Unraveling public good games

Branas-Garza, Pablo and Espinosa, María Paz (2011) Unraveling public good games. Games, 2 (4) . pp. 434-451. ISSN 2073-4336 (doi:10.3390/g2040434)

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This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end-game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation.

Item Type: Article
Keywords (uncontrolled): public good games; end-game effects; beliefs; experiments
Research Areas: A. > Business School > Economics
Item ID: 10197
Notes on copyright: open access
Depositing User: Pablo Branas Garza
Date Deposited: 25 Mar 2013 07:16
Last Modified: 04 Apr 2019 05:13
URI: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/10197

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