Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Branas-Garza, Pablo and Bucheli, Marisa and Espinosa, María Paz and García-Muñoz, Teresa (2013) Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence. Economics and Philosophy, 29 (2). pp. 199-212. ISSN 0266-2671

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Abstract

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. To explore this phenomenon we conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games). We find that donations in the previous period affect present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 13164
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Depositing User: Pablo Branas Garza
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2014 07:24
Last Modified: 19 Apr 2017 09:45
URI: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/13164

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