (A68-9/B93). Hence what consciousness is aware of is the unity implied in the concept it is using. The use of concepts implies the “unity of an act”, by which what is reproduced is recognised. 26


25 One problem with readings of Kant which make the categories into norms which are directly conformed to by the apperceptive subject itself is that they only really make sense for the categories of relation. It is plausible that the ‘I think’ ‘takes itself’ to be conforming to categories of substance, causality, and reciprocity in making a judgment; but what of the other nine categories? The cases of judgments of quantity and quality (which are moreover both taken to be continuous), and judgments of modality are clearly not ‘for consciousness’ in Allison’s and Pippin’s sense of ‘taking as’. As soon as the full machinery of Kant’s categories is taken into account, this normative version starts to look absurd. So either it is only applicable to three categories, in which case the Aristotelian claim that the categories are exhaustively universal must go, or Kant meant something else. I contend that the demonstration and justification of the validity of the pure concepts in the Transcendental Deduction is carried out specifically by the transcendental philosopher, and not by the self-reflection of the experiencing ‘subject’.

26 It may be objected that this is to ignore that Kant is drawing our attention to a “transcendental synthesis”, or a special act of the mind. But Karl Ameriks has decisively shown the error of “intemperate”, or “activistic” readings in his critique of Paul Guyer’s early work (‘Kant and Guyer on Apperception’. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 65, 1983). Guyer writes that Kant is “clearly committed to the existence of a creative synthesis imposing order on the manifold of empirical intuition, whether it is conceived of as a single act of transcendental imagination, preceding all empirical syntheses, or as an ongoing activity of constitution underlying the objective affinity of the objects of nature” (Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis’. American Philosophical Quarterly, 17, 1980, 206) But Ameriks clarifies that there is no transcendental synthesis as such in Kant, although he does think that in the A-Deduction, Kant tends to write as if there were. Rather, what Kant is attempting to show is the transcendental requirement of unity in particular acts of empirical cognition (Ameriks, ‘Kant and Guyer’. 175-179).

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This interpretation is borne out in the rest of this section of the deduction, which rests upon the notion that “all cognition requires a concept” (A106). Kant begins by arguing from empirical concepts; for instance “in the case of the perception of something outside of us the concept of body makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc.” (ibid). The application of a concept thus makes necessary the application of the other Merkmale analytically implied in the concept. This ‘necessity’ entails that these Merkmale are “brought to unity” in a judgment (cf. A69/B93). Now only because of this necessity in all concepts, can Kant move to his claim about pure concepts, which, as the highest genera of all concepts, are necessarily implied.27 Thus “transcendental apperception” denotes the necessary condition that all cognition be subject to the general forms of the “functions of unity” of concepts.28 Back at A108, Kant writes:

the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts, i.e. in accordance with rules that not only make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby determine an object for their intuition, i.e. the concept of something in which they are necessarily connected [my italics].

Self-consciousness, then, if it is permitted at all by the strictures of the Paralogisms, can at best be an indirect inference from the possession of unified experience through the application of particular concepts in recognition.29 In the passage that introduces transcendental apperception, Kant makes it clear that “consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in

27 Cf. A106. On the pure concepts as highest genera, see Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 116-117. Compare also Kant’s notes to A66/B91: “Experience consists of judgments, but it is to be asked whether these empirical judgments do not in the end presuppose apriori (pure) judgments”, cf. Guyer & Wood’s edition of CPR, 202.

28 This further explains why the consciousness of unity is by no means immediately available as such for inspection. The consciousness of unity is simply the ability to understand and apply concepts. But this ability itself depends on conformity to certain basic rules. Thus to grasp the thread of unity in experience, I must conform, for instance, to the rule of causality. Causality is one of the twelve categories that Kant says is required for unity to be possible. Therefore the spontaneity involved in the use of concepts is not to be identified with some active consciousness of unity. If the subject is conscious of its unity this is only due to the transcendental rules that allow it to be so. In other words, the consciousness of unity must be secondary to basic conformity to rules that makes it possible. The spontaneous conformity to rules, therefore, from the empirical down to the transcendental, is not to be understood in terms of ‘ordinary’ self-consciousness.

29 See also Andrew Brook’s deflationist account of apperception in Kant and the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994). 37-43 and ch. 6. He states that the unity of consciousness must be thoroughly distinguished from the consciousness of that unity.
internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable” (A107).\textsuperscript{30} The condition that Kant is describing is instead “a condition that precedes all experience, and makes the latter itself possible” (ibid). It refers to nothing other than the structure required for the use of concepts, a structure which includes apprehension, reproduction and recognition equally.\textsuperscript{31}

Now, we have already seen that this threefold synthesis is largely carried out by the imagination. Examination of another key passage on the unity of consciousness can show how dependent recognition is on the processes that ‘precede’ it:

without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. For it would be a new representation in our current state, which would not belong at all to the act [Actus] through which it had been gradually generated, and its manifold would never constitute a whole, since it would lack the unity that only consciousness can obtain for it (A103).

The notion that an act can “gradually” generate a representation conflicts somewhat with the notion that the act of recognition is “spontaneous”. In fact, the putative ‘gradualness’ suggests an opacity in Kant’s theory at this point that opens it to criticism. If we focus in on the interaction between reproduction and recognition, two alternatives emerge. \textit{Either} the act of recognition is only possible if what it is recognising has already been recognised. Recognition would thus depend on a prior unity, not just of apprehension and reproduction, but of a kind of pre-cognition, or anticipation.\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Or} the fact that a manifold is immediately reproduced in the continuous process of experience entails an automatic ‘marking’ of what is reproduced that affords it some immediate unity. But the unity produced would then not involve any special conceptual or classificatory activity on the part of ‘recognition’. Does Kant have a possible answer to this complication?

\textsuperscript{30} It is striking that in the \textit{A}-deduction transcendental apperception is only twice explicitly referred to in terms of the notion of the ‘I’ (A117n., A123).

\textsuperscript{31} A virtue of this interpretation is that it does not split off the account of transcendental apperception from the empirical use of concepts Kant is so keen to ground. Some interpretations make transcendental apperception into an abstract, mysterious process that unifies consciousness, but is hard to apply to the workings of empirical concepts and intuitions as Kant describes them.

Now while Kant states that apperception is the “inner ground” of synthesis, he also states in the same passage that imagination provides the form. But at this point he says that the synthesis of reproduction does not take place a priori, because it “rests on conditions of experience”. Kant states that the transcendental unity of apperception is therefore related to the “productive synthesis of the imagination” (A118). But as Heidegger points out, “pure reproduction – does this not mean productive reproduction, hence a square circle?” Isn’t Kant gesturing towards the problem we have just met? On the one hand, reproductive synthesis must presuppose some empirical data to be thinkable as re-production, but on the other hand, reproduction must be productive, in that recognition can ‘find’ something in it that was not present when it presented itself in apprehension.

In order to explore this problem further, it will be necessary to delve deeper into the mechanics of Kant’s account of concept formation and application. This will also allow us further to assess the validity of the deduction. Because if Kant’s argument does indeed precede from a claim about all concepts, then the burden of his account of reproduction and recognition must be shifted towards the validity of his account of concepts, as well as of the role of imagination in conceptual recognition.

ii Concept Formation and Application

In the CPR Kant emphasises the application of concepts, while suppressing the formation of concepts. The emphasis on concept application in CPR may be due to Kant’s proximity at this point to his Leibnizian past, in which it is unproblematic that every thing, ideally, has its concept. The Leibnizian notion of the concept continues to abide in Kant’s notion of the logical use of the understanding.

33 “Since [the original unity of apperception] is the ground of all cognitions, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of all possible cognitions” (A118)
34 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 127.
35 It is this overemphasis that (for reasons that we will shortly spell out) leads to an attempt at compensation in CI: the distinction between determining and reflective judgment. There, part of the role of concept formation gets handed over to reflective judgment, while the use of concepts
The formation of a concept involves the establishment of a rule to reproduce and recognise. In turn one only applies a concept after one has attained it; one recognises a set of marks as conforming to the rule. However, the application of a concept always happens in a judgment, which means that it is never purely applied: it is always amplified or at least explicated. The notion that "concepts are predicates of possible judgments" implies an indistinguishability or at least overlap between formation and application, as any judgment involves operating with incomplete concepts.\(^{36}\) The series \(a, b, c\) that makes up the intension of a concept is a kind of rule of thumb, that can in principle be augmented at any time. The rule demands: if you see \(a, b,\) and \(c\) together, you must apply the concept \(X\). A concept in this case is really an indefinite series of marks, which at any point must be distinguishable from all other series. Indeed Kant insists that concepts are ultimately indefinable (A728/B756f);\(^ {37}\) synthetic judgments are perpetually amplifying concepts, while all empirical analytic judgments depend on a prior synthesis. Thus conceptual rules are in perpetual flux.

The unity of the concept is not within the concept itself, but concerns the use of the concept; it concerns the "act of unity". The unity of the set of marks is grounded in the unity of the act of recognition. Then what distinguishes the concept itself from an associated 'unity', which is not really a unity at all? Each concept is made of marks, which themselves must be concepts: they could not be recognisable marks otherwise. But are the marks of these concepts also concepts? At some point they will amount to rules for recognition of sensible marks. But what can such rules be but rules of association? What is Kant's advance over Hume if the unity of the act relies on concepts drawn from association?\(^ {38}\)

dealt with in CPR is now simply identified with determining judgment (the subsumption of a particular under a known general concept).

\(^{36}\) The fact that we cannot separate concept formation from application is not of itself viciously circular as Kant does not attempt to provide a genesis of concept formation, only a functional account. Pippin offers a circular account of the concept when he says "the concept is thus a rule for thinking together a number of individuals each of which possesses a 'marker' picked out conceptually (and so represented) as the principle of grouping", *Kant's Theory of Form*, 106.


\(^{38}\) For the Kantian, the notion of the rule answers a set of empiricist difficulties concerning the concept. Firstly, how is a general Idea formed from particular instances through 'abstraction'? Secondly, if the 'abstract' Idea is drawn from a set of particular instances, how can one account for its characteristic of generality if abstract Ideas are also themselves particular? Thirdly, how does application of a general, abstract Idea to a concrete, particular Idea, occur? Robert Pippin points
In the Jäsche *Logic*, Kant says that a series of ‘logical acts’—comparison, reflection and abstraction—comprise the process of making a concept.\textsuperscript{39} Allison attempts to distance these ‘logical acts’ from empiricist principles, claiming that “simply having a set of sensible impressions that are associated with one another is not the same as having a concept. A concept requires the thought of the applicability of this set of sensible impressions to a plurality of possible objects”.\textsuperscript{40} At a similar juncture, Pippin writes that “contrary to Hume, it is not the case that impressions just by their occurrence generate a feeling of associability. Perhaps Kant’s most decisive objection to Hume is his claim that it is the *mind* which must actively order and associate them, and this according to acquired rules”.\textsuperscript{41} However, these are very abstract presentations of Hume, which overlook the fact that the principles of association are actualised by habit, which grounds the expectation of future instantiations.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, association does not just happen by the mere ‘occurrence’ of impressions (contra Pippin), and the expectation of future instantiations provides the thought of possible applicability to a plurality of objects (contra Allison). Moreover, for Kant, the ‘mind’ is only active in the very “unity of the act” that is the recognition of the concept. Allison and Pippin imply that the mind has a choice about how to apply the concept; but Kant does not seem to intend that the “spontaneity” of conceptual acts in empirical cognition allows for any particular leeway. The act is simply the application of the concept which matches the marks apprehended, which presents itself on the basis of past experience. If we are able to abstract, reflect and compare, this is an activity of reason, not of experience as such, and one which no empiricist would deny is possible.

Finally, if conceptual content depends on association, then Kant faces exactly the same problems as Hume in justifying the appropriateness by which concepts extract their marks. If a concept involves recognition of marks, what is it

\textsuperscript{39} *Logic*, 100.
\textsuperscript{40} Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 67.
\textsuperscript{41} Pippin, *Kant’s Theory of Form*, 116.
\textsuperscript{42} As Deleuze shows in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, for Hume the principles of association are indeed principles to which the mind is subject. He shows that Hume’s point is precisely that association doesn’t just ‘happen’ of itself: it is the result of particular principles that structure the mind. See chapter 6.2.ii. below.
in these marks that grounds the recognition? As Pippin asks, what warrants the appropriateness of the collection of marks, if the concept is simply a rule that constitutes recognition of these marks?43 Here we return to our problem about reproduction and recognition. The reproduction of this mark as that recognised concept is still mysterious. Does recognition anticipate the appropriateness of the mark, or does reproduction itself select the mark 'for' recognition?

Kant's account of 'analytic unity' of concepts begins to look like a rather logicised abstraction, removed from the problems of forming concepts in the world. But this problem starts to infect the notion of concept application as well, for if a concept is to be applied, then the sensible manifold must be recognised to conform to it. But it must gain the right to apply itself to the manifold; it cannot simply 'impose' itself upon it for the sake of recognition.

Hence concept application also requires something else, a tertium quid, to justify the application of a conceptual rule to this sensible instance. But we have a possible answer here, in the notion of the schematism. The schema is a “representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image” (A140/B179).44 As we have seen in the case of concept formation, at a certain point in the account of the concept as rule, a need for ‘guidance’ from the manifold becomes urgent. The schema, as the “representation of a method”, a “monogram of pure apriori imagination” (A142/B181) provides another kind of problematic totality which conditions the application of a general concept to a particular set of empirical intuitions.45 Thus, in the case of the concept “dog”, the

43 “We could say that the collection of ‘markers’ that defines some such rule is ‘warranted empirically’, but the rule is supposed to be only an Erkenntnissgrund, or that by virtue of which the empirical manifold can be determinately apprehended in the first place. It does not seem at all useful to claim that the source of some rule is ‘experience’, unless we are again willing to ask what it is in experience that warrants the rule’s objectifying function”; Kant's Theory of Form, 115.

44 Kant says two contradictory things about this "procedure" or "method". While stating sometimes that the schema is a rule (A141/B180), on the other hand he suggests that the schema cannot be a rule, because then we would creating a regress of rules: the concept rule can only be applied if it conforms to the schema rule (cf. A133/B172). The schema appears to be a method which is not a rule, but does allow the concept to be applied to the sensible manifold.

45 Another interpretation of these issues is made by Paul Guyer. Guyer puts forward the thesis that empirical concepts as rules have no problem of application to the manifold because these concepts are schemata. “Empirical concepts are rules or schemata which tell us to predicate a certain title of a particular object, just in case certain sensible properties indeterminately specified in the rule are actually, and of course determinately, instantiated by that particular object” (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 164). Hence Kant is not concerned with the issue of how to apply a concept. If concepts are schemata, then all that is needed to apply them is “Mother wit”, or a talent for judgment (159, 162). However, Guyer’s notion of the schematism is flawed. In the opening sentences of the ‘Schematism’ chapter, Kant says that “In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representations of the former must be homogeneous with the latter... Thus the
imagination creates a schematic diagram by which all dogs can be shown to be
variations of this unrepresentable invariant, and conversely, that the concept can
be shown to apply to this set of marks. 46

It may seem that at this point all Kant’s innovations concerning the
classification are losing their gravitational pull back to Platonism. However,
Kant’s account of “construction” perhaps provides the key illustration for Kant of
how schematism would work. For instance, Kant shows how the connection
between the concept ‘straight line’ and the spatio-temporal determination ‘shortest
distance’ can be resolved through a schematic method by which the concept is
exhibited in pure intuition. A ‘method’ is promised by which the real possibility
of the notion of the shortest line would be outlined through an internal
determination of the variations of the concept in space and time; such a procedure
would also fulfil the rationalist criteria for a “real definition”. 47 But, as Hegel and
others showed, Kant’s notion of the schematism would seem to be an artificial
bridge over the difference in kind between concept (act) and intuition (receptivity)
to which Kant had committed himself. 48

In fact, it is arguably Maimon who suggested how this method of genesis
could work without straying too far from Kant. “Experience (intuition) shows how
a straight line is the shortest between two points, but it is not that which makes the
straight line the shortest”. 49 A genetic definition is required for the line. “The
concept of line demands two elements: firstly the material or intuition (line,
direction), secondly, the form or rule of the understanding according to which one 
thinks this intuition (identity of direction, rectilinearity) ... The action of drawing 
this line is from the beginning subsumed under this rule". As we have seen, for 
Maimon the forms of intuition, space and time, are forms required for the 
differentiation of intuition, while he calls the objects of this genetic method "Ideas 
of the understanding", which are formally conceived as intensive magnitudes. But 
clearly, if Maimon does bring to fulfilment Kant's suggestion that the schema be a 
method for generating conceptually ordered intuitions, it is at the price of a radical 
transformation of Kant's theory. However, by returning to the issue of empirical 
concepts it can be shown that such transformations and extensions were indeed 
already seeded throughout the extremities of CPR.

3 Ideas and their Necessity

Kant's theory of empirical concepts is caught in a dilemma. It cannot rely on 
realism, or demand order from things themselves; this would beg the question for 
a Humean, who would emphasise both the contingent and merely customary 
nature of concepts, and the importance of not confusing one's impressions with 
real objects. Nor can it appeal to the pure concepts of the understanding, as these 
by themselves are too wide to tell us anything in particular about that to which 
they are applied.

In fact, Kant's account of knowledge as presented so far is fundamentally 
incomplete. The *apriori* forms of the understanding are often taken to be 
conditions for the 'coherence' of experience, but as already suggested, Kant 
argues directly against this view later in CPR, where he goes on to present his 
'third' deduction, of Ideas. Just as the second deduction was a response to the 
possibility that spatiotemporal "appearances could after all be so constituted that 
the understanding not find them in accord with the conditions of unity", thus 
presenting a mere "rhapsody" of sensations (A90/B123), so does Kant admit that 
it is quite possible that "among the appearances offering themselves to us there

50 Ibid., 49. 
were such a great variety ... of content ... that even the most acute human understanding, through comparison of one with another, could not detect the least similarity (A654/B682).\textsuperscript{52} The understanding presents only a “distributive unity” among appearances, without granting a “collective unity” (A644/B672; cf. A583/B611) As the role of the content of knowledge is so far left undetermined, there must be some other rule for the coherence of experience beyond its distributive use.\textsuperscript{53} However, if the collective unity of appearances is precisely what can never be experienced as such, the principle can only be regulative, not constitutive. Kant suggests that

the transcendental Ideas ... have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only an Idea (focus imaginarius) – i.e. a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience – nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension (A644/B672).

The Idea involves the extension of the series of marks included in a concept beyond themselves into a projected totality. It is only by projecting such a “horizon” (A658/B686) that the analytic unity of concepts can be used logically, in such a way that higher and lower “functions of unity” converge with each

\textsuperscript{52} This possibility also provides the motivation for CJ. Cf. particularly the First Introduction: “For although experience forms a system in terms of transcendental laws, which comprise the condition under which experience as such is possible, yet empirical laws might be so infinitely diverse, and the forms of nature which pertain to particular experience so very heterogeneous, that the concept of a system in terms of these (empirical) laws must be quite alien to the understanding, and that the possibility – let alone the necessity – of such a whole is beyond our grasp. And yet for particular experience to cohere thoroughly in terms of fixed principles, it must have this systematic coherence of empirical laws as well” (CJ First Intro 203). The main difference between CPR and CJ here is that in the former Kant does not yet admit the possibility that the forms as well as the content of nature might be infinitely diverse. Cf. A654/B682.

\textsuperscript{53} Kant forbids the notion that reason “has gleaned this unity from the contingent constitution of nature in accordance with its principles of reason. For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth” (A651/B679). Such a law can only be a transcendental principle. In CJ, perhaps realising the importance of this function for even the simplest experience, Kant gives it the name of “reflective judgment”. Kant’s first description of reflective judgment in CJ precisely echoes the quote from CPR A654/B682: “Reflective judgment, which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires a principle, which it cannot borrow from experience, precisely because it is to be the basis for the unity of all empirical principles under higher though still empirical principles, and hence is to be the basis that makes it possible to subordinate empirical principles to one another in a systematic way. So this transcendental principle must be one that reflective judgment gives as a law, but only to itself” (CJ 180). On reflective judgment, see J. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. 151-168.
The Idea is thus the condition of the possibility of unity in a concept; it gives unity to a concept, by acting as the horizon in which unification can occur. Reason, as the faculty of Ideas, in this sense overshadows the understanding. 55

But as the Idea is "indeterminate" and therefore unable to be recognised in a concept, the totality or 'Ideal focus' can only be problematic. The focus is in a strict sense "imaginary". 56 We have already taken this notion in a Deleuzian direction; it has been shown that if the Ideas do 'give unity' that does not imply that they are unified in themselves. Hence the Ideas should not immediately be seen as responding to the "law of reason to seek unity". In the light of these earlier developments it is worth witnessing Kant's description of Ideas play out its consequences within the perspective of his epistemology.

The first thing to notice is that with this notion of an 'ideal horizon', the distinction between the logical and real use of the understanding starts to take on a new significance. The logical use of the understanding projects a world fully representable by concepts. But this 'logical world' is nevertheless a problematic projection, which, from this side, must change its sense with each action of the real use of the understanding (for which conceptual intension is always in flux). 57 What seem to be logical possibilities must have their shifting index in the 'real' possibility which exists for the concrete subject. Representation is thus a mirage, but a necessary one for Kant. This real use encounters its logical extension only in the form of the Idea. To recall Deleuze, the logical horizon of representation is constantly at risk of being 'blocked' by its real use.

Now Kant insists that the Idea is not an object of knowledge, but is only used for knowledge. And this is why a deduction is necessary to justify the precise

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54 Whereas the second Deduction dealt with the affinity of possible appearances, the third Deduction returns to affinity. Three "logical principles" are required to give collective coherence to experience: homogeneity, specificity and continuity; the latter is a "law of the affinity of all concepts, which offers a continuous transition from every species to every other through a graduated increase" (A657/B686).

55 It is this set of claims that is developed in CJ's theory of reflective judgment. Pippin recognises this possibility, but adds "it is, I think, hard to see the range and limits of such a 'reflection', and hard to understand how the demand for order we impose on nature is at all guided by what we learn from nature" (119). With the Hegelian or Deleuzian notions of Idea and reflection, of course, this becomes less hard, as Pippin shows in the case of Hegel, and as will be shown below for Deleuze.

56 Cf. CJ 232, and chapter 4.3.i. above.

57 It must be kept in mind that for Kant God would not have Ideas; Ideas are strictly finite 'foci' by which the human mind orients itself. The horizon of logical representation is a realm projected from the realm of the real. But the projection provides the structure by which the real can be thought.
validity and demonstration that Ideas can have (A670/B698). That Kant does not carry out this deduction with any formal structure should not make us overlook the fact that a deduction indeed occurs, under the heading ‘On the final aim of the natural dialectic of human reason’. In fact, the two steps of any transcendental deduction are present. Firstly, the justification of the internal validity of the structure, then the account of the mutual relation of the faculties, together with the demonstration that the internal structure can be schematised. However, Kant presents his deduction as if it began with the second step. The reason for this surely goes back to the subject of our first chapter: Kant takes the internal structure of reason itself for granted. We will see how problematic this lack of treatment of the first step will be at the end of this section, when all the metacritical problems of reason will reappear once more. I now present a treatment of these two moments in Kant’s Deduction of Ideas.

My general aim in what follows is firstly to continue to show the importance of Ideas for knowledge, and then secondly, to show how, if weight is indeed placed on Ideas of Reason, this finally pushes Kant’s system into a crisis. I claim that Deleuze recognises this crisis and exacerbates it, precisely in order to elicit from it a new distributive order of Ideas, thus actualising a potentiality that had remained latent from Leibniz to Kant. Thus Kant’s tendency to push issues of metacritique onto teleology (the Ideas as “ends of reason”) results in a startling dénouement in Deleuze’s philosophy.

I Ideas and Schemata

Kant begins the deduction with a distinction between two ways in which “something is given to my reason”: “as an object absolutely”, or “as an object in the Idea” (A670/B698). In the former case, reason can have no objective validity concerning the object itself. However, in the case of Ideas, reason does not have objective reality in the sense that Ideas can be demonstrated to determine objects, rather the objective reality of the Idea lies in its capacity to determine “other objects” in accordance with the Idea. Its reality is thus “only a schema, ordered in accordance with the conditions of the greatest unity of reason, for the concept of a thing in general”. The latter clause is important as it shows that Kant is still
attempting to determine what “the concept of a thing in general” is. The Idea is justified through its ability to schematise the *Gegenstände* of ‘absolute’ concepts. This can only mean that it gives *sense* to the problematic nexus of thought and *intellectual* intuition. The Idea thus *is* a schema of the concept of unconditioned concepts *for* the orientation of “other” concepts. Kant goes on to specify that “the things in the world must be considered *as if* they had got their existence from a highest intelligence” (A671/B699). That is, the Idea will also be a schema of God.

However, it is only in CJ that Kant elaborates on how Ideas might be thought as schemata, but in doing so he qualifies his account in CPR. He now describes the demonstration of a concept in an intuitive manifold *in general* as its *Darstellung* or presentation/exhibition, which he also baroquely calls ‘hypotyposis’:

> all hypotyposis ... consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic. In schematic hypotyposis there is a concept that the understanding has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given a priori. In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate (CJ 351).

Schematic presentation is “direct”, and “demonstrative”, while symbolic presentation is “indirect” (CJ 352) and “merely analogous to ... schematising” (CJ 351). It is also analogical in the sense that it takes a concept that it is using to *reflect* on an intuition “and applies the mere rule ... to an entirely different object” (CJ 352). Kant then says that “all our cognition of God is merely symbolic. Whoever regards it as schematic, while including in it the properties of understanding, will, etc., whose objective reality is proved only in worldly beings – falls into anthropomorphism” (CJ 353). This move must be seen as a modification of Kant’s earlier suggestion that God has a schema. Nevertheless, Kant’s main point is in fact reinforced: the specification of a “symbolic” form of intellectual activity furthers the notion that Ideas provide a distinct component of the mind beyond recognition.

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58 Indeed, later Kant emphasises the regulative nature of the claim for an intelligible and intelligent God by saying that although “we must presuppose such a being ... we have presupposed only a *Something*, of which we have no concept at all of what it is in itself (a merely transcendental object *[Gegenstand]*)” (A698/B726).

59 See chapter 3.2.ii. above.

60 In CJ art provides the prime example of a symbolic presentation of Ideas (cf. Deleuze, *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, 54). A white lily might symbolise innocence, which is a moral characteristic related to the *Idea* of perfection: thus an immaterial Idea gains a symbolic ‘incarnation’ or an
However, Kant's vacillation about whether Ideas are schematised or symbolised can be related to a more general problem about the role of Ideas. The later regions of CPR are probably so ignored because the notion that an Idea is 'merely' regulative can seem to say only that we ought to use our reason to explore nature. Now this distinction between 'regulative' and 'constitutive' needs to be correctly determined. That an Idea is regulative does not mean that it is not necessary for knowledge; it means rather that it cannot be said to apply or determine nature in the way that the categories can justifiably do (in virtue of their universality for all appearances). For Kant, if an Idea is not 'constitutive' for nature, it is constitutive for knowledge or experience. The structure of the three deductions, and their interrelation suggest that this deduction of regulative Ideas is just as much a necessary condition of knowledge as the other two deductions are. “I am not only warranted but even compelled to realise this Idea” (A677/B705). The discourse of the “ends of reason” is actually built into the account of knowledge, while, on the other hand, knowledge is necessarily entangled in Ideas, and so is never simply recognition. 61

Ideas thus help to schematise a problematic totality for empirical concept formation, thus providing an essential ‘third thing’ that mediates between concepts and their marks. But this necessity is mirrored by a similar mediation in the case of the role of the schematism as third thing between concepts and intuitions. As we saw above, the schematism points towards an internal determination of the sensible manifold by the apriori imagination.

"indirect presentation" in nature as an object of reflection. (Although, interestingly, Kant still speaks of poetry in terms of a "schema of the supersensible”; CJ 327).

But doesn’t Kant also in effect suggest that organic forms too are schematic or symbolic presentations of the internal teleology of reason? An organic form, strictly speaking, cannot be "experienced"; it presents an anomaly for the "distributive unity" (in Kant’s sense) of the categories, as it seems to cause itself, rather than being caused by a substance that must be seen as preceding it, according to the first two analogies. (It is often pointed out that the second analogy tells us nothing about particular causal connections, only that there must be one for each empirical judgment). It requires reflective judgment to be able to understand it at all. (Kant also goes on to talk about animals sharing "a common schema" or "archetype", which is "able to produce this great diversity of species, by shortening some parts and lengthening others, by the involution of some and evolution of others". The "analogy" among the parts of these species "reinforces our suspicion that they are actually akin, produced by an original mother”; CJ 418-9). In general, it is clear that for Kant Ideas are necessary to experience coherence in the whole of organic nature. It is possible to see CJ itself as an elaboration of the deduction of Ideas in that it shows the many ways in which Ideas can be presented.

61 It is also very pertinent that Kant does not frame the “compulsion” to think Ideas in particularly practical terms in this discussion, thus indicating that freedom is not the force that impels us out of mere recognition, but rather something in Ideas themselves.
It is striking that the determination of the concept in Kant at both of its extremities relies on peculiar procedures of the imagination. What warrants the formation of the concept? Only the Idea as a problematic task. What guides the concept to its application? The schema as the invariant intensive structure that allows the incarnation of various extensive actualisations. Imagination is what leads the way out of the understanding both in the guidance of the formation of the concept and in the schematism. In the former case the imagination prepares a sensible symbol of the Idea, the validity of which depends on its very elusiveness to recognition. In the latter case, Kant points towards a kind of construction that would provide a real definition of the laws of the sensible manifold.

Do we then finally have a suggestion about how imagination might be responsible for the conjunction of reproduction and recognition, through its capacity to unite the inner depths of intuition with the extremities of thought? The imagination certainly seems to provide the possibility of the reproduction of the manifold having a certain rational order that might make it available to recognition. However, what we have before us is an irreducible openness in the concept, in resonance with Ideas and intuition, which eludes the synthesis of recognition. The role of recognition would no longer be central, and thus Kant's theory would need to be further modified. With Deleuze, we have already been making moves towards this modification. But to conclude our account of the structure of Kant's critical project, it is now necessary to return to the issue of the first step of the deduction of Ideas, and the question of the internal validity of the concepts of reason that are being schematised.

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62 A problematic point can be raised here, to be taken up in Appendix IV, related to the next chapter. By making the imagination responsible for both processes, aren't we back with an indistinction between formation and application? Two directions lead off from here. Hegel's trajectory will begin by affirming the imagination as the "common root" of the understanding and intuition, while Deleuze will attempt to keep the faculties distinct, thus preserving the divergent forms of differentiation that belong to each faculty. How can he preserve the connection between Ideas and intuitions without turning to something like imagination as a mediating middle? It can be recalled here how similar Hegel and Deleuze are on the connection between aesthetic Ideas with rational Ideas. Hegel criticises Kant for acting "as if the aesthetic Idea did not have its exposition in the Idea of Reason, and the Idea of Reason did not have its demonstration in beauty" (Faith and Knowledge, 87), while Deleuze writes that "the aesthetic Idea is really the same thing as the rational Idea: it expresses what is expressible in the latter" (Kant's Critical Philosophy, 57). Their differences really concern the manner of connecting rational and aesthetic Ideas, that is, in a sense, the manner of schematising or symbolising the Idea.
The Structure of Ideas

The first step of this deduction has an unusual status. If the first two deductions involved preliminary analyses of the 'origins' or inner sources of a particular kind of cognition in sensibility and the understanding, the last deduction examines the necessary structure of reason itself. But our first chapter showed that the topic of the status of reason itself in CPR is fraught with metacritical difficulties. For reason must not only present its own criteria for its essential ends, but it also must subject the other faculties to itself. It follows from the latter claim that the third deduction itself can also be said in principle to subordinate the other two deductions to itself.

In this way, the three deductions must be seen in the light of the larger teleological fabric that was introduced in chapter 1. The first and second deductions point to the third, which finally ties up "the essential ends of reason". CPR is thus by no means just a critique of knowledge, but a treatise on the destination of man.63

The psychological, cosmological and theological Ideas finally find their claim to validity through their projection of the maximum of systematic unity for experience (A671/B699), thus allowing the formal return of the structure of Kant's early work. In the first edition CPR, Kant says that "the things in the world must be considered as if they had got their existence from a highest intelligence" (ibid, italics mine). By relying only on its 'as if' status, Kant would seem to be able to reaffirm the intelligence of God over his ontological and modal power. While such power was better demonstrated in Kant's early work, by here giving God a merely regulative status, Kant in effect can prioritise his intelligence, as this latter provides a clearer regulative sense for us, which the modal ontological argument by itself lacks. Now, we have seen that Kant modifies his views about the schema of God. But more can be said about the uncertain status of God in this region of the critical project. Perhaps there is a concealed possibility in the first

63 At the end of the section under discussion. Kant remarks that "all human cognition begins with intuitions, goes from there to concepts, and ends with Ideas". He then suggests that "a completed critique convinces us that reason in its speculative use can with these elements never get beyond the field of possible experience, and that the proper vocation [Bestimmung] of this supreme faculty of cognition is to employ all its methods and principles only in order to penetrate into the deepest inwardness of nature in accordance with all possible principles of unity, of which the unity of ends is the most prominent" (A703/B731).
view. In what follows the metacritical issues that have been encountered are pushed to a head.

Kant goes on to say that "the highest formal unity that alone rests on concepts of reason is the purposive unity of things; and the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard every ordinance in the world as if it had sprouted from the intention of a highest reason" (A687/B715). In an explicitly ontological register, he adds that "complete purposive unity is perfection (absolutely considered) ... The greatest systematic unity is the ... ground of the possibility of the greatest use of human reason. Hence the Idea of it is inseparably bound up with the essence of our reason" (A695/B723). But these latter ontological descriptions of the systematic totality provided by God could equally be applied at the level of the pure ontological arguments that we encountered in chapter 2. After all, as Kant shows in CJ, purposiveness can be thought without purpose; therefore an intelligent being is not necessarily thought along with the purposiveness of things. In fact, it is merely the "very contingency of [a] thing's form [that] is a basis for regarding the product as if it had come about through a causality that only reason can have" (CJ 370). Reason cannot simply let the contingency be, it "must always cognise not only the product's form, but the form's necessity as well" (ibid). Kant's reference to teleology here can be seen as exactly analogous to Leibniz's turn to teleology once the irreducibility of real possibility, or compossibility, has been shown. In chapter 2 I argued that the latter moment is the essential one, and that the teleological notion of an intelligent God is really to be seen as the simplest way in traditional terms to deal with the ontological chasm that has been opened up.

So on what does Kant's regulative account of a necessarily intelligent God rest? It must rest on Kant's characterisation of reason's own needs. But is it straightforwardly true that reason desires purpose, unity and collective totality? Why is it better to think nature holistically, when for all we know, it may not be articulated in itself in such a way? An alternative has already been glimpsed: rather than being collectively articulated, the inner natures of things may be distributively organised, so that their external relations may depend in primary ways on intensive relations. Where in fact does Kant find the criteria of unity and collectivity?
Kant says that our suppositions about God are thought only relatively, "on behalf of the systematic unity of the world of sense" (A679/B707), and there is no requirement to make a suppositio absoluta about God (A676/B704). Hence God must be thought "according to the analogy of realities in the world, of substances, causality and necessity ... in their highest perfection" (A678/B706). God must be thought according to the analogy of the forms of judgment. But has Kant adequately grounded the claim that God must be thought relatively and analogically? If reason does transparently present its "essential ends" then Kant can argue that the contingency of nature must imply that reason articulate it in terms of purposes, unity and totality. But it was found that in the first edition CPR, Kant seems to rely on a metaphysical teleology, which became problematised in his practical philosophy. Deleuze's resolution of this – his exacerbation of 'problematicity' by giving it its own specific notion – has been introduced as an alternative. In CJ, Kant himself envisages an alternative: the possibility for a new ground of the unity and vocation of the faculties (including reason) is shown by way of a genesis of their relation, suggesting that the internal teleology of reason, understanding and sensibility no longer in principle requires an end outside of itself (a reason in itself); reason determines its ends in relation to the other faculties.

But in this case, Kant has less and less need for an intelligent God. The way is open for a competing account of reason's relation to contingency. As we have seen, the modal ontological argument of Kant's early work in effect also provides a way of thinking the contingency of nature through the counterfactual form of compossibility. But then 'God', or the ontological structure of reality, no longer needs to be thought according to the analogy of judgment, but can be thought for itself. Although it is Deleuze that develops this direction, Kant does move towards something like it in the Opus Posthumum, as has been suggested.

Furthermore, it has been seen that for Kant, we are referred to the world's systematic unity "only by means of a schema of that unity" (A697/B725; cf.

64 In fact, the recourse in CPR to an intelligent God, rather than having any internal validity specifically demonstrable for the structure of reason, serves as a means for Kant to introduce the most traditional conceptions of what God is and what God thinks good. Kant even admits that "in this idea we can allow certain anthropomorphisms, which are expedient for the regulative principle we are thinking of, without fear or blame" (A697/B725). In terms of the movement of Kant's argument, there is no more need to follow his appeal to anthropomorphism than there is to think of
Given the outlines in Kant’s theory suggesting an internal ‘schematic’ relation between Ideas, imagination, and intuition, is it in fact possible to return to the rationalist project of attaining a real definition of God, that generates the totality of real possibility in a non-anthropomorphic way? Deleuze in effect occupies this open site in Kant’s work. Firstly he can be seen as reconciling the symbolic and schematic presentations of reality through the notion that Ideas are indirectly presented as problems (he elaborates how this happens in terms of the “transcendent exercise of the faculties”, to be further expounded in chapter 6.2). Secondly, he theoretically affirms the play of compossibilities that was denoted by the name of God in Leibniz and Spinoza. However, Deleuze affirms the “unity” of ontological totality not collectively but distributively, so that it is affirmed only through *each* really distinct part. The Absolute is attained only through access to the problematic, which *qua* problematic, promises no collective unity or totality, only the eternally mobile distributions of the object = x. Deleuze thus locates himself in the same metaphysical zones that Kant ultimately occupies (both in principle and historically in CJ and OP); but I will argue that Deleuze’s return to Leibnizian and Spinozist issues is ultimately more consistent than Kant’s actual resolution of these problems.

4 The Primacy of Apperception

Having given a non-traditional account of the role of apperception in Kant’s critical project, based around the first edition CPR, I now turn to the more usual notion that apperception is in some sense the *premise* or *first principle* of the critical project. A case can indeed be made that this was Kant’s intent by referring to the claims of the B-deduction. However, I would suggest that Kant’s greater project in the first edition CPR is not negated, but on the contrary is redistributed throughout CJ and OP. The ‘epistemologization’ introduced in the second edition CPR should be seen in the light of Kant’s redistribution of metacritical, metaphysical and teleological issues (all vital to the critical project) to other works. This introduces a fracture into CPR itself, so that it can now be seen from two angles: first as an attempt at a treatise on the destination of man, and then

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reason in terms of “expediency”. Kant’s later remarks, cited above, about the symbolic presentation of God serve as a corrective to his earlier view.
secondly as an attempt at the epistemological part of a treatise on the destination of man. 65

Nevertheless, the second edition CPR introduces some vital new ideas concerning inner and outer sense, which to some extent can be seen as precipitating the great reorganisation of 1786. But I shall argue that in fact, in union with the continuing edicts of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, they end up providing even more evidence against the methodological primacy of apperception, the weight of which must therefore be shifted elsewhere, whether it be onto pre-reflexive grounds, or onto teleological conceptions of the subject as an Idea. 66

Apperception and Spontaneity

Kant’s claim about transcendental apperception is expressed in the following famous proposition: “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations” (B131). This proposition can be understood as either an uncontroversial analytic truth that follows from the having of representations, or it can be seen as a synthetic apriori truth. In recent times the question of the syntheticity or analyticity of the ‘I think’ has polarised commentators wishing to understand the deduction. Strawson, Henrich and Guyer have underlined the necessity for the deduction of the synthetic apriority of apperception itself, in order to get the anti-skeptical claims of the Deduction underway.

In Identity and Objectivity, Henrich argues that the unity of apperception can only be understood as resting on either the simplicity or the numerical identity of the self. If the self is simple, however, we could not derive any categories from its necessity, because we cannot account for any activity of synthesis. We cannot get from simplicity to the complexity that is a necessary presupposition for synthesis. 67 Hence apperception must involve numerical identity of the self

65 As I remarked in chapter 1, I have been influenced here by E. Förster’s suggestions in ‘Kant’s Notion of Philosophy’.
66 In Appendix III, related to the end of this chapter, I also suggest that in OP Kant finally comes to accept the proposal, first suggested by Aenesidemus, that the transcendental subject of apperception must have the status of an Idea. This will lead finally to the confrontation with an ambiguity which has been constantly on the horizon, between the mere formality of apperception and more ‘substantial’ claims about the subject and self.
67 Cf. Henrich, Identity and Objectivity. in The Unity of Reason, 171: “The subject not only must be able to think of itself as being one in relation to an indeterminate multiplicity of thoughts, but it
through complex states. He first suggests that this could entail a ‘strict’ or Leibnizian numerical identity in which identity is secured only if a thing retains all the properties that it ever has, because the categories would serve precisely to secure the continual self-same identity of all the subject’s states. Henrich gives a number of reasons why this isn’t the kind of identity Kant has in mind, the crucial one being that it doesn’t account for the apriority of the self’s awareness of its identity; the self is rather seen as continually acquiring knowledge of its continuing self-identity. So the identity of the self must instead be a “moderate identity”. Essentially this involves the capacity of the subject to remain itself through the transition between states by means of the “thought of particular ways of transition”, ie. the categories. That is, the subject has the apriori ability to make judgments about its continuing identity due to its use of the categories.

I shall mention three problems with this approach that have come to light. Firstly, the perceived untenability of presupposing a ‘Cartesian consciousness’ as the basis for the unity and numerical identity of apperception. This problem can be subsumed under a second more general problem, that of the susceptibility of the argument to the classic sceptical claim, recurrent in various forms from G.E. Schulze (or ‘Aenesidemus’) to Stroud, that transcendental arguments only prove what it is necessary to believe in order to fulfil a certain requirement of the concept of experience. Thirdly, there is a general concern that the status of the ‘I think’ might conflict with Kant’s claims in the Paralogisms. Kant argues against any consciousness of the numerical identity of the self:

Identity of consciousness of myself at different times is ... only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection, but it does not prove at all the numerical identity of my subject, in which – despite the logical identity of the I –

must also be in a position to bring together many kinds of contents into particular complex thoughts”.

68 Ibid, 175: “The subject must be able to progress [übergehen] from one state to another. And it must be able to do this in such a way that it is able to think of itself as the same subject both in relation to its states and in relation to the process of transition”.

69 Ibid, 182.

70 Aenesidemus claims that “the Critique claims that the original determinations of the human mind are the real ground or source of the necessary synthetic judgments found in our knowledge; but it does this by inferring, from the fact that we can only think of the faculty of representation as the ground of these judgments, that the mind must be their ground in actual fact too”. G.E. Schulze, Aenesidemus, in di Giovanni & Harris eds, Between Kant and Hegel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 113. In his classic article on “Transcendental Arguments”, Stroud states the issue as follows: “For any candidate S, proposed as a member of the privileged class [of transcendentally true propositions], the skeptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make language [or experience] possible if we believe that S is true”. contained in R. Walker (ed). Kant on Pure Reason, 128.
a change can go on that does not allow it to keep its identity, and this even though all the while the identical sounding ‘I’ is assigned to it (A363).

Karl Ameriks and Andrew Brook emphasise that the identity of consciousness relevant for the ‘I think’ must be seen only as a transcendental condition for “one experience” (cf. A110), rather than for a numerical identity between discrete experiences. If I am aware of my identity with my past in any given moment, this says nothing about my ‘objective’ identity or continuity with myself. As Ameriks puts it, “Kant’s premiss is not that my consciousness really is in these various times but only that there are various times ‘in’ my consciousness ... The persistent representation of an ‘I’ need not be the representation of a persistent ‘I’.”

Allison’s account of apperception excludes the claim to synthetic apriori validity involved in Henrich’s account, and argues that its status is purely analytic. He develops Klaus Reich’s account of the analytic unity of apperception as a formal, abstract model of concept use, and argues that apperception and objectivity simply imply one another. Allison attenuates the notion of objective validity so that it simply indicates the capability of a judgment to be true. The analytic unity of apperception comprises the necessary unity involved in the making of a judgment. He then takes the first five paragraphs of the B-deduction to involve the following analytic claims. Any representation of

71 Andrew Brook has written most extensively on this topic; cf. Kant and the Mind, 32f., 132f., and chapter 8 on “unity without identity over time”. Ameriks provides a similar analysis in Kant’s Theory of Mind. Interestingly this same insistence is made by Brook and Ameriks from radically different perspectives: Brook defends a functionalist account of apperception, while Ameriks is resolutely metaphysical. Both functionalism and metaphysics can be understood to encroach upon Kant’s claims for the ‘1 think’ from different sides.

72 Cf. Kant’s peculiar thought experiments with the elastic balls at A363; and Ameriks’ commentary (see note below).

73 Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind, 134-5.

74 Guyer also critiques Henrich’s argument, but claims, against Allison, that the synthetic apriori validity of apperception itself is essential to Kant. (Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 132f. On the necessity of a synthetic apriori premise cf. 77f.) His own discussion of the transcendental deduction involves its dissolution into a ‘patchwork theory’, whereby the two main candidates for the role of central argument are the one just mentioned and a regressive argument that presupposes objective knowledge but uses the deduction to prove the applicability of the categories. This latter fails due to the limitations of such a regressive argument against skepticism. Instead, he offers a minimal claim about empirical consciousness necessarily depending on objective knowledge. However, this has been criticised as essentially a dressed up version of Strawson’s argument, and hence subject to the same criticisms. Cf. J.M. Young, review of Guyer (Kant-Studien, 1990). 101; H. Allison, review of Guyer. Journal of Philosophy 86. 1989). 215

75 Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant’s Table of Judgments, 9ff.

76 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 138.

77 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 137-148.
a manifold as a manifold is a single complex thought. As "concepts are predicates of possible judgments", the thinking of this single complex thought will be through the activity of judgment. A single complex thought requires a single thinking subject, because the thoughts of the distributed parts of a whole are not equivalent to the thought of the collective whole itself. If the subject is conscious of the parts of its thought as a unity, then it also must be able to be conscious of its own identity as subject of these representations. Allison thus claims that the proposition "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations" necessarily implies a subject capable of recognising itself as identical throughout its representations. Nevertheless, he says, this is only "the necessity of a possibility", and thus doesn't entail the material claims of the above interpretations. Against Henrich's interpretation, there is no claim that any explicit awareness of numerical identity is necessary for this thinking subject. Finally, the crucial claim that the deduction is to prove the applicability of the pure concepts to intuition is shifted to the second half of the B-deduction through the introduction of the necessity of the unity of the spatiotemporal manifold. This approach implies a strong reliance on transcendental idealism; without it, Allison's deduction would go the way of Strawson et al.

There are several points in Allison's reading that are relevant for us here, although I can only focus on one cluster of issues around apperception itself.

78 His approach here echoes that of Henrich in 'The Proof Structure of the Transcendental Deduction', in R. Walker ed., Kant on Pure Reason. Ameriks has questioned why Henrich turns to his later account of Cartesian consciousness when he had put forward a more convincing account in this earlier (1969) article; 'Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy' (American Philosophical Quarterly, 19, 1982), 16.

79 I shall have to leave this side of the deduction until the discussion of Deleuze; but we have already seen that for Deleuze the extensive unity of space and time is secondary to its internal, intensive differentiation; so its role in securing the deduction would be put in doubt.

80 I think Allison's argument is also problematised by his manoeuvres around the notion of 'objective validity' (see Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 144-8). Allison straddles the division between the metaphysical and the transcendental deductions uncertainly here. Kant argues on A97 that the objective validity of the categories in the thought of objects is insufficient because there is "more at work" than the understanding. He has argued for objective validity as a relation to objects, and requires an elucidation of the possibility of this relation. The A-Deduction proceeds on this basis. Objective validity thus already involves the transcendental application of the categories, not simply their logical use. Allison tries to save the generality of paragraphs 15-20 from any involvement in the commitments of this application. Admittedly these commitments are not clear, but it is certain that it involves the relation of a concept to its object in intuition (Cf. B179, B187. Allison himself notes this in The Kant-Eberhard Controversy: 63-5). Allison argues that the object in these passages is not the transcendental object, which he argues involves the 'weighty' sense of an object. But the transcendental object is surely precisely the object that is involved in the transcendental use of the categories. Again, Allison himself argues differently in an earlier work, viz 'Kant and the Transcendental Object', where he distinguishes between the
The analyticity of the proposition from B131 derives from the fact that the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations. With this emphasis in mind, the proposition becomes a tautology, and does not tell us anything about a subject of representations. What it does imply is that each empirical representation I have must be able to be gathered up by a transcendental ‘I think’. We may be able to go on to infer that the transcendental ‘I think’ is thus only possible on the basis of a synthesis according to categories, but this tells us nothing about the numerical identity of the ‘I think’. Hence again the importance of keeping a distinction between the unity of consciousness (“one single experience”) and the consciousness of unity; it is the latter claim that is ambiguous. Allison wants to attribute reflective spontaneity to a subject capable of recognising itself as identical. But can he move from his analytic argument about apperception to such a synthetic claim?

The problematic nature of Allison’s reading can be brought out if we focus on the phrase ‘must be able to accompany’. As Allison shows, it is the necessity of a possibility of self-consciousness, not the actual, continuous accompaniment of self-consciousness which Kant is arguing for here. But Allison is caught in a double bind situation. Either self-consciousness is in fact fundamental for the application of the categories, in which case he has to move back towards making a synthetic apriori claim for it, or self-consciousness is merely necessarily possible, in which case the universality of the categories is hardly assured, as the actuality of self-consciousness is not implied at all.82

This chimes with Guyer’s criticism that Allison only adduces a logical necessity, not any de re necessity for the ‘I think’; but only the latter will suffice

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81 Cf. K. Ameriks’ recent reconstruction of this level of the Transcendental Deduction in ‘Understanding Apperception Today’ (in P. Parrini, ed., Kant and Contemporary Epistemology, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), and ‘Kant and the Self’, (in D. Klemm & G. Zöller, eds., Figuring the Self, Albany: SUNY, 1997). These articles present the most sophisticated reading of apperception that I have so far encountered. Ameriks does not, however, use his argument explicitly against Allison’s claims.

82 Cf. Hector-Neri Castenada’s argument in ‘The Role of Apperception in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories’, (Noûs 24, 1990), 150.
to get the argument out of mere conceptual analysis.\textsuperscript{83} (Once again, the issue of the logical and the real.) The question would then be whether Allison is having it both ways by arguing for the analyticity of apperception and then finessing the modal status of the premise so he can claim that the status of apperception is necessary, but only as a ‘possibility’, not as necessarily existential.

The ambiguous modal status clouds the status of apperception as an “act”, or as “spontaneous”. The move from the logical requirement for an “act of unity” to its transcendental status \textit{for experience} is problematic. How exactly does the act of apperception take place? Where is the weight of the claim for spontaneity located? As we have seen, Allison makes a point of diverging from Henrich’s reading of Kant’s statement that “we are conscious \textit{aperi}ori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations ... as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations” (A116). In conformity with the Paralogisms, Allison insists that apperception gives us no \textit{knowledge} of the self; self-consciousness is not self-knowledge. The ‘I think’ cannot be thought through the categories as the I is presupposed by the categories; it therefore cannot be “objectified” and is rather (with Wittgenstein) “a limit of the world”.\textsuperscript{84} Referring back to A116, he claims instead that “what we are aware of is not numerical identity; it is rather the ‘fact’ that this identity must be presupposed as a necessary condition of knowledge”\textsuperscript{85}. But doesn’t this mystify further the issue of what self-consciousness is aware of? Is the apperceptive subject really aware of this “fact” in all its representations?

Recently Allison, perhaps in order to resolve these issues, has pursued a stronger claim for the necessity of self-consciousness in experience, which affirms aspects of Robert Pippin’s normative theory of apperception.\textsuperscript{86} In order to be able to recognise the ordered unity in my representations, I must \textit{take myself} as conforming to the criteria for such unity. “The unity must be not only \textit{in} a single

\textsuperscript{83} Paul Guyer, \textit{Kant and the Claims of Knowledge}, 140: “What Kant requires is not an analytic claim that if I call several representations mine I must see them as representations of a single self (an explication, as it were, of what it \textit{means} to call them “mine”), but a synthetic claim asserting the \textit{de re} necessity that, \textit{however} representations I have, I \textit{can} call them mine and thus ascribe them to myself as representations of a single self. Only \textit{aperi}ori certainty of this synthetic proposition would require \textit{aperi}ori knowledge of any synthesis of them”.

\textsuperscript{84} Allison, \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Idealism}, 290-3.

\textsuperscript{85} Allison, \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Idealism}, 140.

consciousness, it must be for that consciousness".\(^8^7\) That is, the mind must be able to spontaneously recognise the criteria of unity as well as the components of the unity itself. Apperception is a conscious self-relating via the norms of the categories. But while Pippin may be able to defend such an account in Hegelian terms, it would seem to require a rather dogmatic, insomniac subject in the case of Kant. Moreover, four conceptual problems can be mentioned.

Firstly, if the unity is for a consciousness, then which consciousness? The categories, as criteria for unity, are themselves presupposed in order to provide a thread for the unity of experience. But are we supposed to conceive a spontaneous subject somehow apart from these criteria, ‘consciously’ conforming to them? Even if such a subject only has sense by means of these criteria? In other words, at what level is the claim for reflective spontaneity really secured for itself? It cannot simply be that spontaneous apperception is simply another transcendental condition like the categories, because it is itself supposed to be the mediating ‘third thing’ that justifies the synthetic apriority of the categories (cf. again the crucial claims at A88/B120-A91/B123). If the weight of the claim is going to be displaced (ie. so that apperception is merely another ‘formal’ condition), it should at least be clear where it is being displaced to. (My interpretation orients the displacement in the direction of teleology).

Secondly, Pippin’s account of normative claim making is presented as more than merely analytic,\(^8^8\) but nevertheless vacillates uncertainly around the claim that the normative ‘taking-as’ is implicit. Either it is too implicit, in which case the normativity seems to disappear;\(^8^9\) or it becomes explicit, and leads to a ‘dual’ account of consciousness, where empirical judgment is shadowed by an equally de re transcendental judgment.\(^9^0\)

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\(^8^7\) 'On Naturalizing Kant’s Transcendental Psychology' in *Idealism and Freedom*, 60

\(^8^8\) Cf. Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 27.

\(^8^9\) “When S claims to know P, S must be implicitly understanding himself to be participating in the practice of judgment and justification, and ... S must contextually or implicitly understand enough of such a practice to count as participating in it. (Such a reflexive awareness might simply always be implicit and evinced only by what else S can and would do).” (ibid. 22-23). The parenthetic remark surely suggests that such ‘implicit self-reflexivity’ could be more minimally understood according to a framework of counterfactuals.

\(^9^0\) Ameriks compares this aspect of Pippin’s account with F. Neuhouser’s interpretation of Fichte, they both posit an “‘ever-present’ awareness that one is conscious” (‘Kant and the Self’, 72. n. 42) Cf. also Ameriks’ criticism of Pippin’s claim that ‘all human thought is ‘self-reflexive’” (Hegel’s *Idealism*, 7). “It is hard to see what is to be gained by stubbornly insisting on the ‘all’ claim here. It seems obvious that there could be all sorts of non-reflexive relations that we are involved in’; Ameriks, ‘Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation of an Epistemologist?’. (*Philosophy and
Thirdly, Kant would claim, I think, that apperception itself cannot be experienced as spontaneous, because of what he calls the "paradox" of inner sense (B152; cf. B67-69, B152-7), in relation to which he writes that "the consciousness of oneself is ... far from being a cognition of oneself" (B158). All determination is referred to intuition, the two pure forms of which are space and time. In order to experience my own spontaneity, I would have to take it as an object, which would require that it be subjected to and mediated by inner sense, the form of determinability of which is time. "[T]he subject, which is the object of [inner] sense, can only be represented by its means [that is, by the means of inner sense] as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e. intellectual" (B68); the subject is therefore "affected from within, ... as it appears to itself, not as it is" (B69). I cannot determine my own spontaneity prior to the act of determination in time. Moreover, such a determination would, by the hypothesis, already require spontaneity in the very determining of spontaneity. Thus with the paradox of inner sense, not only can I not determine myself as a spontaneously active being, but I cannot determine myself as spontaneous at all. I can ultimately only philosophically presuppose spontaneity, as I can reason, as a transcendental philosopher, that concepts themselves are not given, so must be produced by a mind. Hence the self-relation that is attributed to the notion of apperception remains mysterious, or at least must be mediated by other characteristics.

Phenomenological Research, 52, 1992). 197. For me, the Idea is the locus of the relation between non-reflexive and reflexive relations; cf. chapter 6.2.iii and 6.3 below.

91 Cf. S. Houlgate's treatment of this issue in 'Hegel, Kant, and the Formal Distinctions of Reflective Understanding', (in A. Collins, Hegel and the Modern World), 137-40. Houlgate suggests, indirectly, that Hegel offers us a way out of the paradox of inner sense. He writes: "If I am conscious of myself as thinking and determining, then perhaps that is precisely what the 'I' is in itself, what I am in myself as 'I': not a conceivably determinable (though in fact inaccessible) being or thing which thinks, but just the activity of thinking itself, an activity without an underlying agent, a doing without a doer (as Nietzsche might put it). that is to say, a self-determining thought" (140). My problem would be with the first clause: "If I am conscious of myself as thinking and determining..." To what extent can one appeal to the transparency of self-consciousness? Does Kant's paradox of inner sense not show us the internal complexity of the 'act' of self-consciousness, in such a way that its use as a model for determination is put in question? I return to these problems below when I discuss D. Henrich's and M. Frank's notions of self-consciousness.

92 Although I can only suggest it here, it seems to me that this train of thought also puts in question certain claims underlying the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology. In Appendix I I mentioned that Hegel presupposes at the outset of the Phenomenology an "abstract" account of the relation of consciousness to its object: "consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness, and the determinate aspect of this relating, or of the being of something for a consciousness, is
Fourthly it follows in general that a fundamental ambiguity about the status of apperception is present in Kant. Although Kant seems to imply that, in the form of self-consciousness, apperception is open to reflection, there is also a sense that, although it is founding for experience, it must remain at the level of a condition discovered only by the transcendental philosopher. The criteria of experience are only really revealed in the transcendental analysis undertaken by Kant; they are not available by right to every subject. But in this case how can Kant prove the de re necessity of his account of apperception without being vulnerable to other potential explanations for the unity of consciousness? Apperception seems to become at best an Idea, something we are supposed to presuppose for the unity of experience, but which cannot be apprehended as such. There is one alternative, though: that Kant identify de re the activity of thought involved in transcendental analysis with apperception. However, I will show in chapter 6.2.iii that this could not work, by appealing to Deleuzian arguments about the distinction between thought and experience.

In his most recent essays on apperception, Allison concedes ground to Guyer and appeals to the notion of a ‘fact of reason’ in lieu of any attempt to ground it synthetically. Apperception finally seems to be isolated as another ‘fact of reason’, in which case its harmonic functioning with the other ‘facts’ knowing” (52). Isn’t this “abstract determination” doing rather more than it should by right, given the avowed self-grounding nature and exhaustiveness of the Phenomenology? Pippin’s account in effect admits this by claiming this normative self-reflexivity as a starting point. Quoting the passage just mentioned, Pippin writes that Hegel is here “appropriating a good deal from Kant”, and that “he can make this claim because he regards consciousness as judgmental, as having a ‘relation to objects’. by establishing one through its active judging. Consciousness relates itself to objects” (Hegel’s Idealism, 104; first italics mine). If this is right, then it is possible that the above reflections apply to Hegel’s account as well as to Kant’s. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that Hegel’s “distinguishing and relating” echoes Reinhold’s account of the “fact of consciousness”. If Hegel’s “abstract” account of consciousness is doing the kind of work that some Hegelians say it is, then does it too describe a “fact of consciousness”? What then are we to make of Hegel’s robust early criticisms of Reinhold in the Difference essay (178-195)?

93 Compare my claims to this effect in chapter 3. As I suggested above in note 25, the problem with such “normative” accounts of Kant is that they have to abandon all hope of being able to understand how it is not just the categories of relation that unify experience, but those of Quantity (the Axioms of Intuition), Quality (the Anticipations) and Modality (the Empirical Postulates). How a self-conscious subject can be treating these as norms in the process of experience is impossible to conceive, and, if it is partially attempted, it invariably ends up producing a bloated, impossibly baroque account of the subject. Again, I would insist that the project of demonstration and justification achieved in the deductions is carried out by the philosopher, not by the subject. The subject, which thinks according to the pure concepts of the understanding, can rely on the findings of the transcendental philosopher to guarantee the validity and appropriateness of its pure concepts for experience.

94 These suggestions will be developed below and in Appendix III.

needs explaining. Under additional pressure from the impossibility of proving transcendental freedom, Allison is content to allow that spontaneity is only an Idea. “Spontaneity functions in the technical Kantian sense as an idea in light of which the act of thinking must be conceived in order to retain its normative status”.96 We can only act, or take ourselves to be acting, in the light of this Idea.

But if apperception must be so fundamentally referred to Ideas, Allison’s and Pippin’s belief in the primacy of ‘taking as’, as the identification of the spontaneous subject able to make reasoned judgments with the self-conscious subject of apperception, is also open to question. As we will see, Deleuze in effect shows that a large part of this function of ‘taking as’ is identical with recognition, or subsumption under a judgment, and recognition is a vastly overrated aspect of cognitive activity. Rather than being identified with the dignity of thought, recognition must be distinguished from thought. Furthermore, there are other activities of thought that engage much more profoundly with Ideas.

Thinking is precisely not an experience, or to be identified in any way with recognition. In his late opuscule ‘Is it an experience that we think?’, Kant says the same thing. While I may construct a square according to the laws of empirical cognition, and in fundamental reference to time and space, “when I think a square apriori, I cannot say that this thought is an experience”.97 Kant then argues in general that while “my consciousness when I order [anstelle] an experience” determinates my existence in time, this consciousness itself cannot be in time, as if it were there would be an infinite regress of times, each containing the other. “Transcendental consciousness” is therefore not an experience (ibid). What, though, can thought be if it is not ‘taking as’, or conceptual recognition? Ironically, the trajectory of Allison’s reading can be reformulated in Deleuzian terms so that the issue shifts away from ‘taking as’. Even if thinking were ‘acting according to the Idea of spontaneity’, then this would indicate that we should focus on the cognitive relation to Ideas first if we are to understand thinking. Thinking is inhabiting the problem of what it is to think, or being forced to think by an Idea which remains problematic for experience.98

96 ‘On Naturalizing Kant’s Transcendental Psychology’, Idealism and Freedom. 64.
98 It is Aenesidemus who first acutely asks whether the Kantian subject must be thought as an Idea. Aenesidemus’ problem is metacritical. If the synthetic apriori laws of experience, founded in the transcendental subject, are to be true, then they cannot be themselves subject to mere appearance.
It is important that we now turn to a final group of suggestions about Kant’s theory of self-consciousness, which takes us away from formal readings of apperception towards direct claims about the subject itself. There is another aspect to Dieter Henrich’s reading of Kant that was not mentioned in the above account. Although Henrich ascribes a Cartesian consciousness to apperception in *Identity and Objectivity*, elsewhere he makes a famous attack on Kant’s notion of self-consciousness that leads one to suspect that his presentation of Kant as Cartesian is to be seen in terms of a step on the way to Henrich’s own, more adequate account of self-consciousness.\(^9\) Henrich claims that Kant implicitly adheres to what he calls ‘the reflection theory’ of self-consciousness, which supposes that self-consciousness arises in the first place out of a reflection upon myself. But Henrich argues, like Sydney Shoemaker, that self-consciousness is only possible if *I am already aware* of the self with which I am identifying. Any self-representation such as that involved in apperception thus must rely on a pre-reflexive identification with myself as object which precedes all explicit identification of the self. That is, there is an *unknown ground* that underlies self-consciousness, which, as unknown, eludes my spontaneous self-determination. My act of spontaneity is not radically autonomous, but depends on something Other to my own act.\(^10\) Henrich finds the first glimmerings of such an idea in the later Fichte.

In fact, as Henrich and Manfred Frank have shown, there is a sense in which all the immediate post-Kantians were involved in this gradual realisation. Fichte marks the beginning of a retreat away from the notion that apperception

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\(^10\) In my view, it is these kinds of doubt about spontaneity that form the backdrop to Deleuze’s account of the ‘fractured I’. The ‘I think’ is an “I fractured by time”, according to an “alienation in principle, insurmountable in principle”: hence it “lives” the activity of thought “like an Other within itself” (DR 58/81, 86/116). See the account of the ‘fractured I’ in chapter 6.3 below.
provides a central consciousness of unity towards the notion that self-consciousness relies on a pre-reflexive ground. This ground is no longer a *Tathandlung*, but can only be called an "intellectual intuition". Hence Fichte must give up the realm of experience in the search for its conditions. A similar approach is to be found in Schelling, perhaps increasingly so, to the point where this pre-reflexive ground of being is taken to be a ground of Being, outside all representational thought. On the other hand, as Frank has shown, the later Reinhold, Hölderlin and Novalis also vacate the centre ground of apperception, but in a different direction – towards a notion of the subject as Idea, founded on a teleology. For Novalis and Hölderlin the self-consciousness of the subject testifies to a split in original Being, and can only be experienced as a loss. We have seen the importance of the notion of the spatiotemporal schematism for Novalis. From the present perspective, we can see that there is a sense in which schematism thus fills the void produced by the original chiasmus of reflection. As Frank remarks, “lost being is ... represented under the schema of the past, not(-yet)-Being under that of the future. Split between the two, the self loses its strict identity and is transformed into the continuity of a life history”.

Now Ameriks argues, against Henrich and Frank, that Kant does indeed affirm an adequate account of self-consciousness, which includes the vital element of pre-reflexivity. He appeals to Kant’s claim that the “I think expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition ... an indeterminate perception ... something real that is given ... not as appearance nor as thing in itself (noumenon) but as something which actually exists” (B422-3n). This, Ameriks argues, exactly fulfils Henrich’s requirement. Implicitly arguing against Allison’s view as outlined above, Ameriks claims there are two senses in which the subject can be a limit of the world. On the one hand, there can be a “nowhere becausecentreless” perspective. But there can also, on the other hand, be a “primordial sense of self-familiarity ... that, rather than being in principle ‘from everywhere’, is instead

from an extraordinarily concrete ‘somewhere’, a somewhere so concrete that any description of it would be too general to guarantee unique applicability.”

However, this notion of immediate self-awareness carries its own perils, as shown by Manfred Frank’s attempts to elaborate it. He confesses that it is not possible to move from this bare awareness to anything substantial about the identity of the subject. The awareness of the subject remains prepropositional and does not allow itself to cross the bridge to any de re formulations. Moreover, Shoemaker, the leading Anglo-American proponent of this view, admits that despite my feeling of intimacy with my memories, nothing allows me to infer that I was the experiencer of the object of those memories. All that can be granted is that I register my memories as mine now.

Nevertheless, these accounts of pre-reflexivity are extremely important; moreover Ameriks’ appeal to Kant’s reference to indeterminate intuition is of crucial relevance, and can return us to the suggestion that the subject must be considered, somehow, as an Idea. Furthermore, it has been glimpsed above that in CJ indeterminate intuitions are treated as “aesthetic presentations of an Idea”. Might there not finally be a sense too in which the self figures itself, or gives itself form, as an Idea?

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105 Ibid.
106 Frank expresses in a nutshell the dilemma faced by his theory here: “How am I to recognise that what is ascribed de se is the nonobjective givenness of certain spatiotemporal objects? The problem of making plausible any kind of identity theory (such as I seek) will always consist in the fact that it also must overcome ‘cognitive closure’” [Frank refers here to Colin McGinn’s claim that “we have direct cognitive access to one term of the mind-brain relation (our minds), but we do not have such access to the nature of the link”, ‘Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’ in The Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 8]. In other words, I must be able to recognise that I myself am the de re (thus independently of my subjective perspective) identified body (or a functional identified causal role or whatever); Frank, ‘Is Subjectivity a Non-Thing. an Absurdity,’ in Ameriks & Sturma, The Modern Subject, 196 n.46. See also Robert Pippin’s reading of Frank in ‘On Not Being a Neo-Structuralist’ (Common Knowledge, 6/2, 1997): “Frank veers off only in denying that the right way to conceive of the subject’s self-disclosure is on the ‘reflective’ model” (152); by this latter model Pippin means his own interpretation of Kantianism as essentially involving the “radical assertion that all thinking ... is judging ... a claim-making, a taking by me to be so” (153). I have given reasons above for criticising this model. One way of expressing my problem is in terms of whether a Deleuzian model can negotiate between the poles provided by Frank and Pippin.
108 This view echoes Kant’s own concerns in the Paralogisms (cf. A383); see Ameriks’s formulation above: section 4.1, note 73.
109 Cf. note 60 above, and chapter 1.2.i.a & 1.4.
110 In Appendix III I show that Kant himself ends up attempting something just like this in OP, prompted by Aenesidemus.
In conclusion, a Deleuzian suggestion can be foreshadowed. On the one hand we have noted that Kant admits in CPR that we cannot identify the empirical self with the subject of apperception; in chapter 3 it was shown that no token-identity could be found between the phenomenal and noumenal subjects. Kant indeed allows that noumenally there may be many souls. On the other hand we have also seen that some ‘pre-reflexive’, nonconceptual ‘familiarity’ is apparent in all self-consciousness. Now, with the possibility, opened up in the last chapter, of a problematic expression of the noumenon, another sense can be glimpsed to the possibility that Ideas may orientate the self-awareness of the subject.

For Henrich and Frank the subject is familiar with what is being reidentified but cannot say why or verify it in any way; this ‘identity’ is prior to any empirical memory, and thus far appears like a peculiarly mute and powerless form of intellectual intuition. Deleuze will suggest that this pre-reflexive ground must be articulated through a new exploration of memory. There is already a sense in Henrich and Frank that a kind of anamnesis is at issue, which creates a mysterious gap between the intimacy that my memories present to me and my ability to consciously represent them as my memories. As we have understood it so far, this pre-reflexivity can provide no rule for any special continuity between the selves that I remember having been. I will suggest that Deleuze’s theory does provide such a rule.111 He also takes up anew the problem of the alternative between ground and goal that faced the post-Kantians: Novalis’ and Hölderlin’s lament for the “loss of Being” find a new echo in Deleuze’s accounts of memory and the fractured ‘I’. Nevertheless, it will turn out to be another irony about the proper place of ‘pre-critical’ metaphysics, that in the course of attempting to elaborate a ‘truly critical’ notion of self-consciousness we may perhaps end up with very metaphysical, almost ‘barbaric’ hypotheses about multiple souls and anamnesis.

In sum, transcendental philosophy is haunted by the Scylla and Charybdis of ground and goal. They are like two metaphysical tendencies pulling apperception apart, and in a sense pulling the subject apart. While critical philosophy teaches that metaphysics generates illusions, the very means by which

111 See Appendix IV, related to the next chapter, on the syntheses of habit and memory in Deleuze.
it teaches this lesson itself must rely on a metaphysics. Is there a way out of this circle?
Chapter Six

Quid Facti and Quid Juris: Deleuze

1 The Doctrine of the Faculties

Deleuze's small monograph Kant's Critical Philosophy is on the whole little discussed. The book has a very specific function, both as a reading of Kant and as part of Deleuze's early explorations. Essentially, the book's task is to explore not the three Critiques themselves but the relations between them, and by implication the metacritical status of the critical project as a whole. It does this through the analysis of one continuous strand that runs through all three Critiques: the organisation of the faculties. The difficulty of the book lies in its foregrounding of this neglected doctrine as the key to the critical project. Traditionally, the doctrine of the faculties has not fared well in Kant scholarship, being adduced to a general confusion in Kant's mind of the question de jure of the necessary conditions of experience with the further need for an account of how the mind carries out its syntheses and synopses in terms of the processes responsible for them. Strawson calls the doctrine of the faculties an essay in the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology ... [which] is exposed to the ad hominem objection that we can claim no empirical knowledge of its truth; for this would be to claim empirical knowledge of the occurrence of that which is held to be the antecedent condition of empirical knowledge.

Thus the doctrine also involves a metacritical confusion on Kant's part between the transcendental and the empirical. Related to this criticism is the fact that the

faculties seem to be brute ‘givens’ in the transcendental project, and thus are insufficiently justified. But some critics have defended the faculties. A brief discussion of Dieter Henrich’s approaches to the topic may be useful to orientate ourselves; I will show how Henrich’s and Deleuze’s approaches have much in common at various points, but that Deleuze develops an option that was discarded by Henrich.

In his 1955 article ‘The Unity of Subjectivity’, Henrich argues that Kant’s insistence on the plurality of faculties is polemically directed towards earlier rationalist notions that the faculties could be reduced to one “basic power” (in Wolff’s case a vis representativa on a Leibnizian model). Henrich brings out the problematic character of Kant’s suggestion of “common root” to understanding and sensibility (A15/B29). He points out that “sensibility and understanding are different in their phenomenal presentation and an identity of the two, no matter how hidden, cannot be assumed. ... An understanding that should have access to the problematic common root would have to think nondiscursively”. Kant’s insistence on the problematicity of intellectual intuition, as some postulated unity of the two, thus necessitates the retention of what could be called the ‘real distinction’ of the faculties. Henrich then claims that “the unity of subjectivity, in Kant’s final construction of it, is conceived as teleological”. However, Henrich blocks the development of his suggestion of the “intrasubjective teleology” of the faculties, by insisting that faculties are known only through their effects. He describes the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories as starting from a treatment of apperception in a “logical analysis of knowledge”, which must describe the involvement in knowledge of other conditions (imagination, sensibility, etc.), “which have to be presupposed, but remain inaccessible in their

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3 Dieter Henrich, ‘The Unity of Subjectivity’, in *The Unity of Reason*, 22f. Henrich quotes CJ: “It is quite easy to establish, and has in fact been realised for some time, that this attempt to bring unity into that diversity of faculties, though otherwise undertaken in the genuine philosophical spirit, is futile” (CJ 394).
4 ibid, 30.
5 ibid, 33.
6 ibid, 31.
7 “What we know of them are always empirical derivations, such as attention or reproduction for imagination or the ‘affection of the empirical sense’ through objects ‘as appearances’ for sensibility. The transcendental cognitive functions are already presupposed in each cognition, including that of the empirical realisation of knowledge”, ibid, 36.
Kant thus accepts a “methodological skepticism towards the Subjective Deduction”. Imagination should be seen as “merely the term for the unity of ‘activities’ required ... to render intelligible the actuality of knowledge” (ibid).

But from the Deleuzian point of view we have developed so far, Henrich’s argument fails to follow through the suggestion of “intrasubjective teleology” to the metacritical level. Firstly, Henrich supposes the faculties can be treated only in terms of their effects; as has been suggested, Deleuze claims that a transcendental account of the faculties is possible: what he calls ‘transcendental empiricism’. Secondly, and perhaps crucially, Henrich presupposes the “actuality of knowledge”, despite having suggested that the unity of subjectivity could only be accounted for teleologically. For if “the unification of the sources [of knowledge] is predelineated in their structure – a structure through which alone knowledge can be what it is”\(^8\), then surely ‘knowledge’ itself, rather than being presupposed as miraculously actual, is already being opened up in principle to an interrogation concerning its teleology. Henrich’s “intrasubjective teleology” must be determined further; it cannot simply rely on a providential harmony. As we have already glimpsed, the wider structure of CPR, as a treatise on the vocation of man, is always implicitly posing this question: what is knowledge for, what is the value of knowledge, in the service of which problems is knowledge being placed? Through an analysis of Deleuze’s work, we can perhaps show how the teleological question of knowledge can be seen as possessing a certain priority over regressive transcendental accounts of the possibility of knowledge.

Henrich’s insistence in his later work on the presupposition of ‘facts of reason’ can be seen as an intensification of concern with the givenness involved in the notion of faculty. He no longer focuses on faculties as such, but is still

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\(^8\) Ibid, 37.
\(^9\) Ibid, 39.
\(^10\) Henrich claims that while imagination has “merely subjective significance”, sensibility and understanding are “sources of objective contents of knowledge”. They “contribute to every instance of knowledge of a specific content, whereas imagination has to be presupposed only for the coming about of knowledge” (38-9). But such a view cannot be true. No sensible intuition could have form or meaning without the syntheses of the imagination and its schematic processes. Henrich’s application of the term ‘objective’ to sensibility, outside of the account of ‘relation to Objecte’, is un-Kantian, and presupposes what I would call a ‘materialist presupposition’ (see chapter 2 above, note 113) about the appropriateness of adequately determining Gegenstände through sensibility. But surely for Kant, as an ex-Leibnizian, both sensibility and the imagination could be equally inadequate ways of comprehending Gegenstände (despite being demonstrated as adequate for Objecte).

\(^11\) Ibid, 33.
insistent that the post-Kantians’ turn to intellectual intuition cannot overcome the need for a finite being to presuppose something as given outside of its own self-constitution.12 Henrich’s notion of a synthetic apriori capacity for self-consciousness has already been criticised, but in this context we should note that the proliferation of such ‘facts of reason’ can be seen as an objection in itself in a supposedly ‘critical’ philosophy. Deleuze’s book attempts to address precisely this issue. In an apparently hitherto neglected article, the Kant scholar Ralf Meerbote praises the ambition of Deleuze’s book, arguing that “a transcendental, non-empirical characterisation both of the faculties and of pertinent relations [between them] needs to be given” in part because of the aforementioned recurring problem of facts of reason. He claims that “Deleuze takes considerable steps towards providing some such all-encompassing interpretation of the whole of Kant’s Critical Philosophy”.13 Meerbote then argues that teleology will come to ground such a transcendental interpretation if reflection (understood in the specifically Kantian sense in which reflection is reflective judgment, typified by, among other things, judgments about the teleological structure of actions and faculties) can be interpreted to be identical, in part, or in its entirety to what Kant conceives pure apperception to be. (ibid.)

Pure apperception, he says, would then be considered “wholly originary, self-legislative and self-determining”. But the problem with Meerbote’s interpretation is that Deleuze actually gives a shockingly slight role to apperception and to the Transcendental Deduction in general. Meerbote seems to take Deleuze’s omission of a serious discussion of apperception as a sign of its uncontroversial ubiquity in his account. Thus he reads Deleuze as providing an interesting ‘internal’ approach to the role of apperception in the Kantian system through correlating apperception with teleological reflection. But this, unfortunately perhaps, is not what is going

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12 Henrich’s general argument here is associated with his famous criticism of the ‘reflection theory’ of self-consciousness, which was encountered in chapter 5.4 ii. In his essay ‘The Concept of Moral Insight and Kant’s Doctrine of the Fact of Reason’ (in The Unity of Reason, chapter 2.) Henrich argues that the rationality of the practical agent cannot be grounded in any further transcendental reflection, but must be presupposed as a brute fact, from which conditions of possibility may then be derived. As was shown in the last chapter, his argument in Identity and Objectivity finally turns on the necessity for a Cartesian capacity of apperception which must be presupposed as given in order for the Transcendental Deduction to work. There Henrich’s aim is to confute the Strawsonian Idea of a Deduction as an analysis of the ‘concept’ of experience, such an analysis being open to skeptical objections as to its meaning and its necessity. Henrich suggests that the presupposition of a judgmental capacity or faculty for self-consciousness as the basis for the function of the understanding, a capacity which is indubitable for any thinking subject, moves towards bypassing skeptical objections on this front.
on in the text. What Deleuze is really concerned with is a systematic unity of the faculties as by itself providing the clue to the grounding of critique. But why doesn’t Deleuze follow the approach that Meerbote so clearly sees in his work?

This is a complicated issue. Deleuze seems to have two approaches to Kant which he does not explicitly square up, but which are both fundamental for his project; the first occurs in *Kant’s Critical Philosophy* and DR, the second in DR only. They can be read as internal critiques of the A- and B-Deductions in turn. This chapter will be divided into a reading of the essential elements of both. The first approach involves extending the logic of the Subjective Deduction to an account of the mutual relation of the faculties, the result of which, I would argue, if connected with the reflections on self-critique undertaken so far, brings to light one of the unspelled out destinations of Kant’s critical project as he envisaged it in the first edition CPR and in CJ. However, we will find that Deleuze’s transformation of the Subjective Deduction takes a perilous route, through a controversial reading of the Deduction, then into the wider question of what distinguishes Kantian ‘transcendence’ from a Humean account of knowledge, and finally towards the question of teleology.

The second approach pays attention to the renewed analysis Kant devoted to inner and outer sense in the B-deduction and claims that the argument of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason intrudes upon the claims made for apperception in the Deduction; in Deleuze’s later language, Kant’s “paradox” of inner sense, when understood truly, shows us an ‘I think’ “fractured” by the “pure form of time”. This line of argument, I contend, should be placed into the context of Kant’s general claims about ‘determinability’ and will be related back to the formal, ontological and metacritical claims developed in chapters 2 and 4. I suggest this is the destiny of the Objective Deduction in the Deleuzian project.

However, the relation of these two approaches is also complex. For, having pushed the weight of the Kantian project onto teleology in the first approach, Deleuze precisely takes away the notion of an ultimate ‘final ground’ in the second approach. Nevertheless, I think these two approaches do precisely converge at the zenith of Deleuze’s system, potentially revealing not only a consistently metacritical unity, but also, finally, a consistent twofold sense to the

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notion of immanence, which has so far been fragmented into distinct formal, ontological and metacritical components.

2 Deleuze and the Teleological Ground of Critique

To begin with, I will focus on the first approach, namely, Deleuze’s demonstration that the context of the notion of apperception in the Subjective Deduction is to be interpreted in terms of a teleology. Deleuze attempts to show that the Subjective Deduction’s aim to prove the objective reality of the categories invokes instead a Leibnizian echo of a ‘harmony’ between the transcendental subject and the sensible world. We should note that the opposite is at stake to what Meerbote claims: it is apperception that ultimately depends on a metaphysical account of teleology rather than teleology being grounded in a widened account of apperception. Deleuze announces the peculiar slant of his interpretation in the following sentence:

The fundamental idea of what Kant calls his ‘Copernican Revolution’ is the following: substituting the principle of a necessary submission of object to subject for the idea of a harmony between subject and object (final accord).\(^1\)

The Copernican Revolution is interpreted as the transformation of the Leibnizian (and early Kantian) problem of harmony. Deleuze’s presentation of the issue may be seen as an unusual prioritisation of Leibniz, considering the Copernican turn is often seen to be directed against rationalist accounts of what is by right available to the intellect, as much as empiricist theories of derivation of objective knowledge from sense impressions. But we have already seen how the problem of the synthetic apriori can profitably be seen to ‘name’ a problem that haunts both rationalists and empiricists alike and that perhaps the most helpful way to read Kant’s early writings and their culmination in the 1772 letter to Herz is in terms of a transformation of Leibnizianism. At the end of his discussion of CPR, Deleuze goes on strikingly to put the issue of the possibility of knowledge into the important wider teleological context, crystallising some of the claims made so far:

It is ... necessary not only that phenomena should be subject to the categories from the point of view of form, but also that their content correspond to, or symbolise, the Ideas of reason. At this level a harmony, a finality, is reintroduced. But here it is clear that the harmony between the content of phenomena and the Ideas of reason is simply postulated. It is not, indeed, a question of saying that

\(^{14}\) Kant’s Critical Philosophy. 14.
reason legislates over the content of phenomena. It must presuppose a systematic unity of Nature; it must pose this unity as a problem or a limit, and base all its moves on the idea of this limit at infinity.15

Deleuze on the A-Deduction

With the analysis of any reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, it is vital to observe where the emphases are placed, because the strength and character of the objectivity claim can vary enormously. Immediately following the first quotation above from the Kant book (14) on the submission of the object to the subject, Deleuze raises the issue of why Kantian idealism is not a subjective idealism. He emphasises that we are affected by phenomena, that they are not products of our activity, and then asks how they can then be subject to us. His answer is neither to phenomenalise Kant, nor to adopt something like Allison’s approach and to say that transcendental idealism is a second order discourse and therefore has no bearing on the empirical reality of phenomena. Rather, he simply says “In Kant, the problem of the relation of subject to object tends to be internalised; it becomes the problem of a relation between subjective faculties that differ in nature (receptive sensibility and active understanding)” (ibid). However, such an approach would indicate that Deleuze is approaching the whole question of objective knowledge simply in terms of the Subjective Deduction. Thus the context of the Objective Deduction, with its apprehension of the Gegenstand would be lost. But Deleuze sells his overall position short with this account in the Kant monograph. As we have found already, Deleuze does have a ‘Objective’ account of the de jure limits of conceptual representation and intuition (as well as an interesting approach to the problem of noumena). As suggested, I will be focussing on the ‘Objective Deduction’ in the last part of this chapter, reversing Kant’s order in CPR.

Deleuze’s main description of the deduction is extremely brief. If this brevity can be defended at all, it can only be on good grounds, to be given, for claiming that the true focus for the role and account of the deduction itself lies elsewhere. Deleuze’s description of the main moves of the deduction goes against much other Kant scholarship through its insistence on sticking to the account of synthesis in the first edition, where it is described purely in terms of the processes of apprehension and reproduction. These latter are the “two aspects” of synthesis

15 Ibid. 20.
governed by the imagination. Synthesis is the minimal relating of a sensible
diversity together in one representation and across time. Given the relative
autonomy of this account of the imagination, Deleuze then asks the question
whether “synthesis is sufficient to constitute knowledge?” He says that in fact
“knowledge implies two things which go beyond synthesis itself” (ibid). These
two things are the belonging of representations to a single consciousness, and on
the other hand the relation of knowledge to an object. In this case, the role of what
Kant calls the synthesis of recognition is not after all a synthesis, but “the act by
which the represented manifold is related to an object”. This act of apperception
has an “expression”, “a formal objectivation” – the form of an object in general,
the ‘object = x’. Deleuze goes on to define the categories as “representations of
the unity of consciousness and, as such, predicates of an object in general”. He
concludes that it is not the understanding that synthesize, but rather it is
responsible for the unity of synthesis.

16 Ibid 15.
17 Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 16.
18 In fact there are some potential problems with this aspect of Deleuze’s interpretation of the ‘I
think’ in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, specifically concerning the kind of reciprocity that is
affirmed between apperception and objectivity. He says “the object in general is the correlate of
the ‘I think’ or of the unity of consciousness; it is the expression of the cogito, its formal
objectivation.” (16). By itself, this proposition opens itself to two readings, a standard one and a
more problematic one. The first reading would state simply that inasmuch as the ‘I think’ thinks
something it thinks an Object, through the pure concepts of the understanding. (As Kant says, “It is
the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and
therefore their objective validity and their becoming cognitions” (B137). On this specific notion of
the ‘objective unity of apperception’, cf. Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant’s Table of
Judgments, 28). This means that all an Object will be is the set of categorial relations – substance,
causality, etc. that synthesize representations in a single consciousness. However, Deleuze calls
Kant’s ‘I think’ a cogito, and says that the object is an expression of the cogito. Kant does indeed
refer to apperception as a cogito, but this is only in the Paralogisms, where he is explicitly
concerned with the ‘I think’ in itself, and not as a formal unifying function. Let us move to
Deleuze’s next, explanatory sentence; “Therefore the real (synthetic) formula of the cogito is. I
think myself and in thinking myself, I think the object in general to which I relate a represented
diversity”.

It seems clear that Deleuze is deriving the object = x directly from the act of self-
consciousness. He is not just saying that all my representations must be related to single
consciousness, or even that my representations must be related to a self-conscious subject. If we
turn back to Deleuze’s introduction of Kant’s account of apperception, we find it unfortunately
ambiguous: “Knowledge implies two things which go beyond synthesis itself: it implies
consciousness, or more precisely the belonging of representations to a single consciousness within
which they must be linked. Now, the synthesis of the imagination, taken in itself, is not at all self-
conscious” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 15). The first sentence says that knowledge is only
possible when representations are synthesize in a single consciousness (this is the thesis of a unity
of consciousness). The second sentence implies that this unity of consciousness requires self-
consciousness (thesis of a consciousness of unity). Deleuze seems to conflate the two theses. He is
saying that in the act of thinking myself I think the object to which I relate my representations, as
if the act of self-consciousness comes first. Now on a strong reading of transcendental
apperception such as Dieter Henrich’s in Identity and Objectivity. Kant is claimed to require a
Now, Deleuze distinguishes the task of the Transcendental Deduction as accounting for the *subjection* or legislation of phenomena by the understanding. He suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic contains no deduction, but only a transcendental exposition, precisely because phenomena are not *subject* to space and time, but are defined precisely by their role as spatiotemporal appearances. In pointing out the nonanalytic nature of what the Deduction has to prove, Deleuze now silently shifts attention to the second edition Deduction to which he devotes all of three sentences.20

Deleuze summarises the steps of the argument by alluding to the notion, most explicit in the B-Deduction, that space and time themselves need to be synthesised by the transcendental imagination, and so they themselves are therefore subject to the understanding, which produces the unity for this synthesis (cf. # 24f. of the B-Deduction).21 As it stands this is inadequate even as a summary, for two reasons. Firstly, Deleuze has not adequately shown how the understanding is necessary in the first place for synthesis, other than to assert that it is presupposed for knowledge. Why, in particular, should the synthesis of space Cartesian consciousness which is made possible by the categories. But even there the Cartesian self-identity is not substantial, requiring only a moderate experience of self-identity. Nevertheless we have seen that Henrich’s theory has been criticised for presupposing something indefensible and dogmatic. But Deleuze’s reading seems to be even more dogmatic. The object is an *expression* of self-consciousness. This implies a rather more substantial *cogito* than even Henrich admits. Now, Kant did hold something like the theory imputed to him by Deleuze, in the mid-1770’s. Thus in Reflection 4674, Kant claims, “The object can only be represented according to the relations of the subject, and is nothing but the subjective representation of subject itself, but generalised because I am the original of all objects” (quoted in W. Carl, ‘Kant’s First Drafts of a Deduction’, 16) My subjectivity itself is originally articulated through the interrelated forms of substance, causality and reciprocity. However, he abandoned this conception because it conflicted with the ban in the Paralogisms about what should be merely formal claims about the transcendental subject. As we have seen, nothing substantial about the subject, no *numerical identity* can be presumed.

If Deleuze is identifying apperception with a substantial *cogito*, then it follows from this that apperception will be in conflict with the argument of the Paralogisms against the identity of the subject. But is this a misreading of Kant in his critical period? If it can be shown that some aspect of the Kantian ‘I think’ does indeed contain some dubious claim to substantiality, then Deleuze’s apparent misreading may be vindicated. Now Deleuze in fact will claim in DR that Kant’s arguments about the ‘paradox of inner sense’ and the impossibility of knowledge of God themselves serve to *fracture* Kant’s notion of an integral ‘I think’. However, discussion of this development must be postponed until section 3 below.

19 This obviously conflicts with my reading in chapter 5.1 of the retrospective nature of the Deduction in the Aesthetic. However, I will suggest below (cf. footnote 23) that Deleuze’s position on the Aesthetic in the Kant book should be seen in the context of his overall strategy.

20 I shall outline his approach here not only to highlight its inadequacy but also to show how it plays no significant role in Deleuze’s main argument. My account in this chapter as a whole can be seen as a reconstruction of what Deleuze should be saying. He does not need to appeal to the B-Deduction at this point.
and time in general require a unity proper to the understanding? While Deleuze does explicitly question why the spatiotemporal synthesis should be subject to the understanding, it often seems like the logic of subjection is doing by itself the work that apperception should be doing. The problem is that by stripping apperception of its synthetic nature and giving that entirely to the imagination he seems to deprive apperception of any of its dynamic properties. Apperception is surely a unifying as well as the mere form of unity. 22

Secondly, Deleuze misses out the crucial premise that for Kant space and time themselves must be unities. Now, we saw in chapter 4.2 that Deleuze’s account of space and time in DR emphasises precisely the opposite. They are shown to be internally and intensively differentiated; their unity would only be an extensive, external representation of their own deeper structure. This would block the necessity of attributing unity to space and time, which is the essential step in the second half of the B-deduction – ie. the necessary connection of the singularity of space with the unity of consciousness. 23

So what, if anything, is doing the work in Deleuze’s version of the Deduction? The answer is complex, especially if we attempt to explain it in the context of Deleuze’s other writings. It involves a return to the question of the nature of Kant’s advance beyond Hume. Deleuze sets up a resonance between his two studies of Kant and Hume, whereby the status of the Copernican turn is implicitly put in question by finding moves in Hume that would be more traditionally associated with Kant. Two essential issues are broached. Firstly, the

21 Cf. Allison’s reconstruction of the ‘second part’ of the B-deduction in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 158-172.

22 Nevertheless, it could be pointed out that in the first edition, Kant does not refer so much to a “synthetic unity of apperception” as to an “original unity of apperception”, which is augmented in experience by the imaginative apparatus for synthesis. The advantage of Deleuze’s interpretation would be that it clears up the ambiguity about the role of the imagination in the two editions of the deduction. By giving apprehension and reproduction all the powers of synthesis he would also be potentially shedding light (paradoxically, as obviously the two versions of the Deduction weren’t meant to appear together) on the recourse to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in the B-deduction as the source of the necessary synthesis of space and time themselves. However, such a move remains undeveloped by Deleuze. Furthermore, see Appendix IV on his actual reading of the pre-conceptual syntheses.

23 One could suggest that Deleuze is quietly setting up the possibility of his own account of the schematism of Ideas in an internally differentiated spatio-temporal manifold, but he would need to criticise Kant’s own account much more successfully for us to recognise the necessity of this development. It is significant that Deleuze does not really address space and time in Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Deleuze’s later interpretation of Kant on space and time has to be seen as illuminating this omission in his own earlier rendering of the deduction. Again, one feels strongly that these issues would have benefitted from a much more extensive and careful analysis from Deleuze.
status of knowledge in Kant will be put in question through a reading of the question of apriori synthesis back into Hume. Secondly, it will ultimately follow that according to Deleuze the difference between Kant and Hume (and the ultimate grounds for the distinction between the transcendental and empirical) will be shifted onto the different ways in which they deal with teleology.

ii Quid Facti and Quid Juris in Kant and Hume

Deleuze says that for Kant “knowledge implies two things which go beyond synthesis itself: it implies consciousness, or more precisely the belonging of representations to a single consciousness within which they must be linked. Now, the synthesis of the imagination, taken in itself, is not at all self-conscious”.24 However, in what sense is it possible to take the synthesis of the imagination “in itself”? I argue now that Deleuze’s strategy will be to return to the roots of the question of what distinguishes knowledge from imagination. He sets up a basic distinction between what is given in experience and the act of “going beyond” the given. “The given cannot be the basis by which we go beyond the given”.25

In Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze discusses this going beyond explicitly in terms of ‘transcendence’.26 Our transcendence of the given is conditioned by the apriori structures of cognition that allow us to experience universal determinations, and can be justified de jure (whether they be ‘objects’, art works, or purposive elements in the environment). While this use of the term ‘transcendence’ disappears after Empiricism and Subjectivity, throughout his works Deleuze continues to draw our attention to the Kantian distinction between questions of fact and questions of right, the quid facti and quid juris: it is one of his abiding and crucial inheritances from Kant. Thus, while there may appear to be certain facts about minds in general, and moreover about the constitution of the

24 Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 15.
25 Ibid, 12. Note that the passage just quoted (15) also talks of ‘going beyond’ synthesis.
26 Cf. Hyppolite in Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: In Kant, “the common consciousness goes beyond itself; it transcends itself and becomes transcendental consciousness. But the movement of transcending itself, of going beyond itself, is typical of consciousness as such” (16). The framing of Kantianism in terms of transcendence is a staple of twentieth century French philosophy, deriving from Sartre, and then from Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Heidegger suggests that “transcendental knowledge ... concerns the stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the being ... With the problem of transcendence, a ‘theory of knowledge’ is not set in place of metaphysics, but rather the inner possibility of ontology is questioned”, 10, 11).
elements of the human mind, the critical weight of Kant’s transcendental project lies with its justification of these facts and with our right to claim that they give rise to true articulations in our knowledge and thought. 27

Now we might expect Deleuze to admit that Kant’s advance on Hume is precisely in his complete distinction between the rule-governed activity of the understanding and the passive receptivity of the sensibility, which allows him to posit the immediate necessity of ‘going beyond’ the given in a way Hume cannot do, because of his reliance on the notion that ideas are derived from sense impressions. Hume’s inability to pose clearly the question *quid juris* would in effect imply that his treatment of the question *quid facti* would itself have to deflate any claims about what appears to be the ‘fact’ of transcendence. However, against prevailing wisdom that Hume’s philosophy is either naturalism or skepticism, Deleuze reads Kantian concerns back into Hume. For Hume too, there is indeed a distinct *fact of knowledge*. “*Quid facti?* What is the fact of knowledge? It is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my judgment goes beyond the idea [in Hume’s sense]. In other words, *I am a subject*. 28

Deleuze, repeating in *Kant’s Critical Philosophy* the thesis of *Empiricism and Subjectivity* from ten years previously, claims that Hume too constructs principles that allow for the possibility of going beyond the given. For Hume ‘experience’ means *past* experience – the synthesis of past impressions with present ones according to sensibility and imagination. However, the principles for ordering past experiences are not derived from the given. Association according to rules of resemblance, contiguity, and causality are not derived from sensibility or imagination; nothing in these latter two faculties will tell us how association works. Hume’s principles too have the status of rules for the ordering of the manifold given by sensibility and imagination; hence the distinction between Kant and Hume is not to be found in the question of ‘derivation’; both adhere to a fact of ‘transcendence’. 29

On this reading, both Kant and Hume agree that there are certain matters of fact concerning our ability to apprehend and associate representations, which

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27 As already suggested in chapter 5.1. Kant’s notion of the *quaestio facti* is ambiguous. This will prove to be important shortly.
28 *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. 28.
go beyond the given, considered as mere sensible data. However, such ‘facts’ still do not give us the right to affirm anything about objective reality. Deleuze then goes on to say that the quid juris is a problem for both Kant and Hume. They both ask the question: how does nature conform to our principles? Why should certain principles, whether Humean or Kantian, be allowed to transcend the given? Deleuze emphasises that for both Hume and Kant, the application of the principles is only conditional upon there being some available justification for objectivity in experience.

It is not, however, sufficient that we have principles, we must have the opportunity to exercise them. I say: ‘The sun will rise tomorrow’, but tomorrow will not become present without the sun actually rising. We would quickly lose the opportunity to exercise our principles if experience did not itself come to confirm and, as it were, give substance to our going beyond. The given of experience must therefore itself be subject to principles of the same kind as the subjective principles which govern our own moves. Deleuze identifies the claim of this paragraph, which he is attributing to Hume, with the claim of the famous paragraph in CPR which imagines “if cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black ... my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar” (A100-1). So here Kant and Hume are seen to be pursuing the same path of justification: there is something (a third thing) that gives us the opportunity to associate. Principles or concepts are not imposed upon the given, rather it can be shown that something in the given requires them. Now, as was mentioned in

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29 M. Bell's 'Transcendental Empiricism: Deleuze's Answer to Hume?' (delivered at Middlesex University, January 2001) gives an account of the sense in which Hume's notion of subjectivity goes beyond Kant's allegation that its structure is a product of derivation from sense experience.

30 Kant's Critical Philosophy. 12; italics mine.

31 Kant can be understood to be responding in this passage to Hume's query "is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all trees will flourish in December?", Enquiry, 36. However, A100 itself rests on an inadequate claim against Hume's association thesis. Reference to A113 on 'transcendental affinity' does not help either. Guyer and Allison both find fundamental flaws in the A100 passage and its related claims. Guyer argues that Kant only establishes the conditional necessity that "if I am to know an object, then there had better in fact be some regularity among the representations of it which I can experience", but not the stronger claim that "if I am to experience an object, then I must be aware of a necessary regularity among the representations of it" (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 121-4). Thus he holds Kant to have introduced a modal fallacy, where he confuses the necessity of a conditional with the necessity of its antecedent, and thus illicitly infers the necessity of its consequent. "Thus from the premise that if it is contingent that the data of intuition are orderly, it is also contingent that we can reproduce them, he concludes that it is in fact necessary that they are orderly" (ibid). But Kant has only shown a conditional necessity, not any absolute necessity that such a reproduction must take place. What then are we left with? A conditional reading of the transcendental argument in CPR. If there is objectivity in nature, then a subject must be responsible for synthesising it. This would in effect
chapter 2.1, Deleuze points out that in Hume’s *Enquiry* we find an hypothesis of finality grounding the conditional structure of objectivity.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected. 32

Deleuze claims that Hume’s remarks about pre-established harmony in the *Enquiry* are intended as a serious solution to the problem of what the *something* is, of what the ground for the objectivity of the principles is (the ‘third thing’ again). This thesis is clearly controversial, as such an appeal to pre-established harmony is absent from the *Treatise*, and in the *Essay* seems merely to refer to another *fact*: that as a matter of fact nature has so endowed us to be able to draw order from it, by means of custom. But in fact, by taking seriously Hume’s remark about teleology, Deleuze is really expressing agreement with the Kantian point that although custom may “effect” the correspondence, it is not enough to ground objectivity claims; and therefore Hume in this case would be quite right to look for something else to provide this ground.

However, Deleuze follows this controversial Kantian reading of Hume with another equally controversial claim about Kant. One of Kant’s original moves over the preceding tradition can be taken to be precisely his attempt to circumvent the need for an ‘external’ hypothesis (eg. about finality) about the ‘third thing’ that grounds correspondence. Kant is usually taken to argue that what guarantees the correspondence between our concepts and nature is the principle of the possibility of experience; this would be the truth behind the *something* that is sought as the truth of transcendence, the transcendental object = x. But Deleuze claims that the burden of proof for the *quid juris* in Kant also rests on an appeal to principles of harmony, especially in CJ, in the special sense of a harmony of the faculties. The predominant strategy in Deleuze’s book on Kant is to push Kant towards a reliance on teleology on the question of objective reality.

However, the ground has been prepared in preceding chapters for this move. The coherence of experience itself must depend on a teleological structure that is set up in the background of CPR. The *apriori* synthesis made possible by
the pure concepts, which only functions in relation to empirical cognition and empirical concept use, must be related to association at one extreme, and to Ideas at the other. Association provides the intension of the concept, while its status as a whole is referred to the projective schema of an Idea. It was also claimed that the notion of apperception itself, when developed for itself, tends too to point in this direction.

32 Hume, Enquiries, 54-5.
33 Note on the Subordination of Concepts in Deleuze. More can be said here about Deleuze’s relegation of concepts. Such a relegation would seem most perplexing if the task is indeed to pinpoint what it is that allows us to transcend the given, as concepts seem to be the most likely candidate. However, in chapter 3 we began to see that Deleuze envisages that a synthetic account of the relation between Ideas and intensities would be able to transform Kant’s account of the relation between concepts and intuitions; while in chapter 4 we found in Kant himself the concept being pulled apart in the direction of the extremes of Idea and intuition. “It is only under these conditions”, says Deleuze, “that we can penetrate the mystery of the division of the concept” (‘Méthode de Dramatisation’, 101) Deleuze suggests that the division and specification of concepts cannot be adequately understood on the Kantian model, but that Kant does provide the means of solving this problem with the schematism. However, although the “schema is indeed a rule of determination for time and construction for space ... it is conceived and put to work in relation to concepts understood in terms of logical possibility: this is so much part of its nature that it does no more than convert logical possibility into transcendental possibility” (DR 218/281). The principle of this conversion is obscure, and, echoing Hegel, Deleuze draws attention to the “externality” of concept and intuition to each other in the schematism. Deleuze instead contends that “a concept alone is completely incapable of specifying or dividing itself; the agents of differentiation are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath it, like a hidden art” (ibid, cf. ‘Méthode’, 95-6) And, crucially, Deleuze claims that if spatiotemporal dynamism remains “external to concepts ... it is internal to Ideas” (DR 218/281). The self-differentiation of an Idea in space and time according to intensive relations, then, occurs according to repetition, not conceptual identity. Its “constitution” as such will work at an entirely different level to the concepts that are used to understand its status once constituted. “There is nothing that does not lose its identity as this is constituted by concepts, and its similarity as this is constituted in representation, when the dynamic space and time of its actual constitution is discovered” (ibid).

But if this is the fate of the Kantian concept, then surely this and everything we found in the last chapter must lead to the rethinking of the nature, role and importance of conceptual determination. Now, in effect, Deleuze suggests that Hume’s account of determination is more suited to the above situation. Hume does not envisage determination according to the form of judgment, in which predicates are said to be unified by a subject-concept. Nor does he conceive concepts as generalities in the same way as Kant. Instead, complex ideas are composed of relations between distinct terms that remain external to those terms (Empiricism and Subjectivity, 66). If a resemblance is noted between two particulars, it does not “belong” to those particulars, but exists only insofar as the relation is inferred by a subject. In this way, Deleuze says, Hume liberates determination from the “is” of predication. The ‘is’ simply sanctifies the function of judgment in reidentifying particulars according to generality. But on Hume’s model, resemblance, contiguity and causality form “passages” between ideas and exist only “intensively”, in the sense that if the particular relation was altered in any way, it would change in nature. If the relation was broken into parts, it would no longer be the same relation; it is crucially independent of the terms themselves. (In an article on Hume from the seventies, Deleuze asserts that the world of empiricism is a “world of exteriority, a world where thought is in a fundamental relation with the Outside, a world where there are terms which are veritable atoms, and relations which are veritable external passages – a world where the conjunction “and” dethrones the interiority of the verb “is”. Deleuze, ‘Hume’. in F. Chatelet ed, Histoire de la Philosophie, Vol. 4 (Hachette. 1972) p. 67; cf. the reference to the logic of relations in Dialogues, 15).

So despite Hume’s account of concept formation involving “abstraction”, in a sense it involves less abstraction than the Kantian account of concepts must ultimately demand, because
We therefore need to take account of these dimensions in order to ground the question *quid juris*. Such a move has widespread implications. If the question of the validity of the *quid juris* must be postponed until its teleological validity is secured, this also implies that the *quid facti* too should be reconfigured in the light of this. For, on the one hand, the intimacy of the relation between the *quid facti* and *quid juris* in the second-edition CPR depends on the primacy of apperception; if this primacy must be criticised and qualified, then the possibility seems to open up of separate accounts for the *quid facti* of transcendence and the *quid juris* of the justification of transcendence. But isn’t this, on the other hand, what we find already in the first-edition CPR, where the account of the *quid facti* via the syntheses of imagination in the Subjective Deduction is more explicitly independent and is precisely finally subject to a projected teleological resolution of the *quid juris*? But then, we conclude, the situation with Kant appears, in either case, not to be much different from the situation with Hume. I suggest this homology between Kant and Hume at this point in order now to open the field for Deleuze’s radical development of the questions *quid facti* and *quid juris*; I will return to it at the start of the next section.

In fact, as was shown in chapter 5.1, there are two senses to the *quid facti* in Kant.\(^{34}\) I claim now that the appreciation of Deleuze’s account depends on grasping his precise approach to the *quaestio facti*. Deleuze’s approach to the Subjective Deduction goes in two directions at this point. Firstly, he attempts to construct an independent revision of the “threefold synthesis” which underpins Kant’s A-Deduction (CPR A99f.). Deleuze’s inclination towards Hume (and Bergson) allows him to take Kant’s first two syntheses in the direction of a

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34 In the first edition, the fact of the possession of certain *apriori* cognitions had a metaphysical resonance. We possess different kinds of access to *Gegenstände*, which are not assured until their competing claims are resolved by right. Only in the second edition CPR does Kant change the sense of the *quid facti*, so that it signifies possession of particular facts (such as facts of geometry or science).
twofold passive synthesis of habit and memory. However, if this reconstruction of the A-Deduction was merely psychological, it would concern empirical facti in the second sense. And such an approach has in fact been the Achilles heel of readings of Subjective Deduction. But it is clear that Deleuze is aware of this as he strongly criticises the psychological aspects of Kant's deduction. Therefore a second aspect of Deleuze's account of the syntheses of time must be brought forward. Deleuze grounds the temporal syntheses in an ideal genesis of the constitution of "repetition for itself" (DR 71/97). His account of elementary nonconceptual syntheses (with habit and memory replacing imagination), will proceed by unfolding the core notion of repetition for finite minds. In effect, Deleuze here is returning to the first sense of the quid facti in Kant. I would moreover claim that this move is better justified than Kant's analogous metaphysical facti. In the first edition CPR, the quaestio facti concerns the elements that are taken to be "in our possession", whose relation is then justified first of all in the Objective Deduction, and then, in their actuality, in the Subjective Deduction. But we have seen in chapter 4 that Deleuze conducts a preliminary account of the limits and relations of Ideas, concepts and intensities around the theme of a critique of representation. On this basis, Deleuze will ideally generate the notion of finite synthesis from the notion of repetition. Therefore the quid facti becomes solely related to a kind of Objective Deduction. Reversing Kant, Deleuze separates the general factum of 'transcendence' from its subjective aspects; the account of synthesis will be Objective.

But on the other hand, the problem of the quid juris remains at the teleological level. As we have seen, the weight of the Subjective Deduction has been placed on teleology. Deleuze therefore has two more tasks. Firstly, to proceed with the quid juris at the teleological level; this will be enacted through an account of the relation of the faculties. But secondly, he must finally relate the formal (Objective) claims about repetition with the subjective claims about the faculties. The latter, as the location of the quid juris, must ground the former, but

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35 "It is clear that [in the A-Deduction] Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological consciousness: the transcendental synthesis of apprehension is directly induced from an empirical apprehension, and so on. In order to hide this all too obvious procedure, Kant suppressed this text in the second edition. Although it is better hidden, the tracing method, with all its 'psychologism', nevertheless subsists." (DR 135/176-77).
the structure of repetition must itself demonstrate a teleological movement that provides the *form* for the posing and resolution of the *quid juris*.

I give a full account of the first two ‘syntheses of time’, habit and memory, in Appendix IV. The ‘third synthesis’ of repetition will be the important one for my argument here, as it will provide the ground for the first two. At the end of this chapter I follow through Deleuze’s final moves concerning the grounding of repetition for itself. But what I want to show now is how Deleuze’s notion of transcendental empiricism provides a completion of the moves so far undertaken concerning the Subjective Deduction. Only when this is complete will the hidden ground connecting Objective and Subjective accounts be able to be located.

iii Transcendental Empiricism

The question of the distinction and relation of Kant’s and Hume’s philosophies to each other has been left in the air. What, finally, allows Kant’s philosophy to remain distinct from Hume’s on the question of justification? What, in the current context, is for Deleuze the ground of the distinction between empiricism and transcendental philosophy?

A textual anomaly between *Kant's Critical Philosophy* and *Empiricism and Subjectivity* may help here. We saw earlier that in the former the problem of the ‘cinnabar’ passage in CPR was *identified* with Hume’s problem that association requires an “opportunity” from nature in order to associate. But in Deleuze’s Hume study, the same passage is quoted at length not in support of an identity between Kant and Hume, but in support of Kant’s *critique* of Hume. If we turn to this passage, the difference between the two philosophers becomes clear: it concerns the nature of idealism.

Let us suppose the given is not *initially* subject to principles of the same kind as those that regulate the connection of representations in the case of an empirical subject. In this case, the subject could never encounter *this* agreement, except in an absolutely accidental way. It would not even have the occasion to connect its representations according to the rules whose corresponding faculty it nevertheless possessed.36

In support of the last sentence Deleuze cites A113 where Kant appeals for a condition to ground “the thoroughgoing affinity of appearances, whereby they

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36 *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. 111.
stand and must stand under unchanging laws”. Kant, according to Deleuze, transforms the problem so that the question turns on what is necessary to form a Nature in general. “The given is not a thing in itself, but rather a set of phenomena, a set that can be presented as a nature only by means of an apriori synthesis”.37 As Deleuze amplifies in the Hume study, Hume’s principles operate according to a dualism between nature (in itself) and subjectivity, whereas Kant abolishes this dualism by phenomenalising the relation to objects.38

Deleuze names the “criterion of empiricism” as a dualism between relations and terms. This effectively displaces the ground for Kant’s distinction of his own method from empiricism. Kant claims that “although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience” (B1), referring to the thesis that empiricism involves a derivation of the structure of relations from the accumulation of sense data. So, for Kant, empiricism would seem to require the derivation of relations from things. But Deleuze in fact turns Kant’s requirement for a nonempiricist theory back on itself: “We will call ‘nonempiricist’ every theory according to which, in one way or another, relations are derived from the nature of things.”39 Deleuze thus here defines the Copernican turn in terms of the necessity of the internality of relations, as a result of its phenomenalisation of the given. “For Kant, relations depend on the nature of things in the sense that, as phenomena, things presuppose a synthesis whose source is the same as the source of relations.”40

Now, despite Deleuze’s apparent favour for empiricism, he in effect admits that the ‘objective validity’ of Hume’s account remains compromised by its dualism. All Hume can appeal to is a metaphysical teleology whereby the dualism finds its ‘third’ in an external purpose. Kant’s main advantage over Hume thus seems to lie in his treatment of phenomena in terms of transcendental

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38 It was suggested above (in footnote 31), that Kant’s claim in A113 is inadequate by itself. But Deleuze reads Kant’s advance as specifically involving the appeal to transcendental idealism. Thus I diverge from Martin Bell’s thesis in ‘Relations and Reversals: Deleuze. Hume and Kant’ (in A. Rehberg & R. Jones eds., The Matter of Critique), 198, that Kant can be said to affirm the internality of relations because of the “apriori nature of the mind”, or ‘the transcendental subject’ itself. I claim that it is specifically Kant’s transcendental idealism to which Deleuze is referring in this instance. Even though Deleuze will himself disagree in general with the main tenets of this doctrine, he has a general commitment to a philosophy of immanence, as distinguished from a Humean empirical idealism of ideas and things.
39 Empiricism and Subjectivity, 109.
40 Ibid, 111.
idealism. If the given becomes internal to the subject, then a critical teleology is possible. In CJ Kant attempts to provide a nonmetaphysical, nonexternal account of this teleology, revolving around the relations of the faculties themselves. Deleuze's move is to develop the notion of the relative autonomy of the faculties, which is only imperfectly attained in the first edition of the CPR, and is finally opened up in CPR and CJ. In so doing, I claim, the issue of the quid juris is decisively displaced onto the question of the use of the faculties according to internally justified ends.

In chapters 1 and 3 I have shown the sense in which Kant's critical project is defined first of all as a self-critique of reason. Once the account of apriori cognitions is limited to finite beings, all of Kant's project strains towards the question of purpose. Kant's question is: what are the ends of reason and how are they possible? These are the questions with which the CPR starts, and they are the questions which are continued throughout the critical project and finally set up in their most far reaching sense in the CJ. It follows from this that the question: 'how is experience possible?' is subordinated to this first set of questions. The wider problem is the mutual relation of the ends of any possible finite being, and the sense these mutually limited ends can have. Thus, if the question 'what can I know', is ultimately, like all questions, subject to the question 'What is man', the latter question really means 'What is man for', or what is the destiny of man?

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41 This move, and following discussion of it, should be seen in the light of the discussion in chapter 1.5.

42 It is worth recapping on the main thrust of my Kant interpretation here. In my view, the enduring problem that has dogged the reading of Kant is the abstraction of one critical problem from the whole project. Thus, in much Anglo-American literature, we find that Kant's problem is transformed into the problem of knowledge, while in the literature influenced by the Reinhold-Fichte tradition, the primacy of practical reason is asserted and detached from the dynamic of the ends - in the plural - of reason. With both of these abstractions, the full range of the critical project has been lost sight of, together with its metacritical dimension. One of my claims throughout has been that Kant's overarching aim has often been reversed: for the account of the limits of knowledge was intended to serve as a warning not to let knowledge take over from the interests of reason. All knowledge is always for the sake of... it must be seen from the perspective of its role in the finite situation in general.

However, we have seen that there are two discernible tendencies in Kant himself. The first is both metaphysical and metacritical, and provides the framework for the first edition CPR, while the second involves an epistemologising retreat, represented by the second edition. Thus the question of the possibility of knowledge can be subordinated to the first tendency, but can also become autonomous, if 'facts of reason' are given primacy and undergirded by regressive arguments. However, it has also been seen that Kant's whole project in the first edition CPR is newly distributed across CJ and the Opus Posthumum. The distinction between ideas, as problematic, and experience, as conceptual, remains absolutely central throughout the critical project, and is essential for the mutual limitation of apriori cognitions on which critique is based.
In CPR the faculties of sensibility and imagination functioned in their subjection to the understanding; the Subjective Deduction was conducted in the light of the end of knowledge. But in CJ, Kant finds in aesthetic judgment a sign of the free accord of the faculties. The question of the destination of cognition is opened up. In a sense, then, the ultimate conditions for the Subjective Deduction in CPR are found in CJ. There is no regressive argument in CJ, because Kant is asking about the conditions for the relations of all the faculties; hence the faculties become premises in a wider transcendental argument, their relation to each other being now at stake. The background for the claims of aesthetic and teleological judgment is no longer simply the limits of possible experience or cognition, but the mutual measurement of the faculties themselves. As we have seen, Kant himself affirms the transcendent exercise of a faculty in the case of the sublime: the imagination encounters its “vocation” in reason, at the same time as it realises it cannot itself do what reason can do. Deleuze wants to extend this principle to all of the faculties, so that the vocation of each faculty lies in its transcendent exercise, and in its mutual genetic relation to other faculties. But what can this mean but that each faculty has the capacity to encounter problems, which resist experiential cognition? The realm of problematic Ideas, therefore, will ultimately govern the form of the quid juris, and the procedure of critique itself (the mutual determination of apriori cognitions) will become identified for Deleuze with a

If the problem of CPR is indeed ‘how do we know anything?’ it can only answer this if the apparatus required for knowledge is related firstly to a general account of apriori cognitions and their relations, which, secondly, must be developed into a wider, metacritical framework of possible finite ends. At this point in the thesis we are still engaged in reconstructing these requirements. Nevertheless it has been shown that the system of human ends is put to a limited usage in knowledge. The idea that inspires us to know is eternally out-of-field for knowledge: we will never know this side of the object; what causes us to know is never known. Ideas are not categories, which only apply to the ideal subject of knowledge. Even in an act of knowledge, the subject seeks something that is beyond the template of unity. Insofar as the knower seeks, he is drawn by an idea, which he cannot unify.

Throughout this thesis, in sum, the central ground of CPR has been opened up in principle to confront its limits. ‘Knowledge’, then, both presupposes the idea in its empirical functioning as well as in its transcendental characterisation. If all of our experience can be seen in terms of partial empirical enquiries into the world, we have seen that Kant’s own model of the Copernican turn nonetheless appeals to the notion that “reason compels nature to answer its questions” (Preface to the Second Edition, CPR Bxiii). In the light of our analysis of Kant’s theory of concepts, this goes beyond a Popperian notion that hypotheses must be made prior to the acquisition of knowledge, but states that experience itself is oriented by problems. A concept is by nature general, so always refers, as Deleuze says, to a “set of objects” (DR 168/219), but this set can only have significance in terms of a problematic field. However, despite suggesting that knowing is preceded by asking nature questions, and therefore that empirical cognition will always be motivated by ideas, Kant continues to play down the corollary that knowledge does not simply involve descriptions of states
transcendental empiricism. In this sense, the validity of CJ is finally posed at a metacritical level. Moreover, the products of the faculties - knowledge, morality, art, theology and empirical teleology - are now all intrinsically ordered in relation to each other according to the criteria of systematicity and the metacritical teleology of faculties; a “final end” of the system of man is possible. 43

In this case, the Kantian correlation between the transcendental subject and the object = x is also transformed and widened. For Deleuze, “the transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its ... transcendent exercise” (DR 143/186), 44 the ‘transcendental subject’ should be defined by the ‘transcendent exercise’ of its faculties that allows it to sense or think through problematic Ideas. Now for Kant, the object = x, as the correlate of apperceptive thought, served to unify the passive and active faculties into a common Object, defined as a structure beyond what is given through the particular channels of the faculties. Kant attempted to ground this object = x by its relation to the knowing subject. In the second edition CPR, this tendency is accompanied by a new emphasis on the ‘I think’, as the correlate of the object = x. But Deleuze places these moves squarely back into the discourse of the faculties. “For Kant, as for Descartes, it is the identity of the Self in the ‘I think’ which grounds the harmony of all the faculties and their agreement on the form of a supposed Same object” (DR 133/174); the ‘I think’ organises the harmony of the faculties “under the form of a given common sense” (DR 137/179). Kant’s prioritisation of knowledge, from the current perspective (as a result of the obstacles encountered in chapter 5), finally amounts to nothing more than a ‘common sense’ use of the faculties, in which ‘thinking’ is limited to mere recognition, the use of established, common concepts. But if the object = x is to be identified with the problematic object, it is precisely the uncommon use of the faculties whose grounding is at issue. The mere generality of a concept, while serving to reidentify an object, may actually

of affairs, but concerns solutions. It has been shown that Deleuze’s interpretation brings out the inner logic of Kant’s position.

43 For Deleuze, the genetic relation occurs between sensibility, memory and thought. Unfortunately Deleuze’s reasoning here can be paradoxical to the point of opacity. He calls the relation between imagination and reason in the sublime a “discordant accord” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 51), in this way holding tenuously onto a principle of the harmony of the faculties. In DR, the transcendent exercise of the faculties is called a “final power”, in the sense that each faculty can “discover ... its own unique passion”, its own “transcendent object” (DR 143/186). But at the same time Deleuze insists that this “discord of the faculties” “presupposes neither affinity nor predestination” (DR 145/189).

44 Cf. the discussion above in chapter 1.5.
obscure the problematic nature of a thing, by leaving us without a means to think it. In defining the activity of the cognitive subject in terms of conceptual activity, Kant leaves obscure how the subject could ever think through a problem. (While common sense is of course essential for conceptual recognition, the issue is whether the object \( x \) and thought itself should be exclusively defined in terms of it, considering the other perspectives opened up so far.)

We can make our final moves by developing this transformation of the 'transcendental subject'. When Deleuze talks of sensations and memories that are outside of the structure of recognition, he is clearly flouting Kant's fundamental criterion of unity in experience:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me (B132).

But for Deleuze, some sensations resist conceptualisation because one does not have a concept for them. It is a confusion to say that that means they are nothing for me. Firstly, we should be clear that Kant cannot mean that representations must be able to be recognised as mine, in the sense that they belong to my "self". The point must rather be seen as a statement of a general idealism, in which the 'I think' is specified as a condition for all possible representation. The 'I think', in the second edition CPR, for Kant is the central form of the understanding, the central pivot of the pure concepts of the understanding; to the extent that sensibility and imagination are subordinated to it in knowledge, it dominates all representations as known. If a representation is brought under a concept, it must be conditioned by the 'I think'.

Deleuze's specific way of dealing with this is twofold. Firstly, even for Kant, the 'I think' does not by itself yield up a coherent relational experience, only a unified thought; for experience (knowledge) it must depend on imagination, etc. Now the transcendent exercise of the faculties clearly involves forms of cognition that are precisely not known; they are thought and sensed; it thus involves these other 'elements' of cognition. But that is not enough to justify their possibility, as Deleuze realises: Kant has still stipulated that they must conform to the 'I think' to have any significance. To overcome Kant's view it is essential to criticise his identification of thought with apperception under the aegis of knowledge. Kant is
in effect taking the unity of the ‘I think’ that grounds the understanding by itself (considered prior to its entry into the composite of experience) as the model for *all thought*. But Deleuze argues that there is more to thought than this. Thought is not *apriori* to be identified with the thought of an ‘I think’. Deleuze here takes up Kant’s own notion (encountered in chapter 5.4.i), that thinking is not an experience; he infers that thinking should therefore not be conceived on the model of experience.

Furthermore, we have seen in any case the consequences of granting apperception an autonomy as self-consciousness. Not only is it open to Henrich’s *aperia* about pre-reflexivity, but the ‘paradox of inner sense’ problematises its significance prior to all determinability, so that it ultimately has to be explained in terms of problematic Ideas. Now for Deleuze, in fact, this situation precisely reveals to us the true nature of thought – to think through problems or Ideas. Such thinking is not conditioned by the ‘I think’, because the ‘I think’ itself has turned out to be a form of the Idea according to which one orients one’s thought.

I suggest that we are now in the vicinity of a possible metacritical account of the *quid juris*. We have followed the account of the structure of the object in the A-Deduction to its ultimate grounding under the teleological horizon of knowledge. If the object = x is to be truly justified, then its universal status for all cognition must be demonstrated; its final ground must be at the level of the transcendental constitution of experience. But the object = x is no longer a permanent structure of empirical cognition, rather it is a name for the ‘ideal focus’ itself that pulls us out of experience towards its problematic conditions. The capacity to think and sense problematic ‘objects’ in the end ‘grounds’ our ‘transcendence’, precisely at the same time as ‘ungrounding’ representation (the realm of established solutions).

But with this move, surely the notion of transcendence is given a metacritical justification. One classic formulation of a metacritical problem concerns how the transcendental philosopher can account for his experience, while being ‘in’ that experience. But the transcendent exercise of the faculties gives us a metacritical account of the procedure of critique itself, as the mutual limitation of forms of cognition. It is precisely the problematic *thought* of the

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45 I will return to this in section 3 below.
transcendental philosopher that is self-grounding, so that the transcendental subject is not identified with the subject of experience. Rather, experience is accounted for within the potential structure of cognition opened up by the subject of transcendent exercise. There may indeed be unity, order, or structure in my experience, but for the transcendental philosopher the real questions are how it has been unified, according to which rules and problems, and whether its metacritical level is adequate. These are potentially answerable within a transcendental empiricism. Nevertheless, in Appendix V, where I develop this account further, it will be seen that ‘transcendent exercise’ is by no means limited to philosophy; rather art provides one of its paradigm forms.

3 The Fractured ‘I’ and the Deleuzian Absolute

We should finally assess Deleuze’s account of the implications of the ‘paradox of inner sense’ with regard to the subject. It is this Kantian thought and its consequences that, paradoxically while serving to unground the subject, also sets free the true form of the ‘ideal synthesis of difference’ as Deleuze understands it.

46 The critical project in Kant must therefore be seen not so much as carrying out the grounding of knowledge for the sake of itself, but of ascertaining its limits. To ground knowledge for Kant is in a sense to unground it, by revealing its limit. But the beyond of this limit is a domain of the subject radically different from the domain of knowledge. Hegel suggests that to set up a limit is already to know what is beyond the limit: it shows that the same subject has already crossed the limit. But for Deleuze, we do not know what is beyond the limit, but we can think it. Hegel’s comprehension of the subject in terms of the form of self-consciousness involves a formal ‘homogenisation’ of both sides of the limits of the subject. But the Kantian subject is a complex, internally differentiated entity, besieged and haunted on all sides by Ideas and sensations that attempt to shatter the ‘I think’ that attempts to accompany representations. The destination of the Kantian subject for Deleuze lies in its transcendent exercise. If the I is fractured, Deleuze remarks against Hegel, “what is thus revealed is being, which is said of differences which are neither in substance nor in a subject” (DR 58/81; italics mine).

This problematic notion of the subject appears clearly in Kant’s discussion of the transcendent exercise in the case of the sublime, where he is forced to introduce the ancient notion of the ‘soul’. At the point that the imagination “finds nothing beyond the sensible world to which it can lay hold”, it attains “a feeling of being unbounded” (CJ 127). Kant says that “that removal is thus a presentation of the infinite” (ibid). That is, the imagination apprehends the infinite immediately, but as absent. It apprehends nothing but its own supersensible destination. “It can never be anything more than a negative presentation – but it still expands the soul.” Deleuze says, crucially, that “the soul is felt as the indeterminate supersensible unity of all the faculties; we are ourselves brought back to a focus, as a focal point in the supersensible” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 51). Two extremely important things happen here. Firstly, an Idea of ourselves is felt. It is only through the transcendent exercise of the sensibility or imagination that an Idea can be felt, that it achieves a problematic sense in an affective faculty of the subject. Secondly, the ideal focal point that we are has no real name in Kant: a veil hangs over it – the name ‘soul’. It is an important indication that the Kantian subject may be more expansive and mysterious than is often thought by the identification of the subject with self-consciousness.
It will moreover transport us right back into the issues of determinability and real possibility encountered in earlier parts of the thesis.

Kant says that “the I think expresses the act of determining my existence”, stressing that “the existence is thereby already given”. By stressing that I can talk formally of my existence as given in some sense before its determination (in time) Kant implies that my existence must be seen as \textit{undetermined} in its basic status as self-positing. However, “the way in which I am to determine it ... is not yet given.” Deleuze remarks that this means that the I think, \textit{determination in general}, cannot \textit{de jure} cross the boundary into reality or being, without the addition of

a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference — no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines (DR 86/116)

This third value of the determinable, between the determination of thought and undetermined being (between logic and reality) is \textit{time} (the form of inner sense). But this is a very ambiguous formulation for Kant, as it leads directly to the ‘paradox of inner sense’.\footnote{The determination of my existence can only occur in correspondence with the form of inner sense, according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition, and I therefore have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself. The consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself” (B158).} It was shown in chapter 5.2.ii that this paradox threatens to infiltrate the very structure of the ‘I think’.

Now we have seen that in his late attempt to ground a “system of experience”, Kant exacerbates the wound in the ‘I’ (according to which the ‘I’ can only be affected by itself in time and space), in the hope that God can finally ground it. While Kant comes to accept the status of the subject as Idea, he nevertheless attempts to ground it in a new system of self-world-God. But he could not shake off the fact that Ideas, for him, were only regulative, and to decree them constitutive was to return to a purely metaphysical ontotheological argument. Now Deleuze attempts to locate for itself the faultline behind this movement in Kant’s account: “we should be concerned with a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued by Kant, much less by post-Kantianism” (DR 58/82). This explosive moment
precisely concerns the internal relation of the ‘paradox of inner sense’ and Kant’s own arguments against theoretical proofs for God:

When Kant puts rational theology into question, in the same stroke he introduces a kind of disequilibrium, a fissure or crack in the pure Self of the ‘I think’, an alienation in principle, insurmountable in principle: the subject can henceforth represent its own spontaneity only as that of an Other, and in so doing invoke a mysterious coherence in the last instance which excludes its own, as well as that of the world and God (DR 58; translation modified).

Now the foundation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument is the fundamental Kantian premise that all conceptual thought must be related to an intuition (that is, determinable). Deleuze in fact agrees with Kant that “all concepts only ever designate possibilities” (DR 139/181). Concepts (whether of the pure ‘I’ or of God) cannot be directly related to existence. The fracture in the subject, then, testifies ‘at first hand’ to the radical impossibility of intellectual intuition: conceptual thought and being cannot be conceived in any immediate unity. The fracture in the ‘I’ and the death of God are thus two sides of the same coin.48

Hence what is it that ultimately grounds the relation of thought (in any form) to being? The ‘third’, the form of determinability, seems finally to express no more than a “mysterious coherence”, an unknown harmony. For Kant, if the subject can only be posited according to a regulative Idea, this merely regulative nature would in principle threaten the whole of the edifice of the critical philosophy; on the other hand, Kant can find no grounds either for its constitutive nature. But Deleuze sees past these two possibilities. In fact, the introduction of inner sense into the intimacy of the ‘I think’ should itself be seen as accomplishing a move towards what the Deduction was intended to prove. The ‘I think’ is already related to the form of time; only by such a stipulation of the form of determinability can it engage in any determination at all (DR 58/81, 85f/116f.)

Deleuze brings out this paradoxical status in the following startling quote:

It is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self.

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48 There is a Cartesian analogy to the move Deleuze wants to effect in Kantianism. While Descartes insulates his Cogito from dependence on anything other than its own thinking, he cannot guarantee the identity of the Cogito through time. The Cogito tells us nothing about itself. For this Descartes must rely on the continuous creation of the universe by God. So the identity of the subject relies on God. If God goes, so does the guarantee of the identity of the subject. Deleuze wants to extend this argument beyond the extravagant conception of continuous creation into a Kantian milieu.
which appears in time... [This correlation] constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican revolution (DR 86/117: my italics).

But this “discovery of the transcendental” seems to be identical to the “discovery of Difference” mentioned at the start of this section. Deleuze in fact argues that this fracture is by no means the negation of transcendental philosophy but its most profound characteristic. The fracture in the self is the “internal Difference which establishes an apriori relation between thought and being” (ibid). For Deleuze, the ‘transcendental’ does not primarily specify the account of “modes of knowledge” (A56/B81), but first of all the project of relating ‘logic’ to ‘reality’, the project we found at the roots of Kantianism (the search for a truly sufficient reason). But the crucial innovation in Kant is that determinability here, as opposed to Leibniz, involves time.49

For Deleuze, on the one hand, the fracture in the ‘I’ represents the central opening for the possibility of the Kantian project; but on the other hand, he represents it as wrecking the possibility of Kantianism as we know it, by sullying the purity of apperception.50 Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of Categories requires the move from ‘logical apperception’ to its instantiation in spatiotemporal form. But how can we determine the logical apperception at all, if all determination depends on determinability? We have already encountered arguments in this chapter and elsewhere against the identification of the form of

49 By emphasising in this way the paradox of inner sense in Kant, Deleuze is effecting a transformation of the historical context of the Kantian project. On the one hand, he is reconnecting Kant to anti-Cartesian tendencies, which also displace self-consciousness from the primary role it is often thought to have. On the other hand, Kant is also diverted away from his Fichtean legacy, centred on the development of the primacy of apperception. Fichte founds his system on self-positioning, in which self-consciousness can deduce from its own activity the forms of subjectivity and objectivity. The move towards Leibniz should be spelled out. For Leibniz, the cogito is not primary because of its contingency. Against the claim that thought has immediate access to its own reality, Leibniz counters that “the cogito is merely a proposition of fact, founded on immediate experience, and is not a necessary proposition whose necessity is seen in the immediate agreement of ideas. On the contrary, only God can see how these two terms, I and existence, are connected – that is, why I exist” (New Essays on Human Understanding, 411). It might seem that Descartes had merely argued for the fact that I exist, not for why I exist. But it is the status of the proposition that is important: the cogito itself is not a necessary proposition, it is contingent. As such it requires a sufficient reason in order to make any claim that is not merely logical. In Kantian terms, it is synthetic, and as such requires “some third thing” to ground its truth. (See R. McRae. “As though only God and it existed in the World”, in M. Hooker, Leibniz: Critical and Interpretative Essays, 81-3).

50 “If the greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by
thinking with an ‘I think’\textsuperscript{51} For Deleuze, the pure form of thinking must precisely take place in the “internal difference” between thought and being. But given the identification of the object \( = x \) with the problematic Idea, alongside our analysis of intensity, doesn’t the model of repetition provide us exactly with a notion of determinability? On the one hand, we have seen in outline how “internal difference” for Deleuze, must refer to the relation of problematic Ideas to the actualised manifold.\textsuperscript{52} On the other hand, we have already seen that more can be said about space and time (via notions of intensity and duration) than Kant allowed. The form of duration (and the two passive syntheses), as articulated in the ideal constitution of repetition (Appendix IV) has provided the rudiments for another kind of Objective Deduction, which moreover completely bypasses apperception. Thus don’t we find another way of crossing the divide of logic and reality and pursuing the general task of the deduction?

In fact, it is exactly at this point that ‘representation’ is decisively ungrounded for Deleuze. He has pushed Kant’s system to an ultimate reliance on teleology, only to radically unground the circular \textit{form} of teleology at the last moment. The internal teleology of his system is restricted to the Subjective genesis of the relation of the faculties, while the Objective form of the system of the ‘ends of reason’, is articulated according to the logic of Ideas in their pure form, unfastened from their theological horizon, from the metaphysics of a new form of identity – namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis” (DR 87/117).\textsuperscript{53} Kant, however, defends the simplicity of the principle of apperception, arguing precisely that “I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am” (B157); the paradox of inner sense does not affect the transcendental status of apperception. However, three points can be mentioned: 1. The “that” remains cut off from determinability in general and so gives us no sense of what could be developed from the notion of apperception. If the ‘I think’ is undetermined before it introduces the “third value” of determinability, then how can the pure concepts of the understanding follow from it? 2. What Kant needs in order to fulfil the requirement of the deduction is to move from the structure of unity in the ‘I think’ to the forms of unity in intuition. So, even if the mere form of determination, the I think, is undisputed, what is really needed is the demonstration of its necessary compatibility with, or application to, intuition. So although apperception remains necessary for representational thought, the entire effort of the deduction is to show that apperception itself crosses the bridge to reality and governs the manifold of intuition. Hence what has been problematised is also the application of apperception to the manifold. 3. If the paradox of inner sense signifies that all thought must already be determinable, then how can the pure concepts of the understanding be said to delineate in advance the possibility of experience? Kant states that the notion of the possibility of experience provides us with the long sought-after ‘third thing’ between logic (determination) and reality (undetermined existence). But possibility by itself will remain merely logical unless it is transformed with specific regard to the problem of real possibility.
representation. The teleological completion of the Idea of the subject in the Ideas of world and God, as envisaged in the *Opus posthumum*, is definitively excluded, and the self, “the passive position” of the I think, must “live [the latter] like an Other within itself” (DR 86/116).

Deleuze remarks that one thinker perhaps did continue this “explosive moment” in Kantianism. In Hölderlin’s remarks on tragedy the fraught relation between the subject and God, and the catastrophe that the death of God brings for the subject, become clear in the wake of Kant. In his ‘Remarks on Oedipus’, Hölderlin provides the tragic emblem of the fractured ‘I’, sacrificed to the flow of inner and outer sense.

At the crucial, horrible moment towards the end of *Oedipus Rex*, Oedipus realises he has lived his entire life without understanding the laws that have been actually governing his fate. He realises that he has been living a life that he can now no longer call his own. The normative relation between past, present and future has been broken. Hölderlin describes the empty moment of Oedipus’ realisation as a caesura, and says that a “categorial overturning” occurs and space and time are experienced in their pure state. “At such moments, man forgets himself and the god and turns around like a traitor ... In the utmost form of suffering, namely, there exists nothing but the conditions of time and space”

Hölderlin states that “God forgets himself because he is nothing but time”. But “time is overturned [umgekehrt] categorically at such a moment, no longer fitting beginning and end” (ibid). Perhaps what he means is that the schematised category of causality described in Kant’s second analogy no longer holds, because the subject cannot carry out the synthesis, as the contents of his memory now belong to somebody he cannot identify with, who exists only as a ‘before’. In this moment a pure temporal difference is experienced, a before, a caesura and an after, a pure synthesis without an experiencing subject. This is what Deleuze calls the “third synthesis of time”.

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52 “The Cogito incorporates all the power of a differential unconscious, an unconscious of pure thought which internalises the difference between the determinable Self and the determining I” (DR 174/226).

53 “In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendent of Kant – rather, it is Hölderlin who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self” (DR 87/118).

This pure repetition, in which Oedipus ‘repeats’ his truth at the expense of his empirical coherence, would in principle be a pure synthesis of an Idea. ‘Oedipus’ collapses into a “state of free differences ... no longer subject to the form imposed upon them by an I or an ego, ... they assume a shape which excludes my own coherence no less than that of any identity whatsoever” (DR 113/149). This third synthesis is obviously not of the same kind as the other two synthesizes, and refers to a ‘privileged’ moment in the subject’s life, when repetition finally attains its own autonomy, at the cost of the subject itself. It is this third synthesis that underlies the other synthesizes, in that it enacts a pure correlation between difference and repetition. Problems are synthesised, ‘in and for themselves’. Being says its own sense, its own ‘absolute’ sense. However for Deleuze, we are in the vicinity not of Hegel’s absolute, but of Nietzsche’s eternal return, in which “repetition ... consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the

55 Given the claims in Appendix IV, it might seem that we already have the means to avoid Oedipus’ catastrophe, as we have seen how passive synthesis orders sensibility. If the “ideal foci” are no longer thought according to the rule of teleology, the order of Ideas nevertheless has its own virtual coherence, as we have witnessed. But they can no longer serve to unify at the limit, the coherent subject. Deleuze insists that the horizon of our thought is intrinsically problematic. That is, the problem itself, in its uncertain implication of convergent and divergent differential relations between singularities, is the only criterion for the order of the world and the subject. Once this order has been subject to problematisation, we can no longer rely simply on a coherent narrative about the past; we cannot appeal to the notion that the order of the world is simply the result of the way it has been. The second synthesis already prepares this possibility through the notion that the levels of the past coexist, and therefore form their own networks of “nonlocalisable connections”. The final problematisation we witness here opens up all the convergent and divergent series that could have been at any one point: the world has no other ground than the complicated "chaosmos" of virtual Ideas.

What Hölderlin calls the “turning away” of God at this moment thus not only affects the teleological coherence that is posited as an ideal foci in the future, but also the coherence of the past. The sense we make of the past depends, as we saw, on a continual repetition of the whole of the past. But the significance of any one past moment always must depend on what happened in between and is influencing our present. In fact, the essence of the virtual realm of Ideas is neither bound to the past nor the present, but can be seen as a pure repetition without origin, as every past must always speed referred to its problematic nexus with other pasts, and past interpretations of the past. Thus this mysterious ‘third synthesis of time’ is the revelation of “the pure and empty form of time” (DR 86/116). Time appears in its pure form, no longer fastened to any intrinsic order and convergence of its contents (on the distinction between form and content here, cf. DR 110/146). The ‘I’ is yielded up to the “constitutive passion of the self” (DR 87/117), for which the only identity is the repetition of differences which form their own order in the virtual.Deleuze appeals to literary examples at this point. In Proust, the hero does not repeat an ‘original’ love for his mother, but in his love for Albertine repeats the love of Swann for Odette (cf. DR 124/163). “It is true that our loves repeat our feelings for the mother, but the latter already repeats other loves, which we have not ourselves experienced” (Proust and Signs, 72). Gérard de Nerval’s tale Sylvie is also referred to (DR 18/28), in which the hero’s nostalgia for a past love is revealed to be a kind of ‘optical effect’ arising emergently from the resonance of the past and present (G. de Nerval, Selected Writings, Penguin 1999).
different” (DR 41/60). Perhaps it is now possible to see why “immanence is the vertigo of philosophy”.

We can start at last to envisage the kind of “truly sufficient reason” Deleuze has in mind. Deleuze’s crooked path to the absolute has been achieved through transcendental means, by reconstructing the transcendental syntheses of the subject on the model of repetition so that they point towards the outline of a final synthesis in which the subject gives way to a repetition that exceeds it. This final form is in a sense the point where problematicity becomes the inescapable ground to all knowledge and thought, but in such a radical sense that the characteristic of problems as distinct from each other is referred to their deeper ‘complicated’ matrix in a distributed field of singularities with no original order or rule of convergence. As well as Nietzsche and structuralism, we should think here of Plotinus and other neo-Platonist theories where the self, in ascending to the absolute, loses its individuality, and achieves some sort of ‘eternal’ status. For

56 The conception of the Absolute here, however, remains Leibnizian in important respects. Each ‘distributive’ Idea, even at the point of its most ideal synthesis of repetition, does not dissolve into a ‘collective’ all in which differences find their unity. The following passage is important: “Repetition necessarily flows from this play of difference ... [in the following way]: Because each series is explicated and unfolded only in implicating the others, it therefore repeats the others and is repeated in the others, which in turn implicate it. However, it is implicated by the others only insofar as it simultaneously implicates those others, with the result that it returns to itself as many times as it returns to another. Returning to itself is the ground of the bare repetitions, just as returning to another is the ground of the clothed repetitions” (DR 300/383). As long as the Ideas are conceived without God or any other unified horizon, the only unity in these implicated differences will be perspectival. This passage should be related back to chapter 4.4.i, with its account of a distributed monadism.

57 See Introduction, section 2 above.

58 In the fourth tractate in the second Ennead about “intelligible matter”, Plotinus writes that “any attribute to any subject must be a Reason-Principle, and Indefiniteness is not a Reason-Principle ... [But] the Matter even of the Intellectual Realm is the Indefinite (the undelimited); it must be a thing generated by the undefined nature, the illimitable nature of the Eternal Being” (Enneads, trans. S. MacKenna, London: Penguin, 1991, 106). This “indefinite” is very close to Deleuze’s conception of an Idea, and indeed Plotinus writes in this passage of “the difference of archetype and image”. In the seventh tractate of the fifth Ennead, on ‘archetypes’, Plotinus writes that “if the Soul of the individual contains the Reason-Principle of all that it traverses, once more all men have their (archetypic) existence there: and it is our doctrine that every soul contains all the Reason-Principles that exist in the Cosmos” (407). Given the previous remarks about the indefiniteness of archetypes, Plotinus foreshadows Deleuze, who is not at all averse to pointing out the esoteric nature of his claims about the third synthesis. For the most striking statement in this regard, see DR 244/314, where Deleuze talks of the “subtle, implicated matter of the eternal return ... If the eternal return reduces qualities to the status of pure signs, and retains of extensities only what combines with the original depth, even at the cost of our coherence and in favour of a superior coherence, then the most beautiful qualities will appear, the most brilliant colours, the most precious stones and the most vibrant extensions. For once reduced to their seminal reasons, and having broken all relation with the negative, these will remain for ever affixed in the intensive space of positive differences. Then, in turn, the final prediction of the Phaedo will be realised, in which Plato promised to the sensibility disconnected from its empirical exercise temples, stars and gods such as had never before been seen, unheard-of affirmations. The prediction is realised. it is
Deleuze, though, the notion of eternity would be a concept that denotes by default the peculiar temporality of the third synthesis, as detached in principle from the empirical syntheses of cognition - "the pure form of time" (DR 86/117, 111/147).

Thus we achieve, in principle, a path between the subject and an ontology which no longer depends on God but precisely arises out of the absence of God. It was suggested in chapter 2 that Kant’s early modal proof for the existence of God disappeared underground in Kant’s critical period, and it was suggested that it reappears in the *Opus posthumum* once Kant starts to deal with the consequences of the paradox of inner sense. But considering our transformation of the model of real possibility into a radicalised Leibnizian account of problematic relations of singularities, perhaps the destiny of Kant’s earlier argument lies here with Deleuze. A different passage from thought to being is reawoken as a result of the fracture in the *cogito*: whereas Kant returns once again to the metaphysical argument for real possibility, for Deleuze, the ‘coherence’ of the world (as universe) finally does not depend on the subject at all, but on the “play in the creation of the world”, the free play of problematic Ideas. Both Kant and Deleuze appeal in different ways at this point to rationalist models of ontological differentiation.

However, Deleuze affirms the ongoing dissonance in token- and type-identity between phenomenal and noumenal worlds. We are not the same subject in the two domains: the link is definitively broken. The world has dissolved, God is dead and the greater, mysterious coherence that is governed by Ideas is instead affirmed. “It is the nature of consciousness to be false, problems by their nature escape consciousness” (DR 208/268-9). That does not mean that there is no connection at all between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, rather that the latter must be understood as an inadequate synthesis (composed of habits and memories) of the Ideas that govern it.

The mysterious third synthesis fulfills a position in Deleuze’s system somewhere between Kant’s intellectually intuiting God, and Hegel’s Absolute true, only by the very overturning of Platonism". This extraordinary passage, with its return to the neo-Platonic doctrine of ‘semenal reasons’, and its affirmation of this most ‘otherworldly’ of passages from Plato (*Phaedo* 107c-115a), brings us closest to the profound strangeness and untimeliness of Deleuze’s project, while nevertheless being closest, I believe, to its deepest motivations.
Subject. It expresses the highest point of the system, and as time is absolute,\textsuperscript{59} it is open to some sort of apprehension (if not ‘experience’ in the Kantian sense), but only in principle, and precisely not as a whole. That this moment is possible is both the indication of the absolute status of Deleuze’s system, and a fate worse than death for the miserable Oedipus, the Deleuzian shadow of Hegel’s Christ.\textsuperscript{60}

However, it should be emphasised that the catastrophe of Oedipus represents a ‘limit-situation’ of pure repetition. Elsewhere in DR, Deleuze precisely emphasises that the apprehension, repetition, and living-through of problems does in fact provide finite beings, if not with a final sufficient reason, then with a ‘semi-divine’ capacity to seek the “real conditions of experience”. Far from affirming a ‘fall into indifference’, Deleuze’s theory of problems and their synthesis is meant to show that there is no ‘indifference’, and that the differentiated structure of the virtual provides the articulated backdrop for finite beings, whose lives can be considered less in terms of ‘experience’ than in terms of the constant solution and dissolution, with more or less degrees of inventiveness, of problems. As with the suggestion of the case of the sublime, there are concrete ways in which the subject, while not being able to think itself

\textsuperscript{59} See Appendix IV.
\textsuperscript{60} Note on Philosophers, Kings and Subjects. We have seen that Deleuze describes Spinoza as “the prince of philosophers”. In Hegel’s system, despite the fact that every subject is in a sense a philosopher to the extent that they have a self-understanding of the criteria to which they conform, there can be no king of philosophers to the extent that Hegel himself is simply the impersonal voice of the culmination of philosophy’s development. But there are three suggestions concerning who the privileged subject is who occupies the pinnacle of the system of substance-subject. Firstly, Christ can be represented as the subject of the Phenomenology. As well as Hegel’s remarks in the section on religion, it is in a sense always Christ who suffers the humiliations of the subject on the highway of despair; it is Christ who suffers even in the pathetic humiliations undergone by Rameau’s Nephew. Secondly, in the Philosophy of Right (trans. A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), the Monarch is a representation of the sovereign subject: he occupies the ‘empty place’, at the pinnacle of the Absolute Subject (#279-280, 316-322). Thirdly, of course, it is Us – the modern collective subject – who is the privileged subject of the whole system, who suffer Calvary and are resurrected only through the preservation and “internalisation” of Calvary (Phenomenology, 493).

Who is the king of philosophers, or at least the privileged philosophical subject for Deleuze? In DR, Deleuze describes his system by way of a peculiar symbol taken from Antonin Artaud: “crowned anarchy” (DR 41/60). Is Deleuze simply continuing in the good republican tradition in which the severed head of the King symbolises the death of God, and is the cosmopolitical emblem of the ensuing Copernican revolution in which the finite subject is finally freed from subjection? But there is a more sinister strain at work. There is only one king who appears in Deleuze’s work: Oedipus. The subject of Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence is Oedipus, the symbol of the fractured ‘1’, the sovereign whose fate is to become Nobody. Even if Deleuze’s philosophy is metacritically defensible, and a philosophy of immanence along Deleuzian lines is possible, the results must be entirely different from Hegel’s “internalisation” of human history. Deleuze after all, calls DR “an apocalyptic book” (DR xxi/4). While Deleuze affirms a “philosophy of joy”, there are other references in DR to a “theatre of terror” (cf. DR. 18/28)
immediately, is ‘subject’ to a repetition that at least plays out its inability to experience itself. Moreover, the transcendental empiricist, as the mobile subject of this system of repetition, can precisely enact and describe the problems incarnated in human life.

In sum, the relation of the subject and the object = x undergoes a startling metamorphosis in Deleuze’s work. On the one hand, the object = x, says Deleuze.

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61 Note on Structure and the Subject. It has been shown why Kant spent so much time on dialectical Ideas in CPR. But there is an existential sense to this emphasis as well. In a sense it is these that truly structure the subject, as became clear, although abortively, in the Opus posthumum. It is in Kant’s Paralogisms, the first illustration of transcendental illusion in CPR, that the self is first revealed as an Idea: it cannot experience itself but can only exist for itself spectrally, as an Idea that haunts its interiority but is always other to it. The self is tormented by the spectre of its own existence: thought and being can never coincide in experience.

Deleuze appeals to psychoanalysis, particularly in its structuralist form, for the concrete forms this peculiar ‘half-life’ of the subject takes. Sexual Ideas are presented as problems for the subject, by which it attempts to grasp Ideas that are ontological in their significance. In the psychic repetition of the primal scene, the subject attempts to think its own origin (cf. S. Leclaire, ‘Jerome, or Death in the Life of the Obsessional’, in S. Schneiderman, Returning to Freud (New Haven: Yale, 1980). The Idea of the origin of the subject is a transcendent Idea: it is by definition unrepresentable to a unified subject. The enigma of the origin of the subject cannot be represented, but can only be dramatised in an Idea. Moreover, in this dramatisation, the identity of the conscious subject is excluded: in order to enter into the transcendent exercise of thinking the Idea, it is not just permitted, but demanded that he practice multiple entries into the phantastic structure (cf. J. Laplanche & J.B. Pontalis, ‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality’, in V. Burgin et al., Formations of Fantasy, London: Methuen, 1968; cf. DR 124/163 & note 27). The Oedipus complex, therefore, is strictly speaking never lived, because it embraces a structure that demands the simultaneous and coexistent action of three subjects. Hence the subject-places of this structure can only be repeated by the subject for whom the Oedipus complex is a problem: in the repetitions he will displace himself into each of the places. The Oedipus complex is an example of a problem, which although never lived, articulates the subject’s thought of its own existence. For Lacan, there is no ‘normal’ position for the subject, and our attitudes to the question of origin may be lived in a neurotic or psychotic way. Neurosis and psychosis are not just pathological, but are in a sense ‘transcendental’ positions in the question of the subject. Cf. J. Lacan, ‘The Neurotic’s Individual Myth’, (trans. M. Evans, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 48, 1979).

Deleuze’s Kantian approach to structuralism has the benefit of saving us from futile dispute over the role or absence of a role of the subject in structuralism, while also paradoxically allowing us to find an idea of the subject in Deleuze. The choice between an in principle fully reflexive conscious subject and impersonal structures over which this subject has no control has the perfect structure of an antinomy. The realisation that the subject is entangled in Kant’s Paralogisms, the first illustration of transcendental illusion in CPR, that the self is first revealed as an Idea: it cannot experience itself but can only exist for itself spectrally, as an Idea that haunts its interiority but is always other to it. The self is tormented by the spectre of its own existence: thought and being can never coincide in experience.

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holds good for all worlds. As a problem in itself, it opens onto all the other problems that are ideally 'complicated' within it. On the other hand, for us it becomes infused with the psychoanalytic properties of the 'lost object'. The object = x will thus have two faces: on the one hand a virtual face that always points away from the possibility of apperception and towards Gegenstände, and on the other an actual face that gives it its status as the form of empirical Objecte. It can be concluded that the transcendental philosopher "loses himself" in the immanence of the former precisely in order to produce an immanent critique of the latter.

For Novalis and Hölderlin, this loss of being is always indexed to the past, echoing Platonic reminiscence. This anxiety underlies the philosophy of self-consciousness and reflection. The fear of the loss of the self can only be assuaged by turning to the world and God; without these the self seems sure to plunge into a bottomless chaos. But by returning to the Leibnizian and Spinozist background of Kantian philosophy, and connecting this up with the search for a synthetic apriori in structuralism, Deleuze shows that the loss of the object does not point to an origin, but is the effect of an ontology of repetition: the object = x is a floating signifier that permits the final coherence of the universe, no matter how strange it may be to the empirical subject. The cosmos is immanent without remainder, but transcendent from the point of view of experience; nevertheless it is possible to think, and to metacritically justify the thinking of, the problematic structure of the absolute. The structure of repetition provides the first key to the rationalist distinction between logic and reality, while the unfolding of the connection between synthesis and repetition secondly develops a new Objective account of cognition out of this structure, which thirdly terminates in the Subjective account of the play of faculties for the transcendental philosopher. Thus Deleuze presents a fulfilment as well as a transformation of Kantianism, considered as a project stemming from Kant's first works until his last.

It is finally from this point of view that we can envisage Deleuze's peculiar position between Kant and Hegel, between finitude and the absolute. The object = x is the sign of finitude that itself can have absolute properties if affirmed

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62 On the notion of 'lost sense' in Hegel, cf. J. Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, 26, 102. In his review of Hyppolite, Deleuze remarks that Hyppolite's "allusions to ... forgetting, remembering, to
in its movement throughout all the divergent series. The third synthesis touches on the immanent state of Ideas in their complication, in which all problems are referred back to the complication of their relations and singularities. The thought of this synthesis for Deleuze is both apocalyptic and divine: it shows us the secret of the divine game, the "play in the creation of the world". For Deleuze, the ultimate justification of reality, the only "justice" that could be found, would be to affirm the world as such a game, as a realm of complete chance; it would be such an affirmation that allows all the series to communicate, for the object = x to traverse all the series: "immanence", to paraphrase Hyppolite, would be "complete". But I have only traced the theoretical background to Deleuze's philosophy; its practical significance must await another occasion.

lost sense" suggest an alternative theory of expression (195). Deleuze has clearly attempted to elaborate these allusions.

63 Logic and Existence. 176.
Appendices

Appendix I  Deleuze, Post-Kantianism and Metacritical Criteria

In this Appendix I attempt to introduce Deleuze’s approach to the issue of metacritique by evaluating a series of criteria suggested by the post-Kantians for the success of a metacritique. In the process I will point out critical evaluations that the Deleuzian and post-Kantian views could make of metacritical criteria posited by each other. After running the gamut of skepticism concerning the general possibility of metacritical criteria, we will arrive at the Hegelian and Deleuzian positions on the problem. In general, I hope an account of the post-Kantians will shed light on Deleuze’s views, and vice versa. The following abstract account is a sketch toward a greater aim, to criticise, explore and expand the possibilities for metacritique.

It should first be pointed out that the very notion of metacritique seems to have two strikingly different significations in the literature on post-Kantianism. On the one hand, it is taken in a purely formal signification to mean that dimension of critical and post-Kantian philosophy which is concerned with its own justification. For instance, L.W. Beck and Günther Zöller use the word in this sense; my own use of the term conforms to theirs.¹ On the other hand, philosophers in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition take the term specifically to refer to the philosophical requirement

to account for the historically situated aspect of critical procedure. Habermas has taken the notion in this sense, and has been followed by G. Kortian and G. Rose. For Hegel, it was indeed part of the procedure of metacritique to provide a socio-historical account of the coming-to-be of the ‘we’ who are capable of critique. However, the Hegelian-Marxist reading often takes this part to be the most important and enduring aspect of the very notion of metacritique. I cannot provide a criticism of this position here, but I try to suggest in what follows that this “historicising” notion of metacritique ends up begging the questions that the “formal” notion of metacritique explicitly attempted to deal with. In order to avoid relativism, the historicising account often as not comes to rely on a teleological notion of history, whose power and validity could only rest on the presumption of success of certain formal metacritical criteria.

i The Problem and its Solution

There is one constant that runs from Deleuze’s first work until his last, which can give us a clue to the Deleuzian approach to the issue of the relation between critique and philosophy: the claim that the task of philosophy is to create concepts that respond to problems. This notion of creating concepts can easily look as if it involves the kind of pluralistic, arbitrary production of concepts involved in postmodernism; this impression is further exacerbated by the thought that Deleuze is, in some form, a ‘Nietzschean’. But in order to understand the notion of the creation of concepts it is necessary first to understand the notion of the ‘problem’. I will suggest that this is

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2 This use of the term ‘metacritique’ can in fact lay claim to be the oldest, as it descends from the first explicit use of the term, by J.G. Hamann, in his 1784 unpublished essay, ‘Metakritik über den Purismum der Vernunft’. Hamann thought a metacritique of Kantian philosophy was needed because of the dependence of concepts on linguistic forms, which themselves could not be universal, but varied with language structures throughout history and society. This vein of metacritique was continued in J.G. Herder’s ‘Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, in his Verstand und Erfahrung (1799). For an account of this strain of metacritique, along with Fichte’s and Hegel’s involvement with it, see J.P. Surber, ‘German Idealism under Fire: Fichte, Hegel, and “Metacriticism”’, in Ardis B. Collins ed., Hegel and the Modern World (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 93-109. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel probably avoided the term ‘metacritique’ because it would have been seen at the time to ‘belong’ to Hamann’s and Herder’s theories.


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where we can find the first step in Deleuze’s ‘metacritique’: a general procedure to
discern and evaluate the problems that animate philosophy. His first book,
_Empiricism and Subjectivity_ (1953), outlines his account of the primacy of problems.
However, the terminology he will use later is reversed: the concept of a ‘problem’ is
seen to be analytically linked to the notion of its solution, so Deleuze opts for
‘question’ to express this fundamental ‘field’ within which philosophy moves.

A philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by
itself and in itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, _to the very end_, of the necessary implications of a formulated question. It shows us what things are, or what things should be, on the assumption that the question is good and rigorous (ES 106).

Later Deleuze relegates the term ‘question’ and turns to Kant’s “profound theory of
Ideas as problematising and problematic” (DR 161/209) to demonstrate that
‘problems’ are forms that “must be considered not as ‘givens’ (data) but as ideal
‘objecticities’ possessing their own sufficiency” (DR 159/206). Deleuze argues for
the _transcendental_ priority of these ‘problematic fields’ with regard to the multiple
‘solutions’ of which they may be capable (ibid). However, in a television interview
from the 1990’s, he provides a paradoxical account of the order in which problems are brought to light by philosophers working on them:

The philosopher’s task is already that of exposing the concepts that he is in the
process of creating, so he can’t expose the problems on top of that, or at least one can
discover these problems only through the concepts being created. [But] if you haven’t found the problem to which a concept corresponds, everything remains abstract... The creation of a concept always occurs as the function of a problem.

The problem itself cannot be expounded until _after_ the concepts articulating the
problem have been put in place. Now Deleuze’s insistence here would seem to rule out straightaway any attempt to formulate foundational principles; not just that, but it would particularly rule out the possibility of an adequately _self-grounding_ principle

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4 It is the ‘sufficiency’ I wish to emphasise at the moment, rather than the ‘objecticity’, which is broached in chapter 4.
5 _L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze_, dir. P-A. Boutang (Video Editions Montparnasse), ‘H comme Histoire de la Philosophie’.
6 “One might wonder why the problem isn’t stated clearly by a philosopher since it certainly exists in his work, but it’s because one can’t do everything at once”, _Abécédaire_, ibid.
or system, as the problem would always exceed its conceptual expression. But isn’t precisely the concern of the post-Kantians to superimpose the issue of the problem of metacritique, the problem of self-grounding, upon its conceptual actualisation? In these terms, then, let us take Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre as an example. The ‘I’, says Fichte, is not only a transcendental highest principle, but is also self-grounding.

But, Deleuze would ask, to which problem does the requirement of a self-grounding principle of such a character respond? To this the Fichtean can respond in two complementary ways. Firstly, he can respond that the Idea of a self-grounding, principled system is intrinsic to philosophy itself in its highest form, he can identify his problem as the problem of philosophy itself. Secondly, he can claim that his system nevertheless accounts for itself in its own terms, that is, states the problem to which it responds in the terms of the concepts that are developed at the basis of the system: the problem that leads Fichte to the writing of the Wissenschaftslehre is thus a manifestation of the striving of the I towards its full absolute status. However, Deleuze could reply that neither this preliminary Idea nor this accounting for itself is equivalent to the self-determination of the fundamental concepts at the basis of the system. The Idea comes first, and the self-accounting must come after. Even at the highest level of philosophy, whether it is conceived in ontological or critical terms, the fundamental concepts can only be justified after, and within, their elaboration, yet must nonetheless be conceived as responses to a problem that subsists before. Nevertheless, the ‘Idea of philosophy itself’ can only be expressed in the concepts that give the Idea form, just as the self-accounting must be limited to the structure permitted by the conceptual form. Deleuze would then be pointing out, metacritically,

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7 In Dialogues, Deleuze states that “philosophy always begins in the middle”; he suggests that Spinoza’s Ethics cannot be said to ‘begin’ with the notions of substance and attribute, because they already presuppose a field which is best articulated in terms of the problem of ‘expression’. (ibid. 62). This is indeed the strategy of Deleuze’s monumental Spinoza and the Problem of Expression (1968).
9 Despite his criticisms of Kant for restricting critique to merely propaedeutic status, Fichte continues to preface his system with important propaedeutics, such as Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre (in Early Philosophical Writings, trans. D. Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell 1998) and the ‘First & Second Introductions’ to the Wissenschaftslehre (trans. D. Breazeale. Indianapolis: Hackett 1994). In his early phase Hegel too provided an outline of the idea of philosophy: cf. the section on ‘The Need of Philosophy’ in The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (Albany: SUNY 1977), 89-94.
that the problem has no expression outside of its conceptual articulation, yet at the same time the problem must have a status that subsists outside the concepts formulated in the system.

This may seem like a hermeneutic point about philosophies that claim to be immanently self-grounding. However, what if Deleuze too wants to achieve a philosophy of self-grounding immanence? Deleuze has, after all, stated that problems are transcendental. Now, the term ‘transcendental’ is often used in a vague sense to mean some structure that provides general conditions for the form or existence of a group of particulars or propositions. However, I would maintain that Deleuze intends ‘transcendental’ in a rigorous sense. That is, he intends his transcendental account of problems to be able to exhibit an apriori demonstration and justification of its internal relation to experience. Thus the point cannot simply be hermeneutic. But if this is the case, then Deleuze’s ‘transcendental’ notion would seem to appeal to a distinctly Platonic hypothesis that problems must be wordlessly and nonconceptually prior to their definition and articulation. One’s first objection, then, is: how can you justify this ‘concept’ of ‘problems’ in general?

There is a tension in the notion of problem already present in the passage quoted earlier from the Hume book, where Deleuze writes that “only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question [ie. problem] raised by a philosopher is not a good question [ie. problem], that it does not force the nature of things enough”.\(^\text{10}\) A circle seems quickly to form: firstly, the nature of things is referred to the philosophical problematic that organised them; then ‘the nature of things’ returns almost as a Fichtean Anstoss, or at least a kind of philosophical conscience. Is Deleuze really alert to the labyrinth that awaits the philosopher who attempts to deal with the problem of metacritique?

Deleuze’s concept of the problem seems to work on two levels. Firstly, it applies to the history of philosophy. To do history of philosophy is to discover a previous philosopher’s problem in a way that they themselves could not appreciate it. Moreover, one cannot criticise another philosopher without fully divining what their

\(^{10}\) *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. 107.
problem is. But Deleuze's view here seems to open itself up to a fragmentation of the history of philosophy. It becomes impossible to construct a 'history of philosophy' that is anything else than a discontinuous fabric of concepts 'belonging' to 'great philosophers'. Secondly, the accuracy of the 'divination' of a previous philosopher's problem surely depends on the current concepts of the present philosopher: aren't they also trapped in their own problematic fields?

These problems reach a 'critical' pitch at the 'transcendental' level of the concept of the problem. How is Deleuze's concept of a problem exempt from its own logic? What is his problem? This is the 'problem' that stares anyone in the face who is both 'doing the history of philosophy' in relation to Deleuze, and attempting to work out how his philosophy is metacritically justified.

There are two aspects to this latter issue. First of all, how is one to make sense of this notion that problems are nonconceptually prior to their conceptualisation? This, I suggest, can be dealt with if we unfold Deleuze's properly transcendental theory, in which "problems or Ideas" form a distinct part of the hierarchy of objects for synthesis; I will attempt to do this in the body of the thesis. Secondly, though, there remains the reflexive problem of how Deleuze's own theory can be justified in its own terms: is there a 'special' problem that animates Deleuze? Thus the first metacritical criterion of the relation of problem and solution refers us to the central issues of metacritical reflexivity dealt with by the post-Kantians.

ii  Circularity

The criteria for the success of metacritique are fundamentally separate from the criteria for success of other philosophical problems, in large part because of its awkward position with regard to the issue of the truth. As Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are providing accounts of how knowledge and truth are possible, the issue of

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11 I use the word 'divine' advisedly. In Bergsonism, Deleuze writes "True freedom lies in the power to decide, to constitute problems themselves. And this 'semi-divine' power entails the disappearance of false problems as much as the creative upsurge of true ones". 15.

12 Such a situation is familiar: if someone criticises, say, Heidegger from a Hegelian standpoint, it is not unusual to hear the reply that Heidegger is 'doing something else'. This expresses a general
which of their philosophies is the best cannot be judged according to some independent criteria of truth. How is one account of truth, whether it be transcendental or absolute, to be preferred over another? Plainly, such accounts cannot be judged as to their truth. The criterion for the success of a metacritical system cannot involve the correspondence of the structures detailed in the system with the 'facts' accounted for by the system. Nor can a coherentist account of truth by itself solve the problem, as claims are only judged as coherent within the frame of reference that is being asked about ('facts' are not coherent by themselves). Finally, to take the view that coherentist accounts of truth allow for fallibility and revisability, and therefore permit a virtuously circular account of truth that can apply metacritically as well, would seem to depend on a pragmatic account of truth. But pragmatism is immediately incompatible with the whole project of critique and metacritique.\textsuperscript{13}

As suggested above, the issue of whether a system can be grounded in its own terms is vital to philosophy with a metacritical dimension. But even this most abstract of requirements is potentially open to confusion. First of all, it must be pointed out that the general requirement of self-grounding is really separate from whether the structure of the system itself is \textit{formally} conceived in terms of its self-justification. Two great modern philosophies, Hegel's and Heidegger's, have made it central to their very form that the 'way in' to their philosophical structures is a part of the unfolding of the structure itself. For Hegel this procedure is phenomenological and dialectical, for Heidegger phenomenological and hermeneutic. Both of these procedures make a virtue of circularity. Circularity serves as the assurance that 'we' who start out on the path of understanding a system will be able to account for ourselves, and 'come back to ourselves' with a renewed systematic understanding of who 'we' are. While Fichte and Schelling employ circularity, only in Hegel does this circularity actually form the structure of \textit{every part} of the system.

\textsuperscript{13} This of course does not rule out the possibility that the failure of the project of critique and metacritique might \textit{result} in pragmatism.
But what is the precise role of the criterion of circularity in securing metacritical validity? As suggested, it must be distinguished from entanglement with criteria of truth. For instance, the systematic explanation of the ‘facts’ of who we feel ourselves to be is not of itself grounded by the circular voyage of Hegel’s system. Nor can Hegel’s theory be sufficiently justified by his account of what happens in history, no more than Kant should be able to rely on selective details about the character of experience to ground the structure of possible experience. Circularity in such cases would be as good as the ‘facts’ and relations upon which it depends. The ground can only be the ground of the grounded for reasons internal to the structure of the ground itself (and of grounds in general).

The formal circularity of a system that includes its beginning in its end is thus really an exemplary effect of a successful enactment of a metacritique, but it does not of itself provide a criterion for its success. In fact, an inordinate focus on circularity can lead to a skewed view of metacritical criteria. It is such an approach, I think, that is often responsible for Hegel’s philosophy being described as a philosophy of ‘closure’, ‘identity’, or ‘totality’, as in Habermas’s account of metacritique in Knowledge and Human Interests,14 where such closure is countered by reintroducing a potential infinity into the actual reflexive process of metacritique. But this opposition is the product of a misunderstanding. Firstly, the internal, general success of a system might indeed be realised without closure in its special details or in its empirical instantiation. Metatheoretical, structural closure does not entail closure in the system for which it accounts.15 Therefore, one shouldn’t assume Hegel’s system is complete or ‘identical’ in the sense Habermas thinks it is. Secondly, the idea that metacritique must become more and more socially determined stands to confuse the issue, as the object of metacritique clearly has to remain of the same kind as the metacritique itself. Habermas treats quite distinct criteria of metacritique as if they were a matter of degree. There may be certain fundamental metacritical criteria that remain quite untouched by social issues.

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14 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 20.
15 See J. Piaget, Structuralism, trans. C. Maschler (London: Routledge, 1971) 14f. for an account of how very simple structures operating together may lead to potentially infinite complexity. The
My general point is that even though a metacritique requires circularity at some point, this does not imply that ‘monocentric’ circularity is either the main character or the motor of the metacritical system. In fact, the proliferation of epicycles in Hegel’s system is positively Ptolemaic. Moreover, as Deleuze will show, it is even possible to come up with radical structural variations of the same metacritically justified system.

iii Systematicity

The burden of metacritique thus seems to shift to criteria for the systematic coherence of the ground. However, I suggest now that it is possible to see Deleuze’s work on the history of philosophy as a reductio of the criterion of self-grounding systematicity. Each text precisely presents a philosopher in terms of a fully articulated, self-contained system. Now, above we asked what the problem is that animates Deleuze’s theory of problems, thus initiating our investigation into reflexivity. But if Deleuze’s work does indeed circulate around a common problem, why does he devote so much effort and ingenuity to constructing a series of systems which, in the detail, are often incompatible? The very production of a plurality of philosophical systems would seem to imply a necessary incompatibility between these systems, if those systems claimed to be what, traditionally, philosophical systems claim to be: i.e. self-grounding ideal constructions of mutually supporting, integrated propositions. An interesting and rare statement made by Deleuze about his own philosophy begins to address this situation:

I believe in philosophy as system. I dislike the notion of system that is related to the coordinates of Identity, Resemblance and Analogy. It is Leibniz, I think, who first identifies system and philosophy. I adhere to the sense he gave to this. The questions about ‘overcoming philosophy’ or ‘the death of philosophy’ have never touched me.

relevance of this will become clearer in chapter 4.3.iii when Deleuze’s use of structuralism is examined.

16 Deleuze furthermore never provides a cross-reference from any of his texts to another.

17 Inevitable confusion ensues when one seeks Deleuze’s ideas in his work on other philosophers. How are we to decide which element is Deleuzian and which just proper to the philosopher being studied? How, for instance, is one to square the notions of ‘active’ and ‘reactive forces’ in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* with the account of instinct and intelligence in *Bergsonism*, or the doctrine of the faculties in *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*? They are simply not compatible, and their ‘coherence’ should instead be referred to their metacritical status as problematic systems.
Nevertheless, if one can create a multiplicity of internally valid philosophical systems, doesn’t this put the very notion of system into doubt? Inasmuch as each system would conform to the criteria of systematicity, there would exist an extrasystematic set of criteria, which would presumably have an extrasystematic validity. But by what right, if systematicity itself is supposed to constitute the criteria for validity? Most importantly, if multiple systems could be produced using the criteria of systematicity, wouldn’t this render ineffectual the validity of systematicity as a criterion? That is, doesn’t systematicity necessarily involve not just self-grounding, but unity and completion (totality) as criteria? The absurdity of this position seems only to be heightened by Deleuze’s comments in a 1980 interview, where he argues that, despite the contemporary sense of a breakdown of systems, or of an age of fragmentation, “systems have in fact lost absolutely none of their power. All of the groundwork for a theory of so-called open systems is in place in current science and logic”19. For the question immediately arises: if this groundwork is in place, then what can philosophy, and specifically Deleuze as a philosopher, contribute to actualise the plan? What is stopping him?

In effect, Deleuze’s stance here seems to produce a skepticism towards the notion of systematicity. We return to a point made by Fichte, that it is entirely possible “to ground a system upon a groundless and indemonstrable proposition: the proposition, for example, that there are in the air creatures with human desires, passions, and concepts, but with ethereal bodies”.20 Fichte’s way out was through the attainment of a self-grounding principle that is absolutely certain. If we do not have an independent moment of certainty or self-evidence as a criterion, might we not find ourselves lost without a thread in the labyrinth of Deleuze’s multiple systems?

19 Negotiations, 31-2.
Self-consciousness and the Antinomy of Post-Kantianism

Now, very briefly, I would suggest that the development of post-Kantianism revolves around a particular antinomy that can be stated here succinctly, but is developed throughout the thesis through a return to Kant’s own position on its elements. In order to avoid the charge of creating self-grounding systems that are ultimately arbitrary, post-Kantianism appeals fundamentally to the primacy of self-consciousness as its criterion of indubitable certainty. Yet the status of this appeal remains unstable.

Either self-consciousness provides the fundamental form through which intellectual intuition once again asserts its rights. Kant’s entire problem of how synthetic apriori knowledge is possible is ‘solved’ because the ‘gap’ between knowing, thinking and acting subject and things in themselves is overcome. But the danger with this alternative is that it relies too much on the empirical, immediate ‘fact’ or experience of self-consciousness, which was criticised most profoundly by Kant in his Paralogisms of Pure Reason.

Or the certainty is expressed as an indubitable nonempirical, transcendental principle, which thus avoids the problem of the Paralogisms. Thus the primacy of self-consciousness is pre-reflexive, and if it is immediate, its validity and priority can only be inferred through transcendental argument. But this risks becoming detached from what it grounds altogether, and thus becoming metaphysical.

This, I claim, is the core problematic of post-Kantianism in its ‘classic’ version of the period from 1789 (starting with Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie) to 1807 (Hegel’s Phenomenology). Leaving aside for a moment Hegel’s ultimate solution of the antinomy, there is an important tendency that also radiates from the core antinomy at the turn of the nineteenth century. The antithesis of the antinomy pointed towards a ground beyond reflection, and there remains the possibility of

20 Fichte, Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, p. 101.
21 I show in chapters 1-3 how ‘Kant’s problem’ arose out of the disappearance of the possibility of intellectual intuition.
22 While Fichte does insist that the self-positing of the I is not a Tatsache (fact), what he objects to in this formulation is not the Tat but the Sache. The latter term suggests a reification of the act of self-positing. Hence he coins the term Tahandlung, which is not simply translated as ‘act’ but is an act which is simultaneously a fact. Cf. ‘Review of Aenesidemus’, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 64.
turning the focus of theoretical and practical activity away from grounding and towards teleology. This tendency initially involves Hölderlin and Novalis and the later Reinhold. The notion of time becomes speculatively important for this strain, for instance in Hölderlin’s mourning for a ‘lost’ being, and in the role of poetic ‘romanticization’ in teleologically figuring the future for Novalis. I suggest in chapters 4 & 6 that this turn to time and telos in both of these poet-thinkers plays a part (only sometimes explicit) in Deleuze’s theory of repetition and the syntheses of memory and future. However, the teleologies of Hölderlin and Novalis remain regulative and hypothetical without the ontological moves out of the antinomy made by Hegel and Deleuze.

Now, if this post-Kantian antinomy is taken as all-consuming, then it can appear as if it and the period during which it unfolded are in turn framed by two newly obscured penumbras. On the one side, Kant’s own system risks getting distorted through the lens of post-Kantianism. Firstly, I claim it is not blind to issues of metacritique (see chapter 1). Secondly, it does not, on the whole, appeal to the methodological and systematic primacy of self-consciousness (chapter 5). Thirdly, the developments of the post-Kantians on the issues of self-consciousness are achieved at the expense of the suppression of the claims of the Paralogisms (chapter 5).

The other side of the core antinomy is more problematic for it concerns Hegel. There is a problem here because some readers of Hegel might contend that he could in fact fall into either alternative of the antinomy as I conceive it. For instance, Stanley Rosen and Manfred Frank claim that Hegel does in the end rely on intellectual intuition, while others have claimed that Hegel’s system finally rests on

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23 As we will see, there is a ‘counter-history’ which involves texts by G.E. Schulze (Aenesidemus) and Solomon Maimon.


25 It is telling that for the opponents of the German idealists, such as Aenesidemus, the Paralogisms were held up as the one successful development achieved by Kant’s project; cf. G.E. Schulze, ‘Aenesidemus’, in G. di Giovanni & H.S. Harris eds., Between Kant and Hegel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 126-129.

a combination of transcendental and coherentist claims. However, one can also argue that Hegel does indeed make a breakthrough concerning this antinomy, as does Deleuze.

v Two Resolutions of Metacritique

In the wake of Schelling, Hegel’s notion of the absolute manages to combine both the grounding and the teleological directions of the two currents just mentioned; it points both forward and backward. What Hegel does is to follow through the very notion of metacritique, as a critique that can fully account for itself in its own terms, at the levels of both experience and its conditions, in such a way that not only do they imply each other (as in Schelling’s *System of Transcendental Idealism* and *Ideas for the Philosophy of Nature*, in which the subjective and objective poles are developed separately but are held to imply each other), but they must be expressed together, in a continuous, circular development. Gillian Rose includes all non-Hegelian attempts to resolve the issue of metacritique, including Habermas’s, in the category of ‘neo-Kantianism’, which is caught in a continual ‘bad infinity’ concerning the accounting for its own transcendental conditions. But while she appeals to the Hegelian absolute (or ‘infinity’) as a formally adequate way of resolving this problem, we should specify the two levels on which Hegel fulfills the task of metacritique in a distinctive way.

1. Hegel’s account of consciousness and its object in the opening stages of the *Phenomenology* (especially the ‘Introduction’) is thoroughly metacritical in that it shows how consciousness itself must always be self-conscious. Rather than simply starting with the act of self-consciousness, Hegel generates the importance of self-consciousness through showing the necessary dependence of all consciousness on a

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27 The coherentism here refers to the mutual referring of transcendental claims, not empirical ones. Cf. Robert Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94-108. This latter camp is much more various.

28 G. Rose, *Hegel contra Sociology*, 42, 92: “If God is unknowable, we are unknowable, and hence powerless”. While rightly emphasising the necessity for an absolute, Rose rests her account of how this is to be secured firstly on a (to my mind dubious) conflation of phenomenology and genesis in general (whereas in Hegel the two are separate; cf. 59, 188), and secondly on an unanalysed presupposition of

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parallel dimension of speculative self-consciousness, which the former consciousness must always use to account for itself, in however a rudimentary way. An initial, "abstract" definition of consciousness is all that is needed: "consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness". But this abstract form never appears in itself, only in its concrete variations. Thus the transcendental is developed internally to the very articulation of the experience of consciousness itself. In general, Hegel shows how the circularity of philosophical reflexivity is implied in all kinds of experience, by exposing the dimension of speculative experience. Thus whereas for Kant the relation between experience and its conditions was continually caught in a potential regress because the two never ‘met’, Hegel interweaves experience with its speculative grounding. Speculative dialectic enabled one to be both ‘in’ and ‘out’ of experience. The task of accounting for critique – metacritique – was not an infinite regress, because not only the first moves of critique, but the very first moves of consciousness, involved a metacritical double. Not only was the philosopher always already in the dimension of metacritique, but so was any subject at all. This offers a true resolution of an antinomy, in that it shows how neither side of the antinomy – the transcendental, nor experience - is privileged.

2. Given this resolution to the problem of metacritique in each experience and each condition of experience, Hegel’s task was to order all possible experiences and conditions into an all. Dialectic would allow experience and thought to justify itself progressively and exhaustively, thus realising in the fullest way the project of the self-critique of reason. In the Phenomenology, for instance, experience is united in a progressively complex fashion “for us”, the readers of the book. In turn, Hegel’s system in its entirety is an attempt to break through the post-Kantian antinomy and articulate the true roles of our first three criteria, problematicity, circularity, and systematicity. Firstly, with regard to problematicity, not only does Hegel uncover transcendental structures, but these structures express the process of problematisation and the conceptual articulation of problems. Dialectic is thus the intrinsic ordering of

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problems. Whereas Plato’s dialectic remained problematic, always ordered according to hypotheses, Hegel’s notion that each problem is a determinate negation of simpler problems gives the dialectic a self-grounding form, and nests all problems within each other. Secondly, with regard to circularity, as Jean Hyppolite says, Hegel’s system is an attempt to make Being say its own sense (or meaning). Being achieves full expression in its own articulation through history and philosophy. Thirdly, with regard to systematicity, each part of Hegel’s absolute is utterly transparent to every other part; if there be contingency, and thus opacity, in the system, then this is because it is necessary that there be contingency in certain restricted regions of the absolute.

But although these two main Hegelian innovations, at the levels of consciousness and system, seem to express the very notion of metacritique to its fullest apogee, they are not the only solution. Firstly, I suggest in chapter 5.4.i that the notion that consciousness is intrinsically an activity of “distinguishing and relating” can be questioned by opening up a new historical context. Kant himself does not necessarily hold to such an essence of consciousness, and the adequacy and implications of the notion of ‘distinguishing and relating’ were a topic of direct concern in critiques by G.E. Schulze (or Aenesidemus) and Solomon Maimon of Reinhold’s account of consciousness. In fact, it is peculiar that Hegel’s “abstract” presentation of the basic structure of consciousness mirrors exactly Reinhold’s formulation of the “fact” of consciousness. The question is: how much work is the abstract notion doing, despite the fact that it never “appears” as such? In chapters 1 & 2 I argue both that the question of consciousness is secondary to the issues of the Kantian distinction between logic and reality, and that the structure of transcendental reflection in Kant should be distinguished from the notion of the reflexivity of consciousness.

With regard to the second Hegelian point, it may be possible to envisage an alternative development of the three criteria of problematicity, circularity, and systematicity. To begin in a reverse order, firstly it may be possible to conform to the

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systematic criterion of metacritique - that every part of the system be fully accounted for - without implying that each part must be accounted for in the terms of all the others. Being says its own sense in Hegel’s philosophy: but Hegel takes this ‘saying’ to be a collective articulation. Might there not be a distributive notion of the absolute in which each part of the system is fully self-justified in absolute terms, but is nevertheless not articulated through all the others? Nor would each part have equal value in the light of the eternal self-saying of being. The full self-justification of a metacritical system does not imply its uniform, single articulation. There may be parts of the absolute that can be fully justified, but cannot themselves be actually organised collectively with each other. I contend that Deleuze’s attention to modal issues (roughly, a greater emphasis on the logic of possibility than Hegel, who emphasises actuality) creates an alternative path to the absolute. Secondly, as we have already shown, circularity may be a rather empty criterion for metacritique, and not as intrinsically necessary to metacritique as has been thought. Thirdly, the Platonic notion of dialectic will for Deleuze be a more profound conception of problems than Hegel’s dialectic. Moreover, the problematic status of an Idea, for Deleuze, does not preclude its reality, or even its absolute status. For Deleuze, navigating between Platonic, Kantian and Hegelian conceptions of dialectic, there will be an alternative way of understanding the absolute Idea.
Appendix II  Novalis and the Schematism

Kant’s Schematism is the starting point for his demonstration of the apriori intuitive form taken by the pure concepts of the understanding. Kant suggests that time is more general than space because while all outer sense must take place in inner sense, not all inner sense must take place in outer sense (cf. A139/B178); therefore the schematism must be considered as “transcendental time-determination” (ibid). However, in the second edition CPR Kant modifies his views on the priority of inner sense by suggesting through the Refutation of Idealism that all inner sense must be referred to outer sense; nevertheless he does not correspondingly modify the Schematism. We have already seen Maimon’s perspective on the mutual relation of space and time; Novalis too returns to this ambiguity in Kant, but in his case to develop a notion that there can be different forms of space-time indexed to different material forms. The notion of schematism becomes the crucial means of not only demonstrating the compatibility of conceptual with intuitive form, but of generating the material variations of Ideas in space-time.

In his Fichte-Studien, Novalis develops an unusual hybrid of Kant’s notion of schematism and Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, which he calls “magical idealism”. Fichte’s theory of the mutual relations between the I and not-I arises out of a fundamental distribution of transcendental and empirical accounts of the activity of the I. Transcendentally, the absolute I must be considered to limit itself, because its other is always understood as its other. Empirically (“conditioned as to content”), the I experiences this other as a not-I, in the face of which it acts in two different ways. Firstly, theoretically, it is faced with the not-I as an object of knowledge.

32 Cf. Novalis, Werke, II, 250 for one of Novalis’ earliest appraisals of the importance of the schematism. “What kind of theory am I seeking? I seek to order what thinks in us – to bring to order the transformations in us – and to form [bilden] an intuitive and conceptual whole out of them, according to which I can then order my inner appearances, and explain [them]. One schema for myself” (all translations from Novalis are my own except where stated).
34 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, Part I, #1, 93-102.
35 Fichte, ibid. #2-3, 102-9.
secondly, practically, it can act upon this not-I in order to dominate and overcome it. For Fichte, the I can only realise its absolute status at an infinite practical horizon: it can never be the absolute I, but it ought to be it. For Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel, the fact that the I remained forever separated from itself in infinite striving was a symptom of a residual and intensified Kantian dualism in Fichte; they tend to concentrate on the structural limits in Fichte’s account of the I and not-I in the first part of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. However, Novalis’ contribution in his *Fichte-Studien* is to focus less on the ultimate horizon of Fichte’s account than on the sections on the “interdetermination” of the I and not-I,36 the progressively realised “middle” in the ongoing striving of the I in relation to the not-I. There are actual results in this striving, which should not be downplayed because they appear to be dwarfed by the infinite horizon. The not-I is perpetually undergoing a formation or Bildung by which it becomes open to the absolute within itself, while on the other hand, the I realises itself materially.

The proposition: I determines not-I – is the principle of the theoretical part, and the proposition: I is determined – is the principle of the practical part. The practical part comprises the self-formation [Bildung] of the I towards becoming capable of that communication – the theoretical part comprises the characteristics of genuine communication... The practical part comprises the Bildung of the not-I towards becoming capable of experiencing a true influence, a true communication with the I – thereby also the parallel self-formation of the I.37

In Fichtean philosophy, the determinations of the I articulate the sensible world, and thus “become intuitable”; the intellectual intuition of the absolute I is in effect ‘retrieved’ by the striving of the empirical I. In exactly the same movement, Novalis reasons, “external things [are made] into thoughts”.38 Novalis takes Fichte’s notion of interdetermination very literally, and proceeds to project it as a synthetic method for the genesis of real forms in nature, from psychology right down to mineralogy and geology.39 He envisages a new “magical idealism” as a consequence of the mutual

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38 Cf. *Fichte-Studien*, # 645-7, *Werke* III, 386-387 on analysis and synthesis. Cf. # 657, *Werke* III. 391. where Fichte is held to teach the unity of *Tatsachen* and *Tathandlungen*, facts and actions in conceptual and real experimentation. Here Novalis outlines the ways in which concepts can be constructed and revised with the help of schemata.
realisation of nature and mind in this interdetermination. "Fichte taught – and discovered - the active use of our spiritual organ. Has Fichte perhaps discovered the laws of the active use of the organs in general? Intellectual intuition is nothing else". 40 "Magic is the art of using the senses at will". 41

It is this interplay between the determination of thought and the determinability of intuition that requires a rereading of the schematism. "Bodies are thoughts precipitated and crystallised in space". 42 Novalis criticises Kant's mathematical schematism of space and time for remaining at the level of merely "visible rules of the order of manifold space or of extensive objects". 43 In the same passage, he states that Kant's doctrine remains restricted to "outer sensibility", by which he means not "outer sense" in Kant's sense, but something more along the lines of the "extensive magnitudes" we met earlier. He echoes the argument we have already encountered in Maimon about the reciprocity of time and space, and thus gestures in the direction of an "intensive" model of spatiotemporal differentiation:

Time and space come into being together and are therefore probably one, like subject and object. Space is enduring time – time is fluid, variable space. Space – the basis of everything enduring – time – the basis of everything changeable. Space is the schema – time is the concept (genesis) of this schema. 44

As a mineralogist, Novalis looks to fossils and gems as "schemata of inner transformations", 45 and likens the "synthetic method" to a "freezing", and then a "crystallising, figuring, successive method", by which physical schematisms generate the Bildung of the I in the not-I. If fossils are congealed time, then so are minerals, gems and tourmalines the result of a specific Bildung that could only occur within a precise coordination of certain physical ‘singularities’ over long periods of time. "Every body has its time – every time its body". 46

40 ‘Logological Fragments II’, ibid, 74.
41 Ibid, 61.
42 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, # 942, Werke, III, 449.
43 Novalis, Kant-Eschenmeyer-Studien, # 46, Werke, II, 390. He repeats the same criticism for the case of time.
44 Novalis, Fichte-Studien # 809, Werke III, 427; translated in Philosophical Writings, 134. Cf. 136: "Time is inner space – space is outer time".
45 Novalis, Fichte-Studien # 682, Werke III, 389.
46 Philosophical Writings, 136.
Appendix III  Aenesidemus and the Idea of the Subject in Kant’s *Opus posthumum*

In his *Aenesidemus* (1792), G.E. Schulze asks whether the Kantian subject should not be thought as an Idea. If the synthetic *apriori* laws of experience, founded in the ‘transcendental subject’, are to be true, they cannot themselves be subject to mere appearance. But if this is so, claims ‘Aenesidemus’ (Schulze’s pseudonym), then the mind must have some noumenal status, or at least be a transcendental Idea.47 But the first of these suggestions would conflict directly with the Paralogisms, while Ideas, for Kant, cannot give us knowledge of any reality.48 Aenesidemus therefore claims that Kant does not successfully provide any synthetic *apriori* truths, and has not defeated Humean skepticism. He cannot give an *apriori* answer to the fundamental question posed by both Locke and Leibniz, “where do the representations that we possess originate, and how do they come to be in us?”49

I suggest that it is interesting for this thesis to turn to Kant’s response to Aenesidemus’ criticisms. Aenesidemus doubts whether anything corresponds to Kantian representations. Kant’s first reaction in a letter of 4 December 1792 to J.S. Beck, is to quibble over the meaning of the word ‘representation’, which can only mean “a determination in us that we relate to something else” (C 445, Ak. 11: 395). However, this statement is opaque, as on Kant’s own terms ‘relation to an Object’ implies no *reference* outside the representations themselves. Is he then referring to the notion that intuitions, as receptive, must refer outside themselves? But this is also hard to imagine, as a few weeks earlier in his important correspondence with Beck, he had begun to doubt this very presupposition: “Perhaps you can avoid defining ‘sensibility’ right at the outset in terms of ‘receptivity’, that is, the kind of representations that occur in the subject insofar as the subject is affected by objects. Perhaps you can identify it rather as that which, in a cognition, constitutes merely the relation of representation to the subject” (C 400, Ak. 11:315).50 Evidence in OP in

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48 Ibid. 127-9.
49 Ibid. 105-9.
50 J.S. Beck had begun to press Kant on this problem in a letter of 11 November 1791: "The *Critique* calls ‘intuition’ a representation which related immediately to an object. But in fact, a representation does not become objective until it is subsumed under the categories. Since intuition similarly acquires
fact shows that Aenesidemus had encouraged a deep transformation in Kant’s thought, precisely concerning this issue of representation, which in turn was to be precisely related to a new notion of the subject as Idea.

Now, in CPR, Kant had begun to emphasise what he called the “paradox of the inner sense”, whereby the transcendental subject could only experience itself as affected by itself through time (B67-69, B152-56). Moreover, in the Refutation of Idealism he had also said that inner sense was conditioned by outer sense; it was not possible to experience time without spatial permanence. These moves would seem to introduce the possibility of a new merely empirical criterion for self-identity as reidentification of the states of one’s body. But the context in CJ and OP shows the situation is more complex. We have seen (in chapter 3.3.iii.) that in the first introduction to CJ Kant shows how “a system of experience” is required in order finally to ground the possibility of empirical concepts. In OP, Kant elaborates further on how the unity of the subject itself cannot be guaranteed without collective coherence in the systematic spatiotemporal world-whole. In order to secure this guarantee transcendentally, he must reconceive the relation of the subject to the world. Now, is it not precisely because the ‘auto-affection’ implied by the paradox of inner sense indefinitely withholds any actual awareness of spontaneity, that Kant must find a way to conceive how the subject “inserts itself” into or “posits itself” in the sensible manifold (OP 184; Ak. 22:420)? As was argued in chapter 5.4, the self-relation of the subject in apperception is lacking a final ground according to which it could say that spontaneity is its spontaneity. In OP, the analytic unity of apperception is now held to depend fundamentally on the determinability of myself as object; self-consciousness is now given the formula “I am an object to myself” (OP 167; Ak. 22:450; cf. OP 183-5; Ak. 22:419-21).51 So if the ‘I think’ indeed “expresses only an indeterminate intuition” (CPR B422n.), then “this indeterminate perception” must precisely be expressed only through the form of determinability of intuition. By itself this would still appear immediately to yield the peculiar situation of the paradox of

51 Cf. E. Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, 103; cf. 101-113 for an excellent account of “self-posing” in OP.
auto-affection, in which my experience of myself is mediated through the forms of space and time (that I, moreover, as transcendental subject, give to my experience). But Kant now draws a consequence from the very notion of autoaffection. In CPR he says that “the subject, which is the object of [inner] sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e. intellectual” (B68); the subject is therefore “affected from within, ... as it appears to itself, not as it is” (B69). Now while Kant admits freely in CPR that this is a “paradox” (B152), in OP it is as if he is now giving form to the paradox, but conceiving it more concretely. In order to be affected sensibly in time by my own thoughts, there must be some internal connection between the intelligible and the sensible. Kant therefore conceives of the self-positing of the subject according to the model of force. So it is not only for the new ‘organicist’ scientific reasons he is unfolding in OP, that Kant will no longer characterise the intuiting subject as merely receptive, but as “conscious of himself as a self-moving machine” (OP 65-6; Ak. 21:212-3). The subject is conscious of itself only because it is engaged in a relation of reciprocal action in the world. This, I suggest, is what happens to the notion of self-relating subjectivity in Kant.

More light can be shed on this move if we approach it from the other side, that of the form of intuition: if the subject is determined in and for itself in the spatiotemporal whole, it is dynamics, Kant says, that must be conceived as the condition for the “realisation of space as a single object of the senses” (OP 21:564). Space is therefore “inwardly determined” as force. Kant now suggests that space as pure form of intuition is mere spatium cogitabile (conceivable space), while the spatium sensibile is the true condition for unity. In sum, the subject and the

52 As Eckart Förster says, “Kant’s reasoning in the Opus posthumum ... shows that sensibility cannot be described in terms of passivity alone. Something can be given to the subject only if it is received by a corresponding motion. In other words, receptivity is only a relative form of passivity: it equally entails a reciprocal activity of the subject. Being reciprocal, the activity or motion in question must be subject to the same formal constraints as the receptivity to which it corresponds”. Kant’s Final Synthesis, 109.
spatiotemporal world are now completely bound up with each other in a thoroughgoing force relation. The whole of OP can be considered as taking the "paradox of inner sense" to a higher power.

Now we find Aenesidemus' name mentioned alongside some of these thoughts in OP: "The principle of ideality of all representations as pure apriori intuition: I make myself into a sense-object outside myself (Aenesidemus)" (OP 196; Ak. 22:99). Next to a statement that "metaphysics has to do with sense-objects and their system, insofar as the latter is knowable apriori", we find the words "Aenesidemus, inwardly determining" (OP 198; Ak. 22:105). We can conjecture, then, that Kant intended his new account of the self-positing of the subject in the material world as a response to Aenesidemus' problems with representation, and that this new system was to ground the critical project in a way not managed in CPR itself. The result of this new system of transcendental idealism is that the old problem of token-identity that Kant had unleashed with his earlier non-systematic transcendental idealism, is disenabled. Hence the object of Aenesidemus' concerns about representation is shifted (although, as has been suggested, OP is open to the charge of being a return to dogmatism).

The consequence of this capitulation to Aenesidemus, is that the subject can indeed only be conceived as an Idea. The subject posits itself according to an Idea of the totality. Even though in OP Kant holds this Idea to be more than regulative, self-positing is conceived more on the model of relation to Ideas, than through apperception. Importantly, Kant now places the weight of this conception of the subject on the thinker, indeed upon the transcendental philosopher himself. The sense that the latter is tracing out the implications of the knowing subject's structure of experience from the inside, a conception that I have criticised throughout this thesis, is now truly dissolved. All of these points are expressed strikingly in the following passage: "Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself, and, thereby, also of the whole object of technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one system" (OP 245; Ak. 21:78). Two comments can be made. Firstly, the last clause refers to the fact that God is required to ground the Idea of the subject as person; it is not possible to explore this here.
although it is important to note that Kant’s final system does indeed seem to be a reincarnation of his pre-critical system of self-world-God. It was shown in chapter 3.2.ii that Kant even compares self-positing to Spinozism: “according to Spinoza’s transcendental idealism [!] , we intuit ourselves in God” (OP 214; Ak. 22:56). Kant refers to “Spinoza’s God, in which we represent God in pure intuition” (OP 251: Ak. 21:87). My second point is related to this, but in a way much more complex than I spell out here. The notion that the “subject becomes the originator of itself” is profoundly new. In CPR the subject could only create itself if it acted through intellectual intuition; but here, because of Kant’s increased attention to Ideas, it is the subject’s positing of its own origin as an Idea that both expresses the operation of transcendental philosophy and the truth of subjectivity itself: “transcendental philosophy is the system of the Ideas of the thinking subject” (ibid).

Kant therefore was not only responding to Aenesidemus’ critique, but was also productively taking up his suggestion that the subject might be an Idea. The spontaneity of the subject is now thought together with its receptivity, and the possibility of auto-affection is now intrinsically related to a new system of self-world-God. Nevertheless the criticism still stands that Kant’s OP is dogmatic, or not adequately critical (chapter 3.2.ii). Kant is in effect undertaking the contradictory task of exacerbating the paradox of inner sense in the hope that a material condition of collective unity, a new ethereal incarnation of God, can finally ground it. This is contradictory because the paradox of inner sense precisely testifies to the radical impossibility of intellectual intuition – thought and being cannot be conceived in an immediate unity. If all determination must be referred to determinability in time, then any collective unity, whether it be God or ether, remains just as unjustified as the spontaneous determination of the ‘I think’. Kant thus sketches a formal solution of what it would be like to ‘solve’ the paradox of inner sense, without giving a real justification for the affirmation of collective unity or totality on which the formal solution rests. Nevertheless, it is instructive to observe that for Kant the destination of subjectivity lies in an Idea. Moreover, as can be seen at the close of chapter 6, the suggestion of the subject as “originator of itself”, a ‘semi-divine’ ouroboros, can be given a distinctive sense in Deleuze’s “problematic” vision of the subject.
Appendix IV   Repetition and the Syntheses of Time

In Kant, the threefold synthesis that forms the explication of the *quid facti* (and sets us off towards the resolution of the *quid juris*) is fundamentally *temporal*. It is suggested in chapters 5.2 and 6.2 that the first two aspects of synthesis, apprehension and reproduction, are ‘pre-conscious’, in the sense that they are enacted by the imagination, prior to the unity of consciousness. Deleuze returns to and recasts Kant’s threefold temporal synthesis in DR. But Deleuze will moreover also find such an initial emphasis on ‘syntheses of time’ in Hume too (as well as Bergson). In order to unlock the truly critical dimension of Deleuze’s thought, and to ground the rather metaphysical account of repetition we gave in chapter 4, it is now necessary to redescend into the simplest possible forms of temporal repetition. The unfolding of the elementary syntheses of time will in fact retrace the fundamental unfolding of the notion of repetition itself.

1. Repetition for itself: Duration

As a preliminary, we should mention two aspects of Deleuze’s basic position concerning time. Firstly, I can only suggest here that Deleuze takes duration to be absolute. Just as space is an actualisation of a real yet virtual Idea and is therefore not transcendentally ideal in the Kantian sense (at least in its intensive nature), so is time not transcendentally ideal, but for different reasons. Actualisation is only possible if time is fundamentally real in some form, and must somehow mirror the intensive genesis of Ideas. Obviously there is much that could be said here about the metaphysical status of Deleuze’s theory of time, but it will have to be left aside on this occasion. However, it is again clear that Deleuze is returning, via Bergson, to a rationalist position on the absoluteness of duration. 55 Bergson had precisely affirmed

[55] It is useful to return here to the early dispute about the reality of time between Kant and two defenders of rationalism. Kant was criticised by Lambert and Mendelssohn for denying the reality of *change*, when ironically this was what he had spent the previous 15 years attempting to grant an ontological reality that exceeded the logical determinations of the predominant Leibnizianism. Kant, they said, had inconsistently affirmed the reality of change while denying the reality of time. Lambert argued that “all changes are bound to time and are inconceivable without time. *If changes are real*
against Kant the reality of duration, while contending that our organismic orientation in extensive space forced an external, homogenising projection of an ‘extensive’ time upon the internal differentiation of duration.\footnote{Despite his affirmation of the notion of duration. Deleuze does not make any terminological distinction (as did Lambert) between duration and time in DR.}

The second aspect to be mentioned is the fundamental criterion that time (or duration) requires the notion of synthesis. Deleuze’s reasoning is similar to Kant’s at A99f: “A succession of instants does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants” (DR 70/97). Deleuze makes two moves that, while arising out of Kant’s account, go beyond it. Firstly, he deepens the notion that the fundamental syntheses of the mind are \textit{passive}, not active. Secondly, whereas Kant is ambiguous about whether there are three syntheses or rather three aspects of one synthesis, Deleuze grants his own three syntheses a certain independence.\footnote{In Allison’s interpretation of the ‘second part’ of the B-Deduction (\textit{Kant’s Transcendental Idealism}, 158-172), he interprets the mediating role of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in terms of its capacity \textit{both} to reproduce \textit{and} project the structure of the \textit{whole} of space and time despite their \textit{absence} from what is given in the moment of empirical intuition. Thus the whole of time, past and future, is projected (beyond apprehension and reproduction). Kant says that “The figurative synthesis \textit{must} be called, as distinct from the merely intellectual combination, the \textit{transcendental synthesis of the imagination}. \textit{Imagination} is the faculty for representing an object even \textit{without its presence} in intuition” (B151). In \textit{Kant’s Critical Philosophy}. Deleuze restricts the role of synthesis to

\textit{then time is real, whatever it may be}” (C 116, Ak. 10:107). Time is an ontological condition for change: “perceptions of temporal order need temporally ordered perceptions” (D.H. Mellor. \textit{Real Time} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 8; quoted in J. van Cleve, \textit{Problems from Kant} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 56). Furthermore, Lambert argued that “time is a more determinate concept than duration … Whatever is in time has some duration. But the reverse does not hold, in so far as one demands a beginning and an end for ‘being in time’. Eternity is not in time, since its duration is absolute” (C 116, Ak. 10:106-7). Kant did respond to Lambert (and Mendelssohn) on the issue of the ideality of time: “Certainly time is something real, namely, the real form of inner intuition. It has therefore subjective reality in respect of inner experience; that is, I really have the representation of time and of my determinations in it” (A371/B54). He further says in the footnote that we are conscious of our representations following one another, but only as in a time sequence according to the form of inner sense. As J. van Cleve remarks, “the succession of experiences is by no means sufficient for the experience of succession, since each experience might be forgotten before the next one begins” (\textit{Problems from Kant}, 57). The perception of time and change are thus merely properties of the form of inner sense. However, if Kant were to conclude that the perception of time itself was ideal, then he would be open to an infinite regress. This is where the argument for ideality takes hold, for Kant argues that the perception of time is \textit{itself} ‘real’ in the ontological sense, but as van Cleve says, involves a “virtual” \textit{appearance} (ibid, 59; van Cleve borrows the language of ‘virtuality’ from Quine). To insist upon this is to insist that things in themselves do not change in the sense that we \textit{know}. But this would suggest again the distinction between ‘absolute’ duration and an ideal time. It will be necessary to return to the issue of inner sense in chapter 6.3, when dealing with the ‘I think’.

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Deleuze begins his account of “repetition for itself” with a paraphrase of Hume to the effect that “repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it” (DR 70/96). The notion of synthesis is thus cooriginary with the movement of repetition. A repetition is not possible without a synthesis, but this synthesis makes possible a difference in the mind that has apprehended the repetition. In an important passage, Deleuze writes,

In considering repetition in the object, we remain within the conditions which make possible an idea of repetition. But in considering the change in the subject, we are already beyond the conditions, confronting the general form of difference. The ideal constitution of repetition thus implies a kind of retroactive movement between these two limits. It is woven between the two (DR 71/97).

This “ideal constitution of repetition” will take the form of an ideal genesis of the structural possibilities of the relation between repetition, difference and synthesis.

However, Deleuze’s account of the simplest level of repetition is not so much a synthesis, as analogous to Kant’s ‘synopsis’. A repetition of identical particulars in duration produces a pure durational multiplicity as a result of the enduring character of duration. Referring to Bergson’s example of the successive tolling of four bells, Deleuze writes that “quite apart from any memory or distinct calculation, we contract these into an internal qualititative impression within this living present or passive synthesis which is duration” (DR 72/98). The claim is that even in the simplest case of the synthesis of an apparently identical repetition, a difference is produced in the enduring mind that “contracts” these moments together. From this basic form Deleuze moves to the “first synthesis of time”, in which two different particulars are now related. Rather than the tolling of a bell, take the tick-tock of a clock: the regular apprehension (in its narrow guise in the A-Deduction) and reproduction, thus sticking faithfully to the important discussion in A99 of which after all Kant says that “this is a general remark on which one must ground everything that follows”. Deleuze’s only (and important!) diversion, is the exclusion of recognition from the role of synthesis. Now in his reading in DR, Deleuze refers his first two syntheses to habit and memory, not to the imagination. Deleuze thus generates the distinct senses of temporality harboured in each synthesis; so for instance habit will contain a structure of anticipation, while the ‘whole’ that is found in memory will extend only into the past. Deleuze thus does not posit a whole of time outside the syntheses in the way that Allison does, and in a sense stays faithful to the Kantian letter by remaining with what is inherent in the elementary syntheses. (Allison acknowledges he is embroidering on the text here. The reference, for instance, to “reproductive imagination” at A156/B195 goes against his interpretation.)

58 Cf. Hume, Treatise, I.16, 205.
59 This can also be seen as Deleuze’s first move to spell out (in line with our analysis in chapter 22) the “vectorial” nature of duration.
alternation of the tick and tock, leads to the expectation of the latter upon the appearance of the former. For Deleuze, habit is the fundamental mode for apprehending difference between particulars in duration. On the background, then, of the ‘pure multiplicity’ of duration as such, Deleuze will expound how a more articulated relation of difference is possible.

ii The First Synthesis: Habit

Now part of the intention behind calling habit a “synthesis of time” is to displace Kant’s insistence that only conceptualisation can account for generality. We saw that in Kant, the account given at A99 of temporal synthesis leaves the activity of recognition crucially dependent on reproduction and projection. Both Heidegger and Deleuze respond to this powerlessness of recognition as such by connecting it with some form of anticipation, but Deleuze finds the material for the elaboration of this already present in Hume. In an associative relation, the mind feels a “propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant”61. This synthesis “posits the past as a rule for the future”.62 Deleuze thus interprets the essence of generality as temporal. The repetition of a resemblance or contiguity between A and B, for instance, will produce an expectation if we apprehend A; thus two particulars become ‘synthesised’ not into a unity of a concept, but simply insofar as they give rise to an expectation: “the difference produced in the mind is generality itself insofar as it forms a living rule for the future” (DR 71/97). On the basis of this fundamental synthesis of habit, Deleuze suggests that Hume leads us to an account of temporal synthesis very close to Kant’s: “we rediscover, therefore, this dynamic unity of habit and tendency, this synthesis of a past and a present which constitutes the future, and this synthetic identity of a past experience and of an adaptation to the present”63. This synthesis, says Deleuze, “constitute[es] the lived, or living present”, in

60 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 86-7.
61 Treatise, 1.9, 165.
62 Empiricism and Subjectivity, 94.
63 Empiricism and Subjectivity, 94. Again, it should be pointed out that for Deleuze, habit is a “principle of human nature”, and is not therefore derived from sense impressions. Deleuze’s Hume is not naturalistic, but proto-Kantian.
which the dimensions of the past and the future have a primitive form, in which they are not conceived as abstract dimensions, but as part of basic “contracting” movement. This account of time, while reminiscent of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, is novel in its identification of three distinct elements. Firstly, the temporal form of the living present is identified with the organic form of habit; but then habit is articulated as the fundamental form of generality. 64 Taken together, these aspects of this first form of synthesis allow Deleuze to begin to bypass the requirement of representational mediation, as generality is explained not through the function of conceptualisation, but as a particular, fundamental form of repetition.

Habit therefore implies no “unity of an act”. For Deleuze, Kant was wrong to seek the dignity of spontaneous thought in recognition. The first stage of Deleuze’s critique of recognition is thus to analyse the function of recognition into more basic functions. In the second stage, to be detailed below, it is shown that recognition does not provide us with any right to claim objective reality for our concepts; this claim, as I mentioned earlier, is displaced by Deleuze onto the issue of teleology.

With this first step also begins Deleuze’s displacement of consciousness from its usual role in post-Kantianism (although we have seen that the role of consciousness is perhaps not as vital as often thought in Kant’s A-deduction). It is this aspect of Deleuze’s thought that has led to the mistaken interpretation that, because Deleuze agrees with Nietzsche that “we are in the phase of the modesty of consciousness”, 65 he should be interpreted materialistically. However, if we keep in mind his modification of Kant, and his ‘transcendentalisation’ of Hume then we can avoid this mistake. The “unity” required for experience is effectively sought elsewhere than in recognition. With this first synthesis, Deleuze achieves a minimal temporal structure for the mind, in which generality is secured, without yet guaranteeing a global unity for the generalities found in this way. It is perfectly conceivable for a mind to synthesise data according to the rule of habit without yet having a global unity amongst its syntheses. In fact, Deleuze’s point is stronger than

64 “The present does not have to go outside of itself in order to pass from past to future. Rather, the living present goes from the past to the future which it constitutes in time, which is to say also from the particular to the general” (DR 71/97).
65 Nietzsche and Philosophy, 39.
this: at the level of this first synthesis, the "subject" of repetition is passive, and is nothing more than a "contraction", an expectation, and has no de jure connection with other such contractions. 66 Hence Deleuze's exotic denomination of such a subject as a "larval subject" (DR 78/107). 67

This intimacy between the subject and synthesis also allows Deleuze to make a criticism of Kant's notion of sensibility. "Perceptual syntheses refer back to organic syntheses which are like the sensibility of the senses" (DR 73/99). Sensibility is no longer merely characterised by "receptivity", as for Kant, but is related fundamentally to the form it takes in synthesis itself. Kant, on the other hand, describes the lowest levels of synthesis in terms of a "synopsis of intuition", and a "synthesis of apprehension"; these two are described as "gathering" the manifold, but this gathering is conceived atemporally as a spontaneous act. But here again we encounter the ambiguity of Kant's vacillation between describing the three syntheses as at once distinct and as "aspects" of one synthesis. For if the syntheses were aspects of one synthesis, then each of its elements would have to be described as temporal: not only would recognition and reproduction be intermixed, but also synopsis and apprehension. Deleuze's complex move here is to affirm this consequence, while at the same time affirming that there may nevertheless be more than one such temporal synthesis. This first "originary synthesis" of time thus allows a passage between temporal constitution and sensibility itself; sensibility must first appear in the form of the "living present". We have seen (in Appendix III) that Kant himself began to envisage the necessity for such a connection in the Opus posthumum: receptivity is no longer enough to ground the relation between the subject and the world. His move is analogous to Deleuze's: "we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for

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66 "Time is subjective, but in relation to the subjectivity of a passive subject" (DR 71/97).
67 No doubt Deleuze's thought is far removed from the mainstream of Kantianism here. However, we don't really need to go further afield than Leibniz, with his "little perceptions", and this Humean account of habit, in order to comprehend Deleuze's points. Nevertheless, Deleuze is certainly influenced by the likes of Whitehead and Raymond Ruyer. His account can be placed in the context of moves in early pragmatism and 'radical empiricism' to take the notion of habit beyond its usual epistemological limits. Cf. Peirce, 'The Fixation of Belief', and William James, A Pluralistic Universe. There are also similarities that could be drawn between Deleuze's "larval subjects" and Daniel Dennett's "homuncular" account of distributed processes of consciousness in Consciousness Explained, but again, I would want to insist that Deleuze's transcendental approach be kept in mind.
experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive" (DR 87/7-8).

iii The Second Synthesis: Memory

Now, we must return to the pure durational multiplicity noted at the beginning of this section. It is necessary to show how underneath this account of difference as generality, there is still the fundamental form of the internal differentiation of endurance itself (the four bells). So each of these “general contractions” itself takes place on a backdrop of a duration in which they themselves are potentially differentiable. It is this that makes it possible to invert the relation between generality and particularity, and thus constitute a different kind of synthesis, that of memory. “On the basis of the qualitative impression in the imagination, memory reconstitutes the particular cases as distinct, conserving them in its own ‘temporal space’” (DR 71/98). Now, the past becomes “the past in general”, while “particularity, therefore, now belongs to that on which we focus – in other words, to that which “has been”” (DR 80/109). Thus, an active synthesis of memory seems to be possible in principle given the account so far.69

It is important to see here how Deleuze intends this whole account to present, as we have said, “the ideal constitution of repetition”. He says: “the constitution of repetition already implies three instances: the in-itself which causes it to disappear as it appears, leaving it unthinkable; the for-itself of the passive synthesis; and, grounded upon the latter, the reflected representation of a ‘for-us’ in the active syntheses” (DR 71/97). However, it is exactly with this third act of a representative subject that Deleuze introduces a new problem. The first “originary” synthesis of time, Deleuze claims, is paradoxical: “it constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes. ... This is the paradox of the present: to constitute time while passing in

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68 Even if it is not clear how such differentiation could be articulated for consciousness, it is enough to note, for instance, that the intonation of four bells has a different “durational intension” than that of two bells, or a hundred.

69 Deleuze’s view here is reminiscent of some notes in Nietzsche’s The Will to Power: “Memory” late, insofar as here the drive to make equal seems already to have been subdued: differentiation is
the time constituted” (DR 79/108). Deleuze suggests that “we have by no means shown why the present passes, or what prevents it from being coextensive with time” (ibid). So although we have identified the “origin” of time, we have not yet identified its “ground” (DR 79/108). It is this elaboration of this ground that will allow us to solve the “problem of passage” which hinders any account of temporal becoming conceived on the model of the present. Deleuze argues that there is a “(transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory itself” (DR 81/110).

Deleuze endlessly returns to the “paradox of the past” in most of his books up to and including DR. How does a present moment become past? Does it become a past moment, simply because a new present moment arrives? The past in this case would be conceived as another present which has simply been displaced by a new present; the past would be conceived as an old present. But in that case a twofold problem emerges: how can the past be that past, the past of the former present, if its passage simply depends on the appearance of a new present; and secondly, how is the passage itself to be conceived? A text from Bergson serves as the source for Deleuze’s paradox:

I hold that the formation of recollection is never posterior to the formation of perception; it is contemporaneous with it ... For suppose the recollection is not created at the same moment as perception: At what moment will it begin to exist? ... The more we reflect, the more impossible it is to imagine any way in which the recollection can arise if it is not created step by step with the perception itself.

“At what moment will it begin to exist?” The turning of the present into past cannot simply depend on a new, external present. For that would not explain how the past is the past of the former present. Its status as past cannot have been constituted after the moment has expired, as in that case there would be nothing which could constitute it as the past of that moment. Deleuze therefore suggests, “how would a new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same time that it is present?” The past would never be “constituted” as the past, “if it had not been constituted first of

preserved. Remembering as a process of classification and pigeonholing: who is active?” #501. Cf. also #502, #479.

70 Nietzsche and Philosophy, 48.
71 Cf. Nietzsche and Philosophy, 48; Bergsonism, 58-62; Proust and Signs, 57f.
73 Bergsonism, 58.
all, at the same time as it was present” (ibid). How else could we say that the past was the present that it had been? However, Deleuze’s conclusion is peculiar. He does not present this conclusion as a solution of the paradox; he admits the solution is still a paradox, but at the same time he says this “profound paradox” “gives us the reason for the passing of the present” (DR 81/111). But how can a paradox be a reason? Perhaps we can understand Deleuze’s position more if we turn to his next inference:

if each past is contemporaneous with the present that it was, then all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past. The past is no more ‘in’ this second present than it is ‘after’ the first – whence the Bergsonian idea that each present is only the entire past in its most contracted state (ibid.).

The past coexists with the present; it subsists in a virtual state, providing the ground for our actions (“there is a substantial temporal element ... playing the role of ground” (DR 82/112). Each present is nothing but the entire past in its most contracted state; the past is our enduring “substance”, or essence, while the present moment is the “actualisation” of this realm of essences. In fact, this is still not quite right. For each present, there is a set of possible virtual levels of the past which provide possible contexts of significance for the present. But no present can exhaust these levels, and the fact that each present provides only a limited access into the wealth of memory suggests that the notion of the coexistence of the past with the present is really challenging us to displace present consciousness more radically from its usual role in temporal synthesis. As Deleuze claims, “the past is not conserved in the present in relation to which it is past, but is conserved in itself” (DR 82/112).

We saw above that duration itself has its own form of “internal differentiation”. Here, with the elaboration of the paradoxes of the past, it is possible to see this differentiation put to work. Although the living present “contracts” particulars, the memory of each of these contractions is preserved and their extraction of generalities is thus allowed in the virtual realm itself to vary and connect differentially with other general ideas, which therefore form ‘elements’ in differential relations. Each is virtually referred to a context of significance in which they are qualified and themselves differentiated by virtue of the endurance of past differentiations. But as each moment repeats the whole past, these differences remain preserved in the distinction of levels of the past in the virtual domain, and
remembering thus involves the pursual of the right degree and context of generality in order to help oneself act in the present. Each level, although infused with the whole past, has “dominant recollections, like remarkable points”\(^{74}\). Deleuze helpfully invokes Leibniz here: “everything can be said to be the same at all times and places except in degrees of perfection” (DR 84/114).

Deleuze’s account of memory thus emphasises the basic fact, overlooked by philosophers who treat the past always *from the point of view* of the present, that “memory is by its nature unconscious”\(^ {75}\). Bergson’s distinction between ‘pure memory’, which denotes the “virtual” store of accessible memories considered in themselves, and the act of remembering itself, in which the mind somehow ‘re-actualises’ these memories, is vitally important for Deleuze, and it is clear that Kant, for instance, ignores the first aspect of memory in favour of the process of reproduction and ‘retrieval’. Memory for Kant is always seen from the point of view of the present. But this is to leave mysterious the question of how memories “subsist” while they are not present to consciousness. In fact, by keeping sight of this elusive ground for the possibility of remembering, consciousness once more is displaced. Deleuze cites Freud: “consciousness is born at the point where the mnemonic trace stops”\(^ {76}\). Consciousness, as intentional representational activity geared towards empirical judgment, would be impossible without the exclusion of the contents of memory, which would otherwise overwhelm its space of reflection\(^ {77}\).

But how then is the present to be conceived, if our ‘substance’ is located in the past? We saw above how the “living present” contracted particulars into generalities. Deleuze now says that this “repetition of successive independent elements or instants” in the first synthesis must be considered a “repetition of parts”, to be opposed to the continual repetition of the “whole” past in each present in the second synthesis (DR 84/114). But this former “bare repetition must be understood as the external envelope of the clothed” (ibid). What we apprehend in the merely

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\(^{74}\) Bergsonism, 62; cf. DR 212/274.

\(^{75}\) Nietzsche and Philosophy, 112.

\(^{76}\) Deleuze’s account is based on chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

passing, transient present “conceals” this virtual dimension, which Deleuze says, is nevertheless “real”; he goes so far as to say that “useless and inactive, impasive, it is, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being in itself.”

The present, then, always involves a repetition of a level of the past; in other words, the present is an actualisation. Deleuze says obscurely that the present involves “a passage to the limit, a maximal contraction which comes to sanction the choice of a particular level as such” (DR 83/113). The reference to choice is again reminiscent of Leibniz. Deleuze is conceiving of the past as an ordered set of virtual sections, as if monads were not arranged on an eternal plane but according to the order of duration, “each being the repetition of all the others and being distinguished from them only by the order of the relations and the distribution of singular points” (DR 212/274). In themselves, these virtuals coexist in a state of “complication”, and while each level is like a monadic perspective on the ‘whole’, unlike windowless monads, their content is always really implicated in the other possible perspectives. Crucially, Deleuze says that “each present contracts a level of the whole, but this level is already one of relaxation or contraction” (DR 83/113).

The present is no more than an actualisation of a particular virtual perspective, a way of seeing and being in the world, of inhabiting the problems that orient life. For Deleuze the synthesis of the past does not involve bringing it to the unity of apperception, but engaging in the quite peculiar process of memory. Its peculiarity stems from the fact that memories in themselves have their own order, which is not the same as the order they may assume once actualised. The passive synthesis of the past in duration itself produces a virtual network autonomous of the self-consciousness to which Kant appeals in order to unify the past. The “substantial element” of the past is a “past that never was present” (DR 82/111), composed of

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78 Bergsonism, 55. “Only the present is ‘psychological’; but the past is pure ontology”. 56.
79 Bergson creates a diagram of a cone to explain this, this coexistence of the past with the present at each moment. The apex of the cone is the most contracted level of this whole (the present/past we are in the process of enduring); the base of the cone would be “a thousand individual images” which comprise the particular elements taken up into generality (Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott Palmer. New York: Zone Books, 1994, 162). But our lives proceed “in the middle” of this cone, as our perceptions are always “selections” from the material given offered at the apex, and therefore resonate with the virtual ground for such selection. I am not sure whether Deleuze’s appropriation of the diagram of the cone is as useful as he seems to believe.
“non-localisable connections ... which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions” (DR 83/113).

It is here that we can clearly perceive again Deleuze’s transformation of themes in rationalism. He effects a return to the rationalist problem of grounding coexistence and succession; we saw earlier that for Kant these principles were essential in order to ground sufficient reason and the concept of a ‘world’. Deleuze writes that “duration is only succession relatively speaking ... [it] is indeed real succession, but it is so only because, more profoundly, it is virtual coexistence”. The ‘third thing’ is sought in duration itself, articulated as virtuality in memory. Here, in line with the ‘pre-critical’ Kant, the third has noumenal significance: while our “empirical character ... is constituted by relations of succession and simultaneity ... what we call their noumenal character is constituted by the relations of virtual coexistence between the levels of a pure past” (DR 83/113).

We can further appreciate the rationalist character of the discussion by returning again to Deleuze’s account of consciousness. Let us recall first Maimon’s account of the “forms of differentiation”, for his move away from Kant can now be continued further. For Maimon, space, time and the categories were seen as forms of conscious differentiation, tied to the synthesis in the present. Synthetic judgments were seen to say more about the requirements of this present-bound form of consciousness itself than about the differences in the things themselves. But Deleuze now follows the forms of differentiation beyond consciousness. Maimon had not realised the potential in Kant’s notion that certain aspects of the threefold synthesis were unconscious. Thus, Deleuze’s two passive syntheses of habit and memory are not themselves conscious at all, but rather give rise to effects in consciousness. For instance, if we recognise something, this is as a result of an habitual association which is itself pre-conscious; consciousness comes after. If we experience a sense of expectation, this is an effect of the functioning of the habit, rather than the habit itself. Similarly, memory is something outside of conscious control in a twofold sense: firstly, the virtual realm of memories subsists separately from its form in a judgment; but secondly, memory often eludes our conscious control not due to empirical reasons.

80 Bergsonism, 60.
concerning recall, but because its differential form is essentially different to conceptual recognition; as virtual, it obeys its own laws. In sum, Deleuze is returning to the rationalist point that if we experience only the effects of these syntheses in consciousness, the point is to return to their causes (if cause is considered as 'reason'). Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that Deleuze has succeeded here in powerfully reconnecting the rationalist requirement with a transcendental account of synthesis. The notion of repetition, as the differential power of the Idea, is explicated in its fundamental synthetic form through these two accounts of synthesis.

81 Deleuze is also influenced by the Lacanian account of the conscious ego. The ego is alienated from the true subject which is unconscious. The ego is a reified self-representation. What motivates us as subjects (our 'problems', Deleuze would say) derives from structural forms in the unconscious. Deleuze argues that Ideas are "necessarily unconscious" (DR 192/249).
Appendix V  Remarks on Transcendental Empiricism

In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Deleuze describes Hume’s problem as “how is the subject constituted in the given?” He goes on to criticise the status of the Kantian subject as apparently entirely independent of (and merely receptive to) the given. Deleuze questions the mutual exclusivity that seems to be predominantly accorded to the transcendental and empirical in Kant. (Again, we could say Deleuze is echoing Hegel’s demand in the *Phenomenology* for a *genesis* of the subject in relation to its world.) But we have seen in chapter 3.2.ii how Kant in a sense refers his own ‘construction’ of the subject to a kind of speculative experimentation. The subject can only account for experience once it has undergone the “negative extension” into the realm of the problematic; Kant later uses analogous words to describe the imagination’s encounter with its limits in the sublime. These transcendent uses or exercises of certain faculties are key to the delimitation of experience. For the transcendental philosopher it is essential to ask what it might mean to think something without having a possible intuition for it (rational Idea), just as much as to think whether it is possible to intuit something without having a possible concept (aesthetic Idea); such questions are unavoidable and part of the construction and demonstration of the transcendental subject.  

Deleuze is thus faithful to Kant when he states if we do have access to intensities that can only be sensed, and memories that can only be remembered, such a use of the faculty is transcendent, and cannot be “experienced” (DR 140/182-3). They cannot be experienced as such, although they can be thought as a problem. Transcendental empiricism, then, is not so much an oxymoron, as a provocation that crystallises the ambiguity surrounding Kant’s notion of experience.

82 *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 87.
83 Deleuze also describes how for Bergson our experience is a *composite* of perception and memory, but it is the job of philosophy to think pure percepts and pure memory, *Bergsonism*, 23.
84 When Deleuze asks “what are the conditions of real experience?” he is caught up in this problem of Kantian terminology. He does not mean empirical particulars, he means the aspects of cognition that lie beyond empirical cognition, but nevertheless have significance or sense for cognition. In other words, he means the ideal and intensive *domains* outside experience. The spirits haunting the subject Ideas, intensities, forces.
Everything we have discovered so far leads to the conclusion that the 'transcendental subject' simply denotes the set of functions and procedures by which kinds of cognition are made possible, and which are discovered, constituted, and justified by the transcendental philosopher. The internal constitution of the transcendental subject by the philosopher may continue to yield, through the development of its structure, other possibilities for cognition that the philosopher will be able then to explain and ground. For instance, the mutual relation of the faculties has its own principle that in turn conditions something other than "experience": aesthetic appreciation. Art testifies to the harmony of the faculties, while contravening the unity of conceptual experience. The harmony experienced in the apprehension of an art-object possesses a unity due in the final instance to metacritical criteria, not according to the criteria of experience. We have seen that, as well as providing conditions for "experience", Kant also spends an inordinate amount of time on the role of nonexperiential events in the life of the subject. Rational Ideas are only thought, but they do find a symbolic expression in art which can nevertheless be said to be a presentation of an aesthetic Idea, insofar as the analogies and symbols themselves communicate directly with the "feelings". Thus art must be seen as the indirect "incarnation" of the moral significance of the essences of things in sensible matter; the moral idea of innocence finds a sensible shape in a white lily, which henceforth becomes "more than" merely a white lily. Because Kant has defined experience as 'empirical cognition', he cannot call these 'experiences'. Although I can say, "I heard a Beethoven string quartet this afternoon", what I felt while listening to it is not an event in the world. No matter how much one wants to call such feelings an experience, one cannot, according to Kant. Aesthetic judgment is entirely on the side of the subject; there is no "art" independent of the subject.

Now, although these aspects of the subject all have a vital role to play in the metacritical teleology envisaged at the limit of Kant's system, Kant himself does not explicitly thematise the sense in which he outlines a self-construction of the subject.

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85 Cf. Kant's Critical Philosophy, 54.

86 Similarly, dreaming is not an experience: in recounting a dream I say "You were at X, but it turned out that it wasn't you all along". Could there accordingly be a Critique of Dream Thought, in which
It is left to Deleuze to claim that “the transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its transcendent use” (DR 143/186). It is this ‘experimental’ aspect of ‘transcendental empiricism’ that is the most foreign to post-Kantianism, but at the same time conforms to the Hegelian project to inscribe the activities of the transcendental philosopher within the movement of the subject itself. Transcendental empiricism precisely denotes the procedure of discovery of the higher forms of the faculties.

For Kant such an exercise is merely dialectical. While Kant is right about the status of problems, he sees it from the wrong angle – thus problems are said to lack the capacity to be represented. But at the same time, Kant shows that an Idea is not a criterion in the sense of serving as a rule for an apperceptive subject, and that the apprehension of Ideas must involve some other form of cognitive access. It is this problematic or transcendent exercise which for Deleuze provides the key to the transcendental constitution of his version of the ‘subject’.

From an Hegelian point of view, all this points rather towards the fact that knowledge itself must be seen as intrinsically dialectical; especially insofar as we are pursuing the metacritical dimension implicated in cognition itself. However, there are two ways – Hegelian and Deleuzian - of seeing the dialectical nature of knowledge. On the one hand, Hegel directly takes up representational knowledge into the Idea, in the sense that the former only becomes adequate in the latter, while nevertheless being essential to the unfolding of the Idea itself. For Hegel, then, cognitive experience becomes both grounded and augmented by speculative experience. But on the other hand, Deleuze returns to aspects of the Platonic dialectic, in which a harsher distinction between Idea and concept is preserved. For Plato, any conceptual starting point for the transcendental subject, perhaps through its faculty of memory, was further analysed, in order to ground the possibility of dreams, nightmares, and other non-experiential phenomena. Deleuze does liken transcendental empiricism to Schelling’s superior or metaphysical empiricism. See E.A. Beach, *The Potencies of God(s)* (Albany, SUNY, 1994), 148-162, and Alan White, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom* (New Haven: Yale, 1983), 161-9. There are two main motives behind Schelling’s doctrine. Firstly, he rejects Kant’s Idea that thought is not an experience. Thus it is possible to “experience” thought in its problematic reality. Secondly, however, Schelling intends the doctrine as the ‘positive’ counterpart to the abstract merely ‘negative’ part of his system. Metaphysical empiricism shows us teleological evidence of God’s presence in the world. While both of these aspects have their analogies with Deleuze’s project, it remains true that Deleuze’s methodology and materials are closer to Kantianism.
point is always already problematic, and the ‘ascent’ to the Idea always falls short at any rate of ‘participating’ in it, due to the material presuppositions of ordinary concepts.\(^{88}\) Now, Deleuze thinks that we wrongly apply representational thought to problems that are intrinsically nonrepresentational (representation is the source of transcendental illusion); he thus affirms a kind of Platonism about Ideas. But while Ideas are problematic, he does think that it is possible to “transcend” experience so that this problematicity precisely can intrude upon representational experience. Ideas are thus “immanent” in this sense that they are available in principle to the philosopher (and to the subject of transcendent exercise), but they remain “transcendent” as far as experience is concerned. It is in this way that Deleuze presents his analogous notion to speculative experience — that of \textit{transcendental empiricism}. Both the Hegelian and Deleuzian names refer to the incursion of the metacritical dimension into experience itself: they could almost be synonyms. However, they operate very differently.

Kant’s aesthetics also give us another clue to how this transcendent exercise could amount to an “empiricism of the Idea” (DR 278/356).\(^{89}\) For the harmony of the faculties that gives rise to pleasure in the face of art (or nature experienced as art), is correlated, says Kant, with an apprehension of the \textit{singularity} of the art-object. But

\(^{88}\) Cf. \textit{Republic}, 509d-511e. In the discussion following his paper at the Société française de Philosophie, Deleuze admits his Platonism but contends that there are in effect two different ‘Platos’: A Plato who is concerned with Ideas as multiplicities, and for whom dialectic involves asking ‘how? how much? in which case?’, and the other Plato, the “partisan of a simplicity of essence, or of a sameness of the Idea” (\textit{Méthode de Dramatisation}, 118).

\(^{89}\) If Deleuze can be called an empiricist at all, it is clear that it is by no means because he returns to a philosophy of things and relations, a philosophy most acutely characterised by William James. Deleuze discusses “the secret of empiricism” in the preface to DR: “empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience” (DR xx/3). It is on the one hand, “the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard”, and also “a mysticism and mathematicism of concept, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter”. Finally, for an empiricist, “concepts are indeed things, but things in their free and wild state, beyond ‘anthropological predicates’” (ibid). First, then, let us note the \textit{rationalistic} implications of the statement above that “concepts are indeed things”. A concept can only be identified with a thing if it is an individual concept, as with Leibniz, or expresses a reality, as with Hegel. But note that Deleuze qualifies that he means “things in their free and wild state”. We can interpret these things precisely as objective problems or Ideas. They are called ‘things’ because of their noumenal status. Thus, Deleuze finds the true home of empiricism in the Kantian Idea, considered as “objective problem”. Secondly, if empiricism is “a mathematicism of concepts”, that is because for it, concepts are akin to mathematical schemata; a concept is a “representation of a method”. Thirdly, if “empiricism is a mysticism of concepts”, it is because it attempts to express Ideas by any means possible. And perhaps the reason
again, the aesthetic Idea here has characteristics close to the rational Idea. With a poem, these words, although themselves general, enter into a relation of reciprocal determination which leads us to describe the poem as a whole. To change one element may be to change the whole sense of the poem. We saw in chapter 4.4.i, that in *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze interprets this possibility of art in high metaphysical terms, again appealing to Leibniz. Individual essences, he writes, can only be incarnated in works of art, as only these have a “subtle” enough matter to be able to realise the individualities of an essence. “These substances are ductile, so kneaded and refined that they become entirely spiritual; they are of course colour for the painter, like Vermeer’s yellow, sound for musician, words for the writer”.

The adequate expression of Ideas is not possible in a direct sense for finite beings, but the transcendent exercise of the faculties may help to produce a “perplexity” (DR 140/182), that problematises our experience. Concepts, as generalities, are not suited to the Idea, although obviously we have to use them, or rather misuse them, in order to think through problems. But concepts must themselves rely on habits, memories, and problematic thoughts which provide their horizon, and can determine the structural ideal relations which frame the phenomena. Transcendental empiricism, or the “empiricism of the Idea” connects back up with the given, because every particular is the appearance of a problem, or is a “sign” to be interpreted by the subject.

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why it is “insane” is because Deleuze still recognises the validity of the Kantian concept for representational experience.

90 *Proust and Signs*, 46.

91 The structure of the passive syntheses allows the possibility of anomalous memories. The structure of reproduction in memory is divided between the passive permanence of memory itself, with its own virtual order, and the generalisation of memories under concepts. But one “cannot distinguish within the moment [what] ... should be retained, [that which one] could not yet know would assume a certain meaning” (*Proust and Signs*, 52). Thus a memory may subsist, which at the opposite moment, may be reawoken by an association.
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