Leadership by example in the weak-link game

Cartwright, Edward and Gillet, Joris and Van Vugt, Mark (2013) Leadership by example in the weak-link game. Economic Inquiry, 51 (4). pp. 2028-2043. ISSN 0095-2583

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four-player weak-link game. A weak-link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned.

Item Type: Article
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics > Behavioural Economics group
A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 11966
Depositing User: Aran Lewis
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2013 10:32
Last Modified: 13 Oct 2016 14:28
URI: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/11966

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